THE RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER
The Russian Research Center of Harvard University is supported
by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation. The Center carrie out
interdisciplinary study of Russian institutions and behavior and
rela ted su b j ects.
RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER STUDIES
1. Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion, by Alex lnkeles
2. Soviet Politics - The Dilenttlla of Power,' The Role of Ideas in Social Change, by
Barrington Moore, Jr.
3. Justice in Russia.' An Interpretation of Soviet Law, by Harold J. Berman
4. Chinese C011tt1t1tnisnt and the Rise oj Mao, by Benjamin 1. Sch\vartz
5. Titoistn a1td the C01ninforl1t, by Adam B. Ulam
6. A Docuntentary History of Chinese C0l1t11tUnism, by Conrad Brandt, Benjamin
Sch\vartz, and John K. Fairbank
7. The New Man in Soviet Psychology, by Raymond A. Bauer
8. Soviet Opposition to Stalin: A Case Study in World War I I, by George Fischer
9. Minerals: A Key to Soviet Power, by Demitri B. Shimkin
10. Soviet Law in Action: The Recollected Cases of a Soviet Lawyer, by Harold J.
Berman and Boris A. Konstantinovsky
II. How Russia Is Ruled, by Merle Fainsod
12. Terror and Progress USSR: Sonte Sources of Change and Stability in the Soviet
Dictatorship, by Barrington Moore, Jr.
13. The Formation of the Soviet Uni01t: C01nntttnisnt and Nationalis1n, 1917-1923, by
Richard Pipes
14. Marxis11t: The Unity of Theory and Practice, by Alfred G. Meyer
15. Soviet Industrial Expansion, 1928-1951, by Donald R. Hodgman
16, Soviet Taxation.' The Fiscal and Monetary Problel11,S of a Planned Economy, by
Franklyn D, Holzman
17. Soviet Military Law and Ad111,inistration, by Harold J. Berman and Miroslav Kerner
18. Documents on Soviet Military Law and Administration, edited and translated by
Harold J. Berman and Miroslav Kerner
19. The Russia1t Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevisnt, by Leopuld H. Haimson
20. The Permanent Purge " Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism, by Zbigniew K, Brzezinski
21. Belorussia.' The Making of a Nation, by Nicholas P. Vakar
22. A Bibliograpltical Guide to Belorussia, by Nicholas P. Vakar

BELORUSSIA
THE MAKING OF A NATION

BELOR USSIA
THE MAKING OF A NATION
A CASE STUDY
By
NICHOLAS P. VAI(AR
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, Massachusetts
195 6

@ Copyright, 1956, by tile President and Fellows of Harvard College
Distributed in Great Britain by
GEOFFREY CUMBERLEGE
Oxford University Press
London
This volu11te was prepared under a grant fr011/,
the Carnegie Corporation of New York. That
Corporation is not, however, the author, owner,
publisher, or proprietor of this publication and
is not to be understood as approving by virtue
of its grant any of the state1ttents made 01
views expressed therein.
Library of Congress Catalog Card N1tl1ber 54-3634
Printed in tlte United States of A1nerica

PREFACE
Until recently, Belorussia, or White Russia, has been little known
to the Western world. The large European reference books and ency-
clopedias have scarcely treated the subject as a separate entry. Today,
however, Belorussia is a member of the United Nations, equal in dig-
nity and honor with the United States and Great Britain, even with
the USSR, of which it is, in fact, a part. No other Soviet Republic,
except the Ukraine, has been granted this status - outranking that of
Russia itself. The situation requires a detailed study.
Two forces have been remaking the map of the world, nationalism
and Communism. The interplay between these two is not always clear.
Emerging as a nation from the conflict, Belorussia tells a story, signifi-
cant in its relationship to the larger pattern.
This is not a comparative study. My modest aim has been to collect,
to describe, and to evaluate the available data which others might use
for a more general work. The notes, even if somewhat disproportionate
in size, intend to offer only documentation of specific points mentioned
in the text.
The study is based on historical research. The process of national
self-determination is traced from ethnic pattern to group consciousness,
from literary to political nationalism. Every group in this narrative-
and the reader will be surprised to find how many there are to the
story - had its own concepts of right and wrong. The reader is free to
take sides according to his own judgment - political, moral, or other-
.
WIse.
Over two thousand primary and secondary sources have been con-
sulted in the course of this study. For the sake of economy of space,
most bibliographical references are limited to the name and number
under which the work is listed in A BibliograPhical Guide to Belorussia
(Harvard University Press, 1956).
Hard as I have tried to be objective and fair, I expect to be exposed
to fierce criticism from several quarters. But I wish to protect those
Belorussian, Russian, Lithuanian, and Polish friends who have helped
me most generously in this work, and to whom I wish to express my
warm appreciation and gratitude. Their views are often so varied and,
in fact, so completely remote from my own, that they cannot bear any
responsiblity whatever for the way I have used the information re-
ceived from them.

viii
PREFACE
My thanks are due, first of all, to Michael Karpovich of Har-
vard University and Philip E. Mosely of Columbia University for hav-
ing encouraged this study, and to the Russian Research Center, Har-
vard University, for having made it possible. In particular, I wish to
express my sincere appreciation to Clyde Kluckhohn, the first Director
of the Center, to Helen W. Parsons, the Administrative Assistant, and
to the staff of the Center for their cooperation, understanding, and,
indeed, extreme patience with the slow progress o.f the work so often
interrupted by my teaching obligations. The grant I received from the
Center permitted the defraying of the expenses of traveling, gathering
source material, and preparation of the manuscript.
I am also very grateful to the Committee for the Promotion of Ad-
vanced Slavic Studies and to the Humanities Fund, Inc., both of New
York, and again to the Russian Research Center at Harvard, for their
financial assistance in publishing both this present volume and A Bib-
liograPhical Guide to Belorussia. The latter, a separate volume, will,
I hope, be helpful to students of the area. Warm thanks are also due
the Widener Library staff and photostat service for their effective co-
operation in preparing. the Guide.
I am particularly obliged to the Reverend John Tarasevich, of St.
Procopius Abbey, who generously offered the use of his unique collec-
tion of Belorussian publications and contributed several pages of his
own memoirs; to the Belorussian organizations in the United States of
America and abroad who graciously sent me their publications or lent
material from their libraries; and to all the persons who kindly gave
their valuable time in interviews and lengthy discussions with a foreign
scholar who, they know, was not there to espouse their political cause.
At the end of World War II several hundred thousand Soviet citi-
zens chose to remain in Western Europe as displaced persons rather
than return to the USSR. These emigtes have been supplemented by a
steady flow of fugitives from the Soviet zone of Germany. To tap this
storehouse of eyewitness l{nowledge, the Russian Research Center of
Harvard University, with financial support from the Air Force's Hu-
man Resources Research Institute, sent to the American Occupation
Zone in Germany in 1950 a team of social scientists to conduct an ex-
tensive series of interviews with former Soviet citizens there. Other
researchers made personal contacts with Soviet citizens who had fled to
the United States. An additional 2,500 emigres in Europe and America
not reached by these direct methods answered an exhaustive written
questionnaire on their detailed experiences behind the Iron Curtain. An
impressive store of reliable data has resulted, the large part of which
has already been processed and made available to students.
At the same time, the Research Program on the USSR at Columbia
University, established in June 1951 by the East European Fund, Inc.,

PREFACE
ix
has assisted ex-Soviet scholars and experts to recover and develop their
capacity to carryon independent, objective research, and contribute
the results of their experiences to our general fund of knowledge about
the Soviet system and related subjects. Testimonials, affidavits, and
other eyewitness data have been piling up at the Archives of the
Jewish Scientific Institute, New York; the Rand Corporation, Wash-
ington, D. C.; Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian refugee institu-
tions in Europe and America; and other organizations. The wealth of
unpublished information is great, and the privilege granted me to
partake of it for this study is gratefully acknowledged.
Chapters 12 and 13 draw heavily on material collected by members
of the Project on the Soviet Social System of the Russian Research
Center, Harvard University, under Contract AF No. 33 (03 8 ) 12909
with the Human Resources Research Institute, Maxwell Air Force
Base, Alabama. In particular, extensive use has been made of interview
material as well as of unpublished documents in the personal files of
Alexander Dallin, gathered as part of his forthcoming study of the
German occupation of Soviet territories during World War II. Regular
use was also made of data collected under the Harvard Project by
Herbert Dinerstein, Michael Luther, and John S. Reshetar. I wish
hereby to express my admiration for their work, and my gratitude for
having been permitted to benefit by it.
Various parts of the manuscript have been read by Alexander
Dallin, Kamil Dziewanowski, Merle Fainsod, Michael Karpovich,
Talcott Parsons, Demitri Shimkin, and Wiktor Weintraub. I am most
grateful for their comments, criticism, and suggestions.
Acknowledgments are due to Elsa Bernaut for the material she
kindly permitted me to use, and to George Bentz, Ronald Bollenbach,
David Grindell, Helen Constantine, Ann Chvany, Boris Pross, Ray-
mond S. Goodlatte, John Willison, Mary McCarthy, Claire Pratt, and
Ann Staffeld, who contributed to the preliminary, intermediate, and
final editing of this study.
More especially I wish to thank Gertrude, my wife, who at every
stage of this work has been my encouragement and the most effective
assistant.
Nicholas P. Vakar
Wheaton College
Norton, Massachusetts

CONTENTS
PROLOGUE: WHAT'S IN A NAME?
I THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE
The Linguistic and Ethnic Boundaries. The Vilna Contro-
versy. Religion and Nationality. The Political Territory.
Transfers and Migrations.
2 THE TRADITIONS
Honte and Fantily. Concepts of Justice. Folklore. The
Idiom. The Ecoll01ny. Tlte Town.
3 THE ORIGINS
Concepts of Nationality. Tlte Racial Theory. Tlte Polotian
Rus - Legend and History. The Lithuanian-Russian State.
Lithuania and Poland. Tlte Lublin Union. Tlte Third Litltu-
allian Statute.
I
5
I7
37
4 BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE EAST 5I
Western Russian - Francis Skoryna. Religious Struggles.
The Brest Union. The Polonization of tlte Gentry. The
Uniates and the Schis1natics. The Resistance M ove1nent.
The Mu.scovite Factor.
5 THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE
Partitions of Poland. The Uniate Church. Tlte Polish Up-
rising of I83I. The Insurrection of I863. [(a.stus' Kalinoit-
ski. Rllssification.
65
6 THE NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 75
The Polish Writers. Tlte Belorllssia.n Vertzacular. Literary
Beginnings. In the I86o's. Cultural Natiotzalis1n. The
Revolutionary M oVel1teltt. The Revolution of I905. The
Nasa Niva Period. Acltieve1nents.
7 WAR AND REVOLUTION
The Vilno' Confederation. The Russian Revolution. The
Bolshevik Revolution. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Dec-
laration of Independence. Consecration of a Myth.
93

8 PARTITION OF BELORUSSIA
The BNR in Exile. The Soviets and the First BSSR. Tlte
Polish Occupation. The Second EN R. The Union with
Poland. The Second BSSR. The Treaty of Riga.
9 WEST BELORUSSIA
Tlte Polislt Policy. Belorussification. Reaction. Subver-
sive Propaganda. Tlte Pacification. Literary N ationalis11t.
A New Wave of Oppressi()n. Political E1nigration. On the
Eve of World War II.
1 0 EAST BELORUSSIA
C o 11t11t1l1tis1n and N ationalis1tt. Belor1tssi fication,. Edllcatio'1t.
Natiollal Minorities. Ideological Adjustl1tents. Conditional
Surrender. Tlte Purges. Tlte Reorientation of Belorllssian
Culture. New Purges. The Stalinization of Nationalis1n.
Russification.
1 I THE REUNION
Partition IV of Poland. Tlte Incorporati01t of West Belo-
russia. Tlte Adjust1nent Period. N ationalis1n Revived. Tlte
Purges. Tlte Soviet Clai1ns. Tlte Ideal and tlte Reality.
12 THE GERMAN OCCUPATION
T Ite Ger1nallS Hailed as Liberators . Military and Civilian
Policies . Collaborationists. Local Ad11tinistration. The Ra-
cial Theory. Tile Jews. The Russian Nationalists. Belo-
russian N ationalis1n.
13 THE GUERRILLA WARFARE
Between Soviet Terroris11t and Ger1natt Repression. The
Second Belorussia1t Convention.
14 THE SOVIETS AGAIN
War Devastation. Statistics and Realities . National SY1n 04
bolis1n. Literature and Science. Tlte Intelligentsia a1td the
Masses. Belorussian N atiollalis11t in Exile. I deology and
Politics.
TABLE OF TRANSIJITERATION
NO T ES
INDEX OF NAMES
GENERAL INDEX
xii
1°7
119
137
155
17°
19 1
207
226
23 1
28 3
28 9

ILLUSTRATIONS
1. Tile Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic facing page I
2. Area of the Belorussian Speech, 7
3. The Belorllssian Territorial Claims 9
4. Ian Czeczot 7 6
5. J an Barszczewski 79
6. V. DUllin-M arcinkevic 81
7. J. N esluch01tski 83
8. The Polish-Soviet War and tlte Treaty of Riga 117
9. The Belorussia", Generalbezirk, 1941-1944 (fro 11"
E. Engelllardt, Weissruthenien. V olk und Land,
A 1/tsterdal1t- Prague- Vienna, 1943) 182
10. Janka [(upala facing page 210
II. lakub Kolas facing page 210
12. K. [(raPiva facing page 210
13. E. K. Cikocki facing page 210

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R.
I. The Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic

PROLOGUe
WHAT'S IN A NAMe?
The name Belorussia * is not well known outside the Slavic world.
The area is more frequently referred to as White Russia, a literal
rendering of the native term into English.
Some historians, such as Herberstein and Leroy-Beaulieu, believe
that the name originated from the white clothing worn by the people of
this region since time immemorial; others, including Tatiscev, think
it originated from the deep snow which covers the country from Octo-
ber to April; still others, among them Karski and Pervolf, believe it
comes from the light complexions of the people, and a similar explana...
tion is offered by Zograf for the name Black Russia, applied to the west-
ernmost part of the country, where the inhabitants used to wear blacl{
caps and black coats.
However tempting such theories may be, something more is in-
volved than a mere nicknaming of a people with one of their environ-
mental colors. The name of White Croats, White and Blacl{ Huns,
Black Bulgars and Black Ugrians, who were known long before White
and Black Russia, obviously cannot be accounted for by habitat,
clothing, or complexion.
Various explanations have been offered, not always consistent with
historical facts. t The origin of the term "Blacl{" was sought in the
Chinese tradition, according to which black is the color of the north;
the area in question, however, is located in the west and the theory
leaves the term "white" without explanation (Vernadsl{y).t The Greeks
used "white" to distinguish the pagan Croats and Serbs from those who
were baptized, but all the Slavs were christened by the time the name
White Russia first appears in documents. Perhaps the country was
named belaja (white), from the city of Belsk situated between the
rivers Belaja and Belianka and surrounded by the towns of Bela, Belo-
veza, and Belostok (Iljinski), just as the southwest area was nick-
* The spelling "Byelorussia" is preferred by some. The author, however, feels that the
speIIing "Belorussia" is adequate. The use of y as a consonant softener is unfamiliar to
the English-speaking reader, and is more likely to confuse him than to aid in pronuncia-
tion.
t Only a brief summary of the existing theories is given here; for a detailed examina-
tion, see Nicholas P. Vakar, "The Name 'White Russia,'" The Atnericatt Slavic and East
European Review, VIII (1949), no. 3.
t For references, see Nicholas P. Vakar, A Bibliographical Guide to Belorussia (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).

2 BELORUSSIA.' THE MAKING OF A NATION
named cervonaja (red) from the city of Cerven' (Potebnia); but, al-
though there exists some historical evidence in support of the latter
theory, there is none in support of the former; and both theories are
questionable from the linguistic standpoint, since the adjectives cer-
vensk(ij) and cervon(yj), belsk(ij) and bel(yj), are not interchange-
able (Rastorguev, Vas mer ).
In ancient times, bela, bel, were words used for money. The term
appeared more frequently in documents concerning the territory of
present Belorussia than the rest of the Slavic area (Grigorovic), and
theories have been ventured that Belaja R'tts' might have come simply
to mean wealthy or prosperous part of the country. Unfortunately,
bel(yj) (white), and bela (money), have different etymologies (Vas-
mer), and no historical dictionary suggests that the Slavs ever con-
veyed the meaning of material wealth to the adjective bll(yj).
In 1826, according to Makarov, a theory was formulated tracing
the name of Belorussia into prehistoric times, to an obscure Slavic
deity, Belbog (white god). An association with BaJdag of Teutonic
mythology was made and, on that basis, Belorussians were identified
with BaIts * (l(ryvic, 1923). Consequently, claims today are made
that Belorussia be severed from the Slavic world and form a "Federa-
tion of Baltic Peoples" - together with Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark (Bac'kauscyna, Veda, etc.).
Most of these theories disregard the fact that the term White
Russia does not appear in documents before the end of the fourteenth
century (Karamzin), and when it did appear it sometimes embraced
the territories other than Belorussian. Latin documents describe Ivan
III of Moscow as Ioannes, dux albae Russiae (1472). The Poles and
the Lithuanians will soon call the Muscovite Russia "white," and
White Russia "black." Even the Ukranian lands of Kiev and Volyn'
were at one time included in the term White Russia (Potebnia).
The meaning of the term is better understood when it is recalled
that most Russian lands were conquered by the Tatars (1240-1480).
The Asian hordes consisted of the ruling clans and their dependent
tribes: the former were nicknamed white, and the latter black (Vladi-
mircev, Vernadsky). Correspondingly, the territories under their con-
trol were divided into the white lands, that is, those free from duties,
and the black lands, those under tribute (Chlebnikov). Abundant evi-
dence exists that the terms passed from the Orient to the Slavic area,
with these meanings, even before the invasion. Subsequently, bel(yj)
(white) has become in the Muscovite State a legal term for those who
were exempt from taxation, and cern(yj) (black), for those "who bore
the whole burden of state taxes and services." Thus we have belye
zemli (white lands), belaja gramota (white charter), belomestcy, belo-
* Cf. Lithuanian bdltas, Uwhite."

PROLOGUE
3
sosniki, belopascy (tax exempt townsmen and peasants), belovodje
(unsettled lands) on the one hand; and cernye zemli (black or taxed
lands), cernoslobodcy, cernososniki (taxed townsmen and peasants)
on the other.
In literature and folklore the term "white" is often found as a
synonym of "free" (Dahl). It also is associated with the idea of purity,
moral cleanliness, or lofty ideals, as in Teutonic mythology. More
often, however, the association is with social privilege, disinclination
to work, and "blue blood" (Ushakov). Common are the expressions
belaja kost' (white bone) for people of noble descent, and cel'naja kost'
(black bone) for those of humble origins. Russian writers speak of
"people of white and black bone" (Tolstoy), "black-bone students"
(Miliukov), and Soviet textbooks describe "the victory of the black-
boned proletariat over the worthless white-boned bourgeoisie" (1946).
The metaphor is a current idiom in Central Asia, presumably the coun-
try of its origin.
Borrowed from the Orient, the term "white" was naturally applied
to "the Lithuanian possessions torn from the Muscovites [and thus]
rescued from the Tatar yoke" (Larned). As long as these lands man-
aged to preserve their independence within the political boundaries of
the Grand DU,chy they were white Russia, and those lands which passed
over to the Lithuanian overlords formed black Russia in the western
part of the country (Dragomanov). By the time Moscow threw off the
Tatar yoke, however, and itself became "white," all the Russian lands
in Lithuania "had passed from white to black" (Potebnia). In other
words, the terms, white Russia and black Russia, were not proper
names but described the rather fluctuating legal status of the lands
and the people.
In 1667, Tsar Alexius of Moscow ordered the name Belaja Rus',
White Russia, to be applied to the lands "rescued from the Lithuanian
Polish domination" by the Treaty of Andrusovo. But the term white
imposed under these circumstances did not sound true for the natives,
since from their point of view any power other than of patrimonial
origin was foreign. The name was rejected, and revived in a new form
over a century later. With the partitions of Poland (1772-1795), the
provinces "torn away from Russia and returned" were named Belo-
rttssija by an imperial ukase. After the Polish revolt of 183 I, however,
the country was renamed West Russia from fear that symbols of a his-
torical past might foster secessionist trends. But the identity of the na-
tives, somewhat different from that of other Slavs in the empire, called
for some special name, and Belorussian, banned from the administra-
tion, persisted as an ethnographical term.
However trivial, the event proved to be a turning point in the his-
tory of the people. Their country may have been known, historically,

4 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
as White Russia, but they had simply called themselves Russian. They
now had a name, the symbol of different identity, and around that sym-
bol a movement of national self-determination soon began to crystal-
lize.
As a rallying point of the new nationalism, the term Belorussian
presented certain inconveniences. Semantically, it was too close to
Russia. The early attempts to replace it by the term Kryvican (from
the name of an ancient Slavic tribe on the territory of present Belo-
russia) failed, but were renewed after the Revolution (Lastouski and
others), and more recently by political emigres after World vVar II (J.
Stankevic and others). The use of the term Kryvican, however, is
prohibited in the Belorussian SSR and there is no evidence, at this
writing, that it has been widely recognized by the Belorussians abroad.
The inconveniences of the name Belorussia are particularly great
in foreign relations. The common translation, White Russia, negates
even the little difference that exists in the native idioms, Belarus', Belo-
russija (White Russia), and Rossija (Russia). Furthermore, the Rus-
sians who fought against the Soviets in the Civil War of 1918-1920
were also called White Russians. In the Slavic tongues, the terms belo-
russy, the ethnic group, and belye russkie, the political group, are
easily distinguishable, but the distinction is not clear in the literal
translation into most European languages. To avoid confusion, a Latin
term, Ruthenia, was introduced, and White Ruthenian delegates ap-
peared in the European capitals in an attempt to persuade public opin-
ion that the Ruthenians and the Russians belonged to two different
races. Eventually, the term was accepted by the League of Nations
(Treaty of Riga, 1921). After World War II, however, the United Na-
tions replaced it by "Byelorussia," which, with this spelling, has since
prevailed in official documents and literature.
But no uniformity has been achieved in Belorussian writings. Dif-
ferent transcriptions and spellings of the national name symbolize
different schools of political thought and, dividing the people against
itself, impede consolidation of the nationalist doctrine.

1
THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE
Serious difficulties are encountered by the ethnographer attempting
to determine the number of Belorussians, and the exact limits of the
territory which they occupy. Political and religious passions have ex-
erted a profound influence on statistics, and the matter is further com-
plicated by the fact that there are obviously different degrees of na-
tional self-consciousness among the natives.
In 1943, the Germns came to the conclusion that the only reliable
sources still were an ethnographic map drawn by A. Rittich in 1875
and the Russian imperial census of 1897. Confidence in that old ll1ap
may have been influenced by the fact that Rittich was a "deutschblu-
tiger Generalstabler der Russischen A1mee." 1 Nevertheless, the map is
a good one, which strikes a generally fair balance between Polish, Rus-
sian and contemporary Belorussian claims. It is, moreover, corrobo-
rated by the general census of 1897, the accuracy of which has not
seriously been questioned by any party.2
Population Statistics
According to Rittich, there were 3,745,219 Belorussians in 1875,
and of that number 151,162 lived in other parts of the empire. s As the
Great Russians * at that time numbered about 34,400,000, the ratio
was one Belorussian to nine Great Russians, or more exactly, 1 :9.19.
A similar correlation (1: 9.46) existed twenty years later when the cen-
sus of 1897 established the total number of Belorussians at 5,886,000,
and that of the Great Russians at 55,675,000. 4 Assuming that the same
proportion should hold true for our own day as well, nationalist writers
estimated the Belorussian population at approximately 12,000,000 in
1917-18, as compared to the Great Russian population of 108,000,000
at that time. 6
After World War I, Belorussia was split into two parts, one Soviet,
the other Polish, and the statistics l{ept by both governments gave a
* As opposed to Little Russians (Ukrainians) and White Russians (Belorussians).

6 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
total of about 7,000,000 Belorussians for both parts of the country.
Later, official data showed 4,017,300 Belorussians in the USSR (1926)
and only 1,035,000 in Poland (192 1 ). In the Belorussian SSR, how-
ever, only 3,350,700 persons spoke Belorussian, the remainder declar-
ing Russian, Polish or Yiddish their mother tongue. 6 The official num-
ber of Belorussians in the USSR increased to 5,267,400 in 1939, a
gain of 33.3 per cent over a twelve-year period (sic). Yet the rela-
tion of Belorussians to Great Russians fell from 1: 9 to 1: 16, and
their total gain was only 5.4 per cent since 1897, while the number of
Great Russians increased 59.8 per cent during the same period. It
looked as if the Belorussian people were becoming extinct at a rate
known previously only in the cases of the Lapps and the American
Indians. 7 However, after West Belorussia was incorporated into the
USSR (November 1939), the three million Belorussians who had van-
ished in Poland suddenly returned to life. As of June 1, 1941, the Sov-
iets estimated the population of the BSSR at 10,525,511, of which 80.6
per cent were Belorussian, 8.2 per cent Jewish, and 7.2 per cent Rus-
sian. 8
Unable to take a general census in the Ostland during the war
(1941-1945), and having little confidence in either Soviet or Polish
sources, Gerlnan statisticians, after much labor and highly complicated
calculations, produced the following round figures: In the Belorussian
SSR, 5,000,000; in other parts of the Soviet Union, 1,000,000; in Po-
land, 2,500,000-3,000,000; in Lithuania and Latvia, 50,000-100,000;
in emigration, 100,000; total, 8,550,000-9,200,000.°
Since the total does not differ significantly from the Soviet esti-
mates, we can assume it to have been approximately correct for that
period. If so, it shows a decline in the Belorussian population amount-
ing to a loss of about two millions against what would be expected had
the normal ratio of 1:9 prevailed, since the Soviet census of 1939 reg-
istered 99,000,000 Great Russians. The birth rate cannot account for
such a decline. In Soviet Belorussia, the natural increase of the popula-
tion has always been one of the highest: 19.5 as compared with 17.4
for all Russia. 10 In Poland, fourteen Belorussians were born each year
for every twelve Poles. 11 Yet we know that the number of Belorussians
in Pnland decreased from 3.9 per cent of the total population in 19 21
to 3.1 per cent in 1931 (last census). It is likely that the Polish and
Soviet population statistics reveal not physical extinction but cultural
and linguistic denationalization. That process, and the factors which
might have naturally or forcibly determined it, will be examined later.
The Linguistic and Ethnic Boundaries
The linguistic criterion alone cannot permit valid identification of
Belorussians. Some characteristics (isoglosses) of the Belorussian

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE
7
speech are observed as far east as the Moscow districts of Rusa, Volo-
kolamsk, and Mozajsk (M. I(olosov); as far west as Avgustovo on the
ancient German--Russian border (A. Rittich) and the Novo-Aleksan-
drovsl{ district in present Lithuania (A. Kirkor); as far north and
northeast as the province of Pskov (except for the Porchov district, the
southeastern part of the province of Kalinin and the southern strip of
the Leningrad province); in Vologda province (R. Jal{obson); and as
far southeast as Zizdra, Mosal'sk, Trubcevsk, Sevsk and Karacov dis-
tricts in the provinces of Kaluga, Briansk and Orel (DeLivron) .12
To eliminate confusion, a set of linguistic requirements, based on
a combination of typical characteristics and not on single isoglosses,
was drawn up by Karski and N. Durnovo. Maps drawn in 1915-1917
according to this n1ethod established the frontiers of Belorussian speech
as shown in the map below. 13
These boundaries very nearly- coincide with the map of Rittich
( 18 75), except in the Avgustovo district, where the linguistic boundary
now was removed thirty to fifty kilometers farther east/ 4 and in the
AREA or:- THE. B£LORUSSIAN
PEECH
A. F. RITTIC" (1875)
._._.-.. MOSCOW DIAlECTOLOGICAl COITT[[ (1915)
_______ v. STANKEVIC (1921)
PROF. KARSKI (190))

8[lORUSSIA SSSR Till NOV. 1939
LATVIA
RUSSIA
LITHUANIA
POLAND
Lomla
.
lublll1
.
t<1
.
UKRAINE
tf:'
2. Area of the Belorllssian Speech

8 BELORUSSIA.' THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
south, where Rittich included the territory of Polesie, generally omitted
on the other maps.
Polesie is a vast region on both banks of the Pripet, covered with
swamps and forests. Only two railroads cut through it, connecting
Pinsk, Turov, and a few other towns with the civilized world. The in-
habitants are known as Polescuki (P'olesie-people), and linguistically
they belong to the Ukrainian family. In their ways of life, customs and
psychology, however, they are closer to the Belorussians - a fact
which is recognized by Ukrainians. 15
A map published by the London Geographical Institute includes
Polesie in the area of Belorussian speech. The British ethnographers
fix the linguistic boundary with Polish about eighty miles west of the
Grodno- T arsaw railroad and about forty miles south of Bialystok.
They extend the limits of spoken Belorussian deep into Lithuania, to a
point twenty miles east of Kaunas; but south of this line, they clear
both sides of the Vilna-Grodno railroad down to Avgustov, leaving the
Belorussians only a small island around Troki. Although they place the
linguistic boundary farther south and east from Daugavpils (Dvinsk)
than Karski did, they locate several island.s of Belorussian speech
among the Latvian populations north of the city, where neither Karski
nor Durnovo had seen evidence of Belorussians. The London compilers
also place the southern boundary farther south, at the expense of the
Ukrainians to whom, however, they leave the region of Brest, which is
generally acknowledged as Belorussian.
Belorussian ethnographers, of course, take a larger view. In their
claims at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, they included the whole
territory of Brest and Polesie, as well as the cities of Daugavpils-
Dvinsk (Latvia) and Velikie Luki (Russia) in the northwest, and
Briansk (Russia) in the east, within the boundaries of modern Belo-
russia. 16 In addition, they cut a wedge into Poland in the west, deep
enough to establish a common Belorussian-German frontier eighty
kilometers long in the region of Grajow-Avgustov-Suwalki.
The reasons for these discrepancies were not so much ethnograph-
ical as political. Belorussia in 1919 was trying to organize itself into a
sovereign state, and it pressed extreme territorial claims while its
neighbors hotly contested what they called Belorussian imperialism.
The Latvians claimed Daugavpils (Dvinsk); the Lithuanians, Vilna,
with a rather wide strip of land around the city; and the Poles con-
tested the whole western boundary from Vilna south to Brest; objec-
tions also were raised in Russia and in the Ukraine. Although the latter
two countries were not admitted to the peace conference, their point of
view was not unknown. In the end the Belorussian claims were rejected
by the AlIies. 17
The Polish ethnic boundary roughly corresponded with that of the

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE
9
Borders be!w&eo !he USSR aDd Poland .
- untU 1939
Bord&r. 0' the B&loruuloo 55ft and the
- - - - Russian RSFSR
B.lorusslao temtorles ceded to Poland.
........ CIJId to th& Latvian and the UthuanlaD
SSR oJl,r World Waz II
E t hnoraphlcal
MAP OF BELORUSSIA
Scale I: 2,000,000
3. The Belorussian Territorial Claints, Front Whiteruthenia: Outlines of Whiteruthenia and the
Whiteruthenian National Movement (published in English by a group oj Belorussian disPlaced
persons in Germany in 1947), this 1nap presents the 0 ptitnunt clailn of the Belorussian nationalists.
The map, with slight modifications in the north, was reprinted by a Belorussi.an group in the United
States and distributed by the Belaruskaja Trybuna (Wollingto1t, New York)', Spring 1951.
partition of Poland (1795), and ethnographic maps drawn in the nine-
teenth century acknowledged the fact. Is In 1897, Czynski, except in
some minor details, confirmed Erkert's (1864) and Rittich's (1875)
maps. He even found that between the region of Grodno-Bialystok-
Belsk (which he gave to Belorussia) and the German-Russian border
at A vgustovo-Grajewo, only a strip of land about thirty kilometers
wide was Polish; and he recognized unhesitatingly both the city and
the province of Vilna as being Lithuanian-Belorussian. Czynski's map,
which was reprinted in 1909, was more or less in agreement with the
Russian maps drawn by Karski and the Moscow Dialectal Committee
(1915-1917).19 Modern Polish ethnographers, however, adopted a dif-
ferent view. 20 Out of their collective efforts came the map presented

10 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
by the Polish National Committee to the Paris Peace Conference at the
beginning of 1919.21 The whole region of Grodno-Bialystok-Belsk, the
whole province of Vilna, two large ethnic islands on the southern bank
of the Dvina, and the triangle of Novogrodek-Slonim-Sluck, where
Poles had previously composed from 20 to 50 per cent of the popula-
tion, were now represented as being solidly Polish.
The Vilna Controversy
Polish claims to Vilna * and Grodno were particularly insistent.
The general census of 1897 recorded the distribution of ethnic nation-
alities in the city of Vilna and in the district of Vilna (including the
city) as follows:
Russians
Belorussians
Poles
Lithuanians
Latvians
Jews
Total,
including other
nationalities
City
3°,9 6 7
6,5 1 4
47,795
3,23 8
184
6 I ,847
Dis tric t
37,9° 6
93,89 6
73,088
7 6 ,154
211
77,224
154,53 2 t
355, 21 3
Belorussians and Lithuanians thus formed the majority of the pop-
ulation in the region around Vilna, while Jews, Poles, and Russians
made up the majority within the city itself. With the beginning of
World War I, however, the Poles insisted that they alone constituted the
absolute majority within the city (53 per cent), although still a minor-
ity in the region. 22 In the middle of September 1915 the Russians
evacuated Vilna in the face of advancing German troops. Shortly there-
after a special committee with Captain von Beckerath as chairman was
ordered to ascertain the actual strength of the various nationalities in
both city and province. What procedure the captain used is not known,
but he reported to his superiors that both Vilna and Grodno showed a
large majority of Poles and Jews against a small percentage of Lith-
uanians and other groups.28
Polish accounts of subsequent developments are not clear. Accord-
ing to Smogorzewski, for example, the results of the census "completely
surprised the German authorities," who, "having learned of the nu-
merical strength of the Poles in that region, began to support the
Lithuanians and to persecute the Poles." How they could hope to raise
the Lithuanians to a position of dominance over the Poles when the
* Vilna is Belorussian, Wilno Polish, and Vilnius Lithuanian spelling.
t 20 9,000 in 1939.

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE
II
Lithuanians made up (4.3 per cent of the population," is hard to see.
Smogorzewski explains that the Germans were "stupid people" and
the Poles cleverly responded by further increasing their own numbers. 24
Consequently, a few years later the city was reported to have 195,000
inhabitants "of whom 128,60 were Poles, 54,600 Jews, 7,400 Rus-
sians, and about 2,000 Lithuanians." The Belorussians had altogether
disappeared from the map.25 No longer a Polish island in a Lithuanian
Belorussian sea, the city, writes a Polish historian, now "lies in a coun-
try which has a Polish majority and which is closely linked ethnically
to the main body of Poland." 26
Much the same thing meanwhile had happened in Grodno, as the
accompanying table shows.
ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN VILNA AND GRODNO
(in per cent)
Russians
Belorussians Poles Lithuanians J e\vs and others Source
Vilna district, in- 26.3 20.4 21.3 21.6 10.4 Census. 1897
eluding Vilna 26.8 20.1 20.9 2I.2 11.0 Local estimates
City 19 1 5- 16 n
2.8 ( ?) 7°.0 3.5 23.9 German census
19 16
10.0 80.0 5.0 4. 0 1.0 Poland, 1921
Grodno district, in- 65.8 5.6 1.4 19. 8 6.3 Census 1897
eluding Grodno 65.7 5.7 1.4 27. 2 Local estimates
city 19 1 5- 16 1\
6.2 ( ?) 54. 6 1.5 37.7 German census
19 16
33.5 54. 0 1.6 10.6 0.3 Poland, 192 I
R Estimates made or accepted by Polish ethnographers: see A. Krzyzanowski and
K. Kumaniecki (211), and E. Romer (286).
How such a complete ethnic transformation of a region as large as
Belgium could occur within less than a generation is not known. There
were no mass migrations, no transfer of populations, no mass epidemics
among the Belorussians and Lithuanians, no abnormal increase in the
Polish birth rate. More baffling still is the fact that while the population
in these regions remained 65 to 70 per cent peasant, the Polish element
was described as concentratd "over 60 per cent in the upper and middle
classes." 27
Discussion of East European statistics is useless. The truth is that
the regions in question have always been Polish to the Poles, Lithua-
nian to the Lithuanians, and Belorussian to the Belorussians, irrespec-
tive of the actual distribution of their populations.

12 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
Religion and Nationality
The Poles explain the situation in the following manner. First, the
process of natural assimilation of Belorussians by the Poles, noted by
many observers before, accelerated at the beginning of the century, and
became still more rapid and effective after the formation of the Polish
state. Second, the old Russian statistics "did not conform to modern
scientific requirements" and were "surely garbled to the disadvantage
of the Poles." Moreover, the linguistic criterion, although it may be ef-
fective under normal circumstances, cannot apply in this part of East-
ern Europe, where circumstances have never been normal. "Religion,
historical tradition, and political ideas," the Poles say, "play a more
important part here even than the native idiom." Aside from the per-
sons who "undoubtedly are Lithuanian, Belorussian or Latvian," there
are people who are "one thing by their language and quite another
thing by their mental make up and ways of life." "There are," we can
read, "'Lithuanians' who do not speak Lithuanian at all; there are
patriots who are devoted body and soul to the Polish cause, and who
use Lithuanian, Latvian, or Belorussian dialects in their homes; finally
there are the tutejsi, the 'local people' (Hiesiger), who speak a vernac-
ular of their own and for whom religion, and not language, is the factor
of national self-determination." Indeed, we are told, "it is common to
find families where brothers identify themselves as being of different
ethnic groups." In other words, people called Belorussians "are nothing
more than raw ethnic material; they have no self-consciousness and
cannot be treated as a separate nationality." Consequently, Belorus-
sians vanished statistically in the region of Polesie. The "Polesians"
appeared instead, an old name assuming new significance and legal
status. 28
The situation was further complicated by the fact that, according
to Polish writers, "people of the Greek Orthodox faith have been under
Russian influence, and those of Roman Catholic faith have been influ..
enced by the Poles . . . Belorussians who once were able to absorb
Lithuanians and Latvians in the province of Vitebsk, themselves fell
under the sway of the Poles in the west, or of the Russians in the east
. . . Belorussians of the Roman Catholic faith may therefore be con-
sidered in general as Poles." 29
Some justification for this point of view can be found in historical
precedent. Under Paul I and Alexander I, the population of the Belo-
russian provinces was divided into Russian and Polish according to
religion, and not according to language or origin. The terms pravos-
lavnyj (Orthodox) and russkij (Russian) had been interchangeable
for centuries. In fact, Karski believes that the general census of 1897
registered "a large number of Roman Catholic Belorussians as Poles."

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE 13
The Russian officials continued this policy almost up to the Revolu-
tion. 30
Polish postwar officials followed the Russian practice. Roman Cath-
olic Belorussians (Eastern Rite, uniates) were considered as people
gente Russus, natione Polonus, and were called bialopolski, "White
Poles.'.' Indeed, only 60,123 Roman Catholics registered as Belorus-
sians in 1921. The Polish census recorded the Orthodox in the provinces
listed as follows: Vilna, 261,426; Novogrodek, 421,556; Bialystok,
197,407; Polesie, 49 1 ,5 10 ; total, 1,371,899.
This may explain the total number (1,035,000) of Belorussians in
Poland as given by official estimates at that time. s1 The practice con-
tinued throughout the period of the Polish Republic and, later, Belo-
russians in DP camps in Germany complained that "even the American
officials treated them as Poles, thus creating great confusion every-
where." S2
It is in good faith, then, that the Poles claim that it was extremely
difficult to determine the number of Belorussians on their side of the
border. During the census of 192 I, many of these people "did not know
what nationality they were, and as late as 1931, some were unable even
to tell what language they spoke."
The census takers were given instructions to interpret "mother
tongue" as jf(zyk najbardziej blizki sobie (the language with which one
is most familiar). They had thus no difficulty in finding that "fifty-five
per cent of the people spoke a Polish dialect of Belorussian" while
others conversed in a mixture of either Belorussian Russian or Belo-
russian Ukrainian. 3s The bilingual populations could hardly be blamed
for their ambiguous answers which permitted the officials to list 707,100
people as "undetermined" in Polesie alone, that is, 62.5 per cent of the
whole population of that province. 34 Under the same test, the total
number of Belorussians in Poland fell to 989,000.35
The Political Territory
During the interwar period, the Belorussians claimed a territory
of more than 280,000 square miles, of which 200,000 square miles was
in the USSR, about 80,000 square miles was in Poland, and small areas
were in Latvia and Lithuania. 36 But the Poles recognized no Belorus-
sian territory within the 'boundaries of their state. Neither did Latvia
and Lithuania. The Soviets recognized the territorial principle, but first
they cut the total claim of the Belorussians to the limits indicated by
the Moscow Dialectal Committee, and then gave political form to only
a small part of the area claimed. 37
It must be noted that not until 1926 were the political boundaries
of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic established, and neither
the Smolensk nor the Briansk and Trubcevsk areas came to be included

14 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
in it. The territory of the new republic was to cover 49,022 square
miles, with a population of 5,567,976 distributed as shown in the
following tabulation (in per cent) .38
Urban Rural Total
Belorussians "3 8 .3 89. 2 80.7
Jews 4 0 . 2 1.6 8.2
Russians 15.6 6.1 7.7
Poles 2.3 1.9 2.0
Ukrainians 0.9 0.6 0.7
Latvians and
Lithuanians 0.6 0.4 0.4
Others 0.3
After the partition of Poland in September 1939, the four Polish
provinces of Vilna (except for Vilna city and the adjacent region, ceded
to Lithuania), N ovogrodek, Bialystok., and Polesie, and a wedge into
ethnic Poland at Lomza, were incorporated into the BSSR. The total
population of the republic (estimated as of June 194 I) thus became
10,589,000, distributed according to the following tabulation. 30
Belorussians
Jews
Poles
Russians
Ukrainians
Lithuanians
Germans
Others
Round numbers
7,880,000
935,000
9 2 5,000
59 0 ,000
162,000
9 0 ,000
6,5 00
I 1,000
Per cent
74.5
8.8
8.7
5. 6
1.5
0.9
0.06
0.1
The republic retained the former Polish administrative divisions
but gave them Belorussian names. Polesie was made into two prov-
inces, with Brest and Pinsk as their capitals.
During the German occupation (1941-1944), the Weissruthenien
Generalbezirk consisted of five territories (H auptbezirke), Baranovici,
Minsk, Mogilev, Vitebsk, and Smolensk, subdivided into thirty-eight
rural and five city districts. We have no information as to whether the
Smolensk Hauptbezirk followed the linguistic Belorussian boundary in
the east, or whether, indeed, it had any fixed boundaries. 40 After Ger-
many was defeated, the Soviets returned the district of Lomza to Po-
land. Later the western boundary was again revised, and other sec-
tions of territory, including the city of Bialystok, were ceded to Poland.
The boundaries of November 1939 with the Lithuanian, Latvian, and
Russian Soviet Republics were restored. The territory of the BSSR now
came to cover 89,000 square miles, with a population of 10,386,000.41

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE
15
Transfers and Migrations
Before the war, the Polish and Jewish minorities constituted up to
seventeen per cent of the total population. The Jewish communities
were decimated by the Nazis. After the war, Poles in the BSSR, and
Belorssians in Poland, were to be exchanged, but no treaties con-
cluded to this effect have ever been published in full, and no informa-
tion has been made available as to the exact number of persons trans-
ferred. 42 If the loss of the Jewish and Polish minorities were complete,
the total population of the BSSR would be reduced to 8,529,000, to
which must be added a certain number of persons, by no means large,
who were transferred from Poland and later returned from exile. 43
Another unknown is the number of war casualties never accounted for
by official sources. Unofficial estimates place these losses as high as
twenty-five per cent of the total population, and perhaps even higher.
There are indications in the Soviet press that considerable numbers of
Belorussian farn1ers have been settled in East Prussia and other parts
of the Union. 44 One must wait until a new general census is tal{en to
know how many people now live in the territory of the BSSR.
Meanwhile some indication can be gleaned from the fact that
4,727,950 «electors" were registered in the republic in elections to
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 12, 1950. We know that at
the end of 1937 the total population of the USSR was about 167 mil-
lion, of which 94.1 million, or 56.35 per cent, had the right to vote in
elections to the Supreme Soviet. If there was little change in the age
structure of the Belorussian population during and since the war, the
number of 4,727,950 electors would correspond to a total population
8,39 0 ,000.
On the basis of the Union election figures and the republic elec-
tion figures, respectively, Mr. Shabad found that the total population
of the BSSR was estimated by the Soviet authorities at 9,300,000 in
1946, and 7,220,000 in 1947. The two million discrepancy is explained
by the fact that the electoral districts for the 1946 Union elections
were apparently based on prewar population data and thus ((do not
present a true picture of the population of the USSR immediately
after the Second World War." On the other hand, the electoral districts
for the 1947 republic elections «appear to have been revised on the
basis of postwar data." 45
Since the 1950 Union election figures indicate a general increase in
the Soviet populations of about 5 per cent (since 1947), a guess that
the total population of the BSSR, including all the non-Belorussian
minorities, hardly could exceed 8,000,000 in 1951, would not appear as
unreasonably far from the truth and, in fact, is optimistic. A few facts
stand out significantly, although they cannot yet be translated into

16 BELORUSSIA.. THE MAKING OF A NATION
reliable statistics: The Polish and Jewish elements have greatly de-
creased if they have not altogether disappeared since 1941, while other
non-Belorussian ethnic elements may have immigrated. Should their
proportion to Belorussian-speaking natives have remained the same as
before, the number of Belorussians proper hardly would exceed 6,500,-
000 at this writing. 46 Even this number may prove high, since the avail-
able information suggests that the natives who have moved, or who
have been moved, out of the country since World War II, have far ex-
ceeded in number the migration figures of previous years. 47
Nothing but misinformation or wishful thinking can account for
claims of the Belorussian writers in exile that their nation now con-
sists "of from 15 to 18 million people." 48 Their estimates n1ight have
been correct had there been no revolutions and no wars for the last
fifty years.

2
THE TRADITIONS
No comprehensive study of Belorussian society is to be found and,
in fact, until recently one hardly could speak of the Belorussians as a
distinct society. The upper social strata felt that they were either
Polish or Russian, and there was, until the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, no general agreement about what ethnic group the mass of natives
should belong to. Indeed, the latter never called themselves Belorus-
sians until that name was imposed upon then1 by Polish and Russian
scholarship or administration.!
Traditionally, the peasantry from the Vilna and Smolensk or from
the Grodno and Polesie regions, were more conscious of their differ-
ences in speech and habits than they were of their common origins.
And if, in spite of these differences, they formed a world apart from
other Slavs, they did not themselves become aware of that fact until,
from the mass of ethnographic material gathered in the course of the
last century by foreign scholars, one could select certain characteristics
which form a totality unique with the Belorussian people. 2
Home and Family
Before the Revolution, nearly nine out of every ten Belorussians
(87 per cent) were farmers or city workers closely tied to the village.
Eight of every ten were still occupied in agriculture in 1939. 3
The Belorussian man was generally described as being thickset
rather than well built and hardly ever of more than medium stature,
often giving an impression of being slightly bloated. In general, con-
scripts before the Revolution were "about one inch shorter than the
average in European Russia." 4 «The face is round, the hair light
colored, and the sn1all deep-set eyes are generally grey. At the age of
forty or fifty, he looks like a very old man. Women are blonde and
look fresh and attractive when young, but they fade faster and earlier
after marriage than in many other parts of Eastern Europe. Hard work
and pitiful diet are, in general, responsible for the quick aging of the
Belorussian peasant."

18 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
"Clothing is of almost primitive simplicity, and white is the most
favored color. Men used to wear white jackets, white shirts and
trousers, and white linen belts. The women wear white skirts, aprons
and l{erchiefs. Except for footwear there is not much difference be-
tween summer and winter garb, nor between holiday dress and work
clothes. Boots are rare; bast sandals are most common. Only in the
style of their headgear are the people somewhat fanciful. They wear
peaked caps of cloth or leather, or high felt hats with the brims turned
up or without brims at all. Some wear a round cap. of cloth, felt, or
sheepskin all year round; others, a kind of four-cornered hat. . . There
are no valuable necklaces, earrings or rings among the people. The
only trinkets are cheap beads, artificial jet, or the simplest of copper
ornaments; silver is seldom worn." The meal of the Belorussian peasant
consisted chiefly "of milk and cottage cheese, potatoes, cabbage, beets,
beans and peas in winter; pot herbs, sorrel, and the like, in summer."
"Bread is badly baked from whole rye which, in many homes, still
is ground by hand." Earlier observers insist that "only the fairly wealthy
eat this well, and then only in a good year." 5
The Soviets have not changed the general appearance of the man
nor have they noticeably improved his habitual diet. In fact, the pic-
ture of Belorussian life today does not luuch differ from what it was
half a century ago. Houses, in general, retain their primitive character,
are crowded and ill-ventilated by one or two tiny windows. They are
built of logs, roofed with crude shingles or straw, and often have no
chimney but a hole in the roof above the hearth. "The odor of human
and animal sweat is stifling and, in summer, houses are infested with
flies and cockroaches. . . ." Until recently kerosene and candles were
luxuries, and the houses were lighted with burning pine splinters
(lucina) stuck into the wall. Not many a peasant could afford even a
match. It was cheaper to get fire directly from dry wood by primitive
methods.
Most villages consist of from two to ten households. They are
scattered throughout the forest and swamps, often in places almost
inaccessible even to the peasant wagons called kolesa, or "wheels." In
all reality, these consist of little more - four wooden wheels (fre-
quently birch, unbanded) on axles set in a single crossbeam. The sides,
when in use, rest on the crossbeam and are supported by vertical spikes
opposite the four wheels, forming a V at the front and rear of the
cart.
Horses and harness match the vehicle. The harness is of rope or
of bast. Belorussian cows are no better than the horses, though before
collectivization they were the pride of the farmer and represented a
large part of his material wealth. Both horses and cows are small, thin,
and lacking in strength. Until recently the soil was cultivated with

THE TRADITIONS 19
antediluvian plows, and agricultural methods were highly primitive.
Consequently, harvests were poorer than they need be, since the soil
could produce several tin1es more than it did. In this, as in many other
aspects of his economy, the Belorussian farmer did not differ from most
Russian and Polish peasants except in degree of poverty, ignorance,
and complacence.
One might expect that the Revolution, made in the interest of the
"workers and peasants," should greatly have improved their lot. In-
deed, we read of the erection of large plants and factories, modern
buildings and monuments in the cities, of the introduction of tractors
and other modern agricultural equipment to the fields, and of the
electrifying of peasants' homes. Yet, as before, the traveler can see
«thousands of miserable huts with small dusty windows and rotten
thatch roofs, exactly as the Great Socialist Revolution had seen them
twenty years before. . . As before, people keep young calves in their
huts, only they have fewer calves now. Men sleep on the clay stoves
or on wooden benches, covering their bodies with a sheepskin coat in-
stead of a blanket. The family eats from a common bowl, and they light
an oil lamp just for the time necessary to eat their supper. . . You
travel the long muddy roads, along which no car can run in the au-
tumn or spring. . . In remote villages, people continue to live without
schools, medical help, or any other benefit of civilization." 6
Apparently things do not change fast in the Belorussian land. The
Soviet era of "industrialization, mechanization of agriculture, and edu-
cation of the masses," has not uniformly stirred the Belorussian waters,
no matter how stormy they may have appeared at times. Under Poland,
the western part of the country was little touched by civilization. Under
the Soviets, some effort was made to rescue the people, but they proved
conservative in their customs and habits and, as all peasants, reluctant
to accept sudden reforms.
Evidence abounds that the outlook of the Belorussian peasant on
life and work, his position in the family and in the community, and
even his language, are still reminiscent of the most remote times in
Slavic history. Until lately, households of the zadruga type, or «joint
families," were common, particularly in Minsk province, although they
may not have sheltered all of the members under one roof. «The father
will build a separate hut on his farm for each of his married sons, and
the land, the cattle and the farm equipment will be owned by the whole
family as before; they will work together and eat together; and they
will own separately only their clothes and maybe a few other personal
things. In fact, though in separate huts, they still will live and work as
if they were under the same roof." It was not unusual for such a family
to have fifteen to twenty-five, or sometin1es up to fifty members, united
under the authority of a common head.

20 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
The common head was not necessarily the natural father or grand-
father, "since the joint family often included distant relatives and even
strangers." The position of the latter (semjanin, zdol'nik) depended on
the conditions, oral or written, under which they had first been adopted.
A zdolnik could enter the family fr life, or for a term, and he himself
and his legal heirs were treated as all other members of the family.
Labor invested in the farm, rather than blood relation, was the factor
holding the group together, and this concept has persisted to our day.
Generally, the natural father would be at the origin of a joint
family. But after his death anyone of his sons, the eldest or the ablest,
or his brother, or even a zdolnik, might become head of the group. Un-
like similar usages in Great Russia and in the Balkans, the position
carried no definite title.* The family called their head haspadar (mas-
ter), or chaziain (boss), or bac' ka (father), or dziadz' ka (old man),
or simply by his personal name. No reports mention elections, but the
agreement on the successor had to be unanimous, and somehow it was
reached to the satisfaction of all the members of the family.7
An adult member might require separation at any time, but custom
did not favor it. The practice, however, has become more common in
modern times. The head of the family decided the share to be given
out and, usually, called a kind of a family council to discuss the
matter. As a rule, the share was determined by the labor performed,
not by birthright. A son who had been away from the farm for some
reason did not receive an equal part with his brothers, and might get
no part at all. The custom says, "It is not enough to be born or adopted
into a family; it is necessary to have worked in it and contributed to
its welfare." 8
Some time before the Revolution large families, particularly in the
more industrialized western regions, began to disintegrate. The head's
authority, however, was not diminished, nor his responsibility for all
the members of his household. He supervised their morals, and saw to
it that their personal activities and ambitions did not interfere with
the general interests of the farm. On the farm, his will was sacred and
without appeal. "All members of the household, in their quarrels, seek
justice from him . . . He has the place of honor at the table, right
under the icons (red corner); men, in the order of precedence, sit with
him, and the women at the other end of the table. He says grace, and
he is the first to eat from the common bowl." The custom has persisted
into Soviet times and is acknowledged by the Soviet Belorussian
novelists (J al{ub Kolas and others).
The habit is supported by an ancestor cult (dziady) which, in
Belorussia, has perhaps been stronger, and more consistently observed,
than in any other part of the Slavic world. 9 Belief in the "home spirit"
* Bol'sak, in Russia; domaci1t, in YugoslavIa.

THE TRADITIONS
21
(damavy, damasnik) is expressed in a great variety of forms, and until
the forcible collectivization of farming (1928-1934), the protection of
the boundaries of a homestead was entrusted to a family goblin (cur)
rather than to the law. The cur had been a minor deity common to all
eastern Slavs, witness to which are such linguistic survivals in Russian
and Ukrainian as turban, cUl"atysia, cur menia, etc., but nowhere out-
side Belorussia has his cult persisted to our time. There, as of old,
within the family circle, the father acted as priest and king, saying
prayers and incantations to the dziady (fathers) and bab ki (mothers),
saving food for them after the falnily supper, and performing other
acts reminiscent of ancient pagan sacrifices. In many parts of Belo-
russia the newly married still are called knez (king) and knehinia
(queen) in the wedding songs, while the literary standard uses the
word haspadar for both the head of the nation and the head of the
fan1ily (farm) .10
The father, or the head of a larger family, directed the work of the
men, and his wife the work of the women, and no one could undertake
any job on the farm without permission or assignment. They could
hire out any member of the family, or send him to lnak.e n10ney
in the city. The father held the legal title to the property, but his power
to dispose of it was no less constitutional than that of the King of
Britain. He was in fact a trustee, not the owner of the family estate,
and could not sell or trade it away as long as there were legal heirs.
Dovnar-Zapolski reports the case of a widower who sold his lot of
land and went to work. in a factory; when his legal heirs came of
age they claimed the farm for themselves, and the rural court, sup-
porting custom against the law, annulled the deal: "Having legal heirs,
a man has no right to alienate his property forever." 11 Before the
Revolution, the law generally gave way to custom in the rural areas of
the empire. 12
With certain exceptions for unmarried daughters, man and woman
were equal in relation to family property. What he or she n1ay have
brought into marriage remained his or hers throughout life, and only
that part which they had invested in the farm, and the farln itself,
formed a con1mon estate. After the death of the spouse, his or her
personal property went over to his or her legal heirs or, in the absence
of any such, was returned to the home from which he or she had come,
while the common part was taken over by the living spouse. Generally,
the widow kept the common purse and the eldest son directed the worl{
of the men and represented the household in community affairs.
The obligations of men and women were strictly divided and, in
general, it was degrading for a man to do anything which was con-
sidered woman's work. "A man might be dying to eat after a long day
in the fields, but he never would himself take food from the oven and

22 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
put it on the table: this was up to his mother or wife." 18 Money the
woman might mal{e from selling mushrooms, berries, flowers, or any
surplus from the vegetable garden, was her personal property over
which the family had no right or authority. Earnings of a daughter out-
side the farm, though handed over to the family, also constituted her
personal property. With her mother's advice she could use this money
for clothes and jewels, and she could take the remainder with her when
she married.
Children under fourteen years of age were entirely under their
mother's care and the father could not interfere. The wife was not re-
sponsible for her husband's debts, though he was for hers, as the cus-
tom required that the family have but one legal representative. Gen-
erally, "in the sphere of her own competence, the mother's will was as
supreme as that of the father; she vowed obedience to her husband,
but she was by no means his thing or property: in fact, she ,vas his
assistant and adviser and, as a rule, he treated her as an equal and
very well." Indeed, her position compared very favorably with that of
the woman in Russia and in most parts of the Ukraine. "Cruel treat-
ment of the woman is very rare indeed among the Belorussians," con-
cluded the observer. 14
Marriage was a matter of mutual consent, but the custom also re-
quired the consent of the families concerned. The young couple knew
that they might have to live with the old family, and more often than
not marriage was a matter of compromise. The bride was expected to
bring something with her into her new home. But so also was the
groom. It has already been mentioned that their respective parts, un-
less invested in the new farm, could not merge into common ownership.
More often than not, however, labor was the only capital they had to
invest." "The beauty, and very often the wealth of the bride, are of
little consequence to the Belorussian. What he values above all in his
wife is a good field worker and housekeeper, and only these qualities
of a woman always stand high in his mind." If the woman wouldn't
work, the family could refuse her food. The principle, "He who does
not work shall not eat," had been known in Belorussia long before the
Soviets. 15
The Belorussian required high moral qualities in his spouse. Vir-
ginity of the bride was "a necessary prerequisite for marriage," and so,
in some parts of the country, was the virginity of the man. Should a
wrong be discovered after the wedding, the n1arriage might be discon-
tinued without further procedure. The decision was entirely up to the
wronged party, who might elect to take the sin of his spouse unto
himself and to continue conjugallife. 16 Before the Revolution a church
wedding was required by law, but its importance was small compared
to the very elaborate custom rite persisting to this day. The bride was

TIlE TRADITIONS 23
selected by the young man, or by his family for him, and a trusted man
(svat) was dispatched with some vodka and food (zakuska) to her
home to talk the proposition over with her family. If the parties agreed,
the svat would make another trip to the bride's house, this time with
the groom and his relatives. Again they would bring vodka with them,
but tis time the bride's family would provide the food. At the party,
the young couple would have an opportunity to become better ac-
quainted, and small presents would be exchanged. The ceremony,
which was known as zapoiny, "drinking the business over," might be
repeated several times and, in general, it tool{ the place of betrothal
(za1'ucyny) .17 Either party might break the engagement, but he or she
had then to refund to the other party all expenses incurred, and some-
times her family would receive compensation for "the slight." 18
The wedding was celebrated in both houses, and expenses were
shared by both families. In some localities the bride was put to a sym-
bolic test to prove her virginity (sadzic' na pasad), and if she faltered,
the marriage was declared nul and void and her family publicly humili-
ated. Divorce was by mutual consent, and neither the civil nor the
canon law had been able to supplant the custom. 19 When a son-in-law
came to live with the family of the bride, he was treated on the same
footing as daughters-in-law generally were; that is, he acquired no ,
right to property through his wife, though he might eventually win it
through his own labor, or be admitted "in son's stead" (za syna) .
Children owed obedience to both parents, and the community was
very strict in this respect. Court records show that once a peasant in
the Causy county drowned his disobedient son in the lal{e; he was
arrested and tried, and the rural court condemned him to three months
in jail, not for murder but for inability «to instill in his son the respect
for parents." 20 Conflicts between parents and children were seldom
brought to court, and it did not do any good for either party if they
were. Rural justice made it clear that disobedience of children also is
the parents' own fault. 21
Children were entirely emancipated from parental authority only
when they established their own homes. The custom required them,
however, to take care of their father and mother in their old age. An
aged father might transmit his authority' to his eldest son and then,
though he still lived on the farm, he would owe his son the same
obedience as his son had owed him before.
Daughters, as a rule, had no share in the family estate. If, after
the death of the father, the farm was divided among his sons, their un-
married sisters might only receive a share in the last harvest. Brothers,
however, were under the obligation to marry off their sisters decently
and a part of the family cattle would be reserved for that purpose. But
when there were only daughters in the family, they inherited the whole

24 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
estate, and the husband of the eldest took care of the younger ones
until they married. He received no compensation for the guardianship
and was personally responsible to his wards for any losses incurred in
his management of the estate. 22
Illegitimate children (znajdennye, bohdanovy, bankortyki, ban-
kroty, kraPivniki, bajstruki, etc.; the variety of terms seems to point
to the frequency of occurrences) were treated without discrimination.
They were given the mother's or the godfather's name, seldom the
name of the natural father. By custom their right to inheritance was
the same as that of legitimate children, though the custom conflicted
with the law of the empire. 23 Since, under the imperial law, only a
church wedding made a marriage legal, most illegitimate children
resulted from the common-law unions, particularly among the sects
rejecting the church ritual.
Daughters enjoyed considerable freedom. They were assigned
lighter jobs in the homes, and when possible, their labor was dispensed
with altogether. They had many opportunities to meet young men,
with whom they mixed freely. Several times a year there were public
gatherings in a larger village, or in the town, on the occasion of fairs
(kir1nasy), religious festivals (chvesty), or pilgrimages (Proscy) to a
miraculous well, source, chapel, or perhaps .to a cross erected at a road
intersection or deep in the woods. The inhabitants of the whole region
would sometimes thus gather. Old people would come to pray, or to
see their relatives from distant villages, or to buy something from
peddlers. The young people expected to have fun taking part in the cus-
tomary rites. On such occasions, girls would wear red skirts and white
blouses, loud kerchiefs, copper and silver plate ornaments, and white
jackets over their shoulders. The boys would be in high boots, black
or blue coats with metal or glass buttons of various colors, wide belts,
white woolen overcoats and high white felt hats, now supplanted by
modern caps with leather visors.
These were great occasions for dancing, singing, and playing galnes.
But at home, also, there were open-air dances (ihrysca) in the summer,
and evening parties (vecorki) in the winter. Girls would gather in one
of the houses to weave and sing, or to listen to a story teller. "Boys
would get wind of it and come to see their girls home late at night, and
many couples would be married in the following 3pring." 24
Concepts of Justice
Before the Revolution, rural justice in both the village (sel'ski sud)
and the district (valastny sud), as a rule, ignored the written law. More'
often than not customs would conflict with it, and people who appealed
to the higher courts were frowned upon, witness to which are such de-

THE TRADITIONS 25
rogatory terms as suciaha, suciaznik.* No clear distinction was drawn
between civil and criminal offenses. Murder often was settled with a
sort of wergild' (vykup), paid by the criminal to the relatives of the
victim. t Generally, crime was understood in terms of material damage
and the custom of vykup was common for all sorts of physical offense,
including rape. Although it was against the law, the community held
the view that the case was closed as soon as the offended party had ac-
cepted compensation from the offender. 26
Customary, though also illegal, was moneylending at 20 per cent
interest from March to November, sometimes with an additional charge
of a certain amount of oats or rye to each ruble. The statute of limita-
tions was not commonly recognized: "An offense is an offense as long
as it is relnembered, and it is never too late to settle it." For affairs
which, in the opinion of the village, should not be brought to the
courts, private arbitration was widely practiced. Decision of the ar-
biters was final. Rural judges, little concerned with legality, often acted
as private arbiters in cases which normally should have been tal{en to
the criminal courts.
As punishment, rural justice preferred fines and public work to jail,
and the latter was seldom inflicted for more than a few days. Until re-
cent times) public flagellation (parka) was con1mon. No oath was taken
from witnesses, and before the Revolution, when the court was unable
to make a decision, the parties would be taken to church and, should
the defendant kiss the cross in sign of his innocence, he would be ac-
quitted. 26 Sometimes, the whole community would inflict punishment
without any process of law (samasud), as in cases of horse stealing
and arson. It was also used against "traitors" by the guerrillas during
the last war. In such cases, the criminal was tortured and killed with
bestial cruelty, while public beating and parading through the village
with a rope around the neck was the penalty for minor offenses.
The general tendency, then, was to keep out of the courtroom, and
it found expression in the saying: "The criminal is ours, and so is the
right to do justice with him." 27 The collectivization of farming since
the Revolution has eliminated most causes for land and money con-
flicts, yet "the illegal practices" of the peoples' courts (nal'odny sud),
supporting customs against the law, are constantly reported in the
Soviet press.
Folklore
Belorussian folklore reflects pagan and early Christian times, carry-
ing the medieval outlool{ into our own day. The Soviets acknowledge
their failure in eradicating the century-old habits and beliefs. Ethno-
* The accepted translation is "barrator," but the English \vord does not convey the
depth of opprobrium and contempt which tle Slavic word contains.
t Cf. 'Vira, golo'VJcizna, in Medieval Russia.

26 BELORUSSIA.' THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
graphic expeditions of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences report that
the old tradition has not been entirely superseded by social and eco-
nomic reforms, nor by modern education. This is corroborated by
what one can read in Soviet Belorussian novels,28 as well as by testi-
monies of people who have left the country during and since World
War II. .
Animistic beliefs or superstitions, and not simply material poverty,
may account for the fact that a primitive equipment of fire-making
(ahnevica) until recently has been, and perhaps still is, used in some
parts of the country.29 Even in the better-off communities, fire some-
times was made in this manner on the church porch, and bonfires were
built with it around the village, to repel evil spirits during times of
calamity. P'ermanent fire maintained in the oven is transferred, with
appropriate ritual, to a new home. Popular holidays such as St. John's
Eve, Shrovetide, the Green Week, and others, still bear the traces of
ancient fire worship. A self-respecting peasant still carries in his pocket
flint, steel, and tinder (cyr) in a little bag known as ahnevica, ma-
halejka, or kalita in different parts of the country, and he would not
for anything light his pipe or cigarette with a match.
Incantations (zahavory) to the elements, dating from prehistoric
times, are transmitted from father to son. vVith the coming of Chris-
tianity, songs celebrating ancient festivals such as the advent of spring,
sowing, harvesting, marriage, funerals, were modified in their wording
to fit the new religion. Lately they have become - at least in the Soviet
recordings - colored with words and phrases borrowed from the Com-
munist vocabulary.30
Specifically Belorussian are the bohohlasniki or psalmniki, com-
posed for singing at religious festivals. Based on Bible stories, lives of
the saints, and folk cosmogony, they are sung by crippled and blind
beggars. Some of them show the influence of Polish and Greek religious
hymns, and others strikingly resemble the Negro spirituals of America.
In the seventeenth century, mystery plays presented with puppets
(batlejka, from "Bethlehem") were widely performed; they gave birth
to the "people's theater," which eventually shifted to such lay themes
as "The Peasant Macej and the Doctor" (Muzik Macej i Doktar),
"Anton Leads the Goat" (Anton kazu viadzec), "The Fortune-Teller
(Baba-varazbitka), and the like, all composed by anonymous authors
and performed by village casts.
It may seem strange that the Christian inspiration should not have
produced anything outstanding in the matter of folklore during the
last two centuries. Indeed, the hutarka has become the Belorussian's
most popular form of poetic lament over his unhappy lot. These are,
sometimes real epics, and the most noteworthy of them is the [(azan'ne,
written down by Nosovic in 1848 in Mogilev, and by Sejn in Vilna

THE TRADITIONS 27
province. Other secular forms, the basni (folk tales), bajki (true
stories), and kazki (satirical or moral stories, sometimes with a sharp
political slant),' have also appeared. They all have a characteristic style
which carries over even to tales borrowed from other peoples. To these,
the Cossack, soldier, and cumak * songs can be added, as well as
stories, proverbs, riddles, and sayings, in which the people's mind freely
expressed itself. The general impression is that the "manner of life"
( byt) of the Belorussian people has been extraordinarily stagnant in
spite of their contacts with other Slavs and foreign invasions of their
lands. s1 . .-."';f"./< i
Since the Revolution thousands of new songs and tales have ap
peared on the Soviet Polish war, collectivization of farming, the Ger-
man invasion, and on such subjects as the Soviet Constitution, the Five
Year Plans, the Red Army, and the Soviet guerrillas, with Stalin and
other Communist leaders as heroes. Their authenticity as folklore is
questionable, and it is explicitly denied by the Belorussian emigres.
But they skillfully follow the older models in style, general outlook,
and language. Sometimes they reflect real hopes and griefs of the
people, and one can then hear the old familiar lan1ent. It is significant
that Soviet literature has not been able to replace the outdated forms
of popular expression, or even noticeably to reduce their part in Belo-
russian life. 32
The Idiom
Belorussian folklore impressed its early collectors by its unusua]
wealth of forn1, variety of subjects, and, particularly, by great varia-
tions of the spoken idiom. At first it appeared that the natives
spoke in a language mixed now with Russian, now with Polish or
Ukrainian, and difficult to identify entirely with any of the known
Slavic idioms in phonetics, morphology, vocabulary, or syntax. Very
soon it was noticed that transcriptions by means of the Polish or Rus-
sian alphabet did not render the sounds of the Belorussian speech cor-
rectly. Bezsonov found it necessary to introduce the symbol y (Latin
it) to transcribe the sound similar to English w in widow, and foreign
to the Polish and Russian standards. Then N osovic compiled the first
Belorussian dictionary, and more regional dictionaries have appeared
since, to show that the Belorussian vocabulary, besides the common
Slavic stock, was full of words of various origins and unfamiliar to
other Slavs. ss
In fact, the Belorussian vernacular showed little uniformity, and
Karski counted up to twenty local dialects differing from one another
nearly as much as they differed, in one respect or another, from Rus-
* Peasants \vho used to go to the Crimea with a CU1n (wagon) to get salt for their
country.

28 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
sian, Polish, or Ukrainian. 84 Most single characteristics (isoglosses) of
Belorussian dialects were found in other Slavic dialects, and only their
unique combination in the Belorussian vernacular made it a different
and, indeed, a separate form of the Slavic speech. Within its own area
of distinction it formed, according to A. Sobolevski, two, and according
to J. Stankevic, three or four, larger groups of subdialects: first, (a)
the southwest group, including the regions of Minsk and Grodno and
the southern part of Vilna province, and (b) the northeast group in-
cluding the rest of Vilna province, the Vitebsk, Mogilev, and Smolensk
provinces, and a part of Kalinin (Tver) province; 35 second, (a) the
centtal group, (b) the Vilna-Osmiana group, (c) the southwest group,
around Grodno, and (d) the northeast group of dialects, beginning
west of Polock and going north and east far into the territory of the
RSFSR. 86 Whatever grouping we accept, the fact remains that the
language did not begin to evolve a common literary standard until the
publication of the first Belorussian grammar in 1918.37
For their transcriptions of the vernacular, the Belorussians used
now the Latin (lacinka), now the Russian (hrazdanka) alphabets, ad-
justing them, but not always or uniformly, to their phonetic needs. The
first grammar used the Russian print which eventually prevailed over
the whole territory of the Belorussian SSR. But the Latin characters
continued largely to be used in vVestern Belorussia between the two
wars and still are used by some Belorussian groups outside the USSR.
U sing the lacinka (for the sake of technical convenience in this
writing), the most outstanding characteristics of the Belorussian speech
may be described as follows:
I. Change of the historical 0 for a, and e for ja (ia), in the un-
accented syllables of the word; thus, halavd for Russian "golova,"
Ukrainian "holova," Polish "g}owa"; sl6va, for Russian and Ukrainian
"slovo," and Polish "slowo"; niamy, for Russian "nemoj," Ukrainian
"nimyj," Polish "niemy"; etc. This phenomenon is known as akanie
and yakanie, respectively, and, in various degrees, it is also common to
most South Russian dialects.
2. Absence of the palatalized d' and t' sounds for which the palatal
sibilant affricates dz' and c' are substituted respectively; for instance,
miadz'vedz for Russian "medved'," Ukrainian "vedmid'," Polish
"niedzwiedz. "
3. Absence of the explosive g sound, in place of which, as in
Ukrainian, a fricative variant (h) is used; for instance, halava for
Russian "golova," Polish "glowa"; cf. Ukrainian "holova."
4. Hardened labials and velars, and the universally nonpalatal r
- phenomena which, in various degrees, are also observed in Polish,
Ukrainian, and a few Russian dialects.
S. Use of nonsyllabic it and 1 for u and i after words ending in a

THE TRADITIONS
29
vowel, and of u and u when, in a similar position, v or l are more
common in Slavic. Thus, ja 1 vy; vouk for Russian "volk," Ukrainian
"vovk" Polish "wilk'" b y u for Russian "b y l" Ukrainian "bu v "
, , , ,
Polish "byl"; etc.
6. Substitution of the groups vo for the initial "0," and he, for the
initial "e" (back vowel) under stress; for instance, v6zera for Russian
cCozero," Polish "jeziero"; hety for Russian "etot"; etc.
These and other features, combined in a single phonetic system,
distinguish the Belorussian speech from other Slavic idioms. Words in
common with Polish sound differently because of different syllables
under stress, and the shifting stress often is different from that of Rus-
sian, while less often so from that of Ukrainian. 38
In morphology, many Church Slavic and Old Russian survivals
bring the Belorussian grammar close to the Ukrainian. Strong influ-
ences of Polish can be observed in the vocabulary, and often in the
syntax, of both languages. Yet the peculiar habit of akanie makes the
Belorussian speech sound very different from Ukrainian. While the
habit of dzekanie and other features make it different from Russian as
well, greater affinities can be observed with many local Russian dialects
in their archaic morphology, vocabulary, and syntax. 3D Many common
traits point to a common origin of the Belorussian, Russian, and
Ukrainian speeches. The vernacular of the masses has not been
greatly affected by literary movements in the Slavic East until the most
recent time. But the nationalist philology likes to see direct succession
of Belorussian from Proto-Slavic. According to these theories, the be-
ginnings of Belorussian specialization are tentatively located "in the
fourth or fifth century A.n.," and all concepts of a subsequent "common
Russian (East Slavic) period" are discarded as wrong, imperialistic,
and unscientific. 40
Little evidence, of course, can be produced in support of such a
theory since no written documents earlier than the eleventh century
are known to us in the Slavic East. In fact, Jakobson places the first
specializations of Common Russian (East Slavic) in the tenth to the
twelfth century.41 Sachmatov admits that the local vernaculars prob-
ably began to differ from one another "some time before" the first
known written documents appeared and, in accordance with his theory,
Karski draws the pedigree of the Belorussian speech according to the
accompanying chart. 42
The theory has lost much ground since its criticism by Porzesinski
and Rastorguev. 43 Trubeckoj contends that no specialized isoglosses in
the East Slavic common speech "could even begin to form" before the
end of the thirteenth century,44 and R. Jakobson does not believe that
the distinct phonological characteristics of Belorussian first began to
show before the fifteenth to sixteenth century.45

30 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
Common East Slavic (Old Russian)
I
I
Sou thern Group
(ancestor of Ukrainian)
I
Northern Group
I
I
Northern Russian dialects
(okanie, and g sound)
I
Southern Groups
(aka1tie, and h sound)
I
I
Western Group
(dzekanie)
BELORUSSIAN
I
Eastern Group
(south Russian dialects)
The Economy
For the slow changes in his way of life the Belorussian had more
than one excuse. It would indeed seem that men and nature conspired
in letting him down. His country is a low marshy plain, sloping slightly
to the south and east. Only in the north and northeast are there eleva-
tions of the soil, the highest of which may not exceed one thousand
feet. There, river beds are interrupted by small waterfalls caused by
outcrops of rock, and rocks also appear in most fields. In the basin of
the Pripet, the landscape changes from woodland to extensive marshes,
where the country is flooded in the spring and the rare villages look
like desolate islands lost in the great expanse of water. All work and
communications are then interrupted for several weeks. But where the
swamps have been drained the harvest is good. In general, however, the
soil, being mainly of the ash-colored forest type, with some clays and
sand, is not very favorable for cultivation. Forest and shallow lakes
cover more than one half of the whole land. Winters are relatively mild,
and summers somewhat cooler than around Moscow or Kiev. Crops are
liable to be damaged by hUlnidity rather than by droughts. Few are
raised, in any case, except in the more favored regions of the east, fish
and potatoes being the staff of life for most Belorussian peasants. 46
Historically, the usual chasm between the lord and the serf was
widened by their differences in religion and language. Indeed, the
peasantry were called bydlo (cattle) and treated as such, or even worse.
"We have found that the Russian serf was certainly better off than was
the Belorussian on the lands annexed from Poland," remarks the his-
torian Batiuskov. Incorporation into Russia little improved his lot.
As a rule, the manor exacted three working days a week, or one hun-
dred fifty-six working days a year, from every man and woman

THE TRADITIONS 3 1
(panscyna). Other landlords preferred cash to labor, and charged
every farmer's household on their estates fifteen to twenty-two rubles
(obrok). This was a large sum of money at a time when a chicl{en cost
ten kopeks and a pig would sell for less than one ruble. Indeed, in
Mogilev and Minsk provinces, for instance, only 3 per cent of the peas-
ant population were able to pay the obrok. 47
I'n addition, landlords had other resources. "One of the most shock-
ing malpractices was that landlords leased their serfs in hundreds and
thousands to contractors who were engaged in earth moving in different
parts of the empire. These poor people were used, for the most part, in
building roads and canals. The landlord took the responsibility of de-
livering a certain number of men for a set fee, and the only obli-
gation of the contractor was to keep them from starving to death. In-
deed, government officials supervising the public works demanded from
the contractor nothing more than that these unhappy people be kept half
alive" (N. I. Turgenev).
The Belorussian peasant was freed, in 186 I, at the depth of the
economic depression that had been creeping on i the country since
before the partition of Poland. Freedom improved his lot but did little
more than save him from starvation. True, the imperial law limited the
peasant's yearly payment to three rubles or twenty-five workdays, and
it was not surprising that, when Polish landlords called upon the Belo-
russian peasant to support their insurrection against the empire in
1863, he did not respond. But the individual households had obtained
lots of only 2.7 to 54 acres, depending on the number of males in the
family, and this was far from enough for subsistence on the Belorus-
sian soil. Consequently, many a farmer had to contract part of his labor
to his former Polish master as before. Retaliating against the Polish in-
surrection, the imperial government canceled such "contracts," and in-
creased the individual lot to 15. I 2 acres in Minsk province, 13.23 acres
in Mogilev province, 10.26 acres in the western and 12. I 5 acres in the
eastern parts of Vitebsk province, and so on. Even the formerly land-
less were aBoted 8.10 acres per "soul."
This was better, but not enough. In 1885, the governor general in
the Northwestern provinces reported that "in Vitebsl{ region, peasants
hardly know what bread is. They live on mushrooms and wild herbs
and berries, with widespread illness and disease. Their poverty is un-
speakable . . . The vital forces of the region are fast being drained,
both in a spiritual and the physical sense . . ." 48 Various factors ac-
counted for this situation, and there was no government policy to
remedy them.
In 1897 there were twenty-seven providers for every hundred per-
sons in Russia as compared with thirty-eight in the United States in
1900, while there were only twenty-four in Belorussia. It has been ob-

3 2 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
served that the three-field system of farming practiced in Belorussia
could not support more than fifty persons to one square versta (one
versta equals 0.663 miles) of useful land (Oganovski). The Belorussian
population exceeded that norm by nearly 50 per cent, Vilna province
having seventy-three, Vitebsk seventy-eight, Grodno seventy-four,
Minsk seventy-three, and Mogilev eighty-six persons to one square
versta. The useful land was distributed as follows: state and church,
5.4 per cent; communal, 34.3 per cent; private, 60.3 per cent.
Farm homesteads were grouped in small hamlets amidst meadows
and forests rather than in large villages. With each generation the
family lots broke up into smaller lots, or had to support a larger num-
ber of persons. Periodical redistributions of communal land were not
customary in Belorussia. To the "one-soul lot" obtained in 1863, there
were often five or six living souls twenty years later. The diminished
farmer looked for some land to rent. This was available on the neigh-
boring private estates, and often a tenant had again to till two acres
for one of his own in order to make a living for his family and himself.
With his outdated equipment and methods, he harvested hardly one-
third of what his brother in East Prussia was getting from the same
acreage. But even tenures were getting scarce. Large estates of ab-
sentee owners were not profitable, since labor was no longer free,
and the sown area began to decrease. The country had to import more
and more grain from other parts of the empire. 49
Overpopulation of the rural areas naturally came to entail the con-
centration of useful land in the hands of a few stronger farmers, dis-
possession of the weak, and proletarization or emigration of the latter. 5o
The process was accelerated by two factors: the impoverished gentry's
selling out, and the government's establishing a Peasants' Land Bank
to help the successful farmer. In the 1890's the economic situation
began to show great improvement, and even the social structure of the
country began to change.
By 1905, besides 26.S million acres of communal land, the Belo-
russian peasantry already owned privately 8 million acres. Soon the
large landownership had sunk from 48 to 27 million acres, and the
small farmers' holdings went up from 22 to 40.5 million acres. In 1911,
the average size of a peasant farm reached 48.6 acres. Five years later,
the Belorussian peasantry owned 92.9 per cent of all the sown area in
Smolensk, 91.8 in Vitebsk, 89.9 in Minsk, 86.9 in Mogilev, and 88.9
in Vilna provinces. Concurrently, 94.4 per cent of all horses, 94 per
cent of all cattle, 98.4 per cent of all sheep, and 97.4 per cent of all
pigs, were owned by peasants. While the sown area had decreased by
about 20 per cent since the abolition of serfdom, the over-all yield of
crops in 1913 was three times higher than that of 1860. By 1917 the
cycle had almost closed: large ownership (state, church, and gentry)

THE TRADITIONS 33
owned 9.3 per cent, and the individual farmers 90.7 per cent, of all
useful land in Belorussia. 51
Yet the picture was deceptive in many ways. While the number of
cattle had doubled, its proportion to the population remained about the
same as before. 52 Hardly 5,000 out of 800,000 farms used hired labor
for any length of time in the course of a year. 53 Only one farm out of
five owned more than one horse, and no mechanical power was used
anywhere except on a few large estates. The historian estimates that
only "61 per cent of the Belorussians occupied in agriculture could
indeed consider their position economically secure on the eve of the
Russian Revolution." 64 The ren1ainder of the Belorussian peasantry
formed the pauper class (batraki.) From 16.5 per cent in 1897, their
number had already grown to 26 per cent of the total rural popula-
tion of the country. About one third (37.3 per cent) found temporary
employment on farms; others went into day labor, or domestic service,
or simply hung around. 56 Presently, social and econolnic differences had
sharpened to a degree the Belorussian rural cOlnmunity had not known
before.
The Town
Unfortunately the city and the town were not able to absorb the
surplus manpower. Growing and prosperous in the sixteenth century,
the town had gone into a decline with the expansion of the "golden
liberties" of the rural gentry (szlachta). Landlords, envying and fear-
ing the successful burger, were trying to keep him down as a social
and, eventually, political menace. Townsmen were forbidden to wear
silk and furs, to drive in luxurious carriages, or to show any other
marks of social distinction. The policy of price ceilings, high tariffs,
and other restrictions ruined business. Theoretically, larger cities still
enjoyed the Magdeburg privileges, but the people sought in vain the
protection of the law. Squeezed between the manor and the village,
the urban middle class began rapidly to disintegrate and, in the course
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, thousands of urban families
emigrated abroad. 66
A century later there were hardly four hundred thousand inhabi-
tants in all the seventy-nine towns and cities of the Northwestern
Provinces, with one-eighth of that number in the city of Vilna alone.
In the small mestecko - half town, half village - the nonagricultural
population made up hardly 7 to 10 per cent of the total. The propor-
tion reached 13.4 per cent in 19 1 3, but one should not overlook the
fact that only seven out of seventy-six towns and cities registered at
that time could count more than two thousand families. 57 In the coun-
try the manor was either Polish or Russian, a few shopkeepers were
Jewish, and the mass of the population was the Belorussian-speaking

34 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
peasantry. In the towns that proportion was reversed. Indeed, the
urban community consisted almost entirely of non-Belorussian groups:
Russian officials, Polish gentry, Jewish businessmen, and a rather
small number of Belorussian-speaking workers and domestic servants.
In fact, the Jews made up 43.5 per cent of the total population in the
city of Vilna, 63.7 per cent in the city of Grodno, and up to 90 per
cent in lesser cities and towns.
The Jewish populations were not permitted agricultural occupa-
tion. Consequently, small trade and artisanship were almost entirely
in their hands. They lived in closed communities, cultivated Yiddish,
and did not mix freely with the gentiles unless educated in Russian
schools, which was not often the case. The poetry of Bialik, stories
by Sholem Asch, paintings by Marc Chagall and Mane Katz, give an
idea of their life in that part of Europe. 58 This lent a peculiar color
to the Belorussian mestecko, and often to larger cities. The traveler
was depressed by the view of dilapidated houses and slums on both
sides of the muddy street, dominated by a few official buildings and a
church. In larger cities, a few paved avenues and an anemic public
garden enlivened the landscape. Most townsmen kept a cow, a few
pigs, and some poultry in their back yards, and lived off their own
vegetable gardens all year round. In the business section one would
see a long row of untidy shops, basement stores, public stalls and
booths, and peddler stands "selling anything they had been able to
get hold of on a commission basis, and owning nothing." Even in Vilna
and in Minsk, "one could not find a single store which might deal in
anything else than the left-overs from Poland and Russia."
Somewhat contradicting this description is the fact that there were
as many as 35,308 licensed trade shops in 1908, with an annual turn-
over of 270,000,000 rubles, that is, about 7,600 rubles per shop. True,
the bulk of trade was concentrated in twenty-three cities or towns, and
the cities of Vitebsk, Vilna, and Minsk alone absorbed one-third of the
total. It is also significant that the total trade turnover was three times
as large as that of national industries. 59
Belorussian industry began in the eighteenth century when Count
Antonius Tiesenhausen started a textile plant in Grodno, which he
meant to be "a scientifically organized and managed enterprise." The
project came to employ 3,000 workers, but ended in "a tremendous
financial crash." Yet it greatly benefited the country in that several
foremen hired by Tiesenhausen in Europe remained in Belorussia after
the collapse of his enterprise. They offered their skills to the wealthy
landlords, and a few new industries appeared on private estates, some
of which have continued into the Soviet times simply changing the
title of ownership.60

THE TRADITIONS
35
Belorussia exported lumber, flax, and honey, and imported grain,
salt, herrings, finished products, and a few luxuries such as wine and
furs. The economy had a predatory character. Lumber was floated
down to the Baltic and Black Sea ports, while only 13 per cent of
the annual cut went to the country's own mills. a1 In fact, most local
industries consisted of small distilleries on private estates, a tiny glass
factory here, a textile workshop there. Only in the Grodno region were
there factories able to process 1,5°°,000 pounds of native wool. Before
the Revolution, Bialystok, a city with a population of 50,000, was the
industrial center of the country. Although the total production of native
industries reached 98,000,000 rubles in 1913, the per capita output
hardly exceeded 10 rubles, the equivalent of $5.00 at that time. 62
The general census of 1897 registered 20,000 rural artisans in the
six Belorussian provinces. Primitive in their equipment and technique,
they helped the farmer to continue in natural economy well past the
first years of the Soviet Revolution. In the meantime, the first groups
of urban proletariat began to form and, in 1913, they represented in
Belorussia about 3.5 per cent of the total number in the empire. Al-
though the tendency toward concentrating capital and production had
been growing in the empire, small industries prevailed in Belorussia.
On the eve of the Soviet Revolution, there were 10,000 industrial en-
terprises employing together fewer than 70,000 workers. On an aver-
age, the industrial manpower was distributed 6.56 men to one enter-
prise.
Industries were specialized in the following manner in MinsI{, Mogi-
lev, Vitebsk, and Smolensk provinces:
Per cent
.
tncrease
Industry Enterprises Workers since 1893
Food 4,016 10,007 3 6 . 6
Textiles 284 5,574 7 2 .7
"" ood 261 3,993 28 3.4
Minerals and ceramics 6 8 3 6,180 1 °7. 7
Paper 55 1,686 9 1 . 0
Animal Products 53 2 2,4 6 9 62.8
Chemicals 2,14° 3,735 243. 8
Metallurgy 3 1 1,355 166.1
Others 4S 1,23 6 77.4
Total 8,04 7 3 6 ,235
Altogether, the proportion of the population occupied in industry was
considerably smaller than in the whole of European Russia, where it
was 1.43 per cent of the total population. In Belorussia it did not ex-

36 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
ceed 0.5 per cent of the population, and it is significant that a con-
siderable proportion of that number were Russians. os
Except for an obscure agricultural college in Mogilev province,
there were no institutions of higher learning in the country before
the Revolution of 1917. Secondary schools followed the general
Russian pattern and existed in the larger cities only. Very few
in number, they were accessible only to the children of the better-off
families, while the Jews were subject to restriction irrespective of their
economic status. In the rural areas, schools were rare and what few
there were offered instruction in Russian, not in the native idiom. The
literacy rate for Belorussia was the lowest among the peoples of Euro-
pean Russia, though a few decades before the Revolution programs of
self-education and traveling libraries had been launched by rural co-
operatives in many.parts of the country.64 Poor communications and
the need of child labor on the farm limited their benefits. 65 In general,
cultural activities were concentrated in Vilna, Minsl{, and two or three
other cities, while the rest of the country dwelt in poverty, stagnation,
and indifference.
It will be useful to retain this picture while studying the currents
which stirred the Belorussian political waters.

3
THE ORIGINS
We generally think of a man's nationality as referring to a
given political state. But in central and eastern Europe the concept of
nationality is divorced from that of citizenship. Such current concepts
as the Carpatho-Russian, Lusatian Sorb, Lemko, Jewish, Gypsy, Cos-
sack, and other "nationalities" refer not to national status, but to
racial, tribal, linguistic, or other ethnic groups, and have reference to
the frame of mind rather than to political facts. The common terms
"Tatar nationality," "Ukrainian nation," and so on, simply point to a
different degree of group-consciousness in the process of self-determina-
tion which may eventually, though not necessarily, result in a separate
"statehood." 1
Belorussians have passed, in this respect, through the usual stages.
They first became conscious of their differences from others in their
spoken idiom, then in their customs and beliefs, and, finally, in their
historical origins. Along with the growing recognition of differences
jro1t others caIne the realization of a certain unity within the group.
But it was not primarily from immediate observations that the sense of
unity sprang. It was the awakened consciousness of history and mani-
fest destiny that became the force behind the movement. Indeed, mem-
ory of a common historical past has proven to be the most compelling
factor in promoting the movements of national self-determination
which have swept Europe in the course of the last hundred years. Where
the historical past was inadequate, appropriate myths have been cre-
ated to give the movement the meaning and dynamics of a national re-
vi val.
It is essential, therefore, to see what the modern Belorussian thinks
of his past and what, for that reason, he claims for the present and
expects from the future.
The Racial Theory
The Belorussians consider themselves the oldest and purest branch
of the Slav family, tracing their origins to three ancient Slavic tribes:

3 8 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
the Krivici, Dregovici and Radimici. These tribes, at the dawn of
history, lived in the upper reaches of the Western Dvina and the
Dnieper, and along the banks of the rivers Pripet and Sozh. They are
believed to have been the autochthonous population of present Belo-
russia, "having come from nowhere, and having mixed with no other
tribes." 2
Whether or not the Slavs were the original inhabitants of the
Dnieper valley is a controversial question. There is, however, no doubt
that the territory of Belorussia was settled in prehistoric times. Archeo-
logical investigations have uncovered numerous camps of neolithic man
in the vicinity of Vitebsk, Vilna, Minsl{, and Mogilev. In P'Olesie there
are remains of prehistoric pile dwellings. Soviet archeologists have
. discovered camps of the paleolithic period near Berdyz, in Gomel'
province (1926), and near Juravici on the Pripet near Mozyr' (1929);
still other findings have been more recently described. Not only was
the region inhabited in ancient times, but there is evidence that the
density of the prehistoric population was greater in this area than in
other parts of the Slavic East. 3
The question remains who these people were. Racial distinctions
for that period are not clear. Herodotus refers to the Budini, a people
dwelling in northern Scythia "in forests where there are large lakes,"
presumably the territory situated between the Pripet and Dnieper
rivers. Philologists believe that the word Budini is a variation of
V udini, Venedi, Veneti, Vendi, known to Tacitus and later identified
as Slavs (J ordanes, Fragonarius). Consequently, Niederle, Safarik,
and some other authorities regard the Budini as the most ancient of
Slavic tribes, who may indeed be the remote ancestors of the present
day Belorussians. 4
The antiquity of the Belorussian stock seems to be well established.
It is more difficult to demonstrate its purity. Modern Belorussian
writers contend that through their entire history of descent from the
first Slavs, "the Belorussians did not mix with other tribes." This, says
v
U. 1hnatouski, "was not true of the Great Russians and Ukrainians,
who lived under such circumstances that it was impossible for them to
keep their ancient ethnic type. . . But as far as the Belorussians
are concerned, we know that the Turko-Mongol avalanche did not
touch them, and they never lived with Finnish tribes as neighbors."
He concedes that "Lithuanian and Polish blood may have mixed
with the Belorussian," but this influence "was negligible" and, after
all, "the Lithuanians were Aryans like the Belorussians." One can see
in this a reflection of well-known Polish racial theories (Potocki, Du-
chinsk.i) advanced in the nineteenth century and revived in German
literature after World War 1. 5 The implications were not at first realized
in the USSR, and 1hnatouski's book, in spite of some factual errors,

THE ORIGINS
39
was recommended for use in the schools. In Poland, however, his con-
cepts were judged "no longer satisfactory to Belorussian society." When
the Soviets also 'realized their mistake, the historian paid with his life
for his excessive zeal in creating a national myth. {} .
The inflated nationalism strove to prove that the ancestors of the
Belorussian nation were not only the purest Slavs, but also the most
cultured Slavs. A serious obstacle, however, was the account of the
eleventh-century Kievan chronicler who described them as follows:
They lived in the forest like any wild beast, and ate unclean things.
They spoke obscenely before their fathers and their daughters-in-law. There
were no marriages among them, but simply festivals in the villages. The
people gathered together for games, for dancing and other devilish amuse-
ments, on which occasions the men carried off wives for themselves, and each
took any woman with whom he had arrived at an understanding. 7
Belorussian historians point to the fact that the same chronicler,
while "besmirching the cuI tural life of our ancestors," also indicated
the existence of many cities in the region, and that therefore "life was
not confined to the forest." Ancient foreign observers, including the
Byzantine writers and Arabian travelers, agree on this point. The city
of Polock is mentioned in the Scandinavian sagas. The city of Vilna
existed as early as the twelfth century, and Polish historians place its
founding in the tenth or even the ninth century. The city of Minsk
(Mensk, Menesk, Mines1\.) is first mentioned in the chronicles in
I066, but recent archeological findings point to its existence in pre-
historic times. Civilization of the cities situated along the Varangian
trade route cannot have been much different from that of Kiev or
N ovgorod. Evidence to this effect is found in excavations of countless
mounds. It has been said that "the objects found in burial mounds of
Polesie are made of more precious material, and are more varied in
form, more intricate and even more artistic than those of the present
day made by the people in the same region" (Zavitnevic). No modern
student will quarrel with the Belorussian historians on this point, al-
though he may not accept their far-reaching generalizations.
Along with the Budini, Herodotus also mentioned the Nervy, whom
Karski believes to have been Slavs and others consider Finns (Niederle,
Sachmatov). Noone, however, includes in the Slavic groupings the
Stavanes of Ptolemy, a tribe which lived "on the Boristhenes" (Dnie-
per). The Cimmerians - a race of mysterious origin - also dwelt in
this region, and they have left their traces in such Belorussian family
names and toponymies as Kimbary, Kimbarovici, Kimbarovl{a, and
others (0. Tatur). Non-Slavic tribes, like the J atvagi, roamed and
traded in the area. Huns and Goths also wandered through the land.
The Primary Chronicle mentions the Goliad', a non-Slavic people who

40 BELORUSSIA.' THE MAKING OF A NATION
lived between the Krivicans and Radimicans on the rivers Ugra and
Drotva. 8
The population of Belorussia was by no means homogeneous at the
time when its written history begins. Archeological findings indicate
that in the eighth to eleventh centuries at least two different races
lived in the area and buried their dead in the same graves. Later, Tatar
emigrants and prisoners of war settled in considerable numbers among
the Lithuanians and Belorussians, and many of their descendants may
be identified today. Czech, Polish, Russian and Ukrainian, Latvian,
German, and Greek traders and farmers settled in the country, and
the Jews formed majorities in many cities and towns. Indeed, a cur-
sory glance at history will show that in the areas which can1e later
to be called black and white Russia, Slavic blood was mixed with
Gothic, Tatar, Finnish, Lithuanian, Polish, Jewish, Swedish, and Ger-
man. In fact, physical anthropologists see in the Belorussians as many
as nine different racial strains.
The racial theory nevertheless has been revived in postwar Belo-
russian literature. The writers (in exile) insist that the Belorussians
represent "a pure Balto-Slavic blend," possibly with "some Germanic
(N ordic) admixture"; that their biological structure has determined
the people's "national character and mentality," and that it may ex-
plain their ('political sympathy for the Baltic States" (Scandinavia,
Latvia, Lithuania) on the one hand, and their "historical aversion" for
Russia and Ukraine on the other. 9
The Polotian Rus - Legend and History
In the middle ages, the Eastern Slavs were known as Rus', a term
which included both the people and the country. In Latin documents,
the land was referred to as Russia, sometimes as Ruthenia or Russinia.
When a more specific geographical or ethnic designation was necessary,
the name of the principal city was used: Kievan Rus', Polotian Rus',
Novgorodian Rus', Muscovite Rus', and so on. In time, the city prin-
cipalities became so numerous that they lost all significance as political
divisions. Then new terms appeared to designate larger regions, or old
terms assumed a broader meaning.
Western Russia, before it came to be called "white," was thus
referred to as Polotian Russia, from Polock, its strongest and most ad-
vanced principality. In the Nikon chronicle there is a statement to the
effect that in the ninth century two Scandinavian knights, Askold and
Dir, conq.uered Polocl{ and wreaked havoc on its inhabitants. From
this, the Belorussian historian has deduced that "the legend that the
Varangians were invited to rule over the Slavs does not apply to us."
Unlike Novgorod, the land of Polock "did not need help from strangers
to put their house in order." 10

THE ORIGINS 41
In the last quarter of the tenth century, Rogvolod (Ragnvald, in the
Scandinavian sagas) ruled over Polock. The chronicle contains no in-
formation regarding the origin of this prince. It is not known whether
he was a direct descendant of the local ruling house or whether he was
himself a Varangian. Dovnar-Zapolski, who admits that Rogvolod
probably was a Varangian, believes that he could not have been a
member of the house of Rurik. Indeed, the Russian Primary Chronicle
tells us that in 860-862 [Rurik] "assigned cities to his followers, Polock
to one, Rostov to another . . ." It might very well be that not all
of the retainers of Rurik were of Scandinavian origin; the old docu-
ments supply no evidence either way.I1
Prince Vladimir of Kiev, a descendant of Rurik, killed Rogvolod
and his sons, but married his daughter, Rogneda (Ragnheid). Four
sons and two daughters were born of this marriage. The oldest son was
Iziaslav. According to tradition, Rogneda attempted to kill Vladimir at
night to revenge the death of her father. ("It is evident that it was
not completely safe for a Russian prince to keep even his wife near
him, if she was from Polock," remarked a Belorussian historian.)
Vladimir seized his sword, but the young Iziaslav took the part of his
mother. Delighted at the daring of the child, Vladimir gave him the
principality of Polock, and the princes of Polock. from that time on
all were known as "sons of Iziaslav" or "grandsons of Rogvolod," as
distinguished from the house of Rurik elsewhere in Russia.
Kiev was given by Vladimir to his son Jaroslav, born of a different
mother. Wars between the "sons of Iziaslav" and the "sons of Jaroslav"
ensued and went on for several centuries. The Belorussian historian
Ihnatouski insists on the "dynastic difference," and notes it as late as
the fourteenth century.
Thus the "first independent Belorussian State" was created (Ihna-
touski) . Under V sesla v (1044-1 101) it grew rich and expanded at the
expense of its weaker neighbors. Trade relations were maintained with
Greeks, Arabs, Scandinavians, and Germans. Wars with Kiev and
Novgorod on the one hand, and with Livonia on the other, continued
with varying success. J aroslav twice drove Vseslav from Polock. But
Vseslav, described in the "Tale of Igor" as a king vested with
magic powers, managed to return to his native city. He ruled for fifty-
seven years, and after his death Polotian Rus' went into decline. In
1084, the wars of Vladimir Monomach destroyed Minsk, "leaving
neither calf nor cow, but only charred ruins." Finally, Prince Mstislav
of Kiev drove out the Iziaslav dynasty and installed his own sons and
relatives as rulers. The land deteriorated and the cities were deserted.
The peasantry were taken into slavery and sold on the markets of
other Slavic principalities, and in Greece and in Asia. But in 1132
the citizens of Polock rose and drove out the "foreign princes." The

4 2 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
popular assell1bly (vece) called back the Iziaslav dynasty, the ((grand-
sons of Rogvolod." After the death of Vseslav II, the people, reluctant
to have another prince, selected thirty elders and turned the principality
into a republic (ca. I 190)' About this, the historical sources agree.
Belorussian writers, however, insist that the tradition of the vece
was particularly strong in the Polock land. As a matter of historical
fact, written evidence of the vece is scant, and the city of Polock occu-
pies no prominent place in it. It is also doubtful that the wars of that
time were "wars of political independence," since each faction fought
for its own local prince, and there were in the twelfth century as many
as fourteen independent princes in the Minsk region alone. The con-
sciousness of being Belorussian, or even of being Polotian in a broader
sense, could not, of course, have existed in that period. 12
Historical skepticism of this nature, however, is powerless to affect
a national myth. Belorussian historians cling to a theory that may be
summed up as follows:
I. A thousand years ago the Belorussian people were already politi-
cally independent.
2. The tenth to thirteenth centuries were a period of struggle be-
tween the native Polock dynasty and the predatory Princes of I(iev,
"foreigners by blood and in custom."
3. This period was distinguished by an unusual cultural develop-
ment in the territory of Polock. The twelfth century produced the
glorious names of Euphrosyne (Pradslava) of Polocl{, Clement Smo-
liatie, Cyril of Turov, Abraham of Smolensl{, and other writers. Local
monasteries, libraries, and luxuries were not inferior to those of Kiev
and Novgorod. Indeed, for two centuries Polotian Russia was "the
center of Eastern Slavic culture."
4. The earliest period of Belorussian history was characterized by
the dominance of "democratic ideas" in the societal structure of the
country; there were "no class divisions and struggle, and the keynote
of the period was social equality." "We know of no other Slavic tribe
in which these characteristics were so well developed as in our own
ancestors," says Dovnar-Zapolski.
For many years such a concept of early Belorussian history was
taught in schools in both eastern and western Belorussia. Eventually
it was replaced by textbooks more congenial to the Soviet and Polish
political theories respectively. After World War II, it was revived
with new vigor by Belorussian emigrants from both the Soviet Union
and Poland. Is
The Lithuanian-Russian State
The Belorussian interpretation of the next historical period, the
fourteenth to eighteenth centuries, is rejected by the Poles, half-

THE ORIGINS
43
heartedly accepted by the Lithuanians, and supported, with some
reservations, by the Russians.
West of the land of Polocl{ dwelt the Lithuanians, wild and pagan
tribes. They successfully resisted Christianization by both the Germans
and the Poles, and in the thirteenth century they became politically
organized. Their princes, although illiterate and uncouth, were daring
and shrewd military leaders. They invaded the land of the Krivicans,
annexed Vitebsk, and took a number of other old Russian cities. The
city of Polock regained its independence from the Lithuanians, but then
fell for a time into German hands. When the Germans attempted to
impose the Roman Catholic faith on the. Orthodox population, the
latter turned to the pagan Lithuanians for assistance. The Lithuanians
obliged and conquered Polocl{ from the Germans. What happened im-
mediately after that is not clear. But at the end of the fourteenth cen-
tury the entire land of Polocl{ was annexed to Lithuania. Other Rus-
sian lands were incorporated later, and soon the new Lithuanian-
Russian state reached its greatest extent (1350-1430).
By the middle of the fifteenth century it included the following
cities and lands: Vilna, Grodno, Kovno, Suvalki, Podolie, V olyn',
Minsk, Mogilev, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Kiev, Cernigov, Ekaterinos1av,
Cherson, Ore1, and parts of Kaluga and Tula; the political boundary
stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and the easternmost
Lithuanian posts were situated only sixty-five miles from Moscow.
The Belorussian historians claim that the western Russian princi-
palities united with Lithuania of their own free will- either by dy-
nastic marriages or by agreements made to protect themselves "from
their restless and greedy eastern neighbors"; at any rate, they were not
"conquered" by the Lithuanians (Dovnar-Zapolski). Indeed, many
Russian princes and their bodyguards sought refuge at the Lithuanian
court. The very growth of a political state "in dark pagan Lithuania
was inspired by the Russian emigrants of that time" (Ihnatouski).
There is truth, though perhaps not the whole truth, in this story.
The Lithuanians lived in the forests on the lower Niemen, the lower
Dvina, and their tributaries. 14 They were organized in small clans,
gathering together from time to time for military campaigns, or to
defend themselves against their neighbors. In the middle of the thir-
teenth century, Prince Mindovg (Mindaugas) stood at the head of
the decimated, badly organized tribes. It is quite probable that emi-
grants and refugees from West Russia, who were better educated and
more experienced in military matters, actually aided the unification
and construction of the Lithuanian power. In fact, it expanded more
rapidly than could possibly be warranted by the primitive culture and
the numerical strength of the people. At the time of Grand Duke
Olgerd (Algirdas), Lithuanians constituted only "one-fifth of the

44 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
whole population of the state." A few decades later their rule extended
over all the cities formerly held by the "sons of Iziaslav," as well
as the southern patrimonies of the "sons of ]aroslav." Eventually,
Russian lands constituted nine-tenths of the territory of the Grand
Duchy. In order to manage this vast Slavic world, the Lithuanians
themselves adopted "Russian culture. and the Russian language." 15
In 1323 the Lithuanian capital was moved from Novogrodek
(N ovgorodok) to Vilna. The city was divided into five sections. The
Russians occupied the center and the eastern, or "the greatest and
the best parts" of the city; the Lithuanians dwelt in the north, the
Germans and Jews in the west; and "merchants of all nationalities had
their places of business in the southern part of the city." A traveler
described the capital as being "as large as the city of Cracow in Poland,
with houses built among orchards and vegetable gardens, and with two
strong fortresses, one on the top of the hill, and another down in the
valley; Tatar settlers live in the suburbs which are assigned to them;
they cultivate their land in our fashion and also trade in the city al-
though they speak their own tongue and believe in Mohammed." 16
The capital reflected the multinational character of the state, and
the Belorussian historians insist that "our ancestors, the most advanced
element in the city, occupied a prominent place in the political and
economic life of the country." They even believe that "the ruling
class of the state was not native Lithuanian, but rather was descended
from those Russian princes who, at the beginning of the previous
period, fled to Lithuania to avoid the confusion which prevailed in
Polotian Russia at that time" (Ihnatouski). It was indeed true that
Russian was the official language of the Lithuanian state, that Russians
had political equality with Lithuanians, and that Grand Duke Olgerd
called himself Rex Litvinorum Ruthenofumque. Western Russian prin-
cipalities maintained their traditional individuality and government,
which was guaranteed by charters: "The monarch will not destroy
the old, nor introduce anything new."
It seemed that Russia was at that time growing west, not east, of
the Muscovite border. "Russian letters and arts were blooming in
Vilna, and peace and freedom reigned there" - while !(iev lay in
ruins, N ovgorod was torn by internal dissensions and Moscow still
struggled under the Tatar yoke. The state was Lithuanian "in name
only." 17
Whether the western Russian lands were incorporated into the
Grand Duchy by violence or by consent, is irrelevant. Actually no
single pattern of expansion could have accounted for the rapid growth
of the new state. The Lithuanian princes were excellent military
leaders as well as shrewd politicians. What is important is that the
Russian-Lithuanian union broke the traditional ties politically and

THE ORIGINS
4S
culturally uniting eastern Slavdom. The Russian nation was now form-
ing around two political centers, Vilna and Moscow.
Lithuania and Poland
By the Krevo Act of 1385 the Lithuanian-Russian state was joined
to the kingdom of Poland, which union was sealed by the marriage
of Olgerd's son, the Grand Duke Jagiello, to Queen Jadwiga of Poland.
Jagiello, son of a Lithuanian father and a Russian mother (Princess
Yuliana of Tver), gave his written bond that he would unite his pos-
sessions forever with those of Poland, be baptized into the Roman
Catholic faith, and have his subjects baptized. Legally, "the Lithuanian-
Russian state seemed to have disappeared completely as an independent
entity, and to have become part of the Polish political system"
( Ihnatouski ) .
Only a few nobles and princes, however, not even all the brothers
of Jagiello, accepted the Roman faith. The country as a whole re-
jected their lead and the Russian lands remained Orthodox, the
Lithuanian, pagan. Eventually, King Jagiello was forced to allow the
Grand Duchy to retain its political freedom. In 1388 he gave the
Lithuanian throne to his brother Skirgailo, a man of Russian cul-
ture. Four years later, Prince Vitovt (Vytautas), cousin and life-long
rival of Jagiello, allied hin1self with the Germans and besieged Vilna.
In order to assure his own safety and peace, the King was forced to
give the Grand Duchy away to Vitovt in exchange for a rather vague
promise that Lithuania would "assist Poland with arms when and if
need should arise" (Act of Ostrov, 1392). Skirgailo was moved to
Kiev, and after his death Vitovt annexed his lands as well.
It is true that in 1410, Vitovt, fresh from a Tatar defeat on the
river V orskla, recognized his subservience to the Polish king and prom-
ised that the Grand Duchy would be returned "after his death." Vic-
tory over the Germans at Gruenwalden (1410) again changed the situa-
tion. In 1413, at the Conference of Horodlo, it was mutually recognized
that Lithuania and Poland were each sovereign states, and that the
Grand Duk.e was equal to the King in dignity, honor and power. A
Lithuanian Council of State (Rada) was established, similar to, but in
no way dependent on, the Polish Senate. The dynastic bond was inter-
preted as follows: if Vitovt died first, Jagiello was to succeed him on
the Lithuanian Russian throne; if Jagiello died first, Vitovt, and not
Jagiello's son, would succeed him as King of Poland; after the death
of both, the dynastic union would continue, but it simply would bind
Lithuania "not to choose a Grand Duke without the consent of the
Polish King," and the Poles "not to elect a King without the advice
of Lithuania." Eligible candidates, of course, were understood to be
confined to the House of Jagiello.

4 6 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
The Russian lands of the Grand Duchy were ignored by the Charter
and, in fact, no Russian prince and not a single noble of the Greek
Orthodox faith was invited to the Conference at Horodlo. Presniakov
interprets this fact in the sense that the West Russian principalities
were united to Lithuania in the person of the Grand Duke, and were
not considered as incorporated into the State. iS
The clauses of the Horodlo Charter, however, were not long ob-
served by the Lithuanians. After Vitovt's death, they elected Svidri-
gailo, brother of Jagiello, to the ducal throne, and in so doing did not
ask the advice of the Poles. An armed conflict loomed, and hostilities
had already begun when Svidrigailo was assassinated. He was suc-
ceeded by Vitovt's younger brother, Sigismund I. The dynastic tie with
Jagiello's house was not restored until 1440, when Jagiello's younger
son, Kasin1ir, well known for his interest in Russian language and
letters, was elected to succeed Sigismund I. With I(asimir's subsequent
election to the Polish throne, the union with Poland become personal
again. Once more it was disrupted after his death and restored a decade
later by his son Alexander. The only political tie that endured was the
fact that constantly the Lithuanian Grand Dul{es were elected Kings of
Poland. *
During this period, several attempts were made to bring both
countries closer together, notably in 14 01 , 14 1 3, 1447, 145 1 , 1453,
150r, 1564, and 1567. The dates show that, under threat from Moscow
or Livonia, Lithuania moved closer toward union, but as soon as the
danger vanished, she returned again to the old order. When, in 150r, a
treaty was concluded in Melnil{ providing that the joint ruler of
both states should be chosen by a common assembly (sejm), the
Lithuanians refused to ratify the act and repudiated the ambassadors
who had signed it. The principle of sovereignty and independence was
solemnly confirmed in the ((privileges" of 1492 and 1506, and was
embodied in the constitutional law of r529, which is known as the
First Lithuanian Statute. The law was revised and expanded in 1564-
15 66 (Second Lithuanian Statute), and Sigismund II August took an
oath binding himself and his successors to recognize the autonomy of
the Grand Duchy with its own government, money, army, and laws.
For 184 years, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, while acknowledging
* The Lithuanian and Polish successions ,vere as follows:
Russian-Lithuanian State Kingdont of Poland
Vitovt (Vytautas), 1392-143° } . .
Svidrigailo, 1430- 1 43 2 J aglello- Wladlsla,v II, 13 86 - 1 434
Sigismund I, 1432-144° Wladislaw III, 1434-1444
Kasimir I, 144°-1492 as Kasimir IV, 1447-1492
Al d 6 { Jan-Albrecht, 149 2 - 1 5°1
exan er, 149 2 - 1 50 Alexander, 1501-1506
Sigismund II, 1506-1548 as Sigismund I, 1506-1548
Sigismund III August, 1548-1572 as Sigismund II August, 1548-1572

THE ORIGINS
47
a common dynasty with Poland, had successfully defended its political
and cultural independence. 1o The year 15 6 9 was a turning point. In
that year, Sigismund II August forced Lithuania formally to renounce
her independence.
The Lublin Union
The significance of the Lublin Act is a point of sharp dispute among
Polish, Russian, Lithuanian and Belorussian scholars. The Poles main-
tain that the two powers merged voluntarily into one, with a single
government, and Polish literature praises Sigismund for his wisdom
in bringing about the unification to the advantage of both countries.
The meager accounts of the Lublin meeting which appear in Polish
chronicles corroborate this view, and it has become generally accepted
in Western Europe. Consequently, during the Polish revolt of 1830-31,
Polish en1igres in Paris contended that "all these lands, under the ban-
ner of Poland, have for centuries constituted a national and political
whole, unquestioned and unquestionable." The theory still holds that
"a community of spirit, customs, and historical traditions" con-
tinued to exist "throughout the partition of the common fatherland"
up to our time. Today, it forms the basis of Polish claims to the terri-
tories of historic Lithuania, including the city of Vilna and the western
parts of Belorussia and Ukraine.
For son1e tin1e this interpretation was also accepted by Russian
statesmen and scholars. Reversing policies of Catherine II, the Em-
peror Paul I inaugurated a process of re-Polonization of the provinces
torn from Poland-Lithuania by his mother. Under Alexander I, the city
of Vilna became a center of Polish culture, and the education of the
natives was entrusted to the Poles. The geography textbook required
in Russian schools read that the Poles constituted "the absolute major-
ity of the populations in the Kingdom of Poland, and in the provinces
which have been detached from it" (K. Arseniev). Subsequently, how-
ever, documents unearthed from the Lithuanian archives brought forth
a new historical view. 20 .
As early as the 1840's Salvandi noted: "The Lithuanians signed
the Act of Union for exactly the same reasons that they raised walls
and built fortresses around Vilna. Nevertheless . . . the two states
and their courts stood as far apart as ever." 21
What did actually happen in Lublin in I569? Pressed by the
"Muscovite expansion under the terrible Tsar Ivan IV," the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania "overcame the ancient antipathy . . . and under-
took the obligation of not separating its fate from that of Poland"
(Salvandi). The two states were welded into one under the name
Rzecz Pospolita Polska, that is, Polish "Republic," or, as it is some-
times translated now, Polish "Commonwealth." The head of the new

4 8 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
political entity was to bear the title "King of Poland and Grand Duke
of Lithuania and Russia." He was to be elected by representatives of
the Commonwealth assembled in Warsaw, and crowned at Cracow.
Consequently, the Lithuanian and Russian gentry lost the right both
to elect separately the Grand Duke and to hold separate assembly
(sejm). From then on, only the common (spolny) Sejm would exist,
convening in Poland. Furthermore, all decrees and laws in force in
the territory of the Grand Duchy which were not in accord with the
act of Union were to be repealed. First of these to go were the re-
strictions concerning the acquisition of real estate and the holding of
office by Poles. The political boundary and the tariff barriers between
the states were abolished. The territories of Volyn', Podolie, and Polesie
were separated from the Grand Duchy and declared "lands of the
Crown," that is, incorporated into Poland proper, while Livland was
to become dependent on both the Kingdom and the Grand Duchy.
The rights and privileges of the Lithuanian Russian nobility and lower
gentry were confirmed by the I(ing-Grand Duke, and a uniform cur-
rency was introduced into the whole territory of the "Commonwealth."
The minutes of the Lublin Sejm present a dralnatic picture of the
debates. Lithuanian-Russian delegates were humiliated and distressed.
Their representative, J an Chodkiewicz, delivered a speech during which
"even the Polish delegates were moved to tears." But the Polish nobility
and gentry were adamant. The treaty was concluded "forever," without
time limit or right to revoke. Actually, it was an act of "forcible incor-
poration into the Kingdom of Poland." 22
The Thitd Lithuanian Stat'ute
Forced to accept the Polish terms, the Grand Duchy did every-
thing possible to nullify them in practice. Hardly had the delegates re-
turned to Vilna when the State Council (Rada) demanded the return
of lands annexed by the Polish Crown. The Grand Duchy was even on
the point of backing the demand with force, but it was discouraged by
the general political situation which promised no chance f winning
a war against Poland. The country had no choice but to accept the
territorial losses, but it was still unwilling to renounce its liberties.
A committee presided over by the Bishop of Vilna, and composed of
representatives of the nobility and townsmen, was set up immediately
(1569) to revise the terms of the Union. At first Poland's strength and
Lithuania's weakness did not favor their task. But, in I584, at the
Conference of Vilna a new constitutional law for the Grand Duchy
(Third Lithuanian Statute) was presented to replace "the hun1iliating
clauses" of the Act of Lublin. King Stephan Batory accepted it and
promised to support it before the Spolny Sejm. He died before he was
able to. take action.

THE ORIGINS 49
The interregnum which followed gave a new opportunity to the
Lithuanians. They demanded that the promise of the late king be
fulfilled and the Act of Lublin revoked. The Poles refused. The Vilna
government then presented the Poles with a fait accomPli. Acting as if
there were no Union at all, they began negotiations for peace with
Moscow, and for election of the Muscovite Tsar Fedor Ivanovich to
the Grand Dukedom. In the meantime, the Polish Sejm selected two
kings at the same time, Sigismund of Vasa and Maximilian of Habs-
burg (1587). Lithuania did not recognize either of them, but sent am-
bassadors to both, informing them of Lithuanian demands (Vilna Con-
ference of November 8). Sigismund defeated Maximilian in the battle
of Byczyna and ascended the Polish throne. At his coronation, a
Lithuanian embassy again presented the November demands before
recognizing him as Grand Duke, and Sigismund, weakened in the
internecine war, accepted. The Third Lithuanian Statute restoring
the pre-Lublin liberties was immediately enacted in Vilna (15 88 ) .23
Supported by the k.ing and bearing his signature and seal, the
statute did not receive the consent of the Poles. Poland, however, was
not in a position to enforce the Lublin Act. It remained on paper, and
the Third Lithuanian Statute became the actual law of the territory of
the Grand Duchy.
Although the Statute of 1588 did not assert claim to the lands
surrendered to Poland at Lublin, Articles I, IV, and V affirmed the
sovereignty of the Grand Duchy as a state independent fron1 Poland,
and guaranteed its territorial integrity. Polish nationals were again
forbidden to own real estate and to hold office in the Grand Duchy.
The law, in fact, treated them as foreigners without the rights or
privileges of citizens. The statute further outlined the basic political
structure of the state, governed by the Grand Duke together with the
representatives of the people (Rada). It codified fundamental laws,
organized the administration and the courts, revised the civil and
criminal codes, and introduced legal procedures, quite independently
of Polish law. The Spolny Sejm of the Polish-Lithuanian-Russian
"Commonwealth" established in 1569, was transformed into a Con-
ference between two sovereign states, presided over by the common
monarch. The Conference was to meet alternately in Poland and
Lithuania. The Lithuanian Russian delegates also had the right to
meet separately, and they did so throughout the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries until the time of the Partition. Laws affecting both
countries were enacted separately in the kingdom and in the grand
duchy. Power was exercised in Poland in the name of the king, and
in Lithuania in the name of the grand duke. Command of the armies
was separate. In fact, the Lithuanians often threatened military de-
fense of their rights against the Poles.

50 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
For two centuries, there were no common ministers either for in-
ternal or foreign affairs; no common military command, except the
monarch himself; and no common superior court. Actually, the King
of Poland was Grand Duke of Lithuania not ex officio but by separate
election by the Lithuanian people. When the King-Grand Duke re-
sided in Poland, he was surrounded by Polish ministers and his Polish
court, and his ambassadors represented hin1 in Lithuania. When he
moved to Lithuania, the Lithuanians formed his court; Poles were left
in Warsaw and their an1bassadors came to Vilna on state business.
The boundaries between the kingdom and the grand duchy were re-
established and jealously observed. They were checked several times
by mixed commissions of both states. In fact, and in law, the Third
Lithuanian Statute abolished the "Commonwealth" and restored the
earlier personal union under the King-Grand Duk.e. In the middle of
the seventeenth century, even this union was threatened as the grand
duchy contemplated the dissolution of the dynastic tie with Poland
in favor of a similar union with Moscow or with Sweden.
The political independence of the Grand Duchy was well known
in the Slavic east. Moscow diplomacy in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries kept the two states meticulously separate and pursued dif-
ferent policies toward them.
The first common executive organ for Poland and Lithuania was
the Commission for Popular Education, founded in 1773. But even this
became possible solely because the Commission "did not have the
character of a state power" and was only a "legal entity" to which
was entrusted the management of property formerly belonging to
Jesuit educational institutions (Kutrzeba). It is worth noting that
this occurred in the period between the first and second partitions of
Poland. A year later, the Permanent Conference (Rada Nieustajqca)
was set up to coordinate better the policies of both states. Even the.
Polish historian has recognized that only the Constitution of May 3,
1791, fully embodied the idea of Polish Lithuanian Union (Kutrzeba).
That constitution was annulled by the Targowice Confederation
(1792 ), and thus it became merely a document "expressing the plans
and wishes of a part of the gentry in a country already in its death
throes" (Lappo).
Although the enactment of the Third Lithuanian Statute was a
unilateral decision, and the Lublin Act was never repealed, it is evi-
dent that the fusion of the Polish Kingdom and the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania projected in 1569 was, as a practical matter, never consum-
mated. But however unsuccessful or incomplete the Union may have
been politically, it undoubtedly paved the way for cultural absorption
of the country by Poland. 24

4
BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE EAST
In the Grand Duchy of Lithuania neither the government nor the
population was interested in the promotion of Lithuanian letters. 1
Russian was the official language of the state, confirmed in the fol-
lowing terms: "The scribe shall write legal acts with Russian charac-
ters and in Russian words only, and not in any other tongue or idiom." 2
There \vere n1any reasons for adopting Russian as the language of
public affairs. For one thing, it was the language of the large eastern
dependencies. The Germans in the west were the common enemy. The
Poles, though less aggressive, blocked the way for expansion to the
south. On the other hand, the Russians, torn by internecine wars in
their own principalities or threatened with invasions from the east,
often sought Lithuanian protection and alliance, offering the Lithu-
anian princes their swords, higher culture, and daughters in marriage.
The n1atrimonial policy was by no means a negligible factor in the
territorial expansion of the Grand Duchy. Princes Mindovg, Gedemin,
Olgerd, and Vitovt all had Russian wives. Olgerd married a daughter
of the Prince of Vitebsk after whose death he became Prince of Vitebsk
himself. In a like manner, his brother Lubart became Prince of V olyn.
Olgerd's second wife was Yuliana of Tver. Vitovt married Anna
of Smolensk.. Finally, Grand Duke Alexander married Elena, daugh-
ter of Ivan III of Moscow. Toward the end of the fifteenth cen-
tury, no fewer than sixteen Russian women were married to Lithu-
anian princes. There is no historical evidence that Russian wives were
forced to learn Lithuanian. They brought with them to Lithuania their
own servants and friends, and Russian was spok.en both in the home
and at the court.
According to the Gusyn' chronicle under the year 1246, Grand
Duke Mindovg and his boyars were the first to adopt the Christian
faith. 'Vhether this was of the Orthodox or the Roman rite is contro-
versial. Orthodoxy, however, was making more converts an10ng the
Lithuanian nobility, for, once the Russian idiom was mastered, it was
more natural to worship God in Slavic than in Latin. True, the Chris-

52 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
tian zeal of the early Lithuanian converts has been doubted by his..
torians. But it is significant that Mindovg tried and Vitovt succeeded,
if only ten1porarily, in establishing an autonomous Orthodox Church in
their lands (1416), and that the Lithuanian religious terminology has
preserved until now traces of its Rusian origins.
Western Russian - Francis Skaryna
For centuries West Russian writings formed a common stock with
the literature of Kiev, N ovgorod, and Moscow. There is a distinction,
however, between religious and secular writings. '¥hile the former
long remained uniform for all the Eastern Slavs, the latter soon began
to absorb the local peculiarities of the common speech. Indeed, the
legal acts and documents show considerable differences in the spoken
idioms of Vilna, Smolensk, Novgorod, Lvov, and Moscow as early
as the thirteenth century.3 In the fifteenth century, elements of the
western vernaculars can already be found in both secular and religious
literature. vVritings become invaded with words and phrases borrowed
from Czech and Polish, and sometin1es from German and Lithuanian.
Finally, West Russian became "one of the most distasteful mix...
tures one can imagine" (Bodianski) . Yet. the natives continued to call
it Russian, considering it a more advanced and elegant form than that
used in Moscow and Kiev at that time.
In Moscow they described the language as Lithuanian, in order
to distinguish it from their own form of Russian. In the Ukraine, its
written form was l{nown as Russian, and the vernacular as Lithuanian.
The Poles referred to both by either nan1e. The term Lithuanian, of
course, referred to the geographical location of the idiom, which, in
fact, was Russian. Local scholars Lavrenti Zizani (Vilna, 1596) and
Meleti Smotricl{i (Evje, 1619) gave it a grammatical organization
which was used in all Russia until the Lomonosov reform (1755).
In 1483 the first Russian printing press was set up in Cracow, and
in the same year the first Russian printed book, the Cvetnaja Triad',
appeared. Belorussian historians like to stress the fact that this hap...
pened "exactly twenty-eight years after the first Bible was printed in
Nuremberg, twenty-two years before the first Polish, and eighty years
before the first Russian book came off press in Moscow" (Lastouski).
Four more bool{s were printed there before 1491, but circumstances
were not very favorable to Cyrillic printing in the Polish city. Con-
sequently, literary activities moved to Bohemia where a Lithuanian
College founded by Queen Jadwiga had existed since 1397. There
Francis Sl{oryna published his Russian version of the Bible, using the
famous Venetian edition for the vernacular translations (15 I 7). Since
Francis Skoryna was the first to introduce West Russian provincialisms

BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE EAST 53
into a religious text, he is considered "the father of West Russian liter-
ature. "
Skoryna was born about 1490 in "the glorious city of Polock." into
a family of well-to-do merchants and was baptized into the Greek Ortho-
dox faith. 4 Polock was at that time one of the wealthiest cities in the
country, paying to the state treasury an annual tax of 400 kop hrosej,
while the city of Minsk (present capital of Belorussia) paid only 60. 5
Francis received his education first in Vilna, then in Cracow, Prague,
and Padua, and, after extensive travel abroad, returned to his native
land with a Medical Doctor's degree. His vernacular translation of the
Bible was reprinted in Vilna by the brothers Mamonic, who set up the
first printing press there in 1525. Skoryna subsequently abandoned
n1edicine and dedicated himself entirely to translations of religious
texts into "the simple Russian language." His purpose was to make
them more comprehensible to the common man, "since even many of
the clergy were no longer able to understand Church Slavonic very
well." 6
The demand for literature in the vernacular soon became very great.
Printing presses sprang up in Polock, Minsk, Mogilev, Nesviz, Zaslavl',
Evje, Suporosl', and other places. There were about forty at one time.
1"'he books were translations of religious and secular works fron1 Church
Slavonic, Czech, Polish, Latin, and German, and soon some original
works, written or compiled by local clergy, merchants, and gentry, ap-
peared. The gentry were engaged primarily in polemical literature
directed now against Poland, now against Moscow, and showing strong
Russian Lithuanian patriotism. 7
Religious works, of course, were more conservative in style than the
secular writings. Legal acts and documents were particularly free from
conventional bonds. The "Magna Charta" (Zemskie privilei, 1457)
and the Common Law Code (Sudebnik, 1468) are stamped with dif-
ferences in vocabulary and syntax which received literary recognition
only a century later. The chancellery style and the literary style, how-
ever, interacted in spite of the efforts to l{eep them apart. Intercourse
with the Western powers was increasing and new ideas were invading
the country. Terms for their expression in Russian had to be borrowed
from the Western languages, particularly from Polish, since most for-
eign contacts came to the Grand Duchy through Poland. Already
Skoryna's translations were marked with "barbarisms" inacceptable in
any other part of the Slavic East. s Eventually West Russian naturaIly
becalne that "distasteful mixture" which shocked the Russian purists
(Bodiansl{i, Holovacki, Sreznevski), and permitted the Poles to treat
Belorussian as tak bardzo do Polszcyzny zblizony dyalekt. *
* "A dialect so closely related to Polish," S. B. Linde, Pamitnik Warszawski, V
(1816),126.

54 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
Religious St1'uggles
Under Sigismund II August, the ideas of Martin Luther spread
rapidly in the Grand Duchy in spite of the violent opposition from both
the Roman Catholic and the Greek Orthodox churches. The ground
was well prepared by earlier contacts with Central Europe. The Magde-
burg Statute granted to the Russian Lithuanian cities in the course of
the fifteenth century,* and certain privileges granted to the Jews in
1388, had created a rather strong and independent economic middle
class. Their youth used to go 'Vest for education, if only for a few
years. Typical were the stories of Michail Glinski, who spent twelve
years studying luilitary art in the armies of Albrecht of Saxony and
Emperor Maximilian, of Ivan Sapieha in Rome, and of Prince Svirski,
Francis Skoryna, and others who were granted academic degrees in
Cracow, Prague, Padua, lena, or Paris. These became zealous advo-
cates of the Western way of life.
Interrupted by wars, contacts with N ovgorod and Moscow would
often cease for decades. With its decrease in the East, cultural and
business intercourse developed in the West. Poland and Lithuania of-
fered a most cordial hospitality to the Hussites and, later, to other
Christian heretics. Then, the Reformation can1e like a wind sweeping
the country. The young Grand Duke corresponded with Zwingli, Luther,
Calvin, and Melanchthon, and subn1itted a petition to Pope Paul IV to
permit church services in Russian. Rejection by Rome led to an open
revolt against the Catholic Church.
The closest friends and advisers of Sigismund II August, Prince
Nikolai Radzivill, nicknamed "the Black," and his cousin Nikolai "the
Red," whose sister was married to the Grand Duke, both went over to
Protestantism with their families and all their servants. They founded
an evangelical c4urch in Vilna and chapels with parsonages on their
country estates in Nesviz, Olyka, Kleck, Brest, and other places. A
printing press was established in Nesviz to reprint Calvin's works. The
Radzivills were followed by Kiska, Chodl{evic, Sapieha, Pac, V olovic,
Visnevecki, Oginski, Gorsl{i, and other lords and magnates who only
recently were the pillars of either Orthodoxy or Catholicism. The Chan-
cellor Jan Kiska took to Unitarianism, sparing neither time nor money
in the teaching of Socinus.
This period was marked by an increase in the use of the vernacular,
which in turn was invaded by foreign words and phraseology. The
Catechism published by Simeon Budny in Nesviz (1562) contained
the most venomous attacks on both the Greek Orthodox and the Roman
Catholics and became a very popular book of the time. Protestant
* The cities of Brest and Kovno (I(aunas), in 1408; Troki and Grodno, in 1444;
Polock, in 1444-1456; Belsk and Vitebsk, in 1495; Minsk and Borisov, in 1496.

BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE EAST SS
schools were opened and theological discussions in the common idiom
became fashionable.
The dangerous trend was countered by an increase in Orthodox and
Catholic literature, the latter chiefly in translations from the Polish.
But the defense of the established churches reluctant to use the com-
Inon idioln was not cleverly handled. They continued rapidly to lose
their flocks. In N ovogrodek alone, out of six hundred Orthodox fam-
ilies of the gentry only sixteen remained faithful. For the first time in
Russian Lithuanian history there was not a single Catholic among the
men1bers of the Senate (Pany Rada). By the end of the century over
seventy Christian sects of different denomination could be counted in
the coun try.
The Brest Union
It was, then, only natural for the Orthodox and Catholic clergy to
plan an alliance against a common enemy. Historically, they main-
tained rather friendly relations in the Grand Duchy. The n1unicipal
laws required an equal representation of the two faiths in the city
councils. They were adn1itted on an equal footing to guilds and associa-
tions of various kinds. Political restrictions against the Orthodox, oc-
casionally enacted, had no bearing on the eastern provinces of the
Duchy. The Orthodox clergy in the Grand Duchy took a sympathetic
attitude toward the Union of Florence (1439) and would not have re-
jected it save for the direct pressure of Moscow. Both the Orthodox
and the Roman Catholic authorities were dismayed at losing ground
and Valerian Protasevic, bishop of Vilna, called on the Jesuit Order
for assistance.
The Jesuit fathers knew their business. They did not try to force
the lost sheep back into the flock, but concentrated on the younger
generation. Jesuit schools and colleges mushroomed. In a very short
time their network included Vilna, Polock, Vitebsk, Smolensk, N esviz,
Minsk., Grodno, Orsha, Mstislavl', Mogilev, Slonim, Dvinsk, Pinsk and
Sluck.. Missionary work. used the local idiom and tnet the '(heretics" on
their own ground. In a most spectacular way, it scored victory after
victory. Families split. Four children of Radzivill the Black., the most
active supporter of Calvinisln, went over to Rome. They were followed
by Ivan Chodkevic and his son, former protectors of the Lutheran
church in Vilna. Under pressure from members of his family, Lev
Sapieha, Vice Chancellor of the Grand Duchy, let himself be converted,
and with him a large number of the nobles and gentry returned to the
Catholic Church. Within five years 6,000 persons in the city of Vilna
alone, who had previously abandoned the Catholic or the Orthodox
faith, now shifted to Rome. 9
The Orthodox church had no share in this spectacular victory, but

S6 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
it succeeded in holding its own among the provincial gentry, towns-
men, and peasantry. Peter Skarga, President of the Jesuit Academy in
Vilna, tentatively invited the Orthodox to reinstate the union of West-
ern and Eastern Christianity promoted by the Council of Florence.
The higher Orthodox clergy, impressed by the smashing success of
Rome, thought that the union might improve their own position. Even-
tually, the Metropolitan of Kiev and the bishops of Luck, Vladimir,
and Cholm declared themselves for the union. They n1et with the op-
position of the bishops of Lvov and Przemysl, as well as of the lower
clergy, and negotiations continued secretly for some time.
Finally, in 1595, Kiril Terlecki and Ipat Pacey, bishops of Luck
and Vladimir respectively, went to Rome on a journey sponsored by
King Sigisn1und III. In the name of the Orthodox Church of the Grand
Duchy, they negotiated with Pope Clement VIII the terIns of the union.
The Orthodox clergy would be permitted to worship in Slavic, to main-
tain their eastern rite and canons, and to discard celibacy; in exchange,
they were to accept the dogmatic innovations of the Roman Church
and pledge allegiance to the supreme authority of the Pope. Clement
VIII ordered a n1edal stamped with the words Ruthenia 1'eceptis, while
SigisInund III consecrated the Union by a royal decree in both the
Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
The Orthodox congregations, however, demanded a church council
to discuss the essence and the terms of the Union before they would
accept it in good faith. The council was called in the city of Brest, in
159 6 , but the parties were not able to con1e to an agreement. They held
their councils separately and ended by anathematizing each other. Yet,
the royal decree was not repealed and the Vatican declared the Union
consun1111ated. .
The Orthodox who accepted the Union were given the protection
of ROlne and were commonly to be known as "Uniates." Those who
rejected it were to be considered "schismatics," their churches closed
and services prohibited in cities and towns, though still tolerated in
rural communities.
The Polonization of the Gentry
The Brest Church Union was a logical sequence to the Union of
Lublin. What the Poles were not then able to attain politically, they
achieved through Brest. Lithuania and Poland, politically independent
though they were, began to merge into a cultural and spiritual vvhole.
The rivalry of Polish and Russian cultures can be traced back to
the days of Jagiello, but Lithuanian contacts with Poland commenced
at an even earlier date. Prince Gedemin (13 16- 134 I) married one of
his daughters to Kasimir, son of the Polish King Wladislaw Lol{ietek,
and another to Boleslaw, Prince of Masovia. But the impact of foreign

BETJtVEEN THE WEST AND THE EAST 57
husbands on Lithuanian ways of life was not to be compared to that of
foreign wives. Indeed, no Polish influence is noticeable in Lithuania
until Jagiello married the Polish Queen Jadwiga in 1385, and, on that
occasion, adopted the Ron1an faith. Three years later a Roman Catholic
Pole was installed bishop of Vilna, which office ren1ained Polish, until
it was decided in 1431 that only natives could hold that see.
The natives reacted unfavorably to the infiltration. The Poles were
neither trusted nor liked. Yet Lithuanians were becon1ing more Polish
in their manners and their speech. Russian culture, having been cut off
from its sources, lived on its past glory. On the other hand, the golden
age of Russian Lithuanian literature tended to move toward the West.
And the way to the treasuries of Western culture led through Poland.
Modern legislation, such as the establishment of serfdom in 1457,
organization of the gentry (szlachta) , replacement of the ancient Rus-
sian system of vece by the Magdeburg Statute, and certain novelties
in the legal procedure, though enacted in the Russian language, bore
a noticeable Polish stamp. The language itself, as we have seen, had
become adulterated with Polish words and idioms, since neither Church
Slavonic nor the 'Vest Russian vernacular could keep pace with the
lexical and semantic changes produced by the constant flow of foreign
ideas into the. country.
Still more awkward had becon1e the situation of the Orthodox
Church. The Russian language was protected by law; the Russian
faith was not, since its legal status was equal to that of all other re-
ligious faiths in the Grand Duchy. It was only natural that the Cath-
olics should develop more missionary zeal in a country they wanted
to conquer than the Orthodox, whose utn10st ambition consisted in
being able to hold their own. As a rule, the Catholic missionaries were
Polish, and the infiltration of the Polish language and manners went
apace with the spreading of the Roman faith.
In 1498 a Bernardine monastery was founded in Polock., the strong-
hold of Russian Orthodoxy. Three years later the Dominicans estab-
lished themselves in Vilna. These were followed in 1565 by the Jesuits.
Trained in the 'Vest, they offered the native youth a better education
in their schools. For many, conversion to Catholicisn1 became an initia-
tion into a higher form of civilization and a mark of distinction. The
third wife of Sigismund I (15°5-1548) was Italian and a devout Cath-
olic. Toward the end of his reign, fifty-six Roman Catholic monasteries
and churches were functioning, while eighty Orthodox ones existed at
that time. The Lithuanian Sejn1s in 154 2 and in 1544 complained that,
despite the legal restrictions, all the offices in administration and in
courts were given to Poles. '''hen the Reformation was accepted, it
also came through Poland, and translations from Polish again invaded
the country. Naturally there were people who wanted to read the ori-

58 BELORUSSIA.' THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
ginals and discuss the ideas in the language of their origin. Among the
upper classes, Polish began to assume the part which French came to
play in Russia three centuries later.
Catholicism not only regained its former position but made spec-
tacular headway. In 1563 the prohibition of the Poles' acquiring real
estate in the Grand Duchy was repealed. Reaffirmed by the Lithuanian
Statute of 1588, it never became effective again. From 1569 to 1596,
forty-four new Roman Catholic churches and monasteries were founded
and endowed with large land estates. In Catholic homes, Russian began
to give way to Polish. Ivan Melesko, the Smolensk chamberlain, com-
plained at the Warsaw Sejm, in 1589, that "there are many of us here
who, being of our own bone, have clothed it with the flesh of a dog."
And Smolensk was deep in the heart of the Russian lands.
By the end of the sixteenth century little indeed distinguished the
Lithuanian Russian gentry from their Polish counterpart. Fighting
against political absorption by the state, they becalne the most effective
agents of its Polonization. The Union of Brest brok.e the last barrier.
"Having accepted the spiritual supremacy of Rome, the upper classes
abandoned their native Church and disassociated themselves from the
people; they moved even closer to Poland in religion and culture, and
began to forget their. national character" (Lappo).
The Uniates and Schismatics
The peasantry did not count for much, since, presumably, they
would follow their lords in due course. But the urban n1iddle class,
which had grown in number and inlportance in the course of the last
century, remained immune to Polish Catholic propaganda, and its re-
sistance had to be broken at any cost to make the victory complete.
The historians agree that the period of religious persecution which
followed the Union of Brest was comparable to the Inquisition, al-
though other parallels can be as effectively drawn fronl lnore recent
times.
A Uniate monastic order, copied on that of the Jesuits and dedi-
cated to Saint Basil, was founded by Fathers Rutski and Kuncevic in
1617. vVith the tacit consent of the government, the Basilians under-
took the unification of the country under one spiritual shepherd.
Zealots worked with fire and sword. Orthodox services were prohibited
and Orthodox churches turned over to the Uniates. The schismatics
were persecuted and publicly humiliated. In Vilna, for instance, they
were forbidden to carry their dead out of the city through the gates
commonly used, even by the Jews and by the Tatars, but were directed
to the gates through which only refuse and garbage were carried.
"Monks who rejected the Union were arrested, beaten up and thrown
in jail, and even water was refused them." 10 In Polesie, Archbishop

BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE EAST 59
Kuncevic ordered the dead Orthodox dug out of the Christian ceme-
teries, and their. bones thrown to dogs. 11
Open revolts broke out in different parts of the country. The Basil-
ians turned to the state authorities for protection and assistance. The
Chancellor of the Grand Duchy, although himself a devout Catholic,
tried to talk reason to them, and the letter he sent to Archbishop
Kuncevic is worth quoting at some length:
. . . I have no wish to argue with Your Eminence, but seeing with what
obstinacy and disregard for reason you defend your convictions, I aID forced
to reply to your ill-founded letter . . . In the Sejms, you say, voices now
are heard which are harmful not only to the Union, but the Roman Church
as well. vVhose fault is this? . . . You violated people's consciences, closed
their churches so that they should perish without divine service and rite,
like the heathen . . . The I(ing has ordered you to unseal and reopen the
churches in l\tlogilev, of which I advise you hereby according to his order.
Should you fail to carry this out, I shall myself, by order of the I(ing, issue
orders to have the churches returned to the Orthodox so that they may
worship God according to their faith. The Jews and the Tatars are allowed
to maintain their synagogues and mosques in the Grand Duchy, and you
close do\vl1 Christian churches J . . . May the Almighty bless you with the
spirit of humility and brotherly love. [Lev Sapieha, March 12, 1622.] 12
But the situation needed more than admonitions. Coercion con-
tinued and violence knew no recess. "Orthodox priests were no longer
allowed to appear in the streets lest they be jailed; children died un-
christened, people lived unwed, and the old died without extreme unc-
tion; their bodies were not buried, but thrown to dogs in the field." 13
The great syn1bol of Orthodox piety, the image of the Holy Virgin
placed over the Ostrabrama gates of Vilna City, was handed over to
the Catholic Order of Carmelites. A convent founded by Saint Eu-
phrosyne in the twelfth century in Polock was turned into a Uniate
institution. Finally, "the Holy See stretched both its wings, the Cath-
olic and the Uniate, over the Grand Duchy, and the Orthodox Church
ceased to exist as an organized body" (Lappo).
The Resistance Movement
To the common people, the new proselytism appeared Polish rather
than Catholic or Uniate and hurt their national pride as well as their
religious feelings. The faithful began to organize their own defense,
and it assumed two forms: Orthodox "fraternities" in the urban centers,
and armed uprisings in the countryside.
The original purpose of the fraternities was the financial support
and legal protection of religion, the improvement of the lower clergy,
social work, and general education. They built schools, published serv-
ice books, and supported homes for the sick and aged. Their member-

60 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
ship included enlightened townsmen and gentry, and even a few provin-
cial magnates and overlords. With the Union of Brest, they becalne
centers of resistance to Polonization. Orthodox churches and monas-
teries which had been closed down in cities were reopened on private
estates. Prince Olelkovic built a monastery and a school on his lands
at SlucI{. Prince Ostrozski invited Greek and Yugoslav bishops to a
monastery he founded on his estate at Stepancy to provide for the needs
of the disorganized Russian clergy. He also founded a Theological
Acaden1Y, with library and printing press, and supported more than
six hundred congregations out of his own purse. Furthermore, he and
his friends tried to promote an alliance of the Orthodox and the Protes-
tants, and in 1599, representatives of the West Russian Orthodox and
Calvinist congregations met in the city of Vilna in an attempt to co-
ordinate resistance to Polish Catholic and Uniate proselytism. 14
The fraternities spread in the cities, where the Magdeburg laws
gave them protection. As a rule, the local chapters included gentry,
merchants, workers, and peasants on an equal footing. Any adult of
the Orthodox faith could become a full-fledged brother. Activities were
partly open, partly underground. In 1624 the Basilian Order reported
to Rome that
under the cover of social work they [the Orthodox] have organized Fraterni-
ties in all the cities. They make their own laws, and appoint officials. They
impose a special tax on their own estates, make regular collections at their
weekly gatherings and may, when need arises, levy an extraordinary tax. . .
They have multiplied rapidly, and now they act as if they were a state within
the state, which is very much worrying both ourselves and the Government. 15
But this was an unequal struggle. For the reasons outlined before,
the West Russian aristocracy were abandoning their people. Among
those who went over to the side of Rome now were the sons of that
very Chamberlain of Smolensk who denounced Polish culture as "the
dog flesh clothing our Russian bones," two sons of Prince Olelkovic,
and even the youngest son of Prince Ostrozski, the great protector of
the Orthodox faith. Other noble families followed, and by the middle
of the seventeenth century, the fraternity movement faded away, al-
though some sporadic activities continued through the following cen-
tury.16
The peasantry, however, attempted to protect the faith and lan-
guage of their fathers. On the eve of the Brest Union, Nalivajko, son
of a furrier on the estate of Prince Ostrozsl{i, organized armed bands
against "the oppressors of True Religion and of the Russian people."
In 1595 he captured Sluck, Mogilev, Recica, and Pinsk. Finally, in
1602 he was captured and tortured to death in Warsaw. He was suc-
ceeded by Savula in 1600, Summa in r618, and a number of others. In

BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE EAST 61
162 3 the mob was led to an open revolt in Vitebsk. The Uniate arch-
bishop Kuncevic was killed and his body thrown into the river. Conse-
quently, Pope Urban VIII urged King Sigismund ((to revenge the
martyr" and make "the heretics understand that there is no quarter
for such an abominable crime." The King obliged. Civil liberties in
Vitebsk were abolished and one hundred persons condemned to death.
A wave of terror swept the countryside and kept it quiet until a rumor
spread that the Ukrainian Cossacks under Bohdan Chmelnicki had
arisen against the Poles and defeated the King's army (1647). Thus
inspired, the peasants armed themselves to the number of 100,000 men,
and in a sweeping drive overcame Gomel', Loev, Pinsk, Mogilev, and
Mstislavl'. The government moved the army led by Prince Jan Radzivill
against them. But defeated in one place the rebels would emerge in
another, and soon the cities of Sluck, Bychov, Cernobyl, Recica,
Bobrujsk, and Mozyr fell into their hands. Wherever they passed, the
Catholics and Uniates were lTIurdered, their churches burned, private
homes plundered and destroyed. When, finally, Prince Radzivill sup-
pressed the revolt, he retaliated by a wholesale extermination of the
Orthodox populations in the cities of Mozyr and Turov. 17
The popular uprisings produced no spiritual leaders of any stature
and hardly can be described as a religious war .18 In fact, the Soviet
historians point to the socio-economic and the Belorussia historians to
the national rather than religious character of the struggle. The reli-
gious, economic, and nationalist aspects can perhaps be reconciled in
that the peasant revolted against authority which oppressed him eco-
nomically in the person of the landowner, who was, in most cases,
Catholic in faith and Polish in his way of life. But it is significant that
there was no evidence of plundered estates being divided up or other-
wise appropriated. No wishes for social and economic reforn1s were
formulated. In the rare occurrences when the aims of the revolt were
stated, they invariably read, "For defense of the Orthodox faith and
the native speech." Since the faith and the speech determined nation-
ality, the movement can very well be described as one of "national
emancipation," and, in fact, it. was treated as such by the Poles.
The governn1ent was forced to make concessions. At the corona-
tion of Wladislaw IV in 1642, a royal decree was issued legalizing the
Orthodox faith and confirming the rights of the Russian speech. Al-
though the social and econon1ic status of the peasantry had not changed,
the movement subsided, and forcible Polonization was resumed. The
Orthodox were again deprived of their rights of election to the Sejms,
and presently they also lost the rights of election to the local tribunals
and public offices. Together with the Protestants, their legal status in
1792 was restricted to that of the Jews. The Sejm decreed the death
penalty in 1764 for anyone who should renounce Catholicism for any

62 BELORUSSIA: THE lkIAI(ING OF A NATION
other faith and approved the proposal of Bishop Soltyk in 17 66 that
"anyone who should dare to defend the non-Catholics be declared an
enemy of the people." Since 1697, the Russian language had been
banned from courts and offices: ('The scribe must write in Polish, and
with Polish characters. only." 19
In fact, the Western Russian literary standard had long been dead
before its burial. The educated Russians in the Grand Duchy saw in
their mother tongue only the language of the lower social strata. An
attempt by the Academy of Peter l\10hila in I(iev to restore its purity
and glory failed. The ecclesiastical writers continued in the Church
Slavic tradition, while the educated split into two hostile camps, one
following the lead of Warsaw and the other that of Moscow. ('Only the
toiling classes have remained true to their native speech. Polish lords
closed to them the doors to science and literature. A writer could not
develop from the people, and actually there was none" (Harecki). Oc-
casionally there still appeared religious and school drama, or inter-
medes, in which the educated spoke in Polish and the commoners in
Belorussian. The Uniate clergy published the worl{s of Metropolitan
Lev I(iska written in the vernacular. All this, however, was not litera-
ture but ('a series of chance occurrences appearing from time to tin1e
against the dark background of general decline in our letters" (Ihna-
touski) .
The Muscovite Factor
Moscow had never ceased to look on the West Russian lands as
parts of the Ruril{ patrimony, temporarily in foreign hands. Ivan III,
his son Vasily II, and grandson Ivan IV made very clear statements to
this effect. Moreover, since the fall of Constantinople to the Turks
(1453), Moscow considered itself as the natural protector of the Ortho-
dox faith anywhere, and the Orthodox in the Grand Duchy often turned
to the Grand Dukes of Moscow for assistance and protection. Ivan III
was the first to interfere actively on behalf of "our brothers," and more
than one war with Poland and Lithuania has since been fought in the
interest of religion, or under the pretext of protecting it.
In the war which followed the secession of the Ukraine froln Po-
land, the Muscovite armies virtually occupied the whole Lithuanian
territory (1654-1656). The Uniate congregations were disbanded and
the Catholic population was given a choice between adopting the Ortho-
dox faith or leaving the country. In the meantime, on October 17, 1656,
a peace was negotiated upon the terms of which Tsar Alexius should
succeed Kasimir after his death both as Polish King and as Grand
Duke of Lithuania. The agreement was rejected by the Sejm, and
war with Moscow was resumed. The Muscovite armies were finally
driven from the country, but the Grand Duchy by the Treaty of Andru-

BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE EAST 63
sovo, 1667, had lost the whole province of Smolensk. and the cities of
Nevel, Sebez and Veliz to Moscow. The treaty contained a clause giv-
ing Moscow the right to interfere in behalf of the Orthodox in Lithuania
and Poland, and this was confirmed again by the agreement of 1686.
Subsequently, "there was not a single year when Russian ambassadors
in Warsaw would not demonstrate to the Government of Poland that its
treatment of the Orthodox populations was contrary to the obligations
imposed upon Poland-Lithuania by the treaties."
One may question the real motivations of the Moscow governn1ent,
but the Orthodox in Lithuania and Poland liked to believe that their
"religious brothers in the East" were not entirely indifferent to their
fate. In 1767, five years before the first partition of Poland, the non-
Catholic gentry and townsmen called a conference in Sluck to demand
equality of Christian faiths, and asked Russia and the 'Vestern Powers
for protection. Catherine II supported their demands, and the Polish
Sejm, succun1bing to the pressure of the Russian Ambassador, granted
the Orthodox con1plete equality of treatment with the Catholics. On the
eve of the first partition of Poland (1772), Joseph Poniatowski re-
ported to King Stanislaw that the populations in the eastern provinces
were "obviously on the side of Russia," 20 and, indeed, their reasons
111ay have been other than only a comn10n faith.
Russia, however, treated the Catholics and Uniates very much as
Poland treated the Orthodox: on either side there was little mercy for,
or consideration of, "common blood." Neither was the common faith
a really binding tie. During the war of 1654-1656, the Muscovite
armies destroyed two hundred vVest Russian cities and towns. Though
of the san1e church, the "liberators" did not get along very well with
the natives. The City of Minsk, for instance, readily surrendered to
the Orthodox tsar, and revolted against him a few years later. So also
did the City of Vitebsk, in 1660. For two centuries hostilities continued
almost without interruption, the native populations shifting from one
side to the other, and peace treaties with Moscow were concluded only
for periods of five, or six, or twelve, or "thirteen years and one half
year" (Andrusovo). Peter the Great, in 1706, ordered the cities of
l\1insk and Vitebsk burned simply "because Karl XII of Sweden stayed
there for a month or so." Once the "glorious city of Polock" had
100,000 inhabitants and was larger and wealthier than London, but
there were only 360 fran1e houses, inhabited by 437 Christians and 478
Jews in 1780. In modern Belorussian history books, this is described
as "a typical result of Russian assistance to their brothers in faith
against the Latins."
Great as were the ruins wrought upon the country by the Musco-
vites, they might have been compensated for by Russian contributions
in spiritual values, but the part of Moscow in the cultural life of the

64 BELORUSSIA: THE MAltING OF A NATION
Grand Duchy was very small indeed. Modern Belorussian nationalism
sums up this period as follows:
I. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was predominantly Russian,
and not Lithuanian, in population. The Lithuanians occupying the
westernmost corner of the country were, in fact, a racial minority in
their own state. .
2. The term "ancient Russian" is generally used to designate com-
mon East Slavic literature in the eleventh to fourteenth centuries. In
the Grand Duchy, a Western Russian, or "Old Belorussian," variant
en1erged which, in the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries, "eclipsed all
Slavic literature." The purists may very well describe that language
as "an artificial mixture of terms and phrases which no one could speak
or ever did" (Holovacki), or as "a language of the upper social class
subjected to Polish culture" (Sobolevski); the Belorussian scholars
insist that it basically contained "all the phonetic and morphological
characteristics of modern Belorussian" (Harecki). 21
3. While the upper class and a large part of the middle class
eventually adopted Polish culture, the masses of Belorussian peasantry
"remained faithful to the oral tradition, through which they have
brought their beliefs, customs and the spoken idiom over to our time"
(Piceta) .
4. Had it not been constantly weakened by wars with Moscow,
the Grand Duchy might very well have held its own against Poland.
The Muscovite policies were largely responsible for the decline and
death of Western Russian culture (Ihnatouski).
5. The Polish Lithuanian Union was similar to an anicent republic
"with a small class of masters ruling over a class of slaves" (Piceta).
But a union with Moscow would have been still more disastrous for the
people, whose way of life was "completely and inherently incompatible
with the social structure and moral climate of the Muscovite State."
(Ihnatouski).22
6. All in all, "there was nothing in the glorious past of the BeIo-
russian nation" which might suggest to modern Belorussia a feeling
of sympathy Of gratitude to either Poland or Russia: "Bitter remi-
niscences of the past turn the Belorussian away from both, with an
equal disgust" (Lastouski). 23
The student of history may disagree, but he could hardly convince
the nationalist who claims political independence for Belorussia. 24

5
THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE
Between 1772 and 1795 the territories of the Kingdom of Poland
and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were partitioned between Austria,
Prussia, and Russia, and the Polish Lithuanian Union, or Rzecz Pospo-
lita, ceased to exist as a political entity.
The political boundaries that separated the Belorussian populations
from Russia in the past had disappeared, but the Belorussians were not
to form a separate unit within the empire; they were divided again,
though along a different line. The territories received in Partition I
formed a separate "Belorussian Government General" under the ad-
ministration of Count Zachar Cernysev. Ethnically, their populations
were not recognized as Belorussian or Lithuanian: persons of the Ro-
man Catholic or of the Uniate rite were considered Polish, and those of
the Orthodox faith, Russian. The latter were, for all practical purposes,
assimilated by the natives, while the Poles were given certain privileges
in education and self-government. The name Belorussian was used only
in a geographical or. historical sense.
Before Partition III, a large number of the Orthodox remained
within the reduced boundaries of Poland. The imperial policy in their
regard vacillated. At first, Catherine II consented to their exclusion
from the Polish Senate and executive offices, the Spolny Sejm having
not more than three non-Catholic delegates, mixed courts being abol-
ished, and public burials of the Orthodox being forbidden in Poland
( 1 77 5). Later she insisted that an Orthodox bishopric be established at
Sluck, churches taken by the Uniates be returned to the Orthodox, and
certain improvements be made in the position of the non-Catholic pop-
ulations in general (1785). Instead of improving it, her interference
rendered the situation worse. Suspicious of Russian expansion, the Po-
lish government began to see imperial secret agents in every group
whose political, economic, or cultural interests were supported by the
court of St. Petersburg. In order to test their loyalty, Warsaw sun1-
moned the delegates of Polish Orthodox communities to a conference
in Pinsk and suggested that the Orthodox Church in Poland leave the

66 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
jurisdiction of the Holy Synod of Russia for that of the Patriarch of
Constantinople. The delegates agreed, and in 179 I the religious tie with
Russia was cut. .
This gave Russia one more reason for Partition II. In a letter of
December 22, 1792, to the Russian Ambassador in Poland, Catherine
II pointed to the "necessity of saving from oppression and corruption
these lands and cities that once belonged to us, and were founded and
ever since inhabited by the people of our blood and of our faith." This
she did a few months later; a commemorative medal was minted in
St. Petersburg representing a map of the "saved" regions with the
words Ottorzennaja vozvfatich ("What had been torn away, I re-
turned") .
Partition III followed two years later, and Russia conceded to Prus-
sia a little wedge in the Belorussian territory at Bialystok. In 1807,
however, the Bialystok district also was incorporated into the Russian
empire by the Treaty of Tilsit. The political dreams of Grand Duke
Vasily of Moscow and of tsars l\1ichail and Alexius had been more than
fulfilled. The whole territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and a
sizable part of the Kingdom of. Poland, were now Russian.
The lot of the Belorussian population of the annexed territories,
however, did not change in any noticeable way. Catherine II extended
to the inhabitants of these territories "all the rights and privileges
that the Russian subjects enjoyed." The imperial government, how-
ever, never guessed that two different cultures had been in struggle
in these regions, and even if it had known, "by its very nature it would
not have been able to base its policy on support by the peasantry
and middle classes" (Dovnar-Zapolski). The government was seeking
the support of the gentry who were either Polish or thoroughly Polon-
ized. As a result, paradoxical as it was, Polonization of the region in-
creased under the Russian rule. In the words of a Polish nobleman,
"We feel as though we were still in Poland; life is even better than it
was within the boundaries of the Commonwealth." Indeed, "there was
no mention of the Belorussians or of the Lithuanians as a people dis-
tinct from the Polish in the literature. of that period." 1
In 1815, of the six provinces that formed the Grand Duchy of War-
saw, created by Napoleon, two were returned to Prussia (Poznan and
Bydgoscz), and the remaining four (Kalisz, Ploclc, '¥arsavv, and
Lomza) formed the new I(ingdom of Poland united to Russia in the
person of Alexander I. The kingdom had its own government and
parliament, its own courts, and its own army and currency. In fact,
diminished Poland became to Russia what the Grand Duchy of Lith-
uania had been to Poland.
Yet there was a substantial difference. 'Vhat was natural in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was somewhat out of date in the

THE RUSSIAN E1J1PIRE
67
Age of Enlightenment. Russian policies were extremely mild and tol-
erant in Poland and in Finland, and no attempt was made to convert
these peoples to the Russian way of life or to the Orthodox faith. On
the contrary, they were granted more administrative and cultural
autonomy than the Russians themselves. They were allowed to rule the
territory of the Lithuanian Belorussian provinces as if it were still
their own. Paul I restored the Lithuanian Statute, and Alexander I the
self-government of the local gentry (se jmiki). Against all expectations,
the Jesuit college in Vilna was not discontinued but changed into a
University and handed over to Polish scholars. Thus, Vilna was made
the educational center of the annexed provinces, and the office of the
curator of schools was given to Prince Adam Czartoryski, a scion of a
Belorussian family completely Polonized. In schools, the Polish lan-
guage "was taught by a senior instructor, while Russian was handled
by an assistant having the same rank. as instructors of foreign lan-
guages and of drawing." 2 Polish landlords, meeting periodically in the
district assemblies (se j1niki), ruled the land as before, under the in-
different eyes of the Russian authorities.
The Catholic Church, however, was taken under the supervision of
the imperial Ministry of Justice, and the clergy forbidden "to make
public use of any papal encyclic or statement before it had been ex-
amined and authorized by the Governor General and the Monarch
himself." But, provided that they recognize "no authority beyond the
boundaries of the Russian - enlpire," the Catholics preserved all their
former privileges, and were granted more. The Jesuit order, disbanded
by Pope Clement XIV in 1773, for instance, continued in Belorussia
by a decision of the Russian imperial court, and Jesuit colleges were
opened in Mogilev, Mstislavl', Cecersk, Orsa, Vitebsk and Dvinsk, as
well as nine grammar schools in other places. In 1812 they were
placed under the control of the Jesuit Academy in Polock, which ob-
tained equal status with the University of Vilna. The Orthodox popula-
tions were protected, of course, but the Roman Church was given "all
assistance by the government in converting the Uniates to the full
Roman rite." S
The Uniate Church
The position of the Union Church had become v'ery awkward in-
deed. It was leaning too far east in its ritual to please the Catholic
West, and too far west in its dogma and practices to please the Ortho-
dox East. The Orthodox looked at the Uniates as renegades, and mis-
trusted and disliked them even more than they did the Catholics. And
the Catholics, though for different reasons, also mistrusted and disliked
the Union, and treated it as a lower form of Christianity. Both to Rus-
sia and to Rome, as Paul I aptly put it, the Uniates were "neither flesh,

68 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
nor fish, nor fowl." 4 Their congregations had been taken away from
the jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic Archbishop, but, unlike the
Roman Catholics, they were not granted a central administration of
their own and were, in effect, pressed either to return to Orthodoxy
or to turn completely Roman. Only three Uniate bishoprics thus were
maintained in the annexed regions, while the Roman Catholics had six.
The Union Church, however, had taken root among the lower
classes. The clergy used the vernacular in their services and sometimes
in their writings; they turned now against the Poles, now against the
Russians, protecting the interests of the native as best they could. In a
sense, the Union had gradually become a sort of national Belorussian
Church, though one not yet conscious of its role. This was but an-
other reason for both the Poles and the Russians to desire its dissolu-
tion, though neither wanted the other to benefit by it.
After Partition I, over 1,500,000 persons returned to the Russian
Orthodox Church. About whether the conversion was forced or spon-
taneous, the Polish and Russian sources disagree. But under Paul I
certain restrictions were i111posed on the Uniates returning to the Or-
thodox faith, and the movement slowed down. On the other hand, the
Basilian Order, entirely Ron1anized by that time, urged pupils in their
tVlenty-six schools to abandon the Union for the Roman Catholic rite.
As a result, during the first two decades after Partition III, there were
among the U niates "perhaps as many Catholic as Orthodox converts,
and probably more." 5
The Polish Uprising of I83I
Opinions differ as to whether the Russians or the Poles were re-
sponsible for ending the period of the benevolent attitude of St. Peters-
burg toward Poland. At any rate, the Russian policy soon began to take
a new course.
The change was pron10ted, perhaps even determined, by the forma-
tion of secret Polish societies, such as the szubravcy, filomaty, filarety,
and others, in different parts of the country, and of the Patriotic Asso-
ciation in Warsaw (18 19), all aiming at the restoration of Greater Po-
land. The Patriotic Association conducted secret negotiations with
Russian conspirators, but the Polish claims proved incompatible with
the idea of a Free Slavic Federation held by the Decembrists. 6 The
Polish conspiracy was discovered and suppressed. Prince Czartoryski
lost his position as curator of schools. The Jesuits had already been
expelled from the region (1820), and all education was now put under
the direct control of Russian authorities. Novosilcov, the new curator
of schools, ordered Russian history, literature, and language to be
given preference over Polish in the school curricula. The Uniates were
encouraged, even pressed, to return to the Orthodox Church, and a gov-

THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE
69
ernment decree forbade their conversion to Catholicism (1827). Those
who remained faithful to Rome were now protected by law froin the
activities of Polish priests and teachers, and an independent Uniate
College was founded on May 8, 1828. The Poles took. this as an insult.
Since they also had other serious reasons for discontent, an armed
uprising followed, turning into an open war between the kingdom and
the empire (1831).7
The insurgents' hope for assistance from the Western powers was
deceived, and efforts to raise the Belorussian provinces failed. The re-
volt was suppressed, and its defeat precipitated the further Russifica-
tion of the western lands. As the Russian language had been banned
by the Poles from local courts and administration in 1697, so now was
Polish by the Russians. Vilna University, the hotbed of Polish nation-
alism, was transferred to Kiev, and the Russian language, history, and
statistics were introduced into its curriculum on an equal footing with
Polish, eventually to supersede it completely. In the Ron1an Catholic
seminaries instruction was to be given in Latin or Russian, and not
Polish (1833). Out of 304 Catholic monasteries 197 were closed, and
new Orthodox bishoprics were established in Vilna and Polock. Within
two years, 1,714 Catholics and 122,416 Uniates, with 91 churches and
9 chapels, joined the Orthodox Church.
In 1839, the Union was entirely suppressed. The use of the Belo-
russian vernacular, at that tin1e still considered in St. Petersburg as a
dialect of Polish, was prohibited. The Lithuanian Statute, misunder-
stood as a product of Polish culture, was abolished (1840)' The Cath-
olic Theological Academy was transferred from Vilna to St. Petersburg
(1841). Finally, the very names of Belorussia and Lithuania were dis-
carded and replaced by Severo-Zapadnyj kraj (Northwestern Prov-
ince). The imperial government was not taking any chances. Surprised
and frightened by the revolt, it now believed that anyone who was not
Orthodox in faith and Russian in speech was an actual or potential
enemy of the empire.
Although the Belorussian masses had had no part in the Polish
uprising, they suffered from repression even more, perhaps, than the
Poles. The abolition of the Union Church was the hardest blow. It was
preceded by a Uniate Council at St. Petersburg (1834), after which
1,3°5 Uniate priests den1anded readmission to the Mother Church.
Finally, on February 12, 1839, the Uniate bishops Joseph Semasko,
Vasily Luzinski, and Anton Zubl{o met in Polock and agreed to sign
a petition to Nicholas I to reunite them and their flocks with the Or-
thodox. This the Holy Synod of Russia gladly did, and a medal was
stamped to commemorate the event. s
Yet the country was far from united. By imperial decree (March
25),1,5° 0 ,000 Uniates were registered Orthodox, although no one had

70 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
been asl{ed whether he really wished it that way. Some local resistance
developed, and fifteen Uniate priests \vere deported to Siberia. The un-
rest was quelled, but the church merger did not become more con1plete
or sincere and the governlnent decrees remained inoperative. The Po-
lish gentry, intelligentsia, and business class continued to reign in the
region. In schools, Polish soon was again taught as the first language,
and Russian as the second. Roman Catholicism, freed from its ambigu-
ous alliance with the Union, took deeper root. Everywhere, the Poles
were regaining their former positions. In 1855, Metropolitan Semasko
besought St. Petersburg "to send more Russian officials" to the country
since all the offices and courts were "infested with Poles." But the gov-
ernment, again seel{ing the support of the landowner, could not help
the situation. 9
The Insurrection of 186]
The abolition of serfdom in the Russian empire (186 I) shook the
ground under the feet of the local gentry and loosened their hold on
the country. Once more the Poles rose against the empire. The revolt
surprised the Russians and made even the liberals angry with the
Poles. 10 First, it appeared that the "ungrateful Poles" not only wanted
separation fron1 an empire which had granted them more liberties than
the Russians could afford for themselves, but they also claimed the
political boundaries of 1772, with "the Russian historical cities of
Polocl{, Vitebsk, Minsk, Mogilev and Turov." Second, it was found
that the masses had ren1ained loyal to the empire, and only "landlords,
the gentry and the Polish-educated intelligentsia" took an active part
in the revolt. Indeed, not only would the peasantry outside the ethnic
boundaries of Poland not listen to the enticing promises of the Poles,
but "they helped the Tsarist police to arrest the insurgents, and often
they did justice themselves upon them." Wounded and disillusioned,
the in1perial government felt justified in suppressing the revolt with an
iron hand. 11
There was no complete agreement and harmony among the insur-
gents. The revolt was inspired, and to a large extent organized, from
Paris, where the Polish political emigrants formed two groups, the
democratic "Red Committee" and the aristocratic "White Committee."
The Reds were headed by the historian Lelewel, and the Whites by
Prince Czartoryski. Their common aim was the restoration of the Po-
lish state as of 1772, but they differed sharply on social and economic
reforms. Each group had its own supporters in the old country, as well
as in the Lithuanian Belorussian provinces. Both parties were repre-
sented in the Central Polish Revolutionary Club in St. Petersburg,
which played an important part in staging the insurrection.
The Central National Comlnittee defined the aims of the revolt as

THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE
7 1
"complete independence of Poland, Lithuania, and Rus', indivisible
parts of one Polish State" (March 31, 1863). On July 4, Wladyslaw
Mickiewicz, son 'of the famous poet, wrote to Napoleon III: "On ne
. peut pas plus concevoir la Pologne sans ses provinces meridionales que
l'Italie sans Naples et la Sicilie" ('(To conceive Poland without her
southern [eastern?] provinces is as impossible as to see Italy without
Naples and Sicily"). And to a remark by Alexander Herzen that the
populations should in the first place be asked whether or not they
wanted to be Polish, he answered: '(Ce n'est pas plus utile que de de-
mander aux habitants de Moscou et de Tver, s'ils sont Russes" ("This
is as pointless as asking the inhabitants of Moscow and of Tver
whether they are Russian").
According to that view, reconstituted Poland was to continue "its
historic mission among the Belorussian and Ukrainian peoples." Later,
this also was to be the Polish position at the Paris Peace Conference
(1919), and it was to drive Poland to Minsk and Kiev in the Polish-
Soviet war of 1920-2 I.
But the concept of a greater Polish State was opposed by the Lith-
uanian Section (Oddzial) of the insurgents, who aimed at a restoration
of the Lithuanian Grand Duchy as of the sixteenth century. They
wished union with, and not incorporation into, Poland. They were, in
the first place, '(Lithuanian," and not Polish, patriots, though hardly
any of them spoke Lithuanian. The disagreement led to an open breach
with the Poles. Originally the Oddzial had had on its seal the two coats
of arms of Poland and Lithuania. In June the Polish symbol was re-
moved, and the seal now read: "The Committee Governing Lithuania."
Separation becan1e formal a few n10nths later, but the revolt was vir-
tually over by that time.
[(astus' [(alinouski
The man primarily responsible for the separatist trend was Kastus'
(Constantine) Kalinouski, whose name was eventually to become a
sYlnbol of Belorussian political independence. Son of a petty landlord
in Grodno province, Kalinouski studied at St. Petersburg University.
As a student, he professed radical ideas and was an ardent admirer of
the great Russian revolutionary Alexander Herzen (1812-1870). After
graduation, twenty-four years old, he came to Vilna lool{ing for a job.
Before he found one, he joined the local group of revolutionaries con-
spiring against the empire, allying himself with the democratic "Red
Committee." As the only native of Grodno province in that group, he
was appointed military commissar of Grodno as soon as the insurrec-
tion broke OUt. 12
Although there is no evidence that Kastus' had ever practiced his
radical ideas on the estate of his father, he spent his youth close enough

7 2 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
to peasants to speak their idiom and understand their problems. He
began his revolutionary activities by publishing a clandestine news-
paper, Muzickaja P1'auda (Peasant's Truth), in the Belorussian ver-
nacular, filling every page with his own writing under different names.
He advocated political autonomy of the ancient Lithuanian Belorussian
lands, social equality, and vast land reforms. 13 During the insurrection
he succeeded in organizing about 1,700 men into small armed bands,14
which were soon dispersed by the Russian police. Kastus' fled to Vilna,
and was immediately given a leading position on the Lithuanian In-
surgents Committee, the Oddzial. vVhen, a short time later, all other
members of the Oddzial were arrested or had fled, Kalinouski became
the "dictator" of the Lithuanian insurrection. For several months he
was hiding from the Russian police, trying to revive the dying revolt.
Finally he was betrayed by his own supporters and arrested. He was
tried by a military court, and was hanged in Vilna on March 7, 1864.
Before he died, Kalinouski wrote from jail a note (zapiska) to the
Russian authorities, telling the story of the revolt and explaining his
own attitude (February 28). This is a moving confession of a sincere
and confused youth. His political ideas are vague and naIve and, in
general, give little support to the myth that has been created around his
name. He accepted his fate with resignation and humility. "V\Tith the
conviction that I am not a criminal by nature, but by the force of cir-
cumstances," he did not beg for clemency.15
Kastus' Kalinouski was a patriot who gave his life in the service
of his cause. Although his name holds no prominent place either in
official histories of the revolt or in the "memoirs" of the insurgents,
it has grown to heroic proportions in modern Belorussian literature.
The Belorussian writers emphasize the fact that he never shared the
Polish aims of the revolt, but fought for the restoration of the Russian
Lithuanian state of old. Poland was to him "only a natural ally in the
liberation of his native land." To be sure, Kastus' described himself as
a "Lithuanian," not a Belorussian, but he knew no word of Lithuanian
and his organ, the Muzickaja P1'auda, as we have seen, was published
in the Belorussian idiom "suppressed by the Lithuanian Poles 166 years
before." Thus, Kastus' life was "a most significant landmark in the
history of Belorussian national revival," since he led the struggle
"against both the Polish nationalism and the Russian imperialism."
He failed because the Russians represented him as "an enemy of the
Belorussian people, and hanged him as such a one." "The Belorussian
rabble rejoiced . . . Yet, years have passed, and . . . today, flowers
are brought to Kastus' grave from all parts of the Belorussian land." 16
This may not correspond exactly with historical truth, but a legend
has been created and the anniversary of Kastus' Kalinouski's death is
a holiday for Belorussian nationalists.

THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE/
73
Russification
The Russian' authorities, taken aback by the insurrection, looked
askance at everyone. Perhaps Kalinouski's publications in the Belo-
russian vernacular were responsible for the fact that the punitive
expedition of Muraviev treated the Belorussian population hardly any
better than the Polish.
The fact, however, that the peasants had not been active in the
uprising against Russia could not pass unnoticed. 17 Public opinion be-
gan to realize that populations annexed from Poland in 1772-1795,
though largely Roman Catholic and Uniate, were not ethnically Polish.
They were in fact "Russian" and that was the reason why they would
not follow the Poles in the insurrection. The Den' of the Aksakovs and
the M oskovskie Vedomosti of I(atk.ov, the two most influential organs
of Russian nationalism, did penance because they had overlool{ed the
existence of "our brothers in blood as well as in faith." The term "His-
torical Lithuania" was now coined to distinguish the historical region
from ethnographical Lithuania. The archives of the Grand Duchy had
been opened to scholars a long time before, but their work had largely
been ignored. Now a flood of books, monographs, magazine articles,
and pamphlets invaded literature as if everybody wanted to know
more about this region and its true relation to Russia. Linguistic
studies established that the local vernaculars were "dialects of Rus-
sian," not of P'Olish. Ethnographers swarming over the country re-
corded folklore and found that it was different fron1 the Polish while
very similar to the Russian and the Ukrainian. For tne first time the
question arose whether religion could be a proper standard in classifying
various groups of Slavs. 18 Hard as it is now to believe, it tool{ one
hundred years for the Rusians to discover that the lands annexed
from Poland and Lithuania "were Russian indeed." 19
The result was twofold: (I) the Poles were completely elin1inated
from administration in the Northwestern Provinces, not solely because
of their "disloyalty," but also and primarily because they were now
seen as strangers to the native population, and (2) measures were
taken to arouse the natives to the fact that they were truly "younger
brothers of the Russians." After three centuries of Polonization, the
populations now had become subject to Russification.
The region was divided into six provinces (gubernii): Vilna,
Vitebsk, Minsk, Mogilev, Kovno, and Grodno. It is curious that the
provinces of Vilna and of Vitebsk were given coats of arms reproducing
the historical symbol (pogon', pahonia) of the Grand Duchy, while
the very name of Lithuania was to be discontinued. 20 More Roman
Catholic monasteries were closed, and the clergy put under the super-
vision of local administration. The use of Polish and Lithuanian was

74 BELORUSSIA.' THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
permitted only at home, and not in the schools. The peasantry were
freed from obligations to Polish landlords contracted since the aboli-
tion of serfdom, and the law protected them from further abuses. In
fact, land reform beneficent to the farmer was carried out with some-
what better care than in the rest of the empire.
Along with the forceful Russification, a natural denationalization
of certain segments of the Belorussian population could be observed.
The gentry and intelligentsia, freed from Polish cultural tutelage, were
now "Muscovized" and "Peterburgized" as quickly as they had been
Polonized in a former age. In only one year, 1865-66, more than 30,000
nobles and gentry abandoned the Catholic for the Orthodox faith,
thus passing, in their minds, from having been Polish yesterday to
becoming Russian today. Among these vvere the illustrious families
of Prince Radzivill, Prince Liubecki, Despot-Zenovic, Belinski, and
others. The Inoven1ent swept the country. Not only was Russian now
the only language of administration, education, and law; like Polish
in an earlier age, it had become a l11ark of cultural and social distinction.
The Russian-educated class, however, did not attempt to carry
the mass of the people over to a higher culture. The country continued
to have the highest rate of illiteracy in the European part of the em-
pire. The common people were left to local cust0111S and beliefs and
to oral tradition in literature. They were losing their national memory,
revived at such cost during the Polish Lithuanian insurrection of 1863.
When asked who he was, the Belorussian used to answer that he
was neither Russian nor Polish, but tutejsi or tutasni (local), that is,
one of the native race. He seldom used the term Belorussian, and
when he did, he was rather ashamed of it. Indeed, what little he knew
of civilization now was associated with "Russian" in his mind: "De-
prived of all rights," says a Belorussian writer, "he began even to hate
his mother tongue, and rejected it." 21
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the student would find
the Belorussian group limited, geographically, to an area of local dia-
lects overlapping now with Russian and Ukrainian, now with Polish,
and, sociologically, to the lower strata of the native population. 22

6
THE NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
Against the background outlined in the preceding chapters, the
Belorussian movement of national self-determination began late in
the nineteenth century.1 Its beginnings were vague and uncertain. The
native tongue, generally recognized as a test of nationality, had no
literary tradition, not even a written form of its own. Indeed, Polonized
on the one hand, Russianized on the other, the Belorussians "were as
if they did not exist at all as a people" (Cvikevic).
The Polish Writers
The glorious past of the Lithuanian Russian state and the Golden
Age of "Vest Russian literature had left no heritage; their memory
was distorted, or entirely gone. The new middle class - the standard-
bearer of democracy and nationalislTI - had only begun to form in
the empire, and was but embryonic in Belorussia. The concept of Belo-
russia as a nation rather than a region could come from no quarter
in the country. When it did come, it came from the studies of alien
scholars, Polish and Russian. Indeed, it had its origins in ethnographic
research undertaken first in Vilna, then in Moscow, Kiev, and St.
Petersburg. Scholars were to Jay, or to rediscover, the foundations of
Belorussian tradition, and writers adequately to articulate it, before
it could be ready for political distribution. "" e may conventionally ac-
cept that epoch as the beginning of national self-determination which
then pursued the usual course, from ethnic to literary, and froin cul-
tural to political, nationalism.
The interest in Belorussian folklore was awakened by Polish col-
lectors who looked upon it as a variety of Polish. A group of students
at the University of Vilna published the first collection of Belorussian
folk songs, transcribed according to the rules of Polish orthography.
At first moved by curiosity, the group soon took up their studies more
seriously, and their work represented a valuable and, indeed, unique
contribution to the ethnography of the region. Particularly distin-
guished were T. Narbutt, eventually the author of the first history of

76 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
the Lithuanian people, and J an Czeczot, who was the first to collect
folklore and compile a brief dictionary of the Belorussian speech. 2
Other members of the group - A. Kirkor, A. Rypinski, D. Werigo-
Darewski, Jan Barszczewski - contributed greatly to a better knowl-
edge of the region. Lecturing in Paris, Rypinski stated that Belorussia
was and "will always be Polish, since the language itself is binding the
people with Poland, not with Moscow." At his suggestion the term
"White Ruthenians" was introduced in the foreign press to make more
evident the distinction between Belorussians (White Russians) and
Russians.
4. J an Czeczot
J an Barszczewski (1790-1851), an impoverished member of the
Polish Belorussian gentry, studied and taught at Vilna University.
When the university was closed by the Russian authorities in 1831, he
went to St. Petersburg as a tutor. There he met Adam Mickiewicz,
Nikolay Gogol, Taras Shevchenko, and other writers. Under their influ-
ence, he returned to his native land and began to collect folklore, rewrit-
ing it in a poetical fashion. His work.s were published in St. Petersburg,
and his talent was recognized. Had he written in Russian, he might
have aroused as widespread interest and sympathy for Belorussia as
Gogol's Evenings at a Farm near Dikanka did for the Ukraine. But,
transcribed in Latin characters, the Belorussian words looked Polish.
The Polish reader was impressed. Many people in Poland and in the
Northwestern provinces "perhaps for the first time realized that the

THE NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 77
Belorussian peasants were not bydlo [cattle], but had human qualities,
and even son1e very fine ones." 3
It also was' discovered that Belorussian folklore, while having
some characteristics common to Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, or Lithu-
anian tradition, also had many significant and important traits of its
own, .and even carried the marks of greater antiquity than the others.
Voices arose that the people must be educated, and assisted. In the
numerous writings that followed in the wake of Czeczot's and Barsz-
czewski's publications, scholarly interest in the region was nlarked by
a sentimental slant and mixed with compassion.
The school texts claim that modern Belorussian literature began
in that period. But the student is not sure whether this was Belo-
russian literature in Polish, or simply a Belorussian trend in Polish
Ii terature. Indeed, the ethnic consciousness and provincial patriotis111
were Belorussian, but "their essence was Polish." 4
In Moscow and St. Petersburg, as we have seen, it was commonly
believed that the Roman Catholic population of the Northwestern prov-
inces were a separate people froln the Russians (inorodcy). Their
mass conversion to Orthodoxy under Nicholas I had not entirely de-
stroyed this belief. On the other hand, literary works of Czeczot, Nar-
butt, Barszczewski and others could not but confirm it. In the 1860'S,
however, the negative attitude of the Belorussian masses toward the
Polish revolt against the empire (1863) revived the scholarly and
public interest in the region on a different basis. Scientific and humani-
tarian expeditions streamed to the country. Russian collectors of folk-
lore swarnled into the villages. Toward the end of the century, hundreds
of volumes had appeared and a new attitude toward Belorussians was
generally accepted. The natives were described with sympathy and
compassion for their miserable lot; their modesty and humility were
praised; their simple manners and deep devotion to the native woods
and swamps inspired admiration. Provincial patriotism assumed new
significance; though Belorussian in form, it was Russian in essence.
The Belorussian Vernacular
Q
As "little brothers" of the Russians, the Belorussians were recog-
nized in academic circles as an ethnic group in their own right, though
it was not yet clear whether the group had its own language, or spoke
a dialect of Russian, possibly even a dialect of Polish. Sonle schol-
ars did not hesitate to discuss the Belorussian vernacular on an
equal footing with other Slavic idioms. In the introduction to his
Dictionary (1807), Samuel B. Linde recognized that it significantly
differed frOln both Polish and Russian. 5 Johann Christoph von
Adelung (1809) distinguished "Suzdalan, Little Russian [Ukrainian],
Rusniak [Galician, or West Ukrainian] and Krivican [Belorussian]"

78 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
as different forn1s of the East Slavic (Russian) speech. G The Czech
P. Safarik. (1848) counted four basic East Slavic languages: Great
Russian, or Muscovite; Little Russian, or Ukrainian; White Russian,
or Belorussian; and N ovgorodia (sic). 7 These views were shared
by some Russian students. Maksimovi saw "three groups of vernacu-
lars in Russia, the Great Russian, Southern Russian [Ukrainian], and
Belorussian," 8 and Nadezdin divided the Russian language into three
groups of speech: Pontic Russian (Ukrainian), Baltic Russian (Belo-
russian), and Great Russian. 9 Against a general background of lin-
guistic studies, however, these were isolated opinions. When Spilevski,
in 1846, and Niedziecki, in 1854, compiled Belorussian grammars,
their work was rejected by the Imperial Academy of Sciences on the
ground that dialects may not have grammatical categories of their
own. The view indeed prevailed that the Belorussian vernacular was
not a language, perhaps not even a dialect, but simply a "combination
of phonetic peculiarities in the pronunciation of Russian words." 10
It was not until 1904 that the first scientific evidence of the inde-
pendent status of Belorussian was produced by Karski,11 and not until
1918 that the Belorussian language was given its first grammatical
organization by Taraskevic. 12
Literary Beginnings
Long before their language had won academic recognition, how-
ever, the Belorussians began to use it as the proper expression of the
spirit which permeated their civilization. 13 They decided to write, each
in his own local idiom, using the Polish or Russian characters for
phonetic transcription as best they could. In the 1870's, Bezsonov intro-
duced a special symbol y to transcribe the sound which does not exist
in either Russian or Polish and resembles the English w in widow,
but, for technical or other reasons, it was not at once adopted. Writers
continued to transcribe the sound each in his own manner. The more
writings thus produced, the harder appeared the task of agreement
on a standard. 14 Writings, however, did not begin to grow substan-
tially in volume until the very end of the o century. In fact, their his-
tory before the 1900'S makes a very short story.
One may go back to the eighteenth century and find a few short
plays written for schools, where the text was in Latin or in Polish,
but the rural characters, stupid and uncouth, spol{e in Belorussian to
amuse the audience. Valuable though these may be as linguistic docu-
ments, they are not literature. At the beginning of the nineteenth
century the first work written entirely in the vernacular appeared,
and its purpose also was to make fun of the language rather than to
promote it as a literary medium. This was the Eneida N avyvatat, an
imitation of a UI{rainian parody of Vergil's Aeneid. The epic was com-

THE NATIONAL SELF-DETEMINATION 79
posed .in the Smolensk dialect, and its authorship was attributed to
different persons at different times. It was soon followed by another
anonymous poem, Taras na Parnase, describing the imaginary adven-
tures of a Belorussian peasant on the Parnassus. Both pOelTIS were
circulated by word of mouth until the 1840's, when twenty-one stanzas
of the Eneida 1\7 avyvarat first were published, while another 303
stanza"s had to wait until the end of the century to appear in print.
On the other hand, Taras na Parnase, written in a similar vein, appeared
in print in 1889. Neither work, indeed, can be considered the begin-
ning of the modern Belorussian literary tradition. 15 Perhaps the real
history begins with Pauliuk Bachryn1 (1814-1898)/° a peasant boy
educated in the Ron1an Catholic school of Krosyno, Sluck district. As
he was not able to print any of his poems, only a few stanzas have
survived in the memory of the people, and they were first written
down by Federewski in the late 187o'S.17 '¥e may add the nan1e of
Syrokomlia (Kondratowicz), a Polish writer who greeted the Revo-
lution of 1848 with a poem in Belorussian and later published anony-
mously a collection of revolutionary verses under the title Dobryja
Vesci ( Good News). This practically exhausts the list for the earlier
period.
5. J an Barszczewski
In the I86o's
Not until the 1850's do we find any writer of stature who would
choose Belorussian as his literary medium. Among those who appeared
then, the first place belongs to V. Dunin-Marcinl{evic (18°9-1884).
A medical student in St. Petersburg, he did not complete his studies;

80 BELORUSSIA.' THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
he entered the civil service but soon retired and spent the rest of his
life on his country estate, Liucinka, near Minsk. In 1846 he published
Selianka (Peasant Woman), a musical play in two acts, with the
score written by the Polish composer Moniuszko. In this work, modeled
on the eighteenth-century "schooldrama," landlords spoke in Polish
and peasants in Belorussian. But the outlook was different, and the
moral of the musical was that "peasants and their masters were an
equal before God." Then Hapon (1855) appeared, a didactic story in
rhyme, describing Belorussian customs and conditions of life and show-
ing that good is always rewarded while evil is punished. Among his
other writings are Veczarnicy (Evening Parties, 1855), Dudarz bia-
loruski (Belorussian Piper, 1857), and Zalety (1870). But most popu-
lar was the one-act play Pinskaja szlachta (Pinsk. Gentry, 1866), which
still is often revived on the Belorussian stage.
Classified with the school of sentimentalism, Dunin-Marcinkevic
is not very highly valued by modern literary criticism. But he knew
the Belorussian landscape and people and loved them, and his works
were eagerly read. Historians describe him as "a Polish-Belorussian
poet." But he was the first to convince the reader that the Belorussian
spoken idiom could be flexible, smooth, melodious, and as rich and
expressive as any other language on the earth. 18
It was natural that the moods of Polish society should have been
reflected in Polish-Belorussian writings of that time. There was, in
fact, a direct correlation between the Polish revolutionary moven1ent
and the beginnings of Belorussian nationalism. A political emigrant,
V. Korotynski, published in Poznan (186r), then reprinted in Paris
(1862), Hutarka Staraha Dzieda (A Story Told by an Old Man) in
which this question is asked: "Is it God's will that we Belorussians
should remain forever under control of Mosow?" And the answer was,
"The time soon will come when the Poles will fight the Russians and
restore freedom to Belorussia." He also composed a poem in Belo-
russian prolnising the people, in the name of Poland, "equality and
brotherhood" when "the sun of freedom has dispersed the fog of Rus-
sian domination." The poem was in line with Polish revolutionary
propaganda and had little effect, hardly a dozen copies reaching the
country.
But we have already seen the part Muzickaja Prauda, edited by
Kalinouski, played in 1863. Its six issues, virtually composed by the
hand of one man, form, indeed, the most valuable Belorussian literary
document of the period (see above, Chapter 5, p. 7 2 ). To this there can
be added a few leaflets and verses written by others, such as Archnouski,
Topceuski, and Pluh - if only to satisfy the pride of the researcher,
since they have left little trace in the memories of the people. Their
voices all joined in the prayer to God "to help us to drive the Musco-

THE NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 81
vites out of our land, and to grant us true freedom and restore the
faith of our fathers" (ltluzickaja Pra'ltda, no. 3).
Like the writers of Polish revolutionary propaganda, the Roman
Catholic missionaries also used the vernacular to serve their own ends.
Among other publications, particularly significant was a reader adopted
in schools for Belorussian children, Element dla dobrych dzietok katoli-
k6w (A Primer for Good Catholic Children), where, besides a table
of transliterations and directions for reading, the catechism, comments
on the Ten Comn1andments, and prayers could be found, all in Belo-
.
rUSSIan.
6. V. Dunin-Marcinkevit
In order to counteract subversive propaganda, both political and
religious, pamphlets were issued in Belorussian by the imperial gov-
ernment itself, and in 1863-1864, there appeared two editions of
Razskazy na belorusskom narecii (Tales in the Belorussian Dialect)
sponsored by the state officials; there an anonyn10us writer urged the
natives to call themselves "Russian, not Polish," and to behave "like
Russians." Admittedly, the administration still regarded the people as
Polish. 19
It is noteworthy that neither the Polish nor the Russian side using
the Belorussian vernacular identified it with Belorussian nationality.
Nor was there any such concept among the Belorussians themselves.
Literary activities fostering provincial patriotism centered around a
thin layer of the educated gentry, divided into two camps. There is
no historical evidence that they had any response from the masses.
But the important fact was that the spoken idiom received recognition
as a literary mediuln, and now was used as such by the very people

82 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
who ignored it only a decade or two before. When, in 1867, the Gov-
ernment prohibited its use, the language gained new significance and
moral strength.
Cultural Nationalism
Literary activities died out after the suppression of the Polish .re-
volt. There are only a few manuscripts extant of that period, and
none of literary value. But in the 1880'S Belorussian nationalism re-
ceived a new impetus. There appeared a patriot and writer who cap-
tured the sentiments and imagination of the new generation: F. Bo-
husevic (1840-1900). Born into the gentry in Vilna province, he was
educated in Vilna, studied mathematics and physics in St. Petersburg,
and was graduated from Nezin Law School in the Ukraine. While a
student he took an active part in the Polish revolt, but somehow the
police overlooked this and, undisturbed, he served as a district attorney
for several years, and later practiced law in Vilna. Under that cover
he becalne a writer, using the pen-names of Macej Buracok and
Symon Reuka to conceal his identity. Since Belorussian publications
were suppressed in Russia, he published his two, and indeed only, poems
abroad. Dudka belaruskaja (Belorussian Reed) appeared in Cracow
(r89I), and Smyk belaruski (Belorussian Fiddle), in Poznan (r894).
All his other writings have been lost except for three short stories
published posthumously in 19°7.
Bohusevic was dismayed at what had been done by the heralds
of Belorussian revival. They had been squeezing the country between
two millstones, Russian and Polish, disregarding the real interests of
the Belorussian man. They called him "brother," but his answer
had to be:
Cut it out, will you, what do you need me for?
To eat your bread, or to work your bread for you?
He urged his people to be faithful to themselves. "What is Belo-
russia?" he wrote. "Belorussia is there, brothers, where our language
is spoken and heard." The mother tongue is the highest treasury of
man, and the Belorussian tongue is "as human and noble as French,
German, or any other." "Once the language is lost, the nation is dead,"
he continued. "In cherishing our mother tongue., and in cultivating it,
lies the future of Belorussia."
Bohusevic's books were circulated illegally, and since the volumes
were scarce, his poems were copied by hand, learned by heart, and
passed by word of mouth. In general, he echoed the revolutionary
agitation in the empire. But he contended that no cultural and eco-
nomic development would take root in the country unless the national
consciousness of the people were awakened. His poems were a program,
as well as an appeal. In the history of Belorussian national self-deter-

THE NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 83
mination they mark the beginning of a new period, that of "cultural
nationalisn1." 20
The idea had' already been in the air for some time. In 1 884, the
Russian revolutionary party Narodnaja Volia * issued in Minsk an
underground newspaper, Homan (The Clamor), demanding, among
other things, ('cultural autonomy" for Belorussia. 21 Belorussian his-
torians significantly point to the fact that Ignas Hrynevicki, who killed
Emperor Alexander II on March I, 1881, was a scion of a gentry
family in Minsk province. 22 But the youth of the whole empire was at
that time agitated by revolutionary ideas. Bohusevic was the first
to give the Belorussian movelnent its true direction and impulse.
,
,
7. J. Nesluchouski
A number of anonymous writings, poems and stories, soon appeared
to develop the new trend. The best known are Dziadz'ka Anton abo
hutarka ab usim cysta, sto balie', a eamu balie', neviadoma (Uncle
Anton, or a Story about Everything That Aches Though NoOne
Knows Why), and two or three H utar ki (Stories) printed in London
between 1892 and 1903.23 They add considerably to the volume of
native literature of that period. Other writers, among whom Jan Nes-
luchousl{i (1851-1897) was the most distinguished, strove to awaken
the national consciousness and revolutionary spirit of the Belorussian
* The name stands for both "people's freedom" and "people's will."

84 BELORUSSIA.. THE MAKING OF A NATION
people, but their efforts were perforce limited to circles of personal
friends. Actually their works were not published until 1906, when
Belorussian was at last legalized (A. Elski, Adam Hrynovic, Marja
Kosic, J azep Arlouski) .
The Revolutionary Movement
In the late 1890'S, clubs ostensibly formed "for the studies of
Belorussian life" appeared in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kharl{ov, Novaja
Alexandrija, Yuriev (Derpt). Nationalist students in the Butyrki prison
in Moscow organized a secret Belorussian Socialist Group, although
all they could do while serving their terms was to translate some
Russian subversive writings into the Belorussian idiom. A group of
St. Petersburg students, founded in 1902 "for promoting education
and culture among the Belorussian people," illegally received and dis-
tributed books published abroad. They hectographed small literary
collections, J(aliadnaja Pisanka (19°3) and Velikodnaja Pisanka
(1904), and tried to organize the political underground at home. These
industrious youths even dared to put the Viazanka, an allegorical story
by Jan Lucina (Nesluchouski), through imperial censorship on the
ground that it was written in Bulgarian. Other young men and women
from the gentry Russianized during the previous period now joined
hands with the local intelligentsia which the Belorussian middle classes
had just begun to produce.
A group of intellectuals gathered around the new paper Minskij
Listok and the publishing house Severo-Zapadnyj Kalendar', both
in Minsk. A few distinguished themselves later as scholars and national
leaders (Dovnar-Zapolski, Zavitnevic, Slucl{i, Liacki, and others).
Collections of folklore and historical studies were made with renewed
interest. At the same time, with the assistance of the Polish Socialist
Party (PPS), a Belorussian Revolutionary Hramada was founded in
1902. The Hramada was headed by the brothers Anton and Ivan
Luckevic, and at first its whole membership could find room around a
family dining table. At their first meeting at Minsk in 1903, they
changed their name to the Belorussian Socialist Hramada and adopted
the program of the Polish Socialist Party demanding territorial auton-
omy for Belorussia with a popular assembly (sejm) in Vilna, national-
ization of the land of the nobles, and so on. 24
Concurrently, and also with the cooperation of the Poles, a national
cultural movement began to develop under the leadership of Belo-
russian Catholic priests. Conservative in outlook, it was not so much
directed toward holding back the wave of revolution as channeling
it toward different and more constructive ends. Sub rosa Belorussian
circles sprang up in the Roman Catholic seminaries of St. Petersburg,
Vilna, Zitomir, and Sejm. The active leader of the movement was a

THE NATIONAL SELF-DETERIJ1INATION 85
teacher in the St. Petersburg seminary, Epimach Sypillo, who, with the
students Budz'ko, Hryskevic, and others eventually founded the Belo-
russian Christian Democratic Party.25
Both groups quickly ran into difficulties. The All-Russian move-
ment of liberation was catching the imagination of the Belorussian
youth who preferred to struggle for a general rather than a provincial
ideal, and fight for it on the battlefield of the whole Russian empire.
For many, it was more natural to join a Russian revolutionary party
and to work for an over-all liberation than simply to agitate for "nar-
row regional interests." Indeed, would not freedom for Russia mean
also freedom for Belorussia? Za VaS'll i nasu svobodu (For your free-
dom and ours) was the motto of the time. In the 111ultinational en1pire,
the revolutionary struggle was conducted in the Russian language, and
therefore the study of Russian was encouraged by nationalists in
order to join the movement. Belorussians were urged to read Russian,
write Russian, and speak Russian, lest they be left behind in the march
toward the Revolution.
Thus in the 1900'S Belorussia found itself in an ambiguous posi-
tion. The people preferred Russian revolutionary literature to nation-
alist pamphlets printed in London. Literary nationalisln was out of
date, and political nationalism out of place. Indeed, Belorussia was
now being denationalized by its own leaders. They followed the general
current, hoping that their day would come later.
The Revolution of 1905
The Russian Revolution of 1905, though abortive, gave an impetus
to the Belorussian ideal, and for the first time put it in direct and open
contact with the masses. Enjoying liberties granted by the Constitution,
the nationalists went to work with the Russian intelligentsia. The latter,
although considering nationalism a betrayal of the universal ideal, com-
plied with the wishes of the local clubs. The Northwestern Comn1ittee
of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDRP) printed proc-
lamations in Belorussian. The peasant convention called in March
1905, in Minsk, accepted the program of the Belorussian Socialist
Hramada. A Belorussian Peasant Union was founded and set to work
to organize "fighting brigades" (druzina) and revolutionary gueril1a
bands against the Tsarist police. A Belorussian revolutionary hymn,
Cyrvony Znak (Red Sign), was composed and printed on postcards.
So general was the confusion that the Imperial Post Office accepted
them for distribution. Tens of thousands of copies of proclalnations in
verse, written by a young poet, Cetk.a (Aloiza Paskevic), also were
distributed throughout the country by mail.
Events developed swiftly and the confidence of the nationalists
grew. In January 1906, the Hramada convened for the second time. It

86 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
worked out an ambitious program demanding for Belorussia not only
"cultural autonomy" but "the federation of all free peoples within the
empire." The brothers Luckevic were reelected to the Central Com-
mittee, together with A. Ivanollski and A. Burbis. The Hramada estab-
lished contacts with Finnish, Polish, Latvian, Armenian, Georgian, and
Russian Socialists, and also took part 'in the national minorities Con-
ferences in Paris and Geneva.
This brought disagreement instead of cooperation. The demand that
a Belorussian Constituent Assen1bly be called in Vilna n1et with sharp
objections from the Lithuanians who wanted Vilna for themselves. N e-
gotiations ensued to determine whether a "federation of free peoples"
should follow regional or racial principles. No one had clear ideas on
this, and suggestions were made - too vague to be seriously considered
- that Belorussia and Lithuania form a joint state. 26 There was no
general agreement about what degree of political independence from the
empire was to be clain1ed and, in the case of Belorussia, it was by no
means certain that the people would back up any such claim.
In fact, there was evidence that the masses were largely indifferent
to political ideas. Of course, they remained faithful to their lan-
guage, custolns, creed, and manner of life, and they enjoyed books
printed in the native idiom. But they were in no hurry to join a move-
ment whose aims they were still unable to understand properly. Of
all the Belorussian cities, only in Minsk was the railroad strike of
October 1905 effective, and only in BialystoI{. was a soviet of workers
organized. There were no general or local uprisings, and revolutionaries
were unable to seize power in towns or villages, even for a matter of
hours. The revolutionary clubs in Vilna, Bialystok, Grodno, Mogilev,
and Minsl{. have not even been mentioned by Soviet historians. The
local Social Democrats (Bolsheviks), organized illegally in 1904,
proved a complete failure and nothing further was heard of theln until
1915 when a certain Karl Lander started a paper Trud (Labor) in
Minsk, and laid down the foundations of a new Bolshevil{. group. In
general, the situation in Belorussia was much calmer than in many
other parts of the empire. 27
Apart from the Hran1ada and a small clerical group, Belorussians
at that time displayed little interest in national self-determination. Their
political sympathies were distributed among the Russian Socialist Revo-
lutionary (SR) and Social Democratic (SD) parties, the Polish Social-
ist Party (PPS), the Jewish Union (Bund), the Lithuanian Socialist
Party, the Polish Democratic Party (ND), the Russian Liberal Party
(KD), and others. Obviously, people were interested in changing the
system of government in the whole empire and were little moved by a
somewhat narrow nationalism, although here and there local clubs de-
manded "autonomy" for native Belorussian schools. And it should not

THE NATIONAL SEI,F-DETERlVIINATION 87
surprise us that the peasants, expecting a new imperial decree which
might complete the Abolition Act of 1861 for all Russia, disowned
nationalists who. spoke in their name at the session of the Belorussian
Hramada in Minsk. 28
Fearing to find themselves generals without an army, the Hramada
boycotted the elections to the Russian Duma in 1906. The Belorussian
population voted anyway, and sent to the First Duma 15 per cent
rightists, 51 per cent liberals and progressives, 31 per cent leftists, and
2 per cent with no party affiliations, all of them running on Russian,
Polish, or Jewish - not Belorussian - tickets. It is significant that
during the ten years of constitutional regime in Russia not a single
deputy from Belorussia ever mentioned his specific Belorussian con-
sciousness, although Polish, Lithuanian, f\rmenian, Tatar, and other
nationals spoke freely of theirs.
It would seem that the Belorussian people, recognizing the cultural
significance of nationalist propaganda, willfully rejected its political
implications. Indeed, in nationalist writings, this period is described as
a period of "individual fighters" (epocha adzinak), struggling with
"leaflets" against the denationalization and complacency of their peo-
ple. 29
The Nasa Niva Period
Although Belorussian nationalisn1, as a political factor, failed dur-
ing the revolutionary years 1905 and 1906, it would be incorrect to as-
sume that its activities left no significant traces. Liberties gained at that
period fortified the position of the middle class, which began, though
not without misgivings, to provide the movement with an economic
basis. General consciousness of a common historical past and culture
began to increase. The Belorussian press was legalized and literature
grew in volun1e. It assumed a new quality, too. New writers - youth-
ful, dynamic, self-confident, and ambitious - sprang up from the lower
strata of the people. The lessons of 1905 were understood, and the task
seemed clear. The new leadership centered in Vilna and, in September
of 1906, there appeared the first legal Belorussian paper, the weekly
Nasa Dolia (Our Lot). This periodical, intended for "rura1 and urban
workingmen," was printed partly in Russian, partly in Polish char-
acters. After six issues it was suspended by the Governn1ent for "revo-
lutionary and separatist tendencies." In its place, Nasa Niva (Our
Field) appeared, ((the first Belorussian newspaper with illustrations."
From Novelnber 1906 it continued until 1915. Ties were established in
the provincial cities and villages. In three years, the weekly printed 960
items of correspondence from 489 villages, 246 poems by 61 poets, and
91 stories by different authors. In 1910, it had 229 contributors in Vilna
province alone, 208 from Minsk., 114 from Grodno, 65 from Mogilev,

88 BELORUSSIA.' THE MA[(ING OF A NATION
27 from Vitebsk, IS froin Kovno, and 8 from Sinolensk provinces. so
This was a spectacular gain and it may give an idea of the geographical
distribution of interest in nationalism at that time. The circulation of
the paper attained 3,000 copies. This was very good indeed in a coun-
try where all the Russian and Polih papers together sold barely
I 50,000. Yet this, also indicated that there still was a long way to go.
Publishing societies, sponsored or directly assisted by Nasa N iva,
sprang up in St. Petersburg, Vilna, Mogilev, Minsk, and other cities
for the purpose of printing books in Belorussian. The St. Petersburg
publishing house Zahliane sonce i it nase vakonce (May the Sun Shine
in Our Window Too) became the second important center for the
period. The demand for new publications was increasing. Textbooks
were needed. In May 1907 the first Belorussian student conference was
called and founded a teachers union. A student union, the Belorussian
National Cheura, was founded some tin1e later. Wherever possible,
Belorussian libraries, reading rooms, schools, musical and dramatic
clubs, and credit societies were established, if only on a sinall scale. In
St. Petersburg and Novaja Aleksandrija, literary and ethnographic
societies set to work. The Belorussian People's Theater was opened.
In 1910 performances were given in villages and out-of-the-way places
throughout the country. In the summer of 191 I traveling con1panies
covered fifteen spots in Vilna, Vitebsk, and Minsk provinces.
The success was encouraging, but it called for caution. The Nasa
Niva assumed a very tactful position toward the Russian, Polish, Lith-
uanian, and other nationalities in the region. Indeed, this brand of
tolerant nationalism has been unknown there since. The editors, headed
by Aleksander Ulasau, desired '(to revivify the entire country, bring
back its forn1er glory, revive that language which was once noble and
respected, but is now used only among the common folk." The purpose
was educational, not political. Writers, not always strong in grammar,
aired their sufferings, sorrows, and tears, showing a deep affection for
their native land, which they saw poor, neglected, and sick. For the
country, this weekly paper became ((the river into which all Belorussian
literary creation poured." In fact, modern Belorussian literature began
with it and 'in it.
Among the members of the Nasa Niva group were the young poets
Janka Kupala and Jakub Kolas whose works came eventually to hold
in Belorussia a position equal to that of the "classics" in other countries.
Jakub Kolas (Kastus' Mickevic) was born in 1882, the son of a
forester of Minsl{ province. He attended school and becalne himself a
rural teacher, but was in 1906 removed from his position for participa-
tion in an illegal meeting. He spent three years in Minsk prison and
later returned to teach in Polesie. During World War I he was drafted,

THE NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 89
then discharged because of illness, and lived in Kursk province (Rus-
sia) until he could return to Belorussia in 192 I. He began to write at
the age of twelve; translating Krylov's fables into Belorussian, and has
since been a prolific poet, novelist, playwright, publicist, storyteller,
and compiler of textbooks. All his work, until lately, has been imbued
with 0:ne concern: "the injustice to, and oppression of, the little man."
His talent is deep and gracious, though lacl{ing the sparkle which dis-
tinguished his literary rival, Kupala. The circumstances of Soviet life
did not affect his position, although his writings seem to have become
weaker in style and lacking in conviction. In recognition of his merits
and usefulness to the Soviet regime, he has been made vice-president
of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences, a "People's Poet," and a Stalin
Prize laureate. 31
Janka Kupala (Ivan Lucevic), son of a tenant farmer, ,vas born in
1882 near Minsk. Owing to lack of funds, he could not continue his
education beyond primary school. He took up work in a distillery, and
later served as a junior clerk in an office. After the publication of his
first poem, he was sent back to school by the editors of Nasa Niva.
With their subsidies, Kupala attended adult education centers in St.
Petersburg and l\1oscow and did all he could to acquire n10re knowl-
edge and broaden his vision. His strong and genuine talent soon put
him at the head of the new Belorussian literary movement. Insofar as
it was possible under the Soviet rule, he maintained this position in the
BSSR, where until his death in 1942, he was repeatedly reelected presi-
dent of the Union of Belorussian Writers.
To Belorussian literary historians, Kupala is "the poet-awakener,
beHringer, prophet" (Dvarcanin). In cOlnparison with his contempo-
raries, however, his activity in revolutionary circles was not great
and, in fact, did not go beyond teaching for a time in an underground
Belorussian school early in 1905. A former editor of the f.lasa Niva
says, "The beginnings of Kupala's creative work were completely un-
connected with the movement" (Navina). Kupala wrote his verses un-
affected by the political ideas which were at that time agitating Belo-
russian society. He had his own dreams. His first poem, "Muzik,"
printed in the Russian newspaper Severo-Zapadnyi kraj (1905),
sounded like a folk song, but it had a deeper meaning. It told the story
of a peasant who, for the first time in his life, n1et with the civilized
world; he went through "delightful and terrible pangs" in luaking "the
two strains fuse into the new person who he became" - which was
the case of n1any a Belorussian youth at that time, as well as of the
writer himself. Kupala's adaptation to the Soviet scene was not spon-
taneous, but eventually it became con1plete. In 1941 he was granted the
Stalin Prize in literature. The circumstances of his death the following
year have not been n1ade very clear. 32

90 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
Besides Kolas and Kupala, not many writers of the Nasa Niva
period survived into the Soviet time, and those who did have been
gradually liquidated as no longer congenial with the spirit and demands
of the Communist era. But the period has left an indelible mark on
Belorussian culture. Dvarcanin gives an interesting picture of the social
structure of the movement, and divides all the writers of the period into
six categories: (I) writers of "transition" from the previous period
who continued in the tradition of Dunin-Marcinkevic, Bohusevic, or
Nesluchovsl{i - a class that has produced no outstanding author
(Jadvihin, Kahanec, Paulovic); (2) peasants, who form the largest
group, among them Kupala, Kolas" Cetka, Harun, Lesik; (3) one
proletarian, Ciska Hartny; (4) one "bourgeois," F. Aliachnovic; (5)
nine intellectuals, alnong them Maksin1 Bahdanovic, M. Harecki, Z.
Veras; and (6) ten "others" of widely assorted occupations, some of
them not even of Belorussian origin (Stary Ulas, Santyr, etc.).33 Bi-
adulia (Plaunik) spoke only in Yiddish before he learned Belorussian
at the age of seventeen; Krapiva (Kejris) was a Latvian by birth; and
Ulasall (Vlasov), managing editor of Nasa Niva, was Russian. 34
It is significant that the rustic element should have prevailed. Even
the "intellectuals" in Dvarcanin's classification hardly rise above the
rural level of literacy. Of all the writers of that period, only J advihin
(1870-1925) was a university graduate. Only Maxim Bahdanovic
(1892-1917) and Cetka (Aloiza Paskevic), a peasant's daughter from
Vilna province, received a more or less formal education. One may
say of the others that they were writers before they had learned to
write. Harun was a carpenter by trade; Ciska Hartny, a tanner; Santyr,
a house painter; Cernusevic, a tailor; Hurlo, a locksmith; Paulovic, a
bookkeeper for a railroad company; Plaunik, the son of a Jewish
coachman; Maksim Harecki, a peasant; and so on. For most of them,
literature meant social protest rather than artistic expression, and their
poems were rhymed comments on contemporary conditions of life.
Their lyrics were simple, unsophisticated, and told the elemental love
of the peasant for his land. This was precisely what the Belorussian
reader could understand, and what he appreciated. It is interesting that
practically all works were published under pseudonyms, some writers
using up to ten different names. Whether this was froln fear of repres-
sion - and indeed one or two writers were exiled to Siberia - or from
a peculiar policy of expansion, is difficult to say, since no other na-
tional minority in the Russian empire developed a similar habit, al-
though their literatures were no less oppressed at that time. 35
In 1910, the editorial staff of the Nasa N iva polled its readers to
find out which of the two alphabets, Polish or Russian, theretofore used
indiscriminately, was preferred. The question was decided in favor of
Russian, although not by an overwhelming majority. The clerical

THE NATIONAL SELF-DETERM/1VAT/ON 91
groups, however, continued to use the Polish transcriptions for their
periodical Belarus', although their position was not as Polish in essence
as it had been SOlne time before. On the contrary, they carried on propa-
ganda for the Uniate Church which they now hoped to establish as the
national Church of Belorussia, as distinct from both the Polish Cath-
olic and the Russian Orthodox Churches. Thus they fostered the Belo-
russian national spirit, trying at the san1e time to keep it away from
revol u tionary godlessness. 36
Frightened by the revolutionary winds which swept Russia in 1905,
the conservatives also tried to neutralize propaganda by encouraging
cultural activities, and they assisted such organs as Belorusskaja Zizn'
and Severo-Zapadnaja Zizn' (Belorussian Life ; Northwestern Life),
both published in Russian. They also started in Vilna publications in
the Belorussian idiom: Lucyna (Lighting Chip), a youth magazine;
Sacha (Plow), an agricultural quarterly; and the students' Rannica
(Dawn), in which nationalistic trends were watered down to nonsedi-
tious regionalism.
Achievements
The ten-year period of 1906 to 1917, known as the Adradzen'ne
(Revival) period, can be correctly described as the forn1ative years of
Belorussian political nationalism. NaIve and sentimental concepts of
revival belonged to the nineteenth century. The new generation saw its
task along more practical and in1mediate lines. Theirs was an era of
organizing the national memory; of fostering the process of national
self-determination according to the requirements of modern political
science; of defining the national goal in terms of general culture and
practical policies; and of educating a personnel capable of assun1ing the
national leadershiP.
Everything was tried to awaken and enliven the national conscious-
ness of the people. Literature concentrated on specific characteristics
of the Belorussians as a group, asserting the Belorussian culture from
both historical and comparative points of view. A writer covering that
period points to the fact that "even the imperial officials began locally
to assume a specific individuality, which they son1ewhat awkwardly
called Zapadno-fuss [a variant of West Russian] in distinction to both
Polish and Russian." 37 Nationalist historians identified the Borys-
thenes with the Berezina River, and thus extended Herodotus' travels
to the territory of Belorussia. Others discovered that "the average
Belorussian was, in fact, two to three inches taller than he had been
generally believed to be" (Skialenak). Myths were deliberately created
to foster the dynamics of national revival, and to hasten the attainment
of the political goal. The technique was not new, and the Belorussians

9 2 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
were not to blame for using it any more than other nations before and
.
SInce.
Indeed, it seemed that Belorussia had everything which might be
required for statehood: a territory, a people, a language. It only needed
self-government to become a full-fledged nation. But it was not easy
to convey this concept, still less make it the wish of the masses, woefully
ignorant and indolent. The nationalist leaders realized that the nation
was still in a fluid state. The territory? Polish, Lithuanian, Ul{rainian,
and Russian claims overlapped in such a manner that eventually only
a province or two would be left to Belorussia. The language? Yes, but
"time was needed to decide which local dialect had the better chance
to become the basis of the common literary standard," and the time
was not yet ripe for "all the peculiarities of the native idiom to become
clear" (Taraskevic). The leadership? Writers unquestionably had a
common outlook and an esprit de corps, but they expressed themselves
in different ways and with different emphases. Their life experience
seldom went beyond a native village, or a workshop. To them, the Nasa
Niva symbolized a cultural, not a political goal, though it did establish
and maintain ties with the discontented urban and rural populations.
School teachers' unions, cooperatives, and various cultural societies had
enough revolutionary ferment. Yet political organization remained weak
and inefficient.
This era can be described as "a period of clubs," with no unity
of leadership, most of which consisted of self-educated rural "semi-
intelligentsia." Their loyalties, like those of the established urban in-
telligentsia, were divided between the Russian, Polish, and Belorussian
political parties on the one hand; between the right, the center, and
different shades of the left, on the other. In fact, the total number of
active supporters of nationalism hardly exceeded the number of sub-
scribers to the Nasa Niva, three to four thousand persons. 3S In spite of
some spectacular achievements in the cultural field, it was nonetheless
clear that the movement was ill prepared to face the emergencies which
arose with World War I and the Russian Revolution.

7
WAR AND REVOLU710N
With the outbreak of vVorld "Var I, thousands of Belorussian fam-
ilies fled to the east, and the nation, cut by the front line, was dispersed.
The circumstances, however, were not entirely detrimental to the move-
ment of national self-determination. Direct contact with life in Russia
and the Ukraine brought out for the refugees the unique characteristics
of their own land. In many instances, they found it desirable to keep
together in order to maintain their group individuality in a friendly,
yet foreign, environment. The Belorussian societies and committees
which spontaneously emerged to aid the victims of war and for cultural
purposes created among the refugees an atlTIosphere of national soli-
darity unknown at home. Attempts on the part of the large Belorussian
community of Petrograd to publish periodicals of a political nature
(Svetac in the Polish, and Dziannica in the Russian print) were short-
lived, but humanitarian organizations continued to grow in Moscow,
Kiev, and other parts of the empire.
The Vilna Confederation
Similar activities also began to develop on the other side of the
front line, but they very soon assumed a different trend. The idea of a
Belorussian nation as distinct from both Polish and Russian suited the
policies of the Occupation Army, and negotiations were opened at Vilna
toward establishing a Belorussian administration.
The nationalist group was headed by Anton and Ivan Luckevic,
founders of the Belorussian Socialist Hran1ada. At first, they had sim-
ply wanted to inforlll the Germans of Belorussian interests and even-
tually to organize an agency for the protection of Belorussian nationals
in the zones of occupation. None of them had seriously considered the
possibility of Belorussian statehood. When the Germans made the offer
to them, however, it was too good to pass up. The sooner the state was
organized politically, the better chance it would have to protect its
territorial integrity at the international peace settlement after the war.

94 BELORUSSIA: THE 1J1AI(ING OF A NATION
Aware of their inability to handle the problem by themselves, the
brothers Luckevic consulted with local Lithuanian, Polish, and Jewish
clubs. The reconstitution of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania within its
historical boundaries appealed to all four parties concerned, and the
Germans were syn1pathetic. Consequently, the following statement, the
('Universal," was published in four languages at Vilna:
On December 19, 1915, members of Lithuanian, Belorussian, Polish, and
Jewish organizations undertook to establish a Confederation of the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania. According to their plan, Lithuania and Belorussia . . .
shall be independent, autonomous states . . . in which all ethnic groups
shall be guaranteed their rights . . . All classes, organizations, and citizens
of the country are called upon to forget slander, strife, and n1istrust in view
of the great importance of this historic moment and, considering only the
good of their comn1on homeland, to join in the Confederation of the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania. 1
A Provisional Council, including representatives of all the nation-
alities and political parties in the future Grand Duchy, was to conduct
the "state affairs" and to select "a proper candidate for the office of
Grand Duke." But the Vilna project was at once countered by the Su-
preme Lithuanian COlnmittee in I(aunas, which wanted a Grand Duchy
composed of Lithuanians and Latvians alone. In the statement of Jan-
uary 6, 1916, the Committee conceded, however, that "since the Belo-
russian lands formerly were part of the Grand Duchy, the Belorussians
might, if they should so wish, join with the new state as its third mem-
ber." The Vilna group ignored this and issued another proclamation
defining the aims of the Confederation as follows:
I. The reconstituted Lithuanian Belorussian State shall form a sovereign
nation. The parliament (sejm) shall be in Vilna, elected by universal, direct,
equal, and secret ballot. AIl the ethnic groups living in the State shall have
equal rights in this election.
2. The State shall include within its boundaries all the territories now
occupied by German troops, namely: the provinces of I(ovno [I(aunas] and
Vilna, the Belorussian and Lithuanian parts of Grodno and Suvalki provinces,
the Lithuanian parts of Courland, and portions of the province of Minsk
now under the Vilna administration.
3. The Constitution of the future free Lithuanian Belorussian State shall
not be granted from above, but worked out by a Constituent Sejm in ViIna,
elected by universal, equal, direct, and secret ballot. 2
Under the editorship of the brothers Luckevic and V. Lastouski, a
Belorussian newspaper, H onzan (The Clan10r), was founded to pro-
mote the idea of confederation. The paper appeared three times a week
and had two editions, one printed in the Polish alphabet, the other in
the Russian. The German Military Command ordered clerl{s to trans-

WAR AN D REVOLUTION
95
late the word "Belorussians" as W eissruthenen, and not Weissrussen
as before.
The plan of a quadripartite federation, however, ran into new dif-
ficulties. Quarrels broke out among the four parties. Belorussians and
Lithuanians contended for the city of Vilna, while the Poles claimed the
right to be masters of the entire new state. Within a few months the
coalition disintegrated, and the Occupation Army lost all interest in it.
The Poles, who counted in their midst more professional and educated
men, naturally becan1e advisors to the Gern1an generals and took ad-
vantage of their position to quietly re-Polonize the country. The Lith-
uanian, Belorussian, and Jewish groups con1plained. All they eventually
obtained was a Hindenburg order confirming equal rights for their lan-
guages in the occupied territories. But there was no longer any question
of an equal representation in the administration.
Left to themselves, the Belorussians set out to organize the national
elements into whatever form they could. Soon there emerged a Belo-
russian Club in Vilna, a Scientific Society, a Teachers' Union, the edu-
cational society Zolak, and a few others. This prompted the Belorussian
leaders to apply in Berlin for pern1ission to take part, in the name of
the Belorussian nation, in the "Peoples of Russia" conference in Stock-
holm (April 1916) and Lausanne (June 1916). Berlin agreed, and
Lastouski was dispatched abroad. Together with some other political
emigrants from Russia, he signed an appeal to President VV oodrow
Wilson "to save the national and religious minorities of the Russian
empire from annihilation." 3 For the first time in its history, Belo-
russia appeared on the international scene. This, however, was not
enough to restore German confidence in the nation, which "had never
shown any tendency toward political independence in the past." 4
The Germans favored a Lithuanian nation, with the city of Vilna
as its capital, and the Belorussian lands under occupation were in-
cluded in the Lithuanian political boundaries. From a prospective part-
ner, Belorussians were to become a racial minority in a foreign state.
They accepted the reversal of their fortune graciously, and on Sep-
tember 1, 1916, sent a telegram to the Reichstag expressing gratitude
to Gern1any and hope that they might eventually be permitted the
realization of complete nationhood. 5 In December, however, they sub-
mitted to the Chancellor of the German empire a memorandum re-
stating the idea of a Lithuanian Belorussian State, "in close union with
Latvia and with a firm stand on the Baltic," and suggesting that the
lands not yet conquered from Russia be included in that state. After a
noncommittal acknowledgment, the petition was filed in Berlin. In the
meantime, the Lithuanian National Council, the Tariba, without con-
sulting the Belorussians, offered the ducal crown to Prince Wilhelm of
Drach, member of the Wlirttemberg house, who accepted under the

96 BELORUSSIA.' THE lVIAKING OF A NATION
name of Mindovg II. At the same time, the candidacy of Prince
Eustace Sapieha for the Lithuanian throne was announced in Berlin,
and supported by the Poles. But the Germans showed no haste. It was
evident that they had not yet made up their minds about how to finally
seal the fate of the conquered country.
The Russian Revolution
With the Russian Revolution in March 19I7, Minsk became the
Belorussian center of gravity. Peoples of the empire turned their eyes
to Petrograd as the new symbol of freedom, equality, and justice. The
Belorussian vVar Relief, around which the Inost conscious nationalists
had gathered, was transformed into the Belorussian National Commit-
tee. It included at once the representatives of all the important groups
in the region, from Russian socialists to Polish landlords, from the
ROlnan Catholic clergy to the Jewish Bund, and from scholars and
artists to railroad workers and farmers. The men1bership, politically
and culturally, represented a large cross section of the population, but
the men1bers were chosen through appointment and it was not very
certain whether the Belorussian nation would consider the committee
its legal representative. 6
With great confidence, however, the National Committee presented
demands to the Provisional Government in Petrograd for a permanent
regional assembly with advisory functions on local matters, for open-
ing schools with instruction in Belorussian, and so on. They had no
effect. Apparently Petrograd, with some reason, put no trust in the
National COl11mittee. Already, the Socialists demanded loudly that
"the reactionary and counterrevolutionary men1bers" be thrown out.
The organizations of the Belorussian refugees in Moscow, Kiev, Odessa,
and other Russian cities also refused to recognize the authority of
Minsk. They rallied instead around the Belorussian Popular Hramada
in Moscow, which presented its own demands to the Provisional Gov-
ernment of Russia for ((territorial status" after the war, and nominated
Belorussian delegates to the All-Russian Constituent Assen1bly (Cvi-
kevic, Prusinski, and Turuk among others). Belorussian nationalism
thus found expression in the concepts of national cultural autonomy at
Minsk. and of territorial status at Moscow, but no word was yet uttered
about eventual secession from the empire. Even provincial patriotism
typical of the Nasa Niva period ahnost completely disappeared from
literature. 7
The more immediate social and economic issues prevailed, and the
Belorussians split into innumerable political groups. Besides the Minsk
and Moscow cOlnmittees, a third force presently emerged in Petrograd,
the Belorussian Section of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies.

WAR AN D REVOLUTION
97
Then, in Odessa, the soldiers deserting the southern front formed their
own organization, first called the Belorussian National Rada, and then
the Belorussian National Commissariat. Other groups like the Union
of Belorussian Democracy at Gomel, the Belorussian Christian Demo-
cratic Association at Minsk, the Union of the Belorussian Orthodox
Clergy at Moscow, and the Union of the Belorussian People at Vitebsk,
agitated in different parts of the country, recognizing no authority but
their own. Finally, on June 17, 1917, a Belorussian section of the Bol-
shevik Party was organized in Minsk, which then issued its own mani-
festo to the "workers, peasants, and soldiers" of Belorussia. s
Although most of these organizations were small groups of intellec-
tuals and politicians having little contact with the masses, sometimes
even no direct tie with the country, each one insisted on its exclusive
right to represent «the true interests of the people." Gradually, however,
the Socialist Hral11ada obtained full control over the Belorussian Na-
tional Committee, transforn1ing it into a Central Rada to represent only
"the most progressive and democratic parties." New demands were sent
to Petrograd, for transformation of the Russian empire into a federa-
tion, nationalization of all lands, free expansion of Belorussian culture,
and so on. But this move was not supported by other gruops. The Belo-
russian center in Moscow considered it too far to the left, and the
Belorussian center in Petrograd found it too much to the right - as
though anyone could tell what was "left" and what was '<right" at that
time. The abstract discussion went on, becoming hotter and more bitter
every day, with, it would seem, little real consideration for the country
and people concerned. Indeed, in the first free elections to the rural
(zemstvo) and municipal governments in Belorussia, in the spring of
19 I 7, not a single representative of the nationalist groups won any pop-
ular support. Likewise, in the general elections to the Constituent As-
sembly, the nationalist ticket was not able to collect more than 29,000
votes in the whole country. In fact, only one member of the Belorussian
Socialist Hramada managed to get elected, having wisely hopped on the
bandwagon of a Russian socialist party. N"o more conclusive evidence
could possibly have been produced that the Belorussian populations
had as yet little confidence in their own nationalleadership.9
In the meantime, soviets had begun to spring up in different local-
ities. Calling then1selves Belorussian, they emphasized the solidarity
of the working class, first in Russia and then throughout the world.
Significantly, the membership of the Social Democratic (Bolshevik)
Party in Belorussia was growing far more rapidly than that of any
nationalistic group. The party totaled 2,530 n1embers in August, and
their number was said to have increased to 9,190 by the middle of Sep-
tember, and to 28,508 by the beginning of October. 10 The nationalist
record of the previous decade was, as it were, wiped out in the revolu-

9 8 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
tionary whirlwind. It would seem, indeed, that Belorussian nationalism
was suffering a worse defeat than the one it had faced in 1905-06.
The nationalists had not been able to settle their inner differences
and quarrels. The movement dwindled, splitting up into lesser clubs
and creating one paper organization after another. Dogmatic differ-
ences entailed personal animosities, and what was set up one day was
destroyed the following morning.' This looked like a petty and noisy
game unrelated to the great national calamity, and people busily passed
it by. One can only speculate upon what would have been the im-
n1ediate future of the country had not the Russian Revolution changed
its course.
The Bolshevik Revolution
It is beyond the ability of this writer to give a coherent description
of the confusion which followed the fall of the Provisional Government
to the Bolsheviks in November 1917. But one thing, at least, seems to
stand out distinctly enough. Bolshevism gave Belorussian nationalism
the break it needed lllost, and this it did in two different, albeit equally
effective, ways.
The Bolshevil{s promised «the oppressed peoples" of Russia the
status of sovereign republics, provided they introduce the Soviet system
of governlllent in their lands. However, at the same time, national self-
determination and secession seemed to be the only way of getting
out of the Soviet system at all. Consequently, local nationalism received
recognition and support, even though with different views and purposes,
from both the Soviet and the anti-Soviet sides. The Soviet historians
claim that local soviets had been established in the whole territory of
Belorussia east of the front line by the end of November. The truth is
that the situation remained fluid for several months.
The anti-Soviet organizations in Minsk called a general Belorus-
sian convention in December, in order to organize national resistance.
The Belorussian Central Rada, the Central Military Rada, and the
Executive Committee of the western front published a joint appeal to
the people, beginning as follows:
Russia is living through terrible days. The incalculable riches of the
country are being destroyed by anarchy. The masses, deprived of a recog-
nized government, are attempting to decide by themselves questions vital
to us all. This can lead the peoples of Russia only toward the loss of the
liberties which they bought in February [March] with the blood of their
sons. . . We have decided to take energetic steps to organize the whole
Belorussian people in defense of the rights and freedom we have obtained.
Belorussia must be a democratic republic, united with Great Russia, and with
other neighbor republics of the empire, on a federal basis.
There was little to threaten the territorial integrity of the empire

WAR AN D REVOLUTION
99
in this statement. It did, however, bring forth objections from the Belo-
russian center in Petrograd. Supported by the People's Commissariat
of Nationalities, then headed by Stalin, it decided to call its own Belo-
russian Convention in Minsk, on December IS. Its appeal to the Belo-
russian people read in part:
We see that in the process of disintegration of the Russian empire a
series of small republics are being formed, such as Finland, Ukraine, Don
Cossacks, Ural, Lithuania, Latvia, Siberia, the Caucasus, Turkestan. . . They
can only perish in internecine war. . . Belorussia up to this moment has stood
aside, and has not announced independence. It is true that a small clique of
Belorussians have come out with such ideas, but theirs was not the opinion
of the whole region and of the toiling Belorussian people. . . The moment
has come, ho\vever, when Belorussia as a whole, and in particular its laboring
peasants, must take a stand. But not in order to cause new pain to Russia
and deal her a cruel blow. \\1 e must organize in order to help ourselves, and
to support suffering Russia at the same time. 11
The struggle between the Minsk and Petrograd Belorussian centers
ended in a compromise on the basis of "n1utual support and unity of
purpose." Accordingly, only the "delTIocratic trends" were to be repre-
sented at the joint First Belorussian Convention. The Convention
opened on December 14 in Minsk, with 1,872 delegates, of whom 1,167
had the right to vote. Every local or professional group, no matter how
small, could send representatives. The requirement was that it have a
president and a secretary, and often these, plus a rubber stamp, were its
only members. But there also were segments of the population more
fully represented, among them the rural zen1stvos of the eastern area,
the Minsk garrison, and poli tical parties of a longer standing.
Immediately, the delegates began to split into factions. Along with
the various nonparty clubs there appeared Socialist Revolutionaries
(Right, Center, and Left), Social Democrats (Menshevik, Bolshevik,
and Internationalist), Socialist Hramada, Popular Socialists, Christian
Democrats, and a number of other less clearly defined political groups.
It was significant that the Russian political parties participated along-
side of the Belorussian groups and, in fact, outnumbered them. A Coun-
cil of Elders (Soviet Starejsin) was composed as follows: Serada (a
veterinarian), president of the Convention; Vazillo (student) and
Prusinsk.i (journalist), vice-presidents; Kaliadka (teacher) and Husca
(railroad employee), secretaries; Hryb (student) and Sevcuk. (staff
scribe), assistant secretaries.
The Convention was overwhelmingly non- if not anti-Bolshevik.
In fact, the ten Bolshevik delegates elected in Petrograd, had been
delayed and did not arrive until the session was closed. A conflict with
the local soviet loomed inevitable. Indeed, the issue was not so much
Belorussian nationalism as the acceptance or rejection of Communism.

100 BELORUSSIA.. THE MAKING OF A NATION
This had become evident as soon as the delegates began to deliberate.
The debate revolved around the question of separation from or union
with the Soviets, and for the first time the idea of political independ-
ence was openly expressed. Secession was supported by almost all the
intellectuals, most of them with an entirely Russian background; 12
union, by the peasants and a substantial number of the soldiers. Un-
able to reach a compromise after three days, the delegates agreed to
leave the fundamental question of political independence open until the
end of the Convention.
But the Convention ended in a different manner than anticipated.
On the night of December 18, the Red Army appeared in the hall. A
commander, whose rank and name have remained unknown, came up
to the platform and declared the Convention closed. When objections
were raised, he ordered the arrest of the officers and most prominent
delegates. It is believed that he acted on orders issued by the Bolshevik
commander of the Minsk garrison, but the story has never been fully
explained. 1s
The Bolsheviks arriving late from Petrograd were as surprised as
anyone, and wired their protest to Lenin. Receiving no answer, they
sent a wire to Stalin, People's Con11nissar of Nationalities. But the
Soviet authority remained mute. The l\1inskans were in a quandary for
about a month, when they learned that the All-Russian Constituent
Assembly in Moscow was suppressed in the same manner on January
18,1918.14
In the meantime, those members of the Council of Elders (Rada)
who had not been arrested fled to the woods. They declared the union
of all political organizations, establishing a single, albeit underground,
authority. An exception was made in the case of the Belaruskaja Cen-
tral'naja Vajskovaja Rada (The Belorussian Central Military Council),
otherwise known as Belvajsk1'ada, which continued open activities
under the suspicious eye of the Minsk Soviet. It managed to transfer
to Minsk the 289th infantry regiment of the former imperial army,
75 per cent of whose members were Belorussians, and began negotia-
tions with the Supreme Soviet Military Command about organizing a
national Belorussian Red Army. It then established contacts with the
Ukrainian and Tatar military undergrounds, planning an open revolt.
When the Soviets discovered the plot, they removed the 289th infantry
from Minsk (January 20,1918) and arrested the leaders.
But the underground activities continued and the National Rada
even succeeded in sending its own delegates to Brest-Litovsk to protest
against the treaty. Though they were not recognized by the Central
Powers, they did manage, under cover of the Ukrainian delegation, to
register protest against the partition of Belorussia.

WAR AND REVOLUTION
101
The Treaty oj Brest-Litovsk
The day the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed (February 19,
19 I 8) , * the Reds left Minsk without waiting for the Germans to enter
the city.15 Their flight was expedited by Colonel K. Ezavitau, who had
just escaped from jail, gathered together a group of volunteers, and ap-
pointed himself Commandant of Minsk. Within twenty-four hours some
semblance of order was established, and the Rada returned to the city
to represent the people until a democratically elected Constituent As-
sembly should decide the fate of the country. In order to give more
weight to its own authority, the Executive Committee of the Rada in-
cluded some Ukrainian, Jewish, and Russian representatives, picked up
at random. 16
The manifesto published by the Rada on February 20 read in part:
The authorities which heretofore have governed Belorussia have now left
the country. To use our right of national self-deterlnination it is necessary
to call a democratic Constituent Assembly. Until that tinle, the Executive
Comlnittee of the Rada of the First Belorussian Convention declares itself
the Provisional Government of Belorussia, and delegates full p'owers to the
National Secretariat to be appointed by the Executive Comlnittee. . .
The Provisional Government was forn1ed the following day. It
was composed of fifteen secretaries, who belonged to the local intelli-
gentsia and had had no experience in business or personnel manage-
ment. In the absence of any other authority, however, the citizenry
rallied around them. Without further discussion, they interpreted the
decisions of the Decen1ber Convention as a declaration of independ-
ence. The full meaning of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, however, was
not yet entirely clear, and the German plans remained obscure. The
Austro-German troops of occupation had not yet arrived, and all con-
nections with Petrograd and Moscow had been cut off. Men of the dis-
banded Polish Corps of General Dowbor-Musnicki were looting the
country.17 A police force, summarily organized by a former captain of
the Russian Imperial Army, and the First Belorussian Regiment of
V olunteers, made up within two days by Colonel Radkevic, were trying
as valiantly as possible to maintain order. The National Secretariat
succeeded, however, in holding out for four days until the first German
uniform appeared in the streets of Minsk..
The occupation troops entered Minsk on February 25, 1918, and
the Provisional Government hastened to pay its respects to the Austro-
German High Command. But the Germans received them rather coolly
and told them that, as far as they knew, the Belorussian government
was in Vilna, not in Minsk. The secretaries learned with astonishment
* The dates given are Old Style, falling thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar.

102 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
that a Belorussian Assembly had convened during January 25 to 27 in
Vilna, and elected a Rada under Anton Luckevic. Independence was
proclain1ed on February 18, and the administration included, among
others, an Orthodox and a Roman Catholic priest, a Mr. Falkevic, and
a Mr. Dulka.
The Minsk politicians were dumbfounded. They knew Anton Luc-
kevic, of course, but the names of Falkevic and Dulka were completely
new to theln. l\1oreover, the presence of two eccelsiastics in the admin-
istration terrified the revolutionary Minskans. The Minsk Rada, there-
fore, repudiated the Vilna government and denounced Anton Luckevic
for associating himself with "reactionaries and clericals." On March 9
it published a Constituent Manifesto establishing "the Belorussian re-
public in the boundaries of all provinces with a Belorussian majority,"
and ordering Luckevic to submit to the ('sovereign will of the nation." 18
The supercharged phrases of the Revolution - "state," "republic,"
"sovereignty," "national government" - \vere hurled with every type
of inflection back and forth between l\1insk and Vilna, each clain1ing
the other's territory. If the sonorous language fooled anyone, it was
only the participants in the pageant. The Austro-German Military
Command saw through the situation, and Minsk was given three days
to make peace with Vilna. The blow was lTIOre severe than it may seem.
Something more than the revolutionary pride of Minsk was at stake.
Claiming complete secession from Russia, the Vilna Rada, on Feb-
ruary 18, justified its position as follows:
. . . The Poles are nursing annexationist ambitions toward Belorussia.
The Russians did not give the Belorussian people an opportunity to form
their own An11Y, and have themselves abandoned Belorussia. Our country,
in the course of her history, has proven that she is perfectly fitted for an
independent political existence. The Russian Bolshevik Government uses a
policy of violence, of which the dispersal of the First Belorussian Convention
in Minsk is an example . . . Taking all this into consideration, the Belo-
russian Rada in Vilna declares all ties with Russia severed. The Rada ap-
peals to the western powers for assistance in reconstituting the former
Lithuanian Belorussian State [Grand Duchy of Lithuania] regardless of the
fact that the country is momentarily divided by a war front; it appeals
especially to Germany which has the most economic interests in common
with the Lithuanian Belorussian State. . .19
But the Minskans had aimed at a Constituent Assembly to decide
the question of the Belorussian future, and the idea of a Lithuanian
Belorussian State, reconstructed under the protection of the Central
Powers, was entirely new to them. The Vilna resolution was arbitrary
and undemocratic. Minsk made a bid for delay, but the Germans were
adamant. Finally, after three days of futile debate, the Minsk Rada
gave in, and the Germans called Anton Luckevic to Minsl{.

WAR AN D REVOLUTION
1°3
Declaration of Independence
The representatives of the two Radas met on March 25, 1918, and
"by a majority of only a few votes, and in flagrant contradiction to the
decisions of the First Belorussian Convention in December 19 1 7," 20
declared the independence of the Belorussian National Republic (Bela-
ruskaja N arodnaja Respublika) as follows:
A year ago, the peoples of Belorussia, together with aU the peoples of
Russia, threw off the yoke of Russian tsarism which, taking no advice from the
people, had plunged our land into the blaze of war that ruined most of our
cities and towns. Today we, the Rada of the Belorussian National Republic,
cast off from our country the last chains of the political servitude that had
been imposed by Russian tsarism upon our free and independent land. From
now on, the Belorussian National Republic is to be a free and independent
power. The peoples of Belorussia themselves, through their own Constitu..
tent Assembly, will decide upon the future relations of Belorussia with other
sta teSt . .
This statement was followed by a repudiation of the Brest-Litovsk
Treaty and by a claim upon the whole territory whose people spoke
B elorussian. 21
Many people felt that the Provisional Government had anticipated
the decisions of the Constituent Assen1bly, and several groups walked
out of the Rada in protest. But the declaration, approved by the Ger-
man Military Command, stuck, and the reshuffled government sat down
to business.
The birth of the new Belorussian state was solemnly announced
over the radio to the universe. A national flag with three horizontal
stripes - white, red, white - was adopted. A state seal, representing
the emblem (pahonia) of the ancient Lithuanian Russian state, was or-
dered and postage stamps of three denominations were printed. The
sovereign power thus was demonstrated. .
A memorandum was sent to Berlin requesting that the Belorussian
National Republic be recognized by the German Reich. Belorussian
consulates opened in Moscow, Kiev, Odessa, Rostov, in the Northern
Caucasus (Stavropol), and in Vilna, since it was not clear whether that
city now was to be Lithuanian or Belorussian. Extraordinary and pleni-
potentiary missions were sent to the Ukrainian government in Kiev
and to the Lithuanian Tariba in Vilna, as well as to Warsaw, Ber-
lin, Copenhagen, Bern, and eventually to Paris. Dovnar-Zapolski and
Cvikevic attempted to negotiate with Moscow through the Soviet dele-
gation in I(iev. But Moscow's position was uncertain. So also was the
attitude of the Lithuanians and the Poles and, above all, that of the
Germans in Bel" Jin.
Life began to resume its normal course as best it could under for-

104 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
eign occupation. An administrative system based on ancient rural and
municipal self-government began to take shape. Taraskevic published
his first Belorussian grammar, which helped to teach the native idiom in
the schools. Newspapers and periodicals appeared throughout the
country, all in the Belorussian language. 22 Later, the Germans were to
be credited with "emphatically assisting the cultural development of
Belorussia, and protecting the freedom of the press." 23 But there is
more reason to believe that, once the civic order was established, the
German Military Command indifferently let the country go its own
way.
Meanwhile, the members of the Rada who had walked out after
the declaration of Belorussian independence were replaced by the dele-
gates of a new club called The Belorussian Representatives of the City
of Minsk. This club, headed by R. Skirmunt and composed of land-
owners, homeowners, and the clergy, was the most powerful group in
Minsk and was able to establish satisfactory personal contacts with the
German Military Command. Its organ, Belal"uski Sliach (The Belorus-
sian Way), advocated full collaboration with the Central Powers, and
resisted the land and social reforms which, in its opinion, \vere leading
the country "to anarchy and destruction." It succeeded in alienating
the liberals and socialists from the German offices and began a cam-
paign against the Vilna autonomists.
Despite all expectations, the Vilna Rada did not disband after the
Belorussian National Republic was proclain1ed. On the contrary, it
sent delegates to the Lithuanian National Tariba, and one of its
members became Minister of Belorussian Affairs in the Lithuanian gov-
ernment, that is, in a foreign government with claims to Belorussian
territory. To the Minsl{ protestations Vilna turned a deaf ear. Minsk
appealed to the German High Command, but the Germans had washed
their hands of the affair. Vilna realized that the Lithuanian state was
recognized by Berlin and the Belorussian state was not. Presently,
the whole territory of the Vilna and Grodno provinces, overwhelmingly
Belorussian in population, went under the administration of the Lithu-
anian Tariba. The Lithuanians generously consented to cooperate with
the Belorussian Rada in Vilna, and, not without German pro1l1pting,
accepted its delegates to the Tariba. The people were satisfied with the
freedom given them for cultural and social work, and over 125 Belo-
russian schools were opened in the Vilna and Grodno provinces; a
teachers' college in Svisloc, a chair of Belorussian studies in Vilna,
and various cultural, educational, economic societies, and publishing
houses were established. This was indeed enough to keep a Minister
for Belorussian Affairs busy in the Lithuanian government, and it was
only natural for the Vilna Rada to accept this position for one of its
members.
To the ideologists of Belorussian nationalism, however, the posi-

WAR AND REVOLUTION 105
tion of a racial minority in the land they considered their own was un-
acceptable. A n1eeting of the natives of the Vilna and Grodno provinces
was arranged by l\1insk, at which the agreement of the Vilna Rada with
the Lithuanian Tariba was repudiated and the Lithuanian claims to
Belorussian territory were denied. On the advice of the Skirmunt
group, the Minsk government sent the following telegram to Kaiser
Wilhelm II :
The Rada of the Belorussian National Republic, representing the whole
Belorussian nation, expresses deepest gratitude to Your Imperial Majesty
for the liberation of Belorussia by the Germany Army from the unbearable
yoke of foreign anarchy which has been ravaging the country. The Rada
has declared the independence of entire and indivisible Belorussia, and en-
treats Your Imperial Majesty to support the measures it has taken to pro-
tect the independence and unity of the country, in close union with the
German Reich. Only under the protection of the German Reich can our
country anticipate happiness in the future. 24
Publication of the telegram precipitated the first political crisis in
the Belorussian republic. The Socialist Hramada fell apart, and the
left wing recalled its members from the government. These were fol-
lowed by the Jewish Socialists and by a group of urban liberals. A
temporary Committee of Five was set up and remained in power until
a new cabinet was formed by R. Skirmunt. This "reactionary govern-
ment," however, could not maintain order in a country where Soviet
propaganda was gaining ground even among the moderates and con-
servaives. Skirmunt was replaced by Serada, who attempted to form
a new cabinet on a broader basis. He failed, and was replaced by Anton
Luckevic, whose former associations with reactionaries and clericals
in Vilna were now forgotten. An old hand at politics, Luckevic might
have turned the tide, but it was too late. The Central Powers had been
defeated in the West. Already the Occupation Army was leaving Belo-
russia, and with it went those who depended on its support.
Consecration of a Myth
It has been said that nationhood came to the Belorussians as an
almost unsolicited gift of the Russian Revolution. 25 It was, in fact,
received from the hands of the Austro-German Occupation Army au-
thorities and depended on their good will. The Belorussian National
Republic held no general election, and the self-appointed administra-
tion lacked the elements necessary for international recognition. It
may have been well-meaning, but it had neither the power nor the time
to make reforms effective. Furthermore, its subservience to the Central
Powers alienated many loyal elements in the population. Yet it cannot
be denied that the ten-month period of symbolic independence has
left an indelible impression on the Belorussian mind. A fact, historically
accidental and trivial, has grown into a heroic legend. The date of

106 BELORUSSIA: THE lJ1AI(ING OF A NATION
March 25, 19 18 , is celebrated by nationalists as the birthday of the
Belorussian state and it has now become a symbol about which all
doubts are shouted down as sacrilege.
Emotional nationalism cannot be argued about. Its tenets, however,
have produced a rational historiography which, in a fair analysis, is
not entirely based on distortion of truth. The year 1917-18 was a
time when eastern Europe began to change its political map, as new
states spontaneously emerged in the territories of the Russian empire
broken by war and revolution. All these needed, and actually used,
foreign support to achieve nationhood. Since the Central Powers were
in control of the area in question, there is no more reason for Belo-
russia to be blamed for her collaboration with them than there was in
the case of Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, or the Ukraine
at that time.
After the defeat of the Central Powers, Poland, Finland, and the
Baltic States succeeded in obtaining further support from the Allies,
and Belorussia failed. This, the Belorussian writers insist, was entirely
the fault of the Allied Powers, who, in their ignorance, were responsible
for the fact that the lands of Belorussia subsequently became a battle-
field between Poland and Russia.
The argument that Belorussia was not prepared for statehood is
waved away. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were no better prepared
yet, supported by the Allies, these managed to survive and, eventually,
to prosper. Had the Belorussian National Republic been given an equal
opportunity, it would have done as well, and possibly better. In fact,
,
it is pointed out, Belorussia is larger in territory and in population than
all three Baltic states together, and her natural resources are greater.
The nationalist writers believe that an independent Belorussia would
have been a stabilizing factor in eastern Europe, and might even have
((prevented or circumscribed World War II." This view is further
strengthened by the conviction that only an independent Belorussia
could have escaped Communism on the one hand, Polonization on the
other, and saved its people from decimation.
For the Belorussian nationalists it matters little that their theory
may sometimes be at odds with historical truth. The more remote
in history these events become, the stronger is their feeling that they
have been cheated. Curiously enough, no sense of deep pessimism
is involved, and their writings are filled with hope for the future. The
following words written by A. Stankevic (147 I) have becon1e the
gospel for his generation: "From people, even from those who are not
our enemies, one may often hear that the ideal of Belorussian inde-
pendence is a dream which can never materialize. Never mind. National
ideals of many other peoples were deemed utopian. With time, utopias
have become historical facts I "

8
PARTITION OF BELORUSSIA
The defeat of the Austro-Gern1an armies spelled the downfall of
the Belorussian National Republic (BNR). The pact of mutual as-
sistance signed November 20 (December 3), I9 I 8, between the Vilna
Rada and the Lithuanian Tariba was a straw offered by one drowning
party to another. On Decen1ber 3 ( I 6), the Belorussian government fled
from Minsk. The German troops followed on December 9 (22). The
country was abandoned to armed bands which rose swiftly as if from
nowhere. In their footsteps, the Reds occupied lVlinsk on December
I2(25).
The BNR in Exile
Members of the BNR governn1ent first took refuge in Vilna, then
settled in Germany, and began to work. in the manner common to all
governments-in-exile. Given a sen1i-official status by the German au-
thorities, they issued passports and published two bulletins: "The News
of the Belorussian Press Bureau," in German, and Z Rodnaha [(raju
(From Our Homeland), in Belorussian. Since recognition and as-
sistance had to be sought in London and Paris, delegations were
sent out to inform the Allies of Belorussian claims. The emissaries,
however, were inexperienced in international affairs. In the general
confusion which reigned in Europe, no one would even listen to them,
and they themselves did not know to whom to turn or what to do. The
petition they submitted to the Paris Peace Conference did not even
get a hearing.
Other practical problems, however, remained to be solved. Not all
the Rada members had followed Luckevic to Berlin, and the Allies had
allowed the Austro-German troops to stay for a certain time in the
Baltic region and in western Belorussia. Consequently, Varonka moved
his office to Grodno and succeeded, somewhat belatedly, in assen1bling
under the Belorussian banner one infantry regiment and one cavalry
brigade. In addition, he opened a national theater, established several
new schools, published five newspapers, organized a cooperative union,
and engaged in other spectacular and hurried activities. A new Belo-

108 BELORUSSIA: THE !VIA/CING OF A NATION
russian administration had thus grown up, on what legal basis no one
knew, with Grodno as capital. It was, however, soon to come in con-
flict with the Poles.
On orders from Marshal Foch, the Polish arlnies were moving
eastward to check. the advance of the Reds, and a Polish commissar
appeared in Grodno. On February 1'3, Varonka asl{ed Dr. Zimmerle,
acting head of the German administration in Lithuania, for protection.
Sadly, Zimmerle answered that his authority was gone. Varonka ap-
pealed to the Allied military mission which had just arrived in Kaunas, *
but received no answer. In the meantime, the Poles seized Bialystok,
Sokolka, and Belsk. Hastily, Saulis and Ezavitau were dispatched to
Warsaw to negotiate a demarcation line. The Inission failed. The Poles
were approaching the city of Vilna, and presently the last vestiges of
Belorussian independence were abolished. Varonka and the members
of his administration left Grodno, to join their fellows in exile. 1
The Soviets and the First BSSR
An important fragment of the BNR government - Lesik, Presi-
dent of the Rada; I vanouski, Secretary of Education; Ulasau, former
editor of the Nasa Niva; and a few others - remained in Minsk in the
hope that the Belorussian state might continue with Russian, instead
of German, support. Their hope was realized, though not exactly in
the way they wished.
After the German withdrawal, local municipalities and zemstvos
took over temporarily, to be replaced by cOlnlnissars from Russia,
among whom many were Belorussian nationalists returning hon1e. These
were naturally hostile toward the Vilna and Minsk collaborationists
and, after the November Revolution, rallied around the Belorussian
National Commissariat, formed in Petrograd and later moved to Mos-
cow. 2 The organization had started as a literary club, Dziannica,
headed by Carviakou, Skorynka, and Zylunovic, former members of
the Belorussian National Committee in Minsk (1917). It then became
attached to the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, headed by
Stalin, and was given a free hand to rule Belorussia in the best interest
of the greater Soviet community.
The Reds found that the situation in Minsk had changed consider-
ably. Former federalists were now separatists and did not want to
treat with Moscow otherwise than on a power-to-power basis. The
Kremlin complied on condition that the word "national" be replaced
by "socialist" in the name of the republic. Thus, on January I ( 14) ,
1919, the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed in
Minsk and a Workers' and Peasants' Government was formed with
* Colonel Reboul (France), president; Colonel Grave and Major Ross (the United
States), and G. Watson (Great Britain).

PARTITION OF BELORUSSIA 109
Zylunovic as president, and Carviakoii, Falski, Santyr, Dulo, and
Cernusevic a people's commissars. When an All-Belorussian Congress
of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers was called to confirm "the will of
the people" it became, however, once more apparent that the Belo-
russian masses were not prepared for the idea of statehood. The dele-
gates from Smolensk, Mogilev, and Vitebsl{ provinces declared theln-
selves against it, and left the Congress. 3 In fact, the republic found
itself confined to six counties of Minsk province. The deputies adopted
a sUlnmarily devised constitution, voted fusion of diminished Belo-
russia with Soviet Lithuania, and demanded the union of the joint
state with Soviet Russia. In that manner everybody, as it were, was
given satisfaction: the separatists, the promoters of the Lithuanian
Belorussian state, and the federalists.
Concurrently, a Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, proclaimed
in Vilna on December 16 (29), 1918, also expressed a wish for fusion
with Soviet Belorussia and union with Soviet Russia. On February
27 (March 12), 1919, the Lithuanian and Belorussian republics were
united in Litbel, under the leadership of Kazimir Mickevic-Kapsukas,
himself half Lithuanian and half Belorussian, and the Bolshevik parties
of both countries merged under the Inanagement of a joint Belorussian
Lithuanian Central Committee.
Meanwhile, the Reds were stopped at approximately the Grodno-
Kaunas-Shavli line. The Poles were pressing them back in the south
and, in the north, the Gerlnan volunteers, supported by the Allies and
the local Whites, began to clear western Lithuania and the Baltic
shore. On April 22, General Pilsudski occupied Vilna. '\Then, on May
22, Riga fell to the German Russian volunteers, the Poles already \vere
in Minsk. The Litbel government fled to Smolensk and, in three
months, the rout of the Soviets was complete.
The Polish Occupation
The Poles appealed to the Belorussians in the native idioln, promis-
ing them self-government and freedom, and declaring that the future
of the country would be decided "by the free will of the people whose
rights to self-determination shall in no wise be restricted." 4 This pro-
duced a very favorable impression. Indeed, the protection of Belo-
russia by Poland supported by the Allies, appeared to many as the
best guarantee of peace and order. Even before the occupation, a
delegation from Grodno and Novogrodelt had petitioned in Warsaw for
"incorporation of Belorussia into the Polish state." {) Now the country
was promised even more than the people, under the circumstances,
could reasonably expect. The sincerity of the Poles was not questioned,
for was not Gen,eral Pilsudski himself of Lithuanian Belorussian
descent?

lID BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
On May 2, however, the Warsaw Sejm declared that Belorussia,
('the homeland of Kosciuszko, lVlickiewicz, and Traugutt, belongs to
Poland and is an inalienable part of the Polish state." Liberation, it
seellled, meant incorporation.
The blow was hard, but it should have been anticipated. After the
Soviet Revolution, two trends were evident in Warsaw, each aiming
in its own way toward the restoration of Greater Poland. The parties
only differed in that the one demanded annexation of, and the other
federation with, the historic Polish possessions in the east. The an-
nexationists, who were represented by the government and the Sejm,
came lnainly froln the upper class and from the Polish nationals in
Lithuania, Belorussia, and the Ukraine. G The federalists were the
Polish Socialists and Progressive Democrats who were aware of
Poland's political and economic weakness on the one hand, and of the
advance of national self-determination in eastern Europe on the other.
They proposed to restore the Polish COlnn10nwealth "as of Jagiellonian
times," that is, in the form of a free union witl1 Lithuania, Belorussia,
and the Ukraine, eventually with other states situated between the
Baltic and the Black. seas. 7 General Pilsudski and his group were the
most ardent "federalists." As an arn1Y commander, he was responsible
to \iVarsaw, but it was difficult to define exactly what relations existed
between him and the government. Both spoke of Poland as if each were
the only master of her destiny.
The May resolution contradicted the April orders of Pilsudski who,
apparently, decided to ignore it. There was some hope in this for the
Belorussians, since vVarsaw was far away, and Pilsudski in their land.
Supported by the army, he might eventually impose his will on War-
saw. There was, at any rate, little choice left. Large groups of the
Belorussian intelligentsia and the n1iddle class would have preferred
to accept an alliance with the devil hiInself rather than be thrown into
the Soviet jaws. \i\Then the Polish armies entered Minsk, Pilsudski was
enthusiastically greeted as the "friend and liberator of the Belorussian
nation." 8
The Second BN R
The Poles had already disbanded the Belorussian infantry and
cavalry forlned by Varonka in Grodno. Belorussian administration was
driven out in the western provinces, schools were closed, newspapers
suspended, church property confiscated, political leaders arrested, and
teachers sent to prison. The news was dismaying. The western area
was, however, under the rule of Warsaw, while the eastern part of the
country was under the more enlightened authority of General Pilsudski
and his staff. Not only did Pilsudski permit organization of Belorussian
self-government, but he also urged the natives to form their own ad-

PARTITION OF BELORUSSIA
III
ministration, publish newspapers, open schools, theaters, and clubs.
Expressing their loyalty to the Polish authority, the Minsk politicians
asked for permission to organize Belorussian military units for the
common struggle against the Soviets. This, however, Pilsudski refused.
Public order was maintained by the occupation army, but the
military did not unduly interfere with civil affairs and, in general, the
situation began to look very much like the one under the Germans a
year before. The BNR government returned from exile. Closer bonds
with Poland were sought as protection for the national community. By
the end of May, the Rada transn1itted to the Paris Peace Conference a
petition requesting that "within its ethnographic lhnits, vVhite Ru-
thenia [Belorussia] shall be closely bound to the Polish Republic for
the purpose of guaranteeing its economic and cultural development,
while at the same time preserving a \Vhite Ruthenian [Belorussian]
national constitution." \)
The request was inspired but not sponsored by the Poles, who
had not formally recognized the Belorussian republic. Under the fed-
eralist scheme of Pilsudski, the first conference of representatives was
to take place at Vilna in October, and Belorussia was not invited.
Furthermore, a conference in Helsinki adopted a nurnber of recom-
mendations aiming at the unification of economic and social policies
of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the Ukraine. Belo-
russia sent a delegate as an observer, but was refused treatment on an
equal footing with "the six states lying between the Baltic and the
Black seas" (September 6, 19 20 ) .10
Polish settlers in the eastern provinces were sending petitions to
Warsaw requesting, in the name of the Belorussian people, pure and
simple incorporation. These were forwarded to Versailles where the
political boundaries of Poland were being discussed. At the same time,
political pressure froln vVarsaw began to stiffen in all the territories
earmarked for incorporation. It was clear that Belorussia had been
dropped out of the Pilsudski scheme.
The new policy created unrest all along the eastern border, where
local uprisings broke out. Polish officials were murdered, military
trains attacked, warehouses plundered. The Poles retaliated by burning
Belorussian villages. General Szepticki was reported to have said that
he was prepared to plunge the land into ruin for the life of one Polish
officer. The Rada protested to Warsaw and Paris. The Minister of
Belorussian Affairs in Lithuania c0111plained to the Allied governments.
Fr0111 Soviet Russia came the voices of Janka I(upala, Biadulia.,
Harun, and other writers, denouncing Polish atrocities and inciting the
people to an open revolt. The anti-Polish underground spread rapidly.
By the end of the summer, Luckevic himself set off for Warsaw to try
to bring the Poles to their senses. He was received by Ignace Paderew-

112 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
ski, head of the government, and by General Pilsudski. What passed
between them is not exactly known. But the Belorussian Rada was pro-
rogued, and Luckevic was held in Warsaw for several weeks, until
permitted to return to Minsk on condition that he obtain the consent
of the Rada for formal union.
The Polish grip relaxed. Cultural activities were supported in ac-
cordance with Article 102 of the Polish Constitution guaranteeing the
rights of national Ininorities and with Poland's international obliga-
tions in that regard.* Luckevic, as it were, was being given the oppor-
tunity and the time to prepare a better climate for the showdown with
the Rada/ 1 which on Decen1ber 12 was summoned to discuss union.
It was clear, however, that union meant unconditional incorporation.
A caucus of the Belorussian Socialist parties, preceding the general
session of the Rada, voted against the union. The Rada confirmed the
Declaration of Independence by eighty-seven to thirty-seven votes,
removed the government of Luckevic, and instructed Lastouski to
form a new cabinet.
Lastouski invited a few melnbers of the dismissed administration t
into the new government to make it more acceptable to the Poles. He
met, however, with open revolt from Luckevic who, with the thirty-
seven members of the Rada, decided not to subn1it to the decisions of
the majority. They instituted themselves as a Supreme Rada (Najvys-
saja) , declared the National Rada dissolved, and reinvested the
Lucl{evic government with authority to continue as the only legitimate
power in the country. The National Rada (N arodnaja), now reduced
to eighty-seven members, countered by calling the opposition traitors
and adventurers and inviting the people not to obey "the usurpers of
the national power." 12
The Union with Poland
Polish authority, of course, could not tolerate the existence of two
Belorussian administrations. Lastouski and the n10re prominent mem-
bers of the National Rada were arrested, others went underground or
escaped to Lithuania. Luckevic reported the situation to Warsaw,
where, in spite of his failure, his good will was recognized. He returned
to Minsk with broader powers to pursue the cultural development of
Belorussia, particularly among the Greek Orthodox. 13 The national situ-
ation, however, had been irretrievably con1prolnised, and chances for
improvement appeared slight.
Yet Belorussian nationalism had scored points. In the first place,
Luckevic obtained permission to use the name of the Belorussian
National Republic, as well as its flag and seal. Second, the government
* Amendment to Article 93 of the Versailles Treaty.
t Cvikevic, Zajac, Hryb, and Ladnou.

PARTITION OF BELORUSSIA II3
won the official recognition of Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland,
and Czechoslovakia; subsequently, consulates opened in Prague, Riga,
Libau, Mitau, and Daugapils; a military diplomatic mission was sent
to Latvia; and a Belorussian ambassador was appointed to the Baltic
states. 14 Finally, the Luckevic government could claim to its credit
the brisk development of cultural and economic life, insofar as that
was possible under foreign occupation.
According to official sources of that time, 193 Belorussian schools
were open in l\1insk; about twenty in the Vilna and Grodno provinces;
three senior and ten junior high schools in Minsk, Vilna, Sluck, and
other cities; and a teachers' college in Minsk - all with instruction
in the Belorussian language. A Belorussian theater and a polyphonic
choir were formed and toured the country. Dramatic, artistic, and
adult education clubs, libraries, and reading rooms appeared in the
smaller towns and villages. An agricultural and a cooperative union
were organized with 350 branches in Minsk province and the eastern
part of Vilna province alone. Literary activities, of course, were caught
in the double grip of the Polish civilian and military censorship, yet the
country managed to publish ten newspapers and periodicals, and sev-
eral presses printed texts for Belorussian schools. The clergy was per-
mitted to campaign for Belorussian services and the establishlnent of
the Union church as the national church of Belorussia. 15 In n10st cases,
Luckevic simply restored what had been accomplished under the Ger-
man occupation and what the brief Soviet period destroyed. Yet the
second Belorusisan National Republic under the Poles, in spite of its
semi-official and ambiguous status, had certainly gained more cul-
turally and internationally than the first Republic had been able to
achieve under the Germans a year before.
Nationalist gains could not, however, outweigh the general dis-
content with and growing hatred of the Poles. People were more irri-
tated by restrictions than they were appreciative of benefits. Benevo-
lent though it was, the attitude of the Poles was haughty. Germany
was a great power, whereas eighteen months ago, it was reasoned,
Poland was hardly more significant than Belorussia itself. The Great
Powers had helped her to statehood, as they had done for many other
small nations. For some reason, Belorussia had been left out, and her
national pride was hurt. In vain the Luckevic administration tried to
check the growing anti-Polish trend, but the people, it seemed, would
rather jump into the big fire than burn in the small frying pan.
The Second BSSR
The Communist underground began to forn1 around the Pedagogical
Institute in Minsk, directed by two young scholars, Ihnatouski and
Koreneuski. The movement spread rapidly. Strikes and peasant re-

114 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
volts brok:e out. The Poles, on July 15, 1920, issued a decree parceling
the large landed estates an10ng the peasantry. But it was too late. The
eastern boundary of Poland was crumbling. Assisted by the village and
town people, the Red Armies again were on their westward march.
One must remember that no peace treaty had been signed between
Poland and the Soviets. Indeed, fightfng had been going on without a
formal declaration of war. The eastern Polish frontier was a front
line which, stabilized in the fall of 1919, ran along the Berezina and
farther south, with Mozyr on the Pripet River in Polish hands. It was
about 250 n1iles east of the line suggested later by Lord Curzon as
a permanent Polish-Russian boundary, and approximately 100 miles
east of the border which was to be negotiated in Riga, in March 192 I
(see note 24). In the fall of 1919, secret peace negotiations started
between V\Tarsaw and Moscow through the mediation of a Polish Com-
munist, J. Marchlewski, head of the Soviet Red Cross mission in
Poland. An offer was made to accept the front line as the political
boundary. The offer, confirmed by Lenin, Trotsky, and Chicherin on
January 20, 1920, was discussed in a secret session of the Committee
of Foreign and Military Affairs of the Polish Sejm, on February 6.
Poland consented to open forInal negotiations and, obviously under-
estimating the strength of the Kremlin while overestimating her own,
ventured the suggestion that the fate of Belorussia and the Ukraine
be detern1ined by means of a plebiscite internationally controlled. 16 At
the same time, she was sounding out the Great Powers as to their pos-
sible eventual acceptance of a plan to create "several non-Communist,
democratic, and ethnically non-Russian, independent states in the area
between the 27° meridian in the West [Polish frontier of 1793] and
the Dnieper River in the East [Polish frontier of I772J, in union with
Poland." 17 The Soviets got wind of the maneuver and refused to meet
the Polish peace delegation in Borisov.
In the meantime Poland, on April 2 I, signed a treaty with the
Ukrainian government-in-exile, taking on the tasI{ of "liberating the
Ukraine" west of the Dnieper. 18 On April 26, the Polish armies in-
vaded the Soviet Uk.raine, and tool{ the city of Kiev on May 7. The
victory was spectacular - and short-lived. By the end of May, the
Reds began a counteroffensive northeast of Borisov, and in a few
weeks the Poles were routed all along the front. 19 On July II, the
Reds reentered Minsk. A few days later, the Lithuanians, supported
by Moscow, occupied the city and the central part of Vilna province.
The whole of Belorussia was freed of the Poles.
The Luckevic government and the Supreme Rada left the country
again, taking refuge in Warsaw. The rival Lastouski government and
the National Rada remained in Kaunas, where some time before they
had signed an alliance with Lithuania against Poland; and a Belo-

PARTITION OF BELORUSSIA 115
russian, J. Semaska, was included among the members of the Lithu-
anian delegation to Versailles. A group of nationalists also remained
in Minsk to form a new Belorussian government with the aid of the
Soviets. For a second time, on August 1, 1920, a Belorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic was proclaimed. In fact, Belorussia now had three
governments, with only one located in the native land.
Until a Soviet Congress of all Belorussia should be called, admin-
istration was put in the hands of the Revolutionary Military Com-
mittee composed of three members of the Lithuanian Belorussian Com-
munist Party, one member of the Jewish Bund, and one of the Minsk
revolutionary organization, formerly underground. Carviakou, who had
distinguished himself in the first Belorussian SSR, was appointed
president of the Committee. The name Litbel disappeared from the
scene. Indeed, the idea of a Lithuanian Belorussian state had died
without even an obituary notice. The Belorussian nationalists were
to accept the loss of Vilna to Lithuania or perish. There still was enough
land left to theIn, however, and they were fortified by the hope that
te future might be brighter with Russia than it would have been
with Poland.
On August 14, a Polish delegation left Warsaw for Minsl( to beg
for peace, but during August 16-18 the Red Armies were defeated at
the very gates of Warsaw and put to rout. On their heels, the Poles
reoccupied western Belorussia. On October 9, General Zeligowski
seized the city of Vilna, alloted by the Great Powers to Lithuania,
and made it the capital of a new state, Middle Lithuania (Litwa
Sl'odkowa), which he formed out of four Lithuanian counties and
united with Poland. 20 At the same time, an uprising against the Soviets
broke out in the Red ArlllY rear, in the region of Sluck. The revolt, as it
were, was anti-Russian and anti-Polish at the same time, but there is
evidence that the movement was inspired by Luckevie from Warsaw
and assisted by Polish money and men. 21
Insofar as one is able to put together the bits of contradictory in-
formation, the Sluck rebels seem to have rallied under the banner of
((Free Belorussia," though their tracts were printed in Russian. They
were led by the Sluck Rada, a self-appointed revolutionary committee
headed by Praulevic, a Belorussian Socialist. Their First Belorussian
Brigade, several thousand men strong, eventually joined forces with
the guerrillas of General Bulak-Bulachovic, another controversial
character in the story. What the latter's relation was to the Belo-
russian cause is not certain. It is known that he was supported by
General Pilsudski on the one hand, and by the Russian anti-Soviet
leader Boris Savinkov on the other. Contesting the authority of Lucke-
vie and other leaders, and disagreeing with both Pilsudski and Savin-
kov, he set up his own government in the Belorussain woods and for

116 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
some time claimed the whole region of Polesie, Sluck, and N ovogrodek,
all under the control of his guerrillas. There also were uprisings in
other parts of the country (among them Mogilev, Vitebsk, Gomel), but
they were isolated undertakings of which little is known. They harassed
the Red Army rear throughout the fall and winter, but by the end of
January the Soviets succeeded in liquidating the last centers of re-
sistance. 22
The Poles had not been able to aid the rebels effectively. They
themselves were poorly equipped and inefficiently led, and bogged down
in the Belorussian n1arshes. Nor were the Reds any better off in the
ruined, charred, and bloody land. The war came to a virtual standstill,
stirred only occasionally by skirmishes here and there along the front.
The country lay at the rock bottom of misery and despair. In March the
Polish and the Soviet representatives met in Riga to discuss a peace
treaty.23
The Tteaty of Riga
The peace negotiations went on without Belorussian participation
on either the Polish or the Soviet side. Indeed, it was not easy to see
who could represent the country with authority at that time. Neither
the Belorussian Soviet government of Zylunovic and Carviakou in
Minsk., nor the Belorussian National government of Luckevic in War-
saw, nor the National government of Lastouski in Kaunas was recog-
nized by the Belorussian-speaking populations in Vilna and Grodno
provinces. And the government of "Free Belorussia" formed by General
Bulak-Bulachovic, the Sluck Rada in the Soviet underground, and the
Belorussian Popular Assembly in Vitebsk recognized no authority but
their own, each speaking in the name of the nation.
It is idle to speculate upon what turn the Riga negotiations might
have tak.en had the Belorussian nation been duly represented. The
treaty, signed March 18, 192 I, divided the Belorussian territory into
halves; one was left to the Soviets, the other went to Poland. The Soviet
government renounced all its "rights and claims to the territories west
of the boundary determined by Article 2 of the Treaty," and Poland
made a sin1ilar statement about the territories east of the line. The
historic quarrel was thus settled - at the expense of two peoples con-
cerned, the Belorussians and the Ukrainians. The Great Powers did not
at once recognize the settlement, which was negotiated without their
consent and against their advice. Two years passed before the Confer-
ence of Ambassadors saw fit, on March IS, 19 2 3, to accept the
fait accomPli. American recognition followed on April 5. 24
The new Polish boundary was, in fact, the result of a military con-
quest. The war, however, had been of the kind in which national
and social issues were confused, and the populations split into fighting

PAR1'ITION OF BELORUSSIA
117
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8. The Polish-Soviet }tVar and tlte Treat)' of Riga

118 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
camps irrespective of race, nationality, language, or social class. In
fact, there were as many Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian natives
who took the Polish side as there were Ukrainians, Belorussians, and
Poles in ,the Soviet armies. Since it was generally realized that inde-
pendence for Belorussia and the Ukraine was unrealistic under the
circumstances, the partition seemed to many a lesser evil indeed than
having all the land under either the Soviets or the Poles. Now people
could align themselves with democratic Poland or with socialist Russia,
according to their personal philosophies. Their cultural activities, it
was reasoned, could be pursued so that the national ideal might per-
sist on both sides of the border and perhaps, eventually, bring political
and economic unity to the nation. Consoled by this thought, the national-
ist leaders, on both sides of the border, made it clear that the facilities
they might obtain for cultural work among the natives would deter-
mine their loyal ties to the state.
This was not entirely disagreeable to either Warsaw or Moscow.
On the contrary, each would welcome Belorussian unity at the ex-
pense of the other, pacts and treaties notwithstanding. 'Vho, for in-
stance, could stop the eastern Belorussians if they wanted to join their
brothers in Poland, or the western Belorussians if they revolted against
the Poles? The practical question was how best to guide the people in
the right direction.
To Belorussian nationalists this was a godsend: with competition
on both sides of the border, their cause could only gain 1 The impact
of the Revolution was still fresh; with new enthusiasm the Belorussian
leadership once again set to work, blissfully unaware of the disillusion-
ment which was presently to come, first from the Poles, then fron1 the
Soviets.

9
WEST BELORUSSIA
Polish Belorussia now occupied an area of about 38,600 square
miles, a little less than the territory of the state of Kentuck.y. It in-
cluded the forn1er Grodno and Vilna provinces and the western part
of Minsk province, extending from the Dvina River in the north
to the Bug in the west and the Pripet in the south. Its population was
about five millions.
Canals - neglected and in places obstructed during the war-
connected the Pripet River with the Niemen and the Bug, giving the
country navigable outlets to both the Baltic and Black seas. The
country possessed 1,864 miles of railroads and 4,660 miles of highways,
both in rather bad condition. Except for Vilna and Grodno, there were
no large cities, and the great majority of the population lived in scat-
tered towns, villages, and hamlets. Averaging one hundred persons to
the square mile, the population was engaged in raising mixed crops and
potatoes, cutting IUlnber, and fishing. Yet only 38 per cent of the
land was under cultivation. One-fourth of the area was covered with
forest, and the rest consisted of meadow, pasture, marsh, and sand.
Agriculture, based on the three-field system, produced only ten or
twelve bushels to the acre. A small proportion of the population, about
25,000 men, was occupied in factories and mills, half of this number
in the region of Bialystok. Another 30,000 men were engaged in crafts:
5,000 shoemakers, hatters, and tailors; 2,000 carpenters, blacksmiths,
and jacks-of-all-trades. Economically, this part of the country was
even worse off than its eastern section, in Russia.
For about five years the people had lived under several different
"Belorussian" governments in the establishment of which they had
had little, if any, part. Indeed, Belorussian "republics" came and went
on the bandwagons of the occupation armies - German, Polish, Rus-
sian - and whether they were "Delnocratic," "Socialist," or "Soviet,"
their national character lacked conviction. It was not unnatural, there-
fore, that the people should accept their new status with the same
equanimity with which they had witnessed the rise and fall of former
administrations. For a year or so, small rebel groups were on the prowl

120 BELORUSSIA: THE It1AI(ING OF A NATION
in marshes and woods, and a few intellectuals were still agitating in
the larger cities. 1 But at least peace - though not exactly a just one-
had descended upon the country, and life was gaining a certain stability.
The Polish Policy
Would Poland be satisfied with her new territorial acquisitions?
The Dmowski group (National Democrats) felt that before there was
any further thought of expansion, she should integrate the various
national minorities - racial, religious, and linguistic - which then
made up 30 per cent of the total population. However, the Pidulski
group (Socialists) held a different view. The mutation of ethnic minori-
ties of various origins and culture into full-fledged Poles seemed to
them a long and uncertain process. On the other hand, by fostering and
assisting their national self-determination and, eventually, the libera-
tion of their brothers beyond the border, Poland might more certainly
become a larger commonwealth again, "from the Baltic Sea to the
Black Sea (od morza do morza)."
Already there had been some advance to this effect. F. Bujak, for
instance, proposed that the commonwealth include not only Lithuania,
Belorussia, and the Ukraine, but also Latvia, Estonia, and East Prus-
sia, with the constitutional provision that both the president of the
union and the federal language be Polish. Concurrently, Kamieniecki
visualized the creation of a larger "Lithuanian State" bordered by
East Prussia on the west, the Baltic Sea and the Dvina River on the
north, the Dnieper on the east, and the 1569 frontier in the south. It
would consist of five autonomous cantons: Zhmud with Kaunas, Lithu-
ania with Vilna, Podlaszie with Bialystok, Belorussia with Minsk,
Polesie with Pinsk, and the whole united to Poland. Other writers
considered that number of autonomous cantons too high, and sug-
gested three: Belorussia with Minsk and Pinsl{, Lithuania with Kaunas,
and a Polish belt, or White Poland, with Grodno and Vilna. Still others
insisted that a few Polish districts should be included within the
boundaries of the autonomous Lithuanian and Belorussian cantons in
order to make their ties with Poland proper "more tangible and
stronger" (Strzewski). More cautious writers proposed that Belo-
russia be established only "from Minsk. eastward," as a buffer-state
between Poland and Russia. Although having different forms, all the
projects of that kind accepted, as it were, the principle of Belorussian
autonomy within the boundary of a future Polish commonwealth. 2
In the n1eantime, the incorporated territory was divided into four
provinces (wojew6dstwa), each under a Polish governor, with the right
to their religion and language confirmed and protected by law. The
rights were confirmed by international obligations of Poland and, since
February 13, 1920, guaranteed by the League of Nations. 3 The Polish

WEST BELORUSSIA
121
plan for the federation of the small nations in Eastern Europe was
under way, but it was less clear now what place Belorussia was to be
allotted in that plan. 4
The "centralists" had already obtained iInportant concessions. In
the general census of 192 I, all the natives of the Roman Catholic faith
were registered as Polish, 5 and the total number of Belorussians was
thus reduced from 3,700,000 to 1,041,760. Although many of those
registered as Polish could not even speak the language, it was believed
that being Ronlan Catholic in faith, they would be "conlpletely assimi-
lated wi thin ten years or so" (Studnicl{i). Thus, they would be pro-
tected from, rather than exposed to, Belorussian nationalism. On the
other hand, the adlninistration was prepared to give the Belorussian
nationalists every facility for working among the natives of the Ortho-
dox faith. No "Belorussian territory," of course, was to be cut out for
them within the Polish state until they had become "politically nlature"
enough to become partners in the problematic commonwealth.
B elol'us si fication
The Belorussian leaders protested against the 1921 general census,
and insisted on the CCautonomous status" of vVest Belorussia. The Poles
quieted then1 with promises for the future. The Luckevic "government-
in-exile" was disbanded, but certain nationalist activities were per-
mitted in Vilna and Grodno provinces. At the same time, substantial
subsidies were granted for intensive Belorussification of the eastern
region where "Orthodox" and "Russian" had been synonyms for ages.
This was better than nothing, and the Belorussian leaders accepted
the compromise.
In eastern Europe a political compron1ise is not necessarily what
the lVestern nlan understands by that term. There, it involves no con-
cession of principles and no change of ulthnate objective. The parties
are fellow-travelers, not partners. They may cross the sea together
but each is heading toward his own goal. Polish and Belorussian in-
terests coincided only in the conviction that all traces of Russian cul-
ture ought to be rooted out in 'iV est Belorussia before its fate could
be decided. On this the parties agreed, and began to work. together.o
The Russian language was banned from all schools and the Latin
alphabet, instead of the Cyrillic, reconlmended for Belorussian writ-
tings. Over four hundred schools were opened, seven gymnasia (sec-
ondary schools), and three teachers' colleges, with all instruction in
Belorussian. The Poles supported the Belorussian National Museum,
the Scientific Society, the Teachers' Association, and other institutions.
In addition, the Belorussian press was subsidized. The success was
spectacular. In 1922 the people voted their own ticket in the national
elections, and sent three senators and eleven deputies to the Polish

122 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
Sejm. Even the city of Vilna had three Belorussian deputies in War-
saw. For the first time, Belorussian nationalism had chosen its leaders
by the will of the peoPle as expressed in a regular ballot.
The delegates to the Sejm took their mandates more seriously than
the Poles expected. They came out openly against the administration,
which, they contended, ignored the Constitution and the international
obligations of Poland. They complained that the natives of West Belo-
russia were treated as second-rate citizens and the land as a Polish
colonial domain, while large landed estates were parceled and handed
over to Polish immigrants (osadnicy), not to the natives. 7 Also, Belo-
russification of the Orthodox church was hindered by the Roman Catho-
lic missionaries who wanted no Orthodox church within Poland's bound-
aries. Archbishop Eleupherius and Bishop Pantelejmon were arrested
and confined in a Roman Catholic monastery near Cracow, and Bishop
Sergei was exiled. Polish soldiers were plundering monasteries, and
complaints to the police had no effect. The delegates were flooded with
telegrams and petitions from their constituents. Indeed, there was
hardly a session of the Sejm at which the Belorussian members did
not demand the restoration of law and order.
As a result of these protests, the Belorussian senators and deputies
were informed that their activities and their criticism of the adminis-
tration bordered on disloyalty. In fact, they were told, nationalist
propaganda had made advances into Poland proper, calling for re-
taliation to protect the unity of the state. In other words, the Belo-
russians had no one to blame but themselves if they did not get along
very well with the Polish authorities.
This was hardly the best ground for an understanding. Polish
public opinion was alarmed. Belorussianism now appeared as a menace,
and was rapidly becoming the catalyst for all the discontented elements
in the four eastern provinces. It seemed that, left to itself, Belorussian-
ism might very well develop into a subversive movement of real mag-
nitude. Even the federalists now doubted the soundness of their idea.
Wasilewski expressed the general sentiment when he said: "The ex-
perience of recent years has proven that the Belorussians are not in
any condition to govern themselves." It was said, further, that the
Belorussians in Poland had "the lowest degree of national conscious-
ness and differentiation", and that their agitation was nothing more
than "a regional ethnic trend having a strong economic undercurrent." 8
Presently, the Polish government set out to undo what it had done
toward supporting the idea of Belorussian independence.
Reaction
Bound by international obligations and the Constitution, the gov-
ernment could not openly do an about-face. But the portion of the ad-

WEST BELORUSSIA
12 3
ministration responsible for the Belorussian provinces was given a
free hand in protecting the Polish "national interest" to the best of
its own judgment. Complaints made from the Sejm floor show how
the local authorities had taken to their task.
Three hundred and one Belorussian schools were closed, and 24 0
Belorussian teachers exiled to Cracow (December 14, 1924). Belo-
russian schools were turned into Polish, or entirely closed down - "up
to four hundred grammar schools" (December 4, 1924). Postal clerks
refused to accept telegrams written in Belorussian; Belorussian news-
papers were not delivered to their subscribers, but were confiscated by
the police and handed over to local grocers for use as wrapping paper
(June 28, 1924). More than fifteen Belorussian newspapers were sus-
pended, their editors taken to court and sent to jail (March 3, 1924).
Land for railroad construction was taken from Belorussians without
con1pensation (July 3, 19 2 4). Officials were quartered by force in Belo-
russian homes and the owners were not paid (November 6, 1924).
Horses were requisitioned fron1 peasants without compensation (May
12, 1925). Belorussian villages were overloaded with taxes: a four-
fan1ily halnlet was taxed 726 zlotys; a settlement of sixty houses was
taxed 2,215 zlotys, etc. (November 28, 1924, and January 20, 1925).
Fifteen hundred Belorussians were arrested in a N ovogrodek county
in two days (April 27, 1925). A meeting of the Hramada was raided
by the police in Stary Berezovy; hardly had the session opened when
two hundred policemen and thirty drunken officials arrived in military
trucks, and dispersed the Belorussians with swords and sticks - "the
floors and walls were covered with blood" (December 10, 1926).
The Belorussian deputies to the Polish Sejm, B. Taraskevic, S.
Rak-Michajlouski, P. Valosyn, P. Miatla, J. Sabaleuski, I. Dvarcanin,
Haurylik, Brusevic, Valynec, and others, protested fifty-two times
against restrictions imposed on Belorussian schools, twenty-three times
against forcible seizures of private land, eighty-two times against eco-
nomic exploitation, 2 18 times against personal offenses by Polish offi-
cials - and so on. D
Protestations from the floor of the Sejm had no effect. Finally, the
Belorussian leaders sent to the League of Nations (fifth session) a
memorandum which read in part:
The Belorussian people are suffering unbelievable terror fron1 the Poles.
. . . Corporal punishment is administered to Belorussian peasants, individu-
ally and in mass. Sometimes all the inhabitants of a village are flogged. The
police and landlords beat up Belorussian peasants wherever they happen to
lay hands upon them, in the fields, in the woods, in their homes, at police
stations, even in church. . . At the beginning of this year, Deputy Taras-
kevic visited Polesie province; he could not find a single village where
there was even one man who had escaped merciless Polish beating (Speech oj

124 BELORUSSIA.' THE 1I1AI(ING OF A NATION
B. Taraskevic in the Sejm, June 6, 1924) . . . The Polish police do not
stop at simple beatings with gun butts, knuckle dusters, or fists. . . They
have developed a system of refined torture.
And the document cited the following instances:
A. Water-torture, that is, filling the victim with two or three liters of
water poured in through his nostrils,. which causes unbearable head pains.
(This was used on V. Sevastianovic, I. Lenkovic, and M. [(edys, on May
19, 19 2 4, in the village of Zalesie, Sokolka district.)
B. Beating the heels and soles of the feet with sticks, after which the
victim is ordered to run about. (Protest of the Belorussian deputies to the
Sejm, June 6, 1924.)
C. Insertion of needles under the fingernails. (Fact proven in the trial of
forty-five Belorussians in Bialystok, beginning of May 1923.)
D. The victim is set upon by dogs. (In this "tanner, I. Milenkevic was
badly bitten on all parts of his body, and his genitals were chewed off; he
fled to Lithuania, and his present address is 13, Mickiewicz Street, [(aunas.)
E. The genital organs are beaten with rulers. (Protest of the Bel01'ussian
deputies to the Sej11t, APril 18, 1924.)
F. The victim's head is bashed against the wall, then he is bound and
thrown from a considerable height onto the ground. (Reported in the news-
paper "Borba.")
G. Roasting feet or armpits.
H. Sharp cartridges or pencils are placed between the fingers or knees
of the victim, after which the fingers or knees are squeezed together, so
that the points enter the flesh. . .
The document gave details of each case, pointed out the hideous-
ness of the police crimes, and demanded an international investigation.
But it could not find its way through the procedural maze of the League
of Nations. 10
In a paper friendly to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an
opinion was expressed that the international obligations of Poland
should not give foreign powers "the right to interfere with her domestic
policies or hinder the natural process of assimilation of minority groups
under her protection." 11 The Minority Treaty had no legal basis any-
way, since the United States had never ratified it. Consequently, as
stated by Professor Cybichowski, "enforced unilaterally, the treaty can
be denounced unilaterally as well." 12 This the Polish Minister of For-
eign Affairs did at the fifteenth session of the League of Nations, Sep-
tember 13, 1934. 13 .
Poland had not waited until the formal denunciation of the treaty
to make her new policy effective, but had begun repressive action by
the end of the 1920'S. Before long, only a few dozen Belorussian schools
remained open out of 1,631 that had been founded during the period

WEST BELORUSSIA 125
of "Belorussification." Only one secondary school was in use in Vilna,
and the number of grammar schools fell to sixty-nine, with only thirty-
five of these permitted to use Belorussian along with Polish as the lan-
guage of instruction (szkoly ultl'akwistyczne). Parents were fined for
refusing to send their children to Polish schools. The very name Belo-
russin began to disappear from documents, replaced by Biatopolak
(White Polish) for natives of the Roman Catholic faith, and by Rusin,
tutejszy,* for the Orthodox. The press was muzzled. A former member
of the BNR government, Cvikevic, bitterly summed up the situation:
Yesterday, we and the Poles were two nations on the saIne side of the
fence. Poland, "a nation crucified," was our elder brother in the n10mentous
struggle against Tsarism, and her example gave us strength and courage.
We lived in the hope that freedom would come at the same time for both
our peoples - and what happened? Revolution came and, with it, freedom
for all. But as soon as Poland had risen from the dead, her scourge began
to play over the white body of Belorussia. Behind the big-worded manifestoes
of Pilsudski, gendarmes can1e to our land, and with the gendarmes, PoIish-
Austrian (Galician) officials and Catholic priests. . . 'Ve mistook the Polish
people, or to be more accurate, the Polish revolutionary idealists, for the
Polish state. Life has pitilessly crushed our illusion. 14
Subversive Propaganda
The harder the Poles strucl{ the nail, the deeper it went into the
wood. Tales about the Red Terror in Soviet Belorussia frightened the
native no longer. Nothing, he believed, could be worse than what he
suffered in Poland, and Communist agitators did not waste time making
use of this situation. vVhile in 1924 the total membership of the Com-
munist Party in "\\T est Belorussia (KPZB) was barely fifteen hundred,
a year later there were eighteen hundred Communists in the local jails
alone, and no one knows how many thousands at large. 15 Marxists
joined hands with Christian Democrats; bourgeois, with workers; dis-
possessed landlords, with peasants. In the country, over one hundred
policemen were murdered, hundreds of homes of the Polish osadnicy
plundered and burned. 16 On the other hand, in the cities, subversive
activity used legal devices. A political club, the Belaruskaja Sialianska-
Rabotnickaja Hramada (Belorussian Peasants' and Workers' Associa-
tion), was formed by the Belorussian deputies to the Polish Sejm,
ostensibly for social and cultural work among the natives. The very
name of that organization was ominous enough to indicate that, secretly,
it carried propaganda for union with the USSR. But Belorussian depu-
ties were covered by parliamentary immunity, and the Polish Govern-
ment let them alone until the next elections to the Sejm.
* Literally, ('local resident"; "aborigine" ,vould be the nearest translation. See Chap-
ter I.

126 BELORUSSIA: THE MA[(ING OF A NATION
Between 1925 and 1928, the Hramada succeeded in enrolling over
100,000 members from all social classes in 'Vestern Belorussia, and
very nearly pushed the country into open revolt. Its activities bor-
dered on high treason and, in the heat of general elections to the Sejm,
the movement was suppressed with the full strength of state authority.
Fifty-six leaders of the Hramada were tak.en to the courts, tried behind
closed doors, without even mention in the press. Later, eye-witnesses
related that Deputy Taraskevic had been brought into the courtroom
in shackles, Deputies Dvarcanin and Haurylik beaten to death, and
others treated in a like manner ,17
Moscow seized upon this opportunity to offer the Polish govern-
ment an exchange of the Belorussian prisoners for Poles arrested, pos-
sibly for this very reason, in the Soviet Union. Glad to get rid of the
subverters, the Polish government obliged. It took Warsaw some time
to realize that it should have known better. Indeed, in the eyes of
the Belorussian native, it conferred upon Soviet Russia the role of
legitimate protector of his interests. And more people who already
opposed Polish policies now turned their hopes toward the Kren1lin.
Even the avowedly anti-Soviet groups were now turning against the
Poles. Headed by a few deputies to the Sejm, and centered around the
Belorussian Christian Democratic Party (BCD) and the Peasant
Union, they had early come into conflict with the Hramada on ideo-
logical grounds. vVhile the Hramada had been gaining the support of
the masses, particularly of the Orthodox peasantry, the BCD "at-
tracted to itself the most advanced, intelligent, and constructive
minds. . . There were Belorussian Catholics and these made the BCD
the depository and stronghold of the Belorussian national idea." 18 This
was an open and bold acknowledgment of the failure of Polish policy
which had counted on their complete Polonization "within ten years." 1D
Consequently, the hammer of oppression struck. the Belorussian Chris-
tian Democrats as hard as it did the Belorussian Socialists. The Arch-
bishop of Vilna forbade the faithful to support the BCD movement,
or even to read their organ, the Belaruskaja [(1'ynica; Belorussian
Catholic clergymen were ordered to remove their names from the
ballot in general elections, and priests connected with the moven1ent
were censured (1928). The Polish administration even accused them of
intelligence with the Con1munists, which they denied. 20
Legal Belorussian leadership now was organized around a group of
Polish collaborationists (uhadoucy), headed by Anton Luckevic and
Radaslav Astrouski. In order to counter the Belorussian Institute of
Economy and Culture founded in 1926 and deemed un-Polish, a Cen-
tral Union of Belorussian Cultural, Educational, and Economic Organ-
izations and Institutions was organized and supported by the Polish
authorities. Reverting to the policy he had once tried in Minsk, Luc-

WEST BELORUSSIA 127
kevic succeeded in obtaining from the Poles a large appropriation for
building a Belorussian secondary school in N ovogrodek, 250,000 zlotys
for a teachers' college, 50,000 zlotys for the publication of Belorussian
textbooks, and other forms of support intended to shift activities from
political into cultural channels. The subsidized press explained that
only the anti-Polish, and not the "Belorussian," activities were objec-
tionable and that loyal Belorussians could expect full freedom of self-
expression and the support of the Government. 21
But confidence is a flower that bloon1s only once. The bribe that
might have brought results some time before no longer worked. In the
general elections to the Sejm, the Belorussians joined hands with other
minorities: German, Ukrainian, an Jewish, in 1928; Ukrainian, in
1930.* Restricted and disorganized by the administration, and de-
moralized by inner strife, they were able to elect but two deputies in
1928, and only one in 1930. The resistance moven1ent went under-
ground where it met with the Polish C0111munist Party and joined
hands with it. 22
The Pacification
"For reasons of good neighborhood," the Kremlin had separated
the Communist Party of "vVest Belorussia from the Communist Party
in the BSSR, and ordered it to 111erge with the Polish Communist Party
(1923).23 Consequently, the Communists in 'Test Belorussia formed
autonomous locals of the Polish Communist Party, and their registered
membership grew to twenty-six hundred by 1931.24 In 1925, because of
the unfavorable international situation, they were advised against pre-
paring an armed revolt and urged to support the activities of the
Hramada, instead. After the liquidation of the Hran1ada, party Inem-
bership had approxin1ately doubled, though no exact numbers are
known. 25
More important than party n1embers, however, were the fellow-trav-
elers among all the social classes in ,\1 est Beiorussia. Hardly two years
had passed after the inauguration of the new Polish policy of collabora-
tion when strikes, street demonstrations, and arlned clashes with the
Poles broke out again. Cities were flooded with revolutionary leaflets.
Red (Communist) and white-red-white (Belorussian) banners ap-
peared together bearing such slogans as "Bread and Work," "Land and
Freedon1," "Free Belorussia," and others. Guerrillas were on the prowl
in the woods, and disorders swept the country along the eastern border.
Again the Polish government used force, but the situation now was
more serious than before. For several months regular n1ilitary opera-
tions were conducted against the insurgents. In some places, artillery
was used. We can read reports that: "The fighting front in Polesie was
two hundred kilometers long"; "Polish vengeance was perpetrated on
* The Lithuanian lLlinority boycotted the elections.

128 BELORUSSIA.' THE IVIAI(ING OF A NATION
the peaceful populations as well as on the guerrillas. . . Sixty to sev-
enty peasants were hanged daily. Women, even children, were beaten
to death. . ." "The criminal and the innocent perished equally in the
hands of the Polish gendarmes." Stories printed in the Belorussian press
abroad may often have been exaggerated, perhaps deliberately inflated:
yet to the reader they sounded true, especially since no official Polish
accounts were published, and no press correspondents admitted into the
regions under "pacification." 26
Public flogging and death were not the only means of repression.
The Poles wanted to get at the root of Irredentism and, in the words of
a Belorussian writer, "to kill the very soul in the lacerated body of
West Belorussia." 27 "Village clubs and reading rooms were closed
down. . . Adult education centers lost thousands of zlotys in cash and
in securities, books, musical instruments, stage equipment, radio sets,
etc., and their buildings were turned into Polish schools. . . In the
rural areas, all cultural activities were stopped by order of the local au-
thorities. . . Schools, theaters, publishing houses, reading rooms, and
practically every material evidence of Belorussian self-expression was
destroyed." 28 Yet, the results were the opposite of what the Polish
administration wanted. Even people who had long been indifferent to
nationalist propaganda became conscious of the Belorussian cause.
"Symbols of the disbanded clubs, choirs, and fellowship groups, and
photographs of the arrested or exiled priests, writers, and political
leaders, now were hero-worshipped in every Belorussian home." 29
Perhaps the repression was not as mercilessly harsh as the above
quotations suggest. After all, they are taken from the Belorussian press
which was allowed to continue during the period of pacification, and
after. Polish policy lacked consistency. Actually, central Belorussian
institutions in Vilna remained unmolested. The national sentiment re-
pressed in one part of the country was allowed to grow in another. Ob-
viously, the situation could not be controlled in such a fashion. More
Belorussians - more anti-Polish than ever - were joining the national
cause. In short, the Poles had done what nationalist propaganda had
not been able purposely to achieve.
Literary Nationalism
Although the Poles had succeeded in suppressing Belorussianism as
a political factor, the Belorussian intelligentsia was given an outlet in
literary activities, subject to censorship and police supervision. * Activi-
* In the general elections of 1935, the Belorussians ,vere to lose the last seat they had
in the Polish parliament, ,vhere they now ,vere represented only by landlords and
osadnicy of Polish descent. Social and educational activities were restricted. In round
figures, only 2,300 pupils were permitted to use Belorussian along with Polish in schools,
whereas bilingual instruction still ,vas offered to 473,000 Ukrainians, 7 2 ,000 Germans,
70,000 Jews, 1,500 Lithuanians, 1,700 Russians, and 1,000 Czechs (1934-35).

WEST BELORUSSIA 12 9
ties centered around a few periodicals and cultural clubs in Vilna.
While paying lip service to the Polish state, these were building in the
background a new reserve of national strength. Their first task. was to
renew cultural contacts with the villages. The editorial rooms soon were
swamped with verses and tales in which semi-literate youth poured out
its soul. The editors did their best to encourage popular writings, and
the back pages of the periodicals were full of notes like this : "Your
poems have been received. Their spirit is fine, but they are too crude
to print. We shall try, however, to edit and publish some." In this man-
ner, a new flow was established between the city and the village, which
strengthened their ties. This was a period of ideological rather than or-
ganizational formation of the resistance moven1ent. 30
Before long a few new talents appeared from among the people.
The names of Vasilek, Masara, and other peasant writers becan1e
known and praised. Often their lyrics were clumsy and naIve, but a
more sophisticated literature perhaps would not have been appreciated
by the reader. Devotion to the native land and civic lament were the
common themes. Sincerity and courage, not literary skill, were in de-
mand. There were some writings, however, which attracted attention
abroad, and the poems of Maxim Tank, J. Pusca, and a few others were
translated into Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Polish. Presently, Maxim
Tank (A. Skurko) was compared to Alexander Pushkin and Adam
Mickiewicz in the native press. His simple lyrics stirred the national
pride, and indeed were worth more than volumes of political propa-
ganda. 3 ! Young enthusiasts began to believe that, aside from their his-
torical and political right, Belorussians were culturally equal, if not
superior, to other peoples in eastern Europe.
In n1any respects, the period 1933-1937 in Poland can be compared
to that of Nasa Niva in Russia, 1906-1914. Different, of course, were
the numbers of people and the range of issues involved, as well as the
material achievements. Besides publications dedicated to social work
and education, two magazines dealing with Belorussian history, fine
arts, and literature appeared in Vilna ([(alos' se and LetaPis'). Demand
for books in the Belorussian language was steadily increasing. In 1936,
a Day of Belorussian Culture was inaugurated, to be celebrated annu-
ally, and it met with unprecedented success. Greetings were received
from Belorussian organizations in Paris, Berlin, Chicago, Prague, Riga,
and Kaunas, and from the Lithuanians and Ukrainians. Conspicuously,
no word came from either the Poles or the Russians.
Both the Poles and the Russians, though for different reasons,
looked askance at the literary revival in vVest Belorussia. The anti-
Soviet flavor it assumed irritated Moscow. Agreeable as this may have
been to V\Tarsaw, it was also alarming in that the expected Polonization
of the country was not forthcoming. It was even observed that children

130 BELORUSSIA: THE IJIA[CING OF A NATION
of the Polish osadnicy were speaking Belorussian in preference to Po-
lish and that sometimes their whole families, thrust into the midst of
Belorussian peasantry, became Belorussianized. Still more disturbing
to the Poles was the fact that those who displayed the most aggressive
Belorussian spirit were the Belorussian Catholics, who had already
been designated as Polish in official statistics. The clergy insisted that
Belorussian be introduced as the language of instruction in the Vilna
Theological Seminary and of the regular sern1ons. They even ventured
to write to the Holy See asking that the concordat with Poland be
amended (1925) and Belorussian bishops appointed in Vilna and in
Pinsk (1932). Finally, they obtained from the Nuncio a subsidy for
translating the Gospel and the Acts into the Belorussian language
(1932). Their lead was followed by the Orthodox clergy, who de-
manded the same rights. Both the Roman Catholics and the Orthodox
wanted Belorussian native priests to be represented in their respective
diocesan administrations and the correspondence with parishes to be
conducted in the Belorussian language. The Jesuits found it advisable
to sponsor publication of a Uniate magazine in Belorussian using both
the Latin (lacinka) and the Cyrillic (hrazdanka) alphabets. The Belo-
russian Christian Democrats (Catholics) even dared to take their issues
to the international foruln, * and maintained regular contacts with the
Congress of National Minorities in Europe (1925-1938).32 By deci-
sion of the Vilna Governor, the Christian Democrat Movement (BCD)
was disbanded,33 its organ Belaruskaja [Crynica suspended (1936),
and a new purge of Belorussian organizations ordered (1937) .34
A New Wave of Oppression
The new wave of oppression was significantly different in concept
from that which the Polish government had tried before, and it re-
quired a more effective technique. In 1928-1932 the Poles had fought
Belorussian political nationalism; they now set out to eradicate Belo-
russian cultural activity. Poland, of course, no longer considered her-
self bound by international obligations to her racial, religious, and lin-
guistic minorities,35 and there were plenty of loopholes in the revised
constitutional text of April 23, 1935. Freedoms of religion, of speech,
and of public assembly were subjected to considerations of "common
good," "public order and morals" (Articles 5, I I I) and, in effect, the
executive authority had been made the judge. The attacl{ was leveled
simultaneously against the press, the church, educational institutions,
and community clubs. The clergy was ordered to instruct in Polish only.
One hundred and forty Orthodox churches were closed, and others were
* Theil' memorandum to the Leagu of Nations (1929) \vas supprtssed by the Polish
government (May 6, 1930).

JtVEST BELORUSSIA 131
compelled to use the Polish liturgical texts, even in the regions "where
nobody can speak Polish, or ever did." In the belt one hundred kilome-
ters wide along the Soviet border, the Orthodox were forced into the
Catholic faith, and those who resisted were deported inland, under the
provisions of martial law. The last Belorussian Catholic publications in
Vilna, including the children's magazine Zaseuka, were suspended. The
Catholic priests Adam Stankevic and Wladzimir Talocka, foriner lead-
ers of the BCD, were exiled, one to Slonim, the other to Bialystok. An-
other priest, J. Hermanovic, known under the pen nal11e of Vinduk
Advazny, was forced to leave the country for Rome. Members of the
Belorussian Catholic sect, the Marianists, who had their headquarters
in Druja, were arrested and deported. 36
The Belorussian Institute of Economy and Culture and the Belo-
russian School Society were disbanded (December 2 and 4, 1936), the
Union of Belorussian Teachers and the Belorussian National Com-
mittee dissolved (August 20 and November IS, 1937, respectively),
and the last Belorussian Gymnasium closed. 37 On November IS, 1938,
the Act of January 7, 19 2 5, protecting the right of the natives to have
their own schools, was repealed. Subsidies to the Belorussian Ethno-
graphic Museum were cut off at the beginning of 1939. 38 Only two
streets in Vilna retained their ancient Belorussian names, Skoryna and
Brothers Mamonic. Public meetings were prohibited, cooperatives dis-
banded, and community centers closed. People connected with the
Belorussian movement were not permitted to vote in municipal elec-
tions, and their names were removed from the ballot. Local leaders
were deported to Bereza I(artuska where a concentration camp was
established for those suspected of un-Polish activities. 39
Gleaned from Belorussian publications, none of which appeared
regularly in 1938, and the last of which was suspended early in the
summer of 1939, are the following statements: "We have a seven-grade
school in our village. Originally, instruction was given four hours a
week in Belorussian, but this summer, and the summer before, only one
hour has been given. No one has even bothered to explain the
change." 40 "We have no school here, and our children must go to a
Polish school in the next village where all people also are Belorussian,
not Polish. We send them there lest we be fined. The teaching is poor,
and the children do not know how to read and write after four years
of school (Village Malysniki, Trol{i County)." "The police say that
possession of a Belorussian book is a sign of disloyalty." 41 "The Polish
teacher forbids the children to talk in Belorussian, and makes them
stand on their knees when they are caught doing so (Village Roman-
ovo)." "\7\1 e are told by the police that children may not read Belorus-
sian books either in the library or at home." "The officials have pro-
hibited Belorussian plays." "Our young people are growing up unedu-

13 2 BELORUSSIA: THE 1J1AKING OF A NATION
cated. . . They do not read newspapers or books. They are not in-
terested in the life and history of their people. Indeed, they have no
cultural interests at all." 42
The rural communities were returning to a dark age. Alarmed, the
Chryscyjanskaja Dumka (Christian Thought) urged the people "to
pursue self-education in the way your fathers did during the oppressive
times of Tsarism: let brother teach brother, sister teach sister, neighbor
teach neighbor." Upon publication of this, the Vilna governor sus-
pended the paper. 43 Belorussian youth was given the choice of becom-
ing Polish or remaining illiterate. This choice seemed, indeed, to be the
goal of the new' Polish policy. As long as Belorussianism had been a
movement away from Russia, it was welcome. But as soon as it had
become a movement away from Poland, it could not be tolerated. Since
the awakening of Belorussian self-consciousness was no longer safe, it
was better for a man to remain at the stage in which he used to describe
himself simply as tutej'Si (aborigine) .44 A blank. mind was safer than an
un-Polish mind. Belorussians have been described as "a flat-faced,
goggle-eyed race, devoid of culture." Ignorance and poverty, it was
said, would merely restore that race to its natural condition. 45
The Polish economic policy in particular seems to have been in
agreement with this theory. The Poles affirm that they were doing
"everything that could be done toward rendering [Belorussian] econ-
omy remunerative." They maintain that "the manifold efforts . . . to
develop not only great industrial centers but also smaller establish-
ments scattered over the provinces, and to raise the level and efficiency
of craftsmanship and of local commerce often greatly helped to pro-
mote the well-being of very remote and backward districts . . . This
system resulting in modest but steady progress appeared to be espe-
cially well adapted to the needs and conditions of a country not en-
dowed with remarkable natural resources." 46 This was essentially a
colonial policy. Thirty-seven per cent of all arable land in 'Vest Belo-
russia was owned by the Poles. 47 Native farms of five to twelve acres
(39.7 per cent), others of less than five acres (2 I. 7 per cent), covered
the rest,48 and no Belorussian farmer could legally increase his hold-
ing without permission of the district administrator (powiatowy sta-
rosta).49 Natural resources were exploited in a predatory n1anner. In
1937 alone, state forests in the region rendered a net profit of 42,500,000
zlotys, while the output of local industries declined 25 to 40 per cent,
in the period 1926-1938.50
Besides the city of Vilna with a population of over 100,000, there
were in all West Bellorussia only two cities with 50,000 to 100,000 in-
habitants (Grodno, Brest), only two with 20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants,
and only three with 10,000 to 20,000 inhabitants. 51 Economically and

WEST BELORUSSIA 133
culturally, the four Belorussian provinces remained the least developed
sections of Poland.
There were, of course, individual Poles who approached the matter
sincerely and who tried to find a solution advantageous for both sides, 52
or to raise their voices in defense of the Belorussian rights. Literature,
however, has preserved no memory of any instances of public protest. 63
Political Emigration
Tempered in the furnace of militant nationalism for about twenty
years and faced with the choice of abandoning their people or perish-
ing, the West Belorussian intelligentsia - brought up in the Polish
schools - accepted the challenge. The more active elements went un-
derground, others continued the struggle within the framework of as
much local protective legality as still prevailed, and many left the coun-
try to carryon the struggle from beyond the Polish borders.
According to some estimates, over 100,000 Belorussians emigrated
from Poland. 54 Perhaps one third settled in the United States, Canada,
and Latin America, and others spread into various sections of Europe. 65
There were many, of course, whose reasons for moving were economic,
not political, but their gratitude to and sympathy for Poland were no
greater for that. In fact, they provided the rank and file for the new
"centers of resistance" abroad.
In general, Belorussian emigrants were not able to establish useful
political contacts in their countries of adoption, nor did they succeed
in influencing public opinion in favor of their national cause. Foreign
governments looked askance at all nationalism other than their own,
and immigrant political activities were restricted. Also, to Belorussian
peasants situated abroad, the educated brother from Poland was a
stranger. They did not know much about the later growth of the "Belo-
russian idea" and, in fact, did not care to know. The political emi-
grants, disillusioned as they must have been, found themselves isolated.
Yet their contributions to the Belorussian cause were not entirely lost.
In Lithuania, the Belorussians were treated with sympathy and a
liberal spirit. No distinction was made, however, between the Lithua-
nian citizens of Russian and Belorussian descent. 5G No Belorussian
schools existed there. Yet the exiles from Poland were given substan-
tial facilities for continuing their work. Assisted by the Lithuanian
government, Lastouski and his associates founded a Belorussian Edu-
cational Society, a Belorussian Home, and a theater. In 1933 a Belo-
russian Center for Adult Education opened in Kaunas, with an annual
subsidy of two to three thousand lits fron1 the state. A periodical,
[(ryvic, edited first by Lastouski, then by Dus-Duseuski, appeared for
a number of years, and books and pamphlets were printed in the Belo-
russian language. The trend of the publications was mildly anti-Soviet,

134 BELORUSSIA.' THE lJIJAI(ING OF A NATION
strongly anti-Polish, and they all were intended for "our brothers
abroad," not for the Belorussian natives in Lithuania. 57
In Latvia, Belorussian activities first centered around the Military
Mission and the Consulate, established in 1919 and continued for some
time as agencies-in-exile. Two years later, an educational society,
Bac' kauscyna, was founded in Dvinsk (Daugapils), and the Latvian
government appointed S. Sacharau to organize a Belorussian section in
the Ministry of Education. Soon there were forty-six Belorussian
schools in the country, and Sacharau's office had doubled its staff, from
two clerks to four. The total appropriation for education of the Belo-
russian minority reached 95,000 lats. Yet there was only one school for
every 1,500 Belorussian natives, as compared with one school for every
850 Latvians, every 800 Germans, and every 460 Russians. The Belo-
russian community still had the highest illiteracy in the country, 61 per
cent among men and 71 per cent among women. 58 The hope that their
situation might improve was short-lived. In 1924, Belorussian educa-
tors were accused of subversive activities. The Latvian court acquitted
them in April 1925, but the policy of the government had changed frOID
support to suppression. Cultural activities were restricted, and the offi-
cial number of Belorussians in the country began to dwindle. 59 By
1937, not a single Belorussian school existed in Latvia, and only eleven
hours a week were given to Belorussian studies in two mixed schools in
Riga, with 170 pupils altogether. In Riga, a Belorussian Center, con-
sisting of only a handful of political emigrants, continued to exist and
its publications were allowed to appear until World War 11. 00
Belorussian nationalists enjoyed more freedom in the countries
which did not have the minority problem. In Czechoslovakia an at-
tempt was made to set up a center for all the advocates of a "free and
independent Belorussia." After the death of P. Kreceuski in 1924, how-
ever, the center began to disintegrate and, finally, lost Czech support.
But political succession was strictly observed, and the title of President
of the Belorussian National Republic went to Vasil Zacharka, and after
World War II, to Mikola Abramcyk, who moved the symbol of "Free
Belorussia" to Paris.
In France, Abramcyk had been known since the early 1930'S as a
successful organizer of a Union (Chaurus) of Belorussian workers and
editor of the periodical Recha (Echo), which was both anti-Polish and
anti-Soviet. In the United States, a Belorussian Hramada was organ-
ized in Chicago, headed by the Very Reverend John Tarasevich, Presi-
dent, and J. Lobach, Secretary General. Although it counted a former
minister of the BNR, Varonka, among its members, it did not succeed
in taking root among Americans of Belorussian descent, and its influ-
ence remained small. 01 On the other hand, Belorussian student groups
were formed in Prague, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Belgrade, Munich, and

WEST BELORUSSIA
135
other places, eventually to create an All-Belorussian Student Union
abroad. These were soon to begin to display an even more aggressive
nationalistic spirit than their fathers, though younger leadership did
not come to the fore until World War 11.*
The emigrants had at least achieved, then, political centers and a
press abroad, which would have been inconceivable a generation before.
The years between World Wars I and II produced nationalist leaders,
made keen by the struggle for survival. Thrown out of their native land,
they continued to fight. Since most of them were emigrants from West
Belorussia, it was not unnatural that their attacks against Poland
sounded louder than their invectives against the Soviets.
On the Eve of World Wat II
The hopes of the Polish government that the Belorussian popula-
tion deprived of leadership might display more loyalty to the state
proved ill-founded. An account of the situation which appeared in the
Belal'uskiFront (February 1,1939) is worth quoting at some length:
The Belorussian village is holding its breath, tensely expecting changes
of some sort. . . Those who have long looked toward the East now look to
all sides. In fact, the people will fall into the hands of anyone who will
promise them a better lot - whether the promise be sincere or false. . . Com-
munists have influence but, under present conditions, so would fascists, or
even monarchists, if there were any around. . . Yet some different political
tendencies can be observed, and the people may be divided into several
groups.
The first group consists of Russophiles. They also are called "Com..
munists," but this is not true since there is hardly any ideological Communism
in the rural communities. Their attitude can be described as "orientationally"
communistic, and tomorrow it could be fascistic or monarchistic, depending
on who is ruling over Russia. This is particularly typical of the Orthodox
populations. . . Their attitude has been described as anti-Polish, but it is
also anti-German, anti-Lithuanian, even anti-Belorussian, since it is pro-
Russian above all. They feel that our only hope is Russia, whether Soviet
or otherwise. . . They do not read Belorussian publications and, in general,
take no part in communal life, first because they are frightened by arrests
and provocations, and also because they keep their eyes turned to Moscow,
and trust no one. . .
The second group, small but very active at present, are opportunists,
go-getters, and adventurers seeking quick gain in anything. Some of them
were with the first group at the time of the Belorussian Hramada (1924-28),
but now they collaborate closely with the Polish police, army, and teachers.
. . . They nearly broke their necks in the last communal elections in order
to get "power," but succeeded only where the masses were completely in-
different and passive. There there was competition from the first group or
* For political emigration since the war, see Chapter 14.

136 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
from the nationalists, not one of their candidates was elected. . . The Poles
are mistaken in supporting them, since they will be the first to abandon their
loyalty should the tide turn.
The nationalists form the third group, now scattered and disorganized.
But wherever they are, even in small numbers, they always come to the top
in communal leadership. . . Generally honest, intelligent, and capable, they
have influence among the more advanced and active people.
The fourth group consists of the mass of peasantry whose philosophy is
"Say nothing, know nothing, do nothing." These, countless in numbers, are
like cattle. They can be driven anywhere by a capable leader speaking with
authority. . . Hungry, destitute, illiterate farmers, they are not interested
in politics or social ideas of any sort. They are used to obeying the ecclesiasti-
cal and secular authorities, but they would enthusiastically follow anyone who
promises them bread, and more land to produce bread. . .
The Poles ignored the warning, and suppressed the paper. But the
picture given was correct, indeed prophetic. Presently, World War II
found West Belorussian loyalties divided between Communism and
nationalism - but with none whatsoever for Poland.

10
EAST BELORUSSIA
The situation in East Belorussia between 1921 and World War II
is difficult to reconstruct exactly. In Poland, we have contradictory evi-
dence, but always as a different interpretation of the known facts. In the
Soviet Union, however, facts and their recording have no direct rela-
tionship; very often what is reported as fact may simply be wished or
believed or feared to have happened, and there is no way always of
knowing what did and what did not actually happen. Official secrecy
has given birth to myths which may take more than one generation of
historians to dismantle.
Facts supplied by Soviet sources and by the press in exile often
form entirely different sets of reference which cannot be counter-
checked but must be left to conjecture. In the strange realm where
fiction and reality are confused, only a few landmarks stand out which
leave no room for doubt.
Communism and Nationalism
The theoretical position of Communism in regard to national self-
determination needs no elaboration. The leaders had never concealed
the fact that their policy aimed at the 1'approchement of the proletar-
ians and semi-proletarians of various nationalities "for the common
revolutionary struggle" (Seventh Party Congress, March 1919). The
Party was "properly to use national questions as a vital factor of revo-
lutionary dynamics in exploding and breaking up the capitalist so-
ciety." 1 In other words, Communism was ready to use national aspira-
tions so far as they seemed to fit into its system, but had no desire to
satisfy them. When doubts arose, Stalin authoritatively put things in
their proper place (1930).2 Accordingly, national autonomy under the
Soviets was understood as "an expediency aiming at overcoming the
centrifugal forces," and the federal republic as "an instrument of neu-
tralization of the national question" within the Soviet system. 3
Both Lenin and Pilsudski considered Belorussian national self-de-
termination as a revolutionary dynamic and an expedient, although one

138 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
wanted to use it for World Revolution, and the other for Greater Po-
land. Not unnaturally, therefore, a Belorussian "renaissance" followed
a somewhat similar sequence on both sides of the border: first, the ex-
pansion of national culture to the limits of autonomy compatible only
with a theoretical unity of the state; second, elimination of the national
leadership formed during that period, and enforcement of the political
unity of the state; third, emasculation (USSR), or eradication (Po-
land), of national culture to complete extinction of the national ideal.
The difference lay only in the methods applied by the respective gov-
ernments. In fact, Moscow had greater latitude in handling the prob-
lem than the ideological and political position of Poland could permit.
Lenin certainly promised both peace and self-determination in more
appealing terms than his democratic opponent. He proclaimed the right
of all the peoples of the Russian empire to secession. But the liberated
peoples were expected "freely" to reunite in the Soviet system, and
Stalin was appointed to oversee this process as the first People's Com-
missar of Nationalities. 4 Accordingly, in February 1918, a Belorussian
National Commissariat headed by Carviakou emerged in Moscow as
the prospective government of independent Belorussia. Assisted by the
Red Army, this group becan1e the government of the First and the Sec-
ond Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republics, January to April 1919, and
in July 1920, respectively.
The "Sovereign" Soviet Belorussian state (BSSR), as yet composed
of six counties of Minsk province, with a population of approximately
1,200,000, concluded "a treaty of alliance" with the Russian Soviet
Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR) on January 16, 1920 (Adamovic
- Karachan). Moscow used her legal position as ally to represent the
"interests of the Belorussian SSR" at the conference of Riga in March
1921. Consequently, Poland was bound to recognize the Belorussian
state, although its international status remained uncertain. In fact,
Soviet Belorussia did not even attempt to enter into direct relations
with any country outside the Soviet borders. At the international con-
ferences in Geneva and The Hague in 1922, all the Soviet republics
were represented by Moscow. The formal union followed on December
3 0 , 1922. It consisted of Russia, Belorussia, the Ukraine, and the
Transcaucasian Federation, and the incorporation act guaranteed the
nominal sovereignty of each constituent republic.
Belorussian nationalism had achieved its aim: the country might
have a wrong system of government, but it was now a state equal in
right, dignity, and honor with Russia itself. Furthermore, Russia freely
ceded the Mogilev and Vitebsk provinces to Belorussia in 1924, and the
Gomel and Recica counties in 1926, thus bringing the total population
of the republic to 5,000,000. Obviously, the territorial growth of Soviet
Belorussia was agreeable to the views of Moscow. It certainly was

EAST BELORUSSIA 139
most agreeable to Belorussian nationalists who applauded it both in the
USSR and abroad.
Belorussification
From the Soviet point of view, the establishment of the Belorussian
Republic could serve a double purpose: (I) to attract into and lnain-
tain within the Soviet system those elements of the population to which
the Communist idea might not otherwise appeal, and (2) to integrate
their nationalism with world revolutionary forces. Consequently, con1-
plete freedom was given the local administration to organize a Belo-
russian Home.
Wasting no time, the new administration set out for wholesale Belo-
russification of the region. Belorussian nationality was declared pre-
dominant, and Belorussian the official language. Russian was banned
from schools, courts, and offices - even from homes. Presently, every-
thing which smelled of "old Russia" was destroyed or relllodeled. N a-
tive culture was fostered, incommensurate and rudin1entary though it
was. The people were ordered to bring their dialects into line with the
national standard, though it was itself still in the making. People who
spoke in the n1ixed idiom were denounced as "Muscovites" and de-
prived of rights. Although the Russians became the least considered
minority in the state, Moscow remained undisturbed. Provided the
Belorussian administration professed loyalty to the Soviet ideal, it was
given a green light to proceed as far as it chose to satisfy the idiosyn-
crasies of local nationalism.
Resistance soon developed among the natives then1selves, since to
many, Belorussianism and Communism were now the same thing. In
Vitebsl{ province, newspapers reported the beating, even killing, of
teachers by the peasants, who, unfalniliar with the southwestern dialect
wanted instruction for their children in Russian. In many parts of the
country, guerrillas - comn10nly called "the greens" because woods and
swamps were their headquarters - fought against both the Bolsheviks
and the nationalists. Themselves native Belorussians, they Inade a great
point of using Russian in their communications with each other and in
their printed proclamations. The authorities treated them indiscrimi-
nately as counterrevolutionaries. But, protesting against the unnatural
union of Belorussianism and Communism, they were themselves as un-
naturally united in a negative sense, and the movement never devel-
oped beyond occasional outbursts of popular ire. The largest l{nown
group (Listopad, Miacelski, Makaren, Kazak, Dziamidovic, Kurbyka,
and others) was brought to trial and liquidated in March 1926.
In the cities, however, nationalism seemed to be in complete con-
trol. To the leaders, of whom only a few had joined the Communist
Party, an alliance with the Soviets was an expedient, a good bargain

140 BELORUSSIA.. THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
indeed. They sat down to eat with the devil, sure of having brought
with them the longer spoon. Indeed, at that time, no one could believe
that the Soviets would survive long enough to rebuild an empire. It
seemed reasonable to expect that Belorussian nationalism, nourished in
the hotbed of revolution, would outlive it, and the cost appeared negli-
gible if Belorussia could eventually face'the world in its own right.
Education
Consequently, the efforts of the administration were concentrated
not so much on Sovietization as on installing and developing national
culture wherever possible. Resistance to forcible Belorussification con-
tinued from various groups of the population, sometimes including the
local Communist Party clubs,5 yet the achievements were spectacular
and rapid. By 1928 "Belorussification was entirely completed in the
centra, province, and district institutions." 6 Qualitative evaluation is
difficult, but here are some figures as reported in the press at the time.
An Institute of Belorussian Culture was founded in Minsk in 1921,
to be transformed in 1928 into the Belorussian Academy of Sciences
with seven departments and eight committees on research in archeol-
ogy, history, ethnography, folklore, music, fine arts, language, and nat-
ural resources. Then followed a State University, State Publishing Of-
fice (Dom [(nihi), National Theater, Agricultural Academy, School of
Medicine, Veterinarian Institute, s'everal teachers' colleges, n1useums,
centers of adult education, and other institutions. In 1925, 350,000
children were attending 4000 elementary and 261 secondary schools
where all instruction was now in Belorussian. Nineteen newspapers and
periodicals were published, with a total circulation of 100,000. For a
country which had always been the least literate part of European
Russia, this was an impressive record. 7
In 1928, according to the official sources, there were already four
Belorussian institutions of higher learning (5°4 professors, 4,632 stu-
dents), six workers' colleges (120 professors, 1,028 students), thirty
technical institutes (566 professors, 5,276 students), thirty-four trade
schools (4 08 teachers, 3,077 studen'ts), thirteen factory schools (1 57
teachers, 1,009 students), seven technical schools (4S instructors, 606
students), 277 eight-year public schools (3,077 teachers, 99,437 pu-
pils), 4,5&5 four-year public schools (6,67 1 teachers, 309,009 pupils),
and a large number of. grammar schools, centers of adult education,
reading rooms, and so on - down to smaller villages and hamlets. 8
Granted that these figures are correct, considerable evidence exists
that the schools were not adequately staffed or equipped. Curricula
were reduced to a minimum, and one may wonder about the qualifica-
tions of the teaching staff that the land, starting nearly from scratch,
was to produce in seven years - 1,170 college professors, 7,748 school

EAST BELORUSSIA 14 1
teachers, and 2,630 instructors in various fields r Yet there is little doubt
that the country was given great momentum in education in the native
tongue, and that the youth responded with enthusiasm. "New men are
required to change the face of the earth" was the motto, and the op-
portunities opened up to them seemed breathtaking.
National Minorities
The general census of 1926 counted 80.62 per cent of the total pop-
ulation of the BSSR as Belorussian-speaking, of which 91.7 per cent
were peasants. From that social segment the new national elite was
expected to arise. _ In the meantime, cultural and political life was con-
centrated in the city, ,,yhere the Belorussian element always was rela-
tively weak. Former villagers now constituted about 40 per cent of the
urban population, but only one of every five had established roots in
any such occupations as business, liberal professions, "white collar,"
or industrial employment. 9 These pursuits were almost entirely in the
hands of non-Belorussian groups which now were established as self-
governed "national-cultural cOlnn1unities," with their own soviets. *
Altogether, the foreign eIen1ents thus organized represented 19.38
per cent of the total and 60.74 per cent of the urban population. Since
they legally enjoyed equal opportunity with the Belorussians, the
national administration assumed the composition shown in the accom-
panying table.
ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION, 1927
(in per cent)
Belorussians Jews Russians Others
Legislative branch
Central 55.0 19. 0 15.0 11.0
City 54. 1 30.6 14.5 9. 8
To\vn 53. 2 4°.5 2.5 3. 8
Village 9 2 .3 2.5 1.4 3. 8
Executive branch
Administration 51.4 24. 8 18.0 5. 8
Industry and trade 30.8 49.3 13.2 6.7
Agriculture 59.5 10.1 24. 1 6.3
Army 1.7 3.6 50.8 43.9
Technical personnel
Administration 64. 0 22.9 5.4 7.7
Industry and trade 39. 6 4 2 .7 11.2 6.S
Agriculture 59. 6 16.9 12.9 10.6
* T\venty-three J e\vish, nineteen PoUsh, sixteen Russian, five Latvian, hvo Ukrainian,
and hvo German soviets (1924).

142 BELORUSSIA: THE MA[(ING OF A NATION
It is striking that the armed forces were almost entirely composed
of non-Belorussians (98.3 per cent). Otherwise, the task of building
the Belorussian National Home was about equally divided between the
Belorussian and non- Belorussian leadership.
A decree of July IS, 1924 confirmed "the equal rights" of the four
principal languages: Belorussian, Russian, Yiddish, and Polish. Only
the basic laws and the more important governn1ent acts, however, were
to be published in four languages. Belorussian was given "precedence
in relations between governmental, trade-union, and social agencies
and organizations"; Russian was used primarily "in relations with the
USSR and other Union Republics" and, together with Yiddish and Po-
lish, in such correspondence and enactments "as might be deemed neces-
sary." 10 In fact, only a very few adn1inistrators were tetralingual, and
not very n1any had even an adequate command of Belorussian. In 1927,
for every twenty books in the Belorussian language, ten would appear
in Russian, two in Yiddish, one in Polish. 11
Russians controlled the army and the police, and were particularly
active in Communist indoctrination. But, with equal zeal, they assisted
the administration in squeezing Russian culture out of the land. Early
legislation required knowledge of both the Belorussian and the Russian
languages for the personnel in public offices, trade unions, and social
agencies, and both languages were supposed to be taught in the
schools. 12 Actually, Russian had been banned from the offices, and in
schools it was offered on an equal footing with German and French, as
a foreign language. Unlike the Jewish and Polish communities, the Rus-
sians had no courts of justice, no high schools, and no teachers' college
of their own. Terms of Russian origin were ordered out of the Belorus-
sian technical and legal vocabularies, new terms being borrowed from
the vVestern languages, or created off-hand by Belorussian linguists.
The Academy set out to rewrite Belorussian history, and the term
[(ryvic reappeared in literature, in support of the contention that Belo-
russia had never had much in common with Russia either culturally or
historically. In 1927, an attempt was made to wrench the Belorussian
Orthodox church away from the Moscow Patriarchate - an act some-
what inconsistent with the theory that religion was doomed anyway.13
Belorussian nationalists professed Soviet loyalty, of course, but
"pro-Soviet" was not yet synonymous with "pro-Russian" in the sense
it was later forced to become. The USSR complied, being at that time
for Sovietization rather than for Russification of the world.
Ideological Adjustments
The belief that national emancpation might be achieved through
cooperation with Comn1unist Russia called for a reconciliation of values,
and for an adjustment to practices introduced by Bolshevism. The

EAST BELORUSSIA
143
question arose as to how far one should go in the way of concessions.
The nationalists, so far, had every reason to remain optin1istic. Ex-
propriations from'the social upper class, by no means numerous in the
country, did not contradict their concepts of democracy. Violence and
excesses could be explained by the fact that revolutions are not made
with hands in velvet gloves. Large landed estates, industry, transporta-
tion, banking, and trade were nationalized, but the private sector had
been enlarged with the new economic policy pro1110ted by Lenin. The
village, recovering from arbitrary taxation and wholesale requisitions,
was resuming normal life, even developing brisk trade with the city.
Artisanship and petty trade typical of the country were better off than
before. Indeed, it seemed for the moment that not only the 'lower class
but also the middle class had benefited by the Soviet Revolution.
Economic planning, poor and wasteful of money and men though
it was, could already boast some spectacular achievements. The press
reported that new highways and railroads were being built, old ones
repaired and improved. Navigation was resumed on the canal sys-
tem connecting the Dvina, Niemen, and Dnieper rivers. Radio sta-
tions were built in Minsk and Gomel, new public buildings arose in the
cities, and 171 power plants were constructed throughout the country.
Electric light appeared, or was scheduled to appear, in the rural areas
where kerosene and candles had been luxuries only yesterday. The
federal treasury had invested 33 million rubles in the Belorussian
economy and, according to statistics, industrial output had surpassed
in 1928 the prewar level by 230 per cent. Concurrently, new agricul-
tural methods raised the yield of the Belorussian soil from thirty to
eighty or ninety poods per hectare. * The figures, whether true or fic-
titious, were impressive. Still Inore so were the plans for the future.
There was fear that, abandoned to their own devices, the nationalists
might indeed lose their hold on the people.
Literature of the Ad1"adzen'ne (Revival) period was dedicated to a
democratic, not exactly a socialist, ideal. In his play Tutej'Si (Common
Folk), Janka I(upala described the Polish and the Soviet occupation
armies in equally repulsive colors. Ales' Harun and J advihin fled to Po-
land from the Red Terror. J akub Kolas denounced Moscow treachery
in Riga. All other writers of that school of thought claimed freedom for
all men, not only for workers and peasants. Obviously, this trend had
become incompatible with the situation created when the proletariat
took power into its own hands, "freeing the toiling n1asses, and carrying
out the national liberation of the Belorussian people." 14 While the older
writers hesitated, new ones were taking the lead. Aleksandrovic, Dudar,
Kuzma Corny, Krapiva, Michas Carot, and others formed the literary
club Maladniak (Youth), "to invigorate Belorussian literature and the
* One pood equals 36.113 pounds; one hectare equals 2,471 acres.

144 BELORUSSIA: THE lklAKING OF A NATION
arts with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism." The Adradzen'ne trend was
declared an anachronism, and its survival harmful to the people.
The old guard found a temporary refuge in the literary club Uzvyssa
(Excelsior) and, conceding that new literature "must be national in
form, proletarian and peasant in content," refused, nevertheless, to
make it "subservient to current issues' of the day." But their position
was untenable. The leftist periodical Polymia (Flame), supported by
the might of the state, organized the majority of writers along the Party
line, and the club M aladniak was actually transformed into a Belorus-
sian Association of Proletarian 'iVriters. Jakub Kolas and Biadulia were
the first to jump on the bandwagon. Other elder leaders followed and,
finally, Janka Kupala himself translated ('The Internationale" into the
Belorussian language - collecting royalties for fifty thousand copies
printed and sold by the state.
Socialization of Belorussian nationalism may have seemed complete.
But other events indicated that perhaps this was not yet entirely true.
e onditional Surrender
The commanding position and spectacular progress of nationalism
in Soviet Belorussia, while apparently paying only lip-service to Marx-
ism-Leninism, deeply impressed the Belorussians abroad. They began
to revise their attitude toward Communism, and the revision resulted
in (a) the Hramada subversive movement in Poland (see above), (b)
the surrender of power by the Lastouski government-in-exile to the ad-
ministration of Soviet Belorussia, and (c) the immigration or repatria-
tion of political exiles to the BSSR.
In the winter of I924, the President of the Belorussian Soviet gov-
ernment, Zylunovic, formerly an active member of the Nasa Niva
group, arrived in Prague personally to negotiate repatriation of the
former leaders of the Belorussian National Republic. Accordingly,
Lastouski called a conference of the members of the government-in-
exile in Berlin to decide whether they should continue their activities
or surrender to the Soviet authority. After long hours of discussion, the
government-in-exile on October IO, 1925, decided to disband and to
pass on the symbolic powers of the BNR to the government of the
BSSR, "the only lawful government of Belorussia." Lastouski himself,
and his former ministers, Cvikevic, Zajac, Prakulevic, Badunova, and
Mamon'ka, returned to Minsl{ where they were received with honors
and, in accordance with the terms of the deal, given top positions in the
educational and cultural branches of the government. Only President
Kreceusl{i, Minister Zacharka, and Secretary Hryb chose to remain
abroad, carrying with them the striped symbol of the BNR in exile. 15
The news that former anti-Soviet leaders had been pardoned, and
permitted to have an active part in building the Belorussian Home

EAST BELORUSSIA 145
under the Soviets, stirred the Belorussian population in Poland. For a
moment, it looked as though there might be an open war of secession.
Moscow generously rescued the leaders from the Polish jails and con-
centration camps, and offered hospitality to all the discontented and
oppressed. Before long, all the leaders of the nationalist movement,
except the Christian Democrats and the uhadoucy, gathered in Minsk.
Among them were former Belorussian deputies to the Polish Sejm, S.
Rak-Michajlouski, P. Miatla, B. Taraskevic, Valosyn, and others;
writers I. Dvarcanin, Haurylik, Valynec; scholars M. Dovnar-Zapolski,
Bursevic, Kacanovic; educators, lawyers, medical doctors, engineers,
and other professional men. These were followed by scores of the Bela-
russian intelligentsia returning from Latvia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia,
Germany, and other countries of exile. Admittedly, the Belorussian
capital had never known such a concentration of the national elite as it
now enjoyed under the Soviets in the years 1925-1929.
Although they assumed a Soviet personality, the returning citizens
did not renounce their democratic political ideal. Indeed, employing all
available legal devices to counter Communist indoctrination of the
masses, they wasted no time in adapting to their own ends the circum-
stances over which, in fact, they had no control. Wherever they could,
they used the state might and the state treasury to force Belorussifica-
tion upon all phases of life, public and private, instilling in the fatalistic
and self-doubting people a new belief in their superior character and
destiny. The Belorussian literary standard, moving farther away from
the Russian, was broadened and systematized; large dictionaries of
technical terms were compiled to bring Belorussian science up to the in-
ternationallevel; new institutions of higher learning and research were
opened; reading rooms and libraries were flooded with translations
from foreign languages, and with original works by Belorussian writers
and scholars, occasionally with casual references to Marxism-Leninism
and, more often, without them. "In these years," says one historian,
"the Belorussian culture, though Socialist in form, was unqualifiedly
nationalist in content." 16
The Purges
In the meantime, the Kremlin had been shifting its guns. The faith
in an immediately impending world revolution had vanished. Instead,
a program of building "Socialism in One Country" was promoted,
making the don1estic unity and external safety of the USSR the prime
concern of the Communist Party. No longer could the Soviet boat
carry Communism and nationalism to their respective destinations, but
it now had to be steered to one ultimate goal, all hands on deck. After
having passed up the "revolutionary situation in Poland," Belorussian
nationalism had lost its propaganda value. Its further growth on the

146 BELORUSSIA: THE MAIGING OF A NATION
domestic scene could bring the Soviet Union nothing but trouble. In-
deed, the first Five Year Plan inaugurated in 1928 had already met
with resistance from the Belorussian leadership, and brought it into
open conflict with the Soviets. A similar situation had been develop-
ing in other national republics.
For the Kremlin, a purge of nationalist elements had now become
a matter of life and death. The blow was dealt with the usual Soviet
ruthless efficacy. By the fall of 1929, the whole Belorussian nationalist
leadership found itself behind prison walls. For several months, the
country had been the scene of the wholesale elimination of all oppo-
nents, actual or potential, of the new Stalin policy. No legal procedure
of justice was observed. "Thousands of scholars, writers, teachers, state
officials, even students, were arrested, deported, or liquidated in jail." 17
The available data are scant. The police operated in secrecy and,
twenty years later, there still is no way of knowing how many people
were arrested and how many were deported or liquidated. In most
cases, the fact that a certain person had vanished from the scene is
the only controllable evidence. The historian looks in vain for docu-
mentary proof. Yet, testimonies abound that the wholesale purge
which began in 1929 and continued far into 1933 was immeasurably
n10re ruthless than anything the Belorussian nationalists had ever ex-
perienced in Poland.
Hardest hit were those who had returned from political exile upon
Soviet invitation. The former deputies to the Polish Sejm, Dvarcanin
and Haurylik, who had barely lived through the beating by the Polish
police, were now shot as "Polish spies." Rumors spread that Rak-
Michajlouski was l{illed by guards on his way to jail. P. Miatla, who
upon his arrival from Poland was appointed director of the western
division of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences, was exiled to the
Solovki labor camp on the White Sea, where he died in 1938. President
of the Academy of Sciences, B. Taraskevic, another refugee from
Poland, was first taken to Moscow, then exiled to the Russian north. 18
Bursevic, Valosyn, Valynec, Kacanovic, and all other former members
of the Workers' and Peasants' Hramada and of the revolutionary club
Zmahan'ne in Poland were arrested and in one way or another "re-
moved from circulation."
Former Prime Minister Lastouski, then Permanent Secretary of the
Belorussian Academy of Sciences, and former Minister Cvikevic, then
president of the Belorussian Red Cross, died in prison. The fate of
other leaders of the former BNR is not known - but they have never
been heard from since that time. Dovnar-Zapolski, the founder of the
Belorussian nationalist doctrine, was sent to a concentration camp
where he died a few years later, though the details are not known.
Ihnatousl{i, the moving spirit behind the Academy of Sciences and

EAST BELORUSSIA 147
the State University, on whose textbooks a whole generation had been
brought up, comJ!1itted suicide rather than face the platoon of execu-
tioners. 1o Janka Kupala, on wholn only a few years before the title
of "People's Writer" had been conferred by the Soviet Government,
stabbed himself in the ston1ach to escape arrest and deportation. Also
arrested were Piceta, president of the State University; Lesil{ and
Nel{rasevic, who planned Belorussian education on the national level;
prominent scholars, teachers, writers, artists, and hundreds of stu-
dents. 2o
The purge followed the pattern which has since become only too
well known. The arrested were accused of "bourgeois nationalism,"
otherwise described as a "nationalist democratic n1enace" (nacde-
movscyna), or "driveling intelligentsia nationalism," in the Soviet
press. They were branded "enemies of the people," "spies of a foreign
power," and "secret agents of world capitalism and of world reaction."
The victims of course all "confessed" their "crimes against the people,"
and the Belorussian Soviet governn1ent announced a mammoth "public
trial." For reasons that have remained unknown the show was called
off, and "the traitors" were liquidated under the cloak of secrecy and
silence.
Presently, all the prominent survivors, even the least important
protagonists, of the Adradzen'ne period had been removed from the
Belorussian scene. 21
The Reorientation oj Belorussian Culture
It seemed as though the Kremlin had purposefully gathered all
nationalist leadership together in Minsl{ to do away with it at once.
This was, however, only the first installment of what was in store for
the Belorussian national cause. 22
The old leadership was destroyed, but the national framework of
the Republic had been wisely left intact. It had only to be furnished
with a new personnel, and Belorussian life and culture oriented in
a new direction. The direction was given in Stalin's own words: "Na-
tionalist in form, Socialist in content." Admittedly, there were enough
native Belorussians to carry the order through, and their ranks were
further increased with the "repented," "reformed," and "redeemed"
nationalists. Anything that bore the traces of "bourgeois nationalism"
was to be eradicated, even historical monuments and findings of schol-
ar ly research.
The Belorussian newspapers Saveckaja Belarus' (Soviet Belorussia)
and Belatuskaja Veska (Belorussian Village); periodicals Uzvyssa
(Excelsior), Belarus' [(alchaznaja (Belorussia Collectivized), Polymia
(Flame), Viasna (Spring), Maladniak (Youth), Nas [(raj (Our Coun-
try), in spite of their allegedly Marxist-Leninist line, were suspended

14 8 BELORUSSIA,' THE IJ1AI(ING OF A NATION
and their files destroyed. Libraries, museums, reading rooms, educa-
tional centers, and state archives were depleted. Schools were to go
without textbooks for some time, since the use of old manuals was
prohibited, and the new ones had not yet been compiled. How wide
the scope of "cultural cleaning" was on may see from a list of printed
works and manuscripts removed from stacks, burned, or sent to paper
mills, in 1930:
(a) All books printed in Western Belorussia; (b) the works of Dovnar-
Zapolski, Ihnatouski, and other nationalist scholars; (c) the poetry of Ales'
Harun; (d) collections of folklore compiled by A. Serzputovski; (e) dic-
tionaries of the Vitebsk, Cervency, Mozyr, and other local dialects; (I)
articles written on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of the Belorussian
print (1525-1925); (g) proceedings of the First Belorussian Convention of
archeologists and paleographers, and of the Humanities Section of the Acad-
emy of Sciences (classes of philology, history, ethnography, archeology, fine
arts, and con1mon law); (h) files of the Bela1'uski Archiv (Belorussian
Archives), an academic publication of documents; (i) new Belorussian ter-
minological dictionaries; (j) certain files of Belorussian bibliography. . .23
Anything in literature, the arts, and the sciences that emphasized
the unique destiny of the Belorussian people was earmarl{ed for
liquidation. The relics of St. Euphrosyne, a national symbol, were
taken from Polocl{ and put in an "anti-religious museum" in Vitebsk.
The historical St. Sophia cathedral in Polock was turned into a store-
house. The famous Boris Rocks, the earliest monument of Belorussian
history, were to be blown up to make way for a new highway to Moscow
(1937). The use of the name [(ryvici was prohibited. Pictures of
Skoryna and Kalinouski were removed from public buildings (1931),
and orders were given to rewrite Belorussian history, emphasizing the
common development of the family of nations now forming the Soviet
Union.
These were the years of the First Five Year Plan, and of continu-
ous unrest and revolt among the peasantry resisting collectivization of
agriculture. Having cleaned the city of ('the driveling intelligentsia,"
the Communist Party now could and did strike against the village,
and by 1933 collectivization of farming was virtually completed. 24
New Purges
The horrors of forcible collectivization and famine, and the social
disturbances that resulted from the mass deportations and executions,
engendered a movement in all the national republics of the Union which,
had it occurred now, would perhaps have been described as Titoism.
The Ukrainian Communist Party and the government of the Ukrainian
SSR were accused of "nationalist conspiracy," and drastically purged.
The purge was extended to Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaidzhan, Tur-

EAST BELORUSSIA 149
kestan, and other lands. Evidence soon appeared that a considerable
undercover opposition also existed in the midst of Belorussian Com-
munism.
A large number of Belorussian Communists had then1selves been
farmers, and n1any had been part of the rank and file in the «national
revival" movement before they embraced the Leninist-Stalinist creed.
For many, personal losses and sentimental attachn1ents made their
loyalties divided. The Kremlin realistically kept the position of the
Secretary General of the Belorussian ComlTIunist Party in the hands
of men of non-Belorussian origin, and responsible positions were held
by veterans of the November Revolution and the Civil V\Tar \vho could
not speak Belorussian. Apparently the rule was never to have Belo-
russians supervising Belorussians but to send them to head the NKVD
in other parts of the USSR. Likewise, the commander of the Belo-
russian Military Area (okrug) "was never a Belorussian, and all ranks
higher than commander of a battalion were held by non-Belorus-
sians." 25
Yet even the top Party n1embers now became contaminated with
the undercurrents of nationalism. Already in 1930, the loyalties of the
People's Comn1issar of Agriculture Pryscepau, his Deputy Commissar
Ales' Adan10vic, and the People's Comn1issar of Education Balicl{i were
suspected. All three were removed. Then Party Secretary Saran-
govic was shot as a "Polish spy." President of the Council of People's
Commissars Haladzed, who himself directed the previous purge, was
arrested and liquidated. Zylunovic, nominal president of the BSSR,
was imprisoned and, while awaiting his trial, "died in an asylum for
the insane." The former president and real founder of Soviet Belo-
russia, A. Carviakou, shot himself to avoid torture and shameful "con-
fession. "
As in 1929-3°, the personnel in charge of cultural activities was
hit the hardest. Among the first liquidated were D. Carnusevic, director
of the Linguistic Institute of the Academy of Sciences and former mem-
ber of the Belorussian Politburo; A. Hurlo, director of the Institute of
National Economy; Liascinski, Deputy People's Commissar of Educa-
tion; Zinkovic, director of the Institute for Retraining Soviet Edu-
cators; Slaukovic and Laurynovic, directors of the People's Commis-
sariat of Education; Volfson and Vydra, directors of the Institute of
Philosophy. The purge continued for several years, and only the Krem-
lin records can tell the full range of Party mobility at that period. In
193 6 , the new Secretary General, Valkovic, announced that 15.4 per
cent of the members and 20.5 per cent of the candidates had been ex-
pelled from the Party that year, in addition to 17 per cent of the mem-
bership which had been purged three years before. Complete data are
lacking, but the purge must have been wider than indicated if it was

150 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
true that "188 out of 191 party clubs were censored in Vitebsk province,
and 109 out of 143 in Gomel province." 26 In fact, the composition of
the Central Committee of the Party and of the Council of People's
Commissars had been entirely changed, and new men had been placed
at the head of the provincial administration and the leading cultural
institutions of the republic. They did not remain for long, however.
More purges were ordered in connection with the Moscow trials of
1937-38 and hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Party officials who had
replaced the recently liquidated were liquidated in turn. The Party
organizations, down to the smallest village cell, were again pruned
of members whose Communist loyalty was to any degree suspected.
Of the former protagonists of Belorussian nationalism - with the
exception of Janka Kupala, Jakub Kolas, and a dozen writers and
scholars whose talents the Kremlin could use - not a single n1an who
had labored for the establishment of the Belorussian Home under the
Soviets was alive or free in 1939. 27
The Stalinization of Nationalism
Unlike the Poles, the Soviets had been up against men, and not
against symbols of Belorussianism. The uncongenial personnel was
eliminated, but great care was taken to preserve Belorussian establish-
ments while filling them with new content. The offices were being handed
over to the younger generation, ideologically conditioned in the Soviet
mixer. Unbelievers and waverers had been rooted out from their ranks.
The idealism and senthnentalism of their fathers were scorned, intellec-
tualism condemned. The practical problems of survival prevailed, and
the Soviet form of nationalism was accepted as "the most progressive
and scientifically vindicated." The people were n1ade to believe that
the country was offered "a system of state organization in which the
national problems and the problem of cooperation among nations have
been solved more perfectly than in any other multinational state"
(Stalin) .
The constant menace of "capitalist encirclement and aggression"
called for economic and cultural cooperation with all the Soviet re-
publics. Talents and energies were oriented in nonideological direc-
tions. Planning had been introduced into all branches of social and
cultural life. To the ambitious youth it was clear that the future of
the country lay in association with, not in isolation from, other nations
of the Union. Accepting their loyalties, the Kremlin realistically made
a few more symbolic concessions to satisfy their idiosyncrasies and
pride.
Following the pattern laid down by Moscow in 1934, Belorussian
literature, theater, music, and the fine arts were centralized into unions,
each under the direction of a Party delegate. Union membership con-

EAST BELORUSSIA ISI
fer red a status without which no writer could publish, no artist could
exhibit, no composer could produce his work. The unions met several
times a year to' plan their activities in the spirit of "socialist realism."
New names came to the fore, each being glorified in the press as a new
Belorussian genius apt "to make all the Tolstoys and all the Dosto-
yevslis look sick." 28 A few old hands, Kolas, Biadulia, Krapiva, and
Samujlenak, had been drawn into the Party to demonstrate the con-
tinuity of Belorussian culture, and Kupala was made president of the
Union of Writers, although the press complained that ,he was "writing
little lately, concentrating mostly on translations from foreign lan-
guages." Little though he wrote, he found time to compose an ode en-
titled: "My Best Song Be about Stalin." 29
A State Symphony Orchestra with five divisions was founded to
entertain the people. In Minsk alone, fifty dramatic clubs were engaged
in amateur theatricals. Clubs collecting folklore, or exploring national
resources, or engaging in literary, theatrical, musical, and sports activi-
ties, mushroomed over the country. They were taking the youth away
from "idle talking," making them believe that they also were engaged
in "nationally and socially useful work . . ." The state appropriations
for socio-cultural activi ties had increased "nineteen times since 19 28 ." 80
"In 1939," we read, "70.3 per cent of the national budget went toward
socio-cultural needs of the country (609 n1illion rubles for education,
250 million for public health, 48 million for social security . . .). The
state supported and managed twenty-three institutions of higher learn-
ing, twenty-nine research institutes, and twelve theaters. . . In 1939,
there were 97 technical and high schools with 33,300 students, as
against only 16 such schools and 2,300 students in 19I4. . . The
Tsarist government had been spending approximately 60 kopel{s per
capita on education, and the Belorussian Soviet Government, 116
rubles. There were 1, I 84,000 children in the 7,084 Belorussian grade
schools. . . Education has become universal, and illiteracy liqui-
dated" 31
No less spectacular were the achievements of the rural economy
We are told that "838,000 individual farms have been organized into
9,650 kolkhozes which cover 97 per cent [sic] of the total sown area
of the republic. . . This year [1939], about 9,000 tractors, 4,000
trucks, over 1,000 combines, and thousands of other agricultural ma-
chines are working in the Belorussian fields. . . Last year, the gov-
ernment invested 42,942,000 rubles in national agriculture" (N atale-
vie). "The kolkhozes now occupy 90 per cent [sic] of the sown area
of the republic. . . Each kolkhoznil{ owns a cow. . . A prominent
place is given to the cultivation of industrial crops such as flax and
hemp. Orchards are planned, and the raising of fowls has received
increasing attention from the government" (Liubie-Maevski).

15 2 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
"In 1937, the national income of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic was two billion rubles, or four hundred rubles per capita. . .
Last year [1938], 66,072,000 rubles and this year 78,000,635 rubles
were invested in national industry by the government. . . 35 6 new
enterprises have been put into operatio. . . 200,000 workers are em-
ployed by the larger industrial plants alone, as compared with the
total of 13,000 workers in 1914. . . Belorussia has now become an in-
dustrial-agrarian republic" (N atalevic) .
And the city of Minsk? "Its entire appearance has changed. From
early morning late into the night, the new ten-story Government build-
ing is booming with feverish activity. . . Crowds pour along Lenin
Street, from which motor traffic is excluded; this is a great shopping
center now. . . The Red Arlny Hall is an example of architectural
beauty and perfection. And so are the new quarters of the Central
Con1mittee of the Communist Party, and the National Library. . . The
new editorial offices of Belorussian newspapers, the Academy of Sci-
ences, the State University, the National Conservatory, scientific in-
stitutes and learned societies, drama theaters, a children's theater,
opera and ballet houses, stand today in the city which was not so long
ago a poor provincial town. . . Modern buildings are replacing anti-
quated ones. After two or three years, there will be nothing old left. . .
The former Kon1arov wood is a beautiful parl{ now, and there the new
Pushkin Avenue begins. The Poly technical Institute, a university clinic,
laboratories of the Academy of Sciences, the State Publishing House,
and a number of apartment houses have been built here. The Belo-
russian national motion picture industry also will be located in this
section, not far from fields of rye and wheat." 32
The changes, if true, were miraculous. But the official pictures
represented separate buildings, sometimes very beautiful indeed, with
a carefully eliminated background. Only a few years before, a Soviet
source had stated that most of the peasantry lived "in log huts
thatched with straw, and often without a chimney or windowpanes." 33
New highways had been built, but a Soviet official reported that he
ruined his car on them. 34 We might quote Eudocio Ravines, a member
of the Comintern, who visited Minsk in 1934: "Minsl{ has not changed
since 1929 - rags, misery, vagabonds, thieves, the people badly dressed
and shod even worse. And yet the literature that I received during these
years boasted of the success of the Five Year Plans, the socialization
of more than 87 per cent of the Soviet economy, and the removal of
restrictions on food and clothing." 35
A new Belorussian privileged class, however small it may have
been, grew up, enjoying the benefits of "socialism in construction."
Welfare lay in joining the Communist Party and many sought it, if for
no other reason than that.

EAST BELORUSSIA
153
R 'us si fication
After the purge of 1929-3°, a new linguistic policy was inaugurated
in order to bring the national idiom close to the Russian standard
(1934).36 Dictionaries were revised, obvious archaisms and localisms
eliminated, and recent borrowings from the '""I estern languages re-
placed with corresponding loan-words from the Russian. But there
were not many competent scholars left to tackle the problem and, in
1938, the Moscow press (Pravda, May II) called attention to the
fact that the Belorussian language still was "littered with Polonisn1s
of all sorts." The Kremlin invited the Belorussian Acaden1Y of Sciences
to speed up the reform, and the Belorussian writers to cooperate.
Special committees were formed under the chairmanships of Janka
Kupala and J akub Kolas, and the first manuals in the new series ap-
peared in the following year, turning Belorussian spelling, morphology,
and syntax in the direction indicated. 37 The use of local vernaculars in
literature was restricted; attempts to introduce the ,,\T est Belorussian
vocabulary and spelling were declared ((subversive" and strictly pro-
hibi ted.
In the meantime, the output of Belorussian printing had increased
seven times as compared with the highest tide in 1928; seventy-four
times higher than in 1913. One hundred and forty-nine newspapers
now were published in Belorussian, and forty-eight in the Russian
language, while hardly any were appearing in Yiddish or Polish. Four
hundred and sixty-two Belorussian books, with a total circulation of
14,700,000 copies, were printed in 1938, and 600 in 1939. Of those
published in 1939, however, all except sixteen were translations fron1
the Russian. s8
Curiously enough, the Russian language was not made con1pulsory
in Belorussian schools until 1938. The I(remlin was slow to realize
that a new generation had been growing up in the Soviet republics
with no speaking knowledge of the federal language. Indeed, no Rus-
sian textbooks for non-Russian schools had been prepared and teachers
of Russian, where there were any, often would make "six gran1111atical
errors in only three Russian words." Russian literacy among the
peoples of the Soviet Union had fallen below the level of the Tsarist
time and, indeed, "years of intensive schooling will be necessary to
repair the damage resulting from the incorrect and unpatriotic atti-
tude toward the Russian language since the Revolution." 39
The mistake was corrected with customary Soviet vigor and frenzy.
On March 13, 1938, a decree of the USSR made "the study of the
Russian language obligatory in schools of all the national republics
and regions." The cOlnmissars of education were instructed "to com-
pile and to publish, before the beginning of the next school year, Rus-

154 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
sian primers, readers, and grammars, taking into practical considera-
tion the natural difficulties of individual nationalities in learning Rus-
sian, such as peculiarities of the native speech, local environment, cus-
toms, etc." 40
The order meant that, by September I, within five months, text-
books and equipment had to be prepared, Russian teachers trained,
for eight thousand Belorussian schools I 41 The Belorussian People's
Commissar of Education himself had no adequate schooling in Russian.
There were no teachers at hand, nor could they have been sent over
from the USSR at that time. The Central Committee of the Belorussian
Communist Party decided to appoint all available Party members
who could speak Russian to teaching positions. There were not enough
and, in most cases, instruction in the Russian language, history, and
literature had to be temporarily entrusted to Red Army officers of the
local garrisons. In the following year, a large number of native Rus-
sian instructors were imported, textbooks were printed, and East Belo-
russia moved toward more complete integration into the general Soviet
pattern.
The plan had not been completed when, in the fall of 1939, the
incorporation of West Belorussia into the republic raised new problems.

1 1
THE REUNION
In the course of the twenty years of separation of the two Belo-
russias, the degree of unity achieved before partition was lost. A new
generation had grown up in two cultures, developing independently
in Vilna and in Minsk. With Polonization on one hand and Russifica-
tion on the other, the two centers came to differ widely in their Ian..
guage, literary standards, and education generally, drawing further
apart every year. 1 In the western part, a free economy continued its
traditional path, and the social class structure ren1ained more or less
the same. Meanwhile, in the eastern part, all economy had become
subject to state planning and regimentation, and the private sectors
reduced to proportions never known before. Theoretically, economic
security minus freedom, in the ea$t, contrasted with freedom minus
security, in the west. Although, in fact, there was not much of each
on either side of the border, the people were confronted with problems
of adjustment and survival substantially different in their every day
practical aspects.
The nationalist ideology had assumed two different aspects: politi..
cal, in Vilna; historico-ethnological, in Minsk, though both were soon
defeated. In the west, Belorussianism lost its institutions but saved its
leadership - a wandering spirit in search of a body. In the east, the
spirit was captured and the body placed in an iron lung; the old banner
of independence fluttered over it, but it was in the hands of men whose
first loyalties were for other than their own homeland. On both sides
the people were dispirited and silent, and the nation seemed hopelessly
split - when all at once it found itself reunited as suddenly as it had
been partitioned a generation before.
Partition IV of Poland
On September I, 1939, the German armies invaded Poland. Before
they had reached the Bug River, the Soviets also moved into Poland
"to protect the lives and property of the people of Western Belorussia

156 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
and Western Ukraina" (September 1 7 ). The Poles were confused,
now greeting the Soviet armies as their allies, now resisting them as
the allies of the Germans. 2 Some days later, on September 28, the entire
territory of Poland was divided between the Gern1an Reich and the
USSR. The Soviets received "one-half of Poland's entire territory and
almost two-fifths of her population." 8 With the exception of a wedge
in the Bialystok-Lomza region, the Soviet-German demarcation line
followed, in generally, the Curzon line suggested in 1920 by the Great
Powers as a permanent Polish-Soviet border.
Whether the Soviet occupation was motivated by the desire "to
liberate their blood brothers from Polish national oppression" 4 or to
protect them from German domination is unessential. The Soviet press
has since acknowledged the fact that the USSR "only recuperated
such non-Polish territories as were torn away by Poland in the war
of 1920-2 I, and before." As a matter of historical record, the Soviet-
German agreement actually did restore the northwest boundary of
1795. 5
The Soviet-German partition of Poland is viewed differently by
various historians and it is not the intention of this writer to enter the
debate. To the Belorussians, at any rate, it meant the restoration of
their own territorial integrity long disrupted by wars and revolution.
They could feel that their country was a full-sized nation at last.
Quarrels were forgotten, all problems seen1ed solved. The Soviet press
was flooded with descriptions of mass enthusiasm in West Belorussia
and the picture, overdrawn though it may appear, was not entirely in-
correct. People naturally rejoiced at seeing their land and kin reunited,
their dignity and freedom apparently restored. Polish speech disap-
peared. The radio, loudspeakers, newspapers, posters, and leaflets
spoke in the native idiom, sparing no promises, fostering the people's
hope and new faith in the future. Villages were decorated with garlands
and flags. The liberators, in accordance with an old custom, were
offered bread and salt in the streets. "The century-old dream had come
true" (J. Kupala), and, in the excitement of the moment, the Seven-
teenth of September was declared a national holiday.
Except for the relatively small groups of citizens who knew that
there would be no room for them in the Soviet realm, people seemed to
have no fear of Communism. Embittered outcasts that Poland had
made of them, they thought that nothing could be worse than the life
they had suffered under the Polish rule. 6 Those who were skeptical
kept silent, and some who felt they knew what was going to happen
fled to the German zone or to Lithuania. Others, particularly the Polish
and Jewish communities, remained either because they had no chance
or no time to escape or because, anti-Communist though they were,
they still preferred Soviet to German domination. The Second World

THE REUNION 157
War had just begun, the world political map was being remade again,
and whatever power might arise locally seemed temporal indeed. In
the meantime, the Soviet occupation might save the people and their
homes from the German fury. Wishful thinking made more palatable
the incongruities of the moment, and for the moment at least, the
good .will of most of the populace was assured to the occupants.
The Incorporation of West Belorussia
The Kremlin sized up the situation very well, and was wise enough
not to introduce at once into \iV est Belorussia the policies it had carried
out at home. During the first weeks of occupation, the situation was
handled with unusual subtlety and skill. Civil authority did not closely
follow the Red armies, and the military, as a rule, did not interfere
with local affairs. Elections were coming up and the people were told
that they were free to decide their own future. The Polish administra-
tion continued unmolested in son1e places, and in others it was replaced
by provisional town committees which emerged from the people. After
a week or two, these were reinforced with "instructors" from Soviet
Belorussia.
A certain number of Polish officials, field gendarmerie, osadnicy,
large landowners, prominent businessmen, clergymen, and some mem-
bers of the Polish political parties, the Jewish Bund, and a few anti-
Soviet clubs were arrested. But, in most cases, the arrests were made
by the local, not the Soviet, police, and often the arrested men were
released by order of the higher Soviet authority, who were playing a
nationalist game. 7 The West Belorussian leaders were invited to take
part in the election campaign. Luckevic was appointed technical ad-
viser to the provisional administration in Vilna. Other Polish collabora-
tionists, uhadoucy, were likewise treated with deference and respect,
even permitted certain freedom of speech, travel, and public activity.
Janka Kupala and Jak.ub Kolas, whose personal prestige had remained
great in West Belorussia, were dispatched from Minsk. to stir up the
national feelings of the people. . . This all served to create friendli-
ness toward the occupation power.
On October 6, the Soviet Military Command announced that gen-
eral elections to a National Assembly of West Belorussia would take
place on October 22, based on the universal, equal, direct, and secret
ballot. Franchise was granted to "all men and women over eighteen
years of age, irrespective of race, nationality, faith, education, prop-
erty rights, or former political affiliations and activities." The elections
were to be run on the basis of a single ticl{et. Consequently, nomina-
tion committees were appointed in all the towns and villages by the
local assemblies of workers, peasants, the intelligentsia, and the Work-
ers' Guard hastily organized by Soviet instructors. The occupation

158 BELORUSSIA: THE IJ1.AI(ING OF A NATION
army was ordered to cooperate closely with the population. The cam-
paign was directed by the Committee of Supervision formed at Bialy-
stok and, to many, it seemed only natural as a matter of gratitude and
hospitality to include among the committee members the two highest
officials of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Natalevic and
Hrekau, three Red Army commanders (Gajsin, Markeev, Spasov),
and a few other Soviet citizens not all of whom were native Belo-
russians. s
West Belorussians were not, however, permitted to communicate
with their brothers behind the curtain, from whence came masses of
propaganda - trainloads of literature, posters, exhibits, and com-
panies of entertainers. They were supported by "the thousands of Red
Army men" who also were engaged in "intensive political activity
among the populace." 9 Propaganda was seasoned with salt, k.erosene,
tobacco, matches, and other badly needed commodities, imported from
the Soviet Union to encourage the people to vote for incorporation into
the happy and bountiful Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.
The people were completely isolated from the outside world and
sold on the illusion that, after the incorporation, the united Belorussian
people would at last be able freely to conduct their own affairs. On
the day of elections, a tren1endous effort was made by local authorities
to drive the entire electorate to the polls. Where persuasion and allure-
ment proved ineffective, coercion was used. According to the official
data, 2,672,280 persons, that is, 96.71 per cent of the West Belorussian
electorate, cast their vote. Of that number, 2,409,522 voted for the
"national ticket," and 247,245 against it, while 14,93 2 ballots were
disallowed for technical errors. In all, 927 representatives to the
National Assembly were elected, 804 of them men and 123 of them
women - one delegate for every 5,000 inhabitants of West Belo-
russia. 10
On October 28, after only five weeks of Soviet occupation, the
National Assembly convened in Bialystok and decided unanimously
to demand the incorporation of Western Belorussia into the BSSR.
The delegates were at once dispatched to Moscow to present the popu-
lar demand to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. There, everything had
already been prepared for their reception. On November 2, "the Extra-
ordinary Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR acceded to
the request of the masses of the people of '¥ est Belorussia, and ac-
cepted them into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." 11 The Act
of Incorporation, published on November 4, made East and West
Belorussia into a single state and the Belorussian Constitution was
amended to guarantee its territorial integrity, national status, and
sovereignty within the Soviet Union. 12

THE REUNION
159
The Adjustment Period
The marriage was celebrated, but not immediately consummated.
Grave problems indeed had to be solved before the parties could be
allowed to begin a common life, that is, before the bride could be taken
into he Soviet family to abide by its laws and customs.
In the first place, it was learned somewhat belatedly that the USSR
had handed over to Lithuania the citYt of Vilna and adjacent lands-
2,750 square n1iles with a population of 457,5°0. The Act, alienating
a territory which the West Belorussians considered their own, granted
the Soviet Union the right to establish army, navy, and air bases in
Lithuania. If not denounced at the end of fifteen years, the pact was
to run for twenty-five years. Signed on October 10, it was to become
effective October 27, and its publication was withheld until after the
elections to the National Assembly of vVest Belorussia. 13 It was too
late, and to no avail, to protest. At the Extraordinary Fifth Session
of the Supreme Soviet accepting West Belorussia into the BSSR Molo-
tov coated the pill with the following words: "The Vilna territory
belongs to Lithuania not by reason of population. No, we l{now that
the majority of population in that region is not Lithuanian. 14 But the
historical past and the aspirations of the Lithuanian nation have been
intimately connected with the city of Vilna, and the Government of
the USSR considered it necessary to honor these moral factors." 15
Belorussia was reminded that by the treaty with Lithuania, signed on
July 12, 1920, Moscow had renounced the territory of Vilna in favor
of Lithuania. "The word of the Soviets is inviolate; once a promise
has been made, it is faithfully fulfilled," declared the Soviet press.
Besides, it was pointed out, "the present Soviet-Lithuanian agreement
guaranteeing the safety of the northwestern boundary of the Soviet
Union has strengthened greatly our position in eastern Europe." 10
As compensation, the Belorussians received the Ostrow-Lomza-
Grajewo area west of Bialystol{ where the majority of the population
was unquestionably Polish. They could not foresee, of course, that the
region they were granted, with the city of Bialystok in addition, would
be returned to Poland in 1945. At any rate, from the East Belorussian
point of view, the situation was handled satisfactorily. The republic
obtained 34,000 square miles of former Polish territory with approxi-
mately 4,700,000 inhabitants and, thus, was nearly doubled in size.
Even the loss of Vilna, the old rival of Minsk, seemed to mal{e the
domestic situation easier.
The annexed territory included large groups of non-Belorussians.
Of the fifty-eight candidates in the elections to the Suprelne Soviet in
March 1940, only thirty were Belorussian, sixteen were Polish, six
were Russian, and two were Jewish. Presuming that their distribution

160 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
by nationality was representative of the country as a whole, the pro-
portion of non-Belorussian residents would be 40 per cent of the total
population. Since there was no proportional ballot, the estimate may
not be correct. In fact, the real figure must be even higher, since it is
hard to see why the non-Belorussians, particularly the Polish residents,
should represent the Belorussians in a situation where the opposite
would be more logical to expect. 17 No exact information exists, but it is
certain that the problem of minorities assumed new, and not the most
convenient, proportions in the BSSR.
In accordance with the Soviet Constitution, the minority groups
were granted equal status with the Belorussians and a certain "cultural
autonomy" in conducting their own affairs. Thus, 932 Polish schools,
a Polish theater, and a score of Polish clubs were sanctioned. A daily,
Standart W olnosci (The Banner of Freedom), and even a magazine
for children in Minsk, were published in Polish. There also were
schools for other nationalities, and several state-supported newspapers
and periodicals appeared in Russian, Ukrainian, and Yiddish. 18 At the
same time, the last vestiges of Polish administration were drastically
removed. To the native, this seemed natural enough and no one appar-
ently cared to know what happened to former civil servants, judges,
and magistrates. It was not immediately realized that these were not
only removed as persons, but eliminated as a social group including
families, close relatives, and friends. The Polish colonists, osadnicy,
also were liquidated as a group, although many had become Belorussian
themselves, and their children could speak Polish no longer. "Yet they
all were treated as qualified enemies, very much as the Gestapo was
to treat the Jews: in the severe winter, we saw Polish women, locked
in freight cars without heat or food, throw the frozen bodies of their
children through the windows at the feet of the Soviet guards," says a
a witness .19
Somewhat new was the Soviet attitude toward the Jewish popula-
tion whose number had nearly doubled since the incorporation of West
Belorussia. The official use of Yiddish was now limited to the lower
sections of the administration. Cultural and communal clubs were
either disbanded or their activities restricted. For all Soviet Belorussia,
only 2 5 ,000 Jewish children attended schools with Yiddish as the lan-
guage of instruction, as compared with 36,500 in 1933, and out of four
Yiddish newspapers published in 1935, only one appeared in 1939 and
that in Minsk. 20
Germans in the BSSR and Belorussians in the German zone of
occupation were granted the right of option between Soviet and Ger-
man citizenship. By an agreement signed on November 3, a mixed
German-Soviet commission was to be created to supervise the transfer
of populations, and Belorussians who wished to move from the Govern-

THE REUNION
161
ment General (Poland) to Soviet Belorussia were to register before
March 25, 194 1 , at which time the transfer was to be completed. A
similar agreement with Lithuania was concluded on November 7, and
a special Soviet commission arrived in Kaunas to supervise the transfer
of 170,000 Lithuanians from the Svenciany region to Lithuania, and
100,000 Belorussians from Lithuania to Soviet Belorussia. No inforn1a-
tion, however, exists in regard to either the option procedure or the
number of persons who actually availed themslves of the option right
under either plan. 21 Actually, in the German-annexed provinces the
number of Belorussians was negligible and there is evidence that not
many even wished to return to their native land under the Soviets. 22
On August 3, 1940, Lithuania, in turn, was incorporated into the Soviet
Union and the agreement, insofar as it had not been fulfilled before
that time, became void.
Nationalism Revived
After the National Assembly elections, the nationalist leaders of
West Belorussia were invited to Minsk and the few who accepted soon
disappeared from the Belorussian scene. The more prudent, however,
chose to remain in Lithuanian-occupied Vilna.
Talking with Minsk. from a distance, the Vilna group wished to
protect as many of their "cultural attainments" of the past as, under
the circumstances, they could. It was true that General Vitauskas,
entering the region of Vilna with .the Lithuanian troops, addressed the
population in Lithuanian and in Polish, not in Belorussian. But free-
dom was assured to all the natives here irrespective of race and the
Soviets did not at the time seem likely to interfere with Lithuanian
sovereignty. Indeed, there were not a few who were hoping for an
"autonomous Belorussian community" within the Lithuanian state.
Their stand was encouraged by friends who had fled to Germany,
established a "Belorussian Committee" in Berlin, and were preparing
to publish a periodical maintaining the banner of Belorussian free-
dom. 23 Since their activities bore an obvious mark of German endorse-
ment, the Lithuanians felt that the Belorussian issue was not entirely
in Soviet hands. State subsidies were granted to free Belorussian
schools, cooperatives, and publications; and to satisfy the demands of
the Belorussian peasantry, a plan of land reform was carried out with-
out delay.24 Cultural institutions closed down by the Poles reopened,
and some refugees returned from Germany and from Kaunas to tal{e
part in their work.
The Vilna community, however, was already split between the
anti-Russian and pro-Russian trends. With a few personal exceptions,
the Belorussian hierarchy of the Orthodox Church submitted to the
canonical jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Moscow. The Moscow

I62 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
exarch, Metropolitan Eleupherius, removed bishops Theodosius and
Sabbatius, dismissed the rector of the Vilna cathedral, censored the
father superior of the monastery of the Holy Ghost, and divested the
archpriests Dzikouski, 1(0115, and Rahalski as Polish partisans. His
action raised a cry among the faithful for an autonomous Belorussian
church. A part of the clergy, headed by priest Philip Marosai'I, defied
the canonical authority of Eleupherius, and independent services began
in several churches. The Lithuanian press came out in support of the
movement. 25 The conflict extended over Belorussian education, cultural
policies, and methods of developing the literary language. The passion-
ate debate continued through the summer of 1940 when the incorpora-
tion of Lithuania into the USSR made the question academic.
Meanwhile in West Belorussia nationalist activities were under
observation, but not greatly impeded. Municipalities received subsidies
for better school equipment, housing, and public services. Cultural
work was encouraged and assisted. Schools opened where they had
been closed for years or never existed before. 26 But the Soviet Belo-
russian standard was made mandatory in schools and in public print,
and three-week, one-month, and three-month courses in the Russian
language were established for adults. Since there was a shortage of
teachers, "wives of forll1er landowners, wives and daughters of the
clergy, even occasionally a young priest who had shaved his beard,
became teachers - until the first purge." 27 Not until April 1940 were
West Belorussian writers invited to Minsk, where they were for the first
time introduced to the form of Stalinized nationalisll1. Those who
unwarily manifested their disgust were arrested upon their return and
deported. 28 But others were given a time of grace to mold themselves
more completely to the Soviet pattern.
For several months, the economic policy also was loose. The peas-
antry divided the land and livestock of the large estates, and in many
places individual farms thus doubled in size. Farmers turned a deaf
ear to the advantages of collectivization, and the authorities tempo-
rarily curbed the zeal of their agents. In fact, "only forty collective
farms" had been formed by the spring of 1940.29 For the time being,
the Soviet power limited itself to nationalizing banl{s, industry, and
wholesale trade. The confiscated property was Polish, and this did not
bother the Belorussians. Retail trade and handicraft, with which they
were more directly concerned, remained in private hands. Commodities
imported from Russia were distributed among the free cooperatives
and private traders on the condition that they sell at fixed prices.
The boundary between West and East Belorussia remained closed. so
Full accounts of the situation are lacking, but one finds a glimpse
of it in the letters that Belorussians abroad were receiving from their
relatives in the old country at that time:

THE REUNION
16 3
Our life is happy and gay. Everyone has a chance to study in the Soviet
school and I am also studying at a school named Ten Year Plan. We have
six one-hour lessons a day, and the instruction is good. vVe have a different
teacher for each subject, and we study Russian, German, and Belorussian.
It is very pleasant in the Soviet school, and it is a good place to work. I have
been there only two months. ¥le take baths in the bath house, and we are
examined by a doctor once a month. Even civilians are given free medical
care [Village Bolsie Tynevicy, Belsk County, Bialystok] .31
The Russian soldiers have been completely transformed. They no longer
swear. They get along well not only with each other, but with us civilians. . .
They show us movies free of charge and the movies are very good. . . I read
in the newspapers that abroad they say our voting was conducted at the
point of Russian bayonets, but this is not true. There were no soldiers in our
village. The land of the gentry and the church has come into the hands of
the peasants. lVe have not divided it yet. They have begun to teach the
children Russian in the schools and it is also taught in the high schools
[Village Stradec, Brest County, Polesie].
\Ve have a soap factory and a printing press in Luninec. They publish
a wall-bulletin there, and we can read who has done badly and who has done
well. Every village has a small library. We can take out any book we like and
read it for a whole week. . . In Lachva, they have opened a school and a
hospital. People pay no charges. . . Formerly, about two hundred people
worked in the match factory, and now there are eight hundred. Other mills
and factories are now five tilnes larger than they used to be [Village Borsuka,
Luninec County, Polesie] .32
Weare now living under the Soviets. It is good for the soul. . . They
have given the poor people land, horses, and cows. They gave even the priest
in Peretoki 16 acres of land, a horse, and a cow. Our Lord in Heaven, Him-
self, would be jealous [Novo Zaskovicy, Parycy County, Polesie] .33
The emigrant press readily printed testimonies of that sort. Their
authenticity raised few doubts, although their truthworthiness may be
and, in fact, has been questioned. But it was significant that the writers
were all peasants, and their wonder and enthusiasm sounded sincere
indeed. Not without significance also was the fact that, by the summer
of 1940, their letters ceased to arrive. .
Throughout the winter, the process of sovietization had been accel-
erated. The economic attitudes and principles based on trade, and not
production and services, had to be adjusted; this demanded significant
structural changes within the urban society. "More men were coming
from Russia to be billeted in our homes and soon we all knew what
the Soviet term 'condensation of the living space (uPlotnenie)' meant,"
recalls a refugee from Pinsl{. "Like thunder out of a clear sky came
the news of the first arrests: the mayor, a bakery owner, a restaurant
manager. . . What had they done? No one could understand why all

164 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
the city firemen were arrested. . . In January, Polish money was out-
lawed, but no one as yet had Soviet currency. Fortunately, the Soviet
officers were eager to buy anything they could lay their eyes on, and
we were able to sell some of the family jewelry, silverware, a watch." 34
The people were allowed to convert no more than 300 zlotys into
rubles, and savings above that limit were expropriated. Everybody
was thus forced to look for work and accept such work and wages
as were offered by the only employer, the state. An immediate and
universal proletarianization of the city resulted, and wages became the
only source of income. 3 f>
"In February, the business section of the city resembled a ceme-
tery: stores closed, street lights unlit, people afraid to walk at night. . .
At the public market one could sell and buy old watches, dresses, decks
of cards, frying pans, pillows, all kinds of junk which had suddenly
assumed a new value. . . Breadlines appeared." People were ordered
to take out passports and everybody thus becan1e registered with the
Soviet police. Consequently, the person who owned a larger house, or a
store, or a better equipped farm, was deprived of the right to dwell
in the city, and had to move at least six miles outside the city line.
Thus, "more dwelling space became available" and the billeted officials
moved to vacant apartlnents. "The arrests continued. . . In March,
two thousand people were deported, all relatives of the previously
arrested." 36
The rural life, however, went on unchanged for some time. There
was a shortage of manufactured goods, but these had never been plenti-
ful anyway. The West Belorussian peasant was used to depending on
his own farm for everything, and the Soviet hand was not to reach him
before the harvest had been stored.
By the spring of 1940, the city had been thoroughly cleaned of the
"politically incolnpatible," "ideologically unfit," and otherwise "so-
cially dangerous" elements; some were simply liquidated, others were
deported to the USSR, and large numbers were removed to the country-
side where, economically uprooted, they were forced to depend entirely
on the local administration for making a living. Outwardly Belorus-
sian, the city now was in the hands of strangers: "Their grey faces
and the colorless, somewhat empty looks were striking. . . In general,
the natives looked much stronger and healthier and were better dressed
than the newcomers who had invaded West Belorussia." 37 Wherever
they appeared they grimly swept the place like a plague of locusts.
The Purges
In the sumlner, new elections were held in Lithuania, and the
Communist-dominated Diet, on July 21, proclaimed Lithuania a Soviet
Socialist Republic. On August 3, the country was incorporated into the

THE REUNION 165
USSR, and Soviet Lithuania handed Belorussian affairs over to the
Minsk authorities. A purge was ordered and executed without delay.
v
Ulasau, founder of Nasa Niva; Luckevic, forn1er head of the BNR;
Pazniak, managing editor of [(1'ynica; writers Koscevic, Trepka,
Busel, Samojla, and other nationalist leaders were taken to Minsk or
Moscow where some, including Luck.evic, were shot; others, including
v
Ulasau, died in prison; and still others were sent to labor camps or to
jail. No one has heard of them since. 38 Within a few weeks, the last
stronghold of Belorussian nationalism was liquidated.
The few leaders who did manage to escape were offered hospitality
by the Germans, and facilities to continue their work outside the
USSR. The Belorussian Committee (Pl'edstaztnictva) under the chair-
n1anship of engineer Skutka, and a Committee of Mutual Assist-
ance (Samapomac) were organized, and their agencies established in
the principal German and Polish cities. Leadership was assumed by
Hadletlski, Skialenak., Yanka, Stankevic, Astrouski, Hryskevic, Scors,
and a few others who, though representing different political trends,
were now united by the force of events. Besides Ranica, the mouth-
piece of the Christian Democrats (Catholics) in exile, another periodi-
cal, Belaruski Rabotnik (Belorussian Worker) appeared, with a notice-
able leaning toward Nazi ideology.3D The extent of Gern1an support
these groups were enjoying is not exactly known.
In the BSSR, the purges spread from the city to the village. Prac-
tically everyone who had been politically active in the past was re-
moved, and replaced by new recruits to the Communist party. "The
more popular you were, the worse it was for you," says a witness, and
he cites the case of a lawyer sent to a labor camp for eight years:
"He mjght have received a lighter sentence had not a petition in his
favor been signed by three hundred local workers: 'Now we can see
that you really are a dangerous man,' he was told by his judges." 40
Farmers owning more than one horse and more than one cow were
classified as kulaks, and deported "to the distant regions of the Soviet
Union," Others left the village rather than be enrolled in the collective
farms and went to worl{ in new factories and plants. According to
available evidence, in many localities less than one half of the popula-
tion remained to work in the fields. 41
The individual owner-manager and the unsl{illed laborer were liqui-
dated, and only a quaking fringe of artisans outside the planned mass-
production of goods and services was left. By March 1940, among
the fifty-eight candidates for election to the Supreme Soviets of the
USSR and the BSSR, only thirty peasants, twelve industrial workers,
and sixteen former farm hands were represented. 42
With the emphasis on urban industrialization, the revolution gave
no quarter to those who were unable to make the necessary adjust-

166 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
ments. The Jewish population, being engaged in (Cnonproductive activ-
ities," mainly trading and peddling, suffered most.
From cities, they were expelled to towns and villages where they knew
no one and were treated as "displaced persons" by local authorities. . . Of
course, this was better than the ghetto .under Hitler, but the comparison
was still unknown there, and the exile meant catastrophe and broken lives
for many. People were forced to leave their homes without notice, to aban-
don all things they possessed, and to go nobody knew where. The humiliation
and social discrimination that they were subjected to were horrifying. . .
During nights loud with cries of horror and despair, the peaceful inhabitants
were filled with fear of, and disgust for, the authority which waited for dark-
ness to break into private homes, and which treated its victin1s like cattle. 43
The authority wanted to have the place cleared for more rapid and
complete sovietization, and hun1an dignity was denied to "the socially
unattuned" (social'no nesozvucnye).
The Soviet Claims
Along with the repressions, however, went the constructive effort. 44
In the first place, credits up to 100 million rubles were extended to
West Belorussian social, cultural, and educational works, and for road
construction and repairs. Within a year, the Dnieper-Bug canal was
dug, and "hundreds of thousands of acres of swamps were drained and
transformed into fertile fields and meadows." In 1940, the peasantry
received 1,062,530 acres of land expropriated from landlords, Polish
colonists, and kulaks; 45 also appropriated were "over 15,000 horses
and 33,000 cows," admittedly fron1 the san1e sources. Agriculture be-
came n1echanized: (CIOI machine and tractor service stations were
organized, with 1,500 tractors, 2,000 truck.s, and several thousand farm
machines." The policy of caution, first urged in collectivization efforts,
was abandoned. In the spring of 194 1 , there were already 9,619 collec-
tive farms in Belorussia, covering 20,000,000 acres of useful land. Tiny
individual plots of land vanished, giving place to vast fields (Cculti-
vated by more than 10,000 tractors, 1,600 combine harvesters, and
tens of thousands of other agricultural machines."
The Soviet press stated that "rational agriculture and new tech-
nical equipment have increased the yield of wheat five times, potatoes
two times, technical cultures two and one-half times, and fodder three
times." Besides, "the cattle and poultry breeding and beek.eeping have
also considerably increased." To a Moscow correspondent, Belorussia
now presented "an unforgettable picture of the transformation of
nature by man. . . Old Belorussia was a poverty-stricl{en, marshy,
unhappy land. During the years of the Soviet power, it has developed
into a rich, flourishing country. . . The marshes have vanished [sic].

THE REUNION 167
Today in their place may be seen the immense fields of collective and
state farIns." 46
Not less spectacular was the industrial development. Only a few
months after incorporation, the industrial output of West Belorussia
was reported to have increased by 70 per cent. Unemployment was
eliminated. By 1941, 1,700 new enterprises were organized, producing
"machine tools, agricultural Inachinery, aircraft engines, precision in-
struments, pipes, etc." The general output of Belorussian industries
increased 35 times, that of the peat industry 180 times, and electric
power 109 times as cOlnpared with 1913. Important success also was
achieved in the food, leather, textile, shoe, and other branches of pro-
duction. From a consumer the country was turned into a producer
"whose export of agricultural produce exceeded its import." The eco-
nomic gulf which separated the eastern and the western parts of the
country had thus been closed, and Belorussia transformed "into a
country with modern industry and agriculture."
The cultural gulf was also closed. The literary Belorussian standard
had become unified, libraries were purged, and schools supplied with
new textbooks. Literature, the theater, the arts, and the press were
tak.en under direction and control, and "nationalist ideology" was en-
tirely subordinated to Soviet Communist loyalty. Significantly, this
had not been achieved by suppressing old cultural institutions, but
simply by infusing theln with new blood and by increasing their num-
bers under the new leadership. It was claimed that, in 1941, the
BSSR had "more than 13,000 schools attended by 2,500,000 students;
a national Academy of Sciences ramified into a large number of lab-
oratories and research centers; twenty-six institutions of higher learn-
ing, twenty-two scientific research institutes, twenty-three state the-
aters, thousands of libraries and reading rooms, scores of museums, a
philharmonic society, a conservatory and twenty-three schools of
music." A Belorussian movie industry was developed and produced
"outstanding pictures such as (Searchers for Happiness,' (The Baltic
Sailors,' (A Daughter of the Country,' and others"; 197 newspapers
and periodicals were published; "the fine arts flourished." The Union
of Belorussian Writers numbered "hundreds of novelists, publicists,
critics, poets, and playwrights," and the artists, painters, composers,
and musicians were likewise organized. But the Soviet authority had
taken care not only of people's souls but of their bodies as well. It
established 618 polyclinics, 700 lying-in hospitals, 129 clinics for chil-
dren, 326 medical centers, "and a lot of other medical institutions,"
providing "six hospital beds for everyone thousand of the population."
To make it short, Soviet Belorussia boasted of "moving with seven-
league strides along the road of progress followed by the most advanced
democratic peoples of the world." 47

168 BELORUSSIA,' THE lVIAI(ING OF A NATION
The Ideal and the Reality
Soviet reality, however, is something else than statistics, When we
turn to the people for whom the benefits were intended, we find neither
appreciation nor acknowledgment. Their testimonies are limited to per-
sonal experience, of course, Yet they are sufficiently identical to war-
rant certain generalizations. In fact, patched together and cross-
checked, they produce an impressive body of evidence. 48
Information for West Belorussia is abundant. After the incorpora-
tion the conditions of life began rapidly to deteriorate, first in the city,
then in the village. The normal flow of the economy was stopped. Soviet
management, with whatever money and Inanpower were invested in
it, had been unable to facilitate either the production or the distribu-
tion of goods and services. In Pinsk, for example, "during one year
and ten months of Soviet adn1inistration, only one ton of sugar was
delivered, one thousand persons receiving one pound of sugar a piece,
and the city had thirty thousand inhabitants." 4D Shortages of the most
common commodities developed. The enthusiasm of the people for
being reunited gave way to comparisons with the policies of the old
Polish regime, unfavorable to the Soviets,
Unemployment disappeared, but business was poorly organized
and the waste of effort, thne, and money was amazing. "A match fac-
tory in Pinsk," recalls a witness, "increased the number of workers
from 300 to 800, the forn1er director was deported, and fourteen engi-
neers were hired instead, Under the Poles, the director had been paid
4,000 zlotys a month; the fourteen engineers cost the Soviets certainly
more and, to the general surprise, the factory soon stopped production
for want of adequate supplies: no timber in all the woods of Polesie I "
People had not been used to working overtin1e, at night, and on holi-
days, to attending "educational" meetings and conferences after worl{,
to faking enthusiasm for official speeches - and to not getting their
pay on time. The Soviet press emphatically reminded the worker of
the time when he l1ad been "horribly exploited by the Poles who made
him work for 60 zlotys a month." But the Soviets paid him 180 rubles
which was hardly more than 30 prewar zlotys.
The testimonies agree on the fictitious character of most Soviet
achievements, and this was to be confirmed later by the Gerlnan ob-
servers, If, as the Soviet statistics pretend, the industrial and agri-
cultural output increased, "the product must have been going out of
the country at once, since the people saw none of it." Red tape, dis-
order, and mismanagement seemed to be part of the system: "No one
cared for the work to which he was assigned." Many new enterprises
were only nominal. Hospitals and schools were short of trained per-
sonnel, and sometimes lacked the most elementary equipment. "At

THE REUNION I69
first, people laughed, exchanged jokes. . " Noone could believe that
the Soviets would stay long. Great Britain, we trusted, was powerful
and strong, she would restore Poland within its former boundaries. . .
But, by the spring of I94I, terror had frozen the smiles and laughter." 50
The dream of a Belorussian Home was now fulfilled. But the face
of the host was "ugly, cruel, repulsive." The only safety lay in joining
the Communist Party, or in lying low. The peasants who brought milk
and eggs to the city - the only sector of private economy still toler-
ated - spoke to their old customers freely: "For twenty years," they
said, "the Poles tried to make us Polish, and couldn't do it; but the
Soviets have made us feel Polish in two months!" Yet, in I941, "there
still were districts where not a single collective farm existed." 51 But
the peasants could see that the new master was more ruthless and
dangerous than the old, and had a longer hand.
"When I ask n1yself," wrote an observer, "why it is that in a very
short time there remained no advocates of the Soviet system and-
except for an entirely isolated group of men who were like a small
island in the sea - no one who would not like to see a return to the
prewar order, my answer is clear. Not because the prewar order was
so good that we desired no change. Not because we could not live
through a cold and hungry winter. And not because we failed to see
our own good. The true reason is that no one was any longer master
in his own hon1e. Somebody had put a gag in our mouth, and spoken
in our nalne. Somebody had intruded upon our life, and begun to
boss us, and to push us around at his own will. . . We no longer
quarreled and argued since we shared one misfortune: strangers were
in our home, whom no one had invited." 52
The fact that the "strangers" were Belorussians brought little
comfort. The forln of nationalism they imposed upon the country
could not make converts except among a few privileged groups who
benefited from the changes and identified thelnselves with the new
power. Among the most prominent protagonists of Soviet Belorussian
nationalism were Janka Kupala, Jakub Kolas, K. Krapiva, and even
Maxim Tank and his friends of the Vilna group. There were no leaders
abroad who could rival these men in moral authority, prestige, and
talent. The opposition was broken, the discontent neutralized, and the
situation seemed well under control. Presently, it was to meet the test
of a German invasion.

12
THE GERMAN OCCUPATION
At dawn on June 22, 1941, the German armies attacked the Soviet
Union. In about three weeks the entire Belorussian SSR was overrun.
The country was not of course the first victim of the Blitzkrieg, yet
it seems that the Germans hardly ever made an easier conquest. What
exactly happened? Did the Belorussian population resist the invader?
Was the Red Army defeated by superior forces or did it lay down
its arms and surrender? What did the Germans find in the conquered
land?
Two sets of facts conflict with each other. It is well Itnown that
several million Red Army men were captured by the Germans in the
first months of the campaign and that the Soviet casualties for that
period have never been made public by the Kremlin, perhaps precisely
because of their being dramatically out of proportion to the captured
mass. 1 On the other hand, from June 22 to December I, the German
armies lost 743,000 men, or 23 per cent of the invading force esti-
mated at 3,500,000, which could scarcely have occurred if the Red
Army had not been fighting at all. 2 One might perhaps accept the
theory that there were battles fought and lost by the Soviets, as well
as mass surrenders without a battle, although it is not exactly known
what factors actually accounted for the Red Army behavior in each
case. One may wonder whether the truth will ever be known. s
Significant was the fact that the Germans did not treat the Soviet
prisoners of war uniformly, and that not all the Red Army men who
laid down arms considered themselves prisoners of war. The com-
manders set the captured free when their home was behind the Ger-
man front line. Since there was no screening, many non-Belorussians
also availed themselves of the chance of freedom, giving some Belo-
russian town as their birthplace. Furthermore, thousands of Red Army
men surrounded in the forests and swamps abandoned at once their
arms and equipment, changed their uniforms for civilian clothes, and,
settling down in the neighboring villages, returned to peaceful occu-
pations. Their total number cannot be even approximately estimated,

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION 171
but there was hardly a Belorussian hamlet where there were not two
or three, sometimes several score, of those "adopted sons." They did
not actually surrender. They called themselves okruzency,* and the
war was over for them.
As soon as the first German bomb hit the city of Minsk, the Soviet
government crumpled and left the inhabitants to their own devices.
"All higher officials, militia, secret police, even the head of civil de-
fense and his staff, left the city three days before the Gerlnans occu-
pied it. No one even tried to put down fires started by the German
bombs or set by the NKVD agents." The confusion was so great that
"large stocks of provisions and ammunition were abandoned; bags
full of Soviet currency were moved from the State Bank as far as
the stadium and dropped there; what transportation still was avail-
able was grabbed by frenzied Party men trying to save their personal
property, luggage, even furniture, and move it east. . ." 4 Another
witness reported that "about 60 km. from the city a Soviet convoy
in panic shot all the political prisoners evacuated from Minsl{ and
scurried to catch up with the NI<'VD leaders." 5 Even cities and towns
farther removed from the front became the scene of senseless destruc-
tion and massacre "by the Bolshevil{ rats leaving the ship." In Vitebsk,
the city jail was burned, together with two hundred inmates. 6 In other
places, all the criminals who had served more than a two-year term
and all the political prisoners, even those who had not yet been tried,
were shot in haste. 7 East of Borisov, public buildings and private
dwellings were burned down by the NKVD and the Comillunist Youth
agents, "while the defense works and barracks stood and were taken
over by the Germans as soon as they arrived." 8 In larger rural com-
munities, along the highways, agricultural machinery and livestock
were moved away or destroyed, and the population was left "without
means of production, even of subsistence. . ."
This, if anything, was Stalin's "scorched earth" policy. Testimonies
agree that there was no plan and no system in the frenzied destruction.
In many places thousands left, or were forced to leave, their homes:
"with some of their property in shabby bundles, often entirely empty-
handed, they walked along the roads, through the forest and fields,
having no ultimate aim, and knowing not "\vhere they were going." The
damage to the civilian population proved infinitely greater than that
suffered by the Germans, whose advance little was done to stop. The
upheaval subsided gradually and the migrants began to settle down,
some back in their ruined homes, others wherever they could find new
shelter, work. and food. 9
* The \vord ,vould approximate "the surroundees" in English; in other places, they
pretended to have been Soviet slave laborers at the nearby airdromes, hence their nick-
name, aerodrontcy.

172 BELORUSSIA: THE IJ1AI(ING OF A NATION
Most Belorussian cities and towns were abandoned before the Ger-
mans entered them. Minsk and Borisov remained for three days,
Bobruisk for four days, and some other places for over a week., with-
out a government. Whatever the real reasons for it may have been,
the defeat was obvious. In fact, people were not so much impressed by
the superiority of the German war machine as they were by the abysmal
ineptitude and cowardice of the Communist authority. To the natives,
the Soviet rout lool(ed entirely fina1. 10
The Germans found that the population "awaited us with joy, hoping
for protection and order; especially the older generation which had re-
tained a pleasant men10ry of our armies since the occupation of that
country in World War I." 11 General Guderian recalls "the typical pic-
ture of women in the villages who met me with bread, butter, and eggs
on wooden plates, and who wouldn't go until I had tasted some." 12 The
German reports are corroborated by other sources. Almost everywhere
there were groups of people to receive the occupants with flowers and
symbolic offerings of bread and salt, and to greet them as liberators.
These may not have been mass demonstrations, but no trace of hos-
tili ty or anin10si ty could be seen in the population.
Apparently, too many people had lived under such conditions that
they would have welcon1ed any kind of change. The young, still under
the spell of Communist propaganda, stood first in silent bewilder-
ment, and then were the first to seek. worl{ with the occupants. Even
the Jewish populations "who were remarkably badly inforn1ed about
our treatment of the Jews in Germany, or even in Warsaw which after
all was not far away," said a Nazi reporter, "had a sympathetic atti-
tude, believing that we would leave them alone if they worked dili-
gently." It was evident that the people had no regret for the fall of the
Soviet power. The occupants were received as "harbingers of a better
future, even if the spirits were considerably lowered by wartime con-
ditions such as unemployment, destroyed homes, and lack of the most
essential commodities." 13
The "sincere friendliness and eagerness to cooperate" surprised the
Germans, who had expected at best an attitude of passive resistance.
"I believe I can now explain their attitude in the following terms,"
reported a Nazi agent from Borisov:
First, many people feel a current of 'fresh air,' particularly the peasants
who expect dissolution of the collectives. Second, the friendliness may be a
natural trait of the Russian [sic] character and people meet us without fear
and prejudice, since the anti-German propaganda stopped two years ago
[after the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact]. Third, people are tired of Communism;
they keep telling us with disgust how the Commissars emptied the banks,
collected all the valuables they could, and fled in panic to Moscow leaving
practically nothing for those who stayed. Fourth, the reason also may lie in

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION
173
the type of man forn1ed by COllln1unisn1; people do not care under \vhom
they slave as long as they have enough to live 011. "You are people just as we
are, you have to work just as ,ve have to work, so ,vhy should \ve hate you?"
they say. "\Ve do not consider you our enelnies; what the war is all about, we
don't know" - this is the answer they give when we ask them the reason for
their friendliness. 14
There is no disagreement among observers as to the trend of public
opinion in occupied Belorussia. For the people who for a quarter of a
century had suffered from the confusion and distraction of alternate
moments of illusion and despair, the Gern1an-Soviet war was nothing
but a continuation of the Civil War. The new occupants were received
just as so n1any others had been in the past, not as Germans but as
human beings bringing a promise of change. People were not able to
realize that Belorussian history was merely repeating itself.
Military and Civilian Policies
With liberation from the Communist power, the country's economic
and social structure collapsed. Having been deprived of responsibility
for so long, the people were helpless and unable to take over the admin-
istration even on a local level. As soon as the German troops appeared,
the civilians began looting the supply depots, warehouses, stores, and
the homes of the vanished Soviet officials. "Except for some upper in-
telligentsia, everybody took. part in the pillage," 15 including the Ger-
man soldiers. It was n10stly food products that were grabbed up.
There was neither fighting nor bloodshed, and private property suffered
little. People were looting the state, not one another; they "robbed the
robber," they said, and there was a certain order in, and a common
understanding about, distribution of the booty. Often a share was given
to the widows, the old, and the sick.
The Military Command had no difficulties in establishing order,
however. Orders posted on the walls or announced through loud-
spealers were obeyed without resistance or protest. Ortskommandanten
and Feldkommandanten were appointed and, in the name of "Hitler
the Liberator," an appeal was made to Soviet employees to stay in
office until the population had set up its own adn1inistration and police.
Unprepared as the people were, often the Ortskommandant himself
had to pick out a man - sometimes simply a better dressed man in
the street - and invest hin1 with authority to set up a "municipal
council," uprava. In the rural areas, where no German authority ap-
peared, a medieval pattern of government, the mir, was spontaneously
revived, n1aintaining public order and justice until the occupation
power could take over.
The German Army was busy with fighting, and all it needed was
calm in the occupied areas. For that reason, the military command

174 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
did not try to stifle but rather encouraged the natives' natural desire
for freedom. All kinds of communal ((liberation committees" were wel-
comed and used as a substitute for local civil authorities. Civic order
was maintained by groups of volunteers, to whom military rations were
distributed. They recommended direcors and managers for a few ip-
dustrial enterprises not taken over by the Gern1an Army, and it was
up to the worl{ers' meetings to accept or to reject recommendations; "in
such cases, the questions of wages, food allocation, and the like were
decided in town meetings or in conferences of local delegates." Most
important of all, spiritual freedon1 was if only in appearance restored,
and private initiative was permitted to develop. Enterprising individuals
began to open cobbler's or tailor's shops, home diners, and little stores
where second-hand goods were sold on comn1ission. Most industries re-
mained closed, however, and people looked in vain for employment.
But new currents were in the air, and the feeling was growing that there
might be better opportunities if only men could get a fair start. A
migration developed from cities to the villages where, the rumor spread,
the collectives had begun to breal{ up. People freely discussed their
affairs and under the indifferent eye of the Ortsl{0111mandant some new
pattern of communal order began to shape up, timidly and uncertainly
but with a growing hope.
Two curious things have been noted by observers: (I) Brought
up in a totalitarian system, and dominated by the army of another
totalitarian state, the people set out quietly to build a democratic order,
however elel11entary in forn1 and scope. (2) People showed no haste,
except in a few isolated cases, to denounce the hidden COlnmunists;
rather than seek vengeance upon their former masters, they gave them,
as it were, a fair chance to adjust themselves to the new order and
redeem their sins; there were even cases where people petitioned the
Germans to release the arrested Communists, particularly the Kom-
somol members, when they happened to be decent persons. 16
The German Army appeared neither worse nor better than any
other army, and the burden of requisitions imposed upon the popula-
tion was s0l11ewhat lighter than under the Soviets. There were com-
plaints, of course, about soldiers robbing the native of his last provi-
sions or clothes, slaughtering young pigs, stealing chickens, and so on.
((Although people admitted that the retreating Red Army behaved
just as badly and understood that any fighting army has to eat, they
expected better treatment from the civilized Germans, and one cannot
deny that a certain disappointment exists," said one report. 17 On the
other hands, the military commanders often would lend army horses to
help with the harvesting, and had no hesitation in letting prisoners of
war go when their relatives claimed them. They also released prisoners
of war to satisfy the demands of various communities for farm hands,

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION
I75
skilled labor, specialists, and so on. Since every native organization
tried to free as many men as possible, "one could find former P.G.W.'s
working freely iri factories and plants, in offices and in fields, practi-
cally everywhere; engineers, medical doctors, teachers." 18
The Germans did not expect to find Belorussia a land of plenty
under the Soviets, but they were unprepared for the general misery
they discovered. On the other hand, they were impressed by "the
extraordinary number of little children" and found with astonishment
that, in general, "morality seemed quite high, for Russian conditions."
That sentiment may have accounted for the humane attitude of some
of the individual commanders, but in general these hardly acted out of
sympathy for the people who, after all, were Untermenschen. Obviously,
it was German self-interest to restore order and econon1Y in the land
off which they expected to live. The natives understood this very well
and, at first, did not find life any worse than before - in fact, it had
become better in some respects. But they were somewhat alarmed at
seeing that there was no unity of policy an10ng the military, every
Feldkommandant apparently following his own judgment and whim.
The first proclamations were issued in the German and Belorussian
languages, which seemed to indicate a willingness to treat the Belo-
russians as a nation. In western Belorussia, however, the Poles who
could speak some German rather than the Belorussians were employed
in local administration, and in the eastern provinces Russian was used
as the language of communication. Permits were being issued to print
newspapers in Russian, but not in Belorussian. In fact, the military
pretended never to have heard of the "Belorussian problem," and
treated the population indiscriminately as Russen. 19 There is no evi-
dence that the people resented that treatment, but it must have con-
tributed to their feeling of insecurity. There were many other prob-
lems which, obviously, the military command was not prepared to
solve. The people clung to their hopes, and waited. "Unfortunately,"
says Guderian, "the favorable attitude toward the Germans continued
only as long as there was military government; the so-called Reichs-
kommissaren quickly destroyed the good will of the people." 20 With
this, most observers agree.
The front line moved rapidly eastward and by September Belo-
russia found itself far to the German rear. The "brown shirt" admin-
istration was taking over, and life began to change. rrhe natives real-
ized that the "liberators" wanted their country for keeps. ,
Alfred Rosenberg, on July 17, was appointed Reichsminister for the
entire eastern area, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Within his
province, Belorussia - perhaps not entirely without relation to the
theory of "baltism" of the Belorussian race 21_ was to merge with the
Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) into an Ostland, under the

176 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
authority of Reichskommissar Heinrich Lohse whose headquarters
were in Riga. The four ethnic parts of the Ostland forIned four Gen-
eralbezirke, each under its own Generalkommissar, and Belorussia thus
became known as the Weissruthenische Generalbezirk. Consequently,
Belorussian administrative boundaries were revised in the following
manner: Vilna county was left to the Lithuanian Generalbezirk; the
Bialystol{ region was annexed to East Prussia; Brest, Pinsk, and
Gomel provinces went to the Reichskommissar of the Ukraine; on the
other hand, Sn10lensk province and perhaps parts of Briansk province,
still under military occupation, were to be incorporated into the Belo-
russian Generalbezirk. Curtailed in the west and in the south, and
enlarged in the east, the Belorussian territory was then divided into
five Hauptbezi1'ke, or provinces, with Minsk, Baranovici, Mogilev,
Vitebsl{, and Slnolensk as their respective centers. The borderline be-
tween the military and the civilian zones was traced along the Berezina
river, and Minsk was selected as the seat of the Generalkolnmissar. 22
The Germans wanted "living space" in the east, and they made no
secret of it. 23 More imn1ediately, they needed local n1anpower and eco-
nomic resources to feed the voracious war n1achine both at the front
and at h0111e. The task required the cooperation of the natives and, to
this effect, a system was set up which assun1ed the form of local "self-
government" from the community to the province level under the
supervision of Gebietskommissaren, [(reislandwil'tschajtsfiihl'el', N ach-
wuchsfuhrel', Sonderfuhrel', and other Reichsangestellte. The forlner
Soviet adn1inistrative posts of the territory were preserved, but offices
were renamed according to pre-Revolution usage. Thus, starosta
(elder) reappeared in the rural comlTIunity; starsina (foreman) in
the rural district; uprava (board or council) in the city, county, and
province. Officers selected from the prominent citizens would main-
tain civic order, administer elementary justice, and direct the economic
and cultural life of the country, on the one hand; they were to collect
taxes, supply services, and execute the orders of the occupation power
on the other. The question remained open whether this scheme would
culminate in a sort of central "Belorussian governn1ent" in cooperation
with the Generalkommissar or stay under the direct authority of a
German official at each administrative level.
Collaborationists
Alfred Rosenberg's staff had long been protecting various groups
of nationalists-in-exile who sought separation of their countries from
the Soviet Union. Although the Belorussian groups had been treated
rather as step-children, they gained more attention and favors after
the partition of Poland in 1939; the exiles from West Belorussia were
given refuge in Germany and various, often substantial, facilities to

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION
177
foster their work. 24 In case of a German invasion of Belorussia, their
collaboration was, of course, assured.
Yet, these groups lacked the qualified personnel to form a Belorus-
sian government and to rally all the anti-Soviet Belorussians around it.
Then V. Zachark.a, who represented in Prague the symbol of the
Belorussian National Republic was ren1embered and approached. 25
The old man, it seems, was offered the opportunity "to head the Belo-
russian liberation movement once the German Soviet war has broken
out," and the negotiations continued until September 1941, when,
finally, Zacharka refused. 26 In the meantin1e, the idea of setting up a
puppet Belorussian government had been assuming more concrete
form, and it is said that "a few days before the outbreak of the war,
two large barracks near Berlin were prepared for the Belorussian
natives in Gerlnany and Poland to be drafted into a Belorussian 'army
of liberation.' Even a special uniforn1 was designed for then1." 27 No
one ever heard of them again. Apparently, the plan of exploiting Belo-
russian nationalisn1 had been abandoned. In fact, it was never con-
sidered as seriously as some Belorussian sources wish it to be repre-
sented. Belorussia, to the Germans, was "a land without historical
tradition of its own, in no way prepared for any form of statehood." 28
The country was to be treated as a colony, not as a satellite.
The views of the military command, Rosenberg's officials, the
SS, and the Gestapo, however, conflicted as to how and where the
most effective "collaborationists" could be found, and where they
should be sought. 29 Consequently, both the Belorussian and Russian
emigrants of Hitlerite or semi-Hitlerite persuasion were rushed to the
country as counselors, advisers, interpreters, and assistants to the
German administration. Wherever possible, offices were filled with
natives of German descent. Volunteers were then called from among
the local residents to fill the ranks of the police force and other sub-
ordinate agencies, and preference was given to those who had been
repressed by the Soviets. 30 In many places, however, former Soviet
employees, even Party members, were retained in office. 31 In some
villages, the starosty were elected in town meetings and confirmed in
office by the Gern1an authorities; in others, these were appointed with-
out consulting the people. Where they were needed, competent mem-
bers of the community were ordered to take office, and it was not wise
to refuse.
Whether offices were filled with the right people was a different
question. For one thing, there was a shortage of specialists, partly
because Soviet technicians had been trained only in narrow fields,
partly because "most of the intelligentsia had been moved out of the
area so as eventually to deprive the Germans of adn1inistrative per-
sonnel." 32 Consequently, officials were not qualified for their jobs,

178 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
and, while there were ((some decent people," 33 most of the native ad-
ministrative personnel was "of low moral quality." 34 Some observers
noted that "95 per cent of the people who worked for the Germans
would have work.ed for anyone who paid them, and perhaps five per
cent believed that they could work. 'Yith the Germans for their on
country." This may be an unfair generalization,35 but all testimonies
agree that abuses became much too frequent, and overt bribery took
the place of Soviet blat (influence traffic). In a short time the civil
administration was so thoroughly discredited that no pro-German ac-
tivity could wield any wide influence among the people. 3G
Local Administration
The administrative setup resulted in a colonial pattern with no
clear distinction between military and civil authority, and the SS often
displaced then1 both. Local agencies were headed by emigrants return-
ing froin exile. R. Astrouski, a former high-school principal and BNR
minister of education in 1918, headed the Mogilev and then the Smo-
lensk regional uprava; a forn1er landowner, J. Ern1acenko, was chief
adviser to Generalkommissar Wilhelm Kube; V. Tumas was appointed
Mayor of Minsk; Basilevic took. over the Mogilev oblast; and so on.
But the Bobruisk regional adlninistration, for instance, was entrusted
to the Russian Odincov, a former Soviet non-Party official, and so also
were some other minor upravy. Sometimes even those who admitted
having been Party members becaine mayors, district chiefs, and so
on. 37 They all had their own Sonderfiihrer to supervise and direct their
work, and were responsible, through him, to the higher German author-
ity. Otherwise the upravy were free to n1anage their own affairs.
Members of the uprava were drafted from among the most highly
educated residents, often against their will. The communal sources of
income were taxes from business, apartment rents, payments for the
temporary use of property abandoned by the Soviets, and so on. The
uprava managed a few reopened industrial enterprises, although most
of them were taken over by the Germans; it issued special rations to
the needy and assigned refugees to the various villages, where the
peasants willingly accepted them. When the Germans seized most Jew-
ish property, the remainder was taken over by the uprava which then
issued furniture, clothing, and other effects to former P.O.W.'s and
refugees. It drafted people for compulsory and unpaid work. for the
occupants, such as clearing the roads of snow and repairing bridges and
railway tracks.
This about exhausted the activities of the uprava. Material condi-
tions in the cities were pitiable. In the eastern part of the country, little
if any industry operated. The mark and the ruble were interchange-
able (I: 10), but hard to earn. Workers were paid the same wages as

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION 179
under the Soviets, although prices had skyrocketed. Some people man-
aged to make money by opening luncheonettes and shops, or by manu-
facturing soap, cosmetics, or "moonshine" in their cellars. No regular
stores existed, except second-hand stores for clothing and junk which
suddenly had assumed new value. Black market and barter developed
since the Germans furnished only a minimum of supplies and only for
people who worked for theln. The worst famine came in the fall and
winter of 1941, when in Mogilev and Borisov, for instance, "a pood
[36.113 lbs.] of grain cost one thousand rubles." In some towns, the
uprava distributed 100 gm. of bread a day, "and bread was of very
poor quality." 38 There were no medical supplies. Epidemics spread in
several places. Many people fled to the villages, and some cities lost
n10re than two thirds of their population.
The Germans tried political cases and major criminal offenses, while
local courts tried civil cases. The county (raion) court, as a rule,
had a judge, a secretary, and a typist, as well as a guard, a driver, and
two investigators; members of the jury were picked from the popula-
tion. In general, however, the mayor or the county chief had the arbi-
trary power of trying and convicting people, and, more often than not,
the police - particularly the Geheime Feldpolizei - would take law
and justice into their own hands.
The police were first established in the cities and towns, then in
the villages. An appeal was made to all men of military age to enroll,
and it was risky to refuse. The first units were used to guard German
establishn1ents. The cities were split into sections, with a police chief
for each 20,000-30,000 inhabitants. The country police also were
divided into sections and consisted of two branches: the standing guard
of villages and n1achine tractor stations, and the mobile guard to fight
bandits and, later, the guerrillas. But very soon, under the supervision
of the security police (SD), the native police were given a more elab-
orate organization. The Germans divided the force into four main sec-
tions: (I) the municipal police; (2) the Sturm-I(ompanien, or military
units serving as garrisons, guards, anti-guerrilla squads, and so on;
(3) the secret, or political police; and (4) the economic, or criminal,
police. Each section was headed by a native chief responsible to the
Feldkommandant or to the German SD. The police were dressed in a
variety of uniforms and many wore civilian clothes with a badge on
the arm. SOIne were given old German uniforms with special insignia;
others got a black outfit and a brassard. Most carried Soviet rifles,
although some units were given German arms. Their rations were small,
but approximated those of the military. A policeman received 30 or 40
marks a month. .
Who joined the police? Some wanted a chance to work private re-

180 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
venge on the Communists; others were keen on getting the privileges
of better food and housing, and still others were sent in as Soviet
agents. The Germans welcomed Soviet arn1Y officer$ to the police force,
and many P.O.W.'s came to serve. At first, they were accepted indis-
criminately, later they were screened. But it was natural that "many
criminals and adventurers, NKVD mOen, and all kinds of scum" slipped
in. These, it would seem, were particularly numerous in SD sections
(political and criminal), and by their misbehavior they contributed
generously to creating anti-German sentiment among the people. 39
They were not all necessarily Soviet agents. Some emigres who returned
with the Germans did just as well, or even better. 4o
Wherever the chief of police happened to be a good man, things
were bearable. The town police force, in general, was not the subject
of much complaint. It was primarily composed of local men, mostly
the unemployed, and people realized that after all some sort of militia
was needed to maintain order . Yet the people felt that the police served
the Germans, not the community; they refused to apply the native
term to them, calling them policaj.41
Liberated from the Soviet authority, the rural community was
left to itself for weeks, sometin1es for months, before being integrated
into the new system. There even were villages that did not see a Ger..
man during the whole period of occupation. 42 Contrary to what might
have been expected, no anarchy ensued. The old mir, or town meeting
tradition, revived, as if the twenty years of soviets had left no traces
on people's habits and thought. The sudden and spontaneous come-
back was surprising and significant in its scope and depth. 43
Many Komsomol and Party members and some NKVD men either
had no time to escape from the countryside or stayed voluntarily. Unless
there were personal accounts to be settled with them, they were ac-
cepted by the people on the theory that no man is responsible for the
master who orders him about. They took part in the general meetings
(schod) as regular residents. In accordance with custom, the men
alone decided communal affairs, but if there were no men in a house..
hold the women could take their place. An elder would be elected, and
rarely were there any disputes over the election. Usually, an older man
would be picked, often a former. chairman of the collective, sometimes
even a Party member if he had been known as "a good fellow." The
raion would be informed of the appointment and the man confirmed
by the Germans as a Dorfburgermeister. The general meetings dealt
with economic and practical problems only. The Soviet type of activist
speaker no longer existed, and the discussions were hot, frank, noisy,
and long. Counting votes was discarded, and unanimity of decision
was required as of old. During the discussion of communal affairs the

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION
181
elder could only make suggestions, but when he acted as the agent of
the higher authority the mir obeyed him. 44
The first decision the rural mir made - and there is no evidence
that a single exception existed in Belorussia - was to break up the
collectives. In most places, the stored collective property was imme-
diately grabbed and divided up according to the number of "souls"
or "eaters" in the household; in others, it was decided to ask the Ger-
mans for permission or to wait for orders. The German policy, how-
ever, seemed inconsistent. Some Feldkommandanten said, "Do as you
like"; others said, "Continue to work as before, the only difference
being that the crops will belong to you; call your kolkhoz an ob'Scina
(commune), but don't divide it up." This was a contradiction in terms,
since the pre-Revolution obscina referred to the land divided into in-
dividual holdings with no collective work. The peasantry decided not
to wait for further instructions and, by fall, all the collectives were
dissol ved.
There had been no communication among the villages on any
large scale, but the procedure was astonishingly uniform. As of old,
fields were grouped into three categories: good, medium, and poor,
and each class was cut up into a number of strips which were distributed
according to the size of the households so that each family had a bal-
anced number of plots in every category of soil. The actual measuring
was done by two elders, specially elected by the mir, and wherever a
priest was available a brief religious ceremony preceded it. The elders,
eagerly watched by the whole community, walked down the field with
a double rod, about the width of the strip, in their hands. The meadows
resulting from swamp reclamation projects under the Soviets were
also partitioned. The beehives were divided up likewise. It was agreed,
however, to leave the forests in state hands. 45
Plots were assigned by drawing lots. People returning to the village
from the city, and the formerly dispossessed, or "dekulakized," were
reinstated. Their houses were returned to them, or the community
would grant them building material for a new house and buy them
carts and farm implements with the village money. In fact, there was
more land than the people could handle in the depopulated rural areas. 46
The Soviet P.O.W.'s set free by the Gern1ans, and the okruzency, were
gladly accepted. There was no evidence of national antagonism and, in
fact, Belorussian and Russian, sometimes Polish, were spoken at town
meetings and in the peasants' homes.
But there was no way of bringing in the harvest of 1941 other
than collectively. And this was done swiftly by free common effort. In
some places, the grain was divided up in terms of tl'udodni (labor-day
units), while those families which had men mobilized or killed in the
war were given a share from the community fund; in others, the

182
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THE GERMAN OCCUPATION 183
trudodni were entirely abolished and the harvest was divided up by
sheaves/ 7 while extra food was issued to the households with sick and
old, or many children. In most collectives, the productive cattle and
the fowl were divided immediately and, after the harvest was brought
in, the labor cattle and the buildings were divided, too. The farm equip-
ment not evacuated or destroyed by the Soviets (seeders, threshers,
tractors) were used jointly; even the minor farn1 implen1ents such as
plows and carts, were sometimes given to several familes jointly be-
cause of the general shortage. There were ferocious fights in some
places over the few animals that remained after the Soviet and Ger-
man armies had taken their toll. Finally, this matter also was settled,
with one horse allotted to two, four, or sometimes ten households. 48
The n1ir system was running the community in the spirit of com-
mon, not doctrinal, equity. Apparently there was no discrin1ination
against any particular group of residents, native or alien. Even wives
and children of the hated Soviet officials who had fled were taken care
of like any other forsaken family. "Along with the Soviet system also
disappeared the 'totalitarian' vices such as toadying, fawning, cringing,
lying, spying, and the like," said one observer. "The rural community
has resun1ed its ancient way of life, and returned to the primitive de-
mocracy of old." 40 Even "the local Communists" seemed happy about
the partition of property.50 Productivity promptly increased. People
began to build, helping one another; barter trade with the city de-
veloped, and many peasants were better clothed and shod. In 1942,
despite the lack of equipment and horsepower, all land was tilled and
sown. In some areas, the Germans provided seeds on credit, to be re-
paid after the harvest. The harvest was certainly not worse than be-
fore, and in some instances was better. The peasantry was getting
richer and it is not surprising that there should have been, as some
reports say, people who expected even a brighter future under the
Germans. 51
But the German agrarian policy had remained ambiguous. 52 The
military let the peasantry go its own way, provided that order and
supplies to the army were assured. The civil authorities, however, were
trying to preserve, in fact to reinstate and exploit, collective farming
for German benefit. Finally, on February I5, I942, Reichsminister
Rosenberg issued a decree offering the Belorussian peasantry a sort
of compromise: (a) transformation of the kolkhozes or collective farms
into agricultural communes or obscina; (b) when conditions permit-
ted, gradual apportionment of the communal land to the individual
households - to be decided by the German authority on the merits
of the individual peasants; and (c) promise of private land ownership,
in the future, to peasants who showed good will and outstanding ability
in fulfilling their obligations to the German power. During the "transi-

184 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
tion period," it was stated, the land would be tilled in con1n10n; all the
members obligated to work; German instructions obeyed in increasing
the productivity of the communal land and of individual homesteads;
the economy closely supervised, with German authority to reward the
zealous and punish the remiss. The cqmmunal property that had been
split up was to be restored, and the culprits repressed. Coated in terms
of "emancipation of the Belorussian peasant from the Soviet slavery,"
the new systeln was, in fact, placing a brown yoke 011 top of the red
one. 53
Rosenberg's "agrarian reform" could not be uniformly or effectively
implemented in a country where collective agriculture had spontane-
ously disintegrated. Consequently, local problems were settled at the
discretion of the individual Kommandanten and Sonderflihrer whose
main interests were in collecting grain, hay, milk, potatoes, eggs, and
other dues. The decree remained on paper, but its moral effect was
detrimental. Relations between the village and the occupation began
rapidly to deteriorate.
Realizing their illegal status, the peasants had little feeling of
security and stability. More officials in charge of the regional economy
appeared in every county, registering cattle, fowl, and pigs; directing
and giving orders and "making it clear to the people that everything
they possessed was now Germany's." 54 They were assisted by a native
starsina, that is, head of the rural district (volost', formerly sel'sovet),
who assigned orders for the German taxes and made sure they were
collected; the starsina supervised the administration of the villages
and had a German clerk.; no official decisions allowed of any appeal.
As under the Soviets, the sentiment was growing that no one was any
longer master in his own home.
Although no public-opinion polls were tak.en and the situation
varied from area to area and town to town, the fact can hardly be con-
tested that an overwhelming majority of the Belorussian population -
including the misinformed Jews - continued to feel indifferent, if not
outright friendly, toward the Germans for some length of time. 55
Hardship and privation, and even mistreatment by the occupation
authorities, were being taken as the legitimate price of having been
liberated. 56
Some people apprehended, of course, what the Germans might have
in store for them, but it is difficult, almost impossible, to define in
conventional terms the mental attitude of even the best-informed at
that time. They all seemed to want to liberate their country from
Stalinism and let the people freely decide their own fate. They did not
want to be obligated to Germany alone, but Germany was right there,
and, besides, "there was a feeling of frustration and revulsion at the

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION 185
fact that the western democracies had gone over to the defense of
Soviet totalitariC1:nism." 57 Furthermore, observers were surprised at
the complete absence of ideological thinking and motivation among the
populace. "Everybody hated the Soviets, but their hatred was always
motivated by some personal offense and hardly ever by any realization
of the. evils and moral and physical devastations Communism always
engenders wherever it takes root," remarked a traveler. 58 Nowhere
was there overt refusal of collaboration with the Germans on patri-
otic or other ideological grounds; the reasons given were always "hard
work.ing conditions," "mistreatment," "fear of the Soviet agents," or
the lil(e. Perhaps the attitude of the people for that period was best
summed up by an observer who divided the population into four groups:
(1) a minority from all social strata who were outright pro-German on
the theory that the people were not capable of running their own affairs:
"Since all the former rulers failed, let the Germans try"; (2) a large
number of adventurers and criminals who would have worked with
anyone for money and privilege; (3) the inert mass trying neither to
help themselves nor to resist; (4) a few who argued that "one must
use the Germans against Communism, and then chase them to hell." 59
The popular attitude underwent a complete change within less than
a year. The following reasons predominate: (1) mass execution of
the Jews; (2) mistreatment of the P.O.W.'s; (3) inconsistencies of
policy toward the collectives; (4) the high-handed attitude of the
Nazis; (5) contempt for the Slavic race in general, and for the Belo-
russian nation in particular; ( 6) labor draft for Germany; ( 7) in-
ability to deal with subversive activities of the Soviet agents; later, (8)
the growing conviction that the Germans were losing the war; and
(9) fear of Soviet vengeance on those who had been pro-Gerll1an to
any degree. That was more than enough to switch the large majority
of the Belorussian population from friendliness to hostility.60 Active
fighting broke out against the occupants in 1943 and 1944.
The Racial Theory
It was inevitable that the dogn1atic tenets of Hitlerism should domi-
nate the pragmatic thought of the Nazis in a conquered land. The
racial concept required that certain segments of the native population
such as the Jews and the Gypsies be earmarked for wholesale exter-
mination, and economic and cultural policies in regard to the Slavs
be adjusted to their status of "inferior race." The trend became con-
spicuous with the appearance of the first SS detachments in the occu-
pied area. "While the regular army men mixed freely with the natives,
visited in their homes, courted the girls, and often helped the peasants
in the fields, the behavior of the SS troops was entirely different. They
were stationed on the outskirts of the cities and when they visited

186 BELORUSSIA.' THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
the homes of the natives it was only to arrest someone." 61 Their over-
bearing attitude was insulting. The uniformed Nazis "walked around
with their sticks hitting people in the face," showing no respect for
either age or sex. 62 For a whole year schools were closed, and later on
education beyond the elementary leve was refused to the natives. The
Germans "broke all the laboratory equipment," complained a Smolensk
professor. "Some books were destroyed, others dispatched to Germany;
the museums were pillaged; scientific work was forbidden us." 63
In the winter of 1942-43, permission was given to reopen grammar
schools where German was now taught along with Belorussian. For
most subjects the old Soviet texts were used, but with the pictures
blotted out. In 1943, a teachers' seminar was permitted in Smolensk,
but the whole school network was to be supported by the local upravy
from their meager budgets. 64 A few trade schools were also opened.
Newspapers carried German language lessons and that, with some
literacy in their own idiom, apparently was all the education the human
mass in Belorussia was thought to need in order to labor for the Ger-
man Reich more intelligently and productively. Otherwise the Ger-
mans did not interfere directly with the people's cultural activities,
which - except for the broadcasts in Russian, and sometimes in Belo-
russian, some music, drama, and movies, and the religious services in
the churches that had been reopened - virtually' ceased.
Historical monuments were neglected or destroyed, and no plans
were made for restoring the urban centers to their prewar importance.
From the German point of view, the economic center of gravity lay in
the Belorussian rural areas, not in the cities. And every day it would
be made clearer to the people that their right to life and work depended
on what use the German authorities might make of it.
The Jews
The mass extermination of the Jews came as a terrible blow. Not
that the Belorussians had not been used to mass dispossessions, de-
portations, and executions in the past, but the hope they had Placed in
the occupants was lost, and this was even more important than their
sorrow for mank.ind. Nor had they ever witnessed an execution of
that magnitude. With surprise a Nazi official reported that, in the
eyes of the population, the Germans appeared as "barbarians and
hangmen, the Jew being held to be as much of a human being as the
Belorussian." 65
For centuries, indeed, the Jews had been an integral part of the
Belorussian community. They were concentrated in the urban areas,
sometimes making up half of the population. Before the invasion, nearly
one in every ten citizens was Jewish. As soon as the German civil ad-
ministration arrived, they were ordered to wear a yellow star on their

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION 18 7
clothes and to register periodically ,vith the local SS office. Then, by
the end of 1941, their property was plundered or confiscated, and they
were all moved to the ghettos established for them in the principal
cities. There, within a year or two, the large majority was methodically
liquidated. Indeed, only 5 or 6 per cent of the total Jewish population
in Gomel, 1 per cent in Vitebsk, 25 to 30 per cent in Bobruisk, perhaps
30 to 35 per cent in Mogilev, survived in 1944. In the rural areas, all
Jewish collectives suffered wholesale extermination. In Borisov, 6,500
Jews were slaughtered on the night of October 21, 1941; in Bialystok,
40,000 Jews on August 23, 1943; 66 and, in general, of all Belorussian
Jewry "hardly 20 per cent escaped extermination." 67
How did these escape? "The natives protected the Jews as best
they could, hiding them in attics and cellars and secretly slipping them
out to the woods and swamps where the SS men did not dare to ven-
ture." 68 The evidence is corroborated from other sources and, indeed,
it is hard to conceive how a hunted Jew could have found his way to
safety had not the non-Jewish people assisted him at the risk of their
own life and freedom. 69 In different parts of the country, Jewish
"family can1ps" and "dug-out towns" appeared in the thick of the
forests, guarded by Jewish armed youths. Later, they were the first to
join the guerrilla warfare. 70
Disheartened and appalled, the common people assumed the posi-
tion, outwardly at least, that the Jewish problem was a German one,
and not their concern. With all their compassion for the victims, how
indeed could they help? On the other hand, a few nationalists col-
laborating with the occupants had overtly taken the German stand.
They joined hands with the Nazis in the persecution - sometimes in
the execution, as at Borisov - of the Jew as if hastily to cement with
his blood their position of henchmen. 71 The cement did not prove
strong enough, and the edifice of collaboration soon began to crack.
The Russian Nationalists
Along with the exiled Belorussian nationalists, the Nazis brought
in a host of Russian political emigres, mostly members of the group of
"solidarists" otherwise k.nown as NTS (nacional'no-trudovoj sojuz),
who had been residing in various parts of Europe. Though in agree-
ment on the general tenets of Hitlerism, they differed considerably on
Belorussia. The NTS were unionists, the Belorussians were separatists,
while emigres of other origins treated the peasantry "as swine." 72 The
Germans distributed offices among them, favoring now one, and now
another set of interpreters and advisors.
Russian was the main language of the urban populations and, ex-
cept for a few die-hard nationalists, nobody bothered about distinc-
tions between Belorussian and Russian. The NTS took advantage of

188 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
this for fostering, under the German cover, their own aims. A Russian
radio was established, Russian schools were opened in some parts of
the country, and Belorussian was practically banished from office and
from print throughout the military zone, east of Borisov. 73 The general
line of NTS propaganda represented Adolf Hitler as the liberator of
"all the peoples of Russia," and his 'purpose as promotion of eternal
friendship and alliance between "free and united Russia" and "the
great German nation." The military favored the NTS, to the extent
even of curbing Belorussian nationalism in its overtly "anti-Russian"
trends. 74 Russian rather than Belorussian was used in German occupa-
tion correspondence and the very terms "Belorussian" and "Russian"
were in fact confused.
In spite of the considerable leeway granted them by the Germans,
the NTS were not satisfied. Considering themselves "Russian patriots"
above all, they felt hurt at being treated as employees rather than
allies; they resented favors being loosely distributed between them-
selves and Belorussian separatists; and they were particularly shocked
and dismayed by the inhuman treatment of the Soviet soldiers in the
P.O.W. camps.75 Their pro-Russian position began surreptitiously to
assume an anti-German hue. There are even reports that before a year
had passed, the NTS center in Smolensl{ risked distribution of litera-
ture "with anti-Soviet and anti-German content." In effect, the Nazi
adn1inistration began to lose the support of its most active and articu-
late allies. 76
Belorussian Nationalism
In the meantime, Belorussian nationalists ran into difficulties of
their own. In the foreground stood the emigre Fabian Akincyc, a con-
vert to Hitlerism since the 1930'S when he originated a Belorussian
National Socialist movement in Vilna. Returning to the homeland on
the heels of the German troops, he set out to organize Belorussian
youth in the image of Hitlerjugend. The group sided with the Nazis in
every respect, and supplied the Germans with the personnel most de-
voted to the "common cause." But the n10vement conspicuously lacked
popular support, and its membership never grew beyond a few
hundred. 77
Other nationalist groups were formed of Belorussian en1igres who
had found refuge in Germany in 1939. 78 They were, in fact, remnants
of various political parties in West Belorussia, from Socialists to Chris-
tian Democrats, and there was little unity in their midst other than
for expediency. There were even those who secretly owed allegiance
to Zacharka, president of the BNR in exile, who had declined collabo-
ration with the Germans. They differed, of course, in their ambitions.
Those who aspired to political power soon found that there could be

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION r89
no Belorussian government under the occupation, and that they
couldn't get any further than heading a regional administration under
orders of a Son'del'fiihrer. Others felt that, under the Germans, they
might be able to promote national cultural work "in order to create a
body of active fighters [for some future date], to enlighten the masses,
and to strengthen thir feeling of nationality." 79 And many were satis-
fied with an opportunity simply to contribute to the welfare of their
people in whatever capacity they could. They were all disillusioned at
finding little response to their aims among the Germans, as well as
among the people.
The Belorussian intelligentsia who had separate national conscious-
ness in any degree had been decimated under the Soviets. Throughout
the whole period of occupation, nationalist leadership was to remain
in the hands of the former emigres from West Belorussia, politically
more advanced and educated. 80
At first it seemed that Belorussian nationalisln had been getting
the upper hand in the administration, at least in the western part of
the country. Various local committees that had sprung up under lnili-
tary occupation were unquestionably native in composition. Their
identity was easily asserted under the imported nationalist leadership,
and some of then1 had even adopted national emblems. Belorussian
newspapers were authorized. The Mutual Aid Society (Samapomac)
handled welfare and cultural matters. An effort was 11lade even to
introduce Latin instead of Russian characters in Belorussian writ-
ings; but this went against people's habits in the eastern area, and
the project was quietly dropped. When, in 1942, grammar schools re-
opened under the general supervision of priest Hadleuski, an old
emigre from Vilna, nationalism becan1e even tnore aggressive. Schools
admitted only Belorussian natives and refused education to others.
In the town of N esviz, it is reported, a group of Belorussian Youth
arrested the foreign (apparently Polish) administrators, lynched then1
in the public square, then let the Ortskommandant know that "they
wished to tal{e the adn1inistration into their own hands"; the German
official reported to Generalkommissar Wilhelm Kube and, "to the
astonishment of everyone, the latter ordered him to comply." Then,
"sin1ilar revolts brol{e out in a few other towns, and the Gerlnans let
the insurgents alone." 81
The more concessions that were obtained, the more delnanding
certain groups became. Protests were formulated, though not too loudly,
against the Germans' severance of western and southern territories
from Belorussia, and an underground "Party of Belorussian Independ-
ence (Nezaleznickaja) " was founded in Minsk. 82 The Christian Demo-
crats forilled a "Belorussian People's Front" under the leadership
of priest Hadleuski. Both organizations led underground attacks

190 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
against the collaborationists. The covert slogan "neither the Russians
nor the Germans" began to attract more people as discontent with the
occupation power grew. Small though their numbers were, that seg-'
ment of Belorussian nationalism was becoming a thorn in the side to
the occupation and it was not unnatural that the moment soon came
when the Germans cracked down on them'.
In the summer of 1942, the Belorussian committees that had as-
sumed too strong a nationalist hue were dissolved and their leaders
arrested, some deported to Gern1any and some shot. Belorussian em-
blems and flags were removed fron1 public buildings. The priest Had-
leuski, admittedly head of the opposition, was executed. 83 The local
police received the order to accept the SS command or to disarm. A
few police units refused and took to the woods, and in some cases
"they were followed by the whole population of a village." 84 Repres-
sion "'as swift and ruthless. By 1943, only those nationalists whose
German loyalty was above suspicion were left in office or at liberty.
And these, in turn, could not have been given a stronger reminder
that they had but one master to serve.
Here and there, in the woods and swamps, small guerrilla groups
appeared. One such group organized in Vitebsk province is reported
to have tal{en over the underground publication of the "Bulletin"
of the N ezaleznickaja (Independence) Party. In Sluck, several na-
tionalists were arrested by the SS and "hanged on a Sunday in the
public square"; in retaliation the local Gestapo building was blown
up two months later. 85 The most active "collaborationist," Fabian
Akincyc, was assassinated by a Be10russian youth (Matusevic) in
1943. 86 But the patriotic movement had no chance to develop. Be-
cause of the lack of organization, ideological maladjustment, mate-
rial difficulties, indifference of the masses, and the concealed Com-
munists in their midst, Be10russian nationalism proved unable to
become a leading force. "Conditions became so confused that for a
time," confessed a Be10russian writer, "the Belorussian political
leaders did not see any way out of the situation." 87
Yet on the German side the loss was total. Both the Belorussian
and Russian activists had been antagonized, as well as large num-
bers of those who had greeted the occupants as liberators only a
year before. Many who still were working for the Germans were
now 1001{ing for the first opportunity to turn against them.

13
THE GUERRILLA WARFARE
In failing to make good use of the active elements in the popula-
tion which were eager to collaborate, and in antagonizing the passive
masses, the Nazis spelled their own doom. Two 1110ves proved par-
ticularly unfortunate: the recall of the freed prisoners of war to
P.O.W. camps, and the draft of native labor for Germany.
Most Belorussian P.O.W.'s, as we have seen, returned home. Many
others were freed, settled down, got married, and became part of the
Belorussian community. Their numbers were greatly increased by the
okruzency and it is reported that there were counties "where there
were 30,000 such men" returned to peaceful occupations.! Perhaps, in
many regions, the peasantry would not have been able to bring in the
harvest of 1941 without their help. But, early in 1942, the Nazis began
to comb them out. Thousands fled to the woods. Soon their numbers
were doubled by refugees from cities and towns where the labor draft
for Germany began.
The recruitment had started as a voluntary matter. In the winter
of 1941, a magazine was distributed with pictures and stories describ-
ing the happy life of the foreign workers in the German Reich. People
who enrolled then were mostly refugees from other parts of the country
who could not get settled; the young whom the war had deprived of
the opportunity to continue education; and the curious who wanted to
see Europe, particularly since the food situation and unemployment in
their home towns had become very severe. Soon enough news filtered
back about the bad treatment the workers were receiving in Germany.
The flow of volunteers stopped, and the Arbeitsamt began recruitment
by force. With German efficiency, direct methods were used, as, for
example, when a church was roped off and everybody, except the old
and the infirm, who happened to be in it, was exported to Germany;
a public market was surrounded and all the younger people, including
women, arrested; a train was stopped and the passengers fit for manual
labor segregated; finally, villages were raided and the inhabitants
forced to go. African natives a century ago had been handled in a like

192 BELORUSSIA: THE MAltING OF A NATION
manner. How greatly this helped the German economy is hard to say;
but it most effectively filled the Belorussian forests and marshes with
people struggling for survival, seeking vengeance, and preying on the
neighborhoods with whatever arms they could obtain.
The swamp and forest population, returned to Stone Age civiliza-
tion, was divided into several tribes: Jewish refugees, Belorussian
nationalists, Soviet P.D.W.'s, labor draft deserters, and the otherwise
persecuted or offended. Their total number is not known, but SOlne
observers believe that it was already approaching the marl{ of several
tens of thousands by the end of 1942. Having no unity of purpose
except survival and vengeance, they lacked only leadership and sup-
plies to make them a formidable threat at the German rear.
The story of the guerrilla warfare that developed against this bacl{-
ground and formed a kind of "second front" even before the Anglo-
American landing in Normandy has been obscured and indeed distorted
by the publicity given it in the Soviet press. Insofar as it is possible to
judge on the basis of insufficient data, the Inovenlent only gradually
and reluctantly fitted into the Soviet pattern which, to a large extent,
it finally assumed. The claim that the Soviet agents had created it is
unwarranted, and, in fact, the credit should be given to the Gern1ans
thenlsel ves.
Soviet protestations to the contrary, it is doubtful that the Conl-
munist leaders had succeeded in, or even thought of, leaving any
kind of organized anti-German underground in Belorussia before their
frantic flight. But it is true that this was one of their first thoughts
as soon as they reached personal safety. In July 1941, P. Ponomarenko,
first secretary of the Communist Party of Belorussia, was made chief
of the general staff of the guerrilla movement, with headquarters in
Moscow, and General Moculski became his chief assistant. Several
schools were hastily organized to prepare squads of saboteurs and
spies. The Communist Youth (I(olnsomol) of Belorussian and Ukrain-
ian nationality of both sexes were drafted fr0111 colleges and nlilitary
units, and subjected to two months' intensive training before being
sent in groups of three, five, or seven to the German occupied areas.
From former students of one such school, we know that organiza-
tion of the guerrillas was not in their curriculum at that stage. The third
secretary of the Communist Party of Belorussia conducted political
indoctrination, while technical instruction was in the hands of Army
and NKVD experts; these taught courses in "demolition and explo-
sives, liaison, report, and handing over of intelligence." Women were
instructed to infiltrate German offices as typists, interpreters, cleaning
women, cooks, even mistresses. Spying was not their only job. Along
with the men, they were to commit "all kinds of sabotage," including
"acts of terrorism," and to see to it that "the rear of the enemy was

THE GUERRILLA WARFARE 193
paralyzed at any cost." But the agents thus instructed were forbidden
to engage in any propaganda work or to expose themselves by main-
taining contact with the guerrillas or other subversive groups; on the
contrary, they were to pose as the most ardent German collaboration-
ists and to provoke "the most drastic repressions upon the peaceful
populations in order to stir their animosity and hatred for the Ger-
mans." "We would choose the quietest settlement, with a population
loyal to the occupants," relates a former student; "then we would kill
a German soldier, or we would mine the railroad in the vicinity; the
Germans would retaliate upon the whole village, and the peasantry
learned a cruel lesson." 2
According to some reports, 4,650 saboteurs and spies from such
schools were sent to Gern1an-occupied Belorussia in the fall of 1941.3
The following groups were also secretly dispatched to the German
rear, each having its own assignment: military intelligence, NKVD
agents, and Party instructors, with the task of reviving whatever had
been left of the local I(omsomol clubs. 4 Available Gern1an reports, how-
ever, mention hardly any acts of sabotage or terrorism in the winter
of 1941. Until Christmas, for instance, a large German ammunition
dump in the city of Smolensk. - where, according to some later Soviet
reports, the underground had been particularly active - was guarded
by only two men. 5 For some time, Soviet spies and saboteurs were
lone wolves lacking popular support, and many were denounced, ar-
rested, and shot before they could do any harm to the occupants.
In 1942 the tide began to turn. The Soviet agents had infiltrated
some offices, particularly the political police, in considerable numbers.
Denouncing their opponents as "Comn1unists," they gained the confi-
dence of the Germans. They played a game in which they couldn't
lose; the more cruelly they dealt with the population, the more evident
their German loyalty would be. The people recognized the Soviet
hand at once, yet complaints were of no avail. Then, fear closed their
mouths. The agents became still more daring and planned their activi-
ties on a larger scale. Acts of sabotage multiplied while the blame was
laid upon the local population. Soon the "terrorist squads" ventured
into the larger cities, blowing up Gern1an offices and attacking German
officials. In 1943, they dynamited the Gestapo dining hall in Minsk.
In retaliation Generalk.ommissar Wilhelm Kube ordered wholesale
execution of "the inhabitants of two Minsk streets." Two weeks later,
on September 22, Kube himself was k.iIIed by an explosion in his bed-
room.o He was replaced by SS General von Gottberg, "far more sadistic
and cruel than Kube ever was" - and a reign of terror descended
upon Belorussia. Even German officials protested that "strongly anti-
Bolshevil{ people, or at least people sympathetic to the Germans, or
neutral," were being shot and hanged, and warned Berlin that "the

194 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
psychological effect of the reprisals was detrimental." A Propaganda
Ministry agent reported that "the most loyal elements in the popula-
tion now reasoned thus: if we stay with the Germans, the Soviets will
probably shoot us when they return; and if they don't come back, the
Germans will shoot us anyway." 7 This was exactly what the Soviet
secret agents had been working for. More people were fleeing to the
woods. Soviet contacts had been established and, in a few forest re-
gions, guerrilla activities already raged.
Overwhelming evidence supports the view that the first guerrillas
in Belorussia were nonpolitical groups, 'each merely fighting for its own
physical survival. s They preyed upon the local peasantry long before
they turned their arms against the Germans. A few typical stories may
be quoted:
Until March 1942, everything was quiet in the village of Hlybokae, l\1ogi-
lev province. . . Many Red Army men, surrounded by the Germans in the
summer of 1941, had settled down as if they were natives. In Hlybokae
there were seven such men. When the collective was divided up, each was
granted a plot. Some of them married into the local families. . . But in
March the Germans ordered all former soldiers to appear at the mustering
points. Soon the news spread that those who had heeded the order were sent
into special camps where they were brutally treated, tortured by hunger,
with mortality soon reaching horrifying proportions. No one went any more
to the assembly points. Then the Germans began searching the villages, and
wherever they discovered a soldier, they burned down the farmhouse and
took away the cattle. There was only one thing for the hunted men to do-
take to the woods lest the whole village be made responsible for them. In the
woods they found arms abandoned by the Red Army. Thus they became the
first guerrilla groups in Mogilev province. 9
In December 1941, a German soldier killed a native on his way back
from a sawmill which was used by the Germans; his comrades attacked
the Germans but were mowed down by machine guns; all but one of the
group were killed. The next day the Germans took seven men - all the
males between twelve and sixty in our small village - and shot them. The
news spread like lightning, and this was the push needed to start the guerrilla
movement in our region [Smolensk] .10
Other stories from the Polock, Vitebsl{, Minsk, Slonim, and Lida
regions confirm the point that the sole objective of the fugitives was
to stay out of German hands. "There had not been any cells left be...
hind by the Reds to form the guerrilla groups; men in the woods simply
struggled for survival, trying to stay alive and not doing much else."
At first, they did not even have to resort to plundering, since the peas-
ants of the very villages where they had been residents provided them
with clothes and food. 11 When they grew too numerous, they began to

THE GUERRILLA WARFARE
195
raid the villages in search of food. The dismayed peasantry nicknamed
them lesaviki (wood demons) and turned to the Germans for protec-
tion. But, as 10I1g as the "wood demons" preyed only upon the natives,
the Germans "paid no attention to their complaints." 12 The fugitives
began to attack the isolated Germans only after they had gathered
substantial strength. To better evaluate the situation after the first
year 'of occupation, one must distinguish between (I) the areas under
full German control, (2) the areas contested by the guerrillas and the
Germans, and (3) the areas which eventually fell under full control
of the guerrillas.
Testimonies agree that in the regions firmly held by the Germans,
material conditions had somewhat improved as compared with the
prewar period. In some areas, "the peasants actually became wealthy,
so far as they could within the space of a couple of years." 13 And in
the remote forest areas a certain modus vivendi had been worl(ed out
between the guerrilla leaders and the local peasantry. The situation
was infinitely worse in the contested regions. As the guerrilla warfare
developed, more Belorussian territory fell into this category every
month.
One must distinguish, for the sake of the record, between the vari-
ous guerrilla groups. Roughly, they fell into four classes: Jewish, Na-
tionalist, independent or "Green," and Soviet. The Jewish camps in
the forests have been mentioned before. 14 There, the first guerrilla
groups originated and their independent formation had been "largely
due to the difficulties Jewish fighters encountered when they sought to
join non-Jewish groups." Whether or not their difficulties were due to
the impact of German anti-Semitic propaganda is disputable. There
were instances where the Jewish bands were attacked by 110n-] ewish
guerrillas, and also many cases where Jewish "family camps" were
protected by non-Jewish guerrillas who "even assigned food fOf them
from their own stocks." 15 Evidence exists that the Jewish armed bands
wanted to preserve their separate identity; attacks against them were
often made by those who coveted their arn1S. Later, some of the Jewish
bands were enrolled in the Soviet units but tried to preserve their
autonomous organizations. Their total strength has been estimated at
10,000-11,000. About 3,000 were killed in battle, and the large ma-
jority of those who survived left Belorussia for Western Europe after
the war .16
Little evidence exists of the Belorussian "nationalist" guerrillas.
In fact, available German documents do not mention them at all.
Their "nationalism" must have been so mild that the Jewish historians
invariably refer to them as Russian rather than Belorussian. 17 The
Soviet sources distinguish between the Russian and Belorussian groups,
but treat the latter as entirely integrated into the Soviet pattern. 18

196 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
Finally, the Belorussian nationalists collaborating with the Germans
treated all the guerrillas as "anti-Belorussian - robbing, murdering,
and burning the tortured Belorussian land." 19 On the other hand,
Belorussian literature in exile frequently refers to various, indeed very
sizable groups which were allegedly fighting both the Germans and
the Soviets "for a free and independent Belorussia." Attempts are
even made to describe the entire guerrilla warfare as "the fight for a
Belorussian ideal." 20 For this, material evidence is lacking. The most
frequently repeated story is that of a large group (about 18,000 men
[?]) under the command of a man nicknamed the Black Cat, said to
be a Belorussian native, formerly an officer in the Polish army. "We
always said spadar, never tova1 I i'Sc," says a man who pretends to have
served with the group. "We accepted only Belorussian ex-Soviet sol-
diers, and told the Russians to form their own units and to operate
in Russia rather than in Belorussia." Yet the story contains no refer-
ence to "Belorussian ideology" and mentions no Belorussian national
emblems or insignia used by the guerrillas; the aim of the group was
defined as merely "to be neither German, Soviet, nor Polish." 21
This, apparently, had been the position of the large majority of
guerrillas until 1943-44. Nor could all of them be called "guerrillas"
in the proper sense of the word. Lokot county, Briansl{ province, for
instance, with a population of 35,000, declared itself a self-governing
unit, paying tribute to the Germans on condition that they leave it
alone. Since the "republic" paid taxes regularly and fully, the Germans
complied, and when the Soviet guerrillas invaded the county, they were
turned back by the natives' own "self-defense" arlny. A similar situa-
tion developed near Polock in the region designated by the Germans
as "Bezirk Z" where a peasant, Zuev, had become the self-styled leader
of several "independent" villages. 22 Often "the whole or parts of vil-
lages" would move to the woods. These groups - the Greens - "were
most prevalent in the Belorussian forests at the end of 1943." They
could neither articulate nor promote any political program and appar-
ently all they wanted was to be left alone. The Soviet guerrillas avoided
fighting them so as not to push them into the German camp. The
Greens called themselves "guerrillas" but - cave men of modern times
- they used arms only when attacked in their dugouts. After the war,
"most of them returned to their villages, while some remained in the
woods." 23 There were also "wild" units fighting the Soviets, the Ger-
mans, and one another at the san1e time. These, however, squeezed as
they were between the two calnps, did not last long. According to one
native observer:
People of military age, deprived of the chance to live and work in peace.
felt lost and betrayed. They were anti-Stalin, and wanted to join hands with

THE GUERRILLA WARFARE
197
tho£e who \vere fighting him. They enrolled in the anti-guerrilla units but,
realizing that they had to fight for the Germans and against their own people,
deserted and joined the anti-Gennan guerrillas. Since most guerrillas did not
fight for the people either, our men would desert again. . . Thus many young
people changed sides several times. 24
The Soviets, by offering military and medical supplies, trained lead-
ership, and pardon for political sins, set out to lure the larger guerrilla
groups into the Soviet camp. For the bands whose supplies had run
short there was no choice. From then on, the task. of the Soviet instruc-
tors was threefold: to draft the largest possible number of people into
the guerrilla units, to coordinate and direct their anti-German opera-
tions, and to convince the population that, in spite of German occupa-
tion, it had again C0111e under the Soviet grip.
Tons of leaflets were flown into the country and broadcasts in
Belorussian from Moscow were heard daily. Promises were made that
there would be no collective farming after the Soviet victory. Indeed,
the V oroshilov guerrilla brigade let the peasants in its area of control
work. without any collective system. Rumors spread that freedom of
religion had been granted by Stalin; that the United States and Great
Britain were helping the Soviets; and that, apparently, the German
rout had begun on all fronts. The rumor-mongering was effective.
l\1any who had formerly feared the Soviets now joined the guerrillas
to be on the safe side. And the hope also grew that things might indeed
change after the war. 25 In the meantime, villages were raided and
people forced to go with the guerrillas. Those who refused were shot
as (( German agents."
The most effective technique of recruitment was the provocation
of German reprisals. "One would spy out one or two German soldiers,
bestially n1utilate and kill them, then freeze the corpses, often in the
posture of the Nazi salute, and stand them at road intersections. The
enraged 5S would seek revenge on the nearby villages: shoot innocent
people, burn then1 alive in their huts, confiscate cattle, and devastate
the entire land." Usually, for one Gerlnan killed the SS retaliated on
one hundred natives: "They would throw the hostages into a barn and
burn them alive - men, W0111en, and children," related the escapees. 26
"Like lightning, the news spread allover the region. . . Seized with
panic, people fled to the woods. There the Soviet agents would find
them, curse the Germans with them, and tell then1 that Comrade Stalin
knew their misfortunes and would not leave thelTI without food, medical
help, and arms to defend themselves. . . Then, at night, a Soviet plane
would drop a few n1edical kits and a lot of leaflets full of hints that
life under the Soviets would be different after the war." And the guer-
rilla units swelled with new recruits. 27

19 8 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
The plan was simple. All the Soviets needed was German coopera-
tion, and the Germans obliged. "In the Briansk forests, between Kursk
and Gomel, all the villages were burnt down," notes an observer. "All
we found were ashes and corpses. The remaining population lived in
'dug-holes.' This was the result of a major antiguerrilla action in
1943." 28 Large areas were likewise de'vastated in many other parts of
the country. The number of fugitives so increased that entire guerrilla
"brigades," "divisions," and even "armies" were formed, and new
leaders emerged, such as Deduska (Grandpa), Dziabo, Maskalina,
and so on. Near Polock, it is said, "six counties were in their hands,
and they bragged that they had an army of 20,000 men; besides, they
had an airfield and direct contact with Moscow." 29 In 1943-44, the
total number of Belorussian guerrillas was estimated to be in the vicin-
ity of 200,000 to 300,000.80 As to their moral strength, an observation
has been made that "about 10 per cent were motivated by a political
ideal (idejnye); 25 per cent became patriotic under the influence of
the war, especially the young; adventurers and opportunists made up
15 per cent; people who were recruited by violence and terror, 45 per
cent; and the common criminal element accounted for 5 per cent."
These figures, of course, have no statistical value, but it is significant
that they were supplied by a forIner antiguerrilla agent in the German
service. a1
Soviet control tightened in the winter of 1943. The guerrilla brigades
which had been named "Suvorov," "Kutuzov," "Revengers," "Vic-
tory," and so on were now ordered to change their names to "Stalin,"
"Voroshilov," and so forth. Curiously, no name bearing reference to
Belorussian history or culture was ever used or suggested. A recon-
structed brigade might have from six hundred to several thousand
people and, as a rule, was headed by a commander and a political
commissar (politruk) in Soviet military uniform. The members had
to take an oath of loyalty.82 Criticism of the Soviet Union was pun-
ished. Printing presses were set up in the woods and in city cellars,
and special squads were formed for distributing literature. Many leaf-
lets appealed to Belorussian "patriotism"; the blood kinship of the
Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Russian peoples was emphasized; and
nationalists collaborating with the Nazis were denounced as "traitors
to the Belorussian people." But it is somewhat difficult to explain why
the appeals were invariably printed in the Russian, not in the Belo-
russian language. 83
By the end of the year, more instructors had come from the Soviet
Union. Discipline improved. In the winter, larger operations began,
often on direct orders from Moscow. NKVD control groups were at-
tached to the guerrillas' command to check on the loyalties of the
leadership and on the accuracy of their operations reports. The guer-

THE GUERRILLA WARFARE 199
rillas attacked German lines of communication and supplies, yet open
battles were avoided as before. Individual terrorism now concentrated
)
on collaborationists rather than on the Germans themselves. ('The
indifferent, complacent rural leadership" was scheduled for liquidation
on the theory that the spectacular removal of their kin right from
their own midst would horrify the people more than the n1urder of
former nationalist emigres, whose personal ties with the country had
been severed for many years. Indeed, this brand of terror did prove
more successful in maintaining the population under the spell of Soviet
might. 84
Between Soviet Terro1ism and German Repression
In the forest areas, the peasant was caught between the German
anvil and the Soviet hammer. When he failed to deliver his quota to
the GerlTIanS, his farm was set afire and he was killed for being a
guerrilla. On the other hand, the guerrillas exacted their own toll, and
if he tried to conceal anything from them, his house was burned down
and he was shot as a German agent.
People secretly threshed the harvest in small amounts at a time:
"They would put a sheaf in a sack, and beat it with sticks in the
home." Grinding the grain was another problem: the mills were under
German control, though often raided by the guerrillas. "Sometimes the
grain taken to the mill would be entirely lost, to the Germans or to
their enemies." Beginning with the fall of 1943, says a peasant from
Mogilev province,
there seldom was a day when the guerrillas did not show up in the village,
make the round of the houses, grab eggs, chickens, pork; sometimes they
would take away pigs and sheep, even our horses with carts; they would take
our last coat and shoes, force us to make "moonshine" and, finally, they
began to slaughter our cows. They were not always the same groups of
guerrilla robbers. The local groups, from the forest, robbed the homes if
there were no guerrillas in the families. And the groups from other places,
passing through, robbed everybody. . . The anti-guerrilla units, in turn,
plundered and burned the houses of those who had left with the guerrillas.
Anyone who was spared by the Germans would be liquidated by the other
side as suspected of intelligence with the enenlY. . . Sometimes two groups,
the guerrillas and the anti-guerrillas, would invade the community at the
same time. Ignoring each other they would camp at opposite ends of the
village, slaughter the peasants" cattle, cook and eat it, drink "moonshine,"
play music, sing and dance. Only by listening to the words of their songs
could one guess that these were groups of different political persuasion. 86
"Our village," says another informant, "was for a while in German
hands in the daytime and in guerrilla hands at night. From then on
nobody wanted to be a starosta. So it was decided to alternate the

200 BELORUSSIA: THE Jl.IAI(ING OF A NATION
position, and somebody new was to be starosta every week. Later, the
job was in almost daily rotation." 36 In other places, each resident was ,
to be starosta for one or two weeks at a time, so as to minimize per-
sonal risk. The position became largely symbolic, with no responsibility
involved: "the Germans Itnew it, but t?ere was nothing they could do
about it." Neither could the guerrillas, nor did they want to; the vil-
lage was deprived of authority and that was precisely their aim. 31
Thunderous Soviet statistics notwithstanding,38 the damage the
guerrilla warfare inflicted upon the German occupation power was
hardly worth its cost to the country in n1en and property. "In 1944,
there were 6,000 cows in our district; and only 500 by 1945," says a
report. Many villages were left "with just one cow for every four or
five farms and one horse for every two or three farms." In some guer-
rilla areas, the peasants lost all their pigs and sheep, and "not a single
hen, or cow, or horse was left." Often the peasants themselves slaugh-
tered their cattle, "just to save it from the robbers.)) Over vast regions,
entire settlements were leveled and the people went underground lit-
erally: "Some found peace in graves, and others lived in dug-holes like
tracked and hungry animals." Men did not shave for two years:
"Beards helped them to appear older and conceal their age from both
the guerrillas and the Germans." 39
In most areas a man had no choice but to join either a guerrilla
or an anti-guerrilla group. The decision was fathered by necessity.
With the growing feeling that the Germans were losing the war, sup-
porting the Germans or the guerrillas was largely a matter of expedi-
ency, since it was not possible to protect one's self from both at the
same time.
Besides the German SS troops, the anti-guerrilla forces consisted of
"Russian units" made up of former prisoners of war, police, and rural
"self-defense" groups sponsored by the local German authorities. At
first, the decision to forIn anti-Soviet volunteer units was apparently
up to the local German commander; he would pick a few Soviet officers
in a P.O.W. camp and give them some freedom in selecting the men. 40
Later, General Bernhardt was made inspector of such units for the
H eeresgruppe JI.([itte and it seems that, all together, sixteen battalions
were fornled. Apparently there was little unifornlity in their organiza-
tion: in the Orsha camp, for instance, they wore Soviet insignia of
rank; in Bobruisk., Gern1an stars; some units had no flags, others had
both the Russian tricolor and the German flag; still others reintroduced
the epaulettes of the Russian Imperial Army, replacing stars with
rhombs. The command was in Russian hands, but German liaison non-
coms were attached to each unit (Zahlmeister, supplies, interpreter,
and communications). The volunteers called their units Russkaja

THE GUERRILLA WARFARE
201
Narodnaja Armija (RNNA), but the Germans ignored that name and
simply assigned numbers to the individual battalions. Separate bat-
talions, sometimes even smaller units, were attached to German forma-
tions.
Originally, the RNNA units seemed to be intended for intelligence
purposes and diversionary activities in the Soviet rear. In fact, parts
were transferred to the guerrilla areas where, known as J agdkom-
11zandos (Hunting Squads), they were n1ixed with German units. In
1942-43, a German military school was set up in Briansk for former
Soviet officers who, after graduation, were sent into units fighting the
guerrillas, and often found themselves subordinated to German non-
coms (F eldwebel). From the summer of 1943 on, single battalions be-
gan to be shifted to the West, where they were given full German uni-
fOriTIS, and Gerlnan officers tool{ over the con1mand.
The Jagdkoll1mandos were formed mostly of strangers to the
country, and they often treated the population worse than the Germans
did; although there also \vere son1e Belorussian natives, their treat-
ment of their own kin was hardly any better. 41 Some Ortskom-
mandanten had special watch battalions of volunteers wearing good
German uniforms with distinctive red patches (Petlicy) on the collar,
and Sturn1-Kon1panien forn1ed with local n1en. There also were units
under German comn1and for the special task of convoying transports,
guarding railway tracks, bridges, and so on, and these wore green
German uniforms. In the fall of 1943, an attelnpt was made to organ-
ize the rural self-defense (Wehrdoerfer); men were supplied with some
rifles and an1munition and left virtually uncontrolled, but they proved
of low fighting ability and, several months later, their organization was
discontinued.
Everything considered, the antiguerrilla forces looked well organ-
ized, adequately equipped, and nUll1ericaily strong. Yet it seemed that
the stronger they grew, the wider and bolder the guerrillas became.
Presently, the guerrilla warfare turned into a full-scale civil war, with
the same kind of people fighting on each side. For ll1any, fighting was
practically the only way of n1aking a living and of protecting their
families in the ravaged, charred, and divided land. There was no special
animosity between the opposite camps, and thousands changed sides
time and again. Testimonies abound that entire antiguerrilla units
were formed of former guerrillas and that entire antiguerrilla units,
in turn, went over to the guerrillas. "When we operated in guerrilla
territory," says a former Jagdkommando, "there was an unwritten law
that we and the guerrillas left each other in peace." Actually, both
sides were living off the country, ransacking what was left of the rural
economy.42
The Germans were confused, clislnayed, and finally alarmed. In

202 BELORUSSIA.' THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
the east, their arn1ies were retreating. Belorussia was again close to
the front, and maintaining order had become more imperative than
ever. The high-handed methods had proved ineffective. The situation
called for a drastic change of policies if there were still to be a chance
of regaining the people's confidence and cooperation. 43
On June 3, 1943, Rosenberg issued a decree permitting private
ownership of land by the peasants. The concession was qualified by
conditions which nullified its effect. In' July, Generalkommissar I(ube
set up an informal consultative body composed of the "most active
and loyal Belorussians" of his own choice. Known later as Muzy
daverra (Men of Confidence), or Vertl'auenrat, this group had little
influence and, in fact, nothing is known of its activities during that
period. It was only after the assassination of Kube on September 22
that the new boss of Belorussia, General von Gottberg, after long
hesitation and apparently without orders from Berlin, decided to play
the card of Belorussian patriotisln in the antiguerrilla warfare. He
called the Vertrauenrat in the first forlnal session on December 2, and
asked for advice. On Decen1ber 2 I, he issued an amnesty to all the
guerrilla fighters who would put down their arms. The population was
urged to fight for "order and peace" - not that of the Germans but
their own. Orders were given to help the peasants with the spring
sowing. Taxes were lowered and other grants 111ade, with the result
that within a few weeks "thousand of guerrillas went over to the Ger-
man side, including the commissar of a brigade." 44 Finally, von Gott-
berg called on Astrouski to form a sort of "central Belorussian author-
ity," eventually to take over the civil adn1inistration of the country.
On January 22, I944, a Belaruskaja Central'naja Rada (BCR) was
formed of fourteen members, picked by Astrouski and confirmed by
the Generalkommissar. Their status remained undetermined. The Rada
was supposed to be a consultative body which the Generalkommissar
could call or dissolve at will. On the other hand, it was granted some
powers in handling civic affairs, and was supposed to replace the
Samapomac in the cultural and educational fields. The Rada accredited
"consultants" to various Gebietskommissaren, and soon began to issue
decrees in its own name. It looked as though the country was going to
have a national government. 45
At the BCR's suggestion, a corps of [(raevaja Abarona (Country's
Defense) was set up, wearing the Belorussian white-red-white insignia
on their caps. To nationalists, this was the embryo of the Belorussian
Army, but the Germans hesitated to recognize it as such. In March,
however, a Belorussian National Defense Committee was created. The
Rada called fourteen military classes, and ordered all former officers
of the Polish and Soviet armies into service. Draft evasion was pun-
ished by death. According to some information, "100,000 men were

THE GUERRILLA WARFARE 203
drafted, and 80 battalions formed." 46 But the Germans delayed hand-
ing over arms to them, and large numbers fled over to the guerrillas.
Eventually, a few units were dispatched to the menaced areas, but it
is hard to say how many actually took part in military operations. 47
Observers disagree about the extent to which the appeals to Belo-
russian nationalism had been heeded. In general, the situation was
becoming even more involved and confused. It was not unusual for
a man to work on three or four different sides at once. A case is cited
of a man who was an SD agent; also a n1ember of the Belorussian
nationalist underground, hostile to Astrouski; also a member of the
Rada presided over by Astrouski; also secretly affiliated with the
Russian emigres' nationalist group (NTS); also an agent of a "special
group" of the NKVD; and also the chairlnan of a church committee
in Minsk.. 48 A nationalist writer admits that the Belorussian youth,
educated in Soviet schools, remained "a doubtful asset"; they now
were anti-Communist, of course, but "the normal categories of good
and evil, tenacity and stability in striving for a lofty ideal, the sense
of social responsibility, the moral integrity and certain other charac-
teristics of civilized men, were to a large degree, if not entirely, lacking
in them. . . Unable to adjust themselves, they were strangers in the
new world; they were, therefore, particularly sensitive to the tenets
of Bolshevik propaganda and many, in fact, went over to the Soviet
side." 49
The Second Belorussian Convention
In a desperate move to win popular recognition and support, the
BCR called general elections. The Second Belorussian Convention, 50
representing "all peoples of Belorussia irrespective of race and creed,"
was to reaffirm the principles of Belorussian independence and of
democracy announced twenty-five years before, and to appoint a gov-
ernment responsible to the Rada. Since there was no time for either
an electoral campaign or an organized ballot, a pattern of "corporative
elections" was adopted. The ambiguity of the term was obvious since
no bodies corporate existed in the country, and there were no rules for
groups to qualify for elections. The Germans were not interested, since
they felt that the country was lost anyway.
On June 27, 1944, when the booming of guns at the front could
already be heard, r,039 delegates, 904 men and 135 women, gathered
in Minsk. Forty-eight of them represented the regions cut off from
Belorussia by the Germans; forty-two were emigrants from abroad;
and three were refugees from the USSR. Several small towns sent more
delegates each than some larger cities all together. 51 One might won-
der how the delegates were elected and by whom, were it not known
that, in Belorussian, the term vybl'ac' means both "elect" and "select."

204 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
Indeed, the Credential Committee stated that "I, I 5 I persons were in-
vited (byla zaprosana), of whom only 1,039 were able to come." 52
They called themselves "delegates," a word which had also lost its
meaning since the Soviet Revolution. Whether the assembly adequately
represented the nation is questionable. .It did, however, represent the
most active Belorussian nationalism. By acclamation, Kipel was elected
president; Kasiak and Rahulia, vice-presidents; and Haliak. and
Branavicki, secretaries. Greetings were presented by Astrouski, in
the name of the BCR; by Archbishop Philotheus, Priest Tatarynovic,
and Dzek.uc' Malej in the name of the Orthodox, Roman Catholic,
and Evangelical churches; and by a Mrs. Savenak "in the name of
the Belorussian peasantry, working class, and intelligentsia." In his
opening speech, President Kipel pointed out that the Belorussian as-
semblies that had been called at different times under the Soviets
"were always 40 per cent Jewish" and, consequently, "only two assem-
blies, the First Convention [December 19 1 7] and this Second [June
1944], could be considered as really representing the Belorussian na-
tion." With this the delegates agreed, and the assembly settled down
to work.
Reporting on the work. of the BCR, Astrousl{i admitted that its
organization followed the principle of "Ftihrership," since "the system
of universal, direct, equal, and secret ballot had deceived the hopes of
humanity." Consequently, "the most active and capable persons" were
selected and, for that reason, could not be branded either "self-appointed
leaders" or "German lackeys (chalui)"; indeed, he said, the Conven-
tion was expected to destroy "this vile lie." Astrouski thanl{ed "the
German soldier who tore off the shackles of our slavery," and sadly
acknowledged that practically the whole territory of Belorussia was
ravaged by guerrillas of various denominations, "plundering and
slaughtering our people." The situation had "somewhat improved"
since the organization of the Kraevaja Abarona which, he said, for all
practical purposes, "now is the Belorussian Army." Thanks to the
Germans, he said, the Belorussian battalions were well equipped and
armed at the present moment and, together with the German troops,
"they were now fighting the Stalin bandits." Finally, he said, "a Belo-
russian military school" had been opened on June 15 in Minsk. He
added that the labor draft for Germany continued satisfactorily; in-
deed, the last group of "labor volunteers" had left in May; accord-
ing to his information, the Germans "feed and clothe" the Belorussian
workers very well and, in general, "treat them like their own youth."
From Astrousl{i's report it appeared that little, if anything, had
been done - or could have been done - to bolster Belorussian cultural
and economic life during the German occupation until the BCR was
created. In 1944, schools were handed over by the Generalkommissar

THE GUERRILLA WARFARE 205
to the Rada. Four high schools were opened (Nesviz, Novrogrodek,
Slonin1, Minsk). and there were bigger plans for the following year;
"30 of the best teachers had already been sent to Germany for six
weeks to study the German school system," he said. Moreover, in
February, a Belorussian Cultural Association had been founded "to
take over the direction of cultural institutions, theaters, museums,
libraries, expositions, con1munity halls, etc." In April the BCR initiated
a social security plan to supplement the voluntary work of Samapon1ac
(Mutual Aid).53 Under the German occupation, "Belorussian com-
posers produced 60 new works"; publication of the literary n1agazine
Uzvyssa, suspended under the Soviets, was resumed; and "four col-
lections of verse were printed." A Belorussian "scientific society"
prepared twenty-one new textbooks for elementary and professional
schools, and compiled a Belorussian-Gern1an dictionary.
This, if Astrouski's report was complete, exhausted the cultural
and economic achievements of the country during the years of col-
laboration with the Germans. 54 There was little debate. The Conven-
tion unanimously recognized itself to be "the plenipotentiary and
supreme representative body of the Belorussian nation," and decided
( I) to confirm the declaration of Belorussian independence of March
25, 19 I 8; (2) to repudiate the Belorussian SSR; (3) to denounce all
the treaties and agreements which the USSR and the Polish govern-
ment-in-exile might conclude with third powers or between themselves
in regard to Belorussia; and (4) to declare the BCR "the only legiti-
mate representative of the Belorussian nation at the present time." 55
Contrary to expectations, no question of representative government
was discussed. The Convention adopted the above resolution, and
closed that evening.
The minutes of the Convention leave a strange impression. No
German officials were present, and yet not a word of criticism, however
n1ild, was uttered against theine There were no claims or recommenda-
tions made to the occupation power. Not even a wish to see all the
Belorussian territories reunited at some future time was expressed. 56
Instead, the Convention simply decided "to wire greetings to friendly
governments." The phrase was a euphemism, since everybody knew
who the addressee was. It would seem that the militant spirit of Belo-
russian nationalism had suddenly gone.
Members of the Convention could not of course be blamed if they
sincerely felt that Communism was an even more deadly enemy of
freedom and justice than Nazi colonialism. But they could have had no
doubt that these were the last months, indeed weeks, of German occupa-
tion. No magic of words could stop the debacle. Yet they may have felt
that a national debate at the eleventh hour was a healthy thing. It
could clear the air, release tensions, focus attention on great issues of

206 BELORUSSIA: THE MAltING OF A NATION
Belorussianism, and melt divisionist controversy into a mold of com-
mon conviction. Whatever Belorussian nationalism might say from
the last platform before the curtain fell could have a declarative value,
and this seemed, indeed, the only practical reason for calling the faith-
ful to the battered city of Minsk. .
Yet one is puzzled at seeing how little the assembly did have to
declare. In a phrase or two, as a matter of ritual, the principles of the
Act of Independence (19 18) were restated, with no attempt to instill
new life into the worn-out terms. History was reviewed with accusatory
fingers pointed at Poland and the Soviet Union, while the present situ-
ation was passed over in silence. And so were the burning issues of the
future. The omissions proved more eloquent than the spoken words.
Indeed, there was no vision of a Belorussian nation. The only new idea
with which the assembly wished to enrich the nationalist doctrine was
the cursing of the Jews. This unworthy means was the cheapest way
of paying off the temporary masters of Belorussia,57 but, in the public
opinion, it cost the Belorussian cause something more.
The Convention was not followed by any noticeable change in
the attitude of the people. Later, attempts were made to unfold a
national myth and to make believe that the Convention had begun
(Cto build Belorussian statehood, entrusting the Central Rada with the
administration of the Belorussian state." 58 The BCR was, however, no
longer able to look after even its own affairs. Already the Soviet
armies had crossed the border, pressing the Germans all along the
eastern front.
On June 29, three hundred cadets of the Belorussian military
school, founded only two weeks before, "marched along March 25
Avenue and left the city of Minsk in the direction of Vilna." 59 They
were followed by the BCR fleeing into exile.

14
THE SOVIETS AGAIN
The Soviet-German pact partitioning Poland had been invalidated
by the agreement between the Kremlin and the Polish government-in-
exile on June 23, 194 1 . The Soviets made it clear, however, that they
expected the postwar Polish eastern frontier to be revised in accordance
with the "popular will" expressed in November 1939. Formal Soviet
negotiations with the Allies to this effect dragged on since January
1944. 1 The London Poles resisted, but Moscow had severed relations
with them April 26, 1943, and there were the Moscow, eventually the
Lublin, Poles who proved more accommodating. '''ith the latter, an
agreement was signed on August 16, 1945, recognizing the Curzon
line - "with deviations from three to nineteen miles in favor of Poland"
- as the permanent boundary between Poland and the USSR. 2 The
Bialystok-Sokolka-Augustowo-Hainawka area was cut off from Belo-
russia and handed over to the Poles. The Poles and the Belorussians
abroad protested, albeit from entirely opposite points of view, but the
agreement, after a few minor adjustments, was confirmed in July 1948.8
Although both Moscow and Warsaw had declared it final, the boundary
was somewhat modified again on May 22, 1951, this time in favor of
the Soviets. 4 Finally, the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic gained
31,132 square miles of western territories, coming out of the war 62
per cent larger than before.
The Belorussian state now consisted of twelve provinces - Barano-
viti, Bobruisk, Brest, Gomel, Grodno, Minsk, Mogilev, Molodecno,
Pinsk, Polesie, Polock, and Vitebsk - comprising sixty-six cities,
114 towns, and 175 rural districts. Altogether it covered a territory of
80, 154 square miles with political boundaries "confirmed and guaran-
teed" by the constitutions of both the Belorussian SSR (Article 14)
and the Soviet Union (Article 29). 5
Agreements between the Polish and the Soviet governments pro-
vided for "voluntary migration" of their respective nationals, with the
understanding that "property, both movable and immovable, would
be paid for in accordance with the laws of Poland and of the Belo-

208 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
russian and the Ukrainian SSR's." It was expected that the actual trans-
fer would be carried out between December 1944 and April 1945,
though the time limit was later extended to November I, 1945. 6 How
voluntary the repatriation actually was is an open question. 7 Obviously,
the governments were trying to remove the cause of border conflicts
by creating a neat ethnic demarcation line between the Poles and the
Belorussians. The idea was not entirely new, but the inhuman char-
acter it had of necessity assumed wherever it had been tried perhaps
explains the cloal{ of secrecy that had enveloped the Soviet-Polish
plan. 8
According to different sources, there were about one million Poles
in Belorussia,t) and perhaps half a million Belorussians in Poland. 10
From the fragmentary information that can be gleaned from the Soviet
and Polish presses it appears that by the spring of 1946 only 5,000
Poles had been repatriated,t1 while about 9,000 Belorussians (Cwere
moved" from Poland to the Soviet Union. 12 No more information has
been published since. In the summer of 1947, the rumor spread abroad
that the peasantry in the Bialystok area had revolted; General Paszkie-
wicz, it was said, quelled the revolt with the assistance of the MVD
who surrounded and liquidated the insurgents seeking refuge on Soviet
territory. Altogether, it would seem, 30,000 Belorussians had been
transferred up to that date and "about 500,000 still were living under
the Polish rule." 13 The causes and extent of the failure are a matter
for speculation. Indications exist, however, that the plan was not dis-
carded; it only assumed new directions, the whole impact of which is
not yet l{nown outside the USSR.
The Belorussian demography has become a riddle. Apparently, the
Jewish and Polish minorities, which made up nearly 15 per cent of t.he
total population before the war, were almost entirely eliminated; 14
the number of civilian war casualties has been estimated at over two
million;15 the birth rate dropped greatly between 1943 and 1946,
and the mortality rate must have continued high for some time; 16
mass deportations of the natives whose Soviet loyalties were suspect
have been reported at different times,t7 and thousands of loyal Belo-
russian families were transferred as colonists to East Prussia. Is More-
over, tens of thousands of Ostarbeiter who had been forced to go to
Germany during the war and other thousands who willingly left the
country with the German troops remained in exile; 19 instead, large
numbers of immigrants from other parts of the Soviet Union appeared
in the country, primarily in the urban areas. 20 Although no statistical
data are available, one may safely assume that (I) the total population
of the BSSR is below its prewar level, and the rural areas remain con-
siderably depopulated; 21 and (2) the ethnic composition of the nation
has changed, and the proportion of Belorussian-speaking natives must

THE SOVIETS AGAIN
20 9
have fallen far below the optimistic estimates of nationalist writers
abroad. 22
War Devastation
The war devastation was appalling. "During six months . . . I
traveled from one end of this republic to the other, and I can only
think of it as the most devastated territory in the world," writes an
American observer who visited Belorussia two years after the libera-
tion, "The ruins extend over the length and breadth of thousands of
square miles . . . Minsk itself is go per cent destroyed . . . The
estimate is that it will take fifteen years to rebuild Minsk. All the lesser
cities were at least as badly wrecked. Thus, according to official figures,
Vitebsk is 95 per cent destroyed. I have been there and would judge
that estimate to be correct." 23 Other testin10nies agree. Acres of build-
ings were flattened out in the cities and towns, where four families
out of every five lived in shacks built of debris or had fled to the
woods. 24
Rural areas were turned into wasteland. "The Nazis completely
devastated 9,200 villages; they carried off two million heads of cattle,
three million pigs, and three million sheep." 25 Two years after the
war, the collective farm people still "lived largely in 'homes' that were
little more than holes dug in the earth covered by a thatched roof
(zemlianki)." 26 Altogether, "1, 21 5,000 houses and farm buildings"
were destroyed 27 and "more than 3,000,000 people rendered home-
less." 28 In such districts as Lelcicy, Asvej, Suraz, Rosony, October,
and others, "practically everything was leveled to the ground; in the
Lelcicy district, for instance, only 32 houses still stood by some miracle
out of 7,500 that existed before." 20 The roads were unusable, com-
munications disrupted, industrial and farm equipment destroyed, and
the economy had returned to the Stone Age.
Whether the German and the Soviet armies or the native guerrillas
had been responsible for most destruction was an academic question:
to the people, the housing, clothing, and food problems stood as terrible
realities. "Eighty-five out of every 100 industrial establishments," and
"all machine and tractor service stations," were destroyed. 30 The coun-
try lost "70 per cent of all horses, 77 per cent of the cattle, 92 per cent
of the pigs, 83 per cent of its sheep"; "poultry and beehives were
entirely annihilated"; "the sown area decreased 40 per cent, the pro-
duction of potatoes fell off 50 per cent, and that of flax, 85 per cent." 31
According to the Soyiet press, "the Germans had ruined and
plundered 1,136 hospitals, clinics, and dispensaries, or over 75 per cent
of the prewar total of the republic." 32 "With particular vandalism,
the fascists destroyed monuments of the material and spiritual culture
of Belorussia, its scientific, educational, and other cultural institutions";

210 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
they "robbed the Belorussian Academy of Sciences of its most valuable
historic documents and books; burned the Lenin State Library; utterly
devastated the palace of Prince Paskevic-Erivansky in Gomel, which
had been designed by Quarenghi and had been one of the loveliest
buildings in the republic; they looted or destroyed the finest exhibits
of the state art galleries . . . burned theaters, museums, research
institutes . . . completely laid waste 5,200 and damaged more than
10,000 schools . . . The Soviet intelligentsia was systematically per-
secuted and liquidated . . . many outstanding scholars, teachers, medi-
cal doctors, artists, were killed." .sa Soviet sources estimated that "direct
losses inflicted by the invaders amounted to seventy-five billion rubles";
in other words, they "equalled the national income of the Belorussian
SSR for forty years" [sic] .84 Evidently, the rehabilitation of the coun-
try required an effort far beyond the national capacity and could not be
carried out without assistance.
For more than a year, mine fields kept considerable acreage out of
production, in the eastern provinces as much as 20 to 30 per cent. By
the fall of 1945, however, 20,000 volunteers had cleared 3,000 mine.
fields and removed about ten million mines and unexploded shells";
three more regions remained to be demined before the end of the year. 35
The USSR poured money, technical equipment, and machinery into
Belorussia, and the manpower problem was solved by establishing slave
labor camps, either moved westward from other parts of the Union or
filled on the spot with the repatriated Ostarbeiter from Germany.36
Later, it was emphasized that "had it not been for the Soviet system
and the fraternal help of other peoples of the USSR, Belorussia would
have been held bacl{ many decades in its development." 37
One may wonder what the "developlnent" would have been with-
out the whole trainloads of food, clothing, medical supplies, and other
necessities of life received from Russian War Relief and UNRRA.88
After 1948, a cloak of Soviet boasting descended upon the scene, and
it became impossible to follow the situation realistically.89
Statistics and Realities
In flagrant contradiction to the accounts of the wholesale devasta-
tion during the war, official statements were made that "no one in cities
and villages would be compelled to live in dugouts by the autumn of
1944 [sic]"; 40 that "I I ,500 elementary and secondary schools had
already been opened" in 1944-45; 41 that, "although the medical and
sanitary services had not reached the high level of prewar days they
were adequate to assure the population of essential medical care" in
December 1944; 42 and so forth. The statements were made primarily
for foreign consumption. On the domestic scene, it was found necessary
to devise a Five Year Plan (1946-1950) for the republic, providing for

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THE SOVIETS AGAIN
211
a federal investment of 6,950,000,000 rubles in construction and re-
pairs. The plan also called for an industrial output of 16 per cent
above the 1940 level, the cultivation of 13,086,300 acres of land, a
cattle herd of 2,800,000 head, some 770,000 horses, and the cOll1pletion
of 29,062,800 square feet of dwelling space, as well as for more schools
than before the war.
Five years had not passed when the plan was said to have been
"most successfully completed." 43 As if by a miracle, "thousands of
wrecked enterprises were operating again; the devastated towns were
raised from the ruins; two n1illion rural dwellers had n10ved fron1 mud
huts and dugouts into newly built homes, and the entire prewar net-
work of cultural and educational institutions had been reestablished;
the grain crop in 1948 was greater than in the prewar year of 1940"
and, a year or two later, "a number of collective farms had an annual
income of a ll1illion rubles or more." 44 The Soviet publications boasted
that in Minsk "today you will find hardly a trace of the frightful
damage wrought during the recent war." 45 Photographs, diagrams,
and every kind of graphs were widely displayed to den10nstrate the
significant fact that "the vitality and strength of the Soviet system
proved strikingly manifest in Belorussia's rapid recovery." 4G When we
turn to other sources, however, or even read the Soviet press Bl0re
carefully, the bright colors darken considerably_
We find that "the con1plete reconstruction of towns and villages
devastated by the Gern1an occupants" actually meant that "320,000
cottages and about 10,000 public buildings (schools, clubs, nurseries,
etc.)" had been built in all Belorussia since the war, which would make
a. rather n10dest average of 60,000 peasant homes and 2,000 other
buildings a year. 47 An American observer noted that these were mostly
('log houses which, except for their rye-thatched roofs, are like the
cabins of our own pioneers." 48 The situation in the rural districts was
particularly bad. Collective farming had been reintroduced imnlediately
after the liberation. More centralization and mechanization had to take
place, since farm labor could not be replenished at once. Particular
pressure was applied in Western Belorussia where not all farnling had
yet been collectivized before the war (Brest, Grodno, Molodecno,
Baranovici, Pinsk, and Polesie provinces) ,49 and a super-collectiviza-
tion of farming in the eastern provinces was decided upon (Vitebsk,
Gomel, l\10gilev, Minsk, Polock, and Bobruisk). There, within a year,
9,771 collective farn1s were amalgamated into 3,279 larger units, so
that the average size of a kolkhoz grew from 78 households, I I I adults,
and 983 acres to 239 households, 342 adults, and 2,693 acres. It was
expected that "the productivity of agriculture would increase, as well
as the individual income of farm workers." 50 Then a plan of further
"rational centralization" involving transfer of farm worl{ers into the

212 BELORUSSIA.' THE MAKING OF A NATION
agrogorods ("farm cities," yet to be built) was suggested - and
dropped after a year of trial and discussion. 51
At the February 1950 session of the Central Committee of the
All-Union Communist Party, dissatisfaction with Belorussian agricul-
ture was expressed, and the Party dispatched 7,5°0 "agitators" to fight
the sluggishness of the peasant. 52 The sessions of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of Belorussia held February 12-14, 1951, and
January 24-28, 1952, were dedicated to the failings of the "agricultural
administration." In June 1952, the Central Committee reprimanded
the Party leadership in Mogilev, Molodecno, Grodno, Baranovici, and
Polock provinces for laxity, and accused Minister of Agriculture
Kostiuk of ineptitude and mismanagement. 53
Since not much truth filtered through the curtain, the real situation
is difficult to evaluate. Sources of information that had been unanimous
in describing the war devastation are highly contradictory as to the
postwar reconstruction. Frequent are the complaints about industrial
mismanagen1ent and waste, shortages of various consumer goods, fail-
ures in the cultural field. Boastful statements of the press are directly
challenged and refuted. 54 Occasionally, an eyewitness who has escaped
to the West will tell a story of his town where "war invalids missing an
arm or a leg or both get about as best they can on hand-made wheel-
plates or aided by any odd piece of wood that can pass for a crutch;
ragged, barefoot children swarm about . . . jumping at our feet to
clean our shoes, or simply begging for something to eat." Or of his
native village, where "the only brick building, former house of the
merchant X, fallen to pieces, is converted into a public school; women
plow the fields, tend the cattle, harvest the grain"; women "load the
wagons and drive then1 by hand to deliver the grain to the govern-
ment." 55 The story is retold by a German prisoner of war who, re-
patriated in 1950, also saw "in the markets and around the churches,
crippled beggars displaying war medals and mutilated limbs; veterans
of wholn there are far too many for the number of hospitals." 56 Some-
times a letter will slip out: "Liuba was married last summer; her hus..
band . . . was an orphan and they still live in a dugout." 57
Perhaps evidence is insufficient to warrant generalizations. But the
impression is that, except for the privileged group, the Belorussian
people still live in the squalid poverty of old, accentuated by the drastic
regimentation of labor.
The wholesale purge of collaborators, natiorialists, even neutrals
(kosmopolity) suspected of divided loyalties, was ordered after the
liberation. How many thousands (some writers say "millions") have
been jailed or deported will perhaps never be known, since even men
who had done a carpenter's job for the Germans received a three-year

THE SOVIETS AGAIN 21 3
term. 58 The aim was twofold: to remove subversive elements, actual
and potential; and to replenish much needed manpower in the slave
labor camps. "Tithin a few months, the guerrilla leaders were either
absorbed into the Party ranks or liquidated. The administrative per-
sonnel was replaced, down to the s111allest collective farm; party loyalty,
not competence, being the first qualification. 59
The government's efforts were next concentrated on "cleaning up"
the Belorussian Communist Party itself. The jobs of First Secretary
of the Central Con1n1ittee and of Chairman of the Council of Ministers,
fused during the war, were again divided. 60 ,"Tithin the Central Con1-
mittee, shadow secretariats for industry, agriculture, and propaganda
were established, and in 1947 the secretaries were made members of
the Belorussian Politburo. Next, the entire register of the Party was
reexamined to weed out those who Inight be untrustworthy. Even the
top leadership was not spared. N. Natalevic, long president of the
BSSR Supreme Soviet and vice-president of the USSR Soviet of Na-
tionalities, was discharged and stripped of the Order of Lenin and
the title Hero of the Soviet Union, and he vanished from the scene in
1948. First Secretary Gusarov was replaced by N. Patolicev in 1950,
and the Council of Ministers was shuffled several times. Furthern10re,
from the Party organ Zviazda a number of senior editors were ousted
"for a dulled sense of party responsibility" (1950).
Leadership in the provincial branches was strengthened, and an
educational drive was started to teach members "how to be good Com-
munists." Persons beyond reform were expelled and new men were
"boldly promoted" to fill the vacancies. The Party n1embership con-
siderably increased. Concurrently, the Komson101 was brought from
264,620 members in 1941 to 511,°9° in January 1952, "organized in
18,002 local clubs." Even the number of Red Pioneers had grown to
800,000, nearly one-half of the school-age population of Belorussia.
"About 3,000 political schools were opened and over 3,500 clubs for
the study of Party history . . . and about 2,000 clubs for the study
of Lenin's and Stalin's biographies . . . Besides, over 200 regional
Party schools were established." 61
Although many schools and clubs were not able to complete their
programs,62 and other shortcomings were publicly acknowledged, there
was evidence that the Party did succeed in tightening up the Com-
munist Belorussian moral fabric loosened by the war. Presently the
Party machine (apparat) assumed proportions and strength formerly
unknown in Belorussia.
National Symbolism
More than merely repressive and organizational methods, however,
was required to curb the spirit of particularism revived under the Ger-

214 BELORUSSIA.' .THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
man occupation. There is evidence that even the much-purged Party
leadership remained "Belorussian" in a sense which, it was feared,
might ultimately be steered to weaken the Communist dictatorship.
This may explain the special emphasis laid, after the war, by the
Kremlin upon the political symbols of separate Belorussian identity
within the Union, while the last 1"eal foundations of Belorussian nation-
hood were being assimilated or downright removed. Flattering local
patriotism went along with exposing "bourgeois nationalism" as a dan-
ger to the Belo1'ussian community rather than to World Communisn1.
In that manner, it was expected, false pride would be satisfied without
detriment to the ultimate Soviet aims, and latent nationalism disarlned.
The Belorussians were reminded that their land "received inde-
pendence as a result of the victory of the Socialist Revolution," and
their rights were reasserted in terms putting the nationalist opposition
(abroad) to shame:
Having entered the Soviet Union voluntarily, together with other sovereign
Soviet republics, Belorussia delegated to the Soviet Government certain of
its powers defined in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR (defense,
foreign trade, financial policy). In all other fields Belorussia exercises state
po,ver independently, fully preserving its sovereign rights. The Republic, as
represented by its highest bodies of state authority, adopts its own Consti-
tution, defines the boundaries of its regions and districts, issues it own laws,
safeguards order and the rights of its citizens, approves the economic plan
and budget of the Republic, directs the banks and industrial and agricul-
tural enterprises that are under the Republic's jurisdiction, directs public
health work, social welfare work, public education, and so on. It has the
right to enter into diplomatic relations with any foreign state. . . Belo-
russian is the state language: instruction in the schools and institutes, as
well as court proceedings, are conducted in Belorussian. 63
In the spring of 1945, Belorussia and the Ukraine were made
members of the United Nations, to the exclusion of all other republics
of the Soviet Union, even the RSFSR itself. In 1949, when the thirtieth
anniversary of Belorussian independence 64 ,vas celebrated, Minsk and
Moscow exchanged greetings as powers equal in dignity, honor, and
rights. Finally, the BSSR was granted a new national flag on December
2 S, 19 S I: the cloth is divided horizontally; the upper two-thirds are
red with the sickle and hammer and the five-pointed star in gold as
before; the lower part is green, and a national ornament, white-red-
white, runs along the staff. 65 Of all other Soviet republics, only the
Ukraine had then been granted a similar privilege. What more could be
added to national symbolism?
Under the Belorussian flag, however, Belorussian identity was
being erased. The history of the country was rewritten to stress more

THE SOVIETS AGAIN 215
en1phatically the unity of the East Slavic world, within which the lead-
ing role of the Russians is glorified. Stalin was described as "the sole
creator" of the' Belorussian Republic. GO Literature has followed the
stereotype established for the entire Soviet Union and is no longer dis-
tinguishable from modern Russian, Estonian, or Armenian writings,
except in the linguistic medium, which is itself being brought closer to
the Russian standard. Scholars and writers were directed to borrow
words only from Russian to express concepts for which no adequate
terms exist in the native idiom. In January 1952 a conference of the
Linguistic Institute of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences was called
to discuss further reforln of spelling and gralnmar. G7 In the meantime,
"38 per cent of all textbooks for Belorussian schools were being sup-
plied by the Russian SFSR." 68
Economic and cultural opportunities were now offered to the
Belorussians all over the vast Soviet empire, but technically Belorussia
still was part of an econolnic region vvith a capital at Sn10lensk, in
the RSFSR. The Soviet defense required unification of the arn1Y and
logistics, and more branches of industry and transport were taken over
every year by the federal management; in their agencies embracing
nearly all the technical ministries of the BSSR, correspondence was
conducted in Russian. The BSSR government decrees now are pub-
lished in both languages, though often in Russian alone. The Commu-
nist Party of Belorussia has two separate organs, Sovetskaja Belorussia,
in Russian, and Zviazda, in Belorussian, while the [(olchoznaja Pravda,
dedicated to agriculture, is printed in both languages. 69 Russian alone
is used in the institutions of higher learning, and quite commonly in
the civil service. There have been reports from the refugees that the
city people avoid using Belorussian in the streets lest they be suspected
of "bourgeois nationalism."
In conformity with Soviet practice throughout the Union, a small
percentage of the adn1inistration are nationals. P. Ponomarenko, the
undisputed boss of Belorussia until 1950, was Ukrainian; the First
Secretary of the Communist Party of Belorussia, N. Patolicev, as well
as his predecessor, N. Gusarov, and the assistant secretaries, Zakudraev
and Brene, are Russians; Moserov, General Secretary of the Belorus-
sian Komsomol, and his predecessor Livencov, are Russians; President
Natalevic of the BSSR Supreme Soviet was replaced by Kozlov, a
Russian. In 1951, the governn1ent of the BSSR was composed "of 22
Russians, one Georgian, one Jew, and nine Belorussians." In March
1952, the Supreme Soviet confirmed the appointments of M. Baskakov,
Minister of State Security (MGB): A. Makarov, Minister of Meliora-
tion; V. Isidorov, Minister of the Building Materials Industry; and
unanimously elected another Russian, J. Boldyrev, President of the
Supreme Soviet of the BSSR.70

216 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
The man in the office may be a Belorussian native, but his direc-
tives will reach him from above through the double hierarchy of state
and Party bureaucracy which is in all matters subordinate to, not co-
ordinate with, the government of the USSR.71
Literature and Science
Belorussian writers and scholars cling to the national coloring of
their otherwise colorless work as the only way left to express their feel-
ing for their land and people. This was encouraged, since they could
thus write "inspiring stories about soldiers returning home . . . about
people laboring to restore the ruined cities and villages, the factories
and collective farms." Indeed, Belorussian scholarship and literature
were praised for having done well by the Soviet Motherland during the
war. 72
But the Kremlin has since voiced a strong warning against the "na-
tionalist virus" creeping again into Belorussian "sciences, literature,
language, and the educational system." The arraignment is worth citing
at length:
a. Textbooks on history "continue to support the myth of a Golden
Age of Belorussian culture fabricated by reactionary nationalists . . .
An age which, as it happens, coincided with Belorussia's subjection to
the Polish and Lithuanian overlords is depicted as a time of unprece-
dented political, economic, and cultural flowering."
b. In some recent works published in the BSSR (1945-1948),
"such second rate writers as Czeczot, Barszczewski, Rypinski, Elski,
Harun, and others, whose activities aimed at the estrangement of Belo-
russia from the Russian revolutionary movement [under the Tsars],
are unduly magnified."
c. M. Klimkovic, a Party member and President of the Union of
Belorussian Writers, "carefully glosses over the reactionary views" of
the nineteenth-century landlord and writer Dunin-Marcinkevic, de-
5cribing him as "a sort of mouthpiece of the downtrodden Belorussian
peasantry" (PolY1nia, nos. 2, 3, 1945).
d. The Central Comn1ittee of the Communist Party of Belorussia
censored the new textbooks of history of Belorussian literature (de-
nounced by the Moscow press in 1947). But "new errors of a bourgeois
nationalist character" have since appeared in the works of writers
"who want at all costs to establish a direct line of succession from
Barszczewski and Rypinski to J. Kupala and J. Kolas."
e. The Nasa Niva is erroneously described as expressing "the
thoughts and feelings of the Belorussian people, its dreams, and aspira-
tions," while it is obvious that "the liberal trends of that period are
irrelevant to the present time."
f. The "Belorussian patriotism" of M. Bahdanovic is glorified

THE SOVIETS AGAIN 217
(Polymia, no. 8, 1947), despite the fact that this poet was "a decadent,"
who wanted Belrussia "to be included in the western sphere of influ..
ence, and who saw nothing good in Russia."
g. Belorussian scholarship tends to include "obscurantists and re-
actionaries," "Polish squires," and the "westerners and liberals of old"
among the sponsors of Belorussian enlightenment, placing them on the
same footing as "the revolutionary leaders of the Stalin epoch"-
which is another proof of "nationalist deviationism."
h. On the other hand, the historic bonds of Belorussian literature
with Russian "democratic literature" of the nineteenth century "are
hardly touched upon"; "the literary debt to Belinsky, Cernysevsky,
Turgenev, Nekrasov, Leo Tolstoy, Maxim Gorky, and other Russian
classics" is not duly acknowledged; the works of Kupala, Kolas, and
other modern Belorussian writers "are not examined and explained in
their relation to the revolutionary and literary history of Russia." 78
Belorussian scholarship and literature were invited "more boldly to
step out of provincial narrowness and to discern in Belorussian national
tradition a closer and more organic relation both to the classic Russian
literature and to the multinational literature of the Soviet Union." 74
This was a directive, not merely a reminder. The aim clearly was
(I) to destroy the historic and literary foundation of Belorussian pa-
triotism and (2) to subordinate what might remain of it to Russian his-
tory and tradition. 75 The Belorussian writers complied; six of them
were awarded the Stalin prizes for literature (Kupala, Kolas, Krapiva,
Kulesau, Brouka, and Tank). It is interesting that all six had once
been champions of the political crime of "liberal nationalisn1." 76 In-
deed, their more recent works are praised for having "actively con-
tributed to the campaign against bourgeois nationalism." Modern Belo-
russian scholarship also has been commended for "articles about the
Belorussian language . . . written in the spirit of Comrade Stalin's
works of genius on linguistics"; for studies of "the Russian cultural
impact on Belorussian literature"; and so on. 77 Statements even were
made that "Belorussian literature has become one of the most effective
tools of Communist education." 78
Yet, in 1951, the writers again were accused of living on "obsolete
ideas about the Belorussian village"; of ignoring "the political and
cultural development of the peasantry, the extroardinary advance in
mechanization of agriculture"; of producing "no works about the work-
ing class, the heroes of industrialization . . . the gigantic achieve-
ments of Communism." It was pointed out that Belorussian writers
never took their heroes outside the state boundaries: "they tell the
reader nothing important about our sister republics, nor about Moscow,
the capital of our Motherland." 79 In fact, it is said, "their ethnographic
isolationism is responsible for narrowing down the subject-matter, for

218 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
archaisms, and for certain ideological deviations . . . often for bor-
rowing ideas and symbols from obsolete Belorussian literature. As a
result, their works are nonpolitical, undated, indeed they might have
been written at any time, even before the Revolution." 80 Again, the
Belorussian Academy of Sciences wa reprimanded,s1 and the Party
organ Zviazda called to account for "lax discipline on the ideological
front." 82
Writers are reminded of their obligations toward the Soviet Mother-
land. However, criticism no longer assumes the proportions of a cam-
paign against deviationism. The Party apparently is sure of its hold. The
country is flooded with printed matter which sets the pitch and purpose
of nationallife. 83 The subject matter is restricted to things of immedi-
ate interest to the power, and the matter-of-fact style is flat and uni-
form. One may wonder whether such literature is or can be "an effec-
tive tool of Communist education." It can be argued, however, that it
is better to have inferior rather than inimicalliterature. 84 Admittedly,
from the police point of view, the flatter the landscape of intellectual,
artistic, and professional life, the safer.
The Intelligentsia and the If/asses
Belorussian intellectuals had been systematically destroyed, and
the social void thus created has been filled by the new intelligentsia of
Stalin vintage. Its likeness to the old intelligentsia is deceptive and
limited, and its Belorussian-speaking segment is relatively smal1. 85
There are some Belorussians who surrendered their patriotism to
the Kremlin in the hope that the amalgam might produce "communist"
Belorussianism rather than Belorussian Communism. By the time they
realized their error they found themselves swallowed up by a system
violently opposed to both the "nihilistic nationalism of Tito" and the
tradi tional nationalism of the past (nacdemovscyna). * The scope al-
lowed to their present energies may not satisfy their ambitions, but the
problem of personal survival stands at the fore. Loyalty to the em-.
ployer is their only security, and symbols of Belorussian sovereignty
carefully displayed by the Kremlin appease the conscience.
Activities have been given nonideological directions and the new
intelligentsia think in today's and tomorrow's practical terms, not in
the patterns and platitudes of a quarter century ago. Technology is
confused with science and a leather briefcase with culture; the mem-
bers are overconfident, arrogant, 'predatory, and obsequious before
power. Today, the intelligentsia are an integral part of the managerial
elite in the so-called classless society which, in fact, is divided into two
distinct classes: the labor class, or the mass of the people (trudia-
* With the derogatory suffix scyna, the term refers, in fact, to the Belorussian National
Democratic Party which is said to have existed underground in the 1920'S.

THE SOVIETS AGAIN 2I9
sciesia), and the leadership, or ruling caste (rukovodstvo), which is
more and more isolated from the masses in both its way of life and its
group consciousness. 86
Since Belorussianism has been for years identified with the Soviet
authority, it would seem that it has become to the natives just another
aspect of Comn1unism. We have seen that the Gern1ans were somewhat
surprised that "nationalism" was "hardly extant" in the occupied area. 87
People's attitudes were motivated more by loyalty to traditional ways
of life than by political concepts. Actually, the nationalist doctrine had
never commanded the loyalty of, or a response from, the Belorussian
masses to any significant extent.
Folklore, the only medium through which the popular mind can
freely express itself never became (as it often did with other peoples)
a propaganda weapon for rallying national sentiment. Belorussian folk
tales describe only specific events in a specific locality. Songs display
no spirit of defiance and national resistance, no feeling of ethnic and
social cohesions; but rather a melancholy spirit of defeat. Full of
social lament and vague aspirations toward a better future, Belo-
russian folklore is concerned with the lot of man, and has no concept
of nation. 88
But it is also evident that the present use of the native idiom in
schools, theaters, radio, the lower administration, and the press, has
become a habit. The systen1atic studies of national geography, natural
resources, history, and literature, albeit in Marxist- Leninist-Stalinist
terms, and the existence of formal attributes of statehood, have
strengthened the feeling of separate Belorussian identity. The evidence
is seen in the ever-growing number of poets and writers from the people
who, strait-jacketed though they are, manage to express their love for
and pride in the native Belorussian land. Apparently, this sentiment
does not alienate a man fro111 other peoples of the Union. The period
of German occupation demonstrated that the natives, whatever their
true feelings toward the Soviet system of government may be, tend to
think and act in terms of the whole USSR, and that, in their minds, the
national sentiment is not necessarily identified with the political doc-
trine of nationalism. 89
Belorussian Nationalism in Exile
The nationalist ideology has found refuge abroad, and there it faces
the problems common to political emigration of all times: to maintain
effective communication with the people at hon1e, and to safeguard its
own doctrinal and organizational vigor.
The new emigration is by far the largest in the history of Belorussia.
Representing a cross-section of the country, these emigrants first settled
in West Germany and eventually scattered over the free part of the

220 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
globe. The exact numbers are not known, since the occupation authori-
ties in Germany did not recognize Belorussian nationality at once. The
displaced persons were treated in accordance with their state allegiance
before 1939, and in order to avoid forcible repatriation, Inany Soviet
Belorussians registered as Polish. In, 1947 the separate Belorussian
identity was finally officially acknowledged, and in 1948 approximately
30,000 persons of Belorussian origin were organized in fourteen sepa-
rate DP camps under the supervision of IRO. Certainly, this figure was
below the real number of Belorussian natives, though it probably rep-
resented correctly the number of those Belorussians who were nation-
ality conscious to any degree. 9o
Leadership in the DP camps was taken over by small groups of in-
tellectuals, predominantly natives of West Belorussia, who were quick
to promote nationalist policy all over the area of Belorussian concentra-
tion. First, socio-cultural activities were organized: churches, schools,
theaters, choirs, and various professional groups; by the end of 1947,
licenses were obtained for publication of Backauscyna (weekly) and
Sakavik (monthly). A Belorussian National Center had been created,
allegedly an interparty organization with a platform embracing all anti-
Soviet trends and groups (November 15, 1946). In the camps the non-
conformists were subjected to pressures sometimes "bordering on ter-
ror." 91 But the leadership soon split, and activities focused in two rival,
indeed openly hostile, groups: the Belorussian National Republic and
the Belorussian Central Rada, the former claiming apostolic succession
from the First Belorussian Convention in 1918, and the latter from the
Second Belorussian Convention in 1944.
The Belorussian Central Rada was evacuated by the Germans from
Minsk in July 1944. On September 23, 1944, it disbanded until called
back to life by Astrouski on March 25,1948. Referring to the decisions
of the Second Belorussian Convention in Minsk (June 27, 1944) as a
national ballot, Astrouski reinstituted the BCR as a government-in-
exile, appointed ministers and diplomatic agents, and appealed to the
Belorussian emigration throughout the world to recognize the BCR as
"the only legitimate representative of the Belorussian nation." Beyond
the restatement of the general principles of the Act of Independence
(March 25, 1918) and wholesale rejection of Communism, however,
the BCR and its organ Belaruskae Slova seemed to offer no instruction
or guidance. 92 This was, in fact, an act of self-assertion rather than of
leadership, and it was intended to counter the claim of the BNR, exist-
ing until 1947 solely in the person of M. Abramcyk,* to be "the only
legitimate representative of the Belorussian nation" abroad. 93
The Constitution of the Belorussian National Republic adopted at
* By a dubious procedure of succession from President P. Kreceuski (died in Prague,
1927) through V. Zacharka (died in Prague, 1943); see p. 263 (note 26).

THE SOVIEl'S AGAIN
221
the Paris Conference on November 28, 1947, stated that the President
was "the only legal supreme representative of the Belorussian people"
(Article 7); he' is to "appoint and dismiss" the Prime Minister and
"approve the composition of the Council of Ministers" responsible
to himself alone (Article 8 g,d); he will himself "appoint his successor
in a political testament," which meant that his was a lifetime office
(Article 9); he will be chairman ex officio of the BNR Rada, the mem-
bers of which he will appoint "from among persons known as politi-
cally staunch, morally and nationally [?] irreproachable" (Article 10),
and he also can expel them from the Rada "for ineptitude, insubordina-
tion, and disloyalty" or for "moral and national [?] misdemeanor"
(Article 12), though not without a trial by their peers (Articles 13-14).
The Rada thus constituted will be a legislative and judiciary body
(Articles 13, 17, 20-22g, 32-37) convening on the President's order
"when there is need," or every six months in any case (Article 23).
The statute is to remain in force until "free elections" have becolne pos-
sible in the Old Country (Article 39).94
The Paris decisions were protested as unconstitutional and undem-
ocratic, and Abramcyk.'s position as dictatorship, sectarianism, and
political trickery.95 Other groups, however, accepted his authority and,
through a series of negotiations, the BNR came to include a somewhat
larger representation. 96 A full government was appointed under Prime
Minister Kacanouski, with some ministers residing in Paris and some
in the United States. 97 The position of the Minister of Finance was left
vacant, and the budgetary problem was solved without him. The sources
of money have never been revealed, but they permitted, among other
things, the maintenance of the BNR organ, Backauscyna, the best
trimmed Belorussian publication abroad, and to equip Abramcyk for
extensive tours in North America and Western Europe where he organ-
ized "BNR Rada Sections."
In 1951, to give momentum to the movement, two orders of merit
and a medal were established for citizens who might "deserve well of
the country," 98 and the BNR began to print postage stamps (not yet
recognized by the World Postal Union). No currency, as far as this
writer knows, has been attempted. But the government made claims to
the territories ceded by the USSR to Lithuania and Poland, and sub-
mitted to the United Nations in November 1950 a memorandum deny-
ing the right of the Soviet delegates to represent the Belorussian na-
tion. 99 Finally, it organized the emigrants of the Christian Orthodox
faith into a Belorussian Autonomous Church, while still leaving the
Catholics to the care of the Vatican. loo
Both the BNR and the BCR claim to have maintained continuous
and effective contacts with the underground groups in the old coun-
try.lOl Astrouski's men speak of "thousands of Belorussian heroes scat-

222 BELORUSSIA: THE MAI(ING OF A NATION
tered in the forests and depths of our country and, almost unarmed,
attacking tanks and armored patrols of the Communist police and
troops." 102 Abramcyk's spokesmen, in turn, claim as many as "5°,000
partisans . . . harrying the Russians" under the command of "a guer-
rilla veteran, General Vituska"; and they furnish proof by awarding
the BNR orders and medals to "two generals, two majors, and three
guerrilla commanders" still fighting the Soviets, as it were, in Febru-
ary 1952.103 The assertions seem boastful, unrealistic, a substitution of
desires for facts. But the truth is difficult to assess, and both Belorus-
sian governments-in-exile take full advantage of this.
The BNR seems thus far to have produced the more vocal and
spectacular leadership. According to its claims, it has "united and con-
solidated the whole political en1igration" around President Abramcyk,
except for "two very small groups." 104 On the other hand, the BCR
asserts that the strength of the Abramcyk forces is fictitious, and his
organization racked by "continuous inner strife and splits." 105 Since
the sources of the n10ney with which both governments-in-exile operate
are not known, indeed are entirely concealed from the public, suspicions
have arisen of "secret agreements" with the London Poles and the
Vatican (BNR),106 and of intelligence with the "pro-Russian" Amer-
ican groups (BCR). Consequently, President Abramcyk. is described
as a "Polish stooge," "impostor," and "ignoramus" by the members of
one group, and President Astrouski as a "fake professor," "embezzler
of public funds," and "political nonentity" by members of the other. 107
The things they have in common do not outweigh, under the present
circumstances, the things which separate them, and would undoubtedly
throw them against each other in their bids for power should the Soviet
system collapse. Without reference to the merits of the question, the
issue has become a case of shadow-boxing over a stal{e the ideological
foundations of which are no longer clear.
Ideology and Politics
The BNR and the BCR are the most articulate advocates of Belo-
russian nationalism, but their position can better be described in nega-
tive than in positive terms: they are against Communism; against the
Russian, Polish, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian territorial claims; against
political ties with either Russia or Poland after liberation. By conjec-
ture, one may say, they are for unqualified independence of Belorussia,
within its ethnographic boundaries as of 1917.108
Belorussian communities abroad celebrate the Twenty-fifth of
March very much in the spirit of the Fourth of July in the United
States. 109 But it is questionable whether the symbol carries a clear con-
ception of what Belorussian independence should be in terms of gov-
ernment, economics, and civil rights. Political labels are not affixed

THE SOVIETS AGAIN 223
with care, and betray a considerable confusion. The leaders, of course,
attest their fait in democracy. Yet the BCR had no quarrel with the
Nazi ideology in 1944, and the BNR has adopted since 1947 the very
pattern of authority it claims to resist. No attempt to clarify the issue
has been made in nationalist literature.
Perhaps the Belorussians in exile realize that freedom is not easily
restored once it has been suppressed. Their gravitation toward "stat-
ism" seems irresistible. They tend to invest the concept of Belorussian
nationality and sovereignty with an absolute value in the belief that, in
the Soviet land, they will find a sufficiently large number of disap-
pointed totalitarian-minded people who see a convenient rallying point
in the lTIOst intransigent and narrow nationalism. The questions of gov-
ernn1ent are not discussed. Deliberately, they are left open until the na-
tionalist doctrine will be the sole deterlninant of loyalties, social group-
ings, political associations, and attitudes. The position of the leaders can
be historically and praglnatically explained. But it 111akes them a doubt-
ful ally of democracy - at least, in the sense in which that term is
generally understood. llo
Not unnaturally, therefore, nationalist syn1bolism is concentrated
on Greater Belorussia, playing up the quantitative rather than qualita-
tive aspects of the idea. The present boundaries of the BSSR are not
accepted, and territorial claims are directed against all five Belorussian
neighbors - Russia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the Ukraine. Even
East Prussia is included in the claims. lll Hopes sometimes are ex-
pressed that peaceful arrangements can be made with Latvia, Lithu-
ania, and the Ukraine,112 perhaps with Poland (BNR) /13 but not with
Russia. Except for a rather obscure group of Belorussian federalists/ l4
unqualified hatred of the Russian people, not merely of the Soviet
state, is preached - most violently by the western and Catholic seg-
ments of the nationalist leadership.ll5
How do they expect the good-neighbor problem to be settled? The
expression of Belorussian nationalism abroad leaves an impression that
it has few bold, novel, or constructive intentions. Suspicion, fear, and
hatred are its arn1or. The leaders seem to display a diluted sense of
reality and an amazing capacity to believe in anything they wish to
believe. They mistake intentions for good performance and live, as so
many political emigres of all times, in "apocalyptic expectancy of the
final settlement" - which, they trust, will award them the gift of ful...
fillment of their political hopes and ambitions.
The Problems of Unity and LeadershiP
Belorussian nationalism, however, is not only a political movement.
Most sincere and courageous efforts have been made to raise the cul-
turallevel of the emigration and develop its sense of citizenship. Edu-

224 BELORUSSIA: THE MAKING OF A NATION
cational, literary, scientific, recreational, professional, and social wel-
fare associations, unions, and clubs, mushroomed first in Western
Europe (primarily Germany), then in the new settlements overseas.
In comparison with the cultural activities of Belorussian emigration
between the two world wars, enormou.s strides have been made. Un-
doubtedly, this would point to the people's vitality, moral strength, and
the growth of national consciousness. But the small educated minority
has not yet been able to produce more than an exiguous literature; writ-
ings are provincial and utilitarian, and, though of poetical value, can
be read as geography and ethnography; they have no world outlook,
abstract ideas are seldom discussed. The quaintness and obsolescence
of themes may be explained by the fact that "the emigres' literature is
young and hence immature," perhaps also by too slow contacts with
world culture and absence of literary tradition. 116
The dominant note is intensified love for the country in the hearts
of exiles. History is recast to explain away the puzzling aspects of cer-
tain events prior to and since the Declaration of Belorussian Independ-
ence, and more often than not history and journalism are confused.
Authors are urged to "purify" their speech, to keep it clean of "any
sort of Russianisms," and to ignore completely the reforms of spelling
and grammar in the BSSR. Differences in the literary standards at
home and abroad grow wider. And fears are expressed that this policy
may result in an ethnic split, instead of contributing to cultural unity.117
It is generally estimated that 300,000 to 400,000 American citizens
or residents are of Belorussian birth and origin, yet probably only
150,000 to 200,000 knew Belorussian as "the principal language spokep
in the home in earliest childhood" (which is the United States defini-
tion of the mother tongue) .118 As compared with other minorities, there
was little evidence of a Belorussian "national consciousness" before the
last war. 119 Since that time, "the cream of Belorussian intelligentsia,
political and social leaders, chairmen of clubs and other organizations,
poets and writers, have emigrated [from Germany] to the United
States." 120 Their arrival stirred the Belorussian American group into
a separate and independent cultural and political life. New clubs and
societies have been formed with separate Orthodox and Catholic
churches, even a Belorussian Tatar mosque in Brooklyn. They publish
newspapers and magazines in the Belorussian language, with a total
circulation probably not exceeding 5,000. 121
The leadership, however, is still split between the two groups. The
BCR men called a Belorussian American Congress in South River,
New Jersey (February II, 1951), and the BNR men countered it with
a National Convention of Belorussian Americans in Brooklyn, New
York (February 17-18, 1951), yet neither has succeeded in winning
the Belorussian Americans entirely to its side. Negotiations to produce

THE SOVIETS AGAIN 225
a single nationalist leadership have been reported, but have failed. The
World Union of Belorussian Emigres (Susvetnae Abjednan'ne Bela-
1uskae Emihracii) promoted in Paris in 1948 "has so far existed only
on paper." 122
Apparently, this also is the mode of existence of many other clubs
and organizations. The Belorussian press has confessed that "often
their activities consist merely of calling conferences and making paper
decisions which no one ever follows." 123 Complaints are frequent that
the "national cause" finds little support from the Belorussian emigrants
"once they have left Europe and happily settled in the New World." 124
And the leadership is urged "not only to reorganize entirely the national
activities in emigration," but also "to devise a long-term plan" requir-
ing "pedantic and systematic execution from day to day, week to
week, month to month, by every Belorussian abroad." 125 The appeals
display increasing totalitarian characteristics and sound a shrill note of
alarm. Response is unlikely unless the leadership has sufficient wisdom
to recognize, face, and correct their own inner contradictions.
The postwar period is too close to be history. The purpose here has
been merely to register a few landmarks which we may expect will
eventually enter the historical record. They indicate that Belorussian
nationalism has been moving, as it were, in opposite directions since
the war: at home, toward complete dissolution in the Soviet sea;
abroad, toward further crystallization of the nationalist doctrine. The
crystals produced in political laboratories of the exiles will perhaps
become precipitants of the national sentiment some time in the future.
There are historical precedents which warrant the hope, and there are
others which make it slim. The waters are not clear, and Belorussia is
s till in the making.

226
TABLE OF TRANSLITERATION
Slightly simplified when it seemed practical, the Belorussian Latin alphabet
(lacinka) is adopted for transliterations from the Belorussian standard
(hrazdanka) as well as from the Russian and the Ukrainian.
Belorussian Russian Ukrainian Pronunciation
a a a a a (father)
b 0 0 0 b
c II; II; II; ts (nuts)
y 11 ch (church)
c 1.1 1.1
ch x x x h (hut)
d   ,n; d
e e(3) e(3) (e)e ye (yes) or e (ten)
e to .. yo (yolk)
e e bO
f «P <P q) f
, , g (go)
g r r r
h r r h (hard)
. . . ee (meet)
1 1 II 1
1 .. yi (yield)
1
after fa { { { ya (yard)
consonan ts i u you
. it it it Y (boy)
J
after
vowels or {a { { {: ya (yard)
beginning JU you
the word
k Ie K I k
1 JI JI JI 1
m :M AI },I m
n H H H n
0 0 0 0 o (horse)
p II II II P
r p p p r
s c c c s (self)
v sh (shore)
s III III III
vy shch
sc   Ill;
t T T T t
u Y y Y u (pull)
v v w (widow)
u y
v B B B V
Y bI bY H i (ink)
z 3 3 3 S (rose)
v s (pleasure)
z II, jK )1\
, '(1) ) b I> consonant
pala talized
The Belorussian lacinka uses transliterations ia, iu, ja, ju, in order to in-
dicate the different phonetic value of the signs H, 10, after consonants and

227
vowels or when initiating a word. The usage can be appropriately extended
over transliterations from the Russian and Ukrainian. Consequently, the
partitive signs b '1>, and' preceding a vowel are transliterated j: ceMH, semia;
CHM'H, ceMbH, siamja, semja.
According to the "Vest European usage, the -Hft, -011:, -if I, endings of
the Russian and Ukrainian proper names are transliterated y or i; cf. Gorky,
Tolstoy, Pisemsld, I<.otliarevski.

c:!JVOTES

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES
A SEER Al1terican Slavic and East European Review (New York)
BAC Backauscyna (Oberhofer, later Munich, "Vest Germany), a Belo-
russian periodical
BGB A Bibliographical Guide to Belorussia by N. P. Vakar (Harvard
U ni versi ty Press, 1956)
BSE Bol'saja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija (Great Soviet Encyclopaedia)
HP Harvard University Refugee Interview Project
NRS Novoe Russkoe Slovo (New York), a Russian daily
RP Research Program on the USSR, Columbia University
SV Socialisticeskij Vestnik (New York), a Russian periodical
Note: Italic numbers in parentheses after authors' names indicate an entry
in BGB.

NOTES
C Ita pter I. T he Land and the P eo pie
I. E. Engelhardt (340), p. 219.
2. A. Rittich (180) and A. Rittich and R. Erkert (181). A. Petermann reprinted (181)
in his M itteilllllgen (Gotha, 1878), Bd. 24. For criticism of the census data in the North-
western Provinces, see Vilenskij J(alendar' na 1888 god (Vilna Almanach for 1888; Vilna,
18 8 7), p. 145; and P. Batiuskov (521), p. 373. Complete data of the first general census
of the Russian Empire in N. A. Trojnicki, Pervaja vseobscaja perePis' naselenija Rossijskoj
it1tperii 1897 g. (89 vols.; St. Petersburg: Imperial Central Statistical Committee, 1898-
1905) ; an analytical study (2 vols.; St. Petersburg, 19°5). For a criticism, see K. Verbelis
(227), PP. 51-55.
3. See Rittich and Erkert (181). Most of them became assimilated in the local popu-
lation.
4. In ViIna province, 89 1 ,771 Belorussians; Vitebsk, 788,599; Grodno, 705,°45; Kovno
(Kaunas), 37,798; Minsk, 1,633,091; Mogilev, 1,389,782. The remaining 140,000 \vere
scattered over the territory of the empire. See Trojnicki, First General Census.
5. E. Karski (185 8 ) gives 9,3°°,°0°; V. Stankevic (1425), 8,272,156. See also M.
Dovnar-Zapolski (1382), J. Stankevic (325), and Paris Peace Conference (1370)'
6. While it ,vas beUeved in the USSR that over 3,200,000 Belorussians \vere left in
Poland, the Polish general census of September 30, 1921, gave the follo\ving figures:
Poles, 18,783,326, or 69 per cent; Ruthenians (Ukrainians), 3,897,000, or 14.3 per cent;
Je\vs, 2,102,000, or 7.7 per cent; Germans, 1,100,000 or 4 per cent; Belorussians, 1,035,000,
or 3.9 per cent; Lithuanians, 70,000, or 0.3 per cent; and Russians, Czechs, etc., 180,000,
or 0.8 per cent. Cf. L. Wasile\vski (1640), pp. 3-4. Figures computed on that basis for
1926, K. S. Smogorze\vski (1709), p. 158; they are contested by St. Mornik (1620),
pp. 18- 1 9, and Engelhardt (340), pp. 223-227; see also K. Sroko\vski (293).
For the Soviets, see BSSR (244) and L. J akauleu (1542). But figures vary in other
Soviet studies; cf. Vserossijskaja perePis' naselenija 17 dek. 1926. Pl'edvarUelllye itogi.
I. Gorodskoe i sel'skoe llaselenie po uezdal1t i okrugatn (2nd ed.), and Recense'me1tt de la
population du 17 dece11tbre 1926, Resutnes abreges, Population de l'V.R.S.S. (Moscow:
Central Bureau of Statistics of the USSR, 1927). Rene Martel (1455) ignored PoUsh
sources.
7. According to the 1926 general census, 888,400 Belorussians resided outside the
boundaries of the BSSR.-BSE (1948), pp. 60,1823. The German estimated the number
of Belorussians at 30,000 in Lithuania and at about 70,000 in Latvia in 1938 (cf. Engel-
hardt [340], pp. 232-233), ,vhile A; SmoHc (290) counted 200,000 Belorussians there in
1924. The Polish general census of 1931 gives the following figures: Poles, 2 1,993,4°0 (68.9
per cent); Belorussians, 989,9°0 (3.1 per cent); Ukrainians, 3,222,000 (10.1 per cent);
Ruthenians (?), 1,219,600 (3.8 per cent); Russians, 338,700 (1.0 per cent); Germans,
741,000 (2.3 per cent); Jews, 2,732,000 (8.5 per cent); and others, including the "unde-
termined," 878,600 (2.8 per cent). The Polish total \vas 32,132,936.
In the eastern provinces, nationalities \verc distributed as follo,vs: Belorussians, 928,000
(16 per cent); Polesians, 711,000 (12 per cent); Jews, 558,000 (9 per cent); Russians,
101,000 (2 per cent); Lithuanians, 76,000 (I per cent); Germans, 50,000 (I per cent);
Poles, 2,039,000 (34 per cent) ; Ukrainians, 1,494,000 (25 per cent) ; Czechs, 3 I ,000; others,
9,000. Total population, 5,997,000. - L. Kirkien (1658), p. 53. For details, see The Polish
and Non-Polish Populations of Poland: Results of the Populatio1t Census of 1931 (Wal'-
sa\v: Institute for the Study of Minority Problems. 1(3 2 ), pp. 4-9.
The Polish estimates, although official, \vere not generally accepted by students. Not
all the Poles themselves believed that their statistics expressed the situation correctly. Cf.
Srokowski (293), St. Paprocki (1622,1623), Mornik (1620), J. Czekanowski (257), St.

23 2
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
Kutrzeba (264, 1549, 1550). The real number of Belol'ussians. in Poland \vas estimated
some\vhere between 1,700,000 and 1,900,000 in 1921. The Preussische Statistische Landes-
al1tt accepted 1,700,000 as the lo\vest estimate for that period. The total number \vould
have been 2,137,000 in 1928 (Mornik [1620], pp. 18-19), and 2,750,000 in 1938 (Engel-
hardt [340], p. 231). The events of 1939-40 revealed that the situation had been mis-
represented; see Poland (319). Figures for the earlier period are from Smogorze\vski
(17 0 9), p. 158; Mornik (1620), pp. 18-19; Engelhardt (340), pp. 223-227. For criticisn1
of the Polish statistics, see W. Winkler (1484) and Congress (1599), pp. 131-141.
8. SJightly modified, these figures were repeated at the conclusion of World War II,
but no explanation was given of the basis or the method of computation; see Soviet
Russia Today (July 1944), pp. 26-27, and The Sixteen Soviet Republics, published by the
Information Bulletin, Embassy of the USSR (Washington: December 1945). Bol'saja
Sovetskaja Ettciklopedija (1948), p. 1823, uses data of the 1939 census. From that source,
however, \ve learn that, in 1939, the total population of West and East Belorussia includ-
ing non-Belorussian minorities was over 9 millions. Apparently no exact information was
available at that time (1948), and has not been since.
9. Engelhardt (34 0 ), p. 234.
10. For the provinces of Minsk, Vitebsk, and Mogilev, for example, the excess of
birth over deaths-that is, the natural increase in population-\vas: 19°0-19°1, 19.5;
1905-1907, 18.1; 1911-1913, 19.4. On the other hand, Dovnar-Zapolsld (1030), pp. 24-30,
pointed to the constant decrease in birth rate for the \vhole territory of Belorussia before
World War 1. The natural increase for European Russia \vas: 1910,1.41; 1911,1.70; 1913.
1.59; and for Belorussia: 1910, 1.15; 1911, 1.55; 1913, 1.50. For 1939 figures, see BSE
(1941), p. 60. As compared with the 1926 census, they show an increase of 16 per cent
for the \vhole population of the USSR, \vhile the Belorussian population increased only
1 I per cent during that time; cf. W. Wielhorski (1688a), p. 25.
II. E. Kuehnelt-Leddihn (332), p. 352n.
12. See A.S. (1078); P. Jakobij (1331); P. Buzuk (25 1 , 532); 1. Gnedovski (167);
V. Honcov, "Dyalektycny mezy na Cernihivscyni," in Cerniltiv i pivniclle livoberezzia, ed.
M. Hrusevski (Kiev, 1928); R. Jakobson, Rentarques sur l'evolution pltollologique du
russe (Prague: Travaux du cercle linguistique de Prague, no. 2, 1929), p. 82.
13. See N. Durnovo, N. Sokolov and D. Usakov (197), \vith corrections subsequently
made by Durnovo (1857), pp. 98-100. As Karski (208) was responsible for both maps,
the differences can only reflect the fluidity of linguistic frontiers. See also V. Stankevic
(14 2 5) .
14. According to Rittich, Belorussian settlements in the Rajgorod-Avgustovo district
extended into East Prussia near Lyk (Etnograficeskaja Karla A vgustovskoj gubernii). The
ethnographic boundary was moved east as a result of Polonization of the entire region.
Cf. Engelhardt (340)'
15. See Chvedir Vovk (1347); he claims, ho\vevel', the northwestern triangle of
Pruzany-Belsk-Brest for the Ukraine; cf. Engelhardt (340), 223. See also Wasilewski (23 0 ,
1531), D. Bulgakovski (1273), J. Falkowski (1283), A. Kirkor (1285), A. Moszynski
(1289), K. Moszynski (1290), Cz. Pietkiewicz (1297).
16. Although most ethnographers leave the to\vn of Briansk to the Russians, L.
Niederle (1044) included Briansk in the area of Belorussian speech.
17. A map prepared by the Extraordinary Mission of the White Ruthenian National
Republic in Berlin, W. Jager (1392). Slightly modified, in Belorussia (1370). Cf. Buzuk
(251), reviewed by L. Tesniere in Slavische Rundschall (1929), I, 284-285. Other Belo-
russian studies are summed up by J. Stankevic (3 2 5).
18. Erkert (165). See also M. Kojalovic (171, 172, 173); V. F. Ratch (386); K.
Spruner (188); J. Stodolski (1125).
19. E. Czynski (160). Both Erkert and Czynski list the Roman CathoUcs who do not
speak Lithuanian as Poles. Cf. Durnovo (197).
20. See J. Gruenberg (202), W. Wakar (228), and S. Thugutt (1529); see also
Wasilewski (1531, 230 to 232, 1636 to 1640). A. Krzyzanowski and K. Kumaniecki (211)
and J. Rozwadowski (223) are more moderate in their claims. Cf. E. Romer (286 to 288,
and 1627).
21. E. Romer (288), Table VIII.
22. The Polish side of the story is told by Wasile\vski (153 1 ), 70ff; Thugutt (1529),

THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE
233
and others. Wasile\vski insists that the Belorussians represented 1.4 per cent of the popu-
lation of the city of Vilna after World War I (1640), p. 20, also (7°4). Smogorze\vski
(337), pp. 2.3- 2 5, seep no Belorussians at all.
23. For details of the German census, see The Eastern Borders of Poland (Paris:
Polish Committee on Preparation for the Peace Conference, 1919).
24. Smogorze\vski (337), pp. 17- 1 8.
25. This has become internationally accepted. See P. de Azcarate, League oj Nations
and National Minorities (1945), p. 35. No mention of the Belorussian minority in Poland
is found in The League of Nations and the Protection of Minorities oj Race, Language
and Religion (Geneva: League of Nations Secretariat, 1937).
26. Smogorze\vski's thesis (337), pp. 23-25, is supported by other Polish \vriters \vho
turn statistics to still greater advantage for the Poles. See Wielhorski ( 62 9), pp. 56-59.
Czynski (160) confirmed the 1897 distribution as late as 1909. On January 22, 1919, the
Belol'ussian Administration of Grodno province, contesting the .Polish claims, published
the follo\ving percentages for Grodno district and city, taken frOln zentstvo statistics of
1914, and from Viilker-Vel'teilung in West Russland (1917): Poles, 5.6; Belorussians, 65.8;
Lithuanians, 1 -4; Jews, 19.8; Russians, 6.3; others, 1.1.
For full details of the statistical fight over Grodno in 1917-1920, see K. Ezavitau
(1383), pp. 35-36, 57. According to British sources, the percentage of ethnic groups in
the Grodno region under the Russian rule ,vas as fo11o\\7s: Belorussians, 54; Je\vs, 17.4;
Poles, 10; and the remainder Lithuanians, Gennans, and others. In 1931 the city popula-
tion \vas 49,818, of \vhich nearly hvo-thirds \vere Jews. - Encyclopedia Britannica, X,
9 02 .
The controversy flared up after each Polish census until, in 1939, \ve have a Polish
statement that, \vhen the Vilna district \vas handed over to Lithuania, the percentage of
its total population (489,000) \vas as follo\vs: Poles, 69; ]e\vs, 13.5; Lithuanians, 11.3;
Belorussians, 2.4; and others 3.8.-Poland (1673), p. 12. In the city of Vilna: Poles, 66;
J e\vs, 28; Ukrainians, 4; Lithuanians, I; Belorussians, I. - Kirkien ( 16 5 8 ), p. 56. On
the other hand, the Lithuanians affirm that they made up 37 per cent and the Poles 23
per cent of the total population of the city, \vhile 40 per cent ,vere "Russians and others."
- Lithuanian Bulletin, no. 1-3 (Ne\v York, 1949), p. 12.
27. According to the 1897 census, the social groups of Vilna province \vere distributed
among different nationalities as follows (per cent) :
Nobility Per cent of total
and gentry Townsnten Villagers population
Russians 13.2 27.6 52.6 5.00
Belorussians 2.6 4.8 9 2 .3 56.05
Lithuanians 1.0 2.3 9 6 .6 17.59
Jews 9 6 .5 2.2 12.7 2
Poles 29.5 28.0 41.6 8.17
In Kovno province, the Poles represented 9.04 per cent of the total population, and of
that number, 42.59 per cent \vere gentry, 27.85 per cent to\vnsmen and 28.85 per cent
peasants. The proportion was typical for the whole North\vest Region. - Verbelis (227),
pp. 64- 8 4, 144- 1 4 6 .
For important studies concerning the Polish-Lithuanian dispute, see BGB, 1313-1320,
1510-1717. For the League of Nations vie\v, see pamphlet edited by the Information Sec-
tion, League of Nations Secretariat, Political Activities, I (Geneva, 19 2 5), 24-45.
28. Wasile\vski (1577). The population of Polesie (1,132,000) appeared as follo\vs:
"Polesians, 711,000 (63 per cent); .Poles, 163,400 (14 per cent); Jews, 112,000 (10 per
cent) ; Belorussians, 74,000 (7 per cent) ; Ukrainians, 53,100 (5 per cent) ; Russians, 16,200
(I per cent) ; others, 2,3°0." - Kirkien ( 16 5 8 ), p. 55.
29. Wasilewski (153 1 ).
30. Karski (1858). In 1897 Czynski denied the very existence of Roman Catholic
Belorussians (1858) I, 129. On the confusion which reigned among the Russian authorities
in this regard, see Bobrovski (159); see also S. Smolka (822), pp. 264-284; V. Porosin
(178) ; and the memorandum presented in 1862 to Pope Pius IX, (851).

234
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1
31. See above, p. 231. Cf. Smogorzewski (1709), p. 158; Roczllik (3I9); and Mornik
(1620), pp. 18-19.
There were 4,852,602 Orthodox; 3,195,759 Catholics; 117,656 Protestants; 1,606,737
Je\vish; 15,099 Mohammedans; and 172,898 "others" in the Mogilev, Polock, Minsk, and
Lithuanian (Kaunas, Grodno, and Vilna) bishoprics in 1897 - G. I{iprijanovic (815),
pp. 282-284. In 1931, the Polish census listed in the territories incorporated into Poland
since 1921: 6,110,000 Catholics (of the \vestern and eastern rites); 3,408,000 Orthodox,
1,065,000 Hebrews, 185,000 others. Cf. Poland (I673); p. 18.
3 2 . BAC, II: (February 15, 1948), no. 4 (7), p. 3. Instances reported refer to both
the American and British zones.
33. Italics added. Paprocki (I622), quoted by Engelhardt (340), pp. 229-23°.
34. Engelhardt (34 0 ), p. 229.
35. Roczttik (3 I 9).
36. Smolic (29 2 ).
37. Sovetskaja Enciklopedija (19 2 7).
38. Atlas SSSR (Moscow, 1928).
39. Engelhardt gives a detailed description by regions (34 0 ), pp. 235-238.
40. I bid., p. 278.
41. The Sixteen Soviet Republics (Washington: Information Bulletin, Embassy of
the USSR, December 1945), p. 7; cf. Chap. 10, note 9.
42. There were only 120,000 Poles in the USSR in 1926, and 925,000 in 1945. For
information about the transfers of minorities, see Joseph P. Schechtman (336) and E. M.
l{ulisher (1662) ; see also Chap. II, note 21.
43. According to Pravda, August II, 1946, "300,000 returned from German slavery
to their country"; cf. above, pp. 207-208.
44. New York Ti11tes, December 28, 1946. According to Lithuanian sources in exile,
East Prussia is settled "predominantly by Belorussians." - Lithuanian Bulletin, VII (Ne\v
York, January-March 1949),12. Belorussian sources in exile agree; see Rydlevsky (1497),
pp. 38-39. See above, p. 208.
45. Theodore Shabad, GeograPhy oj the USSR (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1951), p. 499.
46. The London Poles esthnate it at 6,000,000. - Wielhorski ( 62 9), p. 13.
47. A pamphlet, published by the Association of Belorussians in Great Britain (Lon-
don, 1949), estimates that "some 2,000,000" Belorussians no\v are in "various Soviet
camps and prisons," and "more than 3,000,000 have been shot or died there during thirty
years of communist rule," while "about 2,000,000 are exiles," i.e., DP's in Germany and
Austria, and other countries.-Belorussia (I489), p. 2; cf. M. Abramcyk (1486), p. II.
These figures may be grossly inflated, but even ten times reduced they reflect a situation
without precedent in the history of the country; see above, p. 208.
48. "Nineteen million," affirms Belorussia (1489), p. 2. This is supported, as it were,
by a statement that "there are 2,000,000 Belorussian exiles abroad" - ibid. On the other
hand, Abramcyk, president of a Belorussian government-in-exile (Paris), believes that
there are altogether about "10,000 Belorussian exiles in the world," which probably is
more nearly correct. See New York Ti,,,,es, August 10, 1950.
Chapter 2. The Traditions
I. The term CCKryvian" has been suggested by some nationalist groups to replace
"Belorussian." Cf. J. Stankevic, Veda, II (February-March, 195 I») 50.
2. Before the Revolution, the only centers of ethnographic studies in Belorussia were
(I) the Church Archeology Committee and a Society of History and Archeology, both in
Minsk; and (2) the northeastern section of the Russian Geographical Society, active only
from 1867 to 1876 and from 1910 to 1914, and the Ethnographical Museum, originally a
private collection, both in Vilna. The collecting of Belorussian folklore began in the 1820'S,
but comprehensive reports on Belorussian habits and customs did not appear before the
1860'S. More important studies date in the 1890'S and 1900'S. Officers of the Imperial
General Staff, studying the future theatre of war, left valuable descriptions of the coun-
try; see Bobrovski (I250), D. Zelenski (1263), M. Cebrikov (1305), V. Koreva (13 I 6),
V. Domontovic (1328). Ethnographers ,vere particularly interested in the regions of

THE TRADITIONS
235
Vitebsk (N. Nikiforovski), Smolensk (I. Nosovic, Sejn, Romanov), Mogilev and Minsk
(Dovnar-Zapolski), and Polesie (Pietkie\vicz, I{. Moszynski) ; see BGB, 1061-1347.
After the Revolution, studies concentrated in Vilna and Minsk. An historico-ethno-
graphic society \vas formed in Polock, and ethnographic museums \vere founded in Minsk,
Vitebsk, Mogilev, Sluck, Bobrujsk, Grodno, Slonim, and Pinsk. Since 1925, the Institute
of Belorussian Culture in Minsk has been publishing a monthly buIletin, first called N as
Kraj (Our Country), in 1931 renamed Soveckaja Kraina (Soviet Land). The Soviet Belo-
russian Academy of Sciences sent several ethnographic expeditions into the country be-
tween 1931 and 1954. A tremendous amount of folklore has been recorded, though little
has been published so far; cf. M. Grinblat (1063, 1064), N. Nikolski (1070), A. Supinski
(1073). See below, note 32.
3. That is, 75.3 per cent of the total population in the eastern part and 88.3 per cent
in the \vestern part of Belorussia. See "Sojuz Sovetskich Socia1isticeskich Respublik," BSE
(194 8 ), p. 182 3.
4. That is, 165 em., or 5.4 ft. See D. Anucin (1139), pp. 128- 1 5 2 .
5. See A.S. (1078), A. Serzputovski (1121, 1270), I{. Moszynski (1290), L. Wasilewski
(1531), and others; also poems and novels by Janka Kupala, Jakub I{olas, Harun,
Biadulia.
6. N. Vitov in "Socialism and State Capitalism," N RS, April 13, 1949. Cf. the im-
pressions of a South American delegate to the Comintern in 1929 and 1934, E. Ravines,
The Yenan Way (Ne\v York: Scribner, 1951), pp. 55, 114. Files of the Novoe Slovo
(Berlin) and the Parizskij Vestnik (Paris) contain reports by Russian and Belorussian
emigrants who, folIo\ving the German arn1ies as interpreters, civil servants, or enlisted
men, revisited their native land. The impression of poverty and desolation has since been
abundantly corroborated by the DP periodicals such as Backat'iScy1ta (Fatherland) ,
Belaruskae Slova (Belorussian Word), Posev (The So\ving), as well as by reports pub-
lished in NRS, SV, Novy tUI'Jlal, NarodJtaja Volia (New York), and Vozrozdenie (,Paris),
etc. Particularly revealing are the photographs released by the Soviet Photographic
Agency, New York, and printed, some\vhat unwittingly, in Soviet Russia Today (Ne,v
York), and The USSR Inforl1zatio1t Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), in 1945- 1 949.
For impressions of the American visitors, see R. B. Scandrett (1792), p. 496; Leslie A.
Falk (1759), pp. 3 0 9-3 1 3.
7. Dovnar-Zapolski ( 12 54), pp. 83-85. See also Vladimirski-Budanov in Ctenija Istor.
Ob. Letop. Nestora, III (Kiev); A. Brandt (1265); Dovnar-Zapolski (155, 678, 1278);
V. Piceta (695); PhiHp E. Mosely, "Adaptation for Survival," The Slavonic a1ld East
European Review, XXI; American Series, II (March 1943), 56:147-173. For detailed
studies, see F. Leontovic (30, 692).
8. Dovnar-Zapolski (1254), p. 130.
9. Dovnar-Zapolski (1155), N. Teslenko (1179, 1180). Cf. A. Efimenko Izsledovanija
narodnoj zizni, I, Krestjanskoe ze11l1evladenie na krajnem severe (Mosco\v, 1884), for the
Russian north; G. Grebenscikov, Cllraevy, a series of volumes dealing ,vith the life of
peasants in West Siberia, a selected part of which has. been translated into EngUsh
under the title of The Turbulent Giant (1940); S. Kravcinski-Stepniak, The Russian
Peasantry: The Agrarian Conditions, Social Life, a1td Religion (2 vols.; London, 1888),
for central Russia primarily. For other Slavic peoples, K. Moszynski (343).
10. Cf. Dovnar-Zapolski (254), p. 94.
II. Ibid., p. 137.
12. See S. Pachman (1311) and, for comparative data, his Obycnoe Pravo (The
Customary La\v; St. Petersburg, 1910).
13. Dovnar-Zapolski (1254), p. 98; Brandt (1265), pp. 101-102.
14. Pachman (1311» p. 66; Dovnar-Zapolski (1254), pp. 100-106.
15. Dovnar-Zapolski ( 12 54), p. 113.
16. Ibid.
17. Vodka was the biggest item in the expenditure: one half of the groom's budget,
and one third of the bride's - ibid., p. 1 17.
18. Pachman (1311), PP. 54-65; Brandt (1265); Dovnar-Zapolski (1155,115 8 ).
19. Brandt (1265), p. 100; Dovnar-Zapolski (1254), pp. 113-118. Cf. similar customs in
some parts of the Ukraine described by Beauplan in the seventeenth century, and the
c'ltra sex'll a in the Lithuanian Russian State. E. Leontovic unearthed interesting ne\v data

23 6
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
for his little known study published in the Zurnal Ministerstva Jllsticii, September 1903.
20. Brandt ( I26 5),P. 103.
21. Dovnar-Zapolski (1254), p. 108.
22. Brandt (1265), p. 106.
23. In the Russian empire, illegitimate children ,vere disinherited by Jaw, unless the
emperor personally interfered in their favor.
24. For details, see an article by M. Dovnar-Zapqlski in Zivaja Stari1ta, II (1893).
25. Dovnar-Zapolski cites (1254), p. 83, a case returned by the imperial courts four
times for retrial, since the decision of the peasant judges was "against the letter and the
spirit of the law." Each time, however, the original judgment "based on our customs"
was maintained by the valastny slld (county court).
26. Brandt (1265), p. 117.
27. Ibid., pp. 116-1 1 7.
28. This, and a few articles of interest in the Sovetskaja Etttografija are our principal
sources of information for the pos.twar period. Before the war, significant data could be
found in the Bezboznik, a periodical published by the Union of the Godless (dissolved in
1942). The general failure of the Soviet government in its struggle against "superstitions"
is acknowledged in V oittstvujuslee bezbozie v SSSR za Islet ( Fifteen Years of Militant
Atheism in the USSR; Mosco,v, 1932); confirmed by F. Olescuk in his 0 zadalaclt anti-
religioz1toj propagandy (Tasks of the Antireligious Propaganda; Moscow, 1937), and
by E. J aroslavski, vice-president and president of the Union of the Godless, respectively;
Jaroslavski is quoted by N. Timasheff, Religion, itt the USSR (New York, 1942).
29. For a description of the fire-making equipment, see Serzputovski (1121), p. 42.
30. Karski (749), pp. 7ff.
31. Ibid. See also Dovnar-Zapolski (1254), p. 130. Survivals of ancient Slavic mythol-
ogy are described by A. Bogdanovic (1149), E. Liacki (1164, 1165, 1166), Dovnar-Zapolski
(1157,1255), Pietkie,vicz (1174,1175), K..Moszynski (1290). Certain concepts of justice
are reminiscent of Pravda Russkaja, particularly Articles 91-95 and 99-106 (Copy
Troicki I). Parallels exist ,vith the Pskovskaja Sudnaja Grantota (position of the woman,
in particular) and, indeed, some usages can be traced back to the Russian Primary
Chronicle. Many dispositions of the Lithuanian Statute of 1588 \vere retained until 1918.
The study of the West Russian commune in the sixteenth century by Dovnar-Zapolski
(679,680) is particularly illuminating; see also F. Leontovic (30).
32. In the 1820'S J an Czeczot published the first collection of Belorussian songs, and
Dmitriev in the 1860'S published a collection of Belorussian folk tales. Then other trans-
scriptions appeared in rapid succession, covering most of the country. The best collections
of songs have been edited by Czeczot, Nosovic and Sejn, Romanov, and Dobrovolski;
folk tales by Federevski, Sejn and Romanov, and Serzputovski; incantations by Romanov;
and proverbs by Nosovic. See BGB, 1184-124°.
Since the Revolution, the collection of folklore has been continued by the Navukovae
Tavaristva and the Belorussian Museum in Vilna, and by the Institute of Belorussian
Culture in Minsk. Some minor collections have been published in Latvia and Lithuania.
In 1927 the Minsk Institute edited four volumes of Belaruskaja etnahrafija u dasledach i
mataryjalach which contain new data valuable for the student of folklore and the
linguist. In 1936 and 1937, 500 volunteer collectors recorded more than 30,000 items of
prerevolutionary and contemporary folklore. Selections of prerevolutionary folklore have
been published in separate volumes (BGB, 1187, 1188, 1189, 1190, 1207, 1209, 1217,
1221). Phonogram Archives were established in Minsk for some 2,000 scores of popular
tunes, and a number of studies and monographs were under way for publication. The
,var has destroyed most of this. "The Nazis either brned or took away to Germany all
of the archives, destroyed our invaluable fund of manuscripts, phonographic records, and
files of ethnographic expeditions," complains GrinbIat, ccBelorusskaja Sovetskaja etnografija
za 30 let," Sovetskaja Etnografija, II (1948), 224.
After the ,var new expeditions were sent out to the country, and enough material has
been collected since to make an exhibition of Belorussian folklore in Moscow, in 1948.
But new publications have been few. For the Mosco\v exhibit, see Belicer (1241). See
also note 2 to this chapter.
33. Nosovic (18 6 4,18 6 5). Consult BGB, 1855-2001.
34. Karski ( 18 5 8 ), II, 3, p. 290.

THE TRADITIONS
237
35. A. Sobolevski, "Belorusskoe nareCie," Zurnal Min. Narod. Prosv. (1887), V-VI,
pp. 137-147. The grouping he suggested is no\v generally accepted. Cf. S. Eremin and
J. Falev, Russkaja dialektologija, ed. by E. Karski (Moscow, 1928); Durnovo (1857),
pp. 87-98, 200-228, 298-3°3,340-344; R. Avanesov, Ocerki russkoj dialektologii, I (1947),
paSSi11t.
36. The three groap concept, in Kalos'se, no. 4/17 (Vilna, 1938); revised, Veda (Ne\v
York, 1951), pp. 118-121.
37. B. Tarakevic (1999) . For dialect differences between the main groups, see
Durnovo (1857) j Avanesov, Ocerki russkoj dialektologii, I, 208-212. See also J. Stankevic
in Veda (1951), pp. 118-121.
38. See any standard \vork on Belorussian phonetics, also Karski ( 18 58), II, 3;
M. Zyrkevic and A. Karzon (2001) ; and J. Stankevic (1998).
39. See Karski (1976), Zyrkevic and Karzon (2001), J. Stankevic (1999), or any
Belorussian grammar. For differences from, or affinities with, Russian and Ukrainian
standards, see N. Durnovo (1857), and for common traits with Russian dialects, see R.
Avanesov, Ocerki russkoj dialektologii, I (Mosco\v, 1949), pp. 58-121, 169-171, 202-211,
297-300. An attempt to explain these a\vay is made by J. Stankevic, "Kryviccyna u
Tolkovym Slovaru Velikaruskaha ]azyka V. Dalia," Veda, I (New York, 1951), 1-25. For
an outline of the Soviet Belorussian literary standard, see R. G. A. deB ray, Guide to the
Slavonic Languages (New York: Dutton, 1952), and for the pre-Soviet West Belorussian
standard and that still in use outside the USSR, see J. Stankevic (1998) and L. Iskra,
Svaeasablivas'ci Belaruskae M ovy (Paris: Moladz', 1951).
40. Cf. articles by J. Stankevic, M. Skialenak, and others, in Kalos'se (Vilna, 1937-
3 8 ), and ]. Stankevic in Veda, II (1951),35.
41. R. Jakobson, K clzarakteristike evrazijskogo jazykovogo sojuza (Some Characteris-
tics of the Eurasian Linguistic Union; Prague, 193 1 ), p. 41.
42. A. Sachmatov (505), pp. 10-12, and E. Karski ( 18 97), pp. 153-154.
43. W. Porzezinski, "Rzekome pienviestki lechickie w jzykach wschodnio-slowian-
skich," Praca jilologicztta, I (1926), 86-104, and P. Rastorguev, UK voprosu 0 liasskich
certach v beloruskoj fonetike," Trudy postojannoj kontissii po dialektologii russkogo
jazyka, IX (1927), 35-48. See also W. Studnicka, Skqd si wzili po lacy na Rusi (Ho\v
Did the Poles First Appear in Russia? j Warsaw, 1919).
44. N. Trubeckoj (Trubetzkoy), UEiniges tiber die russische Lautentwicklung und die
Auflosung del' gemeinrussischen Sprachenheit," ZeitscltriJt fur slav. Philologie, I (1925),
3 1 7.
45. R. J akobson, "Remarques sur l'evolution phonologique du russe comparee a celIe
des autres langues slaves," Travaux du cercle linguistique de Prague, II (Prague, 1929),
68, 93, 99. The scope and implications of the problem are well outlined by Durnovo,
"Spornye voprosy slavianskoj fonetiki" (Controversial Problems in Slavic Phonetics),
Slavia, III (Prague, 1924), 225-263. For an attempt to reconcile the conflicting theories,
see Y. Serech (I934a).
46. An adequate brief survey of the physical setting and economic pattern of modern
Belorussia can be found in Theodore Shabad, Geography oj the USSR (New York:
Columbia University Press, 195 1 ), I:>P. 469-478.
47. Apparently the .polish landlords \vere more demanding than the Russian, since
30 per cent of the peasantry in Smolensk province were able to pay the obrok set at a
more reasonable rate; cf. Engelhardt (340), p. 81, and Dovnar-Zapolski (1030).
48. Quoted by V. Semenov ( III 9), IX, 1°9-110.
49. The only comprehensive study to date on the history of Belorussian economy
from the 1860'S to the Soviet Revolution is Dovnar-Zapolski's (r030), from which are
taken the data used here, unless othenvise ackno\vledged.
50. In the period 1896-1915, emigrants from four Belorussian provinces represented
one-seventh of the total number of new colonists in Siberia and the Far East, far above
their numerical proportion to the total population of the empire. - Dovnar-Zapolski
( I0 30), p. 25.
51. Ibid., p. 57.
52. Per cent of cattle to population: 42.5 in 1864, and 40.3 in 1916. With pigs, goats
and sheep, the situation had become more favorable, e.g., 105 in 1916, as compared with
59 in 1864.
'"

23 8
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
53. Dovnar-Zapolski (1030), p. 140.
54. Ibid., p. 57.
55. The 1897 general census listed journeymen and domestic servants as the second
largest occupational group in Belorussia, making up 2.75 per cent of the total population.
- Cf. V. Stankevic (14 2 5), p. 45n.
56. Dovnar-Zapolski (1030), p. 2.
57. Ibid., p. 23.
58. Dybouk, a play by A-nski, made into an opera by Tamkin, gives a powerful de-
scription of the Jewish community in a 11testecko. The first chapters of Chaim Weizmann's
autobiography describe a ,ve11-to-do Jewish family in a Belorussian town. For general
studies of the Belorussian Jewry, see S. Dubnov (7 1 9), J. Schall (1342), Z. Biadulia
(1338), A. Sliubski (1343), S. Kacenbogen (1038). The closing chapter of their tragic
history is told by Solomon Schwarz (1792a).
59. Dovnar-Zapolski (1030). For general description of the Belorussian town, see
A. Grusevski (686). I. Beliaev (523), A. Burdzejka (673), and V. Druzcyc (682, 683, 684).
A photo-album, with comments about the J e\vish community in Bialystok, has been pub-
lished in this country by D. Sohn (1252a). For history of the municipal government, see
I. Lappo (690), W. Kamieniecki (593). Guilds in ancient Lithuania and pre-Soviet Belo-
russia are described by F. Klimenko (688) and I. Sprogis (701).
60. For a picture of the Tiesenhausen enterprise, see Gibianski (685). See also T.
Potocki (699) and Dovnar-Zapolski ( 10 3 0 ), p. 7.
61. This \vas an economic phenomenon common to all parts of the Russian empire.
While in Prussia the forest area \vas 150 times less than in the Russian empire, the gov-
vernment spent for its upkeep and exploitation 30 per cent more money than the Russian
administration did in the \vhole empire. Indeed, the annual income of Russia and Prussia
from their forest resources \vere about equal at that time. Today, Soviet schoolbooks
describe the B elorussian land as "over one-quarter covered \vith forest." - Baranski,
Ekollollziceskaja geografija SSSR (Economic Geography of the USSR; Mosco\v, 1947),
P.29 2 .
62. Dovnar-Zapolski (1030), p. 181.
63. In 1866, 22,000 \vorkers \vere distributed among 4,018 enterprises, making an
average of 5.7 apiece. In 1873 there were only 156 enterprises employing more than ten
men each j cf. Dovnar-Zapolski (1030), pp. 164-165, and V. Stankevic (14 2 5), pp. 24-25.
Predominance of Russian immigrants in the urban \vorking class in Belorussia and the
Ukraine is noted by J. Maynard, The Russian Peasant and Other Studies (194 2 ), p. 385.
64. The cooperative movement \vas developing very rapidly. In 1910, there \vere 171,000
members enrolled in 620 cooperatives, and, three years later, 664 cooperatives had in-
creased their membership to 344,700. - Ibid., p. 143.
65. The general literacy in Belorussia has. increased considerably since the 1897 census,
though no exact statistics are available for later periods. A statistical survey of Vitebsk
province in 1907 has established a significant relationship behveen literacy and the size
of a farm: the percentage of literacy on farms from one to 2.7 acres. \vas 25.3; 2.7 to 5.4
acres, 25.5; 5.4 to 10.8 acres, 27.5; 10.8 to 16.2 acres, 30.6; 16.2 to 21.6 acres, 34.9;
21.6 to 27 acres, 38.6; 27 to 40.5 acres, 43.5; 40.5 to 54 acres, 4 6 .5; 54 to 135 acres, 55.7.
Chapter 3. The Origin.s
I. For usages and definitions of the terms "nation," "people," and "nationality" in
Eastern Europe, see Hertz, Nationality in History and Politics (London, 1945), pp. 5-15.
2. Dovnar-Zapolski (1382). Other Slavists hold a similar view, though not ,vithout
substantial reservations; cf. Niederle (344), IV.
3. Cf. S. Sementovski (81), F. Dobrianski (94), N. Avenarius (4), W. Szukiewicz
(431), A. Spicyn (428), and \vorks of G. Tatur, A. Uvarov. M. Kuscinski, and other
Russian and Polish archeologists. Prehistoric data are best organized by B. Rybakov
(475) and L. Sedlaczek-Komoro\vski (479). For more recent discoveries, see N. Artamonov
(4°4), P. Efimenko (4°6), V. Gotje (4°7), A. Liaiidanski (415, 416), K. Polikarpovic
(139,421,422), and :P. Tarasenka (435). For a critical evaluation of the Soviet archeo-
logical research 1tnd literature, ho\vever, see M. A. Miller, Arclteologija v SSSR,' Issle-

THE ORIGINS
239
dovanija i ntaterialy, series 1, no. 12 (Munich: Institute for the Study of the History and
Culture of the USSR, 1954).
4. Cf. P. Safarik (346), Niederle (344), I, IV. The theory seems to be generally ac-
cepted; see Sachmatov (505, 506). T. Narbutt believed the Budini to have been Buddhists
(sic) and forerunners not of the Belorussians, but of the Lithuanians (418). Safarik (346)
surmised that the Veleti and the Liutici may have been the original population there, and
a theory of CCVoloto-Krivian origins" of the Belorussians was formulated in nationalist
literature (Lastouski, Kaspjarovic, Meleska). But it is beyond doubt that the Veleti ,vere
not Slavs; cf. Povest' 0 V olote V olotovite (The Tale of Volot) and comments by F.
Buslaev, Istorileskie ocerki russkoj narodnoj slovesltosti i iskusstva, II (1861), 326ff.
The vie\vs of the Soviet historians have been subject to political change, but the following
,yorks are of value: M. Artamonov, CCVenedy, nevry, budiny v slavianskom etnogeneze,"
V estnik Leningradsko go Gosudarstvenno go Ulliversiteta, II (1946), and uK voprosu 0
proischozdenii vostocnych slavian," Voprosy istorii, IX (1948); B. Rybakov, [( vopros'll
o proiscltozdenii drevnel'1lsskoj narodnosti (Moscow, 1951); T. Trofimov, ccKrivici, viatici
i slavianskie plemena Pridneprovja," Sovetskaja al'clteologija, I (1946); and A. Udalcov,
uProblema proischozdenija slavian v svete sovremennoj archeologii," V oprosy istorii, II
(1949), and "Drevnejsee naselenie Vostocnoj Evropy i problemy slavianskogo etnogeneza,"
Referaty naucno-issledovatel'skich rabot Akadel1tii Nauk SSSR, 1947 (Procedures of the
USSR Academy of Sciences, 1947).
5. The theory insisted that, unlike the Western Slavs, including the Ukrainians, the
Russians have largely lost their Slavic or Nordic blood through Asiatic admixtures, and
hence cannot be considered Slavs at all; see Fr. Duchinski, PeuPles ar'yas et touran. N eces-
site des re/onnes dans l'exposition de l'histoire des peuples aryas-e1lropeells et tourans,
particulierentellt des Slaves et des Muscovites (Paris, 1864). Also Hans F. 1(. GUnther,
The Racial Elel1tents of European Histol'y (New York, 1928), and Ilse Sch\videtzky,
Rassenkullde der AUslawen (Stuttgart, 1938). Bulgarian Nazis, even before World War
II, denied Russja's Slavic character; cf. Janko Janeff, "Del' Untergang des Panslawismus,"
Nationalsozialistische MOllatsltefte, VIII (1937), 881-888.
'OJ
6. U. Ihnatouski (398); the Vilna editors of his book (1927) conceded, ho,vever, that
"Finnish tribes d,velt in Northern Europe to approximately the Pripet River" - in other
words, in the entire territory of Belorussia.
7. Russia (70), I; English translation by Samuel H. Cross (45 1 ), p. 142.
8. To this day in the Srnolensk region are found villages \vith the names Goliadi,
Goliada, Goliazje. Cf. Russia (70), I, under the years 1058 and 1146.
9. This theory, as an element of the nationalist doctrine, is most vehemently articu-
lated by S. Braha (1139a). But see C. S. Coon (1140), pp. 365-367, 568-569; D. Anucin
(1139), pp. 128- 1 52; L. Niederle (344), I, 48-49, IV, passiln.
10. The Primary Chronicle reads: "They accordingly ,vent overseas to the Varangian
Russes . . . The Chuds, the Slavs and the I(rivichians then said to the people of Rus,
cO ur whole land is great and rich, but there is no order in it. Come to rule and reign
over us.' " - English translation, Cross (45 1 ), p. 145.
1 I. A concise and clear summary of the dispute behveen the N ormanists and the
Slavists can be found in Cross's introduction to The Russian Printary C It1'0nicle (451),
pp. 78-135. For a more complete account, see E. Smurlo, Kllrs russkoj istorii (Prague,
1931), and V. Riazanovski, Obzor russkoj kul'tury, I (Ne\v York, 1947). Cross and Ria-
zanovski support opposite views. The Soviet historians discard the Norman theory (N.
Derzavin, B. Grekov, S. Juskov), and the modern Belorussian ,vriters follo,v the same line
(Ihnatouski, Piceta, J. Stankevic).
12. For the number of independent principalities in the Minsk region alone, see Lappo
(391). An excellent political map of West Russia in the thirteenth century is appended to
V. T. Pasuto, Olerki po istorii Galicko- V olynskoj Rusi (Outlines of the History of Galic-
Volyn' Rus'; Moscow: USSR Academy, 1950).
13. See any standard book on early Russian history. For English readers, the tradi-
tional concept is presented by Sir Bernard Pares (383), pp. 3-55. G. Vernadsky (43 1 ) and
his Kieva1t Russia (1948) are based on original research. Among the monographs, particu-
larly valuable are V. Danilevic (452) and Piceta (761) for Polock; E. Golubinski (45 8 )
for Smolensk, V. Ikonnikov (461) and Hrusevski (459) for Turov and Pinsk. For the
origins and history of the Krivicans, Dregovicans, and Radimicans, see L. Kondratowicz

24°
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
(4 1 I), V. Scerbakivsky (426), Spicyn (429), Studnicka (430), Rybakov (475), Sedlaczek
(479), Dovnar-Zapolski (455), and P. Tretjakov (436, 437).
14. The first direct mention of the Lithuanians in literature is found in the tenth-
century religious tale, "The Death of Saint Vojtech." For information collected from the
Russian, Polish, and German chronicles, see C. ]urgela (391).
15. Michalon Litvin (sixteenth century) lan1ented that his countrymen had to use
Russian, "an idiom alien to us Lithuanians \vho ar,e Italians, men of Italian blood." 1'hi
theory had several legendary variants recorded by Belski and Stryjko\vski, and ,vas soon
abandoned. Cf. W. Holubo\\Ticz (408), Tarasenka (435), V. Antonovic (4°3), A. Broni-
ko\vski (528), S. Daukantas (535), J. Totaraitis (5 62 ), J urgela (391).
16. Bolinsky, Republica 111' oscoviae et ul'bes (Leiden, 1580); Johannes Boemi, Dc
gentiu11t nt,ol'ibus (Basel, 1538), Lit. III, cap. ii, p. 81. - Quoted by Lastouski (750),
pp. 259- 260 .
17. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania 'las divided into 3 I districts and 13 provinces:
(I) Vilna, including the districts of Vilna, Osmiana, Lida, Vilkomirsk; (2) Troky, \vith
Grodno; (3) Kovno (Kaunas) and Upica; (4) Zmud; (5) Novgorodok, including Slonim
and V olkovysk j (6) Brest, \vith Pinsk; (7) Podliasje, including districts of Belsk,
Dorogocyn, and Melnicy; (8) Minsk, including Recica; (9)' Mstislavl'; (10) Vitebsk,
with Orsa; (I I) Kiev, including the di,trkt of Mozyr; (12) V olyn, including Luck,
Vladimir, and Kremenec; (13) Podolie, with Braslav and Vinnica districts. Only hvo prov-
inces (nos. 3, 4) and four districts \\Tere settled \vith Lithuanians proper.
18. The Latin text of the Horodlo Charter (1413), as \vll as the texts of the charters
granted or negotiated in the years 1434 to 1565, are appended to M. Liubavski (554),
pp. 297-342; see there also charters granted to such Russian (Belorussian and Ukrainian)
provinces as Smolensk, Polock, Vitebsk, Kiev, V olyn. - Ibid., pp. 342-376. A. Presniakov's
analysis of the Horodlo Charter is very impartial (559), pp. 93-97, 108-109, 114, 118,
128, 133, 136, 164-165, 208.
19. The modern Lithuanian historians emphasize the struggle of Vitovt and his imme-
diate successors for independence, and the Belorussians make the most of the fact that
Svidrigajlo led the West Russian principalities against the Union in the internecine \var
with Sigismund. Both describe Vitovt as an enemy of Poland at heart. Russian historians
are less sure of this; see Liubavski (554), Presniakov (559). For the Polish view, see the
Ca11tbridge History of Poland, I (I950), 188-272.
20. See Narbutt (418), J. I. Krasze\vski (363), V. S. Sopikov (I I5), and 1. Grigorovic
(I6); also B. S. Linde (656), J. S. Bandtkie (729), and J. Jarosze\vicz (361). A compre-
hensive list of primary sources for the early history of the Lithuanian Russian state can
be found in V. T. Pasuto, Ocerki po istorii Galicko-VolY1tskoj Rusi (Outlines of the His-
tory of Galic-Volynian Russia; Mosco,v: USSR Academy of Sciences, 1950), pp. 307-
314. See BGB, 1-90.
2 I. M. de Salvandi, Histoire de Pologne avant et sous Ie roi Jean Sobieski, I (1841),
83-84.
22. The minutes of the Lublin Sejm are edited first by M. Kojalovic (596), then by
M. Liubavski (6°4); their comments differ. The Polish version is summed up by J.
Paewski, in Ca11tbridge History of Poland, I (1950), 348-368. Russian historians are not
far from sharing his view; see Liubavski (554), pp. 272-296. Presniakov stresses the fact
that the Union, forced, as it 'were, upon Lithuania, \vas in fact "prompted by interests
and free \vill of the Russian Lithuanian lo\ver gentry" as a matter of self-protection from
the Lithuanian magnates (560), pp. 215-239. But Lappo (547) shares the vie\v of the
Lithuanians and Belorussians; cf. Jurgela (391) and Ihnatouski (398). Piceta (1670)
following the tenets of Soviet historiography, contradicts his o,vn early ,vorks (400,
6I3). See A. Pankratova, Istorija SSSR (1944) and M. Tichomirov and S. Dmitriev,
lstorija SSSR (1948).
23. As the statute \vas not ratified by the Spolny Sejm, it was promulgated in the
name of King Sigismund III alone. The published text bears the king's signature and the
seal of the Grand Duchy, and is countersigned by both Chancellor Leon Sapieha and
Secretary of State G. Vojna. The cover page of the first edition reads: Statut Velikogo
Kttiazstva Litovskogo ot najasne;Iogo g{ospo)d(a)ra korolia ego m(i)l(o)sti zikgi11tOnta
tretego na korollacyi 'V krakove vydanyi; rok1t 1588 - Drukovano v vol'nont meste
vilen'skont v dr1tkani dom1t Ma1nonilov. - Z laski i pryvil;a korolia ego m(i)l(o)sti

BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE EAST
24 1
(The Statute of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Granted by the Most Illustrious Lord
King, His Grace Sigismund III at His Coronation in Craco\v in the year 1588; Printed in
the free city of Vilna, in the printing house of Mamonici, through the Goodness and
Authority of His Grace the King). All subsequent editions bear the same date, 1588.
Firs.t translations into Polish and modern Russian appeared in 1614 and 1811 respectively.
As a historical document, the statute was first edited in Vre1ttennik, XIX (Mosco\v, 18 54),
xii, 382-424.
For descriptions and interpretations of this period, see general \vorks on Polish, Rus-
sian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian history. For a des.cription of the situation which fol-
lo\ved, see O. Halecki (359), J. Labunski (599), J. Lele\vel (366,55°), W. F. Reddaway
(37 2 ), ICutrzeba (365,598), on the one hand; S. M. Solovjev (647), Lappo (547), N.
Daskevic (534,718), Jurgela (391), on the other.
24 See Ihnatouski (398), Jurgela (39 1 ), Lappo (S47) to compare the Belorussian,
Lithuanian, and Russian views. For study of Lithuanian Russian la\v, see S. Bersadski
(7 06 ), E. Czacki (577), G. Demcenko (707), A. Golmsten (708), A. Jakovlev (709), M.
Jasinski (710), Leontovic (30, 55 1 , 65S, 7 12 ), Liubavski (660, 723), Piceta (696, 697,
69 8 ), S. Ptasicki (714), Dovnar-Zapolski (677, 678), M. Vladimirski-Budanov (672, 702,
703, 7 1 5), Leo Okinshevich (713a) j for social studies, Rene Batillat (648), Bersadski
(7 16 ), Burdzejka (673, 674), Dovnar-Zapolski (679, 680, 681, 1155), A, Jablonowski
( 68 7), Kamieniecki (543, 593), Klimenko (688), Lappo (690), Leontovic (692), A.
Muchlinski (724), I. Novicki (694), Piceta (695), Sprogis (701), A. Szyszman (725),
V. Tumasov (670), V. Zeleneckaja (705), Jurgela (391). For acts and documents sup-
porting the Polish vie\v, A. Grabianski (1 538a).
Chapter 4. Between the West and the East
I. The first Lithuanian grammar was not published until the seventeenth century;
by Klein in 1653, and by Sapunas in 1673. Historians trying to trace the beginnings of the
literary tradition are not able to produce more than sixty titles published from 1547 to
1701; \vith a very few exceptions, all appeared in Prussia. See J urgela (391), Thomas G.
Chase (533), Daukantas (535).
2. The decree \vas directed against spreading the use of Polish. The only kno\vn
document of that period edited in Lithuanian is dated 1639 and concerns the ,vesternmost
part of the country: Samogitia, Sudavia, and Prussia.
3. S. Stang (804) is an exceIlent monograph on the Chancellery language of the Grand
Duchy. Texts. edited by Lastoiiski (750) are not ahvays correct.
4. There \vas no Roman Catholic parish in Polock until the beginning of the six-
teenth century. - P. Vladimirov (7 81 ), p. 45, n. 4.
5. Solovjev (3 8 7), V, 204.
6. Halecki is \vrong in locating the first printing of Skoryna's books in Polock. See
Ca11tbridge History of Poland, I (1950), 285.
7. A complete list of Russian \vritings published in the Grand Duchy from the end of
the fourteenth to the middle of the sixteenth century can be found in Vladimirov (7 81 ) J
pp. 17-2 I. The Vilna Public Library had an invaluable collection of early West Russian
prints, including the Radzivill Bible of 1556; an extensive description, \vith numerous
photostats, is found in Lastouski (750). For a description of West Russian books collected
by the Bodleian Library, see Oxford Slavonic Papers, II (1951).
8. For a philological description of the language of Skoryna, see Vladimirov (781),
pp. 247-317. See also Karski (749) and (18S8), III, Part 2.
9. Cf. Kiprianovic (81S), p. 140.
10. Vasilevski, I storija Vil,ty (History of the City of Vilna), p. 100.
I I. Batiuskov (521), p. 202. The theory is some\vhat biased in tho \vay typical of
the Russian historiography of the time, but contains valuable information dra\vn directly
from the Lithuanian Russian Archives.
12. The full text first published by Sapunov in Vitebskaja Starina, I, 218-222.
13. Batiuskov (521), p. 205.
14. For details, D. Oljancyn, "Zur Frage der General-Konfoederation zwischen Protes-
tanten und Orthodoxen in WHna, 1599," Kyrios, I (1936), 29-46, 198-205; also Chod-
yniecki (829), 305ff, 348ff, 37 6ff , 512ff. The situation is treated from a different angle by

24 2
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
G. Florovski, Puti russkogo bogoslovija (The Ways of Russian Theology; Paris: YMCA,
1937), pp. 36ff.
15. Krackovski, pp. 3°-3 1 , 50.
16. Meleti Smotricki in his Thrinos, or "Lament" (Vilna, 1610), complained thus in
the name of the Russian Church: "Where is no\v the family of Prince Ostrozski, the in-
valuable precious je\vel which, \vith other gems, adorned My Crown and shone like a Sun
among the Stars? Where are other jewels in My Cl'o\vn, diamonds and sapphires, the glori-
ous houses of Princes Slucki, Zaslavski, Zbarazki, Visnevecki, Sangusko, Cartoryjski, Pron-
ski, Rozinski, Gorski, Sokolinski, Lukomski, Puzyn, Solomerecki, Golovcicki, Kasirski,
Masalski, and numberless others? . . . What has become of these old and noble families
\vho had been the cream and the glory of the Russian nation. . . ? You, evil men, have
torn My vestments and laughed at My naked and weakened body of which, however, all
of you \vere born." - Quoted by Batiuskov (521), pp. 210-21 I.
The historian is impressed by the Russian names \vhich subsequently became stand-
ard bearers and symbols of Polish nationalism, such as ViSnevecki (Wisznie\vecki) ,
Tyskevic (Tyszkiewicz), Cartoryjski (Czartoryski), etc. Within a century after the Union,
all West Russian aristocracy turned Polish both in religion and in language j cf. pertinent
references in Ezavitau (144), p. 11.
17. Solovjev (387), X, 246. See also N. Kostomarov, Bohdan Cltmelnicki, II, 185-19°.
18. But Solovjev (387), V, 137, stresses the religious nature of the struggle, and his
vie\v is shared by M. I(orduba) CalJtbridge Hist01'Y of Poland, I) (1950), 508.
19. Batiuskov (5 21 ), pp. 299-3° 0 .
20. See Batiuskov (521), pp. 3°6-307; for details, Kostomarov (64 2 ), pp. 175-177.
21. Quoted from Vladimirov (781), xii-xiii (footnote), and xix. Harecki's opinion
(2020) is shared by the \vhole school of modern Belorussian historians and linguists,
though disputed by Karski (1858).
22. "Vest Russian cities valued their liberties and tried to protect them by charters
and treaties with Mosco\v. In 1654, the city of Mogilev obtained from Tsar Alexius the
right "to be governed as before, in accordance with the Magdeburg laws." Citizens \vere
allowed to \vear their customary clothes, to be exempt from war services and compulsory
transfers, to maintain schools molded on the Kiev pattern, to carryon municipal affairs
through their selectmen, etc. Similar agreements were negotiated by other cities under the
Muscovite occupation) but none survived their eventual incorporation into the Muscovite
state, later the Russian empire. See Solovjev (387), X, 321.
23. See Harecki (2020), Ihnatoiiski (398), Lastouski (750), Piceta (384, 400). The
Polish view is best presented by Kutrzeba (364), Halecki (360, 720), and Cambridge His-
tory oj Poland, I (1950); the Russian view, in Batiuskov (5 21 ), Lappo (547), Liubavski
(1402a), Solovjev (387, V, 647), and Kostomarov (64 2 ). In the Soviet textbooks, the
Russian and Belorussian views have been brought to a compromise j cf. Pankratova,
lstorija SSSR, I (1943), 87-9 1 , 113- 11 7, 130-140, 149- 16 4) 180- 18 9; II (194 1 ), 3-74;
Tichomirov and Dmitriev, Istorija SSSR) I (1948), 7 8 - 10 5, 194- 1 9 6 , 275-283, 381-382 j
see also the later \vorks of V. Piceta (384, 1669). The Lithuanian version is most fully
told by J urgela (39 1 ).
24. For full studies of this period, see BGB, 1-90 and 519-874.
Chapter 5. The Russian Empire
I. Batiuskov (521), pp. 322-333; Cvikevic (137 6 ), p. 30.
2. Batiuskov (5 21 ), p. 335.
3. Ibid., p. 3 18 j Kiprianovic (8 1 5).
4. In a conversation \vith Archbishop Siestrencewicz; quoted from Batiuskov (5 21 ),
P.3 2 7.
5. Ibid., pp. 323-324,336; see also Lappo (547). As against the Russian vie\v, the
Polish historians insist that the government was "forcing the illiterate masses back to
Orthodoxy"; cf. Kuehnelt-Leddihn (816), pp. 3 22 -3 2 3. J. Basarab gives a useful though
deliberately one-sided summary of events in his "Campaign against the Uniates in the
Russian Empire under Nicholas I," an essay for the certificate of the Russian Institute,
Columbia University, 1949-50. K. Nikolaev, V ostocnyj obriad (The Eastern Rite j Paris:

THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE
243
YMCA, 1950) J gives abundant and valuable information about the Union Revival after
World War 1.
6. See Dekabristy i tajnye obscestva v Rossii (The Decembrists and Secret Societies
in Russia; Mos.co\v, 1906). See also M. Wolkonski, Die Dekabriste1t: Die ersten russische1t
Freilleitskaempjer des 19. JaJzrltunderts (Zurich, 1946).
7. The true reasons and aims of the Polish revolt are not my concern here. Polish
historians agree that it ,vas neither ,veIl planned nor \vell conducted, and that it produced
a tragic split among the Poles themselves. The insurgent activities spread over the western
provinces, but they did not affect Belorussia in any significant \vay; cf. H. Dembinski
(947, 94 8 ), who led a column of 3,000 men into Belorussia but \vas unable to find any
substantial support among the local populations. See also S. Gnoro\vski (95 2 ), p. 373,
and Colonel Br. Pa\vlo\vski, "The November Insurrection," Cambridge History oj Poland,
II (1941), 295-310. Ne\v documents from the Lithuanian Archives are described by A.
Ruzancovas in Savivaldyte, I-XII (1930-3 I), and some are published in his Kaunas 1831
ir I863 11tetis sulkilil1t1tese (Kaunas. in the Insurrections of 183 I and 1863).
8. Cf. Batiuskov (521), pp. 360-362; Kiprianovic (859).
9. Batiuskov (521), pp. 3 6 4-3 66 ; Kiprianovic (815). For more details, see BGB}
810- 8 74.
10. Especially important material is to be found in the memoirs of the Lithuanian
insurgents and documents from the Vilna Archives; see BGB, 975-1014. See also A. P.
Coleman in Cal1tbridge History of Poland, II (1941), 365-386. See above, note 7.
II. A PoUsh historian agrees that the insurgents. offered the peasants "far less generous
Iando\vnership than did the celebrated manifesto of the Tsar \vhich had been issued for
the eastern provinces in March . . . Though in isolated villages the peasantry rose
through loyalty to some individual commander, the Polish regiments more generally found
their hardships and hazards aggravated rather than alleviated by the very peasants whom
the ne\v [Polish] regime \vas intent on conciliating"; cf. Redda\vay (37 2 ), pp. 375, 378,
380.
12. The "White Committee" in Vilna was composed of Jakob Gieysztor (president),
Anton Elenski and Alexander Oskierka (Minsk), Francz Dale\vski (Vilna), Ignaci Lopa-
cinski (Vitebsk), and Heronimus Kenie\vicz, son of a Polish emigrant; Count W. Star-
zynski (Grodno), and Count Leon Platter (Vitebsk)" \vere dropped from the committee
in January 1863.
The "Red Committee" was originally composed of Ivan Poklewski-KozelI, Sigismund
Czechowicz, Edmund Werigo, and Anton Zalesski, all of Vilna; Bolesla\v Dlusski from
Kovno, Kas.tus' I(alinoiiski from Grodno, and Bonoldi (a foreigner). Cf. Liaskovski
(998), pp. 64- 6 5, 74-75. N. Berg (979) and the memoirs of Gieysztor (987) are particu-
larly valuable. See also note 7 above for documents published by Ruzancovas.
13. It \vas generally believed until lately that the M-uzickaja Pravda was published
by Tomasze\vski and Wr6ble\vski (later a general of the Paris Commune). Indeed, Step-
niak and Vladimir Burcev (Byloe, 1906) do not even mention the name of Kalinoiiski;
cf. S. Ahursld (975), p. 20. KaIinoiiski's editorship, however, is no\v established beyond
doubt. See Stankevic (I018), Liaskovski (998).
14. Kalinoiiski gave the follo\ving account of his men: "The band of Duchinski hardly
counted 500 men; that of Lander (Lenkie\vicz), 300; Wladek, 100; JundzilI, 250; Kra-
ko\vski, 150; Stasiakie\vicz, 300; and Tyszka, 100; all together, hardly 1700 men."-
quoted by Liaskovski (998), p. 172.
15. The full text of the ZaPiska is appended to Liaskovski (998)., pp. 169-175.
16. Recha (1453), a periodical published in Paris (March I, 1938).
17. Coleman's contention that "all Lithuania had taken up arms for union with
Poland" and that "in Lithuania . . . the insurrection was a genuine uprising of the
people," is a gross overstatement; cf. Redda\vay (372), pp. 379-380. Actually, out of
1,228 battles and minor encounters ,vith the Imperial troops. and police, only 186 took
place in the territory of historic Lithuania; cf. W. Wielhorski ( 62 9), pp. 194-195;
Studnicki (1011).
18. Cf. Bobrovski (159).
19. Although a Western Committee of Count Bobrinskoy and Bishop Semasko,
formed by Nicholas I, had a sufficient understanding of the national and religious char-
acteristics of Belorussia, the general opinion predominated that the mass of the po pula-

244
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
tion was Polish, and it was even supported by publications of the Imperial Academy of
Sciences; see Vasilij Severgin, Zapiski putesestvennika (1839). N. G. Ustrialov was the
first to suggest that the traditional concept of nationality be revised. For a better under-
standing of Russian-Polish relations of that period, the follo,ving can be recommended:
H. Lisicki, Alexander Wielepolski (4 vols.; Craco\v, 1878-79); V. Spasovic, Zizn' i politika
ntarkiza V elepolsko go (Life and Policy of Marquis Wielepolski; St. Petersburg, 1882);
M. Katkov, Sobranie statej po pol'sko11tU vopro$u (A Collection of Articles on the
Polish Question; Moscow, 1887); M. Dragomanov, lstoriceskaja Pol'sa i velikorusskaja
de1nokratija (Historical Poland and the Great Russian Democracy; Geneva, 1883). See
BG B, 875-1060.
20. Kovno province, the center of ethnographic Lithuania, ,vas given a coat of arms
reproducing a monument to the Campaign of 1812, and Grodno province one reproducing
a European bison from the forests of Beloveza (1878).
21. A. Novina (1411)
22. There is no essential disagreement in literature on this point. This may explain
the fact that the status of a separate nationality was so long denied to the Belorussians.
See Wasile\vski (1577), Thugutt (1529), and P. Miliukov (1406).
Chapter 6. National Self-Determination
I. The phrase "national self-determination" is used in the conventional sense; see
above Chap. 3, note I.
2. Narbutt (40, 418), Czeczot (1313, 1314). For the part Vilna University played in
the cultural life of the country, see L. Tur (671).
3. All four volumes of Barszcze\vski's \vorks \vere published in 81. Petersburg under
the title Szlaclttycz Zawalnia (1844-46); the subtitle reads (in translation): "A story of
Belorussia in its fantastic tales."
4. A. Pypin (1106), IV, 59.
5. Linde (1862).
6. J. C. v. Adelung, Mithridates oder allgemeine SprachenkU1tde 1nit dem Vater Unser
als Spracltprobe in beinahe fitnfhundert Sprachen 1tnd Mundarten (Berlin: 1809), VI
Slavischer Sprach- und Volkershamm, II Theile, pp. 629-631.
7. Safarik (34 6 ).
8. M. Maksimovic, I storija drevnej russkoj slovesnosti (History of Ancient Russian
Literature; Kiev, 1839), I, 96-128.
9. N. Nadeschdin, "Mundarten der russischen 8prache," in lahrbuecher der Literatur,
XCV (Vienna, 1841), pp. 181-24°. Pertinent comments in P. Saveljev (1869), pp. 302-314.
10. V. Stankevic (1425), p. 23. This view was based on the judgment of a few leading
philologists (Potebnia, Sachmatov, Sobolevsky) who saw in Belorussian but a group of
related dialects of Russian. For the relation of Belorussian to Russian and Ukrainian, see
])urnovo (1857), pp. 87-92,97-98,183-193,200-228,298-3°3,340-344.
II. Karski (1858).
12. Taraskevic (1999).
13. In Central and Eastern Europe "the growing consciousness of nationality had
attached itself neither to traditional frontiers nor to new geographical associations but
almost exclusively to mother tongue." - A. J. Toynbee, T he World after tlte Peace C 01t-
ference (1926), p. 18. Belorussia \vas no exception to that rule.
14. See above, pp. 27-30.
IS. A Ukrainian parody of Virgil's Aeneid \vas ,vritten by Ivan Kotliarevsky in 17g8.
The authorship of the Belorussian version .,vas long attributed to T. Man'kovski, a gov-
ernment official in Mogilev, later in Vitebsk, but recent research \vould point to V.
Rovinski, a landlord in Smolensk province, as the real author. For a critical study, see
Karski (2026). The authorship of Taras lla Parnase \vas, at different times and by different
sources, ascribed to a group of students at Horki Agricultural College, to Dunin-Mar-
cinkevic, and even to Adam Mickiewicz \vho, as is \vell kno,vn, was born in Belorussia.
The first s.tanzas of E1teida navyvarat were published in Majak, XXIII (1845), and Taras
1ta Parnase in the Minskij Listok, no. 37 (1889).
16. A little earlier if we accept Karski's view (1858), III, that the public proclama-
tions printed in the Belorussian vernacular by the French Army in 1812 were "literature."

NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION
245
17. M. Federewski (1089), III. Harecki (2020), pp. 86-91, credits Bachrym with a
few more poems, but their authenticity is doubted by Adam Stankevic (2050). Attempts
by A. J anulaitis (2024) and Kupala (2031), pp. 21-22, to reconstruct the life and work
of Bachrym are far-fetched.
18. See any standard history of Belorussian literature. A monograph by J. Golbek
(2019)' includes Dunin in the history of Polish literature, and hardly a page is dedicated
to him in the collection of Soviet studies edited by Kupala (2031). See above, p. 216.
19. Reprinted in the M ogilevskie Gubernskie Vedontosti (The Mogilev Official Monitor; '--
Mogilev, 1862), I).os. 51, 60, 61.
20. In modern Soviet literature, Bohusevic's significance in Belorussian nationalism is
played down; see Kupala (2031). M. Piotuchovic (2042) is a work of unreserved glorifica-
tion, but it gives a useful account of facts. A. Stankevic (2051) is a commemorative
tribute.
21. For the story of this rather obscure publication, see Anton Luckevic (1041). The
Belorussian museum in Vilna was known to hold the only extant copy of H ot1tan, no. 2;
but reports circulated that the Lenin Library in Mosco\v may have a copy of H ot1tan,
no. I. According to Luckevic, the paper was printed in the Russian language, and had no
mention of the place of publication; actually, only the title was in Belorussian. Adam
Stankevic believes that Hot1tan was printed in St. Petersburg, not in Minsk; see (1422),
pp. 38-52.
22. .Hryb (1387) and Engelhardt (340), p. 87, -believe that Hrynevicki \vas moved by
"Belorussian patriotism." Their vie\v finds no support in the exhaustive literature on the
uN arodnaja V olia" and the assassination of Alexander II.
23. Copies of the following have been preserved: Klldy mllzickija ltrosy id'llc' (Where
the Peasants' Money Goes); C Itto prat'idzivy pryjacel' bedllaha naroda (Who Is the True
Friend of the Poor iPeople); and Jak zrabic' kab 11ldziant stala dobra na svece (How to
Make Everybody Happy in This W orId). All are composed in the Polish characters.
24. For the beginnings of the Hramada, see A. Burbis (1373).
25. The beginnings of the Christian Democratic Party are fully described by A.
Stankevic (1471 )'.
26. A. Staeiiski (1426), p. 181.
27. During 1861-1863, peasants' revolts against landlords were more important. At
that time, disorders were reported from more than half of the rural districts in Vitebsk,
ViIna, and Grodno provinces, while they were less general in Mogilev, still less in Minsk
province. There were strikes in Vilna and in Bialystok in the 1870's, in 1883, and in 1894,
and public order was sometimes threatened more than in 19°5 . Works such as Ahurski
(1022) are grossly inflated. Soviet general sources seem to be more moderate in their
accounts; see A. Pankratova, lstorija SSSR, II, 244-255; III, 3-55. Misadventures of
the Bolshevik group are told by Engelhardt (34 0 ), p. 87.
28. Nationalist accounts have become more inflated. But the earlier writers who had
a direct part in the events left sober and hones.t reports; see F. Turuk (1427), A. Kancar
(1394), E. Kancer (1395), Nikiforovski (1102,) and A. Cvikevic (1376).
29. Election data in V. Stankevic (1425). The phrase epocha adzinak belongs to N.
Nedasek who used it in his brief review of Belorussian national self-determination, 1917-
I947, BAG, I (4) (January 25, 194 8 ).
30. V. Stankevic (14 2 5), p. 35.
31. Kolas' first poems and stories were published in Nasa Niva. In 1910, his first book
of verse appeared, Pes'ni zalby (Vilna). It was followed by APaviadan'ni (Vilna, I912)';
Rodnyja Zjavy ("Una, 1914); Scenilttyja tvary (Minsk, 1917); Synton Muzyka (Minsk,
1918); Kazki zyccia (Kaunas, 192 I); Vadhll11e (Minsk, 1922); etc. New editions of his
poems and short stories appeared at the same time, as ,veIl as translations into Russian,
Polish, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian. Today, he is the most published \vriter in the BSSR.
The following are among the critical studies of his \vork: Dziarzynski (2017), Mozolkov
(2034a), Piotuchovic (2040), Vaz'niasenki (2056).
32. For 6 ' an early biography, before Kupala had become a national symbol, see Karski
(1858), III, 3:229-23°. The first volumes of verse, Zalejka (1908) and Advecnaja Pesnia
(1910), were published in St. Petersburg. They \vere followed by Son na kurltane (1912)
and Raskidanae httiazdo (1913) \vhich established Kupala's leadership in Belorussian
belles-lettres. Today he enjoys the rare privilege of having his memory extolled by the

24 6
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
Soviet and anti-Soviet camps alike. For a summary of his life and \vork, see E. Mozolkov
(2034), who makes him a Soviet hero; one may profitably compare it with an earlier
\vork by Piotuchovic (2039).
33. I. Dvarcanin ( 206 7), pp. 483-489.
34. See also for Cetka, J. Bibila (2012); for Maxim Bahdanovic, M. Kaspjarovic
(2027) and I. Zamocin (2°59); for Jadvihin, Piotuchovic (2043); for CiSka Hartny,
Piotuchovic (2041); for Biadulia, Karski (1858), III, 3: 187ff.
 35. Ivan Lucevic used half a dozen pen names, among ,vhich Levy, Vajdelota, and
finally Janka Kupala brought him fame. Kastus' Mickevic, alias J akub Kolas, \vas
also known as Taras Husea, Tamas Bulava, K. Albucki, Dziadz'ka I<.arus, Hanna Krum,
Liasovic, etc. Plaiinik never signed his real name, and \vas kno,vn as Biadulia, J asakar,
Iskra, Symon Pustelnik, etc. J advihin signed Anton Levicki; K. Kastravicki signed
Kahanec; Aloisa Paskevic signed Cetka; I<.ejris used the names of Krapiva, I<.rapiiika,
Haiiryla z Polacka, Tymczaso\vy, etc.) but never his o\vn.
36. Indications exist that the members of the Nasa Niva group \vere involved in
secret negotiations with Andrej Szepticki, Metropolitan of the Union Church in the
Austro-Hungarian empire, exploring the chances for the establishment of a national
Church in Belorussia; see Engelhardt (340), p. 89.
37. Cvikevic (1375).
38 Figures given by Engelhardt (340), p. go, are out of proportion. N edasek admits
that in the period 1906-1915 the Belorussian national press had been working on a very
limited scale; see BAC, No. I (4») January 25, 194 8 .
Chapter 7 . War and Revolution
1. Full text, Anton Navina (1409), pp. 8-9; a German translation, Engelhardt (340),
p.3 2 7.
2. Ibid., and Eberhardt (340), p. 95.
3. Here is an excerpt concerning Belorussia, from the World Appeal sent out by the
Lausanne Conference: uWe can at last hope that, \vhatever the issue of the war may be,
the peoples of Europe will help us to secure for White Ruthenia her political and national
rights, \vhich will give our people the opportunity to develop their intellectual, moral, and
economic potentialities, and that these rights ,vill give us the opportunity to become
masters over our own land." Engelhardt (340), pp. 97-99, deals ,vith both Conferences
in some detail. For a balanced picture of the movements of national self-determination in
Russia, see Paul Miliukov, Nacional'nyj vopros: Proischozdenie naciollal'nosti i nacioll-
al'nye voprosy v Rossii (The National Question: Origins of Nationality and National-
ity Problems in Russia; Prague, 1925), pp. 166-168.
4. Von Beckerat, the German advisor on Belorussian affairs, reported to the Military
Command of the Eastern front that "the Belorussian secessionism, supported by a fe\v
Vilna archeologists and journalists, ought to be considered a local matter of no political
consequence." - Quoted by L. Abramowicz (1510), pp. 7-12.
5. uIn political union with ethnographic Lithuania and I<.urJand." -Ibid., p. 28.
6. The Belorussian National Committee in Minsk was composed of R. Skirmunt
(Polish landlord, former member of the Russian Duma), A. Smolic (agronomist), R.
Aleksiuk and J. Zajac (la\vyers), E. Budzko (publicist), V. Falski (railroad employee),
B. Taraskevic and Boborykin (teachers), Hadleiiski (Roman Catholic priest), A. Burbis
(bank employee), K. Kastravicki (lando\vner), \T. Ivanoiiski (engineer), N. Dupejkous.ki
(architect), E. Kancer, I. Kraskoiiski, and N. Kochanoiiski (\vhite-collar ,vorkers), F.
Santyr (la\\7yer), and Zylunovic (industrial \vorker and a Uproletarian poet").
The Socialist Hramada \vas represented by A. B urbis and V. I vanouski; the Christian
Democrats by E. Budsko and Hadleiiski; the conservatives by R. Skirmunt. Later,
Zylunovic identified himself as a Bolshevik. There were no elections. Delegates to the
committee were appointed by the executive bodies of their respective groups.
7. Besides hvo poems by Jasakar (Biadulia), a short poem by Jakub I\.olas, and a
two-act play by Aliachnovic, no nationalist sentiment is expressed in Belorussian literature
after the March Revolution ,vhich brought a promise of freedom to all the peoples of the
empire. Janka Kupala, "the prophet of national revival," published nothing in the period
1916-1918.

WAR AND REVOLUTION
247
8. See Chap. 6, note 28. The Belorussian National Commissariat in Odess.a continued
as an independent body until September 1918. The story of the Mosco,v Hramada, dis-
continued in 1918, i,s told in Belorussia (1364). For activities of the Petrograd Committee
until it evolved into the government of the First Belorussian SSR, see Kancer (1395),
Turuk (1427). The story of the Socialist Hramada is told ,vith significant differences by
Kancer (1395), Turuk (14 2 7), Burbis (1373), Navina (1409), and Prusinski (1469). For
the history of the Christian Democratic Party, see Adam Stankevic (1471) and Belorussia
(1354); Popular Democratic Party, Belorussia (1355, 1356); other political groups,
Hadleusld (1385), Varonka (1430), Turuk (1427).
9. For elections data, see V. Stankevic (14 2 5), p. 39.
10. The first North\vestern Convention on September IS, and the second North\vestern
Convention on October 5. Engelhardt (340), p. 103, gives the figures ,vithou t indicating
the sources. They are doubtful, since tlte total 11te1nbership of the Bolshevik Party in
Russia is kno,vn to have been 4S,S85 in December 1917. - St. Ivanovic, Rossijskaja
[(o11t11tUnisticeskaja Partija (The Russian Communist Party; Berlin, 1924), p. 12.
II. Declaration of November 17, 1917; texts, according to Kancer (1395).
12. "Three quarters of the delegates spoke in Russian, not in Belorussian," testifies
Syla (1498), p. 10.
13. Adam Stankevic (147 1 ), p. 93, identifies the man as Krivosein, commander of
the Minsk garrison, and P. Kreceliski (1450), PP. 52-S3, as "some Bolshevik commissar,"
apparently holding no responsible position in Minsk.
14. For eye\vitness accounts, see Kancer (1395), Turuk (1427), Kreceuski (1450),
Varonka (1430) ; also V ol'naja Belorus', no. 36 (1917).
15. K. Lander, then head of the Minsk Soviet, relates the dramatic flight in V pered,
no. I (1922).
16. The reshuffled Rada had 71 members; 27 represented the city of Minsk; 10, the
municipalities and zentstvos; 9, the country at large; IS, the ethnic minorities (7 Je\vs,
4 Poles, 2 Russians, I Ukrainian, I Lithuanian). - BSSR (1724), p. 201.
17. The First Polish Corps ,vas formed in Russia, in 1917, under the command of
General Dowbor-Musnicki. Squeezed behveen the Reds and the Germans, one infantry
division and a cavalry regiment, about 20,000 men in all, found temporary refuge in
Belorussia. They \vere armed "\vith 8,000 rifles, 2,100 sabres, 125 machine guns, 128 field
cannons and several score of heavy artillery guns, 4 airplanes . . . and they had enough
ammunition for an army of 100,000 men." They concentrated in the region of Bobrujsk
and, when the Reds had withdrawn from the country, they seized Mogilev, Zlobin, Orsa,
Rogacev, and Dubrovina, and raided the city of Minsk. In May 1918 they \vere disarmed
by the Germans and disbanded. For eye\vitness accounts of the looting of the country
by the First Polish Corps, see Ezavitau (1384), and Belorussia (1351). General Do\vbor-
Musnicki (1581) tells a different story; see also Baginski (1025), and Smogorzewski
(17 0 9), pp. 5 6 -S9.
18. The Rada (Council of Seniors) of the first Belorussian Convention made itself
into the Parliament of the Belorussian National Republic, on March 19, 19 18 . J. Serada
was elected president; J. Varonka, vice-president; K. Eza vitali and T. Hryb, secretaries.
Formerly all four had been affiliated \vith Russian, not Belorussian, political parties,
three with the Socialist Revolutionaries and one ,vith the Social Democrats (Menshevik).
Cf. Kancer (1395), Turuk (14 2 7).
19. Texts in Staseuski (1426)', p. 201; Nedasek (1495), pp. 8, IS-16, 20-21. Engel-
hardt (340), pp. 109-112, used a Polish translation by Wasile\vski (1577), pp. 190ff. The
Vilna Assembly ,vas preceded by an appeal to the German Reich; for text and other
details, Wasile\vski (1577), pp. 160-162.
20. Turuk (1427),P.38.
21. The German translation used by Engelhardt (340), pp. 110-111, shows important
discrepancies from the original, \vhich contained no specific mention of Grodno, Bialystok,
Smolensk, Vitebsk, or the parts of Cernigov province. The Polish translation by Wasile\vski
(1577), p. 19 1 , is unsatisfactory.
22. Minsk: V ol'naja Belarus' (Free Belorussia), Belaruskaja Ziamlia (The Belorussian
Land)', Belaruski Sliach (The Belorussian Way), Krynica (The Well), and the monthly
Varta (The Sentry); Vilna: H otltan (The Clamor), Belaruskaja lliustryrovanaja CasaPis
(The Belorussian Picture J ournaI) J and the monthly Kryvilanin (The Krivican); Sluck:

248
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7
Rodny Kraj (The Native Land); Kiev: Belaruskae Slova (The Belorussian Word) and
Belaruskae Echo (The Belorussian Echo) ; Odessa: Belayltsy it Adessi, Mosco\v: Dziannica
(The Morning) ; and Petrograd: Cyrvotty Sliach (The Red Way).
23. See Engelhardt (34 0 ), p. 113, and Nedasek (1495), p. 14.
24. The full German text is given by Engelhardt (340), pp. 112-113. The telegram
was signed by J. Serada (President of the Rada), J. Varonka (President of the Govern-
ment) ; R. Skirmunt, A. Ausianik, P. Aliaksiuk, P. Kreceuski, and J. Lesik, senior members.
of the Rada. The text had been approved by 35 to 4 votes, with 4 abstentions. - A.
Stankevic (1471), p. 128. .
25. D. S. Mirsky, Russia.' A Social History (1931), p. 278.
Chapter 8. Partition of Belorussia
I. The correspondence behveen the Belorussian administration in Grodno and Dr.
Zimmerle was published by Ezavitaii (1383). Engelhardt (340), pp. 116-121, used the
Russian translation. It is. questionable whether the German texts were available to
Abramowicz (15 10 ) and Wasilewski (1577). Ezavitau (1383), Zasecki (1509), and
Varonka (1430) differ in more than one detail, ,but they are the only authentic sources
f or the period.
2. It seems that in many parts of the country the local self-governments resisted the
Soviets, though data are scant. A peasant uprising in Vitebsk province (VeliZ) is related
by one of the survivors, J. Vitbic, NRS, May 10, 1950.
3. Turuk (14 2 7), p. 45.
4. The Belorussian texts of the proclamations signed by General Rydz-Smigly, April
21, and by General Pilsudski, April 22, 1919, have not been available to me. The Polish
texts can be found in Wasilewski (1577), 194ff.
5. The delegation \vas headed by Aleksiuk, former president of the Rada. Ezavitau
(1383), pp. 58, 79- 80 , produces evidence that the delegates ,vere self-appointed and
subsequently disowned in both Grodno and Novogrodek.
6. On March 3, 19 1 9, a note was handed to the Territorial Committee of the Paris
Peace Conference, in which Poland's claims to the historic territories ,vere stated;' they
included the occupied Belorussian lands. Petitions from the eas.tern provinces ,vere directed
to the Polish Provisional State Council (TYl1tCZasowa Rada Stanu)'; abundant quotations
are used by Wasilewski (1577), pp. 179- 182 ; A,bramowicz (15 1 0), pp. 7ff; Engelhardt
(34 0 ),pp.126- 1 32.
7. M. Dziewanowski (1537), pp. 118-IIg. See also Skarzynski (159 1 ), pp. 36-37, and
St. Kozicki (210), p. 119. Literature is most voluminous. More representative writings are
included in BGB, 1510-1717.
8. A Polish historian sums up the different views as follows: "The federalists strove
for the reconstruction of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, with its frontiers be-
tween the Union of Lublin (1569) and the partition of Poland. . . The parts of this
Grand Duchy in which different racial elements predominate were to maintain a certain
distinctness, forming a kind of canton, such as the Lithuanian, Polish-White Russian,
mainly Catholic, and the White Russian, mainly Orthodox . . . The population would
not have been forced to assume Polish nationality, but would have been helped to build
up its own state; thus its friendship ,vould have been gained ,vhile the Polish element,
numerically strong and superior in intelligence, would have acquired a leading position. . .
A second scheme was that of incorporation. Its advocates contended for integral embodi-
ment by Poland of the part of White Russia where the Polish population is in a relative
majority, it being chiefly Catholic and pervaded by Polish civilization. This would become
a component part of the Republic of Poland, while the remaining lands, where the
Orthodox White Russians preponderate, would return to Russia. In view of the German
menace, it was argued, Poland should seek to be on good terms \vith Russia. . . A merely
federative union of this territory with Poland would render impossible the outflow into
those sparsely inhabited areas of the surplus agricultural population from Poland. . .
The program of incorporation was formulated by the National Democratic Party and
several times approved by the Diet [Sejm]. - Kutrzeba, Cambridge History of Poland,
II (1941),523-24. Cf. files of the Minsk newspapers Zvon and Belarus' (1919) edited by
I van Luckevic and J. Lesik respectively.

PARTITION OF BELORUSSIA
249
9. Quoted by J. T. Shotwell and M. M. Laserson, Poland and Russia,' 1919-1945
(Ne\v York, 1945), pp. 44 f f.
10. See Dzie,vaowski (1537), pp. 283-285, or A. Tarnowski, Two Polish Attempts
to Bring about a Central-East European Organization (London, 1945)', pp. 3-7.
II. No records of the Warsaw negotiations have been published. Staseuski (1426)
used indirect evidence. The conjectures seem to be warranted by recorded changes in
Luckevic's attitude since his return to Minsk.
12. Thitry-seven members of the Rada supported A. Luckevic. These were former
members of the Belorussian National Committee, nearly all Mensheviks. On the other
hand, the majority which rallied around Lastouski consisted of eighty-seven delegates,
members of the Socialist Revolutionary and Socialist Federalist parties. After the split,
the Executive of the National Rada \vas composed of Kreceuski, Bodunova, Zacharka,
v
Kozic, and Mamon'ka; and the Executive of the Supreme Rada, of Serada, Ulasaii,
Terescenka, Lesik, and Rak-Michajlousld. Actually, only one member of the Luckevic
government, Minister of Finance Zacharka, had joined the Lastouski group.
13. Polish efforts to check nationalist propaganda among the Roman Catholics is
told by A. Stankevic (147 1 ), pp. 150-155.
14. Their status ,vas not certain, nor their functions clear. Written records are absent,
and missions are kno\vn to have been accredited in Minsk. Communications with foreign
governments went, as a rule, via Warsaw. Discussions of political boundaries and inter-
national trade were never more than academic. See Na Cuzyne (Abroad; Riga, 1920),
no. I.
15. Cvikevic (1376), pp. 169ff.
16. Kutrzeba (1585), pp. 20ff.
17. Kirkien (1658), pp. 23-38, gives a useful account of negotiations, but Dzie,vano\v-
ski (1537), p. 124, tells a some\vhat different story.
18. For the full text of the treaty" see S. Seluchin, V arsavs' ki dohovir flliz Poliakatni
i S. Petliuroju (Prague, 1926); for a French translation, R. Martel, La Pologne et notts
(Paris, 1928).
19. In Polish history, the invasion is explained as "a defensive measure to prevent a
Soviet-German agreement which \vould overthrow the Versailles status quo." The Polish
government, it is asserted, "had documentary proof of the Soviet plan for preparing an
aggressive ,var against Poland"; cf. I(utrzeba (1585), pp. 68-69, and Dziewano,vski
(1537), passitn. For the Soviet version, see 1. Antonau (1580), M. Baravy (1436), P.
Kapaevic (1449)', M. Model (1407), V. Scerbakov (1416), A. Ziuz'kov (1485). A.
Luckevic's account (1403) is too personal to be entirely convincing. For a pertinent
summary of the Polish views and documents, see Abramowicz (1510), Wasilewski (1577),
and Kirkien (1658). See also below, note 24.
20. For details see Engelhardt (340), p. 138. For Polish sources see Smogorzewski
(1709), p. 175. The act of incorporation was signed on March 22, ratified by the Polish
Sejm two days later. On March 28, the Vilna Sejm dissolved and Middle Lithuania
became Vilna province (wojewodstwo) in Poland. The Lithuanian government protested,
and so did the Soviets. Two years later, the Polish right to Vilna was recognized by the
League of Nations (February 3, 1923) and by the Conference of Ambassadors (March 15,
1923). Kutrzeba admits that "the order to Zeligowski had been secretly given by Pilsudski
who cherished an ardent love for Vilna." - Cambridge History of Poland, (194 1 ), II, 530.
21. The history of the Sluck uprising is confusing, its origins obscure. According to
V. Dub, the Sluck militia of five hundred men formed the first guerrilla group that
eventually increased to "ten thousand men." ("T\velve thousand," says General Kusel, in
BAC, no. 72, October 15, 1951). Then two regiments were formed under the command
of Colonel Haurylovic and Captain Semianiuk. The operations concentrated around the
villages of Bystryca, Verabejcy, Vasilcycy, Carnacubaii, VasiliSki, Dakaii, Mackevicy,
Kapyl, Cimkavicy, Vyzna, and a fe\v others. On December 28, 1920, the guerrillas were
forced to cross the Polish border, and ,vere interned at Siniawcy, near Bialystok. Those
who did not \vant to lay down their arms returned to the Sluck woods where "they
continued to fight against the Bolsheviks for nearly four years"; cf. 'Sluckae paustan'ne,"
Belaruskaja Tryb1lna (New York), no. 1-2 (9-10), January 1952. Adam Stankevic,
(1471)', p. 110, believes that the Sluck uprising "was organized jointly by the Supreme
Rada (in exile) and the Polish General Staff." Apparently, this was the generally accepted

25°
NOTES TO CHAPTER 8
view until the 1930'S, when a Vilna paper first suggested "national commemoration of
the Sluck rebellion." The Christian Democratic Krynka objected that the rebellion \vas,
in fact, "a Polish undertaking." The Socialists ans\vered that this \vas Hspitting on the
heroic deeds of our people," and glorified the rebels who, ((arising 'against a foreign
domination, put us on a level \vith the most advanced peoples in their struggle for
political independence H (Zolak, July I, 1936). A national legend has since gro\vn, and the
Sluck revolt has become a symbol. See, for instace, reports on the celebration of its
twenty-eighth anniversary by the Belorussian DP's in Germany, BAG, nos. 39/42, Decem-
ber 12, 194 8 ; 40/43, December 19, 1948.
For the most recently rewritten histories of the Sluck uprising see J. Najdziuk (1783)
and G. Stukalic, Antibol'sevistskie vosstanija i partizanskaja bor'ba v Belorussii (Anti-
Communist Uprisings and Guerrilla Warfare in Belorussia), a paper compiled for RP
(1952), pp. 4 6 -55. It is noteworthy that the detailed "eye,vitness accounts" and complete
Uhistories" of the Sluck uprising did not begin to appear in the Belorussian press until
the 1940'S, more than hventy years after the event.
22. General Bulak-Bulachovic, a native Belorussian, formerly of the Russian Im-
perial Army, earned fame as an able guerrilla leader in the Petrograd region during the
Civil War. His exploits are aptly described in Vozrozdenie (Paris), August 1951. Finally
defeated, he escaped to Estonia \vhere he attempted to establish "a special corps of the
Belorussian National Army," offering its services to both Lithuania and Poland, but failed
for want of volunteers j cf. Na Cttzyne (Riga), no. I, 1920. In Poland, the government
helped him Horganize Russian volunteers to fight \vith the Polish army for an independent
White Russian state." - Kutrzeba, Cantbridge History of Poland, II (1941), 529. "An
adventurer and a knave," Belarllski Entiltrant (Toronto), May 25, 1950, calls him. In
December 1922, he drove what remained of his men in Soviet Belorussia into Poland
where they were interned.
The guerrilla movement continued, as it were, into the 1930'S. A doubtful story of a
Mogilev group and of a Vitebsk group, 700 men strong, liquidated by the GPU in the
summer of 1933 and the winter of 1934, respectively, is told by Golos naroda (Munich),
March 23, 195 2 , reprinted in BAC, no. 15-16 (94-95), April 1952. Even though these
were anti-Communist groups, there is no evidence that they were fighting for "Belo-
russian sovereignty and independence."
23. The authentic sources are J. Pilsudski (1587) and W. Sikorski (1590) j Poland
(1672)', St. Pomaranski (1589), S. Stronski (1711), and Kutrzeba (1585) also deserve
attention. For sources published on the Russian side, see, in particular, USSR (1428; same
in French, 1593), USSR (1481), Suslov (1592), and, in general, chapters on the Soviet-
Polish War in current histories of the USSR. S. Konovalov (1659) gives an academic
summary of the eastern boundary question. The Lithuanian problem and vie\vs are stated
in League of Nations (1614), Lithuania (1616, 1617), and Lithuanian Information
Bureau (1618). For Belorussian complaints, A. Biaroza (1439) is typical.
24. Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles left the question of the eastern boundaries
of Poland open. On December 8, 1919, the Allied Po\vers defined the provisional bound-
ary between Poland and Russia as it had been suggested by a Committee of Russian
political parties in exile on April 9, 1919. On July II, 1920, in an attempt to stop the
Soviet-Polish War, this boundary \vas suggested by Lord Curzon as a definite Polish-
Russian frontier, and hence became kno\vn as the Curzon line. It corresponded roughly
to the Polish-Russian political boundary after the partition of Poland (1795), and was
rejected, first by Moscow, then by Warsaw. Subsequently, the Poles succeeded in pushing
the boundary eashvard, and the Soviets were forced to accept it. Poland thus gained
110,000 square miles beyond the Curzon line, \vith a population of 4,000,000, "a relative
majority of which were Polish (about 30 per cent), while the White Russians and Ukrain-
ians each numbered about 22 per cent." - Kutrzeba, Ca11tbridge History of Poland, II
(1941), 529. The Russian Ukrainian, and Belorussian political groups in exile protested.
The Executive Committee of exiled members of the Russian Constituent Assembly, in
Paris, published a M enz,oire sur Ie traite de Riga contesting the Polish right to settle the
question of boundaries by conquest (May 192 I). The Allied Powers shared this view
until March-April 1923, \vhen the Polish conquest ,vas legalized.
The best exposition of the Polish (Wasile\vski) and Russian (A. Mandelstam) views
is found in a symposium published by Le M onde Slav6 (Paris) in January 1925. Useful

WEST BELORUSSIA
25 1
summaries of the conflicting vie\vs are in Smogorzewski (1679) ; R. L. Buell, Poland: [(ey
to Europe (Ne\v York, 1939, pp. 73-77; Vernadsky, "A Review of Russian Policy," Yale
Review, XXXI (1941-42), 527ff.
Chapter 9. West Belorussia
I. Martel (1455) counted up to forty guerrilla groups, about 3,500 men, in 192 I. In
the follo\ving year, 878 cases of "armed banditry" in the eastern (primarily Ukrainian)
provinces \vere recorded, and 45 Belorussians, accused of preparing an armed revolt, \vere
tried at Bialystok. See Wielhorski (629), p. 22; Poland (1465).
2. Particularly, J. Strze\vski (15 2 7), Studnicki (1570), M. Niedzialko\vski (1557),
F. Bujak (1534), Kutrzeba (155 1 ), and Kamieniecki (1518). Many studies and pamphlets
,,'ere published by the BPK (Warsa\v). Pilsudski's plans are summed up by Dzie\vanowski
(1537). See also I(utrzeba, Cal1tbridge History of Poland, II (1941),523-524; and above,
Chap. 8, note 8.
3. According to the treaty concluded behveen the United States, the British Empire,
France, Italy, and Japan of the one part, and Poland of the other part, the Polish gov-
ernment was "to provide in the public educational system in to\vns and districts in \vhich
a considerable proportion of Polish nationals of other than Polish speech are residents
adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given
to the children of such Polish nationals through the medium of their o\vn language. This
provision shall not prevent the Polish government from making the teaching of the PoUsh
language obligatory in the said shools." The text served as a model for that of the other
minority treaties. The vagueness of tht. terms "considerable proportion" and "adequate
facilities," ho\vever, greatly limited the practical value of the clause.
4. See above, Chapter 8, notes 7-8.
5. For historical precedents, Bobrovski (159). The practice has continued far into
our time; see Encyclopaedia Britannica, XVIII, 148; for the post\var period, BAG, II,
no. 4/7 (February 15,194 8 ),3.
6. Not all Belorussian leaders shared the vie\v that Russian more than Polish culture
\vas antipathetic to Belorussianism. Cvikevic, once a Polish collaborationist, had found
that "the danger from Poland was greater than it could possibly be from Russia, \vhose
ability to denationalize the Belorussian masses has been so far very doubtful indeed"-
(1376), p. 24. "On the other hand," he stated, "after the union of our land \vith Poland,
in 1569, the old Belorussian culture \vent rapidly into a decline, and perished" (1377).
Previously, he held a different vie\v (1536a).
7. Polish statistics recorded parceled estates, but not the number of ne\v Polish
settlers (osadnicy). Some Belorussian and Ukrainian sources estimated their number at
400,000 in 1938; cf. Abramcyk (1433).
8. Wasile\vski (1577), Studnicki (1570), Paprocki (16 2 3), p. 106. There also \vere
Belorussians \vho shared this view. "The Belorussian people have not reached the full
stage of national self-consciousness and political organization which \vould naturally
assure their right to full recognition by their neighbors," \vrote former Belorussian Min-
ister Cvikevic (1376), p. 45. "The Belorussians proved themselves inept at independent
activity at that time, and had sho\vn no strong determination for building a state of
their own," admitted Zolak, 1/6 (Vilna, 1935).
9. The Belorussian interpellations (Poland 50 and 14 66 ) al;e from Martel (1455),
with dates as stated therein - these, ho\vever, are not always correct. The Sejm records
(Stenograficzne sprawozdatt1lia . . . sej11tOWe, 1924-1926) reveal no sessions on March 3,
19 2 4, or April 27, 1925, for instance, and a number of Belorussian interpellations have been
registered at different dates than indicated by Martel. The Sejm records mention interpel-
lations, but do not reproduce them. Only two speeches by Belorussian deputies were
printed in the records during that period (Miatla on May 23, 1924; Taraskevic on June 6,
19 2 4). These fully corroborate the tenor of documents quoted by Martel. Although
Martel's work contains many inaccuracies, the parts here used \vere based on reliable
authentic sources, since several Belorussian deputies had been responsible for their com-
pilation (Poland 50, 1466, 1467). The former deputy Sabaleuski, no\v in the United States,
among other survivors, has confirmed that the memorandum presented to the Fifth As-

25 2
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9
sembly of the League of Nations was based on facts of ,vhich the Polish government had
been officially informed.
10. I have not been able to find the original document among the official publications
of the League of Nations, nor could I find any mention of it in standard accounts of the
League's dealings \vith the minorities problem. Quotations are from Martel, La Pologne
et nous (Paris, 1928), pp. 217-220, who probably obtained the "Memoire concernant les
territoires blanc-russiens sous la domination polonaise presente a la VO AssembIee de la
Societe" from a Belorussian source, not mentioned in the text. Some parts. of the docu-
ment are reprinted in his article (I455), pp. 163-165. An appeal of the French elite
intellectuelle to world public opinion, protesting against "white terror" in regard to racial
minorities in Poland, and signed by Paul Painleve, Edouard Herriot, Leon Blum, Paul-
Boncour, Romain Rolland, and others, is reproduced in La Pologne et nous, pp. 220-222.
The documents are authentic but display Martel's disregard for useful references. Some
Polish friends have objected to my quoting at length from a document \vhich they con-
sider of dubious origins and injurious. The truth of these reports, however, is irrelevant,
as we are concerned rather with recording the Belorussian attitude and the part it played
in the development of a national consciousness.
II. St. Los (16I9).
12. Viilkerbu1.ld und Yolkerrecht, p. 467, quoted from F. Bergmann, La Pologne et la
protection des tninorites (Paris, 1935), pp. 46-5 I. The Belorussian minority is not
specifically mentioned.
13. "En attendant une mise en vigueur d'un systeme general et uniforme de la protec-
tion des minorites, mon Gouvernement se voit oblige de se refuser, a partir d'aujourd'hui,
a toute collaboration avec les organes internationaux en ce qui concerne Ie controle de
l'application par la Pologne du systeme de la protection des minorites," - Polish Foreign
Minister Beck, before the General Assembly of the League of Nations; Actes de la Xyo
Assel1tblee, Seances Plenieres, p. 42. See also above, note 3.
14. Cvikevic (I376) pp. iii-iv.
15. J akauIeii (I 54 2 ) .
16. A statement by President Abramcyk of the Belorussian Hramada in France,
April 23, 1939.
17. The Hramada counted 121,000 members according to Syla (I49 8 ), p. 5, and
150,000 according to Rydlevsky (I497), p. 19. The Polish estimate ,vas 80,000-100,000;
cf. Wielhorski (I688a), p. 16. That the movement undoubtedly was connected with, and
inspired - perhaps led - by the Communist underground, appears certain from the very
name of Hramada ("Workers and Peasants"), its statutes (1926), and accounts of the
trial in the Soviet press; cf. BSSR (I437). The work of Symoncuk (I68I) was not avail-
able to me. For criticism from a nationalist point of view, see A. Stankevic (1471), pp.
186- 1 9 2 .
18. A. Stankevic (I47 I), pp. 186-200.
19. See above, p. 121.
20. The leaders of the Christian Democratic Movement (BCD) protested the decisions
of the Archbishop of Vilna before the Papal Nuncio in Warsa\v (January 22, 1929) and
their memorandum was forwarded to Rome, but the Archbishop's order was not re-
pealed. For nationalism among Belorussians of the Roman Catholic faith, see A. Stankevic
(I471), Belorussia (I354) , and files of the Belaruskaja Krynica (Vilna, 1926-1936).
2 I. The collaborationist group emerged in 1926, when it began publication of the
Belaruskae Slova (1926-27), later Belaruski Dzen' (1927-28). It then constituted itself
as Sialianskaja Partyja (Peasants' Party), and changed the name of its periodical to
Narod (People; 1928-1930). During the period of "pacification," it supported the Polish
administration with Naperad (For\vard; 1930) and Belaruski Zvon (Belorussian Peal;
1931-32)', later changed to Rodny Kraj (Native Land), eventually to be suspended in
1936. An attempt to promote Belorussian Polish "collaboration" ended in a trial for the
squandering of public funds by Astrouski. See Stankevic (147 1 ), pp. 199-200; Belaruskaja
Krynica, nos.. 44, 47, November 15, 24, 1935; Sprawy Narodowosciowe, IX (Warsaw,
1935), no. 6, p. 649.
22. For a balanced account of the situation, see Die N ationalitaten in den Staaten
Europas (Vienna, 1931), pp. 132-141, edited by the Congress of National Minorities

WEST BELORUSSIA
253
(1599). Cf. the inflated figures for the Belorussian School Society (Vilna) in Biuleten
Chaitrus1l belaruskich rabotnika11 'll Francyi, 3 (Paris, 1939).
23. Jakaiileii ('54 2 ).
24. Regula (1703), p. 51, and A. Strapinski, Wywrotowe partie polityczne (Warsa\v,
1933), pp. 38-39. Among the Polish delegates to the Fifth Congress of the Comintern
were hvo Belorussians: Stefanski, a cover name for Alexander Daneliuk, alias Orel, alias
Edmund, secretary of the ICPZB; and ICazimir Cichoiiski, alias Teofil, alias Hrabia, alias
Stanisla\v, former member of the LUbel.
25. In the general elections of 1928, the Communists received 829,416 votes out of the
total 11,758,094 votes cast. From 1931 to 1934, party membership (including the KPZB)
doubled from 6,000 to 12,000. Cf. J. Regula (1703), pp. 114, 122, 13cr- 1 31, 143, 204-206,
259. But Strapinski (p. 39) believes that, with the Communist Youth organizations, it
had reached 20,000 by that time.
26. Reclza,3 (Paris, 1938). Cf. St. Elski (1446).
27. Reclta, 3 (Paris, 193 8 ).
28. For as much as could be published in Poland at that time, see LetaPis T -va Bela-
ruskae Skoly (ViIna, 1933).
29. LetaPis, 2/3 (1937).
30. A fe\v political arrests made at that time may point to some underground activities,
but reports published abroad \vere certainly exaggerated. A. Stankevic gives a sober account
of the situation (1471).
3 I. Some Polish critics also rated Tank's poetry highly. Pion (April 15, 1937) thought
that "Maxim Tank has raised Belorussian literature to the European level. . . and earned
for himself a place of honor among the best European poets," and the Glos Powszechny
(March 21, 1937) believed that "Tank's poem 'Narac' surpasses anything ever ,vritten
in this vein in Belorussian, and even in Polish." - Quoted from the Biuleten Chat/rust/,
belarllskiclt rabotnikat'i u Francyi, 3 (Paris., 1937).
32. Details are given by A. Stankevic (1471), pp. 2°9-226. For earlier attempts, see
his (805).
33. In its place, a Belorussian National Union (Belaruskae Nal'odllae Abjednan'ne)
\vas organized. See A. Stankevic (147 1 ), pp. 243-258.
34. The story of the Belaruskaja Krynica (1916-1936) is told by its editor, Adam
Stankevic (1471), pp. 211-219. The periodical was printed in parallel texts, in the Latin
and Cyrillic alphabets. Its circulation was seldom more than 1,000 copies per issue, although
at the time of general elections 10,000 copies were sold. Altogether, 697 issues appeared in
the course of 20 years; 58 were confiscated by the Poles, and the editors \vere brought to
court 35 times. In 1928, the Chryscyjanskaja DU1nka (Christian Thought) began as a
parallel publication. At the same time, the Orthodox clergy published Svetac Belarusi (A
Luminary of Belorussia), Carkva i Narod (Church and People), Pravasla111lae Abjednan'ne
(Orthodox Union), Pravaslaunaja Belarus' (Orthodox Belorussia), etc. The Uniates pub-
lished a monthly, Zlucennie (Union). Each printed a few hundred copies, but the exact
circulation is not known.
35. See above, pp. 120- 1 30.
36. For relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the Polish state, see J.
Piwowarczyk, Kryzys spoleczno-gospodarczy w swietle zasad katolickich (Cracow, 1932),
and A. Roszko\vski, Katolicyzm spolecz1ty (Poznan, 1932).
37. T\venty-four Ukrainian,- 15 German, 12 Je\vish, I Lithuanian, and I Russian
gymnasia were still maintained in Poland.
38. The museum had gro\vn out of a private collection presented to the Belol'ussian
Scientific Society by Ivan Luckevic. Ahout 5,000 pers.ons visited it yearly. The Poles no\v
decided to transform it into a "regional" museum, thus changing its Belorussian character j
see Luckevic (1404). A nearly complete list of Illelorussian cultural institutions is given
by Engelhardt (340), p. 353.
39. Facts here related are quoted from Kalos'se (Ears of Wheat), Chryscyjallskaja
DU11tka (Christian Thought), Sliach lrloladzi (The Way of Youth), Belaruski Fro1tt
(Belorussian Front), LetaPis (Chronicle), Zorka (Dawn), Zolak, etc. Reclta (Echo),
printed in Paris, \vas publishing some information censored in Poland. Prakop Chor
(1490) recorded the events chronologically, but not very accurately. See also Ch, (1746),
1-2; Mgr. A. M. (826), 28- 2 9; Engelhardt (340), pp. 184-208; and Mornik (1620)',

254
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9
pp. 46-49. The Poles stress the fact that the Belorussians were "the only national minority
in Poland which had absolutely no private schools, although Polish legislation placed no
difficulties in the way of such institutions, as \vas exemplified by the important number
of school establishments set up and maintained by the other national minorities."-
Paprocki (1623), p. 106. There \vere 44 state-supported Belorussian grammar schools, one
junior and one senior high school, with 8,200 pupils, in Poland, "before the \var." -Cz.
Zbieranski (1689), pp. 23-24. This can be compared with "about 400 Belorussian schools,"
in 1921.-M. Swiechowski (1575). On the other 'hand, the Lithuanians \vho numbered
far fe\ver than the Belorussians had one junior high, one senior high, and 1 I 2 grammar
schools, with 8,600 pupils. - Zbieranski (1689).
40. Zorka, 22 (1938).
41. Recha, I (1938).
42. LetaPis,2 (1938).
43. Zorka, I (1939).
44. Thugutt (15 2 9). The Polish vie\v has been explained as follows: "The White
Ruthenians . . . had achieved a certain ethnical awakening only a few decades before the
restoration of the Polish State . . . but did not possess the conditions required for start-
ing on a national life . . . A few White Ruthenian secondary schools, founded in the
first years after the \var, had to be shut do\vn for lack of pupils. Self-dependent White
Ruthenian associations - social, economic, and even cultural- only barely survived,
\vhile the White Ruthenian peasants willingly joined Polish organizations. The White
Ruthenian press was unable to acquire enough readers, and appeared mostly in the form
of \veeklies which vanished after an ephemeral existence." - Eastern Poland (London:
Polish Research Center, 1941), p. 26.
45. Anna Zahorska-Savitry, Trucizny (Poison; Warsa\v, 1931), p. 92. English transla-
tion cannot render fully the overtones of contempt and disgust the Polish phrase contains
(szerok01ltordy i wyluPiastooki okaz 1'asy bialo1'uskiej). Offended Belorussians denounced
the novel as "a Pogrom Gospel" directed against the Belorussian people and comparable
only to "the most violent anti-Semitic literature." - Kalos'se, 4(8), (ViIna, 1936), p. 246.
Wac1a\v J drzejewicz, Wellesley College, and Wiktor Weintraub, Harvard University,
have pointed out to me that Mrs. Zahorska was a second-rate novelist, holding no special
place in Polish literature, and that such prominent \vriters as Maria Rodzie\viczo\vna,
Leonard Podhorski-Okolow, and others, \vrote about Belorusia \vith love, interest, and
compassion. Be that as it may, one seeks in vain for a sign of ackno\vledgment in
Belorussian literature.
46. Eastern Poland, pp. 43-44. Some\vhat in contradiction to this statement, the study
describes the importance of the natural resources of the eastern provinces in the national
economy of Poland: "Without them Poland could lead only a crippled existence." - Ibid.,
p. 53; cf. Chap. 14, note 113.
47. The Poles affirm that the farm holdings u were sold to peasants regardless of reli-
gion or nationality." - Ibid., pp. 33-34. No data, however, have been produced in support
of this statement. Testimonies of the natives have been ,videly used in Soviet propaganda j
see Sputnik Agitatora (Agitator's Guide), no. 6 (Minsk, 1938) j Odinnadcat' SSS Respublik
(Eleven USS Republics; Mosco\v, 1938)", pp. 35-40.
48. Biuleten Clzaurusu belaruskiclt rabotnikat''t 'It Francyi, 3 (1938).
49. Ch, (1490). Since there is no comprehensive account in PoUsh literature of the
land distribution in this region, most writers compile their own statistics via conjecture.
A Soviet computation suggests the following figures: 0.9 per cent of all farmers (land-
o\vners) o\vned 40.5 per cent, 4.3 pel' cent (kulaks) o\vned 10.3 per cent, and 94.8 per cent
owned 49.1 per cent of all arable land in West Belorussia; the landlord estates averaged
1,200 acres, the kulak farms 70 acres, and the "poor peasant" farms 6.7 acres. Better soil
was held by the Polish landlords and osadnicy, Belorussians being forced into s\vampy or
sandy land. About 94 per cent of the forest area \vas owned by the Poles. See T. Gorbunov,
article reprinted in N ovaja Zaria (San Francisco), July 29, 1944. The reliability of the
Soviet sources is questionable, but the picture is generally corroborated by the Poles' state-
ment that the policy of the government \vas to ccoverflow into those sparsely inhabited
areas [sic] the surplus agricultural population from Poland." - Kutrzeba, Cantbridge
History of Poland, II (194 1 ), 524.
50. lzvestija (Moscow), quoted in Poslednie Novosti, October 6, 1939 (Paris). AI-

EAST BELORUSSIA
255
though the data could not be checked \vith Polish sources, they are in general agreement
with other reports from the region. Some visual evidence is offered in photographs taken
in 1939. Chap. 2, note 6.
51. Eastern Poland, pp. 24- 2 5.
52. At the Sejm, February 18, 1937, Congress\voman Wanda Pe1czynska urged the
Polish government "to create conditions \vhich would make the White Ruthenian people
seek satisfaction for their a\vakening aspirations exclusively in cooperation with the Polish
state " . . the White Ruthenian nation's consciousness, should it be born out of the
struggle \vith Poland, would be our defeat, because it \vould be the consciousness of an
enemy." A month earlier, General Zeligo\vski reproached the government for having "no
real program in respect to the White Ruthenian question." - Sprawy Narodowosciowe
(Warsaw), XI (1937), nos. 1-2, p. 102, quoted ,by Lichtensztul (1493), p. 21. With this,
as far as I am able to find, the public record is. nearly exhausted.
53. Along with repeated statements that "the non-Polish population in the eastern
provinces enjoyed full liberty in the us.e of their language in all matters of administration,
local government, and law, as decreed by hvo acts of parliament in the year 1924"
(Eastern Poland, p. 48), mistakes \vere sometimes ackno\vledged and regrets expressed in
postwar Polish literature. It has been admitted, for example, that the Polish "approach to
the problem was not based on a continuous, uniform policy; cases were settled by local
authorities, at their own will . . . decisions were not ahvays just." - Lichtensztul (1493),
pp. 19-20. It \vas "an astonishing paradox," says another writer, that "at the time \vhen
the ideas of Marshal Pilsudski prevailed in the state, the administration of the Belorussian
lands passed into the hands of men who entirely opposed his policy, and this they did
for years without being rebuked by either the government or the Sejm." - Wielhorski
(I688a), p. 15. See also Chap. 14, note 113.
54. Engelhardt (340), p. 21 5.
55. Political emigration to the USSR was of an ambiguous character; it is discussed
in Chapter 10.
56. The general census of 1923 counted 48,392 men and women. On the basis of gen-
eral elections to the Lithuanian Sejm in 1923, Romer (1627) figured their number at
42,610, i.e., 2.1 per cent of the total population of Lithuania. Cf. Wielhorski (629), pp.
60-61.
57. No special study of the Belorussians in Lithuania exists, except an attempt by
Ezavitau (1502), whose data are anachronistic and incomplete. Some information can be
found in Latvia (1506); Engelhardt gleaned s.ome more from other sources, (340), pp.
2°9-211. The primary source is Lastouski (1451).
58. Englehardt (340), p. 212.
59. In 1920, the number of Belorussians in Latvia was 4.74 per cent; 1925, 2.06 per
cent; 1930, 1.90 per cent; and 1935, 1.33 per cent of the total population, falling, over
fifteen years, from 75,600 to 26,000. At the same time, the number of Russians increased
from 124,7°0 (7.82 per cent) to 206,000 (10.58 per cent). It is significant that the total
remained stable (about 12 per cent) throughout that period, suggesting a process of
Russianization among the local Belorussians; cf. Wielhorski (I688a), pp. 17-18.
60. A useful summary can be found in Latvia (1506). See also Ezavitau (1500, 1501) ;
Engelhardt (340), pp. 211- 21 4. .
61. The group published Anterikattskij Belorus (American Belorussian), in Russian,
but soon discontinued it for \vant of subscribers. They estimated at 500,000 the number of
Belorussians "living in the New World; 25,000 in Chicago alone" (February 16, 1930).
The magazine Pra'iida (Truth), started by Tarasevich in Ne\v York, did not continue
beyond the first issue. The Chicago group made several more attempts, but they all
failed. See Chapter 14, note 120.
Chapter 10. East Belorussia
I. N. N. Popov, Nacional'naja politika sovetskoj vlasti (The Nationality Policy of
the Soviet Power; 2nd ed.; Mosco\v, 1927), p. 102.
2. "The national cultures must be permitted to develop and expand and to reveal all
their potential qualities, in order to create the conditions necessary for their fusion into

25 6
NOTES TO CHAPTER 10
a single, common culture \vith a single common language." - Joseph Stalin, Marxism and
the National and Colonial Questions (New York, 1934), p. 261.
3. A. Gurvic, Osnovy sovetskoj konstitucii i principy jederalizma i avtonomiztlta v
sovetskoj sistetne (The Soviet Fundamental Laws and the Principles of Federalism and
Autonomy in the Soviet System; Mosco\v, 1924)'.
4. Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia (November 15,1917).
5. In Gomel, the opposition ,vas led by the secretary of the Communist Party, who
was subsequently removed by Moscow. The nationalists also had to overcome resistance
from the city soviet, trade unions, schools, the theater, and the press, none of which \vas
prepared to s\vitch from Russian to the ne\vly adopted Belorussian standard; see eye-
witness account by V. Budzimer, "Belarusyzacyja HomelScyny," BAG, no. 1-2 (80-81),
January 7, 1952; also HP, no. 45- 1 6(B6), p. 5.
6. The BSSR reported to the USSR Soviet of Nationalities in 1925 that in the central
agencies of the republics only 26.9 per cent of the employees spoke Belorussian. In 1926 the
number had risen to 54 per cent, and to 80 per cent by 1928. In the provincial offices only
36.2 per cent of the employees knew Belorussian in 1925, 52 per cent by 1926, and 70 per
cent by 1927. And, "by the beginning of 1928, in general, Belorussification was entirely
completed in the central, province, and district institutions." - Osnovnye itogi raboty
pravitel'stva Sojuza SSR; k perevybora1n sovetov 19 2 8- 1 9 2 9 gg. (Moscow, 1928), p. 50.
7. According to Soviet statistics, general literacy in the BSSR had risen to 91.8 per
cent - Malaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija, I (Mosco\v, 1930). In 1928 a BSSR report to
the USSR placed it at 82 per cent. The same year a local periodical complained that Belo-
russian literacy stin \vas only 36 per cent of the total population, compared with the
Ukrainian (43 per cent), Russian (49 per cent), Polish (50 per cent), Lithuanian (61 per
cent), J e\vish (70 per cent), and Latvian (74 per cent) in the BSSR; cf. Chackevic
(1833), p. 2. Another Soviet source cited 47 illiterates out of every 100 Belorussians in
1926, although the proportion fell to 21 per cent in 1939. - Liubic-Maevski (1777). For
an attempt to find a way through this statistical maze, see N. Timasheff, "Overcoming
Illiteracy: Public Education in Russia, 1880-1940," The Russian Review, II (1942). At
first Belorussian publications outside the BSSR considerably outnumbered those \vithin,
but from 1924 on the number of the latter rose swiftly. Within the BSSR, publications
numbered 14 in 1918, 61 in 1924, and 275 in 1926. Outside the BSSR there \vere 51 pub-
lications in 1918, 3 I in 1924, and 23 in 1926. Besides political and a few creative writings,
there was little original work. Most books were school texts, translations, and reprints.
8. Data from Martel (1455).
9. Making up nearly 90 per cent of the total rural population, the Belorussians shared
the city and to\vn \vith the J e\vs and the Russians at a ratio of 40: 40: 15. Their shares in
business and in the professions ,vere distributed as shown in the follo\ving tabulation (in
per cent of total population).
Liberal
Workers Artisans E1nployees Trade,'s Pro fessio1ts Arnty Others
B ellorussians 2.8 1.6 1.9 0.3 0.05 0.5 1.15
J e\vs 16.7 26.4 17.0 10.2 0.7 1.1 14. 6
Russians 6.7 2.6 6.7 0.1 0.1 15.2 4.5
Poles 6.9 2.8 4.4 0.1 0.08 0.8 4.02
Others 8.4 5.0 8.3 0.8 0.3 12.3 6.3
Tables given by Chackevic (1833) contain no information as to the actual distribution of
responsibilities upon the hierarchal ladder. The top positions in the educational branch,
ho\vever, were incontestably in the hands of the Belorussian nationalists; see Cvikevic
(1376). For more complete data of the 1926 census, see BSSR (244, and 248 to 250).
10. Sobranie zakonov i rasporiazenij Raboce-Krestjanskogo pravitel'stva BSSR (De-
crees and Orders of the Government of the BSSR; 1924), no. II, item 108. Analysis and
interpretation by a Soviet juris.t: V. Durdenevski, Ravnopravie jazykov v sovetsko1n stroe
(Equality of Languages in the Soviet System; Moscow, 1927), pp. 163-168.
I I. Some achievements of the minority groups in the cultural field are described by
Chackevic (1753,1833). In 1927,389 units printed in 1,316,675 copies were published in

EAST BELORUSSIA
257
Belorussian; 206 units in 291,740 copies were published in Russian; 16 units in 42,500
copies \vere published in Polish; and 41 units in 134,000 copies in Yiddish.
12. DUl'denevski, .Ravnopravie, pp. 163-168.
13. The separatist movement in the Belorussian church is described by Mgr. A (826);
some important chronological data appears in Char (1490).
14. M alaja Sovetskaja Ellciklopedija, I (Moscow, 1930).
IS. A copy of the BerJin Act entitled Resenie pravitel'stva Beloruskoj N arodnoj
Respubliki (The Decision of the Government of the Belorussian National Republic)' is
preserved in Mr. Syla's private collection, but it \vas not available to this \vriter; M. Syla
(1498), p. 12. The writers eager to preserve the continuity of the BNR into our time
either ignore the Ber1in Act or describe it as the \vork of "t\vo sick Ministers, some poUtical
emigres tired of exile, and a fe\v young students, with a former Prime Minister, Lastoiiski,
at their head"-Leon Rydlevsky (1497), p. 18. See above, pp. 112,116, and 133.
16. All Belol'ussian \vriters, even those most outspokenly anti-Soviet, agree on this;
see Rydlevsky (1497), p. 19, and Belorussia (1489), p. 18. Literature is voluminous; for
the Institute of Belorussian Culture, see Cvikevic (1831) and BSSR (1825, 1826); for the
state University, BSSR (1820); for \vork in education, BSSR (1828, 1829) ; in archeology,
BSSR (399, 1824) ; in ethnography, BSSR (1061, 1062) ; in Iinguistics, BSSR (1960-1967,
197 I, 1974, 1975, 1982-1988, 199 2 ) ; reports on the economic situation, BSSR (1733- 1 735);
Belorussian Communist Party, BSSR (1738-1744); publications at that period, BSSR
(121-124, 127, 128). Some methods of Belorussification are described in BSSR (1743).
17. Quoted from Belorussia (1489), pp. 18-19.
18. Taraskevic's fate has never been exactly kno\vn. The generally accepted version
is that, in Mosco\v, he was made editor of a Polish (?) ne\vspaper Trybuna, then exiled
to Vologda. According to other sources, he was first appointed president of a collective
farm near Mosco\v, then exiled to a labor camp in Siberia; see Rydlevsky (1497), p. 20.
It was believed by some that Rak-Michajloiiski, Dvarcanin, and Haiirylik ,vere hanged,
not shot, by the Soviets; see Rydlevsky (1497). A former Ukrainian inmate in the labor
camp at Kern testified that he met there Rak-Michajloiiski, Miatla, Dvarcanin, and
Haiirylik on their \vay to the Solovki islands; later, himself transferred to the Solovki,
this man saw them in 1936 "for the last time." See Zuk, in Belaruski El1tihra1tt (Toronto),
no. 3/41, March 25, 1952, \vith reference to Nidostriliany (1949), "a small book" of
memoirs, published by Pidhajny, and not available to me.
19. Ihnatouski was the first to write a coherent nationalist version of Belorussian
history. His "Short History of Belorussia" (398), and "History of the National-Cultural
Revival of Belorussia" (1388), though little more than pamphlets, had become standard
texts in the Belorussian schools. The revised editions \vere greatly enlarged. The more
elaborate "History of Belorussia in the Nineteenth, Beginning of the T\ventieth Century"
(851) appeared in 1925, and had several reprints until 1928.
20. Only those names are given here about which, apparently, all such sources agree.
Based on reports the reIiability of which is beyond verification, most data appear contra-
dictory, sometimes deliberately exaggerated. Various sources cite the names of the literary
historian M. Harecki; \vriters Pusca, A. Dudar, Dubouka, Halubok, Zylka, Aleksand-
roiiski, Kliastorny, E. Hadleuski, Carniauski, Dal'kevic, Zmudzinski; artists Zirouski,
Zydovic, Teraiiski, Krynica; members of the Academy of Sciences A. Smolic, Krutalevic.
Lojka, Dyla, Dedyrka, Zamocin, Piatuchovic, Epinach-Sypilla, as having been executed
by the Soviet police. Sypsyna (South River, N.].), no. 9, pp. 49-50, gives a larger list
of poets, novelists, playwrights, literary critics, linguists, artists, and composers "liqui-
dated" in the course of purges. The dates and circumstances of death are not exactly
kno\vn. More names appear in Narodn')'m Sliacha111, (Toronto), no. I, March 25, 1952,
pp. 10-12. "Razgrom nacional'nogo dvizenija v Belorussii" (Liquidation of the Nationalist
Movement in Belorussia), a paper by S. Krusinsk.i for RP (1952), contains interesting and
apparently first-hand information; unfortunately, it is \vritten from memory, and s.ome
dates and names are obviously confused. A detailed history of the M aladlliak movement
can be found in BAC, nos. 44 (175) and 49 (180), November 8 and December 13, 1953.
2 I. An official confirmation of the executions can be found in a pamphlet published
by the Comintern, both in Belorussian and in Polish, under the title "Rooting Out of a
Band of Secret Agents Headed by Luckevic and Dvarcanin" (1931). See "Protest of the
Belorussian Cultural Organizations and Ins.titutions (in Poland) against the Terror in

25 8
NOTES TO CHAPTER 10
the USSR," in Engelhardt (340), pp. 352-353. For more information, see Belaruskaja
Krynica (Belorussian Well; Vilna), no. 4, January 2 I, 1934; Rodny Kraj (Native Coun-
try; Vilna) , no. 2, August 25, 1934. The Polish press and the Czechoslovak press were
apparently using the same sources. The tragic fate of Lesik and Ihnatouski, \vho ,vere
urged to "confess," and refused, is told by E. K - i, N RS, September 22, 1950. It would
seem that of all the prominent men arrested at the time, only Piceta survived; he died
in Moscow, June 23, 1947, apparently of natural causes.
22. See Regula (1703), pp. 294-300, \vho tens of the disastrous effect of the purge on
Communist morale in West Belorussia. It ,vas even rumored that the purge in the BSSR
and "pacification" in Poland had been timed by a secret agreement bet\veen the Soviet and
Polish governments, since both regarded Belorussian nationalism as a political danger (this
\vas recorded by Recha, a Belorussian periodical in France).
23. The list is given by Char (1490), without indication of sources. The data are re-
peated in Belorussia (1489), p. 5. Apparently, the information stems from a statement by
Kalubovic at the Second Belorussian Convention (Minsk, June 1944) \vho cited these
figures from "documents discovered by the Germans in the Soviet archives." Cf. the
Minutes (Chap. 13, note 52).
24. Emigre writers estimate about one million peasants exiled in Siberia, Turkestan,
and the Arctic, Belorussia (1489), p. 19; some say over 1,800,000, Char (1746); two
million, BAC, no. 72, October 15, 1951; again, "Three minion of the peasantry have been
physically exterminated," BAC, no. 75, November II, 1951. It is difficult to see how this
could fit in with the fact that the total population of the BSSR \vas scarcely more than
five million at that time. The mass depopulation of the rural areas, ho\vever, is certain.
"Of seventy households, only forty stayed in the kolkhoz, and thirty left the village,"
testifies A. Kazimirov, former member of the collective farm in Minsk province named
after the Seventeenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party; see SV, May 1950.
25. During the purges and the collectivization of agriculture, the position of the Secretary
General of the Communist Party of Belorussia was held first by Aronstam, alias Arthur,
alias Cerniak, a J e\vish revolutionary speaking no Belorussian; then by Gikalo, a native
of the Caucasus; cf. Regula (17°3)', p. 278. Tables published in the Social'nyj i nacional'1tyj
sostav VKP(b), itogi vsesojuZ1toj partijnoj perepisi 1927 goda (Mosco\v, 1928), p. 118,
and in Revolucija i l1acional'nosti, October-November 193 2 , p. 144, and May-June 1933,
p. 12, give the percentage of Russian and non-Russian members in the Party republican
organizations. The proportion of Belorussian natives in the Communist Party of Belorussia
appears to have been 21 per cent in 1922,46.7 per cent in 1927,60.4 per cent in 1932, and
60.8 per cent on January I, 1933. No data have been published since. See also HP, no.
45-16 (B), pp. 10-11; no. 497-15 (Bs), pp. 12-14, but the reliability is uncertain.
26. Belorussia (1489») p. 20. More than 13,000 persons were expelled in 1933 and the
total Party membership fell from 53,753 before the "purges" to only 39,817 members and
candidates. - A. Saltin, "Nekotorye itogi cistki KP (b) Belorussii," Revoliucija i nacional'-
nosti, March 1934, pp. I8ff.
27. Though the documentary evidence is fragmentary, the cold fact is that ,ve can
find no proof in the Soviet press that the persons reported as "liquidated" have ever
reappeared on the Belorussian scene. A photostatic document concerning the execution of
13,325 native Belorussians during the purge of 1937-1938 is published by Abramcyk in a
pamphlet, J a abvinavacvajll Krel1tZ' 1t zabojstve majlto narodu (I Accuse the Kremlin of
the Genocide of My People; Toronto, 1950); excerpts and comments in BAC, no. 65,
January 27, 195 1 ; Belarllski Entihrant (Toronto), November 19so-February 1951; Bela-
rus; and other Belorussian publications in exile.
28. Proceedings oj the First Convention of the Soviet Writers (Minsk, 1935), p. 34.
29. The poem appeared in Ad serca (From the Bottom of My Heart), published in
1940, and awarded the StaUn Prize in literature. The text of Kupala's public repentance
(December 1 I, 13S) is printed by Polyntia revoliucii (Minsk), no. 12 (1935). In 1936
and 1937 "The Song to Construction" and "To the Order Wearing Belorussia" \vere
published.
30. 1. S. Chochlov, president of the budget committee, in the Soviet of Nationalities
of the USSR, lzvestija (Moscow)', May 26, 1939.
31. This and the following are quotations from the statements by the Belorussian
delegates V. G. Vaneev and N. J. Natalevif at the session of the Soviet of Nationalities

THE REUNION
259
of the USSR, on May 26, 1939; stenographic reports in Pravda and lzvestija on the fol-
lowing days. The number of schools and students varies although the delegates spoke at
the same time and. at the same place, and other inconsistencies can be observed in their
statements. Vaneev's statement that illiteracy in Belorussia was "liquidated" is invalidated
by Liubic-Maevski (1777).
32. K. Corny, Nasa strana (Our Country; Minsk, 1939).
33. M alaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija, I (Moscow, 1930).
34, A. Barmine, Vingt Ans au service des Soviets (Paris, 1939). There is an EngHsh
translation, One Who Survived (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1945; 2nd ed., 1952).
35. Ravines, The Yenan Way, p. 114.
36. For full explanation of the reforms of 1934, see BSSR (1954-1958) and Lamceu
(19 80 ); criticism, J. Stankevic (1997).
37. Of these only BSSR (1959) was available to this \vriter. The \vork resumed after
the liberation of the country from the Nazis, and the reforms have been summarized in
the ne\v school texts by Karzon and Zyrkevic (1976,2001).
38. This is compared \vith 2,200,000 copies of books, pamphlets, etc., printed in 1928,
and 200,000 copies in 1913. With the 462 books, II periodicals, and 149 newspapers printed
in the native idiom, the BSSR held, respectively, the sixth, the eighth, and the third place
in the Union. Altogether, there appeared 199 newspapers in 1938, as compared with 37 in
1928, and \vith 19 in 1913. - Cifry 0 pelati S.S.S.R. (The USSR Press Statistics; 2nd ed.;
Moscow, 1939), pp. 11-13, 22-24. Kupala's works have been reprinted 48 times, \vith
1, 21 7,000 copies sold (19 1 7- 1 93 8 ).-lbid., p. 45.
39. U citel'skaja Gazeta (Teachers' Journal; Mosco\v), August 23, 1939. See also the
testimonial by a former member of the Belorussian Communist Party, HP no. 45-16 (B6),
pp. 8-9. For the use of Belorussian in military schools, HP, no. 497- 1 5 (B5).
40. The decree \vas signed jointly by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR
and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party. The full text in Pravda
and lzvestija, March 14, 1938.
41. In the Uzbek SSR, for example, where the number of schools \vas considerably
less, cchvo thousand new teachers of Russian were to be trained within five months."-
Pravda, April 13, 1938. Cf. HP, no. 45-16 (B6), which contains an interesting testimonial
by a director of a ten-grade Belorussian school in the period 1937-1939.
Chapter II. The Reunion
I. Dictionaries compiled in Minsk \vere regarded by Vilna as having a local sig-
nificance at best. Likewise, the Belorussian (Kryvian) dictionary by Lastouski, the Belo-
russian Polish dictionary by Drucki-Padbiareski, and philological research by Janka
Stankevic and other scholars outside the USSR, were denounced ,by Minsk as spurious,
completely distorted, useless, and harmful to Belorussian culture. Even the botanical
dictionary of Belorussian, Polish, Russian, and Latin terms by Zos'ka Veras (Vilna, 1914)
\vas ostracized, and the BSSR Academy of Sciences compiled its o,vn botanical termi-
nological dictionary (Minsk, 1929) - to be, in turn, purged several years later. No au-
thoritative common Belorussian dictionary existed before World War II, as a result of
the suppression and purging of every attempt at compilation during these years.
2. Twelve communiques on military operations in Poland \vere issued by the Soviet
Supreme Command between September 17 and 28, 1939. They indicate that on several
occasions the Soviet armies did meet with organized resistance from the Polish troops.
See Stalin's statement, Pravda, November 19, 1939; see also Marshal Voroshilov in Pravda,
November 7, 1939.
3. Precisely, "51.6 per cent of the whole territory of Poland, with a total population
of 13,403,000"; cf. Zbieranski (1689), p. 18; Poland (1673a) , p. 53. The Belorussians
estimate their number in the four northeastern provinces at 3,500,000. Wielhorski (1688a) ,
p. 22, \vould accept 2,350,000 as an optimum.
4. USSR Inforntatio' Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), February 12, 1944, p. 4.
5. The Soviet-Gennan demarcation line went from the San River in the south up to
Jaroslaw; followed the railway Jaroslaw-Rawa Ruska-Sokal and the Bug River up to the
railroad intersection Bialystok-Warsaw; then turned northwest encircling the cities of
Bialystok and Lomia, touched the East Prussian border and went northeast up to Lithu-

260
NOTES TO CHAPTER 11
ania leaving Suwalki to the Germans. As is well kno\vn, the USSR and Poland \vere
bound by a nonaggression pact concluded on July 25, 1932, confirmed and supplemented on
July 3, 1933, and prolongated until December 3 1 , 1945, by a proctocol of May 5, 1934.
The Soviets maintain that the pact was no longer binding "once the Polish government
ceased to be," and they deny that their occupation of eastern Poland was "an act of
aggression." For a detailed documentation of Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations up to
that period, see Poland (1672).
6. A German .who cannot be suspected of pro-Sovietism observed: uDoch flihrte diese
Politik Polens nur Zl1 einer Radikalisierung der \veissruthenischen Massen, die zeihveise in
einer Zuneigung zum Bolschevismus einen Aus\veg aus ihrer Lage suchten." - Georg
Leibbrandt, Die V iUker des Ostra1t1nes (Berlin, 194 2 ), p. 40.
7. Zbieranski (1689), p. 34, contends that "20 per cent of the population" in the Soviet-
occupied territory had been deported before the elections; this, if true, \vould mean that
more than two minion persons were driven out within four weeks! The statement would
not be worth mentioning had it not become a commonplace in Polish literature abroad.
In fact, the mass deportations did not begin until after the Act of Incorporation.
8. Izvestija, October II, 12, 1939.
9. Izvestija, November 2, 1939.
10. For some reason, 581 votes have remained unaccounted for; see Pravda, October
25, 1939. It is note\vorthy that in a land where the Polish population \vas estimated at
40 per cent, only 110 Poles were included among the candidates, making up 11.9 per cent
of the total number of the nominees; see Pravda, October 19, 1939. On October 2 I, the
Polish government-in-exile (London) protested the plebiscite "in an area under military
occupation, which is contrary to international law," and declared that it would "never
recognize it as having any legal force."
II. USSR Inforl1tation Bulletin, January 4, 1944, p. 6. The decision of the Supreme
Soviet \vas unanimous. The Mosco\v press reported that the Belorussian delegates Turlejski,
an engineer from Lomza, and Pyrka, a textile \vorker from Bialystok, spoke in Polish, and
the chairman, Andreev, asked the audience \vhether they wanted a Russian translation.
But the members of the Supreme Soviet laughed it off \vith the \vords: "Never mind 1
The matter is clear anyway I" They could laugh again \vhen, a few years later, the very
regions of ,Lomza and Bialystok were returned to .Poland.
12. Full text of the Act of Incorporation, lzvestija, November 4, 1939.
13. The illusion ,vas deliberately created by the fact that the Provisional Administra-
tion, set up at ViIna by the Soviets on September 20, included Belorussians and Russians,
and not a single Lithuanian; Zelianin, a Russian, was appointed president; and Adam
Klepacek, a Belorussian teacher, I(arp Paiiloiiski, a Belorussian worker, and Red Army
Colonel Petrov were put in charge of trade, industry, and the police respectively. Not
until October 27 were the Lithuanians permitted to occupy the territory ceded to them
by the Kremlin on October 10.
14. According to Polish data, the Lithuanians made up 1 1.3 per cent of the total
population in the ceded region, and only 0.8 per cent, or 1,600 persons, in the city of
Vilna; see Poland (1673), p. 12 ; Poland (1673a), p. 13.
15. lzvestija} November I, 1939.
16. Krasnaja Zvezda, no. 234.
17. Since 27.2 per cent of the candidates were Polish, Wielhorski concluded that the
proportion of Polish residents among the population of West Belorussia "must have been
about as high" in 1940 - (1688a), p. 23. If this were correct, it would mean that about
one half of the Polish population had been moved out of the country by March 1940.
18. The USSR I1tformation Bulletin, IV, no. 18 (February 12, 1944), p. 4.
19. J. Margolin, "Sovetizacija Zapadnoj Belorussii" (Sovietization of West Belorussia),
Novyj Zurnal) XVIII (1948),255-263.
20. Schwarz (179 2 a), pp. 132, 137, 144,3°3-305.
2 I. The Soviet press estimated that the transfer would affect 150,000 Germans and
about 1,000,000 Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians. Schechtman (336), pp. 368-369,
believes that the actual number of Soviet repatriates hardly exceeded 35,000 including
about 3,000 Belorussians. On January 10, 1941, a treaty was concluded concerning the
transfer of populations from the Memel and Suvalki regions. It would seem that, in all,
21,343 persons ,vere transferred to the Soviet Union from that area; 11,995 Lithuanians

THE REUNION
261
and 9,228 Russians and Belorussians; see Pravda, March 26, 1941. Schechtman and
Kulisher were not able to find any further information in either the Soviet or the German
publications. My o\vn investigation of the Lithuanian sources failed to uncover any supple-
mentary data. See Kulisher, The Displace11tent of Population in Europe (1943) and Europe
on the Move (1948), and Schechtman (33 6 ), pp. 10, 145-146, 154, 185, 3 6 7-379, 482-487,
502-505. See also above, Chapter 1.
22. The Germans found 15,000 Belorussians in Eastern Galicia when they incorpo-
rated it into the Government General (Poland), in July 1942. The general failure of the
Soviet repatriation plan may indeed account for the fact that "our data on the actual
transfer and resettlement are surprisingly scarce." - Schechtman (33 6 ), pp. 376-378.
23. The first issue of Ranica appeared December 3, 1939, and the last in April 1945, in
the Sudetes (Czechoslovakia).
24. By May 1940, 10,000 requests for land were received from the farmers in the
Vilna region; 114 estates, a total of 84,000 acres, 'were distributed, and the period of pay-
ment was extended to 45 years. - Krynica, nos. 3 2 /74 1 , 37/746 (Vilna, 1940).
25. See an article by Janulaitis in Lietuvos Aidas, no. 186 (April 22, 1940).
26. Pravda and Izvestija, October-December 1939. Some data inspired enough confi-
dence to be reprinted by the New York Ti1ltes ("Assistance to the Population of Western
Belorussia"), October 9, 13. For the condition of West Belorussian youth before the
Soviet occupation, see New York Til1teS, December 4,1939.
27. From a description of the Soviets in Pinsk by a witness., E. Silevskaja, N RS,
February 14, 195 2 .
28. Natallia Arsenneva, a ,vell-kno\vn Belorussian poet, recalls that a Minsk coach-
man ,yarned her and other writers in the group not to speak Belorussian too loudly in
the streets, since "this is no\v considered unseemly here." Upon her return to Vilejka, West
Belorussia, she \vas arrested and, together with her children, deported to K.azakhstan,
Central Asia. Eventually, she managed to escape to Germany and tens her story in BAG,
no. 15-16 (94-95), April 195 2 , p. 4.
29. Krynica, no. 32/741, April 23, 1940. Corroborative information in Izvestija, May
5, 1940, and USSR InfoY1nation Bulletin, February 12, 1944.
30. V ecerniaja Moskva, 1939, no. 235.
31. From letters published by Russkij v Argentine (The Russian in Argentina;
Buenos Aires), April 6, 1940.
32. Ibid., April 20, 194Q.
33. Ibid., May 4, 1940.
34. Silevskaja, in N RS, February 14, 1952.
35. Margolin, in Novy Zhurnal, XVIII (1948).
36. Silevskaja, in N RS , February 14, 195 2 .
37. Ibid.
38. Even K. Petrusevic, one of the seven founders of the Russian Social Democratic
Labor Party (Minsk, 1898), whose picture still was displayed in the Mosco\v Museum of
the Revolution, found himself in the Lukiski jail.
39. A Belorussian National Socialist Party \vas founded in Vilna, in 1933, by a small
group of converts. Its organ, the N ovy Sliach, appeared at irregular intervals and had a
circulation of about 500 copies. The leader, Fabian Akincyc, fled to Germany. He ,vas
assassinated in German-occupied Belorussia in 1943. See Chap. 12, note 86.
40. Margolin, in Novyj Zurnal, XVIII (194 8 ), 255.
41. It ,vould seem that mass deportations from West Belorussia were undertaken
"three times in the course of 1940-4 1 ." - BAG, no. 7 2 (October 15, 195I)'.
42. Wielhorski (I688a), p. 23.
43. MargoIin, in Novyj Zurltal, XVIII (1948), 262-263. Only two Jewish candidates
were nominated for election to the Supreme Soviet in March 1940; cf. Wielhorski (I688a) ,
p. 23.
44. One is soon lost in the maze of Soviet statistical and "factual" material, contra-
dictory and inconsistent. For a treatment of Soviet statistics in general, see Seymour E.
Harris, Colin Clark, A. Gerschenkron, et al., "Appraisals of Russian Economic Statistics,"
The Review of Econ01nic Statistics, XXIX, no. 4 (November 1947), 213-246; cf. USSR
lnformation Bulletin, January 4, 1944, April 26, 1945.
45. USSR 11tformation Bulletin, January 12, 1951, p. 16.

262
NOTES TO CHAPTER 11
46. Projsojuzy SSSR (Trade Unions of the USSR), no. 7.
47. Quotations from USSR Infortltation Bulletin and Pravda; see above, note 44.
48. There is no reason to trust the bnigres' press less than the Soviet press, although
it cannot always be trusted more. Testimonies by Belorussian DP's published since World
War II are too numerous to be listed here. The summary here is not exhaustive, its sole
purpose being to demons.trate the change of heart which occurred in West Belorussia some
time before the Nazi invasion. Margolin's story, though limited to Polesie province, seems
to be the most comprehensive and relatively dispassionate account of the situation, hence
is more frequently quoted (note 40). Among the publications consulted are Belaruski
E1nihrant, Belaruski H olas, Belaruskae Slova, Belaruskaja Trybuna, Sypsyna, Bozynt
Sliachant, Posev, Golos naroda, N arodnaja Pravda, V ozrozdenie, N a rubeze, Russkaja
Mysl, BAC, SV, NRS.
49. Silevskaja, in N RS, February 14, 195 2 .
50. Ibid.
51. Golos naroda (Munich), March 23, 1952.
52. Margolin, in Novyj Zurnal, XVIII (1948).
Chapter 12. The Germ,an Occupation
I. On June 22, 1944, Stalin estimated the total Soviet war losses "at 5,300,000 men"
up to that date.
2. Heinz Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (1951). Assman, van Hassel, and
Weitzacker in their memoirs als.o mention "the stiff resistance" of the Red Army; Goeb-
hels' Diary estimated the German losses at 551,000 men by the end of September 1941.
3. For attempts to evaluate the contradictory evidence, see B. Nikolaevsky (1496)
and George Fischer, Soviet Opposition to Stalin.' A Case Study in World War II (Harvard
University Press, 1952).
4. The story is told by A. Prorvic, in SV, no. 10 (October 1950), pp. 197ff.
5. A. Veresov, in NRS, October 23,1949.
6. SV, no. I (1952).
7. Iv. Ivanov, "Vorkuta," SV, no. 5 (May 1949), p. 87.
8. SV, no. I (1952).
9. Full descriptions. can be found in the German press, also in N ovoe Slovo and
Parizskij Vestnik published by Russian collaborationists in Berlin and Paris, respectively.
See in particular a vivid account by N. Fevr, "Mesiac na rodine" (A Month in the Home-
land), Vozrozdenie (Paris), VII (1950), pp. 7-33; included in his Solnce voschodit na
zapade (The Sun Rises in the West; Buenos Aires, 1950).
10. Acknowledgments can be found even in Soviet literature that the evacuated
machinery and livestock were often abandoned en route. See T. .Logunova (1778); the
memoirs by Kovpak, Versihora, and other Soviet guerrilla leaders (Chap. 13, note 3). See
also HP, no. 317-11 (B6), by a former Soviet official in Belorussia.
II. Photostat of a German report from the town of Borisov (incomplete, the first and
last pages missing), recorded Occ EJa-2 in the Archives of the Jewish Scientific Insti-
tute, New York.
12. Guderian, Erinneru,nge1t eines Soldaten (195 1 ); see also HP, nos. 439-11 (B6),
30-20 (B6).
13. See above, note II.
14. Ibid.; a paraphrase.
IS. Quoted from HP, no. 317-11 (B6). No exception for the intelligentsia is made in
accumulated evidence from other sources.
16. See M. Bobrov, "Strasnoe bezmolvie Rossii" (Dreadful Silence of Russia), V ozroz-
denie (Paris), V-VI (1949), and R. Menski, ccKak delili kolkhoz" (How a Collective Farm
Was Divided), Narod1taja Pravda (Paris), nos. 7-8 (1950). Corroborative evidence is
scattered through HP (Schedule B).
17. Archives of the Jewish Scientific Institute, New York, Document Oee E3a-2, p. 2.
18. Bobrov, in V ozrozdenie, V-VI.
19. Belorussia (14 8 9), PP. 30-3 1 , 37. It seems significant that in a number of testi-
monies collected by H P (Schedule B) the natives in Eastern Belorussia are referred to as
"Russians," sometimes by the Belorussians themselves. P. Kleist, a high-ranking German

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION
26 3
official inspecting the occupied area, confirms that the administration preferred Russian
and Polish advisers and assistants "to uncultured Belorussians \vho could not understand
German." - (1491a), p. 17 2 .
20. Guderian, Erinner1tngen eines Soldaten.
21. See above, p. 40.
22. The boundaries \vere not considered final, nor \vere they strictly observed. Engel-
hardt (340), p. 278, ignores the loss of Polesie and of the \vestern strip (Grodno and
Bialystok). Belorussian nationalists expected larger territorial compensations in the east
and believed that "the Germans \vanted to reinforce Belorussia by incorporation of
Kalinin province." - BAG, no. 4°/43, December 19, 1948.
23. The plan of colonization had been overtly discussed in German literature. !{.
Kummer stated in the Berlitter Borsen Zeitung, October 5, 1941: "The territories con-
quered in the east \vill be colonized only after the war. The colonists will be chosen from
among those who were in active service, either in the east or in the ,vest." - Quoted in
Gerntan Failures in Poland (London: Polish Research Center, 194 2 ), p. I9n.
24. See above, pp. 156 and 161.
25. Rosenberg's emissaries were Georg Leibbrandt, according to Lipicanski, Belaruski
Entihrant (Toronto), no. 1/39, January 18, 1952; and Andor von Henke, former German
Ambassador to Prague, according to Rydlevsky (1497), p. 21.
26. According to Rydlevsky (1497), pp. 21-22, V. Zacharka rejected the German offer
at once. But Lipicanski says that Leibbrandt visited Zacharka again in September 1941.
The story goes that Rosenberg's emissary suggested that Zacharka sign "a pact of collabo-
ration" with the German Reich on the follo\ving terms: (I) Belorussia be granted "cul-
tural autonomy"; (2) Zacharka be appointed administrator of the Belol'ussian cultural
and educational institutions; (3) the Belorussian "self-government" be granted political
po\vers gradually, depending on its loyalty to the German Reich; (4) the German occupa-
tion continue for an undetermined period of time. Reportedly, Zacharka countered \vith
demands for (I) official recognition of the Belorussian National Republic; (L.) general
elections; (3) permission to form a Belorussian army; (4) \vithdrawal of the Germans
from Belorussia as soon as the military operations against the Soviet \vere terminated.
This the Nazis were not ready to grant, and no further attempts to make a deal \vith the
BNR \vere reported.
No confirmation of the story can be found in German sources and it may very well
be that a myth is being built up by supporters of the BNR group. Zacharka, who in 1928
succeeded P. Kreceusld in carrying the symbol of the BNR, died on March 14, 1943.
Before his death, it is said, he appointed Larysa Henius custodian of the BNR archives,
and entrusted Abramcyk, then president of the Belorussian Mutual Aid (Sa11tapontal) in
Germany \vith "the mission of preserving abroad the idea of Belorussian statehood and
independence." - Lipicanski, Belaruski E1nihrant (Toronto) no. 1/39, January 18, 1952.
See Chapter 14.
27. Rydlevsky (1497), p. 21. The source is unreliable. The groups referred to \vere
intelligence teams used by Abwehr under Major Kazlouski. No Belorussian "army of
liberation" was planned, or even discussed, by the Germans.
28. General Gottberg's report quoted by Kleist (1491a), p. 175. Generalkommissar
Kube reported in turn that "literaIly speaking, Belorussia is nothing more than a vague
geographical term; the land has no determined boundaries and is composed of former
provinces of such entirely different states as the Soviet Union and Poland." - Deutsche
Zeitttttg i1n Osten, August 30, 1942; quoted by Wielhorski (1688a)', p. 11.
29. The German archives of occupation have not yet been extensively studied. Most
information derives from: reports published during the war in the area under German
control; the DP literature since the \var; evidence accumulated by HP, RP, N RS, SF)
the Archives of the Jewish Scientific Institute (New York); A. Dal1in's files) some corre-
spondence, and intervie\vs. References are made when direct quotations are used, or \vhen
it is believed that the reader might benefit by detailed study of the source.
30. One can find statements to the effect that the "repressed" \vere not necessarily
given preference by the Germans; see HP, no. 143-19 (B6).
31. The head of the raion where the informant lived was a former ((repressed," but
"his secretary and personnel were former Soviet employees; he told me it was frightening
ho\v many Soviet men were on the job." - HP, no. 317-I1 (B6). Evidence is abundant

26 4
NOTES TO CHAPTER 12
that the SS readily used former NKVD men, admiring, as it were, their efficiency and
professional skill.
32. HP, no. 140-16 (B), p. 65.
33. Ibid., no. 219-14 (B6).
34. Ibid., no. 317-1 I (B6).
35. Ibid., no. 140-16 (B6), p. 34. This is. denied by other Belorussians who, in their
correspondence \vith the writer, point out that "thousands of office workers in Minsk
lived on a semi-starvation level, having only a bo,vl of watery soup (zacirka) a day and
earning 300 to 500 \vorthless rubles a month; had they not been moved by a faith and
ideal, they \vould have stayed deep in the countryside where there was plenty of lard,
butter, and eggs."
36. According to nationalist estimates, the natives made up "8o per cent of the civil
administration, and 60 per cent of the police, in 1943." - Rydlevsky (1497), p. 23.
37. "But if one denied being a Party member and it became known, things \vere bad,"
comments an informant, HP, no. 3<r-20 (B6).
38. Ibid., no. 46-M8.
39. Persons interviewed affirm that this was a deliberate Soviet plan. "The idea ,vas
that freed common criminals would go into the German police and commit many abuses
against the populace and thereby create anti-German sentiment." - HP, no. 140-16 (B).
40. Colonel R. from Paris "imposed his own taxes on the peasants and got himself six
wives"; Lieutenant V. had an apartment of 15 rooms and "staged orgies there, \vith
drinking bouts, naked girls, card games, etc."; Colonel P. terrorized Vilejka county and
was assassinated. - HP, no. 317-11 (B6); also no. 141-18 (B6)', etc.
41. As a disparaging term, ,vith all the intricacies of grammatical inflections, it has
entered literature; cf. "I ja . . . popala v ruki policaev," T. Logunova (1778).
42. See, for instance, HP, no. 64-22 (B6).
43. A useful comparison can be made with information gathered in Chapter 2 above.
44. -Later, he was made a recruiting agent for labor in ,Germany, and endless fights
began \vith the mir since nobody wanted to go.
45. For interesting details, see Menski in Narodnaja Pravda, nos. 7-8 (1950). See
also HP, nos. 48-M8, 143-19 (B6), 141-18 ('B6), 317-11 (B6), 30-20 (B6) j Fevr, in
V ozrozdenie, VIr (1950), 7-33.
46. HI never heard any arguments about land," says a former Belorussian peasant.
"We had 800 hectares [about 2,000 acres] for fourteen households.." HP, no. 30-20 (B6).
47. Ibid.; Kazimirov in SV, June 1950, supplements with many interesting details the
story told by Menski, in Narodnaja Pravda, nos. 7-8 (1950).
48. No mention of the distribution of the collectives is found in the Soviet press.
When acknowledgments occasionally are made that the collective livestock had been
divided up, the fact is explained away by the wish of the peasantry "to conceal the com-
munal property from the Germans." - Logunova (177 8 ), p. 36.
49. Menski in Narodnaja Pravda, nos. 7-8 (1950), p. 25.
50. The statement stands somewhat isolated among the evidence accumulated; HP,
no. 141-18 (B6).
51. The change of heart that followed depended 1argely on local circumstances; see
Chap. 13.
52. Cf. Kleist (I49 1 a), pp. 170-171.
53. For a description of the "agrarian reform" and the official texts, see Gerhard von
Mende, "Die besetzte Ostgebiete," J ahrbuclt der Weltpolitik (Berlin, 1944), pp. 197-201.
In the Nazi publications, the effect of the Rosenberg decree was described in the follo\ving
terms: uIn no part of the Ostland has the agrarian reform ending the kolkhoz enslave-
ment and setting the peasants free again on their own land had a more enthusiastic re-
ception than in Belorussia. At many meetings where the new laws were read, people
spontaneously s.ent telegrams and letters to the FUhrer, expressing not only their joy, but
promising to take an active part, to the best of their ability, in the fight against Bolshe-
vism till the final victory . . ." Ostland, no. 2, a monthly published by the Reicltskont11'tissar
jiir das Ostland (Riga, August 1942), p. 33. The Belorussian sources tell a different stoty.
uThe German decree," says a witness, "was read at the general meeting of our village;
women cried when they heard it, and all were depressed." - HP, no. 30-20 (B6); see
also nos. 143-19 (B6), 317-11 (B6), 439-11 (B6). The Belorussian DP literature is

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION
26 5
unanimous in saying that the Rosenberg decree \vas one of the main factors in turning the
peasantry against the German occupants. Wielhorski (I688a), pp. 11-12, dated the Rosen-
berg plan incorrectly. (November 27, 1942); he apparently had no access to the German
source material. Curious is the use the Germans made of the Russian term obslina \vhich
designates a system of periodical distribution of the communal land into individual hold-
ings with no C011tmott work in the fields. On the other hand, the collective responsibility
of the obslina for taxation they disregarded. If the Germans wished to revive an old
tradition they missed the point either way. Besides, of all the Russian lands, Belorussia
and the Ukraine had been the first to abandon that tradition long before the Revolution.
54. Evidence given by Bobrov, in Vozrozdenie, V-VI; Kazimirov, SV (June 1950);
HP, nos. 46-M8, 141-18 (B6), 30-20 (B6), 27-17 (B), 219-14 (B6), varies in details.
In some areas, people felt that they could "get along with the Germans all right" (Kazi-
mirov). In others, the Germans "were taking away everything they could lay their hands
on, and soon began confiscating cattle when the people fell behind in the payment of
taxes" (Bobrov). Sometimes they could be talked out of their plundering schemes; see,
for instance, the dramatic story told by V. Pozdniakov and D. Karov in N ovyj Zllrllal
(New York), XXIX (1952), 189-204. People were particularly hurt when they \vere
ordered "to turn over their felt overshoes and sheepskin coats in the winter 1941-42."-
HP, no. 46-M8.
55. Periods of time vary, depending on the place of residence and the social status of
the informants; the estimates run from "two or three months" after occupation (no
shorter period has ever been indicated), to "the \vhole year 1941-42," and in some rural
areas "until the spring of 1943."
56. HP, no. 317-11 (B6).
57. This is a theme oftentimes repeated in the DP literature; see Bobrov, in V ozroz-
denie, V-VI, 135.
58. Fevr, in V ozrozdenie, VII (1950), 16.
59. HP, no. 317-11 (B6).
60. "Were it not for the Germans' stupidity, popular feeling \vould have stayed on
the German side," invariably insist the testimonies gathered under HP.
61. Bobrov, in V ozrozdenie, V, 96-97.
62. Similar cases have been widely exploited in Soviet literature. Statements found in
HP, nos. 30-20 (B6), 317-11 (B6)', are vague. Various persons intervie\ved by me were
positive about the fact, but \vere unable to cite actual instances.
63. HP, no. 439-11 (B6).
64. In 1942-43, according to some sources, there \vere 3,288 grammar schools with
326,000 pupils in Belorussia in the charge of 9,608 teachers. See Wielhorski (I688a) , p. 12.
65. From the report by Major Doven, Chief of Staff of Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces in the OstIand, to the Reichskommissariat for the Ostland; cf. Schwarz
(I792a), p. 313. See also the report of an unnamed Sonderfiihrer, Document Oce EJa-2,
Archives of the Jewish Scientific Institute, New York.
66. Sohn, Bialystok (Ne\v York, 195 I) .
67. Schwarz (I792a) , p. 227.
68. Bobrov in Vozrozdenie, V-VI, 97.
69. Sch\varz (I792a), pp. 3 1 5-3 16 , doubts the belated Soviet press reports that "hun-
dreds of peasants in Belorussia were executed by the Nazis for appealing to the military
and police authorities against the extermination of the Jews"; or that "in the village of
Ushtasha the peasant population marched in a religious procession, bearing icons and
crosses, to Nazi headquarters in a last-minute appeal to spare the lives of the hvo hundred
Jewish men and women being led from their cells to the execution grounds." On the basis
of extensive research, Schwarz sadly concludes that "a passive attitude" was "apparently
the general rule" in regard to the persecuted Jews. One must admit, ho\vever, that people
remained equally "passive" when their own kin were arrested, deported, or shot at the
time of collectivization and of various purges under the Soviets.
70. See above, p. 195. Along with the Je\vish communities entire groups of Gypsies-
another "pernicious" race - were exterminated. Evidence is scant as to ho\v many were
liquidated, and where and when; see HP, no. 317-11 (B6).
71. Evidence gathered by Schwarz (I792a), pp. 225-227, is conclusive. Facts are
denied in Belorussian nationalist literature, but see HP, nos. 317-11 (B6), 143-19 (B6).

266
NOTES TO CHAPTER 12
It is known that there were no Belorussian "national units." attached to the SS execu-
tionist squads, though there were Latvian, Lithuanian, and "mixed" units \vhich included
some native Belorussians. The anti-Semitic position of the Belorussian collaborationists
is acknowledged, among other things, by a large 1944 poster displaying pictures of Ash'ou-
ski, Kalubovic, and other nationalist leaders, with quotations from Astrouski's speech
about the "Judaistic (azidavely) Kremlin," "Je\vish hirelings," and the like. See Archives
of the J e\vish Scientific Institute, New York, Document Oce 3a-15 (no. 246, Dallin's files).
See also above, pp. 204-207.
72. HP, no. 143-19 (B6)'. See above, note 40.
73. Belorussian complaints are summed up by J. Karaneiiski, BAC) no. 4/83 (January
27, 195 2 ); see also Rydlevsky (1497). For a history and characterization of the NTS,
see United States Department of State, External Research Paper, Series 3, No. 76, NTS:
The Russian Solidarist Movement (Washington, D.C., 1951).
74. When a nationalist ne\vspaper in Minsk published some overtly anti-Russian ar-
ticles and a NTS interpreter complained, "the German colonel ordered several cartloads of
the ne\vspaper burned." - BP, no. 317-11 (B6).
75. The Germans stopped the practice of freeing the Soviet P .O.W .'s. for peaceful
occupations. Instead, they were herded into camps. People were horrified at seeing thou-
sands of physically exhausted and hungry men marching along the long roads, and the
German guards "shooting those \vho \vere falling behind, like dogs." In the Bobruisk
camp, it is reported, where there were "some 40,000 men, an average of ten carts of
corpses, forty-five each, were brought out every day." - ibid., nos. 3 17-11 (B6), 439-1 I
(B6) .
76. Ibid., no. 219-14 (B6). Material evidence is lacking, ho\vever.
77. Belorussia (14 8 9), p. 33; S. Lichtensztul (1493), p. 23; Rydlevsky (1497), p. 24;
BP, nos. 219-14 (B6), 141-18 (B6). Akincyc's group must not be confused \vith the
Union of Belorussian Youth, presided over by Hanko.
78. See above, p. 161.
79. Belorussia (14 8 9)', p. 34.
80. In the eastern section, "Belorussianism lives on among the broad mass.es of the
population only as a language"; cf. the SS Eillsatzgruppen daily reports, gathered by
Alexander Dallin for a forthcoming book on German policies in the occupied eastern
territories. Kleist found Minsk a city where "everybody spoke in Russian" - (1491a) ,
p. 175.
81. Rydlevsky (1497), p. 23. This has been confirmed by several persons intervie\ved,
but documentary evidence is lacking. Belaruskaja N arodnaja Sa1nap011taC (Mutual Aid
Society) replaced the Belorussian Red Cross Society organized by Dr. Antanovic in
July 1941; it should not be confused \vith the Committee of Belorussian Sa1napol1tat
set up in Germany before the invasion, first presided over by Skialenak, then by
Abramcyk.
The follo\ving newspapers and magazines were published in the Belorussian language:
Minskaja Bazeta, later Belaruskaja Bazeta (Minsk), Pahonia (Baranavicy), Belar1tski
H olas (Vilna), H olas Veski (Minsk), Belaruskaja Skola (Minsk), Baranavickaja H azeta
(Baranavicy), Uzvyssa (Minsk), Belarus' na varte (Minsk) , Nasa praca (Minsk), N ovaja
daroha (Bialystok), N ovy sliac/t (Minsk), Zive Belarus' (Minsk), Sloni1nski Kurier
(Slonim). Most of them \vere tiny publications, appearing irregularly. Ranica (Berlin)
and Belaruski Rabotnik (Berlin) were semi-official publications intended for the Ostar-
beiter (drafted labor transferred from the occupied eastern areas to Germany).
The follo\ving were published in the Russian langua.ge: Kolokol (Smolensk), Za
svobodu (Smolensk), N a perelonte (Smolensk) " Golos naroda (Lepel), N ovyj Put'
(Borisov, Mogilev, Gomel, Bobruisk, Orsha, Smolensk), N a straze rodiny (Bobruisk),
Ree' (Bobruisk), Rul' (Minsk), Plug i tnee (Minsk), Zivoe slovo (Bobruisk); and two
satirical magazines, Bie (Smolensk) and Zalo (Bobl'uisk). These \vere somewhat better
edited than the Belorussian publications. Their circulation is not kno\vn. The German
administration published the Minsker Zeitung (Minsk). ,
82. BAC, no. 72, October 15, 195 1 , dates the foundation of the Belorussian Nezalez-
nickaja Party at July 7, 194 2 .
83. There are reports that he \vas shot, Belorussia (1489), p. 33; and that he \vas
"tortured to death by the Germans," BP, no. 141-18 (B6), p. 5. On the other hand, the

THE GUERRILLA WARFARE
26 7
Belarltskaja Trybuna (Ne\v York), January 1952, simply says that "he died on December
24, 194 2 ."
84. Bobrov, in Vozrozdenie, V-VI, 136.
85. Ibid. Both the nationalists and the Communists, claim credit for blowing up
the Sluck Gestapo. According to Pankou (I06a), p. 26, the first issue of the Biuleten of
the Belorussian Nezaleznickaja Party appeared in 1945 in Germany.
86. n 1942, says Rydlevsky (1497), p. 24; in 1943, says Belorussia (14 8 9), p. 33,
\vhich is confirmed by other testimonies.
87. Quoted from Belorussia (14 8 9), p. 3 2 .
Chapter 13. The Guerrilla Warfare
I. HP, nos. 30-20 (B6), 141-18 (B6).
2. A fairly detailed account by former students can be found in an article by Prorvic
in SV, X-XII (1950), 197-199, 221-222, and in the papers "Belye Berega School" and
"Diversionists and Spies" compiled for RP (1952).
3. "Each person was given a passport and other personal documents \vhich \vould
raise no suspicion with the occupation authorities, a gun with 2 I rounds, hvo mines [?],
three grenades, food for ten days, and a medical kit; some of us also received blue railroad
uniforms." - RP, "Belye Berega School."
4. See note 2.
5. HP, no. 317-11 (B6).
6. According to the Soviet version, Kube \vas killed by a Komsomol girl nicknamed
"Black Maria" (Rabotnica, no. 2; Mosco\v, 1947). The Belorussians claim that he \vas
killed by a nationalist "in retaliation for the execution of their leaders hanged in Minsk
by his order" (Bobrov, in V ozrozdenie, 137-14°, V-VI). What is certain is that the
assassin \vas a girl, and Kube's mistress. The fact that she ble\v up her lover \vith a time
bomb \vould indicate that she had contacts \vith the underground. The assassination made
a great impression on the people and fantastic stories \vere circulated, \vith the girl bearing
different names, Russian, Belorussian, and J e\vish. Kleist (1491a) , p. 175, erroneously
dates Kube's assassination in 1944. Kube \vas killed on September 22, 1943, and, ten
years later, Nikolaj Chochlov, a former NKVD man, declared that he personally directed
the plot executed by Kube's maid, Halina Mazanik; see The New York Ti1/tes, April 23,
1954; Posev (Germany), April 25, 1954; and NRS, May II, 1954. But important dis-
crepancies in his story are pointed out in Nasa Strana, May 22, and NRS, May 30 and
June 5,12,1954.
7. Quotes are from a report by Dr. Keutz to the Propaganda Ministry, file 26/44g
Ost 2287. Document Dee E4-1, Archives of the Jewish Scientific Institute, New York.
8. Soviet sources claim that the guerrilla movement started immediately after occupa-
tion. They apply the term guerrilla (partizan), ho\vever, to the spies and saboteurs as
well as to the groups of Komsomolleft behind the German lines. These remained conspic-
uously inactive until late in the fall. But as early as March 1942 a pamphlet We Are
Guerrillas appeared in the series "Soviet War Ne\vs" (Book no. 3) issued by the Press
Department of the Soviet Embassy in London (Hutchinson and Co., Publishers). The
follo\ving are the most advertised works on the subject: L. Canava (I744a); Logunova
(1778)'; S. K.ovpak, Dt Putivlia do Karpat (From Putivl to the Carpathians; Mosco\v-
Leningrad, 1945); B. Polevoy, Povest' 0 nastojaslem celoveke (A Story about a Real
Man), and P. Versihora, "Liudi cistoj sovesti" (Men with a Clear Conscience), Zna11tia
(August 1945, April-July 1946). Unfortunately, the subject is treated in the light of
"socialist realism," and documentation is unreliable. See also BGB, nos. 1186, 1187, 1207,
1208.
We can read that during two and a half months of operation (1941), the guerrillas in
the Minsk region alone "killed 2,500 German soldiers and officers, destroyed three German
headquarters, and demolished 112 bridges"; besides, "39 tanks, 12 armored cars, 22 planes,
400 trucks, 45 cars, 200 motorcycles, .450 bicycles, 200 horse-wagons and horses, and 15
motorized ammunition and supply columns were destroyed; eight ammunition dumps,
75 oil tanks, and 47 army wagons with food, equipment, and other property were blown
up or burned." - We Are Guerrillas, pp. 18-19. No corroborative evidence is found in
either German or native sources. In fact, the very tenn "guerrilla" (partizan) does not

268
NOTES TO CHAPTER 13
appear in German documents until May 1942. Testimonies gathered by HP also point out
that there \vas no guerrilla warfare in Belorussia before the spring of 1942, although a
fe\v local incidents may have occurred in the winter 1941-42. The Belorussian nationalist
press is in agreement \vith this; see, for instance, BAC, no. 28 (107), July 13, 1952. See
Chapter 12, notes 55, 66. An attempt to summarize the available data is made by D.
Karov, Partizanskoe dvizenie v SSSR v 1941-1945 g.g. (The Partisan Movement in the
USSR, 1941-1945; Institute for the Study of the' History and Culture of the USSR,
series I, no. II; Munich, 1954), for which Soviet sources. are, primarily and rather in-
discriminately, used.
9. Menski, in Narodnaja Pravda, nos. 7-8.
10. HP, no. 30-20 (B6).
II. Ibid., no. 140-16 (B), PP. 47-48.
12. Ibid., nos. 188-HD, 64-22 (B6).
13. Ibid., no. 219-14 (B6). "There \vere no guerrillas in our area, since the Germans
were garrisoned nearby; there was peace for three years." - A. Kazimirov, in SV, June
195 0 .
14. For details, Moshe Kaganovich, Der I dis/ter Ontayl itt der Partizaner-Bavegung
fun Sovet-Rusland (Rome, 1948).
15. ". . . Jews from Lida who escaped from a train carrying them to Maidanek \vere
robbed by partisans of the Iskra detachment (Novogrodek district). When the family
camp in Belica had to be transferred to one near the village of Demianovcy, Jews \vere
attacked en route and robbed, and some of them severely beaten, by partisans of the anti-
Semitic V oroshilov company, also called the Lida detachment. There were also instances
\vhere Russian [sic] detachments ambushed returning Jewish foraging parties and seized
the food that the Jews had obtained at the risk of their lives . . . Jewish detachment
.commanders \vere not always able to retrieve the spoils by appealing to the higher
partisan command. Often enough, such happenings resulted in the loss of lives." - Kagan-
ovich, Der Idisher Ontayl, PP. 165££; quoted by Sch\varz (179 2a ), pp. 323-325.
16. Ibid., pp. 329-33°.
17. Ibid., chap. v.
18. Logunova, (1778).
19. Document no. 246 (Dallin files).
20. See above, p. 222.
2 I. The Black Cat group is mentioned only once in the mass of evidence gathered by
HP; see no. 188-HD. Rydlevsky (I497), p. 24, estimated the total number of Belorussian
guerrillas at 250,000 in 1943; this number, he says, "included more than 50,000 intellec-
tuals; 7,175 teachers; 641 agronomists; 2,787 medical personnel; 2,558 engineers; and
35,000 students of all ages." How such a complete census could have been taken is not
explained, but this is exactly how Belorussian history is being rewritten. See Chapter 14,
note 101.
22. Bobrov, in Vozrozdenie, V, 130-132, and V. Pozdniakov and D. Karov, "Respub-
lika Zueva" N ovyj Zurnal, XXIX (1952), 189-204. Als.o the study on Kaminski's .band
by Dallin, RP (1953).
23. HP, nos. 27-17, 143-19, 219-14 (B6), contain some interesting details.
24. Menski, in Narodnaja Pravda, nos. 7-8 (1950).
25. For some details, see HP, nos. 188-HD, 140-16 (B), and Dallin files no. 126.
26. Ibid., nos. I 88--HD, 143-19 (B6), 219-14 (B6), 141-18 (B6), 439-11 (B6); also
I\1enski, in Narodnaja Pravda, nos. 7-8 (1950)", p. 26, and Bobrov, in Vozrozdenie, V-VI,
133- 1 34.
27. Menski, in Narodnaja Pravda, nos. 7-8.
28. HP, no. 64-22 (B6). Mayor Ivanouski of Minsk protested against SS atrocities
on August 15, 1943. Other "collaborationists" also submitted reports about how to treat
the population better.-HP, no. 317-II (B6). Finally, the Gebietskonttltissaren them-
selves began to warn their superiors that the antiguerrilla campaign as conducted by the
SS was feeding popular unrest instead of quelling it; cf. Document Oce E3a-16, Archives
of the Jewish Scientific Institute, New York.
29. HP, no. 30-20 (B6).
30. The guerrillas numbered 200,000, according to BAC) no. 7 2 , October 15, 1951, and
to Lipicanski, Belaruski H olas, no. I, 'March 25) 195 2 ; "250,000," says Rydlevsky (1497),

THE GUERRILLA WARFARE
26 9
p. 24. "Over 300,000 full-titne guerrillas," says the N ovaja Zaria (San Francisco), May 10,
1945), reprinting accounts from the Soviet press; the figure is repeated by ,Falk, a medical
officer with the UNRRA mission to Belorussia in 1946, (1759), p. 306. The Soviet his-
torian says: "In thousands of villages, to\vns, and cities of Belorussia ne\v multitudes of
the Soviet people started an organized movement for fulfillment of the patriotic duties
of the Soviet man; they armed themselves, \vent to the \voods, and formed thousands of
strong guerrilla groups, or brigades, under the banner of the Party of Lenin-Stalin."-
Canava (1744a) (italics mine). Since a brigade counted from 600 to several thousand
men (see above, p. 198), the total number would read in the millions. The German esti-
mates, ho\vever, would hardly add up to a total of 200,000.
31. HP, no. 140-16(B).
32. For the text of the oath as published by the Soviet press, see We Are Guerrillas,
pp. 9- 10 .
33. Here is a typical text: "For thee, 0 Belorussia, in this \val' for the fatherland
Belorussians are fighting in the ranks of the Red Army at the front: 108 generals, hun-
dreds of colonels and hundreds of thousands of \varriors. Thy s.ons are preserving with
devotion the legacy of our fathers and forefathers conscious of their blood union ,vith
the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. As the great and powerful Dnieper River is one-
the Dnieper \vhich nourished the ancient tribes of the Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrain-
ians - so, too, are united our history, culture, aspirations, and interests." -lzvestija
(Moscow), August 8, 1943. According to Soviet sources, "73 newspapers, some of them
in s.everal thousand copies, leaflets, tracts, even books, were printed by the guerrilla
groups"; see N. Natalevic, Belarus' I (Moscow, 1944). See also Canava (1744a)'. But the
German sources mention only one "underground" (25 Sakavik), and four "guerrilla"
publications (Vesti s Roditty, Belarus', Zviazda, Za sovetskuju Belarus'). There \vere a
fe\v publications in the Belorussian language, but, in general, Russian \vas used. Signifi-
cantly, we find no Belorussian names among "the gallant Belorussian soldiers and guer-
rillas," awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union; see the list published by the USSR
Inforllation Bulletin (Washington, D.C.), January 4, 1944.
34. "In Mogilev province alone, over 300 rural leaders ,vere shot by order of the
guerriIIas." - Mensky, in Narodnaja Pravda, nos. 7-8, p. 27. The Soviet sources estimate
at 11,699 the number of "traitors and policemen" liquidated by the guerrillas; cf. Natal-
evic, ccV borbe za nezavisimost'" (In the Struggle for Independence), Belarus' I (Mos.cow,
1944) ·
35. Menski, in Narodnaja Pravda, nos. 7-8, pp. 25-27.
36. HP, no. 141-18 (B6).
37. Ibid., nos. 46-M8, 219-14 (B6).
38. The hvo volumes of Canava (1744a) are filled \vith meticulous descriptions of
the individual guerrilla groups, brigades, and even armies; names of their leaders, political
advisers, and individual fighters; places, days, and hours of operations; etc. The following
official accounts show the unreIiability of Soviet statistics (italics supplied): (I) "From
the beginning of the war to the end of 1943, the Belorussian guerrillas killed 234,000
Gennans, including 16 generals, 3,085 officers, and 745 pilots. Besides, 11,699 traitors and
policemen were liquidated; 3,677 military trains and 2,571 bridges blown up; 519 tanks,
301 field guns, 488 cars, and 8,453 trucks destroyed; and 449 warehouses and arsenals
burned do\vn." - Natalevic (President, Supreme Soviet of the BSSR at the time of
,vriting), "V borbe za nezavisimost'," Belarus' I. (2)' "On their native soil the Belorussian
guerriIIas \viped out 1nore thatt 300,000 Hitlerite soldiel's, including 23 generals; derailed
6,000 trains, destroyed more than 4,100 locomotives and some 50,000 railway cars, flat-
cars, and tank cars, and 23 armored trains; ble\v up 11tOre than 700 1111l1litions and aY11ta-
11ent stol'es, \vrecked more than 4,00a bridges, destroyed 900 tanks and armored cars,
400 field guns, 11,000 trucks, 300 planes; smashed 30 army headquarters and \vrecked
1,400 kilometers of railway track. Government decorations for courage and valor \vere
a\varded to 20,000 guerrillas." - USSR Ittlortnation Bulletin, August 26, 1945. (3) "Dur-
ing the war the Belorussian guerrillas annihilated about half a 11tillion Ger1nan soldiers
and officers, caused 11,128 railway wrecks, and destroyed 1,000 ene11y tanks and 18,740
,trucks . . . They also annihilated over 50 Ger11tan generals and i11tportant Reich offi-
cials . . . More than 45,000 guerrilla conJ,11tanders and 11le1l \vel'e decorated." -Ibid.,

27°
'NOTES TO CHAPTER 13
December 30, 1944. (4) "Over 180,000 fascist officers and 11ten met death on Belorussian
soil." -Ibid., January 4, 1944.
Canava's figures are different, and still another variant is supplied by Pravda, August
16, 1944.
39. HP, no. 46-M8; S. Sch,varz (1792a), p. 328; Menski, in Narodnaja Pravda, pp.
25-27.
40. In the Bobruisk P .O.W. camp, for instance,- a Colonel Schubert formed a Russian
unit on his own, while other German divisions had none at that time; see HP no. 317-11
(B6) .
41. These ,vere not purely military formations and the soldiers .\vere accompanied by
their families. In 1944, the Germans separated the families and put them to ,,,ork, the
groups were broken into smaU units and attached to German formations; see HP, no.
143-19 (B6).
42. Ibid., no. 219-14 (B6). The names of Kaminsky, ccColonel" Rodionov nicknamed
Gil, Michail Oktan, BUchler, and others have become symbols and await a novelist to
narrate their stories. Kaminsky, formerly a Soviet engineer, eventually left the country
\vith the German troops. Rodionov started with a "Russian unit (drllzilla)" in a P.O.W.
camp, saw it grow from 25 to 3,500 men \vith some tanks and artillery picked up in the
,voods and repaired; it rivaled the SS in ravaging the guerrilla areas and, finally, ,vent
over itself to the guerrilla side. BUchler, operating in the region behveen Osipovicy and
Minsk, worked with Germans and guerrillas at the same time. To the stories that have
grown around their names, some details can be added from HP, nos. 141-18, 219-14,
317-11, 143-19 (Schedule B). Bobrov, in Vozrozdenie, pp. 128-130, makes out a case for
Rodionov.
43. In March 1943, Gebietskol1t111issar 1l1ld Regierullgsrat. Dr. Lud\vig Ehrenleitner
submitted to General Kube a substantial report on the political situation in Slonim,
dealing \vith guerrilla warfare, the local administration, and other urgent problems. He
pointed out the "stupidity and dangers" of the SS policy of wholesale repressions; de-
nounced "the ineptitude, lo\v moral standards, and corruption" of the administration;
and made a number of constructive suggestions about securing the common people's co-
operation by restoring "their dignity, sense of justice, and their faith in the German
Reich." With a favorable comment, the report was forwarded to the personal attention
of Reichsminister Rosenberg, via Heinrich Lohse in Riga. There is evidence that a number
of similar recommendations followed in the summer and in the fall, but apparently no
decision was made until late in the faU. Photostats can be found in the files of the Jewish
Scientific Institute, New York (Document Occ 3a-16). For general policies, the follo,ving
are official German sources: Reichsministerium flir die besetzten Ostgebiete: Der General-
bezirk Weissrllthenie1t (Berlin, December 1941); Reichskommissariat Ostland, Anttlicher
A nzeiger, 1943-1944; Verordnungsblatt, 1941-1944; Generalkommissar flir Weissruthenien,
Amtsblatt, 1941-1944 (Minsk).
44. HP, no. 30-20 (B6).
45. The text of the decree of June 3, 1943, is published by Gerhard von Mende, "Die
besetzten Ostgebiete," lahrbuch der Weltpolitik (Berlin, 1944), pp. 197-201. The begin-
nings of the Muzy daverra (Vertrauenrat) are obscure. Kleist says that already in 1942
Wilhelm Kube played with the idea of Belorussian ((self-government" with Dr. Ermacenka
as its possible head (1491a), p. 171. Whether the Muzy daverra existed as an institution
during that time is doubtful. Astrouski has been a controversial figure in Belorussian
politics since the trial of the Belorussian Hramada in Poland in 1928. Syla (1498) presents
his life and work in a favorable light; on the other hand, Vilenski describes him as an
"impostor," "swindler of public funds," and the like, in a pamphlet Dapa1l1tennia da alita-
bijaltrafii R. Astrol'iskaha (Data to Supplement the Autobiography of R. Astrouski;
Germany, 1948) ; see Chapter 14, note 1°7. Little, in fact, is. kno,vn about the circumstances
under which the BCR \vas created. Statements by Astrouski and his collaborators cannot
be relied upon. A church leader who was present in Minsk at that time contends that the
BCR \vas cc a special form of Belorussian government with much restricted rights, actually
\vith no rights at all." - Mgr. A. M. (826), pp. 112-113.
4 6 . Rydlevsky (1497), pp. 24- 2 5.
47. Documentary evidence is extremely scant, and the bits of information scattered in
the Belorussian press abroad are contradictory. It appears, however, that no Belorussian

THE GUERRILLA WARFARE
27 1
battalion sa\v any military action. Cf. Rydlevsky (1497); Belorussia (14 8 9), pp. 37-3 8 ;
Lichtensztul (1493), p. 23, BAC, no. 72 (October 15, 1951); HP, nos. 141-18 (B6), 188-
HD, 140-16 (B). S'ome documents point to continuous intelligence behveen the guerrillas
and the Kraevaja Abarona; see HP, no. 188-HD, and notes 24,42.
4 8 . HP, no. 140-16 (B), pp. 20-21. Cf. the Minutes of the Second Belorussian Con-
vention, June 1944.
49. St. K.ru5ynic in BAC, 110. 14/93 (April 6, 1952). Kleist has a better opinion of
the Soviet Belorussian youth (149 1a ), pp. 17 2 -73.
50. Follo\ving the First Belorussian Convention, in December 1917; see above, pp.
9 8 - 100 .
51. The report of the Credentials Committee contains the follo,ving information about
the distribution of delegates, their occupation, education, reUgion, and age: Minsk (city),
201; Minsk (province), 115; Lida, 30; Novogrodek, 62; Baranovici, 155; Slonim, 69;
Hancavicy, 20; Hlybokae, 105; Sluck, 94; Vilejka, 65; Vitebsk, II; Orsa, 8; Mogilev,
10; Bobruisk, 3; Borisov, I. Outside the territory of the Generalbezirk were represented:
Brest, 5; Pinsk, 6; Kobryn, 5; Bialystok, 17; Grodno, 8; Gomel, 7. Outside the territory
of the BSSR: Vilna (city), 10; Vilna (province), 16; Briansk, I; Orel, I; Riga 4;
Smolensk, 3; Cernigov, I. Outside the territory of the USSR: Craco\v, I; Vienna, I;
Warsa\v, 2; Lodz, 3; Koenigsberg, 4; Berlin, I. .
Educators, 276; peasants, 245; \vorkers, 14 2 ; \vhite-collar employees, 234; medical
doctors, 20; engineers, 31; la\vyers, 25; journalists, 14; agronomists, 18; others, 34.
T,vo hundred and seventeen delegates had a higher, 496 a secondary, and 326 an
elementary education. Their religion: Orthodox, 9°3; Roman Catholic, 125; Evangelical,
4; Lutheran, I; Mohammedan, I; Old Believers, 5. Significantly, only 245 members (23.6
per cent) ,vere peasants, and 142 (13.6 per cent) \vere ,yorkers, \vhile the other 652 (62.8
per cent) \vere \vhite-collar employees and intellectuals. It is also perhaps \vorthy of note
that 109 (12.4 per cent) members \vere under 22 years of age, ,vhile only 15 (1.4 per cent)
had seen their sixtieth anniversary. See Minutes, pp. 36-39; see also Kipel (1491), pp.
7-8.
52. The Minutes of the Second Belorussian Convention in Minsk, June 27, 1944, p.
36. The document \vas published in Rallica, nos. 29/191 and 36/198 (July 23 and Septem-
ber 3, 1944) ; large excerpts in K.ipel (149 1 ). There are 91 type,vritten pages in the original
copy available to this \vriter, but only the first 57 are numbered. Parts of the document
are cut out, and others conveniently rephrased in Druhi usebelayuski kanhres (The Second
All-Belorussian Congress), an attempt at re,vriting history by the BCR group in exile ten
years after the events (Munich, 1954).
53. In 1943, the Sa11-tapo11-tac (Mutual Aid) collected 11,606,170 rubles among the
Belorussian populations. With that money, 36,924 persons ,vere assisted; 137,342 free
meals were distributed; and a medical institute (?) in Nova-Vilna ,vas granted 470,760
rubles; see the Minutes, pp. 18-19.
54. The Minutes, pp. 8-22.
55. Ibid.
56. This cannot be explained by fear of the 'Germans, since the Sa11tap011taC did find
the courage to make a claim for the uniting of all the Belorussian lands at its meeting
on August 21,1943, in Minsk; see Belorussia (14 8 9), p. 37.
57. The Soviet Jews were blamed for the destruction of Belorussian historical monu-
ments and shrines such as the Borisov Rocks (1937), the monastery of Sts. Boris and
Hleb (1930), the churches of St. George and of the Resurrection of Christ (1936), and
the cathedral of St. Joseph in Mogilev (in place of \vhich an NKVD office ,vas erected).
The president of the Central Rada, Astrouski, denounced "the J e\vish conspiracy," and
Vice President SkeHnak directed his speech against "the Communist- J e\vish hirelings
(najl1tity)" of the Kremlin; cf. the Minutes, pp. 3, 54, and the speech of Kalubovic
(n.p.). Also see Chapter 12, note 71.
58. Statement by R. Astrouski on November 30, 1951; cf. Belaruskaja Trybuna (Ne\v
York), no. 1-2 (9-10), January 1952.
59. The story is told by an eyewitness in BAC, no. 4 (83), (January 27, 1952).
Vitebsk was occupied by the Reds on June 26; Orsa, MogiIev, Bobruisk, and Borisov on
July I; Minsk, on July 3; Polock on July 4; Vilna on July 13; Bialystok on July 27;

27 2
NOTES TO CHAPTER 13
and Brest on July 28. By August I, 1944, the reoccupation of Belorussia by the Soviet
armies ,vas complete.
Chapter 14. The Soviets Again
1. On January II, 1944, the Soviet government announced that it wished Poland's
eastern boundary to foHow approximately the Curzon line, but \vas \villing to assist Po-
land to regain territory in the west, to make up for the loss. A \veek later (January 17)
it withdre\v recognition from the Polish government-in-exile. The British government
attempted a mediation, but to no avail. On July 28, a Polish Committee of National
Liberation was formed in the USSR, eventual1y to take up the administration of liberated
Poland. The Con1mittee accepted the Curzon line on October 13 and was recognized by
Mosco\v as the Provisional Government of Poland on December 31. At the Yalta Con-
ference in February 1945 the Allies agreed on the Curzon line, "\vith digressions from it
in some regions of five to eight klm. in favor of Poland." The Provisional Government of
Poland ,vas recognized by the British and the United States governments on July 5.
2. "The establishing of the border by a mixed commission ,vas to start ,vithin fifteen
days of ratification." - New York Tinles} August 18, 1945.
3. Tass, July 8, 1948.
4. The agreement signed in Warsaw by Vyshinsky for the USSR and Zawadski for
Poland. The Soviet Union was given a \vedge of 260 square miles in Lublin province,
Poland the southeastern corner of Drogobycz province from the Ukraine.
5. In September 1939 Poland lost 77,7 0 3 square miles, with a population of about
12,775,000 to the Soviets. It ,vould appear that it has regained about 8,200 square miles,
,vith a population of approximately 2,000,000 by the postwar agreement with the Kremlin.
The Belorussian territory remained divided into t'\velve provinces through 1953; by the
end of that year, five provinces - Baranovici, Bobrujsk, Pinsk, Polesie, and Polock-
were suppressed, and their territories assigned to other administrative centers. For com-
ments from the nationalist point of view, see BAC, no. 14(106), April 4, 1954.
6. New York Ti1nes, July 8,1945.
7. "Representatives of the Polish Committee of National Liberation \vere rounding
up Poles in Belorussia and arranging for their return to Poland." - Shotwell (1707),
p. 68.
8. Neither complete texts of the agreements nor accounts of the operation have ever
been published; see Schechtman (33 6 ), pp. 370-375.
9. Some Polish emigres' sources estimated that at least 6,000,000 persons might move
from the USSR to Poland; but the Provisional Government of .Poland expected that
2,000,000 altogether would be repatriated from the Belorussian, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian
SSR's. Cf. Schechtman (33 6 ), pp. 377-379.
10. According ,to the Belorussian nationaHst press, there still were "about 600,000
Belorussians in Poland in 1949." - Belaruski E1nihrant (Toronto), no. I 1/22 December
I, 1949.
1 I. Included in the total of 30,500 Poles transferred up to that time from the USSR;
Schechtman (33 6 ), p. 379.
12. Soviet News (London), May 4, 194 6 .
13. The story of the Bialystok revolt is reported in BAC, no. 1/4, January 25,1948.
14. Publications in Yiddish and Polish have been suspended since the \var and no
mention is made in Soviet documents of the J e\vish and Polish agencies that previously
existed in Belorussia. In July 1949, the American Jewish League against Communism
charged that some 400,000 Jews had been deported from the Ukraine and Belorussia into
forced labor camps in Siberia; see New York Tilltes, July 24, 1949.
15. See Dr. Leslie A. Falk (1759), p. 307; BSE (1948), p. 1827.
16. Cf. the testimony of an American physician with the UNRRA in Belorussia: Falk
(1759), p. 3 0 9. The fact that no vital statistics have been published since the war is alarm-
ing. Perhaps it is not untimely to recall that at the Minsk War Criminal Trial in 1945, and
at the Nuremberg International Tribunal War Criminals Trials in 1946, the Soviet gov-
ernment alleged that the Ger11tans intentionally spread tyPhus antong the Belorussian
populations - five years later, the A1nericans were to be accused of germ warfare' in
Korea I

THE SOVIETS AGAIN
27.3
17. The Belorussian press abroad reported mass purges and deportations in 1944,
1945, 194 6 , 1948, and 195 I; see Zttic, no. 4/ S (December 195o-January 195 1 ), pp. 7-8;
Bozyt1t Sliacham, no. 5/44 (September-October 1951), p. 14; BAC, no. 72 (October IS,
19S 1 ).
18. See above, p. 15. G. Marinie found "complete Belorussian villages" in the
Olstyn (Allenstein) and Biskup (Bischofsberg) counties of East Prussia; see NRS, Janu-
ary 17,1949. See also Rydlevsky (1497), pp. 38-39.
19. The nationalist press estima'tes that nearly a million Belorussians had been trans-
ferred as forced labor to Germany (BAC, no. 72, October IS, 1951) are about three times
higher than the Soviet official estimate (BSE, 1948, p. 1827). How many remained in the
DP camps is not exactly kno\vn. Figures varying from 10,000 to 100,000 have been ven-
tured in the DP Belorussian press.
20. Indirect evidence can be drawn from the increased number of students and of
voters in the areas that had been reported depopulated; from the slave labor camps
established in Belorussia since the war; from the increased number of men with non-
Belorussian names holding public office; and so forth. See notes 2 I, 22, 70.
21. Population of the principal Belorussian cities:
19 2 6 1939 194 8
Minsk 13 1 ,803 23 8 ,77 2 231,000
Gomel' 86,409 144, 16 9 120,000
Vitebsk 9 8 ,857 16 7,4 2 4 80,000
Mogilev SO,2 2 2 99,44° 80,000
B 0 bruisk 5 I ,29 6 84,1°7 80,000
Figures for 1948 sho\v a rapid increase since the German occupation \vhen the urban
population ,vas reported to have d\vindled by 30 to 70 per cent. The question is, how
many pre\var residents there are. Fear is expressed in the nationalist press that the cities
are being rehabilitated at the cost of their denationalization.
22. See Chapter I.
23. Scandrett (179 2 ), p. 486.
24. Falk (1759), p. 310, estimates that "in certain cities such as Minsk, Vitebsk,
Gomel', and Mogilev, 70 to 90 per cent of an d\vellings had been rendered uninhabitable."
The Soviet official sources maintain that "the biggest cities in .Belorussia - Minsk, Gomel',
Vitebsk, and others - were destroyed to the extent of 80 to 90 per cent"; USSR Infornta-
tion Bulletin, January 14, 1949, p. II; and see BSE (1948), p. 1827.
2S. Daily Worker, April 4, 1946. BSE (1948), p. 1827, estimates the losses at "70
per cent of all cattle and 90 per cent of all pigs."
26. Scandrett (179 2 ), p. 486.
27. New York Times, July 9, 1945. The figure is l'epeated in BSE (1948), p. 1827,
\vhich also adds "416,000 coUective households" (?)'.
28. BAC, no. 40/43, December 19, 1948. Soviet statistics record the material destruc-
tion but, as a rule, do not mention the number of persons affected - whether homeless,
unemployed, sick, or killed.
29. From a Soviet account reprinted in N ovaja Zaria (San Francisco), May 10, 1945.
30. USSR Ittformation Bulletin, December 30,1944; January 12, 19S1; July 20, 1944.
31. Novaja Zaria, May 10, 1945; corroborated in BSE (1948), p. 1827.
32. From a statement by K. Kiselev, Belorussian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in USSR
l11,jorntatiott Bulletitz, December 30, 1944, PP. 5-6.
33. T. Gorbunov, Literat'Ura i Iskusstvo (December 8, 1944); also, USSR Infonlla-
tion Bulletin December 30, 1944, January 4, 1944; N ovaja Zaria, May 10, 1945; BSE
(1948), p. 1831. The number of destroyed school buildings increased to 6,808 in the state-
ment by P. Saevic, Belorussian Minister of Education, Kul'tura i Zizn', no. 24 (August
31, 1950), \vho also said that "all the school equipment and 20,000,000 books in school
libraries \vere destroyed," which went farther than any earlier statement in the Soviet
press.
34. Most figures have no value other than their emotional effect, expression in terms
of rubles and national income being meaningless.

274
NOTES TO CHAPTER 14
35. Falk (1759), p. 3 10 , and Moscow News, Oct. 13, 1945.
36. A map of the slave labor camp network made by the Free Trade Union Com-
mittee of the American Federation of Labor shows a heavy focus of camps in the regions
of Minsk, Polock, Vitebsk, Mogilev, and Gomel in 1951.
A German prisoner of war, repatriated in 1949, tells of "several sections of a P.O.W.
camp located in the city of Minsk." He could not see, he says, "a single free worker"
among many thousands of laborers engaged in the 'construction of a tractor plant. There
\vere other camps "scattered all over the territory of Belorussia," and he himself "was often
moved from one to another."- Vozrozdenie (Paris), IX (1950),171-172.
37. USSR InfoYtnation Bulletin, January 14, 1949, p. I I.
38. In the first half of 1946, "over half the hospital food, excluding rye, potatoes, and
cabbage, ,vas from the UNRRA . . . This same percentage was also approximately true
for the children's homes. . . The American Red Cross also supplied linens and food to
many hospitals." - Falk (1759). Full accounts have been published by the American Red
Cross, Russian War Relief, and the UNRRA. For a brief summary, see New York Til1tes,
June 10, 1946.
39. Statistical data are available froln such publications as Planovoe choziajstvo,
Socialisticeskoe ze11tledelie, Narodnoe obrazovanie, etc.; more specifically, Sovetskaja
Belorussia and Zviazda. I have used the data selected for publication in Pravda,
Izvestija, Soviet Union, USSR Inforntation Bulletin, etc., not becaus.e their reliability is
greater, but because of their significance in having been selected by Soviet authorities
for a wider diffusion.
40. USSR InfoY1nation Bulletin, July 20, 1944.
41. Ibid., December 30, 1944.
42. Statement by Ponomarenko, ibid., December 30, 1944, pp. 5-6. In July, almost as
soon as the Germans had left, the Soviets boasted that "hundreds of hospitals, dispensaries,
and clinics now function and the mos.t important result of their ,vork is stamping out all
epidemics left by the Germans." -Ibid., July 20, 1944. Yet, hvo years later, "the lack of
X-ray, surgical, bacteriological, pathological, chemical, indeed every category of equip-
ment, drugs and supplies, continued to be a serious handicap," in spite of substantial
American aid; cf. Falk (1759), p. 311.
43. USSR InfoY11tation Bulletin, January 12, 195 1 , p. 17. "There are more schools in
Belorussia now than there were before the ,var." - V. Vinogradov, Pravda, September I,
1950. At the same time, Belorussian Minister of Education P. Saevic stated that "there
\vere 11,760 schools in 1949-50 (8,513 grammar schools, 2,664 seven-grade schools, and
583 full secondary schools)." - Kul'tura i iizn' no. 24, August 3 1 , 1950. Apparently, the
earlier statements that I 1,5°0 schools had already been reopened in Belorussia in the fall
of 1944 were forgotten (note 41).
44. USSR Informatio1t Bulletin, January 14, 1949, p. II; June 8, 1951, p. 352.
45. Ibid., January 14, 1952, pp. 24-25; also Osmolovski (17 8 sa).
46. USSR Information Bulletin, January 14, 1949, p. 11.
47. Izvestija, January 10, 1950.
48. Scandrett (1792), p. 486.
49. In 1949, 20 per cent of the cultivated land in ,vestern Belorussia still ,vas in the
hands of individual farmers; see Belaruski Emihra1tt (Toronto), no. 11/22 December 1949.
In 1950, its collectivization ,vas completed, according to Pravda, October 2, 1950. But
January 24-26, 1952, the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of Belorussia admitted
that it \vould take "at least one more year to complete the program"; s.ee Zviazda (Minsk),
January 27, 1952.
50. Statement by Patolicev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Belorussia,
Pravda, November 14, 1950.
51. The plan was devised early in 1950 by N. Khrushchev, member of the Politburo,
who declared that this task was "one of the most important problems" facing Soviet
agriculture. The day after his speech was published, Pravda and other ne\vspapers carried
an editorial note saying that Khrushchev's views were for ((discussion" only. The Soviet
press then ceased to mention the campaign, and the plan apparently \vas discarded.
52. Patolicev stated that u 1 80,000 field-,vorkers (agitators) had full-time employ-
ment in 1951," in Pravda, December 26, 1951.
53. New York Ti11teS, June 19, 195 2 . Full text of Patolicev's reports to the Central

THE SOVIETS AGAIN
275
Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia in Zviazda, February 15, 16, 1951;
January 27, 1952; large excerpts in BAG, no. 17/96, March 27,1952.
54. The BSSR' plan for school texts had been announced as "95.8 per cent fulfilled"
even before the end of the Five Year Plan, but "this ,vas not true," confessed the
U citel'skaja Gazeta, no. 67, August 23, 1950. The tBelorussian Minister of Education
admitted that "the secondary school net,vork still lagged behind." - Kul'tura i Zizn',
no. 24, August 31, 1950. If ,ve consult the files of Zviazda for the single month of April
1952,' we find complaints of "mishandling tractors, many of \vhich have rapidly gone out
of use" (April 27); of "using rusty tin dishware in the ,yorkers' dormitories" in Minsk
where "even the most primitive lockers for clothing" were absent (April IS); of
"fertilizing only the field strips along the high\vays" in a number of collective farms
(April 18); of "dirt and filth in collective dairies and stables" (April 24); "dirt, filth,
and complete absence of utilities" in the ne,vly built ,yorkers' to,vns in Cyrvonae Urocysca
(April 24); failure of the repair shops to maintain the mechanical farm equipment in
\vorking condition (April 22); and so forth. Shortcomings in the fulfillment of the post-
,var Five Year Plan ,vere discussed at the last session of the BSSR Supreme Soviet; see
Zviazda, March 27, 28,29,1952.
55. P. Dementiev, a repatriated emigrant ,vho managed to fiee from the native land
again, in NRS, July 29, 1951.
56. Le Figaro Litteraire (Paris), February 24, 1951.
57. A letter published in Vestnik (Toronto), no. 1046 December 22, 195 I; quoted by
Belaruski H olas (Toronto), no. I, March 25, 1952. Corroborative evidence can be found
in the Soviet press ,vhere the "ne\v homes for \vorkers" are criticized for their lack of
most elementary utilities and fixtures such as "\vater, se\vage system, side\valks, electric
fixtures, \vindo,v locks." - Zviazda (Minsk), April 24, 1952.
58. See letter published by Vestllik, December 22,1951.
59. See statement by N. Patolicev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Belo-
russia, that "out of 3,218 collective farm presidents in the eastern provinces only 197, and
out of 6,054 collective farm presidents in the ,vestern provinces of the republic only 20
are specialists in farming." - Zviazda, January 27, 1952. Tightening up of the Party
control over collective farming has been general in the USSR since the \var; see a pertinent
study by B. Nikolaevsky, "Novyj pochod protiv derevni v SSSR (A Ne\v Offensive against
the Village in the USSR)"," Novyj Zurltal, XXIV (1950), 184-208.
60. Ponomarenko remained Chairman of the Government, and Nikolaj Gusarov, a
Russian member of the Central Committee, ,vas made First Secretary of the Party. A
high Party official testified that "almost all the leaders. of central and provincial adminis-
trations of the Belorussian SSR, including ,the president of the Supreme Soviet [N.
Natalevic], had been liquidated," by the time he himself fled to West Germany. - G. A.
Tokaev, SV, February 195 1 , p. 46.
61. Statements by N. Patolicev, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and P.
Moserov, General Secretary of the Komsomol, in Zviazda, January 27 and 30, 1952,
respectively.
62. KomsOl1tolskaja Pravda, September 12, 1949, and Zviazda, January 27, 30,1952.
63. USSR Infort1tation Bulletin, January 14, 1949, pp. 10-11.
64. The Belorussian Republic (BNR) under the German occupation in 1918 is ignored,
of course.
65. The reasons for the adoption of the new national flag, breaking the common
Soviet pattern, have not been explained, except for a comment in the local press that the
new emblem symbolized "the culmination of the Lenin-Stalin national policy of the
Communist Party." - Zviazda, December 28, 1951.
66. "It \vas on Stalin's personal recommendation that the Central Committee of the
Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) decided to create a sovereign Belorussian State
[J anuary I, 1919], and Stalin personally edited the manifesto es.tablishing the Soviet
system in the ne\V republic," affirmed the Soviet historian, A. Denisov, Sovetskoe gosudar-
stvennoe pravo (Soviet Constitutional La,v; Mosco,v 1947), p. 211; italics mine. The
theory ,vas enthusiastically accepted by the Soviet Belorussian writers; see P. Zaranin,
"Dekada belorusskoj literatury v Moskve," Pravda, January 26, 1949. The theme of
Belorussia's "personal debt" to Stalin is further elaborated in a special volume Lenin i
Stalin - Arhanizatary BSSR (Lenin and Stalin - Founders of the BSSR; Minsk, 1951).

27 6
NOTES TO CHAPTER 14
Since Stalin's death, however, it became Belorussia's "eternal debt to the Central Com-
mittee of the USSR Communist Party."
67. The dictionaries compiled before W o rId War II have been discarded. A new
manual "for correct spelling of Belorussian," containing 12,000 terms, ,vas published in
1948, and a ne\v Belorussian-Russian dictionary in 1953. Professors N. Jakovlev and T.
Lomtev (formerly of the Belorussian State University) urge "a radical reform," and
Russian is to become "the national language of Socialist societies" (Mescaninov); see
the minutes of the November 1949 session of the Language and Thought Institute, USSR
Academy of Sciences, Russkij jazyk v skole, II (1950), 74-75. For problems of the Belo-
russian standard see I. Oss.ovecky (I865a), pp. 151-156.
68. P. Saevic, Belorussian Minister of Education, Kul'tura i Zizn', no. 24, August 31,
195°.
69. Since 1950 it has replaced the Sovetskij Krestjanin (in Russian) intended for
farmers "in the ,vestern [sic] parts of the BSSR." - Pravda, October 2, 1950.
70. Belaruski E11tihrant, December I, 1949; BAC, no. 71 (September 30, 1951);
BozY11t Sliachant (Paris.), no. 46, January-February 1952. The practice is common to all
the Union Republics.
71. The actual functioning of the Soviet federal system has been too often described
to dwell upon it. A. Cobban hopefully states that "at least an outline has been sketched
for the separation of nationality from sovereignty, \vhich may be completed in happier
days."-National Self-Deter1nination (The University of Chicago Press, 1947), p. 12I.
For a more lucid analysis, see H. Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (London,
1950) .
72. Soviet Literature; translations into five foreign languages, published monthly in
Moscow; quoted from an English edition, III (1950), 180-182. The most flattering ap-
praisal of the wartime Soviet Belorussian \vritings is by T. Gorbunov in Literatura i
lskusstvo (Mosco,v), December 8, 1944.
73. V. Galperin, "0 perezitkach burzuaznogo nacionalizma v belorusskom litera-
turovedenii" (Survivals of Bourgeois Nationalism in the Belorussian Literary Scholar-
ship), Literaturnaja Gazeta, no. 38 (2421), May 12, 1948.
74. Ibid.
75. The directive can be traced back to 1934. See J. Bronstein, "The Literature of
the White Russian Soviet Socialist Republic," Literature of the PeoPles of the U.S.S.R.,
published by VOKS Illustrated Almanac, nos. 7-8 (1934), pp. 60-67; lskusstvo Sovetskoj
Belorussii, a collection of articles by P. Ponomarenko, A. Ozirski, M. Grinblat, et ale on
Belorussian drama, music, and fine arts (Mosco\v-Leningrad, 1940)' For the poshvar
period, see the preface to Mozolkov (2034).
76. Kolas was awarded the Stalin prize for his poem, Rybakovaja chata (A Fisher-
man's Hut) in 1948. Broiika published several volumes of verse, and twice received the
Stalin prize, for the poem C hleb (Bread) and for a collection of verse, Daroho zyccia (The
Road of Life). Kulesaii, also twice a Stalin laureate, published three poems in five years.
Maim Tank, who was most prolific in West Belorussia, has produced two small volumes
of verse, starting his Soviet career in 1939 \vith a poem dedicated to Stalin \vhich won
him the Stalin prize. Krapiva closes the list with two plays, Z Narodatn (With the People)
and Piajuc' zavaranki (The Larks Sing).
For a Soviet characterization of postwar Belorussian literature, see I van amiakin,
"Prahrama uzdymu saveckae literatury" (A :Program for Lifting Up Soviet Literature),
Zviazda, August 14, 195 1 ; M. Lynkov, "Literatura belorusskogo naroda," lzvestija, Jan-
uary 15, 1949; D. Zaranin, "Dekada belorusskoj literatury v Moskve," Pravda, January
26, 1949, and uK itogam dekady belorusskoj literatury," Izvestija, February 5, 1949;
M. Iovcuk, "Kul'tura Sovetskoj Belorussii," Pravda, January 13, 1949. The recent data
are summed up in the report by P. 'Broiika, president of the Union of Belorussian Writers,
to the Union Convention in Minsk, Zviazda, March 25, 1952. I. Vasilenak (2ossa) is the
most recently rewritten history of Belorussian literature. See notes 80, 82.
77. Izvestija, November II, 1951.
78. M. Klimkovic, in the preface to Belorusskie rasskazy, ed. by P. Kobzarevsky
(Moscow: Sovetskij pisatel', 1948).
79. The Belorussian magazine Polymia (Flame) was particularly attacked.
80. Such are "the works of the younger poets A. Rusak, E. Ahniacvet, P. Valkadaev,

THE SOVIETS AGAIN
277
N. Taras"; poshvar \vritings of A. Bialevic, K. Bujla, etc.; cf. 1. Samiakin, Zviazda,
August 14, 1951. Bujla \vas particularly attacked for her volume of verse Svitatt'ne (1950)
and for a fe\v poems published in Polyntia in 1951: "The poet is locked in her shell,
incapable of seeing the superb and manifold Soviet reality . . . She depicts her perennial
Belorussia as a forgotten, isolated land, as if she were unaware of its ties with the great
Russian nation . . . Obviously, the \vord rodina [my country] means to her Belorussia,
not the Soviet Union." - H. Scarbatau, Zviazda J July 27, 1951.
81. Pravda, December 26, 1951.
82. Ibid., August 9, 1951.
83. Besides books and pamphlets imported from the USSR or printed by the Belo-
russian state, nine magazines and reviews, ten national, twelve regional, ten urban, and
164 rural ne,vspapers, and 123 "political bulletins" \vere published in 1951, with a total
circulation of over 1,000,000 copies; see Zviazda, August 17, 195 I. For the earlier years,
see BSE (1948), pp. 1643-1645.
84. See the minutes of the Mosco\v Conference of Writers. in 1949 (Pravda, February
26, 1949). Particularly significant is the discussion started in the spring of 1952 by N.
Virta ("Pogovorim otkrovenno," Sovetskoe iskusstvo, May 7, 1952). As for ne,vspapers,
"there is not a single subscriber in the \vhole Mechaucy county . . . and only four in the
I vacevicy county where there are more than 100 households," complains Zviazda, April
13, 1952.
85. Soviet sources list 25,000 persons \vith higher education and 435,526 high school
graduates in all Belorussia; these were "residents" in the BSSR at the time of the census
and the proportion of the natives is not given; cf. BSE (1948), pp. 1235-1236. In par-
ticular, the Belorussian State University has graduated "12,000 young specialists in different
fields of science" in the thirty years since its foundation. - Russkie N ovosti (Paris),
November 9,.1951 (with no indication of the Soviet source).
86. The term "caste" is not generally accepted by students of social change in the
Soviet Union. The concept, however, is creeping into literature. See pertinent observa-
tions by Kasjan Prosin, "Rozdenie kasty" (The Birth of a Caste)," NRS, July 6, 1952;
also Le Figaro litteraire (Paris), February 24, 1951.
87. See above, pp. 175- 1 77.
88. The only pieces of Belorussian folklore referring to national events are Soviet patri-
otic songs, most obviously fabricated in the Party offices. In spite of years of Belorussian
statehood, the peasantry still refer to themselves as tutejsiJ tutasni, (local people)', a fact
sadly acknowledged by the Belorussian nationalists as well. Veda, no. 4/9 (August 1952),
p. 106; cf. Wielhorski (I687), p. 13.
89. "In labor camps and prisons, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Russians, Uzbeks, and
Georgians lived and worked together, and the community of their interests and minds
was particularly evident and felt '. . . No quarrel or argument ever arose among them
on the ground of racial discrimination or nationalist ideologies. The idea that the Russian
people were responsible for the oppression of other nationalities of the USSR ,vould have
seemed very strange to them and, in fact, never entered their minds." - Article by a
fonner slave labor camp inmate, A. Sergeev, in NRS, September 29, 1951; also see
Ukrainec in Vozrozdenie (Paris), XIV (1951),188-190.
90. See Ukrainian Quarterly, I (1949).
91. A letter to the editor of NRS, May 22, 1949. See also BAG, no. 69, August 31,
1951.
92. The statutes of the BCR-in-exile \vere published in Rannica, no. 15/235, March
2 I, 1945; reprinted in Belaruskae Slova, no. 2/14, March 25, 1950, ,vhich is quoted. See
also BAG, no. 15/18, May 9, 1948, and no. 39/42, Decem,ber 12, 1948. Revised texts are
appended to Drulti usebelaruski kanltres (Munich, 1954), pp. 83-88.
93. Full text in BAG, no. 5/8, February 22, 1948.
94. The text has been distributed in mimeographed form; a copy is filed with this
\vriter.
95. See Belaruski Holas (Toronto), no. I, March 25, 1952.
96. In 1951, the following political groups were represented in the BNR Rada: the
All-Kryvian Democratic Independent Union, by V. Panucevic, lawyer, and A. Adamovic,
author; the National Democratic Party, by E. Kacanouski; and the Belorussian Inde-

27 8
NOTES TO CHAPTER 14
pendent Popular Christian Movement continuing, as it \vere, the pre\var Belorussian
Christian Democratic Party in Poland, and represented by Rev. Dr. C. Sipovic.
97. A report prepared by the Common Council for American Unity (March 1951)
gives the follo\ving composition of the BNR government-in-exile: E. Kacanouski, prime
minister and minister of foreign affairs; F. R. Kusel, minister of war; P. Mankouski, state
secretary (internal affairs). They resided in the United States. President Abramcyk and
two other ministers, L. Rydleuski and P. Symanec, then lived in Paris.
98. The Order of Pahonia, the Order of the Iron Knight, and a Guerrilla Medal. Seven
persons were decorated by President Abramcyk. See BAG, no. 7-8/86-87, February 24,
1952.
99. See Zyburai, no. 74/184 (Augsburg: November 27, 1948); reprinted in BAG, no.
40/43, December 19, 194 8 .
100. The autonomy of the Orthodox Church in Belorussia, sponsored by a group of
nationalists, \vas established on German-dictated terms in October 1941 (letter of General-
kommissar Wilhelm Kube to Archbishop Pantelejmon of October 3); it \vas accepted by
a Council of Bishops (Archbishop Pantelejmon; Bishops Philotheus, Athanasius, and
Stephan) on March 3, and promulgated by the All-Belorussian Church Council on August
30, 1942 - subject to acceptance by "all other Christian Orthodox Churches," \vithout
which, the Council conceded, Belorussian church autonomy would remain "canonically
null and void." Epistles to the Eastern Patriarchs were signed on April 17, 1943, and
handed over to the Belorussian Generalkommissariat for delivery, .but "what happened
to them is not kno\vn." Since the Belorussian Autonomous Orthodox Church (the Ger-
mans insisted on dropping the adjective "national," the insertion of which in the title
they themselves had originally s.uggested; see letters of I(ube of October 3, 1941, and of his
political assistant Dr. Jurda of August 18, 1943) had thus assumed no canonical status,
all the Belorussian bishops evacuated from Germany \vent under the jurisdiction of the
Russian Church in exile (1946). A full and unusually ,veIl documented account of the
events is found in Mgr. A. M. (826), \vhich is here quoted from, pp. 48-49, 73-74, 82-83,
94- 10 5.
Having denounced the defection of Belorussian bishops as an act of "national treason,"
a group of laymen held a conference in Constanza (June 5, 1948), and invited Bishop
Sergius Chotenko of the Ukrainian Autonomous Church to head also the Belorussian
"Autonomous" Church. Bishop Sergius accepted and, in order to ease the situation
requiring him to split himself into hvo independent personalities, ordained Vasil Tamascyk
Belorussian bishop (December 1949); the hvo no\v form, a "Synod" recognized by the
BNR in exile as the Belorussian national church.
On the other hand, the BCR in exile solicited the Ecumenical Patriarch (Istanbul) to
take "the orphan church abandoned by its bishops" under his own jurisdiction, which
he did (1951). Bishop Michael, his exarch in America, is in charge of that group, \vith
offices in South River, New Jers.ey.
An attempt to promote the Uniate congregation to the national church of Belorussia
had been suppressed by the Germans and its leader, the priest A. Nemancevic, arrested
and shot in August 1942; his associate, Reverend L. Haroska, managed to escape and
now heads the Belorussian Uniates in exile.
Larger numbers of Belorussian emigrants, however, remain in the fold of the Russian
Orthodox Church (itself split into different canonical jurisdictions), and some in the Polish
Orthodox Church in exile (Archbishop Savva, London). The religious situation is utterly
confused. Current information can ,be found in Sila very (Germany), Garko1/'ny Svetac
(South River, N.J.), Belaruskaja Trybuna (Ne\v York), Bozynt Sliacham (Paris), BA G
(Munich), and the publications irregularly issued by the Belorussian members of the
Russian Synod-in-exile.
101. Some evidence exists that, as the Germans withdrew from Belorussia, the NTS
and possibly the BCR left behind some men for underground \vork, and it is perhaps also
true that the Germans continued sporadically to s.upply them \vith \veapons and litera-
ture until the spring of 1945 j see HP, no. 188 (B) and Bobrov, uH omo Sovietictls,"
Vozrozdenie (Paris), IX (1950), 150. Although most testimonies agree that the anti-
Soviet guerriIIas were completely Jiquidated by 1946, some nationalist sources insist that
the resistance movement has continued to this day.

THE SOVIETS AGAIN
279
102. See John Ermachenko, "Leaders in Exile," reprinted in Ukrainian Quarterly, I,
(1949) .
103 . New York Til1teS, August 10, 1950. The rewards ,vere announced in BA G, no.
7-8/86-87, February 24, 195 2 . See notes 98, 101.
104. The dissident groups ,vould be (I) the Belorussian American Congress Committee
located in N e\v York City, and (2) the Christian Association of Belorussian Workers in
Great Britain \vhich, in turn, "has split into three factions" of \vhich "only the smallest"
still recognized the authority of President Astrouski. - Belaruski ElIz,ihl'ant (Toronto),
no. 4/42, April 20, 195 2 .
105. Belaruski Holas (Toronto), no. I, March 25,1952.
106. Belaruskaja Trybuna, no. 1/4, February 25, 1951.
107. Belaruskaja Trybuna, no. 5/8, September 30, 1951; Belaruski Patryet, no. 9/10
(Windsbel'g, Germany); BAC, no. 78/79, December 25, 1951; Belaruskaja Trybuna, no.
1-2/9-10, January 1952; for a summary of controversial points, Narodnym Sliachanz,
(Toronto), no. 5, May 1953. See also M. Syla (1498); J. Symoncuk (1681), BAG, no.
34/113, August 24, 1952, A. Stankevic (1471), 198-200; BAG, no. 36-37/115-116, Septem-
ber 7-14, 1952.
108. See Chapter 1.
109. A uniform ritual of celebration has emerged, full of simple and moving symbolism;
see, for instance Belaruski El1z,ihrant (Toronto), May 19, 1951, or BAG, no. 14/16,
April 1954.
110. See BAG, no. I (1948)"; Belarus' no. 2/4 (1951); Belaruskaja Tryb1tlla, no.
1-2/9-10 (1952); Belaruski Patryet, no. 2/5 (1951); also J. Karaneuski, "Nasae stano-
visca" (Our Position), BAG, no. 30/109, July 27, 1952.
I I I. Incorporation of East Prussia is claimed as "a just compensation for the enormous
devastation which Belorussia suffered at the hands of the Germans"; besides, it is said,
Belorussia \vould receive "a sea outlet necessary for its economic development." Cf. BA G,
no. 39/42, December 12, 1948; Rydlevsky (1497), pp. 38-39.
112. Strong statements have been made to the effect that Belorussia \vill never agree
to the Lithuanian occupation of Vilna. The Lithuanian view on the "equitable boundary"
\vith Belorussia, expressed in Teviskas Zib1trai (Canada)', no. 12/117 March 20, 1952, is
bitterly commented on in BAG, no. 22/101, June I, 1952; cf. Belar1tski Entihrant, May 19,
1951.
Little contact exists with the Latvian nationalists, although both the Latvians and
the Belorussians participated in the ABN (Russian initials of a union of the anti-Soviet
organizations of nine non-Russian minorities in the USSR) \vhere, by an agreement, the
boundaries question \vas left out of the discussions. The ABN embodies the most agres-
sive and violent nationalism, and suspicions exist as to the true origins of that organiza-
tion; see P. Jarovy, "Cto takoe ABN" (What Is the ABN?), SV, August 1951, pp.
171-172. Cf. BAG, nos. 50-51, December 25, 1953, and 4-5, January 3 1 ,1954.
A project of a "Ukrainian-Belorussian-Cossack Union" suggested by the Ukrainskij
Sa11tostijltik (Ukrainian Independent), December 12, 1951, is favorably discussed in BAC,
no. 1-2/80-81, January 7, 195 2 ; the position of the BCR is stated in the Belaruskae
Slova, no. 2/3, January 15, 1949.
113. The Polish political parties (in exile) continue to claim \vestern Belorussia and
western Ukl'ainia as Polish lands; see St. Stronski, "The Fifth Partition of Poland,"
Ostatnie Wiadonz,osci, January 20, 1952; St. Skrzypek, "For a New Treatment of the
Problem of the Eastern Borderland,H Biuletyn Polski, January 1-15, 1952; Wielhorski
(1687a) , p. 3. The claims of these three authors are based on international law, historical
and cultural grounds, and economic links, respectively. The Polish claims are contested
in the Belorussian press of every denomination; for a summary of arguments, see BAC,
nos. 65 (January 27, 195 1 ), 5/83 and 7-8/86-87 (January-February, 195 2 ), 34/113
(August 24, 1952). For Polish recognition of Belorussian national rights, see Lichtensztul
(1493), pp. 17, 19, 24, 25. The idea of a large "East European Federation" including
Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bohemia, Slovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria, Albania, the Ukraine, and Belorussia, also has been revived but has been met \vith
serious objections. See discussions at the Rada N arodowa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej in Lon-
don (the Polish Parliament-in-exile), Diariusz, no. 6/7 (June 29 and July 5, 1949), pp.

280
NOTES TO CHAPTER 14
1°7-119. The new trend is not clear, but it may provide ground for some understanding;
see, for instance, a moderate article in BAG, no. 13/92 (March 3°,1952).
114. In December 1950 a Belorussian National Liberation Committee (Germany)
published in the Zna1nia Rossii (Ne\v York) a statement directed against the BNR and
the BCR "secessionism." On March 30, 1952, an agreement \vas concluded between an
Association of Ukrainian Federalists and a Belorussian Democratic Committee (feder-
alists) for resisting the Ukrainian and Belorussian "chauvinistic groups. \vhich sabotage
the common anti-Communist action." The Belorussian federalists claimed a large mem-
bership "in the United States, South America, Canada, and Europe," but no names \vere
signed to the appeals; cf. NRS, April 2, 1952. Not until September 1953 did the group-
Objedinenie Belorussov Federalistov - become organized; for details see N RS, October
10, 1953. Little evidence of their further activities could be found in the press.
115. The Russian anti-Communist organizations have not been admitted to the ABN
(note 112), nor were they admitted to the International Committee of the DP and
Political Emigres, formed in 1945 in Hanau (Germany); cf. BAG, no. 1/4, January 25,
1948; New York Ti1nes, May 6, 1951. Both the BNR and the BCR rejected all collabora-
tion with the Council for Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (Russian initials SONR)
sponsored by the -Russian liberals and socialists in exile; see the statement by R. Astrouski
on November 31, 1951, published in the Belaruskaja Trybuna, no. 1-2/9-10, January
1952; "Nasae stanoviSca (Our Position)" in BAG, no. 30/109, July 27, 1952; the general
contention is that "the Soviets constitute an essentially Russian form of government,"
hence "eternal hatred" for Russia is cultivated, even among the Belorussian youngsters.
A poem composed by an eighth-grade schoolboy, uI lay a \vholesale curse on you, 0
everdamned Moscow," is highly praised in BAG, no. 11/14, April II, 1948. But in the
summer of 1953, the BNR joined the International Anti-Bolshevik Coordination Center
(MAKC), and the BCR, the rival Coordination Center of Anti-Bolshevik Action (KCAB),
\vhere some Russian emigre groups. also participate.
116. For a frank and thoughtful self-criticism, see Belaruskaja Trybuna, no. 5/8,
September 30, 1951. Poverty of the emigre literature is stressed in an article entitled
uHow Pitiful All This Is," BAG, no. 74, November 4, 1951. uThe literary standard still
is very much at the folklore level," admits Siadneii in BAG, no. 49 (180) i' December 13,
1953.
117. "The Communists are striving to destroy the 'artificial,' and \ve say natural,
barrier bet\veen the Belorussian and Russian languages; consequently, our task is to
broaden and strengthen that barrier as best \ve can. They condemn our 'provincialism,'
'artificial innovations,' and 'senseless archaisms,' and this is precisely how \ve must enrich
our vocabulary to keep it farther away from the Russian," writes Dr. S1. S1. in BAe,
no. 25-26/1°4-1°5, June 29, 1952. The lead is given by Dr. J. Stankevic \vho authorita-
tively sets the "purified" standard in his scholarly revie\v Veda (New York). Objections
are formulated on the ground that "even the educated Belorussians" are not always able
to understand the provincialisms, archaisms, and novelties thus introduced; cf. Belaruski
Emihrant (Toronto)', nos. 8/31 and 1-11/3 2 -33, September 30 and December 25, 1950,
respectively; see also BAG, nos. 44 and 49, November 8 and December 13, 1953. For
the latest Belorussian nationalist version of history, see a series of articles by J. Stankevic
in Veda (New York, 1951).
118. Estimates are drawn from a report prepared by the Common Council for Amer-
ican Unity, March 1951.
119. A Belorussian Hramada \vas formed in the early twenties in Chicago under the
leadership of Rev. J. Tarasevich, J. Varonka, and J. Lobach. It issued a few publications,
but \vas short-lived for want of popular support. In 1941, a Belorussian American National
Council \vas formed under the same leadership. During the war, it pursued a pro-Soviet
policy, in harmony with the general attitude at that time. Ho\vever, the American Slav
Congress in Chicago (1944), an overtly pro-Soviet organization, ignored the Belorussian
group which protested (Russkoe Obozrenie, Chicago, November 11, 1944). The policy of
the Chicago group has since changed, especially after the arrival of a larger number of
Belorussian displaced persons from Europe. A harbinger of Belorussian nationalism in
America, the group tries to keep out of the quarrel between the BNR and the BCR, but
its following is small. It publishes a mimeographed periodical, Vestki (N e\vs), very irregu-
larly, and represents cultural rather than political nationalism.

THE SOVIETS AGAIN
28r
120. BAG, no. 75, November II, 1951.
12 I. The estimate of the Common Council for American Unity in March 1951 seems
to be largely limifed to the groups \vhich have immigrated since the war. In all there were
thirty-six Belorussian periodicals published outside the USSR in 1952: eleven in the
United States, three in England, one in Australia, one in Belgium, one in Italy, seven in
Canada, eight in West Germany, and hvo in Fran-ce. Most publications \vere mimeographed,
and only two newspapers. and t\vo magazines appeared regularly.
122. BAG, no. 31/110, August 3, 1952. The Belorussian American Congress established
a permanent Committee in Ne\v York City, apparently to maintain regular relations with
the BCR; its organ is the Belaruskaja Trybuna, published at irregular intervals. On the
other hand, the National Convention of Belorussian Americans established a "Supreme
Council" in New York, composed of adherents of the BNR; it publishes its o\"n
periodical Belarus, of which only a few issues have so far appeared. Ideological and psy-
chological difficulties that stand in the way of unity are pertinently outlined by S.
Liadninski in a series of articles in Belaruskaja Trybuna, 1951-52. See also BAG, no. 76,
November 18, 1951; Belaruski Entihrant, no. 10-11/32-33, December 25, 1950; Belaruski
Patryet, 195 I.
123. BAG, no. 31/110, August 3, 1952. A year earlier, a statement \vas made that
"had it not been for small groups . . . in Germany . . . there would have been practically
no 'national liberation' activities. abroad to boast about." - Ibid., no. 75, November 1 I,
195 1 .
124. Ibid. See the polemics between the BAG and the Belaruski E1nihrant in the
winter of 1951-52.
12 5. BAG, no. 31/110, August 3,1952.

INDEX OF NAMES
act. - actor
c. - city
collabr. - collaborationist
com. - communist
fam. - family
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS
g. - guerrilla
I. -leader
n. - nationalist
p. - party
pro - province
r. - river
s. - secretary
sch. - scholar
V. - village
W. - ,vriter
Initials are given for persollalnatn.es whenever these were available in tlte Slavic sources.
Abraham of Smolensk, 42
Abramyk, :Mikola, 134, 221-
22, 252, 263, 266, 218
Adamovi, Anton, 217
Adamovic, J., 138
Adclung, J. ChI von, 11
Advazny, Vinduk, 131
Ahniacvet, E., 276
Akincyc, Fabian, 188, 190, 261,
266
Aksakov, 1. S., 73
Albania, 219
Albucki, K., 246
Alexander, Grand Duke, 46, 51
Alexander I, 12, 41, 66, 67
Alexander II, 83
Aleksandrouski, w., 257
Aleksandrovic, Andrej, 143
Alcxius, Tsar of :Moscow, 3, 62,
66
Algirdas, see Olgerd
Aliachnovic, F., 90, 246
Allenstein, county E. Prussia,
273
America, 221. See also Canada,
South America, United States
Andreev, A. At, 260
Anna of SmoJensk, 5 I
Antanovic, Dr., 266
Arcimouski, w., 80
Arctic, 258
Arlouski, J., 84
Armenia, 148
Arontam, com.p.s., 258
Arsenneva, Natallia, 261
Astrouski, Radaslaii, I2 6, 165,
17 8 , 202-05, 220, 222, 252,
266, 270, 271, 279, 280
Asvej, v., 209
Athanasius, bishop, 278
Australia, 281
Austria, 65
Avgustovo, c., 7, 8, 207
Azerbaidzhan, 148
Bachrym, P., 79
Badunova, P., 144, 249
Bahdnovic, :M., 90, 211
Balicki, A., 149
Balkans, 20
Baltic sea, 43,95, 119-20,115
Baranavici, pr., c., 14, 176,
207, 211-12, 266, 211-72
Barszczewski, Jan, 7 6 -77, 79,
216
Basilevi, colabr., 178
Baskakov, :M., 2 16
Batiukov, P., 30
Batory, Stephan, 48
Beckerath, Captain von, 10
Belgium, 281
Belgrade, 134
Beinski, fam., 74
Belinsky, V. G., 217
Belorussia, see Gen. Index
Belsk, c., 54, 108
Bereza Kartuska, pris. camp.
13 1
Berezina, r., II 4, 176
Berlin, 95, 96, 103, 101, 129,
134, 144, 177, 193, 202,
266,271
Bern, 103
Bernhardt, general, 200
Bezsonov, P., 27, 18
Biadulia, Z., 90, III, 144, 151,
235, 246
Bialevic, A., 217
Bialik, Hayim, 34
Bialystok, pro and c., 8, 10,
13-14, 35, 66, 86, 108, 120,
13 1 , 156, 158-59, 163, 176,
181, 207-08, 238, 245, 249,
259, 260, 266, 271
Bischofsberg, county E. Prussia,
273
Black sea, 43, 119-20, 175
Blum, Lon, 252
B. N. R., see Gen. Index
Boborykin, n., 246
Bobrinskoy, A., count, 243
Bobruisk, pro and c., 6 I, 172,
118, 187, 200, 207, 2 1 I, 235,
247, 266, 270-3
Bodianski, 0., 53
Bohemia, 52, 279
Bohuevic, Fr., 82-83, 90
BoJdyrev, J., 216
Borisov, c., 54, 114, 171-72,
119, I 87-88, 262, 2 7 I
Branavicki, n.1., 204
Brenc, com.p.s., 215
Brest, pro and c., 8, 54, 56,
13 2 , 116, 196, 198, 201, 207,
211,271
Briansk, pr., 7-8, 13, 176, 232,
271
Brooklyn, N.Y., 224-25
Broi'ika, P., 217, 276
B.S.S.R., see Gen. Index
BUchler, g. 1., 270
Budny, Simeon, 54
Budzko, E., 85, 246
Bug, r., 119, 155, 166
Bujak, F., 120
B ujla, Kanstancyja, 271
Bulak-Bulachovic, general, 115-
16
BulilVa, Tama, 246
Bulgaria, 279
Buracok, Macej, see Bohuevic,
Fr.
Burbis, A., 86, 246
Burcev, Vladimir, 243
Bursevic, M., 145-46
Busel, act., 165
Bychov, c., 61
Bystrica, v., 249
Calvin, Jean, 54
Canada, 133, 280, 281
Catherine II, 47, 63, 65-66
Caucasus, 258
Cetka, w., 85, 90, 246
Chagall, Marc, 34
Cherson, c., 43
Chicherin, G. V., 114
Chlebnikov, N., 2
Chmelnicki, Bohdan, 61
Chochlov, Nikolaf, 261
Chodkevi, Jan, 4 8 , 54, 55
Chotenko, see Sergi us, bishop
Chicago, 111., 129, 255, 280
Cichoi'iski, K., 253
Cimkavici, v., 249
Clement VIII, pope, 56
Clement XIV, pope, 67
Clement Smoliatic, 42
Con stanza, conference of, 278
Copenhagen, 103
CourIand, 94
Cracow, 48,52-54,82, 123,271
Cvikevic, A., 75, 96, 103, 1I2,
125, 144, 146, 251
Czartoryskl, Adam, 67, 68, 70,
242
Czeczot, Jan, 76-71, 216, 236
Czechoslovakia, 1I3, 134, 145
Czynski, E., 9
Cybichowski, Prof., 124
Cyril of Turov, 42
arnaubau, V., 249
carniai'iski, J., 251
carnuevic, D., 109, 149

28 4
tarot, Micha, 143
tarviakoi'i, A., 108-09, I I 5-16,
13 B , 149
Cecersk, c., 67
ternigov, pr., 43, 271
Cernobyl, c., 61
ternyev, Count Zachar, 65
Cernyevsky, N. G., 211
tervency, c., 148
Corny, Kuima, 143
Daneliuk, A., 253
DaHin, Aleksander, ix, 263
Darkevic, P., 257
Daskau, V., 249
Daugavpils, see Dvinsk
Deduska, g.1., 198
Dedyrka, sch., 257
DeLivron, 7
Denmark, 2
Derpt, see Yuriev
Despot-Zenovic, fam., 14
Dmowski, Roman, 120
Dnieper, r., II4, 120, 143,
166, 269
Dostoevsky, F. M., 151
Dovnar-Zapolski, M. V., 2 I,
41-43, 84, 103, 145-46, 148
Dowb6r-fusnicki, general, 101,
241
Dragomanov, M., 3
Drucki-Padbiareski, V., 259
Druja, c., 131
Duboi'ika, V., 257
Duchinski, Fr., 38
Dudar, A., 143, 257
Du1ka, n.1., 102
Dulo, n.1., 109
Dunin-Marcinkevic, V., 19-81,
90, 216, 244-45
Dupejkouski, N., 246
Durnovo, N. N., 1, 8
Dus-Duseuski, K., 133
Dvarcanin, Ihnat, 89, 90, 123,
126, 145-46, 251
Dvina, r., 119-20, 143
Dvinsk, pr., 8, 55, 61, IIJ, 134
Dyla, J" 251
Dziabo, g.1., 198
Dziamidovic, n.1., 139
Dzikouski, archpriest, 162
Dzekuc Malej, 204
Dziadika Karus, 246
East Prussia, IS, 120, 176, 208,
223, 259, 279; Belorussian
settlements, IS, 20B. See also
Kaliningrad, pr., and Prussia
Ehrenleitner, Dr. Ludwig, 210
Ekaterinoslav, 43
Eleupherius, metropotit., 122,
I 6 1-62
Elski, A., 84, 216
England, 281. See also Great
Britain
Epimach ypillo, Br., 85, 257
Ermacenko, Dr. J., 178, 270
Erkert, R. von, 9
Estonia, 2, 106, III, II3, 120,
115, 250, 279
Euphrosyne of Polock, 4 2 , 59,
148
Europe, 133, 187, 19 1 , 225,
280; eastern, 106, 110, 120,
159; western, 195, 221, 224
INDEX OF NAMES
Evje, c., 52, 53
Ezavitau, K., 101, loB, 247
Falkevic, n.1., 102
Falski, V., 109, 246
Federewski, M., 79
Fedor, Tsar of Moscow, 49
Finland, 2, 67, 106, III, II3.
See also Gen. Index.
Foch, Marshal, 108
Fragonarius, 38
France, loB, 281
Gajsin, Red Army officer, 158
Galicia, 261
Gedemin, prince, 51, 56
Geneva, 86, 13B
Georgia, 148
Germany, see Gen. Index
Gikalo, com.p.s., 258
Gil, g.l., see Rodionov, Colonel
Glinski, Michail, 54
Gogol, N. V., 76
Golovcicki, princes, 242
Gomel, pr. and c., 38, 91,
116, 138, 143, ISO, 176, 198,
207, 210-II, 256, 266, 271,
214; c., 61, 18 7, 273
Gorky, Maxim, 2 I 1
Gorski, fam., 54
Gottberg, General von, 193, 202
Grave, CoJonel, 108
Great Britain, 108, 169, 197,
212, 279. See also England
Great Russia, 20. See also Gen.
Index
Grodno, pr. and c., B, 10-II, 28,
32, 35, 43, 11, 13, B1, 94,
10 4-05, 109-10, II3, II6,
119-21,13 2 ,207,211-12,
23 1 , 234, 243-44, 24 8 , 271;
c., 34, 54, 55, 86, 107-08,
235
Guderian, Heinz, general, 172,
115
Gusarov, N., 21 3, 2 I 5, 275
Hadlei'iski, E., 251
Hadleuski, V., priest, 165, 189-
90, 246
Hague, The, 138
Haladzed, com. 1., 149
Haliak, L., 204
Halubok, U., 257
Hancavicy, v., 211
Hanko, M., 266
Harecki, M., 62, 64, 90, 257
Haroska, Rev. L., 218
Hartny, Ciska, 90
Harun, Ale, 90, I I I, 143, 148,
216,235
Hauryla z Polacka, w., 246
Haurylik, J., 12 3, 145-46, 251
Haurylovic, Colonel, 249
Helsinki, conference of, II I
Henius, Larysa, 263
Henke, Andor yon, 263
Herberstein, S. von, I
Hermanovic, J., 131
Herodotus, 3 8 , 39, 9 I
Herriot, Edouard, 252
Herzen, A. I., 7 I
Hitler, Adolf, 165, 173, 188
Hlybokae, v., 271
Holovacki, J., 53, 64
Hrekau, com. 1., 158
Hryb, T., 99, 112, 144, 247
Hrynevecki, I., 83
Hryskevic, n.1., 85, 165
Hrynovic, A., 84
Hungary, 219
Hurlo, A., 149
Huca, Taras, 99, 246
lena, 54 "
Ihnatouskl, U., 38-39, 41, 43-
45, 62, 64, 113, 146, 148,
258
Iljinski, G. A., I
Isidorov, V., 216
Iskra, w., 246
Italy, 281
Ivan III, 2, 68
Ivan IV, 62
Ivanouski, A., 86
Ivanouski, V., 108, 246, 268
Iziaslav, prince, 4 1 , 44
Jadvihin, ., 90, 143, 246
Jadwiga, Queen of Poland, 45,
52, 57
]agiello, King of Poland, 45,
56, 57, 110
Jakobson, R., 1, 29
Jakovlev, N., 276
Jaroslav, prince, 41, 44
Jasakar, w., 246
Jordanes, chronicler, 38
Jurda, Dr., 278
Kacanovic, n. 1., 145, 146
Kacanouski, E., 217-18
Kacanouski, V., 22 I, 246
Kahanec, K., 90, 246
Kaliningrad, pr., 1, 28, 263. See
also East Prussia
Kalinouski, Kastus, 71-73, 80,
143
Kalubovic, A., 25B, 266
Kal uga, 7, 43
Kamieniecki, W., 120
Kaminski, g. 1., 268, 210
Kancer, E., 246
Kapyl, v., 249
Karamzin, N. M., 2
Karski, E. F., I, 7-8, 12, 27,
29, 39, 1 8
Kasiak, I., 204
Kasimir i, 46, 56
Kasirski, princes, 242
Kastravicki, K., 246
Katkov, M. A., 13
Kaunas, pro and c., 43, 54, 13,
88, 94, 108-09, II4, 116,
120, 129, 133, 161, 231
Kazak, nJ., 139
Kazlikhstan, 261
Kazlouski, major, 263
Kejris, K., see Krapiva, K.
Kern, pr., 257
Kharkov, c., 84
Khrushchev, Nikita, 214
Kiev, 2,39-45,52,62,11,75,
93, 9 6 , 103, 114
Kipel, J., 2°4
Kirkor, A., 1, 76
Kiselev, Ku£ma, 273
Kiska, Jan, 54
Kiska, Lev, 62

Kleck, c., 54
Klepacek, Adam, 260
Kliastorny, B., 257
Klimkovic, M., 216
Kobryn, c., 271
Kolas, Jakub, 20, 88-90, 143-
44, 150--51, 153, 157, 169,
206, 216-17, 235, 246, 276
Kolosov, M., 7
Kondratowicz, \V:, see Syro-
komlia, W.
Koenigsberg, 271
Korea, 272
Koreneuski, J., 113
Korotynski, A., 80
Koscevic, W., 165
Kosciuszko, Th., 110
Kosic, Marja, 84, 249
Kostiuk, com. 1., 212
Kotliarevsky, Ivan, 244
Kous, archpriest, 162
Kovno, see Kaunas
Kozlov, com. 1., 215
Krapiva, K., 90, 143, 151, 16 9,
206, 21 7,246,276
Krapiuka, w., 246
Kraskouski, 1., 246
Kreceuski, P., 134, 144, 221,
249, 263
Kremlin, 108, 114, 126- 2 7,
145-47, 149-50, 153, 157,
170, 207, 216, 218, 260, 266,
271-72. See also Moscow
Krum, Hanna, 246
Krutalevic, A., 257
Krynica, w., 257
Kube, 'Vilhelm, 178, 189, 193,
202,263,270,278; assassina-
tion, 193, 202
Kuleau, A., 2 17, 276
Kuncevic, archbishop, 58-59,
61
Kupala, Janka, 88--90, III,
143-44, 147, 150-5 I, 153,
156-57, 16 9,206,216- 1 7,
235, 246
Kurbyka, n., 139
Kursk, pr., 89, 198
Kusel, F., 278
Kutrzeba, St., 50
Kutuzov, M. I., general, 198
Ladnou, E., 112
Lander, Karl, 86, 246
Lappo, 1. 1., 50, 59
Lastouski, V., 4, 52, 64, 94-
95, 112, 114, 116, 133, 144,
146, 259
Latin America, 133. See also
South America
Latvia, see Gen. Index
Lausanne, conference of, 95
Laurynovic, n.!., 149
Leibbrandt, Georg, 263
Lelewel, J., 70
Lelcicy, v., 209
Lenin, V. I., 100, 114, 137-3 8 ,
143, 152, 275; order of, 2 1 3
Lepel, c., 266
Leroy-Beaulieu', A., I
Lesik, J., 90, 108, 147, 249,
258
Levicki, Anton, 246
Levy, w., 246
Liadninski, S., .81
INDEX OF NAMES
Liacki, E., 84
Liascinski, n. 1., 149
Liasovic, w., 246
Libau, c., 113
Lida, c., 194, 268, 271
Linde, Samuel B., 53, 77
Listopad, J., 139
Lithuania, see Gen. Index
Litvin, :Michalon, 240
Liubecki, prince, 74
Liubic-Maevski, Prof., 151
Livencov, com. I., 2 15
Livland, 48
Livonia, 46
Lobach, J., 134, 280
Lodz, 2 7 I
Loev, c., 61
Lohse, Heinrich, 176, 270
Lojka, sch., 257
Lokot, see Gen. Index
Lomonosov, M. V., 52
Lomtev, T., 276
Lomza, 14, 156, 260
London, 8, 83, 85, 107, 207,
222, 260, 267, 278
Lubart, prince,s I
Lublin, pr., 207, 272. See also
Gen. Index
Lucevic, I van, see Kupala,
Janka
Luckevic, Anton, 84, 86, 93-
94, 102, 105, 107, I II, 113-
16, 12 I, 126-27, I 57, 165,
249, 257
Luckevic, Ivan, 84, 86, 93-94,
253
Lucyna, Jan, see Nesluchouski,
Jan
Lukomski, princes, 242
Luther, Martin, 54
Luzinski, bishop, 69
Lvov, c., 52
Mackevici, V., 249
:Maidanek, c., 268
Makaren, n., 139
Makarov, A., 216
Maksimovic, M., 78
MamOllka, n.1., 144, 249
Mamonic, brothers, 53, 13 I
:Mane Katz, 34
l\-Iankouski, P., 278
Mankovski, T., 244
Marchlewski, J., 114
Markeev, Red Army officer, 158
!vIarozau, Ph., priest, 162
Masalski, princes, 242
Masara, W., 129
Maskalina, g.!., 198
Matusevic, n., 190
!\fazanik, Halina, 267
1\fiacelski, n., 139
1iat1a, P., 123, 145-46, 257
1\Iichail, bishop, 278
Mickevic, Kastus, see Kolas,
Jakub
1'Iickevic-Kapsukas, K., 109
!\1ickiewicz, Adam, 76, 110,
12 9, 244
Mickiewicz, Wladis1aw, 7 I
Mindaugas, see Mindovg
Mindovg, prince, 43, SI, 52
!\findovg II, 96
Minsk: principality, 42-43,
239; province, 14, 19, 28,
28 5
3 1 -3 2 , 35, 38, 73, 80, 83,
87-89, 113, 120, 13 8 , 176,
194, 207, 211, 23 1 -3 2 , 234,
240, 243, 245, 274; city, 34,
36, 39, 41, 53-55, 63, 70,
71, 83-88, 113, 120, 143-45,
151-52, 157, 159-62, 165,
176, 178, 193, 203-06, 20 9,
211, 235-36, 247, 249, 259,
261, 264, 266-68, 270--7 1 ,
273; political dubs, 96-100,
104, 108, 111-12, II 5, 126,
147,155, 18 9,202- 0 3,24 6 ;
occupied by the Germans (1),
101--05; - by the Red
Army, 107-09, 114-16; - by
the Poles, 109-14; evac
uated by the Soviets, 171-72;
occupied by the Germans
(II), 176-206; re-entered by
the Soviets, 207 ff, 271; dev-
astated, 152; rebuilt, 209,
211
IVlitau, c., 113
l\-Ielanchthon, 54
:Meleko, Ivan, 58, 60
:Moculski, general, 192
IVlogilev, pr., 28, 3 1 -32, 35,
3 8 , 43, 55, 73, 87, 109, 116,
13 8 , 17 8 -79, 194, 199, 207,
211-12, 231-32, 234, 247,
250, 266, 269, 27 1 , 274; c.,
53, 59, 60, 61, 67, 70, 86,
88, 235, 273
Mohila, Petr, 62
foniuszko, S., 80
Molodecno, pr., 207, 211-12
:Molotov, V. M., 159, 172
Moscow, 52-55, 62-64, 75, 77,
84, 89, 93, 96, 97, 101, 103,
108, 114, 118, 126, 129,
135, 13 8 , 143, 145-46, 150,
158-59, 165-66, 172, 192,
197-98, 207, 214, 218, 250,
256-58, 280. See also Krem-
lin
Moerov, P., 215, 275
Mozyr, pre and c., 61, 114, 148
!\fstisla v, prince, 4 I
1'Istislavl, c., 55, 61, 67
Munich, 134
Muraviev, M., count, 73
Nadezdin, N., 78
Nalivajko, g. L, 60
Nap01eon I, 66, 244
Napoleon III, 7 I
Narbutt, T., 75, 77
Natalevic, N., 15 I-52, 158,
21 3,215,275
Navina, A., 89
Nekrasevic, S., 147
Nekrasov, N. A., 217
Nemancevic, A., priest, 278
N esluchouski, Jan, 83-84, 90
Nesviz, c., 53-54, 55, 18 9, 205
Nevel, c., 63
New York City, 279, 280
Nicholas I, 69, 77
Niederle, Lubor, 38, 39
Niedziecki, A., 78
Nieman, r., 119, 143
Normandy, 192
Norway, 2
Nosovic, I., 26, 27

286
ovgorod, 39, 4 0 , 4 1 , 4 2 , 44,
52, 54
ovgorodok, see ovogrodek
ovogrodek, 10, 13, 44, 55,
109, II6, 123, 127, 205, 248,
268, 271
ovosilcov, N. N., 68
uremberg, 272
Odessa, 9 6 , 97, 103
Odincov, colabr., 178
Oganovski, 32
Oginski, fam., 54
Oktan, Michail, 270
Olelkovi, prince, 60
Olgerd, prince, 43, 44, 45, 5 I
Olyka, c., 54
Orel, c., 7, 43, 271
Ora, c., 55, 67, 260, 266, 271
Ostland, see Gen. Index
Ostrozski, prince, 60, 242
Pac, fam., 54
Pacey, Ipat, 56
Paderewski, 1., II I-I 2
Padua, 53, 54
Painleve, Paul, 252
Pantelejmon, archbishop, 122,
27 8 ,
Panucevic, V., 277
Paris, 54, 70, 76, 86, 103, 107,
III, 129, 134, 221,225, 250,
278. See also Gen. Index
Pakevi, Aloiza, see Cetka
Paskevic-Erivansky, prince, 2 10
Paszkiewicz, general, 208
Patolicev, ., 213, 2 1 5, 274,
275
Paul I, 12, 47, 67, 68
Paul IV, pope, 54
Paul-Boncour, J., 252
PaUlovic, A., 90
Paulouski, Karp, 260
Pazniak, n. 1., 165
Pelczynska, 'Yanda, 255
Pervolf, I., I
Peter I, 63
Petrograd, 93, 96-97, 100-01,
108, 250. See also St. Peters-
burg
Petrov, Colonel, 260
Petruevic, K., 261
Pitauchovic, M., 257
Piceta, V., 64, 147, 258
Pilsudski, Joseph, 109- 12 , 115,
120, 125, 137, 24 8 , 249, 255
Pinsk, pro and c., 8, 55, 60, 61,
65, 120, 130, 163, 168, 176,
207, 211, 235, 261, 27 1 , 272
Pius IX, pope, 233
Plaiinik, S., see Biadulia, Z.
Pluh, W., 80
Podhorski-Oko16w, L., 253
Podlaszie, pr., 120
Podolie, pr., 43, 4 8
Poland, see Gen. Index
Polesie, pr., 8, 12-14, 3 8 , 39,
48, 88, II 6, 123, 127, 163,
168, 207, 2II, 233, 262, 272
Polock, pro and city, 28, 69,
148, 194, 196, 19 8 , 2 0 7,
2 I I - I 2 , 234, 240-4 I , 2 72 ,
274; c., 39, 43, 53-55, 57,
59, 60, 63, 67, 70, 235
PoniatowskI, Joseph, 63
INDEX OF NAMES
Ponomarenko, P., 192, 215,
274, 275
Porzezinski, V., 29
Potebnia, A. A., 21-23
PotockI, J., 3 8
Poznan, 82
Philotheus, arcbibisbop, 204,
278
Pradslava, 42
Prakulevic, n.l., 144
Prague, 53, 54, 113, 1 2 9, 134,
144, 177, 221, 263
Praulevic, n.l., I I 5
Presniakov, A., 46
Pripet, r., 8, 30, II4, II9
Pronski, princes, 242
Protasevi, bishop, 55
Pruinski, A., 96, 99
Prussia, 65, 66, 120, 238. See
also East Prussia
Prycepaii, Z., 149
Ptolemy, 39
Pushkin, A. S., 129, 152
Puca, J., 1 2 9, 257
Pustelnik, Simon, 246
Puzyn, princes, 242
pyrka, deleg., 260
Quarengbi, Giacomo, 210
Radkevic, Colonel, 101
Radzivf1l, Jan, 61
Radzivill, ikoIai, 54, 55
Radzivill, princes, 74
Rahalski, archpriest, 162
Rahulia, V., 204
Rak-Michajlouski, S., 123, 145-
4 6 , 249, 257
Rastorguev, P., 2, 29
Ravines, Eudocio, 152
Reboul, Colonel, 108
Recica, c., 60, 61, 138
Reuka, Symon, see Bohuevic,
Fr.
Ribbentrop, J., 172
Riga, 109, II3, 1 2 9, 134, 271.
See also Gen. Index
Rittich, A., 5, 7, 9
Rodionov, "Colonel," 270
RodziewIcz6wna, Maria, 253
Rogneda, 4 I
Rogvolod, prince, 4 1 , 42
Romain Rolland, 252
Rome, 54, 56, 13 1 , 134
Rosenberg, Alfred, 175, 177,
183-84, 202, 270. See also
Ref orm, Agrarian
Rosony, c., 209
Ross, major, 108
Rostov, c., 103
Rovinski, V., 244
Rozlnskl, princes, 242
Rumania, 279
Rurik, prince, 41, 62
Rusak, A., 276
Russia, see Gen. Index
Ruthenfa, 4, 40, 44, 56, 76
Rutski, Fr., 58
Rydleuski, L., 278
Rydz-Smigly, general, 248
Ryplnski, A., 76, 216
Sabaleuski, J., 12 3, 25 1
Sabbatius, bishop, 162
Sacharaii, S., 134
Saevic, P., 273,274,276
Salvandi, A. de, 47
SamojIa, W., 165
Sanguko, princes, 242
Samujlenak, E., 151
Sapieha, Eustace, prince, 96
Sapieha, Ivan, prince, 54
Sapieha, Lev, prince, 55, 59
Savenak, Apalenija, 204
Savinkov, Boris, lIS
Savula, g.l., 60
Savva, archbishop, 278
Schubert, Colonel, 270
Sebez, c., 63
Semasko, J., bishop, 69, 70,
II 5, 243
Semianiuk, Captain, 249
Serada, J., 99, 105, 247, 249
Sergej (Sergius), bishop, 122,
278
Sedputovski, A., 148
Shabad, T., 15
Shavli, c., 109
Shevchenko, Taras, 76
Sholem Asch, 34
Siberia, 257, 258, 272
Sigismund I, 46, 57
Sigismund II (III) August, 46-
47, 49, 54, 56
Sipovic, (;., Dr., priest, 278
Skarga, Peter, 56
Skirgajlo, prince, 45
Skirmunt, R., 104, 246
Skoryna, Fr., 52-53, 131, 148
Skorynka, w., 108
Skurko, A., see Tank, Maksim
Slaukovic, n.l., 149
Slonim, c., 10, 55, 13 1 , 194,
205, 235, 266, 270, 271
Slovakia, 279
Sluck, c., 10, 55, 60, 61, 63,
65,79, II3, 115-16, 190,
235,271. See also Gen. Index
Slucki, sch., 84
Smogorzewski, K., 10, I I
Smolensk, pro and c., 13, 14,
28, 32, 35, 43, 52, 55, 58,
63,79,88,109,17 6 ,178,
186, 188, 194, 21 5, 237, 239,
24 0 , 244, 266, 271; c., 176,
193
Smolic, A., 246, 257
Smotricki, Meletij, 52, 242
Sobolevski, A. I., 28, 64
Socinus, 54
Sokolinski, princes, 242
Sokolka, c., 108, 207
Solomerecki, princes, 242
Solovki islands, 146, 257
Soltyk, bishop, 62
South America, 280. See also
Latin America
South River, N. J., 225,278
Spasov, Red Army officer, 158
Sreznevski, I. I., 53
Stalin,!. V., 27, 99-100, 108,
137-3 8 , 146-47, 150-5 I,
197-9 8 , 204, 2 1 3, 2 1 5, 217-
18
Stankevic, Adam, 106, 131
Stankevic, Dr. Jan, 4, 28, 165,
259,280
Stary VIas, 90
Stavropol, c., 103
Stephan, bishop, 278

Stockholm, 95
81. Petersburg, 69, 70, 75, 76,
77, 84, 85, 88, 89, 245. See
also Petrograd
Strzewski, J., 120
Studnicki, W., 121
Summa, g. 1., 60
Suporosl, c., S3
Sura!, c., 209
Suvorov, A. V., general, 198
Suwalki, c., 8, 43, 94, 260
Svenciany, c., 161
Svidrigajlo, prince, 46
Svirski, princes, 54
Svisloc, c., 104
Sweden, 2, 50
Syrokomlia, 'V., 79
Szepticki, Andrej, mitrpolt., 246
Szepticki, general, I I I
achmatov, A. A., 29, 39
afafik, P., 38, 78
antyr, F., 90, 109, 246
arangovic, V., 149
au1is, deleg., 108
cors, Dr. M., 165
ejn, P., 26
evcuk, n., 99
kialenak, M., 91,165,266,
271
Skutka, engineer, 165
Spilevski, P., 78
ymanec, P., 278
Tacitus, 38
Ta!ocka, 'VI., 131
Tamacyk, Vasil, 278
Tank, Maksim, 129, 169, 217,
276
Taras, N., 277
Tarasevich, Very Rev. John,
viii, 134, 280
Tarakevic, Br., 78, 104, 123,
126, 145-46, 246, 257
Tatarynovic, P., priest, 204
Taticev, V., I
Tatur, 0., 39
Terauski, V., 257
Terecenka, n. 1., 249
Terlecki, Kiril, 56
Theodosius, bishop, 162
Tiesenhausen, Count Antonius,
34
Tolstoy, L. N., 151,217
Topceuski, w., 80
Trepka, W., 165
Troki, c., 8, 54
Trotsky, L. D., II4
Trubeckoy, N. S., 29
Tula, c., 43
Turgenev, I. S., 217
Turgenev, N. I., 31
Turkestan, 148-49, 258
TurleJski, deleg., 260
Tuma, Dr. V., 178
Turov, c., 8, 61, 70
Turuk, F., 96
INDEX OF NAMES
Tymczasowy, w., 246
Ukraine, see Gen. Index
United Nations, see Gen. Index
United States, 108, 116, 124,
133, 134, 197, 221, 223-25,
272, 278, 280-81
Urah, Prince Wilhelm von, 95-
96
Urban VIII, pope, 61
U.S.S.R., see Gen. Index
Ustrialov, N. G., 244
Ulasau, A., 88, 90, 108, 165,
249
Vajdelota, w., 246
Valkadaev, P., 276
Valkovic, com.p.s., 149
Valoyu, P., 123, 145, 146
Valynec, w., 145, 146
Varonka, J., 107-08, 110, 134,
247, 280
Vasi'ek, w., 129
Vasi1iki, v., 249
Vasily II, 62, 66
Vasmer, Max, 2
Vatican, 56, 130, 222
VazilJo, n. 1., 99
Velikie Luki, c., 8
Veliz, c., 63
Verabejcy, v., 249
Vera, Zoska, 90, 259
Vernadsky, G. V., I, 2
Versailles, III, 115. See also
Gen. Index
Vienna, 271
Vilejka, c., 271
Vilna: pr., 8-11, 14, 28, 32,
38, 73, 82, 94, 104, 113, I 15,
119-2 I, 261 ; ci ty, 10-11 ,
14, 33-34, 39, 44, 70, 72,
82, 84, 95, 103, 109, I II,
113, 122, 206: capital of
the Grand Duchy, 43-45,
47-4 8 , 50, 52-55, 57-59,
114, 161-62; population, lO-
11,13,32,33,132; lan-
guage, 8-10, 28, 52, 53, 57,
70, 87-9 1 , 121, 1 2 9, 131,
162; university of, 69, 75;
cultural activities in, 36, 87-
88, 95, 104, 113, 121, 125,
128-31, 259, 266; political
clubs, 70-71, 86, 93-95,
101-02, 104-05, 107-08, 122,
131, 155, 161-62, 169, 188-
89, 261, 271; occupied by
the Germans, 93-96, 101-02,
176; - by the Lithuanians,
95-96, 102, 104, 108, 279;
- by tbe Poles, 109, I 15,
119-33; capItal of M!ddle
Lithuania, I 15; occupied by
the Red Army, 157; ceded to
Lithuania, 159
Virta, N., 277
Vinevecki, princes, 54
287
Vitauskas, general, 161
Vitebsk, pr. and c., 12, 14, 28,
3 1 -3 2 , 35, 38, 43, 51, 73,
88, 109, 116, 138-39, 148,
ISO, 190, 194, 207, 211, 271,
274; c., 34,54,55,61,63,
67, 70, 97, 17 1 , 176, 187.
209, 235, 2 73
Vitovt, prince, 45, 51, 52
Vituka, M., general, 222
Vlasov, A., s.ee Ulasau, A.
Vladimir, prince of Kiev, 41
Vladimir Monomach, prince, 4 I
Vladimircev, B., 2
Volfson, S., 149
Vologda, c., 2S7
Volovic, fam., 54
Volyn, 2, 43, 4 8 , 5 I
Voroshilov, K., 198, 268
Vydra, com. 1., 149
Vyshinsky, A. J., 27 2
Vytautas, prince, see Vitovt
Vyzna, v., 249
'Vasilewski, L., 122
\Vatson, G., 108
\Veizmann, Chaim, 238
\Verigo-Darewski, D., 76
White sea, 146
\Vilhelm II, appeal to, 10S
\Vilson, Woodrow, appeal to, 95
\Vladislaw IV, 61
\Varsaw, 60, 108-18, 122, 126,
129, 172, 207, 249, 250, 271
Yugoslavia, 279
Yuliana of Tver, 45, 51
Yuriev, c., 84
Zacharka, Vasil, 134, 144, 17 8 ,
188, 221, 249, 263
Zahorska-Savitry, Anna, 253
Zajac, J., 112, 144, 246
Zakudraev, com. 1., 215
Zamocin, I., 257
Zaslavl, c., 53
Zaslavski, princes, 242
Zavitnevic, V., 39, 84
Zawadski, W., 272
Zbarazski, princes, 242
Zeligowski, general, 115, 255
Zimmerle, Dr., 108
Zinkovic, n. 1., 149
Zizani, Lavrentij, 52
Zmudzinski, H., 257
Zograf, N., I
Zubko, bishop, 69
Zuev, g. 1., 196
Zwingli, Ulric, S4
e1ianin, com. 1., 260
:liroiiski, A., 257
zitomir, c., 84
zydovic, act., 257
Zylka, V., 257
zylunovic, Z., 108-09, II 6,
144, 149, 246

GENERAL INDEX
Abweltr, 263
Academies: Kiev, 62; Polock, 6,; Vilna, 69;
agriculture, 140
Academies of Sciences: Belorussian, 26, 89, 140,
142, 146, 148-49, 152-53, 167, 210, 215, 218,
235, 257, 259, 276; Russian, 78
Administration: Russian (imp.), 66-74; Belorus-
sian, 93, 95, 101-OS, 107-08, 110-12, 119, 139,
14 1 -50, 170-78, 18 9--90, 202-07, 264; German,
108, 172-206; Polish, 121-28, 130-33, 151, 160;
Soviet, 148-54, 157-69, 17 1 -73, 176, 207-19;
Lithuanian, 95-96, 104-05, 107-08, 161-62, 165.
See also BNR; BSSR; Economy; Education;
Grand Duchy; Occupation armies; Poland;
Police; Purges
Adradzetille, period of, 91-92, 143-44, 147, 149
Aerodromcy, 171
Agriculture, 17-20, 26, 31-34, 113, 119, 132, 140-
41, 143, 14 8 -49, 15 I, 161-62, 164, 166-67,
171, 174, 181-84, 186, 19 1 , 197, 199, 202,
:209- 1 3, 2 1 5- 1 6, 264, 274, 27S; mechanization
of, 19, 151, 166-67, 209, 211, 217, 275;
agrogorods, 2 12. See also Farming; Land;
Kolkhoz; Kulak; 1TS
Allied Powers, 8, 69, 106-09, III, 113-14, 116,
156,185,207,250,27 2
American Federation of Labor, 274
American Jewish League against Communism, 272
American Slav Congress, 280
Americans, 13, 134, 192, 222, 225, 235, 212.
See also Belorussian Americans
Amnesty (German), 202
Ancestors, cult of, 20-2 I. See also Mythology;
Customs
Andrusovo, treaty of, 3, 62-63
Anthropology, I, 17, 40, 91
Anti-Communism, 98-100, 109, 115-16, 126, 129,
133-34, 157, 169, 185, 188, 193, 203-06, 220,
222, 246, 249-So, 277, 279-80. See also
Guerrillas; Underground
Anti-guerrillas, 197-202, 268. See also Guerrillas;
Occupation armies
Anti-Polonism, 122, 12S-2, 132-36, 156, 169.
See also Guerrillas; Underground; West Belo-
russia
Anti-Russianism, 121-26, 139-40, 142, 145, 161.
See also Polonization; Russification
Anti-Semitism, 178, 186-87, 195, 204, 206, 266,
268, 211, 272. See also Jews
Arabs, 39, 4 1
Arbeitsamt, 191
Arbitration, see Justice
Archeology, 38-40, 140, 14 8 , 234, 238, 239
Armenians, 86, 87
Army: Red (Soviet), 21, 99- 1 01, 107-09, 114-19,
138, 143, 149, 152, 154, 156-58, 163-64, 170,
174,119,191--9 2 ,194,200-01,206, 20 9,212,
2 1 5, 241, 259, 260, 211-72; German, 94, 95,
101-05, II 9, 155, 170-71, 181, 185, 188, 19 2 -93,
197,202,204,209,235,247; Russian (imp.),
97, 100, 101, 200, 250; Belorussian, 98, 100-02,
107, 110-11, 113, 115, 14 1 -4 2 , 149, 171, 202-
04, 206, 250; Polish, 101, 108, no-n, 113-
14, 116-18, 119, 122, 1 2 7-28, 135, 143, 196,
202, 247, 250, 259; Lithuanian, 1-61. See also
Occupation armies
Artisanship, 34-35, 119, 143, 162, 165
Arts, 39, 44, 129, 140, 148, ISO, 151, 167, 210
Aryans, 38
Assembly, national, see 'Vest Belorussia
Association of Proletarian Writers, 144. See also
\Vriters
Atrocities: Polish, 110-11, 122-31; Soviet, 125,
145-50, 160, 171, 193, 197,199, 212; German,
I 8S-81, 190, 193--99, 210, 263, 266, 268. See
also Administration; Occupation armies; Purges;
\Vest Belorussia
BalkailIlytla, society, 134: paper, 220-21
Baltic peoples, 2,40,106, 111,115,; federation
of, 2; region, 78, 107, 109-11; <Cbaltism," 175.
See also Race, theory of
Balto-Slavic, 40
Basilians, order of, 58-60, 68-69; schools, 68;
college, 69
Batlejka, 26
BCR, see Belorussian Central Rada
Beggars, 26, 212
Belarus.kae Slo'Va , paper, 220
Belaruskaja Krytlica, paper, 126, 130, 165; history
of, 2 53
Belarllski Fro"t, paper, 135-36
Belaruski Rabotllik, paper, 165
Belorussia; name of, 1-4, 17, 6S, 69, 14; partition
of, 100, 101-18, 176. See also Belorussian SSR;
Black Russia; 'Vest Russia; White Russia; White
Ruthenia
Belorussian American Congress, 279, 281; National
Council, 280
Belorussian Americans, 224
Be10russian Center for Adult Education, 133
Belorussian Central Rada (BCR), 91-98, 202-06;
in exile, 220,222-25,278,281
Belorussian Democratic Committee, 280. See also
Fcderalists
Belorussian Convention (Congress): First, 98-102,
204, 220; Second, 203-06, 220, 258, 266
Belorussian Culture, association of, 205
Belorussian Educational Society, 133
Belorussian Institute of Economy and Culture, 126,
131
Belorussian Military Committee, 115
Belorussian National Center, 220
Belorussian National Cheura, 88
Belorussian National Commissariat, 97, 108
Belorussian National Committee, 96--97, 108
BelorussiaD National Conservatory, 152
Belorussian National Museum (Vilna), 131, 236,
245,253
Belorusslan National Rada (Odessa), 97
Belorussian National Republic (BNR), 103-08,
I I 1-13, 134,"146, 165, 178; administration,
103-05, 108, 110-13; foreign relations, 103,
106--08, III, 113, 134; rada, 105; incorporation
(Poland), 111-13; split, 112; in exile, 107-08,
114-15, 134, 144, 177, 188, 220-22, 225, 263,
215, 278, 281; Paris conference, 221; constitu-
tion, I II, 221
Belorussian National Union, 253
Belorussian Peasants' Union, 85
Belorusslan People's Front, 189
Belorussian Popular Assembly (Vitebsk), I 16
B elorussian School Society, 13 I, 2 53
Belorusslan Scientific Society, 95, I2 I, 23 6 , 253

29°
GENERAL INDEX
Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR), 4,
13-14, 28, 29, 113-18, 125, 127, 137-54, 205,
207-19; first, 108-09, 113, 138. See also
Administration; Atrocities; Foreign relations;
Occupation armies; USSR
Belorussian State Publishing House (Dom Knihi),
152
Belorussian State University, 140, 147,15 2 ,277
Belorussian State Symphony, 151
Belorussian War Relief, 96
Belorussian Youth, union of, 188-89, 266
Belorussians: in Lithuania, 6; in Poland, 6, 13,
15; in the USSR, 6. See also Censuses
Belorussification, 121-26, 139-41, 145; resistance
to, 139-40
Bernardines, order of, 57
Betrothals, 23. See also l\Iarriage
Bezirk Z, 196. See also Administration, German
Bible, trans. Fr. Skoryna, 52-53. See also Litera-
ture, \Vest Russian
Black Cat, 196
"Black Maria," 2 6 7
Black Russia, I, 40
BNR, see Belorussian National Republic
Boltolzlasllik;, 26. See also Folklore
Bolsheviks, 86, 97-100, 102, 109, 139, 247. See
also Communists
Books: first printings, 52-54, 59, 60; publishing,
84, 88, 113, 133, 14 2 , 14 8 , 153-54, 216- 1 7, 245,
259; burning, 148, 186
Boris Rocks, 148, 271
Boundaries: administrative, 14, 65-70, 73, 109,
111-12, II6, 120, 176, 182; linguistic, 6- 1 4,
28, 70, III, 218, 282; political, 3, 13- 1 4, 43,
48, 50, 65, 94, 95, 102, I II, II 4, II 6, 120, 156,
158, 169, 207, 222-23, 263, 272, 279. See also
Terri torial claims; Terri tory
"Bourgeois nationalism," 147, 214-17. See also
Nationalism; Purges ,
Bres t Li tovsk, treaty of, 100-0 I, 103
Brest, union of, 55-56, 58, 60. See also Uniates
BSSR, see Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic
Budini, 38
Bulgars, I
Butyrki prison, 84
Calvinism, see Sects
Camps: Bereza Kartuska, 131; displaced persons,
13, 220, 234, 250, 273; Jewish, 187, 195, 268;
slave labor, 146, 165, 213, 257, 272, 274, 277;
P.O.W., 188, 194, 266, 270,274
Canals, 31,119,143, 166; Dniepr-Bug, 166
Carmelites, order of, 59
Censuses: German, 5, 10-11; Soviet, 6, 15, 14 1 ;
Russian (imp.), 10- 1 3, 35, 231-33, 238;
Polish, 12-13, 121, 231-32; Latvian, 255;
Lithuanian, 255. Se also Population
Central Powers, 100-06, 107
Central Union of Bel. Cultural, Educational, and
Economic Institutions, 126
Chaurus of Bel. \Vorkers (France), 134
Children, 19-20, 22-24, 36, 39, 51, 81, 128-3 1 ,
139-40, 151, 152, 160, 163, 16', 175, 1 8 3, 197,
2 12-13, 274; illegitimate, 24 i lawful guardian-
ship, 24; child labor, 36
Christian Association of Bel. \Vorkers in Great
Britain, 279
Christian Democrats, 85, 97, 99, 1 2 5-26, 130, 13 2 ,
145,165,188- 8 9,25 0 ,25 2 ,27 8
Chronicles: Primary Russian, 39-4 2 t 23 6 , 239;
Polish, 47; Gustyn, 5 I
Chryscia1lskaja Dumka, 13 2 , 253
Church: Belorussian autonomous, 52, 68, 91, 113,
142,162,221-22,246,257,278; Greek Ortho-
dox, 22, 24-26, 32-33, 53-63, 64-66, 69, 9 1 ,
110, 122, 123, 130, 131, 142, 157, 161-63, 186,
191,203-04,212,221-22,224,271; Pinsk
conference, 65-66; Holy Synod, 66, 69; in exile,
27 8 ; Roman Catholic, 22, 24, 54, 55, 57-59,
61, 67, 69, 73, 81, 91, 191, 203-04, 212, 224;
Evangelical, 54, 204; Lutheran, 55; Ukrainian
autonomous, 278; Uniate, 55-56, 58-60, 62, 65,
67-70, 91, 113, 278; Union suppressed, 69.
See' also Clergy; Land, ownership of; Monastic
orders; Patriarch; Population; Religion; Sects
Cimmerians, 39
Civil war, 4, 173
Clergy, 126, 130; Greek Orthodox, 53, 55, 56, 59-
60, 97, 102, 104, 113, 126, 130, 136, 157, 161-
63, 204, 253; Roman Catholic, 55, 57-59, 67-
68, 73, 81, 84, 90-91, 96, 102, 104, 113, 122,
125-26, 130-31, 136, 204; Uniate, 62, 68.
See also Church; Monastic orders; Religion
Clothing, 19, 152, 118-79, 183, 209- 1 0
Clubs, 129-31, 134-36, 151, 157, 160, 213, 224-
25; political, 84-86,93-105, 108, III, 115, 125,
1 2 9, 157, 160; cultural, 93, 95, 99, 104, 108,
III, 113, 128-29, 143-44, 151, 160, 224. See
also Hramada; Political parties
Collaborationists, 108, 126, 135, 172, 176-78, 185,
187-90, 193, 196, 198, 202, 204-06, 212, 262,
270; Russian, 187-88, 203, 262. See also
Occupation armies; U Izadoiicy
Collectivization, see Farming
Colonialism, 122, 125, 128, 130, 132, 157, 160,
166, 175-90, 2 oS, 263. See also Administration;
Occupation armies; Poland
Colors, 1-3; black, I, 24, 54; blue, 24; green,
26, 139, 195-96; red, 2, 20, 24, 27, 54, 100,
103, 107, 108, 114, 115, 116, 119, 125, 127,
138, 146, 15 2 , 154, 157, 15 8 , 170, 174; white,
1-5, 12, 18, 24, 40, 76, 95, 103, 109, III, 1 2 7.
See also Symbolism
Comintern, 152, 253, 257
Commissariat, of nationalities, 97, 99-100, 108,
138; Belorussian national, 108, 138
Committee, Belorussian (Berlin), 161, 165; na-
tional, 96--97, 108, 131; of Five, 105; of libera-
tion, 174; of mutual aid, see Samapomac;
Revolutionary military, I IS; Lithuanian Su-
preme, 94
Common Council for American Unity, 279, 280,
281
Communism, 26, 90, 98, 99, 101, 105, 106, 110-
II, 119, 135-36, 137-39, 14 2 , 144-45, 149, 156,
172-73, 180, 185, 203, 205, 212-16, 219, 222
Communist Party, 27, 86, 109, 115, 125- 2 7, 135-
40, 144-45, 14 8 -5 0 , 152, 154, 165, 169, 17 1 ,
177, 180, 192-93, 212-13, 215-16, 218, 269,
274, 275; membership, 97, 1 2 5, 127, 149-50,
213, 247, 253, 258; purges, 148-50. See also
Kom.somol
Communists, 108, 174, 178, 180, 183, 190,
192-93, 213, 267, 271. See also Bolsheviks;
Poland
Communist Youth, see Komsomol
Conferences: of Ambassadors, n6, 249; of Berlin,
144; of Geneva, 138: of The Hague, 138; of
Helsinki, II I; of Horodlo, 45-46; of national
minorities, 95: of Paris (Peace), 8, 10, 71, 107,
II I; of Pinsk, 65-66; of Vilna, I II; of Yalla,
27 2
Congress, all-Belorussian of workers, peasants
and soldiers, 109, II 5; of Belorussian Americans,
225: of national minorities, 130. See also
Conventions
Constituent Assemblies: Belorussian, 86, 101-03;
Russian, 97, 100, 250
Constitution: Russian (1905), 85; Polish, 50, 112,
120, 122, 130; of Lithuanian Belorussian state,

GENERAL INDEX
94: of BNR, 111, 221; of BSSR, 109, 158, 207,
214; of USSR, 27, 138, 160, 207, 214. See also
Lithuanian Statutes .
Conventions: First Belorussian, 98-102, 204, 220;
Second Belorussian, 203-07, 220, 258, 266: of
Belorussian Americans, 225
Cooperatives, 36, 92, 107, 113, 131, 161-62, 238
Coordination Center of Anti-Bolshevik Action
(KCAB), 280
Council for Liberation of the Peoples of Russia
(SONR),280
Crime, see Justice
Croats, I
Culture, 36, 39, 42, 47, 54, 66, 120, 209, 212,
2 15-19, 224; native, 17-3 6 , 84-88, 93, 95,
97, 104, 111-13, 118, 126, 128-30, 134, 138-4 1 ,
147-51,161-62, 167, 176, 185-86, 189,198,202,
204-05, 209, 212, 215-17, 224, 254, 259:
Polish, 12, 17, 26,47, 50,53, 56-59, 64, 65-70,
74, 75, 82, 120, 155, 160, 248, 251; Russian,
12, 17, 44, 45, 51, 53, 56-57, 63-70, 74, 75,
82, 121, 142, 153-55, 217, 251; Lithuanian,
43; Day of Bel. Culture, 129
Curzon line, 114, 156,207,250,272
Customs, I, 17- 2 5, 3 1 , 33, 37, 39, 4 2 , 47, 74,
80, 86, 154, 156, 172, 180-81, 234, 236;
clothing, I, 18, 19, 22, 24, 33; food, 17-19,
3 1 ; ornaments, 18, 22, 24; vodka, 23; work,
17, 21-22, 24. See also Family; Festivals; Flre-
making; Folklore; Justice; Marriage, Mythology;
Superstitions; Village
Czechs, 40, 128
Decembrists, 68
Defense Committee, 202. See also Administration,
German: Anti-guerriJIas; Occupation armies,
German
Democracy, concepts of, 42, 44, 71, 73, 75, 84, 86,
94, 97-99, 101-04, 109, 114, 118, 119, 14.3,
145, 157, 158, 167, 173-74, 183, 203-05, 221,
223, 225. See also Belorussian Cen tral Rada;
Belorussian National Republic
Dell, 73
Deviationism, 216-18
Dialects, 13, 27-29, 73-74, 77-79, 81, 9 2 , 139,
153; subdialects, 28
Dialects Committee (Moscow), 9, 13
Dictionaries, 27, 7 6 , 145, 153, 205, 259, 276
Displaced persons, 13, 26, 220, 262, 280. See also
Camps: Emigration
Divorce, 22, 23
Dominicans, 57
DorfbUrgermeister, see Starosta
Dregovii, 38
Duma, see Elections
Dz;ady, 2 I
Dz;amzica, 93, 108
East Prussia, 15, 120, 176, 208, 223, 232, 234,
259, 279; Bel. settlements, IS, 208, 234
Economy, 8, 18-19, 25, 30-36, 82, 88, 92, 106,
III, 113, 119, 122-23, 126, 131-33, 136, 140-41,
143, 14 8 -49, 151-52, 155, 158, 161-69, 172-76,
17 8 -79, 181-86, 191, 195, 199-201, 209-10,
214-15, 253; NEP, 193; national Income, 152;
'Vest Belorussia, 119, 122-23, 132, 136, 155,
I 58, 161-69
Education, 19, 26, 34, 36, 43, 47, 50, 65, 67-69,
74, 77, 78, 81, 84- 8 5, 88-90, 92, 95, 96, 104,
107-08, 110-11, 113, 121, 123-3 1 , 133-36,
139-4 2 , 145-49, 151-55, 157, 160- 6 3, 168-69,
177, 186, 188- 8 9, 191, 202--03, 205, 209-11,
21 4, 216, 218, 220, 224, 251, 253-55, 275, 277;
seIC-education, 36, 88, 131
Elections, IS, 20, 87, 97, 99, lOS, 121-22, 12 5-
29 I
28, 1.11, 135, 159-60, 163-65, 174, lBo, 203-04,
221,246,253; to Bel. Conventions, 99,203-04;
to Const. Assembly, 97; to Russian Duma, 87;
to Lithuanian Diet, 1 6 4: municipal, 97, 131,
135; to National Assembly (West Belorussia),
157-60, 163, 260; to Polish sejm, 121-22, 125-
28, 253: to Supreme Soviets, IS, 159-60, 165;
to zemstvos, 97
Electrification, 19, 143
Emigration, 6, 32, 33, 107-08, 208, 220-25: before
the Revolution,S, 32, 33,80,93,96,231,237;
from USSR, 15-16, 208, 220-25; from Poland,
133-35
Emigres, 43, 95, 176-78, 180, 187-89; Belorussian,
4, 27-28, 40, 4 2 , 80, 97, 108, 112, 114, 129,
133-35, 139, 144-46, 161-62, 169, 176-77, 188-
89, 199, 203, 207, 21 9-25, 235, 250, 258; Polish,
47, 70, 76, 207, 222, 234, 262, 272, 279; Rus-
sian, 95, 177, 187, 203, 235, 250, 280; Ukrain-
ian, 250; World Union of Bel. emigres, 225. See
also Belorussian Central Rada; Belorussian Na-
tional Republic, in exile; Governmen t-in-exile;
Poland; Solidarists
E1Ieida Navyvarat, 78-79
Espionage, schools of, 192-93
Ethnographers, 5-10, 27, 37, 3 8 , 4 0 , 73; German,
5, 6; Russian, 6-7, 9, 73; Polish, 8-12; Belorus-
sian, 8; British, 8; Ukrainian, 8
Ethnography, 3, 5-12, 16, 66, 73, 131, 140, 148,
208; research, 17, 25- 2 6, 73, 75, 77, 84, 88, 14 B
Family, 12, 17-24, 26, 31-3 2 , 36, 39, 130, 181-83,
194, 209, 270. See als<J Children; Divorce: l\far-
riage; Customs; Zadrllga
Farms, 19, 23, 74, 89, 96, 132, 151, 162, 164, 165,
172, 174, 180, 183; size of, 31-32, 132, 162,
166; labor, 20,24,30-33,165,174-75; child
labor, 36; farming, 17-20, 30-33, 35, 40, 148;
collectivization of, IB, 21, 25, 27, 14B, 162, 165-
67, 1 6 9, 173-74, IB3, 197, 25 B , 274. See also
Agricul ture
Federalists, 93-104, loB-09, 111,223,249,280
Feldkommatlda"e, 173, 175, 179, 181
Feld'Webel, 201
Festivals, 24, 26, 39
Fifth column, 192. See also Underground, Com-
munist
Finns, 38, 39, 40, 86, 239
Fire-making, 18, 26. See also Customs
Five Year Plans, 27, 146, 148, 152, 210-11, 275
Flax, 35, 151
Florence, union of, 56
Folklore, 3, 25-27, 64, 73-77, 84, 14 0 , 151, 219,
234, 236. See also Ethnography
Food, 17-19, 21-23, 30-31, 35, 152, 160, 167, 168,
171, 173-74, 178-80, 183, 191, 209-10
Foreign relations, 95, 103, 105-08, III, 113, 123-
24, 130, 138, 205, 214, 222-23. See also Treaties
Fraternities, 59-60. See also Grand Duchy; Religion
Fiillrersltip, 204. See also Belorussian Central Rada
Geb;etskomm;ssar, 176, 202, 268, 270
Getleralbezirk, 176
Ge1Zeralkomm;ssar, 176, 17 8 , 189, 193, 202, 204-
oS, 271
Gentry, II, 3 2 -34, 67, 70, 74, 80-84, 90, 104,
110, 125, 162-63, 166, 242; Russian Lithuanian,
45-4 6 , 4 B , 51, 53, 55-58, 60, 62-64, 242. See
also Landowners
Georgians, 86, 215, 277
Germans,S, 10-11, 3 8 , 40, 4 1 , 43-45, 5 I, 93-96,
101-05, 107-09, III, 127, 128, 134, 155-57,
160, 168-74, 177-81, 18 5-90, 192-203, 205, 212,
219-20, 25 8 , 27 2 , 278; national minority, 14,
1 2 7- 2 8, 134, 14 1 , 20B, 210, 220-24. See also

29 2
GENERAL INDEX
Administration: Germany; Language: National
minorities; Nazis; Occupation armies, German
Germany, 7-9, 95, 103-04, 107, 113, 145, 156, 161,
165, 172, 176-77, 184, 186, 188, 190-92, 205,
236, 247-48, 261, 280, 281; appeals to, 247,
248: DP camps, 13
Gestapo, 177, 19 0 , 193
Ghetto, 187
Goliad', 39
Goebbels' Diary, 262
Goths, 39-40
Government-in-exile: Belorussian, 107-08, 114- 1 5,
134, 144, 220-21; Polish, 205, 207, 222, 260,
272
Grain, 3 2 , 35
Grammar, first Belorussian, 28,78,104,215,224
Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 3, 4 2 - 6 7, 7 1 -73, 75,
94-95, 102-03, 248; archives, 47, 243; book
printing, 52-54, 59, 60; education, 43, 47, 50,
53-55, 57, 59, 60; language, 51-58, 60- 6 4: lit-
erature, 51-53, 55, 57, 62, 64; Lublin Union,
47-50, 248; peasants' uprisings, 59-61; Polon-
ization, 47, 56-58, 61-62, 66-67; population,
43-45, 63- 6 4; Rada, 45, 4 8 , 49, 55: religion,
51-63: restoration of, 94-95, 102-03; Sejm,
46, 48; self-government, 46, 48-50; statutes, 46,
48-50, 58; territory, 44, 48-51, 66; wars with
Moscow, 46-47, 62-64. See also Lithuania;
Lithuanian
Great Powers, see Allied Powers
Greek Orthodox Church, see Church; Clergy; Re-
ligion
Greeks, 39, 40, 41, 60
Greens, the, see Guerrillas
Guerrillas, 25, 27, 85, III, 113-16, 119-20, 127-
28, 139, 179, 18 7, 19 1 -200, 209, 2 1 3, 249-50,
262, 278: Bel. nationalist, 85, III, 113- 16 , 195-
96, 222, 249-50; the "greens," 139, 195-96;
Jewish, 187, 195; Soviet, 25, 27,195-99, 20 4,
213; anti-Belorussian, 196, 204; anti-German,
25, 27, 79, 187, 194-99, 202, 204; anti-Polish,
111,113-14,119-20,127-28; anti-Soviet, 115-
16, 139, 195-97, 249-50, 278; supplies, 194, 197,
202; recruitment, 196-98; leaders, 19 6 , 198,
262; loyalty oath, 198; amnesty, 202. See also
Anti-guerrillas; Terrorism; Terrorist squads; un-
derground
Gypsies, 185, 265
Hauptbezirk, 14, 176
Heeresgrtlppe MUte, 200
Helsinki, conference of, I I I
Historiography; Belorussian, 17, 37-44, 52,61, 63-
64, 7 2 , 83, 86, 89, 9 1 , 102, 105-06, 1 2 9, 142,
145, 148, I 56, I 7 7, 2 06, 2 16-1 7, 2 19, 2 24, 239,
245, 249-50, 257, 265, 268, 271, 280; Polish,
39, 47, 50, 68, 7 1 , 7 2 , 74, 240, 24 2 , 243, 249,
260; Russian, 47, 68, 70, 241; Soviet, 61, 86,
9 8 , 137, 147-4 8 , 159, 215- 1 7, 239, 240, 249,
264,267,269; German) 177; Lithuanian, 240
Hitlerism, 177, 185, 187-88
Hit!erj"gend, 188
Holidays, 26
Homatl: Minsk, 83; Vilna, 94
Horodlo, conference of, 45-46
Hospitals, 163, 167-68, 209, 2 12
Hostages, 197. See also Atrocities, Soviet
Housing, 18- 1 9, 34, 143, 152, 162--64, 171, 180-
81,194,197-98,200,209-12,273,275
Hramada: Belorussian (Chicago), 134; Revolu-
tionary, 84; Peasants' and \Vorkers', 123, 125-
27, 135, 144, 146, 270; Popular (]'\;Ioscow), 96-
97; Socialist, 84- 8 7, 93, 97, 99, 105, 247
Hrazdarzka, 28, 78, 87, 90, 93, 94, 130, 226-27.
See also Lad" ka
Huns, I, 39
Hussites, 54
Hutarka, 26, 80, 83
Igor, Tale of, 41
Illiteracy, 36, 43, 74, 90, 131-3 2 , 134, 136, 14 0 ,
151, 153, 186, 238, 256
Independence, Declaration of, 100-06, 112, 203,
2'05-06, 220, 224
Independence Day, 106, 223, 279
Independent Popular Christian l\'Iovement, 277-78
Industry, 19, 34-35, 119, 132, 14 1 , 143, 152, 162-
63, 165, 167, 178, 209, 211-13, 2 1 5- 1 7
Inheritance, 20-21, 23-24
Institute of Belorussian Culture, 140, 235, 236
Institute of Economy and Culture, 126, 13 I
Institute of National Economy, 149
Institute of Psychology, 149
Intelligentsia, 70, 74, 84, 85, 90, 97, 100, 101, 110,
120, 126, 128, 133, 145, 147-48, 150, 157, 173,
I 75, I 77, 189, 204, 2 10, 2 I 8-20, 2 24, 2 7 I, 2 77
International Anti-Bolshevik Coordination Center
(MAKC), 280
IRO, 220
Jagdkotnmalldos, 201
Jagellonian "idea," 110
Jatvagi, 39
Jesuits, 50, 55-57, 67-68, 130; schools, 55, 67
Jews, 6, 10-11, 14- 16 , 33-34, 3 6 , 37, 40, 44, 54,
58,59,61,63,86,87,94-96,101, 10 5,115,
127, 128, 141, 156-57, 159-60, 166, 17 2 , 178,
184-87, 19 2 , 204, 206, 208, 215, 231, 256, 261,
265,271,272; extermination of, 185-87,265;
Jewish Bund, 86, 96, 115, 157; schools, 160.
See also Anti-Semitism
Justice, concepts of, 23- 2 5, 147; arbitration, 25;
courts, 173, 176, 179; crime and punishment,
25, 147, 179; lynching, 25; oath, 25; people's
courts, 25; rural, 21, 23-25; statute of limita-
tions, 25. See also A troci ties; Customs; Law;
Police; Purges
KCAB, 280
Kiev, university of, 69
Kievan Rus, 40
Kolesa, 18
Kolkhoz, 15 I, 162, 165-67, 169, 174, 180-81, 183,
185,187,194,209,211,213,216,258, 275; dis
solution of, 181, 183-85, 194; amalgamated, 211.
See also Agriculture; Farming; ObIUlla; Reform,
agrarian
Kolklzozllaja Pravda, 2 I 5
Komsomol, 171, 174, 180, 192-93, 213, 215, 267,
275. See also Communism; Communists
"Kosmopolity, u 2 12
Kraevaja Abarolla, 202, 204. See also Army, Belo.
russian; Belorussian Cen tral Rada
Kresy, 110-11. See also Osadl1;cy; Poland
Krcvo, Union of, 45
Krivii
KrYllka, 257
Kryvic, 4, 3 8 , 40, 43. 77, 14 2 , 14 8 , 234, 239, 259
Kryvil, 133
Kulaks, 166, 181
Labor, 31-35, 174-76, 181-83, 185-86, 19 1 -92,
204, 211-12, 273; draft for Germany, 185,
191-92, 204. See also Farming; Unemployment
Lacillka, 28, 76, 78, 81, 87, 90-9 1 , 93, 94, 121,
130, 189, 226- 2 7, 245. See also Hrazdanka
Land, ownership of, 31-35, 178, 183; state, 32-33;
church, 22-24, 32-33, 58, 163; private, 3 1 -35,
12 3, 16 3, 17 8 , 183; communal, 32, 181- 8 4;
restrictions, 34, 48, 58, 132, 18 3

GENERAL INDEX
Landlords, 30-34, 67, 70, 7 1 , 74, 80, 96, 104,
12 3, 125, 143
Landscape, 1, 18, 30, '119
Language, 12-13, 17, 27, 30, 37, 67, 95, 118, 120.
130, 139, 142, 153, 155, 162, 167, 2 1 5, 246,
256-57; grammar, 28, 78, 88, 2 15, 224;
morphology, 27, 29, 153; phonetics, 27-30, 78,
153, 21 5, 224, 276; syntax. 27, 29, 53, 153;
vocabplary, 27-29, 53, 57, 14 2 , 153, 276;
literary standard, 28,52-53,9 2 ,139,145,155.
162, 167, 215, 276; akall;e, 29-30; dzckallie.
28-30. See also Dialects; Dictionaries; Lall
guages i Laci"ka,' H razdall ka
Languages: Balto-Slavic, 40; Church Slavic, 29,
5 I, 56, 57; common East Slavic, 29-30, 52;
Czech, 52, 53; Belorussian, 12, 27-30, 37, 68,
69, 72-78, 81-82, 9 2 , 96, 104, 107, 109, 113,
12 I, 125, 128-30, 139-40, 142, 145, 14 8 -49,
153, 155-56, 162-63, 167, 175, 181, 186-88,
197, 214-19, 224, 256, 261, 266, 269, 276;
French, 142; German, 52, 53, 107, 14 2 , 16 3,
175, 180; Latin, 51-53, 69; Latvian, 12;
Lithuanian, 12, 51, 52, 71-72, 12 9, 161, 24 1 ;
Polish, 6, 13, 28- 2 9, 52, 53, 55, 57, 58, 62,
67-70,73-75,77,120-21, 12 5,128-3 1 ,14 2 ,
153, 156. 160-61, 181, 25 1 , 257, 260; Proto-
Slavic, 29; Russian, 6, 21, 27-3 0 , 36, 44, 46,
52, 57, 58, 60, 62, 67-70, 73-74, 77, 7 8 , 85,
II 5, 1 2 I , 139, 142, I 53, I 60, 162 -6 3 , 1 75,
181, 186-87, 198, 21$,257,266, 269i Ukrainian,
8, 21, 27-30, 73, 74, 77, 78, 129, 160; 'Vest
Russian, 51-54, 61- 6 4 i Yiddish, 6, 34, 90, 142,
153, 160, 257, 272
Latvia, 2, 13, 95, 106, III, 113, 120, 134, 145,
175, 233, 279; Belorussians in, 6, 134, 231
Latvian SSR, 14
Latvians, 8, 12, 40, 86, 90, 94, 134, 266
Law: imperial, 21-24, 3 I; customary, 23-25;
canon. 23. See also Justice
Leadership, nationalist, 93, 95, 97-99, 101-05,
107-08, 110, 114-15, II 8, 121-23, 126-36,
13 8 -39, 14 2 , 144-47, 155, 157, 161, 165, 167,
16 9, 18 9-90, 204-06, 212, 214, 220-25, 277-78.
See also Nationalism, Belorussian
League of Nations, 4, 120, 12 3- 2 4, 130, 233, 249,
252
Lenin, Order of, 213
Leninism, 149. See also Marxism-Leninismi
Stalinism
Libraries, 36, 42, 60, 88, II3, 128, 13 1 , 145, 148,
152, 166, 167, 186, 205, 210; traveling, 36
Litbel, 109, lIS, 253. See also Belorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic; Lithuania
Literature: Belorussian, 26, 29, 7 2 , 74, 75, 77-85,
87--9 2 ,96,113,121,128-30,133,14 2 -45,148,
150-51, 153, 158, 16 7, 196, 205, 21 5-19, 223-
24,265,275; Armenian, 215; EstonIan, 215;
German, 38; Lithuanian, 51; Polish, 12, 77,
79, 13 2 , 254; Russian, 44, 46, 68, 21 5, 21 7;
Soviet, 26, 27, 152; 'Vest Russian, 52-53, 55,
57, 62, 64, 75, 78, 80. See also 'Yriters
Lithuania, 13, 94-96, 103- 1 5, 120, 133-34, 145,
156, 159, 161-62, 164, 175-76, 216, 221. 223,
231, 243, 248, 250, 279; Belorussians in, 6-8,
23 1 ; L. Uhistorical," 73, 243; uMiddle L.,"
II 5; national council (Tariba), 95-96, 103-05,
107; Supreme Committee. 94. See also Grand
Duchy of Lithuania; Litbel; 'Yest Russia
Lithuanian Russian province, 65-67, 70-74; state,
42-50, 120. See also Occupation armies, German
I; Russia; Litbel
Lithuanian Oddz;al, 7 I
Lithuanian SSR, 14, 109, 164-65
Lithuanian Socialist Party, 86
Lithuanian Statutes, 58, 67, 69, 236
293
Lithuanians, 2, 3, 11-12, 38, 4 0 , 43-5 I, 64-66,
71, 86-88, 94, 103, 114, 128- 2 9, 133-34, 159,
161, 239, 260, 266; in Vilna, 9-11
Liutii, 239
Livestock, 18-19, 23, 31-34, 163, 166, 171, 183-
84, 194, 197, 199-200, 209, 237, 262
Lokot' urepublik," 196. See also Administration,
German; Guerrillas
Lublin, Union of, 47-50, 57
Lublin Poles. see Poland
Lumber, 35, 119, 132, 168
Luxuries, 33, 35, 4 2
Lynching, see Justice
Iagdeburg statute, 33, 54, 55, 57, 60, 242
l1faladniak, 143-44, 147, 257
1\'Iarianites, 131
Iarriage, 17,21-24,26,39,43,45,51,56-57;
divorce, 22, 23; dowry, 21-22; virginity of the
spouse, 22-23; in-laws, 23, 39; dynastic, 43,
45, 51, 56-57. See also Family
Marxism-Leninism, 144-45, 147, 2 1 9. See also
Leninism; Stalinism
Melnik, treaty of, 46
:Mensheviks, 99, 247, 249. See also Clubs, politi-
cal; Political parties; Socialists
:NIGB, 216. See also NKVD; Police
:NIiddlc class, 11, 33, 54, 56, 58, 60, 64, 66, 70,
75, 84, 90, 110, 119, 125, 271
Hddle Lithuania, 1 15
:Military zone, 176, 188
fi1lSker Zeitung, 266
i11;'lskij Listok, 84
Hr, 173, 180-81, 183. See also Customs; Occupa-
tion armies, German i Peasants; Village
:Mohammedans, see Religion
!-.fonastic orders, 50, 55-60; Basilian, 58-60;
Bernardines, 57; Carmelites, 59; Dominicans,
57; Jesuits, So, 55-57,67-68
M oskovsk;e Vedomosti, 73
?\10scow trials, 1 So. See also Purges
Movies, 152, 167, 186
MTS, 151, 166, 209
?vI uscovite Rus, see Russia; 1\1 uscovite
1vluseums, 121,131,167,186,205.209-10;
of the Revolution, 261; Vilna, ethnographic,
13 1 , 23 6 , 245, 253
?\'Iusic, 113, 140, Iso-5 1 , 167, 186, 205
}'luzickaja Praiida, 72, 80-81
lUttZy dave"a, 202. See also Belorussian Central
Rada i Occupation armies, German
1VD, see NKVD
?\'lythology, 2, 20-21, 24, 26; Slavic. 2; Teutonic,
2-3; cult of ancestors, 20-21; fire worship, 26;
home spirits, 20-21; superstitions, 21, 24, 26.
See also Customs; Folklore
Narod"aja Valia, 83, 245
Nasa Dalia, 87
Nasa Nlva, 87-92, 96, 108, 129, 144, 165, 2 17,
245, 246
National Convention of Belorussian Americans, 281
National Democratic Party, 218, 277
National Liberation Committee, 280
National minorities, 6, 10-12, 15-16, 44, 86-88,
90, 94-95, 98-99, 101, 104, 112, 119-36, 139,
14 1 -4 2 , 146, 159-60, 176, 208, 23 I, 234, 247-
4 8 , 25 2 -55, 260, 279; German, 12 7- 2 8. 134,
14 1 i Jewish, 127-28, 14 1 . 159, 166; Ukrainian,
12 7-28, 14 1 , 160; Russian, 128, 134, 139,
14 1 -4 2 , 159; Lithuanian, 128; Latvian, 141i
Polish, 141-42, 159-60i Congress of, 130. See
also Censuses; Languages; League of Nations;
Nationality; Population
National self-consciousness, 5, 6, 12- 1 3, 17, 37, 42,

294
GENERAL INDEX
58, 68, 70-7 1 , 74, 75, 77, 81, 82, 8S, 87, 91,
93,109,121-22,126,128,132,135-3 6 ,145,
157, 169, 189, 219- 2 0, 224, 25 1 , 255, 277, 281.
See also T1ltejIi
National self-determination, 4, 12, 37, 61, 64, 68,
72, 74-92, 93- 1 06, 109- 1 0, 119-20, 137-3 8 ,
14 2 , 175, 196, 214, 217, 223-25, 246, 254-56,
276. See also Nationalism; Nationality; National
minorities
Nationalism, 4, 8, 59, 75, 85- 88 , 9 8 , 133, 137-3 8 ,
145-4 6 , 14 8 , 153-54, 176-77, 181, 183, 185;
Belorussian, 8, 29,39-41, 64, 68, 72, 75,80-82,
9 1 , 94-9 8 , 102-06, 112-15, 1I8, 119, 121-23,
126-36, 13 8 -47, ISO, 155-57, 161-64, 167,
169, 177, 188-90, 192, 195-96, 198, 202-06,
212-25, 245-46, 256, 258, 272, 277-79;
Lithuanian, 70-72, 95, 104, 159; Polish, 8, 12,
65-74, 80, 91, 95, no-II, 113-16, 122-3 8 ,
24 2 ; Russian, 66, 73,80, 81, 91, 153-54, 187-
88; "bourgeois,)) 147, 214-17; Soviet, 108,
2 I 2 -25. See also Terri torial c1ai ms
Nationality, 4, 10, 12-13, 30, 37, 44, 65, 66, 70-
7 1 , 73, 76, 77, 81, 85, 88, 93, 94, 108-10, 118,
121, 133, 137, 139, 154, 156-58, 161, 175, 188,
19 2 , 195, 19 8 , 201, 215, 21 9-20, 223, 244,
248, 262, 263, 277; Soviet of nationalities, 213
Natural resources, 132,140,151,219
Navukovae Tavaristva, 95, 12 I, 236, 253
Nazis, 15, 165, 172, 177, 1 8 5-88, 19 1 , 197-98,
205, 209, 223, 236, 239, 259, 263. See alw
Administration, German; HiUerism; SS troops
Nazis, Belorussian, 188, 261
Nevry, 39
LV ezalez"ickaja Party, 189-90
NKVD, 149, 171, 180, 192-93, 198, 203, 208,
264, 267, 271. See also Police
Northwestern province, 69, 73-74, 76, 77
Novgorodian Rus, 40
NTS, see Solidarists
ObsUlla, 181, 183, 265
Occupation armies: German (I), 10-1 I, 93-96,
10 4-05, 113, 172; (II) 14, 27, 170-206, 211,
21 4,219,273; Soviet, 108-09,114-18,143,
156-63: PoJish, 109-14, 143; Lithuanian, 161.
See also Administration; Labor; Poland; P.O.'V.;
'Vest Belorussia
Okruzellcy, 171, 181, 191
Old Believers, 271
Ortskommalldallt, 173-74, 189, 201
Osadnicy, 122, 125, 128, 130, 157, 160, 166, 251,
254. See also Colonialism; Poland; 'Vest
Belorussia
Ostarbe;ter, 208,210,266,273. See also Labor
Ostland, 6, 175-76, 264
Ostrov, Act of, 45
PallOnia, 73, 103. See also Symbolism
Papal Nuncio, 252
Paris Peace Conference (1919), 8, 10, 71, 107, III
Partisans, see Guerrillas
Patriarch: of Constantinople, 66, 278; of ?vI os-
cow, 142, 161
Patriarchs, eastern, 278
Peasants, II, 15, 17- 2 4, 30-33, 100, 113-14, 119,
123, 125- 2 6, 128, 130, 133, 135-36, 139, 141,
143, 148-49, 151, 157, 161-66, 169, 172, 178,
180-81, 184-85, 190-91, 193-99, 202, 204,
208, 212, 21 7, 243, 245, 258, 271; before
emancipation, 41, 56, 57, 60-62, 64, 66, 69,
72; before the Revolution, 73, 74, 77, 78, 80,
86, 87, 89, 90; Lithuanian Russian, 56, 57, 60-
62, 64, 66. See also Village
Peasants) Land Bank, 32
})easants) Union, 85, 126
Pedagogical Institute, 113
Periodicals, 87-88, 93, 104, 113, 134, 140, 143,
147-4 8 , 160, 165, 190, 216-17, 234-35, 245,
252-53, 255, 259, 261, 266; in exile, 220-21,
281. See also Publications
Pilgrimages, 24. See also Customs
Pioneers, 2 13
POK01I, see Pallollia
Poland, 6, 8, 14-15, 19, 30, 34, 39, 42, 45-50,
53-54, 56, 57, 62-66, 68-74, 76, 77, 82, 84,
92, 109, 13 8 , 143, 145, 149-50, 155-57, 159,
161, 165, 168-69, 176, 177, 206, 207-08, 216-
17,221-23,247-48,250-5 1 ,260,272,279;
Central National Committee, 70; Central Polish
Revolutionary Club, 70; centralists, 110, 12 I,
248; Commission for Popular Education, 50 ;
Committee of National Liberation, 272; Com.
munists, 114, 126-27, 135-36; Constitution,
50,112,120,122,130; general elections, 125-
27; federalists, 110-11, II4, 120, 122, 248, 279;
First Polish Corps, 101, 247; Government-in-
exile, 205, 207, 222, 260, 272; insurrection of
18 3 1 , 3, 3 1 , 47, 68-70; insurrection of 1863,
70-74, 77, 82; international obligations, 122,
12 4, 130; kings of, 45, 4 6 , 48, 49, 56, 59, 61-
63; kresy, 1I00n; National Committee, 10;
National Democrats (ND), 86, 110, 120;
national minorities, 119-36,138; osadn;-cy, 122,
125, 128, 130, 157, 160, 166, 251, 254; pacifica-
tion, 1 2 7- 28 ; partitions of, 3, 9, 14, 31, 47,
49, 50, 63, 65-66, 155-57, 176, 177, 207;
Patriotic Association, 68; political parties, 70,
84, 86, 157; provisional government (Lublin),
207-08, 220, 272; Red Committee, 70, 7 1 ;
secret societies, 68; Sejm, 49, 58, 63, 65, 110,
114, 122-23, 125-26, 145, 146, 251; Senate,
45, 65; Socialists (PPS), 84, 86, 110, 120;
Spolny Sejm, 46, 48-49, 65; Targowice, 50;
'Vhite Committee, 70; "\Vhite)J Poland, 120,
1 2 5, 24 8
Poles, 2, 10-16, 19, 3 8 , 40, 4 2 , 43, 46-52, 56-
58, 61-62, 65-74, 84, 86-88, 94, 96, 101-03,
107-09, 111-12, 114-15, 119-36, 156, 159-61,
166, 168-69, 175, 189, 260, 272; in Vilna, 10-
I I; in BSSR, 14-16, 141-42; ((white" Poles,
13, 125. See also Censuses; National minori-
ties; Population; West Belorussia
Polesians, 12-13, 231. See also Censuses, Polish
Police: German, 173, 177, 179-80, 190, 193, 264;
Soviet, 146, 157, 171. See also Administration,
German; NKVD; Security police (SD); Sturm
Kompallien
Political parties, 83-87, 92, 94-99, 104-06, 108-
09, 111-12, 115, 125-26, 130, 145, 157, 165,
18 7- 8 9, 220, 247, 277-78, 280; nationalist,
84- 8 7, 9 2 , 94-99, 104-06, 108, 112, 115,
125-26, 130, 189-90; Jewish, 86-87, 96, 105,
II 5, 157; Lithuanian, 86; Polish, 70, 84, 86,
87,9 2 ,120,157: Russian, 83, 85, 86,87,9 2 ,
97, 99, 1 8 7-88
Polish Soviet war, 27, 71, 113-18, 156
Polish Ukrainian treaty. 114
Polonization, 47, 56-58, 61-62, 66-68, 70, 73-75,
95, 106, 109-14, 122-36, 153, 155, 232
Polotian Rus, 40-44
Polym;a, 144, 216-17
Population, 5-6, 10-16, 3 2 -'36, 38, 40, 43-45, 61,
63, 65, 77, 103, 106, 112, 116, 119, 121, 132,
13 8 , 14 1 , 145, 156, 159, 160-61, 164-65, 196,
207-09, 259, 272; Belorussian speaking, 6, 16,
33-34, 74, 103, 116, 141, 208-09; of BSSR,
6, 14-16, 138, 141, 208-09; Greek Orthodox,
12- 1 3, 43, 45, 55, 56, 5 8 -61, 63, 65, 112,
121, 126, 131, 135, 248, 253, 271; Protestants,
60, 271; Roman Catho1ic, 12-13, 43, 45, 65,

GENERAL INDEX
67-68, 69, 73, 77, 121, 125-26, 130, 165;
Uniates, 13, 67-68, 69, 70, 73; West Belorussia,
6, 10-11, 13, 15, 119,,121, 13 2 , 145, 156, 159,
160; migrations, II, 15- 16 ; transfers of, I I,
15-16, 160-61, 207-08; urban, 10-11, 33, 34,
63, 132, 14 1 , 164, 179, 186-87, 208, 273. See
also Censuses; Emigration; Jews; National
minorities; Sects
P.O.\V., 170, 174-75, 178, 180-81, 185, 188,
19 1 -9 2 , 194, 200; German, 212, 274. See also
Camps
Pravda Russkaja, 236
Press: Belorussian, 72, 80-81, 83- 8 4, 87-94, 104,
107, 110-11, 113, 121, 123, 125-3 2 , 135-36,
139-40, 144, 147-4 8 , 15 1 -53, 161, 16 3, 167,
189, 219, 246, 254, 266, 268, 270-71; in
exile, 5, 16, 133-34, 137, 163, 209, 220-21,
224-25, 272; Lithuanian, 162; Polish, 88, 160,
208, 258; Russian, 73, 84, 86, 88, 89, 91, 160,
175, 266: Soviet, IS, 137, 147, 153, 156, 166,
168, 192, 198, 208-09, 211-12, 216, 260, 267,
269; Ukrainian, 160; Yiddish, 160. See also
Periodicals; Publications
Proletariat, 35, 90, 119, 137, 143-44, 164. See also
Working class; \Vorkers
Propaganda, 84, 85, 87; nationalist, 122, 128,
12 9, 219; Soviet, 105, III, 145, 157, 158,
I 72 , 2 I 0- II , 2 13
Protestants, see Population, Religion
Provisional Council (Vilna), 94
Provisional Government (Russia), 96-98; Belo-
russia, 101
Public health, II, 19, 15 1 , 163, 167-68, 179,
209-10, 214
Publications, 77-84, 86, 88, 9 1 , 93, 94, 104, 107-
08, 113, 123, 126, 127, 13 1 , 133-35, 140, 142-
43, 147-4 8 , 153-54, 156, 160-61, 165, 190, 213,
21 5-18, 220-21, 234-35, 245, 252-53, 255, 259,
261, 266, 281. See also Books; Periodicals;
Publishing houses
Publishing houses, 84, 88, 104, 128, 152
Punishment, see Justice
Purges, 145-50, 153, 157, 160, 162-66, 208,
212- 1 3, 234, 257-6r, 269
Race, 4, 5, 37-40, 42, 66, 73, 74, 86, 91, 95,
105, 118, 120, 130, 157, 161, 175, 18 5-86, 203:
theory of, 37-40; racism, 185-87, 239. See also
Anthropology
Rada: Central Military, 98, 100; of BNR, 97,
100-04, 108, 111-12, 221-25; Bel. National
(Vilna), 102, 104-05, 107; Lithuanian Russian,
45, 4 8 , 49, 55; Permanent (Polish), 50; Sluck,
115-16; Supreme, 112, II4, 249. See also Belo-
russian Cen lral Rada
RadimicI, 38, 40
Radio, 143, 186, 188, 197, 219
Railroads, 8, 119, 12 3, 143
Ra;oll, 179-80, 263
Rall;ca, 165, 271
Reclla, 134
Red Cross: Soviet, 114, 146; Belorussian, 266;
American, 274
Reds, 107-08, 114, II 6, 194
Reform, agrarian, 183-84, 202, 264. See also
Administration, German
Refugees, 43, 93, 9 6 , 156, 164, 166, 171, 178,
191-9 2 , 194, 197-<)8, 203, 208, 215. See also
Displaced persons
Rehabilitation, 210-13, 216
Reicllsangestellte, 176
Reicllskommissar, 175-76
Reichstag, 95
Religion, I, 5, 12, 20-22, 24-26, 30, 43-46, 51-
63, 64-74, 95, 110, 120, 128, 130--31, 14 8 , IS7,
295
181, 197, 203, 224, 271; Greek Orthodox, 12-13,
43, 45, 46, 51-63, 64-69, 74, 77, 130; fra-.
ternities, 59-60; Roman Catholic, 12- 1 3, 43,
45, 51, 54- 6 3, 65-70, 73-74, 120, 128, 130-3 1 ,
222-23, 232, 233, 24 8 , 252, 27 1 ; union, 13,
55-63, 65-68, 130; Mohammedan, 44, 59,
224, 271; pagan, 43, 45; Reformation, 54, 57,
60, 61; Jewish, 59-61; restrictions and per-
secutions, 55, 56, 58-63, 65-66, 68-69, 73, 110,
130. See also Church; Clergy; Jews; Monastic
orders; Population; Sects; U niates
Repatriation, 15, 144, 208, 220, 234, 260-61. See
also Population
Revolution: Russian, 4, 17, 19-22, 24, 25, 33, 36,
92, 96-98, 118, 125; of 1905, 85-87, 91;
Soviet, 19, 27, 35, 97- 1 00, 105, 108, 110, 143,
149, 204, 2 14; revolutionary movement, 80-87,
91, 216
Riga, treaty of, 4, 114, 116-18, 138, 143
RNNA, Russkaja Narodnaja Armija, 200-01.
See also Anti-guerrillas
Roman Catholics, see Church; Clergy; l\1:onastic
orders; Population; Religion; Sects
RSFSR, 14, 28, 13 8 , 214-15
Rus, 40-42
Russia, 12, 22, 30, 3 1 , 34, 4 0 , 52, 63, 65-74, 78,
81, 87, 91, 93, 96, 98-99, 106, 108-09, III,
114-15, 129, 135-36, 138-40, 188, 196, 217,
222-23, 23 1 , 24 8 ; Muscovite, 2-3, 40, 43, 44,
46, 47, 49, 50, 62-64; Constitution Democrats
(KD), 86; Socialist Democratic Labor Party
(RSDRP), 85, 99, 247, 261; Socialist Revolu-
tionaries (SR), 86, 99, 247, 249; Popular
Socialists (NS), 99; Provisional Government,
96, 98. See also Black Russia; West Russia;
White Russia; RSFSR; Soviet Union; Soviets;
USSR; Zemstvos
Russian War Relief, 210, 274
Russians, 4-6, 10- 1 4, 19, 34, 36, 38, 43, 44, 47,
51, 68, 72, 76-77, 85-88, 90, 96-97, 101-02,
108,118,128-29,133-36,139,141-42,158-59,
17 2 , 190, 196, 198, 200, 215, 222, 238, 256,
260, 269, 277; in Vilna, 10-11; in BSSR, see
National minorities
Russification, 68-71, 73-75, 153-55
Russinia, 40
Rusiny, 40, 125
Ruthenfa, 4
Sabotage, 192-93
Sagas, 39, 41
Sakavik, 220
Samapomal, 165, 189, 202, 205, 263, 266, 271
Scandinavians, 40, 41
Scholars, 64, 73, 96, 113, 145-47, ISO, 153, 210,
21 5- 1 7,257,259; Polish, 17,67-68,75,77;
Russian, 17, 75, 77-7 8 , 84; purges of, 39, 145-
47, ISO
Schools, 19, 34, 36, 39, 4 2 , 47, 70, 74, 86, 88,
89. 160, 25 1 , 253-54; Belorussian, 86, 96, 104,
107, 110-11, 113, 121, 123-25, 127-28, 131,
33-34, 139-4 2 , 145, 14 8 , 15 1 -54, 160-63, 16 7-
68, 186, 188-89, 203, 205, 209-13, 215, 219-
20, 251, 253-54: Jewish, 160; military, 192-93,
201, 204, 206; ROlDan Catholic, 79, 84-85;
Uniate, 68-69. See also Teachers; Textbooks
Schythians, 38
"Scorched earth" policy, 171
SD, see Security police
Sects: Calvinist, 54, 55, 60; Hussite, 54; Uni.
tarian, 54; Evangelist, 54, 20 4; Lutheran, 55;
Marianlte, 131: Old Believers, 271
Security police (SD), 179-80, 203. See also
Administration, German
Scjm, Lithuanian Russian, 46, 48, 57, 59, 61, 62;

29 6
GENERAL INDEX
Spolny, 46, 48-49, 65; Polish, 49, 58, 110,
114, 122-23, 125-26, 145, 146, 251; Belorussian.
84; Lithuanian Belorussian, 94
Sejtnik, 67
Self-defense, rural, 201. Sce also Administration,
German; Anti-guerrilJas
Self-education, 36, 88. 131. See also Education
Self-government, 65, 67, 97. 99, 104. 108-09,
157-58, 17 2 -74, 176. 178, 180-83, 186, 189-90,
248, 270. See also Administration; Occupation
armies; Zemstvo
Separatists. 99, 100, 102-06, 109, 188, 222-23
Serfs, 30-32. 70. 74, 87
Severo-Zapadnyj kraj. 69-74
Slavs, 1-4, 17, 19- 2 1, 27-28, 37-42. 44. 73. 185,
215: Normanists, 239
Sluck revolt, I 15-16, 249
Social classes, I, 17, 30-34, 42. 44, 67, 69-70.
73-75. 77, 78, 80, 81. 83-90, 94, 97, 99. 100,
104, 110, 113, 114. 119-20, 125-28, 130. 133.
135-3 6 . 139. 14 1 . 143, 145, 147-50. 15 2 . 155,
157. 161-63, 165-66. 191. 94-95, 204, 210,
212. 217-19, 271. Sec also Clergy; Gentry;
Intelligentsia; Middle class; Peasants; Workers
Socialism, 96--97. 105, 108, 118. 119, 143. 145,
21 4
Socialist realism. 151
Socialists. 84-86, 93. 96--97, 99, 104-05, 112.
115, 125-26, 188, 247, 249, 250, 261, 280;-
democrats (RSDRP). 85. 99. 247; - federal-
ists, 249; popular - (NS), 99; revolutionary-
(SR), 86, 247, 249
Solidarists (NTS). 187-88. 203, 266. 278
SOIlder/ii/lfer, 176, 178, 184.189
Songs, 21. 26-27. 75, 219. See also Folklore
Soviet, Belorussian section of (Petrograd). 96--97.
99: of Nationalities, 213. 258-59; Supreme
Soviet. 213, 215-16
Soviet Union, 42, 89. 90, Ill, 126, 135, 137.
139-40, 146-48, ISO. 153. 198, 207. See also
Soviets; USSR
Soviets, 4, 13, 14. 18-20. 22. 25, 34, 39, 4 2 ,
86. 89-90. 97--9 8 , 100, 103, 109-11, 113- 1 4.
116, 118, 119, 135, 13 8 , 14 1 , 145. 147. ISO,
155, 159, 170, 172, 174, 179, 181, 18 4- 8 5.
213. 215-16; established in Belorussia. 97-99.
See also Soviet Union; USSR
Sovetskaja Belorussia. 215
Sports. 151
SS troops. 177, 185- 8 7, 190, 193, 197, 200. 264,
268, 270. See also Administration, German;
Nazis
Stalin Prize, 89. 217. 258. 276
Stalinism, 149-50, 162. 184, 219. See also StaHn
Starosta, 176-77. 180-81, 199-200; Polish. 132
Starlitta. 176, 184
Stavanes. 39
St. Petersburg, university of. 71, 79. 82. 84
Students, 134-35. 146-47, 151. 167; unIon of,
134-35
Sturm-Kompattlett, 179. 201. See also Anti-
guerrillas
Superstitions, 20-2 I, 24, 26. See also 1ythology;
Customs
Symbolism, of colors. 1-3. 20. 27, 40. 100, 107-08,
114- 1 6, 119, 125, 127, 1,38, 139. 146, 152,
154, 157, 158, 170, 174. 195--96, 21 4- 1 5, 223;
nationalist. 73, 10 3, 112, 127, 128, 144, 14 8 ,
150, 155, 177, 190. 196. 202, 214-15, 221, 263.
See also Colors
Szlacllta. see Gentry
Taras lla Partlase, 79
Tariba, Lithuanian, 95-96, 103-05, 107
Tatars, 2-3, 40, 44, 45, 58, 59, 87, 100, 224
Taxes, 123, 143, 174, 176. 178. 184, 196
Teachers, 88, 89, 92. 95, 104, 110, 113. 121, 123,
127, 131, 14 0 , 146-47, 153-54. 162-63, 175,
186, 205, 210, 259, 271; association of, 121;
union of, 95; colleges of, 104, 113. 121, 127,
140, 142, 186
Ten Year Plan, 163
Territorial claims: Belorussian, 5, 8. 9, II, 13,
84,9 2 ,94--95.102,107, III. 1I6, 159. 18"9,
205.221,223,232,262; Latvian, 8; Lithuanian,
8. I I, 48-49, 86, 92. 95. 104-05, 159, 222,
250, 279: Polish, 8-11. 47. 68. 70. 7 1 . 76, 92.
95,10,3.106, 111.114,116.120-21,222.248,
250, 279; Russian,s. 8, 13, 66, 91. 116, 222;
Ukrainian, 8, 91, 222
Territory, 2. 4-10, 13-15, 38, 66, 67, 69, 92-95,
98, 102- 0 4, 109. I I I. 1 15-16, 119-20. 138.
156-59. 176. 182, 189, 204, 207. See also
Boundaries
Terrorism, 192-93, 199. See also Guerrillas;
Kube; Underground
Terrorist squads. 193
Textbooks. 3, ,38-39. 4 2 -47, 78, 88, I 13, 127,
147-4 8 . 153-54. 167. 186, 205, 215-16, 238,
257. 259, 275. See also Books; Language;
Publications
Textiles, 34, 35, 167
Theater. 80. 88. 107, III. 113. 131. 133, 140,
150. 15 2 , 160. 167, 186. 205, 210, 219-20;
mystery plays, 26
Tilsit, treaty of, 66
Titoism, 148, 218
Town meetings, 174, 177. 180. See also ?vlir
Trade, 24. 33-35. 40, 44, 48, 132. 14 1 , 163-64,
166, 174. 179, 183; import, 32; export, 35;
peddlers, 24, 34
Transcaucasian Federation, 138
Transport, 8, 19,30-31,36,119,143,152,166,
171, 178, 201, 209. 215. See also Canals;
Railroads
Treaties, international, 112,118,120, 122. 124.
130, 205; of Andrusovo. 3. 62-63; of Riga. 4.
114. Il6-18, 138, 143; of Melnik. 46; of
Tilsit. 66; of Brest Litovsk. 100-01. 103; of
Versailles, II 2. 124. 249, 250; BSSR-RSFSR,
13 8 ; Germany-USSR, 156. 160-61, 207; Lithu-
ania-USSR, 159, 161-62; Poland-Ukraine, 114;
Poland-USSR, 14, 207, 260. See also Foreign
relations
Trud. 86
Turko-}"fongols, 38
TlltejIi. 12, 74, 125. 132. 277; play by J.
Kupala, 143
Ugrians. I
Ulladoi'icy, 126, 145, 157
Ukraine. 2, 22, 40, 47, 52, 62, 71, 82, 93, 99,
100. 106. 110. III, 114. 1I8. 120, 138. 148,
156. 176, 2 1 4-15. 223, 27 2 . 279
Ukrainian SSR. 148, 208
Ukrainians. 2. 5. 8. 22. ,38. 40. 100. 101. 116,
118. 127-29. 141, 192. 198, 215, 260, 269. 277;
federalists, 280; autonomous church, 278. See
also National minorities
Underground: nationalist. 100, II I. I 12. II 5-16.
12 5-27. 133. 135-36, 139, 189-90, 203. 222,
253,267: Communist, 113, lIS. 125-26. 135-36.
180, 185, 192--94, 197, 203, 252, 263; Tatar.
100: Ukrainian, 100, 113; anti-German. 180,
185, 192--94, 197, 203; anti-Polish. 111-13,
115, 125-27, 133. 135-36; anti-Soviet. 99- 1 00,
113, 116, 222, 278. See also Administration;
Guerrillas; Occupation armies: Poland; Ter-
rorist squads; Uprisings

GENERAL INDEX
Unemployment, 53, 167-68, 174, 191. See also
Labor
Uniates, 13, 55-63, 65""768, 130, 246, 253, 278;
union of Florence, 55; union of Brest, 55-56;
persecution of, 67-73; Basilian order, 68-69;
schools, 68; college, 69; dissolution, 69-70.
See also Church; Clergy; Religion
Union of Belorussian Democrats, 97; of the
Belorussian People, 97; of Belorussian Youth, 266
Unitarians, see Sects
United Nations, 4, 214, 221
UNRRA, 210, 272, 274
Uprava, 173, 176, 178-79, 186
Uprisings, III, 113-16, 126-28, 208, 245; anti-
Polish, III, 113-14, 126-28, 208; anti-Soviet,
115-16. See also Underground
USSR, 6, 13, 15, 3 8 , 12 5, 138-39, 14 2 , 145, 149,
153-54, 156, 15 8 , 159, 161-62, 164-65, 168,
170, 176, 197, 20 3-05, 207-19, 222, 225, 259,
260, 272. See also Soviet Union; Soviets
Uzbeks, 277
Uzvyssa: club, 144, 147; periodical, 205
Varangians, 39-41
Vatican, 130, 252
Vele, 4 2 , 57
Veleti, 239
Venedi, Veneti, 38
Versailles, see Treaties
V ertratlellrat, see M llzy daverra
Village, 17- 2 7, 30-33, 36, 39, 119, 12 3- 2 4, 1 2 7,
129, 135-36, 14 1 , 143, ISO, 164-65, 168, 171,
177- 81 ,19 1 -94,196-200,209,211-12,217,
258. See also Peasants
Vilna: Belorussians in, 10-11; conference of, 48,
III; university of, 67, 69, 75, 76, 244; Con-
federation, 93--96; theological seminary, 130;
public library, 241; provisional administration,
260
V olksde'ds"e, 177
War Criminals Trials: Minsk, 212; Nuremberg, 272
\Var devastation, 198-201, 209-10. See also Re-
habilitation
\Varsaw, Grand Duchy of, 66
Welzrdoerfer, see Self-defense
We;ssrutlzell;ell Gelleralbez;rk, 14, 176
'Vest Belorussia, 28, 116-36, 153-69, 175-76,
188-89, 207, 211, 220, 223; incorporation of,
6, 14, 157-69; population, 119, 121, 13 2 , 156,
297
159, 160; economy, 119, 122-23, 132, 136,
155, 158, 161-69; elections, general, 121-22,
12 5-26, 128, 157-60, 163, 165, municipal, 131,
135; Communist Party, 125, 127, 135-36; ad-
ministration, 157-59; National Assembly, 157-
59, 161; Act of Incorporation, 158; kolkhozes,
162, 165-67, 169, 211; public health, 163,
16 7-68
'Vest Russia, 3, 5 1 -64; name, 3; principalities,
40, 43-46; Polonization, 47. See also Grand
Duchy; Northwestern province
\Vestern Powers, see Allied Powers
\Vhite Poland, 120, 125, 248
\Vhite Poles, 13, 125
\Vhite Russia, I, 3-4, 40
White Russians, 4-5, 109
\Vhite Ruthenia, term introduced, 76, 95, I II
\Vhite Ruthenians, 4, 76, 95, I I I
\Voman, role of, 17-18, 20-22, 128, 158, 160,
180, 191-92, 197, 21 3. See also Family; Labor
Working class, 97. See also Proletariat i Workers
'Vorkers, 17, 19, 34-35, 90, 96, 97, 119, 125,
143, 152, 157, 163-65, 168, 245, 271. See also
Proletariat
\Vorkers' Guard, 151
'Vorld Revolution, 13 8 , 139, 145
World War I, 5, 10, II, 38, 88, 92-105, 135, 172
'Vorld \Var II, 4, 16, 25, 26, 4 2 , 106, 134-35,
137, 155-57, 170-206, 208, 21 3, 259, 262, 276
'Vorld Union of Belorussian Emigres, 225
'VrHers, 78-85, 87-<)2, 12 9, 143-47, 150, 153, 162,
165, 167, 2 1 5- 1 9, 224, 257, 261; union 0(, 89,
150-51, 167, 216, 276; association of Proletarian
-, 144. See a/so Literature; National self-
determination
Yalta conference, 272
Yiddish, see Languages
Yugoslavs, 60
Zadrllga, 19-20. See also Family
Zapadno-Russ, 91
Zapoitty, 23. See also l\;Iarriage
Zdo111;k, 20. See also Family
Zemstvo, 97, 99, 108, 233, 247
Zhmud', 120. See also Grand Duchy of Lithuania
Zmalzat;lIe, club, 146
Zolak, society, 95
Zviazda, paper, 213, 215, 218