REVIEW OF THE
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SOVIET GROUND FORCES
JUL 1980
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REVIEW OF

ARTICLES
THE SOVIET
GROUND FORCES
July 1980
The Soviet Tank Battalion — Radio Communications,
Command, and Control
Major John G. Hines.......................    1
Reserve Officer Training
Bill Evans. . ................................     10
Nobody's Perfect
Betsy Bree. . .
12
FEATURES
Unit Focus: The Guards Chapayev Motorized Rifle
Division
Charles A dems ................ .......	13
Tactics, Training, and Equipment - USSR
Betsy Bree............ . . ........
15
Tactics, Training., and Equipment—Non-Soviet Warsaw
Pact Armies
Betsy Bree.	...............................
25
The Soviet Soldier
Betsy Bree. . .
Тек Speks: 30 mm Automatic Grenade Launcher
AGS 17
76-mm Mountain Gun M1966
Paui Fein ............ ...................
Identification Quiz: River Crossing Equipment
Paul Fein
31
QUESTIONNAIRE
.33
GLOSSARY
35
The Review is published by the Soviet/
Warsaw Pact Division, Directorate for
Research, Defense Intelligence Agency to
provide the widest dissemination of
material relating to the Soviet Ground
Forces based upon information from the
Soviet military press and DIA unclassified
works. The reader is cautioned that ar-
ticles from the Soviet press must be read
and interpreted carefully. They are pub-
lished for specific purposes; for example,
to provide good examples for emulation, v*
motivate officers and soldiers to do then
jobs better, to reward outstanding person
nel, and soon. Each article is reviewed b*
the Soviets before publication to insure
that it conforms to official Communist
doctrine, and that each contains an ele-
ment of official Soviet propaganda. But
the material is well worth reading, be-
cause it is an important part of Soviet pro-
fessional literature. Articles translated in
the Review have been carefully selected <e
present a realistic view of the Soviet
Ground Forces.. As much as possible of th»
propaganda content has been screened
and, where necessary, background infor-
mation has been provided to place the
Soviet material in perspective. The So* t-
ets, like many other peoples, tend to «nir
mote about their successes than their fail-
ures. Certain terms, marked in the w **
are defined in the glossary at the end of
this Review.
EDITOR
Betsy Bree
THE SOVIET TANK BATTALION—RADIO COMMUNICATIONS,
COMMAND AND CONTROL
Major John G. Hines
CONTROL MEANS
The radio is the most important of several means of
control available to the Soviet tank unit commander. So-
viet military writers insist that only the speed and flex-
ibility of radio communications can adequately meet the
demands for command and control in modern combined
arms combat. At the same time, they stress the impor-
tance of being able to employ other means of control to'
supplement or —should it be necessary—to replace radio
communications. The Soviets train extensively in the use
of audio and visual signals, pyrotechnics, and “do-as-I-
do” control procedures in conjunction with well-rehears-
ed tactical formations and battle drills.
CONTROL LEVEL
The battalion is the primary unit for the planning and
execution of maneuver in the Soviet tank arm. Consistent
with that organizational concept, control of radio com-
munications is retained at battalion level. When indi-
vidual tank companies operate as part of their parent
battalion, company nets normally will not exist. All of the
battalion tanks (31 or 40), will monitor the battalion
VHF (FM) command net, and receive orders from the
battalion commander. In combat, the battalion com-
mander attempts to maintain a position from which he
can observe and direct the actions of all his companies.
Requests for fire support usually will be initiated and al-
most always coordinated at battalion level. This practice
is facilitated by the collocation of the supporting artillery
Photo 1. Because Soviet tank units normally conduct
assaults in dose formation, it is relatively easy for the
tank battalion commander to keep the entire unit in view.
commander (with fire mission computation capability)
with the tank battalion commander.
Attached units such as a motorized rifle company, an
artillery unit (as large as a battalion), an air defense ele-
ment, and an engineer support element, as well as or-
ganic supply, maintenance, and medical sections, all op-
erate stations in the battalion VHF (FM) command and
coordination net.* These organic support elements nor-
mally do not transmit unless called.
Company commanders also have the authority to
transmit on the battalion nets. They have the authority to
call for supporting fire in combat, but such calls for fire
normally are channeled through the battalion command-
er. While Soviet tactical communications practices seem
rather restrictive by US Army standards, they do appear
to be adequate to accommodate the company command-
er’s limited control authority, which normally is confined
to the maneuver of his company in rehearsed combat for-
mations.
As might be expected, the authority of the platoon
leader is even more restricted. He is not authorized to
transmit on the radio except in an extreme emergency.
He normally will not initiate calls for fire support. This
passive communications posture is consistent with his
role, which is to lead his platoon in the execution of the
company mission. He does not have the responsibility to
translate his superiors’ mission into a platoon mission.
The noncommissioned tank commander can only
monitor and comply with his superiors’ commands and
follow his platoon leader in the execution of the company
mission. He does not have the means to relay targets of
opportunity to fire support units, since he is not issued a
map and does not have the authority to transmit on the
tank radio.
A commander of a company or a platoon, however,
does have greater latitude when his unit is employed as a
reconnaissance group, as a march security detachment,
or is attached to a motorized rifle battalion. For example,
the company commander of a tank company that is rein-
forcing a motorized rifle battalion will operate his own
company VHF (FM) net while maintaining communi-
cations with his parent tank battalion using his HF (AM)
* Figure 1 depicts a variant of a Soviet tank battalion radio net. The diagram is explained in the text that follows.
1
MOTORIZED
RIFLE PLTS
ATTACHED MRC
CMD NET
1 ST BTRY
,	FWD OP
1ST BTRY \
CMD NET
Note: Broken symbol indicates
as-required operation.
1	2	3	4	5	6
COMBAT RECON PATROL	1ST co CDR	2ND CO CDR	3RD CO CDR	ATTACHED MRC CDR	ATTACHED ADA
	1				
7	8	9	10
BN CDR	BN CHIEF OF STAFF	ARTY BN CDR	TECH AFFAIRS OFF
			
* /30\ I ( 130
Radio Receiver
REGT CMD NET #1 (AM)
REGT CMD NET #2 (FM)
ARTY REG/GP CMD NET (AM)
BATTALION
CMD NET (AM)
DISABLED
VEHICLE
COLL PT
Portable FM radio with power amplifier
in a vehicular configuration (R-l 07)
1ST BTRY
FIRE POS
RECOVERY
AND REPAIR
RECOVERY
VEHICLES
Portable FM radio (R-l 07)
CDR
CDR
CDR
DISABLED TANKS AND ICVS
AM (HF) Radio (R-104)
TECHNICAL
SPT NET
ATTACHED
ARTY BN
CMD NET (FM)
Tank with vehicular radio (R-l 23)
(Also may represent a tank-like
vehicle such as the ZSU-23-4)
A command tank with two radios
(R-l30 and R-l23)
|"1 ST BTRY°] 2ND BTRY J 3RD ВТ RY I'-
f= CDR »| CDR । CDR I
"J Armored Personnel Carrier (APC)
or Infantry Combat Vehicle (ICV)
with vehicular radio (R-l23)
X2/A>
1ST TC CMD NET
2ND TC CMD NET ' <123> 1
3RD TC CMD NET | i
------—--------------------4
1 cbrandI
IAIR WARNT
Figure 1. Radio nets, reinforced tank battafion (variant).
Figure 1 is a radio net diagram of a tank battalion to which an entire artillery battalion is attached for support. A
tank battalion normally would be directly supported by an entire artillery battalion if it were fighting in the first
echelon, or if it were operating separately from its parent regiment, as it might in a pursuit operation, or as the
advanced guard battalion of a regiment anticipating a meeting engagement. Otherwise, a tank battalion probably
would be supported by an artillery battery.
radio. The reinforced motorized rifle battalion com-
mander normally will communicate with the reinforcing
tank company on the tank company commander’s net.
RADIO NETS
The variant of a reinforced tank battalion radio net de-
picted in figure 1 roughly approximates the way in which
the Soviets portray radio net structures in their military
journals and books. Each long vertical rectangle drawn
with a broken line represents a command element or sub-
element within (or attached to) the battalion. Each solid
horizontal line represents a single radio net. If a symbol
(diamond, circle, etc.) enclosing a number appears on a
given horizontal line within the broken lines of a given
command element, it means that the command element
routinely operates a radio station (of the type represented
by the number) in that radio net. The identity of the
radio net is written on the horizontal line, and the identi-
ty of the command element or subelement is indicated at
the top of the command column. If the symbol (dia-
mond, circle, etc.) that appears within a command ele-
ment on a radio net line is drawn with a broken line, it
means that the particular command element may operate
in that net either as required, or as an alternative to an-
other net, but that it does not have sufficient radio assets
to operate in the net on a continuous basis.
2
BATTALION COMMAND GROUP
The battalion command group is represented by col-
umns 7 through 10 in figure 1. Within the command
group is the battalion commander (column 7) operating
from his own tank, which also serves as a mobile com-
mand observation post (CP/OP); the battalion chief of
staff (column 8), who operates the battalion command
post from an armored command vehicle; the supporting
artillery battalion commander (column 9), who operates
his battalion command observation post from a box-
bodied van, or an armored command vehicle; and the
deputy commander for technical affairs, who directs
maintenance, recovery, and support operations from an
armored command vehicle or APC. Not shown on the
diagram is a second command truck belonging to the sig-
nal section which serves as a backup command posL It is
equipped with sufficient radio assets to duplicate every
station maintained in the battalion command post, with
the exception of the CBR and air warning net.
The battalion commander (column 7) has two radios in
his tank. One is a VHF (FM) radio, the R123, which is
similar but inferior to the US AN/VRC-12. The R123
can be pretuned to four preset frequencies. The battalion
commander normally will operate the radio on his own
FM command and coordination net (CMD NET #2). He
can switch to the regimental command net (FM) as re-
quired. Should his companies be operating their own
command nets, he is capable of communicating directly
with any subordinate company’s tanks by tuning to that
company’s net. He normally would use the preset capabil-
ity on the R123 radio to reduce the time required to
change frequencies.
Photo 2. A command variant of the T-64 medium tank.
Note the absence of the antiaircraft machinegun.
The other radio in the battalion commander’s tank is
an HF (AM) set, the R130 transceiver, which is roughly
equivalent to the US AN/GRC-106. The battalion com-
mander normally will operate this radio on his own batta-
lion HF (AM) command net (CMD NET #1), in which
only his company commanders and chief of staff may op-
erate. The battalion commander has both command and
technical control of this net. The commander will use his
R130 to operate in the regimental command net (AM) as
required.
Photo 3. East German soldiers establish communications
from the Soviet-produced BTR-50 armored command
vehicle.
The battalion chief of staff (column 8) controls the bat-
talion command post, which is mounted in an armored
command vehicle. He normally has 3 transceivers and 1
receiver in his mobile command post. One is the R130 HF
(AM) transceiver, which he uses to communicate with
regimental headquarters on the regimental command net
(AM). He uses an amplifier-equipped R107 VHF (FM)
transceiver (roughly equivalent to the US AN/PRC-77/
AN/GRC-160/AN/VRC-64 radio family) to communi-
cate with the regiment on the regimental command net
(FM). It appears that the chief of staff has primary re-
sponsibility for maintaining these battalion stations in the
two regimental nets, thereby leaving the battalion com-
mander free to use both his time and his radios to control
the battalion. The chief of staff will use his R130 radio to
Photo 4. BTR-60PU armored command communications
vehicle.
operate in the battalion HF (AM) command net (CMD
NET #1) as required. He operates the net control station
(NCS) of the battalion command and coordination net
(CMD NET #2) using the R123 VHF (FM) radio in his CP
vehicle. Finally, the chief of staff maintains the only bat-
talion station in the higher headquarters CBR and air
warning net, using the R311 radio receiver HF (AM),
roughly equivalent to the now-obsolete US AN/GRR-8.
He retransmits any warning messages on the battalion
FM command and coordination net (CMD NET #2).
The attached artillery battalion commander (column
9) operates a station in the tank battalion command and
coordination net, (CMD NET #2) using an amplifier-
equipped R107. He rarely transmits on the net, because
he is normally collocated with the tank battalion com-
mander. He communicates with his own higher head-
quarters on the artillery regiment AM command net us-
ing an R104 HF (AM) radio, which is similar to the US
AN/GRC-9 in its operational and technical character-
istics.
Photo 5. BTP 60PU interior view—a possible command
post for the tank battalion chief of staff.
The artillery battalion commander operates his own
command net using another R107 (FM) radio equipped
with a power amplifier. Not shown in the diagram is the
battalion fire direction net, which is controlled by the
battalion fire direction center.
The last element to be considered within the battalion
command group is the deputy commander for technical
affairs. As the senior officer in the battalion support
group, he maintains a station in the battalion FM com-
mand and coordination net (CMD NET #2) using an
R123 vehicular FM radio. He also uses a second R123 to
control the battalion technical support net. Battalion
repair and recovery elements also monitor this net, and
disabled tanks and other vehicles may tune to the net to
request assistance.
SUBORDINATE COMMAND ELEMENTS
The principal subordinate command elements of the
reinforced tank battalion are shown on the left side of the
diagram. Each of the tank company commanders (col-
umns 2, 3, and 4) has two radios in his tank. He uses his
R130 HF (AM) vehicular radio to operate in the battalion
AM command net (CMD NET #1). He operates in the
battalion FM command and coordination net (CMD
NET #2) on his second radio, the R123. Unlike most
other subordinate stations, he has permission to transmit
in the net. Under exceptional circumstances, such as
when the battalion is widely dispersed in a pursuit opera-
tion, he may use the R123 to control his own FM net, in
which case his only radio link with the battalion would be
the AM command net (CMD NET #1). The company net
alternative is depicted by broken lines within each com-
pany command element. Each tank below company level
is normally equipped with only one radio, the R123 VHF
(FM).
The commander of the attached motorized rifle com-
pany (column 5) has two VHF (FM) radios in his ACV or
APC. He uses his R123 to communicate with the support-
ed tank battalion commander on the FM battalion com-
mand and coordination net (CMD NET #2). He controls
his own company net using the R107 VHF (FM) radio in
his vehicle.
Air defense elements and the combat reconnaissance
patrol, normally composed of a tank platoon, (columns 1
and 6) both operate in the battalion FM command and
coordination net (CMD NET #2).
Depicted within each company command element (col-
umns 2, 3, and 4) is an artillery battery command obser-
vation post (CP/OP). Normally, the battery commander
4
is collocated with the commander of the tank company
that he is tasked to support, and communications be-
tween the two commanders are accomplished face to
face. The battery commander maintains radio communi-
cations with his battalion commander on the artillery
battalion command net (FM) using an R107 radio. He
uses a second R107 to communicate with his own battery
firing position, and forward observation post (depicted
on the diagram for the first battery only) on his own bat-
tery FM command net.
Photo 6. The commander of the artillery unit supporting
the Soviet maneuver battalion probably has his command
observation post in a version of the artillery command
and reconnaissance vehicle (ACRV) pictured here.
While fire requests generated by the tank company
normally are coordinated at battalion level, Soviet artil-
lery doctrine and organization do provide for direct re-
sponse to company-level fire requests which can be passed
through the supporting battery commander to his firing
battery over the nets shown here. The degree of central-
ization of fire support coordination will be dictated by the
combat situation as reflected in the task organization and
combat orders.
RADIO SECURITY
It is apparent from Soviet military journals and news-
papers that the Soviets do not employ secure-voice equip-
ment on their tactical radio nets below regiment level in
sufficient quantities to be operationally significant. From
platoon to regiment level, commands routinely are trans-
mitted by radio in clear text during combat.
Stations are identified by call signs that are issued in
the communications operating instructions, which are
similar in function to US Army communications and elec-
tronics operating instructions (CEOI). They are compiled
by the battalion communications platoon leader (a lieute-
nant) from a block of frequencies and call signs issued to
the battalion by the regimental signal officer, called the
“chief of communications” by the Soviets. Each radio net
“item” thus created normally remains in effect for the
duration of the operation.
Place names are identified on the radio using code
names assigned to major terrain features by the battalion
commander during the ground reconnaissance phase of a
combat operation. This local encoding process may be
supplemented by an encoded map reference grid system.
Pyrotechnic tables and brevity codes also are generated
locally, although some code assignments may come from
higher headquarters.
Most information is disseminated orally by the batta-
lion commander and the communications platoon leader
during the ground reconnaissance, which normally pre-
cedes every operation. At that time, the battalion officers
record on their maps code names, frequencies, call signs,
and perhaps even a simple radio net diagram. For ob-
vious reasons, the Soviets call the map the officers’ “en-
coded map,” or “encoded working map.”
The Soviets strive to maintain strict radio discipline. In
the defense, they communicate by wire whenever possi-
ble. In the offense, they maintain radio silence until the
outbreak of battle, when those authorized to transmit
may do so “without restriction.” In an offensive operation
against a defending enemy, the battle is considered to
have begun with artillery preparation. In the “meeting
engagement,” where opposing forces move toward each
other in column, radio silence is lifted as soon as any ele-
ment of the Soviet advancing force, other than the com-
bat reconnaissance patrol, makes enemy contact.
THE RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS
OF SOVIET SYSTEMS
A US combat arms or combat communications and
electronics officer must exercise caution when evaluating
the radio communications of the Soviet tank battalion.
Inevitably, he will compare it to the systems employed in
the US tank battalion, and while such a comparison is
useful, it also can be misleading.
In the US tank battalion, each platoon has its own FM
radio net, whereas the Soviets have a single radio net for
the entire battalion. The standard radio in US command
tanks, the AN/VRC-12, has 10 motor-driven pushbutton
frequency presets, and frequency selection and push-to-
talk transmit capability can be remoted to stations
throughout the tank. By comparison, the Soviet R123 has
four presets, frequency selection cannot be remoted, and
only the tank commander (TC) and gunner are able to
transmit on the radio.
5
US armor commanders can talk secure on their FM
nets down to company level, whereas the Soviets appear
to have no secure-voice capability below regiment. The
US also has computer-assisted production and distribu-
tion of low-level codes and CEOI material, which is issued
in hard copy to every radio subscriber. Because of auto-
mation, US units are able to change frequencies and call
signs more often than once a day. The Soviets rely heavily
on what most cryptographers would consider to be
“home-made” codes and primitive production methods.
Partly because they do not have automated frequency
management and CEOI production and distribution, the
Soviet tank battalion must operate on the same frequen-
cies for the duration of an operation that could last sev-
eral days.
US combined-arms doctrine provides for coordination
by radio between tanks and reinforcing infantry, down to
company and even platoon level, whereas the Soviet radio
communications system does not allow the tank company
commander to coordinate directly with reinforcing, dis-
mounted infantry on the radio. He must communicate
through his battalion, or use means other than the radio.
In the US tank battalion, the noncommissioned tank
commander can pass target information back to the artil-
lery forward observer at company level. The Soviets are
considerably less flexible, since only officers at company
level normally may initiate fire requests, and in many in-
stances the requests are approved and/or coordinated at
battalion level.
Photo 7. Tank Commanders normally do not have direct
radio communications with supporting infantry at
company and platoon levels.
The US Army has communications technology superior
to that of the Soviets and it has the organizational flex-
ibility to better use that technology to apply combat
power against an enemy force. However, it is suggested
that US advantages in advanced technology and organ-
izational flexibility are offset somewhat by the Soviets’ su-
periority in numbers. In fact, the much greater cen-
tralization of control of Soviet radio communications and
the leaders who use them could be seen to reflect the rela-
tively greater density of tanks and troops the Soviets will
be able to deploy against enemy forces. They control the
fire and maneuver of a reinforced tank battalion with
about the same degree of centralization that the US ap-
plies to the control of a tank-heavy company team.
Whether it is by accident, design, or tradition, the lowest
level to which the Soviets allocate true command and
control authority seems to anticipate the advantageous
force ratios they would be likely to enjoy in a confronta-
tion with US divisions in Central Europe. It is likely that a
Soviet tank battalion might be opposed by a unit no larg-
er than a US tank company —and perhaps even a pla-
toon.
Finally, US technological superiority must be evaluated
in light of the chaotic electromagnetic environment that
will characterize tomorrow’s battlefield. The uninten-
tional radio interference generated within each force,
and inadvertently against opposing forces, is likely to be
of such intensity that radio communications may be vir-
tually impossible. It is difficult to imagine how many
radio emitters will be operating at one time in a relatively
confined geographical area in support of modern com-
bat—certainly many times the number used during
World War II. There will be thousands of tactical AM
and FM radios operating on the ground and in the air-
space over the battlefield. The atmosphere will be sat-
urated with emissions from ground surveillance and anti-
aircraft radar, multichannel VHF and UHF radio relay
systems, electronic guidance links, as well as from the
transmitters on thousands of small unattended electronic
sensors, many of which will be transmitting almost con-
tinuously. These many thousands of devices will be using
roughly the same sector of the frequency spectrum. *
In addition the effects of nuclear weapons (should they
be employed) on radio communications must be consid-
ered. “Nuclear blackout,” caused by the atmospheric ion-
ization induced by a nuclear explosion, will temporarily
disrupt most radio communications in the vicinity of the
detonation. Moreover, a nuclear explosion produces a
powerful burst of radio frequency energy called electro-
magnetic pulse (EMP), which is induced primarily by the
gamma component of nuclear radiation. EMP will
render much of the target forces’ radio equipment, par-
ticularly solid-state systems, inoperable and often
unrepairable over an area far larger than that affected by
* Soviet and US tactical radios actually overlap by 22 MHz (approximately 220 channels) in the VHF (FM) band and almost 10 MHz in the HF (AM)
band. Interference from the intermodulation and harmonics of active frequencies is at least as troublesome as the direct interference that will inevitably
result from such unplanned frequency “sharing.”
6
the heat and blast of the detonated weapon.
Notwithstanding unintentional and incidental interfer-
ence, which could nearly obliterate radio communica-
tions, opposing forces will direct their high-powered jam-
mers against each other’s nets. The cumulative effect of
all of this electromagnetic activity is likely to be the vir-
tual elimination of radio communications in the forward
areas for extended periods of time. In such an environ-
ment, the tank battalion that is best able to communicate
by means other than radio will tend to suffer the least re-
duction in its combat effectiveness.
The Soviets should not be drawn “ten feet tall” in the
area of combat communications and command and con-
trol. They are not. They are limited by the relative inflex-
ibility of their organizational structure and the commun-
ications systems that support that structure. They are
more than 10 years behind the US in many areas of ap-
plied communications technology. At the same time, US
military planners cannot afford to be complacent. Soviet
command, control, and communications practices, how-
ever inflexible and overly centralized they appear to be,
are designed to control a very large army. The very size of
their ground forces permits the Soviets to be less con-
cerned than the US about the improved economy of force
that tends to accrue from the application of more sophis-
ticated systems. Furthermore, the US advantage in com-
munications technology may, in a large part, be cancel-
led by the very intensity and volume of electromagnetic
activity characteristic of modern combat.
APPENDIX
The R123M is one of the Soviet Army’s newest frequen-
cy modulated (FM) radios. It fills much the same role in
the Soviet Army as the AN/VRC-12 series of radios does
in the US Army. The R123 is rugged and reliable, but is
nonetheless inferior to its US equivalent in some respects.
It can be preset to only 4 frequencies, whereas the AN/
VRC-12 can be preset to 10. Unlike the US system, the
R123 has no auxiliary receiver component, thereby re-
ducing the system’s overall flexibility. R123 procedures
for preset frequency tuning and antenna loading are
somewhat more complicated and subject to operator er-
ror than the AN/VRC-12. The AN/VRC-12 series has a
more sophisticated squelch circuit, which would enable
US radio users to communicate with less likelihood of in-
advertent interference from Warsaw Pact radio stations.
Warsaw Pact forces, however, would hear many NATO
transmissions whether they would want to or not.
Appendix Photo 1. R123M
TRANSCEIVER R-123 M
FRONT PANEL
1.	Deviation Adjustment
2.	Squelch Control
3.	Mode Selector
4.	Index Adjusting Screw
5.	Frequency Dial Window
6.	Preset Locking Screws
7.	R F Indicator Lamp
8.	Antenna Loading Control
9.	Preset Channel Indicator
10.	Preset Channel Selector Switch
11.	Indicator Meter
13.	Volume Control
14.	Band Selector Switch
15.	Drum Access Cover
16	Intercom P—174 Connector
17.	Calibration Adjustment
18	Power Switch
19	Power Input Connector
20	Tone Control
21.	Dial Light Switch
22.	Frequency Tuning Control
23.	Operate Switch
12	Band Indicator
Appendix Photo 2.
When operated in the “carrier noise activated squelch”
position, several US radios can be netted with the R123.
These include the AN/VRC-12 series, the AN/GRC-160
(which includes the AN/PRC-77 and AN/VRC-64), and
the AN/PRC-88.
CHARACTERISTICS Modulation	Frequency
Frequency Range	20-51.5 MHz
Channel Spacing	25 KHz
Tuning	Continuous
Number of Channels	1261
Presets	4
Power Output (RF)	20-30 watts
Antennas	4-meter whip and 10-meter telescopic
Planning Range	10-36 miles (depending upon antenna used)
Squelch	Carrier noise operated
Power Requirement	24 VDC (through an intermediate power supply)
Dimensions	43 cm wide; 20 cm high; 21 cm deep
Weight	22 kg
Appendix Photo 3. R130
The R130 is probably the most recently deployed
amplitude modulated (AM) single sideband (SSB) tacti-
cal radio in use in the Soviet Ground Forces. It is designed
for installation in armored vehicles, including tanks and
various configurations of armored mobile command cen-
ters. It can provide AM voice, Morse, and teletype com-
munications.
The R130 is similar to the US AN/GRC-106 in its tech-
nical and operational characteristics. The major differ-
ences between the Soviet and US systems are in the fre-
quency range and number of operating channels. The
AN/GRC-106 has 28,000 to 280,000 channels (depend-
ing upon the mode of operation) extending over a fre-
quency range of almost 30 megaherz (from 2.0 to 29.999
MHz). The R130 has only 950 channels and a frequency
range of less than 10 megaherz (from 1.5 to 10.99 MHz).
Because the US radio makes greater use of transistors and
printed circuitry, it is physically much smaller than the
Soviet system. It is probable that several US AM radios,
including the AN/GRC-106 would net with the R130.
The R130 is replacing the older R112 AM radio set,
which is still used in many Soviet tank units.
CHARACTERISTICS Modulation	Amplitude
Frequency Range	1.5 to 10.990 MHz (10 bands)
Channel Spacing	10 KHz
Tuning	Continuous
Number of Channels	950
Presets	Yes (number unknown)
Power Output (RF)	12 to 40 watts
Antennas	Whip, dipole, inclined beam
Planning Range	12 to 31 miles, with 4-meter rod antenna. Up to 220 miles using directional antennas.
Power Requirement Dimensions	26 VDC
Transceiver	80 cm wide; 50 cm high; 50 cm deep
Power Supply	60 cm wide; 10 cm high; 50 cm deep
Appendix Photo 4. R124
The R124 is the newest vehicular intercommunications
system in the Soviet Army. It is a completely transistoriz-
ed system consisting of an A-l main junction box, an A-2
control box, one or more A-3 interconnecting and A-4
terminating boxes, and interconnecting cables. A vehicle
commander has access to the intercom and vehicular
radios through the A-l main junction box, and a second
vehicle crew member, normally the gunner in a tank, has
the same access through the A-2 control box. Other crew
members have access to the intercom (but not the radios)
using the A-3 and A-4 boxes. The number of A-3 and A-4
boxes is determined by the type of vehicle in which the
R124 is installed. Each box has a receptacle to connect
the standard Soviet combat vehicle communications
8
(CVC) helmet. Power is obtained from the vehicle’s 24-
volt DC distribution system.
The R124 has three modes of operation: intravehicular
communications, AM radio (R130), and FM radio
(R123). Either the A-l or A-2 box may be used to select a
mode of operation, and since there are two control boxes,
two different modes may be used simultaneously. There is
a six-pin female receptacle, the equivalent of an A-4 ter-
minating box, on the Soviet armored vehicle’s exterior.
This receptacle is used to provide access to the R124 sys-
tem from outside the vehicle.
The R124 is durable, solidly constructed, and easy to
operate. Replacement of the few external parts (knobs,
fuses, etc.) can be easily accomplished by any crew mem-
ber. Serious equipment failures are difficult and time-
consuming to repair, because all wires in the intercon-
necting cables are soldered directly to internal connecting
points within the individual boxes. Because cable connec-
tors are not used (as they are on US equipment), the re-
placement of a defective control box or cable could take a
skilled electronics repairman several hours to complete.
The R124 is comparable to the AN/VIC-1 intercom-
munication system used in US Army armored vehicles.
The US system, however, is far more versatile in its opera-
tional characteristics, and far easier to repair. New Soviet
armored vehicles produced for both Soviet use and export
are equipped with the R124.
9
SOVIET RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING
Bill Evans
Г
In contrast to the US Army,* only up to 10 percent of
the total number of active-duty Soviet officers (ranking
from junior lieutenant up to major) graduated from re-
serve officer training programs (the Soviet equivalent of
ROTC) at civilian institutions of higher education. (Most
Soviet active-duty officers are graduates of military col-
leges.) It is estimated that the number of new Soviet re-
serve officers available for active-duty callup each year
exceeds 40,000. Soviet sources suggest, however, that only
15,000-20,000 reserve officers are actually called up for
active duty. Thus, over half of all new officers commis-
sioned yearly through the Soviet reserve officer training
system remain in the reserves.
A Ministry of Defense department establishes the re-
serve officer training curricula for Soviet institutions’
military departments. Training activities for reserve offi-
cer candidates are also coordinated with DOSAAF, near-
by military installations, local military commissariats
(draft boards), and civil defense organizations.
Military departments are required to produce qualified
specialists who meet Soviet Armed Forces’ performance
standards. First-year students must complete an indi-
vidual basic training course, which includes arms regula-
tions and training, military tactics, engineering, military
topography, and marksmanship with individual weap-
ons, which continues through the second year. Advanced
tactics, technical, and specialized training begin in the
student’s third year or sixth semester, and are continued
until graduation.
All military instruction is given on a designated day
each week. Students are required to be in uniform and
must observe army regulations with both their peers and
instructing officers. There are 6 hours of classes, then a
short lunch break, which is followed by 2 hours of group
study that includes political indoctrination and indi-
vidual review of the material presented in the previous
classes.
Group study is followed by drill training, where stu-
dents develop military bearing and command voice, and
practice training subordinate personnel. They take turns
in command positions to develop their skills in controlling
platoon formations. Those older students who have com-
pleted their 2-year obligatory service as enlisted men in
the Soviet Armed Forces are consulted during drill train-
ing. All members of an institution’s military department
participate in a monthly drill parade.
After drill training, 2 more hours of activity are sched-
uled for political instruction and student maintenance of
weapons and equipment. Thus, during the course of this
one day, students are given a taste of real active service.
In addition to the training they receive during the
school year, students also undergo field training for a pe-
riod of several weeks to a month during the summer at
military installations throughout the Soviet Union. Dur-
ing this time they participate in field exercises to develop
the skills required for leading motorized rifle and tank
units as large as battalion. They drill with weapons and
equipment and have an opportunity to apply training
they received previously in the tactical employment of
troops.
During field training exercises, instructors attempt to
create realistic combat conditions by employing elec-
tronic equipment capable of simulating the light and
sound of combat operations. Students also train at night
to become accustomed to conducting combat operations
under conditions of poor visibility.
Field training is considered to be an important instruc-
tional tool, and a significant portion of it is held in major
field training areas or in the training centers of nearby ar-
my units or military schools. Since the majority of the
military faculty members from civilian institutions are
regularly involved in the tactical exercises, maneuvers,
and command and staff war games routinely conducted
by the local military districts’ regular units, students
benefit indirectly from the close cooperation between
their military instructors and the officers who staff the
training areas located near their schools.
Socialist competition is widely used as a training tool to
help monitor student performance and develop initiative.
Each student unit’s performance in socialist competitions
is analyzed on daily, weekly, and monthly bases, with
competition winners announced at the semester’s end. To
further develop initiative, prizes such as special cer-
tificates or monetary awards are presented to those who
* Approximately 13 percent of the total number of commissioned US Army officers on active duty are West Point graduates, about 57 percent of the
total number of commissioned US Army officers on active duty received commissions through ROTC, and the remaining 30 percent came from OCS or
direct appointment.
10
have done especially well.
The Soviets consider the training of fully qualified re-
serve officers to be an important goal. To meet this objec-
tive in nonmilitary educational institutions, they strive to
model military training as closely as possible on that con-
ducted in the regular Armed Forces. The Soviet military
press, however, has estimated that quality of “civilian”
reserve officers to be substandard in the following areas:
•	Leadership and management skills.
•	Knowledge of weapons and military equipment.
•	Instructional ability in both practical and military
fields.
•	Ability to apply acquired skills.
Nevertheless, the Soviets appear to be determined to im-
prove and gradually expand reserve officer training at in-
stitutions of higher education, and thus to insure that
plentiful numbers of reserve officers are available for pos-
sible future mobilization.
11
NOBODY'S PERFECT
Betsy Bree
The front page of Red Star usually contains press re-
ports praising outstanding combat performances by arm-
ed forces units participating in training exercises. As a
government-controlled publication, Red Star’s goal is to
provide good training examples to further improve and
promote the combat readiness of officers, warrant offi-
cers, NCOs, and soldiers.
This does not mean that criticism is absent from Red
Star or other Soviet military publications. Articles or es-
says which critique the training performance of a partic-
ular unit or units appear occasionally in the Soviet mili-
tary press. Deficiencies are exposed, guilty parties are ad-
monished, and authors attempt to provide solutions to
training problems, often citing another unit’s good per-
formance for contrast.
There are limitations to the type of criticism allowed in
these articles. For example, illustrations or photographs
of weaknesses are never shown, and equipment shortcom-
ings are never discussed. Training exercises are not de-
scribed in detail, although junior commanding officers
are personally identified by name. Yet, the status quo is
carefully maintained, and criticism is carefully worded so
as not to imply any widespread incompetency.
A random selection of Red Star articles revealed that a
variety of units and officers were criticized for mediocre
showings in training exercises and socialist competitions.
For example, in an article entitled “A Difficult Unit,”
taken from the 28 December 1979 issue of Red Star, the
author, a major, discussed certain problems in a tele-
graph communications unit during the first few weeks of
the winter training period. It appeared that trouble arose
when the time schedule for a particularly difficult and
important training exercise was arbitrarily substituted
with another exercise, thus “disrupting” training. This
was due to the negligence of the commanding officer, a
captain, who had prepared the exercise, but then handed
its execution over to a “less than prepared” sergeant, who
could not carry it through. Thus, the commanding offi-
cer neglected his training responsibilities.
The author noted that the same unit’s performance
had dropped below last year’s levels. Because even small
errors detract from the performance of a communica-
tions unit, it would therefore be more important for each
telegraph operator to be highly trained and motivated.
The responsibility for insuring precision lies with the unit
commander, who in this case, did not achieve his objec-
tive. The author noted that the unit commander did not
monitor subordinate officers’ training methods, neglect-
ed his soldiers’ morale by not including patriotic slogans
in training, and did not give individual attention to those
soldiers who were having difficulty operating the com-
munications equipment. In contrast, another unit, led by
an officer who showed concern and interest in the indi-
vidual soldier, was highly motivated and performed suc-
cessfully. This article concluded with a warning to the
unfortunate captain that much would be expected from
him in the future.
A 2 February 1980 Red Star article entitled “How
Strong Is the Enemy?” probed the shortcomings of air de-
fense batteries with regard to portrayals of realistic sim-
ulated combat conditions. For example, simulation of the
enemy air threat was unrealistic and did not adequately
challenge the tactical skills of the unit. The consequences
of these weaknesses were presented by the article’s author,
an artillery major general, in a variety of unit scenarios,
where laxity, miscalculation, lack of unit communication
and coordination, and an overall reduction in combat ef-
fectiveness were evident, and resulted in low marks given
to the units concerned.
The author placed the blame squarely on those battery
commanders who had failed to carefully organize combat
training, to inject the proper note of urgency into train-
ing exercises, to closely supervise simulated battle condi-
tions, and to demand a maximum effort from their sol-
diers. Another problem was that some commanders at-
tempted to achieve higher evaluations for their units by
deliberately keeping the air threat as weak as possible.
The author stated that the evaluations were meaningless,
and that offenders would receive sharp reprimands and
critique sessions at party meetings.
Various means of portraying a realistic air threat were
mentioned in the article. But the author stressed that the
commanders had to personally insure the adequacy of air
defense artillery training. This meant that each indi-
vidual crew member’s performance must be monitored
and corrected if necessary. In addition, the commander
must draw upon his own experience and resourcefulness
to establish a realistic combat environment and to
achieve the desired results.
The use of criticism in Red Star is part of a continuing
effort to upgrade, perfect, and correct shortcomings in
training. It seeks to reinstate purpose and a renewed de-
sire to achieve training success.
12
UNIT FOCUS
THE GUARDS CHAPAYEV MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION
Charles Adams
Vasiliy Ivanovich Chapayev was one of the legendary
folk heroes of the Russian Civil War of 1918-20. Since his
death in action in 1919, two Soviet infantry divisions have
had the honor of bearing his name.
Photo 1. Division Commander V.l. Chapayev, 1887-1919.
Chapayev was born in 1887 to a poor peasant family
living in the Volga River region. During World War I he
served in the Imperial Russian Army (1914-17), was dec-
orated for valor three times with the St. George Cross and
rose from private to warrant officer—the highest NCO
ranks in the Imperial Army.
In September 1917, following the collapse of the Czar’s
government, Chapayev joined the Communist Party and
began his remarkable, though brief, career in the Soviets’
Red Army. During the next year he commanded a series
of volunteer units and fought several actions against anti-
Communist forces. His commands included the 138th
Reserve Infantry Regiment, a Red Guards detachment, a
brigade, and the 2d Nikolaevsk Division.
November 1918 found Chapayev in Moscow attending
the first course of the newly organized General Staff
Academy. But 3 months later, at his own request, he was
back at the front commanding a brigade.
In April 1919, Chapayev was given command of the
25th Rifle Division, which he had helped raise and organ-
ize the previous year. The division had been formed as
the 1st Nikolaevsk Division, a volunteer unit; in Novem-
ber 1918 it was mustered into the regular army as the
25th. In less than 5 years Chapayev had risen from pri-
vate to commander of a regular division —equivalent to
the rank of major general!
The 25th Rifle Division distinguished itself in several
major actions against Admiral Kolchak’s anti-Com-
munist forces, and Chapayev’s reputation as a bold and
successful commander was growing rapidly. Unfortunate-
ly, his luck was soon to run out.
In the predawn hours of 5 September 1919, a White
Guards unit launched a violent surprise attack on the
25th Division’s headquarters. Division Commander V. I.
Chapayev was mortally wounded; he died shortly after-
ward, while the battle was still raging.
One month after Chapayev’s death, the division was re-
named the 25th Chapayev Rifle Division.
After the war, the 25th remained on active status and
was stationed in the Ukraine until the approach of World
War II. In 1928, on the Red Army’s 10th anniversary, the
division was awarded the Honorary Revolutionary Red
Banner. In 1933 it was awarded the Order of Lenin.
Although information on this point is scarce, it appears
that the 25th was one of several Ukrainian divisions mov-
ed north in 1939-40 for the “Winter War” with Finland.
Following that brief war, the division returned to the
Ukraine.
The Soviets entered World War II on 22 June 1941,
when Germany launched a massive attack on the Soviet
Union. The 25th Chapayev Rifle Division fought hero-
ically against the German onslaught. It participated in
the defense of the Ukrainian port city Odessa, but was
withdrawn to the Crimean Peninsula, where it defended
the port city Sevastopol.
By July 1942 the situation at Sevastopol had become
hopeless, and Stalin’s Supreme Headquarters ordered the
Sevastopol garrison to withdraw. But the Chapayev Divi-
sion, commanded by Major General T. K. Kolomiyets,
fought on —literally to the death.
13
Photo 2. Early 1942: a gun crew of the 25th Chapayev
Division assists in the defense of Sevastopol.
While the 25th Chapayev Rifle Division was dying-, its
successor was being born.
In late 1941 the 71st Naval Infantry Brigade was form-
ed at Novosibirsk from sailors of the Pacific Ocean Fleet.
It subsequently fought well in the defense of Moscow and
was redesignated the 2d Guards Naval Infantry Brigade.
Photo 3. A naval infantry unit conducts reconnaissance
in 1942.
Shortly afterward, in April-May 1942, the brigade was
used as the basis for forming the 25th Guards Rifle Divi-
sion. The major combat elements of this new division
were the 73d, 78th, and 81st Guards Rifle Regiments,
and the 53d Guards Artillery Regiment.
During the rest of the war, the division fought across
southwestern Russia, the Ukraine, Moldavia, Hungary,
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. On Victory in Europe
Day, it was in the Prague area.
The 25th Guards Rifle Division’s combat performance
was recognized by several additional awards: the Order of
the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov, the Order of Bog-
dan Khmelnitskiy, and the honorific names Sinelnikovo
and Budapest. Some 8,000 of the division’s officers and
men were decorated; 77 of them were awarded the honor-
ary title Hero of the Soviet Union.
After the war, the division was assigned to the Kiev
Military District in the Ukraine. In the late 1950s it was
reorganized as a motorized rifle division.
In 1964 the Ministry of Defense awarded the division
the honorific name V. I. Chapayev and gave it the re-
sponsibility for perpetuating the memory and combat
traditions of the legendary commander and his famous
25th Chapayev Rifle Division.
Today, the Guards Chapayev Motorized Rifle Division
carries out this responsibility as the “show” division of the
Kiev Military District.
Photo 4. Some modern "Chapayevites”: a Guards Senior
Lieutenant Platoon Leader and his men.
Photo 5. the Guards Chapayev Motorized Rifle Division
conducts field training in early 1980.
14
TACTICS, TRAINING, AND EQUIPMENT—USSR
The material presented in this section stems from a broad review of articles appearing in Soviet
military publications. Information on Soviet equipment is based upon current DIA data.
COMBAT ARMS	aid. A map showing only the terrain features has been
The following is a paraphrased translation of an article added to give an appreciation of the area that is to be de-
that appeared in the January 1980 issue of Military Her- fended.
A MOTORIZED RIFLE PLATOON IN THE DEFENSE
Col. I. Ershov
While a motorized rifle platoon usual-
ly establishes its defensive position as part
of its parent company’s defense, it also
may receive an independent mission. For
example, a platoon may be tasked to es-
tablish an ambush, function as a combat
security element, or act as the battalion
reserve. The situation will determine
whether the platoon will have to assume
defensive positions either when not in
contact with the enemy or when under
enemy fire.
Clearly, establishment of a defensive
position in the latter instance is more
complicated. The organization of the en-
tire operation must be carried out under
constant enemy pressure, while subunits*
are forced to change their battle forma-
tions and move from one sector to an-
other. Because the probable enemy now
has a variety of means of combat recon-
naissance at his disposal, this is extremely
difficult to do without being detected. At
times it is simply impossible. Conse-
quently, transition to the defensive under
such conditions demands skill and re-
sourcefulness from the commander, and
organization, discipline, and speed of ac-
tion from the troops.
Whenever going over to the defense,
the platoon leader studies his mission and
makes an estimate of the situation.
Through this process, he clarifies in his
own mind the type of terrain his platoon
must hold, the most likely avenues of at-
tack for enemy tanks and mechanized in-
fantry, the optimum distance of the en-
emy troops from his defensive positions
when taken under fire by his platoon,
and the distances of the enemy forma-
tions from his platoon when his senior
commander takes them under fire. An
officer with a well-grounded knowledge
of tactics as well as practical experience is
better able to make the best decision and
pass clear, accurate assignments to his
subordinates.
In a tactical exercise involving the pur-
suit of a retreating enemy (figure 2), the
1st Motorized Rifle Platoon, commanded
by Lt V. Timofeev, reached the western
slopes of hills Malaya and Ovalnaya by
151400 July, when they came under
heavy artillery fire. After several min-
utes, the enemy counterattacked. On Lt
Timofeev’s order, the platoon quickly de-
ployed and, together with neighboring
subunits, prepared to repel the counter-
attack. Several enemy tanks were set
ablaze by supporting fire of the com-
pany’s artillery and antitank weapons,
but five enemy combat vehicles reached
cover on hill Pologaya and began firing
at the platoon. At this point, the com-
pany commander radioed that up to a
company of tanks was moving from
Borovo (off the diagram, 5 km west of
hill Pologaya') and ordered the platoon to
go over to the defense in its present loca-
tion.
Initially, Lt Timofeev intended to as-
semble his squad commanders and assign
* In the Soviet Army, a subunit (podrazdelenie) refers to any unit of battalion size and smaller that is subordinate to a regiment. In this case, the term
refers to platoons and squads.
15
ROCKS
R. PT. 4
H ILL
CUT-OVER FOREST
"BOB
OR. PT. 5
. 3E
BARN
FOREST
Enemy tank platoon in attack
Small hill
Anticipated/ proposed direction of attack____
Friendly defensive line
Enemy defensive line,
Primary direction of fire (friendly)
Enemy recoilless rifle
Secondary direction office (friendly)
Situation at 1 5:50
Friendly tank, APC
Friendly APC in supplemental support
Situation at 1 6:30
Situation at 1 6:50
Enemy tank, APC
Situation at 1 7:50
Enemy tank platoon in combat formation
Situation at 1 8:30
Enemy APC platoon in combat formation
Figure 2.
OR.
PT. 3
NCEN ; n,.TED
FOREST
"KRUGLAYA"
CONCENTRATED
F RE NO. 2
H LL
"LYSAYA"
Depression, hole, trench
Friendly Company Commander's command observation post
Friendly Platoon Leader's command observation post
Friendly heavy machinegun
OR. PT. 1
ENCLOSURE
STONE BARN
CONCENTRATED
FIRE NO. 1
2ND. MOTORIZED
RIFLE PLATOON
2ND. MOTORIZED
RIFLE SQUAD
1ST. MOTORIZED
RIFLE SQUAD
1ST. MOTORIZED
RIFLE PLATOON
3RD. MOTORIZED
FIRE NO. 3
3RD. MOTORIZED
RIFLE PLATOON
BUSHES
16
them missions, but a heavy machinegun
suddenly opened fire on the platoon from
the southeast slope of hill Pologaya, and
a recoilless rifle opened fire from the area
of the livestock pen. In addition, the pla-
toon’s 3d Squad came under enemy mor-
tar fire. He had to abandon his original
plans and immediately pass the mission
to his squads to destroy existing enemy
targets and to fortify their present posi-
tions.
It is obvious that initially the platoon
leader was so preoccupied with the ongo-
ing battle and that he had no chance to
fully evaluate the situation. But when his
platoon had managed to destroy the tar-
gets that posed the immediate threat, he
did not wait for a specific mission. In-
stead, he carefully studied the terrain
and the enemy and friendly situation.
The lieutenant knew that a platoon in
the defense is normally assigned a strong-
point up to 400 meters wide and up to
300 meters deep. In sizing up the imme-
diate situation, he concluded that his
platoon could defend a frontage of up to
500 meters. Terrain features in the area,
in particular hill Malaya, covered with
shell holes, and the river Melky (on his
left flank) favored the defense. If the pla-
toon leader were to ignore the advan-
tages offered by the terrain and restrict
himself to the “text-book” dimensions of
a platoon strongpoint, he would waste a
lot of time and effort on defensive fortifi-
cations and would wind up with a less ef-
fective system of defensive fires.
At 1430 the company commander ar-
rived at the platoon’s position. He listen-
ed to Lt Timofeev’s report and agreed
with most of his suggestions. He then
identified reference points to the lieuten-
ant, gave him the code names of hills and
other terrain features, and assigned him
the following mission:
• 1st MR Pit reinforced with a com-
pany machinegun squad: defend a
strongpoint bounded by hill Malaya, the
barn on the north bank of creek Melky,
and hill Ovalnaya. Your sector of fire:
right limit —from the ravine out to the
SE edge of the cut of trees to your right
front; left limit —from the barn to the
southern edge of grove Kruglaya. You
have a secondary sector of fire with a
right limit extending from the ravine out
to hill Bob. Targets for platoon fire con-
centration are: No. 1 —the small hill on
the NE slope of hill Pologaya; No. 2 —the
road junction; No. 3 —the bridge across
creek Melky. Cover the gap between your
left flank and the 3d MR Pit with light
machinegun fire from an A PC.
•	Friendly Situation: On your right —
the 2d MR Pit is defending a strongpoint
on hill Lysaya and has the mission of
preventing an enemy breakthrough
along the axis from the cut of trees to hill
Lysaya. On your left —the 3d MR Pit of
the company on our left flank is defen-
ding a strongpoint in the area of the
brush and the clearing (not on the
diagram) on your left flank and has the
mission of preventing an enemy break-
through along an axis from grove
Kruglaya to the brush.
•	Tank 190 is occupying a position on
the SW slope of hill Malaya. A mortar
battery attached to the battalion is de
ploying in the Zelyeni brush (not on the
diagram, 500 meters east of hill Oval-
naya). The mortars will interdict the en-
emy’s movement along the axis hill
Dalnaya, hill Pologaya, hill Ovalnaya,
and prevent his deployment along a line
from the cut of trees to the small hill, the
fenced enclosure, and the two separate
trees. The mortar battery also has the
mission to destroy enemy forces that
penetrate between 1st and 2d MR Pla-
toons. At 1450, on order from the batta-
lion commander, combat engineers will
lay a minefield in front of the defensive
positions. Some weapons must be on call
to provide the engineers with covering
fire during the mission. Ammunition ve-
hicles and the battalion medical point
are located in grove Gustaya (not on dia-
gram, 800 meters SW of hill Ovalnaya).
The fire plan is to be prepared and im-
plemented by 1600 hrs, 15 July.
•	My command observation post is on
the northern slope of hill Ovalnaya.
Pyrotechnics: red rocket —radiological
or chemical threat; green rocket —enemy
aircraft.
Once he was sure he understood the
mission, Lt Timofeev ordered the squad
leaders to increase surveillance and to be
ready to repulse an enemy attack at any
time. He then continued his evaluation
of the situation. He studied the terrain
very carefully and concluded that the
road was the most likely enemy avenue of
attack because it was the most accessible
route for tanks and APCs.
The lieutenant examined the terrain
in the area of the strongpoint and'on
both flanks and concluded that the pla-
toon should concentrate its efforts on
holding hills Malaya and Ovalnaya. The
left flank required special attention,
since there was a substantial gap between
the platoon’s strongpoint and that of the
neighboring unit.
As a consequence, the platoon leader
decided to deploy his antitank weapons
in the center of the strongpoint, and to
cover the gap between units with fire
from two machineguns. He established
his command observation post on the
western slopes of hill Ovalnaya, from
which he could easily see all of his squad
positions, his flanks, and part of the rear
area of the platoon’s strongpoint posi-
tion.
Lt Timofeev moved to hill Malaya,
where he noted that the two small hills on
the western slopes of hill Ovalnaya would
partially block fields of fire down the
slopes of the larger hill. He was able to
correct this situation by incorporating
flanking fire from the southwest slopes of
hill Malaya into his fire plan. In the
course of his preparations, the platoon
leader also designated the location of the
defensive trenches and specific positions
for armored personnel carriers and ma-
chineguns.
In the process of surveying the terrain
defended by the strongpoint, the platoon
leader visited all his squads and met with
their respective squad leaders. As a re-
sult, by 1450 he had informed them of
their orientation points, and the inten-
tions and probable strength of the en-
emy. He also reviewed with them the mis-
sions of the platoon and neighboring
units, and assigned them the following
missions:
•	2d MR Squad, defend a position on
the western slopes of hill Malaya. Sectors
of fire: right limit, from the ravine to the
SW edge of the cut of trees; left limit,
from the long pit out to orientation point
number 2. Additional sector of fire on
the right —an arc extending from the
rocky area to hill Bob. APC firing posi-
tion is on the northern slope of hill
Malaya; sector of fire —an arc extending
from orientation point 1 to the livestock
enclosure; additional sector of fire —an
arc extending from the rocky area to hill
Bob.
17
•	1st MR Squad, defend a position ex-
tending from but excluding the ditch
south to mound 1.0. Sector of fire: right
limit — a line extending from the ditch on
the right to the SE corner of the livestock
enclosure; left limit —a line extending
from mound 1.0 to the bushes on the SE
slope of hill Pologaya. You have a
secondary sector of fire to the left exten-
ding south to the road junction south of
the bushes. Your APC’s firing position is
50 meters NE of mound 1.0; APC sector
of fire —an arc extending from the small
hill on the south slope of hill Pologaya
south to the two isolated trees. Designate
a light machinegun to cover the terrain
in front of the 3d MR Squad position.
•	3d MR Squad, defend a position ex-
tending from but excluding mound 1.0
south to the barn. Sector of fire: right
limit —a line extending from but exclud-
ing mound 1.0 out to the two isolated
trees; left limit —a line extending from
the barn to the southern edge of tree
grove Kruglaya. You have a secondary
sector of fire to the left extending south
to the lone tree. Your APC’s firing posi-
tion is 50 meters north of the barn. Sec-
tor of fire —an arc extending from the
road junction south to orientation point
3; APC secondary sector of fire to the
right —extend coverage in arc north to
bushes on south slope of hill Pologaya.
Cover the gap between your left flank
and the 3d MR Platoon with an APC’s
medium and light machineguns.
Company machinegun squad:
•	Gun number 1: establish a firing
position on the left flank of 2d squad;
sector of fire —an arc from orientation
point number 2 south to the two isolated
trees. Secondary sector to the right —ex-
tend coverage north to hill Bob.
•	Gun number 2: establish a firing
position at mound 1.0. Sector of fire — an
arc from orientation point number 2
south to the two isolated trees. Secondary
sector to the left —extend coverage south
to the northern edge of the bushes on the
south slope of hill Pologaya.
•	Watch personnel from the rifle
squads and machinegun squad: destroy
small groups of enemy forces. Open fire
with every weapon available when the
enemy reaches a line extending from the
livestock enclosure to the road junction.
Begin preparing your positions immedi-
ately. Each squad, have an observer and
a rifleman on watch. All weapons must
be in place and ready to fire by 151600
hours.
The platoon leader stated where he
would be located during the battle and
designated a second-in-command.
Based upon the way squad missions
were assigned and the weapons deployed,
it is obvious that the fire plan made skill-
ful use of the terrain and closely integrat-
ed all of the platoon’s weapons with the
engineer obstacles. The platoon leader
dispersed his weapons along the front
and in depth so that he could place fire
on the enemy from the front and from
the flanks, creating a high-density cross-
fire. He was thus able to defend the pla-
toon strongpoint in all directions.
When he had completed organizing
the defense of his position, the platoon
leader made a sketch of the strongpoint
and gave it to his company commander.
Subsequent events unfolded as follows:
At 1550, 30 to 40 minutes after the
squads had taken up their positions, the
enemy began artillery strikes (imitated by
demolition charges), against the pla-
toon’s defenses. During the enemy artil-
lery preparation, the platoon leader and
designated observers maintained con-
stant watch over the battlefield to be able
to immediately detect any enemy move-
ment. All other personnel remained un-
der cover in ditches and old shell craters,
from which they would be able to fire
and repel an attack.
As the enemy artillery fire continued,
three tanks and two APCs appeared from
the Gustaya brush (off the diagram to the
west, 1,800-2,000 meters from the for-
ward defensive positions). One tank and
one APC were hit by tank fire, but the
enemy continued to move forward.
When two enemy tanks and one APC
reached orientation point number 4, the
platoon’s antitank RPGs opened fire.
The enemy tanks stopped and the APC
moved around to the western slope of hill
Dalnaya. A firefight ensued.
At 1630, after firing on hills Malaya
and Ovalnaya with almost uninterrupted
salvos of artillery, the enemy attacked in
two formations. The first formation, a
mechanized infantry platoon reinforced
with three tanks, attacked from the
northeast slope of hill Dalnaya, in the di-
rection of hill Malaya. The second for-
mation, a mechanized infantry platoon
with two tanks, attacked from the south-
ern slope of hill Dalnaya in the direction
of the southern slope of hill Ovalnaya.
The enemy simultaneously attacked
against units defending positions to the
platoon’s left and right flanks.
Lt Timofeev evaluated the situation
and concluded that the enemy force
would try to penetrate his defenses from
the march with the help of reserves al-
ready moving behind the tracking forma-
tions. The enemy would then try to gain
control of hill Ovalnaya by bypassing it
on the right along the gully lying north-
east of hill Pologaya, and by bypassing it
on the left along the road. Based upon
his evaluation, he decided to concentrate
the fires of the 1st and 2d Squads on the
first enemy formation and the fire of the
3d Squad on the second formation. He
gave the implementing commands.
As soon as the attacking tanks appear-
ed on the eastern slopes of hill Pologaya
and the enemy troops had dismounted
from their APCs, the defenders increased
the intensity of their fire to the max-
imum. Under the skillful direction of
their leaders, the platoon and its squads
were able to inflict heavy casualties on
enemy forces. Nevertheless, by intensify-
ing the force of the attack, the enemy was
able to make it all the way up to the for-
ward defensive positions. At this point,
the squad leaders ordered their troops to
keep up a high volume of small arms fire
and to use their grenades. As a result, the
attack was repelled.
But the enemy was still determined to
take hills Malaya and Ovalnaya. Using
artillery fire and a second ground attack,
he intended to inflict heavy casualties on
the platoon and break up its defense. Lt
Timofeev anticipated the new attack and
moved some of his weapons to supple-
mentary positions and revised their mis-
sions as appropriate. It is important to
point out that the platoon leader displac-
ed his weapons by bounds, rather than si-
multaneously. Some weapons continued
to fire at the enemy while others with-
drew to new positions. Lt Timofeev used
smoke to mask the unit’s activity.
Lt Timofeev reported the outcome of
the battle and his subsequent decision to
his company commander. He expressed
concern about his right flank, and asked
for assistance from his superior. The
company commander gave him 50 anti-
tank and 100 antipersonnel mines, which
the 2d Squad emplaced in the gap be-
tween the 1st and 2d MR Platoons. But
18
the enemy was not idle. He pounded the
defenders with heavy tank and artillery
fire. Finally, at 1730, with fire support
from helicopters that suddenly appeared
from behind hill Bob, the enemy renew-
ed the attack. Two platoons of tanks, fir-
ing on the move, quickly advanced to the
forward defensive positions. Numerical
superiority was on the side of the attack-
er, and by 1750 he had penetrated into
the gap between 1st and 3d Squads. At
the same time, a platoon of infantry rid-
ing on tanks moved along creek Melky,
bypassing the platoon strongpoint on the
left (not on the right, as the platoon lead-
er had expected).
In response, the platoon leader order-
ed: “1st squad, hold your present posi-
tion; displace squad APC to fall back
position and cut off the enemy’s penetra-
tion along the road to hill Ovalnaya; 3d
squad, move to fallback position, estab-
lish defenses on SW slope of hill
Ovalnaya, stop enemy bypass of platoon
strongpoint on the left flank along creek
Melky.
Because platoon personnel reacted
correctly and rapidly, they successfully
cut off the enemy’s penetration between
the 1st and 3d Squads. Good coordina-
tion between the motorized rifle troops
and the crew of the tank in the central
sector played a major role in the pla-
toon’s success. The riflemen identified
and designated two enemy vehicles as
targets to the tank crew. The tank de-
stroyed the targets, and then occupied a
position by mound 1.0, preventing the
remaining enemy tanks from moving into
the strongpoint position.
By 1830 hours, the situation had be-
come especially bad when the closely en-
gaged enemy, supported by air strikes,
artillery, and organic fire support, pene-
trated into the gap between the platoon’s
right flank and the 2d Platoon’s strong-
point on the right. To prevent the enemy
from bypassing the platoon to the right,
Lt Timofeev emplaced an APC and a
light machinegun on the northeast slope
of hill Malaya. The company also moved
some support weapons to the same posi-
tion. When these weapons were fired, the
enemy was taken by surprise and suffered
heavy casualties. As a result, the enemy
drive was stopped, allowing the 2d Pla-
toon on the right sufficient time to re-
store its defenses.
The manner in which the 1st Platoon
conducted its operations in this partic-
ular exercise demonstrates, in an exem-
plary way, the essential elements of
strong unit defense. The unit must have a
well-organized system of fires that cor-
rectly incorporates antitank weapons; the
defense platoon must take full advantage
of the terrain that is to be defended; and
fire support assets must be emplaced and
displaced skillfully. The senior com-
mander noted each of these points dur-
ing his critique of the exercise and de-
clared the 1st Platoon to be the victor in
the battle.
Nothing to Cry About
The odd look on the motorized rifle company com-
mander’s face in photo 1 must stem from reasons other
than the so-called “first-cl ass” performance by his men in
what is labeled by a Red Star correspondent in a 28 De-
cember 1979 article as a tactical drill exercise. Certainly,
the array of weapons and equipment featured in this pho-
tograph are nothing to cry about —unless, of course, you
are on the receiving end.
Photo 1.
The vehicle shown in photo 1 is a BTR-60PB armored
personnel carrier, the standard armored personnel car-
rier of the Soviet Army. The BTR-60PB’s main arma-
ment is a KPVT 14.5-mm turret-mounted machinegun.
Using either AP-I, API-T, or I-T ammunition, it has an
effective ground range of 2,000 meters. Its secondary ar-
mament is the PKT 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun, with
an effective range of 1,000 meters and a cyclic rate of fire
of 650 rds/min. The BTR-60PB carries a basic load of
2,000 rounds for this weapon. The BTR-60PB can trans-
port a rifle squad traveling a maximum of 80 km/h on
land and 10 km/h on water.
The infantryman to the left is carrying an RPK 7.62-
mm light machinegun, which has an effective range of
800 meters with a 600 rds/min cyclic rate of fire. The
third infantryman from the left has an RPG-7V antitank
grenade launcher on his shoulder, which is a slightly im-
proved version of the original RPG-7. It has a practical
range of 300 meters, with a maximum range of about 920
meters. The projectile’s shaped charge will penetrate
about 320 mm of armor.
Just visible in the third BTR-60PB is an SA-7/GRAIL
gunner standing up in the vehicle. The SA-7/GRAIL,
which incorporates an infrared homing guidance system,
is shoulder-fired from a gripstock launcher. Its maximum
range is 5,000 to 6,000 meters. SA-7/GRAIL gunners are
usually transported in armored personnel carriers, nor-
mally with the company commander.
Flamethrowers in Action
A Red Star article on 23 January 1980 briefly discussed
the use of flamethrowers in World War II. It noted that
although more sophisticated combat equipment had ap-
peared since the war, flamethrowers remain an effective
weapon when operated correctly. Photo 2 shows two men
19
Photo 2.
with flamethrowers firing during an ambush exercise.
The featured weapon, an LPO-50 portable flame-
thrower, was designed by the Soviets in the late fifties,
and continues to be issued to Soviet and Warsaw Pact
units. As shown in photo 3, its three principal compo-
nents are a tank group, hose group, and gun group. The
tank group consists of three interconnected fuel tanks
mounted on a backpack carrier for ease in mobility. A
manifold system links the tanks to the hose group. The
rubber hose is gasoline resistant and has threaded female
connectors on each end that connect the tank group to
the gun group.
The LPO-50 has a range of 20 meters with liquid fuel
and 70 meters when firing thickened fuel. Each tank has
an approximately 3.4-liter capacity, and has a continu-
ous firing time of 2-3 seconds per tank.
This flamethrower is not capable of firing short inter-
mittent bursts of fire, and the continuous 2- to 3-second
bursts from each tank will reveal the flamethrower op-
erator’s position. Therefore, use of the LPO-50 requires
close infantry support.
Mountain Exercises
All Soviet motorized rifle troops garrisoned in moun-
tainous regions are expected to know how to operate in
the mountains. The Soviets believe that their regularly
organized troops, given proper training and some special-
ized equipment, can overcome mountain obstacles in
both offense and defense. Mountain training techniques
and exercises are conducted regularly, particularly in the
Transcaucasus region of the USSR.
Mountain training in the Transcaucasus region is the
focus of a photo-report taken from the January 1980 issue
of the Soviet military magazine Standard Bearer (Zna-
menosets). The report noted that separate small units,
when bypassing inaccessible sectors of mountainous ter-
rain, can suddenly assault an enemy from the flank and
the rear and can capture passes, road junctions, cros-
sings, and passageways.
Soldiers are specially equipped for mountain opera-
tions (see photo 4). Their equipment includes light weap-
ons, small packs, parkas, and heavy cleated mountain
climbing boots with double straps above the ankle. Photo
5 shows a platoon fording a mountain river under fire. A
mountain ascent and a “hasty descent” are pictured in
photos 6 and 7. Note that the troops are using pickaxes to
aid their progress. Photo 8 shows a soldier suspended over
a mountain river by a rope “chair” firing what appears to
be an AK-47.
Photo 4.
Photo 5.
20
Photo 7.
Photo 8.
A Dismounted Attack
Soviet attack planning is marked by interest and con-
cern for the location and density of antitank weapons in
enemy defense. One of the most typical attack formations
for use against a defense having a high density of antitank
weapons is the dismounted attack.
Photo 9, taken from the 22 February 1980 issue of Red
Star, illustrates an aerial view of what appears to be the
opening stage of such an attack being conducted during a
winter training exercise. The troops involved —a motor-
ized rifle infantry unit —are located in the Group of Sovi-
et Forces, Germany. In the photo, the motorized rifle in-
fantry unit already has dismounted from BMPs, while the
tanks have initiated the assault.
When the attack formation has been achieved, the dis-
mounted infantry will take up a position approximately
100 meters behind the tanks. The BMPs will remain 200
to 400 meters behind them, and will provide fire support.
The infantry is dismounted primarily to lay down a base
of fire and limit the number of casualties that would re-
sult from enemy use of ATGMs.
21
Photo 9.
standard divisional weapon in other Warsaw Pact armies.
It also is currently in use in the Yugoslav Army. The M-30
is mounted on a box section split-trail carriage, fitted
with a shield. It has no muzzle break. Its recoil system
consists of a hydraulic buffer above the tube, and a
hydropneumatic recuperator below it. The breechblock
is an interrupted screw type. The M-30 has largely been
replaced in the Soviet forces by the D-30.
The M-30 has a range of about 11,800 meters, and can
fire both high explosive (HE) and high explosive antitank
(HEAT) rounds. Its rate of fire is about 6 rounds per min-
ute. The HEAT round can penetrate up to 200 mm of ar-
mor. The M-30 requires an eight-man crew.
The Soviets have always advocated the use of linear for-
mations in the employment of artillery (as shown in photo
10). Of late, however, there have been several articles ap-
pearing in Military Herald concerning the survivability of
the artillery when the guns are configured in a straight
line formation. To protect against the effects of weapons
of high-performance aircraft, it has been suggested that
either a wedge formation, a “W-type” formation, or an
inverted semicircle formation be adopted for a six-gun
battery.
Whether or not these formations are commonly used in
a tactical setting is questionable. The linear formation is
a Soviet hallmark, and probably will be used for a long
time to come.
COMBAT SUPPORT
No River Too Wide
Artillery Battery Field Training
An 8 February 1980 Red Star article reported an artil-
lery battery exercise at the foothills of Tien-Shan in Cen-
tral Asia. The 122-mm M-30 (Ml938) towed howitzer
battery commanded by a Guards captain is shown in
photo 10.
Introduced into the Soviet Army shortly before the
start of World War II, the M-30 eventually became the
Photo 10.
A ponton bridge unit in the Northern Group of Forces
was the subject of a 6 April 1980 Red Star article. The
unit was praised for its rapid assembly of a PMP heavy
folding ponton bridge for use by a T-62 tank battalion
during a combat offensive exercise.
The PMP heavy folding ponton bridge shown in photo
11 is the main item of bridging equipment in a Soviet
Photo 11.
22
Army division. Similar to the US Ribbon Bridge, which
incorporates many of the same design features, the PMP
is able to carry 60-ton loads. A complete PMP set consists
of 32 center and 4 ramp sections. A division normally has
a half set of 16 center and 2 ramp sections.
With the PMP bridge design, the Soviets have elim-
inated intermediate floating supports and the necessary
separate superstructure. The roadway has been designed
as an integral part of the ponton itself, and the pontons
are interconnected to form a continuous strip of roadway.
Both the center and ramp ponton sections are con-
structed of a low-alloy steel, type SKhl-4 (chromium-sili-
con-nickel-copper steel). A system of winches, cables,
pulleys, rollers, and a boom attachment is built into the
PMP transporter, a KrAZ 255B truck, for launching and
retrieving bridge units.
The ponton is launched as follows: the travel locks on
the ponton are disengaged and the truck backs to the
edge of the water. It brakes sharply and the ponton slides
over a roller system and unfolds. Six locking devices are
activated, stiffening the pontons. The pontons normally
are then connected together on the near shore to form a
continuous roadway. It is swung into position by bridging
boats, either the BMK 150, or, as pictured here, BMK-T
powerboats.
The BMK-T powerboat is the latest design issued to the
engineer units equipped with PMP bridge sets. Powered
by a 132-kW YAMZ-235 engine, the BMK-T develops a
maximum forward thrust of 2,000 kg and a water speed
of 17 km/h. For transport, the BMK-T is mounted on the
KrAZ 255B, the same truck used to carry the PMP pon-
ton. It takes only 1 minute to launch the BMK-T, and
under ideal conditions, assembly speeds of 7 meters of
PMP bridge per minute can be achieved.
The PMP ponton is recovered as follows: the ponton
truck backs up to the water’s edge and the integral jib is
unfolded from the truck bed. Two cables are strung from
the winch (located at the rear of the truck cab), through
the jib pulley, around the ponton retrieval guides, and se-
cured to ponton retrieval studs. The winch then simul-
taneously folds and lifts the ponton to the truck bed. The
jib is folded back into the truck bed, and the ponton is
winched over the rollers and secured.
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
“Grease Monkeys” in GSFG
The Soviet Union produces approximately 6,200 ar-
mored fighting vehicles per year. Therefore, repair and
renovation of broken-down vehicles and equipment, and
maintenance of operational vehicles and equipment be-
comes a major requirement for Soviet forces. The Soviet
Army is not only able to absorb new equipment but it is
also capable of major overhauls of a vehicle, not just once
but several times if necessary.
Such is the case at a repair facility in the Group of Sovi-
et Forces, Germany, described in a 14 February 1980 Red
Star article. The article goes on to say the this repair shop
not only works on malfunctioning vehicles but it also pro-
vides professional training for those who wish to improve
their mechanical skills. In addition, draftees with previ-
ous technical education are specifically chosen and sent
to this repair facility for their 2-year service. Some even
choose to stay on and become warrant officers.
The BMP assembly line repair unit shown in photo 12
depicts the Soviets’ capability to keep their vehicles in
working order. In photo 13 a line of repaired T-62A
tanks returns to operations.
Photo 12.
Photo 13.
23
The Soviet Semitrailer Field Bakery
Major Kevin Culhane
The Soviet field bakery, as with all modern Soviet
equipment, has increased requirements of mobility and
maneuverability. Thus, the 1970s have seen the introduc-
tion of a new field bakery (PKhZ), which can keep pace
with the units it supports and can produce large quanti-
ties of bread.
Completely contained within one semitrailer and tow-
ed by a ZIL-13V truck tractor, the PKhZ is capable of
baking bread while the vehicle is moving. All of the major
technological operations for the preparation, processing,
and baking of the bread are mechanized. The entire pro-
cess takes from 3 to 4 hours, giving the bakery a capabili-
ty to produce 2 to 2 1/2 tonnes* of bread per day, or
enough to feed 3,000-4,000 soldiers daily.
Soviet literature also states that the PKhZ is hermeti-
cally sealed with an air filtration system, offering a CBR
protection capability for its personnel.
The PKhZ is superior to older field bakeries. It is more
mobile, more maneuverable, more automated, and more
efficient in meeting the ration requirements for its sup-
ported units.
Such innovations show the increased emphasis that the
Soviet Rear Services are undertaking to improve the
“field comforts” of the Soviet soldier.
1. Flour Storage
2. Flour Meter
3. Water Meter
4. Salt-Solvent
5. Dough Processor
6. Dough Separator
7. Racks
8. Oven
9. Generator
10. Portable Screw Conveyor Feeder
Soviet Mobile Bread Plant, PKhZ.
* Metric tons: 2,200 lb.
24
TACTICS, TRAINING, AND EQUIPMENT—
NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT ARMIES
Betsy Bree
A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Company
The February 1980 issue of the East German military
magazine Army Review (Armeerundschau) featured an
article discussing an exercise undertaken by an East Ger-
man reinforced motorized rifle company belonging to the
Ernst-Moritz Arndt Motorized Rifle Regiment. Rein-
forcements consisted of one platoon of four tanks and an;
antitank platoon of two 73-mm SPG-9 recoilless antitank
guns and three AT-4/SPIGOT antitank guided’missile
systems (see diagram).
A Reinforced Motorized Rifle Company
Photo 1.
Photo 1 shows the 73-mm SPG-9 recoilless gun used in
the exercise. This efficient lightweight (47.5-kg) antitank
Photo 2.
gun is in service in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the
Soviet Union, as well as in East Germany. It fires a rocket-
propelled, fin-stabilized round with a HEAT warhead.
Its maximum range is 2,000 meters, and its practical
range against armored vehicles is 800-1,000 meters. The
SPG-9 is the latest Soviet recoilless rifle.
Photo 2 provides a front view of the new АТ-4/
SPIGOT antitank guided missile system, now being sup-
plied to both Soviet and East European ground force
units.
A Czechoslovak CBR Training Exercise
Czechoslovak winter training was the subject of a short
article in the February 1980 issue of the East German
magazine Army Review (Armeerundschau). The article
noted that the second part of the exercise, illustrated in
the following photographs, was conducted under “nu-
clear conditions.”
Before the start of the exercise, Czechoslovak troops ex-
amined CBR equipment that would be used in the exer-
cise. Photo 3 shows soldiers checking over a 20-flag con-
taminated area warning emplacer, a standard feature of
the FUG/OT-65 CBR vehicle. The automatic flag em-
placer enables the crew to mark radi©logically or chem-
ically contaminated areas without having to dismount
from the vehicle. This particular emplacer contains red
flags, signifying radioactive contamination. Yellow flags
are also used as radioactive contamination markers.
Photo 4 shows FUG/OT-65 crewmen sitting in their ve-
hicle, checking their CBR detection equipment. Photo 5,
apparently taken during the exercise, shows an explosion,
25
Photo 3.
Photo 4.
with the FUG/OT-65 CBR vehicle apparently ready to go
into action. The FUG/OT-65 is of joint Czechoslovak and
Hungarian design, and is similar to the Soviet В RDM-2.
Photo 6, probably taken near the conclusion of the ex-
ercise, shows soldiers beginning the decontamination
process. As indicated by the markers, the area is still con-
taminated. The posted sign in the photo warns troops not
to take off their protective masks. They can, however, re-
move their protective multipurpose capes. The Czecho-
slovak multipurpose protective cape is made of a water-
proof, airtight, heat-resistant, and very lightweight syn-
thetic material. The cape provides excellent protection
against liquid chemical agents, and radioactive particles
from nuclear fallout. Protective masks worn in photo 6
are the Czechoslovak M-10 models, which bear a marked
resemblance to the US ABC-Ml 7 protective mask.
The equipment in the background appears to be a de-
contamination shower facility covered with camouflage
netting, and the truck standing next to it appears to be
carrying large containers of decontamination fluid for
the showers. Shower hoses are lying between the facility
and the truck.
Hungarian Mountain Training
Although the Hungarian Army has no special moun-
tain troops, since 1968, a training camp established in the
Hungarian village of Rezi-var is where motorized rifle
troops are specifically trained for mountain warfare.
The training course lasts 2-4 weeks. In photo 7, taken
from the No. 4 1980 issue of the East German publication
The People’s Army (Volksarmee), a Hungarian motoriz-
ed rifleman in mountain gear is shown scaling a cliff.
Photo 5.
Photo 6.
Photo 7.
26
THE SOVIET SOLDIER
Betsy Bree
Happy Birthday to You
Photo 1.
A photo taken from the 22 January 1980 issue of Red
Star shows a birthday party in progress. It is being held
for a senior sergeant of a tank platoon located in the Cen-
tral Asian Military District. The soldier holding the cake
is the honored guest. Note his arm insignia, indicating
that he is a member of the armored troops branch of the
Soviet Armed Forces (figure 1). His rank is indicated by
Figure 2.
Senior Sergeant
Figure 3.
Lieutenant
The commanding officer, a Guards lieutenant, is on
the far left. Although not visible in the photo, his
shoulder board has two small stars set in a horizontal pat-
tern with a single vertical stripe between them (figure 3).
To the right stands a captain —his rank is clearly visible
on the shoulder board.
The party is probably being held in a soldier’s club.
These clubs are used for awards ceremonies or other offi-
cial festivities. Note the samovar, a Russian teakettle, sit-
ting on the table.
A Critical Evaluation
In the Soviet Army, officers are required to closely su-
pervise the training of their soldiers. A photo taken from
the 2 February 1980 issue of Red Star included an exam-
ple of this type of close supervision.
Immediately upon completion of an exercise the officer
in charge conducts a critique-review of the unit’s perfor-
mance. The officer shown here is a deputy political com-
mander—in addition to his political duties, he has major
responsibility for military training.
This critique session was conducted during a short
break, and at its conclusion, the troops returned to their
BMPs and resumed the march.
War and Chess
The game of chess is very popular in the Soviet Union,
and many Soviet publications (including military periodi-
cals) regularly include “chess pages” in their contents.
27
Photo 2. A deputy political commander critiques his troops.
While the game provides entertainment for all the chess
fans in the Soviet Armed Forces, it is also seen as good
military training, and is sponsored by the Government.
For example, the February 1980 issue of Standard.
Bearer (Znamenosets) printed quotes attributed to fa-
mous Soviet military leaders praising chess as an effective
tool for sharpening “tactical and strategic insight.”
For example, the late Marshal of the Soviet Union,
Ivan Konev, stated: “If chess is considered to be a game,
then there is no game like it... (for developing memory
training, logic, endurance, and will power).” Another fa-
mous Marshal of the Soviet Union, Ivan Bagramyan, not-
ed:
Many of our military leaders consider chess to
be a very necessary and helpful game. You see, it
develops the most important qualities of ser-
vicemen, be they soldiers or generals —the ability
to foresee the next move, and to sense the mo-
ment to intercept an enemy’s initiative.
There are many chess clubs in the Soviet Armed
Forces, and they sponsor annual competitions.
Photo 3. At the chess board: a private first class deft), and
a warrant officer (right}.
28
ТЕК SPEKS
30-mm Automatic Grenade Launcher AGS-17
76-mm Mountain Gun Ml966
Paul Fein
Photo 1. The AGS-17 (right). The rifleman on the left fires an AK-74.
The AGS-17* is a crew-operated 30-mm automatic
grenade launcher that can be mounted on a tripod or ve-
hicle. It has a prominent circular cartridge drum mount-
ed on its right side, with the nondisintegrating metallic
link belt exiting from the left side. The short barrel pro-
trudes from a large rectangular receiver. Twin spade
grips are fitted to the rear. A small optical sight is fitted
at the rear of the receiver, and an elevation quadrant ap-
pears on the left rear of the gun.
The gun itself is mounted quite high on the tripod.
The crew consists of a gunner and two riflemen/bearers.
The magazine holds 29 rounds. If each crew member car-
ries 1 magazine, the basic load for the weapon would be
87 rounds.
In addition to the weapon’s expected role against
ground targets, the AGS-17 mount permits high eleva-
tion, up to 85°, allowing it to be used in a limited antiair-
craft role. The AGS-17 can be fired either semiautomatic
or automatic. Ammunition types include a high-explosive
round, incendiary round, armor-piercing round, and
training round. Introduction of the weapon into Soviet
units began in 1975. It appears that there is an AGS-17
platoon with two weapons in BTR-60PB equipped mo-
torized rifle companies. AGS stands for Avtomaticheskiy
Granatmyot Stankoviy, or tripod-mounted automatic
grenade launcher.
CHARACTERISTICS:
Caliber (mm)	30
Range:	
minimum (m)	50
maximum (m)	1,500
effective (m)	700-800
Rate of fire (rds/min)	40-60
Magazine capacity (rds)	29
Crew	3
* There is a resemblance between the AGS-17 and the US XM-174 used in Vietnam.
29
Photo 2.
The 76-mm mountain gun Ml966 was first sighted
during a 1977 Soviet May Day parade held in Baku. It
probably is a replacement for the 76-mm mountain gun
Ml938, but with improved performance over the older
weapon.
Recognition features for the Ml966 include the split
box-section trail, the small shield with winged sides and
scalloped top, the absence of a muzzle brake, and the
rather distinctive torsion bar suspension. The weapon can
be broken down to be transported by pack animals, or it
can be towed when fully assembled. The Ml966 is believ-
ed to fire the same projectile as the 76-mm divisional gun
M1942 (ZIS-3).
Photo 4.
CHARACTERISTICS:
Crew with driver
Weight, travel position
(kg)
Length, travel position
(m)
Width, travel position
(m)
Ammunition (types)
Prime mover
Elevation (D)
Traverse (D)
Maximum range (m)
Maximum rate of fire
(rds/min)
Armor penetration
(mm @0° obliquity
@any range)
Emplacement/displace-
ment time (min)
7
780
4.80
1.50
НЕ-FRAG, AP T, HVAP,
HEAT
Any light truck
-5 to + 65
50 total
10,500-11,500
15
280 (HEAT)
1-2/1-2
30
IDENTIFICATION QUIZ: RIVER CROSSING EQUIPMENT
Paul Fein
This section contains photos of Warsaw Pact equipment
found both in frontline units and in other units in the in-
terior of the USSR. Some non-Soviet Warsaw Pact coun-
tries also have this equipment as well.
31
3£
1.	BAV amphibious truck
2.	PTS tracked amphibian with PKP
amphibious trailer
3.	K-61 tracked amphibian
4.	PMP heavy folding ponton
bridge
5.	NZhM-56 heavy floating railway
and road bridge
6.	PMP heavy folding ponton bridge
7.	K-61 tracked amphibian
8.	K-61 tracked amphibian
9.	GSP ferry
10.	TMM truck- mounted scissors bridge
11.	GSP ferry
12.	PMP heavy folding ponton bridge
13.	PTS tracked amphibian
14.	MTU-20 tank-mounted bridge
15.	MT-34 tank-mounted scissors bridge
(Czechoslovak)
16.	GSP ferry
17.	T-54/MTU tank-mounted bridge
18.	GSP ferry
19.	MT-34 tank-mounted scissors bridge
(Czechoslovak)
20.	T-54/MTU tank-mounted bridge
21.	TMM truck-mounted scissors bridge
22.	TMM truck-mounted scissors bridge
23.	KMM truck-mounted bridge
24.	PMP heavy folding ponton bridge
25.	TMM truck-mounted scissors bridge
26.	BAV amphibious truck
27.	MT-34 tank-mounted scissors bridge
(Czechoslovak)
28.	KMM truck-mounted bridge
29.	PPS heavy girder floating bridge
30.	NZhM-56 heavy floating railway and road bridge.
93
33
63
93
УЗ
03
61
83
t'Z
£3
£3
81
QUESTIONNAIRE
In order to give you the best possible product we can, would you take a few moments to answer the questions below and
mail this sheet or a photocopy to DI A, ATTN: DB-1B5, Washington, D.C. 20301. Thanks!
1.	What is your present assignment? (e.g., Platoon Leader, Company Commander, Battalion Commander, Brigade S-2, etc.)
2.	In your opinion, have the first three articles in this issue presented you with any new or valuable information?
3.	Does the Unit Focus article contribute to your understanding of Soviet Armed Forces history?
4.	Do the Tactics, Training and Equipment features show you what you want to see about the Warsaw Pact Armed
Forces? Are there any aspects that are either omitted or that should be emphasized more?
5.	Would you like to see Soviet articles on tactics, such as the one included in this issue, continued in future issues of the Review?
6.	Has the Tek Speks feature provided sufficient information on the AGS-17 automatic grenade launcher and the Ml966 moun-
tain gun? Is there any particular piece of equipment or weapon that you would like Tek Speks to discuss in future issues?
7.	Are there any specific aspects of the Soviet Armed Forces that you would like to see in future issues?
8.	What did you like best about the contents?
9.	What did you like least?
10.	What is your overall evaluation of this Review? (Please include comments about format, photographs, illustrations, etc.)
33
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300
BUSINESS REPLY MAIL
FIRST CLASS	PERMIT NO. 12964	WASHINGTON. D C
NO POSTAGE
NECESSARY
IF MAILED
IN THE
UNITED STATES
POSTAGE WILL BE PAID BY ADDRESSEE
Defense Intelligence Agency
ATTN: DB-1B5
Washington, D. C. 20301
RSGF 4-80
GLOSSARY
DOBROVOL’NOYE OBSHCHESTVO SODEY-
STVIYA ARMII, AVIATSII I FLOTU (DOSAAF).
This is the Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army,
Air Force, and Navy. Its 80 million members operate un-
der the auspices of the Communist Party. Membership is
open to those 14 years of age or older. It provides premili-
tary and political training to youths 17 years of age or
older. To accomplish this, DOSAAF has clubs for flying,
parachuting, boating, driving, radio operating, etc.
There are no non-Communist Party clubs for these activ-
ities. About one out of three Soviet draftees has received
some type of DOSAAF Premilitary Technical Training.
This constitutes about 350,000 men out of an estimated
Soviet annual draft of about 1 million. Most training for
preinductees is conducted in the last 2 years before they
are called up for military service. For example, 60,000
drivers with some mechanical training are trained by
DOSAAF for the armed forces each year. The number of
pilots is also significant. DOSAAF organizations are also
found in Soviet factories and farms and work hand in
hand with civil defense organizations at those locations.
MILITARY HERALD (VOYENNYY VESTNIK).
This monthly journal is a “general” military publication
for officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers of the
Soviet Ground Forces in that it includes articles covering
all branches of arms and not just focusing on one special-
ty such as artillery or armor. There are journals for each
of the specific arms such as the Air Defense Journal. The
Military Herald covers theory, training exercises, equip-
ment, and articles covering the various branches. A chap-
ter dealing with party and political matters always starts
off the publication. Allied and foreign military services
are also treated.
THE PEOPLE’S ARMY (VOLSKARMEE). This peri-
odical is the German Democratic Republic Army’s news-
paper, and is published weekly. It presents news and in-
formation on selected units within the GDR forces and its
reserves, as well as other Warsaw Pact forces.
RED STAR (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA). This four-page
military newspaper is published six times a week for the
Soviet Armed Forces by the Ministry of Defense of the
USSR. As there are no private enterprises in the USSR,
there is no advertising so the few pages of Red Star are de-
voted principally to armed forces topics. Also included
are sections dealing with world news — Soviet style — party
and political events, military participation in sports, TV
and radio programming, and a large section on the
weather which covers 14 different geographical regions of
the country.
SOCIALIST COMPETITION. Soviet military training
is conducted within the framework of official army-wide
competition. Individuals strive to increase their specialist
ratings and to earn the title “Excellent Soldier,” while
units also compete to earn the title “Excellent Unit.”
There is competition among units, and each year, a regi-
ment is selected to lead the way. It is evident that the con-
cept of the socialist competition is also used in premilitary
training.
STANDARD BEARER (ZNAMENOSETS). This
monthly illustrated publication is a general feature mag-
azine published by the USSR’s Ministry of Defense. Its ar-
ticles are of a nonspecific military nature, and include
short pieces on tactics and training, Soviet Armed Forces
history, and political doctrine. It includes some leisure
pages, and the majority of the photographs in the mag-
azine are in color.
35
NEW RELEASES
Several new DIA handbooks published during the past
few months have been added to the list of DIA publica-
tions available (see ordering information below). The
first publication, Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Equip-
ment Handbook: Armored Fighting Vehicles,
DDB-1100-241-80, was written by Mr. Paul Fein, and
provides unclassified data on all major Warsaw Pact
tanks, infantry, combat vehicles, reconnaissance vehicles,
and armored personnel carriers used since World War II.
Data includes vehicle and weapons characteristics, vari-
ants, derived vehicles, and recognition features. Exten-
sive use has been made of photographs and drawings. A
second publication, The Soviet Naval Infantry,
DDB-1200-146-80, was written by LTC Louis N. Buf-
fardi, and describes Soviet amphibious warfare, and the
organization, training, tactics, and equipment of the So-
viet Naval Infantry regiments, as well as major amphib-
ious warfare ships and craft used to support the Soviet
Naval Infantry. A third publication, Soviet Tactical Air
Defense, DDB- 1140-6-80, was written by Major Michael
H. Crutcher, and provides detailed information on the
Soviet Ground Forces’ ground-based tactical air defense
units, weapons, and tactics. The equipment appendix
provides photographs and basic characteristics of the ma-
jor Soviet Ground Force air defense weapons. Tactics ad-
dressed in the latter two publications are amplified
through the use of diagrams highlighted in color.
These three handbooks will be of interest to all of the
Services and a variety of other consumers.
Questions and comments concerning this publication
should be referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence
Agency, ATTN: DB-1B5, Washington, D.C. 20301. Re-
quests for additional copies should be forwarded from
holders of DIA Customer Account Numbers, through
command approval channels, to DIA, ATTN: RTS-2A,
using DD Form 1142, Interagency Document Request, in
accordance with DIA Manual 59-3, DIA Reference
Library.
Additional information pertaining to secondary distri-
bution of intelligence publications may be obtained from
the service points of contact listed below:
ARMY	Commander Intelligence Analysis Group US Army Intelligence Threat Analysis Center ATTN: IAX-PM-D Arlington, VA 22212	(Autovon: 222-6740)
NAVY	Naval Intelligence Command ATTN: 168-FC2 4600 Silver Hill Road Washington, DC 20389	(Autovon: 293-3624)
AIRFORCE	Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Air Force ATTN: AFIS/INDOC Washington, DC 20330	(Autovon: 227-4844)
MARINES	Commandant Marine Corps (HQSP) Headquarters Marine Corps Washington, DC 20380	(Autovon: 224-2680)
DOD& OTHERS	Defense Intelligency Agency ATTN: RTS-2A2C Washington, DC 20301	(Autovon: 222-5942)
CORRECTION
On page 15 of the 3-80 issue of Review of the Soviet Ground Forces, a mathematical for-
mula for determining river width in the article “Engineer Reconnaissance from aboard a
Helicopter” was inadvertently misprinted. The formula should read: B2 — D2 - H2.
36
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Aa.s.-	JCS/J-4	1	C351	10TH SFG(ABN)1STSF	I	Hullo	USCINCEUR	1
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4835	UNIT MM	5	С414	4TH INF DIV	15	H80J	7TH ARMY TNG CMD	5
ВиОЗ	DiA/DR (PROD REV)	1	0415	STH INF DIV (Mi	15	H320	66TH MI C P	2
ftt*4U	DIA/DIO	1	C417	7TH INF DIV	5	H35O	SFDET (ABN) EUR	1
В060	DIA/RTS-2A5 PENT	i	0419	9TH INF DIV	15	H500	CINCUSNAVEUR	1
tt080	DIA/SWS	1	0428	UP TEST&EVAL AGCY	1	H524	HQ V COR PS	3
BpJ{;	DIA/DB	1	C429	1ST BNiR) 75TB INF	2	H525	HQ VII CORPS	3
В1Й-2	OLA - DE-1	I	0442	USAFS MISAWA	1	Ha2S	HQ 3RD INF DIV	15
В *34	DFA/DE-2	1	C454	FLD ARTY SCH	10	H527	HQ 8TH INF DIV	10
Е155	DLA.RTS-2A4 PP	1	C459	COMD-GEN STF COL	t‘	Ha2fe	IS?’ INF DIV (FWD)	6
В169	DIA/DT-2D	1	0460	E NGINEER SCH	И?	Н52У	HQ 3RD ARMORED DIV	16
В351	DIA/RTS-8A4	1	C46I	INFANTRY SCH	IS	Н531»	HQ 1ST ARMORED DIV	15
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B48S	DIA/AIS	2	C47I	OPGRU ARMY WAR COL		KOOE-	CINCPAC	j
В 548	DIA/VP-A1	I	0500	TRADOC	36	KU07	COMUSJAPAN	1
Б 5 50	DIA/D1-2	1	CS07	USAITAC TAX-1 A-G.	2	Ku i >	L-SFK EA	3
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В 563	DIA/D1-5B	i	C512	DARUOM		KSOC	IP AC .LIBRARY)	i
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В576	DIA/DB-1A	1	CS25	SIG W AR LAP.		K867	N A V FHIBSC H CORO	1
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В 598	DIA/DB-1E	1	0562	TRANS SCH	c		FITCPAC	1
В 737	DIA/RTS-2B (LIB)	3	C568	AIR DEr SCH		мзо:	:OSED INF BDE ;PN)	1
Б 787	DIAz'DB-lG2	I	0587	СМБТ DEV EXPR CDMD		Nites	SRED63OM	4
В8О0	DIA/DL-1 LONDON	2	C590	TARDC		NC20	HDJTF	I
B8J0	D1A/DL-2 OTTAWA	2	C5£G	ESTO		'THERS		
В812	DIA/DL-4 FRG	2	0605	JFK CTR MIL ASSIST				
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