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BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS Britain's Space Shuttle DAN SHARP Crecy Publishing Ltd
Crecy www.crecy.co.uk British Secret Projects Volume 5 Britain's Space Shuttle Dan Sharp First published in 2016 by Crecy Publishing All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage without permission from the Publisher in writing. All enquiries should be directed to the Publisher. © Dan Sharp 2016 All images copyright BAE Systems except where otherwise noted A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library Printed in Malta by Melita Press ISBN 9781910809020 Crecy Publishing Ltd la Ringway Trading Estate, Shadowmoss Rd Manchester M22 5LH Tel (0044) 161 499 0024 www.crecy.co.uk FRONT COVER artwork by Daniel Uhr PAGE 2 Wilf Hardy's spectacular painting of the ВАС Mustard as it appeared in a 1978 Look and Learn children's book. Look and Learn REAR COVER TOP An English Electric P.42 Scheme 4 research aircraft being put through its paces. Jozef Gatial MIDDLE A manned glider version of the ВАС Mustard was among a whole host of research proposals put forward. Chris Sandham-Bailey BOTTOM The Mustard Scheme 7 spacecraft glides back to base after a successful orbital surveillance mission. Daniel Uhr FRONT FLAP This original concept art shows HawkerSiddeley's proposed Type 1019/E2 hypersonic research aircraft. The drop tanks were used up in reaching Mach 1 before being jettisoned as the aircraft passed the sound barrier and accelerated towards Mach 5. BACK FLAP TOP While one version of the Bolkow Raumtransporter kept the Junkers's downwards-angled fins, this had them angled up, beside those of the orbiter, via Barry Hinchliffe BOTTOM Drawing EAG 4462 provided a detailed cutaway view of the proposed unmanned Crest test vehicle. Its nose contained nothing but ballast and in place of the engine was its 'landing system' - which seems to have comprised a large inflatable ring. Research has brought to light many contemporary and rare documents and images of varying quality. They are reproduced and have been enhanced as far as possible.
Contents Introduction...........................................................................6 Acknowledgements.......................................................................7 Chapter 1 The rise of English Electric..............................................8 From the Second World War to Very High Speed Vehicles Chapter 2 ‘Concorde-ish in nature’.................................................27 English Electric P.42 aircraft Chapter? Flying into orbit........................................................66 English Electric P.42 space planes Chapter 4 American inspiration.....................................................88 Douglas Astro and other projects Chapter 5 Multi-Unit Space Transport And Recovery Device..........................112 ВАС Mustard 1964 Chapter 6 Operations in space......................................................138 ВАС Mustard 1965 Chapter 7 The rivals...............................................................163 Hawker Siddeley, Bristol Siddeley and European designs Chapter 8 Later hypersonic designs.................................................195 P.42 under ВАС Chapter 9 Making the Case for Mustard..............................................213 ВАС Mustard 1966-1970 Appendix 1 Europe falls behind........................................................240 Appendix 2 Britain's last chance......................................................245 Reference Sources and Bibliography....................................................249 Index of vehicles.....................................................................251 Index.................................................................................257 5
Introduction This is the story of the British Aircraft Corporations Multi- Unit Space Transport And Recovery Device, or ‘Mustard’ - a Space Shuttle before its time. It might reasonably be wondered, therefore, why so much of this book is devoted to English Electric Aviation and its work on P.42, a project primarily intended to produce and assess designs for high-speed aircraft. The answer is that P.42 led directly to Mustard. It is worth noting that by 1963, when P.42 commenced, working on high- speed aircraft designs was nothing new for English Electric. The firm had already built Britain’s first supersonic fighter, the Lightning, had worked on numerous high-speed missile projects, and had carried out several years of detailed work on the P.10, a projected Mach 3 ramjet-propelled aircraft. It had also been studying faster-than-sound passenger aircraft since joining the Supersonic Transport Aircraft Committee in 1957, and had been left deeply sceptical about the practicality and prospects of such designs. In 1960, English Electric joined the Bristol Aeroplane Company as a joint senior partner in the new British Aircraft Corporation (ВАС), which also encompassed Vickers-Armstrongs and Hunting Aircraft. That same year Hawker Siddeley, its chief rival and competitor, grew to encompass both de Havilland Aircraft and Blackburn Aircraft. It was already the parent of Gloster Whitworth, Avro and Folland. Both firms were industrial giants at the cutting edge of defence technology on the world stage. By July 1963, as the Bristol component of ВАС was getting to grips with the supersonic airliner project that would be named Concorde the following year, English Electric was heavily engaged in work on the TSR2 strike aircraft - another high-speed design. It was at this time and against this backdrop that ВАС received a contract requiring it to study hypersonic vehicles, that is aircraft capable of achieving Mach 5 or above. Designs were needed that could fulfil one or all of four different roles - long-range cruise aircraft, recoverable space vehicle launcher, boost-glide vehicle, and space plane. The work was given to English Electric’s design team at Warton, near Preston in Lancashire, which was already in the process of being rebranded as BAC’s Preston Division. About a month later the team received a report from the Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE), Britain’s closest equivalent to NASA, among other roles, indicating that the contract was more about the pressing need for a cheap and reusable space vehicle than it was about a long-range cruise aircraft that could travel from London to Sydney in 2 hours. Therefore only cursory work was done on the hypersonic transport role and the greatest effort was exerted to design an aircraft capable of launching the maximum possible payload into space. Pursuing this goal led the team to design a series of hypersonic aircraft that could carry space vehicles up to high altitude before releasing them for the final boost into space. Then the hypersonic aircraft itself was pushed onto the back burner and the team concentrated instead on a much more efficient means of achieving the same goal - a vertical - launch rocket-engined spacecraft that could be used time and time again to ferry cargo into orbit. By now English Electric’s naming convention had fallen by the wayside and the project received an acronym rather than a number - ‘Mustard’. The name was particularly apt since the spacecraft and its boosters were hot structure vehicles; rather than deflecting heat away using a shield like the later American Space Shuttle, their lightweight skin simply absorbed it. Hot Mustard indeed! The first drawing depicting this new system was committed to paper on St Valentine’s Day, 14 February 1964. But why were the Preston designers so convinced that a contract to study hypersonic aircraft needed to result in designs for a rocket-propelled spacecraft? It all came down to the relative cost and ease of putting satellites in orbit. The launch of the Soviet Sputnik satellite on 4 October 1957 only confirmed a conclusion reached by the RAE some months earlier that the most effective form of military reconnaissance in the future would be satellite-based. It was decided that Britain should build its own satellites and would therefore need the means to launch them into space. The science of rocketry was already well advanced in Britain and, with doubts growing about the effectiveness and cost of de Havilland’s Blue Streak medium-range ballistic missile as a nuclear weapon, it was decided in 1960 that it should be repurposed as a satellite launcher. But being a disposable vehicle, it was still hugely expensive and entirely unsuitable for space missions where a human crew would be needed. There was a growing fear that the Soviet Union might use its satellites not only for spying, but also as platforms for nuclear weaponry aimed at the West from orbit. If that was the case, Britain would need a reusable vehicle capable of inspecting or even destroying potentially hostile satellites, as well as launching its own. The European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO) had been formed in 1962, with Britain as the senior member, and it was hoped that other member nations would come together to fund a reusable space transport vehicle for launching satellites and other space missions. However, rather than joining forces to work towards this common goal, the British firms and their French and Germany counterparts each came up with their own rival projects, and a European space race began to develop. Like the early work of the Preston team, however, the French and Germans focused on more expensive horizontal-take- off launchers. 6
As the race progressed, Hawker Siddeley too came to favour a horizontal-take-off launcher, leaving ВАС to go it alone with the simpler, cheaper Mustard. A significant part of this simplicity was its ‘lifting body’ form, which would enable it to glide back to earth from orbit without an expensive heat shield. This was inspired by work carried out in America, particularly a project then being promoted by the Douglas Aircraft Company called ASTRO - an acronym whose meaning varied from year to year. Astro was problematic because it involved a small vehicle sitting on the nose of a very large vehicle, each of which would need to be developed separately at great expense. In addition, the payload it could put into orbit was limited by the enormous amount of fuel the two vehicles would have to carry between them. In this respect, Mustard’s key innovation was the use of several units that were nearly identical. Three or more Mustard vehicles would launch together, either in stack’ or cluster’ formation, all of their engines firing, but with only one of them actually reaching space. The others would pump fuel into the orbiter unit so that its tank remained full for the final stage of the journey into orbit. When their own tanks were dry, the fuelling units would detach, glide home and land, ready to be prepared for their next mission. The American system that eventually became the NASA Space Shuttle used the same principle, with an external tank fuelling the orbiter’s engines during launch. But unlike Britain’s Mustard, the Shuttles external tank was not reusable. After every launch it simply fell away into the atmosphere, plummeted to earth, broke up on impact with the ocean and sank, never to be recovered. In essence, the Mustard team developed a technology that the Shuttle would go on to prove was entirely viable. As the ВАС project’s leader Tom Smith later said: ‘There is nothing worse than being right at the wrong time.’ It is difficult now to believe that Britain was once a world leader in spacecraft design, though it is not quite so difficult to believe that this fact was kept largely hidden under a veil of secrecy for more than fifty years by the British Government. While millions were being spent to maintain a space programme based on unmanned rockets, English Electric/BAC’s highly advanced and cost-effective proposals were left on the shelf. The only consolation, perhaps, is that Mustards contemporary rivals today suffer a similar obscurity. This book was written to showcase the incredible achievements of Smith and his team and to ensure that their work takes its rightful place in the history of British technological innovation. Acknowledgements This book could not exist without the unstinting kindness, patience and support of Tony Wilson and Eric Webb at Warton. Both afforded the author every courtesy, answered every question and explained every nuance of systems and technology with which few now can claim to be entirely familiar. The overwhelming generosity of BAE Systems has been vital to this book too, and I cannot thank lan Lawrenson and Howard Mason enough for their help in this regard. I am also indebted to the following people for their help and support: Mark Aston, Peter Collins, Alan Ranger, Peter Barnes and Patrick Hassell at Rolls-Royce, Phillipe Coue and Luc Berger of Dassault Aviation, Chris Farara at Brooklands Museum, Hamza Fouatih, Simon Fowler, Jozef Gatial, Chris Gibson, Barry Hinchliffe, Luca Landino, Scott Lowther of Aerospaceprojectsreview.com, Paul Martell- Mead of Secretprojects.co.uk, Ronnie Olsthoorn, Dr Bob Parkinson, Alexander Power, Gill Richardson, Chris Sandham-Bailey, Daniel Uhr, Hans-Ulrich Willbold at Airbus, Gerald Wilson at Warton, and Jessica A. Brown at The Aerospace Corporation for teaching me a valuable lesson about Wang’s Vehicle. 7
Chapter One The rise of English Electric From the Second World War to Very High Speed Vehicles The British Aircraft Corporations Mustard space vehicle was the culmination of three strands of development that became increasingly interwoven during the eighteen years between 1945 and 1963. The first of these was a scientific interest in the potential of earths atmosphere and space that had begun in Britain during the early 1920s. Second and third were rapid advances in engine technology and the emergence of English Electric as a major force in the aviation industry, both beginning just after the Second World War. Modern British space science began with the discovery of the ionosphere and a fundamental shift in the way space was perceived and understood. Edward Victor Appleton, professor of physics at Kings College London, demonstrated in 1924 that the ionospheric layers in the upper atmosphere could be used for the long-distance transmission of radio waves - something radio pioneer Guglielmo Marconi had demonstrated in 1902 in England without knowing how or why it worked. Suddenly space no longer seemed so remote and its physics so unknowable. It could be reached and used for the practical purpose of communicating over long distances. Scientists began to wonder what other properties the atmosphere might have and how they might be used. The level of enthusiasm was such that in Liverpool on 13 October 1933 Phillip Cleator formed the British Interplanetary Society (BIS), a group dedicated to promoting the concept of space travel and the study of space. Among its early members were science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke, who joined in 1934, and engineer Arthur Valentine ‘Vai’ Cleaver. Cleaver, who later worked on sophisticated rocket engines at Rolls- Royce, wrote of the BIS: ‘It never built rockets, and before the war it always had less than 100 members, who were largely regarded as cranks. Some of them undoubtedly were, but the allusion is made by the present writer in no derogatory spirit, if ABOVE British Airways ВАС Concorde G-BOAC, as it might have looked based on English Electric's P.30M design, approaches Mach 1. Hamza Fouatih for no other reason than because he became a member himself in 1937? Low-key atmospheric research was still under way in Britain when, in 1935, the Government asked the Royal Arsenal’s research department at Woolwich to look at how cordite-fuelled military rockets could be developed. Some work had been done on rockets during the First World War, but their inaccuracy as a weapon and the difficulties of storing them safely led to this being discontinued. The new interest in rockets came as a direct result of German military developments in the field, the British Government having become aware of a significant programme of investment in solid-fuel artillery rockets begun in 1929 at Kummersdorf near Berlin. 8
CHAPTER ONE THE RISE OF ENGLISH ELECTRIC Starting in 1936, Alwyn Crow, the Arsenals director of ballistics research, led a series of studies including work on a rocket capable of reaching targets 900 miles away. Any hopes Britain’s new space scientists might have had that this would lead to a research vehicle for atmospheric studies were dashed in 1939, however, with the outbreak of the Second World War. As Crows team turned their attention to designing solid-fuel anti- aircraft rockets that could be fired at German bombers, a small team from Shell subsidiary the Asiatic Petroleum Company, led by scientist Isaac Lubbock, developed a liquid-fuelled rocket engine at the Fuel Oil Technical Laboratory in Fulham, London. This was intended to help heavily laden aircraft take off, but also to demonstrate that liquid fuel, in this case liquid oxygen, and petrol could work just as well as, or better than, the solid-fuel equivalent. This engine, dubbed ‘Lizzie’, was being bench-tested at the Ministry of Supply Weapons Research Station at Langhurst, near Horsham, by 1942. At around the same time in Germany, the design of the Aggregat-4 or V-2 rocket was being finalised. Topped with a warhead containing 2,2001b of Amatol high explosive, this missile had a surface-to-surface range of 200 miles and a sophisticated guidance system. More than 3,000 were launched at the Allies, but they seldom succeeded in inflicting strategically effective damage. As the war drew to its conclusion amid the ruins of the Third Reich, the Allies moved in to capture as much of Germany’s rocket technology as possible. RIGHT Preparations to launch a V-2 missile during Operation 'Backfire' in October 1945. The British were particularly interested in the intricacies of its guidance system and engines. Despite its history as a terror weapon, the V-2 would provide the basis for the archetypal 'space rocket' of science fiction, via author Technological advances On 14 May 1945, six days after the war’s end in Europe, Nobel Prize- winning English physicist Lawrence Bragg wrote to Alwyn Crow in support of an earlier request made by radio scientist John Ashworth Ratcliffe for captured V-2 rockets that might be repurposed and used for studying the atmosphere ‘at heights of 50-60 miles’. This request went unfulfilled, however. While the Americans gathered rocket scientists, engineers and V-2 components in bulk, and the Soviets took V-2 tooling and workers back to Russia, the British concentrated on studying and documenting what they regarded as the most important aspects of the V-2 - its engines, its guidance system and the ancillary equipment necessary to actually launch it. Beginning in May, the Special Projectile Operations Group under Major-General Alexander Maurice Cameron carried out Operation ‘Backfire at the Friedrich Krupp AG naval gun testing ground at Altenwalde, near Cruxhaven in Germany. Its stated aim was ‘to obtain, while the German technical staff originally employed on long range rockets are still available and the details are still fresh in their minds: - a) Information on the testing, assembly and firing of the German A-4 rocket, b) Detailed knowledge and experience of the German technique for launching long range rockets.’ All the necessary ground equipment was assembled by mid-September and Cameron’s unit launched three missiles one by one on 2, 4 and 15 October, making meticulous notes on every aspect of the procedure along the way. Hundreds of technical drawings were gathered showing every component of the missiles and related equipment, and a five-volume report was produced detailing the construction of the V-2 in minute detail, focusing particularly on its guidance system. The British also obtained all the technical drawings for a wide range of other high-speed guided weapons - Messerschmitt’s Enzian surface-to-air missile, the Ruhrstahl X-4 air-to-air 9
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES missile, Rheinmetall-Borsigs Rheintochter surface-to-surface missile, and many more. The capture of Dr Hellmuth Walter and his Walter Werke facility at Kiel in May 1945 also provided a wealth of information about rocket powerplants fuelled by high-test peroxide (HTP), such as the HWK 109-500 rocket-assisted- take-off engine, the Messerschmitt Me 163Bs HWK 109-509A, and the Me 263’s dual-chamber HWK 109-509C. Lengthy interviews were also conducted with ramjet scientists, including Austrian Eugen Sanger, Me 163 designer Alexander Lippisch, and Focke-Wulf s Otto Pabst, with notes and documents carefully gathered. Ramjet engines, which can only be fired up if they are already moving so fast that air is literally being ‘rammed’ into their intake by the forward motion, seemed very promising for high-speed propulsion. Also of particular interest to the British was a report produced by Sanger in August 1944 entitled ‘Uber einen Raketenantrieb fur Fernbomber’ or About a Rocket Engine for Long Range Bombers’. This detailed a sled-launched rocket-powered bomber designed to carry weapons to the edge of space for an attack on America. Despite being captured by the Americans and translated, the original report and an English translation ended up in the Ministry of Aviation library, where they were regularly studied. During the war Britain had built its own jet engines, experimented with ramjets and become well-versed in solid- fuel rocket construction. It had also worked on a host of advanced electronics - particularly in relation to radar and radio waves. Combined with the vast stockpile of captured German research data, this ensured Britain’s position as a world leader in military science. Less than a year after the wars end, RAE Farnborough established a new Controlled Weapons Department, and in April 1946 the Rocket Propulsion Establishment (RPE) was formed at Westcott, Buckinghamshire - staffed by British and German rocket scientists working closely together. The former was soon renamed the RAE Guided Weapons Department and the latter eventually also became a division of the RAE. Working in parallel was the National Gas Turbine Establishment (NGTE), which had been formed from a combination of Frank Whittles Power Jets company, nationalised in 1944, and the RAE’s turbine development division. It concentrated on the testing BELOW Eugen Sanger's sled-launched rocket bomber, as illustrated in his ground-breaking 1944 report 'About a Rocket Engine for Long Range Bombers'. The British kept several captured copies to study, both translated and in the original German. GDC Abb. 33» Geeamtanordnong dee Raketenbombers von 10 Toanen Leergewioht. 10
CHAPTER ONE THE RISE OF ENGLISH ELECTRIC and development of gas turbine engines, primarily for aircraft. Together the RAE and the NGTE became the nucleus around which a large and technologically advanced weapons and propulsion research industry flourished - despite the general austerity of the post-war years. English Electric rising By now the English Electric Company, a large-scale manufacturer of electrical equipment, engines and railway vehicles before the Second World War, was already establishing itself as a successful aviation company to rival the likes of Hawker and Bristol. In 1938 it had been chosen as a major subcontractor for what was to become known as the shadow’ aircraft industry, building Handley Page Hainpdens at its workshops in Preston, Lancashire. Three years later it started constructing Handley Page Halifaxes too, and built up a small in-house design group to work out modifications necessary for the production line. On 23 December 1942 English Electric acquired D. Napier & Son, adding aero- engine manufacturing and development expertise to its portfolio. In early 1944 the Ministry of Aircraft Production chose English Electric as a potential manufacturer for the advanced Folland Fo. 117A fighter powered by the Bristol Centaurus 12, designed to specification F.6/42, then F. 19/43. Some design work was to be involved, so the company decided to expand its team of designers and engineers, even though the Folland fighter project was ultimately abandoned. At the same time Westland Aircraft began design work on a new medium bomber to be powered by a pair of Metropolitan-Vickers F.2/4 turbojets under specification number B. 1/44. This project was led by Westland’s eccentric but highly intelligent 35-year- old technical director William Edward Willoughby ‘Teddy’ Petter, son of the company’s founder and chairman Ernest Petter. On 13 May 1944 English Electric was notified that it had been chosen to build the new highly advanced de Havilland Vampire jet fighter, and the first contract for 120 aircraft was placed in June. While preparations for this work were under way, Petter resigned from Westland. He felt aggrieved when, upon returning to work after a period of absence, he discovered that work on his bomber had been suspended in favour of a design that eventually became the turboprop-powered Wyvern carrier- borne strike fighter. Westland’s loss was English Electrics gain, for shortly thereafter Petter was hired by the firm as its new chief engineer. After six successful years of producing other companies’ designs, the directors of English Electric had decided that the firm should begin producing its own. The highly experienced, well-connected Petter was the ideal candidate to set this in motion. His first task was to expand the company’s small design team, and he went about doing this by bringing in talented engineers from other firms. Among his key appointments were Frederick William ‘Freddie’ Page, who left Hawker to join as chief stressman, and young engineering graduate Bernard Oliver ‘Ollie’ Heath. With the beginnings of his new team in place, Petter pressed ahead with the jet bomber he had wanted to build all along. A new specification was issued in March 1945, B.3/45, and by the time the war ended the English Electric design was taking shape as what would eventually become the Canberra. BELOW English Electric's first jet aircraft, the Canberra. VX165 was the first B2 prototype and the fifth prototype overall. The Canberra was a huge success for the company and firmly established its design team as a force to be reckoned with. 11
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES After the war the firm was spared the worst of the inevitable military cutbacks since the Vampire it was building had been chosen to equip the newly slimmed-down RAE In addition, the company as a whole manufactured a diverse range of successful industrial products, rather than being entirely dependent on its aircraft business for survival, and therefore had money to continue investing in aviation. This investment was rewarded when an order for four prototypes of the new B.3/45 bomber was placed in January 1946. Petter continued to expand his team by recruiting Raymond Frederick ‘Ray’ Creasey from Vickers as an aerodynamicist later that year. Creasey, born in 1921, had worked for the company throughout the war and had ABOVE Ray Creasey, gifted aerodynamicist and later English Electric director of engineering. BELOW English Electric director of research Ron Dickson would become one of Mustard's greatest champions. undertaken a part-time BSc while he was there, as part of Barnes Walliss design team. Another recruit was Ron Dickson, who had got his first job at the RAE in 1945 before joining English Electric in 1946. That same year the firm acquired Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Company, which brought with it advanced electronics expertise and knowledge of radar design - thanks to the return of Marconi personnel from wartime service with top secret government electronics research facilities. The company hired Leslie H. Bedford as its new chief television engineer in 1947. Bedford had been director of research at radar and electronics firm Cossor during the war, where he had developed ground- breaking anti-aircraft gunnery devices such as the No 9 and 11 Predictors and the AF 1 S-Band autofollow radar, which led directly to the Anti Aircraft No 3 Mk 7 mobile anti-aircraft gun control radar. This could detect a Spitfire-sized aircraft up to 75,000 feet away, or a Beaufighter-sized aircraft from 108,000 feet, and saw service with the British military until the mid-1970s under the code name Blue Cedar. Bedford had also worked on a pilotless interceptor aircraft, the disastrous Monica tail warning radar for the RAF, the Rebecca-Eureka beacon system, and the Brakemine radar-guided missile project. Less than a year after joining Marconi, Bedford was once again working on a guided weapon study project, leading to the formation of a new English Electric Guided Weapons Division - known for security reasons as the Navigational Project Division. Petter’s team also began work on a new project in 1948 - design studies intended to meet the conditions of Experimental Requirement 103 (ER. 103). Issued by the Ministry of Supply at the end of the previous year, this called for a manned research aircraft capable of exploring both transonic and supersonic speeds. Early sketches were produced during July 1948, based in part on theoretical aerodynamics work carried out by Creasey. These showed a design with moderately swept wings, a T-tail and two jet engines stacked within the fuselage but staggered so that one was further forwards than the other. A formal Ministry of Supply contract was issued to English Electric the following month and the results were presented to the Government in the form of a brochure in November. The design it featured, now with a sharply swept wing and tail, was named P.l by the company in January 1949. A contract was then awarded for the construction of a P.l mock-up and wind tunnel models in May 1949 - the same month that the Canberra made its first flight. Page now became assistant chief designer at the firm and his team was joined by brilliant young aeronautical engineering graduate Thomas William ‘Tom’ Smith, who had joined the Gloster Aircraft Company only the year before after graduating from London University’s Queen Mary College. In September the Ministry of Supply issued a new specification, E.23/49, for a supersonic fighter aircraft, and the English Electric team made minor alterations to their research aircraft design so that it would meet the requirements. By the end of the year all the groundwork had been laid for what would become the English Electric LEFT Gifted engineer Tom Smith. As head of the research (aerodynamics) department at Preston, he would lead the Mustard project. 12
CHAPTER ONE THE RISE OF ENGLISH ELECTRIC ABOVE The supersonic English Electric Lightning gave the company's designers valuable experience in the field of high-speed flight. Lightning. At the same time the Navigational Project Division commenced work on a surface-to-air missile project code-named ‘Red Shoes’, which would eventually enter service as the Thunderbird missile. Just two months into 1950, Petter left English Electric due to a disagreement with the company’s board over responsibility for production of the Canberra and was replaced by Freddie Page. Ultimate weapon While the company was getting to grips with working on the Lightning project and establishing Canberra production in 1951, as the type began to enter service, British rocket engine development was progressing rapidly. Four years earlier it had become apparent that densely populated Britain could not provide a suitably large test range for firing off potentially dangerous rockets and missiles. Therefore an agreement was reached between the British and Australian governments to establish a range at Woomera in South Australia, with thousands of miles of empty space around it. Now the range was receiving regular use by British companies. In March 1952 a group of English Electric Navigational Project Division scientists and engineers, led by Bedford, began work on assessing the possibility of developing a ‘long-range offensive weapon’ capable of reaching targets 2,000-3,000 miles away. It was to be a surface-to-surface guided missile along the lines of the V-2 - but fitted with a nuclear warhead. This was the first such work to be carried out in Britain and it was done in absolute secrecy. As this work proceeded, on 16 January 1953 Geoffrey William Tuttle, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Operational Requirements), sent a memo headed ‘The Long Range Surface-to-Surface Weapon’ to the Deputy Director of Operational Requirements, Group Captain Colin Scragg, which read: ‘It is quite clear to me that the deterrent to aggression which will be offered by a front line of Valiants, Victors and Vulcans will not be a deterrent nor a successful Hot War weapon for ever. It is therefore important that we consider now the best way of replacing them. At present our short term policy will be to have the low level bomber with an inertia controlled propelled atom bomb and the thin winged Javelin, with a smaller atom bomb flight refuelled. I do not believe that either of these or both will last very long, nor do I believe that they are a real deterrent. We must, therefore, think of something else. We need a range of 2,000 miles and we must carry an atomic warhead. I believe the only way to ensure delivery in 10 years’ time will be by means of a supersonic unmanned missile, and 1 believe that this solution will take 10 years to achieve. We must start now. In 10 years, any manned aircraft is unlikely to survive in the face of a guided weapon defence, and this weapon must therefore be supersonic, probably with a Mach number of three. In 10 years I would suggest that if there has not already been a war, our stock of atomic warheads would allow a force equipped with this weapon to be a real deterrent without the assistance of Allies. Please commence immediately drafting a requirement (which may have to be an Air Staff Target) for 13
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS. BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 such a weapon, and inform the Ministry of Supply that you are doing so. While I realise that the essential requirement is for terminal guidance, I do not believe that work on the other parts of the system, such as propulsion, navigation, fuzing or materials should be held up for this.’ It seems likely that Tuttle had received an interim report from Bedford’s team, who would not issue their final report until 30 July 1953. Two weeks later, on 14 August, a new Air Staff Target, OR.203 (Issue 2), was circulated by Scragg. This slated: ‘The Air Staff first raised a requirement for a long range surface-to-surface guided weapon under OR.203 - a long range expendable bomber - in 1945, and this was regraded as an Air Staff Target in January 1952. It is considered that progress in this field has been unduly restricted by envisaging the missile as a conventional aircraft form, and, therefore, the Air Staff now wish to restate this requirement in a modified form in the light of the foreseeable development of the operational situation.’ The requirement’s wording echoed Tuttles assessment of the future need for a supersonic long-range surface-to- surface guided weapon. The required range was 2,500 nautical miles but ‘it is highly desirable in the interests of economy and flexibility that the basic missile (warhead, guidance/control system) can be increased in range by adding stages of fuel/propulsion.’ Under ‘warheads’, the requirement stated that ‘an atomic warhead only is required,’ and under ‘accuracy’ it said: ‘Against a precisely known target an accuracy of 500 yards 50% zone is required but the Air Staff will be informed if this degree of accuracy will impose unacceptably severe penalties.’ On 17 September Scragg invited the Air Staff - the RAF’s most senior commanders - to a presentation by Bedford and his team. He wrote: ‘The visit is designed to introduce a new concept in which we are likely to become more closely involved in the future and which will have many most difficult and unusual problems. The presentation will be unofficial and without prejudice to any decisions on our part or the further work which the firm may be undertaking.’ A copy of Bedfords report was attached to each invitation and anyone reading it would quickly realise that the ‘new concept’ it outlined was truly horrifying. The document states: ‘Serious consideration was first devoted to the project of a long range offensive weapon in March 1952, since which time a great deal of ground has been covered in an exploratory manner. Our investigation leaves us in no doubt that the long range weapon is not in the pipe-dream category but is a practical possibility. This being so, it is quite certain that the potential enemy would not fail to fully exploit our geographical disadvantage by the use of such a weapon against us. Certain forms of the weapon such as the ballistic rocket are virtually immune from defensive counter-measures of any kind. In this case, the only possible defence is therefore attack. From a military point of view our ability to launch such an attack, clearly advertised and substantiated, is probably the only useful war deterrent.’ The report makes it clear that English Electric’s study was broad and examined a wide range of missile types. It says: ‘These have included ramjet, glide rocket and ballistic rocket with emphasis increasing in that order. Ramjets have received rather scant attention because the originally considered long flight time of 75 minutes, for Mach 2.4, was inconsistent with guidance accuracy. More recent consideration suggests the possibility of a ramjet flying at Mach 3.5. The glide rocket with Mach greater than six was considered more fully but, though an improvement with respect to guidance accuracy, did not offer an attractive solution and left serious problems with regard to aerodynamic heating. Gradually our opinion has hardened in favour of the (guided) ballistic rocket, this reducing the time of flight to 16 minutes. This solution almost disposes of the problem of gyro drift, for not only is the time of flight relatively short but the gyros are in field free space and hence nominally driftless. A weapon of this type reaches a speed of 17,000ft per second approx, and can probably be considered invulnerable to defensive countermeasures for all time. It is therefore probably the ultimate form of weapon and the circumstances appear to us to justify the bold step of proceeding straight to the ultimate solution without going through intermediate and subsequently obsolete techniques.’ In 1952-53, earlier than perhaps anyone else in the world, Bedford and his team had realised the urgent need for long-range missiles fitted with nuclear warheads. Even the Americans did not give such a weapon top priority until the following year, though Convair had been handed a development contract for a long-range missile in January 195L Il was also clear to Bedford that a huge amount of research and development work would be required to build an ‘ultimate weapon’ that actually worked. There were, he thought, two main problems: getting enough thrust, and designing something that could ‘survive the short but excessively arduous descent through the atmosphere’ - in other words, re-entry. 14
CHAPTER ONE THE RISE OF ENGLISH ELECTRIC In this regard, the report states: ‘The temperature troubles only arise during the final few seconds of descent through the atmosphere. In this regime the heat transfer conditions are somewhat obscure and only tentative calculations have been possible. Two solutions now appear realisable: 1. The use of sweat cooled surfaces with water as coolant. [This] requires considerable ducting and provision of rapid change in rate of water supply. 2. The use of a carbon skin. Carbon has emerged as the most suitable material for use as a heat shield. It is some seven times better than steel in this respect.’ This may well represent the first British scientific examination of the heating problems associated with atmospheric re-entry. In April 1954 the US approached the UK with a proposal of cooperation on the development of ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads. This resulted in the Wilson- Sandys Agreement of August 1954, where the US would work on a long- range missile and the UK would develop one for the medium range. By 8 August 1955 Bedford’s report had resulted in OR.l 139, which called for a medium-range ballistic missile system for the military. The company chosen to fulfil this requirement was de Havilland Propellers, with what became the Blue Streak missile. Joining the space race In 1939 the British Interplanetary Society’s technical committee had published the design of a spaceship for taking three men to the moon and back using a combination of 2,250 RIGHT The five-stage launch vehicle designed by British Interplanetary Society technical committee member Ralph Smith in August 1951. The final stage was a manned orbiter that could make a gliding return to earth following operations in space. Smith's work preceded American studies of boosted spacecraft by at least eight months. BIS 15
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE Ralph Smith's winged orbiter as it appeared in Arthur C. Clarke's 1954 book The Exploration of the Moon. BIS solid-fuel rockets» but this was little more than science fiction and the organisation suspended all activity when the war began. The BIS that reconvened after the war was a very different animal from the one that had gone before, however. Several of its members had been involved in advanced projects during the conflict and, as Britain’s technical establishments absorbed Germany’s missile technology during the immediate post-war period, so too did the BIS - particularly with regard to advanced rockets such as the various proposed developments of the V-2. BIS technical committee members Ralph Smith and Harry Ross approached the Ministry of Supply in December 1946 with plans to modify a V-2 so that it could carry a one-man capsule up to an altitude of 189.4 miles. The capsule would then return by parachute. The proposed vehicle, known as Megaroc, was rejected. However, by 1951 Smith was working for the RPE and had a good understanding of liquid-fuelled rockets. On 2 August of that year he designed a five-stage launch vehicle, the last stage of which was a delta-wing manned spacecraft. At 50ft 3in long and 27ft lOin wide, this orbiter was designed to glide back down to earth once its mission was complete. Smith did not specify the fuel he intended his vehicle to use, but he was most likely thinking of red fuming nitric acid and kerosene. Here was a space launcher that might have actually worked - and which preceded similar American configurations by at least eight months. Rather than being submitted to the Government, however, the design, albeit in modified form with only two or three stages, was used to illustrate Arthur C. Clarke’s book The Exploration of the Moon, published in 1954. In 1953, as the Air Staff got to grips with the need for the ultimate weapon, the RAEs Guided Weapons Department was busy assessing somewhat less futuristic designs for single- and two- stage solid-fuel rockets. Research carried out by the departments Desmond George King-Hele resulted in a single- stage design called CTV 5 Series 3. The CTV (Component Test Vehicle) family had begun with CTV 1 three years earlier, and was intended to trial systems for military missiles. CTV 5 Series 3, designed for use in studying re-entry vehicles, then came unexpectedly to the attention of the Royal Society’s Gassiot Committee. This long-standing committee of scientists, originally formed in 1871 to oversee the Kew Observatory, had been continuing the work of studying the upper atmosphere that had begun before the war, and had been largely unaware of just how far the RAEs rocket research had advanced. In their search for a vehicle with which to carry out practical atmospheric 16
CHAPTER ONE THE RISE OF ENGLISH ELECTRIC experiments, committee members had even visited the US to learn about Aerobee sounding rockets - which were based on the design of captured V-2s. In fact, the Americans had captured so many components that they were able to assemble about sixty working V-2s, though without guidance systems, and to continue using them for atmospheric research alongside the Aerobee until the last V-2 was fired on 19 September 1952. It was the US scientific liaison officer in London, Fred Singer, who told the Gassiot scientists about the RAEs rocket research, and specifically about the CTV 5 Series 3 in 1953. A few months later the Government, also realising the suitability of the RAEs rocket for space research, offered it to the scientists. In 1954 the Gassiot Committee proposed that the CTV 5 Series 3 be developed into a scientific research rocket capable of carrying a 1001b payload to an altitude of around 125 miles. Coincidentally, at the end of that year the Defence Research Policy Committee (DRPC), an influential group of military technology advisors who reported directly to the Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of Defence, set up a working party to look at how long- range military reconnaissance might be improved through new technology. While this work was under way, in early 1955, the Americans were consulted on the CTV 5 Series 3s design. A delegation from the RAE visited the New Mexico Joint Guided Missile Test Range, formerly known as the White Sands Proving Ground, to examine the design of the Aerobee for themselves. From this came the revelation that the number of stabilising fins on a rocket should be three - not two or four - to help it clear the launcher rails. In September 1956 CTV 5 Series 3 was renamed Skylark, after a suggestion made in the RAEs in-house magazine. It was powered by solid-fuel engines developed by the RPE - initially the Raven engine, then the Raven and the Cuckoo when an extra stage was added. While the civilian Skylark was being finalised, a military research rocket, Black Knight, was being devised by Saunders-Roe to investigate design problems posed by the development of Blue Streak. Meanwhile, the DRPC’s working group had reached the conclusion that an orbiting satellite equipped with cameras would be the best possible vehicle for carrying out long-range reconnaissance. King-Hele was then asked to investigate the design features of such a satellite. He reported his findings to the working group in 1956, noting the difficulties of getting images back from the satellite and suggesting that it ought to be solar-powered. He also suggested that Blue Streak might make a suitable launch vehicle. After his evidence had been reviewed by the Royal Society, it was agreed that an Artificial Satellite Sub-Committee should be formed to look more closely at the possibilities of satellites. The first Skylark rocket was test- launched in February 1957, and three months later the RAE put out another report making a much more detailed assessment of how Blue Streak might be used as a satellite launcher - by mounting the smaller Black Knight research vehicle on top of it as a second stage. Neither vehicle had yet been built. At this stage there was no government requirement for a satellite, let alone a satellite launcher, but the RAE was convinced that both would be needed, so continued with its research. Then, on 4 October 1957, the Soviets stunned the West by successfully launching the Sputnik 1 satellite into low earth orbit. Less than a month later, on 3 November, it was joined by Sputnik 2 with a dog on board. Skylarks first scientific research launch took place on 13 November. These dramatic developments resulted in a significantly increased interest in space on the part of the British Government. The Americans launched their first satellite, Explorer 1, on 31 January 1958, and their second, Vanguard 1, on 17 March of the same year. The first of twenty-two Saunders- Roe Black Knight test vehicle launches took place on 7 September 1958. In May 1959 Conservative MP Richard Fort asked Prime Minister Harold Macmillan whether he was in a position to make a statement about space research. Macmillan replied: ‘Design studies are being put in hand for the adaptation of the British military rockets which are now under development. This will put us in a position, should we decide to do so, to make an all- British effort.’ That same month, the first meeting of Hawker Siddeley Groups Space Study Group took place. Its main purpose at that time was to work out what ideas the groups component firms should present at the First Commonwealth Spaceflight Symposium that August. Among them was Armstrong Whitworth Aircrafts Manned Satellite - details of which are given in Chapter 7 - a proposed manned space vehicle for orbital surveillance. And before the end of the year Saunders-Roe produced a brochure for a satellite launch vehicle it called Black Prince, based on designs it had already submitted to the RAE in April. This was an unmanned rocket, rather than a manned spacecraft. It was announced in April 1960 that Blue Streak would be cancelled as a weapon, but would continue in development as a satellite launcher. Saunders-Roe, Bristol Siddeley and the RAE spent the rest of the year working out how Blue Streak might be reconfigured for this new role with the possible inclusion of Black Knight and a new third stage. At the end of the year and into early 1961 attempts were made to interest the French in a joint satellite launcher programme. This first resulted in Eurospace, a private arrangement between Hawker Siddeley and a group of French companies to collaborate on space projects. Then, after protracted negotiations, the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO) came into being in March 1962. The partners were Britain, bearing 38.8% of the cost, France 23.9%, West Germany 22%, Italy 9.8%, Belgium 2.9%, and the Netherlands 2.6%. 17
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 After Lightning Unlike Saunders-Roe and the Hawker- Siddeley Group firms, English Electric had no involvement in the early beginnings of Britain’s space race; its hands were full with other work. The P.l research aircraft made its first flight in August 1954 and the Lightning fighter into which it was developed first Hew in April 1957, entering service in December 1959. Behind the scenes, the company’s designers worked on numerous different versions of the Canberra and Lightning while also developing unrelated advanced projects. Of the project sequence between P.l and P.42, seven were Canberra variants and fifteen, including P.1 itself, were variations on the Lightning theme - such as P.l5, the photo-reconnaissance version, and P.l8, the low-altitude bomber version. Between 1950 and 1955 other projects included P.7, a large transport aircraft powered by a single nose- mounted Armstrong Siddeley Double Mamba turboprop, and P.9, a basic jet trainer aircraft where the instructor and pupil sat next to one another. A third major project began in 1955 in the form of P.10. This was English Electrics first attempt to make use of the advanced power plants under development by its sister company, the engine manufacturer Napier. In 1951 the firm had been contracted by the NGTE to construct a test vehicle powered by a large-diameter ramjet - rival firm Bristol Engines being already engaged in ramjet work with the RAE. The result was the Ram Jet Test Vehicle, or RJTV, and its power plant, the Napier Ram Jet or NRJ. The vehicle was a success and Napier then continued to work on and improve the design, resulting in the RJTV 2, which had a ramjet capable of Mach 3-4. When Operational Requirement OR.330 with specification R.156T was issued in January 1955, calling for a radar reconnaissance aircraft with a top speed above Mach 2.5, it was clear to English Electric that Napiers ramjets could offer a means of meeting that requirement. Numerous different versions of P. 10 were drafted, each with a long pointed nose, a long slender fuselage, a low strongly swept fin, and foreplanes just aft of the cockpit. Where they differed most was in the wings and engines. One early design drafted by Ollie Heath in January 1955, possibly the first P. 10 study, was powered by sixteen Rolls- Royce RB.121 turbojets, eight housed in each wing. This had foreplanes like miniature versions of the Lightnings wings, and one version of it had vertical fins just outboard of the engines for added stability at high speed. The P.10B of March 1955, however, had a dozen ramjet burners within its wings instead; the wing itself had thus become the propulsion system. Exactly how it would have been accelerated to the point where the ramjets could operate is unclear, however. The P. 10C of January 1956 had enormous 60-inch- diameter ramjets on its wingtips and thin wings. Such huge engines did not yet BELOW English Electric's R30M Mach 2.5 airliner. During 1958 the firm worked on a series of supersonic transport designs, and this project provided yet more experience with high-speed aerodynamic forms and would ultimately form the basis of the P.42 studies in 1963. 18
CHAPTER ONE THE RISE OF ENGLISH ELECTRIC ABOVE With the radical P.1O project, begun in 1955, English Electric worked on ways of integrating ramjet engines into a high- speed airframe. This was the beginning of the company's work on vehicles approaching hypersonic velocity. Luca Landino exist, but Napier was rapidly becoming a specialist in large-diameter ramjets. Another innovative feature of the P.10C addressed the P.lOBs propulsion shortcomings. It had a pair of RB.123 turbojets built into the rear fuselage, which would be used to bring the P. 10 up to around Mach 1.2, at which point the ramjets could be lit. Supplemental turbojets were a feature that English Electric would subsequently use with both P.42 and Mustard. The P.10D was a guided missile rather than an aircraft, while the P.10E aircraft again featured in-wing ramjets - this time alternating with turbojets, so each wing had four ramjets and four turbojets. The definitive P.10, the one eventually submitted for OR.330, used the twin fuselage-mounted turbojets of the P.10C with the full-wing ramjets of the P.10B. The project seemed promising, so from early 1955 onwards the NGTE and Napier built a two- chamber ramjet test rig at the NGTE s Pyestock facility. English Electric itself worked on assessing the level of heating that would take place at Mach 3 and above, and found that the nose section forward of the canards would be exposed to surface temperatures of 240°C. However, the lack of internal pressure in this section meant that it could still be built from a light alloy without problems. The data gleaned from these studies would come to stand the company in good stead later on. The OR.330 tender design conference took place on 13 September 1955 and, despite a significant amount of interest in the P.10, Avros rival 730 design was victorious. Nonetheless, English Electric continued working on P.10 because it had been informed that a scaled-up version carrying bombs might go a long way towards meeting another requirement, OR.336. The Pyestock test rig was completed in June 1956 but the NGTE took sole charge of it three months later as interest in P.10 began to wane. Then, on 28 December 1956, George Leitch of the Ministry of Supply wrote a letter to the Treasury requesting that English Electric be given a £400,000 research contract to continue working on the P.10. He wrote: ‘We did not recommend to the Air Ministry the adoption of this design in the context of OR.330 because the development period would have been unduly long and because the firm had not made adequate provision in the design to carry the full range of equipment required. We were, however, greatly attracted by the novelty and promise of certain features of the design, and we have since discussed with them the possibility of a research project with the object of investigating further certain of these features. The ramjet, of course, offers advantages over the turbojet at very high altitude of the order of 70,000ft and at speeds in the region of Mach 3. The particular form of design envisaged by English Electric - the full span row of engines - enables the designer to select engines which are larger in relation to the aircraft size than in more conventional types without any substantial weight or drag penalty. If the research programme confirmed our hopes, the project would represent a great step forward in long range supersonic performance and could form a suitable basis for a long range bomber. Other possible applications are to long range guided weapon design and to the supersonic civil aircraft of the future.’ There then followed a series of debates between the Ministry of Supply and the Treasury that ran into February 1957. After a discussion with his colleague John Herbecq, on 7 February senior Treasury official Timothy James Bligh 19
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 wrote to their superior David Radford Serpell, the Treasury undersecretary with special responsibility for defence: ‘Mr Leitch made it clear that the Ministry of Supply are interested in this at the highest level, and he hoped that we could give them very early agreement. 1 know it is more difficult to drown kittens that have their eyes open, and that there is much to be said for trying to get this project stopped at this stage. Nevertheless the sum involved is relatively small, and I do not believe we can hold such a strong view about this as to be able to prevent Ministry of Supply going ahead with it within the shortly-to-be-reduced (we hope) provision for research and development expenditure. Accordingly I come down on the side of Mr Herbecq’s first recommendation and would let this proceed.’ At this point the P.10 was very close to receiving full funding to be built as a flying research aircraft. The Ministry of Supply wanted it and the Treasury, which held the purse strings, seemingly wanted it too. English Electric had even offered to sweeten the deal by paying £100,000 of the £400,000 out of its own pocket. Serpell, a man later described by British Rail Chairman Sir Peter Parker as being as cosy as a razor blade’, wrote back to Bligh on 11 February: ‘This is clearly one of those cases where divided opinions are inevitable. Let us get away from the idea that “this is only a small one”. The cost - £400,000 over two years - would be very substantial in any field. Even so, what really matters is the effort involved. Most of this money must no doubt be spent, at this stage, on the time of skilled men and complicated machines. Can we really afford this? A great effort is apparently to be made by the British aircraft industry as a whole (or nearly) to develop a British commercial supersonic aircraft (which, incidentally, would not be available until 1970). Yet, as this weeks Flight points out, the team lacks representation from “the only two British firms with truly supersonic experience - Fairey and English Electric”. The first question is, therefore, whether English Electrics resources might not be better used in assisting the development of a commercial supersonic aircraft, rather than - as appears to be the case - jumping ahead to an aircraft development which, if it takes place at all, will, presumably, not be for 20 years from now. At such a date, it seems unlikely that there will be bombers, at any rate in areas where Mach 3 performance would be required, and if there are no bombers the need for fighters of that sort of performance will also have disappeared. The Ministry of Supply’s failure to secure a “defence” view on the value of the P.10 project must be taken as evidence of the probable lack of military interest. But all the same 1 think that such a view should be sought since the P.10 project would take up the time of skilled workers who (the Ministry of Defence might hold) would be better employed on aircraft with a less ambitious performance or on guided missile development and production.’ And with that, Serpell finally killed the P.10 outright. A letter was sent to him on 19 February by Air Ministry official Ronald C. Kent saying of the P. 10: ‘The possible long term applications for such an advanced project, both in manned and unmanned vehicles, are many; and the proposal has the Air Staff s full support.’ But it was too late. In a memo dated 8 April 1957, Herbecq wrote: ‘This project is now a firm candidate for a trim in aid of the £20m target.’ This was four days after the publication of the 1957 Defence White Paper, which was intended primarily to save that amount of money by reducing the number of military projects undergoing development at that point. John Rankin Christie of the Ministry of Supply wrote to Bligh on 1 August 1957 to explain that ‘English Electric agreed to re- examine the programme and proposed another approach which involved a design study stage to explore the possibilities as a first step with some exploratory work on ram jets at Bristols. We are now satisfied that this will keep progress on the project at a satisfactory rate. This stage will last until about March next year when we shall have to decide on examination of the results whether to carry on or not.’ English Electric had apparently agreed to fund the research itself. The Ministry of Supply had allocated £45,000 to the P.10, but this would now be transferred to Bristol Engines’ ramjet work. Here the ailing P.10 came to a halt. But Serpell’s comments about English Electric’s experience and Britain’s future commercial supersonic airliner had been more apt than he knew. Supersonic transports While P.10 was drawing its final breath, English Electric was already preparing to engage in another cutting-edge project - P.17. In October 1956, two months before the resurrection of P.10, English Electric had begun talks with Handel Davies, the Ministry of Supply’s newly appointed Director-General of Scientific Research (Air), regarding proposals for a successor to the Canberra. A set of specifications was being drafted, which included a speed of Mach 1.3 and a range of some 800 miles at sea level carrying either a conventional or nuclear weapons payload or reconnaissance equipment. These were solidified into a new General Operational Requirement in March 1957, GOR.339. The deadline for submissions was 31 January 1958, and the eventual result was that English Electric’s P.17 became the basis for the TSR2 strike aircraft. In the process of winning this major contract, the company was paired up with Vickers-Armstrongs, which was given the project lead. 20
CHAPTER ONE THE RISE OF ENGLISH ELECTRIC ABOVE The only TSR2 to fly, XR219, is seen at BAC's Weybridge factory. The Mach 2.35-capable TSR2 was based in large part on English Electric's P.17 designs, and as the project progressed the company's thoughts turned towards a successor. BELOW The Bristol Aeroplane Company's Mach 2.2 supersonic transport design, Type 198, became part of the ВАС stable when the firm merged with English Electric and Vickers-Armstrongs in 1960. This drawing, dated 4 January 1960, shows features such as the lowering nose cone that would eventually appear on Concorde. Other aspects, such as the engine installation, are very different. 21
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES Less than two months earlier, in November 1957, English Electric had joined the Supersonic Transport Aircraft Committee (STAC). Established thirteen months before, the committee, backed by the Government and the RAE, already included seven aircraft companies - Avro, Armstrong Whitworth, Bristol, de Havilland, Handley Page, Short Brothers and Vickers-Armstrongs - and English Electric joined alongside fellow latecomer Fairey Aviation to make nine. Throughout 1958, therefore, the company worked on its second Mach 3+ project - the P.30 supersonic transport. The STAC made its final report in March 1959 and called for specific design studies from industry LEFT This 17 February 1961 diagram shows how the three main component companies of ВАС might have built the Type 198 supersonic airliner without any French involvement - English Electric CEE A) taking the rear section including fin and engine installations, Vickers- Armstrongs ('VA') building the majority of the wings, and Bristol Aeroplane Company Ltd ('BAL) building the fuselage and managing the project overall. for two different aircraft - one capable of Mach 1.2 carrying 100 passengers and the other at least Mach 1.8 carrying 150 passengers. By this time the process of merging English Electric Aviation, the Bristol Aeroplane Company and Vickers- Armstrongs together as the three main components of the British Aircraft Corporation was well advanced. As a result, all three became involved in drafting designs for supersonic transports. The lead company from the outset was Bristol with its Type 198 designs, while ideas from the P.30 and Vickerss work fed into the final product, which was then successful in defeating designs produced by Hawker Siddeley BELOW A later Type 198, from September 1960, with the engines now positioned in sections under the wings and fuselage. A huge number of different configurations were assessed. 22
CHAPTER ONE THE RISE OF ENGLISH ELECTRIC RIGHT The defeated Hawker Siddeley submission for what would become Concorde. Bristol's Type 198 was a triumph for ВАС and a bitter blow for Hawker. The latter firm never forgot, and later worked on Concorde-like hypersonic designs that it claimed had superior performance. RAeS (NAL)/Mary Evans Picture Library to claim the initial £500,000 government contract for design studies in October 1960. Although it was not chosen to go forward as ВАС s bid for the contract, nevertheless a great deal of work was carried out on P.30, with at least eighteen different designs being drawn up. As with the P.10, these were given letters of the alphabet - P.30A to at least P.30R. It was more valuable experience in working on large high-speed aircraft, and it gave one English Electric designer in particular, Gerald David ‘Dave Walley, an opportunity to demonstrate his abilities. Walleys prodigious work rate often outstripped the ability of the firm’s engineers to assess his creations from a technical standpoint, but allowed the team to quickly visualise ideas and make changes on the run as the project progressed. BELOW The P.30R/1 Mach 2.2 airliner, as drawn by Dave Walley in EAG 3196/1, had a number of Concorde-like features. CONFIGURATION COMPARISON At start of joint feasibility studies.) 23
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUHLE VOLUMES ABOVE Another version of the P.3O designed by Dave Walley - this time with a novel solution to the problem of landing an aircraft with very sharply swept wings. On Concord, the nose drooped so that the pilot could still see ahead even with the front of the aircraft raised up high. In Walley's design the wing itself lifts up, achieving the same effect since the aircraft can then be landed at a more conventional angle. Once BAC’s proposals for the supersonic transport project were chosen over those of Hawker, it was provisionally decided that detail work on the aircraft would be split three ways. Bristol would take the forward fuselage, Vickers the wings and undercarriage, and English Electric the tail and engine installations. It was only later that the French became involved in what was eventually named Concord by the British, and Concorde by the French. High Speed Vehicles While work on rockets and rocket engines, TSR2 and Concorde was continuing elsewhere, on 5 July 1962 a ‘who’s who’ of Britain’s finest aero engineers and designers gathered at Farnborough Technical College in Hampshire for the beginning of the two-day Royal Aircraft Establishment Symposium on Very High Speed Vehicles. Among them were delegations from Whitworth Gloster (Hawker Siddeley), the British Aircraft Corporation (ВАС), Bristol Siddeley and Rolls-Royce. There was a particularly large number of ВАС representatives, since each of the firm’s constituent parts - English Electric, the Bristol Aeroplane Company and Vickers-Armstrongs - sent its own delegates. When all were assembled, RAE director James Lighthill told them they were there to discuss the technical possibilities for winged vehicles capable of Mach 2 and above, and orbital speeds. What exactly these very-high- speed vehicles could be used for needed to be investigated, he said, but a preliminary report on the possibilities had been produced by a working group chaired by Handel Davies, who, having moved from the Ministry of Supply, was now the RAE’s deputy director. Lighthill stressed that many technical issues needed to be resolved before any discussion could take place about ‘what national policy on these extremely fast winged vehicles should be’. RAE specialists then gave presentations on the heating effects of travelling above Mach 2, the possibilities of combining engines with wings, air-breathing hypersonic vehicles, ramjets, rockets, metallic and non-metallic materials, engineering systems and structures. As the first day wore on, it was increasingly clear to the delegates that the RAE wanted the lion’s share of future research to be carried out by the big aviation companies. A paying contract, it seemed, was in the offing. At the beginning of the second day, Davies took the podium and said that the process of developing high-speed vehicles should be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, but warned that high temperatures would result in severe problems for aircraft - including fuel heating to the point of explosion and the need for air-conditioning of systems. On the subject of what a hypersonic aircraft might be used for, Davies said that the most promising role was reconnaissance. He had in mind, he said, something flying at Mach 4-6 at 100,000 feet ‘though a vehicle capable of a higher speed and altitude might be necessary from the 24
CHAPTER ONE THE RISE OF ENGLISH ELECTRIC vulnerability aspect*. This aircraft would have several advantages over a satellite, he said, including ‘improved definition, and greater control over its trajectory. It could also have an offensive ability.’ Other promising uses for such a vehicle were as the first stage of a satellite-launching system and for long-range transport. At the end of his speech, Davies made four recommendations: ‘...that design studies should be made in industry of a reconnaissance bomber/transport vehicle in the Mach 4-6 speed range; that parametric studies of vehicles capable of flight in the Mach 6-12 speed range should be made, including the possible use of such an aircraft as a satellite launcher; the vulnerability of these types of vehicles should be investigated; and basic research over a broad front should continue.’ Assistant Chief of the Air Staff Air Vice Marshal Christopher Hartley then explained the Air Ministry’s position. He said that he was ‘under pressure to define the military requirements for aerospace vehicles’ but was ‘most encouraged to find so much common ground’ between the RAE’s thinking and that of his own staff. He also said it was unlikely that the UK would be able to go it alone with hypersonics and space launcher projects, but that ‘a great deal has to be done before one can approach other countries with proposals for collaboration.’ There were two main reasons, he said, for ‘extension upwards of the Mach number and altitude capabilities of current weapons carriers and transports’: the risk of losing the ability to penetrate enemy defences at low level, and the potential threat posed by enemy aircraft flying at high altitudes. He agreed that the most obvious use for a hypersonic aircraft was for reconnaissance, but ‘there is also a case for a transport of medium to short range which can over-fly countries without being detected. If such an aircraft could take off and land using 2,000-yard runways, it would be a very useful vehicle for transporting key personnel very quickly.’ He warned that ‘little emphasis should be put on a strike application at the present stage, particularly as the type of defensive weapons likely to exist in 15 years’ time cannot be clearly forecast, but obviously one would try to use a hypersonic vehicle in the strike role if it existed.’ Using hypersonic speed for a fighter aircraft also needed to be investigated. Next it was delegates’ turn to offer some of their own experiences with designing Mach 2+ aircraft. Dr Robin Jamison, head of Bristol Siddeley Engines’ newly established Advanced Propulsion Research Group, went first. He described a design study carried out by his firm involving a Mach 7 transport weighing 300,0001b, carrying a 15,0001b payload, that could take off and land on 7,000-foot runways. Three novel engine types had been considered - a reheated turbojet/ramjet combination, a turbojet/rocket/ramjet combination, and a turbo-rocket. Whichever was used, the intake would have been a Nonweiler shape, formed like an inverted ‘V’, and the air flow into the engine would have been controlled by a ramp. Initial power would be provided by the turbojet, with the ramjet lighting up at Mach 1. By Mach 3, the turbojet would just be increasing drag, so it would be powered down and switched off at some point between Mach 3 and Mach 4 - with the air being entirely diverted away from it. Up to Mach 7, the ramjet provided all of the power. Jamison said: ‘It was found that with the turbojet/ramjet configuration, acceleration at transonic speeds was poor and fuel consumption high, but with the addition of rocket power for acceleration in this region there was a decrease of total engine- plus-fuel weight.’ Range without the rocket was 4,400 miles, but with it the aircraft could reach 4,900 miles. Jamison said that if a ‘pick-a-back configuration’ was considered - the aircraft effectively being propelled to altitude by an expendable rocket or similar - climb fuel would be saved and a range of up to 6,900 miles was possible at Mach 7. In the group discussion that followed, Rolls-Royce engineer Stephen Bragg questioned Bristol Siddeley’s fuel consumption figures and said that Jamison’s design study demonstrated the need to study the whole flight trajectory of any hypersonic vehicle. Denning Pearson, the managing director of Rolls-Royce’s aero engine division, and also chief executive of the company as a whole, then said he was not convinced that jet deflection - diverting the airflow around the inside of a turbojet/ramjet combination - would be easy to accomplish in practice ‘as has been assumed by some speakers’. Ray Creasey, now English Electric’s director of engineering, made a presentation describing various project studies carried out by his firm after the cancellation of OR.330. One example, he said, was an aircraft with a capability of Mach 3 at 100,000 feet, which had a ducted wing structure with integrated ramjets. It had been found that there was ample stowage volume available for fuel, but the ratio of engine exit area/inlet area caused problems. He was referring to the P.10, though he did not name it as such, and said that in general ‘once one considers speeds above Mach 2, and skin temperatures above 150°C, many difficulties arise and prospects for civil aircraft with skin temperatures of 600°C appear remote.’ A second representative of ВАС, David J. Farrar, from the part of the corporation that had been the Bristol Aeroplane Company, said that the problems he had faced in designing the Bristol Bloodhound surface-to-air missile were very similar to those facing designers working on high- speed aircraft: ‘For example, the design of control systems with severe aerodynamic and thermodynamic loads, equipment design in an unfavourable environment, protection of materials, including thermal shock and ablation problems.’ Vulnerability studies had shown that ‘a hypersonic 25
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 cruise aircraft should be invulnerable to tactical surface-to-air guided weapons, but not to strategic SAMs such as Nike-Zeus’ I’he UM-49 Nike Zeus missile was a development of the MIM-14 Nike Hercules anti-missile system, designed to intercept incoming ICBMs in the upper atmosphere - or even satellites - and destroy them with a 25-kiloton W31 nuclear warhead. The huge blast created by this device was intended to guarantee a ‘kill’, but strong doubts had already been raised about its effectiveness by July 1962. Detonating a nuclear device in the upper atmosphere made the air below it opaque to radar - effectively blinding Zeus and preventing further interceptions if a second wave of missiles was inbound. Not only that, but the system could not tell the difference between decoys fitted with radar reflectors and missiles carrying live warheads. If the spread of incoming targets caused some to be missed by the first Zeus detonation, it would then be too late for the system to pick up the stragglers. It was cancelled the following year. Farrar then went on to criticise the RAE report for failing to take into account the re-entry problems that would be faced by weapon-carrying hypersonic aircraft, but conceded that such an aircraft ‘might be of great tactical use’. During the final afternoon of debates, Alan Clifton of Supermarine, and now the Vickers-Armstrongs part of ВАС, who had been one of the Supermarine Spitfire’s designers, said: ‘The time scale assumed for producing a hypersonic aircraft appears to be an in-service date of 1980. We are concerned with converting research and development data into ironmongery, and this is a continuous process. The evolutionary way, with research aircraft being regularly designed, is a cheaper way of proceeding than aiming to produce one vehicle in the distant future.’ The Air Ministry’s Morien Morgan, who was at that time chairing the Concorde oversight committee, replied: ‘At the present time record sums are being spent on research aircraft. The ministry is not anti research aircraft, but only a limited sum of money is available. If a good case for a research aircraft is put forward it will be energetically pursued.’ Lighthill then summed up, but did not tell delegates that a second working party had been set up a month earlier to further investigate hypersonics as space vehicles. Only when this research group had all but concluded its research were a pair of contracts for further hypersonics studies drawn up for the two biggest players in the British aviation industry. 26
Chapter Two ‘Concorde-ish in nature’ English Electric P.42 aircraft The Ministry of Aviation issued identical £45,000 research contracts to Hawker Siddeley Aviation (HSA) and the British Aircraft Corporation on 10 July 1963. HSA received Contract No KD/2X/l/CB7(c), while ВАС got No KD/2X/2/CB7(c), requiring the companies to study hypersonic vehicles in four distinct categories, which hinted at potential operational roles without being too specific. The categories were: long-range high-speed cruise aircraft; recoverable launchers; boost-glide vehicles; and space planes. The first of these would form the basis for a bomber or transport aircraft, the second a spacecraft designed to ‘skip through the upper atmosphere, the third a reusable means of putting payload into space, and the last an out- and-out manned space vehicle, designed to ‘fly’ into space and return. Within those four broad headings, the firms were to look at whether two-stage or single-stage configurations would be best, whether rockets and ramjets could be used effectively as ‘boosters’ and ‘sustainers’, and what different fuels might be used, particularly hydrogen and kerosene. Cost and timescale were to be commented on and suggestions for further avenues of research were invited. The terms of the contract required that ‘work under the contract is to begin immediately and to be completed as soon as possible but not later than 31 December 1963.’ This gave the two firms less than six months to conduct ABOVE English Electric's first runway take-off launcher combination - P.42 Scheme 11/4 booster with P.42 Scheme 11/1 spacecraft - sets out on a mission to examine a potentially hostile Soviet satellite. Daniel Uhr one of the most wide-ranging and open-ended studies into new technology ever commissioned in Britain - and on a tiny budget. The letter issued alongside the contract by the Ministry of Aviation’s director of contracts also stated: ‘In carrying out the work described in the schedule you should of course take account of work on propulsion being done at Bristol Siddeley Engines Ltd and Rolls-Royce Ltd. I am also to request that you maintain close 27
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 collaboration with the Royal Aircraft Establishment and with the National Gas Turbine Establishment.* HSAs work on its contract is discussed in Chapter 7. The English Electric Aviation team at Warton, near Preston, Lancashire, were to fulfil BAC’s contract. English Electric had by now been part of the corporation for three years and Warton was rebranded as its Preston Division during the course of the work. The project had already been given the designation P.42 and was under the supervision of Ray Creasey and the head of the research (aerodynamics) department, Tom Smith, with designer Dave Walley responsible for most of the necessary drawings. What the engine companies offered Right at the outset English Electric was urged to ‘take account of work on propulsion being done at Bristol Siddeley Engines Ltd and Rolls-Royce Ltd’. This amounted to perusing various brochures provided by the two companies and attempting to work out which was offering the most reliable set of performance figures - no easy task - and how those figures might change when the engine was actually installed in a real aircraft. While Bristol Siddeley supplied only two brochures, first for its BS.1011 turbojet/ramjet, then for a more advanced version of the same thing called BS.1012, Rolls-Royce gave English Electric four options - its Type ‘B’ turbojets, ‘C’ turboramjets, ‘O’ turborockets, and the ‘flashjef, a version of the latter fuelled by liquid hydrogen alone. The first progress report on English Electric’s hypersonics studies has a whole section devoted to comparing these proposed powerplants. It states: ‘The two engine companies supplied data in somewhat different form. Rolls- Royce submitted performance data for their engine fitted with a fully variable intake and a semi-variable ejector nozzle. There was no allowance for pre- entry drag and the efficiency of the nozzle referred to a “rubber” installation. On the other hand Bristol Siddeley Engines presented a brochure containing matched installed performance for their power plant. The Rolls-Royce engine was matched to a more practical intake and nozzle and the performance corrected accordingly. Although the Bristol Siddeley Engines data included allowances for pre- entry and base drag, these were considered to be optimistic. Therefore, for performance work the allowances were increased, so that the Bristol Siddeley Engines and Rolls-Royce designs were compared on the same standard.’ In other words, English Electric took each brochure with a pinch of salt. The Rolls-Royce figures had to be amended to take real-world installation into account, and Bristol Siddeley Engines’ figures had to be toned down because they were deemed to be overly ‘optimistic Interviewed in 1984, Smith recalled: ‘We started by looking at things which were Concorde-ish in nature and went on from there to high-speed aircraft which would travel at Mach 12.* When two members of the Air Staff, deputy directors of requirements Group Captain A. Hewitt and Wing Commander G. E. Thirlwall, visited Warton in December 1963, they reported on the firm*s design activities and noted in their report: ‘Studies of hypersonic vehicles began about May 1962 in preparation for the Very High Speed Vehicles Conference of July 1962. The subject was considered principally in terms of hypersonic aerodynamics and about 10 people of Aerodynamics Research were engaged. The scale of effort was increased to about 30 and the scope of the work was broadened to cover all aspects of hypersonic flight when work began on the Ministry of Aviation contract. It was emphasised that the best designers, structures engineers and other specialists in the firm had been brought together to form the present team.’ Getting started The English Electric team had chosen to begin their work, before the Very High Speed Vehicles event had even taken place, with a series of general designs for hypersonic cruise research aircraft. This made it possible to establish what difficulties might be faced later and what aspects of design would need the greatest consideration. As usual, the English Electric ‘EAG’ drawing number sequence was used (although no one now knows what ‘EAG’ actually stood for). A designer would be allocated a block of numbers and would then work through them. P.42 began with drawing number EAG 3272 and can be said to have ended on, or close in sequence to, EAG 4495. At first, P.42 was worked on through a series of numbered ‘schemes’ rather than alphabetical letters as had been the case with P.10 and P.30. Many of these were then subdivided into two or more different design variations on a sometimes very loose common theme. Further subdivision was possible with ‘issues’, which retained the same drawing number but differed slightly from one another in detail. For example, the aircraft featured on EAG 4396 was the thirteenth variation on Scheme 11 - making it Scheme 11/13. EAG 4396 was then further subdivided into EAG 4396 P.42 Scheme 11/13 issue 1 and issue 2. Other drawings sometimes also featured a preliminary issue, which went before issue 1. This system lasted until Scheme 20, whereupon the ‘schemes’ system was apparently abandoned and drawings were simply labelled ‘P.42’. Even this ceased after drawing number EAG 4431 - the last drawing number to be labelled ‘English Electric Aviation’. EAG 4432 28
CHAPTER TWO ’CONCORDE-ISH IN NATURE' was the first to be labelled ‘British Aircraft Corporation and P.42 does not appear thereafter - but subsequent designs were still regarded as belonging to the same project. Looking at the first nine schemes for P.42, none of which were reported to the Government, it would be easy to believe that they were simply flights of fancy on the part of the English Electric team. Yet the company's first progress report graphically demonstrates the amount of work that went into every design. Wing size and shape were carefully considered in each case, together with the form of every intake, the amount of fuel and payload that could be carried, the size and weight of the undercarriage, and dozens of other considerations that each played their part in shaping the designs. Engine selection was also an important factor but, unlike many advanced aircraft development programmes, P.42 was not simply a series of aerodynamic forms wrapped around particular propulsion systems. In some cases the engine to be used was not specified, while in others it is clear that the design team were making calculations that allowed for what they regarded as sketchy and somewhat optimistic figures from the two engine companies - Rolls-Royce and Bristol Siddeley Engines. The English Electric teams holistic approach therefore resulted in designs with a solid basis in what was deemed technologically achievable for the time. The first three P.42s P.42 started with a radical hypersonic research aircraft. Scheme 1 was a Mach 5 design described in drawing number EAG 3272 and was roughly the same size as English Electrics touchstone aircraft, the Canberra. However, its layout could scarcely have been more different from the late-1940s jet bomber. It was a 63-foot-long single- seat tailless delta with large canards extending all the way from the sides of the cockpit to nearly the end of its nose. Two large vertical control surfaces near the wingtips stretched from leading to trailing edge. The wing itself had an area of l,500sq ft and a span of 70 feet. The fuselage housed an enormous ramjet of unspecified type, with a huge yawning intake of 5ft 3in diameter at the front, angled to form a precompression ramp, and a 6ft 3in exhaust nozzle at the rear, which was shaped to allow expansion of escaping gases. Additional propulsion, to enable the aircraft to gain sufficient speed for ramjet light-up, was provided by a pair of developed Rolls- Royce RB.162 turbojets, which would retract into the sides of the aircraft as it approached hypersonic speed. With the huge canards completely obscuring the pilot’s view forward and down, the cockpit was hinged near the nose and designed to rise up at an angle BELOW Where it all began - English Electric's P.42 Scheme 1. This monstrous research aircraft with delta wing, forward-tilting cockpit and offset nosewheel, shown in drawing EAG 3272, was to be powered by a huge ramjet with assistance from two RB.162 turbojets. 29
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE The English Electric P.42 Scheme 1 research aircraft performs a fast climb, its ramjet lighting up as its turbojets continue to propel it skywards. Hamza Fouatih to provide improved vision for landing. The undercarriage was a tricycle affair with the nosewheel offset to starboard, and the all-up weight was to be 50,000lb. P.42 Scheme 2 took a more conventional form but embodied much of the same technology. Shown in EAG 3273, it is described simply as a Mach 5 aircraft. This time there was a conventional 75-foot-long fuselage with no canards, no hinged cockpit and no enormous internal ramjet. It had a 45-foot-span delta wing with 70° sweep, though still an area of l,500sq ft. The wingtips were designed to fold down by 90° for aerodynamic efficiency during high-speed flight, and there was a single vertical fin at the rear of the fuselage. The undercarriage was a symmetrical tricycle arrangement. Propulsion was by two ramjets contained in cylindrical pods slung beneath the wing close to the fuselage. Internally, each was simply a smaller version of the ramjet that filled the EAG 3272 aircraft’s fuselage. Again, there were two retractable developed RB.162s for power, but this time fitted in tandem owning to the narrowness of the fuselage. Fitting the ramjets into underwing pods allowed the aircraft to have a rectangular internal payload bay, between the two engines, with the aircrafts centre of gravity right in the middle of it. For P.42 Scheme 3/2, shown in EAG 3277/2, a scaled-down version of the wing from Scheme 2, of 36-foot span down from 45 feet, was combined with a slightly lengthened version of the fuselage from Scheme 1 - 65 feet compared to 63 feet. The fin was also retained from Scheme 2. This arrangement allowed very little room for the nosewheel, no room for LEFT The sleek P.42 Scheme 2 of drawing EAG 3273 - a prettier research aircraft than its predecessor, with podded ramjets. 30
CHAPTER TWO CONCORDE ISH IN NATURE1 RIGHT Another enormous ramjet with an aircraft wrapped around it - P.42 Scheme 3/2 of EAG 3277/2. payload and no indication of where the two RB.162s would go - though they are still indicated as a necessity on the drawings accompanying notes. All-up weight remained the same at 50,0001b. The first three P.42 schemes - though they appear quite different from one another - can be regarded as essentially three different versions of the same experimental/research aircraft. The key component in each case was the ramjet; although it has been suggested that this might have been based on the Bristol Siddeley BS.1001 or BS.1002 ramjet designs, neither of these was expected to be sufficiently powerful for Mach 5, so its type must remain unknown. Space launcher The next three P.42 designs possessed many features in common with their predecessors but took the series closer to the contracted design brief. The drawings are undated, so may in fact have been produced after the contract was awarded. P.42 Scheme 4, of drawing EAG 3280, had almost exactly the same 45-foot-span 70° swept delta wing with movable wingtips as Scheme 2, not to mention the same tailfin. But where that design had the wing set low on the fuselage and was perched atop tall undercarriage legs to provide sufficient clearance for its podded ramjets, Scheme 4 had the wing high up on top of its 75-foot-long fuselage and a much shorter undercarriage. Power came from a pair of developed Rolls-Royce RB.168 Spey engines, the like of which would eventually propel Britain’s McDonnell Douglas Phantom FG.ls. These engines were fitted into a widened fuselage with huge square intakes on either side and to the rear of the cockpit. Top speed was expected to be Mach 4.5. It has been suggested that the Scheme 4 designs large intakes gave it a similar appearance to that of the MiG-25. However, even the prototype of that aircraft did not fly until March 1964 - at least six months after Walleys drawing was completed. Instead, it BELOW and OVERLEAF English Electric P.42 Scheme 4 research aircraft being put through their paces. Jozef Gatial 31
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES resembles more closely the North American A-5 Vigilante. This had entered service in 1961, was capable of Mach 2, and would certainly have been well known to the English Electric team. It also used the same General Electric J79 turbojets that powered the F-4 Phantom 11 in American service. The variant Scheme 4/1 in drawing EAG 3280/1 showed the same design with swing wings, though no further explanation is given. Wingspan changed accordingly to 85 feet at minimum sweepback and 48 feet fully swept. Scheme 4/2 of EAG 3280/2, however, saw the type substantially redesigned. It kept the same high 70° swept, l,500sq ft area, 45-foot-span wing and the same tailfin, but lost the moving wingtips. The forward fuselage was altered to present a more streamlined profile and to accommodate a second crewman, who could manage the payload. The two engines, described as ‘Rolls-Royce ducted bypass “O” types’ LEFT A low stance on its short undercarriage gives P.42 Scheme 4 of EAG 3280 an aggressive look while the broad shoulder intakes faintly echo those of the North American A-5 Vigilante. rather than Speys, were moved apart to make room for a large central payload bay - rather like that of the North American A-5. In the drawing notes, potential loads for this are given as ‘air launching rocket and fairing, weapon or recce-pack’. The undercarriage height was increased to allow for the protrusion of the air launching rocket and its fairing, while all-up weight was increased to 100,0001b and top speed was down to Mach 4. The enigmatic Rolls-Royce ‘O’-type engines seem likely to have been turborockets - particularly since Rolls- Royce engineers Adrian Albert Lombard and John Keenan used a hybrid of English Electric’s EAG 3280 and EAG 3280/2 drawings to help illustrate a paper they presented at the Joint Annual Congress of the Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Raketentechnik und Raumfahrt and Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft fur Luft- und Raumfahrt (German Society for Rocket 32
CHAPTER TWO 'CONCORDE ISH IN NATURE' ABOVE The P.42 Scheme 4/1 - essentially the same as Scheme 4 but with variable geometry wings. It is shown in EAG 3280/1. BELOW The final drawing in the EAG 3280 sequence shows P.42 Scheme 4/2 as a substantially revised design with a capacious payload bay capable of taking an air-launched rocket, weapons or a recce pack. 33
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES technology and Space Travel, and Scientific Society for Air- and Space Travel) at Berlin, West Germany, on 14-18 September 1964. The paper stated that the turborocket *.. .operates by burning oxygen and fuel in a rocket-type combustion chamber. The efflux from this chamber goes through a turbine which drives a compressor taking in air from the atmosphere. The turbine exhaust is mixed with the air ducted from the compressor and additional fuel is burned in the tail pipe. The combustion chamber is operated fuel rich to reduce turbine inlet temperature to a level which allows satisfactory operation of the turbine blades.’ The idea was to produce an engine that weighed just a third as much as a turbojet but which also used three times less fuel than a rocket. One potential use for this engine, presented by Rolls-Royce but probably based on English Electric’s work, was as part of a ‘space launcher system’. The papers overview of this system almost amounts to a description of English Electric’s P.42 Scheme 4/2 aircraft. It says: ‘It is worth examining a possible launch vehicle with a recoverable airbreathing booster system; this is a winged aircraft propelled by lightweight airbreathing engines, and carrying the rocket-propelled upper stage, or stages. These are released at a speed approaching Mach 5 at 80,000- 100,000ft altitude. Because the booster is a winged aircraft it can be brought back to base by a human crew and used for further launchings. Figure 6 [the illustration showing the English Electric-type design] shows a launching system designed to place a 5001b instrumented satellite into a low Earth orbit. A two-stage solid-fuel rocket, which weighs 27,0001b, is carried internally and launched at Mach 4.5 and 74,000ft. The aircraft is powered by two kerosene-oxygen turborocket engines and has a take-off weight of about 100,0001b.’ The Rolls-Royce launcher takes the forward fuselage of P.42 Scheme 4 and mates it to the widened fuselage of P.42 Scheme 4/2, while retaining the undercarriage positioning of the latter. Carrying the rocket payload internally no doubt accounted for Rolls-Royce’s Mach 4.5 speed, compared to the English Electric-calculated Mach 4, based on a larger payload causing greater drag. It is unknown whether English Electric/BAC had any involvement in this development of Rolls-Royce’s work, but while that company persisted in using the P.42 Scheme 4 design for illustrative purposes well into 1964, English Electric quickly shelved it in 1963 and moved on. BELOW The first two-seater P.42 was Scheme 5/1. It was longer than any of the previous designs at 95 feet and was powered by a pair of turboramjets of unspecified make and model. 34
CHAPTER TWO 'CONCORDE ISH IN NATURE' Further early variants The next two major P.42 design subseries, Schemes 5 and 6, were to be powered by turboramjets - similar in operation to the turborocket - and each had two crewmen rather than one. In layout, they followed the same pattern established earlier. The four Scheme 5 designs featured very large intakes in front of and below their cockpits and had engines of uncertain make and model that largely filled the interior of their fuselages. All were intended to reach Mach 5. Meanwhile, the Scheme 6 designs had their turboramjets, specifically Bristol Siddeley-designed units, mounted externally or utilising only the rear portion of the fuselage, leaving the nose with a clean aerodynamic shape. These were all aimed at hitting a top speed of Mach 4. The Scheme 5 variants are described in drawings EAG 3281 to EAG 3281/3 and except for the form of their forward intakes they were very similar - each fitted with two vertical control surfaces extending forwards from the trailing edge on either side. The shape of these curved fins was the same as it had been for every other P.42 design so far. The first P.42 Scheme 5 was 95 feet long and 55 feet wide with a sharp V- shaped nose, the intake openings appearing on either side of the lower part of the ‘V*. Slightly larger at 100 feet long and 58 feet wide, Scheme 5/2 replaced it with a much more complex form - a T-structure with two-shock quarter-cone shaped surfaces widening into the intakes. Scheme 5/3 replaced the ‘ramp’-shaped nose intake with a more conventional rounded profile, but flattened with wide square intakes. P.42 Scheme 6 also appears to have had three iterations - Scheme 6/1 to 6/3 in drawings EAG 3282/1 to EAG 3282/3 - but the first of these is lost. Scheme 6/2 follows on from Scheme 4/2, with its sleek nose and angular intakes. It was to be 78 feet long with the usual 70° wing sweep and the usual single tailfin. All-up weight was 100,0001b too. The positioning of the delta wing was unusual, however: it was so high up that it practically sat on top of the fuselage. Its span was only 42.5 feet, with an anhedral angle of 10°. While it was powered by a pair of turboramjets like the Scheme 5 designs, Scheme 6/2 s engines in the rear half of the fuselage and their intakes were positioned to allow room for an internal payload bay, which was not a feature of any version of Scheme 5. The mainwheels of the tricycle undercarriage tucked up into narrow apertures on either side of the rearward section of the intakes. Scheme 6/3 was very similar to Scheme 6/2 in plan view, but seen from the side or the front it looked like a very different aircraft. Its turboramjets were housed within a boxy structure set beneath the straight delta wing. Above that was the narrow and smoothly tapering main fuselage and standard early Р42 fin. Again there was room for a reasonably capacious payload bay between the engines, and all three undercarriage wheels had to fit into slots in the engine ‘box’. BELOW Drastic intake revisions are clearly visible on EAG 3281/2, showing P.42 Scheme 5/2. This time the design had grown 5 feet in length to 100 feet and its wingspan was up to 58 feet. 35
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUHLE VOLUMES ABOVE With more alterations, the P.42 Scheme 5 nose is made rounder and flatter with side intakes for Scheme 5/3 of drawing EAG 3281/3. BELOW P.42 Scheme 6/2 was a high-wing design intended to reach only Mach 4, while earlier schemes had aimed for Mach 5. It is shown in EAG 3282/2. 36
CHAPTER TWO 'CONCORDE ISH IN NATURE’ ABOVE Carrying over the basic idea of P.42 Scheme 6/2, Scheme 6/3 of EAG 3282/3 featured low wings and large complex intakes for its pair of Bristol Siddeley turboramjets. Booster and boosted The 82-foot-long fuselage of the seventh P.42 scheme further developed the svelte and aesthetically pleasing nose first seen on Scheme 4/2 and the smooth lines of Scheme 6 into a longer and more cylindrical shape. The delta wing was smaller than before, retaining the 70° sweepback but with a span of just 36 feet and an area of l,000sq ft. And unlike the previous P.42s, Scheme 7/1 shown in EAG 3299/1 would begin flying under its own power only at an altitude of 85,000 feet and with a fuel tank still full to its 25,0001b capacity. Its cruising engines were a pair of podded ramjets fixed beneath the trailing edge of its wing, and for low-speed manoeuvring a pair of lightweight developed Rolls-Royce RB. 162 turbojets were placed inside the rearmost part of the fuselage, exhausting under the fin. BELOW A different idea tried for P.42 Scheme 7/1 was to use an expendable rocket booster during take-off and up to the speed where the aircraft's ramjets could be lit up. A pair of back-up turbojets were included. The drawing is EAG 3299/1. 37
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE Another view of P.42 Scheme 7/1, this time sitting on its take-off trolley. Full details of how the booster and trolley were to operated are included as annotations on this drawing, EAG 3302/1. For take-off, P.42 Scheme 7/1 used a single 100,0001b 75-foot-long solid-fuel booster rocket. This was to be fixed between the two ramjets under the aircraft and would provide 175,0001b of thrust. Another drawing, EAG 3302/1, elaborates on exactly how this arrangement could be expected to leave the runway - with the aid of a trolley. Written on the drawing is an eight- point guide to the aircrafts take-off procedure. First the trolley would be rolled under the boosterless aircraft while it sat on the tarmac on its own undercarriage. Next the trolley ‘arms’ would be raised by just 1 foot, lifting the aircraft a little so that its undercarriage could be retracted. Then the booster rocket would be carefully slid into position from the rear - the top of the trolley being fitted with rollers to ease this process along. With the booster attached, the aircraft would then be towed to its launching position at the end of the runway. The booster would then be fired and both trolley and aircraft would begin to accelerate. At 1 OOmph the arms’ would start to extend, giving the aircraft a 5° angle of incidence at 150mph. The front attachments would then release and the arms collapse, allowing the aircraft’s nose to rise up to an angle of 15°. At 200mph the rear attachments would also release and the arms collapse, causing the aircraft to lift off immediately. All of this was to happen within 1,500 feet over the course of just 10 seconds. The booster would then propel the aircraft up to 85,000 feet and a speed of Mach 2.5, whereupon its ramjets could be lit up for ongoing acceleration up to Mach 4. It was to be the only Scheme 7 design. P.42 Scheme 8/1 retained Scheme 7/Is fuselage form but lengthened it by 6 feet to 88 feet. The usual 70° swept delta wing reverted to the Scheme 6 span of 42.5 feet. Rather than relying on a complex trolley and booster arrangement, however, it is noted on the drawing, EAG 3303/1, that Scheme 8/1 was to be ‘self- accelerating’. To this end it had four Rolls-Royce RB.153 bypass turbofans fitted into two double pods beneath its wings. Top speed at a cruising altitude of 85,000 feet was to be Mach 4. Like Scheme 7/1, however, Scheme 8/1 is depicted with a rocket attached to the centreline of its fuselage, between its engines. Rather than being a booster for the aircraft, this was to be an ‘air-launched rocket’ weighing 38
CHAPTER TWO 'CONCORDE-ISH IN NATURE' RIGHT P.42 Scheme 8/1 of EAG 3301/1 is the first aircraft design in the series that could be described as a booster in its own right, rather than needing one itself. It was intended to be capable of carrying an air-launched 2,000lb rocket. 32,000lb that was boosted up to launch altitude by the aircraft itself. Not only was Scheme 8/1 a booster for missiles or space vehicles, it was also the first P.42 design to have an internal payload capacity explicitly mentioned in its drawing notes - ‘20001b approx.’. Drawing EAG 3303/2 is a modified copy of EAG 3303/1 showing Scheme 8/2 - how the aircraft might be redesigned to run its four turbofans on hydrogen rather than kerosene. The most striking change was a massively enlarged fuselage and fin, the former going from 88 to a whopping 132 feet. The only other real difference was a nosewheel that retracted forwards rather than backwards to allow more room for fuel. One of the oddest P.42s, and a footnote to the early sequence of designs, was Scheme 9/1 - another one-of-a-kind, depicted in EAG 3308/1. This time the only feature retained from previous schemes was the ubiquitous tailfin. Power for flight up to Mach 4 came from a pair of Bristol Siddeley BS.1011 turboramjets, overall length was 100 feet, and cruise altitude was 85,000 feet. Scheme 9/1 was the most Concorde- ish design of the whole sequence, recalling the P.30 designs most strongly, even if its resemblance to the earlier project was only superficial. The cambered ogival delta wing was highly unusual. Very few P.42 designs featured any sort of curve to the leading edge of their wings, yet Scheme 9/1 was all curve. Its span was 45 feet and its area l,820sq ft. The point of the camber, which made it look oddly organic, was for high-speed stability. The Royal Aircraft Establishment had done some work on cambered designs, and it appears that Scheme 9/1 was based on the results. In addition, English Electric/BAC kept a close eye ABOVE The enormous fuselage volume required to contain liquid hydrogen rather than kerosene fuel is graphically illustrated in EAG 3303/2. It depicts P.42 Scheme 8/2, the hydrogen-fuelled version of Scheme 8/1, which is shown against it for comparison. Studying the potential of different fuels was part of English Electric's Ministry of Aviation contract. on developments in the US and particularly on work carried out by NASA - perhaps more so than any other British manufacturer. And at this time NASA was also working on fixed swept-wing planforms that might give improved performance at high speed. Five NASA employees filed a patent on a similar cambered wing design nearly two years after Scheme 9/1 was committed to paper. Their claim stated: ‘It is the object of the present invention to provide a new and novel aircraft having a fixed wing capable of attaining superior supersonic flight performance and adequate low-speed, subsonic take- off and cruise flight capabilities. Another object of the present invention is a novel supersonic aircraft configuration utilising wing areas of receding slope to provide 39
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE The P.42 design that most strongly recalled English Electric's earlier P.30 work was Scheme 9/1 of EAG 3308/1. The unusually cambered wing and fuselage was thought to offer greater stability at high speed. maximum utilisation of the inherent nacelle-wing airflow interference. A further object of the present invention is to provide a new and improved fixed wing planform in which a twisted and cambered wing is utilised for maximising supersonic flight efficiency. Yet another object is a new and novel aircraft configuration in which the wing fuselage-nacelle combination is self-trimming and the drag-due-to-lift is considerably lower than that of a low-sweep flat wing configuration of conventional aircraft’ Whether the wing would have actually delivered on the promised benefits in practice remains to be seen. NASA only rated its cambered wing design up to Mach 3.5 and, contrary to its claim, it was hardly novel given English Electrics earlier use of the aerodynamic form. Three-stage P.42 Scheme 10 is lost, but from Scheme 11 onwards it seemed as though the P.42 was on more promising ground. Scheme 11/1, appearing on drawings EAG 3316/2 and EAG 3316/3, was a combination third-stage space vehicle and second-stage booster rocket, and is detailed in Chapter 3. And Scheme 11/4 of EAG 3316/4 - it would seem that there were no Schemes 11/2 or 11/3 - was an enormous first-stage launcher aircraft designed to carry the space vehicle and booster fastened to its back. This piggyback arrangement may have been inspired by a multitude of American design studies stemming from a well-publicised Bell Aircraft Corporation concept from early 1960 for a hypersonic transport system that involved a small rocket-propelled high- altitude vehicle positioned atop a supersonic booster (see Chapter 4). Beyond the basic arrangement, however, the Scheme 11/4 aircraft had little in common with Bells design. Its rounded, almost double-cylinder fuselage was 250 feet long and sat atop a double delta wing with a span of 123 feet and an area of 10;000sq ft. The forward section of the wing was swept back at an angle of 77° and the rearward section at 60°. Instead of the usual P.42 single tailfin, which would have been rendered ineffective by the spacecraft sitting in front of it, two large swept vertical surfaces were fitted, which extended all the way from leading to trailing edges at the point where the delta wing sweepback angle changed. The reason for the aircrafts 40
CHAPTER TWO CONCORDE ISH IN NATURE' ABOVE The earliest known P.42 space vehicle booster is the enormous liquid hydrogen-fuelled Scheme 11/4 shown in drawing EAG 3316/4. At 250 feet long it was the largest P.42 of all and is shown carrying a small orbiter and its expendable booster. enormous bulk was its fuel - liquid hydrogen. Scheme 8/2 of EAG 3303/2 had shown how a load of liquid hydrogen would require a significantly bulked-out fuselage, and so it was with Scheme 11/4. The specified engines were six scaled Rolls-Royce ducted turbojet engine ‘B’ units positioned beneath the fuselage and towards the rear. They would be expected to power the combination aircraft up to a launch speed of Mach 4. However, a note in the margin at the bottom of the drawing suggests that these engines would be too small. It states: ‘Engine system to be increased in size by 10% linear.’ Surprisingly few notes are supplied with the next design in the series, Scheme 11/5. This appears to be an attempt to reduce the overall size of its predecessor by making the fuselage a part of the wing. This increased the amount of space available for fuel and allowed a reduction in length to 211 feet. No details of engines or top speed are given, so it must be assumed that these are the same as those given for Scheme 11/4. A scheme is then missing, but Scheme 11/7 depicted in EAG 3316/7 shows a first-stage launcher aircraft of similar planform that was to be powered by kerosene. Consequently, it was only 181 feet in length. The arrangement of fuselage and wing was a happy middle ground between Schemes 11/4 and 11/5 - with only a minimal rounded half-cylinder of fuselage protruding above the narrow line of the wing. The double deltas angles remained the same as before, but its span was reduced to 108 feet and overall wing area was 7,500sq ft. The six engines and the projected top speed also stayed the same. Scheme 11/10 - another first-stage launcher - was an attempt to simultaneously absorb the six Rolls- Royce engines into the fuselage and swap the double delta wing for a straight delta towards the rear of the aircraft and a set of delta canards towards the front. This served to reduce the aircrafts length to 175 feet, its span to 100 feet and its wing area to 4,850sq ft. Further details are lacking. From an EAG drawing sequence in the low 3300s, the R42 project now moved into a different block of numbers in the high 4300s, with Scheme 11/10 being shown on EAG 4392. Scheme 11/11 was on EAG 4394 and took the previous form to the extreme. Rather than having canards separated from the engine-bearing portion of the aircraft on a long narrow section of fuselage, Scheme 11/11 truncated the length of the Mach 4 launcher to just 129 feet by shortening the forward section and having the canards attached to the engine portion directly. Since this allowed insufficient room for the canards to fit comfortably, a straight section of wing had to be inserted to join them onto the short section of forward fuselage, which now protruded only a short way ahead of 41
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE The same but different - EAG 3316/5 shows P.42 Scheme 11/5, another hydrogen-fuelled booster, but this time with a more efficient wing-fuselage arrangement that made it possible to reduce the vehicle's overall length significantly. BELOW P.42 Scheme 11/7 was a kerosene-fuelled booster similar to the earlier Scheme 11s but smaller due to the lower volume of propellant required. It is shown in EAG 3316/7. Note the very small undercarriage compared to later designs. 42
CHAPTER TWO CONCORDE ISH IN NATURE' ABOVE A wide variety of different intake, fuselage, wing and fin designs were investigated during English Electric's work on P.42. Scheme 11/10 of EAG 4392 was a booster like most of the other Scheme 11s, but with canards sitting almost on top of the fuselage. The aircraft is shown without its space vehicle payload for clarity. BELOW P.42 Scheme 11/11 took compactness to extremes - consisting of a huge rectangular intake and engines with wings and a stubby fuselage attached. It is shown in drawing EAG 4394. 43
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE The aircraft shown in EAG 4395, R42 Scheme 11/12, was a refinement of earlier booster designs and very close to a layout English Electric felt was sufficiently viable to study in much greater depth. the engine intakes. Again, there are no notes to elaborate further on this design. The wingspan was 94 feet. It seems that there was no future in this layout, however, since Scheme 11/12 of EAG 4395 returned to the double delta of Scheme 11/7, albeit with a more integrated engine arrangement similar to that utilised for Scheme 11/10. Length was kept down at 150 feet and the wing sweepbacks were less extreme than before at 73° for the front section and 50° for the rear. The wingspan was 130 feet and the area 7,500sq ft. All-up weight was 300,0001b, excluding the 200,0001b weight of the third-stage spacecraft and its rocket attachment. The first report Although they embodied many advanced features and innovative ideas, the first nine schemes of P.42 were seen as little more than a warm-up for the English Electric team. None of them were individually mentioned in the first progress report that English Electric/BAC prepared for the Ministry of Aviation in late 1963, and which was published in early January 1964. Its introduction made it clear that some areas of the company’s contract had been covered in more detail than others. While the contract defined the four different types of vehicle to be examined as ‘long range high-speed cruise aircraft, recoverable launchers, boost-glide vehicles and space planes’, English Electric instead defined its studies as covering ‘airbreathing boosters, cruise vehicles, rocket vehicles and orbiting and re-entry vehicles’. The report states: ‘Over 50 different layouts have been done of aircraft to operate in the hypersonic flight regime between Mach 4 and Mach 5. Some work has been done on aircraft above this speed bracket but has been discontinued partly due to power plant and structural material uncertainties, but mainly due to poor range or booster performance. In addition to those airbreather studies, expendable and recoverable 44
CHAPTER TWO 'CONCORDE-ISH IN NATURE' rocket vehicles for launching satellites have been looked at in some detail. A small amount of work has been done on the orbiting vehicles to be launched by the above.’ The firm was at pains to point out that although ‘long range high-speed cruise aircraft’ had been top of the Ministry of Aviations research list, there was a good reason why they had received the least attention. The report’s author notes: ‘Because of the contract timescale and financial limitations, it was thought (justifiably, as it emerged) that complete coverage could not be afforded to all these items. In anticipation that this initial investigation would show the need for further work, therefore, it was decided to concentrate most effort on a complete study of one major unknown, the airbreathing booster, while covering the other items, and associated specialist studies, as best the remaining manpower allowed.’ Earlier work on airbreathing vehicles had indicated to English Electric that airframe structure and propulsion systems were the two areas that were likely to present the most difficulties. As the report says: ‘This suggested that the best way of tackling the real problems was to operate partly on a project study basis, investigating a small number of specific vehicles. It was felt that this would enable the inevitable engineering compromises so often missed or ignored in generalised parametric studies, to be made as soon as possible. However, all requirements of the contract have been covered in some degree.’ In other words, the company believed it best to look at specific layouts for specific vehicles so that particular problems could be more easily identified. Furthermore, having looked at the fuel consumption of vehicles travelling at Mach 4-5, the firm concluded that range was unlikely to ever get much better than 3,450 miles - about the distance of a one- way trip from London to New York. Such a journey could be accomplished in less than an hour, but the cost would be enormous and destinations that were further away would be unreachable without a refuelling stop. This seemed to rule out any realistic hope of an aircraft based on the contract’s first required research subject - a long-range high-speed cruise aircraft - so more effort was applied to recoverable launchers, boosters and space planes instead. P.42 had effectively become a space project, focused on getting the maximum possible payload into orbit. Looking at the most achievable and cost-effective top speed for these vehicles, English Electric concluded that wing lower surface and intake duct temperatures rose so dramatically above Mach 4 that the development difficulties associated with attempting anything faster would simply outweigh any possible advantages. The report says: ‘A major factor in choosing the upper limit of the speed range to be investigated was temperature. Structure weight steadily increases with Mach number as higher stagnation temperatures are encountered, the effect being felt chiefly in the engine intakes where radiation relief is slight. Estimated temperatures for 400kts equivalent air speed were as follows: Mach 4 wing lower surface 410°C, intake duct 625°C. Mach 5 wing lower surface 550°C, intake duct l,000°C. Mach 6 wing lower surface 680°C, intake duct 1,460°C. Quite clearly at speeds above Mach 4 we entered a region of increasing difficulty with present materials and constructional methods, and a pronounced upward trend in the structure weight fraction seemed inevitable, especially when intake areas grow with speed. A simple parametric performance study underlined the dubious advantages of very high booster speeds.* A typical airbreather Work had begun on three-stage boosters - large aircraft carrying small spacecraft on their backs - with P.42 Scheme 11/4, so by the time Scheme 11/13 was reached the company believed that it was ready to carry out a more detailed analysis of a sample layout. This appeared in drawing EAG 4396. As already mentioned, by the time of the January 1964 report the designation ‘P.42’ had been all but dropped and the designs are referred to throughout the document simply by their drawing numbers. The report stated that the EAG 4396 aircraft, which was 154 feet long and had a wingspan of 130 feet, was ‘...typical of the kerosene airbreathing boosters that have been studied. Although by no means regarded as optimum, the layout was accepted as the basis for the detailed structural work on which subsequent assessment was made. Designed to carry a two stage liquid-hydrogen powered rocket vehicle to Mach 4 launch velocity at 80,000ft to 100,000ft, this aircraft with load weighs 500,0001b and is powered by six Rolls-Royce turboramjets burning kerosene.’ The intake for these was, the author notes, ‘unfortunately longer than optimum, due to the necessity of retracting the undercarriage into the lower surface of the power unit block.’ Since the intake would be required to deal with extremely high temperatures, it was designed as a self-contained ‘hot structure’ - intended to absorb heat rather than reflecting it, with the entire duct being made from the nickel chromium super alloy Inconel 718. A separate drawing, EAG 4399, was included to better explain the complex internal layout of the EAG 4396’s intake. Although there was technically only one, this was initially split into six sections by vertical dividers and each section had three wedges for compression, with boundary layer air being extracted and collected then vented across the top surface of the 45
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE The P.42 Scheme 11/13 booster was the focus of a major effort on the part of English Electric's engineers. Every aspect of the design, shown in EAG 4396 issue 2, was assessed in depth and formed a significant part of BAC's first hypersonics progress report to the Ministry of Aviation. BELOW Even in bare metal and with minimal markings to keep weight down, P.42 Scheme 11/13 would have made an impressive sight. Note the fairings over the spacecraft-booster attachment points. Chris Sandham-Bailey wing through an ejector nozzle. The angle of ramps within the intake could be varied depending on the aircraft s speed, with the mechanism for moving the ramps housed within the vertical dividers. After the ramps, the dividers were interrupted and the intake became one again for several feet ‘to provide a plenum chamber which allows cross flow to occur in case of engine mismatch or failure (this feature is not now thought to be necessary in view of the ducted nature of the engines but requires examination). This chamber is followed by six discrete ducts which change to circular cross section at the engine face? The double delta wing, with an area of 7,500sq ft, was chosen because it would be self-trimming at Mach 4 and the payload - the spacecraft - was to be carried on the upper surface to avoid both the high lower surface temperatures and interference with the intakes’. This reasoning would appear to rule out the option of carrying the spacecraft below the aircraft somehow. English Electrics detailed analysis had ‘highlighted specific troubles inherent in this type of layout, but these are not so severe as to warrant big changes in layout or structure. Flutter 46
CHAPTER TWO CONCORDE ISH IN NATURE' ABOVE P.42 Scheme 11/134 engine intakes were studied in fine detail. This drawing, EAG 4399, shows the type's proposed engine bay structure. involving longitudinal modes only, appears unlikely. The full problem with spanwise bending and elevator flapping modes has not been investigated? It was determined that the aircraft would handle normally but there was a possibility of control reversal above say 5OOOft/sec’. This would depend on the detail design of the aircraft’s control surfaces, it was noted. If the aircraft was intended to surpass Mach 4 during operations, its structure would have to be made of nickel alloy or a light alloy such as titanium, but with a heat shield. If it would only have to cope with Mach 4 or below, ‘the primary structure could, but not necessarily, be made of titanium alloy throughout (except for the air intakes). Weight estimates are based on the assumption that skin joints are welded and all parts of the structure designed to the minimum thickness required for strength or manufacturing limitations.’ Conventional take-off and landing from normal airfields was assumed, so novel forms of lightweight undercarriage using collapsible metal shock absorbers or replaceable skids were not considered, the report notes, although ‘attempts were made to reduce bending moments by the use of multiple landing gear, but these schemes have been abandoned as impractical and replaced by a conventional tricycle undercarriage with oleo shock absorption.’ Hot and heavy It may have been arranged conventionally, but the EAG 4396 aircraft’s undercarriage was anything but conventional in size and shape. According to the report: ‘This aircraft, with all-up weight of 500,0001b, is considerably heavier than any aircraft so far flown in this country, and careful consideration was given to the undercarriage. Study of airfield information led us to believe that undue restriction on the number of airfields capable of operating the aircraft would be avoided by designing for an LCN of 60. At this figure about one third of the military airfields in this country would be satisfactory.’ LCN stood for Load Classification Number, commonly known today as PCN or Pavement Classification Number, an arbitrary rating for the weight of aircraft that a given airfield can successfully tolerate. This is matched against ACNs, or Aircraft Classification Numbers. So if the ACN is larger than the PCN, the aircraft is too heavy for the airfield. By way of comparison with the EAG 4396 of 1963, a modern Boeing 777 has an all- up weight well in excess of 500,0001b. The impact of detailed calculations made during English Electrics design process is evident here. P.42 Scheme 11/7 with an all-up weight of 500,0001b had only two wheels per main leg, whereas the EAG 4396 aircraft needed twelve wheels per main leg. Each of these was to be a hefty 38 by 14 inches with an operating pressure of 130psi. The report says: ‘This main bogie configuration has been taken as standard on all layouts of 500,0001b to enable realistic stowage comparisons to be made. It is interesting that each main bogie may be represented by a “block” measuring 134 x 94 x 47
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 38in, and that an increase of allowable LCN to 100 would only reduce this block by approximately one sixth in each direction.’ The aircrafts 80,0001b of kerosene fuel was to be stored in its wing structure, but this posed another technical problem: ‘Conventional integral tank construction is not possible due to the skin temperature of up to 550°C at the end of boost, and some form of tankage separated or insulated from the outside skin will be needed. Further work is in progress on this problem.’ English Electric looked carefully at the types of insulation that might be required if EAG 4396 was to travel at hypersonic speeds for any length of time. The Warton engineers considered whether the overall design would be a ‘hot structure’, not just the engine intakes, or an insulated structure designed to keep the heat out. In the latter case this comprised ‘...an outer radiation shield, insulation package and an aluminium basic structure. The outer radiation shield was made up of discrete panels which were structurally capable of carrying the local pressure loads applied to them. The shield was attached to the basic structure by four local supports which passed through the insulation package. The insulation package was considered to consist of low density Refrasil wrapped by a thin stainless steel cover.’ Refrasil is a silica-based textile that is used today to make heatproof blankets. The overall ‘hot structure’ concept was tested and seemed problematic: ‘Investigation into thermal cycling has been carried out, which showed that incremental strain could occur during a cycle of load-heat-cool- unload, which could lead to premature collapse of the structure after a small number of cycles if not taken into account in design.’ Not only that, but with the whole structure of the aircraft being heated, the tolerance of extreme heat areas - particularly the engine intakes, themselves a ‘hot structure’ - would be reduced. As with the undercarriage size, calculations relating to EAG 4396’s weight made it clear that early assumptions had been overly optimistic. It had initially been thought that a payload of 200,0001b could be carried. However, detail work showed that the wing needed to be more than twice as heavy - from an estimate of 23,0001b to a more realistic 50,0001b. Wing tips went from 7,5001b to 15,0001b and air intakes/power plant from 92,5001b to 120,0001b. Fuselage, fins, undercarriage and systems all remained the same. This was 62,0001b of extra weight, which, when combined with the extra fuel required to carry it, resulted in a payload of just 117,5001b. And the actual amount of cargo that could be put into orbit via the piggybacking spacecraft shrank accordingly from 23,3001b to 13,7001b. It is worth noting that while the engine weight figure used was lifted directly from the Rolls-Royce brochure, the systems weight, 60,0001b, had been finely calculated and ‘consisted of the fuel system, hydraulics, electrics, flying controls, protective services, etc, etc, the extent of these systems not being known. It also included the penalty associated with the mounting and separation systems for the second and third stages.’ In addition, it was foreseen that ‘such items as capsule ejection for the crew, windscreen shielding, insulation, separate tankage in lieu of integral tanks’ would all be necessary, as well as ‘second stage mounting and separation systems’ OPPOSITE TOP Working on P.42 Scheme 11/13 in detail gave the Warton team grave misgivings about the use of high-speed conventional-take-off aircraft as boosters for space vehicles. They therefore began to consider low-speed launchers, which seemed to have greater potential. The Convair B-58 Hustler was among the types examined, shown here in EAG 4405. BOTTOM Looking more than a little B-58ish, this unnumbered P.42 aircraft (possibly intended as P.42 Scheme 11/18 or simply Scheme 18) was designed to launch its spacecraft-booster payload at just Mach 2.2. This drawing, EAG 4409, is notable as the first appearance of English Electric's initial lifting body orbiter design, tucked beneath the low-speed booster. ‘Slow’ launchers If detailed studies of the EAG 4396 aircraft taught English Electric anything, it was that putting a payload into space might actually be easier if the vehicle putting it there did not have to be an airbreathing aircraft that travelled at hypersonic speeds. According to the report . .a tentative effort was made to use the Supersonic Transport aircraft as a Mach 2.2 launcher. This showed that modification of the existing aircraft was exceedingly difficult if not impossible, involving large increases in propulsion size, undercarriage mods etc, and a similar conclusion was reached about the modification of any other existing aircraft. Aircraft included in this study included the VC 10, Vulcan and B-58.’ The supersonic transport in question may have been Bristol’s latest Concorde design, the Type 223, or something close to it - possibly English Electric’s own P.30 studies. With existing types ruled out, the design team came up with a new Mach 2.2 aircraft form that bore a loose visual similarity to Convair’s B-58 Hustler - a speculative launcher version of which appears in EAG 4405. The report says: ‘This design, shown on EAG 4409, proved to be capable of launching a greater weight into orbit than the Mach 4 aircraft, due to the fact that the simplification of the launch aircraft allows the load carried to be increased, and this increase more than offsets the reduction in launch velocity. 48
CHAPTER TWO CONCORDE ISH IN NATURE' 49
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE Handsome, if a little Hustler-ish, the P.42 design of EAG 4409 as it might have looked complete with space vehicle and booster. Chris Sandham-Bailey Main weight reducing factors are a reduction in wing area, because the propulsion system no longer dictates the wing planform, a change to light alloy construction, fixed centre-body intakes, simple reheated turbojets and a reduced fuel weight. In addition, the load may be carried underneath the aircraft, which makes separation easier.’ Taking the principle even further, English Electric redesigned EAG 4409 in the form of EAG 4410 - not included in the report to the Ministry - which flew even slower at a mere Mach 0.9. This 135-foot- long 128-foot-span design, marked P.42 Scheme 19, had a delta wing with 60° sweepback and was powered by four Rolls-Royce ‘B’-type jet engines arranged in two pods of two under the wings, outboard of the underslung space plane. A further development of the Mach 0.9 scheme, shown in EAG 4412, was included in the report, which stated: Again the weight put into orbit rose for the same reason, the aircraft itself was lighter by reason of having a simple turbojet installation, and a lower fuel weight stemming from the higher subsonic lift/drag.’ Both the Mach 2.2 EAG 4409 and the 129-foot-long, 104-foot-wide Mach 0.9 EAG 4412 were then re-examined to see how they might perform with liquid hydrogen rather than kerosene fuel. It was found that the latter had enough fuselage and wing volume to allow for the necessary hydrogen fuel tankage - and would therefore have looked about the same. A liquid hydrogen EAG 4409, however, would have required extensive changes. Wing volume was nowhere near enough to house the required pair of large cylindrical hydrogen tanks, so the fuselage would have had to be significantly enlarged. Neither liquid hydrogen aircraft was drawn, however. Despite the apparent benefits of low- speed launchers, English Electric continued to consider high-speed designs in parallel. A striking example of this is the Mach 4 booster shown in EAG 4407 and marked P.42 Scheme 11/17. This aircraft, drawn at the same time as the slow vehicles, was to have six Bristol Siddeley BS. 1011/2 turboramjet engines of 40,0001b thrust each - making it anything but slow. Also of interest is the P.42 numbering sequence at this point. Drawing EAG 4407 is Scheme 11/17, EAG 4408 is unrelated, EAG 4409 is an unnumbered P.42, then EAG 4410 is P.42 Scheme 19, EAG 4411 is unrelated, and EAG 4412 is P.42 Scheme 20. Presuming that the unnumbered P.42 is actually Scheme 18, it would appear that the Scheme Ils from 11/12 onwards were regarded as P.42 schemes in their own right - the sequence running Scheme 11/16, Scheme 11/17, Scheme 18, Scheme 19 and Scheme 20. Problems eliminated Since the EAG 4396 launcher design had been instrumental in helping to identify problem areas with hypersonics, English Electric then went back to it and redesigned it - now armed with substantially more data and new ideas about how to overcome its issues. The result was EAG 4424. This was ‘basically the same as the Mach 4 booster described previously, except that every effort had been made to eliminate problem areas and save weight. ‘The double delta planform has been replaced by a modified delta wing with widely spaced twin fins, which will increase clearances during launch of the second stage, still carried on the upper surface. The swept trailing edge and repositioning of the undercarriage allows the shortest possible engine system to be used, enabling the wing area to be reduced from 7,000sq ft to 6,250sq ft, a major weight saving. The wing tip extensions are lowered supersonically to increase lateral stability and a revision in the boost launch trajectory has allowed the fuel load carried to be reduced.’ OPPOSITE TOP How slow can you go? The aircraft shown on EAG 4410, P.42 Scheme 19, was designed to drop-launch its spacecraft payload while flying at transonic speed - Mach 0.9. BOTTOM Reducing the launch speed meant that the booster aircraft necessary to put a payload into space could be reduced in size too. This relatively small design, P.42 Scheme 20, is almost wrapped over the top of the space vehicle it carries. The drawing is EAG 4412. 50
CHAPTER TWO 'CONCORDE-ISH IN NATURE' Weight was saved in the undercarriage and intakes but the results of a considerable investigation into system DETAILS WNC 5OQC wn А1Ж SQO.QQQw 'A Q FUEL WLJCUjOOl»' EblMS - 4 ROLLS WOE -В T/PE roc z* .зг ЯКХ ct’MLb ш Ofc LAC 44’5 л ~ч 'b~r*W AT 409200* V STKX h'’ Эи*>- ь» ENGLISH ELECTRC АУ1АТЮЫ GA OF M'O-9 кеяо&ш бооэтюАС r^Sui^O I EAC 4412 51
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE The sheer compactness of the P.42 Scheme 20 booster is well illustrated in this artful depiction. Chris Sandham-Bailey and equipment requirements indicated that 60,0001b was an accurate estimate. This allowed a payload of 138,5001b, and the amount of material that could be put into space was similarly increased, up to 17,5001b. Another version of EAG 4424, which was identical to the original in every way except that its Rolls-Royce turbojets were swapped for the equivalent, lighter, Bristol Siddeley models, offered a payload-into-space of 23,0001b. This version was never drawn, however, and remained nothing more than a set of calculations. Flashjet power Having examined the merits of ramjets, turboramjets and turborockets for hypersonic flight, English Electric next turned its attention to another innovative power plant being tentatively offered by Rolls-Royce - the flashjet. This was fuelled by chilled and compressed liquid hydrogen that was passed through a heat exchanger and heated by around 200°C before being expanded through a turbine, driving a frontal compressor. Finally, the hydrogen was burned aft of the turbine as a form of reheat. The first design to feature this novel engine was the Mach 4 EAG 4415 booster, labelled ‘P.42’ but without a scheme number. Two different versions were drafted under the same drawing number - the preliminary issue, which was 175 feet long and had a double delta wing like that of EAG 4396, beginning at the tip of its nose and extending back for an overall area of 7,500sq ft - and issue 1, which was shorter at 165 feet and had a narrower double delta BELOW During the early 1960s in Europe it was commonly believed that the best form a space vehicle booster could take was that of a hypersonic aircraft. English Electric never quite gave up on this concept and continued to study high-speed boosters such as P.42 Scheme 11/17, seen here in EAG 4407, even as it pursued other vehicle types. 52
CHAPTER TWO 'CONCORDE-ISH IN NATURE' beginning aft of the cockpit to give a reduced area of 6,000sq ft. The two designs were the same in most other respects, however - an all-up weight of 500,0001b, two swept vertical fins, again taken from EAG 4396, and four scaled Rolls-Royce flashjet engines with shock cone intakes. These were housed in three underslung pods - one carrying a pair of engines beneath the rear fuselage and the other two either side of it, carrying a single engine each. The large twelve-wheel undercarriage main legs retracted up through the gaps in between to tuck up into the fuselage. In order to allow for sufficient chilled liquid hydrogen fuel, the rear end of the fuselage extended out beyond the trailing edge of the wing. Neither of these was satisfactory, however, and the sample flashjet- powered aircraft design included in the progress report sent to the Ministry was the one shown in EAG 4416. Again there were two versions, with only the second being published. The preliminary issue featured the same four podded flashjets but the wing had changed again - this time a single rather than double delta, which began 15 feet from the rear of the crew compartment and ended in variable-geometry wingtips. This feature had last been seen right at the beginning of the P.42 series, with Scheme 4, shown on EAG 3280. The trailing edge of the wing was also now swept with a kink. The second EAG 4416, issue 1, which did appear in the first progress report, was similar to its predecessor but now had six flashjet engines, two in each of the three underslung pods. Their intakes were revised too, now being semi-fixed half cones.- According to the report: ‘This aircraft bore a strong resemblance to the last of the kerosene-powered booster aircraft described, in that it featured a modified delta wing, lowering wing tips, the rocket vehicle (not shown) being carried on the upper surface. The wing and fuselage were integrated in this layout to provide the necessary volume of fuel, carried in two parallel cylindrical tanks in the centre section. For two reasons a podded layout was chosen, firstly engine/wings integration was not possible by reason of the fuel tanks and secondly it enabled a design comparison to be made of an actual circular form intake, with the previously accepted letter box type. The first layout was attempted with a full circular intake but nacelle shaping was not good, and it was felt that wing interference would prevent the intake “starting” and/or the undercarriage length would need to be increased. For these reasons the semicircular intake was adopted. The curved top cover allows almost the full advantage of a BELOW The detailed work on P.42 Scheme 11/13 resulted in solutions to the design's various problems - which were then brought together in the form of this unnumbered P.42 Mach 4 booster, shown in EAG 4424. It features variable geometry wings, an enormous undercarriage and the shortest possible intake arrangement. 53
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE Among the advanced power plants offered to English Electric for its hypersonics project by Rolls-Royce was the flashjet. The first P.42 design to incorporate it was the unnumbered one shown in EAG 4415 preliminary issue. The four engines were podded in an attempt to keep their enormous heat away from the vehicle's cryogenic fuel tanks. BELOW The 'issue T version of drawing EAG 4415 shows changes to the flashjet-driven P.42 aircraft's wing design. 54
CHAPTER TWO 'CONCORDE-ISH IN NATURE' circular form to be obtained and nacelle shaping is good.’ However, suspending high-temperature flashjets under the wing posed a real problem to which there was no obvious answer. The report notes: ‘On this type of mounting, radiation would take place between the duct and pod skin which would make the resultant temperature of these skins of the same order, eliminating the differential thermal problem. Due to the engines being mounted in such close proximity to the wing, there would be a pressure rise between the top of the pod and the wing which would produce local temperature gradients both spanwise and chordwise on the lower surface of the wing. These present the main structural problem to be solved with this type of engine installation.’ This overheating was not the worst of it, however. EAG 4416 had a serious issue when it came to fuel storage since keeping all that hypersonic heat away from tanks containing chilled liquid hydrogen was not going to be easy. Anything used to fix the tanks to the rest of the internal structure would be just another conduit for the heat. Nevertheless, English Electric went to some lengths to find a solution to this problem: ‘It is not considered practical to carry the fuel in the conventional way in integral tanks, due to the large number of heat shorts into the tanks via spar and rib webs. Even if a load-carrying type super-insulant were developed that could be attached to the inner surfaces of the tanks, because of the surface area ratio to volume stored the rate of hydrogen boil-off would still be embarrassing. One way of nullifying this effect would be to pressurise the tanks just prior to take-off and thus make use of the specific heat of the fuel instead of allowing the fuel to boil away. A layer of insulation would still be required to stop air freezing to the outside of the tank. The weight penalty involved because of the relatively high pressures being transmitted by flat BELOW The P.42 design from EAG 4415 was given variable geometry wings for EAG 4416 preliminary issue. 55
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE There were more significant changes to English Electric's flashjet P.42 in drawing EAG 4416 issue 1. Two additional engines were included, raising the total to six, and their intakes were substantially redesigned. plates leads one to the conclusion that the only satisfactory method of storage would be by cylinders laid in the wing.’ Even this was simply not feasible because a whole collection of these cylinders would need to be made in different lengths and diameters to fit the aerodynamic form of the aircrafts delta wing. Booster mission profile Just as it said it would in its introduction, English Electrics first progress report on its hypersonics work focused primarily on airbreathing boosters for rocket-powered space vehicles. Three main designs were looked at for this function: the kerosene-fuelled turbojet-powered EAG 4396 design, its reworked successor of EAG 4424, and the flashjet- propelled EAG 4416 aircraft. These three vehicles primarily embodied the firms efforts to establish an optimum wing area and power plant combination to give maximum useful payload - the most amount of material put into space. Other variables considered in-depth were weight, intake pressure, fuel type, liquid air boosting, sophisticated boundary layer removal systems, the BELOW The aerodynamic form of English Electric's flashjet P.42 booster reimagined in military service. Although the company was working on designs for space vehicle launchers, there is little doubt that the RAF would have been the main customer for any aircraft actually built. Chris Sandham-Bailey 56
CHAPTER TWO ‘CONCORDE-ISH IN NATURE' ABOVE A design for an 'exhibition model' of English Electric's Mach 2.2 booster system. It is unknown whether this was ever built and, if it was, whether it was ever actually exhibited. A section of the drawing marked 'colour scheme' is of interest, however. The aircraft was to be gloss white on top and gloss black underneath. All intakes and nozzles were to be matt black. The lifting body spacecraft was to be gloss white on top and gloss black underneath, and its booster tanks were to be gloss white. A second space vehicle was also depicted - a more conventional capsule and rocket - which was to have a matt black heat shield but otherwise to be coated in gloss white. BELOW The final English Electric P.42 flashjet was depicted in EAG 4418. The variable geometry wings from the previous design have been deleted, canards have been added, and the number of engines is back down to four. 57
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE Rolls-Royce's flashjet engines presented an intractable problem for English Electric's engineers. There was no way of attaching them to the aircraft that would not create heat-related problems. This drawing, EAG 4420, shows how a two-engine flashjet nacelle might have been arranged. BELOW Representatives of the Air Staff who visited Warton during the P.42 project were excited to see this design, EAG 4426, for a Mach 4 aircraft intended tentatively as a TSR2 replacement. 58
CHAPTER TWO 'CONCORDE-ISH IN NATURE' penalties of a normal take-off and landing, and ‘avoiding the sonic boom nuisance! But how would the English Electric/BAC airbreathing booster have been used in practice? The report states that reaching the greatest height while using up the least possible amount of fuel would have required a fast supersonic climb after take-off - at about 644mph. This would be followed by level acceleration at about 85,000 feet up to Mach 4, with a pull-up manoeuvre then used to launch the spacecraft from the boosters back at a flight path angle of 10- 20°. This move would cause the booster itself a rapid loss of speed as its profile became one of high induced drag. The boosters pilot would then initiate recovery by pushing the aircraft over into level flight and starting a 2G turn, bleeding off speed until it had slowed to Mach 3. Holding that speed, the pilot would then continue the turn, descending to 75,500 feet before slowly decelerating and returning to base. Perhaps the greatest problem facing the English Electric team in attempting to design a hypersonic booster was uncertainty regarding its power plant. The report notes somewhat ruefully: ‘Of the power plants considered, the BS. 1011/2 unit is far superior due to the better characteristics of the fan engine, and the reduced weight of the bare engine and the intake and nozzle systems. There is, however, little doubt that this power plant assumes far more development than the Rolls- Royce units and therefore any comparison is unfair.’ The original Ministry of Aviation contracts terms implied that liquid hydrogen might offer some advantages over kerosene, but English Electrics work served to demonstrate that it offered little real benefit: ‘Liquid hydrogen fuel shows a potential advantage but the extra thrust-weight ratio required to keep the fuel volume within reasonable limits and the extra structure and insulation weight is sufficient to nullify this advantage at the low thrust-weight ratios likely to be used.’ Removing boundary layer air and liquefying it for an extra boost did seem to be ‘very effective in increasing the acceleration capability above Mach 3’, however. TSR2 successor While work on a hypersonic spacecraft booster fulfilled the terms of BAC’s contract, Hewitt and Thirlwall of the Air Staff had far greater interest in another aspect of P.42, which appears in the first progress report only as a footnote. Thirlwall wrote: ‘Some work has been carried out on possible replacements for the TSR2. It was assumed that the TSR2 will become increasingly vulnerable during the 1970s to low level SAM defence systems. However, high-speed high altitude aircraft would be immune to all but the most sophisticated and advanced RIGHT Sectional views of the very compact English Electric Mach 4 naval aircraft. defences. Armed primarily with anti- radar missiles, such aircraft would disrupt the defence system and so permit the operation of relatively unsophisticated tactical strike aircraft in support of land operations. A project design for a 100,0001b Mach 4 twin engine strike aircraft was shown. This aircraft had a delta planform and hinged variable-geometry wing tips and carried a mixed armament of anti-radar missiles and glide bombs totalling 6,0001b. A radius of action exceeding 750 nautical miles at Mach 4 was claimed. A project design for a half size naval version weighing 45,0001b and carrying a weapon load of 2,7001b was also being studied. As far as can be judged at this very early stage, these project designs did not raise any insuperable engineering problems. The principal innovation was the use of steel structures with nickel- based alloys and titanium proposed for selected areas. 59
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE The fighter-bomber P.42. The EAG 4426 design is the same as before but is now, in EAG 4426/1, fitted with weaponry. Two anti-radar missiles are semi-submerged in underwing fairings, another two are semi-submerged into the upper fuselage, ejecting diagonally outwards to launch, and a glide bomb is carried beneath the fuselage. An 'equipment and camera bay' behind the crew is also marked. However, the X-15 has demonstrated that conventional types of structure (i.e. stress skin) can be used for speeds well in excess of Mach 4 and there exists some experience of steel structures in the UK as a result of the Bristol 188 project? The design exciting Thirlwalls interest was labelled P.42 without a scheme number, and appeared without weapons in EAG 4426 and with both anti-radar missiles and a glide bomb in EAG 4426/1. According to the English Electric report: ‘This preliminary layout of a 90,0001b all-up weight aircraft powered by two Rolls-Royce turboramjets of 27,0001b static thrust each could be considered as a strike/reconnaissance vehicle. The power plant is integrated into the thickened wing centre section, the wing planform being a modified delta, the tips of which can be lowered to a vertical position supersonically to provide a valuable addition to lateral stability. The crew of two sit in tandem, a visor nose section is lowered to provide clear vision for landing. A bomb bay may be built into each wing root forward of the undercarriage bay providing a total usable bay volume some 50% larger than TSR2, and a reconnaissance pack could be incorporated in the fuselage. The layout is arranged to permit the maximum of underwing stores to be carried, with a corresponding performance penalty. Operating in the clean condition, from a normal runway, first estimates are that a still air range of l,500nm will be obtained cruising at Mach 4, 85,000ft? The half-scale naval version was shown in EAG 4427. This aircraft ‘...would have an all-up weight of 45,0001b when powered by two scaled versions of the Rolls-Royce engines used in the previous layout. Carrying a crew of two and a reconnaissance pack, on internal fuel only this aircraft should have a range of l,300nm at Mach 4, 85,000ft. Semi-submerged strike weapons could be fitted with reduced performance, or again, external pylon stores may be carried. The aircraft size would probably be attractive for naval use, and with folding nose and wing tips would be acceptable on present day carriers, however, present low speed performance would be 60
CHAPTER TWO 'CONCORDE-ISH IN NATURE’ inadequate and further work is necessary on this. As drawn the take-off speed from a normal runway would be about 170kts.’ Finally, a hypersonic transport aircraft was briefly considered in drawing EAG 4397. This was essentially another version of the EAG 4396 booster but with a cabin for carrying 100 passengers at Mach 4 rather than attachment points for a spacecraft. It would have been fuelled by kerosene due to the huge amount of space required to carry sufficient liquid hydrogen. As previously noted, however, English Electric believed that such a vehicle would have a severely restricted range - limiting its usefulness as a military or commercial transport. Attention now turned to the space planes that all the P.42 hypersonic launchers and boosters might carry. ABOVE AND FOLLOWING SPREAD English Electric's tentative TSR2 replacement from the P.42 series - from drawing EAG 4426 - imagined as it might have appeared in service with 31 Squadron at RAF Laarbruch in Germany in 1984. Luca Landino 61
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES 62
'CONCORDE-ISH IN NATURE' CHAPTER TWO 63
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE This Mach 4 naval aircraft, a scaled-down version of the TSR2 replacement design of EAG 4426, is not marked 'P.42' but is clearly part of the series and is discussed in BAC's first hypersonics progress report. BELOW Three anti-radar missiles could be fitted to English Electric's high-speed naval aircraft, as shown here in EAG 4427/1. The design's dimensions, its folding nose and its drooping wingtips were chosen so that it would be suitable for existing British aircraft carriers. 64
CHAPTER TWO 'CONCORDE ISH IN NATURE' ABOVE The English Electric high-speed naval aircraft is shown in EAG 4427/2 with a single glide bomb mounted under the fuselage, semi-submerged behind a fairing. BELOW Only a single transport aircraft design, intended to reach Mach 4 with a load of 100 passengers and their baggage, was studied as part of the P.42 series - Scheme 11/14. The Warton team thought it highly unlikely that such a vehicle would ever have the range required to make it worthwhile. 65
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 Chapter Three Flying into orbit English Electric P.42 space planes Having begun to assess hypersonic aircraft for a variety of roles including boosters for space planes, English Electrics designers now turned their attention to the winged space planes themselves. Both the Americans and the Soviets had already succeeded in putting manned vehicles into space - Russian Yuri Gagarin had ascended in Vostok 3KA only two years earlier - but these were little more than capsules, capable of only one basic mission. Winged, manoeuvrable and fully reusable space vessels did not exist beyond the pages of science fiction, so the English Electric team assembled what research was available on the conditions of re-entry and the science of space and applied their knowledge of rocket engines, aerodynamics, heating and high-performance materials to the problem. Then in November 1963, four months after receiving the hypersonics contract in July, they received a document from the RAE entitled ‘Report of the Working Party on Air Staff Target OR.9001 for Future Space Operations’ OR.9001 had been issued on 25 April 1962, and ‘drew attention particularly to the potential operational advantages of space vehicles capable of operating from airfields’. According to the report’s summary, OR.9001 ‘.. .was written in the belief that the Soviets could not be allowed to attain an unassailable lead in military space since a crucial change in the deterrent balance might result. The precise circumstances through which this ABOVE Wings tucked against its fuselage, the English Electric Variable Geometry Re-entry Vehicle begins its descent. The design features in several company drawings, most notably EAG 4414. Hamza Fouatih situation could arise are debatable but it is fairly certain that, if there is a strategic advantage to be gained by the use of space, this will be exploited. Bearing in mind Soviet progress and virtuosity in space technology it might be necessary for the major free nations to collaborate in the development and deployment of forces to meet a future Soviet space threat. Accordingly OR.9001 was based on the need to meet a Soviet challenge, which for the present is wholly technical but might 66
CHAPTER THREE FLYING INTO ORBIT become military in nature, and to do this in concert with other western nations? Specifically, the Air Staff wanted to know whether a manned aircraft/spacecraft could be built that could take off like an aeroplane from a runway, fly up into space, carry out its mission, then fly back down and land again in the usual way. Three examples of possible missions were given: ‘Manned control and/or maintenance of orbital weapons (the possibility that this may be one aim of the Soviet programme continues to arouse speculation and anxiety); visual close range inspection of unidentified and potentially hostile objects in orbit; and space base command and control stations for the control of space and perhaps other operations? The RAE working party, established in June 1962, had concluded that there are no insuperable technical obstacles to the development of vehicles able to fly into space and back. After looking at various arrangements, however, its members decided that the most technically promising one would consist of a hypersonic aircraft from which a winged three-man vehicle would be launched into orbit using rockets’. Unfortunately, the cost of developing this system would be staggering and the party therefore recommended using expendable rockets as the sole means of getting the winged orbiter into space. The study of hypersonic aircraft as launchers ought to continue, however, ‘in order to provide the basis for discussions with other countries as to the possibility of a collaborative effort in this field? A staggeringly expensive system might turn out to be the best option after all if Britain wasn’t footing the whole bill. Even then, the RAE believed that there was little prospect of a single- stage vehicle being developed to do exactly what the Air Staff wanted. The only glimmer of hope for this was nuclear propulsion, but ‘multi-stage systems seemed more promising, at any rate as a first step? ABOVE The RAE suggested this design for a 'winged three-man vehicle' as a basis for British aviation firms to work from in creating a reusable spacecraft capable of meeting a future Soviet threat. BELOW The interior of the RAE's suggested space vehicle would have been cramped but would not have required the crew to wear space suits. Its 'shingle' insulation was a remarkable prediction of the later Space Shuttle's ceramic tiles. 67
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 British Dyna-Soars In addition to assessing the prospects of launch systems, the report also examined what the winged spacecraft itself might be like and what features it might need. OR.9001 required that the time spent in orbit should be ‘limited only by crew endurance. This might mean a period of about three weeks and a crew of three would be needed to make this feasible. An operational payload of 20001b in addition to the crew, navigation, communication and life support system, is also specified.’ The working party decided on a layout similar to that of Boeings well- publicised X-20 Dyna-Soar space plane, which was then at an advanced stage of development. This meant a low delta wing with twin fins near the wingtips and a flat undersurface. The fuselage housing the crew compartment would be positioned above the wing so that this could then act as a heat shield during re-entry. Such a vehicle could travel to airfields in the UK or Australia from an equatorial orbit. It would land conventionally on existing airfields. It would not require an extensive recovery system and could be reused.’ Life in orbit on board this British Dyna-Soar was envisioned as being fairly comfortable for its three crewmen, the report noting: ‘It is assumed that the crew will live in a shirt sleeve environment and that pressure suits will be used only during the outward and return journeys and in emergencies.’ Air-conditioning would be provided, with water cooling for equipment and gas or water cooling for the crew cabin, which was 5 feet in diameter and 11 feet long - the latter being preferable to save weight. The report states: ‘Seats arranged in tandem would be used by the crew when working and a bunk or hammock supplied for rest and sleep when off-duty. The power supply, equipment and payload are contained at the rear of the compartment. Access to and egress from the cabin, in both normal and emergency cases, would be through the hinged windscreen: it might be possible to provide ejection seats at some weight penalty if this were thought desirable.’ Mission completed, the orbiter would then return through the atmosphere and fly back to the designated airfield as an unpowered glider, although ‘the weight of power plant and fuel needed to provide the capacity for a short level flight and power on landing would be quite small. It could for instance be incorporated at the expense of some sacrifice in personal equipment and payload.’ The landing itself would be on a skid-type undercarriage, which, when not in use, would retract to form part of the vehicle’s undersurface. In terms of its construction, the orbiter would ‘...consist of a Warren-girder type truss frame, pin jointed to avoid thermal stresses; this would be constructed from a nickel alloy and would be completely covered by radiation/erosion shields formed by discrete shingles, free to expand. These would be constructed from nickel alloy for the upper surface and fuselage, but refractory metal alloy (probably Niobium) with an oxidation resistant coating may be required for the lower surface. The body nose -cap and all leading edges would be constructed in graphite or refractory metal and arranged to allow for expansion. The cabin would be a pressurised structure made of light alloy carrying cabin pressure loads only. It would be carried within the load- carrying truss frame and its LEFT A British version of the American- style re-entry capsule as depicted in the RAE's report on OR.9001. 68
CHAPTER THREE FLYING INTO ORBIT structure would be cooled by water passing through integral channels. The vehicle structure would be designed to withstand normal accelerations of 8g: the temperature on the undersurface of the vehicle is expected to be about 1400°C and over the upper surface about 1000°C.’ Much of this was remarkably foresighted for 1963, since the NASA Space Shuttle as built was completely covered by a Thermal Protection System composed of "discrete shingles’ - tiles - and its nose and leading edges were made of a carbon/graphite material. The RAE had decided to compare its orbiter design against a broadly cone-shaped capsule similar to the already tried and tested American Mercury vehicle; "however, because of its lack of manoeuvre capability it requires a complex recovery system and a good deal of refurbishment would be needed before the vehicle could be used again, with a life of some five flights altogether? The idea of developing a British capsule was quickly dismissed. Triangular orbiter The detailed RAE response to OR.9001 was a lot for the Warton team to take on board. It was clear that the Air Staff, the most likely end user for whatever vehicle or vehicles might result from the hypersonics study project, saw an advanced reusable space vehicle as not only desirable but perhaps essential. It is apparent that although the team’s first space planes were drafted without reference to the RAE report, later designs were intended to meet the OR.9001 requirement of getting at least three men and a payload of 2,0001b into space. The first English Electric space vehicle was P.42 Scheme 11/1, designed by Dave Walley. This was a single- seater with an almost triangular flying- wing shape measuring 29.5 feet long and 37 feet wide with a sweep-back of 60°. The ends of the wing on either side could be flipped up by 90° to form fins for re-entry, reducing the span to just 26 feet. It was to be launched from the back of its hypersonic carrier aircraft with an expendable rocket booster 42 feet long and 25 feet wide (known as a ‘Lilo bed type due to its shape) attached directly to its rear - forming a long ‘fuselage’. The booster would provide 100,0001b of thrust through a trio of unspecified engines and had three identical 30sq ft fins on it, one mounted centrally to form a ‘tail’ and one on either side. Once the boosters fuel was exhausted at high altitude, it was to be BELOW English Electric's first attempt at designing a spacecraft was R42 Scheme 11/1 as shown in drawings EAG 3316/2 and EAG 3316/3. The triangular vehicle, with variable geometry wingtips, two rocket engines and a turbojet for low-speed flight, is attached to an expendable 'Lilo bed type' booster. 69
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUHIE VOLUME 5 Russia's “New Generation” Fighters, Bombers, Copters Farewell to Farnborough's “annual” show We fly the Musketeer SPECIAL SECTION Biggest, best “Fly-In” of Home-Buiit Aircraft LEFT The cover of Air Progress magazine from February/March 1963 features concept art produced for NASA by artist Roger Metcalf, depicting a space vehicle remarkably similar to English Electric's P.42 Scheme 11/1. It seems likely that both designs had a common source, via author jettisoned and allowed to fall back into the atmosphere. The P.42 Scheme 11/1 space plane would then continue on into orbit powered by its own unspecified rocket motors, providing 50,0001b thrust between them. The only drawing of this design, EAG 3316, gives no indication as to the orbiter’s operational payload, if indeed it was to have one. Mission completed, the vehicle was to fly back to base with the aid of a modified version of the lightweight Rolls-Royce RB.162 turbojet mounted in the centre rear of the wing, between the rocket engines. At an appropriate altitude, a small intake on the back of the vehicle would be opened to supply the necessary air for it to run. Landing involved the use of an all-skid tricycle undercarriage. The shape of the P.42 Scheme 11/1 space plane appears to have originated from a NASA scheme of around the same date, but it seems unlikely that the design was anything other than a warm- up or even a placeholder intended merely to embody various thoughts about general layout and configuration. BELOW P.42 Scheme 11/1 had been a basic concept and was swiftly replaced by a more advanced lifting-body orbiter form. The 'Lilo' booster was retained, albeit now with a single engine and no fin. The design was an unnumbered P.42, shown in EAG 4413. Developed space plane After a more detailed assessment of Scheme 11/1, it was decided that another NASA design could provide the basis for an improved orbiter, detailed in drawing EAG 4413. Though it superficially resembled Scheme 11/1, it incorporated several advanced features and was regarded as the definitive space vehicle to accompany most of English Electrics P.42 launcher aircraft. The January 1964 progress report states: ‘EAG 4413 shows a possible arrangement of the rocket stages to be mounted on an airbreathing booster. This is, in fact, the vehicle mounted beneath the Mach 2.2 kerosene boost aircraft EAG 4409.’ 70
CHAPTER THREE FLYING INTO ORBIT ABOVE A note on the EAG 4413 drawing indicates that it was based on this NASA lifting-body space vehicle design, via author BELOW The P.42 orbiter and booster combination of EAG 4413 - shown with and without its cockpit-covering launch and re- entry fairing. Chris Sandham-Bailey The form of the orbiter had been significantly refined from that shown in EAG 3316: ‘The orbiting vehicle shown was shaped to perform a lifting re- entry, and contained within itself the final stage fuel and rocket motor, as well as the three crew members and payload. The moving tips shown have been proposed elsewhere as a means of control, but in this case they also facilitated mounting the vehicle beneath the boost aircraft.’ The EAG 4413s wingtips could be raised to vertical, lowered to horizontal or positioned halfway in between. Its rear-mounted expendable rocket pack was also a redesigned version of the one seen on EAG 3316: ‘The first rocket stage comprised three parallel cylindrical tanks, faired to the vehicle at the forward end, an arrangement that minimises the booster undercarriage length when the rocket is mounted below. It also reduced the aerodynamic drag during the boost phase wherever the rocket is mounted.’ The ‘Lilo’ booster had also been improved aerodynamically, with no fins and now only one engine. This was to burn for 6 minutes and 40 seconds after launch from the carrier aircraft before separation, then the space planes own single rocket engine would fire for another 7 minutes to put it into orbit. For re-entry, the shape of the vehicle itself would generate lift without the need for drag-inducing wings that would be subject to huge stresses during re-entry - a ‘lifting body’. This, the report said, provided more flexibility for missions. With a low lift- drag ratio, it could make a swift return from orbit following a satellite inspection mission to ‘avoid long orbital “holds” and hence vulnerability’. In other words, the quicker it could return to base, the lower the chance of it being destroyed by hostile forces. Evidently, the requirements of OR.9001 had also now entered English Electric’s considerations since provision for three crew members is included in the design, rather than just one. There were other considerations too. What if the end user of this system only wanted to put satellites into orbit, rather than a winged and manoeuvrable space vehicle? The report says: 71
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE The English Electric variable geometry re-entry vehicle designed by Ken Pocock and shown in EAG 4414 represented a different strand in the company's research from that which ultimately produced Mustard. At just 17 feet wide, the orbiter was remarkably compact. ‘Note that it is not inherent in the system that the integrated final stage should be used. Two rocket stages and a separate payload are equally applicable. For this reason, and in order to make booster performances easily comparable, the term “weight into orbit” has been used throughout this report as a measure of boost ability. This may be taken as either the weight of an integral vehicle with all launch fuel gone; or as the weight of an empty rocket stage plus payload in orbit? Lilo or single cylinder? Once EAG 4413 had been designed, the question was raised as to whether the new flat ‘Lilo’ rocket booster design was more or less suitable than a conventional large-diameter single- cylinder rocket booster. Both booster shapes were investigated by examining two carrier aircraft designs in detail - the Mach 4 vehicle shown in EAG 4396, which had the space plane and booster sitting on its back, and the EAG 4409 Mach 2.2 vehicle, which carried them slung underneath. The report says: ‘A preliminary investigation was carried out on the second stage mounted on the upper surface of the aircraft in EAG 4396, comparing multi-cylinder (i.e. Lilo bed type) and single cylinder type boosters. This showed definite weight advantages for the conventional single cylinder type structure. The booster carried on EAG 4409 is mounted under the aircraft. Because of limited ground clearance this booster had to be a multi-cylinder configuration with consequent weight penalty.’ The investigation showed that a single- cylinder booster would be lighter than the ‘Lilo’ multi-cylinder and able to tolerate greater loads during launch. On the other hand, the lower profile of the ‘Lilo’ tended to work in its favour for fitment to launchers. If the Mach 2.2 EAG 4409 was generally the preferred launch vehicle, it would need the flatter ‘Lilo’ booster. Re-entry by swing-wing As Walley worked on the pure ‘lifting body’ EAG 4413 design, another designer, Ken Pocock, drafted an orbiter that aimed to combine the advantages of a ‘lifting body’ with the low-speed stability of wings. His drawing, EAG 4414, was titled ‘Variable Geometry Re- entry Vehicle and amounted to a slab- sided and bulky lifting body form with wings that could be folded inside the fuselage during re-entry then swung outwards to provide greater lift and manoeuxTability as the vehicle descended through the atmosphere. The 50-foot-long orbiter had a large dorsal fin, landing skids and a rocket engine that could be re-angled for manoeuvring. Its wingspan, with the wings fully extended, was 50 feet. Three crewmen sat side-by-side in a spacious cabin, with the pilot’s seat raised up so he could see through the vehicles narrow windscreen. 72
CHAPTER THREE FLYING INTO ORBIT ABOVE In EAG 4421 the variable geometry re-entry vehicle is shown perched atop an expendable rocket booster for launch. This was one of two potential launch methods for the vehicle. ABOVE An even larger disposable booster for the EAG 4414 re-entry vehicle. The design was not regarded favourably. Pocock elaborated on the design in drawing EAG 4421, which showed his orbiter as a second-stage vehicle positioned atop an 83-foot-long expendable booster rocket with small wings at its base. The next drawing in the sequence, EAG 4422, shows the same orbiter positioned atop a 109-foot booster rocket. A final drawing, EAG 4428, shows a significantly scaled-down version of the swing-wing space vehicle. The title is simply ‘Winged Re-entry Vehicle’, but the design appears to be for a single-seat experimental craft intended to prove the aerodynamic concept of the much larger ‘Variable Geometry Re-entry Vehicle’. Neither the orbiter nor the experimental vehicle progressed as far as the first hypersonics progress report. At around this time a third English RIGHT Pocock's final stab at a winged re-entry vehicle is shown in EAG 4428. No dimensions are given for this tiny one-man spacecraft, but it was probably intended as a research vehicle. Electric designer brought forward a new space plane concept. Geoffrey Francis ‘Geoff’ Sharpies drew Pocock’s orbiter slotted into the trailing edge to a large expendable first-stage fuel tank shaped like a wing. The orbiter’s own foldable wings, described as ‘laterally extensible controllable surfaces’, were to be fully extended at 90° to become a part of this wing and act as elevons. This unique arrangement was to allow the space plane to take off from a conventional runway, jettison its wheeled undercarriage and fly up into space under the power of its own single rocket engine, using fuel from the tank. At a suitable altitude, the wings would be retracted and the tank would be detached and allowed to fall back into the atmosphere. 73
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES Sharpies offered three different configurations: the first involved the empty wing-shaped tank splitting down its centreline and falling away in two halves, and the second involved a third stage where the section of tank directly in front of the orbiter remained part of it as the sections to the left and right fell away, then it eventually joined them. For the third configuration, additional control surfaces were added to the outer sections of the wing-tank that were linked to and controlled by the orbiters extended wings. In all three cases, once the wing-tank was gone and the orbiter was in space, its wings could be extended again to act as solar panels ‘for electrical power production, or radiators for heat disposal’, a detail not mentioned in Pococks original study. The orbiter was to be manoeuvred using vernier thrusters - small control rockets - or ‘by gimballing the main rocket and making small discharges from it. It may also be desirable to provide thrust from the main rocket during landing, to permit a LEFT The second launch arrangement for the EAG 4414 variable geometry re- entry vehicle does not appear in the English Electric P.42 drawing sequence, but the company did use it as part of a patent filed on 24 April 1964. In the drawing, Figures 1-3 show different views of the vehicle attached to an enormous wing-shaped fuel tank for horizontal take-off. The tank was designed to split down the middle and fall away once empty. Figure 4 shows an additional 'stage' in front of the vehicle. RIGHT Another drawing from English Electric's fuel tank wing patent, showing how the variable geometry re- entry vehicle, wings spread, might be integrated into the tank and even form part of its in-flight control system. conventional runway to be used, so that recovery of the final stage involves no search and retrieval.’ This was beginning to approach the requirements of OR.9001, offering conventional take-off and flight into space followed by a conventional landing. Another benefit was low cost since only a single rocket engine would be needed and this would survive the mission, ready to be reused. The only part of the vehicle wasted was the large though relatively cheap wing-tank. Like the EAG 4414 swing-wing orbiter itself, Sharpless design failed to appear in the first hypersonics progress report. Nevertheless, the company believed it was sufficiently promising to begin low-speed wind tunnel tests on it. These saw the wing-tank paired with an orbiter much closer to Walleys EAG 4413 design and, as they progressed, the shape of the wing-tank itself was altered dramatically. The result is discussed in Chapter 8. ВАС also got the wing-tank concept patented. The application was made on 24 April 1964, and the patent was accepted on 22 February 1967 - but only Sharpies s name was on it. Monstrous boosters Alongside high-speed cruise aircraft, boost-glide vehicles and space planes, the Ministry of Aviation hypersonics research contract required ВАС and thereby English Electric to study recoverable launchers. This was taken to mean a vertical launch rocket booster, which, having done its job of helping a vehicle reach orbit, could be turned around and flown back to base, rather than being jettisoned and allowed to burn up in the atmosphere. The first of these to be considered by English Electric was a monster. EAG 4391, drawn by Pocock, shows a recoverable rocket built around the American Saturn S.l first stage - the base of the rocket where the launch engines were. The S.l, manufactured by Chrysler, was a proven space launcher, first tested successfully on 27 October 1961, again on 25 April and 16 November 1962, and for a fourth time on 28 March 1963. It was powered by eight Rocketdyne H-l rocket engines, firing with 1.5 million pounds of thrust for 150 seconds to push whatever upper stage was mounted on it to an altitude of 37 nautical miles before burning out. During its four test launches, the expendable Saturn I vehicles followed ballistic rather than orbital trajectories and ended up crashing into the Atlantic Ocean. Despite their success, it was an unavoidable fact that four very expensive rockets had just been destroyed. In 1962, therefore, NASA asked for ways in which the cost of a Saturn launch might be reduced. Boeing came up with several concepts in response - 74
CHAPTER THREE FLYING INTO ORBIT ABOVE English Electric's first recoverable booster - not a spacecraft but designed to get one into orbit - was this gigantic winged vehicle of EAG 4391 based on a Saturn S-l booster stage. Note the alternative nose arrangement depicted in the upper left of the drawing. one of which, Model 922, proposed fitting the S.IC stage with large swept wings and turbojet engines to make it capable of flying back to base under its own steam following a launch. The pilot was housed in an ejectable cockpit module, based on the Boeing Dyna- Soar cockpit design, which projected from the forward edge of the port wing. Six ‘fly-back* engines of unspecified type sat on top of the wings, three clustered together over each one, for low-speed atmospheric manoeuvring. English Electric clearly thought there was some merit in this concept, though not in the way it was executed, since it was redesigned by Pocock with the fins positioned mid-wing and with only two fly-back engines that were integrated into the undercarriage and would become usable only when it was extended. RIGHT The inspiration for the EAG 4391 booster was undoubtedly Boeing's earlier well-publicised efforts to convert a Saturn S-l booster into a reusable vehicle. The example shown here is the Boeing Model 922. via author While the Boeing booster’s cockpit arrangement was unorthodox to say the least, Pocock positioned the pilot initially to the left of the huge rounded ‘face of the vehicle, but then provided a more pointed alternative ‘nose’ where the pilot was positioned dead centre with a retractable heat shield available to protect him during re-entry. This novel design led to a second wholly English Electric recoverable booster from Pocock, fuelled by liquid hydrogen and detailed in both EAG 4403 and 44 ll dated 3 September 1963. The drawings are identical, 4403 being renamed to appear later in the sequence for reasons unknown. They show a Mach 7 vert ical - take-off, horizontal - landi ng booster designed to ferry a smaller space vehicle, similar to the one shown in EAG 3316, into orbit. Rather than the S.Is eight rocket engines, this had only four of unspecified type. The two fly-back engines were retained but moved into the tail end of the big cylindrical fuselage and given flip-open intakes similar to that seen on 75
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE Following on from the booster derived from the S.l was this huge cylindrical vehicle. Designed for vertical take-off attached to its spacecraft payload, the booster shown in EAG 4403 - later renumbered EAG 4411 - had a pad weight of 500,0001b. EAG 3316 itself. It had stubby wings similar in form and positioning to those of the North American X-15 research aircraft and a pair of large tail surfaces. A single central tailfin was of truly gargantuan proportions, though its precise dimensions are not given. The pilot sat high up within a large blunt nose behind a windscreen that had no heat shield - presumably because the high angle of re- entry would protect it from the heat generated on the underside of the vehicle. BELOW English Electric's vast vertical-take-off booster of EAG 4403/4411 as it might have appeared if operated by the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO). Chris Sandham-Bailey OPPOSITE TOP The first booster design that the Warton team appear to have had any real confidence in was the delta-winged recoverable rocket shown in EAG 4423 preliminary issue. The drawing shows how the vertical-launch vehicle would have had its payload positioned on its nose. Following separation, its lower fin would have been detached before it descended under power from its two turbojets for a runway landing on its wheeled undercarriage. BELOW EAG 4423 issue 1 depicted a slightly different version of the recoverable booster shown in the preliminary issue with the same drawing number. Its fuselage was fractionally broader, the arrangement of its engines and rear section had been tidied up and its undercarriage was taller. 76
CHAPTER THREE FLYING INTO ORBIT 77
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 Unlike his Saturn-derived vehicle and his swing-wing orbiter, Pocock’s Mach 7 booster was deemed important enough for inclusion in the January 1964 progress report - alongside the launcher aircraft detailed in Chapter 2. It states that *.. .the recoverable hydrogen rocket shown on drawing EAG 4403 has been considered flying through wind shears, and maximum permissible pull-out during re- entry compatible with maximum loading during boost was found to be 6.5g. If the rocket were designed to this condition then adequate strength would be available for any gusts likely to be encountered during cruise back to base.’ The boosters fuselage was to consist of an externally insulated aluminium cylinder with wings and tail surfaces made from Inconel. The liquid hydrogen fuel tanks would be pressurised prior to lift-off and the insulation outside the cylinder would prevent air solidifying onto it and also protect the structure during re-entry. Unfortunately, a tank pressurisation failure during re-entry would have disastrous consequences for the vehicle and the report notes that . .if the rocket were to be manned a more comprehensive escape system might be advantageous. If unmanned then the probability of tank or system failure would have to be considered. The whole question of reliability and man-rating thus has considerable implications on the structure design.’ Safety concerns aside, the EAG 4403/4411 drawing was one of the first designs produced anywhere in the world to show a dedicated space vehicle - as opposed to a high-speed bomber - and booster that would be ground- launched vertically side-by-side. It takes little effort to imagine the space vehicle attached to the English Electric Mach 7 booster’s side as the Space Shuttle, and the booster itself as the external tank/solid booster rockets. One earlier design to feature a similar configuration was Bell Aircraft Corporation’s Bomber Missile, BOMI for short, conceived by German rocket scientist Walter Dornberger and submitted to the US Air Force on 17 April 1952. BOMI involved a small dart-shaped bomber attached to the back of a large dart-shaped booster for a vertical launch. After 2 minutes of acceleration, the larger vehicle detached and glided back to base. The bomber headed for its target at an altitude of 100,000 feet and a speed of Mach 4 before its fuel was exhausted and it glided for 6,100km, dropping its nuclear ordnance payload as it passed over its target. Bell received a contract worth nearly $400,000 to spend a year working on the design, but in the end it was determined that there was no means by which BOMI could be kept sufficiently cool. The technology simply did not exist in the early 1950s to make such a vehicle a reality. The side-by-side arrangement was dropped and the design was altered to position the bomber on top of a rocket booster instead - the project being superseded by ROBO (ROcket BOmber), then Brass Bell before eventually leading to Dyna-Soar. One spin-off from Bell’s BOMI work, however, was the hypersonic transport mentioned in the previous chapter. At English Electric, no further consideration was given to the EAG 4403/4411 design and Pocock left ВАС shortly thereafter. This was not the end for the company’s recoverable rocket design studies, however. Canard rocket vehicles The bulky design of Pocock’s Mach 7 booster may have been rejected, but English Electric continued to believe that the basic concept of a winged rocket was appropriate for a recoverable vehicle. Under ‘recoverable rocket layouts’, the report notes: ‘Detailed studies have concentrated on fixed wing vertical take-off rockets, although less conventional lifting methods e.g. retractable wings, paragliders, rotating wings etc. have been briefly investigated. It is thought that the problems of deploying a lifting surface at possibly supersonic speed, and the low lift/drags achieved by these methods, provide strong arguments for the fixed wing approach. It has been found that the weight distribution after burnout of a rocket design for boosting is such that a canard or tailless delta layout is the preferred solution.’ The canards also gave the recoverable rocket designs extra lift, which meant that overall wing area could be reduced, cutting both weight and drag in the process. Walley drew the first of these designs, EAG 4423, which retained some features of Pocock’s earlier booster. Measuring nearly 90 feet long with a diameter of 17 feet, it resembled a blunt- nosed cylindrical rocket with four large wings/fins at its base and two small triangular canards beginning 20 feet from its uppermost tip. Power for lift-off was provided by a pair of rocket engines scaled up from the basic design of the Rolls-Royce RZ2, which had been developed to power the de Havilland Blue Streak missile. The vehicle also had a pair of Rolls-Royce Spey turbojets mounted in its rear fuselage with pop-open intakes. The pilot was to sit high up in the nose, his view during the rocket’s vertical launch entirely obscured by the ‘two further liquid hydrogen powered rocket stages’ sitting directly on top of his vehicle. The EAG 4423 recoverable rockets starting weight was deliberately set at 500,0001b, making it directly comparable with the launcher aircraft outlined in Chapter 2, since they weighed the same. According to the report: ‘Following a vertical take-off, separation would occur at approximately 7000 feet per second and this first stage would re-enter. After pull-out, and jettison of 78
CHAPTER THREE FLYING INTO ORBIT UCTAJLS- ГАО W£IC*4T 11500016 г яда ’виси cur wt - zeooc».* -ROW MWC KfifA - 500-.t r-POSi I*: PLANE AR£A - |4O*»« KOJCFT MOTOR - RR RZ2 *H50,OOOia Г HR J 51 'Maox. ГиЕ1- LOX *£R05fH€ -SI 260 mo MIXTJRt RATIO -2 25 AUXILIARY ENGINES - 2.3000l*TK?UST LbJuUSH ELECTPIC AVIATION хли* RECOVERABLE F STAGE POCKET HMD) EAG 4430 । ABOVE Effectively a miniature version of the recoverable rocket shown in EAG 4423, the EAG 4430 design featured a similar layout. More detail is shown in the nose section, which included a large blunt fairing, covering the pilot's windscreen; this was to be ejected following re-entry. The vehicle's two turbojets would be fed by intakes on either side, which would pop open when required. heat shields, the turn-round would commence. At subsonic speeds the intakes would open and return to base made on the power of the turbojet engines, followed by a normal horizontal landing.’ Its fuel expended, the empty rocket vehicle would weigh only 85,3001b for the flight back to earth - slightly more than a fully loaded TSR2 - and having jettisoned its large ‘lower’ fin, presumably with the aid of explosive bolts, it would touch down on a conventional tricycle wheeled undercarriage. Having assessed the EAG 4423 arrangement, the team found its ‘scaled’ RZ2 engines too vague in terms of performance, and uncertainty as to the weight of other key aspects of the design led them to work on a smaller vehicle based on known values, shown in drawing EAG 4430. This retained the earlier design’s canards but it had a combination of wings and smaller fins, rather than four identical tail structures, and it was fitted with a heat shield fairing over the cockpit windscreen that could be jettisoned during atmospheric descent. ‘One of the problems found in performing the previous design study was the uncertainty as to power plant and associated equipment weight and size,’ the report states. It goes on: ‘In order to establish a preliminary idea of detail at a somewhat lower weight than the above a layout was prepared using an existing rocket motor. The motor chosen was the Rolls-Royce RZ2, developed to give 150,0001b thrust at take-off. With a pad weight of 115,0001b and a flight plan as described above, this vehicle could be utilised in two ways: a) As a manned or unmanned recoverable booster, when with two further liquid hydrogen stages, a weight of approximately 3,0001b could be put into orbit, b) As a manned research vehicle.’ As the latter, unencumbered by a second or third stage sitting on its nose, EAG 4430 could be expected to reach hypersonic speeds and English Electric therefore believed that it might be useful for carrying out ‘research on materials, trajectories, hot structures, re-entry techniques, etc, at velocities up to and beyond those likely for recoverable boosters. The low speed and recovery characteristics could be explored at low weights on turbojets alone following a conventional horizontal take-off.’ EAG 4430 itself was actually a simplified version of another drawing, EAG 4429, which gave considerably more detail, indicating that the ‘spine’ along the vehicle’s back was a duct for services, and showing the curvaceous form of its turbojet housings to better advantage. 79
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE English Electric's one-man recoverable rocket booster of EAG 4430, with and without its cockpit windscreen-covering fairing. Chris Sandham-Bailey LEFT Before the EAG 4430 vehicle was put forward as a booster in its own right, it was conceived as a research vehicle. EAG 4429 shows a very similar and even more detailed version of the design. Notes on the drawing state: 'When horizontal take-off is employed fuel for the rocket motor will not be carried & jettisonable lower fin will not be fitted.' 80
CHAPTER THREE FLYING INTO ORBIT ABOVE The definitive English Electric recoverable rocket appears in EAG 4431. The nose has been reshaped, the fairing over the windscreen is neater and the overall design is cleaner. The vehicle's undercarriage is now splayed, giving it a more practical and realistic stance. A third recoverable rocket design was drawn as EAG 4431. This built on the EAG 4429/4430 design by giving better detail on the now splayed undercarriage and how it might fit into the tightly packed aerodynamic form of the vehicle. The nose was also reshaped for better performance at high speeds. This design also appears to be the last EAG drawing ever to bear the name English Electric. BELOW With or without its nose fairing the EAG 4431 recoverable rocket would have made a handsome vehicle and might also have been a useful research tool. However, its small size might have made it less useful as a booster for anything other than upper stages with small payloads. Luca Landino 81
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ‘Exotic’ fuel The second drawing credited to British Aircraft Corporation at Preston was for a fourth recoverable rocket, albeit one with a particularly unusual feature. The design shown in EAG 4433, described as a "Recoverable 1st Stage Research Vehicle - “Monex” Fuel’, has the same cylindrical fuselage and Rolls-Royce RZ2-derived engine as its predecessors but with a pair of Bristol Siddeley Viper turbojets for ‘recovery’. It has wide-span canards and main wings, and was intended as the first stage of a three-stage rocket. The pilot is positioned beneath a large fairing and the drawing notes state: ‘Heat shield over pilot’s capsule and nose fairings on motor nacelles are jettisoned after re- entry phase of flight. Lower fin is jettisoned prior to landing and recovered by parachute. Upper fin and fore-planes are all- moving control surfaces. Pilot’s capsule may be jettisoned and recovered by parachute. Pilot also has conventional ejector seat.’ So far, so unremarkable. What made the EAG 4433 design unusual was its fuel - Monex. The story of this disgusting substance begins four years earlier in 1959 with the formation of the Rocket Research Corporation in Holden Street, Seattle, Washington. This fledgling company was established by a group of former Boeing employees who had previously worked together on the Bomarc, Dyna-Soar and Minuteman programmes. Their aim was to concentrate particularly on high-energy chemical propellants - fuels - and small rocket engines. Chairman of the board was Robert M. Bridgforth )r, formerly the head of the Boeing Propulsion Research Unit and a scientist who had worked on the Manhattan Project during the Second World War. While developing various space projects at Boeing, Bridgforth came up with what he believed to be the future of space exploration - a rocket fuel that could actually be produced out in space by recycling waste materials. He first approached the US Government with his invention before offering it to other nations, including the UK. A patent application filed for Monex W in 1967 says that it is ‘a system and method for utilising and disposing of carbonaceous waste products accumulated aboard a spaceship, including human body generated wastes and other carbonaceous wastes, by processing the waste products into rocket propellants and utilising such propellants for spaceship propulsion.’ In essence, Bridgforth proposed to make rocket fuel out of human excrement and rubbish. There would be a reasonably plentiful supply, it was cheap and it was a relatively simple way of disposing of unwanted waste, particularly during a lengthy manned space mission. Bridgforth describes the ingredients of Monex as carbonaceous wastes such as human faeces, food wastes including the food packaging material, personal hygiene wastes such as towels, sponges, detergents, toothpaste, hair and nail clippings etc.’ Also included would be liquid wastes such as urine and water that had been used for washing. BELOW With the switchover to ВАС now complete, the English Electric recoverable booster design was adapted to suit a vehicle fuelled by Monex. This disgusting concoction, synthesised from human excrement and other waste, was to fill 886 cubic feet of tank space within the booster. A gigantic fairing covered not just the windscreen but the entire cockpit area. Another unusual feature of the EAG 4433 design was the low angle of sweep used for both wings and canards. 82
CHAPTER THREE FLYING INTO ORBIT All these materials would be subject to a complex processing system with many stages, which would eventually result in a thick rubbery material that burned extremely well. The composition of the finished Monex product is given as ‘aluminium 19.6%, ammonium nitrate 45%, urine 10%, faeces 20%, Darco (bone black carbon) 5% and Guartec XO-402 (gallant) 0.4%’. A whole family of Monex types was formulated including Monex А, В, C, D and the final form, W. These would be available in ‘wet’ and ‘dry’ versions depending on whether urine and wash water was to be included. When EAG 4433 was drawn up, Bridgforth was attempting to promote what was at the time the latest version of his fuel, Monex D. No details of the discussions at English Electric/BAC regarding Monex are known, but it appears that only EAG 4433 was ever intended to use it as a fuel, and then only experimentally. Digital computers Designing vehicles that could fly into space was one thing, but working out how they would actually get where they were meant to be going was another. Plotting the necessary trajectory was highly complicated and the English Electric/BAC designers struggled with the same problem that had already taxed the finest minds in the US to their limits. A solution that took advantage of cutting-edge early-1960s electronic technology seemed possible, however. The progress report notes: ‘A study has been initiated to develop a digital computer programme to optimise the vehicle performance during the ascent trajectory. Numerous papers have been published on this problem, primarily by American sources, without an efficient method being evolved and it is appreciated that the full solution is clearly a long term target. As an interim measure, a variety of lifting and non-lifting trajectories have been computed, considering an arbitrary range of the major parameters. One deficiency in the computation of these trajectories is that the use of lift during first stage boost has not been fully investigated. The study of lifting trajectories was initially conceived on the upper stages on the grounds that, in the more rarefied atmosphere that they encountered, a greater proportion of the lift would be provided by the thrust vector; which is more efficient than aerodynamic lift.’ During the course of their research, the team looked at three different vehicle arrangements in a bid to calculate trajectories. - The first was a straightforward three-stage ground- launched expendable rocket, the second was a similar vehicle but with only two stages, and the third was vehicles that had kerosene-fuelled first stages - jet- powered launcher aircraft. This work did not succeed immediately in solving the problem, but it did give English Electric/BAC its first experience of working with the earliest commercially available computers - a significant milestone in its own right. Lines of attack Before the first progress report on hypersonics was finally issued in January 1964, marking the conclusion of six months of work and the end of the Ministry of Aviation contract, Ray Creasey wrote to RAE deputy director Handel Davies to discuss a proposed continuation. His letter of 18 October 1963 indicates a wish to present preliminary ideas for an Aerospace Research Continuation Programme, commencing on 1 January 1964. He wrote: ‘This is after several internal discussions, including key people from around ВАС. Over two months’ more work will be carried out before the end of the year, which could further influence our choice of continuation research. This is likely only in detail, due to our many years’ thought and experience prior to receipt of contract. Now that we have built up a correctly balanced team within ВАС, we trust that this continuation contract will continue as long as possible from January 1.’ He gave a summary of the work carried out, starting with the study of various vehicles able to cruise in the Mach 4-6 range and the use of liquid hydrogen as a fuel. The team ‘...came to the conclusion that the range of such an aircraft, with any worthwhile payload, would not be sufficient to make it an attractive transport or strategic offensive weapon carrier on present extrapolations of technology, unless sheer speed over only intermediate ranges were important. We therefore turned our attention to boosting applications, with the objective of seeing whether we could find a “cheap” way into space, using air-breathing and other recoverable first stages.’ This work had found that any benefits of launcher aircraft with high Mach numbers would be negated by the huge cost of building and operating them. Launchers flying at Mach 2.2 or even 0.9 seemed more promising. This view differed considerably from that held by the RAE, he explained, because his team had calculated engine and engine installation weight to be much higher than the RAE expected. He wrote: ‘As a consequence of this, work is concentrating on finding ways of lightening the propulsion system, including circular intakes, reduction in the amount of variability in the intake and nozzle systems, and examination of more exotic propulsion cycles. Although painting a somewhat gloomy picture of hypersonic airbreathing vehicles, either as launchers or cruise type vehicles, this does depend a great deal on the assumptions about propulsion system weight. 83
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES Although it would take a very large improvement to make a hypersonic launcher competitive with slower airbreathers, or other forms of launcher, there could be a long term case for a transport type hypersonic aeroplane if we find and confirm some method of building lighter power plant installations. This will be discussed further with NGTE and the engine firms. It therefore seems worthwhile doing aerodynamic and mechanical design and test work on schemes which would make a big difference to the weight of intakes and nozzles. Some of this could be under way during the period under review. The long term prospects for hypersonic airbreathing vehicles will be greatly improved only if research is continued into the detailed engineering problems of carrying hydrogen in winged vehicles with lighter structures than seem currently possible. We are discussing tests on small specimens at the meeting at MOA on October 25.’ The weight of essential systems such as life support and radar was also a source of disagreement with the RAE. Crucially, he noted: ‘Our preliminary attempts at comparing costs of the different methods of space launching, allowing for the refurbishing factor on the recoverable parts of the system, suggest that a recoverable ground launched rocket system is better than hypersonic air-breathing launcher systems. We also find that the apparent trend in the USA to much larger boosters is not economical and that it is far preferable to fire off a large number of small payloads to achieve a given orbital mass.’ Weighed against this would be the cost of assembling a large number of small items into one big item in space. ‘We now attempt to suggest the broad outline of a programme for 1964, bearing in mind the efforts it has taken to reach the present state. First and foremost, there will need to continue project design work and the associated assessments.’ He was also keen to get started on working towards practical solutions to the problems associated with actually building a spacecraft. ‘It is suggested that some planning of hardware research programmes could proceed in this period, particularly in connection with re- entry vehicle design. For example, experience will be needed in the handling and fabrication of unusual materials, insulants and associated cooling systems. It will be necessary to study material properties, and also joining techniques, for materials like Inconel (and possibly even titanium), as well as the refractory and insulating materials. On the assumption that it is necessary to launch into a variety of orbits from either a ground based rocket launcher, with subsequent orbital path change, or by taking advantage of the flexibility of an airbreathing launcher and cruise-vehicle, some work should proceed on the associated navigation, guidance and vulnerability problems. This would obviously bring in the expertise of our Guided Weapons Company, who are formulating a detailed proposal, as suggested at our meetings.’ Having strongly suggested reusable ground-launched rockets as the best solution to the problem of putting materials into orbit, Creasey made an appeal for more guidance from the RAE on the practical uses to which hypersonic aircraft might be put - since the evidence suggested that they could fulfil no really useful role. ‘Finally, and most difficult of all, some work should proceed on the operational uses to which high speed vehicles can be put, together with associated operational problems. Firm lines of study cannot be laid down at this stage, but it is hoped that discussions with various potential users could lead to useful lines of investigation. The value of men plus various electronic aids should be compared with purely electronic solutions in an attempt to determine the best cost effectiveness for our overall efforts. This is as far as we can commit ourselves to a programme at the moment as it will not surprise us if you agree that some lines of attack should be shut down and others opened up during the next contract period.’ Universal cussedness On 13 November 1963 Warton team leader Tom Smith gave a very forthright presentation entitled ‘Engineering Problems of Near Future Hypersonic Vehicles’ to the British Interplanetary Society Symposium on Aerospace Vehicles. The speaker before him discussed the huge number of designs that had been assessed and were still being assessed in America for a far-reaching horizontal-take-off space launcher study known as Aerospaceplane. When his turn came, Smith said: ‘The introductory lecturer has outlined the broad concept of the Aerospaceplane. Within this concept there exist a large number of possible systems, i.e. systems that on some time scale are technically feasible. This multiplicity of possibilities is unfortunate, since out of this situation has arisen a number of spokesmen for this or that idea, suggesting that their scheme is a cheap way to space and/or for Europeans, a chance to catch up with the Americans and the Russians. Now this in itself is not bad, but unfortunately all this is meat and drink to the people who will obviously be attracted by the 84
CHAPTER THREE FLYING INTO ORBIT possibility of something cheaper, and if even the experts cannot agree, what better, since that means that no money need be spent at all. Now I am aware that it is very difficult to make out a convincing case to the taxpayer of the need to go into space. I am also very much aware that a deal more work will be required before a clear system emerges for each task, whatever it is; and in this connection it should be noted that, by the universal law of cussedness, one always has to pay for what is apparently an ideal performance-wise. Since we are inevitably dealing with a system which is going to cost a very large amount of money, it is reasonable to ask “why” at every point until the issue is absolutely clear-cut or as near clear-cut as any issue can be in an advancing technology. Our people have been involved over the past 10 years in private studies of systems which have a bearing on the Aerospaceplane, and in spite of the numerous facilities and knowledge acquired, it is inevitable that some decisions are still going to be taken on the basis of faith, intuition or what- have-you. Our aim as engineers should be to reduce the number of such decisions by asking the appropriate questions? He went on to discuss the merits of multi-stage space launchers, the problems associated with take-off, boost, kinetic heating, re-entry and landing, liquid air cycle engines (LACE) for airbreathing vehicles, ablative coatings, nickel alloys, titanium, turborockets and ramjets. The ‘near future hypersonic vehicles’ of Smiths title were evidently space launchers and boosters, rather than long-range transports or military reconnaissance aircraft, pointing to the overall direction of what, at this stage, were still English Electrics hypersonics studies. Quite what Smiths largely non-professional audience made of all this cutting-edge technological material is unclear. In wrapping up, Smith said: ‘Now this matter of cost effectiveness is a vast subject and one which cannot be covered in a paper of this nature. However, I do wish to emphasise that it is something which cannot be divorced from the purely engineering problem and, in fact, good engineering should be synonymous with low costs. It is obvious from the recent spate of US literature on the space booster particularly in the “post-Nova” class, that this philosophy is well rooted. What are the factors which must be considered? The type of task to be performed, cost of assembly in orbit (since this could affect the size of package). Recoverability, the degree of refurbishing, etc, are obvious points, and the latter two are counts on which the airbreather could score over the conventional rocket. Against, are the probable larger research and development costs of the more complicated airbreather or recoverable rocket, and here we are likely to be faced with a dilemma since in a desire to increase the amount of recovered material by increasing the end stage speed of the airbreather we may well increase the initial and production costs of this first stage. Here is an obvious case of costs affecting a major variable in the system, and an indication of the way in which future study must operate.’ And this was, indeed, exactly the way in which Smiths own future studies would be operated - with a keen awareness of how each new complexity or need to develop new technology or processes could drive up development costs unacceptably. It is also evident that his scepticism regarding hypersonic airbreathing space launchers was already hardening in November 1963. ‘Meaningless’ engines Following on from Creasey’s letter in October, a meeting was held at the RAE’s Farnborough headquarters the day after Smiths presentation, 14 November 1963, to review English Electric’s research studies on hypersonic vehicles. Among those present were Lewis Frederick Nicholson, who had succeeded Davies as deputy director of the RAE and was now chairing the meeting, six of his staff, four representatives of the Ministry of Aviation, including its newly appointed Director General of Scientific Research (Air), Rhys Price Probert, one representative from the NGTE, one representative of the American Government, and eleven men from English Electric itself. Creasey opened the meeting by voicing the concerns he had written about previously concerning the assessment by the RAE and the NGTE of the likely weight and performance of the engines that were intended to make hypersonic flight possible. English Electric’s studies, he said, had concluded that these were likely to be heavier, less powerful and more difficult to develop than had been predicted. Furthermore, he said, fundamental differences in assumptions on timescales, and the extent of the research required within those timescales, had resulted in big differences between the proposals by Rolls-Royce and Bristol Siddeley Engines - which made it difficult to determine which was more accurate. Asked whether he thought design work on these engines should begin immediately in the hope that they would be ready by 1973, or after five years of further research with a target date of 1978, he replied: ‘Some period of basic research must be allowed, but predictions become increasingly difficult as you attempt to look further than 10 years ahead.’ After some further debate between members of the RAE delegation on engine intake weights, heights and lengths, Creasey again restated his views from his letter in October, which had already been circulated to those present. The minutes record him saying ‘...that it was his view that project work should concentrate on those areas where rocket engines of 85
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES FOR Smallest take off weight Few unknowns Relatively cheap to develop Fixed base launch requirement Dependence on automatics during launch Majority of hardware lost Possible smaller rocket motors Large proportion of hardware recovered Utilises proportion of known rocket technology Ballistic rocket Higher first stage weight Fixed base launch requirement Additional life support system Operation from normal airfields Recoverable Utilises proportion of known rocket technology Large proportion of hardware recovered Possible pre-launch orbit V.t.o. rocket Recoverable H.t.o. rocket adjustment _________________________ Operation from normal airfields System mobility —Higher first stage weight Possible development to ASo-1"" Greatest complexity hypersonic transport Air breathing launcher Large number of unknowns POSSIBLE CONFIGURATIONS ABOVE The diagram used by Tom Smith to explain the English Electric team's thinking on hypersonic vehicle configurations to a British Interplanetary Society audience on 13 November 1963. Little of the detailed design work carried out at Warton is given away by the drawings shown. reasonably predictable performance could be used, until more fundamental information on airbreathing propulsion systems was available, as he considered that project work based on our current level of knowledge of these latter systems was meaningless.’ The RAE delegates thought they had come to talk about power plants for hypersonic flight, but Creasey was explaining as clearly as he could that any figures for weight or performance of such engines were simply too speculative to work with. Rockets, on the other hand, were a known quantity. He dismissed the discussion about intake problems, saying that a short test programme involving models of intakes would probably be enough to solve them. Probert, a man who had worked for Frank Whittles Power Jets during the Second World War and had until recently been deputy director of the NGTE, found this dismissive attitude to intakes appalling. He had spent a long time working on them and, according to the meetings minutes, he objected that a ‘quick test” intake programme might not be as profitable as Mr Creasey hoped, since the subsonic intake length was related to AGAINST Additional recovery power plant Winged first stage re-entry problem to overcome Higher first stage weight Runway erosion problems the design temperature rise in the engine and a basis for correct assessment of this parameter had not yet been established.’ Smith, who was among the English Electric representatives, quickly jumped in to point out that refining intake design would indeed need to take ‘a very variable range of conditions’ into account, but his team considered that the best design arrangement might well involve ramjets taking over from conventional jet engines at Mach 3, making the detail design of low-speed engine intakes less important. Probert had calmed down enough to agree when Nicholson pointed out that, just as Creasey had said, ‘the existing basis of knowledge, on which to base extrapolations, was tenuous; it was not yet really possible even to predict the performance of designs utilising current techniques, let alone foresee the consequences of design advances,’ The American, D. R. Andrews, then told the meeting about work carried out at NASA on lightweight designs ‘based on simple assumptions’ that were capable of operating up to Mach 8 using a system for scooping up and liquefying air. Just as Smith had done the day before, he was describing LACE. Creasey ‘remarked that even NASA did not yet integrate airframe and engine design fully and he would not, therefore, place too much reliance on these findings, but he agreed to consider them further.’ Nicholson wryly replied that he ‘hoped the firms would keep their minds open to unconventional ideas, such as this, but apply to them the “practical thinking” approach which the Ministry of Aviation expected from the industry.’ Further discussion followed on topics ranging from flashjets to nozzles, with Creasey maintaining his line that tried and tested rocket engines could be just as effective as theoretical powerplants for a fraction of the cost and development time. Regarding English Electric’s overall programme of research, the minutes show Nicholson saying that ‘...as the current contract was to end in December and the work done under it would clearly not define a precise line of investigation to follow in the future, he was proposing that there should be a second short-term study contract phase; the terms of this contract would, however, be more specific than were the existing terms. He had in mind that this contract should run for nine months but that a report should be issued at the end of six months which would be used by the Ministry of Aviation when deciding upon the content of the next phase of a long term programme, if this were to be undertaken. Meanwhile, suggestions for specific research contracts should be submitted for consideration.’ English Electric was getting an extension to its hypersonics research contract, but exactly what would be studied was yet to be decided. Creasey said that it was ‘...not unexpected to find that a year would be necessary to decide upon the main programme. During the extended study contract period, he considered it 86
CHAPTER THREE FLYING INTO ORBIT appropriate to continue the current level of effort at the core. He would, as he had said earlier, wish to concentrate on rocket applications and proposed to study, for instance, a rocket-launched boost-glide vehicle with auxiliary landing engines. He thought it might be possible to achieve appreciable range without a top stage.’ Probert sarcastically commented that it was a new approach to compare a “low level” rocket with airbreathing propulsion with respect to flexibility.’ Apparently ignoring this, Creasey said that with regard to orbital re-entry vehicles he considered that a study of US information would provide the basis, supplemented by specific investigations in certain areas where the available information was insufficient.’ That was precisely what happened next: a nine-month extension to research contract No. KD/2X/2/CB7(c), up to 30 September 1964, was granted together with an additional payment of £67,500. CHAP. 3 RIGHT This diagram from the first English Electric/BAC hypersonics research progress report of January 1964 shows just a few of the theoretical American engine types examined by the firm but ultimately rejected. LACE ROCKET UNIT J AS IN <l) 87
Chapter Four American inspiration Douglas Astro and other projects At the beginning of what was now ВАС Preston’s second stage of work on hypersonics in early 1964» the team undertook a comprehensive review of project work being carried out in the US. The influence of American designs was already evident in what had been produced for P.42, but this had been mainly confined to aerodynamic forms, with the hard calculations required to assess their potential being done entirely in-house. Now the team deliberately set out to examine proposals put forward by the large American aviation companies, looking for ideas and inspiration. At this time companies such as Boeing, Convair, Douglas, Lockheed, Martin, North American and Republic were all working on advanced hypersonic and space projects, usually involving exotic power plants and materials. ABOVE Two-stage high-speed airliner design produced and heavily publicised by Bell Aircraft Corporation in 1959. Both the vehicle in the foreground and the one to its right have features that would later appear in the P.42 series. 88
CHAPTER FOUR AMERICAN INSPIRATION ВАС as a whole actively collected research data on US projects as a matter of course through a variety of channels, ranging from direct contact with the companies concerned to research papers printed in academic journals and even reports in the press. As a baseline for the hypersonics contract, the RAE had already sent ВАС a report on four US projects; two of them were relatively well-known ongoing programmes, one a paper project about to be built, and the last a general area of research that concerns a group of vehicles of great performance potential for which no definite application has, as far as is known, been laid down but to which considerable research effort is being devoted.’ The two ongoing programmes were the North American X-15 and Project Mercury, and the paper project was the Boeing Dyna-Soar rocket-boosted hypersonic glider. The RAE noted: ‘Between them, these three projects cover the entire speed range from low speeds to satellite speed and can investigate the range of altitude of most interest for airborne vehicles. The other field of activity centres round the possible applications of the LACE (liquid-air-cycle engine) and its variants and the possible uses of craft propelled by these systems range from economic first-stage space boosters to relay space stations operating in the outermost regions of the Earths atmosphere.’ This was the Aerospaceplane project. ВАС had already studied the rocket- propelled X-15 carefully. This manned hypersonic aircraft programme had begun in 1954, and by 1964 the three X-15 vehicles had already flown ninety-seven times between them. They had reached speeds of up to 4,1 OOmph and altitudes of up to 67 miles, or 354,000 feet; the lowest of low earth orbits is 99 miles, or 523,000 feet. The cockpit canopy design of the X-15 clearly influenced the shape of those seen on several P.42 designs, for example Scheme 1, but perhaps the most important detail that ВАС took away from the North American aircraft was the material of which its primary structure was made - Inconel X. This alloy, produced by International Nickel and capable of withstanding temperatures up to 650°C, consisted of 72.5% nickel, 15% chromium and 1% columbium, with most of the rest being iron. Inconel X impressed ВАС s engineers as a tried and tested material that could form the basis of a British hypersonic or space vehicle. The RAE summary of the project, written in 1963, stated that the X-15 was capable of speeds up to 6,600 BELOW The first North American X-15, serial number 56-6670. In order to ensure that the research being carried out by ВАС and Hawker Siddeley was along the right lines, the RAE sent them each a summary of four American projects. The first was the X-15 programme. This was the fastest aircraft in the world and as such the research data it generated was potentially of great interest to the British hypersonics effort. NASA 89
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE Many design features of the X-15, particularly its heat-resistant Inconel X 750 nickel alloy skin, had a strong influence on English Electric's early hypersonics. Its undercarriage combination of a nosewheel and rear landing skids appeared on several British designs. NASA feet per second, a speed that the aircraft only actually reached once in its research career, in 1967. The summary also concluded: ‘Much valuable data have been obtained from the flight tests to date in the fields of hypersonic aerodynamics; in particular the confirmation in flight of predictions of aerodynamic performance, stability characteristics and kinetic heating features based on theory and model testing has greatly increased the confidence felt in the ability to deal with future applications in the hypersonic regime. Also as a result of these tests a much better understanding of the fundamental problems concerning flight control outside the atmosphere and the re-entry and exit of lifting vehicles has been obtained. In addition to continuing research in these areas of interest, future testing will be aimed at developing and gaining experience with more sophisticated control systems (of the adaptive type), energy management systems which appear attractive for application in advanced space vehicles and investigation of structural cooling techniques such as mass flow cooling, sublimation and the like. A further proposal is to use the vehicle as a platform for an astronomical telescope.’ The RAE report next detailed Project Mercury, the first US programme to put a man into orbit in a small life- sustaining capsule and bring him back safely. This was of less interest to ВАС but nevertheless did yield some useful technical details and suggested a fundamental rule for designing successful spacecraft: ‘As with the X-15 the basic principles which were adopted were to use the simplest and most reliable approach, to minimise new developments and to develop reliability through a progressive build-up of tests. It was decided that the vehicle would be a drag (non-lifting) capsule since many of the technological advances made in the developments of ballistic missiles were directly applicable and boosters capable of the necessary performance would be available at the required time; further, it was expected that the drag capsules compactness, relative simplicity, and minimum control requirements promised a shorter development time compared to more sophisticated approaches.’ The programme of six manned flights had concluded by the time ВАС came to fix its attention firmly on American projects. In fact, at this time the Americans were preparing for the first unmanned test flight of Mercurys successor, Project Gemini, which took place from 8 to 12 April 1964. The third programme examined was Dyna-Soar, short for Dynamic Soarer, which the RAE had used as the basis for its own recommended space vehicle configuration. This was an unpowered glider, with an engine stage mounted immediately behind it, which launched into orbit atop an expendable rocket booster. Once in space, the glider could manoeuvre using its engine stage before separating from it for the glide back down to earth. Three different development phases were envisioned for Dyna-Soar: research, reconnaissance, and finally orbital bomber. 90
CHAPTER FOUR AMERICAN INSPIRATION ABOVE The Mercury 8 capsule is prepared at Hangar S, Cape Canaveral, Florida, on 10 September 1962. The physical design of the Mercury vehicles was of less interest to ВАС than the way in which the project had been managed and developed. ВАС took note of its emphasis on the simplest solutions and reliability over innovation for innovation's sake. NASA When the contract for this cutting- edge boost-glide vehicle was announced, nine different companies tendered for it, resulting in a huge number of different configurations. Boeing itself, the successful bidder, came up with numerous arrangements. The RAE report states: ‘It is considered that the winged hypersonic glider may be the basis of many future space systems because of its flexibility and manoeuvrability within the atmosphere. The primary objective of the Dyna-Soar programme has therefore been defined as “the establishment of the technological basis for the exploitation of the inherent potential of the atmosphere and man by future military weapons systems operating in the hypersonic and orbital flight regimes’? ABOVE By late 1963, as far as the British knew the Boeing X-20 Dyna-Soar, shown here in a USAF concept painting launching atop its booster rocket, was about to be built and might therefore become the 'standard' space launch vehicle of the day. Its configuration was therefore worthy of note. Little did they realise that Dyna-Soar had already been cancelled. This did not become common knowledge until early in 1964. USAF RIGHT The final stage Dyna-Soar vehicle had no engines of its own - it was a glider - and in orbit it required a 'transtage' rocket engine for manoeuvres, as shown in this concept art painting. However, BAC's primary interest in Dyna-Soar focused on what it was made of, rather than the way it was intended to work. Like Inconel X, Rene 41 retained its strength at extreme temperatures. USAF 91
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES This rather vague description of Dyna- Soar s purpose lay at the heart of what turned out to be a troubled programme. By early 1964 it had already been cancelled, which simultaneously ended any suggestion that the RAE’s space vehicle was the appropriate basis for future work. If the Americans had dropped the idea, it was unlikely to find favour anywhere else. As with the X-15, however, there was more to be gained from Dyna-Soar than its design layout or even the basic concept itself. The materials from which it was to be made offered yet more options for resisting the extreme temperatures of re- entry. The report states: ‘Our best information on materials to be used in Dyna-Soar dates back to 1960. At that time the following were considered most promising and were being tested in full-scale structures: Rene 41 nickel-base alloy for the internal load-carrying structure and the upper-surface wing panels; HS 25 cobalt-base alloy for the lower surface wing panels; coated graphite, with zirconia rods, for the nose-cap; and coated molybdenum-base alloy sheet for the nose skirt and wing leading-edge.’ Fast air-scoopers The Aerospaceplane projects examined by the RAE were collectively referred to as ‘hypersonic air-scooping vehicles’. The report says: ‘These vehicles are based on a form of engine in which some of the air through which the aircraft is travelling is scooped up, liquefied, the liquid oxygen and nitrogen separated and stored to be used at some later stage depending on the application for which the vehicle is designed.’ The Americans called this fuel gathering system LACE, and it was usually to be used in conjunction with an Air Collection and Enrichment System (ACES). While liquid air consisting of mostly oxygen and nitrogen burned well, it was deemed far more desirable to remove the nitrogen and other component chemicals to leave only liquid oxygen - a tremendously potent rocket fuel. The report continued: ‘Two examples of this type of vehicle can be cited. First, a one- stage-to-orbit aircraft which would use hydrogen, carried in liquid form, as its fuel. It would take off, climb and accelerate in conventional manner under turbojet and ramjet power but taking in more air than required for propulsion; this excess would be liquefied using the liquid hydrogen in a heat exchanger and the liquid oxygen stored. Having reached speed and altitude conditions where airbreathing engines become uneconomic, the stored oxygen would be used with the hydrogen in rockets to complete the acceleration to final speed conditions. Second, a space relay station or tanker, which could act as a mother ship for space vehicles exploring more distant regions of space. Here the vehicle is already considered as moving in a satellite orbit at an altitude where atmospheric gases can be collected at a reasonable rate but high enough to avoid serious aerodynamic heating problems. Here again air is scooped up and liquefied but using mechanical and/or chemical means driven by electricity derived from a long life nuclear reactor or solar energy converter. Thrust to keep the vehicle in orbit would be obtained by using a fraction of the scooped gases, preferably nitrogen, as a propulsive fluid in some form of electrical propulsion system. While details are lacking in particular applications to which the US is planning to put this type of vehicle, it is clear from the literature that a considerable amount of research and development effort is being directed to this field.’ Unlike the British, who had little appetite for propulsion that was far beyond state- of-the-art, the Americans had been eager to push the furthest boundaries of speed and science throughout the late 1950s and into the early 1960s. Having already developed a wealth of rocket, turbojet, ramjet and turboramjet technology by this time, they pressed on with more outlandish engines. They were particularly enamoured of rockets, ramjets and turboramjets using LACE and ACES, but believed that scramjets might be buildable too. Scramjets were like ramjets but instead of needing the air flowing through them to be travelling at subsonic speeds, they would use air that was itself already supersonic. The big problem with this was the shockwaves produced at such speeds, which had the potential to cause severe internal heating and reduce the airflow back to subsonic speeds. Aerospaceplane studies The vehicles that would use LACE, ACES and scramjets, referred to in the RAE report, were the final evolutionary stage of a programme begun in 1957 as Department of Defense Study Requirement 89774. This invited concepts for a recoverable space booster, and a total of seventeen firms responded, with designs that veered from vaguely plausible to outright science fiction. Designers at Convair were among the first to realise the new possibilities opened up by LACE later that year. While their firm was still in the process of flight testing its new B-58 Hustler Mach 2 jet bomber, they formulated a concept they called Space Plane. This was a single-stage space vehicle that was intended to do just what the Air Staff would request in OR.9001 five years later - take off from a conventional runway and fly straight up into space, before flying back down again. A huge delta-winged vehicle 235 feet long, just 4 feet shy of a modern Boeing 747, it would take off using its three fuselage-mounted rocket engines. At 92
CHAPTER FOUR AMERICAN INSPIRATION RIGHT Shown here are eight of the hundreds of different launcher configurations examined by American firm Convair during the late 1950s to early 1960s. These were chosen as a representative sample and were presented at various conferences towards the end of the 1960s. The first three had rocket engines, the fourth had turbofan ramjets, the fifth also had these but combined them with rockets, and the sixth used turbofan ramjet engines for take-off, then collected liquid air as fuel using a LACE system. The seventh used scramjets and the eighth received its liquid oxygen fuel in mid-air from a tanker, via author ABOVE The eight Convair designs. The British were aware of the vast variety of designs studied by the Americans that used theoretical power plants such as LACE with ACES and turbofan ramjets, but regarded them with a strong degree of scepticism. via author this point it would weigh 450,0001b, including 270,0001b of liquid hydrogen fuel. None of this would be burned yet, though, since the Space Plane would be sucking in air to make its own fuel using LACE and ACES. Having reached 40,000 feet and a speed in excess of Mach 3, it would switch off its rocket engines and light up six ramjets part-buried in its wings and under its rear fuselage. These would begin burning that part of the hydrogen already warmed up through cooling air to liquefy it. But the air scoops would keep on working, even though they were no longer feeding the rocket engines directly. With the ramjets pushing the speed up to Mach 5.5 and an altitude of 66,000 feet, Space Plane would continue to accelerate while filling up enormous fuel tanks mounted in the centre of its fuselage with liquid air. At Mach 7 the ramjets would be switched off and the rocket engines reignited. At this point Space Plane would weigh more than a million pounds - most of 93
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES that being tanks full of oxygen-rich liquid air. Using this as a fuel, the vehicle would fly up into space, where its 38,0001b of cargo could be released. Northrop also jumped on the LACE bandwagon with a concept that it called PROFAC - Propulsive Fluid Accumulator - which worked in much the same way as Space Plane, using first rockets fuelled by liquid air from a LACE system, then ramjets, then LACE rockets again for the flight to orbit. In addition, Lockheed began work on a LACE vehicle in the spring of 1959, Aerospace Plane, which used the nitrogen extracted from the liquid air with ACES as a fuel for specialised nitrogen rockets. Republic Aviation went further than any of them with a vehicle that used neither LACE nor ACES but was expected to reach Mach 25 and eventually orbit using a combination of turbojets modified to run on liquid hydrogen and scramjets. All three of these studies and many more were drawn up ahead of the Second USAF Symposium on Advanced Propulsion Concepts in October 1959. Their apparent technological promise led the US Air Force to commission a whole host of new studies under what was now Development Planning Study 89774 - specifying a ‘single-stage-to- orbit, horizontal take-off vehicle, powered by airbreathing engines in the atmosphere and by rockets outside the atmosphere’ The programme was named Aerospaceplane, and again many companies responded, including Convair, Douglas, General Electric, Lockheed, Martin, North American, Northrop and Republic. The latter included its Mach 25 design in a presentation of four high- speed advanced concepts on 3 August 1960, the third day of a three-day meeting of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences in San Diego, California. The other three were a vertical-take-off fighter-bomber capable of flying at 75,000 feet and called the A P-100; a bizarre-looking strategic bomber that used nuclear energy to heat the air flowing through two gargantuan cylindrical ramjets to reach Mach 4.25; and a Mach 7 vehicle that used turbojets and ramjets. The latter may have influenced the design of English Electrics P.42 Scheme 5, with which it shares a similar frontal aspect. Giving the presentation, the company’s vice-president Alexander Kartveli said: ‘We have studied a concept of an ultimate airplane. It consists of a lifting machine with chemical airbreathing power plant, carrying substantial military load, capable of taking off from the ground, accelerating to orbital speed, orbiting around the earth and landing on earth when desired. Our study was rather general and was intended only to prove the validity of the idea and the basic feasibility of the vehicle. The design is based upon the assumption that a supersonic combustion engine can be developed. The problems of subsonic combustion at high flight Mach numbers have been extensively investigated and show good promise. The supersonic combustion is not as far advanced in theory and development as can be seen in current literature. Nevertheless, the analysis indicates that a good performance may be available using a supersonic combustion scheme.’ LEFT AND BELOW Republic's 'ultimate airplane' concept was based on the use of scramjets. ВАС studied progress made in this field by the Americans and concluded that the necessary technology was years, if not decades, away from being a practical reality. These images were part of a presentation given in August 1960. via Scott Lowther 94
CHAPTER FOUR AMERICAN INSPIRATION ABOVE While the Hawker Siddeley P.1127 was dose to making its first flight in Britain during I960, Republic was working on this enormously complex design for a supersonic vertical/short-take-off fighter, via Scott Lowther RIGHT AND BELOW Another gargantuan project from Republic with no future was this Mach 4.25 nuclear-powered bomber, via Scott Lowther M--4.25 BOMBER M=4.25 BOMBER GROSS WING AREA 4.860 SQ. FT WING ASPECT RATIO 2.5 THREE VIEW INBOARD PROFILE Kartveli was convinced that the engine he was describing - a scramjet - could be made to work in a practical space plane. His team at Republic had even gone so far as to ‘study the trajectories along which such a vehicle can be accelerated and determined the shape of flight path, fuel requirements and manoeuvre capability? Describing the Mach 25 vehicle, he said: ‘It is an unusual combination of a wing and lifting body having a horizontal projected area of 8,500sq ft. It is 170ft long and 33ft high. Weight analysis shows 400,0001b gross weight, of which 200,0001b is liquid hydrogen fuel and 35,000 military payload. The forward portion of the airplane is shaped in the form of an open air intake which compresses the outside air and supplies it to four ramjet combustion chambers located in the aft portion of the fuselage. Four turbojet engines are installed inside the fuselage. They are fed by the same air intake and can use the combustion chamber of the ramjets for afterburning. Take-off is accomplished by four hydrogen burning J58 type engines and takes approximately 8,000ft to clear a 50ft obstacle. The airplane is then accelerated to Mach 3 by the same engines. At this time, the ramjets are ignited and using liquid hydrogen as fuel in a subsonic combustion mode accelerate the airplane to Mach 7. From there the same ramjets, using supersonic type of combustion, continue to accelerate the ship up to orbital velocity reaching an altitude of 200,000ft.’ 95
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES LEFT AND BELOW While the Mach 25 scramjet-powered vehicle, the supersonic V/STOL fighter and the bizarre Mach 4.25 bomber were of little interest to ВАС, the Republic Mach 7 aircraft was much closer to where the company wanted to be. The American design looks somewhat similar to BAC's later P.42 Scheme 5, particularly when viewed from the front, via Scott Lowther After describing the vehicles orbital capabilities, he said: ‘The vehicle has a most important military characteristic to take-off and land at suitable airfields. It can release a small parasite aircraft which can be used for local tactical missions. This small aircraft provides a weapon system capability which can meet requirements discussed by the air force. From the preliminary studies which we have FEASIBILITY 3-5 CREDIBILITY 5-8 POSSIBILITY 8-?^ DETAILED DESIGN G A BROAD OUTLINE PARAMETRIC STUDIES ONLY ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT BASIC RESEARCH ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT NEEDS PRELIMINARY BASIC RESEARCH BASIC RESEARCH STILL UNCERTAIN. VERY LITTLE ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT CAN BE DONE FUEL CHOICE HYDROCARBONS OR H2 FUEL PROBABLY H2 DEPENDS ON H2 OR NEW DISCOVERY Prototype could be built 8 Years time Prototype not earlier than 10 Years Who knows? made, it appears that this vehicle has so many attractive potentialities and global applications that a more detailed basic research is very much in order.’ Glamour and ridicule Kartvelis can-do attitude was typical of the American aircraft manufacturers of the period. They were generally confident that the problems associated with hypersonic flight and the engines they planned to use in achieving ever higher speeds could and would be overcome - it was just a matter of time and money. The team at English Electric had watched these developments with interest as they unfolded but were soon convinced that scramjets and LACE, while they might be possible in the distant future, were simply unachievable in the early 1960s. With the British engine manufacturers struggling to nail down the anticipated performance of ramjets, turboramjets, turborockets and, in the case of Rolls-Royce, flashjets, which had yet to be designed in any detail, it seemed as though the American LEFT The British were bemused by the proliferation of American designs that depended on technology way beyond the state of the art. This illustration from а ВАС report on propulsive systems graphically illustrates the company's view of the Republic Aviation Mach 25 vehicle, on the right. The vehicle in the centre was shown during a lecture in December 1963 by Republic's vice-president John Stack. The vehicle on the left appears to be a Concorde archetype. 96
CHAPTER FOUR AMERICAN INSPIRATION proposals were highly unlikely to result in practical, functioning engines. They were not alone in taking this view. As the Aerospaceplane studies progressed, strong doubts about their practicality began to arise from the very firms that had previously championed them. In December 1960 the USAF Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), which included senior engineers from both Convair and North American, produced a report that stated: ‘We are gravely concerned that too much emphasis may be placed on the more glamorous aspects of the Aerospace Plane resulting in neglect of what appear to be more conventional problems.’ It was sceptical about LACE and ACES, which, by their very nature, had to work almost flawlessly or not at all: ‘We consider the estimated LACE- ACES performance very optimistic. In several cases complete failure of the project would result from any significant performance degradation from the present estimates. Obviously the advantages claimed for the system will not be available unless air can be condensed and purified very rapidly during flight. The figures reported indicate that about 0.8 tons of air per second would have to be processed.’ Study Requirement 651, asking for further studies of vehicle configurations, engines and aerodynamics, was issued in 1961 and the companies continued to refine their designs and finance their own research. More than twelve months passed and no further government money was forthcoming, but a general consensus had emerged among the firms that a two-stage vehicle was necessary. Just when it appeared as though Aerospaceplane was dead, on 21 June 1963 three companies - Douglas, General Dynamics/Astronautics and North American - each received a $500,000 contract from the Air Force for development planning studies for ‘the first generation Aerospaceplane’ According to an article in the well- connected Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine of 9 July 1963: ‘The first generation Aerospaceplane programme may differ in one major respect from the Dyna-Soar programme. Aerospaceplane is now thought of as an operational system rather than just a research project. Thus the first vehicles would be operational prototypes instead of an end in themselves. The second stage Aerospaceplane could resemble Dyna-Soar superficially in external appearance. But that second stage would have a rocket powerplant and would have to provide for storage of cryogenic fuels, introducing several new sets of problems. The first stage, which will be powered by airbreathing engines, will make use of technology gained from the USAF-North American B-70 Mach 3 aircraft program. It will be a hypersonic cruise vehicle and will carry the second stage either piggy-back or slung underneath, as the Boeing B-52 carries the North American X-15 research aircraft.’ A month after the article went to press, however, the USAF cancelled plans to build a Mach 14 wind tunnel, and another SAB report in December 1963 concluded: ‘The difficulties the air force has encountered over the past three years in identifying an Aerospaceplane programme have sprung from the facts that the requirement for a fully recoverable space launcher is at present only vaguely defined, that todays state- of-the-art is inadequate to support any real hardware development, and the cost of any such undertaking will be extremely large. The so-called Aerospaceplane programme has had such an erratic history, has involved so many clearly infeasible factors, and has been subject to so much ridicule that from now on this name should be dropped. It is also recommended that the air force increase the vigilance that no new programme achieves such a difficult position.’ By early 1964 the Americans had already turned much of their attention to rockets as the cheapest and most practical means of achieving orbit - although the LACE and scramjet studies quietly continued. The RAE report on US projects had itself concluded: ‘It is inevitable that the US should have chosen rocket propulsion as the quickest and cheapest method of achieving research objectives in the hypersonic regime, in view of the early research aircraft and the impetus given to rocket motor development by the ballistic missile programme. Thus the research programme as at present formulated consists entirely of rocket-propelled vehicles. However, this is not to say that the development of the airbreathing engine for hypersonic flight is being neglected. In addition to the air- scooping vehicles, a considerable research effort, notably by the Marquardt organisation, is being devoted to the investigation of hypersonic ramjets of various forms; this programme has been in being for some years. The application for this type of power plant seems to have been aimed at missile application rather than manned aircraft but there are indications in recent reports that these are now being investigated for aircraft application also, although there is a continuing bias towards space flight, for example more economic and recoverable first stage boosters.’ The Marquardt Corporation, based in Van Nuys, California, had become one of the biggest names in American aviation during the early 1960s. It focused mostly on building ramjets and 97
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES had worked on missile projects such as Bomarc and research vehicles such as Lockheeds X-7. In 1959 it had bought Power Systems» a company that brought with it technology for building small rocket engines and thrusters. Three years later, in 1962, Marquardt was awarded a contract by North American Aviation to build the thrusters needed for the Apollo spacecraft. Up to this point it had also been heavily involved in research contributing towards Aerospaceplane, and it was not about to throw all that away. Its work continued. Martin Astrorocket While many of the American manufacturers were working on air- scooping and airbreathing engines, others had different ideas. Martin Marietta and the Douglas Aircraft Company in particular preferred alternative power plants. Martin had designed and built the Titan series of intercontinental ballistic missiles and had been involved in adapting them as boosters for the Dyna-Soar programme. This naturally inclined it towards space launcher projects involving rocket engines, but it was not above designs every bit as outlandish as those of the other Aerospaceplane participants. Its own entry of 1961, called Astroplane, took the form of a winged vehicle larger than the XB-70 bomber with flexible wings that could be extended or retracted during its flight up into space and subsequent descent. Rather than LACE in combination with straightforward rockets, it was to be propelled using nuclear magnetohydrodynamic engines - which scooped up and liquefied nitrogen from the air before being speeded up by a nuclear-powered accelerator. The sheer complexity of Astroplane led Martin to turn its attention to a simpler system using technology with which it was more familiar. This was dubbed Astrorocket and the introduction of the first report on the project in December 1962 states: ‘In the course of Martin Company- sponsored activities on Astroplane, the limitations on gross weight imposed by horizontal take-off were recognised as the basic reason for the unusually high sophistication required of Aerospaceplane-type vehicles. It was also theorised that vertical takeoff (VTO) combined with horizontal landing might relieve the vehicle sophistication sufficiently to realise the operational date at least five years earlier. Studies were initiated in April 1962 to explore the potentials of using VTO techniques that would use the more conventional rocket technology to best advantage.’ A total of eighteen different potential Astrorocket configurations designated AR-1 to AR-14 - four of which encompassed two designs, for example AR-7 and AR-7A - were outlined in the report, produced by project engineers C. W. Spieth and W. T. Teegarden, the first of whom had been heavily involved in Astroplane. AR-1 to AR-3 were tandem launchers, with the spacecraft on the nose of a winged booster for launch. AR-4 to 5 and AR-8 to 13 were two- stage nuclear rockets, while AR-6, AR-7 and AR-14 featured a pair of winged vehicles positioned side-by-side. The lightest of these had a lift-off weight of 400 tons and the heaviest weighed in at a staggering 2,500 tons. The average was about 1,000 tons, and most featured an ejector ramjet that Martin called RENE, or Rocket Engine Nozzle Ejector. This effectively compressed the exhaust from the vehicles rocket engines into a ramjet to provide additional power at launch. Martin may have simplified its Astroplane, but the result was still a set of monstrous concept vehicles with little regard given to cost or practical features. Douglas Astro Douglas too had been involved in the design and construction of missiles since the mid- to late-1950s. Its Thor missile had already formed the basis of several space launcher systems by the early 1960s such as Thor-Able, which launched Explorer 6 in 1959 - the first satellite to transmit pictures of earth taken from orbit - and Thor-Agenda, BELOW A multitude of different launch configurations were examined for Martin's Astrorocket concept of December 1962, but these were regarded as the most promising - AR-7A and AR-10A. The left image was two vehicles forming two halves of a single rocket with stubby wings. The image on the right had nearly the same two vehicles but with a huge frustum-shaped ejector ramjet on either side for additional thrust, via Scott Lowther 98
CHAPTER FOUR AMERICAN INSPIRATION ABOVE The Douglas Astro A2 spacecraft was a compact but attractive lifting-body shape. The concept's reliance on tried and tested technology, combined with a projected programme of steady development, was perceived as representing a lack of ambition on the part of its designers by their American peers. In Britain it was seen in an altogether more positive light. Chris Sandham-Bailey RIGHT Before anyone got anywhere near space, Douglas envisioned a rigorous programme of personnel training and vehicle testing on the ground. Unfortunately this safety-first approach won the Astro concept few admirers stateside. Mark Aston after Douglas original which launched Corona reconnaissance satellites from 1959 to 1963. In late 1961 Douglas began to consider an alternative approach to putting a payload into orbit, which emphasised simplicity, reliability and low cost over the supremely expensive and highly complex technology exemplified by Aerospaceplane. Like many of its other programmes of the time, the company gave it an acronym - ASTRO - which initially stood for Advanced Spacecraft Truck/Trainer/Transport Reusable Orbiter. The first Douglas Astro report was duly published in July 1962. The introduction attempts to make clear the differences between the enormous vehicles of Aerospaceplane and Astro, which was compact and reliable enough to make regular trips into space. It states: ‘Current national thinking, with respect to spacecraft, is evolving toward systems which are recoverable and reusable. Both NASA and the USAF have been actively pursuing studies and evaluations directed toward this goal. General evaluations of vehicle capability seem to indicate two classes of vehicles: 1) the very large booster carrying 250,0001b or more of payload, with infrequent flight schedules; and 2) a smaller system carrying under 50,0001b, with frequent flight schedules. Because of frequent schedules, it is advisable to utilise lifting bodied craft which are reusable and thus economical. This report deals with the latter class? Astro was a Douglas-funded study in progress, intended to ‘determine the feasibility of a design concept which utilises lifting bodies in both booster and spacecraft.’ It consisted of ‘two vehicles (the booster and spacecraft) in tandem, each liquid-oxygen-hydrogen propelled and manned.’ This was a particularly bold proposal for the middle of 1962. While the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA - the forerunner of NASA) had been studying the lifting-body concept since early 1954, it had never been tested in manned flight and was still generally viewed with scepticism. Yet here was Douglas BELOW Among the missions envisioned for the Douglas Astro were orbital reconnaissance, resupply of other units already in space, and rescue in the event of an emergency. Maintenance and inspection of potentially hostile satellites were also considered likely tasks. Mark Aston after Douglas originals 99
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES proposing a wingless lift-generating fuselage coupled with straightforward rocket engines that used existing well- established technology. The report went on: ‘The concept payload capability is shaped to a weight of 10 tons and an altitude of 300 nautical miles, with manoeuvrability in orbit and subsonic flight characteristics being the primary requisites. The objective of the concept is to put man into space operationally within the time period 1964-1970, through logical evolution of phasing, maximum effectivity of the space system dollar, minimum reaction time for mission selection, and maximum use of current technology and facilities. Since this orbital system is based upon current technology with liquid oxygen-hydrogen chosen because of its high performance, the resulting configurations were generated around the available engine types. These types are the RL-10, J-2 and M-l which offer, as building blocks, power levels of 15,000,200,000 and 1.2-1.5 million pounds of thrust, respectively.’ The introduction ended with a declaration: ‘All factors evaluated were done so within the strict ground rule: it must be buildable today.’ The space truck Douglas insisted on describing Astro in anything but glamorous terms. It was to be a cheap but dependable utility vehicle for everyday use. Under the heading ‘mission philosophy’, the 1962 Astro report says: ‘Through vehicle sizing, influenced by existing engines and current sub-systems, a basic truck is generated which by variable use of the payload compartment, on- board orbital propellant and 10 ton payload capacity offers a wide variety of mission capability. Configuring the concept within current technology, existing components, proven systems and including functioning pilot-copilot in the control loop, results in an overall high reliability which is essential for maximum mission and cost effectiveness. The missions considered in the shaping of this concept are training, testing, surveillance and inspection of satellites, maintenance and supply of manned satellites, rescue, satellite space station, scientific payload launch platform and selective reconnaissance.’ A complete Astro system was composed of two vehicles - a large manned booster and a smaller manned spacecraft, essentially a scaled-down version of the booster, which sat on its nose for launch. The spacecraft, dubbed A2 for the purposes of the report, was to be 65 feet long with a wingspan of 44 feet. Its compact proportions are evident when compared with the later Space Shuttle orbiter, which was 122.17 feet long with a wingspan of 78.06 feet. Astro A2 had a crew of two and an internal cargo hold measuring 525 cubic feet - by comparison, a Douglas DC-3 could hold 1,225 cubic feet of cargo, but ‘...since the compartment size is fixed, it may be necessary to carry some cargo piggyback in detachable pods. Certain payload (such as passengers and some equipment) must, by necessity, be contained in a pressurised compartment. Other LEFT The first Astro report in 1962 compared the A2 spacecraft and the larger В booster against the size of a Douglas DC-8 airliner. Mark Aston after Douglas original payload may be stored in non- pressurised areas’. In terms of what the cargo might be: ‘Vehicle A2 is designed as a basic truck with on-board systems common to three selected missions. The variables for particular missions are the cameras for reconnaissance; inspection, kill and capture equipment for satellite surveillance; and maintenance equipment which involves modular spares, tether reels, and shuttle vehicles capable of repair, cargo transfer, and general service.’ The A2 had internal fuel tanks that could hold 165,0001b of liquid oxygen-liquid hydrogen fuel. It had one fixed Rocketdyne J-2 engine and two Pratt & Whitney RL-10 engines that could be rotated on gimbals. It was to have a semi- monocoque, longitudinal-corrugated outer shell made of titanium on the top of the vehicle and Rene 41 on its underside. There was to be an ablative coating on the leading edge of the horizontal fins and a small nose cap made of molybdenum-titanium alloy coated with silicide. The outer shell would be supported by hoop frames running from one side of the vehicle to the other. The frames would themselves be supported by a web of struts attached to the fuel tanks. This would provide body rigidity and keep the tanks separated from the outer skin by a distance of 15 inches. The central section of the tanks would hold the liquid oxygen, separated from the outer parts by insulating panels made of a titanium-fibreglass material. The crew compartment was to be a corrugated, stiffened aluminium shell within another shell, to which it was joined using spot-welding. The spaces created by the corrugations were to provide ‘a water wall for cabin cooling’. In the event of an emergency, the crew capsule separated using small Talco TA5 rocket engines of 3,0001b thrust and was fitted with two 54-foot - 100
CHAPTER FOUR AMERICAN INSPIRATION diameter parachutes for final descent. If the spacecraft was carrying extra passengers, it could be reconfigured so that they also had a chance of escape: Since one of the missions of Astro is servicing manned satellites, maintenance personnel will be located in the cargo compartment. The crew separation, normally forward of this compartment, now moves aft of the passenger compartment so that the crew, as well as passengers, are provided with abort capabilities? The A2 vehicles tricycle landing gear consisted of an ordinary steerable nosewheel and main legs that ended in wire brush skids. After final approach, a landing speed of 104mph was expected. The big booster, Astro B, was 94 feet long with a wingspan of 61 feet and had tanks capable of holding 594,0001b of fuel for its one Aerojet M-l and two J- 2 engines. It was to be built the same way as Astro A2 except that its outer shell was titanium all over, its single- occupant crew cabin was described as ‘a jettisonable fighter-type cockpit’, and its fuel tanks would be separated from the outer shell by 20 inches, rather than 15 inches. Astro В was to be attached to Astro A2 by four explosive bolts arranged in a 9-foot square pattern on its nose. Pressure from the weight of the A2 vehicle would be ‘distributed to the outer shell of the booster vehicle by a forward frame in the nose cap.’ A three-phase Astro development programme was set out. In Phase 1, BELOW AND RIGHT The first stage of Astro development was to launch the space vehicle horizontally by firing it down a track on a sled. The design of the twelve-wheeled sled was basic. Mark Aston after Douglas originals Astro A2 would be tested though horizontal take-offs using ‘a powered sled, on track facilities such as those located at Edwards Air Force Base’. This would provide aerodynamic data, landing practice and flights up to 400 miles in altitude. For Phase II, an Astro A2 vehicle would be modified and given the same nose as the as-yet-unbuilt Astro B. In addition, its two RL-10 engines would be removed and replaced with J-2s so that it could act as a test vehicle for Astro B. The modified vehicle, to be known as Astro Al, would be sled- tested and would undergo vertical launch tests with a dummy A2 mounted on its nose. This done, the A1 would be used to launch a real A2, allowing the latter to undergo re-entry testing. Afterwards, all Al vehicles could be returned to A2 standard. Phase III was to be the research and development phase for the fully operational system and would use both Astro A2 and Astro B. The booster would be tested through vertical launch exercises using a dummy A2 ‘and the final step includes a tandem launching, the return and landing of the booster, the orbiting of the spacecraft, the entry and the landing.’ The operational Astro system was Phase IV, which again emphasised simplicity: RIGHT Once horizontal testing had been completed, an A2 unit would be modified to become an A1 booster. This would then be used to test-launch another, unmodified, A2. Mark Aston after Douglas original ‘The operational phase consists of the (B) booster and (A2) spacecraft. By trading conventional horizontal take-off, as is the case with aircraft, for the vertical take- off to orbit with horizontal landing at return, a system is provided which can perform multiple missions from existing facilities by construction of launch erectors on available facilities. Alternate plans may be instigated through modification of existing launch facilities. Operational wings may consist of 16 В vehicles and 20 (A2) spacecraft. Costing is being prepared on one wing to 10 wings.’ Douglas tried to interest its three potential customers - the US Navy, NASA and USAF - by setting out the ‘projected goals’ associated with each that Astro could achieve. For the Navy these were: a sea-based, manned, manoeuvrable interceptor; an air-sea launch system; a satellite survey system; and a reconnaissance surveillance system. Achievable NASA expectations were given as 20,0001b to 101
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES 175 nautical miles altitude, ten passengers, and extension to single stage to orbit. Only the USAF had a projected goal that Astro could not meet - horizontal take-off - but it could manage 20,0001b to 300 nautical miles, albeit only by 1966; ‘horizontal landing; operational from bases; greatest mission effectiveness; extension of military into space’, and combat capability in space’. Precisely what this capability’ might be is not expanded upon. Astro goes public The first Astro report does not appear to have been widely circulated and was unknown to the designers at English Electric when they commenced work on P.42. The project did come to their attention, however, in early 1964. It had been the subject of a presentation to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) by M. W. Root and G. M. Fuller in June 1963, less than five months after that organisation had been founded, and a series of striking Astro concept images had appeared in the American press from July to November. The Astro that emerged from the AIAA presentation was a more considered and more detailed system backed up by a year’s worth of research. The meaning of its acronym had changed too. Instead of Advanced Spacecraft Truck/Trainer/Transport Reusable Orbiter, it now stood for Aerodynamic Spacecraft Two-Stage Reusable Orbiter - the goofy ‘truck’ analogy had been dropped. Fast development, low cost, reliability and reusability were still key features, however, and the presentation was subtitled An Available Economical Solution to the High Cost of Space Flight’. The 1963 Astro spacecraft, now only fleetingly referred to as A2’, was slightly narrower and longer, with a wingspan of 43.9 feet compared to 44 feet in the 1962 version, and a length of 68 feet compared to 65 feet. The booster was fractionally wider at 61.5 feet compared to 61 feet, and longer, 95.2 feet compared to 94 feet. The boosters cabin was modified too, with the pilot being positioned higher up in the nose for improved visibility. Leading edge sweep on both vehicles was 67.5°. Off-the-shelf products were to make up 72% of Astros equipment, ‘...the remainder are being developed now with the exception of the guidance and control system. The guidance and control system is essentially a system tailored to the peculiar needs of the vehicle and hence no attempt has been made to categorise it in this listing. Other systems have been examined in a similar manner but a detailed treatment has been omitted. These systems include: cockpit controls and cabin furnishings, environmental control systems, auxiliary power systems, flight controls, accessory controls, landing gear, vehicle rendezvous and docking, stage separation, range safety and destruct, and crew escape.’ The presentation gives a checklist of technology requirements, and under BELOW Aside from the general Astro concept, the fact that the Douglas proposal had been thoroughly and realistically costed appealed to the ВАС team. Part of that costing was an attempt to work out what an Astro base might look like, and how much would need to be spent on setting it up. Mark Aston after Douglas original 102
CHAPTER FOUR AMERICAN INSPIRATION СП < LU 5000 NON ORBIT O2H2 5000 ORBIT O2H2 20,000 ORBIT O2H2 35,000 LUNAR TRIPROP 20,000 CIS LUNAR O2H2 70,000 ORBIT TRINUC 40,000 ORBIT TRIPROP 200,000 ORBIT SOLAR 200,000 MARS NUCLEAR PAYLOAD (LBS) ABOVE The second Astro report featured a chart showing the concept's potential for future development, beginning with the test vehicle '1', through to the operational Astro '3' and on to huge single-stage-to-orbit vehicles '6' and '7f before finally enabling the construction of a vast nuclear-powered spacecraft in orbit during the late 1970s to early 1980s, ready for the journey to Mars. Mark Aston after Doug/as original guidance and control’ notes similar to Polaris’ - the Lockheed Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile having recently entered service. The engines were the same as before but a further year of development had taken place: ‘The Pratt & Whitney RL-10 is in a later stage of development than either the Rocketdyne J-2 or the Aerojet M-L Single engine arrangements have been operated more than 9,000 seconds with more than 50 restarts. To date, no measurable damage or performance degradation has been experienced due to normal operation. This is far in excess of the present engine specification implying the possibility of a large number of missions without refurbishment. Malfunction analyses of the RL-10 engine to date have failed to indicate a mode of catastrophic malfunction. All engine failures analysed have resulted only in a decay in performance.’ The status of the M-1 was less promising, but Douglas put a brave face on it: ‘The design data available on the Aerojet M-l engine has been in a constant state of flux. The engine data used in the conceptual design of Astro is the initial performance quote. The engine has since been redesigned to higher thrust levels.’ While the booster vehicle’s M-1 would simply burn until its fuel ran out, the spacecraft needed to conserve its propellant and the biggest problem facing the Astro system as a whole was how to measure how much of it was left. In addition, the spacecrafts engines needed to be capable of at least two restarts with nearly empty fuel tanks. According to the presentation: ‘The use of conventional capacitance probes on this vehicle appears limited by the large range in flight attitudes of the vehicle. The use of either a radiation gauging system or 103
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 an acoustic resonance system is limited by possibly poorer accuracy than the capacitance probe system and little practical experience with their use. Propellant quantity measurement techniques will undoubtedly have a significant effect on development schedules for any manned recoverable and reusable system of the near future.’ Provision was made, however, for dumping Astro’s fuel load in an emergency: ‘Non-catastrophic malfunctions in the propulsion systems of Astro must be expected. It appears as foolish to destroy a stage of Astro as it is to destroy a commercial aircraft whenever such a malfunction occurs. Study has shown that, for flight conditions allowing a minimum time to dump the propellants, there is enough time to safely dump and purge the liquid hydrogen fuel and, subsequently, to dump the liquid oxygen.’ Much more detail was also given on the construction of the spacecraft’s interior: ‘The cabin is constructed using a wick wall configuration. This system is used both for cabin cooling and outer skin thermal protection. The radiation cooled molybdenum outer skin is the thermal protection system during re-entry. It is composed of square- corrugated members that are attached to the cabin wall and in which water is allowed to vaporise. The outer surface of these members is covered with an insulating material and within the corrugations is a thickness of highly absorbent lightweight wick material in which is submerged a porous or perforated water feed tube. During re-entry, water is forced from the feed tube into the wick which absorbs heat by vaporising. The saturated steam thus produced may be allowed to absorb more heat if it is superheated before being exhausted to the atmosphere. The design limit of the inner cabin wall is 85-110°F (29-43°C) and the outer cabin wall 2,200°F (l,204°C).’ The previously mentioned small nose cap was now a much larger nose cap shell made of titanium-zirconium- molybdenum (TZM). It served as a re- entry shield, covering the crew cabin, and a safety feature. According to the presentation: ‘The aft 20in of the cap is composed of hinged flaps which deflect outward for aerodynamic braking when the capsule is aborted at near orbital velocity.’ Windows were provided for the pilot, cut through the front and sides of the nose cap. During re-entry ‘these openings are covered by retractable covers to protect the cabin windows. The window covers are insulated on the inside to reduce heat radiation into the cabin through the windows. The analysis was made for both Rene 41 and TZM molybdenum.’ Inside the cabin, separated from the payload compartment, there was now ‘a flexible tunnel to allow easy access to the cargo without leaving the pressurised environment. For abort, the tunnel is severed and the cabin ejected leaving the cargo behind. The cargo compartment could also be aborted, if required.’ Douglas had done a lot of work on ensuring that astronauts had a reasonable chance of escape in the event of disaster - which would probably involve a devastating explosion: ‘A booster failure is the most catastrophic failure that could occur during the vehicle ascent trajectory. The design problem is one of flying the escape capsule, containing the crew, away from the booster at velocities high enough to preclude envelopment by a damaging wave of overpressure. For the conditions of booster failure on the launch pad, it was assumed that the maximum allowable overpressure on the capsule was 6psi, the explosive energy in the fuel was equivalent to 50% of the propellant weight in TNT, and the time between ejection initiation and the detonation was 2.2 seconds. The radius of the 6psi overpressure circle of 810ft determined the propulsion requirements.’ The capsule would need to go from 0- 300mph within 2 seconds with its abort rockets firing at a thrust of 27,0001b. This would subject the crew to a g- force of about 7g - well within human tolerances. Escape was also possible during ascent and in orbit: ‘The Astro concept provides allowances in weight for life support and heat shielding for abort at maximum dynamic pressure conditions and in space. Recovery is by a parachute system and impact is attenuated by an aluminium honeycomb landing mat. Flotation gear is provided for water landings. Where high Mach number and high heating environments prevail, recovery will utilise multiple deployment of parachute-type drag devices.’ NASA’s ‘M’ vehicle Astro had clearly benefitted from a year’s worth of work, but research carried out elsewhere made it all the more convincing. The presentation mentions in passing that the spacecraft’s form was ‘not too unlike some NASA configurations’ This was something of an understatement since, by the time the talk was given, tests were under way at the Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards Air Force Base, California, using a wingless unpowered lifting-body glider that bore a striking visual similarity to Astro. The M2-F1 vehicle had been designed by Dryden engineer R. Dale Reed, who had already built and tested a radio-controlled model based on the М2 lifting-body form devised at NASA’s Ames Research Center. It was built for just $30,000 by 104
CHAPTER FOUR AMERICAN INSPIRATION THIS PAGE Bell Aircraft Corporation worked on designs for a two-stage high-speed airliner during 1959. The horizontal-take-off supersonic booster aircraft had a crew of two while the hypersonic transport it carried had seats for 30 passengers and three crew. The firm put out press releases and concept art in May 1960 and even gave away mock-up tickets for a one-way $1,550 trip from New York to Melbourne, Australia, lasting just 1 hour 22 minutes, at speeds of up to 16,000mph. The Bell concept's general layout would prove to be highly influential on later European designs, including English Electric's P.42, via Scott Lowther Twelve hundred combat-ready men anywhere on Earth within 45 minutes ВАС Aerospace Intelligence Bulletin for March 1964 All large aviation companies of the 1960s had systems in place for the collection of intelligence on new technologies being developed by their rivals and other contemporaries, and the British Aircraft Corporation was no exception. Its Guided Weapons Division in Bristol produced a regular Aerospace Intelligence Bulletin, which was then circulated throughout the company. Ray Creasey personally received the copy sent to BACs Preston Division and it must have made interesting reading, given that his designers and engineers were working on their own space project. 105
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES The March 1964 edition also demonstrates the wealth of material to which ВАС was privy. The document begins with a summary of developments within ESRC, the European Space Research Organisation. Next it has a brief note on the US National Space Station Program, suggesting that a special panel has been established to recommend the best configuration. A much longer entry details the US Re- entry Materials Program, ‘General Electric claims that the problem of spacecraft re-entry at the 25,000mph velocity range - subject of intense research by industry for several years - has been “solved” by use of pyrolytic graphite.’ In other non-military news, NASA was moving Syncom II, the worlds first geosynchronous communications satellite, currently stationed over the Atlantic Ocean, to a new position over the Pacific, at a rate of 1.52 degrees a day? The Hughes Aircraft Company had applied for a Federal grant to begin the first commercial space venture, ‘the launch of an “early bird” synchronous communications satellite*. This was Comsat Corporations Intelsat Fl, to be built by Hughes, which referred to it as HS 303. NASA was working on a lunar communications satellite known as MIROS - Modulated Inducing Retro- directive Optical System - and elsewhere ‘the Soviet Union plans to reorganise its weather forecasting system to take greater advantage of satellites and automatic stations’. The US Weather Bureau was working on a satellite system known as SCOMO - Satellite Collection Of Meteorological Observations - to ‘gather 34 kinds of information on atmospheric and sea conditions’. The bureau was also involved in a satellite programme called TIROS, the Television InfraRed Observation Satellite, which worked using a system of cameras and infrared sensors to monitor weather patterns. Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, was working on a probe called IMP-D, which was to orbit the moon, and NASA was planning Thor-Agena launches to put Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory hardware into space. North American was building an X-band radio antenna for the USAF called Haystack, which would serve as a test-bed for development of ground- based transmitting and receiving equipment for communications satellites. Under a heading of ‘launch vehicles and energy sources’ it was recorded that Boeing’s Minuteman ICBM was to be ‘added to USAF Space Systems Divisions list of launch vehicles. It would be topped by a fourth stage, possibly the one for the Scout vehicle for which industry is competing.’ The next entry relates to Scout itself: ‘Chance Vought - development schedule for a higher-thrust fourth stage to replace the present Allegany Ballistic Laboratory motor on the Scout booster will rule out the use of Metal X (beryllium or beryllium hydride additive) in the solid propellant. A glass filament-wound case probably will be used in the 20in diameter motor to give high mass fraction.’ Martin was busy working on its Titan III launcher and Department of Defense funding had been allocated to the project. The Saturn V booster programme was slipping behind schedule and ‘this could put the US goal of landing a man on the moon by the end of this decade almost out of the question.’ The French were working on a successor to their Diamant booster, to be known as the Regent, and Bell Aerosystems had successfully fired a 40,0001b thrust fluorine-hydrogen engine. A joint NASA/JPL/Shell Oil Co project had produced a catalyst for monopropellant hydrazine rocket engines for spacecraft guidance and control. LEFT Art from 1964 showing the Douglas Ithacus concept, formerly known as Douglas Icarus, which was intended to transport 1200 'rocket commandos' anywhere in the world within 45 minutes. The name was presumably changed to avoid any negative connotations associated with 'Icarus'. NASA 106
CHAPTER FOUR AMERICAN INSPIRATION Lockheed had ‘received a contract to demonstrate the feasibility of pulsed operation of solid propellant rocket motors and Westinghouse had predicted that 1964 would be the ‘success year’ for the Aerojet- Westinghouse NRX-A1 reactor assembly for the Nerva nuclear rocket engine. There then follows a lengthy section devoted to non-space weapons systems and electronics before a section headed ‘military environment - space’ again picks up the theme. This notes that four contractors have been chosen for the SSGS Standardised Space Guidance System, which ‘must provide a capability for space systems, space shuttle, satellite inspection, deep-space employment, orbital bombardment, general reconnaissance and deep zonal penetration above the earths surface.’ NASA had drafted ‘the first outline for establishing a semi-permanent US base on the moon”, and Lockheed was working on MIDAS - Missile IDentification and Alarm System. Under ‘USA/Aerospaceplane Programme/USAF’ it is stated: ‘Concept for a booster and piggyback aerospaceplane has been presented to the air force by Lockheed. The booster aircraft would take off on four conventional turbine engines from existing Strategic Air Command bases and fly to about 70,000ft. Rockets on the tips of its triangular wings would then boost the vehicle to 150,000ft where the booster would separate and return to base. The piggyback vehicle would continue on its own rocket power to perform a space mission, then return to base. The Lockheed proposal is similar to one by Martin-Denver. Each vehicle would accommodate at least two men.’ Finally, and most remarkably, the document mentions Douglas ICARUS - Inter-Continental Aerospacecraft-Range Unlimited System: ‘The Douglas Missiles and Space Division is seeking military interest in a single-stage intercontinental ballistic troop transport concept that could deliver 1,200 combat-ready men or 132 tons of equipment anywhere on Earth within 45 minutes. Icarus would be a modified version of the ROMBUS (Re-useable Orbital Module- Booster and Utility Shuttle) vehicle designed for land recovery. With a pressurised, six-level troop compartment as the payload, it would be 210ft high and 70ft in diameter. A four-man crew compartment would be located in the centre-body. A one-fifth smaller configuration requiring four million pounds thrust could be utilised as a commercial global transport carrying 172 passengers and 36,0001b of cargo to any point on earth in less than 45 minutes. According to a US Marines spokesman, this application of space technology could have a staggering impact on sea power and amphibious operations and on future national military capability as a whole.’ BELOW The survey of American space launcher and booster concepts during late 1963 and early 1964 included a wide range of advanced vehicle designs. Drawing EAG 4408 sheet 1 featured the Douglas ROMBUS vehicle - which led to a projected military transport named ICARUS, later renamed ITHACUS because of the first acronym's negative connotations. Other vehicles in the same image were the Douglas Roost and Martin Renova. EAG 4408 sheet 2 featured the even larger General Dynamics Nexus and the tiny-by-comparison Astro. NASA staff working alongside the locally based Briegleb Glider Manufacturing Company, and had a steel tube internal frame and mahogany plywood outer shell. Elevons attached to its rudders - just like those of Astro - were made of aluminium and its landing gear from taken from a Cessna 150 light aircraft. It also had a large flap running along its trailing edge, which acted as an elevator. 107
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE The M2-F1 vehicle designed by NASA Dryden engineer R. Dale Reed had a configuration remarkably similar to that proposed for Astro - though the Astro vehicles had been designed just as the programme that led to the M2-F1's construction was getting started. NASA It was decided that the testing programme should begin with the completed M2-F1 being towed on the end of a 1,000-foot rope by a car. Calculations showed that 4001b of towing force maintained at HOmph would be necessary, but no existing production model car was up to the task. A retired US Air Force major who worked for NASA, Walter ‘Whitey’ Whiteside, approached the management of West Coast Pontiac and secured a convertible Catalina fitted with the non- streetable 405hp, 42leu in, 6.9-litre Super Duty V8 and a Tri-Power carb, rather than the more usual pair of four-barrel carburettors. He then used his connections within the California hot- rodding community to obtain slick tyres capable of sustaining 150mph, roll bars, a high-ratio transmission and upgrades to the cars cooling system and suspension. The front passenger seat was reversed to face the back of the car while the rear bench was removed and replaced with a raised single seat positioned behind the driver and set sideways. A tow rig and airspeed measuring equipment were also added, the latter giving it a little ‘fin on the rear left side. The Catalina was painted white with NASA decals on the sides, but the bonnet and boot lid were painted bright yellow like those of other flight-line vehicles on the air base. It had US Government licence plates bearing the number NA 1059. Unencumbered, the car was found to be capable of a consistent 140mph, well beyond the standard speedometers ability to measure, but it could manage 160mph at a push. The dynamometer found that it produced maximum torque at 1 OOmph and it did just 4 miles per gallon. The first M2-F1 tests took place on 1 March 1963, and several low-speed runs were undertaken. During a test on 5 April, the M2-Fls nose began to lift when the speedo hit 60mph. A week later Whitey took the car up to 86mph and the glider lifted, but then began to bounce uncontrollably from side to side. A rudder and control adjustment eliminated this problem, and soon the M2-F1 was being towed at a steady 1 lOmph, allowing the pilot to climb up to 20 feet off the ground, release the tow line, then glide for 20 seconds before landing smoothly. By the end of April the Pontiac had towed the glider forty-eight times and the lifting body concept for a gliding re- entry from space had been proven - lending new strength to the Astro proposal in the process. At Preston, the ВАС team also became aware of the test results, through data distributed by NASA. 108
CHAPTER FOUR AMERICAN INSPIRATION Operating Astro Unlike the 1962 report, the 1963 presentation gave a full run-through of an Astro mission launch from start to finish. It began with assembly of the two Astro vehicles ‘...horizontally on a tractor trailer transporter. This vehicle contains the erecting structure, power source, and pad. The vehicle is driven into alignment with the exhaust deflection system and the pad-vehicle combination is rotated into place. Both the pad and the deflecting surface of the exhaust system are removable and replaceable without altering the permanent foundation structure of the exhaust deflection system.’ In vertical launch position, the Astro boosters engines would be tested at full thrust before clamps were released and it took off. After 2 seconds of purely vertical flight, the vehicle would begin a gravity turn - using gravity to steer it onto its correct trajectory - before allowing the booster to expend all its fuel. Shortly before separation, the spacecrafts outboard RL-10 engines would be started and run up to full thrust before the four explosive bolts holding the vehicles together were blown and the spacecraft was accelerated away from the booster, which would then start a gentle turn away. At a suitable distance, the spacecraft’s J-2 main engine would then be fired. Now at an altitude of 270,400 feet and 54 nautical miles from its launch point, the booster would begin its flight back to earth - though not to its original starting point. Continuing on to orbit, the spacecraft could then carry out its mission. From the 1962 reports wide range of possible functions, the presentation narrowed down Astros intended missions to just four - reconnaissance-surveillance, maintenance and repair, personnel and life support, and maintenance supply and rescue. Mission complete, the Astro vehicle would then use partial to full rolling manoeuvres to begin its descent, the presentation going into great detail on how this was to be accomplished. A similar level of detail was lavished on ground operations: BELOW Between the first Astro report in 1962 and the second in 1963 some thought was given to how the two vehicles would actually be assembled in tandem and how they would be launched. The proposed solution was to lift them onto a horizontal tractor trailer transporter. This could then lift the vehicles into an upright position ready for launch. Mark Aston after Douglas original 109
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ‘In order that high flight frequency may be achieved with a minimum number of vehicles, the turnaround time on the ground should be kept within reasonable bounds. For planning cost purposes, a total of 240 flights per year was selected as the flight frequency. A fleet strength of 12 boosters and 24 spacecraft was used as a basis for this discussion. Each booster must make 20 flights per year resulting in an 18 day turnaround requirement. The 12 additional spacecraft may be used to maintain different payload configurations at the ready or to increase the number of missions flown per year. This emphasizes a significant advantage of the two- staged multi-mission reusable spacecraft. Since booster flight time from launch to landing is in the order of 10 minutes, the use of the booster for additional spaceflights is limited only by the turnaround time and available spacecraft.’ Getting the boosters ready for another flight was a particular problem since, having burned all their fuel flying away from their launch point, they would be unable to turn round and were forced to continue on in the opposite direction during their gliding descent. Four alternatives were offered for bringing the booster back into use, including aerial tow-back by Douglas C-133 Cargomaster, fly-back after landing at an advance base for refuelling, and simply being prepared for a new mission at the advance base. The fourth option was direct fly-back after re-entry. This would require either the addition of turbojets, making the booster design 30% bigger to accommodate them and their fuel, or adding enough rocket fuel for the return journey - resulting in a staggering 60% size increase. Neither of these scenarios was particularly desirable. Turnaround time after aerial tow- back, assuming ground crew working in two shifts, was three and a half days. For the spacecraft, assuming it landed back at its launch base, turnaround with two shifts was four days. The Douglas speaker added: ‘The study of the turnaround times takes into account such events as: crew removal, de-briefing, remotely controlled tank purging, pressure tests, fly-back time, vehicle inspection, operational checkout, x-ray inspection, vehicle ground tow, prelaunch checklist, system checkout, installation of vehicles on launcher-erector, refurbish ablative coatings as required, purge of ecological system, and refurbish landing skids. Acoustical studies have shown that x-ray inspection will be required at 50-mission intervals. Predictions based on available development test data indicate a 50-mission capability of the engines also.’ It was predicted that each Astro vehicle would have an overall service life of 300 missions. Costs and development During the Douglas presentation, the three phases of Astro development from the 1962 report were instead labelled ‘Developmental Part A-C’, but were largely the same. The only change was to Part B, the equivalent of Phase II, which suggested an alternative to modifying an Astro A2 spacecraft to create an Al booster. This ‘would be to mate the A2 spacecraft to a ballistic-type booster, such as Titan III, Saturn Cl or C5.’ Research and development costs for Astro were given as $1,231 bn. Vehicle cost for one full production model booster was $23.9m, and $7.9m for two spacecraft, giving an overall cost of $31.8m for three vehicles. The cost of operating these for 100 flights was given as $97.23m. The grand total therefore came to $1.36bn. Taking all that into account, the cost per launch came out at just over $ 13.6m. The cost per equivalent Titan III launch was given as $12m. However, since most of the cost associated with Astro was to be one-off research and development spending, carrying out 2,400 flights over ten years using twenty-two boosters and thirty- four spacecraft, would cost $3.664bn - significantly better value. Unlike the report of a year earlier, the 1963 presentation made some attempt to project future developments of Astro. The system, it was said, could be scaled up to provide larger vehicles if necessary, and more advanced engines could be installed if a time delay and greater costs were acceptable. Six different potential engine upgrade options were given in ascending order of cost and safety risk - Astro’s existing engines running on oxygen difluoride/hydrogen at two different mixture ratios; new oxygen difluoride/diborane engines at two different ratios; high-pressure oxygen/hydrogen engines; or high- pressure oxygen difluoride/diborane engines. Oxygen difluoride and diborane are both hazardous, with diborane in particular igniting spontaneously in humid air at room temperature, and would have required very careful handling. An example of up-scaling the Astro booster was also given: ‘To illustrate this point, let us say we want a booster whose landing weight empty is approximately 500,0001b. This weight is an approximate limit of present runways. The resulting booster would have a gross weight of 4,663,4001b, of which 4,158,0001b was fuel. The corresponding spacecraft would weigh 1,377,9501b, of which 1,155,0001b was fuel. This could be used to put 260,0501b of payload into orbit. One significant conclusion from the above example is that payloads above 250,0001b are not likely to be carried by winged vehicles that are required to land on existing runways’ The example vehicle, the speaker went on, would require nine M-l engines. A single M-l was 25.3 feet long and 14 feet in diameter. 110
CHAPTER FOUR AMERICAN INSPIRATION ABOVE Almost immediately preceding the first depiction of BAC's Multi-Unit Space Transport And Recovery Device is this drawing, EAG 4434, of Douglas's Astro vehicle. The Warton team always acknowledged the inspirational role played by Astro in the creation of Mustard. Next came a chart showing how Astro might evolve. After the basic system had proven successful in service, ‘the Astro spacecraft could be combined with a liquid or metallic fast reactor placed in orbit by the Saturn C5 system. The spacecraft is put in orbit with its own booster.’ This would allow Astro to reach orbit around the moon, but ‘the Astro spacecraft must be modified through the addition of an outer insulation “overcoat”, since re- entry will be at escape velocity. The growth of this phase is projected to a lunar landing capability.’ Then an Astro booster could be ‘modified for tri-propellants bringing about a single stage to orbit capability. This phase may be accomplished with the existing booster size or may be rescaled to include a larger payload.’ At this time, engine firm Rocketdyne was experimenting with fuelling rocket engines with a mixture of liquid lithium, gaseous hydrogen and liquid fluorine - three propellants mixed together, hence ‘tri-propellant’. The ultimate development of Astro was to be a scaled-up booster designed to use high-pressure liquid oxygen/hydrogen engines with ‘the capability of an engine change to nuclear power. This vehicle could be made to be either a horizontal or vertical take-off vehicle or could be built for water take- off. After that, a winged vehicle is no longer practical.’ BAC’s next move At the end of their concentrated US projects review, the ВАС team had examined everything from proposals to turn the Mach 2 Convair B-58 bomber into a launch vehicle to possibly the largest and most costly space vehicle ever devised - a design produced by H. E. Wang of the California-based Aerospace Corporation and known to the British as ‘Wang’s Vehicle’. But it was Douglas Astro that struck a chord. The ВАС engineers recognised a combination of features in the basic system that might well suit the needs and capabilities of a British space programme. Astro utilised existing technology as much as possible, was based on sound aerodynamic principles and was being sold on the basis of its versatility. A cost-effective, reusable multirole space vehicle was exactly what Britain needed, but with two different vehicles and a structurally challenging tandem launch arrangement Douglas had overcomplicated what was meant to be a simple system. Taking the Astro idea, the ВАС team applied their own innovations and solved the problems Douglas had struggled with. The result was the Multi-Unit Space Transport And Recovery Device - Mustard. 111
Chapter Five Multi-Unit Space Transport And Recovery Device ВАС Mustard 1964 Amid a bewildering variety of possible spacecraft shapes, stages and engines being proposed by US aircraft companies during 1963-64, the Douglas Astro stood out as offering a simple and practical basis for further research and development. A detailed drawing of the American concept was produced by the English Electric/BAC team, as was their usual practice for designs that interested them, and was incorporated into the official drawing sequence as EAG 4434. The team may have been inspired by it, but the Warton designers believed that they could do better still - taking Astros finer points, adding their own ideas and know-how, and moulding them into a relatively inexpensive system that could meet Britain’s likely requirements. The Multi-Unit Space Transport And Recovery Device, or ‘Mustard’ - it seldom appears in contemporary reports as MUSTARD - was devised in early 1964 and first appears almost ABOVE A range of different launch configurations were drawn up for the Multi-Unit Space Transport And Recovery Device from the outset. One of the more unusual arrangements involved three booster vehicles joined in a cluster with a fourth vehicle -the spacecraft - attached to their noses with a disposable tubular section. Daniel Uhr immediately after Astro in the drawing sequence. The basic idea was to have a number of vehicles lifting off together that were identical in external 112
CHAPTER FIVE MULTI-UNIT SPACE TRANSPORT AND RECOVERY DEVICE ABOVE The first drawing to depict BAC's Multi-Unit Space Transport And Recovery Device (Mustard) was EAG 4436. The basic module is shown in the top left-hand corner and with it are eight possible launch configurations. Some, such as the six module cluster in the bottom right-hand corner, would have required substantial changes to the shape of the basic module. appearance but only one of which was actually the spacecraft. The others would boost it up to the edge of space before separating from it and flying back to base. Drawing EAG 4436 by Dave Walley is unusual in showing not just a single three-view design but also eight separate arrangements of recoverable modules'. It is dated, too: 14 February 1964. The first image shown is a three- view of the ‘basic recoverable module on its own - a blunt lifting body form with a single rocket engine positioned centrally at the trailing edge. The undercarriage is a nosewheel with a pair of skids to the rear, and for stability and control a pair of short moveable fins appear at the tips of the loosely triangular ‘body'. The remaining eight drawings show possible arrangements of modules joined together for launch. Clusters of three, four, five or even six vehicles are depicted, though the modules shape has to change to accommodate these groupings, becoming narrower as the number increases to avoid creating a hollow ‘ring’. The cluster of three comes in for particular attention, with drawings showing the vehicles almost-touching noses being faired over and used as a mounting point for either a disposable fuel tank or a fourth module. Another design on the same sheet has the basic module launched alone atop a conventional non-recoverable rocket system’, and the last shows a pair of modules positioned underside-to- underside with fuel tanks or rockets BELOW Mustard before it was Mustard: the ВАС 'basic recoverable module', as shown in EAG 4436, lacks a central fin and has a straight trailing edge. It might be regarded as Mustard Scheme 0. Luca Landino wedged into the resulting gaps left and right. In all instances, on all modules, the fins appear in their vertical ‘folded’ position for launch. The ‘Mustard’ name has yet to be applied. Most of the designs featured in EAG 4436 were later redrawn for a patent application, but with every vehicle now sporting a dorsal fin in addition to the two tip fins originally shown. This extra fin first appears in Walleys EAG 4437 preliminary issue, which shows a single 113
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 THIS PAGE Three different views of the 'FIG.4* launch arrangement from the first Mustard drawing - a 'cluster of three modules with single module'. Daniel Uhr basic vehicle. It is now referred to as a ‘recoverable space module’, and text written beside the illustration refers to the three-module cluster of drawing EAG 4436, giving the overall combined weight for an assembly of three modules (1 spacecraft 4- 2 booster)’ as 600,0001b. The spacecraft shown - identical in external appearance to its two boosters - is intended to carry a payload of 10,0001b into space. With its side fins folded, it has a span of 50 feet; with them extended this increases to 75 feet. Overall module length, from the tip of its nose to the tips of its three fins at the rear is 88 feet. A narrow, almost suitcase- shaped crew and cargo capsule is shown in the centre of the vehicles body, far back from the nose. 114
CHAPTER FIVE MULTI-UNIT SPACE TRANSPORT AND RECOVERY DEVICE ABOVE When ВАС decided to patent the Mustard concept a few months after development work was begun, the launch configurations shown in EAG 4436 were used. But rather than use the module that appeared in that drawing, effectively the Mustard Scheme 0, each configuration was redrawn using Mustard Scheme 1 with its central fin. Several additional launch configurations were added too. The configuration sketches were scattered across several pages of the patent application document but here they are brought together in a loose approximation of the original EAG 4436 drawing. The next drawing, EAG 4437 issue 1, refines the module shape further, with the rear part extending outwards to meet the gimballed engine nozzle, and what might be a pointed nose fairing appearing at the front of the module in plan view. Length, even without this, is increased to a full 90 feet. For the first time, the drawing is labelled 'Mustard’ and given a number, Scheme 1. Another drawing by Walley, this time unnumbered, shows the control surfaces and internal arrangements of Scheme 1 in detail alongside a geometry map showing the curvature of the modules surfaces. Dated 2 March 1964, it shows the crew and cargo capsule as a larger and almost cylindrical container mounted within the centre of the vehicle. Mustard Scheme 2, which only appears in an unnumbered drawing, is BELOW When Dave Walley drew the 'recoverable space module' on its own for the first time, in EAG 4437 preliminary issue, he modified it to include a large central fin, and the crew compartment was positioned centrally within the vehicle's fuselage. The name 'Mustard' had not yet been decided upon for the concept. 115
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE Mustard Scheme 1 shown in EAG 4437 issue 1. Named, and with the central fin still in place, this design features a convex rather than straight trailing edge and the internal structure has been substantially revised from the earlier design. No crew compartment is labelled but is presumed to be the central fuselage area; the engine is gimballed and the nosewheel mechanism is more complex. BELOW Dated 2 March 1964, this design shows the shape and dimensions of Mustard Scheme 1 in more precise detail. 116
CHAPTER FIVE MULTI-UNIT SPACE TRANSPORT AND RECOVERY DEVICE ABOVE The second Mustard, Scheme 2, did not receive a drawing number and must therefore have been quickly dismissed. It differs from Scheme 1 in several key respects, however. The central fin has been deleted, the fuselage is somewhat more slender, the form of the trailing edge is concave, and the vehicle appears to have both fixed fins and fixed wings. BELOW Mustard Scheme 3 appears to have been designed specifically to suit carriage beneath a launcher/transporter aircraft. Its form is long and slender, albeit still blunt, with the two crewmen now seated in tandem in the nose. The fins are rigid too, rather than possessing the variable geometry of Scheme 1. Scheme 3 appears in EAG 4442. 117
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 similar to Scheme 1 but lacks its central fin. Where Scheme Is rear end is convex, Scheme 2s is concave and features a shallow V-shaped depression where a central fin might otherwise have been. Its fuselage is also slightly shorter and slimmer than that of Scheme 1, but beyond these basic shapes the drawing is otherwise lacking in detail. EAG 4442 shows Scheme 3 looking dramatically different from its predecessors. While the internal structure is similar to that of Scheme 1, with a near-cylindrical container positioned centrally for cargo, and fuel tanks positioned around it, there is now a separate crew compartment in the vehicles nose. The two crewmen are seated one in front of the other, with the back-seater having the nosewheel rise up between his feet. Instead of the single gimballed rocket engine to the rear, now there are three, all of them sunk well into the fuselage, and beside these at the trailing edge of the vehicle are two large control surfaces. Overall length is slightly greater than that of Scheme 1 at 98 feet, but where Scheme 1 is broad, blunt and somewhat triangular, Scheme 3 has a long slender forward section that tapers gently back to a short rectangular rear section with a fixed vertical fin on either side. It is the narrowest of all Mustard schemes, though by no means the longest. The reason for this compact form becomes clear in drawing EAG 4444, which shows another Scheme 3 vehicle, this time slotted neatly into the underside of a remarkable 172-foot-long Mach 0.8 ‘launch or transport’ aircraft. This was to have eight Rolls-Royce Conway RCo.43 turbojets - the final and most powerful development of the dependable Conway - in four pods of two slung beneath its outer wings. Its most unusual feature, however, is its undercarriage. The mainwheels are attached to the end of 20-foot-long legs and retract forwards into 40-foot-long pods fixed to the wing about 10 feet outboard of the fuselage. With this unusual arrangement, and a removable fairing under its fm, the transport would have sufficient clearance for the space vehicle to be manoeuvred into its narrow berth on the ground. During the earlier P.42 studies, English Electric had determined that a low-speed transport might actually be more efficient than a hypersonic air- launcher, but the unnamed EAG 4444 aircraft does not feature again in the Mustard project sequence. Rather, drawing EAG 4445 shows the favoured launch method - three Mustard Scheme 3 units arranged in a cluster. A note on the drawing states ‘tank to be fitted inside base of cluster’. Evidently three long, narrow Scheme 3s leaning together would leave a convenient gap at the base where an additional fuel container could be slotted. BELOW The reason for Mustard Scheme 3's unusual shape becomes apparent when seen together with its intended launcher, the Mach 0.8 aircraft shown in EAG 4444. This large transporter would have required enormously long rear undercarriage legs, folding up into large nacelles on its wings. 118
CHAPTER FIVE MULTI-UNIT SPACE TRANSPORT AND RECOVERY DEVICE л/brr. ТЛМ n и ftrrtt WSIM ™ VLittLr. ~&££&££TО2Ш&ШШ ^USTAfZC -' ,f444 g ABOVE A launcher aircraft was not the only configuration considered for Mustard Scheme 3. EAG 4445 shows a cluster of three Scheme 3 units. The flat, narrow shape of these modules would have left a large gap in the base of the cluster, however, and it was thought that this could house an expendable fuel tank. BELOW From plan and side views, it is not easy to appreciate the slightly irregular form of Mustard Scheme 3. This three- quarter view illustrates the uneven underside of the vehicle, carefully modelled from the original drawings. Luca Landino Mustard Scheme 4 The first of four EAG 4450 drawings shows a halfway house between Schemes 1 and 3, with a shortened forward section and a broader rear with four rocket engines. Mustard Scheme 4s fins are fixed but lean outwards slightly, the horizontal control surfaces are retained, and the overall length is 94 feet. The pilot is sitting up front in the vehicles nose and, of the landing gear, only the two rear skids are shown. A second drawing, also labelled simply ‘EAG 4450", shows a revised design that retains the same general outline but with thinner fins and a reduced length of 88 feet. Now two crewmen are shown in the nose, sitting 119
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE The definitive Mustard of 1964 was Scheme 4. The design was worked on in great detail - including the pair of turbojets that would be extended from the upper surface to provide power for the flight home, following re-entry. Chris Sandham-Bailey BELOW The Mustard pictured in the first EAG 4450 drawing, an early Scheme 4f has the smooth curves and tip fins that would become the concept's most distinctive features. The four rocket engines are grouped together in a quad at the centre of the trailing edge, and the pilot is in the nose. side-by-side. The arrangement of the cellular fuel tanks is shown both in plan view and in cross-sections, and the nosewheel now makes an appearance 25 feet back from the nose, positioned beneath Scheme 4 s most striking new feature - its pair of pop-out turbojets. In the accompanying notes these are referred to as ‘landing engines and were to have been modified Rolls- Royce RB. 172-54 Adours with 6,0001b of thrust each, running on liquid hydrogen fuel. Following the module’s descent through the atmosphere, space LEFT Just as EAG 4445 showed a cluster of Mustard Scheme 3 vehicles, so this illustration from the second ВАС hypersonics progress report shows a cluster of Scheme 4 vehicles. The hatch on each for the fly-back turbojet pack is clearly shown and each also features what appears to be a small vision porthole for the pilot or possibly a periscope aperture. 120
CHAPTER FIVE MULTI-UNIT SPACE TRANSPORT AND RECOVERY DEVICE ABOVE Mustard Scheme 4 is more fully fleshed out in the second version of EAG 4450. Now it features a pair of pop-out turbojets to provide manoeuvring thrust during the flight back to base. The Warton team hoped that these could eventually be deleted to save weight as design work progressed. BELOW While close to the 'classic1 Mustard form, Scheme 4 lacked direct forward visibility for the pilot and had its pop-out turbojets positioned towards the front of the vehicle. Later designs would feature turbojets buried in the rear fuselage, with only the intakes opening outwards from the surface of the vehicle. Luca Landino mission completed, they were to rise upwards and backwards from the upper fuselage and lock into position before being used to provide a powered landing at the pilots destination of choice - as long as it was within range given the engines’ fuel supply. While the first two drawings labelled ‘EAG 4450’ show general Mustard Scheme 4 vehicles’, the third, EAG 4450/1, shows the Scheme 4 spacecraft. Neither of the previous drawings had shown where Scheme 4’s cargo was to be carried, but now it is clear that the section immediately behind the crew would house it. Three payload options are also provided: two crew and five passengers, two seated directly behind the crew and another three in a row behind them; two crew and 5,0001b of equipment; or three crew and 2,0001b of supplies to last them for a three-week stint in orbit. The trade-off for this capability was a reduction in fuel for the turbojets. The spacecraft would get just 15 minutes of power before it ran out - enough for only limited manoeuvring shortly before touchdown. Pilots of the Scheme 4 booster on the other hand, 121
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE Though based on the previous EAG 4450 drawing, EAG 4450/1 had the word 'vehicle' in the title block overwritten with 'spacecraft'. Accommodation for two crew and five more personnel is shown in the forward compartment, and on the sectional view at 25 feet more detail on the nosewheel design is given. BELOW In 4450/2, the word 'vehicle' from the original 4450 drawing is overwritten with 'booster' - showing the design of the vehicles that would put the Mustard Scheme 4 spacecraft into orbit. The only other change is to show the two crewmen pushed right to the very front of the vehicle to allow the maximum space possible for fuel. 122
CHAPTER FIVE MULTI-UNIT SPACE TRANSPORT AND RECOVERY DEVICE RIGHT The cluster was the preferred mode of launch for Mustard Scheme 4 and earlier, but even at this stage thoughts were beginning to turn to a different arrangement - the stack. Positioning the boosters on either side of the spacecraft in this way allowed for a more even distribution of thrust and helped to negate the eHects of wind shear. shown in EAG 4450/2» would get a generous 75 minutes worth, enabling them to turn the vehicle around and fly directly back to base under full control. A final drawing from this visual development phase, missing from the sequence but probably EAG 4451 or 4452, shows a new launch arrangement for Mustard - the stack. This involved three or more vehicles attached together while standing in parallel formation. While these drawings were being committed to paper by Walley, a team of engineers worked on all four Mustard schemes concurrently to assess their potential benefits and drawbacks, even the basic Scheme 1 not being ruled out. The aerodynamic characteristics of lifting-body designs at low speed were of particular concern at this stage because, if it proved impossible or simply too difficult to land such vehicles, the whole Mustard concept would have to be abandoned. Even the Americans with their M2-F1 manned lifting-body glider lacked sufficient data to be entirely certain that the concept would succeed. Since this was a matter of immediate interest", according to its own Hypersonic Vehicles Progress Report No 2 dated August 1964, ВАС had decided to pursue a wind tunnel test programme. A model of a Mustard-like delta body vehicle with 70° sweepback, cylindrical leading edges and clipped tips was made that could be fitted with a variety of different fins and tailplanes in various different positions. The model was also meant to be tried with an extended forward section to see how this would affect its aerodynamic characteristics. STACK OF THREE MUSTARD UNITS It was hoped that testing would show that a longer, narrower form would not have a significant effect on Mustards stall speed and that small modifications in the shape and positioning of fins would result in improved lateral stability. Records from English Electrics wind tunnel facility suggest that owing to a lengthy queue of other designs waiting to be tested, this first round of experimentation probably never took place. Going into orbit When the second progress report appeared, Mustard Scheme 4 was the main focus of its section on ‘recoverable rockets", which was by far the largest part of the report overall. Scheme 4"s lifting-body shape had been chosen over the cylindrical canard-equipped recoverable rocket designs of the first progress report because of the ‘...thick wing-like shape possessing reasonably good aerodynamic qualities, while retaining to a large degree the high volume/surface area ratio and low structural weights of conventional rockets. Typical of these shapes are the American concept Astro by Douglas (the structural philosophy of which we acknowledge) and the “M” series of research vehicles." But there was a problem. Once the Mustard design had been chosen, assuming its lifting-body shape performed as expected, it became increasingly clear that too little was known about how such a vehicle would work in practice. The engineering systems such as life support, heat shielding, air-conditioning, fuel tank structure, electrical power, cockpit controls and manoeuvring thrusters would undoubtedly account for a large chunk of the vehicles weight, but precisely how much was still a grey area. The report states: ‘The services provided will differ very considerably from the familiar jobs performed on normal aircraft, and we have no easy yardstick to use to get our systems weights. So, apart from using confusing American data plus guesswork, there is no alternative but to consider the requirements in some detail and then to rough-design the vehicle systems. Besides giving us weights, this process is highly informative. 123
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES The main problem areas emerge, and the weaknesses in UK technology are highlighted so as to give a good guide to the proper direction of future research.’ ВАС had spent most of the six months since its first progress report figuring out exactly how Mustard would function, but with this done it was able to present a design that was nominally capable of two basic example missions. The first was supply and crew rotation of a ten-man orbital space station, involving the transfer of five technicians or a 5,0001b payload into orbit, and the second was an alternative military mission for reconnaissance, satellite inspection, and near-space control’. To perform these tasks, the Mustard spacecraft had to be ‘capable of sustaining a crew of three men in orbit for up to three weeks, with 2,0001b of special equipment’ - the requirements ofOR.9001. The proposed Mustard launch process was outlined, beginning with the assumption that a cluster of three Mustard Scheme 4-type units, standing vertically in triangular formation, was already sitting on the launch pad, clamped to the ground, ready for take- off. At this point the empty main cryogenic fuel tanks would be ‘kept under a small stabilising pressure of 5psi using helium gas’. The dry weight of each Mustard vehicle would be about 18 tons. Electrical heaters on valves near the fuel tanks would be warmed up using power from a ground supply, and fuelling of each unit would then begin from ground storage tanks. There were two separate connections per unit - one for the liquid oxygen and the other for the liquid hydrogen. This process would take about 30 minutes and ‘no special problems are involved apart from metering the fuels in slowly at the start to avoid very high boiling rates as the fuel meets warm metal.’ The main fuel tanks would be only partially insulated but the space around them would be purged with helium to prevent condensation. It was expected that a high boil-off rate of the extremely cold fuels would have to be countered by continuous topping from the ground supply. A few minutes before lift-off the tank pressures are raised to the flight level with helium, and boiling will cease. The fuel levels are then adjusted, the fuelling connections are removed, and the system is ready for engine start.’ Some 73.7 tons of rocket fuel would be carried in these tanks, five-sixths of it being liquid oxygen and the remainder liquid hydrogen. But since liquid oxygen is sixteen times denser than liquid hydrogen, its single tank would be quite compact while the more numerous hydrogen tanks occupied most of the volume of each vehicle. Orbital manoeuvre fuel would be added too, 4 tons of it being pumped into smaller well-insulated spherical tanks. Within these, kept at -253°C, would be bottles containing the vehicle’s essential helium supply. The rocket engine pumps would be pressure-fed from the main fuel tanks, which would be pressurised to 30psi, while the secondary tanks would be kept at 45psi. At launch, each Mustard unit would weigh 97.3 tons. With all four rocket motors burning on all three Mustard units, twelve engines in total, the clamps would be released and the vehicle would take off. The design of Mustards engines, ‘advanced liquid hydrogen/liquid oxygen motors operating at a chamber pressure of 3,0001b per square inch with a nozzle area ratio of 45:1’, was based on brochure information supplied by Rolls-Royce. In addition, the report notes: ‘Because ‘Mustard’ is a manned system, it is required that a motor failure should not be catastrophic or even abort the mission. Each “Mustard” unit therefore has four motors installed providing sufficient redundancy.’ None of the pilots on board would actually be in control of the system at this stage in the launch, however: ‘Since the true potential of the pilot of a spacecraft is not yet known, it has been assumed that he acts largely as the supervisor of an automatic vehicle controlled by electronics. Quite possibly weight could be saved with enhanced reliability if the pilot could do more, and there is scope for further research here. The nucleus of the electronics is a digital computer, which takes on the role of autopilot/autostabiliser through the various phases of the mission. Fed with data from inertial devices, it will steer the vehicle through a pre-programmed boost trajectory into orbit.’ With the engines running, the tank pressures would be maintained by supplying hydrogen gas from the rocket chamber cooling jackets to the rapidly emptying liquid hydrogen tanks, and by supplying helium to the liquid oxygen tanks. Once the Mustard cluster had reached a speed of about Mach 6.2 and an altitude of 40 miles, with each of the three units having around a third of its fuel remaining, ‘all motors are shut down and a coast phase of 60 seconds initiated’. A turbopump unit aboard each of the two booster modules would then activate automatically to begin transferring their remaining liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen across to the spacecraft. During this time ‘small ullage rockets’ would be used to keep the cluster on course. With the transfer complete, the two booster units would separate from the spacecraft, ‘re-enter the atmosphere and return to the launching site on the power of retractable turbojets, performing a normal landing.’ In the event of an emergency during the launch phase, none of the Mustard units would be able to simply dump its highly explosive fuel: ‘No provision is made for large scale propellant jettison. To be useful, jettison would have to be extremely rapid (e.g. consequent upon failure to relight after fuel transfer between modules). This is difficult to arrange without a high 124
CHAPTER FIVE MULTI-UNIT SPACE TRANSPORT AND RECOVERY DEVICE weight penalty. The approach adopted here is to have several rocket motors rather than one, and to duplicate essential fuel system components so that the vehicle can burn away unwanted propellant weight usefully in climbing to a safe height and a low flightpath angle? With its boosters gracefully peeling away after separation, the spacecraft’s attitude stabilising rockets would be switched off and its main engines relit, pushing it into an orbital altitude of 100 miles up. The end goal was to get the Mustard spacecraft to an altitude of 300 miles, but the initial 100-mile orbit was intended as a ‘staging’ position where any errors in the initial launch trajectory could be corrected or where the mission could be more easily aborted in the event of a malfunction. Space and re-entry Assuming everything had proceeded according to plan, the spacecraft would then transfer to its destination orbit 300 miles up. At this point any remaining fuel in the main tanks would be jettisoned, ‘the main tanks are then isolated and blown down to 5psi. This reduces the stress level in readiness for the loss in material strength when the tanks become warm.’ Once in space, Mustards electronic inertial navigator unit would begin making continual corrections ‘by reference to stars and by scanning the earths horizon’ and the mission could begin using the 4 tons of fuel in the small secondary tanks for orbital manoeuvring. According to the report: ‘The secondary fuel system works in just the same way as the main system (apart from higher tank pressures), and much of the piping is common. Any one of the main rocket motors could be used for orbital manoeuvres, probably throttled.’ The pilot could now take manual control, though his manoeuvres ‘would be monitored by electronics’. Whether Mustard was seeking to dock with a space station or engage a potentially hostile enemy satellite, ‘using a forward looking radar for target data, the computer informs the pilot of the various velocities required for rendezvous until visual contact is made.’ The spacecraft’s main engines could be fired for large increases in speed, but Mustard was also intended to feature a total of twenty-six small vernier thrusters for manoeuvring, much like those eventually used by the American Space Shuttle. Each one was to be controlled by two on-off solenoid valves. The report states: ‘The vernier system, used for attitude stabilisation only, has twelve 101b thrusters, mounted in opposed pairs for pure rotation about the vehicle’s centre of gravity. In parallel with the verniers are fourteen 6001b thrusters which provide rapid pure rotation about all three axes as well as movement along each axis.’ The 1,4001b of hydrazine fuel for these, sufficient for 235 seconds of thrust, was to be stored in spherical bladder tanks under 250psi helium pressure. Two separate hydrazine piping systems were to be employed for safety, so that if one failed the spacecraft would still be able to manoeuvre for re-entry in an emergency Once the mission had been completed, a final ‘velocity pulse’ would be used to take the Mustard spacecraft out of orbit and into a shallow-angle re-entry. At this point any remaining fuel in the secondary tanks would be jettisoned and the last dregs of the helium supply used to maintain pressure in the empty tanks. This measure was particularly important because ‘...the tanks are unable to withstand any collapsing pressures and a positive differential must be maintained right through the re- entry. During the hot period trapped propellants will boil, gases expand, and so on, and the tanks will vent outwards. As the vehicle goes subsonic, conditions become cooler and the gases in the tanks contract while atmospheric pressure rises. Tank pressures must now rise, keeping always a few psi above atmospheric.’ Mustard’s on-board computer was to control the re-entry trajectory either directly or by instructions to the pilot. It would operate the reaction controls using hydraulic actuators and electrical signalling until altitude was low enough for the vehicle’s elevons and rudders to work as air began to pass over them. Two separate 4,000psi hydraulic systems would be installed and the actuators would be duplicated too. Both systems’ pumps would be powered by turbines running on hydrazine. Once the spacecraft had passed through the communications blackout phase of re-entry caused by ionised air, its own radar system could be switched off and it was to be ‘brought in by a ground radar at the landing site’. Surplus electrical generating capacity from the now inoperative on- board radar system could be used, if necessary, to heat pitot heads or a clear- vision panel so that the pilot could see where he was going, ready for landing. As it slowed to subsonic speed, the vehicle’s turbojet pack could be extended and started, allowing the pilot to make a normal airfield landing on its nosewheel and skids. Immediately following the landing, a ground helium supply would be connected to the spacecraft and any propellants left ‘blown out into a bowser’. The vehicle would be left to boil dry - any liquid oxygen or hydrogen simply becoming gases - ‘and its whole fuel system is thoroughly helium purged before it can be taken into its hangar.’ Mustard’s outer shell In addition to the practical mechanics of how they would work during a mission, the internal design of the Mustard units was also examined in considerable detail by ВАС and outlined in the same second progress report. While the booster and spacecraft units had some minor internal differences, they were externally and structurally almost identical. 125
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES diagram of spacecraft structure (UOW WMG UQAPI*? » UBS/SQ rO SECTION QN£QF VEHICLE TYPICAL SECTIONS THRO' FRAMES ANO SKIN. ABOVE A simplified view of how the Warton team intended Mustard to be constructed. The different materials that were to make up the corrugated skin structure are shown, together with the dividing webs that would keep the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks separated from one another. Each vehicle would consist of two major assemblies - an outer shell and the pressurised fuel tanks that formed an inner core. The outer shell was to consist of two main braced frames, the forward one carrying the nose landing gear and crew/cargo capsule and the rear one carrying the rear landing gear and rocket motor. The frames themselves would be made from a corrugated web’ 6 inches deep. Stretched over the frames would be the vehicles skin. The report explains: ‘During re-entry the vehicle would be subjected to an extreme temperature environment, but with a low re-entry angle from orbit coupled with the low wing loading and favourable shape this could be reduced to an acceptable level where nickel based alloys could be used for the lower surface and leading edges of the vehicle. Providing that the temperature gradients across the surface were not excessive, a continuous skin on the outer shell could be used. Thus any possibility of a leakage of hot gas to the internals would be obviated.’ It was calculated that, depending on the vehicle’s trajectory, lower-surface temperatures would vary between 727°C and 927°C. The upper surface of the vehicle, with its nose high up at an angle of 40° to 45° during re-entry, would be in ‘a virtual vacuum’, however, and the ВАС designers determined that it would experience surface temperatures of no more than about 277°C. It was therefore decided that corrugated titanium 0.01 inch thick and half an inch in section would be used for the upper skin, while 0.006- inch-thick, 0.36-inch-section Rene 41 would form the lower skin. A layer of insulation would also be installed between the lower part of the structural frames and the Rene 41. LEFT Mustard was a 'hot structure' vehicle that absorbed heat rather than keeping it out. This diagram shows just how hot the different areas of the spacecraft's underside would have become during re-entry. 126
CHAPTER FIVE MULTI-UNIT SPACE TRANSPORT AND RECOVERY DEVICE In designing the outer shell, Mustards designers encountered two difficulties. First, and most seriously, it would be subjected to a terrific level of noise during a rocket-propelled lift-off, leading to ‘high acoustic loading’ To make matters worse, ‘it is possible that in the clustered arrangement the noise levels would increase in the confined spaces between the vehicles? As a result, the skin of Mustards almost flat unpressurised outer shell would suffer a significant level of ‘sonic fatigue - damage that would shorten the overall service life of the vehicle. This is less of a problem with conventional cylindrical rockets because they are made rigid by high pressurisation and are therefore less affected by sonic vibration. The second problem threatened the fundamental design concept that Mustard boosters and spacecraft should be nearly identical: ‘The transient heating on the booster units would be more severe than on the orbit vehicle in a clustered arrangement, although the maximum temperature reached would be less. During one of the trajectories considered, the rate of change of the skin temperature was five times greater on the booster than on the orbit vehicle.’ It was possible, therefore, that the boosters might need to carry additional insulation, resulting in expensive design variation. Crew compartment The Mustard spacecrafts two-man crew were to be housed in a forward cabin with a separate equipment bay immediately behind it. As far as possible RIGHT This 'suit loop' chart is as close as ВАС got to designing a British space suit. Mustard's crew, circa the 1964 design at least, would have been expected to wear 'a multi-layer aluminised outer garment completely enclosing the wearer'. The 'shirt- sleeves' environment earlier envisioned for the crew by the RAE was not a feature of the design at this stage. all equipment that needed pressurisation or a cool ambient temperature or both was to be contained in one of these bays. The cabin would be pressurised to 5.5psia with oxygen while the equipment bay was to have a helium atmosphere to reduce any risk of a fire. The atmosphere in both would be cooled by fan circulation through heat exchangers, the fans apparently ‘providing a useful measure of turbulence to help cooling under zero g’ The crew themselves would wear full pressure suits for ‘primary protection’ According to the report: ‘The suit is a multi-layer aluminised outer garment completely enclosing the wearer, and is normally pressurised with oxygen to l/l()psi below cabin pressure for easy movement. If cabin pressure fails, the suit is held at 4psia. Oxygen circulating in the suit loop is used for cooling and breathing, and is continuously purified by activated charcoal and lithium hydroxide packs. In normal operation the oxygen is pumped around the loop at 1.51b per minute per man, and is cooled and dehumidified in a heat exchanger. Failure of the suit loop is countered by a fixed oxygen bleed at 0.11b per minute, which is adequate for both cooling and purification.’ Mustards central cooling system would consist of two independent liquid coolant loops, taking heat from the crew’s pressure suits, the cabin and equipment bays, the vehicles electronics, and the fuel cells in that order. The 127
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 wanned liquid would then be pumped through radiators in the upper surface of the vehicles wings, returning cooled. During boost and re-entry the radiators would be bypassed and water used to cool the liquid instead. The design team thought that it was possible that Mustards electrical fuel cells and the bulk of its electronics could be cooled directly if they each had their own cold-plate. In addition to the internal cooling systems, the underside of Mustards cabin and cargo bay would need insulation to keep out the searing heat of re-entry. A water cooling system was suggested for this purpose too, but ‘for simplicity and complete reliability only pure insulation has been considered so far’ This consisted of a medium-density silica wool, about 3 inches thick, installed under the bottom centreline of the cabin. Outer shell temperatures here were expected to reach around 927°C but the wool would ensure that the temperature of the cabin floor under the crews feet only reached a maximum of 40°C - not quite hot enough to burn exposed skin, even through fairly prolonged exposure. The report states: ‘The relatively small flow of heat into the interior is easily taken up by the cooling systems, and by a very small temperature rise in the furnishings and equipment.’ Cooling systems were deemed unnecessary during the initial Mustard launch phase and immediately following re-entry and would have been switched off at these times. If cooling did prove necessary during subsonic flight after re-entry, the radiators could be manually turned back on. Electrical system ВАС determined that Mustard’s peak power requirement in space would amount to around 3,000W with the average being about l,300W. The lightest and therefore best means of providing this was to use stacked hydrogen-oxygen fuel cells giving a main bus voltage of 28V. The stacks would be grouped into three modules, each capable of l,300W, so that any one module could supply just about enough power on its own if necessary. The cryogenic reactants needed would be stored in insulated spherical containers. A liquid cooling system was proposed to keep the fuel cell membranes, or electrolyte, at about 50°C, and the same coolant could also be used to pre-heat the reactants. Water produced by the chemical reaction, at about 301b per day, was to be removed by a wick system and stored for drinking by the crew and for use in re- entry cooling. As a back-up for the fuel cells, silver- zinc batteries were proposed, offering sufficient charge for l,500W during two orbits and re-entry. According to the ВАС report: ‘Primary batteries would supply most of the power, but secondary high-discharge-rate batteries would also be needed. No additional power generators appear necessary for re-entry as the power requirement is no higher than the rendezvous phase, even when we include heaters.’ As for the electrical equipment to be used within Mustards cockpit, the design team decided not to go into quite that much detail: ‘Apart from the electronics, a fair amount of electrical equipment will be needed to control the motors and systems, for ancillary blowers and pumps, for warning systems, lights, etc. It is beyond the present scope to delve into details of this sort except to make reasonable allowance for its weight and power requirements. By analogy with current aircraft of about the same dry weight (e.g. TSR2) we should expect a weight of some 5001b and a peak power consumption of l,000W. The time-average power requirement will probably be only 500W, mainly going to cabin and suit blowers.’ Cryogenic tanks Mustards fuel tanks were arranged in cells within the outer shell to make the best possible use of the space available, but were separated from it by ‘pivoted links running to the intersecting walls LEFT As well as showing the main structures of Mustard Scheme 4, this diagram also shows the multitude of 'swinging links' that attached the cryogenic fuel tanks to the vehicle's outer shell and the engine mounting structure - which would have to bear much of the vehicle's weight just prior to a vertical launch. 128
CHAPTER FIVE MULTI UNIT SPACE TRANSPORT AND RECOVERY DEVICE of the tanks’. These would allow the fully pressurised tanks to brace the outer shell during the launch and would then serve to keep the empty tanks in shape during re-entry and landing. In addition, ‘this ensured that if during orbit the vehicle was punctured by a meteorite which penetrated the propellant tanks it would retain its structural integrity.* A single liquid oxygen tank was to be positioned centrally, supported atop the engine mounting structure when the vehicle was standing vertically ready for launch, and the lighter liquid hydrogen tanks were to be suspended from it on either side. These main tanks were assumed to be made from low interstitial titanium, which demonstrated ‘the best specific strength except for some composite materials’. It was also assumed that welding techniques would be developed that could produce a single seamless skin. Titanium had its drawbacks, however: ‘By selecting titanium as a material for a liquid oxygen tank it is realised that there would be an explosion risk if the tank was burst by some object. The most likely object would appear to be a meteorite when the vehicle is in orbit, however, it is most probable that the oxygen content would be low enough not to support an explosive reaction.’ The common wall between the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks would be of ‘sandwich construction’, which would limit heat flow between the tanks and act as a structural beam to separate the very dense liquid oxygen and the liquid hydrogen. The secondary liquid oxygen fuel tank was to be made of stainless steel and heavily insulated. It was well understood that during re- entry the very hot skin of the outer shell would radiate heat onto the underside of the tanks, but no decision was reached on whether a 0.25-inch-thick blanket of silica wool or a more complex internal cooling system would be necessary for insulation. Some consideration was also given to using a lightweight low emissivity finish - such as gold paint - to cut down the intensity of radiation on the lower part of the tanks. The weight allowance for fuel tank insulation, whatever form it took, was 5001b to cover around 200 square feet. The difficulty of adequately covering such a large area with so little material is made plain in the report: ‘To achieve this weight, radical departures from the usual steel jacketing will be necessary. Alternative schemes (e.g. fabric, wire netting) need investigation.’ Then there was the issue of electronic and other systems that needed to pass through the fuel tank bay. They would be subjected to intense cold when the vehicle was full of cryogenic fuel before launch, and intense heat during re-entry. Even routing them over the top of the tanks would expose them to an estimated 327°C for about 25 minutes, but ‘systems and engine components to stand this ambient temperature should be available as electrical and hydraulic systems have already run at 327°C and 527°C respectively in America.’ Even so, it was determined that ‘an insulated external services duct will probably be needed’. There was evidently also some uneasiness about constructing large fuel tanks out of very thin titanium: ‘Typical wall thicknesses of from 0.010 to 0.060in were required. To obtain an accurate weight estimate for this type of structure, early practical tests would be necessary to determine the feasibility of manufacturing a large structure from foil thickness material and the sort of tolerances that could be maintained on these thicknesses.’ Cluster versus tandem Determining how many Mustard booster units would be needed and how best to arrange them was critical and had huge implications for the system’s operational success or failure, not to mention its total cost. As a result, a lot of work was initially done to compare three- or four-unit clusters against what ВАС called Two-Stage- Tandem’ or ‘TST’. This was the Douglas Astro configuration, with a small spacecraft mounted on the nose of a larger booster. The section of the report detailing this comparison makes no bones about its findings: ‘The overall performance of the “TST” configuration is clearly superior to either “Mustard” configuration; the necessary total manufactured weight and total launch weight are both less for any required payload.’ So Mustard was heavier, but it did have one very clear advantage over Astro: ‘On “Mustard” all available effort can be concentrated on a single module; the full orbital system is developed later, using three or four modules. On a “TST” configuration the design and development of two vehicles involves an initial commitment of more than twice the manufactured weight of the equivalent “Mustard” module.’ Designing Astro would mean designing two different vehicles, whereas only one basic design was needed for Mustard. Also, the Astro space vehicle wras smaller than the equivalent Mustard spacecraft, which might create its own design and manufacturing problems: ‘The two vehicles carry the same payload and crew and would have many systems components the same. The space available to accommodate them on the “TST” spaceplane would be less, making fitting, inspection, etc, more difficult. Further, re-entry heating is dimensional; the heating rate is greater on a smaller vehicle. Thus the extent of nose area requiring refractory heat shielding would be a greater proportion of the total surface area on a smaller vehicle; this was not allowed for in the performance calculations.’ 129
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE Three pieces of concept art were produced early on during the development of Mustard, this one showing its launch in cluster formation. Ordinarily these images would have been used for publicity, but Mustard was worked on under a blanket of secrecy and by the time this was lifted the concept had changed. The early art was no longer needed and today only low-quality reproductions survive. ABOVE The second piece of concept art from 1964 showing the booster separation phase. BELOW Coming in to land - the last piece of early Mustard art depicts the spacecraft, with the aid of its turbojets, about to touch down. Even at this stage Mustard was shown in all-white, despite the materials it was to be made from being gunmetal black. 130
CHAPTER FIVE MULTI UNIT SPACE TRANSPORT AND RECOVERY DEVICE ВАС had realised early on that one of Mustard s chief advantages was its cost- effectiveness. The savings made by developing only one vehicle, the report said, would significantly outweigh the higher cost of actually using the heavier Mustard system - even if it was used to put 4,500 tons into orbit over the course of ten years. It goes on to say: ‘For comparison, the Douglas Astro project is indicated; this project is a “TST” configuration. Its performance is claimed to be superior to the estimated “TST” performance. The differences have been examined in some detail and Astro weights for both structure and systems seem rather optimistic. A major criticism was that the “Astro” vehicles did not appear to be aerodynamically balanced. To correct this a structurally less efficient layout had to be adopted. However, if the Astro performance can be obtained by a “TST” configuration, the “Mustard” performance will be equally improved.’ When they were reasonably confident that the ‘TST’ arrangement could be dismissed in favour of the cluster, the Warton team turned their attention to working out which form of cluster was best. The design of Mustard units and the typical mission outlined in the report assumed a triangular cluster of three units for launch, but the report notes that ‘...other clustering arrangements have been and are being considered. If an arrangement could be found which did away with the necessity for the coast phase, e.g. fuel transfer during boost, a considerable system weight would be saved, gravity losses would be reduced, and overall reliability would increase.’ While this proved to be an unattainable goal in the short term, three different configurations were assessed in detail: three units divided into two stages (two for the first stage, one for the second); four units divided into two stages (three for the first stage, one for the second); and four units divided into three stages (two for the first stage, one for the second and the last for the third). It was found that the four-unit/two- stage arrangement always put a lower payload into space than the four- unit/three-stage one, so it could be safely ditched. The four-unit/three- stage arrangement even proved to be slightly better that the three-unit/two- stage cluster, but it was decided that ‘this advantage may be cancelled however by higher launch rate requirement due to lower reliability of the three-stage vehicle.’ Computer simulations BAC’s second hypersonics progress report was concluded with a wide range of possibilities for further research. It began with a list of sixteen areas of general research that were needed to address British technological weaknesses before moving on to general research that might be carried out by ВАС, and a set of seven more specific proposals for further research in the field of aerodynamics. The general research list included projects on working with liquid hydrogen and hydrazine, storing cryogenic rocket fuel in space for weeks at a time, operating hydraulic and electrical systems in extreme temperature environments, using digital computers, the mental and physiological suitability of humans to pilot spacecraft, cooled pressure suits, and a range of other cooling systems. It was stressed that more time should be spent carrying out parametric studies on Mustard sizes and weights: ‘The work so far has served to demonstrate to us the importance of the various parameters. Since the quality of our data must improve, a continuance of the parametric studies will enable us to determine optimum systems and sizes, with overall system costs as the criterion.’ Guidance systems for accurate control of re-entry were another grey area to be examined in more detail, and there was a desire to replicate NASA’s manned lifting-body experiments, as detailed in Chapter 4: ‘The success of the first stage of the М2 glider programme at Edwards AFB for what appears to be a ridiculously low cost, should be an incentive to try the same technique on the proposed shapes. We should like to investigate the design and cost with the intention in the near future of submitting a research proposal for such a programme.’ The Warton team also believed tests similar to those carried out by the manufacturer of the Mercury capsule might be useful for Mustard. By August 1964 McDonnell had launched three ASSET or Aerothermodynamic elastic Structural Systems Environmental Test vehicles. These were effectively scale models of the X-20 Dyna-Soar s forward nose section mounted atop surplus Douglas Thor and Thor-Delta missiles and blasted off on a suborbital trajectory at speeds of up to Mach 14. The goal was to test structures and materials under conditions resembling the re-entry of a spacecraft into the earth’s atmosphere. According to the ВАС report: ‘A rocket boosted structural model programme along the lines of the US McDonnell “ASSET” could well be the cheapest way of demonstrating the overall feasibility’ of the re-entry concept presented in this report. Furthermore, the necessary preliminary design, etc, could serve a very useful purpose in itself, since many of the problems, techniques, etc, inherent in the design of a full size vehicle would need to be tackled. We should like to investigate the problem of doing a programme along these lines starting with something perhaps less ambitious, to determine its worth, again with the intention of submitting an eventual research programme.’ 131
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE A McDonnell ASSET test vehicle sitting atop the nose of a Thor missile ready for launch. RIGHT AND BELOW These designs for the first Mustard wind tunnel model, known as the R12 and based on Schemes 1 to 4, were intended to be easily adaptable so that a variety of different configurations of wings, fins and forward fuselage could be tried. The seven proposals for further aerodynamic research were divided up into four wind tunnel test programmes, named Ae.R.30 to Ae.R.33, two studies using Wartons analogue computer flight simulator, Ae.R.34 and 35, and one theoretical programme, Ae.R.36. The first wind tunnel proposal involved investigating the performance, stability and control of a blunt lifting- body strongly resembling Mustard Scheme 3 at speeds of Mach 4 and Mach 132
CHAPTER FIVE MULTI-UNIT SPACE TRANSPORT AND RECOVERY DEVICE ABOVE Photographs of the R12 wind tunnel model with different arrangements of wings and fins. Records suggest that it was never actually tested. Efforts had been made to have tests carried out during the middle of 1964 but the wind tunnels at Warton already had a long waiting list of priority projects involving types such as the Canberra and Lightning. 6. Three different versions of the model, differing mainly around the nose, were to be studied at each speed, for a total of six models. The total cost of doing this would be £70,000, covering six months’ use of the 4 feet by 4 feet Mach 4 wind tunnel at Warton, and 200 runs in the sites Mach 6 tunnel. 133
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUniE VOLUMES ABOVE The second ВАС hypersonics report featured this diagram showing proposed wind tunnel models for the Mustard concept. The designs have features lacking from the R12 - such as the inclusion of pop-out turbojets. The next proposal, for flow tests on lifting-bodies, involved the use of facilities unavailable in Britain and would require the use of an American research lab such as Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory at Buffalo, New York. Again, a test model was to be used that looked similar to Mustard Scheme 3. Aerodynamic efficiency at Mach 10 was the third wind tunnel test, and the last involved aircraft-type boost vehicles (see Chapter 8). Wartons flight simulator would be used to work on two particularly difficult areas of Mustards space mission - orbital rendezvous and landing a lifting-body vehicle on a runway. The sample operation given in the report skimmed over these operations somewhat, saying simply that they would be carried out by the pilot. But piloting a space vehicle was likely to be anything but simple without full knowledge of the necessary techniques and a comprehensive training programme. The ВАС proposal for simulation of aerospace-plane landings’ states: ‘Extensive effort is being concentrated by the US on “lifting body” configurations with greater lifting capability and consequently greater flexibility and accuracy of return. Such vehicles open up the possibility of performing “conventional” landings instead of using the rather cumbersome parachutes or paragliders.’ It goes on to point out that the best vehicle shape for travelling at hypersonic speeds and surviving in an extreme heat environment ‘would not be entirely compatible with the requirements for a conventional landing. Therefore, if conventional landing is desired, some compromise must be reached and such a compromise will inevitably incur a weight penalty.’ The point of carrying out simulated landings was to ensure that this compromise did not swing too far in favour of an easy landing at the expense of high-speed extreme heat resistance: ‘Successful design compromises can only be achieved against a background knowledge of the minimum and desirable landing characteristics of the re-entry vehicle.’ Successful landings already performed by the North American X-15 are then discussed but the proposal notes: ‘It is conceivable that the approach pattern developed for the X-15 is inappropriate for low wing loading vehicles. A manoeuvre involving a more gentle “flare”, initiated at a higher altitude, during which the pilot makes final adjustments may be preferable. This poses a major problem for study by the simulator programme. A further point made in the discussion of X-15 results was that the good accuracy and repeatability of the landings was largely due to the “good” handling qualities of the aircraft. This point was not enlarged upon and there was no presentation of how “good” the handling must be for satisfactory performance. This would form the second main topic for investigation. - The touch-down accuracy achieved by the X-15 was excellent, but it must not be forgotten that the available landing ground measured 10 nautical miles by five nautical miles. This must have played a large part in providing pilot confidence. For operational purposes, the advantages of powered landings (possibly bang-bang control, i.e. small rocket motors) should not be 134
CHAPTER FIVE MULTI-UNIT SPACE TRANSPORT AND RECOVERY DEVICE ignored. This would form a third major study. In addition, the effects of gusts and steady winds, control layout (side-controller an advantage?) and fuel characteristics and possibly visibility would be involved.’ Wartons computer flight simulator was the result of more than a decade of development work in its own right. English Electric had acquired its first analogue computer in 1953 and built a flight simulator around it. This was developed further for use during the Lightning programme and further still for the TSR2. At the heart of the model being used by 1964 lay an Electrical Associates Inc Pace 231R, an English Electric Lace Mk 11 and Solartron analogue computing equipment. These were linked to a fixed base cockpit mock-up fitted with both conventional and side controllers, a full array of simulated aircraft instruments and a TV display tube in front of the pilot to simulate the view through the aircraft’s windscreen. The TV display showed a view of the Terravision system, which wras effectively a moving ‘belt’ with landscape features modelled onto it. As the simulated aircraft manoeuvred, the belt changed position to give the impression of movement. A substantially modified version of this was proposed to simulate the orbital rendezvous manoeuvres that Mustard would be required to make. At the time the report was written, however, it was unclear exactly what the pilot would see through his TV display: ‘The proposal is that a fixed-based simulator presents data to the pilot and allows him to control the interceptor to the target to achieve rendezvous. The loop is closed around an analogue computer which solves the “free-space” equations of motion. Initial studies would include obtaining suitable means of presenting the necessary information to the pilot for him to control the terminal phase, as well as the problems of impulsive and variable thrusting with regard to the fuel requirements.’ The final research proposal was to be an investigation of how new digital computers might be used to replace their analogue predecessors in aircraft systems, with the associated spin-off benefits for vehicles such as Mustard. The team at Warton had a long- standing interest in computers as a means of assessing vehicle design and this may well have been the proposal they were, in fact, most keen to pursue. Costing Mustard Working out exactly what Mustard was likely to cost was no easy task, but the Warton team knew from previous experience that a detailed estimate was essential if any sort of government contract was to be forthcoming. As with other aspects of Mustard’s design, examples from America were cited in the first instance. The section of the second hypersonics progress report that deals with cost begins by setting out two categories into which ‘next generation orbital operations’ were likely to fall. These were ‘the post Nova type of vehicle typified by the Douglas Rombus with a payload of about one million pounds, and the “space bus” concept of which the Douglas Astro is a good example with a payload of 20,000-30,0001b.’ Massive Rombus-type vehicles could be expected to have an operating cost of just $10 for every pound of weight put into orbit, while Astro types would cost a little less than $50 per pound. On this basis Rombus looked very attractive, but then the development costs had to be factored in - $5,106m for Rombus compared to $1,23Im for Astro. In other words, building Rombus would only be justified if large orbital payloads are contemplated, e.g. orbital assembly of a planetary mission or lunar base supply. For general orbital logistics, e.g. space station supply, satellite inspection, the smaller vehicle will be used.’ The actual and projected cost of various American aerospace projects was then examined, including Rombus, Astro, Saturn V, Saturn I, Saturn IB, General Dynamics’ TFX aircraft and Centaur rocket stage, Convair’s B-58 bomber, North American’s RS-70 reconnaissance aircraft and Navaho missile, Aerojet-General Corps Astroplane space vehicle, and Aerospace Corps ‘Wang’s Vehicle’. These were compared against European projects including Hawker Siddeley’s P.1154 fighter, BAC’s own TSR2 and Bristol 188 research aircraft, the ELDO launcher, and Dassault’s Mirage IIIV VTOL fighter. In conclusion, the report said: . .one of the chief attractions of the Mustard vehicle is that the initial development cost is reduced by as much as 25%. Mustard also has the advantage that a complete vehicle can be developed progressively from a single module. Thus the financial commitment for the final configuration could be withheld until late in the programme. Assuming a conversion rate of $5 per £1 the following average annual costs are obtained for the four-module Mustard vehicle: development period (five years) £47.3m, operational period (10 years) £24.4m. Such a programme is well within the capacity of Europe and would hardly cause widespread economic dislocation even if a single country undertook it as a national programme.’ The rise of Eurospace The remark about Europe was telling. Shortly before the completion of BAC’s second hypersonics progress report, a relatively new organisation had begun to make its presence felt - Eurospace. This was a body established to represent primarily the interests of the largest European aerospace companies in the field of space vehicle design and construction. Its formal establishment, in Paris on 29 May 1961, had followed joint studies carried out by Hawker Siddeley Aviation 135
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES and Societe pour 1’Etude et la Realisation d’Engins Ballistiques (SEREB), a consortium that included most of the French aerospace industry, including Nord Aviation, Sud Aviation, SNECMA, the ONERA, Dassault, Matra and SEPR. During early 1964 Eurospace, which now also counted German firms such as Junkers, Messerschmitt, Bolkow and Entwicklungsring Nord (ERNO - comprising Focke-Wulf, Weserflug and Hamburger Flugzeugbau) among its members, began to publicise a concept it called Aerospace Transporter. Similar in nature to the later versions of the American Aerospaceplane concept, or perhaps even based on them, this project called for designs that might form the basis of a future reusable launch system that the whole of Europe could get behind and support. While ВАС s space work had been carried out effectively in isolation, Hawker had been collaborating with its European partners and now the British two-horse race had opened out into a wide field of potential competition. Not that the Europeans regarded Aerospace Transporter as a direct competition. At this stage it was simply a gathering of ideas, but there were two important considerations that played on the minds of all concerned. First, if European governments did decide to back Eurospace, there might be a lot of money involved, and a company whose design was chosen for further development might well be in the driving seat when it came to claims on future work contracts. Second, the whole point of Eurospace was to build something ‘in- house’, without any overt American help, that could take off and land either from territory in Europe or from territory that could be said to be part of a European nations sphere of influence. Just as the company that came up with the ‘winning’ design was likely to receive large financial support, the area of land chosen as the launch site would also attract huge amounts of investment in terms of infrastructure. It would certainly be desirable to site the factories that would build the Aerospace Transporter as close as possible to the launch site, wherever that might be, with the accompanying prestige and economic benefits. ВАС had certainly grasped this fact and the following appears on the opening page of the second hypersonics progress reports recoverable rockets chapter: Tn considering future space systems, those in fact capable of carrying out routine space flights to a schedule, one factor is paramount. This is that unless the system can be launched and operated from Europe, within easy reach of its associated manufacturing, overhaul and technical establishments, then transport costs and time lost will affect the overall economy, and certain facilities will centre themselves around the launching site, wherever that may be. Europe, including Britain, is a highly populated area. Unfortunately, it comprises the western end of a large continent which means that the opportunity of making use of an ocean launching range for the more effective easterly launchings is denied us. It is possible to launch a polar orbit towards the north from Britain without encountering a land mass in the boost phase, but this only emphasises the restriction that would be forced on a European programme using present day launch systems. Economically, an easterly launching is mandatory for repetitive space flights. Also economically, in a wider sense, we must endeavour to be capable of launching from Europe. We must therefore accept launching over populated areas and full recovery of all boost stages is mandatory. This means full recovery; no debris at all. No interstages, fairings, separation packages etc. Also necessary is reliability up to aircraft standards. Allied to this is the possibility that all stages be piloted, not only for the part the pilot can play in the system, but also for the demonstration of human involvement. This might be necessary to ensure public acceptance in countries over-flown (it must be remembered that to the vast majority of people the pilot is the only difference between a missile and an aeroplane).’ The launch site had to be ‘European, but Britain still had the last vestiges of empire that could, at a pinch, be described as ‘British’ and therefore somewhat European, in spirit at least. Later on in its report, ВАС named two potential launch sites that were really anything but European: Christmas Island, which had become part of Australia in 1958, and Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, which was still part of the UK in 1964. The only truly British launch site put forward was the Hebrides, off the west coast of mainland Scotland. Sticking with Mustard As the members of Eurospace worked on their concepts, ВАС continued to refine Mustard and measure its chances of success against other booster configurations and space vehicle designs. Three configurations in particular were being taken seriously by other large aerospace concerns that had not formed part of the ВАС studies, largely because those studies were based on a contract that emphasised hypersonic speed and reusability. The report states: ‘So far, in the booster field, we have considered the airbreather and the vertical take-off recoverable rocket. We cannot discount other possible systems even if the only conclusion is that we are able to say that they are not competitive.’ The first was aircraft-like rockets: ‘Several US proposals have included horizontal take-off vehicles using rockets as the main propulsion means. Since this approach replaces the 136
CHAPTER FIVE MULTI-UNIT SPACE TRANSPORT AND RECOVERY DEVICE difficult intake/nozzle problems with the possibly simpler problem of fuel stowage associated with obviously higher fuel quantities it cannot presently be discounted. The second was ground-assisted launches, e.g. catapult. German and US proposals have included mention of catapult- assisted launching. A proper assessment of the penalties involved is required to measure against the velocity advantages.’ And finally there were the proven and simple but expensive and wasteful expendable rockets. ВАС felt that these might ultimately prove to be Mustard’s most formidable competitor. When Hypersonic Vehicles Progress Report No 2 was published there was still a month to run on the extension to BACs original contract, No KD/2X/2/CB7(c), but discussions had already been held with the RAE on whether this could be extended still further or a new contract issued. At a meeting held at Warton on 11 June 1964, Ray Creasey had asked RAE deputy director Lewis Nicholson whether the Ministry of Aviation was at present able to indicate whether airbreather developments or the Mustard idea would be preferred’ Nicholson said it was too early to decide this but he would be interested to see what the extent would be of test programmes of application to either.’ He added that ВАС should add ‘reconnaissance vehicle’ to ‘the priority list in the operational studies work; he was particularly concerned about the feasibility of return to base and to learn alternative paths in space for such a vehicle.’ At the end of the meeting, Nicholson told Creasey that Hawker Siddeley had asked that submission of its second progress report be delayed until the end of August, but he also said that earlier submission of BAC’s report would be welcomed. The date given on the cover of the report is August 1964, but it is likely that the second progress report was actually submitted as early as July. Discussion with the RAE continued, and by the end of September both Hawker Siddeley and ВАС were each in receipt of a new contract for further ‘hypersonics’ studies. While the former got No KD/2X/3/CB7(c), ВАС received No KD/2X/4/CB7(c). These ran from 1 October 1964 to 31 March 1965, and were worth £30,000 each - bringing the total sum spent on BACs hypersonics work by the Government to £142,000. Nicholson’s reconnaissance vehicle was not added, the terms of study remained the same, and a second major phase of work on Mustard began. RIGHT The cost and weight of various American projects set against European projects being run in parallel in this 1964 ВАС chart. 137
Chapter Six Operations in space ВАС Mustard 1965 ABOVE The Mustard Scheme 7 spacecraft glides back to base after a successful orbital surveillance mission. Daniel Uhr 138
CHAPTER SIX OPERATIONS IN SPACE ABOVE A cockpit bulge with true forward visibility for the pilot made its first appearance in the Mustard series with Scheme 5, shown in EAG 4454. The turbojets have now been relocated to the rear of the vehicle and each has its own pop-open intake. It soon became clear to ВАС that the members of Eurospace were concentrating almost exclusively on aircraft that took off from runways carrying space vehicles before boosting them into orbit - exactly the sort of configuration that the Warton team had already examined in detail and dismissed as impractical. This put the Mustard system in a strong position since ВАС knew from the outset that it was likely to be simpler and cheaper than its leading competitors. However, there remained some significant gaps in the technology needed to make Mustard a reality. With the basic structure and operational routine established, the design team at Warton now focused on addressing those gaps. First, though, some design niggles had to be ironed out. EAG 4454, Walley s first drawing under the second research contract, shows Mustard Scheme 5 with the unorthodox pop-out turbojet arrangement deleted and the engines neatly housed within the rear fuselage instead. Seated beside the four rocket engines, they are fed by a pair of flip-up intakes on the vehicles upper surface. The design is 11 feet longer than Scheme 4, at 99 feet, and in addition to the forward compartment a second cargo area is pictured at the rear of the vehicle between the turbojet intake pipes. The other major difference is at the front of the vehicle - the crew compartment has been reshaped to provide direct forward visibility for the pilot through a pair of windows somewhat reminiscent of those fitted to the X-15. Otherwise EAG 4454 is somewhat basic as a drawing, lacking any landing gear detail. Its follow-up, EAG 4463 showing Mustard Scheme 6, is based directly on it and shares many of the same dimensions and features but for one significant amendment. Scheme 6 lacks its predecessors quartet of rocket engines, being fitted instead with a single large engine exhausting through an aerospike nozzle. The aerospike concept involved effectively turning the traditional rocket engine inside out. The usual bell-shaped nozzle was replaced with a tapering spike. With the engine on, exhaust gases would run down the outside edge of the spike and form themselves into a natural ‘bell’ shape. As the vehicle climbed to high altitude and air pressure dropped, the exhaust ‘bell’ would grow larger and provide extra thrust. Scheme 6 is also depicted with a very low undercarriage; the usual nosewheel is present together with two skids to the rear. The next drawing, EAG 4464, shows a radical ‘skinless’ Mustard. Sandwiched between a pair of Mustard Scheme 6s is a third module minus its outer shell but retaining the aerospike rocket engine at its trailing edge. Most remarkably of all, a fourth vehicle sits on top of the naked Mustard, labelled ‘Apollo type capsule’. This represents the only suggestion that Mustard might have had the potential to be involved in a mission to the moon. There was certainly never any intention to send a Mustard unit beyond earth orbit, but EAG 4464 does demonstrate that the ВАС team regarded their multi-unit booster as being capable of putting a wide range of different payloads into space - including a lunar exploration vehicle. 139
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE The revised layout of Mustard Scheme 6 saw the usual four rocket engines replaced with a single large aerospike engine. The more compact nature of this propulsive system allowed for a repositioning and realignment of the turbojets. BELOW One of the oddest Mustard designs was the 'skinless' Mustard expendable booster of EAG 4464. This stripped-down shell-less tank structure and engine combination was designed to be sandwiched between two production-model Mustard Scheme 6 boosters with the goal of putting an Apollo-type capsule into orbit. The weight allowance given on the drawing for the capsule and its module, 50,000ib, is not far off the actual total weight of the Apollo 1 vehicle, which was 45,0001b. Overall length of the three boosters stacked together is given as ‘106ft (excluding escape tower)’. Precise detail on how the system might have operated is lacking, but it may have involved all three Mustards burning together to begin with, before the outer units detached in the lower atmosphere and the expendable skinless Mustard then boosted the spacecraft on to the final leg of its outward journey. 140
CHAPTER SIX OPERATIONS IN SPACE ABOVE The key Mustard vehicle of BAC's third hypersonics report was Scheme 7 of EAG 4465. Although by no means the final design, it became the basis for the Mustard Orbital Reconnaissance Unit - the first attempt to give the concept a clear role and mission. It was also the first module to have an all-skid landing gear. RIGHT A thermal map of Mustard Scheme 7's underside during re-entry. The diagram erroneously refers to 'EAG 4456', which was a Mach 10 cruise vehicle, when it means EAG 4465. Mustard Scheme 7, of EAG 4465, is what came to be regarded in BACs Hypersonics Progress Report No 3 of April 1965 as the definitive layout - in the same way that Scheme 4 had been at the time of the second progress report. Scheme 7 is the same length as Scheme 5 and its launch weight is given as 400,0001b, exactly double that usually specified for Scheme 4. The third progress report goes on to cite nine ways in which Scheme 7 is an improvement over Scheme 4, including the previously mentioned crew compartment reshaping, the extra cargo bay and the relocated turbojets. The other six improvements are a little less visually obvious but no less important: 141
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ‘Main forward bulkhead is moved forward to immediately aft of cabin; orbit manoeuvre and return fuel is now stored in tanks inside the main fuel tanks to reduce cryogenic storage problems; revised fuel tank shaping allows greater fuel volume utilisation; and the heavy vertical diaphragms separating the liquid oxygen and the liquid hydrogen fuel have been reduced in area by a half, thus reducing the weight of this critical item? rhe liquid oxygen tank was now to be made of either steel or a ‘super alloy’ on the ‘basis of information on the LEFT This comparison from the third hypersonics report illustrates the dramatic growth of Mustard from Scheme 4 to Scheme 7. Module length increased by just 11 feet, from 88 to 99 feet, and span by 15 feet from 55 to 70 feet, but weight had doubled. reactivity of titanium with oxygen which showed that it was a very explosive combination.’ This was clearly essential but made the tank heavier. Finally: ‘The layout of the rocket motors has been revised to suit the different thrust structure. Other detail design features remain virtually unchanged.’ This last improvement involved all four motors being positioned horizontally in a row, with the turbojets above the middle two. Three other new features went unmentioned: Mustard was now to land on an all-skid undercarriage, the Warton team having finally dispensed with the nosewheel; the two turbojet air intakes from Scheme 5 are combined into one large shared intake; and a hatch allowing direct crew access to the payload bay from the vehicle’s exterior is depicted. BELOW Throughout the first two years of Mustard's development there was a degree of uncertainty about the most effective launch configuration. By the time of the third progress report, the Warton team were leaning towards the stack as the most efficient, but it was still unclear precisely how many vehicles would be needed. EAG 4466 shows three Scheme 7 boosters, plus the spacecraft. 142
CHAPTER SIX OPERATIONS IN SPACE ABOVE AND BELOW The cluster launch formation had not yet been abandoned in 1965. EAG 4467 shows how a trio of Scheme 7s would have fitted together. A stack of four Mustard Scheme 7s, ready for take-off, is shown in EAG 4466, and a cluster of three is shown in EAG 4467. From this point on, a series of variant Mustard layouts, up to Scheme 14, was devised with the aid of early digital computer programmes to determine the optimum size and shape of the modules. Narrow delta Mustard EAG 4470 shows Mustard Scheme 8 with all the same features as Scheme 7 but packaged up in a different aerodynamic design. It was longer than any of its predecessors at 110 feet from its nose to the tips of its fins, and its delta wing lifting-body shape had a straight rather than curved leading edge. 143
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE Mustard Scheme 8 was a radical departure for the series. The characteristic Mustard curves were gone - a straight leading edge in their place - and the almost uniform thickness of previous designs was replaced with a slightly more bulbous form. The vehicle is shown in EAG 4470. This concept was taken even further in Scheme 9, shown on EAG 4471, with a design that swapped the ‘Lilo* layout of the earlier Mustards’ fuel tanks for one huge near- cylindrical central tank - liquid hydrogen at the front and liquid oxygen at the back - with smaller tanks on either side to contain the vehicle’s orbital manoeuvre fuel. The fuselage form became correspondingly thicker and more rounded to accommodate it and the rocket engines had to be rearranged into a two-up, two-down format. BELOW The basic premise of Mustard Scheme 8 was taken much further in Scheme 9 of EAG 4471. The vehicle was made narrower and still more bulbous, dramatically altering the Mustard shape. A central fin was reintroduced and the side fins were given a variable geometry capability, able to fold down to horizontal for better lift and manoeuvring after re-entry. 144
CHAPTER SIX OPERATIONS IN SPACE ABOVE Perhaps the least Mustard-like Mustard was the 128-foot-long Scheme 10 of EAG 4472. The lifting-body aspect of its design was barely in evidence and it relied on moveable side fins, which had really become wings, in order to provide the lift that the body itself no longer offered. The central fin was also retained. Mustard Scheme 9 also reintroduced a central tailfin - a feature not seen since Scheme 1 - which required the turbojet intake to be split into two again and the engines themselves to be splayed out on either side. Length was extended still further to 120 feet and the all-skid undercarriage was retained. The nosewheel would play no further part in Mustard design studies. Measuring 128 feet from end to end, Scheme 10 of EAG 4472 is the largest known Mustard arrangement, despite weighing the same as every other scheme from 7 onward - 400,0001b. Building on Scheme 9, it retains the large central split fuel tank for liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen and the smaller side- tanks for manoeuvring fuel. The rocket engines are again shown in a two-up, two-down arrangement, and the turbojets are again divided by an enormous central fin. Apart from its sheer size, Scheme 10 s other key feature is its variable-geometry fins, which could be raised up 60° for launch. This gave it an overall fins-up width of 42 feet, and 64 feet with them down. Scheme 11, shown in EAG 4473, returned to the length and plan view form of Scheme 8, with its dead straight leading edges, but its internal structure differed. The fuel tanks were dramatically altered so that the vehicle could assume a more uniform shape in profile and its turbojets remained divided even without a large central fin to physically separate them. The twelfth Mustard appears in EAG 4474 and is a redrawn version of Scheme 11. The cockpit bulge is reduced in size, the portholes being diminished also, and the internal fuel tank structure is rearranged to position the two circular cargo compartments more centrally for better weight distribution. Other features and dimensions are largely carried over from the earlier design. Scheme 13, of EAG 4476, appears faint and indistinct in the original drawing, but a redrawn version created for the third hypersonics progress report reveals its true shape - another highly swept form but longer than Schemes 11 and 12, and with enormous moveable fins. The Warton team picked out Schemes 7, 11 and 13 for special attention and discussed them in the April 1965 report: ‘Three different module layouts have been schemed to the point where a preliminary (but detailed) weight estimate could be prepared. In each case the plan area, crew compartment and fuel tankage volume are identical. Plan form was progressively changed, and the tank configuration modified to suit the resulting shape. Aerodynamic balance of the three layouts becomes increasingly difficult; indeed, the low speed characteristics of Scheme 13 necessitate drooping the tip-fins to achieve the required aerodynamic- centre position. It is known from previous work that this difficulty is due to the adoption of an unmodified delta shape, and that a cure can be effected by modifying the planform after the fashion of Scheme 7? 145
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE Mustard Scheme 11 was similar to Scheme 8 in plan view but differed in profile. Its form was flat from front to rear and its rocket engines were rearranged into a quad. It appeared in EAG 4473 and, like Scheme 8, it also lacked a central fin. It was decided that fitting all the parts needed to make the fins of Scheme 13, and also Scheme 10, movable would add too much weight. In addition, there would need to be gaps in the outer shell’s otherwise seamless skin to give the fins room as they changed position, and large moving panels might be a source of reliability issues too. And, since fins were BELOW Another revision of the Scheme 8 and 11 design, Mustard Scheme 12 was differentiated by changes in fuel tank structure - particularly at the front of the vehicle, where the forward compartment was squashed up into the nose to allow more room for fuel. 146
CHAPTER SIX OPERATIONS IN SPACE ABOVE AND RIGHT The original drawing showing Mustard Scheme 13, EAG 4476, is faint and apparently incomplete. The same vehicle design appears in plan view in the third hypersonics report, however, where its true shape is immediately apparent. Its main distinguishing feature was a pair of gigantic fin/wings. BELOW A Mustard ensemble. Pictured from left are Schemes 8, 9, 10 and 11. Luca Landino 147
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 essential to give a narrow delta wing shape enough lift, it was decided that Mustard should retain the curvier Scheme 7-type form, which could do without them. Mustard Scheme 14 was still unfinished as the third hypersonics progress report was being finalised. Cluster versus stack As well as explaining how and why Mustard units of different sizes and shapes had been assessed, Hypersonics Progress Report No 3 also offered a series of lengthy appendices that outlined the missions for which Mustard might be best suited, the experimental vehicles that might be built to test the concept, and the computer programmes that might be used to gather further data useful to the project. First, though, it revisited the way in which the Mustard modules ought to be arranged on the launch pad and came down heavily in favour of stacking, rather than the clustering highlighted in the second progress report. It states: ‘Two methods of grouping the modules for launch are possible. “Stacking” is the arrangement currently in favour, and the advantages of this method over “clustering” can be simply stated. Two, three or more modules can be stacked together, the cluster method only works for the designed number. Stacked units are locked together on structure near the thrust units and concentrated masses. Clustered units are of necessity fastened together near the “wing-tip”, thus requiring structure which would otherwise be unnecessary. Aerodynamically the base area of the “stack” is virtually the sum of the unit base areas; it is difficult (but not impossible) on the cluster to avoid having a large roughly triangular base which not only increases drag, but could lead to recirculation or acoustic problems. The upper or forward-facing surface of one module in a “cluster” during boost is presented to the air flow at a larger angle than on the “stacked” system, giving rise to high airloads. This loading is higher than that of any other part of an orbital mission and is to be avoided if possible as a design-case (it should be mentioned that local pressures in the channels between “stacked” units are not amenable to calculation, and a test programme is required to determine if there is a problem here).’ 1*T & 3” STAGES RECOVERABLE !tt& combined г^з*0 STAGES RECOVERABLE SIMILAR RECOVERABLE UNITS IDENTICAL RE- COVERABLE UNITS BALLISTIC WINGED LIFTING BODY LIFTING BOWlWINGED ~4b-IO 14-20 LIFTING BODY l/d-0-05 Wo-15-2 0 l/d = I0 %-10 BELOW No fewer than thirteen different launch configurations appear in this diagram from BAC's third hypersonics progress report. On the left is the classic expendable rocket booster, while flying up above are four different P.42-type horizontal take- off boosters. One of them even carries a Mustard-type orbiter. Flying on the right is an example of the type being proposed by Junkers, Lockheed and Martin Marietta. The first five designs on the left below show various arrangements using the English Electric recoverable booster, and next to them is the Douglas Astro. Finally, bottom right, is the Mustard system. FIRST STAGE m AIR V» m 15TSTAGE RECOVER -ABLE NON RECOVER -ABLE ROCKET P “ 73 MlGLAS ASTRO I'MUSTARD' SYSTEH REDUCED COST. MODULAR CONCEPT. R E C 0 HIGH-CHREKE5 COST OF MANUFACTURE LOX-KERFUEL, RECOVERY OF MANNED > PAYLOAD KRYCOSTLY. TIGH RE-ENTRY TEMKMl -UElxMOTOR IN 3“ STAGE INCREASES FLEXIBILITY . &MASS RECOVERED. IMPROVED FLEXIBILITY! CONVENTIONAL MATERIALS.LOX-LH,, LOWCfeW*; ALLUNITS ULLOW-CkWS BOTH STAGES. HIGH COST. IMPROVED REENTRY* FOOTPRINT' ’ HORIZONTAL LANDING. 0 T A L R I V E R C MANNED Iя S STAGE WITH LOX-LH. Z" STAGE WITHLOWY ьЧ/s CONVENTIONAL RE'dOcED COST. REDUCES RE ENTRY MATERIALS, LOX- IMPROVED FLEXIBI TEMPSl^ ALLOWS --------- ----------------- CONVENTIONAL MATERIALS. HTOaVTO TRANSPORT JUNKERS LOCKHEED • A MARTIN. 148
CHAPTER SIX OPERATIONS IN SPACE RIGHT ВАС agonised over whether the stack or cluster would be better for Mustard. Despite firm evidence in favour of the stack, the cluster continued to appear in the company's reports, as shown in this drawing. Essentially, a cluster created all sorts of problems that the stack was able to avoid. Perhaps the deciding argument was the fact that using a stack appeared to resolve an issue that had dogged the Mustard concept since its inception - the need for a wasteful 60-second coasting’ phase during launch when the booster vehicles had to transfer fuel to the spacecraft. The report says: ‘It is believed that with a clustered arrangement, to prevent an extreme out-of-balance condition existing, fuel must be burnt equally from all three units to staging velocity. At this point a brief coast phase must take place to allow fuel to be transferred from the two “boost” modules to refill the spacecraft module. During the boost phase of the “stacked” system fuel is burnt from the two outer “booster” modules by the motors of all three modules. Thus the fuel transfer takes place during the boost, no balance problem exists, and the transfer coast phase disappears, along with its gravity-loss penalty and possible lower reliability. Work is still continuing with both schemes in mind, until the respective penalties can be properly assessed.’ Shipboard Mustard Part of BAC’s contract that had not been thoroughly addressed by either of the first two progress reports was the study of boost-glide vehicles, that is an aircraft accelerated rapidly up to high speed then allowed to glide for the rest of its mission - in a similar manner to that intended for the American X-20 Dyna-Soar. RIGHT The possible routes that could be flown by a boost-glide version of Mustard are shown in this diagram from the third hypersonics report. 149
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES Now the Warton team moved to redress the balance with another novel launch arrangement for Mustard: a single unit taking off on its own. It was decided that in order to create a truly successful long-range sub-orbital boost-glide vehicle, able to withstand extreme speeds and temperatures, it would be necessary to build something with capabilities approaching those of a spacecraft. According to the third progress report, ‘this of course means that the boost-glide vehicle must be “staged”, and that the lifting re-entry technique proposed for the “Mustard” space- transporter can again be called upon. With this in mind, the Mustard system was re-examined as a terrestrial transport’ that could travel from one place to another within the earths atmosphere, rather than going into orbit and returning to its original base. A large 400,0001b unit fitted with advanced high-pressure rocket engines would have a sub-orbital range of about 3,000 nautical miles, minus a few hundred if it was required to launch westwards, against the direction of the earths rotation. Range would decrease again if the unit needed to be fitted with turbojets to help it land. The report noted that launching from Britain, ‘a vehicle with a range of about 3,000 nautical miles does not appear to have any operational value in this role. It could, however, be quite useful in other parts of the world, e.g. operating over Indonesia as a reconnaissance vehicle between Darwin and Singapore.’ During the early to mid-1960s, Indonesia was led by the Soviet-allied government of the country’s first president, Sukarno, and therefore of interest to the British. ВАС even suggested that ‘...with a range of 4,000 miles and a mobile base, e.g. a ship in the Indian Ocean, vehicles could return to the United Kingdom but the potentially hostile territory covered would be small. A very large module would be required to carry out this mission, bearing in mind the effects of launching westwards. In addition, during the second half of the flight, the vehicle would be re-entering and the difficulties with photography under such conditions would require close examination.’ The report does not say so, but the technology needed to successfully launch a single Mustard unit from a ship being tossed around in the Indian Ocean in order to pursue a very brief photographic mission over, say, East Germany, was substantially beyond the state of the art in 1965. Using two Mustard units to form a boost-glide vehicle was an entirely more reasonable proposition, however. With eight rocket engines firing together, a final boost speed of 25,500 feet per second, or Mach 22, was possible. This would enable the ‘antipodal’ vehicle to reach Australia from the UK in less than an hour and it would only cost the same as a Mustard system designed to reach orbit. It wasn’t all good news for the sub- orbital Mustard, though: ‘There are two other factors, however, which can be said to favour the orbital system. Firstly, the vehicle lands back at its launching site with the data collected. This is considerably better than having to transmit it back to the UK from Australia. Secondly, on the political plane, the orbital vehicle may be accepted as a satellite and allowed to pass over unfriendly territory. On the other hand, the antipodal vehicle may be regarded in the same light as a U-2, although the vulnerability of either system is probably the significant political fact.’ Surely a means of travelling from London to Sydney in half an hour would be worth pursuing though? Not exactly: BELOW Among the many ideas for potential Mustard missions was that of sub-orbital airliner. One-way tickets for a seat on the once-a-week London to Sydney 'antipodal vehicle' had an expected price tag of £15,000-£20,000 in 1965, the equivalent of £262,000-£350,000 today. It would have been quite a ride for those who could afford it, however. Daniel Uhr 150
CHAPTER SIX OPERATIONS IN SPACE RIGHT This simple diagram from а ВАС report depicts Mustard as a turbojet- powered 100-passenger supersonic airliner - but only as an example comparing lifting body forms with conventional supersonic transport designs. ‘The 20,000lb payload antipodal vehicle operating once per week is an interesting passenger transport. However, the one-way fare would be about £15,000-£20,000 per passenger, for the three module vehicle, of which 50% would be amortisation of development costs? A ticket price of £15,000-£20,000 in 1965 equates to £262,000-£350,000 today. Spies in space With Mustard’s design fine-tuned and its launch formation updated, the third progress report next addressed the uses to which the system might be put. No specific requirement for a space launcher had been forthcoming from the Ministry of Aviation, and no further guidance had been given to ВАС on what, exactly, such a system might actually be needed for. Research funding had kept coming, though, so the Warton team attempted to work out for themselves what Mustard was capable of. Under the heading of operational considerations’, the report said that efforts had been made . .to examine as much as possible of the range of space missions which can reasonably be foreseen, and during this examination to demonstrate that a space- transporter system using recoverable rockets (as typified by the “Mustard” concept) can perform very well in every one of these missions, and in some cases, exceptionally well. Furthermore recoverable rocket systems perform certain missions which are completely impossible by other means. It is worth remembering that the “Mustard” system is tailored so that all these missions can be based, and launched anywhere, even in this country.’ ВАС foresaw that the most likely missions for Mustard would involve satellites. Exactly why satellites were so important was outlined in great detail, with particular reference to the benefits that the Americans were already believed to be receiving from systems such as the ‘highly classified Samos satellite, one of which is launched at intervals of about one month to six weeks and has a lifetime of a few days.* Samos, an acronym for Satellite And Missile Observation System, involved a satellite taking reconnaissance photographs from orbit and dropping the film back to earth in a capsule. In fact, the Samos programme is believed to have ended in 1962, whereas the similar Corona system was used throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, with its final launch taking place in 1972. ВАС also believed, probably correctly, that the Russians had achieved a similar capability with their Kosmos satellites. The report noted: ‘The apparent invulnerability of orbiting vehicles and the precedent which they have created of overflying hostile territory makes them an obvious choice for reconnaissance purposes. In comparison with other possible systems such as hypersonic aircraft and sub-orbital vehicles, an orbital system (in spite of its high initial and operating costs: Atlas- Agena is approximately $8m per shot), appears to give the cheapest coverage, i.e. in terms of cost per nautical square mile covered. But, since all areas reconnoitred are not of equal value and the resolution obtainable is likely to vary for different systems, a great deal more needs to be done on cost- effectiveness studies to arrive at logical standards of comparison. However, the advantages of orbital reconnaissance are in some respects impossible to assail.’ Using satellites for photographic reconnaissance and surveillance presented some serious problems, however: ‘In considering what can be done from space, an immediate concern is that the information shall be useful. For example, inaccurate guidance, incorrect selection of area to be reconnoitred, cloud cover or poor quality pictures all may make the mission useless. However, with larger payloads available and hence the ability to carry man and various sensors, the amount of useful information should be greatly improved.’ 151
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 The report then examined the various sensor packages that might be fitted to satellites, such as television image tubes, infrared scanners and radar, and non- imaging sensors such as nuclear radiation detectors and radio signal monitors. It also looked at the benefits of satellites for predicting weather patterns, carrying telephone signals, and ‘...with the possibility of orbiting larger payloads a synchronous satellite could be developed which could relay high-quality television pictures direct to domestic receivers. Television programmes originating on the ground would be beamed up to the satellite which would re-transmit them back to a ground area of several million square miles.1 Finally the report looked at the Transit satellite navigation system, a precursor to the Global Positioning System, or GPS, which allowed any observer on the earths surface to determine his present position? Hostile enemy satellites In making the case for Mustard as a satellite launch system, ВАС argued that conventional multi-staged expendable rockets could be expensively unreliable: ‘It is believed that since each launch is virtually a first test-flight, 100% success can never be attained, and the occasional partial or complete loss of the use of a satellite will occur due to a faulty launch.1 Not only that, once the rocket had done its job and the satellite was in orbit, there was no way to correct it if it failed to deploy as expected, and no way to fix it if it had suffered damage during launch or went wrong due to mechanical breakdown. However, the report went on: ‘...let us suppose that an artificial satellite, after functional tests, is loaded into the cargo hold of the spacecraft unit of a manned space- transporter such as “Mustard11. During boost the satellite is afforded protection by the launch vehicle. The manoeuvre capability of the Mustard unit ensures that the precise orbit required is achieved. The satellite is then released from the hold, and manoeuvred free of the vehicle on a handling arm or probe. Aerials, etc, can then be extended (manually if required!) and final functioning checks in true environment can be carried out. If all is satisfactory the satellite is then released and the spacecraft unit performs a re-entry and lands back on earth (most probably at the launch site). If the final checks are unsatisfactory, the satellite can be re- stowed, and with the certain knowledge of what went wrong, brought back for correction.1 No provision was ever made for Mustard to be fitted with a handling arm or probe, and extracting cargo from the hold after first space-walking over to it via the vehicles exterior was problematic, but these problems were expected to be addressed later in the design process. BELOW Watching the watcher: with concern growing in 1965 about the potential for Soviet orbital weapons, satellite inspection would have been a likely Mustard mission. Daniel Uhr 152
CHAPTER SIX OPERATIONS IN SPACE A cost figure of £1.5 to £2 million was given for putting a 2,000lb satellite into space using an expendable rocket, compared to a cost of just £150,000 for doing the same job using Mustard - excluding development costs in both cases. Given that the cost of one satellite was expected to be £7 million, ‘the ability to place it precisely in its planned orbit and check that it is operating satisfactorily, is a major advantage.’ Putting satellites into orbit was one thing, but Mustard might also be called upon to take a closer look at satellites that were already there. During the early 1960s there was a growing realisation that the Soviet Union might well decide to position surveillance satellites above Britain to gather intelligence. Furthermore, it was feared that the Soviets might trying to arm one of their space vehicles with weapons, nuclear or otherwise, that could be fired against ground targets from orbit. If this was the case, the ‘delivery time - the time between the weapon being launched and the target being hit - would be perilously short. Another alternative was to simply put a manoeuvrable bomb into orbit. If needed, thrusters on the bomb could be activated that would began an automatic re-entry process, bringing it down on a pre-selected target. The ВАС progress report states: ‘At present, the fact that any potential enemy satellite is “hostile” is very difficult, if not impossible, to deduce from the ground. Therefore it may be necessary to inspect at close quarters to determine whether a satellite poses a serious enough threat to warrant destruction or other action. Initially ground stations would ascertain orbital parameters and, if possible, vehicle characteristics; also if command links could be determined, attempts at command take-over may be made. However, it is most likely that an orbiting inspection system would be required to make a closer inspection and if necessary to achieve disablement. Such a system may be made co- orbital with the “hostile” satellite and by employing various techniques (optical, infrared, etc) it could determine more precisely its nature and possible threat. For this system it is considered that a man would be invaluable. If the hostile satellite was not within the rendezvous capability of the inspection spacecraft then it could launch a probe which would rendezvous with and inspect the satellite before being recovered.’ Since the Soviet Union was thought to be developing orbiting weapons, ВАС also suggested that Mustard might form a basis for Britain’s own space- based attack or defence system. The report states: ‘With vehicles capable of carrying large payloads into orbit, consideration must be given to the fact that these payloads could consist of weapons. This offers the possibility of a new weapon- delivery system. With a number of weapon satellites and/or military space stations in orbit, at least one would be within range of any target and could on command discharge its weapons. The principle advantage of such a system is the short delivery time, but problems of cost and malfunctions obviously need detailed examination. Along with the possible detection and tracking of ballistic missiles from space there is the possibility of carrying an anti-missile, similarly in the case of a satellite inspection system. However, here again comparisons with other systems on cost-effectiveness grounds are needed.’ The Warton team did most of its work on ‘the inspection or disablement of “hostile” satellites’, but also suggested that Mustard might be suitable for the manned inspection and maintenance of‘friendly’ satellites. Recce Mustard It was thought that Mustard would be very useful as a reusable supply vessel for orbiting space stations of the sort that America was considering throughout the 1960s. Had the US gone ahead with a programme such as its Manned Orbiting Laboratory, there may well have been a place for Mustard on the resupply roster. According to the Warton teams assessment: ‘Although several hundred thousand pounds of cargo would be sufficient to maintain a small space station for 10 years, millions of pounds of cargo will be required for the more ambitious NASA schemes now being discussed. This support mission for a space station, involving as it does repeated and regular launchings at maximum payload capacity, will almost certainly be the over-riding design case for the recoverable rocket launching system, and has indeed been considered so in our “Mustard” scheme.’ There was an alternative to supporting an American space station, or even constructing a British or European one: Mustard itself could be used as a semi- permanent space station, a concept similar in some ways to the Spacelab modules flown aboard the Space Shuttle from 1983 to 1998. The report said: ‘It is possible to consider the “Mustard” spacecraft unit as a self- launching space station, which carries into the required orbit equipment, crew, and supplies sufficient for a normal crew rotation period. When the time comes, the replacement crew and fresh supplies are ferried up from earth by the space transporter system, and the retiring crew, experimental results, etc, exchanged and returned to earth. Although the freight hold of the 400,0001b “Mustard” unit has a usable volume of 1,000 cubic feet, not counting the flight crew compartment, it is conceivable that 153
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES for a “permanent” station, this vehicle might be volume limited. In this case the crew launched with the station would consist of engineers, their job being to make the necessary alterations to allow some portion of the now empty tank volume to be utilised as living space, storage space, or zero “g” laboratories.’ Five ‘important advantages’ of using Mustard as a space station over a long time period were given, including dual use of the basic Mustard vehicle design, relative cheapness, built-in attitude controls, ready-made crew cabin, and ‘finally a most important and unique advantage: the entire space-station can perform a re-entry and landing back on earth if an emergency should arise which dictates such an action.’ Mustard was also volunteered for duty as a short-term reconnaissance station - short-term because the crew would live and work on board for around two weeks but would return home when their supplies ran out, rather than being resupplied by another vehicle. ВАС had high hopes for this idea and even went so far as to produce a detailed description of a Mustard unit adapted for a reconnaissance mission complete with surveillance cameras, reconnaissance camera, sideways-looking radar and electronic countermeasures. It is shown in drawing EAG 4475, which uses Mustard Scheme 7 as a basis. An 18-inch focal length camera and 9-inch film, on a unit orbiting 100 miles high, would produce a picture width of 50 nautical miles with a ground resolution of 25 feet. Orbiting at 250 nautical miles above the earth, the same camera would cover 125 nautical miles per image with a resolution of 63 feet. This low-resolution equipment could be used for ‘many purposes of identification, mapping, fix point data, etc.’ For true tactical reconnaissance, however, an 8-foot focal length camera could be fitted. At 100 miles altitude, this would give a picture covering just 10 square nautical miles, but with a ground resolution of 5-6 feet. Without any form of optical compression to get a better resolution from a shorter lens, Mustard could accommodate lenses up to 10 feet long. This lengthy camera, fitted within the crew compartment, could be gimballed too, allowing for fine manual adjustments. Mustard was less well suited to the installation of sideways-looking radar, however. It was hoped that such a system could be fitted so that a radar map of the ground could be seen, but ‘the size of present day aerials, which would be required to obtain a reasonable resolution from orbital altitudes, cannot be accommodated.’ It was hoped that the development of a synthetic aperture or synthetic array could resolve the problem. It was also stated that ‘...the provision of electronic countermeasures would appear to be worth considering. They can be divided into two parts: active measures, or jamming; and passive measures, or listening. Whether jamming would be used in a “cold-war” environment is questionable, as is what form it would take (wide-band jamming or decoys, etc). Listening, being purely passive, is analogous to photo-reconnaissance and attempts to establish the location and characteristics of electronic LEFT Shown in EAG 4475 is a Mustard Scheme 7 module fitted out with a gimballed high-resolution camera in its nose and three further cameras behind the pilot, radar equipment, electronic listening gear and countermeasures. The vehicle is described as an 'orbital reconnaissance unit' with the note 'upper surface of unit faces earth on this mission'. 154
CHAPTER SIX OPERATIONS IN SPACE defences. This information could be displayed for direct viewing on cathode ray tubes or recorded for later analysis on video tape. With the payload capability of the proposed Mustard vehicle, it is considered that all of the systems discussed could be installed in a reconnaissance version. However, in order to define the systems more fully it is obvious that much more information of classified nature is required.’ Project Crest Following the submission of BACs Hypersonic Vehicles Progress Report No 2 to both the Ministry of Aviation and the RAE, discussions had been held regarding the proposals for further research that it set out, but no firm decisions were made. In preparing for the third progress report, these same proposals were revisited and refined, while two new proposals for practical flying Mustard test vehicles were added. The first of these, Project CREST, was another acronym, standing for Combined Re- Entry and Structural Test. However, this explanation of the name does not seem to appear in documentation until 1968, and it has been suggested that initially it was named ‘Cress’, a botanical relative of Mustard, but with a ‘t* substituted for the second ‘s’ to avoid sounding too frivolous. Subtitled ‘a research proposal for a free flight rocket launched blunt lifting body’, the project’s goal was to design, build and fly an unmanned hypersonic lifting-body vehicle ‘in order to investigate lightweight structural concepts, hypersonic stability and control, and the ability of nickel super-alloy structures to withstand the implied heating rates and temperatures.’ It was hoped that the process of seeing the project through to completion would also help to establish manufacturing techniques that could be used during the production of Mustard itself. The Crest vehicle was to have a thick modified-delta wing designed in close cooperation with the RAE. Just like Mustard, it was to have a ‘hot’ external shell made up of frames covered with corrugated skin panels - made from Rene 41 on the underside and titanium on top. In place of fuel tanks, an internal structure containing the vehicle’s scientific equipment was to be suspended from swinging links. It was hoped that Crest could be launched atop a first-stage Saunders- Roe/Westland Black Arrow rocket, which had just been ordered into production during the autumn of 1964. The suggested alternative was a Douglas Thor missile; this was particularly apt since surplus Thors returned to the US by Britain a year earlier had already been used to launch McDonnell’s ASSET vehicle, which had provided the template for the Crest proposal. Having been launched inside a protective outer shield, the Crest vehicle would climb to 240,000 feet before separating from both its booster rocket and the shield. Now travelling unprotected at just over 9,500 feet per second, the vehicles skin would be subjected to temperatures in the region of 927°C. This would test how well its structure could withstand the most extreme levels of heat Mustard was expected to encounter during operations. Crest trials were to take place on the Westerly Woomera range in Australia and it was expected that the sheer velocity achieved and distance travelled would require the installation of additional down-range instrumentation, not to mention the use of long-range recovery equipment. BELOW Just as McDonnell's ASSET vehicles had been fired on ballistic trajectories using Thor missiles, so it was proposed to launch a Mustard test vehicle, known as Crest, atop a similar booster. The first drawing to show this configuration was EAG 4461. Crest was to be contained within an interstage heat shield until it reached an apogee of around 240,000 feet. The vehicle would then leave the shield and make a gliding descent, followed by a vertical parachute landing. 155
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 Five flying Crests would need to be built, together with another two for static testing, but unlike every other ВАС research proposal there was no estimated cost given. The report ruefully noted: ‘For several reasons, it is impossible to make a valid estimate of the total cost of this programme. This is greatly to be regretted, but stems from uncertainties on the following items: a) Booster configuration and capability, b) existing and planned Woomera range capability, c) the new technology of foil-gauge super-alloy structures.’ It was proposed that Project Crest would be divided into two phases. Phase 1, lasting a year, would include preliminary vehicle design and wind tunnel testing, work on control and telemetry equipment, checks to ensure compatibility with the Woomera range facilities, and finally a full costing of the remainder of the project. Phase 2, expected to take a further two and a half years, would encompass final design work on the vehicle itself, its mode of attachment to the chosen launcher and other associated equipment, construction of the seven gliders, their transportation to and assembly at Woomera, the flight tests themselves, and finally interpretation of the flight test results. The most important element of Mustards design that Crest could not test, however, was the cryogenic liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen fuel tanks. ВАС had wanted to study this - had even put forward a detailed proposal to do so - but the RAE decided that it would do the necessary testing itself. It was a decision that gave ВАС great cause for concern. The report stated: ‘Proposals are in the process of formulation by Space Department RAE (LHSV panel) for a basic materials study centred on ELDO second stage cryogenics requirements. The work as presently planned is going to be limited by lack of facilities, even considering the small scale of the investigation; and the time-scale is such as to cause concern. It is our opinion that to restrict the scope of the initial study to, say, material testing only, without a parallel consideration of the problems of cryogenic vessel behaviour and manufacturing techniques may result in the derivation of superfluous data. Our original proposal catered for the testing in hard vacuum of a small-scale double-bubble vessel, suitably phased in with materials testing and with an overall programme time-scale of three years. This programme included the provisioning of facilities in an initial nine month period during which fabrication studies would be continuing. Furthermore, the reusable re- entry vehicle concept will involve a hot, tanks-empty phase and neglect of this, while not relevant to expendable booster vehicles, could well result in failure to recognise an alloy which would be efficient in all applications. It is recognised that a large amount of materials and structure data can be derived which contributes to general qualitative assessments, but the majority of which provides little quantitative design information.’ In short, the tests proposed by the RAE did not go far enough, nor would their results necessarily be directly applicable to the design and construction of Mustards fuel tanks. BELOW AND RIGHT Drawing EAG 4462 provided a detailed cutaway view of the proposed unmanned Crest test vehicle. Its nose contained nothing but ballast and in place of the engine was its 'landing system' - which seems to have comprised a large inflatable ring. The second part of the drawing shows how a successful test of the vehicle was expected to unfold. 156
CHAPTER SIX OPERATIONS IN SPACE Lifting-body glider At the time of BAC’s third hypersonics progress report, three of the seven proposals for further aerodynamic research outlined in the second report had apparently been chosen by the RAE ‘with a view to contracts being placed’ The first was Ae.R.30, a wind tunnel study of blunt lifting-body shapes. ВАС noted: ‘This is considered as an initial part of a programme to test various shapes. RAE and ВАС would agree on the precise shape to be tested. This could clearly be affected by the outcome of the Crest proposals.’ Ae.R.32 was another wind tunnel study, this time to study camber and trim on high-speed vehicles, and had aroused interest because ‘knowledge would be obtained about Mach 4 aerodynamics’. And Ae.R.34 was designed to use Warton’s analogue computer flight simulator to look at how an aerospace plane might be landed. The report stated: ‘We understand that Aero Flight Department RAE are interested in this proposal.’ Comments were also being awaited on a fourth proposal, Ae.R.36, the use of digital techniques in guidance and control systems, but now three new research proposals were put forward: Ae.R.42 covering Crest, Ae.R.43 the construction of a lifting-body glider, and Ae.R.44 low-speed wind tunnel tests on lifting-body shapes. The latter two, in conjunction with Crest, would provide test data on lifting- body forms across the speed spectrum and, where Crest was loosely based on ASSET, the glider would be loosely based on the ‘М2’ vehicle still being tested by NASA at Edwards Air Force Base. The glider proposal’s stated aim was to ‘obtain in an efficient and economic way, information on the low-speed flying and handling qualities of a lifting re-entry shape. To this end we propose the manufacture of a wooden, steel tube braced glider.’ Preliminary designs are shown in three very slightly different versions of drawing EAG 4455. The vehicle was to be 26 feet long and 8ft 4in high with a span of 16ft 8in. Plan area was 200sq ft and maximum all-up weight was 4,0001b. In the annotations to one version of the drawing, its general shape is stated to be that of Mustard Scheme 5 from drawing EAG 4454. According to the report, however, ‘the shape is amenable to variation during the scheming phase and discussion of its features will take place with members of the RAE.’ The glider was designed to be built quickly and at low cost, with the result that ‘it will also be possible to introduce easily any shape or functional modifications found to be interesting in the subsequent test programme.’ Among the aspects of Mustard’s design to be tested were the ‘acceptable degree of bluntness’ needed by a bulbous lifting-body vehicle to survive the hostile environment it would encounter during its return from space and then land safely. The report said that this would be dictated by two factors: ‘Firstly the desired footprint area of permissible landings and secondly the ability to control the vehicle at low speed and land it. It is the second factor which is to be examined by this proposal. BELOW ВАС had high hopes that building and flying a manned glider version of Mustard, its shape based on Scheme 5, would generate public and government enthusiasm and support for the project in addition to providing valuable test data. The first version of the design is shown in EAG 4455 issue 1. 157
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE The second version of the Mustard glider, from EAG 4455 issue 2, featured a deeper fuselage to bring it into line with a design taking shape right at the end of preparations for the third hypersonics report - Mustard Scheme 14, of EAG 4477. The landing gear on this interim version was not yet finalised. LEFT This is the EAG 4455 Mustard glider as it appeared in the company's report to the Ministry of Aviation - featuring the deeper revised fuselage and a finalised shorter undercarriage. The landing qualities are expected to be mainly dictated by the wing loading and lift drag ratio, and for the vehicle in mind they should lead to an approach with a high sink rate at high speed? During its descent to land, Mustard would be losing altitude and decelerating rapidly and it was thought that a particular set of carefully controlled movements would be required immediately before it reached the ground. In order to test this last- second manoeuvring safely, it was considered that the glider might need to have its own engine so the pilot could abort the landing if things went wrong. The report said: 158
CHAPTER SIX OPERATIONS IN SPACE RIGHT A cut-through diagram showing how the Mustard glider was to be constructed. Precisely which light aircraft the undercarriage was to be borrowed from does not appear to have been determined. ‘The landing technique will demand a flare at the end of the approach, timed to permit touch down soon afterwards. The match of control power to inertia and pitch damping will be important and in the dead stick landing case the rapid loss of speed during flare may introduce difficulties. For this reason provision is made for a small rocket propulsion unit to be fitted. The pitch control is interesting. If possible it would be better not to use control surfaces on the lower surface of a re-entry vehicle in order to minimise heating problems. Thus there is interest in the effectiveness of upper surface flaps on such a thick body for pitch control.’ Just as NASA had done with the M2- Fl, ВАС expected that the glider test programme would begin with ‘a few ground tows’ before the main programme of air tows, which would require a towing aircraft of something like the DC-3 performance’. Designing and building the glider was expected to take just over a year and the cost of the whole programme would be £75,000. Control surfaces The third of the new aerodynamic research proposals was Ae.R.44 - a programme of low-speed wind tunnel tests. Like the glider, these were intended to help finalise the design of Mustard’s lifting-body shape, but the proposal also included a detail about the spacecraft that is not addressed elsewhere in company reports - what form its control surfaces might take and how they would work. The final design for the wind tunnel model as a whole was to be agreed in conjunction with the RAE, assuming the research proposal was accepted, but ВАС suggested a 65-70° sweepback blunted delta with a deep cross-section - similar to its earlier untested models. Possible variations on the basic shape included an elongated nose to assist in balancing the aircraft and various degrees of boat-tailing of the back-end to minimise base drag and/or provide trim at the full scale higher speeds.’ Tip fins would be better than a central dorsal fin, the report said, because when Mustard was coming down through the atmosphere fast with its nose up high, the vehicle’s forward fuselage would effectively prevent any BELOW If the Mustard glider was to make an impression on crowds at air shows it would need to stand out. A bright Norfolk yellow test vehicle scheme - in keeping with the more prosaic meaning of its name - might have been among those considered. Chris Sandham-Bailey 159
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 air from reaching the latter - and it would be ineffective without air flowing over it. As for the control surfaces, controls outboard of the wing tips would be exposed to severe heating at hypersonic speeds so it is likely that trailing edge controls will be used.’ Three different alternatives were suggested for the type of elevators to install along the wide trailing edge of the models fuselage - split flaps on the upper and lower surfaces; overhanging flaps that stuck right out from the rear; or a pair of interconnected flaps that overhung to the rear but both moved in the same direction. Yaw control would be by conventional rudders on the fins or by spoilers; air brakes would be a useful aid to energy management and could possibly be incorporated with spoilers which are used for yaw control.’ While control surfaces had been depicted on numerous Mustard project drawings, this was the first time any detail on their form and operation had been given. It was estimated that the complete wind tunnel programme, including design and construction of the model, would cost £5,000 and would take about twelve months to complete. Finally, the third progress report gave an account of how computers were being used to aid the Mustard system design process. As had been the case almost throughout, ВАС continued to see Mustard as a golden opportunity to use computers as a means of quickly solving problems and assessing the effect of tweaking different variables on the overall design. The report proudly states: A series of programmes have been developed using mostly IBM Fortran II, written by engineers (as opposed to full-time programmers). This development, i.e. direct access to computers by engineers, is a most refreshing side-effect of the present work and has not gone unnoticed as a possible future pattern for other similar work.’ The programs written allowed the assessment of fuel tank pressures, the effect of wind shear on a rocket flying vertically upwards, work on launch trajectories and flight path angles, range during a gliding re-entry, analysis of thermal stresses, weights and costs, and performance of airbreathing vehicles. RIGHT AND OPPOSITE When the Mustard form was finally tested as a wind tunnel model at Warton, in late 1965, it was with a new design known as the R12A. BELOW While the R12 wind tunnel model of Mustard had been awaiting a gap in the Warton wind tunnels' busy schedule, the vehicle's aerodynamic form had moved on. This design was intended for low-speed testing of the latest shape in the site's 9-foot by 7-foot tunnel. FIG. 160
CHAPTER SIX OPERATIONS IN SPACE RIGHT Trailing-edge control surfaces had been depicted on drawings of Mustard since Scheme 3, but exactly how they might function was not addressed until 1965. Three different alternatives were suggested, as shown in this drawing from ВАС research proposal Ae.R.44. Don’t mention Mustard With the publication of Hypersonic Vehicles Progress Report No 3 of April 1965, BACs last hypersonics research contract was concluded and the government money that had been financing the Mustard project ran out. This was not the end, however. The members of Eurospace were just getting into their stride in producing designs for the Aerospace Transporter, and ВАС felt that Mustard was superior to anything anyone else was working on. It therefore continued the project at a low level using its own money, finally carrying out a series of wind tunnel tests during October and November 1965. It was hoped that a government contract would eventually be forthcoming, but there was a more pressing problem: the Ministry of 161
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES Aviation had formally requested that BAG remain silent about Mustard. This meant that while the European companies were relatively free to drum up support for their designs through the press, at air shows and most importantly in the corridors of power across the continent, ВАС personnel were allowed only to ‘indicate an interest’ in space vehicles and launchers. After repeated requests to have what amounted to a gagging order lifted, ВАС chief of research Ron Dickson sent an exasperated letter to the Ministry of Aviations Director-General of Scientific Research/Air Rhys Probert on 31 August 1965. He wrote: ‘As you know we have made several attempts to clarify our position about the extent to which we can talk about the work done under the Hypersonics Research Contract. The present restricted position has frequently caused embarrassment when talking to interested European countries particularly on such subjects as the “space transporter”. Whereas we appreciate, as you have indicated, that ultimately any major move towards collaboration must be at government level, we feci that some measure of technical agreement on concepts and the ground rules for design would be advantageous. At the moment there appear to be as many concepts as participants, in the “space transporter” fields.’ Dickson said that two recent events had brought the matter to a head. First, in July 1965 the Royal Aeronautical Society Journal had run an article written by David Ashford of Hawker Siddeley Aviation entitled ‘Boost Glide Vehicles for Long Range Transport’, which, Dickson said, ‘by its submission date and content might be assumed to stem from their Hypersonic Contract’. In other words, Hawker had apparently already given strong hints to the public about work carried out under its identical hypersonics contract. The second event concerned the patent covering the Mustard concept. This had originally been classified secret shortly after its submission on 4 June 1964, but that order had been revoked just over a month later on 17 July. ВАС had then gone to make some additions to its patent submission and asked whether secrecy was going to be reimposed. On 20 August 1964 it was told that no further secrecy order would be made. So while the patents were now available to the public, ВАС was unable to talk about them. Dickson went on: ‘The position is not satisfactory at the moment, and we feel at least we should be allowed to make some disclosures both in public and to possible collaborators, as have Bristol Siddeley Engines, Hawker Siddeley Aviation and European firms. This would help to establish our position and will also improve morale of the team engaged on this work. Up to now we have refrained from indicating other than interest, as requested. Please advise if any improvement in the position is likely in the near future.’ If ВАС was to gain support for Mustard it had to be able to talk about it. And in light of the British Government’s general reluctance to commit to funding a space transporter on its own, Mustard’s future depended on the company convincing other nations that it was the best prospect on offer. And in the meantime, the number of concepts vying for prominence under the European Aerospace Transporter banner continued to grow. 162
Chapter Seven The rivals Hawker Siddeley, Bristol Siddeley and European designs The first meeting of the Space Study Group of the Hawker Siddeley Group (HSG) took place on 25 May 1959, with the aim of coordinating the firms participation in an event arranged by the British Interplanetary Society. The First Commonwealth Spaceflight Symposium, due to take place at Church House, Westminster, London on 27-29 August, was intended to bring together space scientists and representatives of the aviation industry to consider the technical aspects of satellite, spacecraft and launch vehicle design - something that had not be done in Britain before. During the May meeting, the study group examined the work already carried out up to that point by HSG’s component companies, including a report prepared by Bill Hilton of Sir W. G. Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft (AWA), a subsidiary of the Hawker Siddeley Aircraft Company since 1934. Hilton, the firms chief aerodynamicist and the man who coined the term ‘the sound barrier, had begun working on the problems involved in creating a manned spacecraft in 1956. He had then presented a research paper entitled ‘Recovery After Re-entry by the Use of Aerodynamic Lift’ in July 1957 at the Royal Aeronautical Society’s High Altitude and Satellite Rockets Symposium, held at Cranfield. At the end of 1957 AWA had engaged the services of the senior lecturer in aeronautical engineering at The Queen’s University in Belfast, Terence Nonweiler, as a consultant. London-born Nonweiler had been working on winged and wing-shaped re-entry vehicle designs since 1951 and now joined Hilton to work on what was named the Manned Satellite. ABOVE The Hawker Siddeley Aviation Aerospace Transporter, travelling at Mach 11 at 120,000 feet, prepares to launch its second-stage space vehicle into orbit. Hamza Fouatih At the beginning, they had considered three different planforms for the Manned Satellite - circular, rectangular and triangular. The first to be worked on was the circular design with spin stabilisation, which had been the focus of Hiltons 1957 paper, but this was soon dismissed. According to AWA report TP 15 Issue 1 of May 1959 - produced specifically for the Space Study Group meeting - the difficulty with the circular form ‘was to devise a logical and workable set of controls for the pilot, who would be rotating with the vehicle. Gyroscopic moment would make control difficult, and so this design was not followed.’ 163
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 A rectangular vehicle with endplate fins ‘was considered because of favourable hypersonic characteristics but difficulty was experienced in locating the pilots cabin on the lee side of the small wing.’ Nonweiler also considered that a flying rectangle would be difficult to control without a tail and would be unstable at subsonic speeds. With the other options discounted, a triangular form was chosen. The report states: ‘The triangular shape now proposed is the third shape to be considered seriously. The delta wing has several advantages for this work, namely: inherently small stiff wingspan for a given wing area. Small span reduces overhang on launching rocket diameter. Minimum centre of pressure travel between subsonic and supersonic speeds. Some low speed experience available for problems of subsonic landing. Contains near-spherical pressure cabin very conveniently.’ The delta wings underside was flat, with ‘all protuberances on the upper side’. Since the upper side itself would not be presented to the airflow during re-entry, Nonweiler considered that it was not especially important what shape it took: ‘Aerodynamics only determine the boundaries of the cool area, and a pyramid shape fills this available volume very well.’ Although the company resolutely referred to its invention as the Manned Satellite, Nonweiler s decision to use a pyramidal shape for his spacecraft’s upper surface inevitably resulted in it being nicknamed ‘The Pyramid’. With the spacecraft’s basic form now in hand, the team began to form an outline of how the vehicle might operate and how it might be constructed. Nonweiler considered that fins and rudders would be needed, together with an elevator-aileron surface that was to run right along the vehicle’s trailing edge. Inside the three-sided pyramid structure, a ‘swinging capsule much like those in current human centrifuges’ was attached to a fixed central transverse LEFT Bill Hilton's circular spin-stabilised re-entry vehicle. Hilton, the man who coined the phrase 'the sound barrier', worked for Hawker subsidiary Sir W. G. Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft and proposed his circular vehicle as part of a research paper in July 1957. axle, about which it could rotate freely. This would rest under its own weight in such a way that the two crewmen, seated side-by-side on contoured seats facing an instrument panel and a small observation window, were always in the most efficient position to withstand high acceleration - lying down. When the vehicle was not accelerating, the capsule, 5 feet long and 6 feet in diameter, capsule could be moved and locked into any position at the crew s own discretion. The capsule would be pressurised to lOpsi, with water vapour being removed from the air inside by the air- conditioning system. According to the report, carbon-dioxide and odours would be removed chemically by current miniature submarine techniques. Oxygen and drinking water would be bottled, a total of rather less than 121b being required for a 24 hour flight.’ Both crew were to wear pressure suits designed with ‘allowance for personal hygiene’. The controls needed for take-off and re-entry would be grouped on the crews armrests - duplicated so that either man could take over in an emergency. And all other controls were to be within reach for either crewman too, if freed from their restraints. The pilot would have control over the attitude of the vehicle and the firing of its motors, if needed, as well as having aerodynamic control during re-entry. The crew would have one final last- resort escape option in an emergency - the rear section of the pyramid could be jettisoned and the capsule ejected. It would be fitted with parachutes or a balloon as part of its pivot support structure to help it float down to earth safely. Nonweiler only remained with AWA for a year, departing in late 1958. The project would continue without him, however. 164
CHAPTER SEVEN THE RIVALS ABOVE A slender delta wing shape was initially chosen for Armstrong Whitworth's Manned Satellite vehicle, with a domed crew area similar to that of the circular vehicle, but this was later rejected in favour of a broader triangular form. ABOVE Concept art showing the AWA Manned Satellite in its May 1959 configuration during re-entry. BELOW When representatives of Hawker Siddeley Group's component companies met in May 1959 to discuss what projects they would reveal at the First Commonwealth Spaceflight Symposium, this was the version of the The introduction to the May 1959 report began by asking a question: ‘Why undertake a Manned Satellite programme at AWA?’ The answer was: ‘Belief in ultimate government contract. It is our belief that Parliament will soon decide that Britain should enter the space travel field. Space travel is the only major field of scientific advance in which Britain has so far failed to make a significant contribution, in fact the matter has hardly been discussed at all in the House. Assuming government support, we must consider the pattern which a new industry such as this will necessarily have to follow. The question of trained manpower is and will remain more dominant than money. The law of exponential growth, shows that no organisation can grow larger suddenly; the more people already working in an organisation, the more people may be usefully engaged per annum. The first Government space vehicle contract (as distinct from research contract) may be for as little as £10 million or as much as RIGHT The Manned Satellite shown at the First Commonwealth Spaceflight Symposium featured a modified layout, with little wings offering 'outrigger controls' rather than an elevon on the vehicle's trailing edge. AWA Manned Satellite put forward. RE-ENTRY VEHICLE. OVERALL DIMENSIONS LENGTH 28 ft. 9 INS SPAN 18 FT HEIGHT 9 FT 3 INS FIN HEIGHT 7 FT 6 INS ELEVON CHORD 3 FT 2 INS RE-ENTRY VEHICLE CONFIGURATION WITH OUTRIGGER’ CONTROLS LEADING PARTICULARS LENGTH SPAN HEIGHT PLAN AREA CONTROL MEAN CHORD 0 2 4 6 8 10 □ и SCALE IN FEET 25 ft. 3 in». 29 ft. 6 ins. 9 ft. 3 in» 358 sq. ft. 5 ft. 8 Ins. (35%c> 0 2 4 6 8 Ю r;.i SCALE IN FEET 165
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CHAPTER SEVEN THE RIVALS £100 million. Neither AWA nor even the Hawker Siddeley Group as a whole is yet in a position to spend this kind of money on space travel in what the Government would call a reasonable time. Most of our possible competitors are even less prepared, however. Effort will have to be built up by means of research contracts. AWA is already trying to secure an American government contract for research into re-entry paths? The report then makes the case for a manned space vehicle, rather than something remotely or electronically controlled: ‘Unmanned space vehicles have already told the Americans and Russians much about outer space. Unfortunately there are distinct limits on what can be achieved by guided missile telemetry, and it would appear that unmanned rockets will become commonplace before we can enter the field. However, certain things cannot be done readily by remote control, but are simple if a pilot is carried. For example, scientific experiments can be very much more fruitful under the direction of a trained observer. Many unsuccessful firings would have been successful if a pilot on board had switched from auto to manual control at the appropriate time.’ Potential uses for a manned vehicle included astronomical observations, meteor observations, crew training, radiation and high vacuum physical laboratory, and radio and TV relay. One of the less obvious suggested applications was dumping atomic waste: ‘We cannot afford to pollute the oceans indefinitely at the present rate, and the waste material may have to be “buried” in space. The vehicle required would not of course be manned, but might well utilise a similar launching rocket.’ Photographic reconnaissance is mentioned: ‘Manned vehicles on polar orbits could cover photographically the entire earth’s surface every day. This would be of military use in addition to long range weather forecasting.’ And prestige: ‘Lastly, national prestige may carry more weight than cold logic. The true advantage of space travel may not become apparent until the first manned trips are made? ‘Pyramid’ launch The AWA Manned Satellite was to be launched vertically atop a three-stage liquid-fuelled rocket booster. The Satellite itself, the orbiter, was shaped like a three-sided pyramid with fins on either side, and with a large identically shaped ‘image’ fairing attached to its underside to create a symmetrical diamond form ‘in order to relieve any undesirable aerodynamic effects during launching resulting from lack of symmetry of this type? The fairing could either be empty or ‘used as a first stage propellant tank, the propellants being pumped down to the first stage tanks during the firing of that stage? For re-entry, a thick layer of solid metal, a heat sink, was to be used on the orbiters underside . .to conduct heat backwards from the nose - to spread it out over a greater area; it can then be radiated away from both sides of the projection at a surface temperature which is quite permissible for a material like one of the chromium molybdenum alloy steels. Moreover, behind the “false nose” a thin skin may be used, as the temperature there has dropped to a low enough value to allow high tensile strength to be obtainable from existing structural steels? Within all this was the cylindrical pressurised crew capsule. The boosters first stage took the form of a 41-foot-long cylindrical rocket, 13 feet in diameter and weighing 133.5 tons, of which 120 tons would be fuel and oxidiser. By comparison, the de Havilland Blue Streak missile was 60 feet long with a diameter of 10 feet. The AWA rocket booster was to have a fully gimballed motor unit producing 450,0001b of thrust compared to Blue Streaks two motors producing 150,0001b of thrust each. In the lecture on the Manned Satellite to the 1959 Commonwealth Spaceflight Symposium at Church House, AWA technical director Henry Romaine Watson said: ‘Armstrong Whitworth do not themselves intend to participate in the design and construction of rocket motors, since this is the business of an associated company, Bristol Siddeley Engines Ltd. We have therefore confined ourselves to a few general assumptions on the current and future states of the art to enable us to estimate the size and weight of the vehicle which we have to launch? During a typical mission, the brochure said, the first stage would burn for 161 seconds after launch - at which point the vehicle would be 38 miles up and travelling at a speed of 9,700 feet per second. The trajectory of the vehicle would then be inclined from 90° to an angle of 40° from horizontal and the first stage would be jettisoned, together with the ‘image fairing. Next up was the second stage, weighing 22.07 tons, of which 19.85 tons was fuel. As soon as the first stage was clear, this would be fired up and would burn for another 173 seconds at a thrust of 69,4001b, giving an altitude of 75 miles and a speed of 21,000 feet per second. The report notes here that OPPOSITE TOP The three-stage rocket that would blast the Manned Satellite into space was to be a bespoke Bristol Siddeley design, rather than something 'off the shelf' like Thor or Blue Streak. BOTTOM Conditions inside the Manned Satellite would have been extremely cramped. This Armstrong Whitworth concept art shows the crew strapped into their contoured seats with armrest controls that could only be reached by slipping a hand into their protective sleeve. 167
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUffLE VOLUMES the thrust of the then state-of-the-art Black Knight rocket was only 16,0001b. When the second stage burned out, the angle of ascent would be changed to just 3°, then a coasting period of several minutes would be inserted into the trajectory in order to give time for a computer on the ground to receive data regarding height, speed and inclination at second-stage burnout, process this information and transmit instructions to the vehicle regarding the third burning time to give the exact orbit required. While coasting, the vehicle would rise to an altitude of 80 miles. The third stage was to have a thrust of 30,0001b and its burn time would be controlled by the spacecrafts pilot, accelerating the vehicle to 26,640 feet per second, subjecting the crew to a force of 6g just before burnout. Its casing and motor would then be jettisoned, leaving only the Manned Satellite re-entry vehicle in orbit. Safety was clearly a big concern and potential methods of pilot escape at every stage of take-off were considered - though none of them seem likely to have had much chance of success: ‘If a failure occurred at or during the firing of the first stage booster, the method of escape would be to fire the third stage rocket and subsequently separate from it and land the re-entry vehicle. This method would also be applied if the second stage failed to fire.’ Bringing the Manned Satellite’s nose down for a controlled re-entry and glide would be critical. If the crew were unable to decrease the vehicles angle from that of its initial ascent to less than 20° they ‘would be subjected to over 10g for 15 seconds after plunging from a height of 150 miles to 17 miles in four minutes.’ A failure during second stage burning would require the pilot to separate the third stage and orbiter from the second stage at extremely high velocity, ‘then use his trim rockets to turn the vehicle and fire the third stage to reduce the rate of climb. He would then turn the vehicle to its normal position, jettison the spent third stage and make a safe return to earth in the re-entry vehicle.’ In the event of the third stage failing to fire, it would just be jettisoned, enabling the orbiter to make ‘a near optimum re-entry’. The report optimistically states: ‘Thus should a failure occur during any phase of the take-off, the crew would have a reasonable chance of returning safely to earth.’ Bringing the AWA Manned Satellite back to earth was apparently straightforward: ‘The pilot should select the correct continent or ocean in which to land, before initiating his descent. Having fired his retarding rocket, the pilot would find himself passing through the upper atmosphere at very high speed at 65 miles altitude instead of 80 miles as previously.’ The Satellite would be flown down at an angle of 40-50°, keeping its heat- shielded underside facing the earth. The report says: ‘Now this fixed angle of incidence will not stop the pilot from controlling his vehicle; at any moment the amount of lift will be fixed but its direction (up, down or sideways) is at the pilot’s discretion. The vehicle will enter the atmosphere at 5.04 miles per second, and must slow down to less than the circling speed of 4.88 miles per second before commencing the glide.’ The report notes that the most difficult part of any space flight is re-entry but says: ‘Ideally, the vehicle would follow a smooth re-entry path containing no climbs or dives, just a steady downward glide. Such an optimum re-entry from a height of 65 miles for example would take 35 minutes to complete and cover a range of just less than 7,500 miles.’ While the Manned Satellite was to be designed in such a way that the crew capsule could be ejected in the event of an emergency, it was proposed that the orbiter itself would be capable of making a landing. According to the report: ‘The angle of attack at landing, as well as hypersonically, would be high. This together with the fact that landing gear - wheels, brakes, steering, etc - would form a considerable addition to the weight of the re-entry vehicle, leads us to suggest that touchdown should normally be made on water. There a pair of hydroplanes, plus the capsule parachute for braking, should ensure a safe arrival.’ But in his lecture on the system, three months after the Space Study Group received the Manned Satellite report, Watson painted a different and perhaps more realistic picture of how the spacecraft might be expected to return to earth: ‘Although the vehicle can fly supersonically as a controlled aircraft, it is clearly most unlikely that it will be gliding down to a conveniently placed airfield. In the early space flights, it will represent a considerable achievement to land away from inhospitable areas such as sea, mountains, or jungle, and a touch-down probably hundreds of miles from the target point must be expected. Thus at the best we must expect to land on rough ground. Tunnel tests indicate a speed of about 88mph at touch down. Clearly this will be out of the question on really rough ground as some form of landing skid is the best we can hope to provide. The need is thus re-emphasised for jettisoning the capsule from the rear face of the pyramid, and then relying on a parachute descent. The capsule and instrumentation would thus be saved and the pyramid shell is a relatively simple and inexpensive item to lose.’ 168
CHAPTER SEVEN THE RIVALS Avro’s contribution While Watson had given the Manned Satellite presentation at the Commonwealth Spaceflight Symposium, the concept’s co-creator, Bill Hilton, had presented a paper on AWA’s work on a supersonic ramjet intended to reach speeds of up to Mach 7.4. Another noteworthy contribution to the event came from Geoffrey Pardoe, Blue Streak missile project manager at de Havilland, who offered A General View of a British Spaceflight Programme Based on Blue Streak’. John Allen, deputy chief engineer at Avro’s Weapons Research Division (WRD) at Woodford in Cheshire, discussed spaceflight as a spur for technological innovation and the potential uses of the Blue Steel missile as a research vehicle. Blue Steel was originally designed to reach speeds of up to Mach 5, though in operational form its top speed was only Mach 2.5 and, being the size of a small aircraft, it seemed to offer a ready-made platform for high-speed research. From 1958 onwards the WRD had been studying the Flight Corridor concept for high-speed aircraft. The corridor’ was effectively the earth’s atmosphere between 100,000 and 300,000 feet. In this region a winged aircraft travelling at hypersonic speeds would not get too hot because the air was thin - but not so thin that it would not still provide aerodynamic lift. Gradually climbing through the corridor’, a hypersonic vehicle would be able to accelerate from about Mach 1.5 at 100,000 feet, meeting some air resistance but being able to manoeuvre, to Mach 22 at 400,000 feet, on the fringes of space, where it would meet virtually no resistance but would finally lose the ability to use its traditional wing and tail control surfaces. As a result, Avro’s contribution to the May 1959 meeting of the Space Study Group had been what it called the Fringe Flight Research Vehicle, under the company designation Z.47. This was effectively a four-stage unmanned missile based on Blue Steel’s aerodynamic form and material construction. The missile was to be taken aloft under an Avro Vulcan and released. Four Raven solid-fuel booster rockets strapped to the outer shell would then fire up as stage one. Stage two was the Rocketdyne A-6 main engine, and stage three was an Armstrong Siddeley Snarler rocket engine that would propel the final payload stage into orbit. WRD did not count the Vulcan launcher as a stage in its own right - even though this made it four stages. Work on various re-entry and boost-glide vehicles followed during 1960 and into 1961, then in September 1961 WRD launched a fresh Flight Corridor research programme using five vehicle designs, four of them based on Blue Steel Mk 1. The first, Z 99, was a basic Blue Steel minus its operational equipment but fitted with a parachute for recovery. Z 100 was the same except for a set of skid landing gear rather than a parachute. Z 102 was a 7-foot dart mounted atop a long booster rocket, and Z 103 was a Blue Steel satellite launcher. Z101 was to involve the conversion of a Blue Steel missile into a manned high- speed aircraft. Among the necessary modifications was the removal of the BELOW During 1961 Avro's Weapons Research Division (WRD) worked on a series of research projects based on the firm's Blue Steel nuclear stand-off missile. Z 101 involved removing several major components and modifying the vehicle to become a manned research aircraft. Mark Aston, after Avro WRD original 169
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES TAPE RECORDER RECOVERY PACK POWER SUPPLIES RECOVERY PACK RESEARCH INSTRUMENTS TRACKING EQUIPMENT CONTROL ACTUATION INSTALLATION IN AVRO VULCAN' 4,5001b warhead and its replacement with an extra high-test peroxide fuel tank and an enlarged kerosene fuel tank The huge Marconi Elliot inertia navigator unit was to be taken out to make way for the cockpit, and retractable landing gear was to be fitted, consisting of a nose wheel and two skids to the rear. Wings and control surfaces remained largely unchanged, as did the two-chamber Armstrong Siddeley BELOW The tall undercarriage of the Vulcan bomber would have allowed a 40,0001b rocket to be fitted into its bomb bay, protruding in a similar fashion to the Blue Steel weapon. Mark Aston, after Avro WRD original Stentor rocket engine. The former meant that the Z 101 lacked wing flaps and its pilot would therefore be obliged to make his landings at 218mph with the vehicles nose up in the air. Avros WRD hoped that the converted missile would be capable of making ten flights, but worried about the landing. In addition to high speed and high angle of incidence, the pilot would also have to contend with stability and LEFT Among the early projects that Hawker Siddeley Aviation offered to its new European partners in Eurospace was a three-stage payload-carrying rocket that could be launched from the bomb bay of an Avro Vulcan. This Avro drawing shows how the system could be used to launch a hypersonic test vehicle. control problems derived from the small canards at the front of the aircraft. One suggestion to resolve these problems was to turn the Z 101 into a paraglider for landing - having a large wing unfurl from the upper surface to bring it in for a gentle unpowered landing. Working on the assumption that the Z 101 would be flown in Australia, Avro made enquiries about potential landing sites for a manned high-speed aircraft. Dry salt lakes were initially thought to offer the ideal solution, but it was soon found that these could not even bear the weight of a car, let alone a hypersonic test vehicle. Next Lake Wirrida and another dry clay pad were considered. Had it been built, the Z101 would not have flown before November 1965, by which time Blue Steel Mk 2 had been cancelled and the Mk Is future looked uncertain as developments in submarine- launched missile technology continued. Eurospace and Hawker Another delegate at the Space Study Group meeting in May 1959 had been Michael N. Golovine, a director of Hawker Siddeley Group’s information gathering unit, ATS. While Avro was working on its re- entry and boost-glide vehicles, Golovine was working with Maurice Roy of Air Liquide in Paris, an industrial gas company and supplier of both liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen, to forge an Anglo-French alliance. The result was Eurospace, which, as previously mentioned, was established in May 1961. Two months earlier it had been announced that Hawker Siddeley was working with the French aircraft industry body SEREB on a trio of satellite designs - now this arrangement had been formalised. 170
CHAPTER SEVEN THE RIVALS In a handout to journalists at the joint ventures announcement, Hawker Siddeley stated: ‘It has seemed to the two firms [Hawker and SEREB] that it would be in their greatest mutual advantage to exchange their opinions on the technical and industrial aspects of space problems and to give broad outlines of a joint effort in those fields where it seems to them both feasible and desirable.’ More than a year later, in October 1962, Hawker approached its new European partners with two ideas that had originated with Avro - the Z 123 Blue Streak-Launched Re-entry Research Vehicle, and the Z 124 Vulcan-Launched Optimum 3-Stage Satellite Vehicle, or the ‘Vulcan Orbiter’ for short. Z 123 was presented as two options: a small winged research vehicle mounted atop a single-stage Blue Streak booster, from which it would detach for a gliding re-entry, or the same vehicle fitted with a small expendable booster stage, both launched on Blue Streak. A manned version of the re-entry vehicle, which bore more than a passing resemblance to the AWA Manned Satellite, was apparently suggested. According to John Allen, speaking during a lecture in 2005, the Z 124 concept ‘...began with the recognition that the Vulcan, because of its delta wing, had a very tall undercarriage. This would permit the installation of a large multi-stage rocket weighing up to 40,0001b under the fuselage. This would be carried and air launched much as was Blue Steel, from a height of about 50,000 feet, but the trajectory would be more akin to that of the ballistic Skybolt as the orbiter was wingless. It was calculated that this three-stage vehicle could place a 6501b payload into a low earth orbit. Although less design detailing was done on the orbiter than on the manned Blue Steel, its potential was recognised. Here was a revolutionary way of placing application satellites (for communications, meteorology, survey, navigation, etc) in orbit launched from a mobile platform. Two advantages sprang from this. Firstly the Vulcan could fly to any base in Europe, collect its rocket and launch into a variety of orbital planes; secondly, with flight refuelling, the craft could be placed into an equatorial orbit. In this way, Europe could have had its very own launching system, quite different from that of the USA, which was totally expendable. This project was announced at a lecture and received a lot of publicity. Whether it was ever considered seriously by the government is doubted, but it could have given the RAF an opportunity to take a bold step into spaceflight.’ During another lecture three years later in Glasgow, he elaborated a little on the Vulcan Orbiters failure: ‘Why was it not adopted? Clearly France was keen to put a Gallic flavour into European collaboration and backing the Orbiter would have detracted from their aim of developing Ariane and the launching complex in Guyana.’ The following year, 1963, Avro’s hypersonics research team was moved to Hawker Siddeley s headquarters at Kingston to form the nucleus of the company’s new Advanced Projects Group, known as the APG, under the leadership of former Avro chief engineer Hugh Francis. In July 1963 Francis and his team received the twin of the contract that had led to В AC’s first round of hypersonics studies. Under Ministry of Aviation contract KD/2X/1/CB 7(C), like ВАС, Hawker was required to study ‘the feasibility of hypersonic flight for long range high speed cruise aircraft, recoverable launchers, boost-glide vehicles and space planes’. It also had to study ‘the relative merits of two-stage and single-stage vehicles for hypersonic flight’, ‘the relative merits of rockets and ramjets as boosters and sustainers’, ‘the relative merits of various fuels, particularly hydrogen and kerosene’, ‘to provide preliminary comments on the cost and the timescale of the development of hypersonic vehicles’, and finally ‘to make suggestions for research investigations required to further the above studies.’ Unlike ВАС, however, Hawker decided that only the first and last requirements were feasible. Francis and his team devoted their efforts to studying hypersonic long-range high- speed cruise aircraft and to suggestions for further hypersonic investigations with the goal of attracting a more substantial research contract. The company’s first progress report, dated December 1963 but delivered, like BAC’s, in January 1964, was tightly focused on the possibilities of airbreathing aircraft flying at speeds of Mach 5-7. In particular, Hawker was strongly in favour of building a medium-sized hypersonic research aircraft. The report states: ‘We consider that only by a realistic design exercise of this kind can the real problems of hypersonic flight be exposed. The aircraft examined could fly for research purposes by about 1970-71. Its airframe would be constructed of nickel alloy, of a type already available, and propulsion would be by a Bristol Siddeley engine which, it is considered, could be available in 1970. Systems design would be within the present state of the art except for two problem areas: it would be necessary to develop bearings suitable for hot environments (500- l,500°C) and also there would be a requirement for a high temperature ram air turbine. This aircraft study has been taken far enough for fair confidence in both the performance and weight estimates: take-off weight would be about 70,0001b; total flight times on typical sorties with kerosene fuel would be between 45 and 55 171
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 minutes, of which between 12 and 22 minutes would be at Mach 5. An aircraft of this kind undertaken as a research project is, in our view, a necessary preliminary to any more sophisticated hypersonic aircraft planned to meet specific military or civil requirements.’ Precisely why Hawker entirely neglected to examine any of the Ministry’s space-related requirements under its hypersonics contract, when ВАС took almost the opposite approach, is unclear. Francis and his team may have genuinely considered that it was pointless to speculate about boost-glide vehicles and launchers when the necessary aerodynamic layouts, materials and engines were as yet untested. However, with Eurospace-related projects aimed at achieving those goals already being worked on in the background, APG may have regarded the Ministry of Aviation contract merely as an opportunity to have the Government fund research it would have carried out itself anyway. And if the Government could be persuaded to pay for a research vehicle that would yield test data useful to Eurospace, then so much the better. Hawker satellite killer The second Hawker hypersonics report was dated July 1964, but was delivered to the Ministry in August, again like the ВАС equivalent. As with the first report, it focused heavily on the need to build a research aircraft - Type 1019/E2 - but just as English Electric/BAC’s P.42 encompassed a multitude of different designs, intended for different roles, so too did Hawkers Type 1019, a total of seven being detailed in the second report. Type 1019/E2, detailed in drawing number APD.1019E/0210 Issue 2, was described as a ‘basic’ design that was believed to have ‘development potential’ as a ‘launcher of anti-satellite missiles’. It measured 70 feet long with a 26ft 3in wingspan and a height of 16ft 9in, and in addition to its sharply swept wings with tip-fins it had a pair of all- moving canards on either side of the pilot’s cockpit. Power was supplied by a single Bristol Siddeley BS.1012/7 turboramjet engine, and the all-up weight was 65,1401b, with 22,0001b of kerosene fuel being carried internally. There was an option, however, to fit a pair of 225-gallon drop tanks, which would increase the all-up weight to 69,3601b. It was intended to reach Mach 5 at an altitude of 84,500 feet, which it would sustain for 8.7 minutes. With the drop tanks fitted, this could be extended to 12.2 minutes, the fuel these contained being burned first, and the tanks dropped at Mach 0.96. Hawker found that ‘the present aircraft’s performance is limited, not by take-off weight but by fuel volume, and for this reason there is no advantage in fuelling it with liquid hydrogen. There is however substantial advantage in using fuels of higher calorific value/unit volume than kerosene; possible choices are the boro-hydrides or high density hydro-carbons.’ An example of the latter was given as Shelldyne, a Shell Oil product that had just been patented. The second hypersonic vehicle detailed was Type 1019/E5, a twin- engine design also with canards. It was 82ft 6in long, with a span of 34 feet. It had an all-up weight of 109,4001b, 41,6001b of which was the internal kerosene fuel load for its pair of BS.1012/7s, and it was designed to fly at Mach 5 for 21 minutes. Using a mix of pentaborane and kerosene fuel, rather than straight kerosene, and with the addition of drop tanks, it was thought that the E5 could sustain Mach 5 for 49 minutes with a range of 2,780 nautical miles - London to New York is 3,016 nautical miles. BELOW This original concept art shows Hawker Siddeley's proposed Type 1019/E2 hypersonic research aircraft. The drop tanks were used up in reaching Mach 1 before being jettisoned as the aircraft passed the sound barrier and accelerated towards Mach 5. 172
CHAPTER SEVEN THE RIVALS GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF TYPE I0I9/E2 (ONE B.S. 1012/7 ENGINE) ABOVE A general arrangement diagram showing the Hawker Siddeley Type 1019/E2 in more detail. The side view, where the pilot is visible, gives an idea of scale. BELOW One of many drawings produced by Hawker Siddeley showing constructional details of the Type 1019/E2. While the English Electric/BAC team at Warton attempted to fulfil the requirements of their hypersonics research contract, Hawker attempted to demonstrate that those requirements could only be met through further research - and the construction of the Type 1012/E2. 173
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE While the Type 1019/E2 was powered by a single Bristol Siddeley BS.1012/7 engine, the Type 1019/E5 had two. Its fuselage was longer and its profile sleeker, but building the E2 was still the firm's first choice if a research contract was to be awarded. Pentaborane was considered as a jet or rocket fuel by the British, the Americans and the Soviets, but was eventually rejected by all three, primarily on safety grounds. It burned with a green flame and exploded on contact with air. Moreover, its exhaust fumes when burned as a jet were toxic. Both the E2 and E5 were to be made primarily from nickel alloy, and in both cases ‘the cockpit is insulated and cooled, and the air passes on to cool the equipment bays. Entry to and escape from the cockpit is by way of a sealed, double-walled hatch in the roof. No transparent area is envisaged other than a small port in the hatch.’ It was thought possible to increase the E2 s speed up to Mach 6 by using ceramic fibre insulants to protect the nickel alloy internal structure of its intakes. The intake leading edge would have had to be made from niobium alloy for speeds above Mach 5 and tantalum alloy above Mach 6 - and both of these would require the development of new heat-resistant anti-oxidation coatings. Most of the airframe, though, would remain nickel alloy up to about Mach 7. As with Mustard, noise levels were expected to be very high and acoustic fatigue meant that ‘it is not considered possible to design for an indefinite life’. However, Hawker went into great detail in describing the structural make-up of the E2. Every joint and spar was outlined in order to make a more persuasive case for building it as a manned research vehicle. Substantial detail was also given on how exactly an aircraft to the E2 specification might be used to launch missiles at ‘hostile satellites. The report states: ‘In the missile launching role a hypersonic capability is used only to accelerate the missile to the launch speed; there is no requirement to cruise at a very high speed to the start of the launch manoeuvre. It is in the nature of the satellite interception problem that the missile launch time will be determined up to one and a half hours before the event; the decision to intercept could be made even earlier. Thus a subsonic or low- supersonic speed cruise (obtainable carrying large drop tanks) is acceptable, and acceleration to hypersonic speed need come only in the launching phase of the operation.’ Toxic mixture The third and fourth hypersonic designs to be detailed in the second Hawker hypersonics report were the Type 1019/Al and A5, 100-passenger transports capable of cruising at Mach 5. The Al was a civilian airliner with a take-off weight of 465,000lb and a range of 3,670 nautical miles, flying on kerosene. The A5 was its military equivalent with a take-off weight of 472,7901b and a range of 5,800 nautical miles - made possible by using a presumably horribly dangerous and toxic mixture of pentaborane and Shelldyne fuel. 174
CHAPTER SEVEN THE RIVALS ABOVE ВАС was convinced that its hypersonics contract from the Ministry of Aviation required it to work on space vehicles and boosters, in addition to hypersonic transports. Hawker Siddeley, on the other hand, ignored the space aspects of the contract and concentrated instead on the transports. The Type 1019/A1 was the firm's airliner to beat Concorde, while the externally identical A5 would be the military version, able to run on more efficient but also more volatile fuels. Both aircraft would be 187 feet long with a wingspan of 97 feet, a height of 41 feet and a wing area of 7,090sq ft. In both cases the power plant was to be six BS.1012/2s. Next the report describes a pair of aircraft capable of speeds above Mach 7. These were to be second-stage vehicles powered by supersonic combustion ramjet - scramjet - engines with near orbital capability, launched from hypersonic carrier aircraft. Type 1019/H1 was a highly unusual design with a ‘flat upper surface for mating with the first stage aircraft’. It RIGHT The Type 1019/H2 was a second- stage vehicle designed to be launched from a booster aircraft. Its upper surface was flat so that it could be fitted to its carrier, but whether it was meant to be carried flush against the underside or in a recess on the upper surface is unclear. was 112 feet long, 21 ft 6in wide and 19 feet high with an all-up weight of 117,0001b. It carried 37,0001b of liquid hydrogen fuel and 5,0001b of kerosene for its ten Rolls-Royce RB. 189 lift engines - intended to enable a vertical landing. The layout of the main engine and its intakes dictated the form of the lower portion of the vehicle, and Hawker acknowledged that this made the installation of undercarriage and auxiliary turbojet engines complicated’. 175
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE Using the same principle of attachment to its booster as the H1, by having a flat upper surface, the Type 1019/H2 improved upon the earlier design by having a split intake for its engines. This problem was solved with the Type Ю19/Н2» with a similarly flat upper surface, where the intake flow was split into two, meaning that ‘a significant part of the lower surface of the vehicle is now free from engine surface’. The H2’s all-up weight was 128,5001b, of which 35,0001b was liquid hydrogen and 5,0001b was kerosene for its twelve RB 189s. It was to be 125 feet long, 24ft 6in wide and 21ft 6in high. Finally, in its fifth appendix, the second Hawker report detailed a seventh hypersonic - the Type 1019/E6. Two versions were examined, one with canards and the other without. Both were to be powered by a pair of Rolls- Royce FPS 146 turborockets. The E6 was held up as a possible alternative to the E2 as a short time scale’ research aircraft. The report states: ‘A basic difference between the Types 1019/E2 and E6 is the use of non-integrated podded engines in the E6. Whilst the E2 is powered by a single large turboramjet unit, fed by a two dimensional intake, the E6 has two podded turborocket engines fed from axisymmetric intakes.* The intake for the turborocket was ‘very much more complicated than the simple ramp and jack system’ of the turboramjet and there was additional complexity in the formers ‘intricate’ intake boundary layer bleed system too. The turborocket only weighed 60% as much as the turboramjet and produced a comparatively higher thrust, but fuel consumption was also significantly greater. The other major difference between the E2 and E6 was BELOW Hawker believed that the main problems likely to arise from its Type 1019/E2 research aircraft centred on the central internal position of its engine. This would pay dividends for speed but would make maintenance tricky, and major adjustments an enormous headache. Building a research aircraft with its engines in conveniently located external pods, as shown on the Type 1019/E6, would resolve that problem and speed up development but with an associated performance penalty. leading data LENGTH SPAN TO ENGINES SPAN OVERALL HEIGHT WING AREA GROSS WING AREA NET FOREPLANE AREA NET FIN AREA UPPER FIN AREA LOWER 85 FT 29 FT. 342 FT 21 FT 727 FT? 453 FT? 45 FT? 126 FT? 78 FT? GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF TYPE 1019/E6 (WITH FOREPLANE) TWO ROLLS ROYCE FPS 146 TURBOROCKETS ROLLS ROYCE RB I62/3I LIFT ENGINES 176
CHAPTER SEVEN THE RIVALS ABOVE The first Hawker Siddeley Type 1019/E6 had foreplanes, but a second version did not. This meant that it was smaller and possibly cheaper to build - but with penalties in controllability. fuel - the latter required a supply of liquid oxygen for its engines as well as the usual kerosene. The E6 with foreplanes was 85 feet long with an overall span including engines of 34.2 feet and a height of 21 feet. The design also included a pair of Rolls-Royce RB. 162/31 lift engines to help with take-offs and landings. The E6 without foreplanes was only 80 feet long but had the same overall span. It was 20 feet high and had only a single RB.189 lift engine. None of the seven hypersonic aircraft described in the second report was a spacecraft - nor did any of them have the capacity to send a payload into orbit. The undated third Hawker hypersonics report was issued in April 1965. Based on the new Ministry of Aviation contract KD/2X/3/CB 7(C), it covered the same period as BAC’s third report and dispensed with even the Mach 7+ vehicles - concentrating instead on the ‘Type 1019/A series hypersonic transports and the problems likely to be faced by the Type 1019/E2 during flight trials. The introduction states: A 100-seat Mach 5 transport originally presented in the first interim report has been redesigned to give a lower weight and longer range, and a 150-seat version is also shown. These studies show that Mach 5 transport aircraft offer substantial advantages over Concord type performance. Further studies being considered on Mach 5 aircraft include application of several wave rider configurations to transport designs, variable-geometry transports, combined reconnaissance-launcher aircraft and further theoretical and experimental work on intakes, nozzles and aerodynamic heating effects.’ Both Hawker Siddeley and ВАС had tendered for the 1960 supersonic transport design study contract that eventually produced Concorde, but Hawker lost out. On 27 October 1960 the Conservative MP for Macclesfield, Sir Arthur Harvey, submitted a written question to Minister of Aviation Peter Thorneycroft in the House of Commons, asking if he would ‘make a statement on the outcome of the discussion between his department and the companies concerned on a supersonic airliner.’ The written answer was that ВАС had been given the design contract, worth £350,000. Ministerial papers show a supplemental section to the answer that went unrecorded in Hansard. It reads: ‘Why not Hawker Siddeley? Both groups submitted proposals for undertaking the work. On balance, we preferred those of ВАС, both on technical and financial grounds. In these circumstances it would not be sensible for both groups to continue to devote design resources to the project.’ Clearly, Hawker had not forgotten this rejection four and a half years earlier and now presented not one but two hypersonic airliners - both of them much faster than Concorde and with greater range. 177
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE The second Hawker Siddeley Type/1019/A1 was 4ft 6in longer than the original. It also stood a foot taller and had only four Bristol Siddeley BS.1012/2 engines compared to the six fitted to the earlier design. However, it fulfilled the same function of civilian airliner. BELOW another hypersonic transport from Hawker was the Type 1019/A6. Being 20 feet longer than Concorde and with six engines, each more powerful than Concorde's Olympus 593s, it was intended to be superior in every way, at least on paper. 178
CHAPTER SEVEN THE RIVALS The Al was the 100-passenger aircraft and the A6 carried 150. The former was lengthened from its earlier configuration - up to 191ft 6in - but with the same wingspan of 97 feet. Height was slightly reduced to 40 feet. Power now came from four rather than six BS. 1012/2s, which were separated into two packs of two, rather than being grouped together in a single block. The A6 was significantly longer at 222 feet, with a span of 102 feet and a height of 44 feet. It had six BS.1012/2s, like the original Al and A5 designs, and burned kerosene fuel like the A1. No further detail was given in the third report about the several wave rider configurations to transport designs, variable-geometry transports, combined reconnaissance-launcher aircraft’ mentioned in the introduction. Among these were Hawkers spacecraft. An internal report on them had already been issued in February 1965, but it was kept entirely separate from the hypersonics contract work. The designs were reserved for Eurospace. Aerospace Transporter The first attempts to form a European consensus on a space transporter were outlined in a Eurospace report called ‘Proposals for a European Aerospace Programme issued in 1963. This was followed, on 23-24 January 1964, by a meeting of Eurospace members in Brussels, chaired by Eugen Sanger, to discuss concepts for what was now known as the Aerospace Transporter. At this point, none of the Eurospace member companies had any idea that ВАС was working on space launcher systems. In March 1965 Eurospace drafted a collective proposal asking for the equivalent of $6 million in funding for a two-year feasibility study on Aerospace Transporter development, and sent it to governments across Europe. A further five Eurospace meetings then followed in England and Germany during 1965 and 1966 to discuss the progress of the various companies and responses received from the various governments. ВАС finally revealed Mustard to the members of Eurospace in February 1966, just before the concept was revealed to the public, and suggested that it met all of the necessary criteria to become the Aerospace Transporter. In a report entitled ‘The Aerospace Transporter: The Concept and its Development’, Tom Smith and Bill Clegg wrote: ‘The Aerospace Transporter will involve a radical departure from the generally accepted types of aircraft structure and our number one priority is to gain experience in these new areas as quickly as possible. It is extremely unlikely that in the timescale proposed for the Aerospace Transporter, some technical breakthrough or clever idea will give an obvious solution to all our problems. Success will be the result of a steady build-up in technology and any delay will mean that once again Europe has missed its opportunity. Eurospace has suggested what is essentially two years of “broad brush” paper studies. This, we feel, was put forward without full realisation, due to security restrictions, of the extent of the studies already done, a situation which should now no longer apply. In view of this, such a “broad brush” policy, we believe, will result in an unnecessary delay and furthermore be damaging to the morale of the people concerned. The argument is not that further paper studies are unnecessary, but that we have reached the point where they must be backed and integrated with pilot engineering. To illustrate this by just one example; the cost and feasibility of any of the solutions is going to be profoundly affected by the life of the vehicle structure and systems, extent of refurbishing, etc. Paper exercises just will not resolve this. One has to resort to some hardware.’ The hardware suggested by Smith and Clegg was the Crest test vehicle. Their report stated: ‘ВАС have in fact submitted a proposal to the Ministry of Aviation for such a research vehicle and have given it the code name Crest.’ They outlined the research proposal, then: ‘We are suggesting that Phase 1 of the Crest programme could usefully be carried out as the centrepiece of the Eurospace two year feasibility study. It is the cheapest way for us to gather experience in the field of advanced aerospace engineering and management and represents a necessary step in the development of the Aerospace Transporter.’ The low-speed manned Mustard glider proposal was also offered up as representing ‘a very necessary step in the development of the Aerospace Transporter. An alternative would be to use one of the variable stability aircraft available in the USA. This, on examination, is a rather poor alternative’. The use of Crest and the glider as research vehicles for the Aerospace Transporter could be supported by study sub-groups: ‘If the organisation is to work smoothly, the sub-groups should be under the direct control of their associated centre. It would appear reasonable to have one centre located in each of the three countries concerned, say, Crest in UK, Aerospace Transporter Preliminary Design in Germany and Mission Studies in France. It is not essential, although of course very desirable, that a sub-group should be in the same country as its activity centre.’ It was suggested that Crest, the manned glider and the supporting studies would be ‘applicable to the modular vertical take-off lifting body vehicle shown in Fig. 4’, which was a picture of Mustard. ‘This is not meant to infer that we are certain that the Aerospace Transporter will be of this configuration. It is simply following the policy that planning should be based on the most likely 179
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 approach as it appears from the facts available at the time. Unless this is done, the objectives are hidden or forgotten and nothing is achieved.’ A diagram was also included to show how Mustard could be funded up to becoming operational in 1977, with a projected in-service lifespan of ten years. Finally: ‘Europe is certainly going to spend money on space. A recent report suggested £400m to be spent on ELDO developments. Is it not reasonable to ask that the case for the Aerospace Transporter be considered in any future deliberations?’ Hawker’s anti-Mustard In May 1966 Hawker’s Advanced Projects Group leader Hugh Francis produced a report entitled ‘An Airbreathing First Stage for the Aerospace Transporter’, which was pointedly aimed at Mustard. Francis had spent years working on his plans and his thunder was in danger of being stolen by BAC’s sudden unveiling. The introduction began: ‘Published schemes for recoverable aerospace transporters fall into four categories: horizontal take-off or vertical take-off, and pure rocket propulsion or mixed airbreathing-rocket propulsion. Recently there has been a proposal that a start should be made in Europe on development of a particular system based on vertical take-off pure rocket vehicles, without further examination of any of the alternatives. The present paper attempts to show that there are partly airbreathing systems at least as promising as this proposed rocket system and that further detailed examination is necessary before a reasonable choice can be made between the various contenders. Also, that before any of these recoverable schemes can be taken to the development stage, it is necessary to show a clearer margin of superiority over the expendable rocket launcher than has yet been established.’ After discussing the generally unfavourable outlook for turboramjet and turborocket vehicles, as he saw it, Francis advocated what the Martin Company had called RENE in its Astrorocket report of December 1962. He wrote: ‘The compound rocket-ramjet engine known variously as an air augmented rocket, an ejector ramjet or a ram-rocket seems to have some advantage over other airbreathing systems. At Mach numbers below about 3 such a system has a propulsive efficiency which, while better than that of the pure rocket, is of course much worse than that of the turboramjet, but against this there is comparatively low weight and also sufficiently high thrust to significantly reduce the importance of the transonic drag. The system seems attractive for vertical as well as horizontal take-off.’ Although his report had been produced in 1966, Francis had conceived his rocket-ramjet-powered space booster in 1964 and numerous vehicle designs were produced. The drawings that accompanied the 1966 report show the Hawker Siddeley Aerospace Transporter as a large horizontal-take-off booster weighing 375,0001b. It was 157 feet long with a span of 80 feet and came complete with a second-stage spacecraft that was 45ft 9in long, 25ft 4in wide and only 13ft 6in high. Two sets of ducted rocket engines would be fired with a thrust of 200,0001b to get the booster rolling down the runway on a take-off trolley and into the sky, with air sucked in through the ducts increasing this to LEFT When ВАС proposed the hitherto top secret Mustard to Eurospace as a basis for the Aerospace Transporter in February 1966, several companies were caught on the hop, including Hawker Siddeley. Hugh Francis, head of the firm's Advanced Projects Group, responded three months later with 'An Airbreathing First Stage for the Aerospace Transporter', which detailed the vehicle shown here. It was to be powered by an ejector ramjet engine, also known as a ram-rocket. 180
CHAPTER SEVEN THE RIVALS 240,0001b by Mach 1. The faster it went, the more air got ducted into the rocket efflux, increasing the boost. Above Mach 5 the rockets would be shut down and the engines would begin to function as an orthodox supersonic combustion ramjet" - a scramjet. The second-stage spacecraft would be launched off the boosters back when speed reached Mach 11 at 120,000 feet, 650 nautical miles from base. Mission complete, the booster would then pull a 2.5g turn and return to base with its engine still in scramjet mode. At 160 nautical miles from base, the scramjets would be shut off and the vehicle would decelerate to subsonic speed, ready for final approach to the airfield using auxiliary turbojet power. A presentation made by Francis to the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) in May 1967 relegated the rocket-ramjet version of the Aerospace Transporter to the status of‘alternative first stage while a substantially larger design powered by ten turboramjets was given top billing. This booster was to be 188 feet long with a span of 98 feet and a recess on its upper surface to house the spacecraft. The turboramjets would be arranged in two banks installed in the centre-rear part of the wedge-shaped fuselage. These would be supplemented by a hydrogen-fuelled scramjet on either side. The turboramjet Aerospace Transporter weighed 480,0001b and was to be constructed mainly of nickel alloy but with anti-oxidation coated niobium for leading edges and control surfaces. The extremely complex actively cooled scramjet intakes made up the whole of both sides of the vehicle, while the turboramjet intakes were located on its flat underside. A 20,0001b take-off trolley would be used for this larger booster too, but there was also a retractable undercarriage for landing on normal runways. The second-stage spacecraft had grown too. It now measured 57 feet long and 34ft 6in wide. Francis’s presentation described it in more detail than his earlier report: ‘There have been proposals for ABOVE The second stage proposed for Hawker Siddeley's Aerospace Transporter design was a relatively conventional rocket-powered lifting-body orbiter that slotted into the booster's upper surface. BELOW By 1967 Hawker Siddeley's favoured Aerospace Transporter design was this larger vehicle powered by ten turboramjets. Rather than being partially submerged into the vehicle's upper surface, the second-stage orbiter was to sit atop this first-stage booster aircraft with a small pointed fairing over its blunt nose. scramjet vehicles with orbital or near orbital capability. The technology required for these, however, is probably beyond European reach in the 10-20-year period we are now considering. Accordingly, the second stage of the present launch system can be schemed only on the basis of rocket propulsion, and the main uncertainly is the degree of development one can expect in rocket propulsion in this period.’ Francis believed that one development 181
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 almost certain to reach fruition was the use of highly toxic but high-energy tripropellant rocket fuels, and using these he decided that Hawkers second- stage vehicle could carry 10,0001b of payload into orbit. In conclusion, he said: ‘Comparison of the apparent development costs of different types of space launcher system could be very misleading if these were considered in isolation from those of other fields of aerospace activity. A large part of the research necessary for any such system must be chargeable also against other activities. This point is particularly significant to the airbreathing system because of the similarity of its problems to those of the high-speed air transport. The demand for higher speed air transport combined with longer range is not likely to diminish. The successors to the Boeing SST and Concord airliners will probably be turboramjet aircraft cruising at Mach 4-6 and they in turn may be succeeded by scramjet aircraft at Mach 8-10. A partly airbreathing reusable space launcher would be a natural by-product of this activity in much the same way as our present expendable rocket systems are a by- product of the military programmes of the 1950s? History would prove Francis wrong on all counts. Even the Boeing supersonic transport he mentions failed to materialise. There was a third version of Hawkers Aerospace Transporter - powered solely by an impressive cluster of fifteen rocket engines - and it was even bigger than the other two at 200 feet long and 120 feet wide. Its layout was similar to those of the others, and using liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen fuel for its first stage it was thought that the second- stage spacecraft would be able to put an 8,0001b payload into orbit. Hawker continued to design space launchers and orbiters into the early 1970s, but none went any further than paper studies and ultimately the American Space Shuttle put an end to them. BSEL booster Almost as soon as it was formed from the merger of Armstrong Siddeley and Bristol Aero Engines in 1959, Bristol Siddeley Engines had established a new team, the Advanced Propulsion Research Group (APRG), to examine the technology associated with high- speed power plants such as turborockets and supersonic combustion ramjets. Although the company's primary concern was naturally engines, the groups head of advanced projects and theoretical research, John Lane, had gone so far as to suggest aircraft designs that might be best suited to using the firms power plants and the company had then patented them. Two patents filed on 27 August 1959 by Raymond John Lane, who went by his middle name, and Raymond Frederick ‘Ray’ Sargent of Bristol Siddeley Engines, show advanced supersonic aircraft. The first has a very large rectangular fuselage that tapers into a wedge shape at its forward edge. The delta wings and tail are sharply swept and the engine intakes are complex. Lane and Sargent’s second supersonic aircraft is even more unusual, being largely comprised of the first vehicle but with a pair of long pointed-nose fuselages protruding from its leading edge. The squared-off frontal intake of the original design remained, but was now positioned between the two fuselages, each of which had a stubby canard wing attached on one side. Both of these designs were produced through privately funded research, but between 1962 and 1967 the APRG received a series of paying contracts from the Ministry of Aviation and later the Ministry of Technology to ‘lay the foundations for realistic project assessment of high-speed vehicles using airbreathing engines particularly ramjets.’ This meant speeds of up to Mach 7 and encompassed both subsonic and supersonic combustion ramjets. In addition, with the beginnings of Eurospace, and the general move towards the study of hypersonics and space vehicles, Bristol Siddeley found itself working with Hawker Siddeley on high-speed launchers. Lane seized upon this opportunity to design another vehicle concept that would again showcase his firm’s advanced engines. This ‘recoverable airbreathing booster for space vehicles’ was showcased in an LEFT The third and presumably final Hawker Siddeley Aerospace Transporter layout followed ВАС down the road of all-rocket propulsion. This huge vehicle had fifteen rocket engines and balanced the second stage orbiter on the centre of its sloping back. 182
CHAPTER SEVEN THE RIVALS RIGHT Bristol Siddeley Engines began studying hypersonic aircraft designs as soon as it was formed from what had been Armstrong Siddeley and Bristol Aero Engines. John Lane was the engineer responsible for designs such as this wedge-fronted high-supersonic vehicle, patented in August 1959. Rolls-Royce article Lane produced for the June 1962 issue of the Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society. He wrote: ‘This paper attempts to show where the airbreathing system is likely to score over the all-rocket system. The studies described indicate that very large gains in payload into orbit can be obtained if the first stage of a satellite booster is accelerated by air-breathing propulsion instead of the more usual rocket stage? After a lengthy discussion on the relative merits of airbreathing engines and rocket engines, Lanes paper featured a three-view drawing of his proposed booster. In describing it, he wrote: ‘The rocket stages are shown mounted on the back of a recoverable boosting vehicle which, it has been assumed, would take off from the ground, climb and accelerate to 110,000ft at 12,000ft/sec. The rocket stages would then be slipped and the first airbreathing stage would be flown back to the take-off base. The first stage vehicle (which is almost an aeroplane) would be cooled, and the rocket stages sheltered from the heating of the initial acceleration path. The intakes of the airbreathing engines have been mounted underneath the wing in a position where wing precompression can be obtained at high Mach numbers and wing incidences.’ RIGHT Filed for patent protection on the same day as his first high-supersonic aircraft design was John Lane's second such vehicle - this time with twin fuselages projecting from the front. Rolls-Royce 183
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 LEFT Little is known about this design, but it is believed to be a further development of Bristol Siddeley's work on turborocket engines and aircraft concepts that might use them, dating from around 1960/61. Rolls-Royce BELOW Bristol Siddeley showcased this innovative space launcher vehicle design in June 1962. It was a large delta- winged aircraft powered by underslung turborockets, and carried a two-stage rocket on its back. When it was launched, this would slip backwards off the aircraft before boosting into orbit as the aircraft descended. Rolls-Royce SIDE VIEW 2^ к 3* STAGE ROCKETS l**STAGE WINGEO VEHICLE PLAN VIEW AIR BREATHING ENGINES FRONT VIEW LEFT Having gained some positive publicity through its first booster design, Bristol Siddeley continued to refine the concept. This design shows the vehicle's progression - the forward section of the carrier aircraft has been lengthened to cover the front of the rocket, much larger fins have been added, and the delta wing has narrowed. Rolls-Royce When Hawker Siddeley and English Electric were given their identical hypersonics contracts, they were urged to work with Bristol Siddeley, alongside Rolls-Royce, to develop the necessary power plants, so Bristol Siddeley remained aware of developments in both firms as their respective projects progressed. LEFT Several demonstration models of the Bristol Siddeley booster are known to have been constructed. This low- quality image shows the vehicle from the front, its black rocket payload partially submerged. Rolls-Royce RIGHT A view of the Bristol Siddeley booster model's underside, showing its compact engine installation. Rolls-Royce Far from being forgotten, or dismissed as a mere example of how the technology might be applied, Lanes booster went on to appear time and again in a wide variety of publications during the early to mid-1960s. Exhibition models of both the booster and the twin-fuselage high-speed aircraft were made and shown at various events such as the Paris Air Show on the Bristol Siddeley stand, and concept art showing the booster in action was also produced. However, Lane himself was not content with the original design. A paper published in several American journals in 1966 shows an evolved version of the booster, with the forward section now folded back over the front end of the space vehicle - presumably to provide it with yet more protection 184
CHAPTER SEVEN THE RIVALS from high-speed heating. Certainly the Europeans considered the Bristol Siddeley booster to be a serious contender as a potential basis for the Aerospace Transporter. Its days were numbered, however, and its time in the sun was cut short when Rolls-Royce bought the company in 1966 and promptly ended the project. Lane himself went on to lead Rolls-Royces work on the Panavia Tornados RB.199 engine before being appointed as the company’s top man on the new EJ200 engine project in 1989 - the power plant of the Eurofighter Typhoon. BELOW A drawing of the Junkers Raumtransporter as it appeared in a 1964 company report on the project. Airbus Junkers and Bolkow Hawker aside, ВАС considered that West German firm Junkers Flugzeug und Motorenwerke AG posed the greatest threat to Mustard with its Raumtransporter project. Starting in 1961, the West German Government had sponsored the company under National Space Programme Research Project 623 (Space-transporter) to carry out a feasibility study on a system where a two-stage reusable winged booster and spacecraft was launched horizontally by firing it down a track using a catapult. This was a continuation of the work carried out during the Second World War by Sanger - who was a consultant for Junkers until his death on 10 February 1964. Costs were investigated and it was decided that a European launcher would not need to put huge quantities of material into orbit - 6,0001b would be enough for a single payload. Seven different configurations were examined, including the two-stage catapult-launched vehicle, a two-stage vehicle launched from a Mach 0.85 carrier aircraft, a two-stage vehicle launched from a Mach 4 turborocket aircraft, and yet another two-stager launched from a Mach 7.5 turboramjet aircraft. The fifth and sixth layouts were the same as the third and fourth but with only one rocket stage. The seventh was the catapult system as before but with the first-stage booster powered by ramjet-rockets. Junkers ensured that each stage of each configuration was capable of a /. Stufe 2.Stufe Slarfgewichl 79 Io 21 to Treibstoffgewicht 69 Io 13 to 1964 Bild: 1 Typischer 2-stufiger Raumtransporter Junkers ^Ftuijzeijg- и Motorenwerke A G 185
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 Abb 5: Dos Koniept ASTRO eines xwoislufigen Raumfrantport«rs mil Oj/Hj, nach |6] runway landing and every vehicle had a two-man crew. Scramjet vehicles were deliberately excluded from the LEFT Like ВАС, Junkers examined numerous American concepts before settling on its sled-launch Raumtransporter. This image of an early Douglas Astro configuration was used by the company's Jurgen Lambrecht to illustrate a presentation to the Third European Space Flight Symposium at Stuttgart in May 1963. Airbus project, according to a presentation made by project engineers Jurgen Lambrecht and Edwin Schafer at the 1967 SAE conference, since hardly any data on this type of future propulsion system are available in Germany. We think it is unlikely that the first generation of reusable launch systems will employ supersonic combustion.’ The most promising configurations were deemed to be the catapult launch, the Mach 0.85 launch - which would involve a Boeing B-52 with a section of its lower fuselage chopped out - and the ramjet-rocket with catapult launch, mainly because these designs were expected to be cheaper to build than the rest. And of this trio, the original catapult-launched vehicle was described by the engineers as our favourite system’. As the project progressed during 1963, Junkers forged a partnership with another German firm, Bolkow- Entwicklungen KG, and to a lesser degree a northern German consortium that included Focke-Wulf - the Entwicklungsring Nord (ERNO). In its final configuration, regardless of launch method, the Raumtransporters first stage booster was 30 metres (98.4 feet) long with a span of 11.8 metres (38.7 feet), and had three identical rocket engines clustered at the rear. The second stage, 20.5 metres (67.3 feet) long with a span of 8.8 metres (28.9 feet), had only a single rocket engine. Both were to be made BELOW This original concept art shows the two launch configurations considered most suited to the Junkers Raumtransporter - a carved-out Boeing B-52 with the two-vehicle combination embedded in it (top), known as the RT7-1-01, and a sled powered by a superheated steam rocket from which the RT8-1-01 combination would launch at 550mph. Airbus 186
CHAPTER SEVEN THE RIVALS ABOVE This model of the Junkers Raumtransporter, here labelled 'RT-8-0T, has cutaway sections showing how its liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen fuel tanks would be evenly depleted to avoid a dramatic shift in the vehicle's centre of gravity. Airbus BELOW The moment of departure: the Raumtransporter orbiter rockets away from its booster, having slid off the red-coloured rails on its back. Airbus 187
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE The Junkers Raumtransporter in space, with yet another version of its name on display - RT8-II-01. It is presumed that the RT is short for RaumTransporter, the '3' is a reference to the launch configuration, and the 'II' may refer to the vehicle being either the spacecraft or the booster. In another drawing, the booster is given as 'RT8-1-0T and the spacecraft is 'RT8-2-01'; here the '2' is simply substituted for a Roman numeral. The '01' remains constant throughout and its meaning is unclear. Airbus from high nickel alloy steel and on both vehicles the nose and wing leading edges were to have ablative heat shield coatings for protection during re-entry. Vertical control surfaces for manoeuvring in the atmosphere were part of wingtip fins on both vehicles - though the fins were turned down on the booster and turned up on the spacecraft. For a catapult launch, the Raumtransporter - also known as the RT8-1-01 - would sit atop a superheated-steam rocket-powered sled on two-mile-long rails. The sleds engine and all four rocket engines would fire at once to initiate take-off and the vehicle would become airborne at 550mph - with the sled grinding to a halt using a friction or water brake. However, it was feared that firing all four rocket engines on the ground might burn up too much fuel, so some consideration was given to installing an extra tank in the steam rocket sled to keep the vehicle topped up during this phase. All four rocket engines would continue to burn during climb-out, with the booster feeding fuel into the spacecraft to keep its tanks full, before booster separation at an altitude of 40 miles. Two different ways of separating were considered - one involved explosive bolts or small thrust rockets to push the stages apart, the other had the booster simply shut down its engines and allow the still-firing spacecraft to slide off it on rails. The latter was the preferred choice. For the subsonic return flight after re-entry, the booster would have two jet engines mounted to the rear. However, there was a fundamental disagreement between Junkers and Bolkow over this point, and the latter came up with an alternative design for the Raumtransporter booster. It proposed eight ramjet-rocket engines mounted in long pods under the vehicles wings instead of the three rocket engines, the rear section of the vehicles fuselage being covered over with an aerodynamic fairing. One drawing shows the tip fins on Bolkow s booster turned up, while another shows them turned down, like the Junkers design. These appear to be different proposals, rather than an indication of variable-geometry fins. The Bolkow Raumtransporters second-stage spacecraft was also slightly different, since Bolkow did not believe that a single rocket engine was 188
CHAPTER SEVEN THE RIVALS ABOVE There was a disagreement between partners Junkers and Bolkow over the Raumtransporter's engines. The latter proposed fairing over the booster's tail end and employing eight ramjet-rocket engines under its wings instead. The Bolkow version of the spacecraft was also different - having two rocket engines instead of one. While one version of the Bolkow Raumtransporter kept the Junkers's downwards-angled fins, another had them angled up, beside those of the orbiter, via Barry Hinchliffe sufficient and specified two instead. It kept most of Junkers’s aerodynamic form for this vehicle, though. In both versions of the Raumtransporter, the second-stage spacecraft would be able to remain in orbit for around 24 hours before performing its re-entry manoeuvre and flying back down for a lifting-body descent and landing on a combination of skids and wheels that would be explosively deployed and non- retractable once they were down. Rather than pursue the Raumtransporter on its own, or even in partnership with other European nations, Junkers was keen to enlist an American company as its development partner - hoping to avoid some of the heavy costs associated with experimental testing by buying in data. Addressing a mainly American audience during the 1967 presentation, Lambrecht said: ‘We in Germany have reached the same conclusion as you in your country, that only by extending the work to include experiments will improvement of the results available now be possible. First experimental work is being started in Germany at the moment. The most important areas for early experiments that have been identified are external insulation, aerodynamic re-entry and landing, and cryogenic technology. Only after problems of this type have been investigated experimentally, can we hope to improve our analysis to the extent that a logical decision can be made as to the best type of upper stage. BELOW Concept art showing the Bolkow Raumtransporter's underwing engines and its upswept fins. In most other respects the Bolkow vehicle was based entirely on the Junkers design. Airbus 189
BRIIISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES The work in the USA has reached a similar point and at the present time it appears to be illogical that work should be duplicated without benefit from this duplication. A coordinated team effort in the USA and Europe pursuing complementary projects would help to alleviate the capacity problems in the USA and would help Europe to avoid the pursuit of technological solutions which have been discarded in the USA because of previous experience. In my opinion, both sides would only gain, if the efforts on reusable launch systems were coordinated.1 I le went on to suggest a programme of shared research before offering a subtle reminder of Germany’s prior experience in the field of rocket science: ‘NASA’s Wernher von Braun has suggested that work of this type could be part of the Apollo Applications Program. This would prevent Europe having to generate manned space-flight experience all over again. Collaboratively we could generate, much faster and more cheaply for both sides, the awaited means of transportation that we believe to be essential before space flight becomes economically viable.’ Sadly for Junkers, the US would eventually conclude that it simply did not need any help from Europe. Nord-SNECMA-ERNO By 1964 Entwicklungsring Nord (ERNO) had already ended its brief collaboration with Junkers and set to work on its own two-stage tandem recoverable launcher similar to those being studied by ВАС at around the same time. The ERNO Aerospace Transporter involved a vertical lift-off using rocket engines with the spacecraft sitting on the nose of a recoverable booster. Payload was 6,0001b with the fuelled- ABOVE The first ERNO Aerospace Transporter had a Dyna-Soar-type configuration for launch, but with a reusable winged booster rather than an expendable rocket, via Barry Hinchliffe BELOW The upper and lower stages of ERNO's space launcher were joined with the aid of a fairing, which would be blasted free shortly before separation. via Barry Hinchliffe up first-stage booster weighing 262,0001b and the second-stage spacecraft weighing 96,0001b. Like ВАС, however, ERNO found that this arrangement was unsatisfactory and cast around for a different design. Within a year, it had established a new partnership with French companies Nord Aviation and SNECMA, and together they developed a large two-stage horizontal- take-off launcher. The first stage was a carrier aircraft measuring 53 metres (173.9 feet) long, 30 metres (98.4 feet) wide and 13 metres (42.7 feet) high, weighing 120 tonnes - a little smaller than a modern Airbus A330 airliner and with only half the wingspan. This was to be powered by four turboramjets running on kerosene up to Mach 4, with an injection of cryogenic fuels thereafter to reach Mach 7. At an altitude of 35 kilometres, the second-stage spacecraft would detach from the aircrafts underside and fire up its rocket engines for the journey into orbit carrying 6,0001b of payload. This vehicle measured 25.8 metres (93.5 feet) long, 15 metres (49 feet) wide and only 4.5 metres (14.8 feet) high, weighing 80 tonnes. Overall weight of both vehicles on take-off was 200 tonnes. However, the requirement to reach Mach 7 would have necessitated lengthy research into new materials and heavy heat shielding, so a second Nord-SNECMA-ERNO Aerospace Transporter configuration was devised to allow for a slower launch. A new second stage was added, making the spacecraft the third stage. This was a large disposable rocket booster powered by four engines running on liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen. It weighed 50 tons, was 31 metres (101.7 feet) long and slotted into the underside of the launcher aircraft - suitably modified to accommodate it - above the spacecraft. LEFT Side and plan views of the two vehicles that made up the ERNO launcher - the booster above and the spacecraft below, via author 190
CHAPTER SEVEN THE RIVALS ABOVE The partnership between German consortium ERNO and French firms Nord Aviation and SNECMA resulted in a horizontal- take-off Aerospace Transporter system where the booster carried the spacecraft in a recess on its underside. The booster's main distinguishing feature was the enormous intakes for its four turboramjet engines. The main image on this period leaflet is a photograph of an exhibition model. via Barry Hinchliffe LEFT Even with the spacecraft partially recessed in its fuselage, the Nord-SNECMA-ERNO Aerospace Transporter required very long undercarriage main legs, via Barry Hinchliffe RIGHT The second Nord-SNECMA-ERNO Aerospace Transporter configuration had a new second stage in the form of a disposable booster rocket slotted into the launcher aircraft's fuselage between it and the spacecraft. This arrangement necessitated the spacecraft being inverted so that the rocket was attached to its underside and its fins pointed downwards. via Barry Hinchliffe BELOW RIGHT With the launch arrangement changed, a second exhibition model of the Nord-SNECMA-ERNO Aerospace Transporter had to be constructed. This grainy image shows how the orbiter and its booster rocket would have separated - leaving a gaping hole in the launcher aircraft, via Barry Hinchliffe BELOW A forward view of the Nord-SNECMA-ERNO Aerospace Transporter exhibition model, prominently displaying the booster's huge intakes, via Barry Hinchliffe 191
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE As they had done with other designs of interest, the team at Warton produced a drawing showing the Nord-SNECMA- ERNO Aerospace Transporter, numbered EAG 4480. This included an interesting detail lacking in the other available images: the interior of the engine intakes and how each was split before reaching its two turboramjets. The spacecraft itself was the same size but significantly lighter, weighing only 30 tonnes to ensure that the take- off weight of 200 tonnes remained the same. Separation was still at 35 kilometres but now at only Mach 5. The second-stage rocket would then fire and take the spacecraft up to 180 kilometres before it separated and fell away, leaving the spacecraft to continue its journey. As with the Hawker and Junkers designs, support for the Nord-ERNO- SNECMA project was not forthcoming and it was eventually dropped. RIGHT The concept art put together for Dassault's Transporter Aerospatial or TAS largely comprised photographs of models set against scenic backdrops. This first image in a sequence of six shows the Concorde-like TAS shortly after take-off. © Dassault Aviation Dassault TAS During the January 1964 Eurospace meeting, Avions Marcel Dassault engineer Henri Deplante presented the findings of his firms first space transporter feasibility study and showed the audience two sketches depicting a horizontal-take-off vehicle comprising two recoverable stages. This design underwent some refinement over the next three years and Deplante and his colleague Pierre Perrier were among the delegates at the 1967 SAE conference, ready to give an update on progress. Deplante said: ‘It seems that the tremendous experience gained from the X-15 BELOW The large TAS booster aircraft was intended to take its spacecraft payload up to the edge of space before releasing it. © Dassault Aviation 192
CHAPTER SEVEN THE RIVALS RIGHT Attached to its large booster rocket, the TAS spacecraft drops away from the booster before firing its engines. © Dassault Aviation FAR RIGHT Its fuel spent, the TAS expendable booster is jettisoned, leaving the spacecraft to continue its mission. © Dassault Aviation BELOW LEFT Ready for re-entry - the Dassault TAS spacecraft alone. © Dassault Aviation BELOW RIGHT After re-entering the earth's atmosphere, the TAS spacecraft would extend its variable-geometry wings before flying back to base with the aid of a small turbojet. © Dassault Aviation flights which we followed with much admiration has demonstrated what could be obtained from a composite space transporter with horizontal take-off. We have also seen with satisfaction that during their experiments on re-entry vehicle recovery, the Americans moved towards manually flyable vehicles by designing them with variable- geometry planforms powered by auxiliary engines. These two features were already present in our 1964 project.’ With regard to the general design of the Transporteur Aerospatial, or TAS, he said: ‘Instead of setting for ourselves the task of designing from scratch a space transporter, we chose to start from existing supersonic aircraft and to proceed in successive steps until we reach a stage where the design project fulfils all the requirements for a space transporter. All the problems to be solved as we moved from present day aircraft to the space transporter have been listed and investigated. This has led us to very valuable knowledge. It appears that the Avions Marcel Dassault’s concept derives logically from present day civil and military aircraft.’ It was later explained that this meant the company’s Mirage prototypes, particularly delta-wing and variable- RIGHT Two main configurations were studied for the Dassault Transporteur Aerospatial. TAS 1 (top) was the larger and carried a single-stage space vehicle. TAS 2 (bottom) was the preferred design and featured an expendable booster rocket. © Dassault Aviation geometry designs, and the MD-620 missile. In fact, the Dassault TAS looked more like Concorde but with a spacecraft carried on its underside. As with the Nord-SNECMA-ERNO design, two different arrangements were examined - a 230-tonne two-stage version with just the carrier aircraft and the spacecraft known as TAS 1, and a 150-tonne three- stage version with the carrier aircraft, a rocket booster and the spacecraft known as TAS 2. In both versions the carrier aircraft had kerosene fuel tanks in its wings, liquid hydrogen fuel in the forward fuselage and liquid oxygen in the rear fuselage. The centre section of the fuselage, directly over the cockpit of the underslung spacecraft, was deliberately left empty. In the event of an emergency, the two-man spacecraft crew could eject upwards through the top of their own vehicle, right through the RIGHT The Dassault TAS orbiter. During an emergency on take-off, the crew of the orbiter would have been able to eject right up through an empty section of the carrier aircraft into open air. © Dassault Aviation 193
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES fuselage of the carrier, and safely away into the slipstream. The two-man crew of the carrier aircraft also had ejection seats. Deplante said: ‘The two flyable and recoverable stage scheme was attractive, but we found that the addition of a second stage booster to place the space vehicle in orbit would mean a 35% reduction in gross take-off weight. For a 4,0001b to 6,0001b payload, the take-off weight would vary from 300,0001b to 400,0001b, which would permit conventional take-off from existing and future major airports. There are many of them throughout the world and this means that the space transporter would have a high degree of mobility.’ The TAS 2 first-stage aircraft, measuring 58 metres (190 feet) long and with a span of 23 metres (75.5 feet), was to be powered by turboramjets up to around Mach 4, at which point the second-stage booster rocket would be fired - before separation. Under the power of the boosters rocket engine, the whole three- stage vehicle would accelerate to Mach 6, with the carrier aircraft feeding more fuel into the booster to keep it topped up, before the carrier finally detached. It would then turn around and fly back to base for a runway landing using its conventional wheeled undercarriage. During re-entry, its wing leading edges, air intake lips and other hot areas would be protected by steel alloys that were not load-bearing structural components. After landing, these parts would simply be removed and taken away for refurbishment, with fresh parts being installed in their place. Rather than being a ‘hot structure like Mustard, the Dassault orbiter was designed to be kept cool during re-entry with an ablative thermal protection system. Once it was through the upper atmosphere, the orbiter had thin wings that swung out on either side to provide sufficient lift for the landing phase - aided by a small Rolls-Royce RB. 162/1 turbojet of the sort used in the Mirage IIIV VTOL aircraft. Touchdown was on a set of underbelly skids. Deplante told the audience that the orbiter’s crew compartment ‘can also be designed like a jettisonable capsule but there would be a weight penalty.’ The first-stage TAS 2 carrying an empty second stage spacecraft during a ferry flight at low speed would have a range of 2,000 miles. If the spacecraft’s tanks were full of rocket fuel, this dropped to 1,000 miles, but if they were full of kerosene that could be fed into the aircraft’s engines, range rose to 3,700 miles. Deplante said: ‘For the next steps in the development of an aerospace transporter, Avions Marcel Dassault recommend the building of a half size composite space transporter. It would be used to investigate the validity of the design and of the systems. This reduced-size vehicle would minimise the overall development costs and the experience gained from testing it out and operating it would be most valuable when building the full-size transporter. To conclude, we do not presume to say that we have found “the” solution to the problem of selecting an optimum space transport system, but we do believe that the concept we have outlined looms as the most promising compromise possible within today’s technological boundaries. Its promises are founded not only on the basis of the very limited risks it entails but on the relatively limited dimensions of the space transport and on its amazing operational flexibility. These characteristics would take most space activities from their drama- packed phase into routine low cost operations performed by man to explore and exploit the immense possibilities that the conquest of near outer space will bring him.’ Like the other Eurospace designs, Dassault’s Transporteur Aerospatial went nowhere - but the company kept it in mind and tried on several occasions to bring back some aspect of it, such as with the 1986 Dassault- Breguet Star H recoverable space transporter study. 194
Chapter Eight Later hypersonic designs P.42 under ВАС While the ВАС Preston Division team believed that the rocket- propelled vertical-launch Mustard system was by far the most promising design to emerge from their hypersonics research, they never entirely gave up on conventional take- offbooster aircraft. English Electric began studying these airbreathing vehicles under the designation P.42, but that had disappeared together with the old company name. However, the same team continued to work on the same project when the original contract was extended and renewed, so P.42 continued in all but name. It was well understood, as outlined in Chapter 2, that designing and building a working aircraft capable of launching another vehicle at speeds of Mach 4 and beyond was an immense technical challenge, but there were three good reasons to continue with the research even after Mustard had been devised. For a start, the original terms of the Ministry of Aviation contract had not been changed since it was issued in the summer of 1963. Even in March 1965, ВАС was still obliged ‘to make studies of the feasibility of hypersonic flight for long range cruise aircraft’ as well as recoverable launchers, boost-glide vehicles and space planes, and ‘to study the relative merits of two-stage and single-stage vehicles for hypersonic flight’ Then there was the fact that almost everyone else was working on high- speed booster aircraft. If a partnership with another European nation, or even another European company was arranged, with the express purpose of developing a horizontal-take-off booster, complete with some hefty financial backing, it would be useful if ВАС had already carried out substantial work in this field. Finally, the RAE and the Ministry of Aviation, and even BACs own senior management, believed that the Warton team would eventually conclude that a ABOVE BAC's Mach 7 booster aircraft of EAG 4453 prepares to turn for home after launching its upper surface spacecraft payload at 85,000ft. Hamza Fouatih hypersonic aircraft was the best solution. There had been genuine surprise across the board when Mustard was proposed, and no one quite believed that its many advantages as a system on paper would translate into a working space vehicle. Mustard project assistant engineer Eric Webb later wrote: ‘At the end of Phase 1 it was concluded that all the types of hypersonic airbreathing vehicles (military, transport and space launcher) were simply too expensive to develop and operate. The only system worthy of more detailed study was the recoverable rocket powered launcher. This wasn’t the conclusion the government establishments or the 195
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES Warton management were expecting. Despite this, after much debate, a Phase 2 contract was awarded. This allowed the Warton team to concentrate on launchers whilst also refining some of the airbreathing vehicle designs for comparison? These refined airbreathing boosters were detailed in the second ВАС hypersonics progress report, of August 1964. Before examining individual design studies, it offered some fundamental principles for the work undertaken: ‘A booster aircraft which is to launch an upper stage into orbit from Mach numbers between 3 and 7 must carry approximately half its take-off weight as payload if it is to be effective. Earlier studies had shown that the aircraft weight could be regarded as made up by the combination of four features: the part of the weight that was primarily determined by the wing area; the power plant weight; the total fuel load required; and undercarriage and systems? Boiled down, the problem facing the designers was how to carry the maximum payload weight with the smallest possible wings, the lightest engines and the least amount of fuel. The size and shape of the wings and engines, together with the volume of fuel to be carried, would determine the size and weight of the undercarriage. The electronic, hydraulic and other systems represented a fixed weight that could not be reduced. Every effort was made to balance this equation but, where earlier studies had concentrated on booster aircraft that would work at a conservative Mach 4, ВАС now tried to establish what the upper speed limit of such an aircraft might be. Design assumptions and estimates on areas such as engine output had deliberately tended towards the pessimistic before, but now ‘in order to provide an idea of an “upper” limit to performance any such assumptions were allowed to tend towards the optimistic? For the first hypersonics progress report, numerous P.42 designs had been drafted and rejected before any were deemed worthy of a fully comprehensive assessment and write- up. For the second report, there was just one interim design that didn’t make the final cut - the Mach 4 Rolls- Royce flashjet-powered booster shown in EAG 4432. Pre-dating Mustard, EAG 4432 appears to have the distinction of being the first drawing in the series to be labelled ‘British Aircraft Corporation Ltd (Preston)’, rather than ‘English Electric Aviation Ltd’. As with the earlier P.42 designs, the all-up weight of the EAG 4432 aircraft is shown as 500,0001b with 50,0001b of liquid hydrogen fuel carried in two long cylindrical tanks that make up most of the 155-foot-long fuselage. The wingspan is 78 feet and wing area 5,000sq ft, and there is a large fin at BELOW The first 'P.42' designed under ВАС, rather than English Electric, was the Mach 4 booster shown in EAG 4432. The English Electric project number had been dropped but the project continued unabated. 196
CHAPTER EIGHT LATER HYPERSONIC DESIGNS each wingtip. The enormous undercarriage main legs are shown, when retracted, as being housed inside fairings on either side of the underslung engine block. Booster problems The first P.42-like booster aircraft design to be fully assessed from an engineering standpoint for the second progress report is shown in drawing EAG 4435. It represented a concerted attempt to ‘produce a smaller vehicle with less drag’ than the enormous designs studied in the first progress report - such as the ‘typical’ EAG 4396 aircraft, which had a fuselage 144 feet long, a wingspan of 130 feet and a wing area of 7,500sq ft. By comparison, the EAG 4435 design had a fuselage 104 feet long, a wingspan of just 78 feet and a wing area of5,000sq ft. Both aircraft had a take-off weight of 500,0001b, however. According to the report, the new compact booster \.. was kerosene fuelled and had BS 1012/2 engines. A 3% thick wing was used and fuel was carried both in the wing and the fuselage. The engines and undercarriage were hidden behind the intake and fuselage, the upper engine filling the fuselage base. A point of interest is that it was intended to burn the boundary layer air in nozzles at the rear edges of the nacelle. Optimisation studies carried out at the time indicated that the wing area could be reduced from the 6,000-7,000sq ft used previously and an area of 5,000sq ft was used.’ The drawing itself shows EAG 4435 with a trio of Bristol Siddeley BS 1011 /2 engines scaled up to produce 1.47 times the thrust figure given in the engine firm’s brochure. As the design was assessed, two problems soon became apparent. First, balance was very difficult to achieve since the aircraft’s centre of gravity, naturally towards the rear where the engines were, would shift still further in that direction as its fuel was depleted, causing the nose to pitch up. And second, putting the two-stage spacecraft/booster on top of it resulted in massive drag that was ‘many times the drag of the boost aircraft alone’. Attempts were made to design a fairing that would make the piggybacking spacecraft more streamlined, but this proved to be ‘very difficult’. BELOW Retaining the weight and wing area of the Rolls-Royce flashjet-powered EAG 4432 aircraft, the booster shown in EAG 4435 was nevertheless a much more compact vehicle with Bristol Siddeley BS.1011/2 engines. 197
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 Taken together, these two factors effectively killed the EAG 4435 booster. Three more vehicles were then designed along similar lines - the Mach 4 boosters of EAG 4438 part 1, part 2 and part 3. These slender aircraft were each 132 feet long with a span of 66 feet and four rather than three scaled-up Bristol Siddeley BS 1011/2 engines. Wing area was just 4,000sq ft in each case. A further design - shown in EAG 4446 - found a middle ground between the EAG 4435 and EAG 4438 vehicles. It measured 120 feet down its centreline and had a wingspan of 75 feet, yet retained the 4,000sq ft wing area of its immediate predecessor. Take-off weight remained at 500,0001b too, with a larger fraction of this now being available for the payload. However, such a diminutive set of wings caused its own problems. Giving the engines enough room became more difficult, as did fitting the spacecraft and its rocket booster on top. But here ВАС was able to take advantage of the innovative expendable wing-shaped fuel tank developed by Geoff Sharpies. The report said: ‘The solution shown here places the third stage at the rear of the booster with the second stage fuel tank forming a long forward fairing, the whole being a lifting body in its own right? The form of Sharpless wing-shaped tank had changed significantly, but the principle remained the same. Low- speed wind tunnel tests had already been carried out on the configuration shown in EAG 4446 at the time of the second progress report and preparations were being made to put a similar model through a programme of high-speed wind tunnel testing. Positioning a large tank full of rocket fuel towards the front of the vehicle helped with the centre of gravity problem too: ‘Balance of the combined upper stages is obtained by placing the LOX tanks at the front of the vehicle. This layout is suitable for launch speeds between Mach 4 and Mach 5.5? There were further areas of difficulty that caused the Warton team a headache, however - the substantial intake needed for the aircrafts array of Bristol Siddeley BS. 1012/2 engines and the bulky fairings needed to house the undercarriage. The report noted: ‘The complicated intake was so heavy that a study was made to determine the minimum overall power plant weight. The results have yet to be applied to the intake weights but have been used to show that the optimum number of engines for this layout was five. The five engines used are BS. 1012/2 engines scaled by 1.2. The engine weight has been determined by taking six times the brochure weight for a single engine, and adding an installation allowance. The undercarriage is faired into chord length fairings on the wing. The weight of the fairings, 4,0001b, is a large penalty to pay, and a trade-off between weight of reduced fairings and increased drag requires investigation? A weight allowance of 10,0001b was set aside for the mounting equipment needed to attach the spacecraft and its booster rocket to the upper surface of the aircraft, but working out exactly how the launch procedure would be carried out would require a significant programme of testing and design in its own right - putting it beyond the reach BELOW When it was decided that the wing area of the EAG 4435 booster was too great, a series of three vehicles were designed with smaller wings. The EAG 4438 part 1 vehicle had a straightforward delta wing, a central fin and an evenly shaped fuselage above its four scaled Bristol Siddeley BS.1011/2 engines. 198
CHAPTER EIGHT LATER HYPERSONIC DESIGNS ABOVE The second EAG 4438 vehicle saw the design's fuselage squeezed in the centre and lowered to sit within its delta wing rather than on top of it. The fin has a slightly greater angle of sweep too. BELOW A last version of the EAG 4438 booster deleted the central fin and replaced it with a pair of wingtip fins. Otherwise it retained the squeezed and lowered fuselage of the second version. 199
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE The booster shown in EAG 4446 had moved on several steps from its predecessors. It now sat on a much lower undercarriage, its tip fins were more sharply swept and no longer extended below the wing, and the shape of its wings was altered for improved performance despite a low surface area. Easily the most interesting aspect of the design drawing, however, was the spacecraft positioned on the booster's back. This was loosely based on the old EAG 4413 design but with an aerodynamically shaped expendable fuel tank now attached to its forward section. of the funds allowed in Ministry of Aviations hypersonics research contract. ВАС was forced to admit: ‘It is still completely unknown what form this mounting has to take? The last booster aircraft to be studied in the second progress report was shown in EAG 4453. It was intended to reach Mach 7 with a set of six Bristol Siddeley BS. 1012/6 engines, which were similar to the BS. 1012/2 but with an additional ramjet. The normal engine would be used to reach Mach 5 before being bypassed in favour of the second ramjet, which would propel the aircraft up to its top speed. The BS 1012/6 as it was presented in the company brochure was not powerful enough for this operation, however, so ВАС simply scaled it up by 20%. It had been hoped that this last booster could be based on the compact form of the EAG 4446 aircraft, but this proved impossible because the diminutive wing planform did not provide enough room for the necessary engine intakes and there was a similar lack of space for the large exhaust nozzles needed. The fuselage length was 118 feet, wingspan was 75У2 feet and wing area was 4,075sq ft. The nozzle problem was solved by shifting the whole engine installation downwards at an angle, but the intake issue proved intractable. Neither a cropped delta wing nor a cropped double delta could give sufficient room - the cropping being necessary for the tip fins, deemed essential for carrying an upper surface payload - so in the end a more radical solution was called for. A large rectangular centre section was added that had sidewalls all the way from its leading edge to join up with the sidewalls of the intake itself. This provided the intake with the area it required while at the same time helping to cure the centre of gravity issue still plaguing the series by adding more weight up front. The engines kerosene fuel was to be carried in the wings, the fuselage and the space between the wing and the engines. After TSR2 At the very outset in mid-1963, P.42 was seen as an opportunity to work through ideas for an aircraft that might eventually replace the TSR2, and this effort continued into the second progress report, of 1964. From a starting point of the EAG 4426 and 4427 drawings from the earlier P.42 sequence, the Warton team replaced the twin Rolls-Royce ducted ‘C’-type turboramjets with a pair of Bristol Siddeley BS.1012/2s scaled down to 90% of their brochure size. The original wing was replaced with a 200
CHAPTER EIGHT LATER HYPERSONIC DESIGNS ABOVE The final 'P.42' booster. Evidence of the calculations underpinning the Mach 7 aircraft shown in EAG 4453 is clear in the wing area of 4,075sq ft, derived from a span of 75ft 6in. The unusual wing shape was a compromise necessitated by the required intake length for its Bristol Siddeley BS.1012/6 engines. double delta ‘since it seemed likely to simplify the problem of aerodynamic balance’, and the variable-geometry wingtips of the P.42 designs were deleted in favour of a fixed wing structure. The result is shown in EAG 4441 - a slender aircraft with a surprisingly small engine installation and a very large tailfin. The basic design top speed of Mach 4 was retained, but calculations were made that would allow the aircraft to either be built of lighter materials with scaled-down engines if it was only required to reach Mach 3 - its all-up weight being reduced from 146,0001b to 140,8001b - or fitted with greater insulation and 100%-size engines if the top speed was to be Mach 5, resulting in a weight increase to 155,6001b. In either case the actual size of the aircraft would remain the same, with a wingspan of 62ft 6in, a wing area of l,750sq ft, and an overall length from the end of its nose to the tip of its tailfin of 120 feet. Some consideration was also given to how the aircraft might be equipped. According to the report: ‘The fuselage made provision for an equipment bay aft of the cockpit which could take a sideways- looking aerial 23ft long. Air-to- ground television similar to that designed for TSR2 could also be accommodated.’ Furthermore: ‘Systems weight has been derived largely by comparison with other aircraft, due allowance being made for simplification. A typical example is that 1,5001b has been allowed for reconnaissance pack equipment whereas the TSR2 figure is 2,0001b.’ When it came to the undercarriage, the design team were keen to maintain an overall weight lower than 160,0001b, since this would allow the aircraft to retain ‘...a simple undercarriage which stowed neatly into the sides of the engine nacelle without involving any undue penalty in cowl drag. Any substantial increase in weight, by increase of wing size for example, would have increased the complexity of the undercarriage and raised awkward problems of stowage.’ This was as far the second progress report went, but several further drawings were produced that developed the design further. EAG 4458 shrank it dramatically in the same way that EAG 4427 was a miniature 201
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 /*/5 о Гт. 62 S Г ? Ac * f В ’ Bs /04?/л ЛС» "лъ/ % / CH 70 ABOVE Sporting a huge fin, a compound delta wing and a compact engine installation, the reconnaissance aircraft depicted in EAG 4441 was compared directly against TSR2 in the second ВАС hypersonics progress report and deemed superior in several respects. version of EAG 4426. Overall length went from 120 to 87 feet, wingspan from 6216 to 53 feet, and wing area went from 1,750 to l,290sq ft. The engines were half-scale BS.1012/2s and all-up weight was just 96,0001b, with 52,0001b of that being kerosene fuel. The fuselage shape, rather than being cylindrical, became flattened and broad, overhanging the narrow engine installation on either side. Next came EAG 4459, which shows the original cylinder-fuselage restored and the outer portion of the double delta wing angled downwards slightly. A more detailed undercarriage is depicted, but no cockpit features are given. Overall length is down to 85 feet, but the other dimensions, engines, weight and fuel load remain unchanged. BELOW AND OPPOSITE The reconnaissance aircraft of EAG 4441 as it might have appeared in service. Luca Landino 202
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BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE The wing shape of the EAG 4441 vehicle was carried over to the smaller aircraft shown in EAG 4458. No title is given and this design was not featured in BAC's reports, but it is likely that this was another attempt at a TSR2 replacement. It features a rugged wide- track undercarriage and very compact engine block. LEFT As often happened with BAC's hypersonics designs, the original drawing was cleaned up and had details added so that it could be used in an official report or as part of a publicity campaign. This design shows how the EAG 4458 aircraft might have looked with a compact tandem cockpit. OPPOSITE Had the EAG 4458 aircraft entered service with the RAF, it might have appeared in the colours of 3 Squadron, based at RAF Coningsby in Lincolnshire. Luca Landino 204
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BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE Combining elements of EAG 4441 and EAG 4458 was the aircraft shown in EAG 4459. It had a somewhat narrow-track landing gear but more splayed than that of EAG 4441. The cylindrical fuselage of that design is retained, but the tall tailfin has been replaced in favour of the more swept type from EAG 4458. This appears to have been the last of BAC's potential TSR2 replacement designs. The same basic double delta wing layout is also shown in EAG 4468 as the basis for a comparison of liquid- hydrogen-powered aircraft. Three designs are shown on the same sheet with varying wing areas, and in each case the fuselage is grossly distended to accommodate the necessary fuel load. The smallest of this trio, shown at the top, measures 187 feet in length with a fuselage radius of 4.88 feet, the next largest is 194 feet with a 5.1-foot radius, and the last 201 feet with a 5.27-foot radius. One last cruise vehicle that appears only within the drawing sequence and is not mentioned in the reports is shown in three different versions of the EAG 4456 drawing. This was a go-for- broke vertical-take-off aircraft powered by a large aerospike rocket engine and two podded ramjets, and was intended to cruise at Mach 10 at 100,000 feet. The design that appears on the preliminary issue of EAG 4456 has a near cylindrical fuselage 124 feet long, ending in a single conventional tailfin. Positioned 10 feet back from the tip of the nose were a pair of delta wing canards emerging from halfway up the fuselage. Towards the rear, however, were a pair of unswept wings that jut out horizontally at right angles from the fuselage, giving a wingspan of 58 feet. These were entirely rectangular in planform but had an almost triangular cross-section. ‘Pad weight’ was 100,0001b, and its rocket engine was to provide 150,0001b thrust. The undercarriage took the form of a nosewheel on a very short leg, while skids to the rear retracted into a fairing installed specifically to house them. The shortness of the nosewheel gear meant that the whole aircraft would have had a very front-end-down attitude when landing - perhaps to give the two crewmen a better view from their position in the nose. An unlabelled drawing from the set, perhaps intended to be EAG 4456 issue 1, shows almost the same design but scaled up 100%, with a pad weight of 200,0001b and a rocket thrust of 300,0001b. Wingspan was nowr 75 feet and net wing area 930sq ft. The range, which was not given on the preliminary issue, is shown as 3,000 miles. The third and final EAG 4456 design, marked as issue 2, differs significantly from its two predecessors, but is still recognisably based on the same basic template. Another Mach 10 vertical-take-off cruise vehicle, it is a return to the preliminary issues pad weight of 100,0001b with a rocket thrust of 150,0001b. The fuselage is 130 feet long and ends in a more sharply swept tailfin. The canards remain but these too are angled further back and sit higher up on the fuselage. Now the squared-off w'ings are gone, replaced by very short swept wings ending in more detailed ramjets. Even the undercarriage has changed, with the rear skids being replaced by a single 206
CHAPTER EIGHT LATER HYPERSONIC DESIGNS ABOVE A trio of aircraft designed with the optimum fuselage and wing shape for carrying large quantities of liquid hydrogen fuel appears in EAG 4468. As the length of the fuselage is progressively increased, the size of the compound delta wings is decreased. Dating from 1965, these aircraft appear to predict Reaction Engines' Skyion design of nearly 40 years later. wheel on either side. This seemingly flimsy option was acceptable since the vehicle would take off vertically - no undercarriage required - and weigh just 55,500lb when it landed, the same as a fully loaded Canberra B6 at take-off. From this point on no further P.42- like aircraft were drawn, and Mustard took over the sequence, commanding all of designer Dave Walley’s attention. But there were yet further undrawn hypersonic aircraft studies, including work on a reconnaissance aircraft that could be launched from the back of a runway-take-off booster. It was BELOW This vertical-take-off cruise vehicle with canards, shown in EAG 4456 preliminary issue, was intended to make use of a single large aerospike rocket engine to reach speeds of up to Mach 10. 207
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES ABOVE Despite being unnumbered, this drawing appears to be EAG 4456 issue 1. The vehicle shown is 50 feet longer than the design shown in EAG 4456 preliminary issue, but is otherwise very similar. BELOW Another design featuring a long tubular fuselage and canards, again bringing Reaction Engines' Skyion to mind, is shown in EAG 4456 issue 2. Now the rocket engine appears to have been deleted, though it is still mentioned in the accompanying notes. The extremely short wings end in ramjets and the top speed is again intended to be Mach 10. 208
CHAPTER EIGHT LATER HYPERSONIC DESIGNS considered that putting a scramjet- powered aircraft on top of a Mach 6- capable launcher aircraft could result in the second stage’ being able to cruise at speeds of up to Mach 11. The report explains why no drawings were made of this theoretical arrangement: ‘For simplicity the cruise aircraft was considered to be basically of two dimensional form and consisted mainly of a single low angle wedge intake followed by a very short combustion chamber and an external expansion nozzle.’ From the side, this vehicle would have looked like a very long, very thin triangle. This made it aerodynamically efficient but resulted in serious problems when it came to working out how the necessary amount of liquid hydrogen fuel would be squeezed in. The report noted: ‘Small highly swept stub wings were used to carry the control surfaces and to provide sufficient wing area for landing. As it is obvious that any final shape must integrate smoothly with the first stage booster aircraft it appeared necessary to keep the maximum depth of the cruise vehicle well aft.’ There were other problems beside fuel storage: ‘Aerodynamic stability of this configuration was difficult to achieve and the trim problem appeared considerable.’ Last gasp hypersonics After August 1964, only sporadic work was done on hypersonic aircraft at Warton. The third progress report, of April 1965, stated that the only ongoing work on cruise aircraft since the last report had been ‘concerned with answering some specific points raised during the various official meetings’. RIGHT Long after the designs had been all but dismissed by the team at Warton, the English Electric EAG 4396 P.42 Scheme 11/13 booster with EAG 4413 space plane and expendable rocket pack were featured in a sequence of ВАС publicity images. One of these had been about BAC’s P.42 reconnaissance aircraft designs: would it not make sense to use a bigger engine so that such an aircraft could perform a tighter turn when preparing to head for home? The answer was that a smaller engine would allow a 1.6g turn at top speed, losing only about 50 nautical miles of range while making the manoeuvre, whereas ‘this penalty is at least twice as great if extra power plant is installed to allow a 2.5g turn at the cruising height. In Progress Report No 2 the cruise Mach number for best range was found to be about 4.0, and so far this conclusion remains unshaken as far as the power plant with subsonic combustion ramjets is concerned.’ What about altitude - what would be the effect on range if the reconnaissance aircraft flew higher? ‘For an aircraft of constant take-off weight the operating height can be increased at the expense of range by increasing the wing area and reducing the fuel load. Halving the range at Mach 4 raises the operating height at the end of the outward flight from 80,000ft to 90,000ft. If the complication of a rocket booster pack is accepted, instead of increasing wing size, the height over target can be raised to 120,000ft for a short time for a loss of straight line AIRBREATHER PAYLOAD 11Z5OOlb AIRBREATHER + EXPENDABLE ROCKET + LIFTING BODY SPACEPLANE range of just over 400 nautical miles. If the vulnerability were significantly reduced by such height gains, this could be a fruitful area for further study.’ But wouldn’t using liquid hydrogen fuel instead of kerosene increase range? ‘The use of hydrogen fuel in an aircraft of this size has been found to give a range barely matching that of the kerosene-fuelled aircraft even on the most favourable assumptions as to carriage of fuel in the wings and the effect of a bulky fuselage on lift-drag ratio.’ Had ВАС considered using scramjets, like the Americans? ‘Some thought has been given to cruise aircraft with supersonic combustion ramjets. In order that the airframe and engine should be as simple as possible it was assumed that the aircraft would be either rocket-boosted or air- launched to Mach 6 and then accelerate under ramjet power.’ The only ongoing work on airbreathing boosters for air-launching spacecraft since the last report had been ‘in respect of possible improvements at Mach numbers above 6’. ‘It was found that the use of a larger powerplant to maintain acceleration on a trajectory at 209
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 AIRBREATHER PAYLOAD 145,000 lb REVISED AIRBREATHER + EXPENDABLE ROCKET + LIFTING BODY SPACEPLANE AIRBREATHER PAYLOAD 178,000 lb AIRBREATHER WITH CURVED INTAKE SURFACES PLUS HYDROGEN FUEL ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY LIGHTWEIGHT AIRBREATHING BOOSTER AIRBREATHER PAYLOAD 236,000lb STRUCTURE 15-8% POWER PLANT 10 8% SYSTEMS 12-0z£ FUEL 14-4% PAYLOAD 47 2% A.U.W. 1000% AIRBREATHER + EXPENDABLE STAGE + LIFTING BODY SPACEPLANE LEFT The second design in BAC's series of horizontal take-off launcher publicity drawings was EAG 4424, labelled P.42 in the original drawing but unnumbered. Again, the Mach 4 aircraft is paired with the EAG 4413 spacecraft. Its variable-geometry wings are depicted in the down position. lOOpsi intake pressure improved performance slightly and that rocket boost could help above Mach 6.5. The use of supersonic combustion ramjets between Mach 6 and 7 was potentially better than any of the above, but presented practical problems of installation which still required solution. Even so, the best performance obtained at Mach 7 - capability of launching an upper stage of 100,000lb - did not significantly alter the picture presented in Progress Report No 2, that the maximum payload into orbit occurred at a launch speed of Mach 4.3? This latter conclusion only applied to space vehicles when launched with an expendable rocket booster. ВАС had also investigated the possibility of air- launching a larger, entirely reusable space vehicle such as a Mustard unit from the back of a hypersonic aircraft: ‘Since launching a single stage into orbit could have operational advantages, performance was examined to see how far the airbreather launching performance fell short of this capability. It was MIDDLE The EAG 4416 issue 1 Mach 4 booster appears to be the basis for the third image in BAC's launcher artwork series. It does, however, appear to be shown with four engine pods rather than three. Again, the variable- geometry wingtips are in the down position rather than horizontal. LEFT Representing the final development in BAC's P.42 follow-on airbreathing launcher programme is this depiction of the EAG 4446 booster. The spacecraft shown launching from its upper surface features the ultimate evolution of the expendable wing-fuel tank concept initially patented by ВАС in 1964. 210
CHAPTER EIGHT LATER HYPERSONIC DESIGNS found that optimum performance was at a higher Mach number - between Mach 5 and Mach 6 - than with an expendable stage and that the performance deficiency was in meeting the demand for velocity capability to manoeuvre in orbit rather than in reaching orbital velocity.’ This said, the report concluded that from a cost-effectiveness point of view, ‘The airbreathing booster appears to have no promise unless a considerable portion of its development cost can be amortised against some other objective.’ ‘Grave difficulties’ The third progress report had no new hypersonic aircraft designs to offer, booster, transport, reconnaissance or otherwise, but went to some lengths to explain why not and to argue that although a manned research vehicle might now be called for, it definitely should not be built as a testbed for a future hypersonic aircraft. It stated: ‘It has become increasingly evident that our investigations are being hampered by the lack of “know- how” in the recently developed aerospace technologies. Great strides have been made in the USA since this country reduced its efforts in the advanced aircraft business in 1957. Programmes such as X-15, A-11, B-70 and in particular the manned and unmanned space programmes have revolutionised the US industry and the experience gained has given confidence in the use of new techniques and materials. However, major development programmes of this type are very costly and much of the expense is incurred in resolving quite ordinary engineering problems. Whilst all of this is very necessary in attaining a reliable weapon or space system, it is a very costly way of advancing the state of the art, if this is the main objective.’ Any research project, it said, ought to be used to develop as many new materials, construction techniques and other technologies, and it was ‘...equally essential that a research vehicle should be orientated towards some useful purpose, i.e. it should be part of some larger plan. It is our opinion that we have now reached the stage where some form of pilot engineering to back up the paper studies is essential. This raises the question of whether a research vehicle is worthy of consideration. A variety of hypersonic vehicles powered by various airbreathing engines have been studied. Our work has shown that such vehicles do not appear to be strong contenders as space vehicle boosters.’ The Warton team gave three reasons why they believed that there was no real point in studying hypersonic booster aircraft any further, and the first was financial: ‘Cost effectiveness studies do not show that the airbreathing booster possesses any inherent advantages, indeed quite the reverse. As a consequence of its large manufactured weight to orbital payload ratio, the development cost will be greater than for the recoverable rocket. The advantages generally claimed for the airbreather, reduced fuel cost and launch facility requirement', are quite small items compared with vehicle development and do not compensate to any large degree.’ Next up was operational problems. Unless a launcher aircraft could go faster than Mach 4 or 5, the spacecraft it was carrying would need to be fitted with an expendable booster rocket and this would present ‘grave difficulties if operated from the European continent because of the debris problem’. Finally, any launcher aircraft would need the spacecraft it was carrying to have a rocket engine of some sort - resulting in at least two different vehicles having to be developed, substantially increasing the overall cost: ‘Assuming that there is only a limited amount of research money available, priority should obviously be given to the technology which is common to all the possible systems.’ It was conceded that ‘in an alternative form it is possible to visualise a high-speed cruise vehicle for reconnaissance or transport although at this time no operational requirement is apparent.’ While this possibility was being explored, it had been suggested to ВАС that a research aircraft capable of Mach 4-5 and weighing about 80,0001b might be a useful tool in the development of hypersonic airbreathing engines and airframes for a future cruise vehicle. The company could not have been more against the idea. The third progress report said: ‘The question must be asked whether it is maximum value for money. We feel quite strongly that it is not and that sufficient confidence could be obtained from calculation and ground testing to go ahead with the operational vehicle, developing it up to full performance in the usual manner. We would certainly not suggest the building of an intermediate test vehicle. A great deal of the effort involved in the test vehicle would have little to do with hypersonics. For instance, rigs for systems proving would have to be built and large sums of money would be spent in demonstrating and improving the reliability of certain combinations of components. Whilst some basic problems would be resolved, the majority of the work would be applicable only to the research vehicle and the basic problems could have been dealt with quite satisfactorily during the project definition stage of the operational vehicle. Again, an entirely new engine would be required for the research 211
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 vehicle. Much of the cost in producing a new engine is in assembly, running and breakdown of test engines, i.e. in achieving reliability, not in solving basic problems. In spite of the existence of the Pegasus and the Olympus 22R engines, the BS.100 and the Concord Olympus 593 development costs have each been quoted as about £50m. Unless then the engine of the final operational vehicle were identical with that of the research vehicle, the earlier reliability demonstration would have to be repeated and the expenditure duplicated. We contend that such a programme is not based on a defined target objective and that it does not yield a very favourable return of knowledge for money invested. To summarise, we suggest that a case can be made for a hypersonic boost-glide test vehicle but the case for a manned airbreathing test vehicle is doubtful? This firmly put the last nail in the coffin of any prospect that ВАС might develop a hypersonic research aircraft - or make any further moves towards the development of a hypersonic booster aircraft. The company’s view remained unchanged throughout the 1960s, despite calls from many quarters to abandon Mustard and rocket boosters in general and return to developing a very-high-speed aircraft. A report was produced by Warton engineer Peter Cooper at the end of 1966 called ‘Hypersonic Vehicles - A Summary of Work Carried Out by ВАС Preston Division’. This both reiterated the company’s faith in Mustard and restated its case against airbreathers. He wrote of these: ‘The combined effect of drag, fuel capacity, aircraft dry weight, and specific impulse, is such that, measured by the terminal velocity to which the aircraft can accelerate, the recoverable rocket has been found in our studies to have the better performance. Taking account of the factors which make it possible to reduce the zero fuel weight when designing for vertical launch, it becomes clear how easily the apparent advantage of the high specific impulse of the airbreather vanishes when the attendant disadvantages are properly considered. On these grounds we formed the opinion that further intensive work on airbreathers would be unrewarding compared with a similar amount of effort applied to recoverable rocket-propelled vehicles.’ In other words, no matter how fast you could make an aircraft, giving it a ‘high specific impulse’, there would be so many problems in other areas that any benefit gained from giving it a very high top speed would simply evaporate. For good or ill, ВАС was committed to Mustard as the only viable system to emerge from its intensive research on hypersonic vehicles. But how could the rest of the world be persuaded to buy into the concept? 212
Chapter Nine Making the case for Mustard ВАС Mustard 1966-1970 Mustard was first revealed to the public during the 13th Barnwell Memorial Lecture, given to the Royal Aeronautical Society’s Bristol branch on 2 March 1966, by Robin Inskip, 2nd Viscount Caldecote and BACs deputy managing director. The Ministry of Aviation had finally allowed the company to reveal limited details of the project after relaxing an almost two-year embargo. The companies that made up Eurospace had learned of its existence less than a month before and now it was the turn of everyone else. Lord Caldecote opened his address, entitled ‘Britain’s Future in Space’, by talking about the pioneering achievements of Captain Frank Barnwell, designer of the Bristol Fighter, Bulldog and Blenheim, for whom the lecture was named. He next outlined the achievements of America and Russia in space exploration and asked what role Britain could and should be playing in ‘this vast, exciting and expansive new field of human endeavour which is developing so rapidly before our eyes.’ He further asked whether Britain’s technological progress at that time was ‘matching up to Barnwell’s courage and enterprise 50-odd years ago.’ A quick run-through of space projects and scientific developments followed, including the joint American- Canadian HARP (High Altitude Research Project), which was to use a smoothbore 16-inch naval gun to shoot projectiles into space, nuclear power plants, charged particle rocket motors, ABOVE A final scheme Mustard spacecraft high above the earth. Daniel Uhr circular orbits, the UK.3 satellite (later renamed Ariel 3) and the Black Arrow satellite launcher rocket. After briefly touching on ways in which spent rockets might be recovered and reused, he moved on to discuss what he referred to as the ‘British space transporter’. Standard rocket-type space vehicles could never be launched from Britain, he said, because there was too much risk of expendable stages and debris raining down over populated regions. But a completely reusable space transporter would entirely avoid this drawback. Setting the scene, he said: 213
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUHLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE This is the first in a series of four pieces of concept art produced as part of the 1966 publicity campaign that accompanied the unveiling of Mustard to the public. The modules depicted are Mustard Scheme 15s - close to the final version. The all-white colour scheme is an invention of the artist, since the engineers would have preferred bare metal - black - to save weight. This would have been essential in areas such as the wing leading edges, nose and underside. BELOW Glowing white-hot at the tip of its nose and red across the rest of its underside, the Mustard spacecraft passes through the earth's atmosphere during re-entry. ABOVE Separation of the Mustard 'stack'. The boosters on either side detach and peel away, leaving the central spacecraft to continue on its journey into orbit. This is the second image in the series of four. BELOW The final image in the concept art sequence shows the Mustard spacecraft about to make a runway landing on its skids. The pilot of a Scheme 15 module would have had only a single turbojet to help him manoeuvre during this last stage of the mission. 214
CHAPTER NINE MAKING THE CASE FOR MUSTARD ‘Unless specially protected by ablative shields, hardware on re- entering the earths atmosphere from space in free fall burns up. But during the launch the first stage at least is jettisoned at relatively low altitude, perhaps 200,000ft, and returns to earth intact. Launch sites must therefore be placed in remote areas where there will be no risk of damage to life or property from falling launch debris. A space transporter with each stage or component retrievable could be operated from almost anywhere with no more risk and little more inconvenience to the public than is offered by the operation of, say, a supersonic transport aircraft? Next, he rubbished the proposals of BACs competitors, most of whom were by now pushing for a conventional take-off launcher aircraft - hypersonic or otherwise. ‘Some people who have studied the problem have thought that the space transporter could be a natural development of the supersonic transport aircraft; that it could be designed to take off horizontally like an aircraft, using airbreathing engines and carrying a second- stage launcher on its back. This, I think, is an unlikely development. Considerations of structural strength and weight favour vertical take-off. The cost of development and complexity are likely to rule out the development of airbreathing engines. Until such times as more sophisticated forms of propulsion, such as electron particle or nuclear-powered propulsion, are developed, the most likely form of propulsion for space transporters will be the rocket motor, burning liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen? This emphasis on fuel was important, since much of Britain’s rocket technology up to this point had been developed to use high-test peroxide. Switching to liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen indicated a break with two RIGHT Though this drawing was seldom shown in publicity, and Mustard was never seriously considered as a two-stage tandem launcher like Astro, the Warton team always acknowledged that the latter provided the inspiration that led directly to Mustard. If the vehicles could be similar, why not make them the same? decades of home-grown technological development. He stressed that the space transporter would need to be able to Пу back to base to avoid the cost and complication of splashing down in the sea, like the American Mercury and Gemini capsules, then outlined the Mustard concept in simple terms, albeit without mentioning its name: ‘The space transporter would have to be a multi-stage vehicle and several configurations are possible. For example, pick-a-back, tandem, cluster or stack. Studies made by a team led by Mr T. W. Smith of ВАС (Preston Division) favour the cluster or stack concept, which consists of three modules of almost identical size and shape, designed as manned winged vehicles? Missions for the vehicle were likely to include mostly civilian tasks such as ‘...the placing of scientific, navigational and communication satellites into orbit, the transport of crew and replenishments to orbiting space capsules and the transportation of parts for the assembly of space stations. It could also be used as a manned observatory, or any other kind of scientific satellite or as a reconnaissance vehicle? The estimated cost of bringing the transporter into service was £300 million and ‘whilst this would be too ambitious a project for Great Britain to take on single- handed it might well be within the capability of Europe to undertake as a joint international project and is certainly deserving of further feasibility studies? In summing up, he made the economic case for a space transporter: ‘Space undoubtedly has an enormous commercial future. The use of satellites for communications, navigation, meteorology, etc, will grow and there will be an increasing world demand for the construction and supply of satellite systems and associated ground installations. We must get our share of this business? The cost of funding a useful space programme, he went on, would be a drop in the ocean compared to the amount of cash the nation regularly spent on smoking and drinking: ‘The National Industrial Space Committee has estimated that an increase in expenditure on a national programme from £20m to £35m per annum would be sufficient to get 215
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES COMPARISON OF StOOO L В PAY LO A D LAUNCH VEHICLES !00 ______aL t- STAGE EXPENDABLE VTO ROCKRT S.OO 0 ITO,SOO 33.» 0 0 6,500 ts.TTO ♦ го ♦ 36 111,000 252.800 г s.Goo 3500‘l6500 Its, ООО 500* t.000 ♦ 3 6 5 I, SOO 61, 3 00 PAYLOAO (LB) LAUNCH WEIGHT (LB1 CHARACTERISTIC VELOCITY (F PS) STAGING VELOCITY (FPS) MANUFACTVRtO WT. (LB) м-tew 5000 *♦5,100 SV 00 it.500 It, SOO ♦ to ♦ 56 propellant tan дох ।га,ooo WEIGHT [KEROSINE ISTAGE EXPENDABLE VTO ROCKET ♦ L R V S O 00 5 8 0,000 34 800 l 3.600 55, TSO ♦ to ♦ 36 5 П, О О 0 5 000 511,000 SO,BOO 35 00 116.100 231,500 1500- 1,000 43 5 13 5,5 00 05,100 561,300 St. ООО I t .000 IlS.tOO ♦ to 5 0 0 0 It 3.800 34,600 10. 0 00 ИЗ. 100 ♦ to 43» SOI. ООО ABOVE Another weapon in BACs PR arsenal for Mustard was this chart showing different vehicle configurations. Particularly interesting is the recoverable vehicle with expendable vertical-take-off rocket. This was effectively a Mustard unit in the role previously envisioned for the various English Electric recoverable rocket vehicles. Britain moving and enable us to make a useful contribution to international programmes including communications satellites. Compared with an expenditure of some £1,200m a year on tobacco and alcohol which, though pleasant luxuries, make no contribution to future prosperity, this is surely an insignificant sum. It is my hope that this paper and others like it may help to make clear what is at stake, that money spent on space activity is neither a gamble nor a luxury but a sound investment in Britain’s future, as important today as LEFT This basic drawing showing side and forward views of the two contending Mustard launch formations accompanied many press reports of the concept during 1966, though often with little explanation of why the vehicles were arranged in these ways. Barnwell s work was 50 years ago? The reaction of the audience to these revelations went unrecorded. Highlights from the speech, heavily edited to focus more clearly on the space transporter, duly appeared in Flight International magazine eight days later, accompanied by a painted concept art image showing three Mustard modules separating during launch and a line drawing showing side and top views of the stack and cluster launch arrangements. The latter made it clear that the system described by Caldecote was in fact called Mustard, although the name was not explained. The gamble Two weeks later, Tom Smith was able to make the case for Mustard in his own words. He had produced a paper outlining the Mustard project called ‘An Approach to Economic Space Transportation, edited sections of which first appeared in Flight International on 24 March. Other publications ran parts of it later in the year, such as Aircraft Engineering in June and the Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society in August. 216
CHAPTER NINE MAKING THE CASE FOR MUSTARD ABOVE A selection of exhibition models were made so that Mustard could make an appearance at shows around the world if required. This one depicts, perhaps, three Scheme 1 vehicles with an aerodynamic nose fairing fitted. ABOVE A later exhibition model showing a stack of Mustard Scheme 15 vehicles ready for launch. Again, the colour chosen to depict Mustard, which would certainly have been at least partially if not entirely black, is white. Smith got straight to the point: "Sooner or later, Europe must indulge in space exploration and subsequent exploitation if she is not to lose her position as a principal technical community. While exploration may be undertaken by “small-scale” activities, exploitation will require a substantially greater capacity to deploy men and materials in space.’ He said that BAC’s approach to making this happen was based on a four-point philosophy: low total cost, low research and development costs, operation from bases in Europe, and general versatility. He also reiterated the points made by Caldecote. ‘We are assuming extensive exploitation of space, which must involve the recovery, and return to base, of orbital payloads. This fact alone immediately reduces the competitiveness of the purely expendable booster, since the mass delivered to orbit must now include a re-entry and recovery device. For flexibility on re-entry a manoeuvrable vehicle is required; only about 15% of the orbital mass of such a vehicle would be useful payload. Our first thoughts some years ago on very high-speed boosting systems were devoted to airbreathers, but early answers on the airbreathing booster application were discouraging, largely because of the high weight of the propulsion system. Subsequent efforts to improve this situation highlighted problems of detail in layout, balance, heat distribution, etc. It followed fairly naturally from the airbreathing studies that we should examine systems with lower manufactured weights and thus investigate the vertical take-off lifting-body approach, because of its promised high structural efficiency.’ He said the early work on winged rockets had not been promising but ‘favouring the lifting-body configuration is the avoidance of weight penalties from the bending and load concentrations associated with winged aircraft-like vehicles.’ Using a lifting-body shape meant that there would be no ‘crippling thermal stresses caused by local hot spots on sharp leading edges, junctions, etc’ during re-entry. Efficient nickel alloy materials could be used for the outside skin and as a result there would be no need for external heat shields. ‘Similar reasoning obviously led to the Douglas Astro concept, many ideas in which we acknowledge,’ he added. Few of Flight Internationals readers could have had any idea what Smith was talking about here, but a small picture of Astro was included with the article in any case. He then offered an insight into how the idea for Mustard actually came about, which had only really been hinted at previously, even in BAC’s own reports: ‘An advantage stated for the Astro concept was the considerable 217
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES development effort that would be saved by virtue of similar geometry. Since we had concluded that such vehicles may have had to be made of similar materials, it is a natural extension of this argument to see what gains would result if the dimensions were identical (implying identical jigs, etc), i.e. to consider what can be done with multiples of near-identical units. This modular concept we have called Mustard (Multi Unit Space Transport and Recovery Device), and has been the subject of considerable detailed work.’ The stack versus cluster launch arrangement was again outlined, with the stack being the preferred choice, and Smith also explained why this was superior to Astros tandem formation, e.g. the booster is not subjected to the large second-stage end-load to be transferred through the whole length of structure towards the end of first- stage boost.’ In spite of these advantages, though, Smith was candid: Mustard was not a guaranteed winner. He said: ‘The gamble must be emphasised. The module combination, because of this departure from ideal staging, may have a poorer mass ratio, but it has a reduced development cost.’ The Mustard concept was then outlined in reasonable detail for a publicly available magazine, including structural layout, how a typical mission would progress, and a weight breakdown. Smith made it clear that his team, despite their focus on Mustard, were attempting to keep an open mind: ‘Our studies on such systems are by no means at the stage where we could be dogmatic. Nevertheless, we feel justified in using the values we have obtained to make comparisons, if only to illustrate the kind of comparison that should be made in choosing a joint European space transporter.’ Five drawings were used to illustrate the article this time - a sequence of three concept art images showing a Mustard stack launching, separation and runway landing; line drawing depictions of the stack, the cluster, Astro, and Mustard posing as Astro; and a three-view drawing of a Mustard scheme that had not yet existed at the time of Hypersonic Vehicles Progress Report No 3. When the full paper appeared in the Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society it also included cleaned-up and slightly redrawn versions of EAG 4396, EAG 4416, EAG 4424 and EAG 4446, the latter featuring a different fin arrangement from that of the original drawing. The following month, the Journal printed a second paper by Smith, this time co-authored by Tom Derbyshire and Bill Clegg, entitled ‘Economic Space Transportation - Thoughts on Missions, Size and Operational Sensitivity.’ This largely examined the wider economics of Mustard set against other launcher systems, but it also made a broader case for the system’s reconnaissance role. It stated that the availability of Mustard ‘...would probably revolutionise the whole spectrum of spaceflight activities and open up new fields of spaceflight applications. Manned spaceflight would certainly become a commonplace and reliable operation, not only for experienced astronauts, but for scientists, engineers, and other specialists. At the same time, other BELOW A summary of English Electric/BAC's work on airbreathing boosters was a small part of the Mustard publicity campaign - if only to show that detailed work on such vehicles had been carried out before they were dismissed. The design featured here is a cleaned-up version of drawing EAG 4396. The spacecraft is slightly smaller and rounder but fully detailed, and the booster's nose has been blunted. BELOW A cleaned-up version of the EAG 4424 booster. The original drawing shows only the booster, but here the picture is completed with the spacecraft and its accompanying expendable 'Lilo' rocket booster pack. 218
CHAPTER NINE MAKING THE CASE FOR MUSTARD ABOVE Its nose reprofiled and its windscreen shrunk, the Rolls-Royce flashjet-powered EAG 4416 booster was otherwise largely unaltered when it was redrawn for presentation to the public. ABOVE The fourth booster to be redrawn was the EAG 4446 vehicle. The original drawing lacked details such as the windscreen and portholes but now they are shown in full. The spacecraft of the original, which had stubby pointed fins and a strong delta shape, has been softened and rounded out. The fins are now more conventional and sweep up, rather than jutting out to the sides. types of space mission would be simplified and made more reliable.’ A drawing included with the article shows . .a possible application for a vehicle of the Mustard type. Here the payload is shown to consist of a high resolution, long focal-length camera, which would enable extremely high definition pictures of the earths surface to be taken from orbit. It is not difficult to envisage other types of equipment which could equally well go to make up the payload of such a vehicle. Sensors, radars and other specialised equipment could be placed in orbit and maintained there for a period of time, since a vehicle of the Mustard type makes an excellent temporary space station, with the capability to return to base at very short notice. The fields covered by such applications of the space transporter could include meteorology, reconnaissance, agriculture, pest control, water management, fisheries control, and so on, as well as fundamental astronomy and space research activities.’ In the December edition of the Journal, Smith answered a reader’s letter about his August paper. The ‘reader’, whose ABOVE Another ВАС publicity image from 1966 is this drawing depicting the interior of a Mustard reconnaissance module's cockpit and cabin. Three survey cameras are positioned immediately behind the pilot and co- pilot, with the crew hatch positioned centrally above and between them. A third crewman operates the high- resolution camera in the nose. Lockers are provided for storage and a ladder connects the upper and lower levels. name was given as ‘D. M. Ashford’, was in fact David Ashford, a graduate member of the society, and the same David Ashford of Hawker Siddeley Aviation whose paper on hypersonics published in the Journal the year before had prompted such a frustrated response from ВАС. It might seem unorthodox for a member of Hawker’s rival hypersonics team to so boldly make suggestions for ‘modifying’ the work of ВАС through the pages of an academic periodical, but Ashford, who had worked for Hawker since 1961, was in his mid-20s in 1966 and was a precocious talent. He wrote: ‘I was very interested by T. W. Smith’s article “An Approach to Economic Space Transportation” in the August Journal 1966, which I think has many stimulating ideas of real value. It seems to me that there are a number of possible modifications or extensions of the author’s proposals, and I should like his comments on two which I think might be worthwhile. No doubt the work he has done could throw light on their practicability. The first point concerns airbreathing boosters. These are discussed early in the article, and it is concluded that they are too heavy and too slow. I should like to know whether the author has considered adding a rocket motor to an airbreathing first stage. The airbreathing engines would be used up to their maximum speed and then shut down, and a rocket motor taking over would propel the vehicle up to separation speed. Simple sums suggest that such a mixed power plant first stage is quite promising.’ 219
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES He then made reference to his own paper of the year before and commented that the airbreathing rocket-assisted vehicle he had proposed would be \. .5,OOOft/sec faster than “Mustards” staging velocity and is probably fast enough for a reusable upper stage to boost a useful payload into orbit. An expendable rocket second stage would not then be necessary.’ He outlined the three take-off configurations - ‘Mustard’, two-stage tandem and airbreather - before wondering . .would it not be sensible to make such a vehicle for research purposes first? The information gained would be used to help choose one of the three systems and the vehicle could then be modified and refined to form part of that system. ‘The suggested vehicle could be built more crudely than “Mustard” and hence more cheaply. My suggestion is to build a “Battleplate Mustard” as a reusable first-stage booster.’ Smiths answer was printed below Ashfords letter. He wrote: ‘Comparing the requirements of a recoverable upper stage launched at Mach number 12 with the carrying capacity of the rocket- boosted airbreather at Mach 7 it is clear that our studies offer very little prospect of usefully launching a single recoverable upper stage by this means. With regard to the research programme it is agreed that a Mustard module represents a common element between competing launch systems, but a boiler plate research vehicle would conflict unacceptably with the objective that engineering problems unrelated to the goal-in-view should be strenuously avoided. A multiplicity of different systems is a luxury. Anything that adds to the versatility of the prime unit should be examined, of course, but the criterion should not be that it is technically feasible or has simply an interesting performance, but whether it is worth doing overall. I suspect that major modifications leading to virtually a new vehicle do not satisfy this criterion.’ Hawker and ВАС were clearly at odds with one another about the best form for Britain’s future space launcher, if it was to have one at all. Regarding the exchange, ВАС engineer Eric Webb said: ‘We were well aware of HSA’s very different approach to the hypersonics contract. I think the Warton view could be summed up as they [Hawker] were looking for more immediate returns in the form of more research contracts whereas we were looking for sensible applications of the technology. Our conclusions weren’t very popular with the establishment people (Ministry and RAE).’ Mustard 14 and 15 The wind tunnel tests carried out on Mustard models during the autumn of 1965 were not the only developments to be made as work on the system continued at a reduced rate using BAC’s own funds, rather than government money. By 18 June 1966 BAC’s aerospace department at Warton had just sixteen members of staff, and only a small number of these continued to work on Mustard - a level at which it would continue for at least two more years, though the department was renamed ‘advanced projects’ in 1968. The fourteenth and fifteenth Mustard schemes had been finalised by Walley during the months following the publication of the third progress report, however. Scheme 14 appears on EAG 4477 and Scheme 15 on three different versions of EAG 4478, EAG 4483 and then again on EAG 4484. At a glance, Mustard Scheme 14 appears similar to Scheme 7, its stocky form measuring 102 feet from end to end compared to Scheme 7s 99 feet. The conical nozzles of its four rocket engines protrude almost completely from the rear and they are installed as a compact and symmetrical quad rather than side-by-side in a row. From the incomplete original drawing, it is unclear whether it was intended to have one or two turbojets. The large fins now slightly overhang the rear of the vehicle, but perhaps the greatest difference is the extendable control surfaces that now hinge outwards from the trailing edge of the lifting body form - one of the three elevator options that had been presented in the third progress report. BELOW Wind tunnel tests were certainly carried out on Mustard models at Warton, though it is unknown precisely how many. This image appears to show a late-period wind tunnel model, possibly known as the R20. 220
CHAPTER NINE MAKING THE CASE FOR MUSTARD ABOVE Probably drawn shortly before the submission of BAC's third hypersonics report in the spring of 1965, but too late to be included in it, is drawing EAG 4477 showing Mustard Scheme 14. The vehicle is shown with its trailing edge control surfaces extended. Following on from this, Mustard Scheme 15 as it appears in EAG 4478 sheet 1 (rather than ‘issue Г) looks very similar again. Yet closer inspection reveals some significant differences: for a start, it is 17 feet shorter from the end of its nose to the tip of its fins, its total length being just 85 feet. The fuselage is also slightly deeper than that of Scheme 14, giving the newer design a more rotund appearance. And rather than the rocket engine nozzles being exposed, they are now largely recessed within the vehicles trailing edge. The crew cabin bulge is now BELOW Mustard Scheme 15 was externally identical to the unnumbered final version of Mustard. The four rocket engines, single turbojet and payload compartment are all clustered centrally at the rear of the vehicle. Control surfaces are extendable, landing gear is all-skid and the fins have a slightly curved overhang to the rear. The vehicle, shown here in EAG 4478 sheet 1, is also extremely compact at just 85 feet in length. 221
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES broader and bulkier, protruding more above the vehicles nose and stretching right across it from one side to the other. The hatch to get inside is now positioned over the nose itself, in front of the pilot, rather than being above and behind the cabin as in earlier schemes. Scheme 15’s fully loaded launch pad weight is shown as 266,0001b, making it one of the smallest yet heaviest Mustard schemes, with its engines producing a thrust of 400,0001b. The total volume of its liquid oxygen fuel was 2,850cu ft, with a liquid hydrogen volume of 9,800cu ft. Payload was 5,0001b. Drawing EAG 4478 sheet 2 gives more design detail, this time showing the attachment arrangements for a Scheme 15 stacked launch formation, the vehicles skid landing gear and even the positioning of service ducts within the outer shell. An illustration for the landing gear shows a ‘dishpan-shaped nose skid, lowering devices and ‘yielding metal straps’. A note on the panel designed to go over the nose skid states: ‘Cover plate, welded or bolted in position after skid has been manually retracted during refurbishing. Explosive charge removes panel for lowering.’ At the rear of the vehicle, another note points to the extended control surfaces, saying: ‘Control surface extended area 250sq ft. Radiator built into upper surface. 3 actuators & piano type hinges. Angular movement 180° approx.’ Part of the drawing shows details of the main frame, with four strong points for attachments and for holding the vehicle down prior to launch. According to a note on the attachment frames that would hold the modules together during their ascent: ‘Attachment frame carried by boosters folds backwards after release. Alternatively panels from booster hinge out to spacecraft.’ Yet another note mentions the designs fuel transfer pipes being built into the attachment frames. Finally, EAG 4478 sheet 3 is primarily concerned with giving precise measurements for the curvature of the module’s shape and its dimensions. EAG 4483 is very basic, simply showing a trio of Mustard Scheme 15 modules in stacked launch formation from the side and from above, while EAG 4484 is a ‘presentation grade drawing that pulls together elements of all three EAG 4478 sheets into a single sheet, clean and uncluttered with notes. Beyond these drawings, there were further images showing a part of Scheme 15’s workings in even more detail - ВАС filed a patent on the sheet 2 ‘radiator built into upper surface’ idea in Walley’s name on 29 June 1966. The patent, entitled ‘Space Vehicle Radiators’, describes Walley’s innovation: ‘A recoverable space vehicle is formed of a lifting body with a trailing edge on which are hinged two stabilising and control flaps which are moveable between a position closely adjacent to the body forward of the trailing edge and a position behind the trailing edge. Radiators for dissipating heat into dark space are mounted on the wall of the body which is covered by the flaps when they are in retracted position and on the inner faces of the flaps, so that BELOW Drawing EAG 4478 sheet 2 gives details of Mustard Scheme 15's landing gear, its stack formation attachment points, its internal service ducts, and the fuel transfer pipes necessary for Mustard's booster arrangements during launch. 222
CHAPTER NINE MAKING THE CASE FOR MUSTARD ABOVE Precise shapes and dimensions for Mustard Scheme 15 are shown in EAG 4478 sheet 3. BELOW EAG 4483 is a basic drawing to show how three Mustard Scheme 15 vehicles would fit together in stack formation, though it lacks the connection point details previously shown in EAG 4478 sheet 2. 223
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE A cleaned-up 'summary' of Mustard Scheme 15's various design features is shown in drawing EAG 4484. This is the final numbered ВАС drawing known to feature Mustard. Components such as the rocket engines are shown in detail, together with the numerous 'swinging links' connecting the cryogenic fuel tanks to the outer shell. BELOW AND OPPOSITE The fifteenth Mustard scheme as it might have appeared in the metal. Just as the Space Shuttle's external fuel tank was originally painted white but later left bare in its natural orange, so too Mustard might have been left in unpainted bare black metal to save weight. Luca Landino 224
CHAPTER NINE MAKING THE CASE FOR MUSTARD 225
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES these radiators are exposed only when the flaps are moved away from their retracted position.’ It went on to describe the problem that the invention was attempting to solve: ‘In the majority of space vehicles, radiators are required to dissipate heat from the cabin and equipment cooling systems during space flight. Radiators of large area are necessary, and for maximum heat dissipation these must be oriented towards dark space, away from sun, moon and earth. This can be achieved by fixedly mounting the radiators on the spacecraft body and orientating the spacecraft, or where that is not desirable, the radiators can be movably mounted with respect to the spacecraft. In this case the radiators would need BELOW ВАС filed a patent for 'Space Vehicle Radiators' in June 1966, accompanied by this drawing. The idea was to have radiators sitting flush against the Mustard module's upper surface, covered over by the retracted trailing edge control surfaces during launch. When the control surfaces were extended, the radiators would be revealed, allowing them to do their job of dissipating heat absorbed by the Mustard 'hot structure'. to extend from the spacecraft contour to be fully adjustable. Each case poses difficulties in the recoverable type of vehicle because the radiators would require protection during the re- entry phase of flight. In the latter case the radiators would require to be retracted leading to mechanical complication and a considerable weight penalty.’ Recoverable spacecraft capable of generating lift would need control surfaces, however, and Walleys innovation was to effectively use these to shield the radiators. ‘According to this invention a recoverable space vehicle includes at least one aerodynamic stabilising and control member capable of extension beyond and retraction substantially flush with the vehicle body, the vehicle having one or more heat radiators located such that on extension of the member the radiators are exposed and on retraction of the member the radiators are concealed. Preferably the heat radiators are located on the stabilising and control member.’ Scheme 15 represents a consolidation of sorts and an attempt to present Mustard at its most conservative and practical, with an effort made to tackle matters of detail that had previously been glossed over during the formulation of the concept. It was this design that first appeared in the public eye - and while it was close to the final Mustard form, there were yet changes to be made as the project continued slowly on into the late 1960s. Defending Mustard A meeting was held at the RAEs Farnborough headquarters on 16 June 1967 to discuss ВАС proposals for a hypersonic structural research programme. Chairing the meeting was Dr Dietrich Kuchemann, head of the RAEs aerodynamics department, and among the attendees for ВАС were Ron Dickson, Tom Smith and Peter Cooper. Following on from the hypersonics research carried out by ВАС and Hawker Siddeley Aviation, the companies had been offered a £100,000 contract between them to carry out a collaborative programme of further research on propulsion and on structural research related to the field. Dickson said that the ВАС team had already submitted their proposals for this research during the autumn of 1966 and both these and Hawkers proposals had been discussed at a meeting on 1 February 1967, but ВАС had ‘thought that it had been decided to admit two broad possible aims, namely airbreathing transports and modular space vehicles’. This had raised an objection from the Ministry of Aviation. In his typically diplomatic style, Kuchemann said that ‘the importance of structural engineering research to 226
CHAPTER NINE MAKING THE CASE FOR MUSTARD various possible hypersonic applications was generally accepted.’ At this point another attendee from the RAE interjected. Harry Plascott had been involved with testing some of the first jet engines during the Second World War and was firmly against hypersonics as a means of reaching orbit. He observed that some people would argue that the transport application was most likely, and that a space application was not admissible even at this early stage.’ Optimism about Concorde was arguably at its peak in June 1967, with an advertisement having run across a double-page spread in the 29 May issue of Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine predicting sales of some 350 aircraft by 1980. If such a market existed for a supersonic aircraft, there was every reason to believe that travellers might be just as inclined to pay for a hypersonic trip to Australia from London or even New York, even if such belief was wildly optimistic. However, Dickson and Kuchemann agreed that these and other applications at present all suffered from the inability to make reliable weight estimates’. Dickson remarked pointedly that ‘it was not possible to choose responsibly for several years, although it was easy enough to conceive a bias towards one application.’ ВАС was proposing basic research on thin-gauge sheet materials, including how to make and test them, which ‘would yield information of value to hypersonic vehicles generally, subject to the inclusion of tests with appropriate ranges of heating and environmental conditions.1 After this, Dickson said, the next step involved ‘the design, construction and testing in four or five years’ time of a small unpowered test vehicle.’ This would provide an objective with sufficient challenge and focus, including the minimum standard of engineering, and a high return of new knowledge on the relevant problems.’ Clearly, ВАС still hoped to build the Mustard manned glider. And if that could only be built and flown successfully, it might well galvanise support for the project as a whole. The suggestion of resurrecting this research project from 1965, however, did not seem to go down too well with the RAE. Dickson backtracked hastily, saying that ‘perhaps too much emphasis had been laid on the flight test aspect of this programme; ВАС, of course, fully appreciated that a great deal of valuable information would result from the ground-based research on such a vehicle.’ Stepping back from this sticking point, Kuchemann gave a summary of where Britain’s space programme stood at that time. The country was financially committed to the European Launcher Development Organisation for ‘two or three years’ and to twelve rocket launches during that time. There was, he said, ‘...a lot of debate regarding the possible follow-up, with RAE/Space showing a preference for a “modest” launcher (Black Arrow) and electric propulsion for satellites. At present, Black Arrow was being continued for another year. From the RAE standpoint it was desirable to see whether a test vehicle of the sort proposed by ВАС could fit into a space programme and also to review the possible RAE support for the design of such a test vehicle and subsequent application.’ He warned, however, that the RAEs aerodynamics department was not likely to be available to support the testing of such a vehicle or any vehicle where levels of heating up to Mach 12 would be a problem. Smith said that the temperatures associated with ‘the space module’ fell far below that, and Dickson ‘commented that he could not concede that the modular vehicle was necessarily more exotic or difficult than the hypersonic cruise vehicle, in fact, in many ways (e.g. aerodynamics and propulsion, as well as structurally) it was less so, even though the Mach number was higher.’ Plascott chimed in again, now saying that it was indeed clear that ‘a reasonable choice of option could not be made at this stage on technical grounds.’ Kuchemann wearily stressed that ‘...it was essential to realise that there was no high-enthalpy facility and no way to cope with high Mach number problems. For 10 years, the UK had persevered in this field, with little to show. It was not realistic to try to compete with the US in this area. Supposing the research of the next two years led one to pursue the re-entry test vehicle, it would take many years to provide the right type of support for the applications, even taking European collaboration into account.’ Seeing where Kiichemann was going with this, and not liking it at all, Dickson ‘...reiterated that the modular vehicle was not as exotic as was being implied. In any case, the nonexistence of facilities or knowledge at this stage should not be allowed to prejudice a responsible choice of aim. Many projects, including Lightning, had been pursued successfully in the past, even without the knowledge and facilities we have today.’ Smith added that the RAEs help on aerodynamics would not be quite as essential as Kuchemann thought, since the ‘shape of the modular vehicle was largely determined by structural considerations and the emphasis on aerodynamic refinement was much reduced.’ Pressing still further, Dickson said he thought ‘the political situation might well change in favour of space applications, particularly in collaboration with Europe.’ US reports could be relied upon in some measure, he said, to fill in the technological blanks along the way. ВАС was not at all convinced of the feasibility of the hypersonic transport ‘and even less of the economic aspects. Naturally, ВАС only wanted to be associated with those 227
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 projects which made the most economic sense.’ The conversation was developing into a battle that might well determine Mustards future one way or another. Cracks had begun to show in Kuchemanns previously unflappable facade and he threw the mention of American data back at ВАС. He ‘...said Mr Allen (H. Julian Allen, director of the Ames Laboratory in California) expressed a preference for the transport application, on which NASA would maintain a holding effort. Mr Allen also argued that the recoverable launcher, although a better technical solution, could only be justified for space applications if a large number of repetitions of the same task could be envisaged.’ Dickson retorted that ‘it seemed attractive for Europe to investigate a sophisticated solution, rather than use brute force. Moreover, quite different opinions from those of Mr Allen were held by others in the USA.’ Smith then pointed out that the NASA ‘holding effort’ actually covered reusable launchers as well as transports. Once again, Kiichemann shut down the line of discussion and shifted the debate on to what common ground could be found between Hawker Siddeley s hypersonics work and that of ВАС. It was glaringly obvious to everyone that the rival companies had approached the same hypersonics contract work in completely different ways. Could they now work together on a common project that was somehow related to both programmes? Dickson confirmed that ‘...there were common problems, for instance, the provision of thin- sheet materials, the fabrication of suitable structures, and cryogenic aspects. ВАС had specifically deferred the study of cryogenic tankage problems in view of the Hawker proposals, concentrating instead on other aspects, such as fabrication, of common interest.’ A representative of the RAE’s structures department, D. R. Lewis, said that BACs proposals did include ‘a list of relevant research items. In general, the structures department were favourably disposed to the materials and fabrication research proposed by ВАС. The next stage needed was for ВАС and Hawker to evolve together complementary programmes of research.’ Unlike the reluctant Kiichemann, Lewis seemed to find BAC’s glider proposal rather exciting. He considered that ‘...it would eventually be necessary to try a complete design and pass through the stage of flight test before reliable weight estimates were possible. It was certainly attractive to think in terms of a sequence involving a preliminary design study and a research support programme leading to a decision whether or not to construct and test the vehicle.’ Kiichemann studiously ignored these remarks in his summary, however, which stipulated that the two firms’ ‘intramural research was aimed at transport applications, with options open for recoverable launchers and for missiles’. Value for money had to be achieved, the emphasis should be on structural engineering work with only ‘a small provision for project assessment work’ and the firms had to agree a coordinated programme from the start. Determined to keep the door open for Mustard, Dickson said that ВАС could do what was required ‘provided a premature decision on the final application could be avoided’. But having said that, ‘ВАС recognised the need to resolve the case for space research and applications more positively, and were in contact with the RAE space department on this subject.* The last scheme There were to be no more numbered Mustard schemes after 15, but a final version developed from research carried out during 1966. This was summarised in a paper delivered to the Society of Automotive Engineers, an American organisation, in February 1967, called ‘A British Reusable Booster Concept’. Smith gave an outline of the usual Mustard details with regard to its modular concept, how it would work and some weight breakdowns, but in a section headed ‘Mustard Structure Design’ he presented BAC’s latest research developments. He wrote: ‘The whole concept depends on the credibility of the assumptions made for the structure, its weight, integrity and lifetime. To determine whether we have a practical vehicle, and more immediately, to find the areas in which to concentrate further structure and materials research, we are developing appropriate analytic and empirical methods. These allow us to analyse structures subject to creep effects when exposed to varying and repeated mechanical and thermal loads. These methods, even in their early form, have caused some interesting changes to our ideas.’ In fact, the Warton team had discovered that the ‘swinging links’ between the fuel tanks and the separate outer shell, designed to allow for heat expansion and to help the vehicle maintain its shape, were not going to work. ‘Very briefly, what we have to design is a structure subject during boost to large inertia loads, quite severe acoustic loads, aerodynamic loads with associated buffet, flutter and non-steady problems, not forgetting guidance loads. Both boosters and spacecraft then must be able to cope with their respective re-entry conditions. Each are then, however, relatively light, and the inertia and other loads are of lesser importance than the thermal loading. On the structure we propose, this gives rise to distortion due to creep. We had the ironic possibility of a satisfactory re-entry, but a structure in such a state of stress that it failed 228
CHAPTER NINE MAKING THE CASE FOR MUSTARD under the next boost loads. It is an assessment of the new disturbed form in the next and subsequent flight that enables us to determine the structure suitability and lifetime.’ With the swinging links in place, a Mustard module would be able to perform its first mission perfectly, going into space and coming back in one piece. But the stresses placed on the structure during this process would cause it to become distorted - potentially leading to a catastrophic failure during the next mission, or the next. The operational life of a Mustard module would have been very short indeed. But there was a solution: ‘Our experience so far, however, is that significant improvements in the likely life can be obtained by relatively small changes in structure detail design and that provided the first few flight cycles can be endured satisfactorily, an economically useful lifetime is likely to be obtained. The basic idea of a separate load bearing heat shield surrounding pressure stabilised tankage is retained, but we have dispensed with any connections between tanks and outside skin except via bulkheads at front and rear. The high stiffness of the tanks is an embarrassment if constrained, subjecting the whole structure to unnecessary thermal stresses during re-entry. It appears to be quite satisfactory to hold the tanks at the rear main frame position and merely locate by spigots or other means of permitting fore and aft movement only, at the forward main frame. The liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen tanks are separate, eliminating difficult junction problems at the expense of a reduction in volume utilisation, and the shear loads are carried by two vertical corrugated webs between the forward and rear main frames, forming three tank bays.’ The swinging links were gone, and the fuel tanks had now been separated, with corrugated webs supporting the structure instead of the stiff tanks themselves. Smith went on to give still more structural detail, outlining the unusual form of Mustard s skin: ‘The corrugation-stiffened skins will be supported by closely spaced spanwise frames. The skin corrugations will run longitudinally over the major part of the vehicle, the major skin sub- assemblies being welded up from the largest convenient sub-panel. An exception to this conventional looking stiffening arrangement will be the leading edges where large temperature gradients are inevitable, leading to unacceptably high thermal stresses if a continuous skin is retained. Here we propose to use a “concertina” leading edge with corrugations around the leading edge top to bottom; sub-frames normal to the leading edge picking up on the corresponding spanwise frames. The top and bottom edges of this leading edge assembly would be welded to the upper and lower skins. Thus the “concertina” effect would be progressive.’ BELOW The final scheme. A significant change in Mustard's internal structure occurred after the third ВАС hypersonics report had been submitted. It was decided that the 'swinging links' would be ineffective and they were replaced with bulkhead attachment points instead. This drawing shows the revised internal layout. With the spectre of fatal creep distortion of well-used Mustard modules now looming, the Warton team had gone to some trouble in working out how the vehicles could be thoroughly checked and repaired, if necessary, between missions. Smith wrote: ‘Particular attention has been paid to the dual problem of assembly and breakdown-for-inspection. Such inspections may have to occur at fairly frequent intervals and is one of the penalties likely to be paid to obtain a reusable structure. The choice of a breakdown line is limited, because even after the first flight cycle, the vehicle will be in a state of stress due to creep caused by the high thermal loading during re-entry. Luckily, it appears that the distortion is likely to be low enough to permit a break at the maximum area position thus allowing a withdrawal of the tanks. This is also a most convenient choice for the last joint of final assembly.’ A fresh set of drawings had been prepared ahead of the presentation, in January 1967, showing how Mustard was to be built. 229
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 During construction, a module would be put together as five big pieces: the cabin, the forward outer shell, the rear outer shell with fins, the three fuel tanks, and the rear hold and propulsion bay. Next, the forward outer shell and cabin would be attached, the skin being seamlessly welded together. At the same time, the fuel tanks, rear outer shell and propulsion bay would be attached to one another. Then, at last, the forward section would be offered up to the rear section and the two bits would be mechanically joined together - rather than welded. This joining point could later be undone so that the tanks could be easily removed for maintenance, and the outer shell could be thoroughly checked for stress- related damage. ‘So far, our studies have not unearthed any fundamental error in the proposed structure philosophy and only relatively minor redistributions in the weights,’ concluded Smith. Externally almost indistinguishable from Mustard Scheme 15, the final scheme would have been substantially different inside and would have had a very fine seam running all the way around the centre of its otherwise seamlessly welded outer shell. One drawing from the January 1967 set, which was not shown at the Society of Automotive Engineers event, depicted the final Mustard scheme with a single rectangular windscreen for the pilot, rather than the usual oval portholes. Presumably this was because the design would have conflicted with all the other iMustard concept art also displayed at the event. Mueller at Warton What became the American Space Shuttle had its roots in a NASA committee, the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board Subpanel on Reusable Launch Vehicle Technology, formed on 24 August 1965, making its first report in mid- September 1966. The committee reviewed dozens of concepts from across Americas aerospace companies but was unable to find one that was, on its own, likely to satisfy both the needs of NASA and those of the US Department of Defense. It did, however, decide that a partially reusable launch vehicle was preferable - mainly because this would cost less to develop. On 3 July the following year, the Warton team received a letter from NASA’s Langley Research Center entitled ‘NASA Request for Proposal L-8226 - Study of Application of Large Supersonic Aircraft to Reusable Launch Vehicle Systems’. ВАС was being asked to offer Langley a proposal for a six-month study on a two-stage-to-orbit launch system which employs a first stage similar to an SST aircraft, and which is propelled by a combination of airbreathing and rocket engines, and which aircraft carries internal to itself a ballistic second stage spacecraft.’ Unfortunately, the Americans had sent the letter to the ВАС Guided Weapons Division at Filton, Bristol, on 9 June. On the 27th it was forwarded to Tom Smith at Warton as the most appropriate recipient, and arrived six days later. The project deadline was 6 July 1967 - just three days away - making the task impossible. It did serve to demonstrate, however, that ВАС was on NASA’s radar. George Mueller, the NASA manager who had been pressing hardest for the development of a cohesive reusable launcher programme, attended a ceremony in London on 10 August 1967 to receive a Certificate of Honorary Fellowship from the British Interplanetary Society. After the award presentation, he gave a lecture about what NASA was calling a ‘space shuttle’. While he was in the country, ВАС invited him to Warton where he received a short presentation on Mustard from project engineer Eric Webb. A report of the 10 August event in the 22 August edition of Flight International was illustrated with the Mustard concept art image showing a stack during launch. The caption read: ‘While a breakthrough in the development of aerodynamic space vehicles by NASA now appears very likely, Britain has also made detailed BELOW During late 1965 and into 1966 some thought was given to how Mustard might be manufactured. It was decided that it should be built in five sections, which could then be married up and slotted together once they were complete - as shown in this 1967 drawing. BELOW Another view of the final Mustard configuration with insets showing how its skin was to be structured. Also of interest is the cockpit, which now features a single large rectangular windscreen in place of the familiar oval portholes. 230
CHAPTER NINE MAKING THE CASE FOR MUSTARD LEFT A rehashed version of the original 1965 Crest drawing, EAG 4462, was used to illustrate a 1968 presentation to BIS on the merits of launching the test model using the Black Arrow rocket. Drawings showing the vehicle's skin structure dating from early 1967 have also been added. ABOVE The size of the Crest (Combined Re-Entry and ABOVE From end to end, the Black Arrow/Crest combination Structural Test) model changed little between its first would have measured just 35 feet. appearance in 1965 and its last in 1968. studies of such vehicles. BACs Project Mustard was a design for a space transporter which would deliver a 3,000kg payload to a 300 nautical mile polar orbit for a take- off weight of 936,0001b. In one respect (the salvage of boosters), Mustard appears to be more economic than the NASA design, in which, apparently, no provision is made for the salvage of the tanks? During the 1st Annual Meeting of the British Interplanetary Society in Southampton on 23-25 April 1968, a presentation was given by ВАС Prestons Derek Pritchard-Jones entitled ‘The Black Arrow as a Vehicle for Testing Advanced Structures’. Pritchard-Jones gave a brief summary of the Mustard concept and its candidacy as a vertically launched Aerospace Transporter before outlining plans to use the Black Arrow rocket, then in development, as a means of launching Crest vehicles to assess materials and structural designs. Regarding Mustard, he said: ‘The actual material specification, with due regard to the rate of decay of properties towards the upper limits of temperature, is critically dependent upon the accuracy of temperature estimation. Uncertainties exist here, particularly on the vehicle upper surfaces where the conditions are unknown to the degree of being unable to make the choice between titanium and nickel alloys. Since the overall economics of the Mustard concepts are based on reusability, feasibility depends upon the structural integrity under repeated application of these thermal loads. The shaping of the trailing edge surfaces of the lifting body will influence both the temperatures and the control requirements. Deflection of the control surfaces will give rise to thermal gradients between their upper and lower surfaces and confirmation of the 231
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES flight conditions is imperative for their design.’ Crest was considered a vital part of the development process for Mustard, and it is clear that ВАС was still actively pursuing the testing programme. As for the company’s proposal to launch Crest atop Black Arrow, Pritchard-Jones said: ‘The use of Black Arrow as a model launcher arises if one considers the possibility of representing the required heating rates rather than attempting to reproduce the full- scale vehicle trajectory. Estimates of suitable models and launchers showed that a satisfactory solution is feasible with a 1,5001b model launched at 9,500ft per second and is based on an assumption of an unmodified Black Arrow with total payload of 3,0001b of which the model accounts for 1,5001b and the installation and shieldings 6001b. The recovery systems could amount to 2001b or more depending upon the degree of sophistication, leaving a contingency of around 7001b if required for further equipment, ballast etc.’ The method of launch and separation from both booster rocket and protective shields was largely unchanged from the original Crest proposal first outlined just over three years earlier, although ‘at some time prior to the release of the ELEMENT GROSS VOL 37460 FT^ PLAN AREA = 2538 FT2 WING AREA 8X1 FT2 Fifure 3. 7 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT CONFIGURATION C (IPD) model it may be required to make some provision for bringing the vehicle up to a higher temperature at a reasonable rate. This, in order to avoid undue thermal shock on release of the shields.’ Pressing his case, Pritchard-Jones said: ‘From the structural view point we are a long way behind in our experience, and structural weight fractions loom large in the assessment of concepts. We urgently require to assess the validity of analytical methods in the re-entry environment and we see Black Arrow as being a potentially available and comparatively inexpensive way of making progress’ It was not to be, however. Black Arrow made only four launches before the project was scrapped, and none of them involved Crest. On 30 October 1968 the Manned Spacecraft Center and the Marshall Space Flight Center issued a joint request for proposals that could form the basis of an eight-month study of an Integral Launch and Re-entry Vehicle System. And in early 1969, NASA formed a Space Shuttle Task Group to evaluate potential Shuttle needs and missions, and a month later the organisation awarded preliminary analysis study contracts to Lockheed, General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas and North American-Rockwell. Space Shuttle remarks Work now began to gather pace and throughout 1969 there were further meetings to discuss different aspects of the Shuttle project. Towards the end of the year, Mueller invited the American firms’ European counterparts to attend a Space Shuttle Symposium at the Museum of Natural History of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, DC, on 16-17 October. Representing ВАС on the first afternoon of the event, after the Germans had given a presentation on the Junkers Raumtransporter, were Ray Creasey and Tom Smith. Creasey opened with: ‘Dr Mueller wants to re- examine all creative ideas and invited constructive comments on the work being undertaken by NASA. This is just what we tried to do from the start of our own work many years ago.’ He showed two slides to the audience, which featured a line-up of different launch configurations, ending with the Mustard three-module stack, and said that ВАС had tried to maintain a symmetrical configuration. He said: ‘This included the arrangements which are most commonly referred to as Mustard and which you are today calling “Triamese”, although our acronym for “Multi-Unit Space Transport And Recovery Devices” embraces others. After identifying the necessary structural and other technology, we eventually concluded that even the cheapest solution was beyond UK ambitions, and awaited international agreement. It was apparent from this morning’s discussions that there is some confusion about this outcome LEFT General Dynamics/Convair came up with what it called a Triamese' launch system in 1969, which bore marked similarities to Mustard. The Americans were careful to incorporate many technical aspects of the British system without actually infringing its patented design. If the two boosters and one spacecraft had been lifting- body vehicles, rather than having variable-geometry wings, it might have been a different story, via Scott Lowther 232
CHAPTER NINE MAKING THE CASE FOR MUSTARD to our early studies. Our triamese study was referred to particularly this morning. This was carried out over five years ago and has since been partly declassified. Tom Smith was at that time in charge of our project design, so I will ask him to give a fairly light-hearted reminder of this, with more emphasis on some of our structural considerations, before I try and relate it all to your present studies.’ Smith then took over the microphone: ‘Speaking from the position of an historian has decided advantages. Either I can say “I told you so” or plead that in view of the elapsed time, I’ve been able to change my mind. Firstly, I should point out that in addition to the system studies shown by Mr Creasey, we did a considerable amount of work on propulsion systems.’ He then showed a slide depicting an early steam locomotive and said, ‘Connoisseurs will recognise Stephensons Rocket! The audience’s reaction to this humorous reference, intended to demonstrate the time elapsed between BACs work and the Americans’ decision to build what would apparently end up as a similar system, went unrecorded. Smith then flipped to the next slide, showing the familiar side- on and top-down views of both Mustard’s cluster and stack formations. He then rattled through the customary details of Mustard’s launch, its fuel transfer and re-entry using turbojets, showing the four concept art pictures that had appeared in magazines three years earlier. After that, he said: ‘Now, in our published papers, we dwelt at perhaps exorbitantly great length on optimisation of payloads and so on, and I won’t bore you with anything on this. Bear in mind that one of our aims at the time we started was to find the kind of technology that Europe generally ought to indulge in to keep itself in the picture. In addition to the other points that Dr Mueller and Mr Creasey mentioned, the critical item as far as we were concerned was the credibility of the assumptions made about the structure, its integrity, its weight and its lifetime.’ He then described the work carried out after 1965 that would significantly alter Mustard’s internal design, before handing the microphone back to Creasey, who said: ‘Now to make some further comments, as we were asked, on what we have seen so far of the NASA Space Shuttle work. I don’t think that NASA would disagree with any of our general conclusions from five years ago, judging from their reports we have seen. You seem to have improved rocket and material technology even more than we expected. We did leave two main qualifications: one was the “probably triamese” and the other was “possibly variable geometry” Dealing with the first, we did rather favour our triamese version of Mustard, and I think these figures on the blackboard will partly explain the reasons.’ The figures showed that NASA wanted to put a 50,0001b payload into orbit and estimated the weight of a two-stage launcher at 3.5 million pounds. ‘Triamesing’ would mean three vehicles weighing 1.5 million pounds each - a weight disadvantage of 1 million pounds overall. But designing one vehicle of that weight, then building three of them, would save $2 billion in development costs, he said. He quoted from a Lockheed report presented earlier that day to back up this argument, then moved on to variable geometry: ‘We were looking at anything that would increase the subsonic or hypersonic cross range. We hankered after basic hypersonic shapes that had been thoroughly flight tested by NASA and USAF, using the wind tunnel to develop acceptable subsonic geometry. Everyone knows that Sir Barnes Wallis started work 25 years ago, and ВАС have considered it in practically every supersonic project in the last decade. On this one, we did come round to either the kinds of configurations we have just shown you, or the normal kind of folding tip and variable sweep. So I was a bit surprised by some of the drawings we saw this morning that showed fixed straight wings. From the aspect ratio look of some of them, they would need to be relatively thick sections to avoid even simple elastic and other problems. One would probably visualise these wings having to be over 10% thick, some probably 20% thick if one could ignore the aerodynamic problems, not to mention aerothermo-elasticity. It does seem to me that this kind of configuration could have a very rough time, repeated through the transonic speed range, and clearly this whole system has to come through that in a normal sort of way, with low G structures and other stress forms. I think it was interesting that there was a great similarity between the set of requirements set forth in the early studies and those requirements that we are currently considering for the Space Shuttle.’ At this point, ВАС believed that the Americans were interested in the technology underpinning Mustard - particularly since much of the technical groundwork had already been completed - and they were, but they were much more interested in saving money. A national-level financial agreement between Britain and the US would help with the bottom line and it was this that the Americans most eagerly pursued. In the meantime, American firm General Dynamics/Convair presented its own ‘triamese’ concept to NASA in October 1969. It was to operate along similar lines to Mustard, and had three identical modules to keep costs low, but 233
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES was unable to use a lifting-body configuration without infringing BAC’s patent, which had been prudently filed in the US as well as the UK. Therefore it had variable-geometry wings that would flip out in a manner similar to those of the Dassault TAS orbiter after re-entry. The ВАС team were unconcerned by Convair’s Mustard- like system, regarding the imitation as flattering. The final months At the end of the year, the ever- inventive Dave Walley came up with another Mustard-related invention that ВАС decided to patent, the application being filed on 31 December 1969. It was entitled ‘Trolley for Recoverable Spacecraft’ and consisted of a streamlined pallet with a fixed tricycle undercarriage and a pair of turbojets built into its rear section. The description on the patent form said: A recoverable spacecraft has rocket propulsion engines for vertical flight into space, and has lifting surfaces for horizontal flight after re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere. When transporting the craft over land, its size makes road transport difficult, and makes its flight energised by rocket motors uneconomical. The invention provides a trolley which can be releasably attached to the craft for such transportation; the trolley has wheels, a braking system and airbreathing engines to energise transportation flight. It forms a streamlined blister beneath the craft, but has itself no lifting surfaces, the flight using those of the craft. The trolley is attached to and released from the craft only when the two are stationary on the ground.’ The trolley would effectively give any Mustard module an undercarriage that could be used on any runway, and engines with which it could fly within the earths atmosphere so that none of the vehicles owrn on-board engines had to be used. This would make transporting modules from one location to another over short distances much easier. The trolley would carry its own fuel supply too, although ‘...as an alternative they could receive their fuel from a tank within the spacecraft. Controls for wheel braking, engine throttles, etc. are connected from the trolley into the cabin of the spacecraft and normal engine flight data are presented to the pilot. The trolley may be designed for easy dismantling into component form to facilitate transportation when not in use.’ The patent was granted on 27 June 1972, but by then it was unnecessary, since Mustard had effectively come to an end at the beginning of 1970. In April 1970 Tom Smith wrote a report for ARC’s hypersonics sub- committee entitled A British View: The Place of Reusable Launch Vehicles in Western Europe’s Future Space Posture’, which gave a weary but still resolutely positive review of options for further space research. It continued to press the case for a reusable launch system, though without mentioning any particular example. He wrote: ‘When one considers that Western Europe has a gross national product (GNP) greater than that of the USSR and about half that of the USA, its total expenditure on space, national and international (about 0.05% GNP compared to 1.0% GNP in the US), looks rather pitiful and is a sad reflection on the abilities of a supposedly technologically advanced community. However, in a sense this can be interpreted as a blessing when contemplating what Europe’s future space programme might be. The very fact that Europe does not have anything approaching the US investment in space hardware should allow her to take a dispassionate look at what has been done (and why) by the space powers, and (hopefully) profit by their experience. It is in this context that reusable launch systems have been examined in Europe; and whereas it should be admitted that a great deal of what has been said and published exhibits liberal quantities of naivety and technical optimism, this should not be allowed to cloud the basic issues involved. LEFT Through the use of a trolley fitted with turbojets, designer Dave Walley believed that a Mustard unit could be temporarily turned into an aircraft for transfer flights or transportation duties. A patent was filed on the last day of the 1960s - at which point the Mustard project was all but ended. 234
CHAPTER NINE MAKING THE CASE FOR MUSTARD The intrinsic disadvantages of the present boosters is that they are one-shot devices. The resulting operating cost is high and consists largely of expended hardware. The reusable launcher is aimed at prolonging the life of the launch hardware, thus reducing the operating costs, but of course the very process of making the launcher reusable costs money, and so the break-even point occurs after a fairly large number of launches. Most studies show that if the economics of putting payloads into orbit were the only consideration, the break-even number of launches would be very high - of the order of 50-100 per year - and a total 10- year programme would need to orbit 500-5,000 tons, depending on the amount of hardware designed to be reused.’ He said that this was the most frequently used arguments against reusable launchers, but studies in Europe - no examples are given - had demonstrated that in fact only a much smaller number of launches would be needed to justify such a system. He said: ‘The space programme in Europe beyond the present national programmes and ELDO/ESRO are admittedly rather vague, but in plans that are subjects of debate at the moment the communication satellite in various forms looms large. The recent proposals of Eurospace are indicative of this. Of the proposed satellites, the first versions are within the launch capabilities of the ELDO-PAS (Perigee Apogee System) or of improved versions of this vehicle. However, the foreseeable needs for TV broadcasts, which according to the Eurospace studies would require a satellite weighing about two tons, would mean either a new European launcher or the use of other people’s hardware. It would be hopelessly uneconomic, of course, to build a new booster solely for this task, since the booster development cost would be many times that of the satellites. So the question of which other missions would utilise this booster will arise, and thus the whole future space plans of Europe will need debating. The possibilities of reusable launcher/spacecraft must be involved.’ Finally, he concluded that ‘...at the present time, the consensus from the many studies on the subject is that rocket- propelled, possibly vertical-rising vehicles will lead to the lowest total costs. The alternative of vehicles using advanced forms of airbreathing propulsion will lead to high-development costs, but would also require significantly greater advances in technology before becoming feasible. Their probability of success is thus appreciably less than the rocket-propelled systems, and this must be a telling factor in the choice for any long-term programme.’ Writing in the Journal of the British Interplanetary Society in 2006, Professor John Allen of Hawker Siddeley conceded: ‘Looking back on the European designs 40 years later, the HSA project had potentially the lowest operating cost but required the most advanced airbreathing engines. The ВАС Mustard probably had the least design risk and could have been built in the 1960s following a modest programme of enabling technology.’ In the same publication, BAC’s Eric Webb wrote: ‘The Mustard project did not proceed to full development but the experience gained by the Warton team did have a lasting impact on the way in which future aircraft projects were conducted. For the first time computers were used to study design interactions more extensively than had ever been possible before. The advantages resulting from the ability to compare widely different concepts in a short time were obvious. This experience led directly to the development of software that has been in daily use ever since. The Mustard programme finally ended when it became-apparent that there was no prospect of any further UK government funding. The next step would have been to initiate research programmes to demonstrate the feasibility of the design, but in the absence of any UK government interest these could not be funded. Many loose ends remained but by this time the team was confident that the Mustard concept was viable and would be a serious contender in any objective competition to develop low cost space transportation. Unfortunately, as the US Shuttle programme has demonstrated, paying high development costs in the short term in order to generate operating cost savings in the much longer term is not an approach that appeals to politicians.’ ВАС and the Shuttle During mid- to late-1970, the American administration asked the British Government whether it would like to be involved in the NASA Post-Apollo Program - the project title for what was to become Space Shuttle - for a price. The British Government approached both ВАС and Hawker Siddeley and together the firms agreed to match-fund a government investment in joining Post-Apollo for a period of twelve months. The Government paid 50% and the firms paid 25% each. New contracts were drawn up for the work, ВАС receiving No K43A/312/CB 43A2. With the cash in place, the Americans paired up ВАС with Space Shuttle prime contractor North American Rockwell Corporation, while Hawker Siddeley was paired with McDonnell Douglas. A team from ВАС flew out to North American’s Los Angeles facility in November 1970 and spent several 235
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN’S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 ABOVE ВАС artwork on the cover of its Space Shuttle Contract Final Report from January 1972. weeks getting to know their American counterparts as well as getting up to speed with the Post-Apollo Program, which was in its Phase В period. At the same time, they were encouraged to choose ‘work packages’ - the way in which work on the Shuttle was parcelled up so that different contractors could concentrate on different aspects of the build - that would be suitable for study in the UK. The ВАС effort was not directed by the firms Warton offices, however, but was under the direction of the Bristol Division team, who were coming close to the conclusion of their work on Concorde. The corporation had formed a Space Shuttle policy committee under the chairmanship of Handel Davies - who had now joined ВАС as its technical director - with David J. Farrar as Space Shuttle project director. It was eight years since both had spoken at the 1962 Royal Aircraft Establishment Symposium on Very High Speed Vehicles. According to the ВАС Space Shuttle Final Report of January 1972: ‘The main areas selected for study by ВАС were compatible with the North American Rockwell programme needs and with the existing expertise and facilities.’ Specifically, these were the orbiters vertical stabiliser, the cargo bay doors and the avionics. The first of these ‘work packages’ tackled was the doors. RIGHT Throughout Post-Apollo Phase B, during which ВАС was involved, it was assumed that the Space Shuttle would be carried on the back of a reusable booster of some sort. The ВАС Space Shuttle Contract Final Report included these as the four most likely launch configurations. 236
CHAPTER NINE MAKING THE CASE FOR MUSTARD ABOVE A diagram showing the three 'work packages' allocated to ВАС during its year-long cooperation with North American Rockwell in 1970-71: the cargo bay doors, vertical stabiliser and avionics. BELOW ВАС designs for the Type 161C's fin and speed brakes. The ВАС Space Shuttle project was coordinated by the firm’s Bristol Division, rather than the Mustard team at Warton. VERTICAL STABILIZER AND SPEEDBRAKES ABOVE LEFT The fin was the second Shuttle 'work package' to be tackled by ВАС after the cargo bay doors. Work was started on North American Rockwell's Type 130G orbiter configuration, pictured here, before being switched to delta- wing designs. ABOVE RIGHT Detailed design work was carried out by ВАС on the fin of North American Rockwell orbiter Type 161C. BELOW Another ВАС fin design, this time for a Space Shuttle reusable booster that never made it into the latter stages of the Shuttle programme. Starting in November 1970, the ВАС team commenced work on a straight wing orbiter configuration with an exposed titanium door design. And then, after NASA’s 180-day Phase В review in January 1971, "ВАС assumed prime responsibility for further work on this work package and the work was developed following the NASA selection of a delta-winged orbiter configuration.’ BAC’s designs were later included in the North American Rockwell final Phase В submission to NASA. The second work package to be commenced, in December 1970, was the fin. The report states: ‘While the details of the participation of the ВАС team in the UK were being set up in December 1970, the vehicle configuration was in an active state of flux. Two basic types of orbiter were being studied at that time, a straight- winged low cross range version and a delta-winged high cross range version. The second in particular was being reconfigured with a view to its adoption as baseline, subject to the NASA 180 day review.’ The ВАС team began by designing the structure of a fin for the straight-winged Type 130G ‘in the full knowledge that work on this particular configuration was unlikely to be continued after the January review.’ Work then began on the fin of a delta-winged design - Type 161C - the fin of a ‘reduced size orbiter vehicle known as VC70-110E, and the fin of reusable booster configuration B-9U. Regarding avionics, the report states: ‘Senior engineers and specialists were assigned to the North American Rockwell and General Dynamics engineering groups in California. The tasks demanding rapid communication and thorough inter-discipline understanding were conducted in the US. ‘However, engineering trade studies and hardware definition to established requirements were performed in the UK by a larger group of engineers drawn from both the electronics and space systems and commercial aircraft groups of ВАС Bristol. This management philosophy has worked well to date, giving excellent NASA visibility and minimising transatlantic communication problems. The ВАС resident team at North American Rockwell, California, were invited to attend NASA avionics technology discussions held at MSC Houston during the Phase В Shuttle contract. These meetings, with senior NASA 237
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 officials and the engineering managers from all US prime contractors, provided considerable information on the aspects of technology priorities, and results. ВАС were the only non-US company represented, the team’s views were welcomed and technology reports were made available.’ Overall, BAC’s involvement in Post- Apollo had earned respect both at North American Rockwell and at NASA, where a good demonstration of favourable European potential cost productivity had been given, showing that the value to the US of ВАС contribution to the programme exceeds the cost by a factor of approximately 3:1It was beneficial to the Americans to have British engineers working on the project because they were only paid, on average, a third of the salary paid to their American equivalent and work productivity was estimated to be roughly level. In reality, the arrangement was even more beneficial to the Americans since Britain was expected to pay for its share of the work, rather than being paid for it. Furthermore, ‘the Americans would like to use Post-Apollo as a vehicle for uniting a large sector of European space efforts, and while there are still wide differences of policy between nations, the participation date has encouraged some valuable co-operation between certain European countries.’ There were other benefits too: ‘Both prior to the start of ВАС participation in the Space Shuttle programme and throughout the involvement, it was realised that there would be considerable access to US technology. It has been consistent ВАС policy throughout the programme to ensure that HM government had the opportunity to obtain maximum benefit from any available technology. To this end, meetings were set up with NGTE, BLEU [Blind Landing Experimental Unit] and RAE at the start of the programme to obtain an initial brief on areas of particular technological interest to these establishments. Throughout the programme, HM government were kept fully informed of all the data which ВАС received from the USA, and certain documents considered of special interest were sent to the Ministry. Certain other documents were supplied on request.’ Following the publication of its Space Shuttle Contract Final Report, ВАС Bristol Division put out a pamphlet emphasising the importance of an ongoing British involvement in the American Space Shuttle programme. The Americans had set a deadline of 1 July 1972 for firm offers of involvement from European countries - offers that would need to be backed up by large quantities of government cash. The pamphlet said: ‘The United States is now firmly set on its course to design and build the “Space Shuttle” - an aeroplane-like vehicle for carrying men and satellites into space and then landing back on an earth airfield in a conventional manner. Europe and Great Britain have been invited to take part in this Space Shuttle programme, which will succeed the present and spectacular NASA Apollo Moon- landing series which ends this year. The deadline for decision is 1 July 1972, and all that Great Britain has to do in order to be out of future space programmes based on the Shuttle is, by that date, to have done nothing.’ The cost of a combined European involvement was given as £35 million a year for six years. Britain might be expected to stump up a quarter of that, making the cost to Britain just under £9 million a year. Europe’s general disunity, however, was likely to be the major stumbling block, the pamphlet opined: ‘If Europe’s current disarray is not tidied up by July 1 - UK will either be out of space, probably for all time, or will have to negotiate a direct bilateral deal with the USA, which would not be popular in Europe. British science and technology is at a real and critical crossroads.’ According to the official US Air Force history, Space Shuttle: Fulfilment of a Dream by Richard P. Hallion and James O. Young, NASA had been following some of the European space transporter development work for three years prior to the October 1969 symposium, ‘...particularly the British Mustard concept which resulted in the agency taking a close look at a more streamlined (and unrelated) American concept by General Dynamics called Triamese. Overall, however, desires by the Europeans to involve themselves in the American Shuttle programme “fell by the wayside” in the words of LeRoy Day, former NASA deputy director of the Space Shuttle programme. Britain wanted in on construction of the orbiter and its avionics, and Germany desired to make contributions to the Shuttle’s propulsion system, but after consideration, NASA decided that the management was “too complicated and it would really make it too tough for us to do’? And the Europeans were simply unwilling to spend the sums of money that the US wanted for what might amount to little more than a foot in the door of the Space Shuttle programme. From Mustard to Hotol During the 1970s the members of the Mustard team moved on to other projects. Ray Creasey died in 1976. A year later, ВАС and Hawker Siddeley were merged and nationalised to form British Aerospace. In 1983 that firm’s Space and Communications Division (Stevenage) began to consider ideas for a new orbital launch vehicle. It was proposed as a low-cost successor to the Space Shuttle and French Ariane rockets for putting 238
CHAPTER NINE MAKING THE CASE FOR MUSTARD ABOVE Its fuel tanks flushed, a final scheme Mustard unit rests on its skids and awaits refurbishment after a successful mission. Daniel Uhr payload into orbit. From 1983 to 1984 initial designs for the system, dubbed HOTOL for Horizontal Take-Off and Landing, were conceived by Dr Bob Parkinson at British Aerospace and engineer Alan Bond, who had previously worked for both British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce. Having headlined on ITN News at Ten in July 1984, the concept was made public at the Farnborough Air Show two months later. And mid-way through the following year British Aerospace managing director Sir Raymond Lygo invited the BAe military aircraft division at Warton to take leadership of the Hotol proof-of-concept study team, and Sandy Burns was appointed as project and technical manager. Part of the reason for transferring leadership of the project from Stevenage to Warton was the expertise in space vehicles built up at the Preston Division while working on Mustard. Webb was among the engineers at Warton who joined the Hotol team and, as part of their studies for the new system, the Mustard files were reopened and re-examined. Ultimately, Hotol itself was shelved due to lack of support from the British Government - the same fate that had befallen Mustard. Tom Smith retired in 1990 and died in 2012. There are still areas of the Mustard design that remain unresolved today, such as how to manufacture its pressurised fuel tanks and how to attach the outer shell to them. But the rocket technology was ready back in 1965, the materials specified for its construction such as titanium and nickel alloys would still be used now, and the aerodynamics had been suitably refined. Mustard was a Space Shuttlejn waiting - a viable design that might have taken British astronauts into orbit and back years before the American Shuttle made its first flight in 1981, and at a fraction of the cost. It deserves to j>e remembered as a high point of British technological innovation during the 20th century. 239
Appendix One Europe falls behind The aircraft manufacturers industry body Eurospace put together a report in May 1966, entitled Towards a European Space Programme, which provided an overview of what Eurospace itself was all about, what it had done so far, and the current state of space research in Europe compared to the rest of the world. These verbatim extracts offer an unvarnished Euro- centric perspective on the position of Europe and European nations against that of their perceived rivals and competitors. Western Europe in the space field Two geographical factors clearly show the dramatic situation in which Europe finds itself: Europe is a small appendage of the vast Asian continent, without a national frontier and is faced with a worldwide population surge mainly affecting the non European countries. To retain, as far as possible, its existing civilisation, it must at least ensure its military security, the ultimate defence of its political structures. In addition its exports must be maintained and adapted to take account of world evolution evident by the growing technical superiority of the two major powers and by the industrial opportunities now available to the countries under development. Space developments are an essential factor and a testimony of the power of these nations and any analysis of the situation in Europe in this field should firstly consider the world situation. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe The Russian programme started with the great advantage of having large launching vehicles available which could handle heavy payloads. Moreover its space effort began considerably earlier than that of any other country. The first Russian satellites, the “sputniks” were designed to explore near space. Very soon afterwards the missions were extended to moon exploration and the first ever photographs of the hidden side of the moon were taken in 1959. The Russian space programme also included the first tests to determine the effect of prolonged weightlessness on living beings. These tests were followed very rapidly by the first manned space flight. Since this time the Russian programme of manned flight has been considerably increased. There have been simultaneous orbital flights of two manned capsules as well as orbiting of a three manned vehicle. Little information on the Russian space programme is known but the successes obtained suggest that it covers a complete range of scientific missions, near and deep space; the setting up of automatic space stations, and the landing of men on the moon; and meteorology and navigation. In addition plans have been made to set up a satellite telecommunication system to serve the large distances involved in the USSR and its associated territories. In the military field various reconnaissance vehicles of the “Cosmos” series have been launched and in 1965 the Russian authorities announced that they had developed a system capable of placing atomic bombs into orbit which could be directed at any time towards targets on earth. Information about the exact costs of the Russian programme is not available. However judging by results, it can be safely assumed that these costs are comparable to those of the USA although representing a much higher percentage of the GNR There is some cooperation in the space field with the Eastern European countries but these latter activities appear to be limited either to the tracking of the satellites and the reception and processing of the data from the Russian satellites that is ground installation work; or to purely scientific and theoretical work. Other non-European countries The interest aroused in the world by astronautics is shown by the large number of countries which in varying degrees are actively engaged in this field. Some of them, like Canada and Australia, have based their programmes mainly on cooperation with NASA and Europe or like Japan want to acquire the means which give it a greater independence, in particular regarding the development of their own launchers. In other cases where the technical and economic possibilities are more limited, e.g. India, Argentine and the United Arab Republic, they are trying by means of agreements with neighbouring countries or with the major space powers to enter the space field either for the technological advancement involved or to increase their military potential. Whatever efforts these countries may make however it hardly seems possible that any radical change in the balance of power can result in the near future. The case of China is probably different and requires closer attention. There has been no knowledge regarding any space efforts on the part of China. It can reasonably be assumed, however, 240
APPENDIX ONE that the Chinese keep a close watch on what is going on in this field and are themselves working in it. They have, as we know, master nuclear technology, at any rate to the extent that they were able to develop, produce and explode an atomic bomb of their own. From this, two deductions can be made concerning their space activity: Tactical ability as well as adequate funds would seem to be available, so that a promising activity in the space field is equally conceivable. The course of events has shown that every country developing nuclear bombs endeavours at the same time to have at its disposal the launchers with which to deliver the bombs. By present-day technological standards this means, above all, rockets, and it is in rocket technology that space technology had its origins. How soon China will be able to realise any space plans she may have is a matter for speculation. But in this respect the example of Russia provides cause for reflection. Compared with Western Europe, Russia was at the beginning of this century, one of the technologically underdeveloped countries, but in the space of about 30 years she not only caught up with, but far surpassed her European rivals and is today one of the two world powers. In view of the evident possibility of such a surge forward in development, it is by no means impossible that in the case of China the process will be repeated. European space activities review The FRENCH national programme covers all the fields of space activity, small launching vehicles, scientific and experimental payloads, launching sites in France, in the Sahara and near the equator in French Guiana, tracking installations in various parts of the world, test facilities etc. It is spread over a period of five years and has been allotted relatively large funding (2000m francs). The three-stage ballistic rocket Diamant designed and manufactured in France made it possible on 26 November 1965 to orbit for the first time satellites launched by exclusively European facilities. It was only in 1960 that the idea of undertaking space activities on a national scale was seriously considered by the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, mainly because of the international arrangements that it had made and because it did not appear possible that an industrial nation could, in the long term, afford to ignore space development. However the very limited funding available has only allowed work of a theoretical nature to be undertaken. The Federal Republic of Germany is not considering a national programme spread over several years. ITALY presents a particularly interesting case in that it shows that a decision to concentrate the efforts of a country on those aspects already partially resolved can be successful. Thus Italy is cooperating with NASA in the development of a scientific satellite to be launched from a floating site near the equator. This project called San Marco has aroused great interest. In addition, Italy is developing a payload for the ELDO launcher and in fact in general it tends to specialize in satellite techniques as well as special launching methods. Although the results obtained are remarkable they do not reduce much the dependence on the US which such cooperation brings to European space efforts. It would appear that BELGIUM and the NETHERLANDS are extremely interested in certain aspects of joint projects which are beyond their national capabilities and it is evident that only such projects will give these countries the chance to use their capacity to the full. The same holds true for the Scandinavian countries, SWEDEN, NORWAY and DENMARK which have some space activity. This is particularly true for Sweden since at the moment this country is limiting its ambitions to scientific experiments, mainly using high altitude probes, and participation in the world system of Satellite Telecommunication (INTELSAT) which consists essentially of building a ground receiver station. The SWISS are particularly interested in satellite telecommunication and the economic aspects of space activity. The stimulating effect of this growing activity on industry and the whole economy can be seen there. However it hardly seems likely that an increase in the Swiss space efforts can be envisaged other than through joint projects. In the other European countries: Austria, Spain and Portugal, there are hardly any national space programmes. An Aerospace Transporter The Aerospace Transporter is a concept which has attracted great attention in Europe. It represents a reusable launch system which can deliver a considerable payload into a near earth orbit. Such a system will inherently be more reliable and more economical than current expendable ballistic rocket systems. It will also provide considerable mission flexibility. A number of proposals for aerospace transporter systems have been made in the past both in Europe and in the USA. Most of the systems proposed consist of two aircraft type stages using rocket propulsion, though in some cases air- breathing propulsion has been proposed for the first stage. Both horizontal take-off, as in the case of an aircraft, and vertical take-off, as for satellite launchers, have been proposed; take-off sometimes being assisted by catapult or carrier plane. Aerodynamic reusable launch systems are especially suited to European conditions. As opposed to ballistic rockets, they can be launched from Europe, which is a distinct advantage considering the extensive launch preparations and the costly launch facility required. Also, in the future, the safe return of the payload to the ground will become a requirement of increasing importance which for Europe implies a controlled landing at a predetermined site. 241
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES Economy and reliability of the launch system will be considerably improved. Another important reason for the European interest in the aerospace transporter is the possibility of a stepwise development of an aerodynamic system. This means that the development can be based on aircraft experience available in Europe today, the range of flight conditions being increased step by step. The use of existing aircraft as “platforms” for launching experimental vehicles can be considered as a stage in the test programme leading to the development of an aerospace transporter. At the same time work on the aerospace transporter lays the foundation for the technology which will be required for future hypersonic aircraft. The most important transport mission for an aerospace transporter is without doubt the logistic support of space stations with personnel and supplies. However the transport of materials, tools etc. for orbital assembly is also of interest. There are many reasons for establishing permanent space stations. Since a space station crew will only partly consist of specially trained astronauts, accelerations and decelerations during flight in the aerospace transporter will have to be kept within the limits which are readily acceptable for persons of normal health. For the ascent phase this requirement can be met by using engines of variable thrust. For the re-entry phase this is another reason for using aerodynamic vehicles. Transportation of satellites into near earth orbits is the simplest mission, for an aerospace transporter. Satellites and space probes for higher orbits will also be carried; however, they must have their own separate propulsion systems for orbit changing. It even appears possible that future satellites will in addition have a propulsion system for reducing orbit height after a certain time, for servicing or repairs using the aerospace transporter. Up to now, information available on the life of satellites is too limited for any claim at the moment that possible cost savings due to repairs of satellites constitute an additional reason for the development of an aerospace transporter. Recently it has been suggested that due to the continued increase in the number of satellite launchings, those satellites no longer operational should be collected and brought back to earth. The use of the aerospace transporter for the rescue of astronauts who might encounter difficulties in orbit, is a mission of a certain significance. With the increasing number of manned space flights in the future, EUROSPACE would affirm how appropriate the aerospace transporter, with its rendez-vous capability, has become. The requirements of a European aerospace transporter are now listed, as previously presented by EUROSPACE in the autumn of 1964: 1 - The basic mission will consist of transporting a payload and a two man crew into orbit. 2 - The basic orbit would be circular at a height of 300km. 3 - The payload, which represents the sum of the mass of propellant necessary for rendez-vous with another space vehicle at the same height and the transferable mass of this vehicle, would be 2.5 tons, representing 10m3 volume. 4 - The vehicle will be launched from a base in Europe and have a maximum launch weight of about 200 tons. 5 - The envisaged aerospace transporter will comprise, in principle, two piloted stages each being recoverable at a predetermined site, preferably the launch site, and reusable. As an indication of reusability, 50 operations in two years should be the target. 6 - The first stage basically confined to the usable atmosphere can be powered by airbreathing motors or by rockets or by a combination thereof. 7 - The upper stage, i.e. the orbital stage, will be powered by rockets using high energy propellants such as oxygen and hydrogen combinations. 8 - The maximum acceleration to be experienced should be limited to about 2.5 g. The standard mission of an aerospace transporter will consist of supplying all kinds of auxiliary equipment to space stations, including their relief crews. The orbiting speed of the space station is approximately l8,000mph (29,000km/h). If the space transporter is to dock with the space station its speed must be adjusted to the orbital speed of the space station during the rendez-vous manoeuvre. The last phase of the approach to the space station will be manually controlled by the pilots. The initiation of the rendez-vous manoeuvres will be automatically controlled from the earth or the space station. After accomplishment of the mission the aerospace transporter will return from its orbit to the earth. The retrorockets that have to be fired at a preselected point of the orbit in order to reach the target airfield reduce the speed. Nevertheless, the outer skin is red-hot during re-entry into the earths atmosphere. Careful insulation and artificial cooling protects the interior and the crew against frictional heat. The descent path of the aerospace transporter is controlled automatically by electronic means. The vehicle reaches its target base by power-off gliding. The landing procedure is similar to that of a conventional aircraft. Proposals from American companies also indicate several solutions for the aerospace transporter as is the case with those of their European counterparts. All of the major aerospace companies have presented proposals to the public. These are based on considerably higher payloads, usually 13 tons, the systems having 1 to 3 stages. The propulsion systems proposed sometimes include very new engine types. The European proposals are intentionally concentrated on a smaller payload of about 2.5 tons, which for the majority of missions is adequate. Those power systems which are only in the basic research stage have, as was proposed by EUROSPACE, been excluded. Thus it should be understood that the European project may be undertaken without fear of duplicating 242
APPENDIX ONE unnecessarily an American type. On the contrary, it could adequately form part of a possible Western coordinated effort. There is no information available from the USSR. From the lack of such information, however, it should not be concluded that in RUSSIA no such projects exist. It is likely that active work by the USSR in this field is being undertaken. Widespread public discussions have resulted since the question of a European development of a reusable space launcher has been made public. The arguments put forward are mainly concerned with the following three aspects: New technology involved Cost of the project Transport volume New technology involved It is 25 years ago since the first proposals for the realisation of aerodynamic launch systems were made. At that time, however, the technical problems of ballistic systems could be more easily solved, and in addition the higher payload ratio of ballistic vehicles, at that time, was a decisive factor regarding the small number of launchings involved. Thus the trend, which led from the V-2 rocket to the present remarkable ballistic launch systems of the USA and the USSR, was established. In the meantime, however, enormous technical progress has been achieved in many fields, which has the effect of bringing aerodynamic launch systems much nearer technical realisation. In particular the folowing technical developments are of decisive importance: rocket engines using high energy propellants which allow higher payloads and structural weight for the same number of stages high temperature resistant materials which were required for solving the re-entry problem electronic high speed computers which enable a high degree of system optimisation test facilities for the simulation of nearly all load conditions, thus allowing an experimental verification of theoretical results, and electronic equipment of high reliability, low weight and low energy requirements Cost of the project There have been frequent doubts expressed that the development of a reusable launch system would be too costly for Europe. These opinions, however, are based on the present space effort in Europe which is totally inadequate. Although several estimates both in Europe and in the USA have been given, EUROSPACE is refraining from giving any value. It should be understood that the choice of the solution is a very important factor regarding cost and it was one of the reasons that EUROSPACE suggested preliminary feasibility studies in order to gain the necessary information for reliable cost evaluation. However, it can be stated without any doubt that such a programme lies within the financial means of Western Europe. A West-European space programme could amount to £180 million per year without difficulty which could certainly meet the expenditure required for the long term development of an aerospace transporter. Transport volume The question has often been raised as to the annual volume of payload to be put into orbit by one or more European aerospace transporters when the system becomes operational (1980-85). It is objected that this volume will always be very small as far as Europe is concerned because in this field no exact estimates can be made. This follows from the lack of basic information in a field entirely new, still to be explored by man, where future requirements will only emerge by experience. Finally estimates of future profit capability are only valid when the data is exact and reasonably reliable but not for a future, even only 15 years ahead, during which time the economic situation could evolve in a totally undeterminable manner. However even though the transport requirements cannot yet be clearly defined, so far ahead, a number of flight missions appear reasonable and necessary and have been mentioned already. Realising the future importance of the aerospace transporter in a coherent and coordinated European programme, the first EUROSPACE report, published in 1963, stressed this project. In order to intensify the work already in progress within EUROSPACE, a study was initiated into the technical, financial and economical aspects of an Aerospace Transporter in which many firms in France, Germany and the UK participated. The results of this study, mentioned in the 1963 report, were finally published in a report entitled “Aerospace Transporter” in 1964. This report was circulated to the authorities in the various countries and received a public presentation on the occasion of the EUROSPACE General Assembly in Hamburg in September 1964. In this report, EUROSPACE has proposed a two years’ feasibility study, to investigate the various solutions possible and to compare them with each other. Those systems especially suited for Europe for different missions should be clearly defined. The cost of the development programme should be determined as accurately as possible. Thus, the European governments would be given a sound basis for a decision on the important question of a joint development of an aerospace transporter. It was hoped that the efforts of European industry in this respect will result in an acceptance by the European governments of this stimulating and rewarding challenge. As it has been frequently misunderstood, it should be emphasised again that EUROSPAC is calling for a preliminary feasibility study and not for the immediate development of a European aerospace transporter. Indeed, 243
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 this is exactly the same position as exists in the USA as imposed by the government. A prominent US expert in this field Wernher von Braun recently strengthened the conviction that EUROSPACE holds in this matter when he stated: “I cannot see why an important target such as the aerospace transport should not be attainable if the joint capabilities of the European aerospace and electronic industries are systematically aimed towards that goal.” EUROSPACE has tried its best to explain and convince governments and European public of the importance and necessity of studying seriously and without delay the possibilities of long term projects such as the aerospace transporter. Such a project will give rise to beneficial effects regarding space technology and allow Europe a chance to play a dignified and useful role in the future. If the necessary decision to undertake a preliminary feasibility study is delayed any further Europe will risk seeing this chance disappear with all the resulting consequences. 244
Appendix Two Britain’s last chance America offered the British government an opportunity to participate in the Space Shuttle programme and set a deadline of July 1, 1972, for some form of commitment or at least an expression of interest. ВАС, having been involved in the Shuttle development process, believed that this was the nations final opportunity to remain a part of the space age’ This four-page leaflet sets out BACs position with an underlying sense of increasing desperation. The Space Shuttle The United States is now firmly set on its course to design and build the "Space Shuttle"—an aeroplane-like vehicle for carrying men and satellites into Space and then landing back on an earth airfield in a conventional manner Europe and Great Britain have been invited to take part in this Space Shuttle programme, which will succeed the present and spectacular NASA Apollo Moon-landing series which ends this year. The deadline for decision is 1 st July, 1972, and all that Great Britain has to do in order to be out of future Space programmes based on the Shuttle is, by that date, to have done nothing. The Space Shuttle is widely agreed to be an essential tool if there is to be cheaper and more reliable and widespread access to Space. Many scientists and ecologists believe that only by access such as that provided by the Shuttle, can man hope to control and manage the affairs of this planet and to discover and husband its true resources. 245
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 The Space Shuttle Fundamental understanding of the laws of nature and knowledge about the earth and what happens on it have been the mainspring of such powers and abilities as have accrued to man over his relatively short history of life. Even by virtue of the little he has so far discovered, man can now place himself as an observer in Space. What enormous potential for further break-through thinking and discovery this new ability will bring cannot yet be sensibly guessed at. It must surely result in a wider interpretation of many of the facts already known. Probably and eventually, however, it will give us a whole new understanding of the fundamentals of gravity, electro-magnetism and the nature of life. And to the sceptics one can recall that, only 15 years ago. at the time of the first Sputnik in 1957, there were very few who would have predicted Apollo 16 by 1972, or the multi-thousand-channel satellites which have already revolutionised world communi- cations and sent traffic soaring. Who, then, can even begin to define what we may not be able to do in space by 1985 ? One of the things we have learnt in the past 15 years, however, is that behind the probing spearhead of the new technology, there has already been a remarkable practical consolidation by the applied scientists. Today, so short a time after the start of the Space Era, there are satellites whose sensors can observe and monitor the world s weather, detect oil and mineral deposits, plot the movements of fish (and do it by species), notify many kinds of surface pollution, show up early-stage plant diseases, control and guide surface and air traffic, and replace wire cables as the main conveyors of earth communications. Almost every day, a new ability for Earth Management or for discovering Earth Truths is made available to man via satellite payloads. KEY STEP One key step, however, has to be taken if all the tremendous new satellite capabilities which still come crowding in are to be made available for the benefit of us all. There has to be a cheaper, more cost- effective and more reliable method of access to orbit than the current and clumsy “firework" method in which the hardware is lost. All the wonderful new Earth Resources, Earth Truths and Earth Management sensors are useless unless man can afford to put them quickly and conveniently into station in Space. POST APOLLO The NASA Post-Apollo programme is a far-sighted (but feasible) concept which is aimed at providing just that necessary routine access to orbit without which the fundamental progress of mankind will be severely slowed and restricted. The full Post-Apollo programme consists of the following elements, loosely known as "The Shuttle" system The Space Shuttle Orbiter Vehicle This is virtually a re-usable Space aeroplane which will be able to return from Space to earth and land at an airfield It is about the size of а ВАС One-Eleven jetliner and will be able to place satellites into orbit and provide service and repair facilities for them. It will also, itself, be able to perform short-term Space missions and can remain in orbit for up to 30 days Each Orbiter is likely to be good for several hundred Space sorties. Its payload is 65,000 lb. (29,500 kg). The Launcher This will be powered by solid-fuel rocket boosters carrying the Orbiter piggy-back. Later a re-usable aeroplane-type launcher may be used. The current boosters, however, will be sea-recoverable. The Orbiter and Launcher together are what is usually meant by the words "Space Shuttle". 246
APPENDIX TWO The Sortie Can This is a fuselage-like canister, or cylindrical container, which will fit in the cargo bay of the Orbiter. It will carry up to a dozen scientists—in shirt-sleeved comfort—into orbit and will enable them to conduct . their own experiments in Space—eliminating the "middle man” of the trained astronaut. The Space Tug This is a small, unmanned engine, controlled from the ground, which can be parked in orbit and used as a tug or shunting engine to move a satellite from one orbit to another. It can also be used to take a satellite or probe out of orbit and send it on its way to the planets or Outer Space. Cost US Government intention to build the Shuttle (Launcher and Orbiter) was announced in January 1972 by President Nixon. The cost will be $5 5 billion over the next six years. This expenditure will provide two Orbiters and two boosters. Additional Orbiters will cost $250 million and boosters $50 million. Service Date The service date is likely to be 1980, although 1978 is the current target. Savings Use of the Orbiter as their "DC3 of the Space Age" will save the USA $12 to $13 billion, on launchers and satellites, 1980-92. That is a billion dollars or nearly E400 million a year. The major saving is not in the launch costs, but in the payload costs. With the "Shirt-Sleeved Shuttle", satellites can be much less rugged and no longer have to be self-contained for life They can be serviced and their data can be recovered by hand This eliminates the need for radio-links and ground stations. Europe's Position It is quite clear:— (a) that the USA will now go ahead with the Post-Apollo programme, and (b) that, for a variety of political, financial and engineering reasons, the USA very much wants European participation. Europe, itself, now has to decide whether to join Post-Apollo or not. It has until 1st July, 1972, to make up its mind. EUROPA 3 PROBLEM At the moment, the European Space Conference seems to favour participation in Post-Apollo as part of a wider European programme which also includes the development of a purely European satellite- launcher rocket—Europa 3. A number of Europeans, however, oppose the conventional Europa 3 rocket because it will re-invent an already outdated technology. The British Government is of this view and has no commitment at all to it. There is also in Europe, however, distrust of USA intentions—notably as to European basic rights of payloads in the Shuttle once USA commercial interests are involved. Europa 3, therefore, is seen as a safety fall-back, but the British Government does not see this as justification for such a very large expenditure. Some European thinking also favours the “Space Tug" and/or the "Sortie Can" as package deals from Post-Apollo which could be totally undertaken entirely by Europe (design, development and manufacture) and so be the European contribution to Post-Apollo. There is, however, a strong school of thought, notably in the UK, which believes there should also be active participation in the Orbiter itself. This is because the really practical and wide-based structural and aerodynamic technology, which will read across to future sub-orbital aircraft, etc., lies in the Orbiter, not in a Space Tug engine. 247
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES THE PACKAGE CONCEPT It is generally agreed that the method by which participation by Europe in the Shuttle would be imple- mented would be for Europe to be entirely responsible for an agreed package which would then be produced from scratch for NASA in Europe and at no cost to NASA. No dollars would then flow from Europe to USA—only completed work, paid for by Europe in European factories. Because of the 3 : 1 difference in man-hour costs between USA and Europe, a European contribution to the Shuttle would actually be worth over double its face value to NASA. UNITY NEEDED European unity, on the whole complicated space issue, is very desirable (and is possibly essential) if the best "access to Space" terms are to be obtained from the USA for Shuttle rides. To achieve this, there has to be rapid resolution of the current European attitude which says "subscribe to all our Space projects, including Post-Apollo and Europa 3. or stay out", and the conflicting UK view of "we will join in Post-Apollo, but not in Europa 3". There also has to be a minor, but important, resolution as to whether Space Tug or Orbiter work is the better package to seek. In fact, Europe could well obtain and afford both Space Tug and Orbiter participation and also the Sortie-Can packages if she wants. But be that as it may, the hard fact is that—if Europe's current disarray is not tidied up by 1st July—UK will either be out of Space, probably for all time, or will have to negotiate a direct bilateral deal with the USA, which would not be popular in Europe. British Science and Technology is at a real and critical cross-roads. COST TO UK The usually quoted percentage of a total European contribution to Post-Apollo is 10 per cent. Ten per cent, of $5 5 billion is $550 million and, spread over 6 years, is $91 million (£35 million) a year. The UK share of Europe’s 10 per cent, is generally put at 25 per cent. This works out at a total cost for the UK of $140 million for six years, or $23 million (£9 million) a year. UK's total current expenditure on Space is about £25 million a year. PRESENT UK PARTICIPATION The two main British airframe companies—British Aircraft Corporation and Hawker Siddeley Aviation— have both been involved with USA Post-Apollo studies so far, ВАС with the famous Apollo Command Module firm of North American Rockwell and HSA with McDonnell Douglas. These studies have been 50 : 50 financed by UK Government and Industry. The ВАС team has, in USA, been very closely involved in basic Orbiter design—notably on the vertical stabiliser. It has also done important work on data- handling and on the cargo doors. ВАС and HSA are also both members of European industrial consortia involved in Space Tug and Sortie-Can studies. UNTHINKABLE TO OPT OUT It seems unthinkable that, at this infant stage of the Space Age and all that it is clearly going to mean to man s scientific and engineering technology, Great Britain should opt out. Access to Space will, by the end of this decade, clearly be the great dividing line between the Have and the Have-Not nations— between the developing countries and the declining ones. Yet—unless some new initiative is taken in UK itself and also in Europe—this opting out seems almost inevitable. By 1st July, NASA, with time- tables to meet, will move ahead and will place firm contracts. These will either include Britain and British industries or not, but once signed there can be no going back on them and, therefore, no way in for those who are left outside. BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION the most powerful aerospace company in Europe lOO PAlL MALL LONDON SW1 248
Reference Sources and Bibliography Research papers Engineering Problems of Near Future Hypersonic Vehicles by TW Smith (1963) An Approach to Economic Space Transportation by T W Smith (1966) Economic Space Transportation: Thoughts on Missions, Size and Operational Sensitivity by T Derbyshire, W В Clegg and TW Smith (1966) Eurospace: Towards a European Space Programme (1966) A British Reusable Booster Concept by T W Smith (1967) Air-Breathing Reusable Launchers by R H Francis (1967) Review of European Aerospace Transporter Studies by H Tolle (1967) A West German Approach to Reusable Launch Vehicles by Jiirgen Lambrecht and Edwin Schafer (1967) A French Concept for an Aerospace Transporter by Henri Deplante and Pierre Perrier (1967) A Comparison of Fixed Wing Reusable Booster Concepts by Richard A Nau (1967) Design Considerations for Orbital Transport Systems by Dietrich W Fellenz and Charles M Akridge (1967) The Case for Ballistic Recovery of Boosters by Phil Bono (1967) The Black Arrow as a Vehicle for Testing Advanced Structures by D Pritchard-Jones (1968) Space Shuttle Remarks by R F Creasey and T W Smith (1969) A British View: The Place of Reusable Launch Vehicles in Western Europe's Future Space Posture by T W Smith (1970) Company reports (English Electric/BAC) The Long Range Surface to Surface Weapon (1953) Hypersonic Vehicles Progress Report No. 1 (1964) Hypersonic Vehicles Progress Report No. 2 (1964) Hypersonic Vehicles Progress Report No. 3 (1965) Costing the Aerospace Transporter by W В Clegg and К D Janik (circa 1965) The Aerospace Transporter: The Concept and its Development by W В Clegg and T W Smith (1966) Hypersonic Vehicles: A Summary of Work by British Aircraft Corporation, Preston Division by P J Cooper (1967) Technology of Advanced Propulsion Systems With Regard to Installation and Performance in Aerospace Vehicles by P J Cooper (1967) Space Shuttle Contract Final Report (1972) Company reports (Hawker Siddeley) Factors Affecting the Surface Temperature of a Hypersonic Aircraft. Report APG/1019/0703 (1963) Hypersonic Vehicles Research Study - Second Interim Report. Report APG/1019/0120 (1964) Hypersonic Vehicles Research Study - Third Interim Report. Report APG/1019/0121 (1965) RAE reports Research Aircraft for Speeds of Mach 4 and Above. Technical Note No. Aero 2639 (1959) Re-entry of Manned Earth Satellites by R H Plascott. Technical Note No. Aero 2640 (1959) Future Research at Very High Speeds and the Prospects of Applications in this Field. Report No. Aero 2667 (1962) Notes on the RAE Symposium on Very High Speed Vehicles at Farnborough Technical College. Report No. Aero 2669. (1962) Report of the Working Party on Air Staff Target O.R.9001 for Future Space Operations (1963) Hypersonic Aircraft and Their Aerodynamic Problems by D Kuchemann. Tech Memo Aero 849 (1965) Ramjet Propulsion for Hypersonic Aircraft by L H Townend. Tech Memo Aero 917 (1966) Space Projects in the United Kingdom by Sta ff o f Space Department. Technical Report No. 66058 (1966) The Range Performance of Hypersonic Aircraft by D H Peckham and L F Crabtree. Technical Report No. 66178 (1966) ARC reports Recommendation Astr./64/5 - Hypersonic Recoverable Launchers ARC 26 734 (1965) A Review of Hypersonic Research in the UK by E W E Rogers. ARC 27 352(1965) Liaison Meeting on Hypersonic Aerodynamics of Bodies. ARC 29 504(1967) The Case for Continuing Hypersonic Research. ARC 29 811 (1968) Comments on Current UK Effort on Lifting-Body Research at Hypersonic Speeds by E W E Rogers. ARC 31 841 (1970) 249
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES Books and other publications The Exploration of Space by Arthur C Clarke (1951) Spaceflight Technology edited by Kenneth Gatland (1960) Manned Satellites: Their Achievements and Potentialities by WF Hilton (1965) Frontiers of Space by Philip Bono and Kenneth Gatland (1969) History of British Space Science by Harrie Hassey and M О Robins (1986) Wingless Flight: The Lifting Body Story by R Dale Reed and Darlene Lister (1997) Space Shuttle: Fulfillment of a Dream by Richard P Hallion and James О Young (1998) The Black Arrow Rocket by Douglas Millard (2001) A Vertical Empire by C N Hill (2001, revised edition 2011) Space Chronicle: UK Spaceplanes JBIS Vol 59, Suppl. 2 (2006) British Secret Projects: Hypersonics, Ramjets and Missiles by Chris Gibson and Tony Buttler (2007) Die Deutsche Luftfahrt: Deutsche Raketen-flugzeuge und Raumtransporter-Projecte by Dietrich E Koelle et al (2007) Facing the Heat Barrier: A History of Hypersonics by T A Heppenheimer (2007) Secret Projects: Military Space Technology by Bill Rose (2008) 250
Index of vehicles ABOVE The 15 numbered Mustard schemes presented in uniform scale, from the 90ft long Scheme 1 on the top left to the 85ft Scheme 15 on the bottom right. Details of each version are presented below. Mark Aston Wingspan/ Engines Name (drawing number) Length width Weight Page numbers for relevant drawings shown in brackets English Electric P.30M 155ft 72ft 280,0001b 4 x Rolls-Royce RB.160 (18) P.30R/1 I84lt 88ft n/a 6 x Bristol Olympus 593 (23) P.42 Scheme 1 Mach 5 research aircraft (EAG 3272 preliminary issue) 63ft 70ft 50,000lb Unspecified ramjet, 2 x developed RB.162 turbojet (28, 29, 30) P.42 Scheme 2 Mach 5 aircraft (EAG 3273) 75ft 45ft 50,0001b 2 x unspecified ramjet, 2 x developed RB.162 turbojet (30) P.42 Scheme 3/2 Mach 5 aircraft (EAG 3277/2) 65ft 36ft 50,0001b Unspecified ramjet, 2 x developed RB.162 turbojet (30) P.42 Scheme 4 Mach 4.5 aircraft (EAG 3280) 75ft 45ft n/a 2 x developed RB. 168-31R turbojet (31, 32) P.42 Scheme 4/1 Mach 4.5 aircraft (EAG 3280/1) 75ft 85ft/48ft n/a 2 x developed RB. 168-31R turbojet (32) P.42 Scheme 4/2 Mach 4 aircraft (EAG 3280/2) 75ft 45ft 100,0001b 2 x Rolls-Royce ducted bypass ‘O’ type turborocket(32) P.42 Scheme 5/1 Mach 5 aircraft (EAG 3281/1) 95ft 55ft 200,0001b 2 x unspecified turboramjet (35) P.42 Scheme 5/2 Mach 5 aircraft (EAG 3281/2) 100ft 58ft 200,0001b 2 x unspecified turboramjet (35) P.42 Scheme 5/3 Mach 5 aircraft (EAG 3281/3) 100ft 58ft 200,0001b 2 x unspecified turboramjet (35) P.42 Scheme 6/2 Mach 4 aircraft (EAG 3282/2) 78ft 42.5ft 100,0001b 2 x Bristol Siddeley turboramjet (35) P.42 Scheme 6/3 Mach 4 aircraft (EAG 3282/3) 79ft 42.5ft 100,0001b 2 x Bristol Siddeley turboramjet (35) P.42 Scheme 7/1 Mach 4 aircraft and booster (EAG 3299/1) 82ft 36ft 50,0001b plus 100,0001b 2 x unspecified ramjet, 2 x developed RB.162 turbojet (37) booster 251
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES Wingspan/ Engines Name (drawing number) L .ength width Weight Page numbers for relevant drawings shown in brackets P.42 Scheme 8/1 Mach 4 aircraft (EAG 3303/1) 88ft 42.5ft 100,0001b 4 x ducted bypass turbofan based on Rolls- Royce RB.153 (38) P.42 Scheme 8/2 comparison hydrogen-kerosene aircraft (EAG 3303/2) 132ft 42.5ft 100,0001b 4 x ducted bypass turbofan based on Rolls- Royce RB.153 (39) P.42 Scheme 9/1 Mach 4 aircraft integrated and cambered (EAG 3308/1) 100ft 45ft 100,0001b 2 x Bristol Siddeley BS.l 101 turboramjet (39) P.42 Scheme 11/1 Space vehicle (EAG 3316/2) 29.5ft 26ft 23,5001b 2 x rocket engine and 1 x modified RB.162 turbojet (40, 70, 71, 75, 76) P.42 Scheme 11/1 Booster (EAG 3316/3) 42ft 25ft 44,000lb 3 x rocket engine (40) P.42 Scheme 11/4 Mach 4 aircraft boost or cruise launch (EAG 3316/4) 250ft 123ft n/a 6 x scaled Rolls-Royce ducted engine ‘B’ turbojet (40) P.42 Scheme 11/5 aircraft liquid hydrogen booster only (EAG 3316/5) 211ft 123ft n/a n/a (42) P.42 Scheme 11/7 Mach 4 aircraft kerosene boost or cruise launch (EAG 3316/7) 181ft 108ft 500,0001b 6 x scaled Rolls-Royce ducted engine ‘B’ turbojet (41) Recoverable S-1 booster for Saturn C-1В (EAG 4391) n/a n/a n/a 8 x rocket engine, 2 x Rolls-Royce turbojet (74) P.42 Scheme 11/10 Mach 4 canard aircraft kerosene boost or cruise launch (EAG 4392) 175ft 100ft n/a n/a (41) P.42 Scheme 11/11 Mach 4 aircraft kerosene boost or cruise launch (EAG 4394) 129ft 94ft n/a n/a (41) P.42 Scheme 11/12 Mach 4 aircraft kerosene boost or cruise launch (EAG 4395) 150ft 130ft 500,0001b including 200,0001b upper stages 6 x scaled Rolls-Royce engine ‘B’ turbojet (44) P.42 Scheme 11/13 Mach 4 aircraft kerosene boost or cruise launch (EAG 4396 issue 2) 154ft 130ft 500,0001b including 117,5001b upper stages 6 x Rolls-Royce turboramjet (28,45,47,48, 50, 52, 53, 56,61,72, 197,218) P.42 Scheme 11/14 Mach 4 transport aircraft (EAG 4397) 166ft 130ft 500,0001b 6 x Rolls-Royce turboramjet (61) P.42 Scheme 11/17 Mach 4 aircraft kerosene booster (EAG 4407) 150ft 90ft n/a 6 x Bristol Siddeley BS. 1011/2 ducted fan engine (50) P.42 Mach 2.2 kerosene booster aircraft (EAG 4409) 140ft 102ft 500,0001b including 198,0001b upper stages 4 x reheated turbojet (48, 50, 70, 72) P.42 Scheme 19 Mach 0.9 kerosene booster aircraft (EAG 4410) 135ft 128ft 500,0001b including 265,0001b upper stages 4 x Rolls-Royce engine ‘B’ turbojet (50) Vertical take-off horizontal landing Mach 7 booster (EAG 4403/4411) n/a n/a 500,0001b 4 x rocket engine, 2 x turbojet (50, 75, 78) P.42 Scheme 20 Mach 0.9 kerosene booster aircraft (EAG 4412) 129ft 104ft 500,0001b including 265,0001b upper stages 4 x scaled Rolls-Royce engine ‘B’ turbojet (50) P.42 3rd stage spacecraft for Mach 2.2 launch (EAG 4413) 45ft 38ft 198,0001b combined 1 x rocket engine (70, 71, 72, 74) P.42 2nd stage booster for Mach 2.2 launch (EAG 4413) 61ft 24ft 198,0001b combined 1 x rocket engine (70, 71, 72, 74) Variable geometry re-entry vehicle (EAG 4414) 50ft 17ft 55,2921b 2 x rocket engine (72, 74) (50ft with wings extended) P.42 Mach 4 booster (EAG 4415 preliminary issue) 175ft 140ft 500,0001b 4 x scaled Rolls-Royce flashjet (52) including upper stages 252
APPENDIX THREE Name (drawing number) 1 _ength Wingspar width i/ Weight Engines Page numbers for relevant drawings shown in brackets P.42 Mach 4 booster (EAG 4415 issue 1) 165ft 120ft 500,0001b including upper stages 4 x scaled Rolls-Royce flashjet (52) P.42 Mach 4 booster (EAG 4416 preliminary issue) 165ft 120ft 500,0001b including upper stages 4 x scaled Rolls-Royce flashjet (53,55,56,218) P.42 Mach 4 booster (EAG 4416 issue 1) 165ft 120ft 500,0001b including upper stages 6 x scaled Rolls-Royce flashjet (53, 55, 56, 218) P.42 Mach 4 booster (EAG 4418) 180ft 88ft 500,0001b including upper stages 4 x scaled Rolls-Royce flashjet (57) P.42 Recoverable Rocket (EAG 4423 preliminary issue) 89ft 52ft 500,0001b including upper stages 2 x rocket engines, 2 x Rolls-Royce Spey turbojet (78, 79) P.42 Recoverable Rocket (EAG 4423 issue 1) 89ft 55ft 500,0001b including upper stages 2 x scaled Rolls-Royce RZ2 rocket engine, 2 x Rolls-Royce Spey turbojet (78, 79) P.42 Mach 4 kerosene booster aircraft (EAG 4424 preliminary issue) 150ft 120ft 500,0001b including 138,5001b upper stages 6 x scaled Rolls-Royce engine ‘C’ turboramjet (50,52,56,218) P.42 Mach 4 aircraft (EAG 4426) 86ft 48ft 90,000)b 2 x Rolls-Royce ducted engine ‘C’ turboramjet (60, 200, 202) P.42 Mach 4 aircraft with weapons (EAG 4426/1) 86ft 48ft 90,0001b 2 x Rolls-Royce ducted engine ‘C’ turboramjet (60, 200, 202) Mach 4 naval aircraft (EAG 4427) 62.5ft 34ft 45,0001b 2 x scaled Rolls-Royce ducted engine ‘C* turboramjet (60, 201) Mach 4 naval aircraft with weapons (EAG 4427/1) 62.5ft 34ft 45,0001b 2 x scaled Rolls-Royce ducted engine ‘C’ turboramjet (60, 201) Mach 4 naval aircraft with weapons (EAG 4427/2) 62.5ft 34ft 45,000)b 2 x scaled Rolls-Royce ducted engine V turboramjet (60, 201) Winged re-entry vehicle (EAG 4428) n/a n/a n/a 1 x rocket engine (73) Recoverable first-stage rocket - research (EAG 4429) 58ft 35ft 115,0001b 1 x Rolls-Royce RZ2 rocket engine, 2 x turbojet (79, 81) Recoverable first-stage rocket (manned) (EAG 4430) 58ft 33ft 115,0001b 1 x Rolls-Royce RZ2 rocket engine, 2 x turbojet (79) Recoverable first-stage rocket (EAG 4431) 62ft 32ft n/a n/a (28,81) British Aircraft Corporation Mach 4 booster with flashjets (EAG 4432) 155ft 78ft 500,0001b 3 x Rolls-Royce flashjet (28, 196) Recoverable first-stage research vehicle - 54ft Monex fuel (EAG 4433) 33ft 55,8001b n/a (82, 83) Mach 4 booster, kerosene fuelled (EAG 4435) 104ft 78ft 500,000]b 3 x scaled Bristol Siddeley BS. 1011/2 (197, 198) Recoverable space module (EAG 4437 preliminary issue) 88ft 50ft (fins extended 75ft) 197,4001b (booster 201,3001b) 1 x rocket engine (113, 115) Mustard Scheme 1 (EAG 4437 issue 1) 90ft 50ft (fins extended 75ft) 197,4001b (booster 201,3001b) 1 x rocket engine (113, 115) 253
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 Name (drawing number) Length Wingspan/ Engines Page numbers for relevant drawings shown in brackets width Weight Mach 4 booster (EAG 4438 part 1) 132ft 66ft 500,0001b 4 x scaled Bristol Siddeley BS. 1011 /2 (198) Mach 4 booster (EAG 4438 part 2) 132ft 66ft 500,0001b 4 x scaled Bristol Siddeley BS. 1011/2 (198) Mach 4 booster (EAG 4438 part 3) 132ft 66ft 500,0001b 4 x scaled Bristol Siddeley BS. 1011/2 (198) Mustard Scheme 2 (EAG unknown) 85ft 75ft n/a 1 x rocket engine (115, 118) Reconnaissance aircraft (EAG 4441) 120ft 62ft 6in 140,8001b/ 146,0001b 155,6001b 2 x scaled Bristol Siddeley BS. 1012/2 (201) Mustard Scheme 3 (EAG 4442) 98ft 50ft n/a 3 x rocket engine (118) Mach 0.8 launch or transport aircraft (EAG 4444) 172ft 176ft 500,0001b 8 x Rolls-Royce RCo.43 Conway turbojet (118) 4,000sq ft boost aircraft (EAG 4446) 120ft 75ft 500,0001b 5 x Bristol Siddeley BS.1012/2 (198, 200, 218) Mustard Scheme 4 (EAG 4450 outline) 94ft 62ft n/a 4 x rocket engine (119, 121,123) Mustard Scheme 4 (EAG 4450) 88ft 55ft 200,0001b 4 x rocket engine, 2 x Rolls-Royce RB.172- 54Adour(119, 121,123) Mach 7 boost aircraft (EAG 4453) 135ft 75ft 6in 500,0001b 6 x Bristol Siddeley BS. 1012/6 (200) Mustard Scheme 5 (EAG 4454) 99ft 68ft n/a 4 x rocket engine, 2 x turbojet (139,157) Mustard low-speed glider (EAG 4455) 26ft 16ft 8in 4,0001b none (157) Mach 10 VTO cruise vehicle (EAG 4456 preliminary issue) 124ft 58ft 100,0001b 1 x aerospike rocket engine (206) Mach 10 VTO cruise vehicle (EAG unknown) 174ft 75ft 200,0001b 1 x aerospike rocket engine (206) Mach 10 VTO cruise vehicle (EAG 4456 issue 2) 130ft 35ft 100,0001b 1 x rocket engine, 2 x ramjet (206) Untitled high-speed vehicle (EAG 4458) 87ft 53ft 96,0001b 2 x half-scale Bristol Siddeley BS.1012/2 (201) Untitled high-speed vehicle (EAG 4459) 85ft 53ft 96,0001b 2 x half-scale Bristol Siddeley BS.1012/2 (202) Mach 4 aircraft (EAG unknown) 87ft 53ft 96,0001b 2 x half-scale Bristol Siddeley BS.1012/2 (202) Mustard Scheme 6 (EAG 4463) 105ft 68ft n/a 1 x aerospike rocket engine, 2 x turbojet (139) Skinless Mustard expendable booster (EAG 4464) *(including capsule and 2 x Mustard unit) 106ft 52ft 1,225,0001b* 1 x aerospike rocket engine (139) Mustard Scheme 7 (EAG 4465) 99ft 70ft 400,0001b 4 x rocket engine, 2 x turbojet (141) Liquid hydrogen aircraft (top) (EAG 4468) 187ft 86ft n/a n/a (206) Liquid hydrogen aircraft (middle) (EAG 4468) 194ft 78ft n/a n/a (206) Liquid hydrogen aircraft (bottom) (EAG 4468) 201ft 70ft n/a n/a (206) Mustard Scheme 8 (EAG 4470) 110ft 64ft n/a 4 x rocket engine, 2 x turbojet (143) Mustard Scheme 9 (EAG 4471) 120ft 52ft (tips down 70ft) 400,0001b 4 x rocket engine, 2 x turbojet (144) Mustard Scheme 10 (EAG 4472) 128ft 42ft (tips down 64ft) 400,0001b 4 x rocket engine, 2 x turbojet (145) Mustard Scheme 11 (EAG 4473) 110ft 64 ft n/a 4 x rocket engine, 2 x turbojet (145) Mustard Scheme 12 (EAG 4474) 110ft 64ft n/a 4 x rocket engine, 2 x turbojet (145) Mustard Scheme 13 (EAG 4476) 120ft 52ft n/a 4 x rocket engine, 2 x turbojet (145) Mustard Scheme 14 (EAG 4477) 102ft 66ft n/a 4 x rocket engine, 2 x turbojet (220) Mustard Scheme 15 (EAG 4478) 85ft 58ft 266,0001b 4 x rocket engine, 1 x turbojet (220, 221, 222) 254
APPENDIX THREE Name (drawing number) Length Wingspan/ width Weight Engines Page numbers for relevant drawings shown in brackets Mustard unnumbered final scheme (EAG unknown)92ft 4in 63ft n/a 4 x rocket engine, 1 x turbojet (230) Sir W. G. Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft Manned Satellite (May 1959) 28ft 9in 18ft 44801b none (17, 163, 164,165, 167, 168, 169,171) Manned Satellite (August 1959) 25ft 3in 29ft 6in 41201b none (17, 163,164,165,167,168,169,171) A. V. Roe & Company Z 101/35 (manned Blue Steel) 35ft 13ft lin 16,4801b 1 x Armstrong Siddeley Stentor (169,170) Bell Aircraft Corporation Bell hypersonic transport (transport vehicle) 88ft n/a 160,0001b 1 x rocket engine (40, 105) Bell hypersonic transport (booster) 200ft n/a 750,0001b 6 x turboramjet (40, 105) Boeing Model 922 351ft 6in 150ft n/a 5 x rocket engine, 6 x turbojet (75) Bristol Aeroplane Company Bristol Type 198 (start of joint studies) 171ft 80ft n/a n/a (22) Bristol Type 198 (4 January 1960) 190ft 80ft n/a 6 x Bristol Olympus 591 (22) Bristol Type 198 (16 September 1960) 182ft 80ft n/a n/a (22) Avions Marcel Dassault Transporteur Aerospatial (TAS) 2 booster 190ft 75ft 6in 300,000- 400,0001b 6 x turboramjet (192, 193, 194) Douglas Aircraft Company Astro Al test vehicle (1962) 65ft 44 ft 214,9601b 3 x Rocketdyne J-2 (101, 110) Astro A2 spacecraft (1962) 65ft 44ft 198,6201b 1 x Rocketdyne J-2,2 x Pratt & Whitney RL-10 (100,101,102) Astro В booster (1962) 94ft 61ft 681,2401b 1 x Aerojet M-l, 2 x Rocketdyne J-2 (101, 109,110, 111) Astro A2 spacecraft (1963) 68ft 43.9ft 196,8501b 1 x Rocketdyne J-2,2 x Pratt 8t Whitney RL-10 (100,101,102) Astro В booster (1963) 95.2ft 61.5ft 666,2001b 1 x Aerojet M-l, 2 x Rocketdyne J-2 (101, 109,110, 111) Hawker Siddeley Aircraft Hawker Siddeley SST (start of joint studies) 185ft 77.2ft n/a n/a (22, 23» 24) Hawker Siddeley SST (final configuration) 179ft 74.6ft n/a n/a (22. 23, 24) Type 1019/A1 (early) 187ft 97ft 465,0001b 6 x Bristol Siddeley BS. 1012/2 (174, 179) Type 1019/A1 (late) 191ft 6in 97ft 400,0001b 4 x Bristol Siddeley BS. 1012/2 (174, 179) Type 1019/A5 187ft 97ft 472,7901b 6 x Bristol Siddeley BS. 1012/2 (174, 179) Type 1019/A6 222ft 102ft 530,0001b 6 x Bristol Siddeley BS. 1012/2 (179) Type 1019/E2 70ft 26ft 3in 65,1401b 1 x Bristol Siddeley BS. 1012/7 (172, 176, 177) Type 1019/E5 82ft 6in 34ft 109,4001b 2 x Bristol Siddeley BS. 1012/7 (172) Type 1019/E6 (foreplanes) 85ft 34.2ft 78,1501b 2 x Rolls-Royce FPS. 146,2 x Rolls-Royce RB. 162/31 (176) Type 1019/E6 (no foreplanes) 80ft 34.2ft 78,1501b 2 x Rolls-Royce FPS. 146,1 x Rolls-Royce RB.189 (176) Type 1019/H1 112ft 21ft 6in 117,0001b 1 x scramjet, 10 x Rolls-Royce RB.189 (175) Type 1019/H2 125ft 24ft 6in 128,5001b 1 x scramjet, 12 x Rolls-Royce RB.189 (176) Aerospace Transporter (ejector-ramjet) 157ft 80ft 375,0001b ejector-ramjet (180) Aerospace Transporter (turboramjets) 188ft 98ft 480,0001b 10 x turboramjet (181) 255
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES Name (drawing number) Length Wingspan/ width Weight Engines Page numbers for relevant drawings shown in brackets Aerospace Transporter (rockets) 200ft 120ft n/a 15 x rocket engine (182) Aerospace Transporter orbiter (early) 45ft 9in 25ft 4in 48,0001b 4 x rocket engine (180) Aerospace Transporter orbiter (late) 57ft 34ft 6in n/a 1 x rocket engine (181) Junkers Raumtransporter RT8-1-01 (booster) 98.4ft 38.7ft 174,1651b 3 x rocket engine (185, 186, 188, 189) Raumtransporter RT8-2-01 (spacecraft) 67.3ft 28.9ft 46,2971b 1 x rocket engine (185, 186, 188, 189) Martin Marietta Corporation Astrorocket AR-7A 130ft 40ft n/a rocket engines (98) Astrorocket AR-10A 130ft 96ft n/a rocket engines, 2 x ejector-ramjet engine (98) Nord-SNECMA-ERNO Aerospace Transporter (booster) 173.9ft 98.4ft 264,5551b 4 x turboramjet (190, 192) Aerospace Transporter (spacecraft) 93.5ft 49ft 176,3701b 4 x rocket engine (190, 192) Republic Aviation Corporation Mach 25 vehicle 170ft 98ft 8in 400,0001b 4 x Pratt & Whitney J-58, 4 x scramjet (94, 95) AP-100 Mach 2.3 V/STOL aircraft 67ft 9in 35ft 6in 38,0001b 6 x improved General Electric J-85, 3 x lifting fan (94) Mach 4.25 bomber 150ft 110ft 350,0001b 2 x ramjet based on General Electric AC- 210-1 nuclear engine, 3 x General Electric J-79 (94, 95) Mach 7 aircraft 79ft 2in 76ft 8in 140,0001b 2 x turboramjet (94) 256
Index Advanced Orbiting Solar Observatory......................106 Aerobee sounding rocket..................................17 Aerojet-General Corporation Astroplane...............98, 135 Aerojet M-l rocket engine..................100, 101, 103, 110 Aerojet-Westinghouse NRX-A1 reactor assembly............107 Aerospace Corporation.................................7, 111 Aerospaceplane...........84, 85, 89, 92, 94, 97, 98, 99, 107, 136 Aerospace Transporter....136, 161, 162, 179, 180, 181, 182, 185, 190, 194, 231, 241, 242, 243, 244 AF 1 S-Band autofollow radar.............................12 Aggregat-4 (V-2).............................9, 13, 16, 17, 243 Airbus A33O 190 Air Collection and Enrichment System (ACES)............92, 93, 94 Aircraft Engineering........................................216 Air Liquide.................................................170 Air Staff..................13, 14, 16, 20, 25, 28, 59, 66, 67, 69, 92 Allegany Ballistic Laboratory..............................106 Allen, H Julian............................................228 Allen, John........................................169, 171, 235 Altenwalde, Germany..........................................9 Amatol high explosive........................................9 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.........102 Ames Laboratory, California............................104, 228 Andrews, D R................................................86 Anti Aircraft No. 3 Mk 7 (Blue Cedar).......................12 Apollo spacecraft................98, 139, 140, 190, 235, 236, 238 Appleton, Edward Victor......................................8 Ariane rocket..........................................171, 238 Ariel 3................................................213 Armstrong Siddeley.....................................182 Armstrong Siddeley Double Mamba turboprop...............18 Armstrong Siddeley Snarler rocket engine...............169 Armstrong Siddeley Stentor rocket engine...............170 Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft...............17, 22, 163, 167 Asiatic Petroleum Company................................9 Ashford, David.................................162, 219, 220 Atlas-Agena.............................................151 Australia..................13,68, 136, 150, 155, 170, 227, 240 Aviation Week & Space Technology....................97, 227 A V Roe and Company (Avro)...............6, 22, 169, 170, 171 Avro 730................................................19 Avro Blue Steel................................169, 170, 171 Avro Vulcan............................................169 Avro Vulcan Orbiter (Z 124)............................171 Avro Weapons Research Division (WRD), Woodford...169, 170 Barnwell, Captain Frank............................213, 216 Bedford, Leslie H..............................12,13, 14,15 Bell Aircraft Corporation......................40, 78, 106 Bell Bomber Missile (BOM1)..............................78 Bell Brass Bell.........................................78 Black Arrow............................155, 213, 227, 231, 232 Black Knight.........................................17, 168 Black Prince...................................................17 Bligh, Timothy James.................................19, 20 Blue Streak........................6, 15, 17, 78, 167, 169, 171 Boeing 747....................................-................92 Boeing 777.....................................................47 Boeing B-52..........................................97, 186 Boeing C1M-10 Bomarc.................................82,98 Boeing LGM-30 Minuteman..............................82, 106 Boeing Propulsion Research Unit................................82 Boeing X-20 Dyna-Soar..........68, 75, 78, 82, 89, 90, 91,92,97, 98, 131, 149 Bolkow.....................................136, 185, 186, 188 Bond, Alan....................................................239 Bragg, Lawrence.................................................9 Bragg, Stephen.................................................25 Brakemine......................................................12 Bridgforth, Robert M.................................82, 83 Briegleb Glider Company.......................................107 Bristol Aero Engines..........................................182 Bristol Aeroplane Company.......................6, 22, 24, 25 Bristol Bloodhound.............................................25 Bristol Centaurus 12...........................................11 Bristol Siddeley BS.100 turbofan..............................212 Bristol Siddeley BS.1001 ramjet................................31 Bristol Siddeley BS.1002 ramjet................................31 Bristol Siddeley BS.1011 turboramjet.................28, 39 Bristol Siddeley BS.1011/2 turboramjet......50, 59, 197, 198 Bristol Siddeley BS.1012 turboramjet...........................28 Bristol Siddeley BS.1012/2 turboramjet..........175, 179, 197, 198, 200, 202 Bristol Siddeley BS.1012/6 turboramjet........................200 Bristol Siddeley BS. 1012/7 turboramjet.......................172 Bristol Siddeley Engines Limited..17, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 35, 52, 85, 162, 167, 171, 182, 184, 185 Bristol Siddeley Olympus 22R..................................212 Bristol Siddeley Pegasus......................................212 Bristol Siddeley Viper turbojet................................82 Bristol Type 188.....................................60, 135 British Aerospace Space and Communications Division (Stevenage)..................238, 239 British Aircraft Corporation (ВАС)....6, 7, 8, 22, 23, 24, 25,26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 39, 44, 59, 74, 78, 82, 83, 88, 89, 90, 105, 106, 108, 111, 112, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 131, 134, 136, 137, 139, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 159, 160, 161, 171, 172, 177, 179, 185, 190, 195, 196, 198, 200, 209, 210, 211, 212, 215, 219, 220, 222, 226, 227, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238 British Aircraft Corporation Crest.....155, 156, 157, 179, 231, 232 British Aircraft Corporation TSR2......6, 20, 24, 59, 60, 79, 128, 135, 200, 201 257
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUME 5 British Interplanetary Society (BIS) .8,15, 16, 84, 163, 230, 231,235 British Rail.............................................20 Burns, Sandy............................................239 Cameron, Major-General Alexander Maurice..................9 Cessna 150..............................................107 Chance Vought Corporation...............................106 Christmas Island........................................136 Chrysler.................................................74 Church House Westminster............................163,167 Clarke, Arthur C..........................................8 Cleator, Phillip..........................................8 Cleaver, Arthur Valentine (Vai)...........................8 Clegg, William (Bill)...............................179,218 Clifton, Alan............................................26 Comsat Corporation Intelsat Fl (HS 303).................106 Concorde.......................6, 24, 26, 48, 177, 193, 227, 236 Convair.................................14, 88, 92, 94, 97, 233 Convair B-58 Hustler.....................................111 Cooper, Peter.......................................212, 226 Cossor...................................................12 Creasey, Raymond Frederick (Ray).... 12, 25, 28, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 105, 137, 232, 233, 238 Christie, John Rankin.......................................20 Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, New York...................134 Corona reconnaissance satellite.........................99, 151 Cranfield University........................................163 Crow, Alwyn..................................................9 CTV 5 Series 3..........................................16, 17 Cuckoo engine............................................17 Dassault Aviation...........................136,192, 194, 234 Dassault-Breguet Star H.................................194 Dassault MD-620 missile.................................193 Dassault Mirage IIIV.................................135,194 Davies, Handel..........................20, 24, 25, 83, 85,236 Day, LeRoy..............................................238 Defence Research Policy Committee........................17 Defence White Paper 1957.................................20 De Havilland Aircraft Company......................6, 22,169 de Havilland Propellers..................................15 de Havilland Vampire.....................................11 Department of Defense.............................92, 106, 230 Deplante, Henri......................................192,194 Derbyshire, Thomas (Tom)................................218 Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Raketentechnik und Raumfahrt and Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft fur Luft- und Raumfahrt...............................32 Dickson, Ron............................12, 162, 226, 227, 228 Dornberger, Walter.......................................78 Douglas Aircraft Company.......88, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 107,110, 111, 123 Douglas Astro....7, 98, 99, 100, 101,102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 123, 129, 131, 135,217,218 Douglas C-133 Cargomaster...........................110 Douglas DC-3.....................................100, 159 Douglas GAM-87 Skybolt...............................171 Douglas Icarus.......................................107 Douglas Rombus....................................107, 135 Douglas Thor/Thor-Able/Thor-Agena/Thor-Delta......98, 106, 131, 155 Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards AFB.................104 East Germany...............................................150 Edwards Air Force Base........................101, 104, 131, 157 Electrical Associates Inc. Pace 231R.......................135 English Electric Canberra...............11, 12, 13, 18, 20, 29,207 English Electric Guided Weapons Division (Navigational Project Division)..........................12 English Electric Lace Mk.l 1.................................135 English Electric Lightning....................6, 13, 18, 135, 227 English Electric P.l.....................................12, 18 English Electric P.7........................................18 English Electric P.9........................................18 English Electric P.10....................6, 18, 19, 20, 23, 25, 28 English Electric P.l5.......................................18 English Electric P.l7.......................................20 English Electric P.l8.......................................18 English Electric Red Shoes..................................13 English Electric Thunderbird................................13 Entwicklungsring Nord (ERNO)..................136, 186, 190, 193 European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO)............6, 17, 135, 156, 180, 235, 241 European Space Research Organisation (ESRO).........106, 235 Eurospace.........17, 135, 136, 139,161, 170, 172, 179,182, 192, 194,213, 235 Explorer 1 satellite......................................17 Fairey Aviation Company................................20, 22 Farnborough Air Show.....................................239 Farnborough Technical College, Hampshire..................24 Farrar, David J....................................25, 26, 236 Filton, Bristol..........................................230 First Commonwealth Spaceflight Symposium..............17, 163 Flight International..................................216, 230 Focke-Wulf.........................................10, 136, 186 Folland Aircraft...........................................6 Folland Fo.H7A............................................11 Fort, Richard.............................................17 Francis, Raymond Hugh...................171, 172, 180, 181, 182 Friedrich Krupp AG.........................................9 Fuel Oil Technical Laboratory, Fulham, London..............9 Fuller, GM...................................‘...........102 Gagarin, Yuri.............................................66 Gassiot committee......................................16, 17 General Dynamics/Astronautics..........97, 232, 233, 237, 238 General Dynamics Centaur................................135 General Dynamics TFX....................................135 General Electric Corporation........................94, 106 General Electric J79 turbojet..........................32 Gloster Aircraft Company..........................6, 12, 24 Gloster Javelin........................................13 Goddard Space Flight Center, Maryland.................106 258
INDEX Golovine, Michael N.....................................170 Guyana..................................................171 Hamburger Flugzeugbau...................................136 Handley Page Halifax.....................................11 Handley Page Hampden.....................................11 Handley Page Limited.....................................22 Hansard.................................................177 Hartley, Christopher.....................................25 Harvey, Sir Arthur......................................177 Hawker Siddeley Advanced Projects Group (APG)...171,172, 180 Hawker Siddeley Aviation........6, 7, 11, 18, 22, 24, 27, 135, 136, 137, 162, 163, 167, 170, 171, 172, 174, 175, 176, 177, 180,182, 184, 185, 192, 219, 220, 226, 228, 235, 238 Hawker Siddeley P.l 154.................................135 Heath, Bernard Oliver (Ollie)............................11, 18 Hebrides, Scotland......................................136 Herbecq, John............................................19, 20 Hewitt, A................................................28, 59 High Altitude and Satellite Rockets Symposium...........163 High Altitude Research Project (HARP)...................213 Hilton, Dr William F (Bill)..........................163, 169 Horizontal Take-Off and Landing (HOTOL)..............238, 239 Hughes Aircraft Company..................................106 IMP-D probe..............................................106 Inconel 718........................................45, 78, 84 Inconel X................................................89 Indian Ocean.........................................136, 150 Indonesia...............................................150 Inskip, Robin - 2nd Viscount Caldecote..................213 Institute of Aeronautical Sciences, California...........94 Jamison, Dr Robin........................................25 Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society...162, 183, 216, 218 Junkers Flugzeug und Motorenwerke AG........136, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 192 Kartveli, Alexander...................................94, 95 Keenan, John.............................................32 Kent, Ronald C...........................................20 Kew Observatory..........................................16 King-Hele, Desmond George.............................16, 17 Kings College, London.....................................8 Kingston upon Thames, London............................171 Kosmos satellite........................................151 Kuchemann, Dr Dietrich..........................226, 227, 228 Kummersdorf, Germany......................................8 Lake Wirrida, Australia.................................170 Lambrecht, Jurgen....................................186, 189 Lane, Raymond John..........................182, 183, 184, 185 Langley Research Center..................................230 Leitch, George.........................................19, 20 Lewis, DR................................................228 Lighthill, James.......................................24, 26 Lippisch, Alexander......................................10 Liquid Air Cycle Engine (LACE)..85,86, 89,92,93,94,96,97,98 ‘Lizzie rocket engine.....................................9 Lockheed A-11...........................................211 Lockheed Aerospace Plane...............................94 Lockheed Corporation....................88, 94, 107, 232, 233 Lockheed Polaris......................................103 Lockheed U-2..........................................150 Lockheed X-7...........................................98 Lombard, Adrian Albert.................................32 London, England..........6, 8, 9, 17, 45, 150, 163, 172, 227, 230 London University Queen Mary College...................12 Lubbock, Isaac..............................*...........9 Lygo, Sir Raymond......................................239 M2-F1 lifting body vehicle...............104, 108, 123, 159 Marconi, Guglielmo......................................8 Marconi Elliot inertia navigator......................170 Marconis Wireless Telegraph Company....................12 Macmillan, Harold......................................17 Manhattan Project......................................82 Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL)......................153 Manned Spacecraft Center..............................232 Marquardt Corporation...............................97, 98 Marshall Space Flight Center..........................232 Martin Marietta Corporation.................94,98, 106, 180 Martin Rocket Engine Nozzle Ejector (RENE)..........98, 180 Martin Titan missile...........................98, 106, 110 Mauritius.............................................136 McDonnell Aerothermodynamic elastic Structural Systems Environmental Test (ASSET).........131, 155, 157 McDonnell Douglas..................................232, 235 McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II.......................32 McDonnell Douglas Phantom FG.l.........................31 Mecanique Aviation Traction (Matra)...................136 Megaroc................................................16 Messerschmitt AG......................................136 Messerschmitt Enzian....................................9 Messerschmitt Me 163...................................10 Messerschmitt Me 263...................................10 Metal X...............................................106 Metropolitan-Vickers E2/4..............................11 Mikoyan and Gurevich MiG-25............................31 Ministry of Aircraft Production........................11 Ministry of Aviation.......10, 27, 28, 44, 59, 74, 83, 85, 86, 137, 151, 155, 171, 172, 177, 179, 182, 195,213, 226 Ministry of Supply.........................12, 14, 16, 19, 20, 24 Ministry of Supply Weapons Research Station, Langhurst.....9 Missile IDentification and Alarm System (MIDAS)...........107 Modulated Inducing Retro-directive Optical System (MIROS)..............................106 Monex fuel...........................................82, 83 Monica tail warning radar...............................12 Morgan, Morien..........................................26 Mueller, George................................230, 232, 233 259
BRITISH SECRET PROJECTS: BRITAIN'S SPACE SHUTTLE VOLUMES Mustard (Multi Unit Space Transport and Recovery Device)...6, 7, 8, 19, 111, 112, 113, 115, 118, 119, 121, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 148, 149,150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 174, 179, 180, 185,194, 195, 196, 207, 210, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221» 222, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 238, 239 Napier (D Napier & Son)..........................11, 18, 19 Napier Ram Jet (NRJ)....................................18 National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA).........99 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)..6, 7, 39, 40, 69, 70, 74, 86, 99, 101, 104, 106,107, 108, 153, 157, 159, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235, 237, 238 National Gas Turbine Establishment (NGTE).......10, 11, 18, 19, 84, 85, 86, 238 Nerva nuclear rocket engine.............................107 New Mexico Joint Guided Missile Test Range...............17 New York, USA...............................45, 134, 172, 227 Nicholson, Lewis Frederick........................85, 86, 137 Nike-Hercules...........................................26 Nike-Zeus...............................................26 Niobium......................................... 68, 174, 189 Nonweiler, Terence..............................25, 163, 164 Nord Aviation...............................136, 190, 192, 193 North American A-5 Vigilante.............................32 North American Aviation.................88, 89, 94, 97, 98, 106 North American Haystack antenna.........................106 North American Navaho...................................135 North American-Rockwell................232, 235, 236, 237, 238 North American XB-70/B-70/RS-70 Valkyrie....97, 98, 135, 211 North American X-15....60, 76, 89, 90,92, 97, 134, 139, 192,211 Northrop Corporation.....................................94 Northrop Propulsive Fluid Accumulator (PROFAC)...........94 Office National d’Etudes et de Rechersches Aerospatiales (ONERA).................................................136 Operation Backfire........................................9 Pabst, Otto..............................................10 Page, Frederick William (Freddie)........................11 Pardoe, Geoffrey........................................169 Paris Air Show..........................................184 Parker, Sir Peter...................................... 20 Parkinson, Dr Robert (Bob)..............................239 Pearson, Denning.........................................25 Perrier, Pierre.........................................192 Petter, Ernest...........................................11 Petter, William Edward Willoughby (Teddy)...........11, 12, 13 Plascott, Harry.........................................227 Pocock, Ken.................................72, 73, 74, 75, 78 Pontiac Catalina........................................108 Power Jets..............................................10, 86 Power Systems (company)..................................98 Pratt & Whitney J58 turbojet.............................95 Pratt & Whitney RL-10 rocket engine.........100, 101, 103,109 Preston, Lancashire..........6, 11, 28, 82, 105, 108, 195, 196, 212,215, 239 Probert, Rhys Price............................85, 86, 87, 162 Project Gemini......................................90, 215 Project Mercury............................69, 89, 90, 131,215 Pyestock, near Farnborough................................19 Queens University, Belfast...............................163 Ram Jet Test Vehicle (RJTV)...............................18 Ratcliffe, John Ashworth...................................9 Raven engine........................................17, 169 Rebecca-Eureka............................................12 Reed, R Dale.............................................104 Refrasil..................................................48 Rene 41.................................92, 100, 104,126,155 Republic Aviation Corporation.......................88, 94,95 Rheinmetall-Borsig Rheintochter...........................10 Rocket Bomber programme (ROBO)............................78 Rocketdyne...............................................111 Rocketdyne A-6 rocket engine.............................169 Rocketdyne H-l rocket engine..............................74 Rocketdyne J-2 rocket engine 100..................101,103, 104 Rocket Propulsion Establishment (RPE), Westcott.....10, 16, 17 Rocket Research Corporation...............................82 Rolls-Royce ‘B’ type turbojet.........................41, 50 Rolls-Royce Conway RCo.43 turbojet.......................118 Rolls-Royce ‘C’ type turboramjet.........................200 Rolls-Royce flashjet...........................28, 52, 53, 196 Rolls-Royce FPS. 146 turborocket.........................176 Rolls-Royce Olympus 593..................................212 Rolls-Royce ‘O’ type turborocket..........................32 Rolls-Royce RB.121 turbojet...............................18 Rolls-Royce RB.123 turbojet...............................19 Rolls-Royce RB.153 turbofan...............................38 Rolls-Royce RB.162 turbojet....................29, 37, 70, 194 Rolls-Royce RB. 162/31 turbojet..........................177 Rolls-Royce RB.168 Spey turbojet..........................31 Rolls-Royce RB.172-54 Adour..............................120 Rolls-Royce RB.189...................................175, 177 Rolls-Royce RZ2 ....................................78, 79, 82 Rolls-Royce Limited...8, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 34, 48, 52, 59, 60, 85, 96, 124, 184, 185, 239 Root, M W................................................102 Ross, Harry...............................................16 Roy, Maurice.............................................170 Royal Aeronautical Society...........................163, 213 Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE)......6, 10, П, 12, 17, 18, 22, 24, 26, 66, 67, 69, 83, 84, 85, 86, 89, 90, 91, 92, 97, 137, 155, 156, 157, 159, 195, 220, 227, 228, 238 Royal Aircraft Establishment Symposium on Very High Speed Vehicles.........................24, 28, 236 Royal Arsenal, Woolwich....................................8 Royal Society, The........................................17 Ruhrstahl X-4 missile......................................9 Sanger, Eugen.......................................10, 179, 185 Sargent, Raymond Frederick...............................182 Satellite And Missile Observation System (SAMOS).........151 260
INDEX Satellite Collection Of Meteorological Observations (SCOMO)...................................................106 Saturn Cl...................................................110 Saturn C5..............................................110, 111 Saturn S.1...................................................74 Saturn V...............................................106, 135 Saunders-Roe Limited.................................17,18, 155 Schafer, Edwin..............................................186 Scout rocket................................................106 Scragg, Colin...........................................13, 14 Second USAF Symposium on Advanced Propulsion Concepts...................................................94 SEREB Diamant rocket..............................136, 170, 171 Serpell, David Radford.....................................20 Sharpies, Geoffrey Francis (Geoff).................73, 74, 198 Shelldyne fuel.........................................172, 174 Shell Oil Company......................................106, 172 Short Brothers...............................................22 Skylark rocket...............................................17 Singer, Fred.................................................17 Smith, Ralph.................................................16 Smith, Thomas William (Tom).......7, 12, 28, 84, 85, 86, 179, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 232, 233, 234, 239 Smithsonian Institution, Washington DC......................232 Societe d’Etudes pour la Propulsion par Reaction (SEPR)....136 Societe National d’Etudes et de Construction de Moteurs dAviation (SNECMA).....................136,190, 193 Societe pour 1’Etude et la Realisation d’Engins Ballistiques (SEREB)..............................136, 170, 171 Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE).............181, 186, 192 Solartron computer.........................................135 Soviet Union............................6, 66, 67, 106, 150, 153 Spacelab...................................................153 Space Shuttle.......................................7, 69, 233 Space Shuttle Task Group....................................232 Special Projectile Operations Group...........................9 Spieth, C W..................................................98 Sputnik 1.............................................. 6, 17 Sputnik 2....................................................17 Stephensons Rocket.,.,......................................233 Sud Aviation................................................136 Sukarno.....................................................150 Supermarine Spitfire.........................................12 Supersonic Transport Aircraft Committee (STAC)...............22 Sydney, Australia......................................6, 150 Syncom II satellite.........................................106 Talco TA5 rocket engine.....................................100 Teegarden, W T...............................................98 Television InfraRed Observation Satellite (TIROS)...........106 Terravision system..........................................135 Thirlwall, G E.........................................28, 59 Thorneycroft, Peter.........................................177 Treasury, The..........................................19, 20 Tuttle, Geoffrey William...............................13, 14 USAF Scientific Advisory Board...........................97 US Air Force (USAF).....78,94, 97,99, 101, 102, 106, 107,233, 238 US National Space Station Program.......................106 US Navy.................................................101 US Weather Bureau.......................................106 V-2 (Aggregat-4).................................9, 13, 16, 17 Vanguard 1 satellite.....................................17 Vickers-Armstrongs............................6, 20, 22, 24, 26 Vickers VC 10........................................... 48 Von Braun, Wernher......................................190 Vostok 3KA...............................................66 Walley, Gerald David (Dave).........23, 28,69, 72, 78,113,115, 123, 220, 234 Wallis, Sir Barnes......................................233 Walter, Dr Hellmuth......................................10 Walter HWK 109-509.......................................10 Walter Werke, Kiel.......................................10 Wang, HE................................................Ill Wang’s Vehicle....................................7, 111, 135 Warton, Lancashire......6, 7, 28,48, 69, 84,112, 131, 133,135, 137, 139, 142, 145, 150, 151, 153, 195, 196, 198, 200, 209, 211,212, 220, 228, 229, 230, 235, 236, 239 Watson, Henry Romaine...........................167, 168, 169 Webb, Eric..........................7,195, 220, 230, 235,239 Wesertlug................................................136 West Coast Pontiac.......................................108 Westland Aircraft....................................11, 155 Westland Wyvern..........................................11 Whiteside, Walter (Whitey)..............................108 Whittle, Frank........................................10, 86 Whitworth Gloster........................................24 Woomera, South Australia.........................13, 155, 156 261
OTHER BOOKS FROM CRtCY PUBLISHING British Secret Projects Volume 1 Jet Fighters Since 1950 The original version of this book described the development work from the end of the Second World War to build the new generation of British jet fighters, in doing so it lifted the lid on many projects and ‘dead-ends’ which had never been publically discussed. This was the book that launched the hugely successful ‘Secret Projects’ series and the writing career of renowned historian and author Tony Buttler. This completely revised and redesigned second edition takes the original primary source material and adds to it much new material that has come to life in the decades since the original edition was published. Particular emphasis is placed on the tender design competitions and the decisions at the Air Ministry to reject many promising projects, yet allow others to be built and flown. Aircraft types covered include the Hawker P.l 103/P.l 116/P.l 121 series, the extraordinary jet and rocket mixed power-plant interceptors from Saunders-Roe, the equally impressive Fairey ‘Delta ПГ and the origins of today’s Hawk and Eurofighter. The book includes appendices that list all the British fighter projects and specifications for this period. There are also a number of specially commissioned colour renditions of‘might-have- been’ types in contemporary markings, plus photographs and general arrangement 3-view drawings - over 400 illustrations in total. The result is a unique insight into the secret world of British jet fighter projects through the ‘golden years’ of the British aerospace industry, while also presenting a coherent picture of British fighter development and evolution. Volume 1 Tony Buttler Hardback, 224 pages ISBN 9 781910 809051 £27.50 US $44.95 262
OTHER BOOKS FROM CRECY PUBLISHING FRENCH SECRET PROJECTS French Secret Projects Volume 1 Post War Fighters Despite six years of occupation, in the years immediately after the end of WWII France made determined efforts and rapid progress to catch-up with other countries in developing high-performance military and research aircraft. For the next twenty years France was the only country where aircraft manufacturers investigated turbojet, ramjet and rocket propulsion for manned fighters with equal effort, either taking advantage of German ‘war-booty’ technology or using national pre-war research. In doing so, they conceived and designed some of the most radical aircraft of the post-war era. A few, such as the Leduc and Griffon ramjet- powered fighters, reached prototype form, the Trident rocket-interceptor advanced to the experimental series (pre-production) stage and the Ouragan, Mystere, Super-Mystere, Mirage III and Etendard were produced in quantity and went on to win export orders. Later, many attempts were made to design variable-geometry aircraft (including the Mirage G series) and VTOL types (the SNECMA Coleoptere and Dassault Mirage IIIV), and there were even a few flying boat interceptor studies. In the late sixties, in the pursuit of ever-higher speeds, Nord Aviation, Sud Aviation and primarily Avions Marcel Dassault also produced many Mach 3+ proposals. A truly ground-breaking work, French Secret Projects 1 brings together period drawings and blueprints, promotional art, photographs of prototype aircraft, mock-ups, wind tunnel and promotional models to present, for the first time in the English language, a complete view of French military aircraft design from the Liberation of France to the late twentieth- century. Many of these aircraft were until now almost unknown inside France, let alone in the wider aviation community, and this book will lead to a complete revision of the accepted wisdom surrounding the capabilities and ingenuity of the French aircraft industry. Volume 1 J-C Carbonel Hardback, 280 pages ISBN 9 781910 809006 £27.50 US $44.95 263
OTHER BOOKS FROM CRECY PUBLISHING American Secret Projects Volume 1 Fighters, Bombers and Attack Aircraft 1937-1945 With all that has been written about the United States’ combat aircraft of WWII, it is astounding how little has been published about the dozens of aircraft designs that were rejected before reaching production. By December 7, 1941 almost all the major American combat aircraft of WWII had been designed, selected and in many cases were under production - everything from the P-40 fighter to the huge B-36 ‘Peacemaker’. Even so, the war years to 1945 saw a dizzying array of new aircraft designs and types being proposed. For example, between 1942 and 1944 Boeing alone submitted no fewer than eight multiengine, intercontinental bomber designs for consideration by the USAAF - every one of which had a wingspan of over 200ft; one had a span of a whopping 277ft! The Navy competition that resulted in the F7F Tigercat carrier fighter received more than a dozen different design submissions from at least half a dozen manufacturers. Then there are the virtually unknown Vought ‘flying flapjack’ series of designs, including one fighter and one attack aircraft for the USAAF. In researching American Secret Projects vol 1, internationally-renowned aviation authors Tony Buttler and Alan Griffith have uncovered hundreds of previously classified files to provide specifications, histories, artist illustrations and 3- view drawings - many redrawn for clarity from the original factory submissions specifically for this book. The result is an unparalleled and fascinating record of the creative genius of American aircraft designers, from material which has lain hidden and forgotten for over 70 years. American Secret Projects vol 1 is filled not only with aircraft that most historians, aircraft enthusiasts and modellers have never heard of, but many more that no-one but their designers could ever have dreamt up Volume 1 Tony Buttler and Alan Griffith Hardback, 192 pages ISBN 9 781906 537487 £27.50 US $44.95 All titles from Сгёсу Publishing Ltd. la Ringway Trading Est, Shadowmoss Rd, Manchester M22 5LH Tel 0161 499 0024 www.crecy.co.uk Distributed in the USA by Specialty Press. 39966 Grand Ave, North Branch, MN 55056 USA. Tel (651) 277-1400 / (800). 895-4585 www.specialtypress.coni 264
When the team behind the supersonic English Electric Lightning and ill-fated TSR2 set to work to assess the feasibility of high-speed aircraft and reusable spacecraft in 1963, the result would be dozens of innovative designs for air and space travel, based on state-of-the- art technology and years ahead of their time. Under the project heading R42 a huge variety of designs were studied, ranging from gigantic delta-wing launchers to small three-man spaceplanes, manned rocket boosters and potential TSR2 replacements capable of Mach 4. XSI2P // As the project’evolved, it becar team, based at Warton, Lancash Device - MUSTARD^^^^H its mission in orbit and^^^H| Americans began to work^W| And yet this remarkable technol Ministry of Aviation and the Royal^^^^^bt reach production and much of the Now author Dan Sharp has been given el^H not seen the light of day for half a century, design team. The result is British Secret Proje< history that reveals one of Britain's best kept milH^^^B manned spacecraft design. Dan Sharp's gripping story of the P.42 and MUSTARD pM period drawings, presented in their original unaltered fori illustrations and specifications. Together they provide a cornel air and space technology in the 1960s, and what might have b< ie clear that a reusable space vehicle was n jffc created the Multi-Unit Space Transport ^^mHaunch orbiter with two boostersgd к to bas^r a 'Space Shuttle', developed^ went almost unnoticed Lent pre awn Other Titles in the Secret Projects Series Japanese Secret Projects Volume 1 Expenmental Aircraft of the UA and UN 1939-1945 French Secret Projects 1 Post War Fighters 9781910809006 £27.50 $44.95 9 781857 803173 £24.95 US $42.95 9 781906 5374876 £27.50 US $44 95 American Secret Projects Volume 1 Fighters, Bombers and Attack Aircraft 1937 1945 juired and so the rid Recovery signed to carry out irs before the Doubters within the lect would never sified for decades. ints that have h original tehensive ^brld in