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NATO and Western Perceptions of the Soviet Bloc This book examines the NATO reports on the Soviet bloc’s political and economic system, from 1951 to the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the beginning of détente. As part of the wider history of Cold War Alliances, the detailed assessments of the NATO experts regarding the non-military aspects of Soviet power are a crucial indicator of Western/allied perceptions of the adversary. Their study allows us to widen the discussion on the Western alliance, the accuracy of its information or perceptions, and the nature of the Cold War. Hatzivassiliou argues that the Cold War was not only a strategic dilemma (although it certainly was that, as well), but also the latest stage of the crisis of legitimization which had been raging since the dawn of modernity. NATO/Western analysis is examined in this context. At the same time, the book discusses the relative influence of the major NATO members – US and British influence was strong while French, West German and Italian influence was also significant – in the drafting of the reports, and thus in shaping the alliance’s perceptions during the Cold War. This book will be of much interest to students of NATO, Cold War Studies, international history, foreign policy and IR in general. Evanthis Hatzivassiliou is Associate Professor at the Department of History at the University of Athens, Greece. He is author of Greece and the Cold War (Routledge 2006). Cold War History Series Series Editors: Odd Arne Westad and Michael Cox
In the new history of the Cold War that has been forming since 1989, many of the established truths about the international conflict that shaped the latter half of the twentieth century have come up for revision. The present series is an attempt to make available interpretations and materials that will help further the development of this new history, and it will concentrate in particular on publishing expositions of key historical issues and critical surveys of newly available sources. Reviewing the Cold War Approaches, interpretations, theory Edited by Odd Arne Westad Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War The State, military power and social revolution Richard Saull British and American Anticommunism before the Cold War Marrku Ruotsila Europe, Cold War and Coexistence, 1953–1965 Edited by Wilfried Loth The Last Decade of the Cold War From conflict escalation to conflict transformation Edited by Olav Njølstad Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War Issues, interpretations, periodizations Edited by Silvio Pons and Federico Romero Across the Blocs Cold War cultural and social history Edited by Rana Mitter and Patrick Major US Internal Security Assistance to South Vietnam Insurgency, subversion and public order
William Rosenau The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s Negotiating the Gaullist challenge N. Piers Ludlow Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the Role of China, 1949–64 Changing alliances Mari Olsen The Third Indochina War Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972–79 Edited by Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge Greece and the Cold War Frontline state, 1952–1967 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou Economic Statecraft during the Cold War European responses to the US trade embargo Frank Cain Macmillan, Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–1960 Kitty Newman The Emergence of Détente in Europe Brandt, Kennedy and the formation of Ostpolitik Arne Hofmann European Integration and the Cold War Ostpolitik–Westpolitik, 1965–1973 Edited by N. Piers Ludlow Britain, Germany and the Cold War The search for a European Détente 1949–1967 R. Gerald Hughes
The Military Balance in the Cold War US perceptions and policy, 1976–85 David M. Walsh The Cold War in the Middle East Regional conflict and the superpowers 1967–73 Edited by Nigel J. Ashton The Making of Détente Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–75 Edited by Wilfried Loth and Georges-Henri Soutou Europe and the End of the Cold War A reappraisal Edited by Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, N. Piers Ludlow and Leopoldo Nuti The Baltic Question during the Cold War Edited by John Hiden, Vahur Made and David J. Smith The Crisis of Détente in Europe From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–85 Edited by Leopoldo Nuti Cold War in Southern Africa White power, black liberation Edited by Sue Onslow The Globalisation of the Cold War Diplomacy and local confrontation, 1975–85 Edited by Max Guderzo and Bruna Bagnato Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War Reconciliation, comradeship, confrontation, 1953–1957 Svetozar Rajak The End of the Cold War in the Third World
New perspectives on regional conflict Edited by Artemy Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko Mao, Stalin and the Korean War Trilateral communist relations in the 1950s Shen Zhihua; translated by Neil Silver The Iran–Iraq War New international perspectives Edited by Nigel Ashton and Bryan R. Gibson International Summitry and Global Governance The rise of the G7 and the European Council, 1974–1991 Edited by Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol and Federico Romero Human Rights in Europe during the Cold War Edited by Kjersti Brathagen, Rasmus Mariager and Karl Molin NATO and Western Perceptions of the Soviet Bloc Alliance analysis and reporting, 1951–69 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou
NATO and Western Perceptions of the Soviet Bloc Alliance analysis and reporting, 1951–69 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou
First published 2014 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2014 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou The right of Evanthis Hatzivassiliou to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him/her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Chatzevasileiou, Euanthes, 1966– NATO and western perceptions of the Soviet bloc : alliance analysis and reporting, 1951–69 / Evanthis Hatzivassiliou. pages cm. – (Cold war history) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization–History–20th century. 2. Soviet Union–Politics and government–1953–1985. 3. Europe, Eastern–Politics and government–1945–1989. 4. Soviet Union–Economic conditions–1945–1955. 5. Europe, Eastern–Economic conditions–1945–1989. 6. Cold War. 7. World politics–1945–1989. I. Title. UA646.3.C485 2014 355'.03109171709045–dc23 2013048471 ISBN: 978-0-415-74375-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-81347-9 (ebk) Typeset in Baskerville by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
For Mariana The fact that we are heirs but also prisoners of the Western past, caught in the very midst of an unpredictable and incredibly fastmoving flux, does not make it easier to discern critical landmarks, as we can, with equanimity if not without error, for ages long past and civilizations alien to our own. William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: History of the Human Community (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 567 Il est quelquefois difficile pour une nouvelle génération de réaliser l’état d’esprit de celle qui l’a précédée. Des changements se sont produits, les éléments des problèmes politiques se sont modifiés. Il n’est pas possible de prouver que les événements qui ne sont pas arrivés, bien qu’ils fussent possibles et même probables, se seraient produits si certaines précautions n’avaient été prises. Paul-Henri Spaak, rapporteur, sub-group 2, 4 October 1967, The Harmel Reports, in www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/80987.htm, assessed 28 September 2013 One of the things that makes war so fascinating to its students and so frustrating to its participants is that in a moment of supreme crisis it is rarely given for one side, obsessed by its own difficulties, to see just how bad things are in the enemy camp. Alistair Horne, The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916 (London: Penguin, 1993), p. 150
Contents About the author Acknowledgements List of abbreviations Introduction The object of NATO reports: the Cold War as a crisis of legitimization NATO as a subject of study 1 A new look at the opponent, 1951–6 Testing the ground, 1951–2 Moving on to a comprehensive analysis, 1952–3 Studying the post-Stalin Soviet puzzle, 1953–5 Failure and reform in 1956 In retrospect: facing the riddles of de-Stalinization 2 The emergence of specialized studies: from the Three Wise Men to APAG, 1957–62 The new machinery of NATO analysis Khrushchev supreme: Soviet internal politics and the economy, 1957–62 The challenge of Soviet foreign policy and of détente A new set of reports: the question mark of Eastern Europe The Sino-Soviet relationship and its uncertainties Concepts, interpretations and the global conflict: the ‘economic offensive’ of the ‘Sino-Soviet’ bloc The rediscovery of comprehensive analysis: the emergence of APAG, 1960–2
3 A more complex Cold War, 1963–7: doubt, optimism and the prospect of détente Analysis during an era of intra-alliance tensions A reliable enemy: Soviet politics and foreign policy Economic malaise and political conservatism: the Soviet Union’s emerging dead end Economic failures and ‘national roads’ in Eastern Europe The Third World and the communist challenge East–West relations: the intra-NATO debate and the road to détente, 1962–7 4 On the road to détente, 1967–9: the Harmel Report, the Prague Spring and the dynamics of the Cold War The Harmel Report and East–West relations NATO analysis and the Prague Spring Planning for détente: prospects of East-West relations, 1968–9 5 Conclusions NATO analysis of the Soviet world: trying to understand the Other NATO analysis and NATO: the search for the West The Cold War: so near, and so far away List of sources Select bibliography Index
About the author Evanthis Hatzivassiliou is Associate Professor at the Department of History of the University of Athens. He chairs the Academic Committee of the Foundation of the Greek Parliament for Parliamentarism and Democracy. He is a member of the Academic Committee of the Constantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy; of the Publications Committee of the Eleftherios Venizelos Foundation; and of the Greek–Turkish forum.
Acknowledgements Concluding a long and demanding project, I need to express my gratitude for the support that I received from many people and institutions. In the NATO Archives, Eudes Nouvelot, Johannes Geurts, the former director Anne-Marie Smith, and her successor Ineke Deserno, aided my effort with a professionalism and effectiveness which I came to admire. Professor John O. Iatrides of Southern Connecticut State University generously offered his invaluable advice and enlightened perspectives. Professor Theofanis G. Stavrou of the University of Minnesota aided me with his deep knowledge of the Soviet Union and of the relevant scholarship. Dr Evelyn Davidheiser and the Institute for Global Studies of the University of Minnesota facilitated a visit to the impressive library of their institution, and also gave me the opportunity to seek the views of their informed colleagues. The University of Athens, through its ‘Capodistria’ research programme, greatly facilitated my research. I would also like to thank the editors of the Cold War History series, Professors Odd Arne Westad and Michael Cox of the LSE, and Andrew Humphrys of Routledge for their support. Last but not least, my wife, Mariana, to whom this book is dedicated, has, as always, offered her support and encouragement. It goes without saying, of course, that I am the one responsible for any mistakes or omissions.
Abbreviations APAG Atlantic Policy Advisory Group CCP Chinese Communist Party COMECON Council for Mutual Economic Assistance CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union CWIHP Cold War International History Project ECE Economic Commission for Europe ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EDC European Defence Community EEC European Economic Community ERP European Recovery Programme GATT General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade GDR German Democratic Republic GNP Gross National Product IMF International Monetary Fund IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile MLF Multilateral Force NAC North Atlantic Council OEEC Organization of European Economic Cooperation PHP Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact PRC People’s Republic of China SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
Introduction This book presents and discusses the findings of the NATO committees and working groups which studied political and economic developments in the Soviet world during the first half of the Cold War. The starting point is the year 1951, when the first reports on the Soviet bloc were produced. At first sight, the analysis should end in 1967, when the Harmel Report led to a reshaping of NATO and its roles. Still, it was considered necessary to expand the book in order to include the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, a period when the alliance reconfirmed its decision to pursue a policy of détente and negotiation with Moscow. From then on, a reorganized NATO had to respond to a significantly different Cold War context, and its analysis needed to adjust accordingly. The history of the two Cold War alliances has now been extensively researched. Naturally, military balance, threat perceptions and intra-NATO relations (mostly the transatlantic dimension) are prominent in these works.1 However, the Western alliance’s detailed assessments of the non-military aspects of Soviet power have not yet received wide scholarly attention.2 These assessments dealt with a huge variety of issues, and their drafting was a part – although a lower-level part – of intra-alliance political consultation. Thus, the book discusses a specific NATO process, leading to the production of analysis papers and situation reports, which served as background material for the biannual ministerial sessions of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). NATO analysis attests to a systematic examination of the non-military Soviet strengths and weaknesses, and allows us to widen the discussion on the Western
alliance, the accuracy of its information or perceptions, and the nature of the Cold War. The book is mainly based on the NATO Archives, held at the alliance’s Headquarters in Brussels.3 This is an invaluable, yet scarcely used and sui generis source. The NATO records are not the archive of a government: they do not always lead to the climax – or the catharsis – of a ‘decision’, exactly because the NAC usually was not expected to make one. Serving an inter-governmental structure, the NATO International Staff was not similar in its functions to a state administration, nor was the Secretary-General a head of government. In other words, the NATO archive lacks the pyramidal form of a governmental archive, with a ‘Cabinet’ or a President at the top, controlling (or trying to control) a solid decision-making process. Moreover, the NATO reports on the Soviet world raise the perplexing problem of the connection between national, international and transnational elements in the structure of the post-war West. NATO had no intelligence-gathering capability of its own and relied on national submissions which, of course, differed widely from very strong and sophisticated to less groundbreaking contributions. The larger members, such as the US and Britain, provided most of the input, but usually were reluctant to share with NATO allies elaborate intelligence gathered via espionage whose sources needed to be protected. Last but not least, the members of the NATO committees and working groups which reported on the Soviet world were diplomats or national experts, who were bringing into the process the perceptions but also the priorities of their states. Dependent on their national governments, but also obliged to conform with the intergovernmental nature of NATO, the experts had a ‘dual’ role, which makes their interaction even more interesting. In this respect, the NATO Archives are notable for a sui generis relationship with the national archives of the member-states: NATO material is not something completely ‘different’ from the Western national sources, but it is the product of a different, though related, international process.
There are additional peculiarities of the NATO sources. As products of such a delicate structure as an alliance of unequal, yet sovereign nations, the NATO reports on the Soviet bloc carefully avoided extensive descriptions of intra-alliance disagreements, which could prove embarrassing. Thus, referring to a meeting on Latin America in 1962, the British delegation to NATO commented: ‘The Experts had had some lively discussion and there were some fairly sharp differences of opinion, mainly connected with the assessment of Castrism [sic] and Peronism (these would not, however, be evident in the finally agreed report)’.4 The same phenomenon is also detectable in the records of the meetings of NATO committees: the priority of avoiding any manifestation of internal disagreements led to the production of ‘sterilized’ records of discussions which evidently were significantly more lively than shown in the official papers. These mean that the NATO archive is a somehow cumbersome source, but it still gives the scholar the invaluable opportunity to trace the interaction of influences, national traditions and interests among the alliance members. The use of US and British archives complements the NATO documents. This book does not explain US and British policy towards the alliance; it merely makes use of their archives’ information about the NATO analysis process. The use of these countries’ sources does not suggest that NATO was not an AngloAmerican affair. However, as the British Permanent Representative, Sir Frank Roberts, pointed out in 1958, the Anglo-American relationship was ‘the kernel of strength and real influence within the alliance’.5 British and US archives provide valuable material on many NATO processes and internal disagreements (including reports on the discussions in the alliance working groups and committees), on which the alliance officials preferred (or were obliged) to be less outspoken. US documents raise additional questions, such as the extent of NATO dependence on American input or the alleged subordination of its analysis to Washington’s wishes. It will be shown that, although US influence was indeed great (and the alliance heavily relied on US
inputs), it is not correct to assume that the Americans imposed their views in the NATO analysis process. NATO was an alliance of sovereign nations, and the Americans themselves knew that this was one of its major advantages. Moreover, the NATO and the US processes of monitoring the Soviet world were significantly different in scope. The US, as a nation-state, used analysis in order to find the best ways to act. NATO was a defensive union of sovereign states, and in its analysis functioned as an observer of the Soviet world. One of the major differences between the US National Intelligence Estimates and the NATO studies lies in the fact that the latter were situation reports: the alliance analysts were usually discouraged from offering proposals for action, if only because this might spark intra-NATO disagreements, while the recipient of these reports, the NAC, was not expected to make decisions for concerted action on political or economic problems. Furthermore, the US utilized a variety of agencies for its observation of the Soviet world: diplomatic representation in the Soviet Union and its allies; the CIA and the departmental intelligence-gathering services; and a huge reservoir of academic studies on the Soviet Union, which was booming exactly in the 1950s and 1960s.6 NATO lacked such services, and depended on the input of data from the national delegations. These meant that in US national analysis, the debate was much more profound, lively and bold than in the NATO documents, which were drafted by small numbers of experts and required the approval of twelve to fifteen states. Last but not least, one should always keep in mind a difference of geographical focus: US national analysis could not but be global, whereas for the NATO study groups the treaty area – primarily Europe – always played a larger role. Thus, the capabilities of US analysis were much larger, but also qualitatively different, compared to NATO analysis. As always, the British proved to be acute observers of an international process. British influence in NATO analysis was strong, if only because the Americans, who did not want to subject their global policy to the NATO process, were content to allow their British partners to take the initiative. The British were happy (or eager) to fill
the vacuum, and maximize their influence in the alliance. Their huge experience in international committee work also allowed the British to play a crucial role in the shaping of NATO analysis. An initial advantage of the British, especially in the early 1950s, was the existence of their own Russia Committee, and the production of monthly reports on ‘trends of Communist policy’. The Foreign Office (FO) archive contains extensive reports of the British delegation on intra-NATO discussions, including reports of the British experts who took part in the meetings of the alliance working groups, offering inside information which does not appear in the NATO documents themselves. The object of NATO reports: the Cold War as a crisis of legitimization Strategy, ideology and legitimization NATO was a defensive alliance, and mainly focused on the military needs of a future war in the NATO area, especially Europe. Thus, many of the bodies of its International Staff and its Military Committee dealt with war plans, infrastructure, standardization of equipment and military integration, and so on. At the same time, an additional topic of the civilian machinery (the International Staff) was grand strategy in, and the needs of, a protracted Cold War, which raised a qualitatively different series of questions and dilemmas. The Cold War was the result of a security crisis,7 arising out of the inability of the victors of 1945 to fill, in an agreed manner, the power vacuums that the defeat of Axis had left in pivotal parts of the globe, namely in the highly industrialized area of Central Europe and in the Far East. The Western fears that Soviet control of Germany would result in the Kremlin dominating the ‘heartland’ of Eurasia, and Joseph Stalin’s fears for a German economic and military revival (solidly based in his own fixations, but also in the fear of Soviet communism for whatever it did not control) resulted to the division of the continent. In the Far East, Japan’s collapse raised the huge
question mark of China, and then the Korean War irrevocably shaped the threat perceptions of the West. It was these pressures that made it necessary for the US to achieve a ‘preponderance of power’ in order to protect the West from a ‘predatory’ Kremlin.8 The Soviet Union was first and foremost an insecure state, and the clumsy handling of its own insecurity created a sense of immediate threat to the West.9 As Henry Kissinger noted in a major book about NATO, ‘[t]he motives of the Soviet leaders may well be defensive. The problem is that they feel secure only when all conceivable rivals have been reduced to impotence’.10 At the same time, a totalitarian state which also was the centre of a revolutionary ideology could, either by miscalculation or by design, start a world conflict. The complexity of the Soviet reality, as we see it now, should not obscure the intensity of the strategic dilemmas faced by the Western statesmen at that time: they were certain that if they had given ground, they would have been annihilated. Perhaps they would have been; we do not know that, even now. But in any event, perceptions, especially threat perceptions, acquire their own dynamic. As a leading authority notes, ‘[t]he security dilemma cannot be abolished, it can only be ameliorated’.11 The Cold War could not break out without a security crisis. The eruption of a conflict of such dimensions and intensity requires the emergence of strategic dead ends, in which both sides feel unable to retreat without putting their very existence at stake. Arguably, this cannot be triggered by the working of ideological or psychological parameters alone – witness, for example, that the Cold War was not caused by the existence of the Soviet polity in 1917–45, but only when such strategic dead ends came to the forefront. However, once the Cold War started, ideology played a major role in shaping the form of the conflict and the actors’ perceptions of it.12 ‘The Cold War was not just another power confrontation. It was also a clash between opposite social and economic projects, a theater of cultural and ideological warfare’.13 Leading works on the Cold War point to the ‘interwoven’ aspects of the balance of power and the clash of
values.14 Thus, once the strategic dilemma emerged, ideology could not but conserve and deepen it, especially since both superpowers were ‘young’ actors, relatively inexperienced in dealing with a powerful Other, and tending, under the influence of universalist ideologies, to a kind of crusading.15 The Cold War, moreover, involving transnational ideological values and communities, complicated things even further by bringing forward new security challenges which were not only ‘national’ but also internal: the ‘catholic Pole’ or the ‘communist Greek’ posed challenges to their states which were largely unprecedented for the traditional postWestphalian ‘states system’. Of course, such ideological elements had appeared in the international system since the inter-war years, but now the process assumed gigantic proportions. However, it is not simply ideology that concerns us here. The Cold War was also the peak of the crisis of legitimization, which had been raging since the dawn of modernity. How should human society organize itself? How can power be legitimized? The Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the development of capitalism, the two great liberal revolutions of the eighteenth century (the American and the French), the rise of the national idea, the Industrial Revolution and urbanization, the First World War and the Great Depression were manifestations, or triggers, of different phases of this gigantic process. By the 1930s, the Great Depression and the rise of communism and Nazism raised doubts about the survival of Western liberal democracy. It was then that the US provided a model for the reshaping of the political and social texture of the Western world: this was the New Deal, which sought a new social legitimization through state intervention in a free economy, and through economic development for all – what Franklin D. Roosevelt called ‘freedom from want’. By the late 1940s, the defeat of fascism meant that two social systems – the communist and the emerging community of liberal democracies – would compete in the Cold War. It was, as a US President would later describe it, a struggle ‘for the soul of mankind’.16 This was the main subject of the NATO reports
examined in this book; the security crisis was addressed by other (arguably more ‘mainstream’) NATO bodies. Legitimization involves more than the theoretical notions of ideology: it embraces the nature, function and appeal of the social and political systems, as well as the actual exercise of power. It is the point of convergence between political practice and the radiance of the social systems, including their ability to win the support of the mobilized masses of the ideologically charged twentieth century.17 It is in this context that notions such as ‘development’ (especially industrial development, seen as a precondition of success in late modernity), ‘consumption’, ‘production’ or ‘standard of living’ must be placed: the two Cold War ‘worlds’ sought development, but differed sharply regarding the preconditions and the means to achieve it.18 It will be seen in this book that the NATO analysts focused on the effective exercise of power and on the comparative ability of the two ‘worlds’ to cope with the demands of modernity. The major political documents of early NATO history – such as the Report of the Committee of Three in 1956 and the Harmel Reports of 1967 – gave particular emphasis to the nature of the Cold War as a crisis of legitimization, raging in the long historical duration. According to the US proposal for NATO’s Ten-Year Planning exercise of 1960–1: In attempting to devise such long-term guidelines, they [the NATO nations] must first grasp fully the nature of the larger historical cycle within which their tasks must be faced. The challenge of our era far transcends the role of NATO as a security organ, or even the broad power conflict between the Atlantic nations and a hostile Communist Bloc. It is the challenge of an age of revolution – political, social, industrial and technological – a century of dynamic change, of which this power conflict is but a part. The basic forces of this age will mould the world environment in which the contest must be fought. Indeed the side which can best adjust to and cope with these forces will almost surely determine the shape of the future.
In the course of the twentieth century, the whole world order is being profoundly reshaped. There has been a vast extension of national and individual freedom, and rapid progress in material well being, science and technology. For forty years the prior order has been breaking up under the impact of the forces of aggressive communism, nationalism, war, the continued spread of the industrial revolution, and the onrush of science and technology into whole new dimensions. Key factors in this process include: (a) the emergence of the less developed nations, with the sharp contrast between their vaulting aspirations and their inability to achieve them unaided; (b) the growth of new power groupings, chiefly the Communist Bloc, the emerging European Community and the nascent Atlantic Community; and (c) the missile-nuclear revolution in means of warfare, which is radically affecting previous concepts about the use of military force. We are now at midpoint of the twentieth-century revolution, with the process of change still continuing. The challenge of the coming decades is how we can guide the process of change, and determine the shape of the coming world order.19 Perhaps this challenge was greater for the West, whose liberalism needed to provide not only ‘certainties’, but also a reasonable space for ‘doubt’, allowing for such crucial notions as freedom, evolution and change. The liberal West lacked a ‘scientific’ or ‘objective’ basis to legitimize its system, as was the case with Soviet communism. And, although we – who ‘now know’ – recognize this as one of the West’s greatest strengths, it is by no means certain that Western statesmen of that time would readily agree with such an assessment. They felt vulnerable, and needed to strike a difficult balance between certainty and fluidity, or between security and development. As has been perceptively stressed, the West managed to prevail in the Cold War, exactly because it proved able to respond to the challenges of the post-war era: ‘challenges, I would suggest, that inhered not so much from the power of the Soviet Union as from the legacy of the
Great Depression and two world wars as well as from the structure of the international system’.20 On the other hand, the search for legitimization was not an exclusive characteristic of the West. Recent scholarship interprets the US as an ideological power, but the Soviet Union was an ideological state in a completely different manner and intensity, mostly because it was based on a dogmatic theoretical system: unlike the West, the Soviet world had a ‘scientific’ truth to wage as a weapon.21 Communism seemed, for many people, to be an attractive alternative for meeting the problems of modernity,22 and this often scared Western analysts and statesmen. Additionally, it was mostly ideological worldviews that determined Soviet perceptions of NATO: for example, the Kremlin’s constant fear of capitalist encirclement.23 Still, the Soviet leaders were trying in their own way (certainly, not a way compatible to representative democracy) to acquire legitimization.24 Until the late 1960s they were successful in this venture, at least inside the Soviet Union itself: ‘the two decades after Stalin’s death were considered by many Soviet citizens to be socialism’s best years’.25 The role of ideology in Soviet policy has been hotly debated, and the balance of opinion is that it was usually subjected to the attainment of policy aims, although, in a dogmatic system, it remained a guiding ‘framework or analytical prism’.26 As Zbigniew Brzezinski noted in his groundbreaking book on the Soviet bloc, ‘[t]he Communist camp is at one time an empire and a church, and this combination results in a type of relationship which is deeply binding’.27 This, in turn, made it extremely difficult for the Western analysts to assess the role of ideology in the Soviet decision-making process, or to understand the role of dogmatism in the idiosyncratic legitimization of the Soviet communist system. The Kremlin was ‘a black box’ for the Westerners.28 Usually there was a pattern in Western perceptions: whenever the West accepted the notion of cooperation (even antagonistic cooperation) with the Soviets, it tended to assume that
Soviet policy was pragmatic rather than dogmatic – this was the case, for example, during the Second World War, or on the road to détente during the late 1960s. Part of the Western effort to understand its enemy and its potential in the ongoing crisis of legitimization was the NATO reports which form the subject of this book. The emergence of the West and the crisis of legitimization: NATO as an instrument of Western legitimization By 1945 it was mainly the West which faced a problem of legitimacy. The Great Depression had brought about the collapse of old-style capitalism, and had practically de-legitimized Western liberal government, especially in a Europe which subsequently, during the war, fell (often ingloriously) to fascist domination. It was the combined legacies of the Great Depression and of the war that gave rise to the dominant fear in 1946–7 about a possible collapse of Western Europe from within. The answer was provided by the Marshall Plan, which was a crucial aspect of the struggle for Germany and a pivotal step in the outbreak of the Cold War. As has been perceptively described, it was the crossing of the Rubikon.29 But as an exercise in securing Western European independence, the European Recovery Program did more than providing the money to close the dollar gap. Mostly, it was instrumental in transplanting to Europe the new political methodologies of the New Deal, and in building in the continent a ‘reformed capitalism’, able to attract legitimization against the ‘new’ force of the Soviet Union, crowned by the glory of its victory in the Eastern Front. In this respect, the Marshall Plan and the European Recovery Programme (ERP) were founding events of the new post-war West.30 The process was completed with the making of NATO in spring 1949.31 The Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), East– West trade, the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT),32 as well as NATO, meant that this new West was an institutionalized community, based on common ideas and values. Western values
were transnational – as were communist values – and transnational networks were important in the shaping of the Atlantic Community concept.33 The fact that the transatlantic relationship made sense on the economic level (and provided answers to many problems) was crucial in the success of the whole project.34 As Kissinger noted, the development of the ‘Atlantic relationships’ was America’s ‘most constructive policy in the post war era’.35 This was exactly because institutionalization provided for legitimacy. On the other hand, the new institutionalized West consisted of unequal partners, and this raises important questions regarding US leadership and influence, including the debate about ‘empire by invitation’.36 This debate will, of course, continue for the foreseeable future, and it is necessary to retain our historical perspective. It was not just money and ‘power’ that the Americans brought to Western Europe through the Marshall Plan. The Americans had met the existential challenge of the Great Depression; they had succeeded where the Europeans had failed, and their intervention was crucial in reforming a defeated, war-torn Europe. Moreover, the Marshall Plan intended to aid the Western European nations to stand on their feet, resist an emerging imperial threat from the Soviet Union, and also to block the revival of fascism, militarism and aggressive nationalism in the tormented continent.37 Last but not least, US intervention left a wide margin of fluidity in the political systems of the recipient states. In other words, the Marshall Plan did not construct a ‘Western’ Western Europe, but merely allowed it to remain what it wanted to remain, namely Western. This institutionalized West was, to a large extent, an American concept. It was the point of convergence of the old American internationalist idealism with the new demands of realism and of containment. NATO, as a version of the organized Western system, was an essential tool in the crisis of legitimization. US control was never abolished, but this did not negate the independent character of the member-states. By the late 1940s, Western Europe could no longer aspire to be a middle-of-the-road solution (or a ‘Third Force’)
between the US and the Soviet Union: Europe could not but be – economically, socially, ideologically and intellectually – a part of the West.38 NATO provided answers to many problems: it offered a formal defence relationship with the mighty Americans, protection against the perceived Soviet challenge, and also, indirectly, security against a feared German revival or a means for the integration of West Germany in the West.39 But even this latter dimension should not be underestimated: in the early post-war period, Germany’s formal entry in the West was part of a much-needed response to challenges. NATO’s greatest advantage was exactly that it was an alliance of sovereign states: ‘Despite Moscow’s ability to reassert its rule in Eastern Europe and the evolving arms race, that power would remain the West’s fundamental asset, which the Soviet superpower could never match’.40 NATO as a subject of study The nature and political roles of NATO The two Cold War alliances were reflections of their worlds: NATO was a voluntary union with the US retaining a dominant position; the Warsaw Pact was an instrument of Soviet imposition and quasiimperial rule of Eastern Europe, although increasing internal disagreements and a movement towards a more participatory structure in the 1960s have also been noted in its case.41 However, studying NATO raises additional difficulties, if only because it still exists. This is a notable example of the methodological challenges of contemporary history, which sometimes tries to interpret not only ‘contemporary’, but also ongoing processes. The nature of NATO defined its priorities and aims. It was a defensive structure, the members of which found themselves in completely different geopolitical positions, since the most powerful one, the US, was separated by a whole ocean from the less powerful and more exposed European members. The Atlantic was ‘a source
of grave military weakness and potential conflicts of interest’.42 This meant that throughout the Cold War, NATO faced an opponent – the Soviet bloc – which enjoyed considerable superiority in conventional forces and had the geographical advantage. Perceived military inferiority is an element of catalytic importance in a defensive alliance, and in this context NATO’s main weak spot was the possibility that a wedge could be driven between its European and American components: in that case, European NATO would remain economically vulnerable and militarily indefensible against the Soviet colossus. These unfavourable geopolitical and military realities explain the intensity of the European members’ insecurity, their constant search for additional US guarantees and thus the huge importance of transatlantic relations. Consequently, the greatest political priority for NATO – the very precondition to fulfil its main function, common defence – was the guarding of this unity and cohesion. It will be seen in this book that NATO documents studying the Soviet Union usually ended with dramatic calls for unity. The two major reforms in the alliance (the 1956 Report of the Three and the 1967 Harmel Report) mainly aimed to tackle this very problem. Unity was the ultimate good of the alliance, and the lowest common denominator of its statesmen. However, NATO’s nature went beyond its defensive roles. As a manifestation of the institutionalized West, the alliance had a political role to play as well, especially after Stalin’s death, when the intensity of an immediate Soviet military threat receded, and NATO needed to become a political instrument as well. The Canadian-inspired article 2 of the 1949 Washington Treaty made an explicit reference to the concept of the Atlantic Community, to the commonality of ideas and values, and to the prospect of NATO becoming the field of an expanded political cooperation of its members. Recent scholarship points out that NATO’s task was wider security, not merely military security.43 Although political consultation did not develop to a satisfactory level, and there were always domains, such as propaganda, which the larger members jealously kept under national
control,44 NATO retained its political roles in the context of the Cold War crisis of legitimization: The founders of the alliance, in the context of the early Cold War, had not conceived NATO in the tradition of a classical defense coalition of sovereign states. NATO was founded as an alliance of like-minded states with a common heritage – shared democratic values and common interests – that combined the defense of values with the defense of territory.45 The documents and beyond: NATO analysis of the Soviet bloc NATO reports of the Soviet world were thus a manifestation of these additional, non-military functions of the alliance. However, in a book about analysis and perceptions, the ‘document’ plays a slightly different role than in a study of a specific policy. Terminologies and definitions are important, and point to the dominant assumptions of their era. The document remains central to the project, but it cannot ‘prove’ that something ‘happened’; it merely proves that its authors estimated (or feared or hoped) at that time that a process was taking place. Let us first check the fundamental spatial definitions, forming the background of NATO analysis. The first subject was, of course, the Soviet Union itself. It was impossible to separate the perceived Soviet threat from the internal dynamics of the Soviet regime: ‘Any credible analysis of the Soviet threat had to begin with the internal situation and dynamics of the Soviet Union’.46 For the West, the Soviet Union, especially in its post-war glory, represented a major threat arising from its revolutionary ideology and totalitarian structure (which allowed it to mobilize huge resources without much concern for its population), as well as from traditional Russian geopolitical ambitions. It also was a huge political, ideological, economic and social question mark: since the 1950s Western analysts pointed to the enormous economic potential and the rapid development rates of the country, which was the ‘most self-sufficient nation economically
in the world today’.47 We now know that the Soviet economic system was eventually to collapse, among other reasons exactly because of its inward-looking and static nature, and its inability to accept genuine large-scale reform: the Kremlin proved unable to go beyond the ‘limits on economic progress set by a system that took shape during industrialization in the 1930s’.48 However, the Western analysts of that time did not know this: in the 1950s and 1960s the structural weaknesses of the Soviet system had not yet appeared decisive. According to Western standards, the methods of Soviet modernization were simply wrong: this was a process organized and directed from above, taking little account of the need to ensure fluidity in society or, for that matter, to create a viable price system. However, at that time Soviet methods seemed to work. As the Kremlin boasted enormously high growth rates in the 1950s and 1960s, and as its influence expanded in the Third World, it appeared that the Soviet Union was there to stay. By the late 1960s, the view was becoming dominant that the Soviet system should be encouraged to evolve to forms more compatible with the Western priorities. In the beginning of the era of détente, this was even one of the West’s hopes.49 The Soviet Union was the most important, but not the only pillar of the communist world. For the NATO experts, its most incomprehensible element was the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Was China a part of the bloc? And if so, in what form exactly? Its emergence as a new actor in Asian and world politics, its huge economic potential and the enormous unreliability of its statistics made the NATO experts uncertain when discussing the PRC. But communist China was on the other edge of the world, and often the European NATO members showed little interest in discussing it – a situation which usually embarrassed the Americans. Yet, the greatest question mark of Mao Zedong and his regime was their relation to the Muscovite metropolis: it will be seen that the nature of this relationship kept eluding NATO experts, even after the Sino-Soviet split became public and tense.
More important to NATO than distant China was Eastern Europe. This term describes both the ‘satellites’ and Yugoslavia, an area which would be part of the main battlefield in a shooting war, and thus a region of major interest for NATO. Of course, in essence, the term ‘Eastern Europe’ is wrong: for centuries, the so-called ‘Eastern European’ areas had been integral parts of the European/‘Western’ world.50 However, during the Cold War the term was employed to define a political/economic sphere of Soviet influence, and not as a cultural definition; this is how it will also be used in this book. It will be shown that the NATO working groups often noted that these ‘Eastern European’ states were essentially Western communities which had fallen under the relentless control of an enemy. At first sight, the Third World was not a subject of concern to NATO. Yet, the major differentiation between ‘area’ and ‘out-of-area’ problems was becoming blurred when the issue of political consultation was coming into the picture: the NATO powers agreed that their obligation to consult went beyond the narrowly defined ‘NATO area’; this obligation did not entail an obligation to act on these issues.51 Scholars have correctly stressed that out-of-area problems were regarded in NATO as ‘secondary’ compared to the European Cold War confrontation. However, by the mid-1950s (after the drawing of the lines in Europe and the Far East) the periphery became the field of tense Cold War conflict. In the midst of a struggle for the ‘soul of mankind’, NATO could not ignore the dimension of the ‘global Cold War’.52 These out-of-area problems tended to embarrass the alliance: until 1960 the Americans refused to aid the Europeans in colonial disputes, but in the 1960s and especially in Vietnam the Europeans declined to help the Americans. Thus, the major priority of the alliance was to avoid the problem, rather than to present a comprehensive policy on these fields.53 At any rate, the NATO analysts focused on the Cold War in the periphery: the subject of their reports was mostly Soviet penetration of these areas, rather than the situation of the global South as such.54
Some NATO members were more active in producing the reports than others. NATO lacked the machinery to collect information on the Soviet world, and had to rely on the inputs from the national delegations. US inputs were extensive and crucial, while France, and also West Germany and Italy played an important role. Yet, it was the British who proved to be a major influence. Especially in the early 1950s, almost all NATO reports on the Soviet Union were based on British drafts: in March 1954 the FO expressly noted that ‘in the past our draft has always been accepted as the basis of the eventual Paper, but for that very reason I rather feel at this time we should not push our own draft’.55 Yet, even then, the British estimated that they finally wrote half of the final report.56 The British clearly expected the three ‘major’ powers (themselves, the US and France) to lead the discussions, but also aimed to use the NATO documents to provide guidance to the small members, to facilitate a measure of coordination of their foreign policies in NATO-related subjects, to ensure acceptance of British policy, but also to keep off the agenda matters which might embarrass them.57 The US provided a crucial part of the intelligence necessary for the drafting of the NATO reports. The Americans clearly did not disclose all their information to their allies: thus, in October 1955 the State Department, in a cable to its delegation to NATO regarding political consultation in general (not only the drafting of the specific reports), mentioned the need ‘to put information in form suitable for distribution to NAC’, and pointed to the ‘dangers of leak on individual projects [which] would outweigh advantage of keeping NATO informed’.58 This was indicative of the relative distance that the Americans wanted to take from the drafting process, especially in the early 1950s, which was a further reason why they preferred to allow their British partners to do much of the running. A pattern can be seen here: in general, especially until the mid-1950s, the British usually noted that their draft had been the basis for the NATO documents, and the Americans tried to make sure that their comments had been incorporated in the text. Still, the State
Department followed carefully NATO analysis. In April 1955 the US delegation described the forthcoming report on ‘trends of Soviet policy’ as a paper ‘of extreme importance to NATO and absolutely essential for ministerial meeting’.59 In the 1960s, the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations appeared eager to expand consultation in the alliance. However, until the late 1960s, the British role in the NATO committee system remained unique. It is telling that when, in spring 1968, the British alone were having difficulties in attending an experts’ meeting on the specific date, the Americans asked to change the date, as ‘it was impossible to hold a meeting of this sort without the appropriate UK experts being present’.60 In early 1970 a member of the delegation to NATO explained Britain’s role in these terms: our Allies look to us to make the running in putting forward proposals and doing the essential groundwork. This is very good for our standing with our Allies – not least with the Americans, who, though not always agreeing with the substance of our initiatives, are nevertheless glad that they do not have to be seen to dominate the day-to-day work of the Alliance themselves.61 There were additional reasons for the high standing of the British in this committee work. The British diplomats were ready to shoulder the drafting work, which was barely attractive from the point of view of high politics, but crucial regarding the opportunity to exert influence. Moreover, the presence of Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary-General (1952–7), and after 1958 of Evelyn Shuckburgh, the NATO Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs (chairing the Committee of Political Advisers) played a role in enhancing British influence in the process. Indeed, Shuckburgh’s post was so crucial, that the British Permanent Representative, Sir Frank Roberts, cautioned the FO that it was necessary to avoid the impression that he was ‘a British agent in NATO’.62 In 1960, Shuckburgh was replaced by another Briton, Robin Hooper, who
also became the chairman of the new NATO body of planners (rather than ‘experts’), the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (APAG). It is telling that after his service in NATO as Permanent Representative, Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar became Permanent Under-secretary of the FO (namely, the head of British diplomacy), while Shuckburgh left the NATO Headquarters to become Deputy Under-secretary of the FO, and then returned to NATO as the British Permanent Representative.63 Still, no country could ensure the full acceptance of its views. The British Permanent Representative, Sir Christopher Steel, commented in early 1954: ‘when unanimity is the rule and the partners are so disparate in bureaucratic experience and ability it would be unreasonable to expect quick decisions or dynamic staff work’.64 The alliance documents were products of an international process, and thus of compromise. In early 1952, discussing the NATO report on Soviet foreign policy, the British noted that ‘though the drafting leaves something to be desired, as is inevitable with a joint production of this kind’ it was better to accept it as it was, ‘considering that it had been six months in the mill of an international forum’.65 Commenting on the first NATO report on the Far East, in late 1958, the FO noted that ‘although it is naturally not expressed quite in the way we would have written it if left to ourselves – as I suppose must always be the case with international papers of this kind – it is generally a reasonable statement of the situation’.66 In other words, the NATO reports are a sui generis example of international analysis. The undertaking of NATO studies of the Soviet world was part of a larger process which concerned the organization of the alliance’s administrative machinery. The 1949 Washington Treaty did not set up a detailed administration. The first steps towards the creation of such a structure were made in the London NAC of May 1950 and then in February 1951, when a working group was created to deal with the establishment of an international budget for the NATO staff. In summer 1951 the International Staff was set up, under the
direction of the Executive Secretary, Nigel E. P. Sutton. The February 1952 Lisbon NAC reorganized NATO administration, strengthened the International Staff, set up an NAC in permanent session and decided on the appointment of a Secretary-General. A highly organized permanent administration was a novelty for a military alliance, and the role of this new structure became, as was usual in NATO, the subject of intra-alliance disagreements. The first Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, reflecting British views, wanted political consultation and non-military cooperation to develop, based on a large multinational staff. On their part, the US and France preferred a less powerful Secretary-General, who would assume a more ‘technical’ role. The final result was a compromise which did not always prove successful in promoting political consultation. However, Ismay created a new pillar for consultation, the Division of Political Affairs, which also assumed the responsibility for preparing reports about matters of NATO interest.67 At the same time, the Korean War had a profound impact on the workings of the alliance. NATO was militarized, and political consultation was overshadowed by the perceived needs for immediate military defence. Thus, the notions that NATO could acquire a role in European cooperation were set aside, and the success of the Schuman Plan led to a different scenario of European integration.68 Still, even during those years, NATO coordinated the economic burdens of defence, and thus became ‘part of an overall political economy as well as a defense response’.69 Economic rationality was indispensable in a defence process of the midtwentieth century.70 In other words, from the very start NATO was more than an exclusively military structure. It was in this context that the first studies of the Soviet world were undertaken. This is where our story, at last, begins. Notes
1 See, among others, Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994); John Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); Vojtech Mastny, ‘The Warsaw Pact as History’, in Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (eds), A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991 (Budapest: Central European University, 2005), pp. 1–74; Phillip A. Karber and Jerald A. Combs, ‘The United States, NATO and the Soviet Threat to Western Europe: Military Estimates and Policy Options, 1945–1963’, Diplomatic History, 22/3 (1998), pp. 399–429; Matthew Evangelista, ‘The “Soviet Threat”: Intentions, Capabilities and Context’, Diplomatic History, 22/3 (1998), pp. 439– 49; Vojtech Mastny, ‘Imagining War in Europe: Soviet Strategic Planning’, in Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark and Andreas Wenger (eds), War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 15–45. See also the activity of the Cold War International History Project (hereafter CWIHP), and of the Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP). 2 Studies of NATO and Western perceptions tend to focus on a higher level, mostly discussions in the North Atlantic Council, and particularly among Ministers: see Robert Spencer, ‘Alliance perceptions of the Soviet Threat, 1950–1988’, in Carl-Christoph Schweitzer (ed.), The Changing Western Analysis of the Soviet Threat (London: Pinter, 1989), pp. 9–48; Anna Locher and Christian Neunlist, ‘What role for NATO? Conflicting Western Perceptions of Détente, 1963–65’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 2/2 (2004), pp. 185–208. A first effort to study the alliance analysis papers can be found in Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, ‘Images of the Adversary: NATO Assessments of the Soviet Union, 1953–1964’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 11/2 (2009), pp. 89–116. 3 Lawrence S. Kaplan, ‘The Development of the NATO Archives’, Cold War History, 3/3 (2003), pp. 103–6. 4 London, The National Archives (hereafter TNA), FO 371/162000/13, Donald (NATO) to Edmonds (FO), 27 March 1962. 5 TNA/FO 371/137793/1, Roberts to Selwyn Lloyd, 28 February 1958, annual review for 1957. 6 The ascent of Russian studies and its impact on US analysis have been researched. See David C. Engerman, Know Your Enemy: the Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), especially pp. 97–128 on studies of the Soviet economy, and 180–232 on the Soviet society and the political system. 7 Lawrence S. Kaplan, The United States and NATO: the Formative Years (Lexington, Ky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984), p. 189; Robert Jervis, ‘Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 3/1 (2001), pp. 36–60. 8 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). 9 Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: the Stalin Years (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). See also, among others, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Stalin’s Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943 to 1956 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995); Gerhard Wetting, Stalin and the Cold War in Europe: the Emergence and Development of East–West Conflict, 1939–1953 (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008); Beatrice Heuser, ‘Stalin as Hitler’s Successor: Western Interpretation of the Soviet Threat’, in Beatrice Heuser and Robert O’Neill (eds), Securing Peace in Europe,
1945–62: Thoughts for the Post-Cold War Era (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 17– 40. 10 Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 196. 11 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 82. 12 Mark Kramer, ‘Ideology and the Cold War’, Review of International Studies, 25/4 (1999), pp. 539–76; Douglas J. Macdonald, ‘Formal Ideologies in the Cold War: toward a Framework for Empirical Analysis’, in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretation, Theory (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 180–204; Leopoldo Nutti and Vladislav Zubok, ‘Ideology’, in Saki Dockrill and Geraint Hughes (eds), Cold War History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 73–110; Odd Arne Westad, ‘The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century’, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 1–19. 13 Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), p. 163. 14 Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: from the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 76. 15 See, among others, Robert Jervis, ‘Identity and the Cold War’, in Leffler and Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. II, pp. 22–43. 16 Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: the United States, the Soviet Union and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), p. 3. 17 See the interesting connection between ideology, the economy and alliance cohesion in John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 189–200. 18 David G. Engerman, ‘The Romance of Economic Development and New Histories of the Cold War’, Diplomatic History, 28/1 (2004), pp. 23–54; Charles S. Maier, ‘The World Economy and the Cold War in the Middle of the Twentieth Century’, in Leffler and Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I, pp. 44–66; Wilfried Loth, ‘The Cold War and the Social and Economic History of the Twentieth Century’, in Leffler and Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. II, pp. 503–23. 19 NATO Archives, Brussels, International Staff, TYP/US(60)1, US document, ‘NATO in the 1960s: Non-military Guidelines for the Future’ (pp. 7 and 59–60), conveyed by Burgess to Permanent Representatives, 29 October 1960. 20 Melvyn P. Leffler, ‘Bringing It Together: the Parts and the Whole’, in Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War, p. 57. 21 See, among others, Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and the Cold War, 1945–1991 (London: Routledge, 1999), especially pp. 5– 9. 22 Archie Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism (London: Vintage, 2010), pp. 117–34. 23 Vojtech Mastny, ‘NATO in the Beholder’s Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949– 56’, CWIHP Working Paper No. 35, Washington, DC, 2002. 24 See, among many others, Constantine Pleshakov, ‘Studying Soviet Strategies and Decision-making in the Cold War Years’, in Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War, pp. 236–7; David Priestland, ‘Cold War Mobilization and Domestic Politics: the Soviet Union’, in Leffler and Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I, pp. 442–63; Peter Gatrell, ‘Economic and Demographic Change: Russia’s Age of Economic Extremes’, and Lewis H. Siegelbaum, ‘Workers and Industrialization’, in Ronald Grigor
Suny (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia, Vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 383–410 and 440–67 respectively. See also the observation that after Stalin all Soviet leaders preferred not to test the patience of the Soviet public, in Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: an Economic History of the USSR from 1945 (London: Longman, 2003), p. 6. Last but not least, see the legitimizing impact of the (evolving) narratives of the October Revolution during the first era of the Soviet polity: Frederick C. Corney, Telling October: Memory and the Making of the Bolshevik Revolution (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004). 25 Thomas C. Wolfe, Governing Soviet Journalism: the Press and the Socialist Person after Stalin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), p. 208. 26 Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II (New York: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 34–8. 27 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 406. 28 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: the Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2006), p. 17. See also, Ronald Grigor Suny, ‘Reading Russia and the Soviet Union in the Twentieth Century: How the “West” wrote its History of the USSR’, in Suny (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia, Vol. III, pp. 5–64. 29 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: the Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 63–5. 30 A. S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1951 (London: Methuen, 1984); Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); William I. Hitchcock, ‘The Marshall Plan and the Creation of the West’, in Leffler and Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I, pp. 154–74. On the nature of the Marshall Plan see also the extremely interesting debate in Journal of Cold War Studies, 7/2 (2005), mostly Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, ‘The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan’, pp. 97–133; Marc Trachtenberg, ‘The Marshall Plan as Tragedy’, pp. 135–40; Charles S. Maier, ‘The Marshall Plan and the Division of Europe’, pp. 168–74. 31 Timothy Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: the Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (London: Aldwych, 1981); Martin H. Folly, ‘Breaking the Vicious Circle: Britain, the United States, and the Genesis of the North Atlantic Treaty’, Diplomatic History, 12/1 (1988), pp. 59–77. 32 See for example, Ian Jackson, ‘“Rival Desirabilities”: Britain, East–West Trade and the Cold War, 1948–51’, European History Quarterly, 31/2 (2001), pp. 265–87; Francine McKenzie, ‘GATT and the Cold War: Accession Debates, Institutional Development, and the Western Alliance, 1947–1959’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 10/3 (2008), pp. 78– 109. 33 See for example, Thomas W. Gijswijt, ‘Beyond NATO: Transnational Elite Networks and the Atlantic Alliance’, in Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher (eds), Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960s (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 50–63. 34 See among others, Klaus Schwabe, ‘Efforts towards Cooperation and Integration in Europe, 1948–1950’, and Manfred Knapp, ‘Economic Aspects of the Creation of the North American–Western European Alliance System (1948–1950)’, in Norbert Wiggershaus and Roland G. Foerster (eds), The Western Security Community, 1948–
1950: Common Problems and Conflicting National Interests during the Foundation Phase of the North Atlantic Alliance (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1994), pp. 29–44 and 343–74 respectively. 35 Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 3. 36 See, among others, Geir Lundestad, ‘Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952’, Journal of Peace Research, 23/3 (1986), pp. 263–77; Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: from ‘Empire’ by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Geir Lundestad, ‘Empire’ by Integration: the United States and European Integration, 1945–1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), especially pp. 40–82; Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace; Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 211–13, 234–5, 280–2, 285–6 and 350–1; John W. Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe, 1945–1951 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984), pp. 99–107; Lawrence S. Kaplan, ‘NATO United, NATO Divided: the Transatlantic Relationship’, in Mary Ann Heiss and S. Victor Papacosma (eds), NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 2008), pp. 3–24; Ralph Dietl, ‘Towards a European “Third Force”? Reflections on the European Political and Security Cooperation, 1948–1964’, in Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher (eds), Transatlantic Relations at Stake: Aspects of NATO, 1956–1972 (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2006), pp. 23–50. 37 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: a Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 36–42. 38 See among others, John Kent and John W. Young, ‘British Policy Overseas: the “Third Force” and the Origins of NATO – in Search of a New Perspective’, in Heuser and O’Neill (eds), Securing Peace in Europe, pp. 41–61; Wilfried Loth, The Division of the World, 1941–1955 (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 175–95. 39 See also Norbert Wiggershaus, ‘The German Question and the Foundation of the Atlantic Pact’, in Joseph Smith (ed.), The Origins of NATO (Exeter: The University of Exeter Press, 1990), pp. 113–26; by the same author, ‘The Other “German Question”: The Foundation of the Atlantic Pact and the Problem of Security against Germany’, in Ennio di Nolfo (ed.), The Atlantic Pact Forty Years Later: a Historical Reappraisal (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1991), pp. 111–26; Christian Greiner, ‘The Defence of Western Europe and the Rearmament of West Germany, 1947–1950’, in Olav Riste (ed.), Western Security: the Formative Years. European and Atlantic Defence, 1947–1953 (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1985), pp. 150–77. 40 Vojtech Mastny, ‘NATO in the Beholder’s Eye’, p. 92. 41 See, among others, Vojtech Mastny, ‘The Warsaw Pact: An Alliance in Search of a Purpose’, in Heiss and Papacosma (eds), NATO and the Warsaw Pact, pp. 141–60. 42 Hugh Farrington, Confrontation: the Strategic Geography of NATO and the Warsaw Pact (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 143; see also pp. 138–50 (the analysis refers mostly to the late Cold War period). 43 On the commonality of ideals, the concept of the Atlantic Community, and the Canadian role in its projection see Robert S. Jordan, Political Leadership in NATO: a Study in Multilateral Diplomacy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 14–18; Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher, ‘New Perspectives on NATO History’, and Jeremi Suri, ‘The Normative Resilience of NATO: a Community of Shared Values amid Public Discord’, in Wenger, Nuenlist and Locher (eds), Transforming NATO in the Cold War, pp. 3–12 and 15–30; Beatrice Heuser, Transatlantic Relations: Sharing Ideas and Costs (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996).
44 Linda Risso, ‘“Enlightening Public Opinion:” A Study of NATO’s Information Policies between 1949 and 1959 Based on Recently Declassified Documents’, Cold War History, 7/1 (2007), pp. 45–74; Giles Scott-Smith, ‘Not a NATO Responsibility? Psychological Warfare, the Berlin Crisis, and the Formation of Interdoc’, in Wenger, Nuenlist and Locher (eds), Transforming NATO in the Cold War, pp. 31–49. 45 Wenger, Nuenlist and Locher, ‘New Perspectives on NATO History’, pp. 3–4. 46 Spencer, ‘Alliance Perceptions of the Soviet Threat’, p. 9. 47 Ronald S. Ritchie, NATO: the Economics of an Alliance (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1956), pp. 25–32. 48 Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy, p. 6. 49 See a similar analysis in a work which became part of a series on the history of European civilization edited by Geoffrey Barraclough: J. P. Nettl, The Soviet Achievement (Norwich: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967). A similar thought was expressed in the groundbreaking work by William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: History of the Human Community (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963). 50 In this respect, the term ‘démocraties populaires’, employed in the title of a major work, seems a more sound theoretical option: François Fejtö, Histoire des démocraties populaires, 2 Vols (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1969). 51 NATO, Research Section, ‘The Evolution of NATO Political Consultation, 1949–1962’, 2 May 1963, NATO/NHO/63/1, www.nato.int/archives/docu/d630502e.htm, assessed 12 February 2011. 52 See the analysis of the American ‘empire of liberty’, the Soviet ‘empire of justice’ and the search of Third World leaders in Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 8–109. See also Mark Philip Bradley, ‘Decolonization, the Global South and the Cold War, 1919–1962’, and Michael E. Latham, ‘The Cold War in the Third World, 1963–1975’, in Leffler and Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I, pp. 464–85 and Vol. II, pp. 258–80 respectively. 53 John Kent, ‘NATO, the Cold War and the End of Empire’, and Frode Liland, ‘Explaining NATO’s Non-Policy on Out-of-Area Issues during the Cold War’, in Gustav Schmidt (ed.), A History of NATO: the First Fifty Years, Vol. 1 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 141–52 and 173–89 respectively; Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945, pp. 142–67. 54 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, ‘Out-of-Area: NATO Perceptions of the Third World, 1957– 1967’, Cold War History, 13/1 (2013), pp. 67–88. 55 TNA/FO 371/111684/5, minute (Hohler), 23 March 1954. 56 TNA/FO 371/113684/5, Hohler (FO) to Brown (NATO), 13 April 1954. 57 TNA/FO 371/102301/2, minutes (Hood), 8 November 1951 and 23 January 1952; TNA/FO 371/106529/5, Mason to Broadmead, 12 March 1953. 58 Washington DC, National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), RG 59, Hoover (State Department) to Paris, 24 October 1955, 740.5/10–2455, Box 3122. 59 NARA, RG 59, Martin (Paris) to State Department, 12 April 1955, 740.5/4–1255, Box 3116. 60 TNA/FCO 28/22/12, Bushell (NATO) to Smith (FO), 2 April 1968. 61 TNA/FCO 41/607/4, minute (Waterfield), 9 February 1970. 62 TNA/FO 371/137828/1, Roberts (NATO) to Hancock (FO), 26 September 1958. 63 See The Diplomatic Service List, 1967 (London: HMSO, 1967), pp. 237 (Hooper) and 317 (Shuckburgh). Another Briton holding a major NATO post in the 1950s was the
Executive Secretary Lord Coleridge, who had little competence in matters connected with the subject of this book. 64 TNA/FO 371/113217/1, Steel to Eden, 3 February 1954. 65 TNA/FO 371/100846/1, minute (Hohler), 14 January; FO 371/100847, minute (Uffen), 3 March 1952. 66 TNA/FO 371/133300/1, Benson (FO) to Cheetham (NATO), 28 November 1958. 67 Robert S. Jordan, The NATO International Staff/Secretariat, 1952–1957: a Study in International Administration (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 19–45 and 289; Jordan, Political Leadership in NATO, pp. 23–54; NATO, Lord Ismay, Report to the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC in Bonn, May 1957, in www.nato.int/archives/ismayrep/index.htm, assessed 12 February 2011; Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949–1954, at www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/index.htm, assessed 12 February 2011. See also Kaplan, NATO and the United States, pp. 32–49. 68 Alan S. Milward, ‘NATO, OEEC, and the Integration of Europe’, in Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (eds), NATO: the Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 241–52. 69 Charles S. Maier, ‘Finance and Defense: Implications of Military Integration, 1950– 1952’, in Heller and Gillingham (eds), NATO, pp. 335–51. 70 Michael H. Smith, ‘The Political Economy of Transatlantic Relations: Forces of History and the Shadow of the Future’, in Schmidt (ed.), A History of NATO, Vol. 1, pp. 289– 304.
1 A new look at the opponent, 1951–6 Testing the ground, 1951–2 In the early NATO structure, until 1952, the NAC met only at the ministerial level. A lower-level body of diplomats, the Council Deputies, was assisted by the Political Working Group, which produced background papers. Political consultation was in its infancy. Every member of the Council Deputies could raise an issue, provided that there was enough notification to the other members to prepare for the discussion. The NAC encouraged the exchange of views, noting that this was useful particularly ‘to the smaller countries who did not enjoy the same facilities as the larger countries for obtaining information from widely differing sources’.1 Yet, intra-NATO discussions focused mostly on the post-Korean War military build-up, coordination on infrastructure, the appointment of a Supreme Commander in Europe and German rearmament. The discussion on the ‘survey of the world situation’ during the December 1950 NAC involved mainly NATO’s military effort and the Soviet military threat; nothing was mentioned about the Soviet regime or its economy.2 By that time, NATO cooperation on the non-military field focused on the organization of an allied information service: this, according to the Americans, was necessary to strengthen the European public’s support for the common defence effort.3 Things began to change in 1951. The Council Deputies discussed various questions ‘of common political concern’, including the situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.4 The first topic was Yugoslavia, for which Western fears had peaked after the start of the Korean War; in fact, the Yugoslav discussion set the pattern for the debate on other Eastern European countries in the following
months.5 The Council Deputies concluded that Yugoslavia’s breach with Moscow had become unbridgeable; the West should help Tito preserve his independence from Moscow.6 On the special case of East Germany, two months later, they noted that no active resistance was to be expected: the East German economy was improving, and despite its unpopularity, the regime seemed to be making inroads into East German public opinion.7 A similar examination of conditions in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania suggested that the regimes were firmly established, although peasant hostility remained strong. Economic conditions were bleak and consumer goods were in short supply, but rapid progress was being made on the field of industrialization, even if planning seemed overambitious.8 On Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Council Deputies suggested that, despite the essentially Western identity of these nations, the monopoly of communist education and propaganda was having an effect on the public opinion.9 Thus, at that moment the NATO officials feared that the pro-Soviet leaderships could shape East European opinion and gain legitimacy. It was only later – after the 1953 East German riots and mostly after the 1956 Hungarian Revolution – that the NATO authorities became more confident regarding the fundamental unpopularity of the Eastern European regimes. This first round of analysis was crowned by a study of political and economic conditions in the Soviet Union. However, it soon became apparent that it was not easy to monitor the main Cold War adversary. The discussion in the Political Working Group was poorly organized, political considerations tended to blur the needs of accurate analysis and the limits between the various NATO bodies had not yet been delineated. Thus, the French Deputy, Hervé Alphand, wanted the Deputies to include Soviet military capabilities in their report. This was accepted by the other members, but then the French, who faced the discomfort of their public opinion for the European Defence Community (EDC), wanted the report to state that if the West rearmed, the Soviet Union could evolve to become a
better neighbour. The French hoped to make the EDC more acceptable to their public, but this was a political consideration, and other delegations stressed that there were no indications of a ‘Soviet evolution’. On top of that, the military authorities refused to disclose military information on grounds of security. This also raised the question of the competence of different alliance bodies. In the end, the Council Deputies also discussed military potential, as an aspect of Soviet power. The process was dominated by Alphand, the US Deputy, Charles M. Spofford, the US Vice-Deputy, Theodore C. Achilles, and the British Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar, while the drafting was also assisted by national experts, such as Hugh Morgan of the FO.10 Still, when the report became available, the discussion of the Deputies revealed a notable similarity of views of the member-states regarding the main adversary.11 The NATO members were eager to unite in the face of a strong opponent. The report of the Council Deputies reveals the awe of the West when facing the Eastern superpower of the late Stalinist period: There can be no doubt about the internal stability of the Soviet regime. It is probably more secure today than it has been at any time since 1917, and unless some chance or outside agency (e.g. world war) brings about a radical change it is likely in future to become even stronger. The Council Deputies considered that even the death of Stalin would not cause a split in the party or a modification of the system of government. Living standards were improving gradually, and there was little chance for an effective opposition. Intellectuals showed little sign of unrest, and nationalism, although a potent force, had been reconciled with the system through the granting of cultural autonomy. The Soviet Union’s vast natural resources ensured its continuing development, especially in the industrial sector, and the Soviet economy already had surpassed pre-war levels. The poor state of the transportation system was considered a major long-term impediment for growth.12
These documents were submitted to the Ottawa NAC in September 1951. The Ministers devoted two consecutive sessions to the discussion of the ‘world situation’, and noted that, apart from the danger of invasion, social and economic realities facilitating communist subversion should be taken into account.13 In the November 1951 NAC, the discussion on the ‘survey of the world situation’ included the Far East, Indochina and the Middle East.14 Still, at this stage of the Korean War, the Ministers mostly dealt with the military threat. A prime aspect of this threat involved the capabilities of the Soviet economic system to support a major war effort. This subject was examined both in June by the Council Deputies (in their report of the Soviet Union) and in November by the military authorities, in a document on which the Council Deputies also commented; the latter focused on Soviet military capabilities to act against NATO in the period 1951–4 and the Soviet economy’s ability to maintain and increase military forces even after the outbreak of a war. The two documents noted that the Soviet Union was not as developed industrially as the West, but possessed the necessary manpower, and devoted huge resources to its war industries. Its economy ‘in all branches affecting the Soviet Union’s capacity to wage war, is stronger than at the beginning of World War II’ (June 1951). The Soviet Union was largely self-sufficient in war materials, and was already stockpiling those which it did not possess. The Kremlin had kept its munitions industries running. Many plants had been converted to peacetime production, but had been designed to revert quickly to wartime use (for example tractor factories to turn to tank manufacture). As for its capacity in war, the Soviet economy was capable of supporting both the existing formations and the additional ones which would be formed after the outbreak of hostilities. For example it was expected to increase its annual output of aircraft from 8,000–10,000 to 40,000–50,000 within two years after going into full war production. Its vulnerability to Western air attacks against its industries would be its major problem. In other words, the Soviet system maintained a high readiness to go to war, and the central control over the economy facilitated the
transition from peace to war production. In fact, the Soviet Union’s economic preparedness for war was expected to rise compared to the West’s.15 The two documents tended to exaggerate the capabilities of the Soviet economy, but also supported the need for a sustained NATO effort to rearm. At the same time, the Atlantic Community Committee (the socalled Pearson Committee consisting of Foreign Ministers Halvard Lange of Norway, Alcide de Gasperi of Italy, Lester Pearson of Canada, Dirk Stikker of Holland and Paul van Zeeland of Belgium) was set up to make recommendations for the strengthening of nonmilitary cooperation according to Article 2 of the Treaty. The Committee noted the need to discuss political issues, including outof-area problems.16 However, the Americans felt uncomfortable about this prospect, fearing that it would limit their freedom of action in the Cold War.17 Thus, NATO had started discussing wider political and economic aspects of the Cold War, although the first reports on the Soviet bloc were rather simplistic, if not timid, descriptions of its realities. Meanwhile, by late 1951 and early 1952, the stalemate in Korea and the debate on German rearmament raised a different question. Even if, during the Korean War, Stalin had been tempted to consider an invasion of Europe,18 the West was in the process of raising an effective military deterrent. Perhaps the West now needed to prepare itself for a protracted Cold War. This line of thinking finally emerged in the 1952 British Global Strategy Paper, which placed its emphasis on the new concept of deterrence and on nuclear weapons, rather than on a huge and costly conventional military establishment.19 Although the first British attempts to change NATO strategy met with the opposition of the Truman administration, which focused on the rapid building of NATO’s military capabilities,20 London now raised the question of a long Cold War, in which it would be imperative to establish a better understanding of Soviet aims and potential. In October 1951, a separate British paper was annexed to the report of the Political Working Group on the ‘world situation’, arguing for the
need to place emphasis on the economic realities, to raise the standard of living, and to develop the non-military purposes of NATO.21 In late 1951, during the Rome NAC, the NATO Ministers decided to ask for a comprehensive document discussing Soviet ‘aims and means’. This was presented during the Lisbon meeting of the NAC in February 1952, together with a comparison of Soviet bloc and NATO military strength, which sketched a gloomy picture of the balance of conventional forces, and referred to ‘175 Soviet line divisions’, an estimation which, as we now know, was inaccurate. This document, moreover, once more stressed the potential, the output and the operational readiness of Soviet war industries. The Soviets had the necessary manpower, but faced a ‘scarcity of skilled labour’; even so, their industries could concentrate on the more essential military equipment. Armament production was kept running since 1945, and thus large stocks of weapons existed. It was only on the sector of transport, with its major difficulties, that the Soviet war effort was going to face major problems. Evidently, these estimations were also meant to convince reluctant Europeans to step up their defence effort.22 The February 1952 document on Soviet foreign policy was based on a British draft (with the FO’s Hugh Morgan again as the major expert),23 and represented the first NATO attempt to sketch a fuller picture of the Kremlin’s international conduct. Its drafting was telling of some intra-alliance differences. Thus, the US delegation disagreed with the notion that the Soviet intelligentsia supported the regime. The Americans also were not fully comfortable with the paper’s rather ‘relaxed’ attitude towards communist China.24 In its final form, the report reproduced the dominant perception in the West since the days of George Kennan’s 1946 Long Telegram, namely the notion that Soviet foreign policy was ‘the offspring of a marriage between traditional Russian imperialism and Communist doctrine’, and aimed at the establishment of a communist world order. The NATO analysts considered that the first priority of the
Kremlin was to protect the Soviet power base, and to deal with the constant Russian/communist fear of encirclement. The Soviets’ insistence on the incompatibility of the social systems meant that they were responsible for international tensions: ‘It can be considered that the cold war waged by the Soviet Union since the end of the Second World War is a logical expression of Communist ideology’. War by proxy also was considered as a likely Soviet option, although its attractions seemed to have decreased after Korea. According to the report, Soviet policy aimed to disrupt NATO and paralyse any anti-communist power combination; control Eastern Europe and overthrow Tito (though not necessarily through an invasion of Yugoslavia); divide the US from the European members of NATO; control Germany, ‘the key to control of all Europe’; and prevent West German participation in Western defence. However, the document also stressed that the Soviets would probably tolerate West German disarmament if some safeguards were established. Last but not least, the Kremlin aimed to eliminate Western influence in other parts of the world. The Sino-Soviet relationship seemed to be cordial, but did not resemble the absolute Soviet control of Eastern Europe. It was also stated that in the Middle East and North Africa conditions were favourable for the Soviets to subvert Western influence. However, in these regions communist parties were weak, and Moscow was more likely to cooperate with nationalist ‘anti-imperialist’ forces and encourage neutralism. The document cautioned that general war could not be ruled out. Thus, ‘[t]he West should prepare for a long drawn-out period during which they must remain firm and vigilant’.25 This document directly referred to a protracted Cold War (the emerging British thesis), but also to the high danger of a hot war (the American prerequisite). It differed from subsequent analysis documents in that it gave its emphasis on Soviet external policies, and dealt summarily with internal realities in the annex (the Soviet regime was described as stable, even in the event of Stalin’s death). Yet, the document did not seem to have a significant impact: the NAC at Lisbon merely took notice of its submission.26
Moving on to a comprehensive analysis, 1952–3 The first attempt, December 1952 After the Lisbon NAC, the emergence of a strong Secretary-General, Lord Ismay, significantly affected the evolution of NATO reporting on the non-military aspects of Soviet power: Ismay represented a strengthening of British influence, and thus pressed for preparing for a long Cold War. Moreover, Ismay now led an NAC in permanent session: the Permanent Representatives were not merely deputies, but fully expressed the positions of their countries.27 At the same time, additional developments seemed to point to the need for better consultation. In summer 1952 the smaller NATO powers strongly reacted when the Standing Group powers (the US, Britain and France) replied to the Soviet note on Germany without consulting their allies. In June, the Norwegian Permanent Representative, Arne Skaug, suggested the creation of a formal NATO Political Committee to discuss relevant issues; the larger powers rejected the notion of a standing committee, but the British thought that ad hoc working groups could be useful in this juncture.28 In September, the proposal of the French Permanent Representative, Alphand, to turn NATO into a global strategy body was rejected by the other members of the alliance, as it would expand the alliance’s competence outside the treaty area.29 On its part, the US was concerned about the tendency of the European allies to consider that the military threat had eased, at a time when the Americans were shouldering the burden of the Korean War and of European defence. By September, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, summarized his government’s position: the US should accept expanded consultation, but this should not result in the Americans limiting their own freedom of action. Acheson preferred to allow the NATO Secretariat to draft the relevant papers, on which the US delegation would comment, rather than to submit a US document, which could be leaked.30 This US preference left the road open to the British, with their different ideas
on the Cold War, already incorporated in the Global Strategy Paper. If nothing else, the British were prepared to do the drafting. In early October, the NAC discussed the forthcoming 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Skaug, the Norwegian Permanent Representative, asked for a paper on Soviet foreign policy. Despite US objections (the Americans wanted to place emphasis on military issues), the NAC approved a proposal by the British Permanent Representative, Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar, to set up an ad hoc working group on ‘trends of Soviet policy’, under the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs, Hugh Cumming, a US diplomat with former service in Moscow.31 This was going to be a new process, and the British managed to control it from the start. In fact, the State Department underestimated the novelty of the venture, instructing the US delegation to use the February paper as a basis for the report.32 On the contrary the British Russia Committee was already preparing similar papers. In other words, the British were well ahead of the rest in this subject.33 At the same time, the British managed to block Cumming’s ideas for bringing in major experts such as Charles Bohlen or George Kennan. The British insisted that the Permanent Representatives should control the process, while the drafting should be made by lower-level experts: ‘only the United States, after all, happens to possess an unemployed one-man delegation like Kennan’.34 In the first meeting of the working group, it was apparent that three experts (the FO’s Hugh Morgan, the French Jean Laloy, and Dick Davis, the head of the State Department’s Soviet desk) would draft the report, which would then be submitted to governments. As Morgan reported to the FO, ‘so we have gained our main point’.35 This became evident during the meetings of the group. Morgan noted that ‘since I was armed with the paper that we had already produced in the Foreign Office, the enclosed draft is very largely based on that’.36 This meant that the draft report largely reflected British thoughts about the long Cold War. It even avoided mentioning the ultimate Soviet aim of world domination which had been stressed
by the previous NATO reports. Morgan, barely hiding his characteristically British contempt for such big words, commented: In fact [the American expert] Dick Davis (whether speaking for the State Department or not, I don’t know) has come to have doubts whether the Soviet leaders really do think in their heart of hearts that they can govern the whole world. Rather than risk any speculation on so esoteric a point of eschatology, the drafting group just left it out.37 During this transitory phase of the Cold War, the production of such a ‘forward’ draft inevitably stirred reactions. In Washington, the American administration had grave doubts about the draft. The US did not care much about the phraseology regarding the Soviet intention to establish a communist world order; the State Department itself regarded this as an uncertain statement. However, according to the US view, the working group had not gone ‘deeply enough into the question of Soviet intentions’, and considered that war could be triggered mainly by Soviet miscalculation. The Americans were also concerned at the inconsistencies regarding Soviet intentions between the Soviet political report and the military capabilities papers by NATO. These could encourage European relaxation of the defence effort, a major American fear of that time.38 Even then, however, Washington, focusing on the military dimension of the NATO effort, underestimated the process. Although the US delegation in Paris pressingly asked for the quick return of Davis, the American expert, and reported some ‘“doctrinal” changes in Soviet for[eign] policy paper’, the State Department proved too slow in its reactions.39 The American demands for changes were put forward in early December, after the last meeting of the working group, and were not fully incorporated in the final report. The Americans wanted the report to note that ‘Soviet leaders look forward to the eventual establishment of a Communist world order, dominated and directed from Moscow’ (although specific Soviet initiatives could not be predicted), and to state clearly that Soviet ‘deliberate aggression’
could not be excluded; also, to delete the phrase that the Soviets ‘seem unlikely to want a major war in any near future’.40 The British did not consider the point on the communist world order as worth fighting for, but regarded some of the proposed amendments (for example Soviet deliberate aggression) as unacceptable. They opted to settle this difference with the Americans ‘outside the NATO Working Group’. They suggested a compromise wording; in case this was not agreed they were ‘prepared to let the original report go forward with the United States position stated as a minority view (it is believed that the other NATO members would support us in this)’.41 The Americans did not want the NAC to appear divided, and decided to accept the report with minor changes, but also to make a statement during the ministerial meeting.42 The episode was indicative of the tensions of that era, but also of the nature of NATO as a union of sovereign states: facing the danger that their thesis would be recorded as a minority view in NATO, the Americans had to give way. The brief for the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, noted with satisfaction that the report reproduced the British view of the long Cold War, arguing that NATO should take into account the economic prospects and the emergence of new weapons.43 The final report was a long document, dealing with a variety of issues, from Soviet internal and foreign policies and economic prospects, to the nature of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe, and Soviet intentions regarding the ‘underdeveloped’ world. It will be seen in this book that, at later stages, these areas would become the subject of different, specialized documents. However, the December 1952 report was the first of its kind, and set the pattern for subsequent ones. The working group concluded that the Kremlin’s strategy and ideology remained unchanged, although variations in tactics could be expected. The Soviet leaders’ confidence had grown considerably since the end of the Second World War: they believed that they would outpace the West in economic development, and seemed to regard the development of Soviet economic strength as ‘the key not only to their security but to the outcome of the “two worlds” struggle’.
Yet, it was unlikely that the Soviets would prefer an armed confrontation with the West. Indeed, the working group stressed that the Kremlin had not yet decided whether the West meant war. Stalin’s aims were to preserve the Soviet regime; consolidate and protect the ‘Soviet orbit’; and expand Soviet control. As regards relations with the West, the Soviets aimed to disrupt NATO, the Marshall Plan and European integration, and to drive a wedge between the US and Western Europe. Stalin believed in a life-anddeath struggle between the two worlds, and his basic strategy took two forms. The first, ‘direct action’, involved military intervention by the Kremlin ‘or by proxy (as in Korea)’, and subversion by force, including internal revolution as had happened in Greece, Indochina and Malaya, or coups as in the case of Czechoslovakia. ‘Indirect action’, the second form of Soviet activity, involved non-violent subversion, such as psychological pressure through propaganda campaigns, economic pressure or political/diplomatic initiatives such as proposals for non-aggression pacts. Stalin, the working group continued, could also countenance tactical retreat when met by superior force: ‘Soviet policy is thus within limits extremely flexible’. There was only one overriding consideration for the Kremlin: the need to protect the Soviet Union itself, namely, the seat of Stalin’s power and the springboard of the revolution. Thus, the Soviets ‘cannot deliberately contemplate a total war unless they feel reasonably assured of victory’.44 Despite its more relaxed tone regarding the Kremlin’s political aims, the report again noted the huge capacities of the Soviet economy to support a major war effort. The analysts stressed that the Soviets preferred to maintain the numerical levels of their military forces, and to ‘concentrate rather upon raising the long-term economic and military potential of the Soviet Union’. The new fiveyear plan was expected to facilitate the supply of first-class modern arms and munitions. The NATO experts were convinced that the Soviets had since 1945 maintained an industrial base capable of producing arms at a higher rate than its wartime peak, and that defence expenditure since 1950 had mainly aimed to improve arms
and equipment. The potential of the Soviet economy to convert to a war footing was again underlined. As regards administration, the recent CSPU Congress had provided interesting evidence. The replacement of the Politburo and the Orgburo by an enlarged Presidium and Secretariat tended to confirm the trend of merging the state and the party. On the other hand, Georgi Malenkov’s criticism of malpractices in public life seemed to indicate that the country was reaching a point where ‘further economic advance will be a matter of technique rather than manpower and correspondingly more difficult’. The report pointed out that the Soviets ‘have not solved the problem posed by the emergence of a relatively privileged class who may before long discover their own standard of life is more important than world revolution’. Soviet capability to cause trouble ‘varies inversely with Western strength and determination’, but Soviet aims remained unaltered: The containment policy increasingly caused a certain loss of initiative on the Soviet side and concentration on negative aims at countering Western moves. […] ‘“Peaceful co-existence” is in fact no more than the Soviet name for the Soviet policy that we call “all mischief short of war”’.45 The document then turned to the examination of Soviet policy in various parts of the globe. The experts expected the Kremlin to become more active in the periphery. The 19th CPSU Congress had made a strong reference to anti-colonial struggles, aiming to sever ties between the colonial peoples and the colonial metropoles. In the same context, the Soviets appealed to peoples and countries in Latin America, the Middle East and Asia which the West regarded independent, but which, according to Soviet theory, continued to suffer under the yoke of capitalist domination. Thus, NATO should be prepared for the outbreak of economic warfare, especially in SouthEast Asia, where relatively small Soviet exports could make an important difference. The report ended with a call for NATO vigilance and unity, as the Cold War evolved to become a protracted struggle:
We can be certain only that the Soviet Government will be quick to exploit any weakening or relaxation in the free world and will not hesitate to revert to direct aggressive policy if they judge the circumstances propitious. But as far as we can see provided the Western world adheres to the course it has chosen, it is unlikely that the Soviet Government would deliberately start general hostilities. We can look forward to a period of cold war, lasting perhaps many years, during which the Kremlin will maintain unremitting pressure upon the free world. The foundation of their policy is the conviction that they can win the psychological political and economic battle now in progress for the minds of men.46 The report took sides in an intra-NATO discussion: it supported the notions of the British Global Strategy Paper on the prospect of a protracted Cold War, which embarrassed the Americans. On 16 December, the day when the ministerial NAC met, Acheson intervened with a statement which was also circulated as an NAC document. Acheson accepted the ‘well-stated and considered’ report, but noted that as long as ‘the initiative for aggressive action rests with the Soviet Government we cannot flatly say that we can prepare for a long, cold war without consideration of the real possibility of a hot war’. Thus, Acheson continued, the Soviet Union, as a totalitarian state, would always seek to perpetuate its own power and would always keep open the option of the use of force; any Soviet miscalculation of Western resolve could lead to war. The US Secretary of State praised the report’s conclusion that the continuation of Western defence effort could deter war.47 Acheson thus went out of his way to stress that these studies should not lead to a relaxation of Western military effort or of German rearmament. During the discussion in the NAC, the British Foreign Secretary, Eden, and his French counterpart, Robert Schumann, praised the analysis of the working group, but also asked that the Chinese role in Soviet policy be taken into account as well. Foreign Ministers Fuat Köprülü of Turkey and Stephanos Stephanopoulos of Greece took the opportunity to point out that, in a long bras de fer with the Soviet
world, NATO needed to aid the economic and social development of its less developed members. Norway’s Halvard Lange insisted that the subject be kept under ‘constant review’.48 Yet, it is interesting that, despite his interventions prior to the NAC meeting, Acheson, reporting to Truman, expressed his satisfaction at the discussions, which showed the ‘basic unity of view and purpose among us’.49 This was indicative of the complicated relationships in an alliance such as NATO. It was pivotal for the development of the NATO analysis process that a new US administration took over at that moment. Despite their ideological rhetoric, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, believed that the Cold War was now becoming a protracted conflict, in which alliances would prove extremely important; the US should avoid an overextension of military spending, which could also have a distorting effect on American society itself.50 This meant that US reservations about the British emphasis on the long Cold War would decrease: Despite his long military career, Eisenhower tended to downplay the military dimension of the Cold War, a tendency that Dulles shared. Neither of them believed that a Soviet threat could be regarded solely in military and nuclear terms, which the Truman administration had seen as the main danger after the outbreak of the Korean War. The Eisenhower administration saw the Communist threat as a combination both of Soviet military power and of a gradual Soviet political, psychological, and economic encroachment into the West.51 Beyond Moscow: China and East–West trade, spring 1953 The December 1952 report did not exhaust the subject. As requested by the NAC, a paper on China was prepared by the Working Group on Trends in Soviet Policy. Before submitting its report, the working group discussed the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the nature of the Sino-Soviet
relationship. It noted that even if disagreements occurred between Moscow and Beijing, these would be submerged ‘in the dominant identity of interests’, although it was unclear whether China would prove an asset or a liability for Moscow.52 Initially the drafting was entrusted to the French, but their text met with US and British objections and the final draft was produced by the Foreign Office.53 However, the manner in which US objections were put forward was telling for the Eisenhower administration’s determination to reassert US control over the NATO analysis process, and to avoid a European ‘imposition’ of views as had happened in December 1952. Thus, in mid-March Dulles rejected the draft ‘in its present form […] due to its length, factual inaccuracies and statements reflecting bias of drafting officer’. The US suggested the acceptance of a British submission as the basis for the report.54 In this way, the Americans made clear that they could not be ‘ignored’ again; and by accepting the British draft (despite the fact that their previous quarrel had been with the British), they also showed that this was not merely an issue of a barren ‘revenge’. Evidently, from this point onwards, the European members were much more anxious to listen to US views very carefully. In its final report, the working group dealt extensively with the history of relations between Soviet and Chinese communism, noting that the strengths of the latter, which had developed before the Second World War, had been ‘the result of policies not in accordance with the precepts of the Comintern’. Relations between Moscow and the CCP in 1945–9 were characterized by ‘hesitations and uncertainties’, although after Mao’s victory the Chinese had entered the ‘pro-Soviet phase’. The experts pointed to Beijing’s aid to the insurgency in Indochina (in which ‘[t]he Soviet contribution seems to be relatively unimportant’), and to the first Chinese Five-Year Plan of 1952 which depended on increased Soviet assistance. Mostly, the Korean War provided evidence of ‘close coordination of policies between China and the Soviet Union’, with China contributing the manpower and Moscow the arms, equipment, technical advice and training. In view of these, the experts tried to answer the main
question: was a split between Moscow and Beijing probable? They saw four possible areas of Soviet–Chinese disagreements: Soviet aid for the economic development of China; territorial problems in Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang; antagonism for leadership in Asia; and differences over doctrine. On the latter, the working group noted that Mao’s originality lay more in practical politics rather than doctrine, but he might be less prepared to unquestionably follow Stalin’s successors than the great Soviet revolutionary himself. The study noted that the CCP assumed power in China by its own efforts, and the country was now ‘a world power in its own right’. Communist China was a ‘junior partner’ of the Soviet Union, rather than a satellite, although differences with Moscow were more likely to be submerged in the face of the common Western enemy.55 A third analysis document on East–West trade was drafted by the Secretariat, under Ismay’s direct supervision. It was presented in June 1953, but the decision to draft it had been taken by the NAC on 4 March, following a proposal by the Turks, who feared Soviet economic warfare against NATO countries.56 Although they did not regard NATO as the appropriate forum to discuss economic issues, the State Department officials accepted this discussion. It is notable however that they also instructed their delegation in Paris to hold informal discussions with the British and the French prior to the submission of the report.57 It was clear that Washington would not underestimate the NATO analysis process again, especially on a subject which it regarded as important. After all, it was at American insistence (and with considerable Western European opposition) that the strategic embargo to the Soviet bloc had been imposed in the previous years.58 In this report, ‘West’ was taken to mean ‘all the trading nations, including Japan, outside the Soviet orbit’, and ‘East’ included the PRC. The document noted that West European exports to Eastern Europe were about two-thirds, and imports from Eastern Europe no more than one-quarter of the pre-war volumes. Trade had declined
since 1949, both because of the Western strategic embargo, and as the effort of the Soviet bloc to industrialize had led to a reduction in the production of their pre-war exportable goods. Moreover, the Western strategic embargo had forced the Soviets to develop their own production, and had benefited black marketers. The Secretariat was in favour of keeping the restrictions in force, but also argued that East–West trade should continue: an ‘abrupt cessation’ would simply damage the economies of NATO countries with no compensatory effect. However, NATO members should take special care to avoid dependence on Eastern markets, and should avoid offering Moscow and its allies ‘unduly generous’ long-term credits. The experts suggested that the satellites had ‘to sell cheap to the Russians and buy dear’, and this exploitation of Eastern Europe could be favourably compared with the advantages of trade with the West: ‘Western goods in Polish and Czech shops are, it is understood, of good propaganda value in themselves’. However, the creation of a rigid Western bloc on trade would run counter to the notion of free trade and ‘would not in itself be desirable’. The document concluded that NATO was not equipped to deal with economic questions: the alliance could only call for a better coordination of its members.59 The reception of the Secretariat paper was mixed. The Americans, when asked by the British, noted that this discussion would provide ‘an outlet for the expression of the feeling of smaller NATO countries’. On their part, the British were highly critical of the paper: they thought that it was not based on reliable data. They also wanted to prevent NATO from engaging in close monitoring of the members’ trade activities, and from playing a role in trade, which was the domain of other international organizations: anyway, they noted, NATO did not include important players in East–West trade such as Japan and West Germany. Last but not least, the British and many continental European countries felt that security controls in exports were practically untenable, whereas the Americans hoped to maintain them through the NATO discussion.60 In early 1954 the British successfully discouraged the production of a new study, with
the argument that the subject was now being covered in the ‘Soviet trends’ reports.61 The production of these NATO papers started before Stalin’s death. Convinced that the West had succeeded in ‘stopping Soviet aggression’ in Europe and in the Far East, the NATO statesmen needed to examine both the need to develop their military power, and the scenario of a long Cold War. However, all these questions assumed a dramatically more pressing nature (and the importance of NATO political consultation grew) after Stalin’s death in March 1953, which caused ‘apparent bafflement’ among Western statesmen.62 By February, the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy was discussing whether to amend the December 1952 report or to produce a new one, and the Americans, supported also by the chairman of the working group, Cumming, held that there had been no significant new development (apart from the doctors’ plot) to justify a new document.63 Stalin’s death changed the setting. Although individual delegations submitted papers,64 the Americans insisted that only a ‘brief factual account’, as a supplement to the December 1952 report, be prepared. The American view won through, and the working group merely presented a ‘calendar’ of events, to be discussed by the Permanent Representatives.65 At the same time, the US delegation also provided a brief summary, indicating that they detected no change in Soviet policies or regarding the character of the regime.66 The discussion of the calendar by the Permanent Representatives showed that the other members agreed with this American estimation. The French, Dutch, Greek and Turkish Permanent Representatives noted that the defence effort should not relax. The British Sir Frederick HoyerMillar, evidently reflecting Winston Churchill’s preference for a summit meeting, suggested that the West should keep an open mind.67 It is telling that the British Russia Committee also did not produce a full report but a special paper for March 1953.68 This is
another indication of the West’s bafflement when evaluating the great event. During the ministerial meeting of the NAC, in April, the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, took the lead in stressing that, despite declarations about peaceful coexistence, the new Soviet leadership changed the Kremlin’s tactics, not its aims; the USSR was, and would remain, a ‘total dictatorship’. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Köprülü, reminded his colleagues that ‘peaceful coexistence’ was not a new policy of the post-Stalin leaders, but a line which Moscow had pursued since 1951; thus it was a Stalinist concept, and a mere change of tactics. Belgium’s van Zeeland, Canada’s Pearson, Greece’s Stefanopoulos and Italy’s de Gasperi agreed that the West should not relax its defence effort. France’s Georges Bidault expressed his fear that the Western public opinion could be lured to a state of relaxation by the discourse of the new Soviet leaders. Yet, there were also Ministers who remarked that, without relaxing its defence effort, the West should keep an open mind and be prepared to negotiate; among them, the British Selwyn Lloyd, the Dutch Johan Beyen and the Norwegian Lange.69 Yet, even the Americans themselves did not have a full picture of the situation in Moscow in spring 1953.70 It was clear that the transition in the Kremlin called for fresh studies of Soviet policy and its power base. Studying the post-Stalin Soviet puzzle, 1953–5 Monitoring the rise of Khrushchev The post-Stalin period raised crucial questions for the NATO analysts: among others, the nature of the transition of power in a totalitarian state, the character of the new regime and its disposition towards the West. Historians today agree that the window of opportunity, if there had been one, to end the Cold War after Stalin’s death was too small and lasted too little.71 Yet, the NATO analysts of the early 1950s did not feel free to pose such questions: their terms
of reference obliged them to serve the needs of the Cold War, not to dispute it. Indeed, an event of such magnitude, posing important questions regarding the precious unity of the alliance, pushed the West to seek stability, rather than new opportunities. Soon the Americans became worried that the Soviet ‘peace offensive’ tended to weaken European attachment to NATO, while the European allies were worried that the US might lose interest in the alliance.72 Ismay himself worried that Stalin’s death had led to a relaxation of Western public opinion, and to a loosening of the members’ military effort: ‘NATO is losing momentum’.73 As the Americans noted in June 1953, ‘United support for any projected program by the fourteen Nato governments and by Western Germany is almost more important than the program itself’.74 At the same time, these uncertainties made the NATO allies instinctively close ranks. Thus, when the Soviets offered to ‘join’ NATO early in 1954 in a clear attempt to disrupt it, the NAC unanimously rejected the idea: the US delegation reported that this ‘was the most effective and fruitful example of consultation we have seen in the NAC’.75 In turn, it became even more important to monitor the Soviet Union, in a process which was still a novelty in NATO and had produced minor but interesting tensions between the US and the European allies in autumn 1952–spring 1953. Evidently, the emergence of major questions regarding the opponent was a stimulant for the member-states to go through this formative period of NATO analysis. It is clear that the British and the Americans sought and managed to retain the production of reports on ‘Soviet trends’ under control. The State Department did not repeat its mistake of late 1952 to underestimate the drafting process: it consistently followed the discussions, making sure that its revisions would be incorporated in the British drafts.76 On its part, the NATO Secretariat did not have the resources to study the Soviet Union, and had to turn to the major powers of the alliance to provide experts and inputs. Thus, in October 1953, when a new report had to be prepared, Cumming’s successor as chairman of the working group
on Soviet trends, the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs Sergio Fenoaltea, produced a telling idea. He noted to the British, the French and the Americans that, since the smaller powers criticized the ‘Big Three’ (US, Britain and France) for dominating the drafting process, this time the Secretariat would prepare it; but as it lacked the people to do it, he asked the ‘Big Three’ to ‘assist’ in the drafting; he would then present it as a Secretariat proposal. This was also indicative of the intra-alliance realities. As the FO commented on the final report, ‘I think the paper is now reasonably satisfactory. It is, at any rate, very much as we drafted it’.77 The same procedure (of Big Three drafting) was followed in the first report of 1954, while in the second, in which the Secretariat again tried its hand, the British noted that the officials of the three major powers had altered the text ‘beyond recognition’.78 The smaller members felt uneasy at this domination of the Big Three, and the British tended to put forward two arguments: first that the smaller nations often failed to record their views (which was correct); and second that the drafting was being done in the working group by all members. The second argument was not always very accurate. Thus, it was the British, the American and the French experts who mostly did the running. The most influential were the FO’s Morgan and J. A. Dobbs, the French Laloy, and Walter Stoessel, the Acting Director, Soviet Affairs, of the State Department’s Office of Eastern European Affairs. The drafts were also examined by members of the British Russia Committee, and there is evidence that in the American side Charles Bohlen also commented on them.79 By late 1954, a new trend appeared: the documents were increasingly prepared in Paris by members of the national delegations (with the Big Three again playing a major role). Of course, these officials remained highly dependent on inputs from their capitals. Thus, to give an indicative example, in the British side the members of the delegation, Denis Greenhill and then John Cheetham, received advice from London-based FO experts such as Reginald Hibbert and Thomas Brimelow. The rank of experts remained relatively low, without the big (American) names coming in, as the British had initially wanted.
From early 1954 the title of the relevant documents was partially revised to become ‘trends and implications of Soviet policy’. This was an indication that the NATO experts were aware that they were studying a much more mobile and energetic opponent. The ‘trends’ reports became biannual. Despite worrying leaks of these documents to the Press, mainly Cyrus Suzberger of the New York Times,80 the work of the working group did not stop. In spring 1954 the Secretariat prepared another paper on ‘Current Appraisal of Soviet Strength’, which would also serve ‘as background to the discussion on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’.81 In mid1954, a time of important soul-searching in Western strategy,82 evidently it was deemed necessary to present a comprehensive picture of Soviet political/economic and military policies. The first full post-Stalin analysis on the Soviet transition was submitted to the NAC in December 1953, when the internal political situation in the Kremlin had stabilized, and a new Cold War ‘normalcy’ seemed slowly to emerge. By that time, the working group on ‘trends’ had a new chairman, Fenoaltea (he was replaced by another Italian, Giuseppe Cosmelli, late in 1954). It is notable that the Permanent Representatives discussed whether that report should also include a section of ‘conclusions for the Western powers’, but the idea was dropped since it was felt that suggestions over policy lay beyond the scope of the experts.83 This set the tone of subsequent reports as well. The NATO analysts reported that the transition in the Kremlin had been successfully completed; Stalin’s autocracy was now transformed to rule by a small group of people with the Prime Minister, Georgi Malenkov, as a primus inter pares, and the leader of the CPSU, Nikita Khrushchev, as the second most important personality. Still, the NATO experts obviously did not have all the answers in such an early stage: their information regarding the internal struggles in the Kremlin was very limited. Commenting on Lavrentii Beria’s impressive demise, they noted: ‘Manoeuvring for position as indicated by the Beria episode probably continues, but
we cannot identify the contending factions and personalities with any certainty’. Although the experiment of collective leadership was a radical departure compared to Stalin’s era (‘genuine collective rule is incompatible with the totalitarian nature of the Soviet state’), no doubt was expressed regarding the stability of the regime. The new leaders, always placing their emphasis on heavy industry, also announced their intention to raise living standards in the country. However, no change in the ideology, totalitarian structure or ultimate aims of the regime could be traced. The new Soviet leadership aimed to encourage loyalty towards the CPSU rather than towards a specific individual, while the extent of army influence could not yet be determined. Some concessions to the Soviet public, such as the amnesty, the termination of the ‘doctors’ plot’ campaign and the promise for a rise in the standard of living, were seen as part of the effort to consolidate the new regime. The report noted the apparent contradiction between the emphasis to heavy industry (as a doctrinaire priority but also as a prerequisite for rapid economic growth imposed from above), failures in agriculture and the need to seek legitimization by responding to social needs. The NATO experts stressed the continuity of Soviet policies compared to the Stalinist era: the country continued to maintain an excessive industrial base and military establishment; Marxism–Leninism remained ‘the guiding creed of the Soviet leaders’, and the Kremlin continued to adhere to the notion of an inevitable struggle between the two worlds. In other words, the transition in the Kremlin did not change the fundamental elements of the Cold War.84 This conclusion was also embodied in a resolution for the NAC, which determined that Soviet policy had not changed, and therefore that NATO forces needed to remain at their existing levels.85 With the Soviet autocrat now absent, more emphasis was placed on the totalitarian character of the regime, reflecting a dominant trend in Soviet studies of that era.86 Subsequent reports took a similar line. The regime was described as more flexible compared to the Stalin years, but, as was noted in December 1954, ‘this has been a change of manner rather than
substance’.87 The fall of Malenkov early in 1955 puzzled the NATO analysts, who displayed a difficulty to grasp the workings of a rigid political system, where personal or practical differences tended to be disguised into differences over dogma.88 In its further reports, the working group noted that Malenkov’s demise was the result of an internal power struggle, masked behind disagreements over policy, mostly Malenkov’s advocacy for intensive methods for increasing agricultural production and Khrushchev’s preference for the extensive methods. Despite internal power struggles, however, there was ‘nothing to indicate that the stability of the regime itself has been fundamentally affected’. The continuity of the regime was stressed, although the army leaders seemed to have strengthened their role.89 Interestingly, the late March 1955 document of the working group was not an agreed report, but a summary of the discussion by the chairman, Cosmelli. This evidently reflects the uncertainty that the fall of Malenkov caused to the NATO experts; in the NAC, the British and the French Permanent Representatives, Steel and A. Parodi, noted that much in that report were hypotheses, not conclusions based on hard evidence.90 Post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy, 1953–5: continuity or change? Soviet foreign policy naturally was a prime interest of the NATO experts, who tried to assess the meaning of peaceful coexistence or, in Western parlance, the Soviet ‘peace offensive’. The December 1953 report stressed that there was no sign of a change in the Kremlin’s ‘aggressive aims’ and hostility to the West. However, Soviet tactics could ‘undergo considerable mutations in order to take advantage of circumstances’: the Soviets were prepared to lessen international tensions through their advocacy of peaceful coexistence, the encouragement of East–West trade, acceptance of high-level four-power talks, and the Korean armistice; they seemed to believe that ‘less aggressive tactics would pay better in political warfare’. They mostly aimed at frustrating Western defence and preventing or delaying the incorporation of West Germany in the
Western defensive system. Thus, the Kremlin kept making a German settlement dependent on the scraping of the EDC, and on the withdrawal of US troops from Europe. The June 1953 riots in East Germany and Konrad Adenauer’s electoral victory in West Germany confirmed the Soviet determination to maintain its hold in the ‘Soviet zone’. Thus, signs of the new policy of peaceful coexistence, such as the abandonment of Soviet territorial claims against Turkey, the setting up of frontier commissions between Yugoslavia and its Soviet-controlled neighbours, and the Bulgarian offer to settle disputes with Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, were seen as attempts to weaken solidarity among the Western powers. The NATO experts did not give the Kremlin the benefit of the doubt even regarding the Korean armistice: they thought that the Soviet attitude could be attributed to the strain which the war imposed on the Soviet economy, while they also referred to indications that the Chinese and the North Koreans wanted the conflict to end. At the same time, the Kremlin displayed a new interest in developing trade with other parts of the world.91 In other words, this report referred to continuity in Soviet aims, and to the adoption of more dangerous and mobile Soviet tactics. The NATO analysts did not expressly interpret the East Berlin riots as a major crisis of legitimacy in the Soviet bloc, perhaps because suppression was regarded as a natural response of the Kremlin.92 As officials of a defensive alliance, they were reluctant to point to opportunities for rollback. These conclusions were repeated in subsequent reports. The Malenkov–Khrushchev ‘duel’ was not attributed to differences over foreign affairs. Peaceful coexistence was interpreted as a Cold War tactic rather than as an offer for a definite settlement and a lasting peace. The conflicting demands of heavy industry and the armaments industry on the one hand, and the need to devote resources to agriculture and the raising of the standard of living were considered as incentives for the Soviets to seek a ‘lowering of tension’ with the West. The NATO analysts stressed that peaceful coexistence focused on ‘inexpensive verbal appeals and symbolic acts’ which could also impress opinion in the West. However, they
argued that this Soviet tactic entailed a ‘recognition of the growing strength and cohesiveness of the Western world’. Soviet foreign policy was seen as aiming to undermine the cohesion of NATO, retain strategic positions in Germany and in Eastern Europe, disrupt the EDC, prevent the integration of West Germany in Western defence, split Western Europe from the US and effect a US withdrawal from the continent. The Soviet leaders wanted to avoid a nuclear war, but at the same time they used the theme of nuclear disarmament as a propaganda slogan, and they knew only too well that a ban on such weapons would destabilize Western defence and leave Moscow supreme in conventional forces. Moscow’s major aim was to block German rearmament, and bring Germany and the whole of Europe under Soviet control. Thus, the experts expressed strong relief at the London Accords of autumn 1954 and the accession of West Germany to NATO. The conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty in May 1955 was seen as an effort by the Soviets to tempt the Germans with neutrality, although it was also noted that Austrian neutrality posed serious problems of communication between NATO forces in Italy and in Germany. These reports also contained brief sections on the Soviet ‘satellites’ in Eastern Europe, mostly stressing the effectiveness of Soviet control over this region. Last but not least, the NATO analysts noted the increasing use of cultural and sporting events by the Soviets for propaganda purposes. The working group consistently insisted that the West should avoid showing signs of weakness or division.93 These reports also reflected NATO’s perceptions regarding the birth of its institutional opposite, the Warsaw Pact. The July 1955 document, prior to the Geneva summit, was discussed in two sessions of the ‘trends’ working group, but was drafted as a personal report by the chairman, Cosmelli. Expressing relief at the West German accession to NATO, Cosmelli did not show alarm either at the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact or at Khrushchev’s and Bulganin’s visit to Belgrade in May 1955. The report stressed that the Warsaw Pact contained a clause for its own dissolution in the event of the creation of a new European security system:
This suggests that the Pact itself is conceived as a bargaining counter. But in reality the Pact does not fundamentally modify the existing balance of force in Europe, though it may give the USSR a better means of controlling and integrating the forces of the Satellites.94 Thus, the NATO experts formed an accurate understanding regarding the functions of the Warsaw Pact: recent scholarship has stressed that, at least initially, the Soviets conceived it exactly as a means for bargaining, since the Eastern alliance did not play the pivotal role in the formation of the Soviet bloc (and its military strategy) that NATO was playing for the West; a possible dissolution of both alliances would leave the Soviets supreme in the continent.95 The ‘trends’ reports also dealt with Soviet policy in other parts of the globe. The Kremlin showed particular interest in South Asia, especially in cultivating ties with India and in disrupting Pakistan’s rapprochement with the West. The NATO experts pointed to close cooperation between the Kremlin and the PRC, especially in the Geneva conference on Indochina. Soviet aid to the Chinese economy was merely ‘modest’, and pointed to Moscow’s discomfort about communist Chinese claims on the offshore islands. Still, China was not expected to take initiatives in Asia (for example an invasion of Formosa, South Korea or Thailand) without Soviet consent. After late 1954, the NATO analysts noted the increasing emphasis of the Soviets on the periphery and their effort to capitalize on anti-colonial struggles (the Americans also, in their submissions to NATO, noted the Soviet emphasis on neutralism, especially in Asia). In late 1955 the working group noted that ‘[h]olding, and being held in Europe, the USSR has recently made, and is likely to continue to make more spectacular moves in Asia and the Middle East’. Moscow was expected to encourage neutralism through trade of arms or industrial assistance of a ‘spectacular’ nature, ‘calculated to make a dramatic impression on public opinion (the High Dam on the Nile, the Indian Steel mill, the street-paving in Kabul)’. Especially Khrushchev’s visit
to India illustrated ‘the flexibility of Soviet tactics and the global conceptions on which they are based’. By early February 1956, the NATO analysts were referring to an ‘economic offensive’ of the Soviet bloc in the underdeveloped world, ‘which does not attempt to match the massive Western aid to underdeveloped regions but rather seeks to make political gains with a minimum of actual expenditure’. The reports also noted the attractiveness of Soviet communism as a development strategy for these states. These meant that the Soviet Union now ‘acted in several areas of the world with a new freedom of manoeuvre’, which was a completely new tendency of Soviet policy.96 The ministerial NAC tours d’orizon on the international situation, which discussed these reports, show the NATO statesmen’s resolve to avoid being drawn into a state of relaxation by the new Soviet leadership. During the December 1953 and April 1954 ministerial NACs, the Ministers were resolute on German rearmament. In April 1954, Dulles accepted a Canadian resolution calling for the expansion of political consultation, but he also added that consultation should be ‘within the bounds of common sense’, since the US could not subject their world policy to the NAC.97 The Ministers also appeared anxious that the road to the 1955 Geneva summit could lead to unwanted relaxation of Western public opinion, thus disrupting the NATO defence effort. In the May 1955 ministerial NAC, with the Geneva summit in sight, Dulles stressed once more that Soviet aims had not changed, to which Turkey’s Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, France’s A. Pinay, and Germany’s Konrad Adenauer agreed, while Belgium’s Paul-Henri Spaak stressed that the West should carefully prepare its positions in the summit, exactly in order to avoid disappointing the Western public.98 It is notable, however, that although special reports were prepared prior to the summer 1955 summit with the Soviets, Dulles insisted that they be examined by the Permanent Representatives, not the special ministerial NAC, as it was premature for Ministers to discuss them.99 As will be shown in the next chapter, there is an interesting difference of this case with
what would happen prior to the 1960 summit. In July 1955, the special ministerial NAC prior to the summit was greeted as a progress for consultation by Spaak and Lange, but also by Pearson, speaking to the Americans; the fact that the Americans, British and French reported to the NAC immediately after the conference satisfied the other alliance members, who were always afraid of a ‘directorate’ by the Standing Group powers.100 Still, Ismay repeatedly made clear his anxiety that the new international climate should not disorient the Western public, who might think that NATO was unimportant.101 The uncertainties of the new international climate seemed to argue in favour of an effort to expand political consultation. This was stressed by Ismay prior to the December 1955 ministerial NAC, and in the NAC itself by the Italians and the Canadians.102 It was clear that a strengthening of consultation would now be needed. Assessing the claims of Soviet economic ascent, 1954–6 The riddles of the post-Stalin era were not confined to the political level. Indeed, with the Cold War evolving into a protracted antagonism between East and West, the economy emerged as a potentially decisive factor. This was further underlined by the impressive Soviet economic growth in these years and by the Kremlin’s claims, especially during the Khrushchev era, that the Soviet economy would soon overtake the West.103 Thus, Soviet economic prospects, and the relative economic growth of the two camps became the subject of specialized studies by the Western powers and NATO. It is clear that US input was crucial for these NATO studies, but the differences between US and NATO attempts need to be noted: the American documents also dealt more extensively with Soviet military capabilities and the cohesion of the Eastern Bloc, and pointed to problems in the Soviet economy, especially agriculture (a subject which will not become salient in NATO studies before the early 1960s).104 On their part, the
Americans academics went even further, stressing that the Soviet economy was ‘better suited for brief bursts of rapid growth than for long-term steady expansion’.105 On the contrary, the NATO studies often painted the picture of an over-effective Soviet industrial expansion, triggering US discomfort. The first comparison of the economies of the West (including West Germany) and the Soviet bloc (excluding China) was undertaken in 1954 by the Secretariat, under the Deputy Secretary-General H. van Vredenburgh. Once more, the wording was indicative. The option to undertake a ‘comparison of economic trends’ reflected the West’s own initial insecurity when facing the boasts of Soviet economic ascent. The Secretariat pointed out the difficulties in such a venture, especially the unreliability of Soviet bloc statistics, and also stressed that the study did not involve the capacity of the two alliances to wage war, which would depend on additional factors, such as the resources devoted to defence or the dependence of the belligerents on external sources of supply. Moreover, it was expressly stated that the exclusion of China from the study inevitably led to an underestimation of Soviet bloc capabilities. It was also stressed that the West remained dependent on free trade with the other parts of the world, whereas the Soviet bloc maintained its self-sufficiency, which was a qualitative difference between the two camps, and a stimulant for the West’s interest in the development of other areas of the globe.106 The findings attest to the Western alarm at the breathtaking Soviet economic growth. In 1952 the value of the total output of the NATO countries (including West Germany) was four times higher than the Soviet bloc’s; the output of the European NATO countries was one and a half times larger, and of the US two and a third times larger than that of the Soviet bloc as a whole. The Eastern European countries’ output was roughly one-third of the Soviet bloc’s total. The average per capita income in NATO was two and a half times that of the Soviet bloc, although three members (Greece, Portugal and Turkey) had a lower per capita income than the Soviet. Consumption of energy was four times larger in NATO than in the Soviet bloc, and
steel production and wheat production three times larger. However, by 1972 the absolute margin of NATO superiority would increase, but the communist world would substantially improve its relative position. Total output in the NATO countries would be two and three-quarters times larger than that of the Soviet bloc; the US would be one and two-thirds times larger; and that of the European NATO countries ‘rather less’ than the bloc’s. By the same time, the per capita income in the Soviet bloc would be half the average per capita income of the NATO countries as a whole and about 80 per cent of the average of European NATO. The study clearly showed the importance of Europe. Without the East European countries, the Soviet economy would still be considerably smaller than European NATO in 1972; but if the Soviet bloc managed to extend its hold on Western Europe, its economy would be roughly as large as the US economy by the same date. Without West Germany, the Western European economy would merely be half the size of that of the Soviet bloc in 1972: ‘[w]ithout Western Germany, NATO Europe would be overshadowed’. This fundamental conclusion explains the emphasis of the West in preventing Soviet domination of that country. The struggle for Germany involved much more than the dilemmas of rearmament.107 The report rejected the claims that the Soviet economy would overtake the West. However, the Soviet economy was growing rapidly, and in the following twenty years the communist countries were expected to be able to extend aid to the underdeveloped states, which might also view communism as a model for development. Thus, NATO could not ignore the need to speed up economic development and to make the best possible use of its resources. This was a difficult task, taking into account that in a free economy it was impossible to reach the rate of investment which a totalitarian state could achieve. The West should, above all, preserve its unity: [T]he NATO countries must stand together in order to provide an effective counterweight to the growing power of the Soviet bloc.
No smaller combination of countries could hope to achieve this.108 The Secretariat report was a watershed, in that it showed the need for more systematic comparisons and projections. Yet, it had some weaknesses: the British commented that it was useful, but not as thorough as their own studies of the Soviet economy. Its main merits, according to the FO, lay elsewhere. First, it showed that NATO military effort should be based on ‘healthy economic expansion’. Second, it showed to continental Europeans that older notions of European autonomy were impractical: ‘the Third Force is no force at all and […] the Western world without the United States is likely soon to fall so far behind in economic power as to be unable alone to exert any weight’.109 The Americans, on their part, noted the ‘limited’ character of the report.110 The NAC also thought that the study was ‘incomplete’, and decided to set up a special Working Group on Comparison of Economic Trends in NATO and European Communist Countries (this would evolve to become the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy), under John Licence of the International Staff.111 During the following months this group discussed the methodology of its study.112 This time, the national delegations, especially the British and the American, played a greater role: among them the British Raymond Bell and (in 1956) A. K. Potter, as well as the American Walter Stoessel, who was now serving with the US Embassy in Paris; at the same time, the drafts were also examined by the national governments (in the British case the FO, but also the Treasury). The Americans contributed important information, as did the delegations of Italy, France and West Germany. The British noted the unreliability of Chinese statistics, which made work on that country ‘a waste of time’. The smaller powers stated that they had no information to submit.113 By autumn 1955, it was becoming clear that the NATO International Staff could not digest the US input and asked for an American expert to help (the US sent Stoessel). Moreover, the US projection for twenty years would not be ready in
time.114 It was with some difficulty that the Americans, who regarded that the document had been prepared hastily, accepted that there would be a ‘brief treatment of projections’; the Americans were mostly interested in the impact of the report to the Ministers, and noted that it was ‘important to avoid use aggregate East–West figures which could be construed to justify complacency over relative strengths and prospects of Sov[iet] bloc and NATO area’.115 Thus it was clear that the report of the working group would be of an ‘interim’ nature. This report was submitted to the NAC in late 1955. Noting the difficulties of comparisons between dissimilar economies, the working group pointed to the ‘marked economic superiority’ of the NATO countries. The population of the NATO members was one and a half times bigger than the population of the Soviet bloc, but NATO members’ annual production of goods and services was three and a half times larger. However, in 1948 total annual production had been four times larger than the Soviet world. This meant that the margin of Western superiority was decreasing due to the rapid pace of industrialization in the Soviet world. Soviet industrialization had been achieved through massive investment in heavy industry, at the expense of other sectors of the economy and by retaining a low standard of living for the population. The same model was followed in the countries of Eastern Europe. The NATO analysts noted that the Soviet industry had grown at an impressive rate of 13 per cent annually in 1928–37 (when the Western industry did not grow at all) and had shown remarkable powers of recovery after 1945: by 1948 Soviet industrial production was almost 20 per cent above the 1937 levels, and since then it had continued to grow ‘about twice as fast as in the NATO countries as a whole’. The experts noted that this kind of development presented serious disadvantages, mostly the one-sided emphasis to heavy industry. Agriculture was seen as the main weakness of the Soviet economy: collectivization and the lack of mechanization were serious impediments. Soviet agriculture employed almost half of the Soviet labour force, whereas this figure was less than a quarter in the NATO countries and about 12 per cent
in North America. Still, Western agriculture was much more productive than the Soviet.116 The working group noted that the main difference of the NATO and Soviet economies lay in their use of resources. As a totalitarian state which could neglect demands regarding the standard of living, the Soviet Union devoted almost half of its annual output to investment and defence, while the figure in the NATO countries was below 30 per cent. On the other hand, only about 40 per cent of the Soviet annual output was going for consumption, compared to two-thirds in the NATO countries. Thus, the Soviet citizen was paying the cost of the spectacular Soviet industrial and military development, by having a standard of living which was about two-fifths of the average for NATO Europe. As for China, its population was estimated at 600 million, but its development problem was deemed more grave than the one which the Soviet Union had faced in the interwar period: China had a smaller industrial base and a more pressing problem of agricultural production, while it was impossible further to reduce the standard of living to acquire resources for industrialization.117 In an effort to project the picture twenty years in the future, and assuming that no major war or economic depression would occur, the working group noted that the Soviet bloc would have to devote increasing resources to agriculture, housing and other social investment, but would continue to develop its industrial output, at about 1.6 times the rate of Western industrial growth. As for China, provided that it displayed ‘determination and effectiveness in mobilizing resources’, it could achieve by 1975 ‘a level of industrial production something like that in Western Germany today’. The growth of the Soviet economy would enable Moscow to offer assistance to the underdeveloped countries and to pose as a model for development. The interim report noted that the West’s economic lead would remain, but the margin of Western supremacy would narrow down.118 In the ministerial NAC, Dulles, France’s A. Pinay and West Germany’s Hermann von Brentano pointed to the growing Soviet
capacity to open several fronts, economic and political.119 Yet, beyond the formal context of the NAC, the report was badly received by important member-states. The British FO and the Treasury considered that it was based on unreliable data, and had failed to show the trends clearly. The British noted that the Secretariat had simply been overwhelmed by the bulk of the inputs of the memberstates.120 On the American side, Dulles was especially angry at the report, which he termed ‘dangerous’, without giving any further arguments. In the face of Dulles’ discomfort, the NATO Secretariat toyed with the idea to make a further report omitting the twenty-year projection and focusing on the Soviet Five-Year Plan. At that stage, the British, who regarded these reports as invaluable, especially for the smaller alliance members, insisted to prepare a fresh report for the May 1956 ministerial NAC, but the Americans made clear that they would be in no position to provide the necessary data on time.121 The British were surprised to find out that the US officials repeatedly failed to explain, when asked, the reasons for Dulles’ discomfort. In the end, the FO reached the conclusion that the Secretary of State feared that these studies encouraged the minor allies to relax their defence efforts. It was only in mid-summer 1956 that the Americans finally agreed, after intense British lobbying, to the drafting of a new report.122 The US delegation to NATO also insisted, in its cables to Washington, about the importance of continuing the comparison reports, especially at a time of ‘competitive coexistence’. The State Department finally agreed to the drafting of a further report, on the condition that it would be more analytical and critical, taking into account ‘political, social, psychological factors as these affect trends’.123 Washington regarded that the simple reproduction of figures tended to present a distorted view of a dynamic situation, which could confuse alliance members in their determination to resist Soviet expansionism. The new study of the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy appeared in late 1956.124 Drafting was aided by additional work on the Soviet Sixth Five-Year Plan, which impressed the West. In fact,
the opinion was expressed that the 1955 interim report had probably underestimated the rate of growth in the Soviet Union.125 The US delegation submitted six papers, the German two, the British four, the French sixteen, and there was one joint contribution from Norway and Denmark.126 Once again, therefore, the main role was played by the major powers of the alliance. The final memorandum stressed that in the subsequent two decades the overall rate of economic expansion of the Soviet bloc would certainly surpass that of the NATO countries, while the PRC would also emerge as a major economic and industrial power. The Soviet Union was able to achieve higher growth rates because, as a totalitarian state, it could maximize investment without concern for the needs of the population, concentrate investment on the desired sectors of the economy, mobilize cheap domestic resources and transfer surplus labour from agriculture to industry without concern for the average citizen: ‘the Russians have pursued growth as a deliberate goal, made higher production the measure of success and arranged incentives accordingly’. Growth rates could decline in the following years, but the Kremlin’s ability to maintain investment at a level unattainable in a free society would permit continuing expansion. Still, the Soviet aim, declared at the Twentieth CPSU Congress, of overtaking the West, would not be realized, although the West’s relative superiority would be reduced. The Soviet bloc economy would grow at a rate of 1.7–1.9 times faster than the total NATO. In 1955, the national product of the Soviet bloc was one-third of that of the NATO total, but by 1975 it would be at least half, and would be further augmented by the addition of the Chinese national product. By 1975, the total production of NATO Europe would be exceeded by the production of the Soviet bloc and possibly of the Soviet Union alone. US production would still exceed that of the USSR, but the combined output of the US and Canada would be overtaken by the combined output of the Soviet bloc plus China. Industrial production of the Soviet bloc, which in 1956 was less than one-third of the NATO total, would increase to between one-half and two-thirds in 1975, and Soviet industrial production could surpass
that of the US. These were impressive, though controversial, predictions. By 1975, consumption per head in the Soviet bloc would reach the level of consumption in European NATO countries in 1956, although by that time the latter would have moved significantly ahead. Soviet trade with the underdeveloped states would increase, with obvious political repercussions, as a new antagonism would surface between NATO and the communist East for supplies and markets in the periphery. The economic Cold War would play a major role in the East–West confrontation.127 Throughout this period, 1954–6, the capabilities of the Soviet economy in time of war remained a subject of NATO analysis. In the spring 1954 ‘Current Appraisal of Soviet Strength’, it was again noted that the Soviet economy possessed the resources to provide equipment and supplies to the Soviet and the satellite forces, and still to implement an intensive programme of stockpiling. The comparison of wartime economic capabilities of the two ‘worlds’ also loomed large in the 1955 and 1956 reports. These again overestimated the force projection capabilities of the Soviet economy. In the 1955 document, the experts noted that defence expenditure in the Soviet Union and the West was difficult to compare: it was estimated to be at 9 per cent in NATO and at 20 per cent in the Soviet Union. Allowing for the difference in the respective GNPs, the Soviet bloc’s defence spending was estimated to be twothirds of the Western one. However, the experts cautioned that this could not be taken as an assessment of relative fighting power: the economic base of the Soviet Union revealed its potential to mount an ‘increasing military threat’. The purchase of weapons represented a larger proportion of defence expenditure in the Soviet bloc than in the West, with its extended lines of communication and higher production and maintenance costs. Moreover, the Soviet costs of subsistence of troops were much lower than the Western ones. This meant that the Soviets acquired more weapons, more quickly than the West. In 1956 it was noted that Soviet forces could be numerically reduced, but this would be ‘more than offset by increased costliness of new weapons’. The experts were certain
about the ability of the Kremlin to shoulder the cost: it was estimated that Soviet military expenditure would expand by 5 per cent per year. Since the expected rate of growth in the Soviet economy was even higher, by 1975 the share of defence expenditures would be lower than in 1956. In other words, the Soviet Union grew more rapidly than the West on the military field: so long as the Soviet bloc economies expand so much faster than those of the NATO countries, the improved relative economic strength of the Soviet bloc and of the USSR in particular will alter substantially the military capabilities of East and West over the next twenty years.128 These first comparison reports reveal the Western awe at the economic capabilities of a totalitarian regime, reigning in a huge country. The politically guided Soviet economy could pose enormous challenges to the free economies of the West. Throughout these years, the NATO experts repeatedly noted that the increase in Soviet economic power allowed the Soviets to pursue various aims simultaneously: maintain strong conventional and nuclear forces, pose as a model for development in the Third World, and enter world markets, possibly acquiring the ability to influence them in certain respects. The Soviet economy was regarded successful, an element which solidified the power base of Khrushchev and the CPSU, and intensified the threat (including the military threat) that the USSR posed to the West. Failure and reform in 1956 An unusual party congress Meanwhile, the first half of 1956 was a time of confusion for NATO analysis of Soviet policy. The surprise caused by the fall of Malenkov pointed to a gap in the NATO committee system, which was unable constantly to follow Soviet developments. Moreover, the Americans had criticized the spring 1955 ‘trends’ draft report on the grounds
that it put too much emphasis on appearances rather than substance, and downplayed the elements of continuity in Soviet policy.129 Thus, the NAC decided that the working group on Soviet trends would meet on a regular basis, and would produce monthly reports. This was despite the protests of the chairman of the working group, Cosmelli, who noted that the experts did not have enough information for this.130 The FO grudgingly accepted the new procedure, but noted that a standing working group would tend ‘to show almost limitless capacity for discussion and argument’.131 The FO considered that regular meetings in Paris, attended by members of the national delegations but not necessarily by national experts, would fail to produce adequate results. The Americans tended to agree with the FO, but the smaller powers (and the Germans) insisted on the monthly scheme.132 The novel practice, from early 1956, of the production of monthly reports coincided with the exceptionally confusing information coming from Moscow exactly in this period. Thus, these monthly reports either failed to predict developments, or were unable to evaluate them correctly. Already in April 1956 the working group returned to the practice of producing semi-annual reports. In early February 1956, as a new CPSU Congress, the twentieth, was drawing nearer, the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy submitted a short note to the NAC. It expected ‘no notable surprises’. In foreign policy, the Asian tour of Khrushchev and Bulganin showed their increasing interest in encouraging anti-Westernism in Asia, while pursuing a ‘relatively static’ policy in Europe. In internal affairs, the working group detected ‘several recent developments of importance but none of them have indicated a basic change in policies’. The document expected the Twentieth Party Congress to be a case of ‘business as usual’.133 It proved to be anything but that. The surprise caused by the Twentieth Congress was huge, and was not confined to the NATO experts: the US also failed to predict developments, and after learning of the Khrushchev speech the director of the CIA is quoted as wondering whether Khrushchev ‘had
been drunk’.134 NATO received the news about the Khrushchev speech from the US, and in April the US delegation circulated at the NAC a long note on the congress.135 In March, the working group on Soviet trends noted the impressive changes that the congress had brought about: certain doctrines had been revised and Stalin’s personal dictatorship had been repudiated; an ‘economic offensive’ to the underdeveloped world had started, and the Kremlin held that the struggle with the capitalist world would be fought on the economy. Noting that ‘the fundamental outlook of the Soviet leadership has not changed’, the NATO experts pointed out that the Soviet Union had now an increasing volume of capital goods to export to other countries, and needed imports from the periphery. However, ‘[t]he weapons are economic, but even though the Soviet objectives are no doubt also in part economic, the danger to the West is principally political’. The document ended by posing a number of questions regarding Khrushchev’s motives in accepting the notion of different roads to socialism, the repudiation of Stalin or the aims of the ‘economic offensive’.136 This was a further failure: the last thing the NATO authorities wanted at that moment, was a series of questions. The working group needed to have answers. In April, the next report stressed the continuity of the regime despite de-Stalinization.137 In June 1956, a further paper discussed the Khrushchev speech which had now become available. Khrushchev’s ethical assumptions were described as sui generis, since he was repulsed by Stalin’s violence and torture against CPSU members, but accepted these methods against enemies of the regime. Although the NATO analysts attributed de-Stalinization to a desire for ‘revenge’ against the dead leader, they also noted the Kremlin’s need to reassure the CPSU apparatus that the excesses of the Stalinist era would not be repeated. The focus was on the rights of the party members: Khrushchev ‘gives to the Party what is meant for mankind’. However, this document was not an analysis of Soviet policy; effectively, it was a political ‘answer’ by Western political analysts to the Khrushchev speech.138
During the May 1956 NAC, as was usual in cases of surprises from the East, the Ministers, with Dulles taking the lead, stressed that the alliance should safeguard its unity. At the same time, in view of the insistence of many members since the previous NAC, but also of the failures of Western intelligence regarding the Twentieth Congress, they agreed that NATO political consultation should develop further, including a more systematic study of the new Soviet policy in the ‘underdeveloped’ world. Dulles referred to the dangers of the new Soviet opening to the developing countries. Lange warned that if the West refused to talk to the Soviets, it would simply strengthen the extremists in the Kremlin. Selwyn Lloyd suggested that the Soviet system might not survive the rise of a middle class and the increase of contacts with the West. The Soviet turn to the periphery, Selwyn Lloyd noted, was an indication of NATO’s success in Europe. Spaak – always more radical than his colleagues – called for an effort to ‘re-launch’ NATO. This discussion led to the appointment of the Committee of Three for the reorganization of NATO’s non-military functions (see below).139 The declarations of the Twentieth Congress regarding the new emphasis by the Kremlin on the underdeveloped world seemed to open a gigantic new ‘front’ of the Cold War. Previous reports on Soviet economic growth and on ‘trends’ of Soviet policy had predicted a more vigorous policy on that field. In February 1956, the West German Permanent Representative, Herbert Blankenhorn, suggested that NATO should analyse not only the political, but also the economic aspects of Soviet policy in the Near East.140 In March 1956, the French and the Italian delegations submitted notes to the NAC pointing to the vigour of Soviet ‘penetration’ of the ‘underdeveloped world’, and calling for greater exchange of information and the coordination of Western responses to these developments.141 A month later, Ismay prepared a memorandum on this new aspect of Soviet policy. He noted that Moscow had radically expanded its trade contacts with countries in the Near and the Middle East: five agreements in 1952, fifteen in 1953, thirty-four in 1954 and fifty-two in 1955; the volume of Soviet trade with these
countries had risen from $276 million in 1952 to $521 million in 1955. Ismay stressed that the Kremlin had shown great skill in making trade to serve ‘a well-thought-out ideological and political campaign’, and the Twentieth Congress showed that Moscow would continue this policy.142 NATO’s definite decision to monitor Soviet bloc economic activity in the global South came after much soul-searching. The Belgian Permanent Representative, André de Staercke, put forward an idea for the creation of a NATO fund in which every member would contribute; this, predictably, was not very popular with the other members. On its part, the US did not want to subject their global policy to the cumbersome NAC process, and anyway did not regard NATO as the appropriate forum to discuss these issues. The Americans preferred the major states (US, Britain, France, Canada and Germany) to coordinate their action outside the NAC processes. The British (stressing that money for the periphery, not international machinery, was lacking) preferred that action be undertaken by a small committee of ‘donor states’. They noted that it was anyway impossible to agree on common NATO action, while the new states of the periphery distrusted the Western alliance. Consultation, however, was another matter: NATO could discuss Soviet economic penetration of the global South, although it would not reach decisions to act. Pearson and the British pressed this point very convincingly, while the US delegation stressed to the State Department that the other allies expected such a discussion and would anyway raise the subject themselves. Although the State Department initially wondered ‘what such countries as Portugal, Italy and Greece could contribute besides “views”’, it finally agreed that periodical surveys of the ‘economic offensive’ would be welcome. Dulles and Selwyn Lloyd discussed this issue prior to the NAC meeting of May: both agreed that NATO should discuss the issue, but action should be taken outside the NATO framework, since it involved out-of-area questions. At the insistence of the German Foreign Minister, Heinrich von Brentano, and of Ismay, the May 1956 ministerial NAC asked for a more detailed study of this subject. The
Permanent Representatives authorized these studies in June 1956.143 In July 1956, in the wake of the crisis over the Suez Canal, the NATO economic experts prepared a memorandum on Soviet bloc interest in building a shipyard and a dry dock in Alexandria.144 At the same time, the discussion for the terms of reference of a new Committee of Technical Advisers to examine issues connected with Western aid to underdeveloped countries (the French Pineau Plan, see below) displayed the complexity of these problems.145 The breathtaking developments in Moscow, the inadequacies of the hastily prepared monthly reports on Soviet trends and the new needs for monitoring Soviet economic activity in the periphery (an unheard-of challenge for the civilian machinery of a military alliance) posed enormous problems. The NATO experts had failed to provide a credible analysis of Soviet policy: they merely provided commentary after the event. The need for a better structure of analysis was clear. It is telling that the March ‘trends’ report was regarded as particularly feeble in the British FO (and was criticized for laying too much emphasis on the economic, rather than the political motives of the ‘economic offensive’); the effort to discuss the ‘implications’ of Khrushchev’s speech was described as ‘rather vague and woolly’, and the relevant document as ‘useful, though somewhat pedestrian’.146 The British blamed Cosmelli for the inadequacies of the NATO process, and pressed for the return to the previous type of semi-annual ‘trends’ document. Although this was accepted for the April 1956 report and the British were entrusted with its drafting, it is interesting that the Americans showed some discomfort for this, and the British agreed to show their draft to the US officials before submitting it to the working group.147 These pointed to the need for a readjustment of analysis processes. Soon, new developments in Europe would push towards the same direction. Crisis in Poland, revolution in Hungary, surprise in Paris
Contrary to the US, which was monitoring Eastern Europe and was seeking a political warfare strategy towards it, the Soviet-dominated part of the continent – in Western parlance, the ‘satellites’ – had not taken up much space in NATO reports until 1956. Usually, the alliance experts noted that the Soviet hold on this region remained. Soviet repression was regarded as the natural consequence of a Soviet rule which effectively amounted to military occupation of, or quasi-imperial rule over the region. However, by late 1956 Eastern Europe was in turmoil and Hungary had been invaded.148 As was usually the case, turmoil had to appear in the ‘satellites’, especially in Poland in summer 1956,149 before the alliance experts got down to deal with it. Cosmelli’s replacement as Assistant Secretary General (and chairman of the working group on Soviet policy) by Alberico Casardi, in summer 1956, seems to have contributed to, but not to have caused this belated response, which was a permanent characteristic of NATO analysis. In July and August 1956 the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy turned its attention to the effects of de-Stalinization in Eastern Europe. The larger NATO members contributed papers on the situation in the satellites: it was perhaps predictable that, while all papers discussed the general situation in the region, the West Germans focused on the effects of de-Stalinization in East Germany, the French on the doctrinal discussions in the Kremlin and the British on the ‘more liberal trends in Soviet internal policy’.150 In late September 1956, a long memorandum entitled ‘The Thaw in Eastern Europe’ pointed to a new climate in Eastern Europe, which had its origins in ‘the passive resistance of the people to further sacrifices on behalf of the projects of their unpopular regimes’ and also in ‘the more active resistance of the West’. The Soviets, especially after Stalin’s death and Beria’s fall, reacted by ‘loosening the screws a few notches’, while most Eastern European leaderships were against any change. Noting the role of local intellectuals in pushing things towards the ‘thaw’, the NATO experts insisted that the causes were social and economic, mostly the failure of forced
collectivization, one-sized industrialization and the break of these societies’ links, economic and other, to the West: It would be wrong to look on at the thaw either as something forced on unwilling regimes by discontent from below or as concessions freely dispensed by Moscow and imposed on the local Communists from the ‘Centre’. Rather it should be viewed as a response to the political and economic situation which Stalinism had created – a situation which may be characterized as an impasse in both domestic and foreign affairs.151 Regarding particular countries, the NATO experts thought that there was little prospect for change in East Germany, where the population was strongly anti-Soviet, but had also realized after the June 1953 disturbances that ‘the Red Army cannot be driven out by workers with sticks and stones’. Discontent in East Germany was expressed ‘chiefly through the continuing exodus’. The analysts expressed hope about Poland, which was regarded as the satellite with the greatest anti-Soviet disposition. The June 1956 Poznan riots and the return of Wladyslaw Gomulka to power were seen as manifestations of this potential, although it was also stressed that the future of the country would be decided ‘in Warsaw and Moscow and the West can play only a marginal rôle’. The situation was much better for dissidents in the ‘northern tier’ (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary), while in the ‘southern group’ the regimes ‘have not merely tried to restrain [criticism], they have nipped it in the bud’. On its part, Moscow accepted a change of leadership in cases where the old rulers were ‘unduly conservative or hopelessly discredited’. This had happened in Poland, but also with the replacement of Vulko Chervenkov by Anton Yugov in Bulgaria, and with the reappearance of Imre Nagy in Hungary. Thus the Soviets tended to apply different measures in different countries, ‘perhaps pushing Bulgaria a bit and certainly holding back on Poland’. The NATO experts stressed that this was a departure from Stalinist methods, but there was no doubt about Soviet ability to retain control. At the same time, Tito’s Yugoslavia, which was (wrongly) described as ‘now more or less
back in the Communist camp’, could not act as a model for change. Thus, according to the NATO experts, the West should apply a careful and selective policy of contacts with these countries, and cautiously encourage the dissidents through contacts or broadcasts. However, the NATO experts went out of their way to criticize, indirectly but clearly, the recent Free Europe radio broadcasts to Eastern Europe. They stressed that moral support was important, but as we are not prepared to use force to liberate them, we should not encourage futile rebellions on their part […] the danger to the West is the tendency to substitute hope for reason and to assume that the ‘thaw’ has gone considerably further than it has in fact.152 This was an interesting effort to take distances from US propaganda. US strategy ruled out the ‘direct use of military force’ in an effort to ‘liberate’ Eastern Europe.153 However, the rhetoric of liberation was a different matter, and evidently caused strong discomfort in NATO. The NAC discussed the report on 26 October, as the crisis in Hungary was mounting. It is clear that the Permanent Representatives did not expect the climax of the following days: they asked for further studies on the subject.154 Indeed, the process of consultation had already continued, with the submission of additional papers by the British, the French and the Americans, in midOctober.155 However, as it turned out, there was no time for the preparation of a fresh report: NATO failed to predict a full-scale crisis in Hungary. It is true that the alliance experts did not have the time to digest information coming with breathtaking speed from Eastern Europe, and thus could hardly predict political and military developments which had acquired a dynamic of their own. This also was a time of grave strains for the Western alliance: the Suez crisis caused a major intra-NATO problem and led to a major propaganda success for the Soviet Union, at the very same moment when the Red Army was crushing a full-scale revolution in Eastern Europe. Additional internal strains had been caused by the Cyprus dispute
which had brought three NATO members (Britain, Greece and Turkey) at loggerheads. On various levels, things appeared to be going badly. Meanwhile, the NAC met repeatedly to deal with the crisis in Hungary. Ismay and many Permanent Representatives wanted the alliance to act as a body, but could suggest no clear way of ‘action’, whereas the British and the US took the line that there was little that NATO could do, except mobilize Western opinion. The British and the American view prevailed.156 The Soviet invasion also upset the drafting of a new report on Soviet ‘trends’. This time the Americans had been entrusted with the drafting, but the British objected to their analysis, when the Moscow Embassy commented that the text presented the Soviet leaders as ‘more in control of their own policies than they really are’.157 On top of that, the invasion of Hungary raised fresh dilemmas and stopped the production of the new report. In the NAC, the Belgian Permanent Representative, de Staercke, posed the crucial question: was the invasion a ‘revirement’ (a reversal and a return to Stalinism), or a ‘coup d’arrêt’ (a temporary interruption)?158 The NATO experts would now need to address this issue. However, as the US delegation reported to Washington, the dual crisis of autumn 1956 also served to demonstrate to all members the need for unity: this was the effect not only of the Soviet military operation in Hungary, but also of their fear of an intra-NATO split over Anglo-French policy in Suez.159 Finally, the December 1956 ‘trends and implications’ report was submitted by the International Staff, and presented an overall interpretation of Soviet policy. Echoing the dominant view in the West, the report stressed that the Soviet Union was both a springboard for world revolution and the inheritor of old Tsarist geopolitical ambitions. The Kremlin leaders had displayed ‘increasing realism and variety in their choice of methods’. In the three years since Stalin’s death, the aims of the Soviet regime had not changed, but its methodology had proved much more flexible, and its policy had become even more dangerous to the West.
Understanding that modernization was incompatible with ‘Stalinist violence’, the Soviet leaders were trying to strike ‘a new balance between coercion and initiative’. Evidently, this attitude, together with the apparent improvement of living conditions, ensured for them the acceptance of the Soviet public. In other words, the NATO analysts stressed the increasing legitimization of the post-Stalin regime and of ‘collective leadership’ under Khrushchev.160 Thus, NATO analysis now drew a clear line regarding internal legitimacy between the Soviet Union and the ‘satellites’. Unlike the Soviet case, Eastern European regimes were not legitimized. Following Stalin’s death, the new Soviet leadership had tried to moderate ‘the more onerous forms of Soviet control’, thus putting Soviet power in that region on a ‘sounder basis’. They had succeeded in most cases, although things had got out of control in Poland and mostly in Hungary, where Soviet concessions had come too little and too late. However, the Kremlin could not contemplate losing control of this area. In Western Europe, the Soviets had failed to stop German rearmament and mainly aimed to consolidate the East German regime, as a united pro-western Germany would alter the correlation of forces in the continent. This was regarded as the cornerstone of Soviet policy towards European NATO: ‘there is a direct connection between the problem of control over the Satellites, the German problem and the European problem as a whole’. At the same time, however, Moscow furthered cultural and scientific contacts with European NATO and tried to promote popular fronts in order to bring about changes of policy in the NATO members. The report expressly mentioned Iceland, Turkey and Greece as targets of Soviet propaganda and diplomacy.161 A special section of the report dealt with ‘the Middle East, Asia and Africa’ (also described as ‘the Bandung area’). It was stated that an alliance of the Soviet bloc with nationalist, anti-colonial and neutralist forces could outflank Western defences, strike at Western economic development and eventually pave the way for ‘forward policies in Europe’ – a marvellously ambiguous phrase. The Soviet propaganda success in posing as the champion of Egyptian independence during
the Suez crisis, and the Soviet arms sales to Egypt and Syria, were mentioned as serious threats. The Kremlin no longer pursued the Stalinist method ‘of trying to overthrow the existing régimes and encouraging only Communists or groups allied with the Communists’; it was prepared to work with any group with which it could ally against the West.162 This report was the last in which the NATO experts tried to study Soviet global policy in a single document. During the lengthy discussion in the December ministerial NAC, the French and the British came under fire for their action in Suez. All Ministers stressed the need to reinforce the unity of the alliance, but noted that the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution did not necessarily mark a return to Stalinist policies. At any rate, the European Ministers stressed, the West should not encourage uprisings which it could not aid militarily. Dulles went further, by posing the question whether the satellite armies would be a reliable ally of the Soviets in case of war. He also noted that the communist regimes were treating their populations as ‘slave labour’. The mood in the ministerial NAC was one of upholding the endangered unity of the alliance, and the ‘trends’ report was an integral part of the effort. This was one of the cases where the trends document played an important role in a ministerial session of the Council.163 Connected to the new aspects of the Soviet menace, was the study of the newly created Committee of Technical Advisers on a French scheme (the Pineau Plan) to set up an international/Western organization to administer aid to developing countries. This report raised problems of strategy in a global Cold War. It noted the dangers of Soviet penetration of the periphery: the economic expansion of NATO members was partially dependent on basic raw materials coming from these countries, and on access to their markets. Moreover, there was always the danger that the countries of the periphery, striving for economic development, would be tempted to adopt authoritarian regimes: ‘Whether or not such dictatorships fall within the Soviet orbit, their existence would not be conducive to world political stability’. Although the development of
these countries could impair sectors of Western industry (for example textiles), increased specialization in the global economy should be seen as a welcome trend: [D]evelopment is a long-term process, and the adjustments necessitated should consequently be assimilated in the process of economic expansion in NATO countries themselves. NATO countries can and must adapt themselves to increased competition from developing countries […]. In general, the economic growth of underdeveloped countries should have favourable long-term repercussions on the economies of the advanced countries […]. It is very desirable that the new influence of these countries in the concert of nations should be in support of the free world.164 However, the NATO members expressed strong reservations about the French idea of setting up new international machinery. Anyway, the less developed members of NATO, which had consistently argued for increased economic aid, objected to the French plan with the argument that the alliance should first aid its less advanced members. The restructuring of NATO analysis: the impact of the Report of the Three, December 1956 By mid-1956, when the Western powers (and the NATO analysts) had been surprised by the Twentieth Congress, and when NATO debated how to discuss the Soviet ‘economic offensive’ to the global South, it was clear that a new system of improved consultation was needed. The old dilemma between a long economic/political Cold War and the emphasis to defence had already been solved: NATO had to prepare for both. The prospect of ‘peaceful coexistence’ in a long Cold War raised once more the pressing need for safeguarding NATO cohesion: evidently, an alliance of sovereign states could more easily hold together in the face of a clear and present military danger, but could suffer from increasing internal disagreements in
the environment of a more loose and prolonged conflict. How could NATO respond to what the British Permanent Representative, Sir Christopher Steel, termed a ‘Soviet war of smiles’?165 In the December 1955 ministerial NAC, the Italians, the Canadians and many of the smaller members had called for a fuller implementation of Article 2 of the Treaty, and Ismay initiated the relevant discussion.166 This opened the road for a major rethinking about NATO, decided at the May 1955 ministerial NAC, which led to the Report of the Three in December 1956. In other words, NATO’s 1956–7 reform was rooted in the mutations of a long Cold War, whose tensions were now being visibly transferred, to a large extent, to non-military fields and the global South, while deterrence in the NATO area remained a main aspect. This meant that procedures for consultation now acquired a new importance. Despite their determination not to submit their policies for NAC approval, the Americans wanted to promote political consultation on the understanding that this would not entail a loosening of the defence effort.167 In summer 1956, parallel to the work of NATO’s Committee of Three Wise Men, the Americans set up their own working group, under Julius C. Holmes, to report on the ‘Atlantic Community’. This working group stressed the need for a readjustment of NATO and for strengthening its unity.168 In March 1956, Steel had made an interesting comment. Arguing for a NATO adjustment, Steel thought that Article 2 was a ‘joke’, and was often leading to demands which were ‘nonsense’, but there was a general uneasiness regarding the question ‘where we stand and where we are going’: Basically, I think it rests in the acute realization of all members of the Council that, with the exception of the United States, we are all pretty small fry except as members of the Atlantic Alliance. There is a genuine realisation both of what the Alliance has meant to the life of Western Europe during its existence and of the danger that unless an alliance has a real sense of purpose and a real vitality it will soon cease to be much more than the proverbial scrap of
paper. During the first few years of NATO’s existence there was no doubt about the purpose. An attack by the Soviet Union seemed an ever present possibility; the Western world was wholly unready for war; and the means to make ourselves ready for war quickly were not very ready to hand. The Organisation therefore had a very simple common goal – that of making progress without economic disaster towards a more adequate state of military preparedness. The world, however, is now not so simple. No one expects a Russian attack in the very immediate future; instead we are faced with the more difficult and less dramatic task of maintaining present standards of effectiveness with rapidly developing new weapons which no one except the Americans can afford. At the same time the Russians are seeking to undermine our position by tactics of a different order from those they have used in the past […].169 The Committee of Three was set up by the NAC ministerial session of May 1956 and aimed to address these major problems. It consisted of the Foreign Ministers of Italy, Gaetano Martino, Norway, Halvard Lange, and Canada, Lester B. Pearson, who in the previous years had distinguished themselves in seeking a deepening of consultation. Its terms of reference were ‘to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO cooperation in nonmilitary fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic alliance’. The committee held its first meetings in Paris at the end of June, and drafted a questionnaire which was sent to the memberstates. In late August the member-states submitted their replies, and the committee met again in Paris on 10–22 September, when it also heard representatives of the members.170 The enormous volume of working papers and background work by the International Staff attests to the effort of finding a common position on a variety of issues. In this process, the International Staff accepted the US position that the studies of the Soviet bloc economy did not entail an economic role for NATO:
the growing interest of the Organization in economic matters arises from the changing tactics of the Soviet bloc rather than from the intention of the member countries to use NATO as an instrument for general economic collaboration.171 In late September an initial report was drafted to which some special advisors also contributed: Professors Lincoln Gordon of Harvard University, Guido Carli of the University of Rome, and Robert Major, an advisor of Lange. The draft was revised in mid-November to take into account developments in Suez and Hungary.172 Presenting their final Report to the NAC, the Three expressly referred to the ‘signs of deterioration’ of intra-NATO cooperation, since ‘important initiatives affecting the common interest’ had been undertaken by some members without consultation with the allies. The Three made it clear that they had drafted a political document, addressing not only defence problems, but the wider crisis of legitimization of late modernity.173 This character of the Report was strongly declared in its very first paragraphs. The Three stressed that their recommendations aimed at strengthening ‘internal solidarity, cohesion and unity’. The employment of three different wordings which described the same thing – internal unity – was telling. Moreover, the Three stressed one of Ismay’s favourite points, namely that the notional barriers between military and political/economic security had been lowered, and that NATO’s deterrent role could not be fulfilled without close political and economic cooperation of its members: It has also become increasingly realised since the Treaty was signed that security is today far more than a military matter. The strengthening of political consultation and economic co-operation, the development of resources, progress in education and public understanding, all these can be as important, or even more important, for the protection of the security of a nation, or an alliance, as the building of a battleship or the equipping of an army. These two aspects of security – civil and military – can no
longer safely be considered in watertight compartments, either within or between nations.174 In the conditions of a long Cold War, the Three stressed, the Atlantic Community needed not only to protect itself, but also to prove that ‘the common cultural traditions, free institutions and democratic concepts’ of the West – all menaced by the Soviet Union – presented the best option for ‘progress and co-operation’. NATO had to ‘become more than a military alliance […] to grow beyond and above the emergency which brought it into being’. The development of such an Atlantic Community should take place gradually, and always keeping in mind that the military threat had not disappeared: ‘Strengthening the political and economic side of NATO is an essential complement to – not a substitute for – continuous cooperation in defence’. In these circumstances, the threat could only be dealt with through international cooperation, corresponding to a new phase of human history, in which nation-states had to combine to deal with the challenges: [The threat] comes from the revolutionary doctrines of Communism which have by careful design of the Communist leaders over many years been sowing seeds of falsehood concerning our free and democratic way of life. The best answer to such falsehoods is a continuing demonstration of the superiority of our own institutions over Communist ones. We can show by word and deed that we welcome political progress, economic advancement and orderly social change and that the real reactionaries of this day are these Communist regimes which, adhering to an inflexible pattern of economic and political doctrine, have been more successful in destroying freedom than in promoting it […]. The fundamental historical fact underlying this development is that the nation state, by itself and relying exclusively on national policy and national power, is inadequate for progress or even for survival in the nuclear age. As the founders of the North Atlantic Treaty foresaw, the growing interdependence of states, politically and economically as well as militarily, calls for an
ever-increasing measure of international cohesion and cooperation. Some states may be able to enjoy a degree of political and economic independence when things are going well. No state, however powerful, can guarantee its security and its welfare by national action alone.175 The Three went out of their way to note that a theoretical acceptance of the obligation to confer was insufficient; it was necessary to develop consultation in practice. The member-states needed to exchange views in an initial stage, prior to reaching decisions on a national level: ‘[w]ithout this the very existence of the North Atlantic Community may be in jeopardy […]. There cannot be unity in defence and disunity in foreign policy’. The Three also accepted that policy-making was a national competence, and that cases of emergency could arise, which would not permit consultation.176 The Report suggested an annual political appraisal of the alliance by the Secretariat. It also called for the setting up of a Committee of Political Advisers, drawn from each delegation, which ‘would include among its responsibilities current studies such as those on trends of Soviet policy’. The Three also proposed a process for the peaceful settlement of intra-NATO disputes. This would provide for an obligation of the members to solve their differences within NATO before resorting to a different organization, while the SecretaryGeneral would have the right to offer his ‘good offices’ in these cases. Still, specialized issues such as economic or legal problems would be exempted from this process.177 Economic cooperation in NATO was described as compatible with participation in other economic and mostly European organizations. This was a direct reference to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the discussions for the setting up of a European Common Market. The Three noted some priorities of the alliance in the economic field: avoidance of economic competition between the member-states; the promotion of the well-being of the peoples of the alliance; ‘the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movement of manpower and long-term capital’;
aid to underdeveloped areas of the globe. However, the Three also accepted the US view that the alliance could not claim a role in the economic development of its members, which involved the work of other organizations. Intra-NATO cooperation should focus on economic issues which were of special interest to the alliance, and on the development of consultation, including scientific and technical cooperation, a pivotal field in the development of the Atlantic Community. At the same time, the economic development of the Soviet world needed to be studied comprehensively. Thus, the Three proposed the setting up of a Committee of Economic Advisers, which would absorb the functions of the Committee of Technical Advisers. The report also dealt with the need to promote cultural cooperation in ways which would underline the ‘common cultural heritage’ of the Atlantic Community, such as exchange programmes or the NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Programme. Information policy remained at the hands of national governments, but consultation should also be strengthened through the cooperation of national services and the alliance’s Information Division. The Three considered that the NATO mechanism was adequate for the promotion of non-military cooperation, although better preparation of the ministerial sessions was needed in order to encourage ‘discussion rather than simply declarations of policy prepared in advance’.178 The NAC approved the Report in December 1956. Although Lester Pearson himself noted that consultation did not develop adequately in the following years,179 this was a huge leap for NATO. Political consultation would now be strengthened, and analysis of the nonmilitary aspects of Soviet power would become more thorough. In retrospect: facing the riddles of deStalinization The first attempts to develop NATO analysis in 1951–6 reflected the insecurities of the Western alliance, and its fear of the visibly ascending Soviet opponent. NATO insecurity was accentuated by
the fact that the Soviet Union was a totalitarian state, able to pursue growth as a political goal, without any regard for the needs of its own society. This was an extremely alien concept for an official or statesman of the liberal West, and tended to underline the threat coming from Moscow. The changes in the Soviet polity after 1953 were met with an insistence about the unchangeable totalitarian character of the Soviet Union. In the climate of that era, it was natural that NATO, a defensive alliance facing military inferiority and geographical disadvantage, tended to exaggerate Soviet economic or military capabilities. However, insecurity was also mirrored in the hiccups recorded in the NATO analysis process, mostly between the Americans and the European allies: initially underestimating the process of NATO analysis, the US suffered a serious ‘defeat’ in December 1952, and tried to reassert their primacy in the following years. The process was a novel phenomenon, and new methodologies had to be invented, new balances to be reached. In this context, the most pressing concern of the NATO working groups was to argue for allied unity, which was regarded as a precondition for survival. Thus, to give a few examples, in November 1954 the study of Soviet economic capabilities stressed the need for unity, as ‘no smaller combination of countries’ could provide a counterweight to the Soviet Union. In April 1955, dealing with the new change in the Soviet leadership, the NATO analysts repeated that ‘any serious weakness or division in the West’ would be dangerous.180 Evaluating the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence in July 1955, the analysts cautioned that it should not lead to a relaxation of Western effort: ‘In this way the West might be led to lose sight of the fundamental importance of maintaining its unity in NATO, and pressure might grow for major cuts in the defensive structure of the West’.181 The Committee of Three was expressly requested to report on strengthening allied unity, and this task became even more important in the year of the Suez crisis. Last but not least, the need for unity was a constantly recurring theme during the NAC ministerial sessions. However, after the restructuring of late 1956, mere calls for unity would not be enough. The first phase had
cleared the ground; now, a better understanding of the opponent needed to be projected, and a higher level of consultation to be reached. Notes 1 NATO/C5-D/2, ‘Report of the North Atlantic Council Deputies’, 14 September 1950; C5R/1, NAC record, 15 September 1950. 2 NATO/C6-R2, 19 December 1950. 3 NARA, RG 59, Penfield (London) to State Department, 6 February 1951, 740.5/2–651, Box 3432. 4 See the proposal of the Political Working Group for the procedure in NATO/D-D(51)92, ‘Exchange of Views on Matters of Common Political Concern’, 9 April 1951. 5 NARA, RG 59, Spofford (London) to State Department, 20 February 1951, 740.5/2– 2051, Box 3432A. 6 NATO/D-D(51)29(final), ‘Exchange of Views on Yugoslavia’, 14 February 1951. See also D-D(51)174, ‘Economic Assistance to Yugoslavia’, 7 July 1951. 7 NATO/D-D(51)90, ‘Draft Agreed Minute on Exchange of Views on Political, Economic and Military Conditions in East Germany’, 5 April 1951. For US views on East Germany see NARA, RG 59, Webb (Washington) to London, 20 February 1951, 740.5/2–2051, Box 3432A. 8 NATO/D-D(51)80(final), ‘Summary Report on Exchange of Views on Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria and Albania’, 24 April 1951; AC/2-D/5, ‘Draft Agreed Minute’, 20 April 1951. 9 NATO/D-D(51)133(revise), ‘Revised Draft Summary Report on Exchange of Views on Military, Political and Economic Conditions in Poland and Czechoslovakia’, 8 June 1951. See also TNA/FO 371/94488/1, Hoyer-Millar to FO, 26 April 1951; NARA, RG 59, Achilles (London) to State Department, 27 April 1951, 740.5/4–2751, Box 3434. 10 TNA/FO 371/94815/1, 2, 7, 9, minutes by Uffen, 2 May and Morgan, 19 April, HoyerMillar to FO, 3 May, minutes (Morgan), 25 May and 4 June 1951. 11 NARA, RG 59, Spofford to State Department, 12 June 1951, 740.5/6–1251, Box 3436. 12 NATO/D-D(51)169, ‘Draft Summary Report by the Political Working Group on the Deputies’ Exchange of Views on Political and Economic Conditions in the Soviet Union’, 28 June 1951. See also the drafts in AC/2-D/9(revise), 22 June 1951, and AC/2D/10(revise), 23 June 1951. 13 NATO/C7-D/1, ‘Report by the Council Deputies’, 1 September 1951; C7-R2 and R3, 16 and 17 September 1951; C7-D/24, ‘Exchange of views on the World Situation’, 19 September 1951. 14 NATO/C8-R2, 24 November 1951. 15 NATO/D-D(51)169, 28 June 1951; C8-D/4, ‘Estimate of the Relative Strength and Capabilities of NATO and Soviet Bloc Forces at Present and in the Immediate Future’, 23 November 1951. 16 NATO/AC/10-D/1, ‘Atlantic Community Committee’, 30 October 1951; C8-D/6, ‘Interim Report by the Committee of the North Atlantic Community’, 26 November 1951; C9-D/8, ‘Report by the Committee on the North Atlantic Community’, 19 February 1952.
17 Winfried Heinemann, ‘“Learning by Doing”: Disintegrating Factors and the Development of Political Cooperation in Early NATO’, in Mary Ann Heiss and S. Victor Papacosma (eds), NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 2008), pp. 47–8. 18 Vojtech Mastny, ‘Imagining War in Europe: Soviet Strategic Planning’, in Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark and Andreas Wenger (eds), War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 18. 19 John Baylis and Alan Macmillan, ‘The British Global Strategy Paper of 1952’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 16/2 (1993), pp. 200–26. 20 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 448– 53. 21 NATO/AC/2-D/13, ‘The World Situation’, 4 October 1951. 22 NATO/C9-D/9, ‘Relative Strength and Capabilities of NATO and Soviet Bloc Forces’, 9 February 1952; AC/2-D/15, ‘Assessment of NATO Military and Economic Capabilities in Relation to those of the Soviet Bloc’, 6 December 1951. On Soviet capabilities and the mistaken estimation of the ‘175 divisions’, see Mastny, ‘Imagining War in Europe’, p. 16. 23 TNA/FO 371/100846/1, minute (Hohler), 14 January 1952. 24 Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1952–4, V part 1, p. 280. 25 NATO/C9-D/1, ‘Soviet Foreign Policy’, 6 February 1952. Also published in FRUS, 1952–4, V part 1, pp. 280–8. See also the draft of the Political Working Group, in NATO/AC/2-D/14(revise), ‘Draft Summary Report on Exchange of Views on Soviet Foreign Policy’, 16 November 1951. 26 NATO/C9-R3, 22 February 1952. 27 Ismay strongly insisted on this point. See Ismay, Report to the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC in Bonn, May 1957, in www.nato.int/archives/ismayrep/index.htm, assessed 12 February 2011. 28 TNA/FO 371/102301/10, Hoyer-Millar to Hood, 27 June 1952. 29 See among others, FRUS, 1952–4, V part 1, Draper (NATO) to State Department, 9 July 1952 and 26 August 1952, Bruce (Washington) to US Embassy London, 16 August 1952, Acheson to US Embassy France, pp. 309–11, 315–17, 313–15, 319–21. 30 FRUS, 1952–4, V part 1, Acheson to US Embassy France, 19 September 1952, pp. 323–7. 31 TNA/FO 371/100833/1, UK delegation NATO to FO, 7 October 1952. See also NATO/CM(52)116, Cumming, cover letter, 1 December 1952; AC/34-D/2(revised), 3 November 1952; CR(52)24, 10 October 1952. 32 NARA, RG 59, Bruce (Washington) to Paris, 16 October 1952, 740.5/10–1652, Box 3456. 33 TNA/FO 371/100833/1, Hohler (FO) to Hoyer-Millar, 14 October 1952. 34 TNA/FO 371/100833/5, Mason (FO) to Brown (NATO), 22 October 1952. 35 TNA/FO 371/100833/5, Morgan (NATO) to Hohler, 24 October 1952. 36 TNA/FO 371/100833/7, Morgan to Grey (Moscow), 10 November 1952. 37 TNA/FO 371/100833/5, Morgan to Hohler, 1 November 1952. 38 NARA, RG 59, memorandum, Wolf to Moore, 19 November 1952, 740.5/11–1952, Box 3457. 39 NARA, RG 59, Draper (Paris) to State Department, 20 November 1952, 740.5/11– 2052; Bruce to Paris, 20 November 1952, 740.5/11–2052, Box 3457.
40 TNA/FO 371/100833/14, UK delegation NATO to FO, 7 December 1952; NATO/AC/34D/4, US memorandum, 7 December 1952. See also NARA, RG 59, Acheson to Paris, 2 December 1952, 740.5/12–252; Draper to State Department, 3 December 1952, 740.5/12–352, Box 3458. 41 TNA/FO 371/100833/14 and 15, minutes (Morgan), 8 and 9 December 1952, UK delegation NATO to FO, 8 December 1952, and FO to NATO, 10 December 1952. 42 NARA, RG 59, Acheson to Paris, 8 December 1952, 740.5/12–852, Box 3458. 43 TNA/FO 371/100833/20, Brief for the Foreign Secretary, 11 December 1952. 44 NATO/CM(52)116, ‘Trends of Soviet Policy’, 1 December 1952. 45 NATO/CM(52)116, ‘Trends of Soviet Policy’, 1 December 1952. 46 NATO/CM(52)116, ‘Trends of Soviet Policy’, 1 December 1952. 47 NATO/CM(52)139, Acheson statement, 16 December 1952. 48 NATO/CVR(52)38, 16 December 1952. 49 FRUS, 1952–4, V, part 1, Acheson to Truman, 17 December 1952, pp. 351–3. 50 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: a Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 127–63. 51 Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p. 27. 52 NATO/AC/34-D/6, ‘The Role of China in Soviet Policy’, 4 March 1953. 53 TNA/FO 371/106529/30, Brief for the Minister of State. 54 NARA, RG 59, Draper to State Department, 3 March 1953, 740.5/3–353, Box 3462; Dulles to Paris, 19 March 1953, 740.5/3–1953, Box 3463. 55 NATO/CM(53)44, ‘The Role of China in Soviet Policy’ 16 April 1953. 56 NATO/CM(53)14, Memorandum by the Turkish delegation, 24 February 1953. 57 NARA, RG 59, Smith (Washington) to Paris, 9 May 1953, 740.5/5–953, Box 3465. 58 See Ian Jackson, The Economic Cold War: America, Britain and East–West Trade, 1948–63 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001); Frank Cain, Economic Statecraft during the Cold War: European Responses to the US Trade Embargo (London: Routledge, 2007). 59 NATO/CM(53)86, ‘East/West Trade’, 22 June 1953. 60 TNA/FO 371/106025/2, 4, 5, 8 and 9, Vincent to Christofas, 3 July, Bell (NATO) to Crawford (FO), 27 July, Hardman (NATO) to FO, 13 August, Christofas to Vincent, 31 August, Steel to FO 2 September, and minute (Christofas), 8 September 1953. See the discussion of the Secretariat paper in the NAC, in NATO/CR(53)40, 3 September 1953. 61 TNA/FO 371/111684/2, Brown to Dobbs, 12 February 1954. 62 Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–73 (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 545. 63 NARA, RG 59, Dulles to Paris, 3 February 1953, 740.5/2–353, Box 3461. 64 See NATO/AC/34-D9 and D-10, memoranda by Portugal and Belgium, 24 and 30 March 1953 respectively. The French wanted NATO to issue a declaration of policy towards the Soviet Union, but this was resisted by the British and the Americans: TNA/FO 371/106529/25, Mason to Hoyer-Millar, 10 April 1953. 65 NATO/CM(53)38, ‘Calendar of Events since Stalin’s Death and Points to be Considered by Ministers’, 14 April 1953. 66 NARA, RG 59, Smith to Paris, 10 April 1953, 740.5/4–1053; Smith to Paris, 13 April 1953, 740.5/4–1353, Box 3464. 67 NATO/CR(53)17, 17 April 1953. 68 TNA/FO 371/106529/7 and 13, Brown (NATO) to Morgan, 18 February and 7 March 1953; FO 371/106528/4, minute (Roberts), 8 April 1953.
69 NATO/CVR(53)21, 23 April 1953; NARA, RG 59, Draper to State Department, 24 April 1953, 740.5/4–2453, Box 3464. 70 FRUS, 1952–54, VIII, Special Estimate: ‘Current Communist Tactics’, 24 April 1953, pp. 1160–2. 71 On the emergence of the post-Stalinist leadership, the Khrushchev–Malenkov duel, and the debate about the ‘window of opportunity’, see Mark Kramer, ‘The Early PostStalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East–Central Europe’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 1/1–3, (1999), pp. 3–55, 3–38 and 3–66 respectively; Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: the Stalin Years (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 180–5; Mark Kramer, ‘International Politics in the Early Post-Stalin Era: A Lost Opportunity, a Turning Point, or More of the Same?’ and Vojtech Mastny, ‘The Elusive Détente: Stalin’s Successors and the West’, in Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood (eds), The Cold War after Stalin’s Death: a Missed Opportunity for Peace? (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), pp. xiii–xxxv and 3–26, respectively; Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: the United States, the Soviet Union and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), pp. 100–35; Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), pp. 96–109; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: the Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2006), pp. 28–9; Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: from the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011), pp. 134–5; Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Stalin’s Cold War: Soviet Strategies in Europe, 1943 to 1956 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), pp. 171–91; William Taubman, ‘The Khrushchev Period, 1953–1964’, in Ronald Grigor Suny (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia, Vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 268–91; Geoffrey Roberts, ‘A Chance for Peace? The Soviet Campaign to End the Cold War, 1953–1955, CWIHP Working Paper No. 57, Washington, DC, 2008. 72 FRUS, 1952–54, V, part 1, Hughes (NATO) to State Department, 27 and 29 June and 2 July 1953, Merchant to Dulles, 7 July 1953, memorandum for the President, 8 July 1953, pp. 416–36; FRUS, 1952–4, VIII, memorandum (Nitze) to Dulles, 10 March 1953, Special Estimate, 12 March 1953, pp. 1107–8, 1125–9. 73 NATO/CM(53)87, Ismay, ‘NATO: the Present Position’, 25 June 1953; CR(53)16, 14 April 1953. See also CR(53)32, 1 July 1953, when the NAC discussed Ismay’s paper: although all Permanent Representatives agreed with his conclusions, the British and the Norwegian, reflecting their governments preference for negotiations with the Soviets, insisted that things were not so bad regarding the Western public opinion. 74 FRUS, 1952–4, V, part 1, Draper to Eisenhower, 5 June 1953, pp. 401–8. 75 FRUS, 1952–4, V, part 1, Hughes to State Department, 8 April 1954, pp. 495–7. 76 See, among many others, NARA, RG 59, Dulles to Paris, 20 October 1953, 740.5/10– 2053, Adair to Thurston, 22 October 1953, 740.5/10–2253, Box 3469; Dulles to Paris, 6 November 1953, 740.5/11–653, Dulles to Paris, 28 November 1953, 740.5/11–2853, Box 3470; Smith to Paris, 13 April 1954, 740.5/4–1354, Box 3474; Dulles to Paris, 27 October 1954, 740.5/102754, Box 3480A; Dulles to Paris, 5 November 1954, 740.5/11– 554, Box 3481. 77 TNA/FO 371/106530/53, 57 and 61, Brown to Jellicoe (FO) 8 and 20 October 1953, and minute (Hohler), 26 November 1953. See also NARA, RG 59, Hughes (Paris) to State Department, 20 October 1953, 740.5/10–2053, Box 3469.
78 NATO/CR(54)8, 19 March 1954; TNA/FO 371/111684/5 and 14, Brown to Dobbs, 17 March 1954, and Brown to Jellicoe, 25 November 1954. 79 See NARA, RG 59, Adair to Thurston, 22 October 1953, 740.5/10–2253, Box 3469. 80 NATO/CM(54)57, 5 July 1954. In November 1954 the NAC considered a suggestion to present digests of the ‘trends’ report for the press (in order to avoid leakages), but this was successfully resisted by Fenoaltea, the chairman of the working group, who (with British support) pointed out that the production of different versions would itself be leaked and cause a sensation: CR(54)44, 26 November 1954. Leaks to Sulzberger had occurred even in the case of the 1953 China paper, sparking strong US fears about the security of the NATO processes: NARA, RG 59, Dulles to Paris, 29 April 1953, 740.5/4– 2953, Box 3464. 81 NATO/CM(54)36, Note by Ismay, 20 April 1954. 82 On the New Look see, among others, Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, pp. 164–97; Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look. 83 NATO/CR(53)50, 4 December 1953. 84 NATO/CM(53)164, ‘Report on Trends of Soviet Policy’, 5 December 1953. 85 NATO/CM(53)166, Resolution on the 1954 Annual Review, 15 December 1953. 86 David C. Engerman, Know Your Enemy: the Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 206–11. 87 See the documents ‘Report on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, NATO/CM(54)33, 15 April 1954; CM(54)116, 9 December 1954. 88 See NATO/AC/34-D(55)1, ‘Purge of Malenkov’, 7 March 1955. 89 NATO/CM(55)36, ‘Recent Developments in the USSR’, 26 March 1955; and CM(55)46, ‘Report on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 29 April 1955. 90 NATO/CR(55)11, 1 April 1955. 91 NATO/CM(53)164, ‘Report on Trends of Soviet Policy’, 5 December 1953. 92 On the 1953 events, see Wilfried Loth, The Division of the World, 1941–1955 (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 267–73; Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: the Crisis in Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 6 and 15; Christian F. Ostermann, ‘The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback’, CWIHP Working Paper No. 11, Washington, DC, 1994; Kramer, ‘The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle’. 93 See the documents ‘Report on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, NATO/CM(54)33, 15 April 1954; CM(54)116, 9 December 1954; CM(55)46, 29 April 1955; CM(55)62, 4 July 1955; CM(55)121, 3 December 1955; CM(56)10, 8 February 1956. 94 NATO/CM(55)62, 4 July 1955. 95 See the works of Mastny, ‘The Warsaw Pact as History’, in Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (eds), A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991 (Budapest: Central European University, 2005), pp. 3–6, and ‘NATO in the Beholder’s Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949–56’, CWIHP Working Paper No. 35, Washington, DC, 2002, p. 66. 96 See note 93, and Hoover to Paris, 23 November 1955, 740.5/112355, Box 3123. 97 NATO/CVR(53)53 and 54, 14 December 1953; CVR(54)17, 23 April 1954. 98 NATO/CVR(55)18, 19 and 20, 9 and 10 May 1955. 99 NARA, RG 59, Dulles to Paris, 30 June 1955, 740.5/6–3055, Box 3119. 100 NATO/CVR(55)32, 16 July 1955; CR(55)34, 22 July 1955; NARA, RG 59, Dube (Ottawa) to State Department, 28 July 1955, 740.5/7–2855, Box 3120.
101 NATO/PO/55/800 and PO/55/985, Ismay to Permanent Representatives, 22 September and 6 December 1955. 102 NATO/CVR(55) 88 and 60, 15 and 16 December 1955. 103 On the growth of the Soviet economy in the first post-Stalin years see, among others, Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: an Economic History of the USSR from 1945 (London: Longman, 2003), pp. 48–69. 104 See, among others, FRUS, 1952–4, VIII, National Intelligence Estimate, 16 June 1953, Special Estimate: ‘Probable Long-Term Development of the Soviet Bloc and Western Power Positions’, 8 July 1953, National Intelligence Estimate: ‘Soviet Bloc Capabilities and Main Lines of Policy through mid-1959’, 7 June 1954, National Intelligence Estimate: ‘Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action through mid-1959, 14 September 1954, pp. 1188–92, 1196–205, 1233–8, 1248–53. 105 Engerman, Know Your Enemy, pp. 112–13. 106 NATO/CM(54)99, ‘Economic Comparison between the NATO Countries and the Soviet Bloc’, 9 November 1954. 107 NATO/CM(54)99, ‘Economic Comparison between the NATO Countries and the Soviet Bloc’, 9 November 1954. 108 NATO/CM(54)99, ‘Economic Comparison between the NATO Countries and the Soviet Bloc’, 9 November 1954. 109 TNA/FO 371/111341/2, Cheetham (NATO) to Hohler, 19 November 1954. 110 NARA, RG 59, Dulles to Paris, 24 November 1954, 740.5/11–2454, Box 3481. 111 NATO/CR(54)44, 26 November 1954; CR(54)45, 2 December 1954. 112 NATO/AC/89-D/1(final), 25 April 1955; AC/89-D/2, 24 February 1955. 113 NATO/AC/89-R1, R2 and R3, 11 February, 7 April and 21 July 1955. See also TNA/FO 371/116122/6, Bell (NATO) to Rodgers, 8 February, and FO paper, March 1955 (on the working group’s procedure). The British were already working on comparisons up to 1975: TNA/FO 371/116122/20, COS/Joint Intelligence Committee, ‘The Economic Development of the USSR – 1950–1961’, 7 July 1954, and Brief: ‘The Long-term Economic Growth of NATO Countries and the Sino-Soviet Bloc’, summer 1955. See also NARA, RG 59, Dulles to Rome, 2 March 1955, 740.5/3–255, Box 3115; State Department instruction to Paris, 10 March 1955, 740.5/3–1055, Box 3116. 114 NARA, RG 59, Perkins to State Department, 24 September 1955, 740.5/9–2455, Box 3122. 115 NARA, RG 59, Hoover to Paris, 3 November 1955, 740.5/11–355, Box 3123. 116 NATO/CM(55)119, ‘Comparison of Economic Trends in the NATO and Soviet Countries – Interim Report’, 2 December 1955. 117 NATO/CM(55)119, ‘Comparison of Economic Trends in the NATO and Soviet Countries – Interim Report’, 2 December 1955. 118 NATO/CM(55)119, ‘Comparison of Economic Trends in the NATO and Soviet Countries – Interim Report’, 2 December 1955. 119 NATO/CVR(55) 88 and 60, 15 and 16 December 1955. 120 TNA/FO 371/116122/25, Record of meeting in Treasury, 22 November 1955; FO 371/122088/1, Bell (NATO) to Radice (MoD), 17 January 1956. 121 TNA/FO 371/122088/2, Bell to Neild (Treasury), 20 February 1956, and Hohler to Barker (Washington), 28 February 1956; FO 371/122790/16, minute (Nove), 9 April 1956. See also NARA, RG 59, Perkins to State Department, 28 February 1956, 740.5/2–2856, Box 3126; Perkins to State Department, 2 March 1956, 740.5/3–256, Box 3127.
122 TNA/FO 371/122088/18, 23 and 34, Barker to Gallagher (FO), 23 June and 17 July, and FO minute ‘Comparison of Economic Growth in the Soviet Bloc and in NATO Countries’, late 1956. 123 NARA, RG 59, Martin (Paris) to State Department, 12 January 1956, 740.5/1–1256, Box 3125; Dulles to Paris, 23 June 1956, 740.5/6–2356, Box 3132. 124 For reports on its meetings, see TNA/FO 371/122088/25, 32, 33, Potter (NATO) to Spicer (Treasury), 17 November, 20 November and 27 November 1956. See also NARA, RG 59, Perkins to State Department, 12 October 1956, 740.5/10–1256, Box 3135; Perkins to State Department, 15 November 1956, 740.5/11–1556, Box 3136. 125 NATO/CM(56)50, ‘The Soviet Sixth Five-Year Plan’, 26 April 1956; AC/89-D/6(revised), ‘The Soviet Sixth Five-Year Plan and Its Implications for NATO’, 23 April 1956; AC/89D/12, ‘Comparison of Economic Growth in the Soviet bloc and NATO’, 12 November 1956. 126 NATO/AC/89-D4, 5 March 1956. 127 NATO/CM(56)131, ‘Comparison of Economic Growth in the Sino-Soviet Bloc and in NATO Countries’, 30 November 1956. 128 NATO/CM(54)36, 20 April 1954; CM(55)119, 2 December 1955; CM(56)131, 30 November 1956. 129 NARA, RG 59, Dulles to Paris, 10 March 1955, 740.5/3–1055, Box 3116. 130 NATO/CR(56)5, 9 February 1956. 131 TNA/FO 371/116658/3, Greenhill (NATO) to Laskey (FO), 15 February 1955; FO 371/116659/25, Greenhill to Jellicoe, 2 July 1955. 132 TNA/FO 371/122789/1, Steel to FO, 15 February 1956. 133 NATO/CM(56)10, ‘Analysis of the Trends of Soviet Policy’, 8 February 1956. 134 FRUS, XXVI, Paper on the Soviet Leadership Situation, 11 January 1956, Policy Information Statement, 8 February 1956, pp. 38–40 and 56–8; Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look, p. 159. 135 NATO/CM(56)40, ‘Note by the US delegation’, 5 April 1956. The US Ambassador to Moscow, Charles E. Bohlen, reached quite early the conclusion that Stalin’s repudiation aimed to reassure party members that the past excesses would not be repeated, and to conclude the transfer of legality to the CPSU: FRUS, 1955–57, XXVI, Memorandum (Davis, PPS) to Bowie, 11 April 1956, pp. 93–5. 136 NATO/CM(56)26, ‘Analysis of Trends of Soviet Policy’, 8 March 1956. 137 NATO/CM(56)49, ‘Trends of Soviet Policy’, 20 April 1956. 138 NATO/CM(56)80, ‘Some Implications of Khrushchev’s Secret Speech’, 19 June 1956. See also AC/34-WP(56)5, ‘Some Implications of Khrushchev’s Secret Speech’, 13 June 1956. 139 NATO/CVR(56)20 and 21, 4 May 1956. 140 NATO/CR(56)6, 18 February 1956. 141 NATO/CM(56)29, (French delegation), 12 March; CM(56)36, (Italian delegation), 18 March 1956. 142 NATO/CM(56)52, Note by the Secretary-General, 28 April 1952. 143 TNA/FO 371/120804/4, 5, 16, Coulson (Washington) to Wright (FO), 5 April; Caccia to Wright (Washington), 18 April 1956, FO circular to Embassies in the Commonwealth countries, 28 April, and FO to Washington, 29 April 1956; FO 371/120805/33, Note on the ‘Belgian Plan’, May 1956; FO 371/120807/97, Steel (NATO) to FO, 28 June 1956. See also NARA, RG 59, Perkins to State Department, 13 March 1956, 740.5/3–1356, Box 3127; Perkins to State Department, 27 April 1956, 740.5/4–2756, Box 3129; Dulles
to Paris, 22 May 1956, 740.5/5–2256, Box 3130; FRUS, 1955–57, IV, US delegation NATO to State Department, 4 May 1956, pp. 54–57. See also, NATO/CM(56)74 ‘Periodic Surveys of Soviet Economic Penetration in Underdeveloped Countries’, 31 May 1956; CR(56)30, 15 June 1956; AC/89-D/10, ‘Periodic Surveys of Soviet Moves vis-à-vis the outside world’ (draft), 4 September 1956. 144 NATO/CM(56)100, ‘Egyptian Project for Building a Shipyard and Dry Dock in Alexandria’, 20 July 1956. 145 NATO/CM(56)79, ‘Proposed Terms of Reference of a Committee of Technical Advisers’, 15 June 1956. 146 TNA/FO 371/122789/8, minutes by Hibbert, 12 March, Hutchings, 13 March and Duncan, 15 March 1956; FO 371/122790/27 and 31, Greenhill to Hibbert, 8 June and FO minute, 18 June 1956. 147 TNA/FO 371/122789/11, Greenhill to Gallagher, 23 March 1956. 148 Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II (New York: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 244–51; Zubok, A Failed Empire, pp. 114–19; Johanna Granville, The First Domino: International Decision-Making during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2004); Charles Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006); Mark Kramer, ‘The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings’, Journal of Contemporary History, 33/2 (1998), pp. 163–214; Aleksandr Stykalin, ‘The Hungarian Crisis of 1956: The Soviet Role in the Light of New Archival Documents’, Cold War History, 2/1 (2001), pp. 113–44; Csaba Békés, ‘The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality’, Cold War History, 6/4 (2006), pp. 477–500; Csaba Békés, ‘The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics’, CWIHP Working Paper No. 16, Washington, DC, 1996, p. 21; Lászlo Borhi, ‘Rollback, Liberation, Containment, or Inaction? US Policy and Eastern Europe during the 1950s’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 1/3 (1999), pp. 67–110; Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, pp. 114–37; Haslam, Russia’s Cold War, pp. 166–74. 149 See the discussion on the Poznan riots: NATO/CR(56)39, 18 July 1956. 150 See among others, NATO/TSP/56/12 and 14, 13 and 21 July 1956 (West German papers); TSP/56/16 and 22, 26 July and 6 August 1956 (Italian); TSP/56/19, 27 July 1956 (British); TSP/56/23, 13 August 1956 (French). 151 NATO/CM(56)110, ‘The Thaw in Eastern Europe’, 24 September 1956. 152 NATO/CM(56)110, ‘The Thaw in Eastern Europe’, 24 September 1956. Especially on Tito’s effort to resist, exactly then, Soviet pressures to return to the fold, see Svetozar Rajak, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953–1957 (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 151–9 and 168–72. It should be noted that the US disagreed with the view that Tito had returned to the Soviet sphere of influence. 153 See the careful analysis in Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look, pp. 158–67; see also Christopher J. Tudda, ‘“Reenacting the Story of Tantalus”: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Failed Rhetoric of Liberation’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 7/4 (2005), pp. 3–35. 154 NATO/CR(56)56, 26 October 1956; CM(56)122, ‘The Thaw in Eastern Europe – further action’, 27 October 1956. 155 NATO/TSP/56/26, 27 and 28, 8 and 10 October 1956 (British, French and US papers respectively).
156 TNA/FO 371/131024/1, Steel to Selwyn Lloyd, 21 January 1957, annual review for 1956. 157 TNA/FO 371/122791/57, Parrot (Moscow) to Brimelow, 12 October, and Cheetham to Brimelow, 19 October 1956. 158 TNA/FO 371/122791/61 and 65, Cheetham to Bushell, 6 November, and Porter to Hancock, 19 November 1956. 159 NARA, RG 59, Perkins to State Department, 9 November 1956, 740.5/11–956, Box 3136. 160 NATO/CM(56)133, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 3 December 1956. 161 NATO/CM(56)133, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 3 December 1956. 162 NATO/CM(56)133, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 3 December 1956. 163 NATO/CVR(56)69 and 70, 11 December 1956. 164 NATO/CM(56)142, ‘Report on the Pineau Plan for Aid to Underdeveloped Countries’, 18 December 1956. 165 TNA/FO 371/131024/1, Steel to Selwyn Lloyd, 21 January 1957, annual review for 1956. 166 For informative summaries, see TNA/FO 371/124797/4 and 18, FO papers on Article 2. 167 FRUS, 1955–57, IV, US delegation NATO to State Department, 17 December 1955 and 4 May 1956, pp. 41–4 and 54–7. See also FRUS, 1955–7, IV, Dulles to Eisenhower, 5 and 6 May 1956, and NSC, 284th meeting, 10 May 1956, pp. 75–84. The US position was stated to the Committee of Three: NATO/CT-R/11, Report on the consultation with the United States, 19 September 1956. 168 NARA, RG 59, Report, Atlantic Community Working Group, 3 August 1956, 740.5/8– 356, Box 3133. 169 FO 371/124798/37, Steel to Clarke, 28 March 1956. 170 See the questionnaire at NATO/CT-D/1(revised), 28 June 1956; CT-WP/3, ‘Draft Analysis of the Replies’, 31 August 1956; and the records at CT-R series for the consultations. See also the discussions of Pearson with the Americans, in NARA, RG 59, Rewinkel (Ottawa) to State Department, 5 June 1956, 740.5/6–556, and Record of meeting (Dulles–Pearson), 11 June 1956, 740.5/6–1156, Box 3131. 171 NATO/CT-D/7, Report by the International Staff, 28 August 1956. 172 NATO/CM(56)127(Revised), Annex 1, ‘Committee of Three: Formal Record of Procedures’. See the two main early drafts in CT-WP/7(final), 24 September 1956; CTWP/7(final)(Ottawa), 23 October 1956. 173 NATO/CM (56)126, Letter of transmittal of the Report of the Committee of Three, 17 November 1956. 174 NATO/CM(56)127(Revised), Report of the Committee of Three, 10 January 1957. 175 NATO/CM(56)127(Revised), Report of the Committee of Three, 10 January 1957. 176 This aimed to reduce US objections for political consultation, and to secure Washington’s freedom of action: see Heinemann, ‘“Learning by Doing”’, p. 51. Without questioning this interpretation, this author suggests that US freedom of action was also welcome by some of the smaller powers of the alliance, which always felt more secure knowing that the mighty Americans would be able to assume initiatives. 177 NATO/CM(56)127(Revised), 10 January 1957. The Three had examined the possibility to set up a standing committee of the NAC, responsible to mediate in infra-NATO disputes; an arbitral board had also been discussed. However these options would not secure the acceptance of all member-states, and the proposed procedure was
presented as the ‘minimum requirement’ which could be acceptable to all. See NATO/CM (56)126, Letter of transmittal, 17 November 1956. 178 See NATO/CM (56)127(Revised), 10 January 1957. 179 Lester B. Pearson, Memoirs, 1948–1957, Vol. 2: The International Years (London: Gollancz, 1974), pp. 96–7. See also a similar observation in Alistair Buchan, NATO in the 1960s: the Implications of Interdependence (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1960). 180 NATO/CM(55)46, ‘Report on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 29 April 1955. 181 NATO/CM(55)62, ‘Report on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 4 July 1955.
2 The emergence of specialized studies From the Three Wise Men to APAG, 1957–62 The new machinery of NATO analysis The approval of the Report of the Three led to a more organized structure of NATO analysis. New permanent machinery was created: the Committee of Political Advisers, and the Committee of Economic Advisers. Deciding the functions and roles of the two committees was an interesting process. The Committee of Political Advisers, consisting of members of the national delegations, seemed to raise most of the problems. Initially, the Canadians wanted it to be able to choose the themes of its agenda, which the NAC would then confirm. However, this suggested a wide autonomy for the committee, which other members found unacceptable. The State Department objected, pointing out that the agenda of the Political Advisers should be ‘firmly in hands Council [NAC] itself’, which (together with the Secretary-General) should retain the leading role in political consultation.1 Still, the Political Advisers practically expanded their agenda, if only because of the width of the topics that they had to address: the situation in, and regular contacts with the Soviet bloc, intra-NATO deliberations, the political dimensions of defence, as well as developments in other parts of the globe. It was impossible for the NAC to discuss everything, and the lower-level Political Advisers offered an alternative forum in which memberstates were able to inform their allies about Soviet developments, and to exchange views. Despite the State Department’s initial reservations, the US delegation to NATO was favourable to this
tendency: thus, in early 1957, when the smaller countries wanted to raise disarmament in the Political Advisers, the delegation reminded the State Department that consultation was important for the smaller members, and a negative US attitude would have a ‘dampening effect’. The US, the delegation concluded, should be ‘liberal’ on this.2 In 1958, when the Canadians wanted to discuss Spaak’s contacts with other regional alliances, the US delegation cautioned the State Department that it was better to have this debate in the lower-level Political Advisers, rather than in the NAC.3 Thus, the Political Advisers proved of much value both for the large and the smaller members of NATO. The State Department, after ensuring that the Political Advisers would not become a ‘second NAC’, acquiesced to their expanded roles. Since the Committee of Political Advisers consisted of members of the delegations, its membership was subject to constant change. In the first meetings of 1957, it was chaired by the Assistant SecretaryGeneral for Political Affairs, Casardi, and the most active members were J. Cheetham (Britain), F. E. Nolting (US), J. le Roy (France) and E. Wickert (Germany). William M. Newton of the Political Affairs Division and J. Licence of the Economic Affairs and Finance Division also participated.4 Some members had already played a major role in the working group on Soviet trends (for example Cheetham) or in the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy (Licence), and this provided for a measure of continuity with the work of the previous bodies. At the same time, national experts also advised the members of the committee or attended some meetings, for example the British FO’s Brimelow. The Economic Advisers would report on economic issues, including Soviet activity in the periphery. A little later, the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy became a sub-committee of this new group. According to US preference, the Economic Advisers would be a standing committee consisting of members of the delegations and delegating specific studies to working groups (whereas the British preferred it as an ad hoc body with flexible membership, including
experts from the national capitals).5 The American idea was adopted. At US suggestion, the Economic Advisers were able to ask for the Political Advisers’ comment on the political implications of their reports, but no hierarchical relationship between the two was established.6 As could be expected, problems of coordination between the two bodies occurred, especially in an early stage. Thus, in March 1957 the Assistant Secretary-General for Economics and Finance (and chairman of the Economic Advisers), François-Didier Gregh, complained that the delegations were submitting papers of economic interest to the Political, instead of the Economic Advisers.7 The British successfully resisted the idea to produce ‘parallel’ studies on political and economic Soviet ‘trends’ by both the Political and the Economic Advisers, arguing that a single document (by the former) would be more comprehensive.8 In 1958 the Americans and the Canadians urged for more extensive exchanges on Soviet economic policy.9 It took about a year to find a new balance. In its initial meetings of 1957–8, the committee’s membership included A. K. Potter (Britain, one of the longest-serving members), E. Martin (US), P. Blanc (France), A. Böker (West Germany), and the International Staff’s Licence and P. Basolevant (from the Political Division).10 Again, the presence of people who were very active in the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy (like Licence and Potter) provided for continuity with the previous period. At the same time, the drafts of the Economic Advisers were also being examined by the national governments, both the Foreign Ministries and the economic authorities. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that the documents of the Political and the Economic Advisers did not represent merely the views of medium-rank diplomats; they were accepted (eventually) by the national governments. The setting up of the two committees soon brought institutionalization and a sort of ‘normalcy’ in intra-NATO consultation. By the second half of 1957, their work acquired a quiet flow, and usually was not accompanied with the tensions that were evident in the previous stage of 1951–6, when procedures, themes
and roles had to be defined from scratch and often on an ad hoc (or even a hand-to-mouth) basis. It is indicative that in early 1958, when the Political Advisers met to discuss developments in the Soviet bloc, the US delegation cabled to the State Department that ‘[b]elieve no instructions required’.11 It was the Political Advisers themselves who decided to move on with separate reports for Soviet trends, Eastern Europe and the Middle East in autumn 1957; the NAC approved their recommendation.12 The creation of the two committees entailed the production of specialized papers. In post-1957 NATO analysis, the Soviet world was no longer the subject of a single document. Different sets of reports appeared, covering the Soviet Union, economic developments in the Soviet bloc, Soviet activity in the periphery, and Eastern Europe. Even more impressive was the appearance of outof-area studies: sets of documents for the Middle East (starting from 1957), the Far East (1958), Africa (1959) and Latin America (1961): the tour d’orizon of the ministerial NAC was increasingly covered by discussion of these out-of-area problems. In this study, emphasis will be placed on the documents which dealt with Soviet policy and the economy, Eastern Europe and the Soviet bloc’s economic penetration of the periphery. The creation of the two new bodies represented a leap forward on many levels. Many countries sent experts to participate in the first meeting of the Political Advisers on the Soviet ‘trends’,13 and drafting (which until then was mostly done by the British) became a more collective affair. This was welcome to the British as well, who could not cope with the preparation of so many documents: the delegation to NATO stressed that the two new committees had made consultation more effective, but the drafting process often ended up in ‘long and unprofitable discussion’.14 A division of labour between the larger powers appeared: for example, in the first meetings of the Political Advisers, it was agreed that the Americans, the British and the French would have experts with ‘basic draft papers’, while the Italians, the Germans and the Canadians experts with ‘drafts on
particular points’.15 In spring 1958, the Americans suggested to the British that the US be responsible for drafting of the ‘trends’ paper, the French for the study on the satellites and the British for the Middle Eastern report (the British accepted the idea, but asked to see an early version of the US text).16 Thus, although British influence remained strong, drafting became more balanced and additional countries were involved.17 The new phase of NATO analysis was to a large extent the product of the leadership provided by the new, from 1957, SecretaryGeneral, Paul-Henri Spaak.18 In the 1958–9 Annual Political Appraisal and in his ‘interim report on political co-operation’ late in 1958, he regarded political cooperation as ‘the essential condition for the survival and progress of the Alliance’. He argued that, despite progress, the level of consultation was unsatisfactory; especially on economic studies, the results were ‘quite inadequate’. He even suggested that the distinction between ‘questions arising within the Treaty area and questions arising elsewhere is largely artificial: it is the common interest and not geography which justifies consultation’. But Spaak went even further: he thought that in out-of-area consultations, it would not be necessary to arrive ‘in all circumstances [to] a specific expression of unanimity’, but to a more loose agreement or even to a position where reservations would be acceptable.19 Evidently, this emphasis on flexibility rather than unanimity was one of his ideas that scared many NATO members, who regarded solid agreements and unanimity as essential preconditions for a NATO process.20 Of course, by the term ‘consultation’ Spaak did not simply mean the reports on the Soviet world, but mostly intra-alliance discussions of ongoing crises (for example, he regretted the ‘silence’ of the smaller states during consultations). In the Secretary-General’s words: It is true that reports prepared by groups of experts on the most significant aspects of the international situation are submitted in ministerial meetings. But these documents, however valuable, do
not constitute a true ‘policy forming’ factor, since although they offer the best possible appraisal of facts, they usually contain no recommendations for action by the Council.21 It is impossible to evaluate the strengths, but also the limits, of NATO analysis in those years without taking into account Spaak’s impact. Spaak differed from Ismay, but also from subsequent SecretaryGenerals, in that he was a champion of Western integration, which he wanted to strengthen even in NATO, an intergovernmental (not a supranational) organization. Thus, Spaak was both a hope and a threat for many NATO members, who were eager to protect the intergovernmental character of NATO and thus the principle of unanimity. The Scandinavians often expressed distrust for his forward initiatives.22 The British described him as a ‘more brilliant but also a more controversial figure’ than his predecessor,23 regarded him as ‘difficult enough to influence’, and considered that Evelyn Shuckburgh’s presence in Paris (as Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and chairman of the Political Advisers) was invaluable, since ‘the Latin group around Spaak, i.e. Casardi, Saint Mleux and Gregh, are all yes-men, convinced that the great man can do no wrong’.24 The British always kept a wary eye on Spaak, but soon reached a modus vivendi with the new Secretary-General. Spaak’s 1958 report on political consultation ‘was drafted by Shuckburgh after some discussion with ourselves’.25 In 1959, the Permanent Representative, Sir Frank Roberts, stressed that the Secretary-General’s ‘approach to most NATO problems is practical and non-doctrinaire and usually in harmony with United Kingdom thinking’.26 Equally multifaceted, but still fundamentally functional, was Spaak’s relationship with the US. Thus, he accepted the fundamental American thesis that the NAC should be kept informed on global problems, although it could not act outside the treaty area.27 However, Spaak’s major problem came from Charles de Gaulle: the Secretary-General’s preference for greater integration
ran counter to the French leader’s views. Moreover, Spaak, like most prominent Europeanists, was also an Atlanticist, and disagreed both with de Gaulle’s reserve for deeper European integration and with his obstructionist policies within NATO. In 1958–9, in an agonizing effort to appease de Gaulle (or block his more ‘dangerous’ ideas), Spaak floated ideas about the expansion of consultation on out-of-area issues through the establishment of informal regional groups consisting of the ‘Big Five’ (US, Britain, France, West Germany and Italy) and of representatives of any member willing to participate. This, however, caused strong reservations by the British and the Americans, who regarded that the proposal would not satisfy de Gaulle and at the same time would anger the smaller powers, who would perceive it as the creation of two different classes of NATO members. Furthermore, it would create an even more cumbersome procedure. As the British noted, ‘if policies had to be discussed first in the tripartite Anglo-American French group and then in a Spaak group and finally in the NATO Council, we should all be exhausted with discussion and never get anywhere’.28 The search for increased political cooperation, combined with de Gaulle’s demands for a new type of NATO leadership, led to a process unusual for a military alliance. In 1960, following a US proposal, the Secretary-General initiated a ‘Ten Year Planning’ exercise, with the object of deciding the alliance’s needs for the new decade. Spaak once more indicated his anxiety to develop and deepen non-military cooperation, by calling the member-states to place more emphasis on out-of-area issues, develop a better coordination on economic issues, and discuss the economic situation in the less developed member-states (an issue which Greece and Turkey were constantly raising).29 However, things went badly. Spaak’s views on integration of policies were more advanced than those of the majority of the member-states. Serious disagreements emerged regarding the road to détente in 1959–60. Moreover, the balance of opinion was that NATO should not deal with the economic conditions in the member-states, or ‘duplicate’ the
functions of the international economic organizations. Spaak resigned early in 1961, and the Ten-Year Planning produced relatively small results.30 The role of the US was always crucial. Just as the advent of the Eisenhower government in 1953 played a crucial role in expanding NATO’s perspective beyond the short- or medium-term military threat, the emergence of the Kennedy administration was similarly decisive. President John F. Kennedy and his Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, wanted to reassure the European allies that their views would be taken into account. Moreover, they were anxious about developments in the Third World, and tried to carry the European allies with them.31 However, intra-alliance relations soon encountered the major difficulties of de Gaulle’s nuclear ambitions and the problems of the Multilateral Force (MLF), while the Kennedy government, contrary to its predecessor, opted for full US control of the MLF. Still, the European allies appeared more content with Kennedy’s attitude on consultation, compared to the Eisenhower era. In any event, the US position in a voluntary (but also unequal) alliance was always delicate. As Rusk told Spaak’s successor, Dirk Stikker, during a discussion on the Berlin situation in September 1961, ‘the US is usually criticized for lack of leadership if it does not put forward firm proposals, but it is criticized equally for dictating to others when it does submit firm recommendations’.32 Khrushchev supreme: Soviet internal politics and the economy, 1957–62 A stable regime The most important conclusion of the Political Advisers regarding internal Soviet developments concerned the stability of the regime. Despite the emphasis on heavy industry, living standards were improving, and the average Soviet citizen acquiesced to the regime. Furthermore, the experts noted that de-Stalinization was not abandoned, but the party leadership was trying to show the limits
beyond which criticism would not be tolerated. At that stage, intellectual dissent in the Soviet Union was not regarded as ‘a threat to the system’.33 On leadership, the committee stressed that, especially after the suppression of the June 1957 coup against him and after the removal of Marshall Zhukov in autumn of that year,34 Khrushchev was firmly on the saddle. The picture of Soviet internal stability seemed to be confirmed after Khrushchev’s assumption of the premiership in spring 1958. By institutionalizing the power of the CPSU (contrary to the cult of personality of the Stalinist era), Khrushchev seemed to enhance the legitimacy of the Soviet system. The CPSU was described as servile and as lacking initiative (elements ‘bred in them by a generation of arbitrary Stalinist rule’), but its defects were seen to be partially offset by Khrushchev’s energetic personality. The Soviet leader was described as bold, ‘dynamic, confident and pragmatic’ (April 1958), a man of ‘thrust and energy’, who succeeded ‘in presenting himself as a popular leader’ (December 1958). It was only in 1962–3, when the Soviet predominance of the world communist movement had been challenged, but also when the economy showed signs of slowing down, that the NATO experts noted that Khrushchev, although still dominant, needed to negotiate with other leaders in the party.35 There was a subtle but important difference between NATO and US attitudes towards Khrushchev. Although both agreed on the stability of the regime, the Americans were more reserved towards the Soviet leader: on various occasions Dulles insisted that ‘Khrushchev was the most dangerous person to lead the Soviet Union since the October Revolution’, because he was emotional, ‘obviously intoxicated much of the time’, capable of doing irrational things and essentially unpredictable, whereas previous Soviet leaders were ‘the chess-playing type’.36 The Americans also were less certain regarding Khrushchev’s internal position: they saw potential challenges (a ‘conservative opposition’) to Khrushchev’s rule.37 The European members of NATO arguably were more ready than the Americans to give to Khrushchev the benefit of the doubt.
Regarding the economic basis of the Soviet regime, the NATO experts noted the evident stress that rapid industrialization posed on the system. However, the performance of Soviet industry throughout this period appeared impressive, and Western analysts remained astonished at the capability of the Kremlin to channel almost unlimited investment to the desired sectors. In late 1957, the NATO experts became interested in the abandonment of the Sixth FiveYear Plan, and noted that Moscow was facing problems in simultaneously accomplishing an excessively high industrial expansion, and meeting targets on agriculture which were ‘unrealistic’. The Kremlin was facing a dilemma: industrial development remained the established dogma, but the raising of the standard of living affected the legitimization of the regime, and could not be ignored: it was ‘an aspect of the policy of competitive coexistence and of the attempt to give to the outside world, and to the underdeveloped countries in particular, a more attractive impression of communism’. Moreover, the 1956 Hungarian and Polish experience had indicated that there were limits to the sacrifices that even totalitarian regimes could impose on the peoples.38 In 1957 the Canadians noted the ‘extraordinary centralization of the Soviet system’, which meant that no one dared make decisions and everything was referred to Moscow. Other members criticized previous papers on the grounds that these presented an excessively positive view of the Soviet economy.39 Soon, however, the announcement of the Seventh Five-Year Plan contradicted the sceptics. The new plan provided for an annual increase of industrial output of 8.6 per cent. The NATO experts noted that the plan took account of the needs of modern industry, and gave priority to oil and natural gas, chemical industries, the development of the enormous natural resources especially in the east of the country, as well as housing, education and public health. Although the Soviet claim that the country would overtake the United States’ levels of production per capita was ‘grossly exaggerated’, the vigour of Soviet development was impressive.40 Indeed, the British delegation commented in mid-1959 that the new Soviet educational
system was an attempt to adapt to the needs of a more complicated, industrialized society.41 In the late 1950s the Political Advisers noted a trend for decentralization, associated again with Khrushchev’s impact. The NATO analysts pointed out that, contrary to the Stalin era, in Khrushchev’s days unexpected economic difficulties did not automatically lead to the sacrifice of consumer interests. This was seen as important in Khrushchev’s quest for ‘Socialist legality’. Moreover, economic difficulties were not regarded sufficient to dispute the strength of the Soviet economy or substantially to affect its foreign policy. Successive reports reminded that the rates of Soviet growth were, and would continue to be, higher than that of NATO states. In the April 1960 report, the Political Advisers went out of their way to stress in no uncertain terms that ‘there is probably now a wider public “acceptance” of the Soviet régime than ever before’. However, 1960 was the high tide of the NATO experts’ insistence on the nexus of Soviet economic success and Khrushchev’s personal power. In 1961, the Economic Advisers remarked that the recently announced Twenty-Year Plan aimed at ‘transforming the USSR into the world’s most powerful country’ by 1980, but doubted the realization of its targets. By 1962 the NATO analysts pointed to the absence of a ‘clearly consistent line’ in Soviet internal politics and the economy, a sign of a new pattern which would emerge more clearly in the following years.42 However, the NATO analysts were reluctant fully to accept the American optimism about a gradual ‘change from below’, namely, from a Soviet population seeking more freedom and affluence.43 Long-term economic realities In April 1960 the Economic Advisers submitted to the NAC a fresh report on long-term (1960–75) economic growth in NATO countries and in the Soviet bloc; the latter was taken to mean the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, while China was treated separately.44 This was the first report since 1956, and its drafting had been delayed due
mostly to the ‘well-known’ US discomfort with such studies.45 The report repeated that the relative position of the Soviet bloc economy would improve in the period 1960–75, while Soviet bloc industrial growth would rise ‘substantially faster’ than that of the NATO countries. The Economic Advisers once more stressed that the rapid expansion of the Soviet economy had been aided by the huge natural resources of the country, but also by the ability of a totalitarian state to ignore demands for a better standard of living and to move labour arbitrarily from one sector to the other. The experts estimated that the enormous rates of Soviet growth would decline in the following years (because of the need to devote resources to the improvement of living conditions), although they would again rise after 1964, aided also by the increased post-war birth rate, as well as by improvements in education and in mass production methods. However, economic performance in the satellites would be less impressive, as these countries lacked the rich natural resources of the Soviet Union, and had not achieved either specialization or regional cooperation sufficient to boost development. On the contrary, European NATO had developed new schemes of European cooperation (mostly the European Economic Community – EEC) which also encouraged specialization, and its economic prospects were excellent. The Economic Advisers stressed that by 1975 the national product of the Soviet bloc would exceed by about 18 per cent that of European NATO, but would be only 45 per cent that of the NATO countries as a whole. This was the first sign of an increased Western self-confidence on the economic level. The Western economic lead seemed to hold: ‘There is not the remotest chance that the USSR will overtake the United States in living standards and per capita industrial output by 1970, as boasted by Khrushchev’.46 Regarding communist China, the economic experts stressed the lack of credible data, the backward state of the economy, but also the enormous potential of the country. By 1975 the PRC would emerge as a major industrial power, the third largest globally, although it would still lag behind the US and the Soviet Union in
technology and per capita output. Chinese industry was technically backward, and thus relied on Soviet and East European aid and supplies of advanced machinery. However, dependence was being rapidly reduced due to the determined efforts of the PRC government. The NATO experts estimated that by 1965 this dependence would become of secondary importance for the Chinese economy.47 Contrary to the previous similar reports, the 1960 one did not place emphasis on the war-sustaining capabilities of the Soviet economy. This was for many reasons: a war was no longer regarded imminent, and anyway the experts took it for granted that the Soviet Union, a nuclear power able to develop inter-continental missiles, had the necessary economic means at its disposal. Emphasis now was placed on a different front: the new element in the correlation of economic forces was the position of the Third World. The NATO experts went out of their way to stress that this new factor complicated the picture: these countries needed to achieve growth and industrialization, while they also faced huge pressures by the rise of their populations. Moreover, ‘the very wide gap in living standards between developed and underdeveloped countries is one of the most serious problems facing Western countries’. In this respect, the ‘spectacular scientific and technological achievements’ of the communist countries would continue to impress the underdeveloped states, and the ‘Sino-Soviet bloc’ would increasingly pose as a model for development. This process would also be augmented by the bloc’s growing available resources to be used in the periphery. This was a battle which the West could not afford to lose: In this area the problem of whether or not a noticeable measure of economic progress can be achieved under conditions of freedom will be a major factor in the global struggle against communism […]. The free world is challenged to demonstrate to the peoples of the underdeveloped countries that it is possible to achieve their legitimate aspirations under conditions of freedom. This will not be
possible unless the Western countries adopt policies which ensure the growth and stability of their own economies.48 The 1960 comparison report was a further sign of Western awe at the economic capabilities of a totalitarian regime, reigning in a huge country. The late 1950s was, according to NATO analysis, the peak of the Soviet Union’s economic ascent: the regime seemed to enjoy a significant degree of legitimization in the country, its leader was energetic, mobile and capable, and its economy, despite its evident ‘abnormalities’ (at least according to the Western canon) seemed to grow at rates which the West regarded as fearsome. Soon, however, from the early 1960s onwards, this picture was going to change. The challenge of Soviet foreign policy and of détente Trying to understand Khrushchev’s foreign policy, 1957–60: ‘détente’ as a stillborn child Following the twin crisis of autumn 1956 in Suez and Hungary, the Political Advisers argued that no change was detectable in Soviet strategic aims. However, wishing to avoid a nuclear war, Moscow now aimed to ‘reconstruct’ the cohesion of its bloc, while increasing its economic strength and military capabilities; to weaken the cohesion of NATO and the West; to effect a withdrawal of US forces from Europe and from strategic positions around the USSR; and to encourage neutralism and Soviet influence in the periphery. The Soviet invasion of Hungary had damaged the international standing of the Kremlin, but the Soviet leaders strove to repair damage within Europe, as well as to consolidate their gains in the Middle East by posing as the champions of Arab independence. According to the NATO experts, the ultimate Soviet aim was to bring the Middle East under the Kremlin’s control, but the immediate goal was the denial of the region’s resources to the West. However, it was clear, the analysts noted, that the major Soviet priority was Eastern Europe,
not the periphery. The replacement of Dmitri Shepilov by Andrei Gromyko as Foreign Minister in February 1957 was interpreted as part of this readjustment of Soviet tactics, and was seen as an effective step, placing a respected person (‘a highly qualified career diplomat’) at the helm of Soviet foreign policy.49 Soon, the attention of the NATO experts focused on another issue: the Sputnik flight, the test of the first intercontinental missile, disarmament, and the NATO summit in Paris in December 1957, to examine the installation of US Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) in Europe. The Soviet Union was extremely active on disarmament issues since early summer 1957. The Political Advisers attributed this to an effort to divide NATO, and responded with their usual call for alliance unity.50 The Sputnik flight and the test of the first intercontinental missile were described as an ‘enormous success’: the Kremlin would now seek to negotiate with the West from a ‘position of strength’, and to augment its influence in the Middle East. The simultaneous Soviet rapprochement with Syria and the Soviet bloc proposals for nuclear-free zones in Central Europe (the Rapacki plan) and the Balkans (the Stoica Plan) were seen in this light.51 The apparent strengthening of Soviet nuclear capabilities caused major changes to NATO military posture. Moreover, the Soviet advances in nuclear weapons tended to increase the range of options for Soviet foreign policy. Having shaken the West’s ‘massive retaliation’ strategy, Moscow could now assume the initiative, either through friendly gestures or through intimidation. It was this realization, together with Khrushchev’s idiosyncratic personality, that puzzled the NATO analysts in the following years, when facing the Soviet leader’s sudden switches from offers for pacification to threats. In fact, the NATO experts tended to view Khrushchev as a ‘reliable’ opponent who wanted to avoid war, but failed to realize, as contemporary bibliography stresses, that he was willing to match ‘American nuclear superiority with Soviet nuclear brinkmanship’, relying ‘more on his instincts rather than on strategic calculations’;52
or that he was prepared to engage in a nuclear gamble, being ‘the most provocative, the most daring, and, ironically, the most desirous of a lasting agreement with the American people of any man or woman in the Kremlin’.53 The NATO analysts never realized these contradictions in Khrushchev. This was yet another reason why some of his initiatives caused such surprise in NATO. Even Khrushchev’s tactics were incomprehensible to the NATO experts: in 1958 alone, the Soviets insisted on increased East–West trade and proposed a fresh summit meeting,54 but then they published unilaterally the exchanges on the summit giving a serious blow to their own idea, and in mid-July they proposed a European Treaty of Friendship (which left the US out, and which the Western powers rejected as a propaganda move). Last but not least, Khrushchev’s November 1958 ultimatum on Berlin stirred all the West’s insecurities about the unpredictable adversary. Soviet unilateralism always panicked the West, and was now evident not only in Eastern Europe, but also in Berlin, one of the most dangerous points of Cold War confrontation: Soviet policy toward the West is likely in the immediate months to come to be marked by a greater tendency to probe weak spots in the West’s position, e.g. Berlin, and to resort to intimidation and pressure rather than blandishment in order to muster support for Soviet proposals on specific issues. Generally speaking, Soviet tactics reflect increasingly the thrust and energy of Mr. Khrushchev.55 Nevertheless, in subsequent months Khrushchev again changed course and promoted ‘détente’.56 From the NATO point of view, Khrushchev’s U-turns and mostly his offers for pacification raised the existential problem of allied unity and cohesion. Intra-NATO relations suffered because of insufficient consultation on Berlin between the US, Britain and France, which dealt with the crisis as they also had special obligations in the German question, and the smaller members, which felt that they were being left out of the discussions
in an issue which could spark a general war. Indeed, the British suspected that the small members’ dissatisfaction was also fuelled by Spaak himself.57 Things became even more difficult because of Eisenhower’s unilateral pursuit of détente in his 1959 meeting with Khrushchev in Camp David, which again alarmed the smaller members. At the same time, intra-alliance tensions were accentuated as de Gaulle was demanding the creation of a NATO directorate. By late 1959, political consultation in NATO had sharply deteriorated.58 Spaak tried to respond, among others, by initiating an intra-NATO discussion on the meaning of détente. The kick-off of the détente discussion was a report by the Political Advisers in late 1959. The experts noted that Khrushchev’s recent visit to the US had led to an improvement in atmosphere, but not to a ‘solution of, or even appreciable progress in solving the major political issues which underlie East–West tensions’. The Political Advisers obviously did not appreciate the profound impression that, as we now know, the US society and economy made on the Soviet leader.59 On the contrary, they noted that ‘he has been at pains since his return from the United States to give the impression that the visit has not caused him to revise his thinking’. Thus, the Soviet leader had effected a ‘change in tone rather than in content, and no change at all as regards ideology or long term political ambition’. According to NATO analysis, the Soviets understood détente as a continuation of the Cold War. In this context, the West might be able to negotiate some agreement on partial disarmament ‘and gradually to reduce the role of military considerations in East–West relations’. The Soviets also aimed to improve their prospects for infiltration of Asia and Africa. Mostly, they wanted ‘primarily to undermine the unity, cohesion and determination of the west’, and Khrushchev’s advocacy of détente referred to a ‘vague impression of relaxation, in which it would be easier for him to extract concessions from the Western Governments’. Once more, therefore, the Political Advisers pointed to the intra-NATO problems of cohesion that could arise from the new Soviet line, and called for greater unity and coordination.60
The ministerial NAC of December 1959 failed to solve differences on détente or political consultation. Spaak was rather aggressive, pointing out that the US, Britain and France negotiated with the Soviets without notification of the alliance. He also again referred to the problem of consultation on out-of-area issues. All ministers agreed that détente represented a change of Soviet tactics rather than of aims. Détente, argued the Belgian Foreign Minister P. Wigny, was only a ‘frame of mind’. The US Secretary of State, Christian Herter, noted that the Cold War was a kind of trench warfare, but in a climate of détente it would acquire more mobility and manoeuvre. He also suggested to review NATO’s prospects for the following decade (this led to the Ten-Year Planning exercise of 1960–1). The Foreign Ministers most suspicious of détente were Heinrich von Brentano of West Germany, Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza of Greece and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu of Turkey, representing frontline states towards which the Soviets kept exerting strong pressures. The smaller members strongly reacted against the prospect that the US, Britain and France would act as a quasi-directorate and handle a summit with Khrushchev. At the insistence of the smaller powers, the ‘Big Three’ would report on this issue to the NAC.61 The US Permanent Representative, Randolph W. Burgess, reporting to the State Department, cautioned his superiors that the anxieties of the smaller powers should be seriously taken into account.62 The insecurities of the frontline NATO members were also noted by the Political Advisers, who in late 1959 and April 1960 recorded Khrushchev’s pressure on the Adenauer government, his strong pressure on Greece in May 1959 not to accept US IRBMs, the new proposal for denuclearization of the Balkans, in June 1959, by concerted statements from the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Romania, and the Soviet proposal for denuclearization of the Baltic.63 Last but not least, the prospect of détente could affect NATO’s resolve and the continuation of its defence effort. In March 1960 the Americans repeated that ‘expansionist Communism […] has not changed its ultimate objectives’, while the recent Soviet force reductions presented no cause for comfort, since they were
accompanied by a wide programme of weapons modernization which would result in increased Soviet military capabilities. Thus, the US would continue its military aid programmes, provided that the Congress was satisfied that ‘military aid supplements, and does not substitute for, maximum effort of our allies to support our common defence’.64 It is telling of the mutual fears during the Cold War that at that stage, when the West was trying to deal with such insecurities, the Warsaw Pact authorities projected the image of an aggressive NATO alliance which, from the military point of view, was more effective and fearsome than it actually was.65 The hiccups of consultation, the tense discussion on détente and the Gaullist tactics created a difficult situation at a crucial moment. The British Permanent Representative, Sir Frank Roberts, spoke of a ‘malaise’ of the alliance.66 Thus, Spaak issued a questionnaire early in 1960, asking for the views of the members not represented in the working group on the forthcoming summit. It is telling that all members replied.67 In February 1960 the Secretary-General suggested a five-power committee to harmonize NATO policy on disarmament and a four-power committee (including West Germany) to discuss Berlin.68 In his April 1960 annual political appraisal, Spaak again lamented the failure of the larger states to consult their allies in the previous year. He regretted the lack of discussions on ‘other areas of the world’, expressly noting that the papers of the Political Advisers could not cover this vacuum. If détente were to come, the Secretary-General noted, ‘its main feature will be that the struggle in the underdeveloped areas will become more and more severe’. Spaak believed that consultation in the alliance had reached a point of ‘complete stagnation’.69 In early May, the ministerial session of the NAC discussed the line to be pursued with the Soviets in the forthcoming Paris summit. This aimed to diffuse the ‘revolt’ of the small countries during the previous ministerial NAC. Still, objections were raised about the Western bargaining positions in the approaching Paris summit by Canada, Italy and Turkey. France (Maurice Couve de Murville) and Holland
(Joseph Luns) objected to Spaak’s bold thinking on political consultation. Norway’s Lange noted that the NATO experts’ reports were being prepared at the last moment, and the Ministers did not have the time to study them. Finally, the Council merely accepted Spaak’s suggestion to stress that détente could only be linked with increased alliance solidarity.70 This was an instinctive NATO response to the prospect of relaxation of tension, but remained a vague reference and solved nothing. Arguably, the spectacular collapse of the summit contained the growing intra-NATO tensions, forcing the alliance members to draw together once more. The failure and the turning point of 1960 Meanwhile, the road to the 1960 summit led to one of the greatest failures of NATO analysis. As the Americans noted, following the debates of 1959, the alliance ‘has been linked closely to summit preparations’.71 In April 1960 the Political Advisers submitted to the ministerial NAC (which was held prior to the summit) a report which proved crushingly inadequate. The committee noted that Khrushchev saw détente as a means to achieve his major aims without war: enhance Soviet power, weaken the solidarity of NATO and expand Soviet influence in the non-committed countries. At the same time, ‘there is an implicit contradiction between Khrushchev’s forward policy on Berlin (based, as it is, in the last resort, on the threat of unilateral action), and his general policy of détente’. The Political Advisers tended to view Khrushchev’s line as more rational than it finally proved: In short, he has sought to strengthen his bargaining position at the summit, to remind the West of its vulnerability in Berlin, and to weaken Western resolve by posing as forceful a threat as possible, without, however, committing himself to precise conditions and timing for its implementation. The NATO experts expected Khrushchev to adopt a more flexible attitude at the Paris summit, including a possible acceptance of an
agreement for partial disarmament: It is probable that at the Summit Khrushchev will press for some broad Western commitment to a form of complete disarmament along the lines of the Soviet proposals, calculating that either acceptance or rejection would generate political problems for the NATO countries. […] In any event it seems likely that he will seek to gain the greatest possible propaganda effect, although he may be prepared to make some concession to the Western position in order to achieve at least a limited agreement.72 Few NATO documents proved more mistaken in their predictions than this report. It assumed that the Soviets would follow a rational policy at the summit, but Khrushchev used the U-2 episode to destroy it. Considering also that the same report noted explicitly that ‘the Chinese continue to acknowledge Soviet leadership of the bloc’, and that ‘there is, however, no likelihood in the foreseeable future that they [the Chinese] will pose any real threat to the Sino-Soviet alliance’ (whereas the public Sino-Soviet quarrel would erupt a few months later), the report made huge errors on many fronts. These spectacular failures of the April 1960 report came on top of the intraNATO tensions on the meaning, advisability and procedures of détente. It is interesting to remember that Dulles’ reserve towards the Soviets had led him to insist that no paper be tabled to the ministerial NAC prior to the 1955 summit; this time the West appeared more confident and relaxed, but the result was disappointing. The failure of the report raised a number of difficult problems on many levels. Mostly, it threatened to discredit even the larger alliance members in the eyes of the smaller ones, which had already expressed dissatisfaction with political consultation procedures (and repeated their complaints in June 1960, when the Americans, the British and the French continued their consultations outside the NATO forum73). Moreover, these threatened the significant British influence in the NATO committee system: the head of the Political
Advisers was a major British diplomat, Evelyn Shuckburgh, who additionally was scheduled shortly to return to London to become Deputy Under-secretary at the FO. He was to be replaced as Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs by another British diplomat, Robin Hooper. The failure of the April 1960 report could damage British prestige in NATO on many levels. The response of the FO and the resultant discussion were very interesting. The Foreign Office was greatly embarrassed by the failure of the trends report. In May 1960, at Spaak’s insistence, the Political Advisers debated the causes of Soviet behaviour in the summit, but the process appeared inconclusive and to some extent chaotic: each delegation made hypotheses without offering a clear framework for analysis.74 Thus, the British proposed a more thorough study. Evidently, they aimed to re-establish their leading position in the committee, and also to help Shuckburgh and Hooper. Yet, their nervousness is vividly displayed by the haste and confusion which this NATO discussion caused in such a well-functioning machine as the FO: the British delegation asked the FO for material and a report by Sir Patrick Reilly was duly sent, but then the FO instructed its representatives not to circulate it. Subsequently, the FO sent a British paper to Shuckburgh himself, sparking some discomfort to the other NATO delegations, who asked that the document be made available to them as well, and not just to the ‘Secretariat’.75 In the summer, Shuckburgh left to assume high office at the FO. Now, the British proposed that instead of the usual ‘trends’ document by the Political Advisers, a meeting should be convened in NATO, with the participation of ‘senior officials’ from the national governments to draft a new report. Shuckburgh himself instructed the British delegation to NATO to ensure that the report be drafted under the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs (Hooper) and not under the Deputy Secretary-General (Casardi). He intended that the British ‘produce a first class “papier de base”’. The British suggested a meeting in two phases, with the drafting to take place in the period between them.76 It is clear that London intended to restore its wounded prestige in Paris. This time, the British
themselves were proposing the elevation of the level of experts, which they had resisted earlier. The Americans had already asked their delegation to ‘smoke out probable level and competence’ of the experts of the other members, and then suggested that the first phase of the meeting should involve experts and only the second ‘senior’ persons. However, in the Committee of Political Advisers on 18 August, they met a British-led opposition to their suggestion by almost everybody else: the British wanted ‘senior officials’ in both phases.77 After receiving this blow, the Americans threw their diplomatic equivalent of a nuclear bomb on the British: in late August they announced that their ‘senior official’ would be Charles Bohlen himself.78 The US delegation reported that the news of Bohlen’s participation was ‘taken as real shot in arm by all members POLAD’.79 This way, however, the American announcement turned the tables on the British, who had no comparable expert to field. The FO asked the delegation to NATO to undermine the US initiative. The delegation’s Peter Murray replied that it was impossible to do this: the other alliance members welcomed Bohlen’s participation enthusiastically, and anyway it was impossible for Britain (which had set things in motion) to backtrack ‘when the United States field their No. 1’.80 This produced a strong reprimand by Heath Mason of the FO, who cautioned Murray that London never intended to block Bohlen: Britain had proposed a meeting at the level of heads of departments, namely Councellors, and ‘Bohlen amongst the Councellors would indeed be a whale amongst the minnows’. Mason then continued in a personal tone, very unusual for British diplomatic correspondence: ‘I am now writing to you personally about the tone of your letter, which gave me the impression of having been dashed off in a moment of impatience and irritability’.81 Irritability was apparent, and perhaps not only in the delegation in Porte Dauphine. The British were now facing the possibility that their initiative would backfire. In view of Bohlen’s presence, the British threw their strongest card in the meeting: Shuckburgh himself, the
former head of the NATO Political Advisers. In a barely concealed effort to save the day, Shuckburgh met the French expert, Jean Laloy, and suggested to allow the chair (namely, Hooper) to do the drafting, despite the fact that Bohlen had offered to assist in this as well.82 Amusingly, even in mid-October, Shuckburgh, obviously in agony, ‘inquired [the US embassy in London] whether Bohlen still intends participate. Shuckburgh expressed strong hope he would do so’.83 Finally, Shuckburgh went to the first meeting of officials in October armed with everything that the FO could throw in his arms: eighteen briefs of sixty-two pages on every possible aspect of Soviet internal and external policy, including various aspects of Sino-Soviet relations. Even more indicative is the fact that these briefs also contained a report of the FO expert Thomas Brimelow about an exchange that he had with Bohlen himself. It is difficult to resist the thought that Shuckburgh went to Paris partially to face the leading American expert.84 Still, Shuckburgh was not available for the second meeting, since he had to accompany the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, in his visit to Rome.85 Thus, the Americans showed, even in a very indirect way, that, when they wanted it, the game was theirs. Yet, they did not press their advantage excessively: they made their point, but refrained from embarrassing the British further. The special report was presented to the NAC in December. It noted that Soviet policy had become more militant, although it was impossible to determine whether this was a ‘transitory phenomenon’ or a permanent change of posture. Khrushchevite diplomacy was characterized by the alternation of periods of tension and of peace offers. The experts suggested that the post-Stalin Kremlin had distanced itself from the bipolar understanding of the early post-war years (which had led to a hostile attitude towards any noncommunist state), and now understood the world in terms of a triangle, consisting of the capitalist West, the socialist East and the uncommitted countries. Although Khrushchev needed to show to the latter a moderate face, there were instances when he needed to be
harsh to the West, in order to satisfy the national liberation movements and to maintain the morale of communists worldwide. Khrushchev was the leader not only of a state, but also of a world movement which now included ‘two super-powers, the USSR and China. It is crossed by various currents’. The hardening of Soviet policy could also be attributed to the emerging ‘Sino-Soviet dispute’. Yet, the experts reminded that these ‘fluctuations of Soviet policy’ were nevertheless kept within certain limits, such as the need to avoid general war and to safeguard the unity of the bloc. Thus, the ad hoc working group called for prudence and moderation: Fluctuations within the limits defined above should therefore be regarded as a normal aspect of Soviet policy during the present phase. The West, while seeking to understand the underlying motives, must not view them with undue alarm. To be oversensitive to these variations would, moreover, provide the Soviet leadership with an effective psychological weapon.86 The experts pointed to Soviet policy in the developing world, and argued that the West should not appear divided on colonial questions. They were particularly interested in Soviet dissatisfaction at the prospect of a powerful UN Secretary-General as this was manifested in the Congo crisis: Moscow reacted adversely to any procedure or actor it could not control. Regarding Berlin, the experts put forward two possible explanations for Soviet policy: either Moscow was trying to keep up the pressure on the West by exposing its weakness in a pivotal point; or Khrushchev and the East German leader, Walter Ulbricht, genuinely saw the existence of West Berlin as a threat to the stability of East Germany, and strove to eliminate it. The West should leave no doubt about its determination to defend West Berlin: ‘Such a policy of psychological deterrence is the best method of preventing the USSR from going too far’. Thus, the analysts again took a calm view of Soviet policy and tended to show some understanding for Khrushchev’s position: ‘Despite the failure of the May Summit Conference the West should not take too negative a
line about the prospect of further negotiations with the Soviet Union’. In any event, the West should mostly guard its unity.87 This report evidently marked one of the instances when NATO analysis documents supported an effort to re-establish calm in an NAC torn by internal disagreements and insecurity. Moreover, the relative success of the autumn 1960 experiment with government officials pushed things to a slight alteration in the procedures of NATO analysis in the following years: although the participation of ‘senior officials’ was not repeated for some time, increasingly from 1961 onwards, political reports would be produced by expert working groups, with the participation of national experts, under the direction of the Political Advisers. This was a natural response to the growing complexity of the problems. Early in 1961 Spaak resigned his post of Secretary-General. Of course, this cannot be attributed to the failures of the April 1960 report. Clearly, he was disappointed at the problems posed by the French and at the reluctance of the NATO members to accept his ideas for integration. It was for some time that he obviously felt that he could not stir NATO to the desired direction, and since 1959 there had been rumours of his impending resignation.88 Moreover, since the December 1960 ministerial session of the NAC, a further major disagreement surfaced between Spaak, who wanted to create a machinery of permanent and restricted committees, and the majority of the member-states, which preferred ad hoc and open ones.89 Spaak’s problem may also be revealed by the fact that early in 1961 he again issued a questionnaire on the Soviet bloc, but (as his temporary replacement, Casardi, informed the NAC in April) only five delegations replied.90 Spaak himself never fully explained his reasons for resigning, although speaking to the Americans and the British, and also in his memoirs, he noted that the inadequate development of political consultation was one of his reasons to do so.91 The record of the NAC meeting during which he tendered his resignation provides no explanation, as is usual with NATO documents touching upon difficult moments of the alliance, and
especially internal problems.92 However, it is clear that his need to respond to Belgian internal needs was also a major incentive: Spaak himself mentioned this to the British and the Americans, and his biographer also put forward this interpretation.93 Certainly, after the row during the December 1960 ministerial NAC over his proposals, his position had become awkward, and it is telling that the British expressly noted that they did not want to stop him from resigning.94 From Berlin to Cuba The failures of 1960 and Spaak’s resignation were partially offset by the changes in US attitudes on consultation, effected by the new Kennedy administration. The climate in NATO substantially changed because of the new US government’s apparent desire to reassure the European allies that they were being kept informed. According to the new Secretary-General, Dirk Stikker, in 1961–2, the ‘Other Eleven’ (namely, the smaller members except US, Britain, France and West Germany) had been reassured by the American position.95 It is difficult to trace how far this change of tone should also be attributed to the tendency of Spaak to see the glass halfempty, and of Stikker to see it half-full. Nevertheless, the failures of NATO (and US) analysis of Soviet developments would continue. In April 1961 the Political Advisers noted Khrushchev’s return to a more conciliatory line. They pointed out that Khrushchev was obviously facing a serious problem inside the communist world, as this became evident during the Moscow conference of communist parties in November 1960, when the Soviet leader’s détente policy was severely criticized by the Chinese. The experts repeated that Soviet interest in disarmament did not involve only propaganda, and thus the West should pursue the relevant discussions. As for a new summit, the West should accept this prospect, maintaining its unity and aiming ‘to ascertain whether there are issues regarding which Western and Soviet interests, however opposed in many ways, may nevertheless permit limited agreements to be reached’. However, once more the NATO experts
failed to predict developments in Berlin. They noted that the Soviets might try to bring things to a head in Berlin during 1961, and discussed various alternatives at the disposal of Moscow (signature of a separate Peace Treaty or the de facto transfer of control to the East German regime). Yet, their emphasis was on a possible Soviet attempt to restrict Western access to the city. The building of the Wall was not among the options they examined.96 Thus, the building of the Berlin Wall was another surprise for the NATO experts, who, after the event, stressed that the Soviet initiative did not affect Western control in the city, and thus was kept within some limits, mostly the need to avoid war. Serious concern was expressed at the tendency of the bloc to raise the level of verbal confrontation with Greece and Turkey (there was a Greek–Bulgarian exchange of accusations for espionage and a Soviet protest at the holding of NATO manoeuvres in the area). This was interpreted as an effort to divert attention from the former German capital. The Political Advisers also noted with concern the large-scale Warsaw Pact military manoeuvres after the building of the Wall.97 However the experts did not understand that it was exactly at that time that the Soviet bloc armies definitely assumed an offensive posture in Europe, as recent research has shown.98 Evidently, the NATO authorities took it for granted that the Warsaw Pact, and mostly Soviet national strategy, was aggressive from the start. Furthermore, the experts focused on the Kremlin’s motives in Berlin, downgrading the role of the East German regime or the possibility that Khrushchev was influenced by his own misperceptions of American policy, especially after the debacle in the Bay of Pigs.99 Once more, the terms of reference of experts working for a defensive alliance compelled them to give priority to the consequences of Soviet actions for the NATO area, rather than to the roots of these actions in the Soviet bloc itself. In any event, the NATO experts did not have access to sufficient evidence for the latter. This also holds for US national analysis, but the defensive priority was more pronounced in NATO analysis.
In the following year, the Political Advisers noted the problems of indecisiveness which were becoming evident in Soviet policy, as the Sino-Soviet rift continued and intensified, and Albania was pursuing a pro-Chinese line. However, Khrushchev was again presented as aiming to effect a lowering of tensions.100 This time, however, the Americans had to deal with strong Franco-German objections to their position that the Kremlin was showing signs of flexibility on Berlin: especially the West Germans felt that US support on this pivotal point left much to be desired. In the ministerial session of the NAC in May 1962, many Ministers, including Britain’s Lord Home, Holland’s Luns, Turkey’s Feridun Kemal Erkin and Norway’s Lange, expressed hope for a ‘lull’ with Moscow.101 However, the Cuban missile crisis unfolded in the autumn. The boldness of the Soviets’ Cuban venture, aimed at effecting a sudden, unforeseen and radical change in the balance of power, seemed to scare NATO experts. In their November 1962 report, they noted that the difference from previous crises, including the building of the Berlin Wall, was that in Cuba, Soviet policy violently and unexpectedly breached the ‘limits’ which it had respected in those previous instances. Soviet action in Cuba ‘involved a very high degree of risk, not characteristic of Soviet behaviour in the past and hence surprising’, but ‘the potential military gain was such as to justify the risk’. The experts noted that the Soviets had apparently reached the conclusion that the balance in nuclear weapons was shifting against them and tried to redress it by enhancing dramatically their own first strike capabilities. The Soviets were seeking ‘to accomplish a major shift in the balance of power in their direction’; they might even want to strengthen their hand ‘for a showdown on Berlin’ in the ensuing months. In doing so, and in stepping into the Western hemisphere, the Kremlin had crossed the line, simultaneously displaying ‘duplicity, audacity and resourcefulness’. Still, the experts continued, Moscow had miscalculated the likely US reaction, and the Soviets’ claim that they had saved Cuba ‘is a small consolation in comparison with the prize which they had reckoned they would gain’. The experts noted that
Khrushchev’s prestige had suffered a serious blow, and he might seek to create diversions elsewhere to compensate for the Cuban failure. As a crisis in Berlin was regarded unlikely, the fear was expressed that the Kremlin could try to weaken the alliance in SouthEast Europe.102 The Cuban missile crisis also showed the limits of NATO consultation: the US took initiatives ignoring the positions of its allies or the NATO procedures themselves.103 On the other hand, the US could not be expected to handle such a pressing crisis trying to secure the unanimous approval of its fourteen allies; and arguably the NATO allies themselves seemed relieved that Washington took things in its own hands without bringing them such dilemmas. In the December NAC, the allies appeared reassured by the strength of the US reaction and the perceived Soviet capitulation, and complaints were not aired.104 As Rusk commented: ‘For first time in many years US Secretary of State did not raise hand and swear that US would indeed faithfully meet its solemn NATO commitment; no one noticed the omission in atmosphere of general confidence’.105 In the 1963 annual political appraisal, Stikker made the debatable statement that ‘the Council were kept closely and fully informed by the United States Government’.106 A new set of reports: the question mark of Eastern Europe A new focus on Eastern Europe, 1957–9 Until 1956, the NATO studies focused on the Kremlin: Eastern Europe was regarded as an occupied area, in which little prospect for change existed. The 1956 Polish unrest and the Hungarian Revolution revealed the problems of legitimization which the Soviets were facing in this pivotal ‘heart’ of their empire. Of course, 1956 had left scars in NATO as well: it is indicative that during the ministerial NAC of May 1957, the German Foreign Minister, von Brentano,
caused a stir by stating his hope that, if a rebellion occurred in East Germany (the ‘Soviet zone’), NATO would not confine itself to ‘declarations of pure form’. He then explained that he did not ask for armed intervention, but for diplomatic sanctions.107 The 1956 Eastern European unrest raised the need for fresh and specialized studies on Eastern Europe. Beyond the discussion of humanitarian assistance for Hungary (which should not turn into aid to the Kadar regime),108 a series of biannual reports of the Political Advisers emerged, under titles which, once more, were telling. The first report was entitled ‘The Satellites’, then the term ‘Situation in Eastern Europe’ was used, and from 1959 a clear differentiation was made between Eastern Europe and the East German entity, reflecting NATO (and mostly West German) refusal to recognize the German Democratic Republic (GDR): ‘The Situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany’. Perceptions as well as political and cultural attitudes need to be addressed before embarking on an analysis of these documents. First, it is interesting to note, again, similarities and differences between NATO and US national analysis of the region. Both agreed on the superficial stability of Eastern European regimes, and on the need to avoid revolution but to encourage evolution. However, the Americans, in their national analysis documents, sometimes included the Soviet Baltic republics in ‘Eastern Europe’ (which the NATO analysts never did), and examined the prospects of active resistance in Eastern Europe (and in the Baltic States or the Ukraine) in case of war, which again the NATO analysts avoided. The major difference involved the scope of analysis: the US was seeking for ways to act, even indirectly and in the long run, whereas NATO’s situation reports were confined strictly to the observation of developments in Eastern Europe.109 It is also interesting that during the drafting of the first Eastern European report, early in 1957 and in the immediate aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution, the Americans successfully resisted a French suggestion to discuss the ‘re-stalinization’ of
Eastern Europe.110 At that moment, the Americans appeared calmer in their analysis than the Europeans. The NATO experts consistently pointed out that the Eastern European countries did not form a monolith, but were divided into several sub-categories. The simplest categorization was political: there were ‘progressive elements (Poland, Yugoslavia)’ and the ‘conservatives’ in Czechoslovakia, the ‘Zone’ and elsewhere.111 The East German regime (the ‘Zone’) was always described as the most repressive, but also vulnerable Eastern European entity, forming a category of its own, since it lacked international recognition, but also because of its pivotal importance ‘to the Soviet position in Europe, and to the Soviet hold over the bloc’.112 The East German regime was consistently described as being hostile to Khrushchev’s openings to the West. The conclusion of trade agreements with the GDR was strongly discouraged.113 Additional categorizations appeared. There were countries in this region (the northern East European states and East Germany) in which public opinion was notable both for its anti-Russian and anticommunist disposition. The NATO experts noted that Soviet rule was unpopular throughout Eastern Europe, but it was more unpopular in some countries than in others. This refers to a cultural attitude: although this was not expressly stated, the NATO analysts evidently held that the northern East European states (today’s East Central Europe), with their Catholic tradition, were ‘more’ restive and antiSoviet – and arguably, more European, and more important – than the South-East European countries such as Bulgaria (or, at times, even Yugoslavia), with their Orthodox and pro-Russian tradition, and their low level of development. Moreover, the northern East European countries faced NATO’s pivotal Central Region, while the Balkan ones only the Southern Flank. In any event, the NATO experts kept stressing that the Soviet problem in Eastern Europe was unsolvable: as they noted in December 1958, ‘they [the Soviets] have not been able to resolve the basic difficulties underlying their
position in Eastern Europe – hostility to Soviet domination and antipathy toward communist rule’.114 Last but not least, a prominent part of NATO analysis concerned economic realities and trends in Eastern Europe. The experts referred to the forced attempt of these states to industrialize in 1948– 53, as a result of the dogmatic priorities of communism: although most of these countries were agricultural societies, their industrial output had doubled from 1938 to 1956. However, this had happened too fast: societies in Eastern Europe had little time to absorb a change of this magnitude, while agriculture was neglected, and property rights were violated. These created sources of tension. Furthermore, the Economic Advisers pointed to the failures of collectivization: in 1955 the food output was two-thirds of the pre-war level, and the Soviet bloc policies of autarky accentuated problems. The five-year plans of the satellites had paid lip service to the need to raise the standard of living, but had achieved very little, while harsher policies had been implemented in early 1956, such as a renewed drive to collectivize agriculture. At the same time, the Soviet Union until 1956 granted loans, not credits, and exploited its satellites economically. All these profound social and economic changes, the NATO experts stressed, were not results of national revolution, but imposed from abroad, and could spark the reaction of local societies. Furthermore, these changes led to economic failures, posing a further problem for Soviet rule in Eastern Europe.115 The first Eastern European reports of the Political Advisers in 1957–9 stressed the problem of Soviet imposition. The documents noted that in 1956 Moscow had managed to carry out ‘a fairly successful blocking operation in Eastern Europe’. The campaign against ‘revisionism’ in 1958 (including the execution of Imre Nagy) was seen as part of this drive to contain anti-Sovietism. This, however, did not solve the Kremlin’s long-term problem: Moscow had merely managed to suppress popular unrest, not uproot it. The NATO experts stressed that following the 1956 crisis, the Kremlin’s hold rested more than ever on the repressive nature of the Eastern European regimes, and (as Khrushchev had declared) on Moscow’s
readiness to intervene militarily in the region. Moreover, after 1956 the Soviets stopped the economic exploitation of these states and extended aid to them. In fact, Eastern Europe was becoming a Soviet economic liability. Still, the NATO experts also stressed that Soviet aims in the region were not merely strategic. The need to maintain the ‘conquests of Socialism’ should not be underestimated, and the Soviets knew that if the situation in one country got out of control, unrest could easily spread to the others. The NATO analysts underlined that in case of further disturbances in Eastern Europe (in Poland, Hungary or East Germany), the West should carefully try to maintain the morale of the peoples, but it was impossible to wean these countries away from Moscow by economic and political means alone. The West should also strive to localize a future intra-bloc armed conflict, and should avoid encouraging the East European peoples to use force in their effort to achieve liberation. This was another admission that NATO did not have the power decisively to influence developments in that area.116 The NATO experts also looked for centres of resistance to Moscow. Dissident intellectuals were regarded as a hopeful sign, but as unable to effect change. Yugoslavia remained a puzzle for Western analysts. Belgrade’s recognition of the GDR frightened the NATO experts, who regarded that Belgrade was returning to the Soviet fold.117 Still, the renewed Soviet campaign against ‘revisionism’ since autumn 1957 and the open quarrel of Moscow and Belgrade on the 1958 Yugoslav Party programme reassured them. By December 1958 the Political Advisers were confident that Yugoslavia was ‘a Communist power but not a Satellite’. It was clear, however, that Moscow would not allow Yugoslavia to function as a model for the other Eastern European countries.118 In 1957–9 the Political Advisers pinned their hopes on Poland. This was a general trend in Western analysis: for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski noted in his book the existence (or his hope for the existence) of a ‘Polish way to socialism’ and of ‘Gomulkaism’.119 It is true, as we now know, that 1956 was a watershed in delegitimizing
the Polish communist regime,120 but this would only work in the long term, contrary to the NATO experts’ expectation for quicker results. At that time, Gomulka wanted to reform the Warsaw Pact, not dispute it.121 In other words, the NATO experts evidently allowed their expectations to rise too high. Early in 1957 many delegations argued for a more lenient attitude towards the Gomulka regime.122 Based on these assumptions, the Political Advisers emphasized that the Kremlin faced a ‘very serious problem in Poland’, and suggested to aid the Gomulka regime through the conclusion of economic agreements; this, however, should not mean that the Soviets would allow Poland to ‘recover complete economic independence’.123 The hope for a semi- (or potentially) independent Poland thus emerged. The first Eastern European report noted that the Soviets’ problem in the area ‘would not be so acute but for Poland’s successful assertion of relative independence under Gomulka’s leadership’. Situated strategically between the Soviet Union and Germany, Poland could not be isolated from the other communist countries in the manner that Tito had been in 1948. Furthermore, politically ‘the Polish example presents more radical aspects than the case of Tito in 1948 […] the Polish “way to Socialism” from the outset represents a potential danger to the Soviet system itself’. In an even greater exaggeration, the report went on to suggest that ‘Poland has to some extent become a foreign body within the Soviet bloc’, as deStalinization was under way, speech was ‘reasonably free’ and the jamming of Western broadcasts had stopped.124 In April 1958 Poland was described as having acquired a ‘semi-independent position’, as shown by its reluctance to participate in the publication of a new communist journal, and by its desire to join GATT and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Political Advisers even suggested that the Rapacki plan for the denuclearization of Central Europe echoed not only Soviet priorities, but also ‘strictly Polish motives’, including the creation of international controls which would ease Soviet military pressures on Poland.125 Still, these hopes were
dashed by late 1958 and in 1959, when Gomulka firmly came out against the Yugoslavs and ‘revisionism’, showing that he would not challenge Moscow. By that time, the NATO analysts had also detected a tightening of the internal political situation, although the gains registered by the Catholic Church had not been reversed. Still, it was repeatedly stressed that, even so, the Gomulka regime continued to be the satellite with the best relationship with Titoist Yugoslavia.126 The NATO experts as well as the governments of the member-states continued to aim to encourage the perceived effort of the Gomulka government to maintain some distance from Moscow. By 1960 Poland was the only satellite which was receiving Western government-to-government credits (and not merely governmentguaranteed ones).127 Still, by 1958–9 the NATO reports were pointing to the visible limits of Soviet control, which were a result of the ‘basic hatred of Communist rule and Russian overlordship’. Successive documents presented an estimation of Khrushchevite policy in identical wording: ‘A flexible Soviet policy, which can isolate Tito, prefer an Ulbricht but simultaneously accept a Gomulka, may well prove more profitable for the USSR in Eastern Europe than earlier Stalinist policies’.128 By late 1959 the Political Advisers noted that the post-1956 stabilization and consolidation in Eastern Europe had insecure foundations: Basic weaknesses […] remain. In spite of jubilant statistics, life in the people’s democracies remains difficult. Their populations are still apparently by no means convinced of the superiority of Socialism, and resentment against Soviet hegemony continues.129 At the same time, the NATO experts were careful to warn against excessive optimism and Western interventionism. The Political Advisers noted that ‘in the long run the fate of the Eastern European peoples fundamentally depends on developments within the Soviet
Union itself’.130 They also did not omit to include in their reports their favourite call for allied unity: Such changes [in Soviet policy] may be assisted by the continuing pressure exerted by the very existence of a strong and united Western Alliance […]. The Western nations, without relaxing their opposition to Communism, should, while exercising due caution, not neglect any real possibilities for assisting evolutionary trends in the bloc.131 1960–2: the high tide of Soviet control? In 1960–2 the mood started to change. Initially, the Political Advisers referred to a growing ‘political confidence’ of the Eastern European regimes, detecting a ‘trend toward acquiescence’, which was aided by growth mostly in the industrial sector (but not in agriculture) and by the relative improvement in the standard of living. The NATO experts, following American suggestions,132 thought that this was partially the result of economic coordination through COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance). On the other hand, these did not solve the fundamental problem of legitimacy which troubled the communist countries: thus, the Eastern European leaderships appeared to be afraid of détente, exactly because relaxation could spark dissent, as in 1956. The fundamental struggle between the communist regimes and the Eastern European Churches continued unabated, and signs of popular hostility towards the regime were evident, mostly in Poland, the GDR and Hungary. However, the East European societies could do little to effect change: as noted in April 1961, the public opinion in the satellites seemed to take the communist regimes as ‘an enduring fact of life’. Moreover, the SinoSoviet split was seen as increasing the satellites’ space for manoeuvre, as Moscow now needed their support against Beijing. Albania’s defection from the Soviet bloc was noted (and fervently commented by the British, Turkish and Italian delegations early in
1961), but was not regarded as a development of catalytic importance.133 Regarding individual countries, the Committee insisted that Poland was still able to maintain its gains of 1956, although the previous claims that the country could play a crucial role in the evolution of the bloc were not expressly repeated. Czechoslovakia was described as the most stable satellite, with an entrenched regime and a ‘relatively prosperous’ economy. Hungary was seen as slowly overcoming the economic problems caused by the 1956 Revolution and invasion, while the Janos Kadar regime was described as unpopular and relentlessly repressive, but also provocatively defiant of the West. The most extreme case in Eastern Europe continued to be East Germany. The Political Advisers noted the regime’s exceptionally repressive character and the exodus of refugees causing its manpower problem. Following the building of the Wall, the NATO experts stressed that the Ulbricht regime has dropped all pretence of government by consent and has resorted to threats, force and brutality to impose its will […]. From all this the régime has derived new confidence in its powers, but conversely, has never been so hated by the population. Yet, this provided little comfort for the people, ‘whose despondency was increased by the immunity with which the régime was able to proceed to seal off East Berlin’.134 In 1961–2, however, new trends became evident. In the first instance, the NATO documents referred to a constant failure in agriculture, resulting in major food shortages. Although the NATO experts described these problems as ‘embarrassing rather than dangerous’ for the communist regimes, this was a pattern which would continue in the years to come. The analysts pointed to the main reason for the satellites’ economic difficulties: ‘the essential pre-condition to a rational allocation of resources – namely a price system that reflects real costs of production – remains unfulfilled’. At the same time, the reports detected a Soviet bloc tendency to view
the highly successful EEC as a ‘serious challenge’. The obvious response was to mobilize the COMECON in order to balance Western European success. However, COMECON now appeared less successful: in a scenario of Eastern European economic integration, there was potentially a conflict of interests between the industrialized members of the Soviet bloc, such as the ‘Zone’ or Czechoslovakia, which would welcome a larger market, and the more backward members, ‘who fear that they will be relegated to the role of primary producers’.135 Apart from economic challenges, in 1961–2 the NATO experts detected the possibility of ‘a weakening of Soviet ideological predominance and a strengthening of the tendency of the satellite countries to reassert their national identity’. This process was being aided by the Sino-Soviet split, but also by the fear of Eastern European leaders that Khrushchev’s policies might expose them to a new 1956.136 This raised important questions about the likely Western response, and would occupy NATO in the following years. The Sino-Soviet relationship and its uncertainties Taking the ‘communist monolith’ for granted, 1957–60 Of all the riddles of the communist world, none was more perplexing for the NATO analysts than the position and prospects of the PRC, which was not only communist, but also Asian and Chinese. The greatest question mark was, of course, its relationship with the Muscovite metropolis.137 It is here that one of the most interesting failures of NATO analysis can be detected: the NATO working groups failed to assess the growing Sino-Soviet tension. Even after the Sino-Soviet split became public in 1960, they remained uncertain, and kept dealing with the two countries as a united antiWestern force in international affairs. Evidently, the NATO analysts allowed their awe of communism to obscure the deep divisions that grew in those years between the two communist power-centres.
The PRC was studied in three different contexts: as a member of the communist world which deserved special analysis; in the Far East situation reports of the Political Advisers; and in the context of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Yet, NATO analysis on the PRC differed radically from the reports on the Soviet Union. The major problem was the abysmal unreliability of Chinese statistics and the absence of Western diplomatic representation in Beijing, which meant that Western analysts lacked adequate intelligence or evidence to evaluate the PRC’s policies. The Economic Advisers reported on China in the summer of 1958. They noted that the ‘conquest’ of China was a success which offered the communist world ‘opportunities that it never had before’, but the development of the country could prove an enormous burden. China’s greatest problem was its rapidly expanding population: the density of the population was four times higher than that of Russia in 1928. On the other hand, the economic experts noted that China now had allies which would contribute to its development; industrial output had already doubled, and the Chinese economy was stronger and more diversified than before.138 However, the Americans had to step in during the drafting process and caution the NATO analysts that they tended to present a more favourable picture of the PRC economy than was real.139 The lack of reliable information also tormented the Political Advisers, who initially regarded the Great Leap Forward as a successful policy, and only gradually came to realize its failures. Even then, they were alarmed to note that, despite failures in agriculture, the PRC was developing faster than the other countries of the region. The Political Advisers monitored the increasing international activity of the PRC, including its ambition to court the neutral Asian countries. They considered that India and Japan formed the most notable counter-weights to the Chinese challenge in Asia.140 The most intriguing problem was, of course, the nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Since 1953, reports on China had stressed that the PRC was not a satellite but a sui generis ally of the Soviet Union, although a break between Beijing and Moscow was regarded
improbable. The NATO analysts had pointed out that Mao was prepared to accept Stalin’s primacy, but it was probable that he, as a revolutionary leader, would be less willing to do the same with the next generation of Soviet leaders, who had risen from the ranks of Soviet bureaucracy and lacked the revolutionary aura. On the other hand, it was also clear that China was dependent on Soviet aid for its own development. In late 1957 and early 1958 the issue of SinoSoviet relations was debated in the alliance, and in March 1958 a report by the Political Division on the PRC’s relationship with the Soviet bloc was submitted to the NAC. The report noted that the Chinese were ‘only lukewarm’ in their support of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization policy. Evidently, Mao was displeased with the deconstruction of Stalin’s myth, and the PRC’s discomfort grew bigger with the events in Hungary and Poland. The Chinese regime decided to tolerate criticism: the ‘Hundred Flowers’ campaign (based on the slogan ‘Let all flowers bloom together’ and aiming at scientific progress) was part of this enterprise. However, this led to unrest which the regime could not accept: the government then launched the ‘rectification’ campaign and its struggle against the ‘rightists’, which included increased propaganda and ideological ‘purification’ of dissidents. Part of this drive was the Chinese support to the parallel Soviet campaign against ‘revisionism’. Despite the use of the term ‘Hundred Flowers’ by East European dissidents, it was clear that this Chinese policy had not led to more freedom, while Beijing supported Moscow in the 1956 invasion of Hungary. Moreover, in his November 1957 visit to Moscow, Mao accepted the Soviet Union’s primacy in the communist world.141 The Political Division stressed that the Sino-Soviet alliance benefited both countries. The Chinese leaders were seen as devoted communists, dependent on Soviet economic and military aid: ‘It would clearly take a great deal of provocation to make them quarrel openly with their Soviet comrades’. The NATO experts discussed possible fields of Sino-Soviet friction. They regarded a Sino-Soviet break ‘over a purely doctrinal issue [to be] almost unthinkable’. They did not believe that Chinese demands for aid could lead to friction:
‘The Soviet Alliance is the source from which the Chinese leaders at present derive […] capital, and it would be quixotic for them to throw away this advantage’. At the same time, the analysts noted, the Soviets were exercising self-restraint towards China, and did not try to turn it into a ‘docile satellite’. Even historic causes of conflict (differences over Sinkiang, Outer Mongolia, Manchuria or over Asian leadership) were not expected to overcome the factors that drew the two regimes together; this was a ‘remote’ prospect. As for differences over Eastern European developments, China had neither the interest nor the power to exert influence there. Last but not least, there was no evidence ‘of profound differences between Moscow and Peking over their views of the outside world’. There was evidence of Soviet discomfort that ‘the younger brother is growing up so fast’, but there were no signs that a real divergence of interests could occur. The NATO experts carefully pointed out that in 1947 a similar conclusion would have been drawn regarding Soviet– Yugoslav relations: ‘the unlikely does sometimes come to pass’. Still, they insisted: The Tito–Stalin type of break in Soviet–Chinese relations is a less likely contingency than a possible progressive disillusionment of one or the other partner with the Alliance. Of this there are at present no signs on either side […]. The likelihood must be faced that the Sino-Soviet alliance will persist for a long time, despite differences of greater or less seriousness beneath the surface.142 In other words, the NATO analysts were seeing the possible causes of Sino-Soviet friction, but did not believe that the two communist power-centres would allow an open break. In essence this was due to a difficulty to understand how revolutionary leaders, especially the Chinese, worked. Another set of Western misunderstandings became clear late in 1958, after the new crisis over the offshore islands, which raised the danger of an armed clash between Chinese and American forces. The Political Advisers failed fully to appreciate the effects of this crisis or the Chinese fears of Soviet domination. They also failed to
note the importance of Chinese nuclear ambitions. They thought that Soviet restraint on the Chinese was effective, and that ‘Moscow’s performance in fulfilment [sic] of these pledges has been exemplary in vigour as well as in its outward harmony and co-ordination with Peking’. The NATO analysts considered that, despite their differences, the two powers were united by common ideology and their hostility to the West, while China’s economic dependence on Moscow was also a crucial factor. ‘Thus, Sino-Soviet relations in the foreseeable future are likely to be characterised by solidarity and close co-operation’.143 In their simultaneous Far East report, the Political Advisers noted ‘no sign of a weakening of the Sino-Soviet alliance’.144 In the following years the NATO committees maintained this line. The April 1960 ‘Soviet trends’ report of the Political Advisers, which also failed to predict Soviet policy in the summit, stressed that the Chinese ‘continue to acknowledge Soviet leadership of the bloc’: There is no firm evidence of Sino-Soviet rivalry for the direction and control of communist parties and their activities in the underdeveloped areas, although there appears in some cases to be imperfect co-ordination. Whereas Soviet Communism has now successfully overcome the most formidable problems of its early years and can afford to take a more relaxed and confident view of the future, Chinese Communism is still in the early stages of socialist economic construction and cannot afford to relax its initial revolutionary impetus […] There is, however, no likelihood in the foreseeable future that they [Sino-Soviet differences] will pose any real threat to the Sino-Soviet alliance.145 In both their Far East reports of that year, the Political Advisers insisted on this interpretation. In April they noted that ‘a breach between the two countries can be confidently ruled out for the foreseeable future’, and in late 1960, even after the Sino-Soviet split had come out in the open, they argued that the differences
concerned ‘tactics’ rather than the ‘fundamentals’: ‘no rupture of the alliance is to be expected in the foreseeable future’.146 Refusing to acknowledge the Sino-Soviet split, 1961–2 In subsequent years, the NATO experts continued to point to the existence of a ‘Sino-Soviet bloc’. It proved difficult for them to question one of the major assumptions of Western analysis, namely the ‘monolithic’ nature of communism. Mostly, they could not decide what the West could do to exploit this dramatic development. At the end of the day, the problem for the NATO experts seemed unsolvable: China, which was quarrelling with the Soviets, argued for a more aggressive policy towards the West. Unable to suggest a rapprochement with the more extremist communist country, the NATO experts obviously could not support the unthinkable course of siding with the Soviets against the Chinese: this would only bring the West into the strange position of trying to solve the Soviets’ problem! In August 1962 Alexander Böker, the head of the NATO regional working groups, told the Americans that the Political Advisers had done everything they could in analysing the phenomenon, but the nature of the conflict ‘made it difficult to draw any new policy conclusions, particularly with respect to implications of the SinoSoviet conflict for Western policy’. Böker was in favour of setting up an ad hoc working group to study this issue.147 A similar mental attitude was detectable in American and British diplomacy. In 1961 the Kennedy administration appeared eager to provide to its NATO allies early guidance on the issue of Chinese recognition, evidently fearing ‘misunderstandings’ by the Europeans, who were usually critical of the US policy of non-recognition.148 When, in 1961, a NATO questionnaire asked the alliance members whether they believed that NATO could take advantage of the SinoSoviet dispute, the British gave a negative reply.149 In 1962 SinoSoviet relations were debated in the Committee of the Political Advisers. The Americans noted that they were not certain that it was yet an open breach. The British took a similar line, although they
disagreed with the US assessment that the Soviet world until 1956 was under the full control of Moscow: ‘The control was more apparent than real’. Moreover, the Americans and the British, not having reached definite conclusions themselves, did not want NATO to write a major study about this dispute: the Political Advisers should provide factual accounts or address specific issues.150 Thus, apart from major policy dilemmas, the NATO analysts also faced their rather restricted terms of reference, imposed by national governments which remained uncertain when facing this phenomenon. Moreover, as the British noted, NATO analysis suffered from an endless commenting on previous comments on China.151 In this context, the Western analysts preferred to adopt an attitude of waiting. But this ‘waiting’ could take different forms. As early as December 1960–January 1961, US national assessments insisted that the rift would not be easily bridged, although they did not foresee a complete break. In fact, the Americans were afraid that a full break might free the Chinese to opt for war with the West.152 George Kennan himself suggested that the West could do little to influence Sino-Soviet relations, and should carefully observe developments.153 Later on, the Americans pointed to the difficulty of bridging the gap, although they did not yet refer to a full break between the two communist centres.154 In view of such uncertainties, NATO analysis proved timid. The November 1960 ‘review of Soviet policy’, took a non-committal line towards the Sino-Soviet split. It noted that ‘it is probable that the Sino-Soviet dispute has played an important part in the recent hardening of Soviet policy’ (towards the West). The experts pointed out that the Kremlin seemed more confident about the communist position in the world, but also alarmed at the prospect of a nuclear war. On the contrary, Beijing wanted a more vigorous drive towards revolution in the periphery, held that the possibility of war remained and accused the Soviets for being ‘soft’ on the West. Behind these problems of strategy, the report continued, were issues of doctrine
and of predominance in the communist world. Mao’s claim to be a direct successor to Lenin obviously embarrassed the Kremlin: Mao was the leader of a successful revolution, whereas the post-Stalin Soviet leaders were simply successful bureaucrats, and this meant that their standing in a world revolutionary movement was peculiar, compared to the leaders of Beijing. The experts also pointed to other sources of friction: Chinese dissatisfaction with Soviet economic aid, Chinese nuclear ambitions and the Chinese Formosan priorities which were quite low in Soviet policy. However, the NATO experts could not bring themselves to believe that an intra-communist quarrel could prove more decisive than hostility to the West: Despite the bitterness of the Sino-Soviet dispute, mutual interest in maintaining the Alliance is more compelling than any fissiparous tendencies, and an open breach does not seem likely. While in the long run the maintenance of the dispute should be to the advantage of the West, in the short term it has tended to harden Khrushchev’s line by making him more eager to obtain visible successes for his policy. This serious dispute between the two greatest Communist powers tends to tarnish the myth that Communism eliminates national differences and offers an infallible guide in political questions. Western propaganda agencies can use this fact to advantage, though there is little that can be done by the West to exacerbate the dispute.155 Perhaps in 1960 it was premature to reach a bolder conclusion. However, in subsequent years, the NATO analysts did not deviate from this line, and insisted that the West adopt a ‘hands-off’ policy. In December 1961 the Political Advisers argued: Although the continuance of the rifts in the Sino-Soviet bloc carries certain benefits for the West, it appears that in general overt attempts by the Western powers to deepen or exploit these rifts would probably be counter-productive, since they would tend to
bring the parties together on the issue on which they are most united, viz. hostility to the West.156 The Sino-Soviet dispute was now being discussed by the Political Advisers, with many delegations contributing papers. The Americans were not certain that the split had reached a ‘decisive point’: the two countries remained communist, and ‘even a complete break between Soviet Russia and Communist China would not end the Cold War’. However, the Americans also revealed their embarrassment by adding: Neither would it [a complete break] result in a decisive shift in the balance of forces that could be brought to bear either in global war or in violent or non-violent attempts to secure advantage in local areas around the world. It would not in itself eliminate any of the particular points of conflict between the United States and Soviet Russia or between the United States and Communist China. It would most likely not give the United States opportunity to ‘win over’ either of the two, or even to establish particularly friendly relations with the one or the other.157 In view of this analysis by the leader of the alliance, the NATO experts continued to be puzzled by the Sino-Soviet quarrel. They could not rule out the possibility that the two communist powers would again draw together, and were uncertain as to what form this dispute would take in the future: With regard to foreign policy, co-ordination of the bloc’s moves against the West will become more difficult. However, this will not necessarily mitigate the dangers which communist hostility and purpose raise for the free world, nor diminish the increasing material power which underlies the communist threat.158
Concepts, interpretations and the global conflict: the ‘economic offensive’ of the ‘Sino-Soviet’ bloc A new global Soviet policy Moscow’s ‘rediscovery of the Third World’159 opened up a new field of economic and political conflict, which assumed greater importance and complexity after the acceleration of decolonization in 1960. In the aftermath of the Twentieth CPSU Congress, following a proposal by West Germany, NATO had decided to monitor this global Soviet activity. The task was extremely demanding for a defensive alliance, which primarily wanted to defend its ‘treaty area’ in Europe. It was undertaken by the Committee of Soviet Economic Policy which later became a sub-committee of the Economic Advisers. The initial discussions showed an important extent of agreement between the major powers, although the Americans and the British insisted that the reports should not give the picture of NATO interfering in the internal affairs of the new states, and Africa should not yet be covered.160 Once more, perceptions and descriptions were crucial: the relevant documents were entitled ‘the economic offensive of the Sino-Soviet bloc’, revealing the West’s feeling that it was being attacked in parts of the globe in which, until recently, it was supreme. It was also telling that the phrase ‘the Sino-Soviet bloc’ remained even after it had become clear that the Sino-Soviet dispute was difficult to bridge. The ‘economic offensive’ documents indicated that economic growth had allowed the Kremlin to undertake major initiatives globally. The first of these memoranda, in 1957, stressed that the economic offensive posed ‘a major political and strategic threat to the outside world’. The new Soviet policy had become evident in late 1952 and especially after Stalin’s death, and involved a new strategy in the Cold War: ‘The Soviet acceptance of the fact that the two leading powers had reached a nuclear stalemate gave renewed importance to the use of non-military means in the achievement of communist aims’. The ‘offensive’ involved trade, aid, technical
assistance and trade fairs. From 1953 to 1957 the trade of the Soviet bloc with underdeveloped countries had almost doubled: thus, to give indicative examples, ‘trade with the Middle East and Africa doubled between 1953 and 1955, while with Latin America increased five-fold’. During the same period, 1953–7, almost $1.5 million of Soviet bloc aid was given; two-thirds of Soviet aid was of a nonmilitary nature, although in the Middle East the delivery of arms was more important than the granting of economic assistance. The Economic Advisers noted that the total volume of Soviet bloc trade was still small (in 1957 it represented 2.5 per cent of total world trade), but had serious political and economic repercussions: But the smallness of the total understates the impact of the trade drive, which is designed so as to have the maximum political effect and concentrates on countries who are in need of economic assistance and trade outlets […]. The prime aim of Communist foreign economic policy is undoubtedly the weakening of Western influence in strategic areas of the world, by attempting to gain sympathy for the communist cause from national governments that are pro-Western or neutral in their foreign policies. Recent events in the Middle East demonstrate this clearly.161 The main point of these studies concerned the increasing capabilities of the Soviet economy. The experts noted that Soviet economic growth allowed the bloc to offer long-term credits at low rates of interest, arranging for the bulk purchases of raw materials from the developing countries, usually (or at least nominally) above market prices, thus tying up a large part of their surpluses and ultimately distorting world trade. Such a distortion could also be caused by massive Soviet sales at prices lower than those of the world market: this was the case with Soviet sales of tin and aluminium in 1958. The NATO experts cautioned that Cold War strategy was not the only reason for the intensification of Soviet economic activity: intensive industrialization had created more need for raw materials and had made available a larger volume of exportable manufactured goods, together with traditional exports of
oil and wheat. In summer 1957 the experts went as far as to note that ‘[i]t is estimated that certain parts of the Soviet Union’s heavy industry compare favourably both in quality and in efficiency with those of the United States’. As for the Soviet arms trade, the NATO experts noted that this involved obsolescent arms and secured in exchange important raw materials, and thus it was an economic and political gain for the Soviet bloc. Furthermore, after 1954 credits became an increasingly important tool of Soviet economic diplomacy. In 1959 the experts recorded a great leap in Soviet bloc credits, given for a period of twelve years, with low interest (2.5 per cent). By 1962 the NATO experts estimated that arms deliveries through credits or grants exceeded the economic development credits. However, at the same time, 1962, the Economic Advisers noted the ‘increased vigour’ and the expanding geographical focus of the ‘economic offensive’, especially the granting of credits to small and poor countries, ‘where even small amounts can have a considerable economic and political impact’, such as Mali or the Somali Republic.162 The experts also noted the concerted character of the ‘economic offensive’, an indication of the increased threat that it represented for the West. China focused on Asia, and a division of labour was detectable between individual Eastern European states. Thus, East Germany specialized in electrical equipment or ships, Poland in railroad rolling-stock and mining equipment, Hungary in diesel engines, Czechoslovakia in heavy machinery and so on. Still, the most successful example of Soviet trade was the supply of arms to the Middle East. Early in 1960, the NATO analysts described the Eastern European satellites as ‘sub-contractors on its [the Soviet Union’s] major credit deals with underdeveloped countries’. In 1959 the NATO experts detected a Sino-Soviet rivalry regarding aid to the developing countries, but did not interpret it as a source of friction. They held to the concept of a coordinated communist policy.163 Technical aid and education slowly became a major aspect of Soviet activity. The NATO experts stressed the importance of Soviet technical aid to countries such as India, Burma, Afghanistan and
Egypt: the number of Soviet technicians abroad was estimated to have risen from 2,000 in 1958 to 6,500 in late 1959 and to 10,230 by late 1961. Equally important was the ‘Peoples’ Friendship University’, founded in Moscow in 1959 and later renamed ‘Patrice Lumumba’, which trained Third World students. In 1962 the Economic Advisers stressed that since 1955 more than 15,000 nationals of these countries had studied in the Soviet bloc. This number was well below the annual intake of British universities from the same areas. However, Soviet educational activity was a recent phenomenon, remained highly selective to nationals of specific key countries and included indoctrination.164 Evaluating the new threat The NATO experts stressed that Soviet trade and aid ‘is also in line with some developments in underdeveloped areas’. Not all of these countries’ products (rice, cotton, sugar, etc.) could be absorbed by Western markets, and thus could be used to secure Soviet bloc capital goods. Mostly, the Soviet bloc’s ‘economic offensive’ was highly selective: it focused on specific ‘key countries’ (for example, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Yugoslavia, India, Turkey, Burma, Indonesia, and after 1959 Cuba), on ‘spectacular’ projects (the Indian steel mill or the Aswan High Dam) or on oil and oil equipment. By 1959 a mounting Soviet economic effort was detectable also in Latin America, as agreements were signed with Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, while Cuba followed soon afterwards. In 1960 the Americans noted that ‘experienced’ governments, such as those of Egypt or India, were displaying some reserve towards Soviet aid, but inexperienced ones could more easily be lured by this prospect.165 A special field of Soviet activity concerned oil. By the early 1960s Moscow was offering to build oil industries in developing countries. This might allow the latter to seek larger revenues and disrupt the world oil market and therefore Western energy policies. At the insistence of the Americans, Soviet oil policy soon became the subject of the study of a separate working group. Early in 1962 the
Economic Advisers reported on the enormous potential of Soviet oil production, which had risen from twenty-one million tons in 1932 to 148 million tons in 1960, while the goal for 230–240 million tons by 1965 would be met. The output of the bloc represented 16 per cent of the world production, and would rise to 20 per cent by 1965. The Economic Advisers estimated that in the mid-1960s about 15 per cent of consumption in Western Europe itself would come from the Soviet Union. The committee noted that there were disagreements in its ranks regarding the nature of the threat: some analysts thought it was immediate, others considered it less urgent.166 The NATO experts were mostly concerned about the political, rather than the economic capabilities of the force they had been studying, and stressed that for the communist world, economic aid, military assistance or trade were subjected to political aims.167 The monopolistic nature of the Soviet economy and the centralized totalitarian system allowed the Kremlin to be very effective in channelling trade and aid selectively to politically sensitive areas of the globe, sometimes irrespectively of the economic logic of its initiatives. As the Economic Advisers noted in mid-1958, ‘Soviet aid is closely co-ordinated with Soviet diplomacy as a whole’. In 1962 they stressed that ‘if either for economic or political reasons, the bloc considers it desirable to conquer certain markets, there is nothing to stop it from lowering its prices without being always compelled to take into account production costs’. Moreover, the spectacular industrial expansion of the Soviet Union was projected as a model for the underdeveloped countries which also aspired to achieve industrialization and tended to see the Soviet model as more adequate for their ambitions than the ‘slow’ modes of Western capitalist development. Although no country had gone communist because of the ‘economic offensive’, Western lines of communication were under threat. The Soviets posed as a new and ‘different’ economic power, which supported the national and economic aspirations of the new nation-states. In a struggle for ‘the soul of mankind’, the NATO analysts were viewing this as one of the most alarming aspects of the ‘economic offensive’. As the Economic
Advisers noted in early 1960, the economic offensive was ‘an integral element of total communist strategy’.168 It was difficult to counter these Soviet moves: the Kremlin presented itself as the new liberating force, in former colonial territories which had been ruled by Western powers and sought independence. According to the ad hoc working group which reported on Soviet policy to the NAC in November 1960, difficulties arose by ‘the complexity of the relationships between the West and the underdeveloped countries, the multiplicity of the agencies involved, and the slowness with which a free society moves – especially in financial matters – compared to a dictatorship’.169 Western nervousness also became apparent in 1958–9, when Western European industry called for NATO measures to counter the ‘economic offensive’, but the NAC did not know how to respond, since this was outside the alliance’s competence.170 In 1960 the Economic Advisers called for an increase of Western aid through an International Development Association, and urged that the West accept the prospect of competition with growing industries of the developing countries.171 In 1961 the Political Advisers argued that it was imperative not to disappoint those developing countries which opted to ally with the West.172 These thoughts were markedly similar to the conclusions of the 1956 report of the Technical Advisers on the Pineau Plan. However, the US and Britain consistently resisted suggestions that NATO discuss policies of aid to the Third World.173 In the framework of the Ten-Year Planning exercise, in 1961, the member-states re-examined NATO’s role on the economic field, and the Economic Advisers discussed possible counter-measures to the ‘economic offensive’. However, disagreements were too wide to be bridged: the US and Britain insisted that NATO should not duplicate the work of existing economic organizations and should not assume an executive role.174 The Americans also were extremely reluctant to submit their global policies to a NATO process: although in 1960 they toyed with the idea of informal periodic assessments of the threat by the larger
NATO countries, when in 1962 the head of the Economic Advisers, Gregh, suggested that the NATO analysts focus on specific countries and propose Western counter-measures, the State Department quickly discouraged any thought for the latter, pointing out that its policy was not decided merely on the basis of NATO reports.175 This was one of the infamous out-of-area problems, and NATO remained an observer. The rediscovery of comprehensive analysis: the emergence of APAG, 1960–2 By the early 1960s, NATO reports had become excessively compartmentalized, and had been notable for some spectacular failures. This sparked a rethinking of NATO analysis. The new idea was to complement the specialized studies with the creation of a partially independent group of analysts, who would address specific questions of prime importance. It was hoped that this would offset the tendency for compartmentalization, thus providing Ministers and NATO officials with high-quality analysis on specific major issues. Arguably, the ‘experiment’ of autumn 1960, when national experts had participated, also played a role in this process. As often was the case in the Western alliance, the proposal came from the US and Britain, in the context of the Long-Term Planning Exercise of 1960–1. The American idea involved a permanent committee of prominent experts, who would not necessarily be subordinate to the NAC, but would have more freedom in discussing issues. Perhaps this was too bold for NATO, and the British notion for a more loosely organized group finally prevailed.176 The British wanted an ad hoc group, functioning under the NAC, but also free to present thoughtprovoking analysis on specific major questions. It would consist of ‘planners’, not merely ‘experts’, and thus would also be able to make recommendations to Ministers. This meant that the influence of the major powers would be retained (since only they had planners), but the smaller members would also be integrated in the process.
Indeed, the original British idea was to rotate the meetings in all NATO countries, both to allow the small powers to act as hosts (and thus to chair the meetings), and also to get away from Paris, where the new body would run the risk of becoming merely another working group of the national delegations.177 The British delegation submitted the proposal to the NAC in autumn 1961.178 This set the stage for the creation of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (APAG). At the request of the NAC, the Political Advisers studied the proposal, and in October 1961 proposed terms of reference. APAG would make studies on long-term policy problems at the request of the NAC, and would also make suggestions for future action. The focus on long-term policy problems would guard against overlap with the competence of the existing machinery of NATO analysis. APAG would consist of experts from the member-states, although they were expected to express opinions and reach conclusions without constant reference to their governments.179 At British insistence, the group would focus on specific problems, as it would be pointless to discuss everything.180 This was the major point that interested the British, who did not elaborate much on the details of APAG’s terms of reference: In general, we do not want to be sticky about details: once this Group is launched we should be able to steer it in the right direction without constantly referring to every comma in the master paper.181 APAG now became one the focal points of British interest in NATO analysis, more so since the project was placed under the direction of Hooper. Of course, in the beginning there were the usual problems of coordination. In its first meeting, on 5–6 July 1962 at the NATO Headquarters in Paris, APAG was charged with an evaluation of the long-term threat to NATO, but the Standing Group proved reluctant to release detailed military information.182 The meeting also discussed the problems of neutralism. It was attended by high-
ranking planners, including the American Walt W. Rostow, the Head of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department; the French Jean Laloy, Assistant Director of Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministry; and the British P. E. Ramsbotham, the Head of the Western Organizations and Planning Department of the FO.183 The three countries, the only ones in NATO which had policy planning staffs, retained the initiative in subsequent APAG sessions as well.184 APAG expected that the main features of Soviet policy would remain unchanged until 1970. However, the Soviets would now face increasing difficulties on the economy, as the competition for resources would continue between agriculture, defence, capital and consumer goods. The Kremlin would also face problems because of the Sino-Soviet dispute (although APAG was not prepared to consider the split as final and regarded that a complete break was ‘unlikely in the near future’). Last but not least, the problem of nationalities within the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc was expected to surface more vigorously. APAG stressed that the defence of NATO depended on the economic and social progress of its members, and was part of the economic and social defence against communism. The group wished that the EEC become stronger, and consider its enlargement – a clear reference to Britain’s ambitions to join the Community.185 In the NAC, in midJuly, both Stikker and many Permanent Representatives stressed that the report added little new. It was recognized that the subject (the long-term threat) was very wide, something which strengthened British arguments about the need to focus on specific issues.186 APAG’s second meeting was held in Paris in mid-October 1962. The group completed its discussion on neutralism, following submission of papers by the US and the British delegations,187 and started the examination of Western economic might in relation to the Soviet bloc. The participants included Rostow and Laloy, and, from the British side, the new Head of the Planning Department of the FO, E. J. W. Barnes.188 The resulting APAG document did not deal with classic neutralism of the Swiss of Swedish type, but the ‘new’ and
‘emotional’ type which was surfacing in Asia, Africa and to a lesser extent in Latin America. APAG stressed that these countries were becoming easy targets of Soviet propaganda and penetration. The West should not oppose neutralism: it could even use some of the neutral countries ‘as a buffer or even as a mediator between the two blocs’. Mostly, it was imperative that the Western countries coordinate their policies in the Third World.189 Despite the fact that its first reports were too general, APAG differed significantly from existing working groups: it could make policy recommendations, and was expected to provide new perspectives. An example can be found in its December 1962 progress report. In the context of a long Cold War involving legitimization, APAG pointed to the need to confirm the West’s progressive character: The West would therefore be well advised to avoid giving the impression that the system which it advocates is based exclusively in the unrestricted play of economic forces which, historically has led to serious crises. The West should recognise that laissez-faire needs to be tempered by controls based in central planning of the economy, involving state action.190 Mostly, APAG’s reports were not agreed minutes,191 but rather the chairman’s report on the discussion. These allowed it to be bolder than the other NATO bodies. Still, it should be remembered that APAG was not created as a decision-making body; this competence was always reserved for the NAC and the national governments, and it could not be otherwise in an inter-governmental organization. APAG would provide stimulating analysis and food for thought. Its setting up was a telling indication that NATO was now seeking more critical reports. The emergence of APAG and the Ten-Year exercise also aided another change in NATO analysis procedures: since late 1961, the Political Advisers decided to start recording disagreements in their documents (although they would still not propose policies), and in mid-1962 decided to prepare shorter reports and also to stop
reviewing and redrafting the documents of the expert working groups.192 It was hoped that these, together with APAG, would allow for bolder NATO analysis. By 1963 the Cold War was entering a new phase, and NATO would confront fresh challenges. Notes 1 NARA, RG 59, Dulles to Paris, 23 January 1957, 740.5/1–2357; Dulles to Paris, 26 January 1957, 740.5/1–2657, Box 3139; Dulles to Paris, 19 February 1957, 740.5/2– 1457, Box 3140. See also TNA/FO 371/124815/70, minute (Hood), 30 November 1956. 2 NARA, RG 59, Perkins to State Department, 2 February 1957, 740.5/2–257, Box 3139. 3 NARA, RG 59, Burgess to State Department, 24 April 1958, 740.5/4–2458, Box 3152. 4 Other members of the committee in 1957 were: J. Poppeians de Morchoven (Belgium), P. Tremblay (Canada), S. Sandager-Jeppesen (Denmark), C. Gasparini (Italy), M. Alexandrakis (Greece), A. Philippe (Luxemburg), K. Aars (Norway), A. Martins (Portugal), Z. Kuneralp (Turkey). See NATO/AC/119-R1, 30 January 1957. 5 NATO/CM(58)61, ‘Future Work of the Committee of Economic Advisers’, 3 April 1957; TNA/FO 371/131029/5, Steel to FO, 24 January 1957; TNA/FO 371/131051/1 and 2, Potter (NATO) to Bushell, 7 and 15 February 1957. See also NARA, RG 59, Perkins to State Department, 26 January 1957, 740.5/1–2657, Box 3139. 6 NARA, RG 59, Perkins to State Department, 14 February 1957, 740.5/2–1457, Box 3140. 7 NATO/AC/89-R17, 13 March 1957. 8 TNA/FO 371/128995/6, Gallagher to Cheetham, 7 March 1957. 9 NATO/AC/127-D/28, US note, 4 March 1958, and D/32, Canadian note, 17 July 1958. 10 Other members were: M. Frérotte (Belgium), P. Bridle and J. H. Warren (Canada), E. Jørgensen (Denmark), T. Christidis (Greece), C. Gasparini and R. Ferrara (Italy), G. De Graaf and J. H. Lubbers (Holland), P. G. Schøyen (Norway), A. Martins (Portugal), I. Kavadar (Turkey). See NATO/AC/127-R1, 17 April 1957. 11 NARA, RG 59, Houghton to State Department, 1 March 1958, 740.5/3–158, Box 3151. 12 NARA, RG 59, Perkins to State Department, 17 September 1957, 740.5/9–1757, Box 3143; NATO/AC/119-R2, 5 February 1957 and R13, 18 June 1957. 13 TNA/FO 371/128995/6, Cheetham (NATO) to Gallagher, 1 March 1957. 14 TNA/FO 371/131054/1 and 3, Porter (NATO) to Anderson (FO), 6 April, and Cheetham to Anderson, 11 April 1957. 15 NARA, RG 59, Perkins to State Department, 4 March 1957, 740.5/3–457, Box 3140. 16 TNA/FO 371/134565/1 and 2, Barker (Washington) to Joy (FO), 17 March, and Barker to Gallagher, 24 March 1958. 17 Interestingly, by mid-1959 the delegation to NATO cautioned the FO that British contributions to the Political Advisers were decreasing: TNA/FO 371/146343/20, Shattock (NATO) to Pemberton-Pigott (FO), 19 June 1959. 18 On Spaak’s leadership, see Robert S. Jordan, Political Leadership in NATO: a Study in Multilateral Diplomacy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 55–101; Michel Dumoulin, Spaak (Bruxelles: Éditions Racine, 1999), pp. 533–7 and 550–2.
19 NATO/CM(58)138, ‘Interim Report of the Secretary General on Political Consultation’, 17 November 1958; CM(59)29, ‘Annual Political Appraisal’, 17 March 1959. Interestingly, the Danes also suggested that the reports of the Political Advisers should be agreed documents, except in the cases of out-of-area issues: NATO/PO/57/244, Ismay to Permanent Representatives, 7 March 1957. 20 See for example the discussion in the ministerial NAC in NATO/CVR(58)62, 16 December 1958. 21 NATO/CM(58)138, 17 November 1958. 22 TNA/FO 371/137814/3, Roberts to Rumbold, 6 February 1958. 23 TNA/FO 371/137793/1, Roberts to Selwyn Lloyd, 28 January 1958, annual review for 1957. 24 TNA/FO 371/137828/1, Roberts to Hancock, 26 September 1958. 25 TNA/FO 371/137811/5, Brief, autumn 1958. 26 TNA/FO 371/146300/1, Roberts to Selwyn Lloyd, 23 February 1959, annual review for 1958. 27 See, among others, FRUS, 1958–60, VII, part 1, Dillon to US Embassy France, 18 July 1959, Burgess (NATO) to State Department, Record (Dulles–Spaak), 10 November 1959, pp. 468–73 and 501–3. See also Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), p. 66. 28 TNA/FO 371/146344/37, Roberts to Hoyer-Millar, 8 October 1959. See also TNA/FO 371/146346/17, Steering brief, ‘Spaak’s visit’, and Brief, ‘Consultation in NATO: Monsieur Spaak’s Proposals’, autumn 1959. The British were informed on Spaak’s views by Shuckburgh on a confidential basis. 29 NATO/PO/60/775, Spaak to Permanent Representatives, ‘First Thoughts on the “Ten Year Plan”’, 6 July 1960. 30 NATO/CM(60)111, ‘Progress Report by the Secretary-General on Long-Range Planning’, 5 December 1960; TYP(61)1, Spaak to Permanent Representatives, 18 January 1961; TYP(61)9, ‘Competence and Objectives of NATO in the Economic Field’, 29 March 1961. See also TYP(61)7, Casardi to Permanent Representatives, 20 March 1961, forwarding a report on the situation on the field of political consultation. Casardi signed the cover letter as Secretary-General Interim since Spaak had tendered his resignation. TNA/FO 371/167033/1, Mason to Home, 19 January 1962, annual review for 1961. See also, NATO, Research Section, ‘The Evolution of NATO Political Consultation, 1949–1962’, 2 May 1963, NATO/NHO/63/1, www.nato.int/archives/docu/d630502e.htm, assessed 12 February 2011. 31 See, among others, FRUS, 1961–3, XIII, Policy Directive, ‘NATO and the Atlantic Nations’, 20 April 1961, ‘NATO Ministerial Meeting: Scope and Objectives’, 1 December 1961, and ‘NATO Ministerial Meeting’, 17 May 1963, pp. 285–91, 335–9 and 575–9 respectively. 32 FRUS, 1961–3, XIII, Record (Rusk–Stikker), 9 September 1961, pp. 326–9. 33 On the contrary, recent research has stressed the importance of dissidence of intellectuals or students. See Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), pp. 168–72. 34 On the power struggle of 1957, see Zubok, A Failed Empire, pp. 119–22; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: the Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2006), pp. 144–57. Of course, NATO
analysts did not have the clear picture of internal Soviet political struggles that recent bibliography presents. 35 See the reports ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, NATO/CM(57)62, 16 April 1957; CM(58)69, 22 April 1958; CM(58)144, 6 December 1958; CM(60)38, 12 April 1960; CM(62)109, 26 November 1962; CM(60)107, ‘NATO Review of Soviet Policy since the Summit Setback’, 30 November 1960. Initially, in early 1957 the French feared a return to Stalinism: See AC/119-WP16, 25 February 1957. On West German doubts about Khrushchev’s position, see AC/119-WP(59)28, 27 February 1959. See also AC/119-WP(61)70, ‘Military Leaders and Soviet Foreign Policy – Note by the Division of Political Affairs’, 6 December 1961, and, on the same subject, AC/119-WP(62)4/2 Note by the US delegation, 27 January 1962. 36 See FRUS, 1955–7, XXVI, NSC, 298th meeting, 28 June 1956, pp. 118–23; Dulles made similar remarks to Spaak, who did not comment: FRUS, 1958–60, VII, part 1, Record (Dulles–Spaak), 4 May 1958, pp. 325–6. See also FRUS, 1958–60, X, part 1, Report on the Khrushchev visit, no date [1959], pp. 485–92. 37 FRUS, 1955–7, XXVI, NSC, 330th meeting, 11 July 1957, and Thompson (Moscow) to State Department, 15 July 1957, pp. 146–54; FRUS, 1958–60, X, part 1, Memorandum (Anderson) to Herter, 27 March 1958, and Special National Intelligence Estimate, 8 July 1958, pp. 156–8, 171–5. See also FRUS, 1961–3, V, National Intelligence Estimates, 1 December 1960, 21 February 1962, 22 May 1963, pp. 1–9, 374–9, 685–701; see also in the same volume, Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 20 April 1962, pp. 407–9, and the discussion of Khrushchev’s possible succession (at an admittedly inopportune moment), in Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 19 October 1962, pp. 535–41. See also, regarding the communication of these views to NATO, NARA, RG 59, Durbrow to State Department 7 February 1962, 375/2–762, Box 636; Rusk to Paris, 9 April 1962, 375/4–962, Box 637. 38 NATO/CM(57)149, ‘Recent Economic Developments in the USSR and the Implications of the Abandonment of the Sixth Five Year Plan’, 7 December 1957; AC/89-D/16, ‘The Soviet Economy in 1956 and in the First Half of 1957’, 4 September 1957. 39 NATO/AC/89-WP1, (US delegation) 27 February 1957; AC/89-WP5, (French delegation) 30 April 1957; AC/89-WP7, (Canadian delegation) 5 August 1957; AC/89WP12 (US delegation) 29 October 1957; AC/89-WP13 (Italian delegation) 4 November 1957; AC/89-R22, 15 November 1957; AC/89-R23, 5 February 1958. 40 NATO/CM(58)144, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 6 December 1958; AC/89-D/22, ‘Current Economic Trends in the USSR’, 28 November 1958. 41 NATO/AC/119-WP(59)86, 24 July 1959. 42 See the documents ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, NATO/CM(57)62, 16 April 1957; CM(58)69, 22 April 1958; CM(58)144, 6 December 1958; CM(60)38, 12 April 1960; CM(61)28, 18 April 1961; CM(61)144, 5 December 1961; CM(62)45, 17 April 1962; CM(62)109, 26 November 1962. See also CM(60)107, ‘NATO Review of Soviet Policy since the Summit Setback’, 30 November 1960; CM(62)89, ‘Economic Questions and the 22nd Congress of the CPSU: the 20-year Programme’, 28 August 1962; CM(62)90, ‘Results of the 1961 Soviet Economic Plan and the Plan for 1962’, 28 August 1962. See also the economic experts’ analysis of the twenty-year programme in AC/127-D/105, Note by the Sub-Committee on Soviet Economic Policy, 16 July 1962. 43 For these American estimations see among others, FRUS, 1961–3, V, Thompson (Moscow) to State Department, 1 February 1961, National Intelligence Estimates, 21 February 1962, 2 May 1962, 22 May 1963, pp. 50–4, 374–9, 414–29, 685–701.
44 Regarding problems of methodology see NATO/AC/89-D/26, ‘Comparative Economic Strength’, 28 August 1959. 45 NARA, RG59, Burgess to State Department, 21 November 1957, 740.5/11–2157, Box 3148. 46 NATO/CM(60)39, ‘Long-Term Economic Trends in NATO Countries and in the Communist Bloc and Some Implications for the Atlantic Alliance’, 15 April 1960. 47 NATO/CM(60)39, ‘Long-Term Economic Trends in NATO Countries and in the Communist Bloc and Some Implications for the Atlantic Alliance’, 15 April 1960. See also NATO/AC/127-D/43, Paper on the Great Leap Forward, 8 March 1960; AC/127D/73, ‘Economic Development in Communist China in 1959’, 2 July 1961. 48 NATO/CM(60)39, ‘Long-Term Economic Trends in NATO Countries and in the Communist Bloc and Some Implications for the Atlantic Alliance’, 15 April 1960. See also NATO/AC/127-D/43, Paper on the Great Leap Forward, 8 March 1960; AC/127D/73, ‘Economic Development in Communist China in 1959’, 2 July 1961. 49 NATO/CM(57)62, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 16 April 1957. 50 NATO/CM(57)93, ‘The Recent Soviet Political Offensive’, 13 June 1957. For the NAC discussion see also TNA/FO 371/128995/19, Roberts to FO, 10 July 1957. 51 NATO/CM(57)140, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 29 November 1957. See also Lykourgos Kourkouvelas, ‘Denuclearization on NATO’s Southern Front: Allied Reactions to Soviet Proposals, 1957–1963’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 14/4 (2012), pp. 197–215. 52 Zubok, A Failed Empire, p. 153. 53 Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, p. 7. See also pp. 355–6 and 412–16. 54 NATO/CM(58)69, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 22 April 1958. 55 NATO/CM(58)146, ‘East–West Relations’, 10 December 1958 (Political Division); CM(58)144, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 6 December 1958. See also, on Berlin, CM(59)28, ‘Trends and Implication of Soviet Policy’, 16 March 1959. 56 Wilfried Loth is correct when referring to a ‘deescalation of the Cold War’, rather than to a ‘proper’ détente in the late 1950s. See Wilfried Loth, Overcoming the Cold War: a History of Détente, 1950–1991 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 34. 57 TNA/FO 371/146343/1, Roberts to Rumbold, 13 January 1959. 58 Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 169–234; Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: the Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 251–82; Dumoulin, Spaak, pp. 569–73; Christian Nuenlist, ‘Into the 1960s: NATO’s Role in East–West Relations, 1958–1963’, in Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher (eds), Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960s (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 69–88; Bruno Thoss, ‘Information, Persuasion or Consultation? The Western Powers and NATO during the Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962’, in Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher (eds), Transatlantic Relations at Stake: Aspects of NATO, 1956–1972 (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2006), pp. 73–94; Loth, Overcoming the Cold War, pp. 47–56; Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist, ‘Containing the French Malaise? The Role of NATO’s Secretary General, 1958–1968’, in Mary Ann Heiss and S. Victor Papacosma (eds), NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 2008), pp. 75–8. 59 Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, pp. 227–48. 60 NATO/CM(59)96, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 25 November 1959; PO/59/1615, Spaak to Permanent Representatives, 4 December 1959.
61 NATO/CVR(59)44 and 45, 21 December 1959. 62 FRUS, 1958–60, VII, part 1, Burgess to State Department, 22 and 26 December 1959, pp. 560–2. 63 ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, NATO/CM(59)96, 25 November 1959; and CM(60)38, 12 April 1960. 64 NATO/CM(60)27, ‘Meeting the Defense Burden – Note by the US Delegation’, 16 March 1960. 65 See document 12, ‘Warsaw Pact Views of NATO’s Plans and Capabilities, April 28, 1960’, in Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (eds), A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991 (Budapest: Central European University, 2005), pp. 105–7. 66 TNA/FO 371/154541/1, Roberts to Selwyn Lloyd, 8 February 1960, annual review for 1959. 67 NATO/PO/59/1663, Spaak to Permanent Representatives, 18 December 1959; PO/60/30, Spaak to Permanent Representatives, 15 January 1960. See also the summary of the replies in PO/60/276(revised), Spaak to Permanent Representatives, 5 March 1960. 68 NATO/PO/60/139, Spaak to Permanent Representatives, 5 February; PO/60/248 and 253, Spaak to Permanent Representatives, 29 February 1960. 69 NATO/CM(60)40, ‘Annual Political Appraisal’, 21 April 1960. 70 Nuenlist, ‘Into the 1960s’, p. 72; see also NATO/CVR(60)18–21, 2–3 May 1960; FRUS, 1958–60, VII, part 1, Burgess to State Department, pp. 588–90. 71 NARA, RG 59, memorandum, Tobin to Meloy, 8 March 1960, 375/3–860, Box 628. 72 NATO/CM(60)38, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 12 April 1960. 73 TNA/FO 391/161265/1, Mason to Home, 12 January 1961, annual review for 1960. 74 NARA, RG 59, Burgess to State Department, 24 May 1960, 375/5–2460; Burgess to State Department, 25 May 1960, 375/5–2560; Burgess to State Department, 16 June 1960, 375/6–1660, Box 628. 75 TNA/FO 371/151922/35, Shattock (NATO) to Bullard, 25 May, 1 June and 10 June, minutes by Bullard, 24 May, and Henderson, 3 June, Shattock to Shuckburgh, 3 June 1960. 76 TNA/FO 371/151926/73, Petrie (NATO) to Leavett, 29 July, minute (Leavett), 2 August, and Shattock to Leavett, 19 August 1960. 77 NARA, RG 59, Dillon to Paris, 12 August 1960, 375/8–1260; Burgess to State Department, 19 August 1960, 375/8–1960, Box 629. 78 NARA, RG 59, Herter to Paris, 30 August 1960, 375/8–3060, Box 629; TNA/FO 371/151926/73, Petrie to Bullard, 31 August 1960. 79 NARA, RG 59, Burgess to State Department, 31 August 1960, 375/8–3160, Box 629. 80 TNA/FO 371/151926/73, Murray (NATO) to Mason, 12 September 1960. 81 TNA/FO 371/151926/73, Mason to Murray, 14 September 1960. 82 TNA/FO 371/151926/73, minute (Shuckburgh), 5 October 1960. 83 NARA, RG 59, Whitney (London) to State Department, 12 October 1960, 375/10–1260, Box 630. 84 TNA/151931/127, Briefs for Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, October 1960. 85 TNA/FO 371/151932/131, minutes by Shuckburgh, 7 November, and Mason, 3 November 1960. 86 NATO/CM(60)107, ‘NATO Review of Soviet Policy since the Summit Setback’, 30 November 1960.
87 NATO/CM(60)107, ‘NATO Review of Soviet Policy since the Summit Setback’, 30 November 1960. 88 TNA/FO 371/146344/47, Roberts to Rumbold, 27 October 1959. 89 NATO, Research Section, ‘The Evolution of NATO Political Consultation’. See also FRUS, 1958–60, VII, part 1, Record (Spaak–Burgess), 13 June 1960, pp. 591–6. 90 NATO/PO/61/142, Spaak to Permanent Representatives, 9 February 1961; PO/61/425, Casardi to Permanent Representatives, 12 April 1961. 91 Paul-Henri Spaak, Combats Inachevées, Vol. 2 (Paris: Fayard, 1969), pp. 212–25. TNA/FO 371/161278/5, Mason to FO, 31 January 1961; NARA, RG 59, Burgess to State Department, 29 January 1961, 375/1–2961, Box 631. See also FRUS, 1961–3, XIII, Record (Eisenhower–Spaak), 21 February 1961, pp. 260–6. At any rate, it was agreed that no connection should be made between Spaak’s resignation and intraalliance disagreements. 92 NATO/CR(61)7, 8 March 1961. 93 Dumoulin, Spaak, 573–7. 94 TNA/FO 371/161278/2, Mason to Tomkins, 19 January, and Shuckburgh to Mason, 27 January 1961. 95 FRUS, 1961–3, XIII, Finletter to State Department, 18 December 1961, Record (Kennedy–Stikker) 6 February 1962, Rusk to State Department, 6 May 1962, pp. 340– 1, 360–4, 388–9. See also NATO/CM(62)47, ‘Annual Political Appraisal’, 17 April 1962. 96 NATO/CM(61)28, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 18 April 1961. 97 NATO/CM(61)118, ‘The Situation in Eastern Europe and Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany’, 27 November 1961. 98 Mastny, ‘The Warsaw Pact as History’, pp. 18–19 and document 21, ‘Organizational Principles of the Czechoslovak Army, November 22, 1962, in Mastny and Byrne (eds), Cardboard Castle?, pp. 137–9; Matthias Uhl, ‘Storming On to Paris: the 1961 Buria Exercise and the Planned Solution of the Berlin Crisis’, in Vojtech Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark and Andreas Wenger (eds), War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 46–71. 99 See Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 194–202 and 248–58; Hope M. Harrison, ‘Driving the Soviets up the Wall: A Super-Ally, a Superpower, and the Building of the Berlin Wall, 1958–1961’, Cold War History, 1/1 (2000), pp. 53–74; Petr Lunák, ‘Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis: Soviet Brinkmanship Seen from Inside’, Cold War History, 3/2 (2003), pp. 53–82. 100 NATO/CM(62)45, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 17 April 1962. 101 NATO/CVR(62)21 and 22, 4 May 1962. 102 NATO/CM(62)109, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 26 November 1962. 103 See mostly, Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Longman Publishing Group, 1999); Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, ‘One Hell of a Gamble’: Khrushchev, Castro, Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis 1958–1964 (London: John Murray Publishers, Ltd., 1997); Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 235–60; Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II (New York: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 152–9; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 260–80; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 258–71; Zubok, A Failed Empire, pp. 143–9; Philip Nash, The Other
Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy and the Jupiters, 1957–1963 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). 104 NATO/CVR(62)58 and 59, 13 December 1962. 105 FRUS, 1961–63, XIII, Rusk to State Department, 18 December 1962, pp. 458–60. 106 NATO/CM(62)29, ‘Annual Political Appraisal’, 6 May 1963. 107 NATO/CVR(57)26, 27 and 28, 8 and 9 May 1957. 108 NATO/CM(57)65, ‘Report on Hungarian Refugees’, 17 April 1957; AC/119-R1, 30 January 1957; CM(57)39, ‘Relations with the Kadar Government’, 26 April 1957. See also documents by many delegations on trade with Hungary, in AC/119-WP2, February–March 1957, and the view that no recognition of the Kadar government was needed in AC/119-WP5, 1 March 1957. 109 For US analysis see indicatively, FRUS, 1955–7, XXV, National Intelligence Estimate, 19 February 1957, pp. 578–9; FRUS, 1958–60, X, part 1, National Intelligence Estimates, 4 February and 4 March 1958 and 11 August 1959, pp. 5–11, 100–2. See also in the same volume, NSC 5811/1, 24 May 1958, and OCB Report, 27 July 1960, pp. 18–31 and 118–22. 110 NARA, RG 59, Dulles to Paris, 5 February 1957, 740.5/2–557, Box 3139. 111 NATO/CM(57)140, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 29 November 1957; AC/89-WP36, Note by the US delegation, 25 June 1958. 112 NATO/CM(57)57, ‘The Satellites’, 12 April 1957; and the documents ‘The Situation in Eastern Europe’, CM(58)70, 23 April 1958; CM(58)145, 8 December 1958; CM(59)31, 20 March 1959. 113 NATO/CM(58)75, Note by the West German Delegation, 26 April 1958; CM(58)103, ‘Commercial Relations between NATO States and the Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany’, 25 June 1958. 114 NATO/CM(58)144, ‘Trends and Implication of Soviet Policy’, 6 December 1958. 115 NATO/AC/89-D/13(revised), ‘Economic Difficulties in the Satellites’, 1 March 1957. 116 Reports ‘The Situation in Eastern Europe’, NATO/CM(57)57, 12 April 1957; CM(57)138, 28 November 1957; CM(58)145, 8 December 1958; CM(59)31, 20 March 1959. See also the documents ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, CM(57)140, 29 November 1957; CM (58)69, 22 April 1958; CM(58)144, 6 December 1958. See also AC/119-WP50, ‘L’URSS et les Démocracies Populaires – Note by the French Delegation’, 12 June 1957’; AC/119-WP(58)52, ‘La Lutte contre le Revisionism en URSS – Note by the French delegation’, 24 June 1958; AC/119-WP(59)15 and 21 Notes by the West German delegation, 10 and 23 February 1959 respectively. 117 NATO/CM(57)138, 28 November 1957; CM(57)140, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 29 November 1957. 118 Reports ‘The Situation in Eastern Europe’, NATO/CM(58)70, 23 April 1958; CM(58)145, 8 December 1958; CM(59)31, 20 March 1959. 119 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 333. 120 See, among others, Krystyna Kersten, ‘1956 – the Turning Point’, in Odd Arne Westad, Sven Holtsmark and Iver B. Neumann (eds), The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945–89 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1994), pp. 47–62. 121 See Mastny, ‘The Warsaw Pact as History’, pp. 9–10. 122 See, among others, NATO/AC/119-WP11 (Dutch delegation) 17 February 1957; AC/119-WP14 (French delegation) 19 February 1957; AC/119-WP19 (British delegation) 26 February 1957.
123 NATO/CM(57)62, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 16 April 1957; CM(57)45, ‘Economic Relations with Poland’, 27 March 1957. 124 NATO/CM(57)57, 12 April 1957. See also AC/119-WP/89 (French delegation) 16 October 1957; AC/119-WP(58)73 (US delegation), 17 September 1958. 125 NATO/CM(58)70, 23 April 1958. 126 Reports ‘The Situation in Eastern Europe’, NATO/CM(58)145, 8 December 1958; CM(59)31, 20 March 1959; and CM(59)97, ‘Eastern Europe and the Soviet Zone of Germany’, 26 November 1959. 127 NATO/CM(60)63, ‘Credits to the Soviet Bloc’, 21 June 1960. 128 Reports on Eastern Europe, NATO/CM(58)145, 8 December 1958; CM(59)31, 20 March 1959; CM(59)97, 26 November 1959. 129 NATO/CM(59)97, 26 November 1959. 130 NATO/CM(57)57, 12 April 1957. 131 NATO/CM(57)62, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 16 April 1957. 132 NARA, RG 59, memorandum, Whitnack to Kupinski, 2 March 1960, 375/3–260, Box 628. 133 Reports ‘The Situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany’, NATO/CM(60)41, 22 April 1960; CM(60)101, 18 November 1960; CM(61)29, 14 April 1961; CM(61)118, 27 November 1961; CM(62)111, 30 November 1962. See also CM(62)88, ‘The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), 24 August 1962; AC/119-WP(61)2, ‘The Mechanism of Soviet Control in the Satellites – Note by the UK Delegation’, 14 January 1961. On the Albanian defection, see AC/119-WP(61)11. On COMECON, see the note by the Sub-Committee on Soviet Economic Policy, describing it as ‘mildly successful’, in AC/127-D/104. 134 Reports ‘The Situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany’, NATO/CM(60)41, 22 April 1960; CM(60)101, 18 November 1960; CM(61)29, 14 April 1961; CM(61)118, 27 November 1961; CM(62)111, 30 November 1962. See also AC/89-D/30, note by the US representative, 20 November 1959; AC/89-D/37, paper on COMECON Council Plenum in Moscow, 27 August 1962. 135 Eastern European reports, NATO/CM(61)118, 27 November 1961; CM(62)111, 30 November 1962. 136 NATO/CM(62)46, ‘The Situation in Eastern Europe and Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany’, 18 April 1962. 137 On the Sino-Soviet split, see Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 210–35; Nogee and Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 251–62; Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–73 (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 635–9 and 679–85; Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), especially pp. 49–84; Lorenz Luthi, The Sino-Soviet-Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), especially pp. 80–104 and 157–80. See also Constantine Pleshakov, ‘Nikita Khrushchev and Sino-Soviet Relations’, and Chen Jian and Yang Kuisong, ‘Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance’, in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Brothers in Arms: the Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), pp. 235–40 and 246–94 respectively; Shu Guang Zhang, ‘China’s Strategic Culture and the Cold War Confrontations’, in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretation, Theory (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 258–77; Shu Guang Zhang, ‘The Sino-Soviet Alliance and the Cold War in Asia, 1954–1962’, in Melvyn P. Leffler
and Odd Arne Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 353–75. 138 NATO/AC/89-D/21, ‘Economic Development in Communist China’, 9 July 1958. See also AC/89-WP9, (British delegation) 28 September 1957; AC/119-WP(58)69/1 (Canadian delegation), September 1958; AC/119-WP(58)76 (US delegation), 1 October 1958; AC/89-D/23, (French delegation), 11 December 1958. 139 NARA, RG 59, Dulles to Paris, 13 March 1957, 740.5/3–1358, Box 3151. 140 Reports ‘The Situation in the Far East’, NATO/CM(58)143, 5 December 1958; CM(59)101, 3 December 1959; CM(60)42, 22 April 1960; CM(60)108, 30 November 1960; CM(61)33, 19 April 1961. 141 NATO/CM(58)50, ‘China’s Relation to the Soviet Bloc’, 18 March 1958. 142 NATO/CM(58)50, ‘China’s Relation to the Soviet Bloc’, 18 March 1958. 143 NATO/CM(58)144, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 6 December 1958. 144 NATO/CM(58)143, ‘The Situation in the Far East’, 5 December 1958. 145 NATO/CM(60)38, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 12 April 1960. 146 ‘The Situation in the Far East’, NATO/CM(60)42, 22 April 1960; and CM(60)108, 30 November 1960. 147 NARA, RG 59, Durbrow (Paris) to State Department, 15 August 1962, 375/8–1562, Box 639. 148 NARA, RG 59, Wolf to Fessenden, 25 March 1961, 375/3–2561, Box 632. 149 TNA/FO 371/159193/2, FO paper, February 1961. 150 TNA/FO 371/165784/88, Youde (FO) to Donald (NATO), 2 May, Donald to Bullard, 26 April, and FO paper, Comments on the United States Paper, spring 1962. 151 TNA/FO 371/165785/105, Rose (NATO) to Youde, 11 May 1962; FO 371/165785/106 and 110, Wright to Youde, 15 May, and Donald to Youde, 24 May 1962. 152 FRUS, 1961–3, V, National Intelligence Estimate, 1 December 1960 and 17 January 1961, pp. 6–7 and 17–24. 153 FRUS, 1961–3, V, Record, PPS, 8 February 1961, pp. 62–63. 154 FRUS, 1961–3, V, National Intelligence Estimates, 21 February 1962, 2 May 1962, 22 May 1963, pp. 374–9, 414–29, 685–701. On the submission of US views to NATO see NARA, RG 59, Rusk to Paris, 12 October 1962, 375/10–1262, Box 640. 155 NATO/CM(60)107, ‘NATO Review of Soviet Policy since the Summit Setback’, 30 November 1960. 156 NATO/CM(61)144, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 5 December 1961. 157 NATO/AC/119-WP(62)15, Note by the US delegation, 14 March 1962. See also in the same folder the views of other delegations. 158 NATO/CM(62)45, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 17 April 1962. 159 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 66–72. See also, Nogee and Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 163–79. 160 NARA, RG 59, Perkins to State Department, 19 March 1957, 740.5/3–1957, Box 3141; Dulles to Paris, 14 June 1957, 740.5/6–1457, Box 3143. 161 NATO/CM(57)116, ‘The Economic Offensive of the Sino-Soviet Bloc’, 21 August 1957. This report was soon regarded by the NATO Secretariat as ‘out-of-date’: NARA, RG 59, Perkins to State Department, 12 September 1957, 740.5/9–1257, Box 3146. 162 Reports ‘The Economic Offensive of the Sino-Soviet Bloc’, NATO/CM(57)116, 21 August 1957; CM(58)97, 16 June 1958; CM(59)103, 8 December 1959; CM(60)4, 1 March 1960; CM(61)68, 18 July 1961; CM(62)13, 12 February 1962; and CM(62)36,
‘The Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Offensive, 1954–1961: A Summary Review’, 9 April 1962. 163 Reports ‘The Economic Offensive of the Sino-Soviet Bloc’, NATO/CM(57)116, 21 August 1957; CM(58)97, 16 June 1958; CM(59)103, 8 December 1959; CM(60)4, 1 March 1960; CM(61)68, 18 July 1961; CM(62)13, 12 February 1962; and CM(62)36, ‘The Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Offensive, 1954–1961: A Summary Review’, 9 April 1962. On the roles of the satellites see also AC/119-WP(59)60 (US delegation) and 60/1 (British delegation), 20 May and 5 August 1959 respectively. 164 Reports ‘The Economic Offensive of the Sino-Soviet Bloc’, NATO/CM(57)116, 21 August 1957; CM(58)97, 16 June 1958; CM(59)103, 8 December 1959; CM(60)4, 1 March 1960; CM(61)68, 18 July 1961; CM(62)13, 12 February 1962; and CM(62)36, ‘The Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Offensive, 1954–1961: A Summary Review’, 9 April 1962. On Soviet personnel see also NATO/AC/119-WP(61)6, Brief by SEATO, 8 February 1961. 165 NATO/AC/127-D/50, Note by the US delegation, 8 August 1960. 166 NATO/CM(60) 91, ‘Creation of a Study Group on Soviet Oil Policy’, 28 October 1960; CM(62)30, ‘Soviet Bloc Activities in the World Oil Market’, 26 March 1962. 167 NATO/CM(62)36, ‘The Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Offensive, 1954–1961: A Summary Review’, 9 April 1962. See also this assessment in AC/127-D37, (questionnaire of the Committee of Economic Advisers to the member-states regarding the ‘offensive’), 28 October 1958; the replies of the member-states in AC/127-WP/9 (January 1959). 168 Reports on the ‘economic offensive’, NATO/CM(57)116, 21 August 1957; CM(58)97, 16 June 1958; CM(59)2, 21 January 1959; CM(60)4, 1 March 1960; CM(62)36, 9 April 1962. 169 NATO/CM(60)107, ‘NATO Review of Soviet Policy since the Summit Setback’, 30 November 1960. 170 NATO/PO/58/1352, Spaak to Permanent Representatives, 30 October 1958; CR(59)6, 11 February 1959. 171 NATO/CM(60)4, ‘The Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Offensive in Underdeveloped Countries’, 1 March 1960. 172 NATO/CM(61)144, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 5 December 1961. 173 See for example the position of the British Permanent Representative, Roberts, in the NAC in NATO/CR(58)28, 28 April 1958, and the discussion in CR(60)9, 24 March 1960. See also AC/127-WP/7, Note by Italy, 19 May 1958. On the US attitude, NATO/AC/127WP/43, Note by the Chairman, 8 October 1959. 174 TNA/FO 371/161273/8, 12, 15 and 17, Potter to Crawshawm 22 February, Potter to Goodfellow, 4, 15 and 25 March, and Basic Brief, ‘Role of NATO in the Economic Field’, 4 March 1961. 175 NARA, RG 59, Herter to Paris, 24 June 1960, 375/6–2460, Box 628; Durbrow to State Department, and Rusk to Paris, 6 February 1962, 375/2–662, Box 636. 176 NATO, Research Section, ‘The Evolution of NATO Political Consultation’. For the American origins of the proposal see also FRUS, 1958–60, VII, part 1, Report (Bowie), ‘The North Atlantic Nations: Tasks for the 1960s’ (summary), pp. 622–7; FRUS, 1961–3, XIII, Policy Directive, ‘NATO and the Atlantic Nations’, 20 April 1961, pp. 285–91. See the US and British proposals at NATO/TYP/US(60)1, Burgess to Permanent Representatives and US memorandum, ‘NATO in the 1960s: Non-military Guidelines for the Future, 29 October 1960; TYP/UK(61)2, British paper, ‘Political Aspects of LongRange Planning’, 31 January 1961; PO/61/441, Stikker to Permanent Representatives,
24 April 1961. See also PO/61/529, Note by the US delegation, 9 June 1961; TNA/FO 371/161273/26, Murray to Ramsbotham, 14 April 1961; NARA, RG 59, Burgess to State Department, 19 April 1961, 375/4–1961, Box 632. 177 TNA/FO 371/161284/12, 19 and 24, minute (Ramsbotham), 21 April, Ramsbotham to Tomlinson (NATO), 18 August, and minute (Ziegler), 30 October 1961. 178 NATO/CM(61)88 Note by the British delegation, 6 October 1961; CR(61)51, 17 October 1961. 179 NATO/CM(61)101, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 31 October 1961. See also TNA/FO 371/161284/22, 23 and 24, UK delegation, report on NAC meeting of 11 October, and Wright to Ramsbotham 18 and 24 October 1961 (on the discussions in the Committee of Political Advisers). See also NARA, RG 59, Finletter to State Department, 26 October 1961, 375/10–2661, Box 634. 180 NATO/APAG(62)1/1, Note by the UK delegation, 5 September 1962; APAG(62)2, ‘APAG, Terms of Reference’, 11 October 1962. 181 TNA/FO 371/161284/24, Ramsbotham to Wright, 27 October 1961. 182 TNA/FO 371/167044/11, Wright to Ramsbotham, 3 April 1962; FO 371/167045/12, Donald to Elliot, 8 June 1962; NARA, RG 59, Finletter to State Department, 4 April 1962, 375/4–462, Box 637. 183 TNA/FO 371/167045/13 and 18, Report of the first meeting of APAG, Paris, 5–6 July, and Ramsbotham to Wright, 10 August 1962. 184 Turkey also had a similar staff. The other countries were usually represented by heads of departments, who also had experience of NATO procedures (especially the Political Advisers), such as the Belgian Poppeians de Morchoven and the Portuguese Martins. 185 NATO/APAG/1, ‘Basic Assumptions for an Assessment of the Long-term Threat to NATO’, 6 July 1962. The document was submitted to the NAC as CM(62)79. See also NATO/AC/214(a)-D/1, APAG, ‘Basic Assumptions for an Assessment of the Long-Term Threat to NATO’, 19 June 1962. See also papers on Western economic power in relation to the East–West conflict, in AC/214(a)-WP/5, Note by the British delegation, 9 October 1962; WP/6, Note by the US delegation, 10 October 1962; WP/10, Note by the West German delegation. 186 TNA/FO 371/167044/18, UK delegation, report on NAC meeting, 18 July 1962; NARA, RG 59, Finletter to State Department, 20 July 1962, 375/7–2062, Box 638. 187 NATO/AC/214(a)-WP/1, Note by the US delegation, 22 June 1962, and WP/2, Note by the British delegation, 22 June 1962. 188 TNA/FO 371/167046/25, Notes on the APAG meeting of 15 October, minute (Barnes), 28 November, and Report on the second meeting of APAG, Paris, 15–17 October 1962. See also NARA, RG 59, Finletter to State Department, 16 October 1962, 375/10–1662, Box 640; Finletter to State Department, 20 October 1962, 375/10–2062; Finletter to State Department, 23 October 1962 (two reports), 375/10–2362, Box 640. 189 NATO/CM(62)94, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 28 September 1962. 190 NATO/APAG(62)4, ‘Progress Report’, 18 December 1962. 191 See the Anglo-American agreement in NARA, RG 59, Rusk (London) to State Department, 25 June 1962, 375/6–2562, Box 638. 192 NARA, RG 59, Finletter to State Department, 13 September 1961, 375/9–1361, Box 634; Finletter to State Department, 8 June 1962, 375/6–862, Box 638.
3 A more complex Cold War, 1963–7 Doubt, optimism and the prospect of détente Analysis during an era of intra-alliance tensions If the 1950s had marked the apogee of the two superpowers within their respective alliances, the next decade proved more complex. The US and the Soviet Union continued to be the strongest states in the globe and the undisputed leaders of their blocs, but the limits of their power started becoming apparent. The Americans encountered enormous problems at Vietnam, but also within NATO, where de Gaulle mounted an unprecedented challenge. The Soviets faced the dispute with China and the rise of national feeling in their delegitimized Eastern European empire. As APAG commented in 1964, ‘in the East as in the West, there were forces at work tending towards the break-up of alliances’, although the West could cope with this tendency better than the rigid communist system.1 The mid-1960s was a strange era for NATO. The US Permanent Representative, Harlan Cleveland, pointed to the two ‘ghosts’ haunting the alliance (French dissent and Vietnam),2 while his British counterpart, Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, referred in early 1966 to ‘a virtual declaration of war [by de Gaulle] against the organisation’.3 The Gaullist challenge came close to undermining the sacred cow of NATO, its unity.4 It has been stressed that the French President put forward demands which existed before his return to power in 1958.5 Yet, he also sought a veto on US decisions, which it was certain that he would not get.6 As is correctly noted, the intra-NATO crisis of the 1960s was ‘fundamentally a crisis of legitimacy which derived from
the evolving East–West context, combined as it was with the changing international setting within NATO countries’; détente itself raised ‘the issue of the articulation between the evolution of the East–West system and the transformation of the Alliance’.7 De Gaulle was not the only problem. European détente originated mostly in Europe,8 but raised difficult problems for NATO, where differing interpretations for its meaning appeared. Once more, it was becoming apparent that it had been easier for the Western world to stand united in the face of clear and present danger, as in the days of the Berlin blockade or of Korea. The precious unity of the alliance could be corroded in times of relative relaxation of international tensions. Moreover, many NATO members disagreed with US policies in various parts of the world, mostly Vietnam, which threatened to draw US attention away from Europe. The Western Europeans always feared their ‘abandonment’ by the US, and now refused to lend full support to a badly waged and embarrassing war in distant South-East Asia.9 Last but not least, NATO was embarrassed by the April 1967 military coup in Greece.10 For NATO, the 1960s was an era of doubt and uncertainty. Ironically, it was also an era of a new optimism. The crisis of French withdrawal from the NATO military command in 1966 was admirably overcome through the Harmel Report in 1967, which marked a new stage in NATO’s development. Moreover, since the early 1960s, Western analysts noted persistent evidence that something was going very wrong with the Soviet economy. This was crucial in the long Cold War, in which its economic lead was the West’s main advantage. Thus, despite challenges, the confidence of Western leaders in the 1960s was higher than in the 1950s, when the Soviet Union was seen as rapidly closing the gap with the capitalist world. In this new phase of NATO analysis, compartmentalization reached a peak, with separate reports dealing with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America. These were now being drafted by expert working groups (who were
given more time – four days instead of three – for their discussions), and were presented to the NAC without redraft by the Committee of Political Advisers. It was accepted that the Political Advisers should not try to ‘control too strictly’ the experts, who had a deep knowledge of their fields; nor could the Political Advisers (namely, members of the national delegations) have the specialization required to follow events on a global scale.11 After 1962 and until the early 1970s, the experts on the Soviet Union and on Eastern Europe were meeting under the chairmanship of William M. Newton of the International Staff, an experienced member of the NATO civilian machinery and a former member of the Political Advisers. Alexander Böker (the former West German member of the Economic Advisers) was the chairman of the regional expert groups. At the same time, there was a clear attempt to have a thread uniting these specialized studies through the work of the new body, APAG, which focused on long-term questions of strategy. The cover letter of APAG reports mentioned that they were drafted, revised and circulated by the chairman (Robin Hooper until 1966) ‘on his own responsibility’. This meant that the APAG reports were not agreed documents: the idea was to stimulate discussion. In many cases, APAG produced documents which were being referred for ‘follow up action’ to the standing committees of the alliance, such as the Political Advisers. Through the ‘informal and non-committal nature of its discussions’, it was easier for this group to handle the frequent intra-NATO disagreements of these years. Yet, as APAG itself stressed, its limits were defined by the nature of the alliance: it was not really a NATO policy planning body, if only because NATO was not expected to decide and implement a common policy on global issues.12 APAG’s integration in the NATO Committee system did not come without tensions. The new group needed to find a new point of balance. As the British noted, Walt Rostow, the American member of APAG, sometimes scared the smaller countries into thinking that he wanted to turn it into a steering group for the alliance as a whole. Stikker and some smaller members such as Belgium were afraid that
APAG would escape from the control of the NAC. This was why Stikker only grudgingly accepted that APAG meetings could be held away from Paris. The Canadians seemed to think that APAG practically reflected the domination of the great powers.13 On their part, the Americans found the new group useful, and Rusk himself received the APAG delegates of the spring 1963 session, held in the US.14 In autumn 1963, Rostow showed the value of contacts in the APAG context, when he advised the State Department to take more into account the constant fears of the European members about the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ monopoly of negotiations with the Soviets, or about a possible US–Soviet deal over their heads.15 Thus, APAG slowly found a role in the NATO system. On the other hand, the emergence of APAG and of the expert working groups had an important impact on the work of the older alliance bodies, the Political and the Economic Advisers. They were chaired by Hooper and Gregh, the Assistant Secretary-Generals for Political Affairs, and for Economics and Finance until 1966, when they were replaced by Joachim Jaenicke and A. Vincent respectively. In 1963 the Political Advisers decided not to repeat a high-level review of Soviet policy (on the autumn 1960 model), exactly because the matter would be studied by APAG.16 In 1964 the heads of the Political and the Economic Advisers defended their newly acquired right to note some disagreements and to offer some recommendations.17 APAG’s work on long-term problems and the decision to avoid redrafts of the texts of the expert working groups meant that the Political Advisers, who now met very regularly, were more occupied with exchange of information on various aspects of relations with the Soviet bloc and with the ‘other business’ part of their agenda, mainly developments in the global Cold War which was intensifying in these years.18 However, the successive US reports of the Political Advisers meetings show that the committee was working smoothly, and was becoming increasingly valuable in providing a further, though lower-level, opportunity for consultation. Last but not least, the many ‘layers’ of NATO consultation (NAC, APAG, Political
and Economic Advisers, expert working groups) also meant that a tendency appeared in the NAC to deal more with administrative problems. In April 1963 the US appeared anxious for more substantive discussions in the ministerial NACs, possibly through a focus on fewer topics.19 Early in 1964, Stikker and the Americans showed their concern that the permanent Council should deal more with substance than with administration.20 The effort to strengthen consultation was clear, though not always successful. However, despite all these readjustments, it was finally proved, in the moment of internal crisis in 1966, that the NATO mechanisms were able to function. This was mostly because the members themselves wanted them to function, and clearly shows NATO’s role as one of the instruments which forged the post-war West. Adjustments were also recorded in the internal balances of the NATO analysis process. The creation of APAG – a body of planners – and then the road to the Harmel report entailed a significant elevation of the level of experts: instead of Councellors, more senior people, and sometimes leading analysts and politicians, now came in the process. US influence was always strong, and the alliance committees relied heavily on US input regarding the Soviet bloc and the Third World. Moreover, the dominating personality of Rostow in APAG also maximized the impact of US views. The West Germans now stepped forward and assumed a larger role, especially in analysis on Eastern Europe, but also through the assumption of leading posts in alliance reporting by Jaenicke and Böker. Despite their problems with the alliance (and even after their withdrawal from the military command in 1966), the French continued to participate in the expert groups and in APAG. However, by 1966 their major Soviet European expert, Jean Laloy (their representative at APAG), seemed to have fallen from grace in Paris because of his pro-NATO views.21 This evidently contributed to the relative reduction of French influence. The British FO kept drafting many NATO reports, and submitted much-valued analysis documents.22 However, there were
so many regular NATO reports, that some distribution of labour needed to done with the other alliance members. The British now mostly focused on APAG, which they considered as a pivotal process both for NATO and for their own influence within the alliance analysis system. Despite initial complaints in early 1963 that APAG’s texts were not stimulating enough, the FO was obviously satisfied with the setting up of the new group, and eagerly hosted its meeting of spring 1964 at Ditchley Park.23 The British also evidently considered that Hooper’s role as its chairman allowed them to exert important influence in the process. It is telling that, after the spring 1964 Ditchley Park meeting, the British representative to APAG, Sir John Nicholls, wrote to Shuckburgh to complain that the resulting report was evidently drafted by a French member of the Secretariat, and lacked ‘the imprint of the personality and authority of its Chairman’, Hooper.24 Perhaps this was why in the next APAG report of autumn 1964, and in the face of criticism regarding his handling of the reports, Hooper stressed that drafting was his own responsibility ‘and he does not undertake necessarily to accept all proposed amendments’.25 Thus, British influence evolved, but remained strong in this period as well. A reliable enemy: Soviet politics and foreign policy Khrushchev and the others Throughout 1963–7, the NATO experts insisted on the stability of the Soviet regime and of the CPSU hold on Soviet society. However, they also noted that the internal political situation was being aggravated by economic strains: failures were being recorded in agriculture, and the conflict between the needs of defence (including space appropriations) and of raising the standard of living posed important problems in the allocation of resources. The NATO analysts pointed to the party and government reorganization of November 1962 and the setting up of a Supreme Economic Council
in March 1963, which aimed to increase efficiency in the economy. These, however, meant that the grip of the party’s hold over the economy tightened, and such measures tended to aggravate the problem rather than solve it.26 However, once more, the experts failed to predict an internal Soviet process, namely the fall of Khrushchev. The April 1964 report stressed: [H]e [Khrushchev] continues to dominate the political scene and the top leadership as a whole has remained remarkably stable […]. If Khrushchev is on occasion obliged to bow to opposing views, this does not of itself imply any weakening of his grip. He retains a firm hold on the main levers of power and has shown no sign of being prepared to abandon any of them [thus providing] a potential opponent with the institutional basis to challenge him. Nor is there any sign of the formation of an effective group opposing his policies within the leadership. Barring his sudden illness or incapacitation, there is no reason to expect any major changes in the Soviet leadership.27 The NATO analysts were right to note that there was no bloc which could force Khrushchev out. However, they were wrong in that Khrushchev fell from power later in that year, by a coup by Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin and Andrei Gromyko, who, until then, were considered as his own people. In this respect, once more, US national analysis seems more bold and accurate: the CIA and the State Department had insisted that Khrushchev’s stature within the Kremlin was falling. They stressed that, according to Soviet leadership traditions, a succession would involve no orderly procedure, but would again be a case of the ‘survival of the fittest’; still, his likely successor would come from the present high echelons.28 In 1963 the British also expressly criticized the expert working group for failing to consider the possibility of a leadership change in the Kremlin.29
The fall of Khrushchev in autumn 1964 surprised NATO analysts, but did not alarm them.30 In November 1964 and April 1965 the expert working group and APAG noted that Khrushchev’s removal was motivated by internal realities (mostly his style of leadership and his decision to create separate agricultural and industrial contingents in the CPSU, which threatened the power of the party members) and by the concern caused by the Sino-Soviet split, rather than by disagreements on policy towards the West. The coup was presented as ‘adroitly managed’. The new leaders were seen as members of the Khrushchev group who strove to reassert the position of the party, and their ascent was regarded as a partial change in the existing power structure. The NATO analysts expected that the new leadership would seek to consolidate its position, deal with the internal problems of the world communist movement, and try to penetrate further the Third World. They noted that in the long-term, the Soviet system tended to one-man rule: the post-Khrushchev arrangements seemed temporary. Still, the country faced serious economic problems, which might call for even more radical reforms than those which cost Khrushchev so dearly. As the November 1964 ‘trends and implications’ report noted: [Khrushchev’s] elimination does not alter the realities of power in the world or the complexity of the internal and external situation against which the Soviet policies must be conducted […]. The only hope of solving these [internal economic] problems probably lies in the adoption of even more radical reforms than Khrushchev himself was willing to risk.31 In the following years, the NATO experts searched for, but failed to find, the distinctive agenda of the new leadership. They merely noted the collective nature of the new group and the attempt to reassure the CPSU about its own stature in society. The importance of Brezhnev was stressed late in 1965, and also after the April 1966 23rd CPSU Congress, when he assumed the revived title of Secretary-General. The NATO experts noted the efforts of the new
leaders to boost industry, although this was made with great ‘caution’ and much compromise. However, the fundamental problems of the Soviet economy remained. The 23rd Congress was described as an attempt to promote reform in the economy, although policies on other issues, such as internal stability, the authority of the party, freedom of expression and ideological matters were much more conservative. In a subsequent report it was also stressed that there was an inherent contradiction in the new leaders’ attempts to increase the influence of the party (and discipline) and to encourage initiative from below. Thus, the NATO analysts reached the conclusion that this was a conservative leadership, characterized by ‘indecision or inability to reach agreement on major long-term economic issues’ (May 1967). Furthermore, on the 50th anniversary of the Russian Revolution, the celebrations projected the view that, as the NATO report put it, ‘revolution was a historical fact, not a present inspiration’ – another sign of growing conservatism.32 Assessing Soviet foreign policy, 1963–7 Throughout 1963–7 NATO analysis documents stressed that the aims of Soviet foreign policy had not changed. The experts considered that the internal economic problems, the ‘lessons’ of the Cuban missile crisis and the Chinese challenge made the Kremlin eager to show restraint in foreign policy. On the other hand, the Cuban crisis had shown that Western unity and resolve were essential prerequisites in a process of ‘taming’ the Soviet Union. On these, NATO analysis agreed with US intelligence assessments. Yet, national US analysis placed more emphasis on Soviet denunciations of US policy in Vietnam and in the resulting bilateral estrangement of Washington and Moscow, and pointed to internal divisions among the Soviet leaders in foreign policy.33 On the other hand, Cuba held ‘lessons’ both for the Soviets and for the West. Discussing the missile crisis in the first half of 1963, APAG noted that Soviet policy was at a crossroads: it could become more ‘tough’, it could seek a compromise with the West or it could evolve to a strange mixture,
aiming to obtain advantages without resorting to force. The balance of opinion in APAG was that the third course was the most probable, which did not entail a speedy end to the Cold War.34 In the last period of Khrushchev’s rule, the expert working group described the Soviets as striving ‘to avoid being faced again with a “Cuban choice”’, and as seeking a ‘limited accommodation with the West’, which would allow them to concentrate on domestic problems and the Sino-Soviet dispute. This argumentation also served to explain the Soviet decision to sign the limited Test Ban Treaty in the summer of 1963, although the NATO analysts also noted that the Kremlin hoped to avoid an expensive arms race, and to isolate the Chinese in the world communist movement. However, the experts also remarked that this policy of limited agreement with the West presented to the Kremlin opportunities to disrupt the NATO unity or to preserve Berlin as a lever against the West.35 In late 1964 the NATO experts were convinced that Khrushchev’s fall would not lead to changes in Soviet policy towards the West: the new leadership needed to consolidate its position inside the world communist movement, and thus the Kremlin would not seek trouble.36 In February 1965 the new Secretary-General, Manlio Brosio, initiated in the NAC a discussion on East–West relations. He noted that following Khrushchev’s fall there had been no major change in Soviet policy towards the West: the new leadership was seeking détente in Europe, and an expansion of Soviet influence in the developing world. According to Brosio, ‘[a]s far as Europe and the German problem are concerned, caution and continuity have been the keynotes’.37 Brosio, who was sceptical about ‘forward’ détente policies,38 addressed the problem of East–West relations at a time of significant intra-NATO disagreements over this issue (see below), and stressed that national policies towards the Soviet bloc should not be allowed to become competitive, especially regarding trade with Eastern Europe. This call for unity was the main theme through which NATO tried to respond to Khrushchev’s fall. In May 1965 ARAG reached similar conclusions, and argued that the new
Soviet leaders might aim to ‘reduce the risk of a major China–United States confrontation, which would face the Soviet Union with an agonizing choice’.39 In the following years, the NATO experts noted the continuity of Soviet policy. Still, they also stressed that the Vietnam War did not allow the Kremlin to appear too accommodating towards the West. This West European ‘understanding’ of the Soviet position in Vietnam was one of the elements of NATO analysis which irritated the Americans. The NATO experts described Soviet foreign policy as careful, but also as ‘active, diversified and subtle’, although by 1966 the phrase ‘cautious, though not to say inactive’ was also used. However, this policy also was highly contradictory, since the Chinese would resist an understanding with the West. Thus, the Sino-Soviet rift was interpreted as a factor which severely complicated the picture: it created the motives for a less adventurous Soviet policy, but also placed limits on a Soviet understanding with the West. In this context, once more the fundamental call for unity was repeatedly expressed in successive reports, with almost identical phraseology. In the road towards détente, unity was more important than ever: In this situation, close consultation, unity and preparedness, and readiness to explore areas of understanding with the Soviet Union continue to be indicated for NATO countries [April and November 1965]. Without compromising the basic aims of the alliance and keeping in mind the objectives of Soviet policy, member governments should endeavour to profit from any indications that the USSR and East European states genuinely seek to work for better relations in Europe. Continued consultation and exchange of information amongst members of the Alliance in relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is of great importance [December 1966]. While the member countries of the Alliance should be realistic about the true aims of the Russians when they proclaim their desire to improve relations with the West, and must show prudence in regard to ‘détente’, they can derive benefits which are by no means negligible from increasing contacts with
the East. It is most important, however, that they should keep their information up-to-date and consult together regularly on Soviet policy and its manifold aspects, which are often of great complexity [May 1967].40 (Reluctantly) acknowledging the Sino-Soviet rift: so what? The Sino-Soviet rift affected all aspects of Soviet foreign and defence policy.41 Sino-Soviet relations took a turn for the worse after the Cuban crisis and the 1962 Sino-Indian clash. Initially, the NATO experts insisted that bilateral differences should not be overstated, but by autumn 1963, after the signing of the Test Ban Treaty, the Americans appeared more confident that the break was beyond repair.42 In late 1963 and early 1964 the expert working group pointed to the primacy of national, as opposed to ideological, differences between the two countries: it had become clear that the Soviet refusal to supply the PRC with nuclear weapons was a major cause of Chinese disillusionment with Moscow. At the same time, the NATO experts noted with interest the Soviet proposal to call a world conference of communist parties which could formalize the split with Beijing. The emergence of pro-Chinese dissident parties or factions meant that Moscow no longer was able to speak for the whole communist movement. The balance of opinion in NATO was that the West should opt for a policy of waiting and of non-involvement.43 Thus, NATO analysis at last acknowledged the importance of the Sino-Soviet split. By summer 1963 some Permanent Representatives, such as the French, François Seydoux, and the Greek, Christos Xanthopoulos-Palamas, argued that ‘greater distinction’ should be made between Soviet and Chinese policies, since these were no longer similar.44 In the December 1964 ministerial NAC the balance of opinion was that the communist world had become polycentric.45 However, NATO analysts and statesmen remained anxious, insecure and indecisive towards this phenomenon: they could not make up their minds about the nature
of the dispute or about possible Western initiatives to exploit it, while the Americans always were disappointed by the ‘indifference’ of the Europeans regarding China.46 Nor could APAG suggest answers. In November 1963, reporting on the projected nuclear capability of China, APAG stressed that Moscow’s refusal to grant nuclear weapons to Beijing was one of the causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Noting that the Kremlin was faced with the danger of ‘a Cold War on two fronts’, APAG remarked that the Soviets now were forced to accept some diversification in their bloc: otherwise a leader might ‘look towards the wrong Rome’. As was usually the case in NATO when confronted with an uncertainty of this magnitude, APAG instinctively made a call for NATO unity: the report stressed that détente was preferable to the Cold War, but caution was needed, since a relaxation of tensions could endanger the cohesion of the West.47 In its April 1964 report, the group noted that the Sino-Soviet dispute ‘seems to be hardening and becoming permanent’, while it also rendered communism less appealing in the Third World. However, ‘this did not diminish the danger for the West. The two threats were cumulative rather than mutually exclusive’. In the same APAG meeting, the French decision to recognize the PRC was criticized. Still, the view was also recorded that ‘it would be wrong, however, indefinitely to ignore the existence of Communist China’ – a constant criticism of the Europeans to the strong US position on the issue of recognition.48 During a new APAG meeting in autumn 1964, Rostow ruled out an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, and suggested that the younger generation of Chinese, especially the technicians, might be more interested in relations with the West than the revolutionaries.49 But this, again, did not constitute a suggestion for action. The NATO analysts were interested in the attempts (and failure) of the post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership to bridge relations with Beijing. They noted that Moscow refrained from adopting a more active anti-Chinese line or formalizing the split. However, the Chinese had proved unappeasable:
Soviet efforts to reduce the intensity of the conflict with Peking have encountered Chinese intransigence, and there seems little likelihood that the two sides will draw closer together. But this does not exclude the possibility that in some situations their policies, even if for disparate reasons, will run along parallel lines […]. The USSR will continue to face the prospect of an interminable and unrelenting fight for the allegiance of left-wing forces, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America. They must seek to cope with the natural tendencies in the international Communist movement towards greater autonomy, as well as with active Chinese efforts to split parties sympathetic to the Soviet Union and build their own corps of supporters.50 By late 1966 the NATO experts noted that Chinese ideological intransigence, as evidenced in the Cultural Revolution, led to a further deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, and made the Kremlin less sensitive to Chinese charges of ‘collusion’ with the Americans. In early 1967 it was noted that Sino-Soviet relations were ‘at times nearing rupture’. This was also the first time the possibility of an armed clash between the two countries was raised in NATO analysis documents. Although the experts did not regard this scenario probable, the change of tone was striking, and the split was now regarded as definite. However, the expert working group did not expect the Sino-Soviet rift to lead the Kremlin to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the West.51 The problems of backwardness of the Chinese economy (which now became the subject of specific studies), the economic effects of the Cultural Revolution and the population boom in China frightened the NATO experts.52 It is interesting that the Far East situation reports noted that the adverse effects of the Cultural Revolution (aimed at ‘blooding a new generation of revolutionary youth’) on the PRC’s economy could not be measured accurately, due to the unreliability of Chinese statistics. However, the 1967 reports included the impressive statement that it was ‘desirable that Communist China should be brought out of her isolation’, as its extremism could hide
unprecedented dangers. The Prime Minister, Chou Enlai, was seen as aiming to ‘protect the country’s economic and technological development from the disruptive effects of Mao’s political extremism’.53 Once more, the problem for the NATO analysts was insoluble: the main opponent in the Cold War, the Soviet Union, was the more moderate of the two major communist powers, and the feeling that China was entering a further phase of instability made the NATO experts even more reserved towards Beijing. Thus, the Western observers had no practical proposal to offer. They were content to see the split unfolding, hoping that it would continue to place difficulties on Soviet policy. This was the line that APAG adopted in January 1966, noting also that ‘[t]he relative immobility which has overtaken Soviet policy had its advantages for the West in that Khrushchev’s successors had on the whole abstained from provocative actions’.54 Of course, this was a passive attitude, not an answer. Economic malaise and political conservatism: the Soviet Union’s emerging dead end A new picture of the Soviet economy, 1963–5 In 1963–7, a major change in NATO analysis took place. Until the early 1960s the rapid growth of the Soviet economy (and mostly, Soviet industry) had frightened Western analysts. Starting from 1962–3, however, a gradual but marked change of tone of the NATO analysis documents is detectable: the experts now started to point to a slowdown of Soviet economic growth.55 This did not mean that they foresaw economic and political collapse. However, long-term economic trends pointed to severe problems. In the long Cold War, this was a decisive development. The spectacular failures of Soviet agriculture played an enormously important role. In the doctrinaire Soviet system, always focusing on industrial development, resources had been taken away
from agriculture, ‘the orphan child of Marxist thinking’.56 This now started to show. In 1963–4 the Soviets made large imports of wheat (eleven million tons) from Canada and the United States.57 This puzzled the Economic Advisers, who initially regarded Soviet wheat imports as a temporary phenomenon. However, soon it was seen that the failures of Soviet agriculture were permanent and created needs for regular wheat imports from the West.58 In 1965–7 the Economic Advisers described this trend: in 1958 the Soviets could stockpile about ten million tons of wheat, in 1959–62 they could just meet their requirements, but in 1963 production was ten million tons below requirements. This revealed the ‘sorry state of Soviet agriculture’ (March 1965). The NATO experts now stressed that Soviet agricultural failures were caused not only by bad weather (as the Kremlin claimed) but also by structural weaknesses, deficits of mechanization and lack of incentive.59 Agricultural failure, thus, was more than an indication of a conventional economic problem: it marked the failure of collectivization, and also the inability of the regime to cover crucial needs of its citizens. Since a large part of Soviet and Chinese wheat imports came from Canada, by 1967–8 the Canadian delegation assumed a leading role in reporting on Soviet wheat production.60 The first references to Soviet economic malfunctions had appeared in NATO reports of 1961–2, but a turning point was reached at the APAG meetings in 1962–3, on ‘Western economic power in relation to the East–West conflict’. APAG came out with the view that ‘not only was the economic potential of the West superior to that of the Soviet bloc, but also that the difficulties encountered by Communism demonstrated that the Western system was better fitted to solve the economic problems of the modern world’. APAG stressed the failures of Soviet and Chinese agriculture, the failure to raise the standard of living, the burden that the East European countries, mostly the GDR (and Cuba) represented for the Soviet economy and the fact that even in the Third World the Soviets seemed to be facing setbacks. The overall production in the NATO
countries was three times larger than in the Soviet bloc, while growth in the West was sustained by economic integration, especially in Europe. The report confidently stressed that a turning point had been reached in the economic Cold War.61 A new APAG report, in April 1964, also stressed the growing Soviet economic difficulties.62 Similar conclusions were drawn by the long-term economic comparison which the Economic Advisers prepared in mid-1963. The previous document of this kind had been submitted to the NAC in 1960. The new report covered the same period (1960–75), reiterated that growth in the ‘Sino-Soviet bloc’ would remain higher than in NATO, but also made an unprecedented statement: But, compared with the previous decade, the pace of expansion is most likely to slacken in the Sino-Soviet bloc, while it is expected to speed up in the NATO countries […]. The consequence of these various changes is to strengthen the relative position of the West in terms of combined national products, standard of living and relations with less-developed countries.63 This was the first report of NATO economic experts which predicted not simply the maintenance of the Western lead, but also a relative improvement of the Western position: Western rates of growth would improve, especially in European NATO (showing the success of the EEC); the Soviet ones would remain unchanged; and Chinese industrial growth would be delayed as a result of the failures of the Great Leap Forward and of agricultural problems. The Economic Advisers indicated that in 1960 the combined Gross National Product of the Soviet bloc represented 45 per cent of the NATO total, while in 1975 it was expected to rise to 59 per cent; however, in absolute terms, the combined product of the bloc would rise by $560 billion, while the combined NATO’s by $754.6 billion. Thus, in absolute terms, the NATO countries’ lead over the bloc would widen. The experts also made it clear that by 1975 the Soviet bloc would have overtaken the European NATO in combined GNP, ‘[b]ut there is not the remotest chance that the USSR will have overtaken the United
States’. In terms of Gross National Product per head (or else, the standard of living) the Economic Advisers predicted that the Western lead would also be strengthened. The average GNP per head in the Soviet bloc would rise from 53 to 65 per cent of NATO’s. However, in absolute terms the GNP per head in NATO countries would rise more than that of the Soviet bloc ($1,021 against $891). These meant that in this crucial indicator, directly affecting the legitimization of the regimes, the Soviets would be unable to turn their higher growth rates into a political advantage. By 1975 some cities in the Soviet Union and the satellites (especially East Germany and Czechoslovakia) might reach a standard of living comparable to the richer parts of Western Europe. However, quantity was not the whole story, and ‘it remains to be seen whether planning methods in the Soviet bloc will become sufficiently flexible to provide goods and services as varied as those sold in the West’.64 The Economic Advisers once more noted that a totalitarian regime was able to depress arbitrarily the standard of living and devote huge resources to investment in sectors contributing to increases in output, especially heavy industry. Moreover, a totalitarian regime could arbitrarily move labour from agriculture to the cities or, through large-scale demobilization in the armed forces, from the military to the civilian sector. However, investment in light industry, housing or other social projects was very low. The Soviet economy was growing too fast and in an unbalanced manner. Yet, its prospects were not bad: ‘it would therefore be imprudent to expect a sudden sharp decline in the Soviet rate of growth up to 1975’. China was, again, a huge question mark for the NATO analysts. The Economic Advisers repeated that the resurgence of China would be a major economic event in the years to come. However, Chinese industry was weak, and its problems were made worse by the cessation of Soviet and satellite technical aid.65 Regarding the impact of these trends on relations with the Third World, the Economic Advisers again noted that the gap in GNP per head between the periphery and the West would widen. The West needed to show to the new states that ‘what matters for them is not
the gap, even widening, but economic growth’. The Economic Advisers focused on the major question that the Third World faced: what was the best regime to find ‘a short cut towards economic development’? Was the communist system better suited for this purpose than Western-style democracy? The NATO experts thought that many factors caused the appeal of the communist system to recede: the visible economic slowdown of the Soviet world; Western economic aid, which exceeded by far that of the ‘Sino-Soviet’ bloc; and the better prospects for trade with the free economies of the West.66 The APAG study of March 1963 and the June 1963 report of the Economic Advisers were watersheds: it was the first time that studies pointed to a Soviet bloc economy which was becoming, even partially, vulnerable. This picture was complemented by additional reports. The Sub-committee on Soviet Economic Policy prepared studies on the Soviet, the satellite and the Chinese economies in summer 1963 and summer 1964.67 Summaries of these reports were presented to the NAC in October 1963 and August 1964. As Gregh noted in the October 1963 summary, ‘the economies of the Communist countries have now reached the stage at which increasing difficulties have reduced the rate of growth achieved in recent years’. The NATO studies showed that in 1963 agricultural production in the Soviet Union had fallen by 7 per cent, while the rate of industrial growth, although impressive (8.5 per cent), was still lower than in previous years. The increases in net material product were also declining: 8 per cent for 1960, 7 per cent for 1961, 6 per cent for 1962 and 4.5 per cent for 1963. The targets of the SevenYear Plan for housing and consumer goods had tacitly been abandoned. The 1964 reports confidently noted that simple reallocation of resources could not redress the Soviet problem: ‘more drastic remedies, including fundamental reforms in methods of economic planning and management, are clearly called for’. The rate of growth was also falling in Eastern Europe, and living standards had stagnated there as well. COMECON had failed to stimulate growth through common management of joint projects, while the
satellites themselves had shown increasing suspicion towards such supra-national cooperation.68 As for the PRC, a separate study of the Sub-committee on Soviet Economic policy noted that the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the cessation of Soviet aid had caused significant problems. Chinese agriculture was described as ‘primitive’. The total grain output in China was 1.5 times higher than in the Soviet Union, despite the fact that the Chinese agricultural labour force was four times larger. Industry had stagnated at the 1960 levels, as the country tried to cope with its agricultural crisis. However, the NATO experts stressed that China was going through the last stages of a transitory phase, aiming to achieve technological independence from the Soviet Union. Chinese economic progress was slow: thus, steel production in 1963 was less than one-twelfth of the US, one-tenth of the Soviet, one-quarter of the West German and the Japanese, onethird of the British and less than one-half of the French. In electricity, Chinese production in 1963 stood for 3 per cent of the US, 7.5 per cent of the Soviet, and one-fifth of the British, West German and Japanese production. Regarding mechanization of agriculture, China possessed fewer than 100,000 tractors compared with 4.7 million in the US, 1.2 million in the Soviet Union, 940,000 in West Germany and 740,000 in France. The experts regarded China as a country with a huge potential and on the road towards economic independence, but unable, at that moment, to seek economic exchanges with the West.69 These reports were combined with the findings of an ad hoc study group of the Committee of Economic Advisers on Soviet bloc demographic trends. The issue had been studied by the economic experts since 1961.70 The studies on the Soviet population and the labour force showed that the population of NATO countries was, and would continue to be, higher than that of the Soviet bloc (excluding China). The Soviet bloc population was aging probably due to the losses and low birth rates during the Second World War. By 1970, however, the trends would again be rising, and the main difficulty for the Soviet planners would be the distribution of skilled labour. The
experts stressed that, contrary to Soviet bloc propagandist claims, unemployment existed in Poland and in the rural areas of Romania, Bulgaria or Slovakia, although Czechoslovakia was suffering from a shortage of labour. The agricultural labour force represented a substantial part of the total in the Soviet bloc, despite attempts at industrialization: 18 per cent in East Germany, 23 per cent in Czechoslovakia, 36 per cent in Hungary, 40 per cent in the Soviet Union, 48 per cent in Poland, 63 per cent in Bulgaria and 66 per cent in Romania. Women represented almost half of the labour force in the Soviet Union compared to 34 per cent in the US. However, attempts to make better use of human resources had proven unsuccessful, due to the ‘rigidity of national plans and national prejudices’. The experts took great care to note that ‘the economic advantages derived from movements of labour in the West show the superiority of a free economic system and the efficiency of a freely accepted international co-operation’.71 Still, the economic experts also noted that the Soviet educational system was producing more graduates than the West (and equally well educated), and this pointed to a significant potential for Soviet development.72 These reports of 1963–5 formed a novel picture of the Soviet bloc economy, compared to the sense of its threatening growth of the 1950s. The Soviet economy was continuing to grow, and was a formidable force in the global economy. Yet, the NATO experts of various bodies now noted with increasing self-confidence that the Soviet bloc was starting to record its first relative economic failures, in the form of a marked reduction in the pace of its continuing growth. A propaganda exercise? The March 1965 comparison report In 1964 the Americans aired the idea in the NAC to publicize Soviet economic problems.73 In March 1965 the Economic Advisers produced such a document on the comparison of economic trends. In his cover letter to the NAC, the chairman, Gregh, stated that ‘provided no NATO origin is mentioned’, this document – which,
uniquely, was unclassified – could be used by national governments and by the Information Service ‘as source material for public information work’, including the developing countries. Gregh referred to the desirability of ‘ensuring the widest possible circulation of the study’, by journalists or speech writers and officials ‘in contact with the public’.74 The Secretary-General, Brosio, told the NAC that the study should be widely circulated since it ‘was already presented in a form avoiding the NATO label’, and the Greek Permanent Representative, Christos Xanthopoulos-Palamas, even suggested to publish it ‘in the form of a brochure without, of course, any attribution to NATO’.75 The propagandist function of the report is underlined by the fact that the next comparison report, of 1966, made a reference to its predecessor from 1963, but not to the 1965 document.76 Indeed, the March 1965 report was different in tone and structure from previous similar documents. The fact that it covered ‘basic’ information on the Soviet world (which was taken for granted in previous similar documents) is another indication of its role as an essentially public document. The human and natural resources of the Soviet Union were described as substantial: its territory was ‘seven times larger than the whole of Western Europe and two and a half times larger than that of the US’, and was rich in minerals. However, economic performance was poor, due to the weaknesses of the communist system: despite the comparative advantages of the Soviet Union, the Soviet GNP was less than half of the American and slightly smaller than the GNP of the EEC countries; the Soviet GNP per capita was less than 40 per cent of the US and 75 per cent of the EEC average. In the Soviet Union, consumption amounted to 42 per cent of the GNP but investment to 32 per cent, whereas the figures in the West were 60 per cent and 20 per cent respectively. This painted the picture of a cruel Soviet regime which did not care for its own citizens. Even the high Soviet rates of growth were not unique: they were matched by the much more advanced economies of West Germany and Japan. Mostly, the Soviet system had proved efficient in the first stage of development or in the phase of
reconstruction after the war, but would prove inefficient from then on, since it could not meet the needs of an advanced economy: In fact, the Soviet economy has now reached a stage at which its present system of planning constitutes a serious obstacle to further progress. Economic growth is a pointless process unless the goods, production of which is growing, meet a need. But the Soviet system of hypercentralised planning is singularly unsuited to identifying and responding to the needs of the consumers, whether these be private individuals or enterprises. Products are manufactured in quantities and according to specifications decreed by the central planners. These, however, are not in a position to assess the likely demand for the products whose manufacture they prescribe. Thus products are often manufactured which nobody wants to buy. This tendency is greatly reinforced by the system of rewarding enterprises primarily according to their success in fulfilling the gross output plan. This leads to an obsession with the quantity of output at the expense of qualitative considerations.77 The failures of Soviet agriculture took up a large part of the report: the Economic Advisers were profoundly ironic, noting that since forced collectivization started in 1928, agriculture had been the ‘sick man of the Soviet economy’. Following a ‘partial recovery’ in the mid1950s, ‘the patient suffered a serious relapse in 1963’. Low productivity and lack of incentives were the results of collectivization and under-investment in agriculture: the experts noted that ‘the output of one American farm worker is about eight times greater than that of his Soviet counterpart’. At the same time, there were immense failures in consumption and the standard of living: the experts attributed another large part of their report to the bad nutrition of the Soviet citizen, the poor quality of the consumer goods and of housing. This was the result ‘partly of a deliberate choice by the Soviet leadership which for many years gave low priority to the
claims of the consumer, and partly of the highly centralised form of planning practised in the Soviet Union’.78 The experts noted the autarkic nature of the Soviet economy and the huge resources of the country, which explained the relatively small role that international trade played for the Kremlin. The Soviet Union ‘has tended to regard foreign trade essentially as a means of plugging vital holes in its economic plans’, or as a political tool, useful to cultivate relations with developing countries. However, the ‘clumsy centralized trading apparatus in the Communist countries’ had failed to meet demands of the developing countries or to back up its exports of machinery with adequate after-sales service. This, too, was a novel element in a NATO report. Soviet bloc aid to the developing countries was small but selective. Moreover, the political returns of this aid were described as ‘disappointing’ for the Kremlin: only Cuba had been reduced to the status of a satellite. According to the NATO experts, most developing countries had realized that their economic interests lay with the Western world.79 It was the first time that the NATO analysts felt that they could utilize in public this picture of crushing Western economic and social superiority over the Cold War opponent. The failure to reform, 1965–7 The picture of relative Soviet economic failure did not change in the following years. The Sub-committee on Soviet Economic Policy noted a slight improvement for 1964, but in 1965 serious difficulties appeared again in agriculture. The Kremlin was buying wheat (almost nine million tons) from Canada, Argentina, Australia and France, while it exported grain to Eastern Europe, Cuba and Egypt. This was another indication of the irrationality of the dogmatic and politically driven Soviet bloc economy. Last but not least, albeit with some incredulity, the Economic Advisers reported the possibility that some Soviet workers who had been made redundant by mechanization and automatization, remained on the payrolls of state
enterprises. The experts commented that the system was visibly incapable of distributing labour efficiently.80 The Economic Advisers studied the Soviet economic reforms of autumn 1965. These reforms were introduced by Alexei Kogygin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and involved an emphasis on profitability at enterprise level, but also a strengthening of the role of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan).81 This was the first attempt by the Kremlin to ‘adopt a more cost-conscious attitude towards production and respond to the demands of the users of its products’. Despite hopes expressed in the West that it could be the first step in transforming the Soviet Union into a market economy, the NATO experts held that it was a ‘compromise’ between the supporters of liberalization and the conservatives, and in effect signalled a return to the centralized system of the pre-1956 period: ‘the problem of ensuring a satisfactory balance between initiative at enterprise level and firm overall control from the centre of a vast and increasingly complex and diversified economy will continue to bedevil the Soviet Authorities’.82 In a further report six months later, in which national officials from member-states participated, the reforms were described as an effort to achieve the hoped-for efficiency in the economy. Examining the results of the Seven-Year Plan (1959–65), the experts noted that the pace of Soviet growth had declined, mostly because of the setbacks in the agricultural sector, but also because of the increasing burdens of defence and space expenditure, and ‘the inadequacy of the system of industrial planning and management which has proved increasingly incapable of meeting the requirements of a complex industrial society’. The Soviet system consistently failed to devise ‘a more rational system of prices’. This could not be determined from above; but if a more rational price system were allowed to evolve from below, it could undermine the authority of the central planning system and the party. Thus, even though the reforms were described as ‘a significant step forward’, they also were ‘disappointingly cautious, even timid’. The experts were divided on the significance of the reforms: some believed that the Kremlin had ‘crossed a Rubicon’
towards liberalization, others that the reforms were bound to fail simply because economic efficiency could not be compatible with central planning. All experts, however, agreed that the autumn 1965 reforms were the most important Soviet effort to adopt a more ‘cost conscious attitude towards production’. In this context, the NATO experts estimated that the aims of the new Five-Year Plan (1966–70) were over-optimistic, both in industry and in agriculture: the reforms would take time to make a difference, and even if they proved successful, they were not a panacea for all the problems that burdened the Soviet economy. Still, the plan was a ‘workmanlike document, noticeably free of the bombast characteristics of Khrushchev’s excursions into the realm of economic planning’.83 In essence, however, the reforms did not change the fundamental characteristics of the Soviet system. As APAG noted in January 1966, a more diversified Soviet economy could stimulate desire for political freedom, but ‘the Soviet leadership was still to a great extent the prisoner of its own ideology, and […] when ideology and reality came into conflict, it was still ideology that carried the day’.84 The new system of management and planning was implemented in Soviet enterprises with good results, but the central authorities continued to fix prices in an unrealistic manner, which meant that results could only be limited. Still, 1966 proved a better year for the Soviet economy, mostly because of better returns in the agricultural sector. The economic experts hoped that all these could facilitate détente. However, the fundamental character of the Soviet communist system had not changed, and the experts stressed that ‘[t]he well-known question whether a well-fed Communist is better than a lean one remains largely unanswered’.85 In this period the war-sustaining capabilities of the Soviet economy were taken for granted, and these economic problems were not expected to influence the Soviet defence effort. Soviet defence expenditures were estimated to be at 10 per cent of the GNP, which was comparable to the US defence effort. Still, the Soviet GNP per head was less than half compared to the American, and thus the funds for defence were coming out of a significantly smaller ‘pocket’.
The experts noted that in the 1966–70 plan, the Kremlin appeared anxious not to increase defence spending, but also needed to develop new and expensive weapons systems. There was no indication for the diversion of funds from military and space expenditure to consumption: this would benefit the West, but was unlikely to happen. Indeed, the channelling of resources and skilled labour to defence continued. It was thought that the progress of the Soviet economy allowed it to meet various demands simultaneously.86 A new comparison between the West, the Soviet bloc and the Third World was presented to the NAC in late 1966.87 The Subcommittee on Soviet Economic Policy tried to update projections of economic growth up to 1975. It is interesting that no projection was attempted after 1975, which had been the preferred time limit of the relevant studies since the mid-1950s. In this report, the older concept of a ‘compact’ Sino-Soviet bloc was also abandoned, at least partially: the term ‘Communist countries’ described the Soviet Union, the Eastern European satellites and the ‘underdeveloped Communist countries (Communist China, the other Asian Communist countries, Cuba and Albania)’. The ‘Third World’ described Latin America (except Cuba), Africa (except South Africa), the Middle East and Asian countries other than the communist ones. The most striking feature of this report was its tone of confidence: During the years 1961 to 1965, the economic growth rate of the industrialised countries was more or less similar (4.5% per year) in both the market economy countries and Communist countries. However, whereas expansion was slowing down in the latter, it speeded up in the market economy countries. Thus, in contrast to what had generally been forecast in the early 1960s, the industrialised countries of the Free World maintained and even increased their lead over the Communist countries. As the level of the economic resources of the United States exceeds both that of all the other NATO countries put together and – to an even greater extent – that of the Soviet Union, although the rate of growth of all
these countries is the same, the margin of superiority of the United States’ economy is widening in absolute terms.88 The Economic Advisers made a series of additional points. They stressed that the ‘less advanced’ countries of both worlds (Bulgaria, Romania, Spain, Greece, Portugal, but also Japan) developed in similar patterns: ‘for these countries, which are still in an intermediate stage of development, both systems gave about the same result’. However, China’s growth rates were lower than the less-developed Western countries – which negated the argument that communism allowed for higher growth rates in poorer states. The Economic Advisers also noted that the growth of the lessdeveloped countries of both worlds had slowed down, while the growth rate of the industrialized countries rose. Thus, the gaps between richer and poorer countries within both blocs widened, while the agricultural crisis of the communist and the Third Worlds, together with the population increase, referred to a possible food crisis by the mid-1970s. Last but not least, the Third World’s dependence on trade with (and aid by) the West had intensified. By 1975 the gap between industrial (Western or communist) and lessdeveloped countries would widen even further.89 This was the first NATO report which mentioned a new cleavage in world affairs: the one between industrialized countries as a whole, and less-developed ones. However, the conclusion was clear: the West was winning the economic Cold War. Economic failures and ‘national roads’ in Eastern Europe NATO analysis regarded the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe as an integral part of the Soviet power-base. In the mid-1960s Soviet control in that pivotal area seemed to undergo significant changes. The Kremlin faced a matrix of interrelated problems, such as the slowing down of Soviet economic development, the resurgence of
national feeling in the satellites, and the Sino-Soviet dispute, which forced Moscow to seek the support of its satellites and thus allowed greater space for manoeuvre to them. The West was interested in both levels: Soviet policy itself, and the situation in the specific countries. The first level was mostly dealt with by the ‘trends and implications’ reports, and the experts noted that Soviet control could not be disputed. However, the Kremlin appeared apprehensive about Western efforts to approach countries of Eastern Europe, especially the new Eastern policy of the post-1966 West German government, led by Kurt-Georg Kiesinger and Willy Brandt. The West German opening to the satellites in 1966–7 was seen as undermining Soviet control.90 The second level involved the area studies undertaken by the expert working group for Eastern Europe. A new mood in the satellites had been noted in 1960–2, but from 1963 onwards it became more pronounced. The satellites were facing growing economic problems, but these did not seem to threaten the Eastern European regimes. Economic failures appeared in industry as well as in agriculture, thus leading these countries to seek imports of food from the West. Even Czechoslovakia now appeared less successful economically. This led the NATO analysts to hope that some of these regimes might turn to ‘unorthodox ideas borrowed from free-market economies’, but soon this proved illusory. Politically, the regimes appeared stable. The most conservative of the satellite governments (Bulgaria, the GDR and Czechoslovakia) continued to be repressive towards dissidents, and Poland no longer sparked immediate hope. In the November 1963 report, discussing relaxation of police pressure and tolerance towards intellectuals, the experts noted that ‘Poland, however, which hitherto had played the rôle of pilot in this evolution, has, comparatively speaking, lost ground’. Instead, Hungary was portrayed as ‘the model towards which the eyes of the liberals in the other Eastern European countries are now turned’. However, soon disappointments were bound to come from Budapest as well. The GDR’s treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in mid-1964 also attracted attention: the experts noted that this was ‘a poor substitute’
for the peace treaty that Kremlin had promised to East Berlin, and thus confirmed that the ‘Zone’ remained totally dependent on Moscow.91 The NATO experts pointed to the revival of national feelings and to the emerging trend towards diversity between the satellites, seeking now ‘national roads’ to socialism. Again, this was not an innovation of NATO analysis: Brzezinski had already referred to the possible centrifugal tendencies in this region, also cautioning that a ‘national road to socialism’ might even increase the legitimacy of the proSoviet regimes.92 The alliance analysts stressed that this process was also aided by the Sino-Soviet dispute which forced the Kremlin to seek support from its Eastern European allies, and thus to accept a degree of ‘polycentrism’ or even autonomy within its bloc. However, it was strongly noted that the satellites were firmly behind Moscow in the salient problems of the Cold War, including Berlin, Cuba, enmity towards the EEC, the MLF or the Sino-Soviet dispute. The failure to strengthen COMECON was also noted with interest. The NATO experts acidly remarked that supranational cooperation was far more successful in the ‘bourgeois’ West than in the ‘internationalist’ Soviet world: the growing nationalism of the satellites, the reluctance of the poorer ones to accept specialization and the absence of a coherent price system in their planned economies were noted as the major impediments for such a course.93 The fall of Khrushchev came as a shock to the satellites as well as to NATO, but did not change the fundamental patterns of power in Eastern Europe. According to the alliance experts, the news provoked ‘astonishment and regret’ in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, although the first two endorsed the coup. Bulgaria omitted any reference to the fallen leader, while ‘the Romanians observed a magisterial silence’. Khrushchev’s demise was a blow to Soviet prestige, and was expected to give an impetus to the trend towards diversification and to ‘the movement towards independence,
which now appears to have become irreversible’. However, no spectacular or immediate change should be expected.94 From now on, the NATO experts focused on the economies of the Eastern European countries. Following a US proposal in 1964, the Economic Advisers undertook periodic studies of the economies of the individual Eastern European satellites.95 It is interesting (though also inevitable) that some distribution of labour is recorded for the drafting of these reports: for example, the British wrote the Hungarian, and the Germans the Bulgarian one.96 In successive meetings of the NAC and of the Economic Advisers during the discussions of these reports, the representatives of the memberstates stressed the increasing importance of this subject.97 The experts stressed that ‘elements of liberalism’ could now be introduced to Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary (and the US hoped that opportunities existed in Poland). They were less hopeful for Bulgaria, which was becoming dependent on Soviet trade and simultaneously showed little desire to take distances from the Kremlin, and saw no prospect for liberalization in the GDR (despite the 1960–2 failure of forced collectivization of its agriculture), as the regime was dependent on Moscow and the exodus of skilled workers had dealt a huge blow to the economy.98 In the case of Albania, the NATO experts noted the links between Tirana and Beijing which embarrassed Moscow, but also stressed that in the long term the isolation of the country should be terminated.99 The discussion of the Eastern European economies led to a report by the economic experts in autumn 1965 on the ‘five Communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany’. The report noted that after a period of rapid growth, these countries encountered serious economic difficulties in the early 1960s. The initial rapid growth rates of their industry were explained by the observation that this was a common feature in the first phases of industrialization. However, these countries were now facing structural problems, deriving directly from the rigidity of the communist system, especially in advanced and diversified economies. Thus, the Eastern European
leaders had started introducing initiatives for decentralization as well as market elements in their economies, but the NATO experts could not be certain about the final results of this venture.100 The NATO analysts kept insisting on Moscow’s continuing hold over the area. The Kremlin now opted for bilateral economic agreements with its satellites, thus confirming the failure of COMECON to encourage coordination. Leonid Brezhnev’s reference in 1965–6 to the need for better consultation within the Warsaw Pact was interpreted as an attempt to accept a measure of autonomy and enhance cohesion in the bloc, which was becoming more complex than before. Still, the strong condemnation by the satellites of US policies in Vietnam – especially in the 1966 Bucharest Declaration of the Warsaw Pact – their support to the Kremlin in its dispute with China and their attitude in the Middle Eastern crisis of summer 1967, confirmed that Moscow’s control remained. The NATO experts also referred to the ‘inner contradiction of a social order in which the leading circles require fresh impulses and new ideas from their intelligentsia whilst they cannot allow them to overstep certain limits’. In December 1966 the experts noted that ‘[i]t is clear that the leaders are aware of the difficulty of reconciling economic decentralization and continued Party control’. On this level, Poland was again a disappointment (its accession to GATT did not change the picture), and Hungary halted its liberalization experiment because of fresh economic failures. The NATO experts continued to stress the weakness of the extremely repressive regime in East Germany: the anxiety of the Ulbricht regime at West German diplomatic activity in Eastern Europe in 1966–7 was seen as an indication of this. The NATO experts were impressed by the continuity of Romanian policies following the death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, and by Romanian resistance in 1966 to closer organization within the Warsaw Pact. However, they held that Romania could not become a catalyst for Eastern Europe: the country was too backward, one of the harshest regimes in Eastern Europe, and presented no hope for ‘liberalization’. Czechoslovakia was now seen as taking the lead in reform: this was an industrialized country which had remained under
severe totalitarian rule until 1963–4, but by 1965 it tried to decentralize. The NATO experts hoped that this would encourage the other satellites to move towards the same direction.101 On the other hand, Yugoslavia was now described as an autonomous entity, and its economic reforms of the mid-1960s were seen with much interest: ‘It is in the interest of the West that the economic reforms now implemented in Yugoslavia should be successful’. Yugoslav success could encourage the Eastern European satellites to move towards the same direction.102 The Third World and the communist challenge Pointing to Soviet problems and opportunities, 1963–4 The economic activities of the Soviet bloc and China in the Third World remained one of the major subjects of NATO analysis. The relevant reports were drafted by the Sub-committee on Soviet Economic Policy and were being approved by the Economic Advisers. The economic problems of the Soviet bloc and the evolving Sino-Soviet dispute caused differentiations in NATO analysis regarding the southern hemisphere. This was mirrored in the relative optimism of the NATO experts. The Soviets were now present in the Third World, and thus they had gains to defend or even to lose in case of mistaken moves. The experts noted that Soviet policy often was opportunistic: for example Moscow had to keep both Baghdad and Cairo satisfied (an almost impossible task), and sacrificed the small communist forces in Iraq. The Soviets were described as determined ‘to pay as heavy a price as necessary to maintain the Castro régime as a Communist beachhead in Latin America’,103 which was dangerous for the West, but containable. Most of all, the Sino-Soviet split had led to a vicious antagonism between the two communist centres for the support of the developing countries.104 It was on this subject that the break-up of the ‘Sino-Soviet bloc’ was noted, for the first time so clearly:
Although both the Soviets and the Chinese aim at eliminating Western influences in the developing countries, to describe such communist economic activities as originating from ‘a Sino-Soviet bloc’ would suggest a higher degree of co-ordination than warranted by recent developments.105 This increased self-confidence was mirrored in the reports on Soviet economic activity in the periphery.106 From 1964 onwards, the relevant NATO documents no longer referred to the ‘economic offensive’ of the ‘Sino-Soviet bloc’, but employed a more descriptive title mentioning ‘communist economic activities’ in the developing countries. These reports noted that the Sino-Soviet dispute had affected the foreign aid policies of the two states, which now were in some respects (especially in East Africa) competitive. The NATO experts noted a slight decrease of communist aid in the early 1960s, and a further increase since 1964 especially in arms deliveries (Indonesia, Iraq, Egypt Algeria, India, Cuba and Somalia). Soviet aid was slowing down, probably due to the economic problems of the Soviet bloc: as the May 1963 report noted, the Soviets could not afford ‘“several Cubas” at the same time’. The experts stressed that Western aid to developing countries (including private capital) was eighteen times greater in absolute value than Communist aid, while trade with the West accounted for 70 per cent of the total of the Third World, compared to a mere 5 per cent of trade with the communist states. Thus, communist ‘penetration’ of the periphery, although successful in some respects (especially in the Middle East and in Asia, and in raising the morale of Latin American leftists) was not as effective as feared in the late 1950s. It certainly had not led to the imposition of communist regimes, with the exception of Cuba; but even in Cuba, the cost was too high. Still, the economic experts stressed that ‘penetration’ now took more subtle forms, and technical assistance played an increasingly important role: by mid-1963 the number of Soviet bloc technicians in developing countries had risen to 15,800 (including 4,600 military advisers), or double the number reported in 1960. At the same time, the number of nationals of Third
World countries receiving training in communist countries (including military personnel) increased steadily. It was estimated that since 1956, 37,550 students from seventy-eight countries had received training in communist states. Additionally, 7,200 Cubans were being educated in Soviet bloc countries in academic or technical fields, while the number of Cubans receiving military training was unknown. An interesting pattern was revealed by the observation that military training rose at a faster pace than technical or academic training. Thus the NATO experts noted that communist economic tactics in the Third World were becoming more elaborate and sophisticated, and remained a major threat to the West.107 ‘Revolutionary democracy’, Vietnam and the ‘diversification’ of the Third World, 1965–7 Soviet activity in the Third World intensified after Khrushchev’s fall, at a time when the Vietnam War also did a lot to corrode the US image in the developing countries. The Kremlin aimed to expand its influence in the Third World, without coming into direct conflict with the US, but also without leaving space for a Chinese thrust to its position. Moscow now put forward the notion of ‘revolutionary democracy’ to describe anti-Western regimes. This tactic, the NATO experts stressed, was applicable mostly in Africa, whereas in Latin America the Kremlin continued to work through local communist forces.108 The American delegation commented that, contrary to Lenin and Stalin, the post-1956 Soviet leadership saw the Third World as ‘a main theater of the world power struggle’, and as ‘its principal target area’.109 In December 1966 APAG also studied the Soviet doctrine of ‘wars of national liberation’, and noted the significant adaptations for which Soviet policies in the developing world proved capable. This was seen as the ‘logical counterpart’ to the theory of peaceful co-existence. The latter aimed to avoid general war, whereas the former justified Soviet interference in cases where profits could be made without provoking a general crisis: ‘in practice the Soviet Union has been very cautious and
flexible in applying this theory’. APAG also discussed the ways in which the West should respond to contingencies falling under this category of ‘wars of national liberation’: Western armed intervention should be considered as a last resort; the facilitation of economic and social progress for the populations of the Third World was the preferred course of action. Moreover, it was stressed that the West should avoid giving ‘unconditional support to reactionary régimes’, while emphasis should be given to ‘the strength of national feelings and traditions as an antidote to Communism’.110 These, however, appeared rather theoretical in the era of Vietnam. For Moscow, the Vietnam war presented significant opportunities and challenges.111 The post-Khrushchev leadership showed solidarity for North Vietnam and the Vietcong, if nothing else, to avoid further attacks by the Chinese for failing to support the communist cause in the Third World. At the same time, Moscow wanted to avoid a direct confrontation with the US, or even to prevent a clash between the US and China. The NATO analysts estimated that the Kremlin regarded the Vietnam War as a manageable low-intensity conflict, which it was in the Soviet interest to let unfold, just like it was in the interest of the West to let the SinoSoviet dispute develop. This was an interesting indication of a more complex context in the global Cold War of the 1960s.112 In December 1966 APAG noted that the outcome of the war in Vietnam was crucial for the course of events in the whole of South-East Asia (the domino theory), but also that ‘this conflict influenced East–West relations less than might have been expected’.113 Regarding the regional dimension, the Far East reports of the expert working group, also echoing the dominant domino theory, repeatedly stressed that ‘it remains a vital interest of the West to prevent a communist victory in South Vietnam which would stimulate similar developments throughout South East Asia’. The Far East reports insisted that the commitment of US ground troops had led to an improvement of the military situation in South Vietnam, but did not prevent the North Vietnamese from interfering in the south. The
weakness of the anti-communist forces in the country was seen as the major Western problem. The 1968 Tet Offensive was regarded as important mostly because it impaired the prospect of a viable South Vietnamese government, rather than because of its military implications.114 However, it is clear that (despite Brosio’s pleas for closer consultation115), the NATO working groups tended to downplay the adverse effects of Vietnam to the West’s image in the Third World, as well as to Western public opinion.116 During a period when serious reservations were being expressed within NATO regarding US policies in South-East Asia, the NATO bodies evidently preferred not to open another field of intra-alliance tension. Last but not least, a major political and military crisis erupted with the Six-Day War in the Middle East in summer 1967. The NATO analysts stressed the Soviet willingness to replace the Arab losses of military material, and expressed concern at Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean, behind the alliance’s treaty area.117 Meanwhile, in 1965–7 the economic experts reported a revival of communist economic activities in the Third World. This was evident in the increase of communist aid (economic and technical) and trade: aid by communist countries exceeded $1,5 million for 1964, with China increasing its contributions substantially. Sino-Soviet competition in the Third World intensified (indeed, Chinese technicians and ‘labourers’ in the Third World rose from 470 in 1963 to 2,160 in 1964 and 5,150 in 1966). Still, the NATO experts stressed that China had not reached a level of development which would enable it to emerge as a major competitor of the Soviet Union in the global South. Soviet trade remained selective and focused on specific countries (Egypt, Afghanistan, Guinea, Syria, Mali, Ghana and Cambodia). The number of Soviet civilian and military technicians in the developing countries reached 18,000 in 1964 and 25,820 in 1966. The number of students from developing countries in the communist world reached 36,000 in 1967 (of which 14,500 came from African countries). In the 1967 report, the new Soviet aid commitments to Latin America were also noted with concern.
Nevertheless, by 1967 the NATO experts commented that Soviet economic credits were being extended at more ‘commercial conditions’ (for example higher interest rates), while ‘in total value, Communist countries have thus far provided developing nations with more weapons and military goods than industrial equipment and tools for their economic expansion’. The economic experts noted that fresh studies should be undertaken on these aspects of communist activity, and the West should remain alert: communist aid and trade, although substantially smaller than the Western ones, remained selective and politically targeted.118 APAG once more proved bolder than the more formal NATO working groups. In late 1964 it stressed that the developing countries were often on the wrong economic path: despite the need to modernize their agriculture and deal with their food problems, most of their leaderships opted for a spectacular industrialization. However, Western enterprises also made excesses in trying to control the developing economies, and thus the blame should not fall solely on the developing countries.119 In January 1966. APAG considered that the Third World was undergoing ‘a significant process of diversification and even of disintegration’, as the unifying force of anti-colonialism was being weakened and the Sino-Soviet split deepened. Neutrality and non-alignment were considered to be less appealing to Third World countries than before. APAG thought that the West should take advantage of this trend, ‘curb Chinese expansionism’, encourage the new countries to overcome ‘excessive nationalism’ and assume greater efforts to achieve development.120 APAG considered that the problems of the developing countries ‘are expected to become increasingly important in the 1970s’.121 However, the huge blow that Vietnam (and, before that, the Congo crisis) dealt on the West’s image in the Third World was always underestimated. The NATO experts seemed content to note the Soviet difficulties in the global South, but arguably failed to assess that the West’s own failures could open the door for spectacular successes of Soviet policy in the periphery in the following decade.
East–West relations: the intra-NATO debate and the road to détente, 1962–7 By the early and mid-1960s, the texture of the Cold War was changing. The economic problems of the Soviet bloc, the SinoSoviet dispute, the resurgence of national sentiment in the satellites, the evident desire of the satellites for commercial agreements with Western Europe, but also the emergence of a more elaborate international economy (following the immediate post-war reconstruction), seemed to open new prospects for a more active Western policy. Was, perhaps, détente an opportunity for the West to use its main advantage, namely, its economic preponderance, and breach the Iron Curtain? Could the mighty Western economy succeed where politics had failed? As usually happened with NATO during the Cold War, opportunities were also accompanied by fears: was it possible for NATO to retain its precious unity in a climate of relaxation of tensions, and with the Gaullist challenge unfolding? Would a more relaxed commercial policy towards the East end up with the NATO members competing against each other for contracts with the Soviet bloc countries? This debate pointed to the difficulties of free economies to mount a concerted response to an international economic challenge. The NATO civilian machinery was monitoring Western trade with the Soviet bloc since 1960. Although the figures involved were rather low (around 3 per cent of the total exports and imports of the NATO countries was directed to the Soviet world), the Eastern European satellites were by far the largest trade partners of the West: 58 per cent of the total trade of NATO countries with communist states was directed towards Eastern Europe.122 At a moment when the ‘satellites’ were searching for ‘national roads to socialism’, this could present an opportunity for the West to increase its leverage with them. In summer 1962 the British took the lead in suggesting a policy of ‘opening up’ Eastern Europe: trade was expected, gradually and in the long term, to weaken the Soviet hold over the satellites, although
quick results should not be expected. In November 1962 the Political Advisers – a NATO body in which British influence was always strong – came out in favour of such a policy. They stressed that the Soviet Union would try ‘at all costs’ to maintain control over Eastern Europe. Thus, the West should adopt a ‘positive long-term policy’ towards the satellites, trying to ‘vigorously exploit’ the attachment of Eastern European peoples to Western social and cultural values. The aim was to encourage ‘evolution’ rather than ‘revolution’.123 It is notable that the essence of this British strategy had important common elements with the views expressed by Brzezinski in his landmark study of the Soviet bloc.124 The November 1962 report of the Political Advisers was one of the cases in which an alliance analysis document played a major role in policy-making, and became the subject of heated debates in the NAC and among the alliance statesmen. In fact, the adoption of the memorandum was not a panacea. The NATO powers had agreed on the principle of an expansion of trade, and on the advisability of trying to exploit the situation in Eastern Europe, but they strongly disagreed over the means to implement such a policy. These disagreements tended to come out when specific issues, rather than principles, were discussed. Thus, the Americans insisted that the extension of government-guaranteed long-term (over five years) credits to the Soviet bloc amounted to a transfer of resources to these countries. The British disagreed with this limitation, which they considered arbitrary and pointless. In early 1963 the EEC Six pressed the British to limit credits to five years, but this was an inopportune moment for such a proposal, since in January of that year de Gaulle had vetoed British accession to the EEC, thus making it even more important for Whitehall to secure exports to the East. Trade in specific commodities also revealed strong disagreements: for example, large diameter oil pipes and pipeline equipment was an item which had been removed from the strategic embargo list, but the Americans insisted that the sale of such items to the Soviet Union would increase its military potential in Europe, and wanted the British to avoid such transactions. London,
however, pressed by its economic predicaments, the French veto of its EEC application, and also convinced that limitations of credits would have a negligible effect on the Soviet economy, went on with its policy. Soon, a rift emerged between Britain, the Scandinavians and the Canadians, on the one hand supporting a more ‘forward’ policy, and claiming that NATO was not a body competent to direct ‘economic warfare’, and all the rest who wanted a more concerted and less ambitious expansion of trade with the East. Britain, essentially, was accused for starting a ‘credit race’ between the Western countries. This way, the omnipresent fear of endangering NATO unity came to the fore. When the British refused to change course, the Americans struck with venom: during the NAC meeting of 18 November 1963, which was attended by economics Ministers of the member-states, the US Under-secretary of State, George Ball, led an attack on the British position, while the Six seconded the American onslaught. Britain found itself isolated. However, it was an indication of London’s strong influence in the NATO committee system that by 1964, the Economic Advisers recorded the disagreements, called for a more concerted stand of the NATO members, but also effectively proposed to allow freedom of action to those countries supporting a ‘forward’ policy. This was the first time that a NATO group suggested that the NAC openly recognize a major intra-NATO disagreement.125 The strong disagreements over the role of trade, and the simultaneous uncertainties caused by the fall of Khrushchev sparked the intervention by the new Secretary-General, Brosio. As noted above, in February 1965 Brosio suggested a wider discussion of East–West relations. He explicitly mentioned his worries that disagreements over East–West trade could damage NATO, and noted that his initiative was partially caused by the fact that ‘a number of Governments of the Alliance’ were taking ‘vigorous action’ on a bilateral basis. Brosio stressed that relations with Eastern Europe were ‘important but subsidiary’, and asked the memberstates to place alliance unity above any other consideration. In the ensuing debate, the member-states agreed to try to encourage
diversification in Eastern Europe, but this should be done by concerted policies. The disagreements persisted, but involved means rather than aims, and thus were manageable.126 Things changed gradually in 1966–7. The US itself decided in 1966 to embrace détente – a decision which culminated in President Lyndon Johnson’s October 1966 speech.127 NATO’s pace towards the restructuring of its defence dogma and its acceptance of détente was accelerated in the climate of soul-searching triggered by the French withdrawal from the NATO military command (announced in March 1966), which brought any Anglo-American disagreements over trade into second place. NATO now embarked on a process of rethinking its future, détente and relations with the East. This was part of a larger process which the US preferred, of involving the allies more deeply in the major decisions which were to follow. A crucial step was made by the report of the Council in Permanent Session on East–West relations in November 1966, at the request of the June 1966 ministerial NAC.128 It is telling that, although the Political Advisers produced the first draft, the Ministers gave this task to the Permanent Representatives: this meant that the new policy line would be formally agreed by all member-states. The British and the Canadians, fervent advocates of a ‘forward’ policy in previous years, regretted that the terms of reference were too narrow, but clearly welcomed the new trend. In the ensuing discussion, the US Permanent Representative, Cleveland, made the first references to the dual pillar of détente and defence, which should support the new policy.129 Significantly, some reservations were expressed regarding the final document: the French did not approve the section which described NATO’s role in East–West relations, arguing that a concerted political line would simply confirm the existence of two opposing blocs. Moreover, the Greeks argued that more emphasis should be placed on the Soviet threat rather than on the prospects for détente.130 Despite some American disappointment for the French reservation,131 these were not fatal for the recommendations of the report: France was anyway expected to
distance itself from a concerted NATO policy, and the nature of the Greek complaint (seeking a larger emphasis to defence) was compatible with alliance aims. The Permanent Representatives’ report clearly welcomed the prospect of détente. It stressed that despite the reluctance of the Soviets to end the partition of Europe and of Germany, the Alliance should encourage the slow and difficult process of reassociation of East European states and the USSR with the Western world […]. We should be mindful that a permanent solution to European problems is unthinkable without the cooperation of the Soviet Union. The Permanent Representatives were in favour of the expansion of trade, (which ‘would serve a useful purpose, both from the political and the economic point of view, and should be promoted as far as possible’), tourism, cultural, educational, scientific and technical exchanges, and consular relations. However, this expansion of contacts should be done in a concerted manner (thus not allowing for the perceived British ‘unilateralism’ on trade). The Council was also in favour of reviving the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), examining the association of communist states with Western organizations such as GATT, OEEC and IMF, and using the Council of Europe as a forum for ‘informal and semi-official East–West discussions’. Still, it was on the major political issue – Germany – that the future of détente would be decided: However, the gradual reduction and elimination of misunderstandings between Germany and the Eastern European peoples through small but concrete steps could constitute an important factor in creating a favourable climate for the process of reunification and for broadening the basis of future negotiations on Germany and European security. The USSR and its Allies should be brought to realise that their desire for a genuine reduction in tension in Europe will be judged not only by the continuing
improvement in their relations with most NATO countries, but also with the Federal Republic of Germany. The report ended with a call to improve consultation: NATO should become ‘a more effective Western clearing house’. This was the part of the report which sparked French objections.132 This document became the basis for the decision of the NAC in December 1966 to move on to détente and to the reorganization of the alliance in the context of the process which would become known as the Harmel Report.133 At the same time, despite initial reservations, the US and NATO also accepted (or at least did not object to) a British declaration for Europe.134 The Permanent Council’s (the so-called ‘reinforced POLADs’) report signalled a new search for détente procedures by the leaders of the West. Cleveland noted to Rusk that until then détente had been discussed in an abstract manner: ‘Now we have to move on from slogans to concepts – escape the hard–soft, hawk–dove dichotomy […] and feel for a strategy that will guide it along lines that make sense in the US interest’.135 At the same time, Brosio himself, despite his personal reservations for détente, noted that ‘we could not go on making offers to the East, while the East gave up nothing. Improved atmosphere was not enough’. He also asked for more ‘concrete measures’ of East–West cooperation.136 Thus the tendency for a ‘linkage’ had appeared before the emergence of the Nixon–Kissinger team on the scene. A détente policy naturally entailed increasing trade with communist countries. Despite continuing US criticism of governments which provided credits to the Soviet bloc, in mid-1967 the economic experts stressed that this was a worldwide phenomenon of the 1950s and 1960s. In reality, the economic experts noted, there had been no coordinated Western attitude on this issue, if only because the Western governments themselves were eager to increase trade with the East: in 1967 ‘long-term’ credits (of over five years) accounted for 41.4 per cent of the total of NATO countries’ credits to
the bloc. Long-term credits of European NATO to communist countries were expanding faster than those to the Third World; they were also important for the Eastern European states, although there also was the danger that the latter might not be able to repay them in the end.137 In other words, the experts noted that the financial/commercial tools of détente were being applied even in the absence of a fully concerted NATO policy. Thus, by 1966–7 NATO finally agreed that détente was a new strategy for the West. The West appeared to enjoy clear advantages in this process: its economic system was proving more efficient than the communist in meeting the demands of the post-war world; the EEC was proving spectacularly successful, thus widening the potential of the West; West Germany strengthened this potential in Eastern Europe; the Soviet leadership was conservative, reserved and timid; the Sino-Soviet split was limiting the Kremlin’s options and opening opportunities in Eastern Europe. However, before moving on to détente, two major obstacles needed to be overcome: a reorganization of NATO, and the side-effects of a new Soviet military operation in Eastern Europe. Notes 1 NATO/CM(64)27, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 29 April 1964. 2 FRUS, 1964–68, XIII, Clevelant (NATO) to State Department, 18 December 1965, pp. 285–8. 3 TNA/FO 371/190610/1, Shuckburgh to Stewart, 18 January 1966, annual review for 1965. 4 From the huge bibliography on this subject see Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), pp. 84–104; James Ellison, The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963–1968 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Andrew Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO: Britain, America and the Dynamics of Alliance, 1962–68 (London: Routledge, 2006); Frédéric Bozo, La France et l’OTAN de la Guerre Froide au Nouvel Ordre Européen (Paris: Mason, 1991), pp. 65–104; Frédéric Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001); Pierre Lelouche, L’Allié Indocile: La France et l’OTAN de la Guerre Froide à l’Afghanistan (Paris: Editions du Moment, 2009), pp. 37–56; Anna Locher, Crisis? What Crisis? NATO, de Gaulle, and the Future of the Alliance, 1963–1966 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010); Frédéric Bozo, ‘Chronique d’une Decision Annoncée: le
Retrait de l’Organization Militaire (1965–1967)’, and Frank Costgliola, ‘La Réaction Américaine en Retrait de la France de l’OTAN’, in Maurice Vaïsse, Pierre Mélandri and Frédéric Bozo (eds), La France et l’OTAN, 1949–1996 (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1996), pp. 331–57 and 403–20 respectively; Geir Lundestad, ‘Empire’ by Integration: the United States and European Integration, 1945–1997 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 58–82. 5 Maurice Vaïsse, ‘Indépendence et Solidarité, 1958–1963’, in Vaïsse, Mélandri and Bozo (eds), La France et l’OTAN, pp. 219–45. 6 Geoffrey Warner, ‘De Gaulle and the Anglo-American “Special Relationship”, 1958– 1969: Perceptions and Realities’, in Vaïsse, Mélandri and Bozo (eds), La France et l’OTAN, pp. 247–66. 7 Frédéric Bozo, ‘Defense versus Security? Reflections on the Past and Present of the “Future Tasks” of the Alliance (1949–99)’, in Gustav Schmidt (ed.), A History of NATO: the First Fifty Years, Vol. 2 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 71 and 74. 8 Jussi M. Hanhimäki, ‘Detente in Europe, 1962–1975’, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 197–218. 9 See, among others, Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: from ‘Empire’ by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 156–61; Lawrence S. Kaplan, ‘The Vietnam War and Europe: the View from NATO’, and Fredrik Logevall, ‘The American Effort to Draw European States into the War’, in Christopher Goscha and Maurice Vaïsse (eds.), La Guerre du Vietnam et l’Europe, 1963–1973 (Paris: LGDJ, 2003), pp. 89–102 and 3–16 respectively; Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 131–63; Effie Pedaliu, ‘Transatlantic Relations at a Time When “More Flags” Meant “No European Flags”: The US, Its European Allies and the War in Vietnam, 1964–1974’, International History Review, 35/3 (2013), pp. 556–75. 10 Louis Klarevas, ‘Were the Eagle and the Phoenix Birds of a Feather? The United States and the Greek Coup of 1967’, Diplomatic History, 30 (2006), pp. 471–508; Effie G.H. Pedaliu, ‘“A Discordant Note”: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967–1974’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 22/1 (2011), pp. 101–20. 11 NARA, RG 59, Finletter to State Department, 16 January 1965, Central Files 1964– 1966, NATO 3, Box 3270. 12 NATO/CM(66)1, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 5 January 1966. 13 TNA/FO 371/173382/2 and 4, Wright to Barnes, 27 February, minute (Tickell), 1 March, and Tomlinson (NATO) to Barnes, 12 March 1963. 14 See for example NARA, RG 59, memorandum, Tyler to Rusk, 18 April 1963, Ball circular telegram, 4 May 1963, and Rusk to Paris, 21 October 1963, Central Files 1963, Pol 3 NATO, Box 3795. 15 NARA, RG 59, Finletter to State Department, 10 October 1963, Central Files 1963, Pol 3 NATO, Box 3795. 16 NARA, RG 59, Finletter to State Department, 10 July 1963 and 3 July 1963, Central Files 1963, NATO 3, Box 4229. 17 NARA, RG 59, Finletter to State Department, 22 April 1964, Central Files 1964–1966, NATO 3, Box 3270. 18 NARA, RG 59, Finletter to State Department, 9 June 1966, Central Files 1964–1966, NATO 3, Box 3270.
19 NARA, RG 59, Finletter to State Department, 4 April 1963, Central Files 1963, NATO 3, Box 4229. 20 NARA, RG 59, Finletter to State Department, 27 January, and Ball to Paris, 28 January 1964, Central Files 1964–1966, NATO 3, Box 3271. 21 NARA, RG 59, McBride (Paris) to State Department, 7 December 1965, Central Files 1964–1966, NATO 3, Box 3270. On French participation see also TNA/FO 371/190610/1, Shuckburgh to Stewart, 18 January 1966, annual review for 1965. 22 See for example, TNA/FO 371/188933/2, British paper for the NATO expert group on Soviet policy, 10 May 1966; TNA/FCO28/333, minute (Sutherland), 16 May 1967; FCO 28/333/7, British papers on the NATO meetings of experts on Soviet policy, 10 May and 2 November 1967. 23 TNA/FO 371/173382/1, Wright to Barnes, 4 January 1963; FO 371/173383/21 and 28, Shuckburgh (NATO) to Barnes, 8 May 1963, and minute (Barnes) 2 September 1963. 24 TNA/FO 371/177815/30, Nicholls to Shuckburgh, 20 April 1964. 25 TNA/FO 371/177815/46, Nicholls, memorandum on APAG meeting, Italy, 1–4 October 1964. 26 ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, NATO/CM(63)25, 29 April 1963; and CM(63)98, 26 November 1963. 27 NATO/CM(64)29, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 24 April 1964. 28 FRUS, 1964–8, XIV, National Intelligence Estimate, 8 January 1964, Intelligence Memorandum, 19 March 1964, Special Report by the CIA, pp. 5–6, 43–4, 59–64. 29 TNA/FO 371/173383/21, Barnes to Shuckburgh, 10 May 1963. 30 On Khrushchev’s fall, see Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: the Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2006), pp. 531–9. For analyses of the new leaders in Moscow, see Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), pp. 193–8 and 201–7; Jonathan Haslam, Russia’s Cold War: from the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011), pp. 215–20; Stephen E. Hanson, ‘The Brezhnev Era’, in Ronald Grigor Suny (ed.), The Cambridge History of Russia, Vol. III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 292–315. 31 NATO/CM(64)118, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 28 November 1964. See also CM(65)46, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 13 May 1965. For the similar conclusions of US analysts, see FRUS, 1964–68, XIV, Intelligence Memorandum, 17 October 1964, National Intelligence Estimate, 27 January 1965, Special Report by the CIA, 9 April 1965, pp. 137–41, 215–27, 273–85. 32 Reports ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, NATO/CM(65)32, 27 April 1965; CM(65)94, 26 November 1965; CM(66)42, 10 May 1966; CM(66)129, 7 December 1966; CM(67)29, 29 May 1967; CM(67)65, 29 November 1967. 33 FRUS, 1961–3, V, National Intelligence Estimate, 22 May 1963, pp. 685–701; FRUS, 1964–8, XIV, National Intelligence Estimates, 19 February 1964, 27 January 1965, 28 April 1966, 28 September 1967, pp. 20–31, 215–27, 390–2, 581–92. 34 NATO/CM(63)35, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 8 May 1963. 35 Reports ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, NATO/CM(63)25, 29 April 1963; CM(63)98, 26 November 1963; CM(64)29, 24 April 1964. See also AC119-WP(63)2, ‘Soviet Policy in the Post-Cuba Period’, 15 January 1963, and AC/119-WP(63)29 for documents of the national delegations. 36 NATO/CM(64)118, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 28 November 1964.
37 NATO/PO/65/56, Brosio to Permanent Representatives, 1 February 1965. 38 Robert S. Jordan, Political Leadership in NATO: a Study in Multilateral Diplomacy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 214–16; see pp. 165–247 for an assessment of his service as Secretary-General. See also Bozo, ‘Defense versus Security?’, p. 72; Bruna Bagnato, ‘NATO in the mid-1960s: the View of SecretaryGeneral Manlio Brosio’, in Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher (eds), Transatlantic Relations at Stake: Aspects of NATO, 1956–1972 (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2006), pp. 165–87. 39 NATO/CM(65)46, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 13 May 1965. 40 Reports ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, NATO/CM(65)32, 27 April 1965; CM(65)94, 26 November 1965; CM(66)42, 10 May 1966; CM(66)129, 7 December 1966; CM(67)29, 29 May 1967; CM(67)65, 29 November 1967. 41 For the Sino-Soviet conflict see, among others, Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 160–70; Lorenz Luthi, The Sino-Soviet-Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 273–339. 42 NATO/CM(63)25, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 29 April 1963. See also FRUS, 1961–3, V, Memorandum (CIA), 9 August, and Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 27 September 1963, pp. 741–2 and 770–4. 43 Reports ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, NATO/CM(63)98, 26 November 1963; CM(64)29, 24 April 1964. See also AC/119-WP(63) 14, Note by the Chairman, 28 March 1963, and AC/119-WP(63)29/1, 30 September 1963. 44 NATO/CR(63)33, 24 June 1963; CR(63)38), 23 July 1963. 45 NATO/CVR(64)54 and 55, 15 December 1964. 46 See for example NARA, RG 59, memorandum, Jacobson to Bundy, 22 December 1965, Central Files 1964–6, NATO 3, Box 3270. It was only in the December 1966 ministerial NAC that the Americans were content to see a growing European anxiety about the rise of Chinese power: FRUS, 1964–8, XIII, Clevelant to State Department, 17 December 1966, pp. 523–4. 47 NATO/CM(63)84, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 15 November 1963; see also APAG’s further report on NATO and the developing countries, where a similar uncertainty and disagreement as to the West’s ability to exploit the Sino-Soviet emerged: CM(64)128, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 2 December 1964. 48 NATO/CM(64)27, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 29 April 1964. See also APAG(63)5, ‘La Crise Sino-Sovietique’, 26 August 1963; TNA/FO 371/177815/29, Note on the APAG meeting, 10–13 March 1964. 49 TNA/FO 371/177383/1, Palliser, report on APAG meeting on China, 23 October 1964. 50 NATO/CM(65)32, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 27 April 1965. See also the report for the discussion of the Political Advisers on the Moscow meeting of communist parties, in NARA, RG 59, Durbrow to State Department, 10 March 1965, Central Files 1964–6, NATO 3, Box 3270. 51 Reports ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, NATO/CM(65)94, 26 November 1965; CM(66)42, 10 May 1966; CM(66)129, 7 December 1966; CM(67)29, 29 May 1967; CM(67)65, 29 November 1967. 52 NATO/CM(66)7, ‘Economic Developments in Communist China in 1964 and 1965’, 28 January 1966; CM(68)10, ‘Survey of the Economic Situation in Communist China (1966–1967), 26 March 1968; AC/89-D/198, ‘Economic Trends in Communist China’, 10 October 1966.
53 See the reports ‘The Situation in the Far East’, NATO/CM(66)45, 23 May 1966; CM(66)100, 22 November 1966; CM(67)27, 30 May 1967; CM(67)60, 20 November 1967. 54 NATO/CM(66)1, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 5 January 1966. See also the similar line in CM(66)52, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 26 May 1966. 55 For the Soviet economic performance in the early 1960s see Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: an Economic History of the USSR from 1945 (London: Longman, 2003), pp. 70–97; Richard N. Cooper, ‘Economic Aspects of the Cold War, 1962–1975’, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 44–64. On the attitudes of American academics towards the Soviet economy see David C. Engerman, Know Your Enemy: the Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 121–6. 56 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 188. 57 Reports ‘NATO Countries’ Trade with Communist Countries’, NATO/CM(64)52, 29 June 1964; CM(65)55, 7 July 1965. Canada had started wheat exports to China since 1961; see also CM(65)21, ‘Wheat Purchases by the Communist Countries’, 16 March 1965. 58 For discussions of the Economic Advisers see, among others, NATO/AC/89-R/59, 19 November 1964; AC/89-R72, 20 September 1965. This was a permanent topic of discussion in these years. 59 Reports on wheat purchases by the Soviet bloc, NATO/CM(65)21, 17 March 1965; CM(66)21, 8 March 1966; CM(67)28, 24 May 1967. See also the papers of the national delegations in AC/89-WP/199 and WP/202. 60 NATO/AC/89-WP/236, ‘The 1967 Soviet Wheat Harvest’, 5 January 1968; AC/89WP/247, Note by the Canadian Delegation, 7 March 1968. 61 NATO/CM(63)10, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 15 March 1963. See also NATO/APAG(62)4, ‘Progress Report’, 18 December 1962. 62 NATO/CM(64)27, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 29 April 1964. 63 NATO/CM(63)49, ‘Long-Term Economic Trends in NATO Countries and in the Communist Bloc and Some Implications for the Atlantic Alliance’, 26 June 1963. 64 NATO/CM(63)49, ‘Long-Term Economic Trends in NATO Countries and in the Communist Bloc and Some Implications for the Atlantic Alliance’, 26 June 1963. 65 NATO/CM(63)49, ‘Long-Term Economic Trends in NATO Countries and in the Communist Bloc and Some Implications for the Atlantic Alliance’, 26 June 1963. 66 NATO/CM(63)49, ‘Long-Term Economic Trends in NATO Countries and in the Communist Bloc and Some Implications for the Atlantic Alliance’, 26 June 1963. 67 NATO/AC/127-D/127, ‘Current Economic Developments in the Soviet Union’, 4 July 1963; AC/127-D/128, ‘Recent Economic Development in the European Satellite Countries and Prospects for the Future’, 5 July 1963; AC/127-D/129, ‘Evolution de la Situation Economique de la Chine Communiste depuis 1959’, 3 July 1963; AC/127D/164, ‘Recent Economic Developments in the European Satellite Countries and Prospects for the Future’, 11 June 1964; AC/127-D/166, ‘Economic Development in Communist China in 1964’, 30 June 1964; AC/127-D/167, ‘Current Economic Development in the Soviet Union’, 4 July 1964. 68 NATO/CM(63)71, ‘Recent Economic Developments in the Soviet Bloc and Communist China’, 2 October 1963; CM(64)64, ‘Economic Developments in the Soviet Union and the European Satellite Countries during 1963’, 10 August 1964. See also the US report
of the NAC discussion of the latter report: NARA, RG 59, Finletter to State Department, 3 September 1964, Central Files 1964–6, NATO 3, Box 3271. 69 NATO/CM(64)65 ‘Economic Developments in Communist China in 1963’, 12 August 1964. 70 NATO/AC/127-D/59, 4 January 1961. 71 NATO/CM(63)82, ‘Demographic Trends in the Soviet Bloc’, 5 November 1963; CM(65)16, ‘The Labour Situation in the USSR, the Eastern European Countries and the Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany’, 11 March 1965. See also AC/127-D/131, Report of the Ad hoc Group of Experts on Demographic Trends in Soviet Bloc Countries, 20 September 1963. 72 NATO/AC/127-WP/141, ‘The Comparative Development of Education and the Graduation of Scientists and Engineers in the Western Countries and the Soviet Bloc’, 15 May 1964; the study was undertaken at French and Greek insistence. 73 NATO/CR(64)40, 9 September 1964; TNA/FO 371/178114/240, Potter (NATO) to Hugh-Jones, 22 September 1964. 74 NATO/CM(65)17, Cover letter by Gregh, 11 March 1965; AC/127-D/183, Note by A. Vincent, 8 February 1965. 75 NATO/CR(65)13, 30 March 1965. 76 See NATO/CM(66)95, ‘Long-Term Economic Trends in NATO Countries, in Communist Countries and in the Third World’, 8 November 1966. 77 NATO/CM(65)17, ‘Comparison of the Economic Performance of the Soviet Union and the Western Countries’, 11 March 1965. 78 NATO/CM(65)17, ‘Comparison of the Economic Performance of the Soviet Union and the Western Countries’, 11 March 1965. 79 NATO/CM(65)17, ‘Comparison of the Economic Performance of the Soviet Union and the Western Countries’, 11 March 1965. 80 NATO/CM(65)81, ‘Current Economic Developments in the Soviet Union’, 8 October 1965. 81 Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy, pp. 101–8. 82 NATO/CM(66)8, ‘Economic Reforms in the Soviet Union’, 28 January 1966. See also the US report on the discussion of the Economic Advisers in NARA, RG 59, Cleveland to State Department, 5 May 1966, Central Files 1964–6, NATO 8–4, Box 3275. 83 NATO/CM(66)55, ‘The Current Economic Situation in the Soviet Union and the New Five-Year Plan (1966–70)’, 6 June 1966; AC/89-D/52, meeting with national officials, 22 April 1966. See also AC/89-WP/187, ‘Development of the Soviet Economy during the Period of the Seven-Year Plan (1959–1965)’, 16 March 1966; and AC/89-WP/189, ‘The Soviet Five-Year Economic Plan (1966–70)’, 4 April 1966. For reports of the meeting with national officials, see also NARA, RG 59, Cleveland to State Department, 12 May (two reports) and 13 May 1966, Central Files 1964–6, NATO 3, Box 3271. 84 NATO/CM(66)1, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 5 January 1966. See also CM(66)52, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 26 May 1966. 85 NATO/CM(67)78, ‘Review of Recent Economic Developments in the Soviet Union’, 12 December 1967. This was again aided by a meeting of the Economic Advisers with national officials: see AC/89-D/60, ‘Review of the Soviet Economy’, 6 October 1967. See also the US note on the Soviet economy in AC/89-WP/221, 3 July 1967. 86 NATO/CM(66)55, 6 June 1966; CM(67)78, 12 December 1967; AC/89-WP228, ‘Soviet Defence Expenditures’, 14 September 1967. See also AC/89-WP/222 and 229.
87 NATO/CM(66)95, ‘Long-Term Economic Trends in NATO Countries, in Communist Countries and in the Third World’, 8 November 1966. As noted above, the Chinese economy had become the subject of special studies: see NATO/CM(66)7, ‘Economic Developments in Communist China in 1964 and 1965’, 28 January 1966; CM(68)10, ‘Survey of the Economic Situation in Communist China (1966–7), 26 March 1968. 88 NATO/CM(66)95, ‘Long-Term Economic Trends in NATO Countries, in Communist Countries and in the Third World’, 8 November 1966. 89 NATO/CM(66)95, ‘Long-Term Economic Trends in NATO Countries, in Communist Countries and in the Third World’, 8 November 1966. 90 Reports ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, NATO/CM(66)129, 7 December 1966; CM(67)29, 29 May 1967; CM(67)65, 29 November 1967. 91 Reports, ‘The Situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany’, NATO/CM(63)27, 6 May 1963; CM(63)99, 28 November 1963; CM(64)36, 24 April 1964; CM(64)124, 3 December 1964. See also the discussion of the Political Advisers in NARA, RG 59, Finletter to State Department, 6 March 1964, Central Files 1964–6, NATO 3, Box 3270. 92 Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, pp. 405–8. 93 See note 91. The Economic Advisers debated especially whether the Romanian motives for resisting COMECON’s coordination were ideological or economic, but mostly concluded that there was little to expect from the harsh Romanian regime: NARA, RG 59, Finletter to State Department, 20 July 1963, Central Files 1963, NATO 3, Box 4229. 94 NATO/CM(64)124, ‘The Situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany’, 3 December 1964. 95 NATO/AC/89-R/54, 5 June 1964; AC/89-R/55, 26 June 1964. 96 TNA/FO 371/182604/4, Smith (FO) to Harpham (Sofia), 14 June 1965. 97 NARA, RG 59, Cleveland to State Department, 22 May and 2 December 1965, Central Files 1964–6, NATO 3, Box 3270; Durbrow to State Department, 31 July 1965, and Cleveland to State Department, 16 September 1965, Central Files 1964–6, NATO 8–2, Box 3273. 98 NATO/CM(65)41, ‘Economic Review of Individual Eastern European Countries: Czechoslovakia’, 3 May 1965; CM(65)42, ‘Poland’, 4 May 1965; CM(65)57, ‘Hungary’, 12 July 1965; CM(65)63, ‘Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany’, 29 July 1965; CM(65)80, ‘Bulgaria’, 7 October 1965; CR(65)24, 26 May 1965, on US views on Poland; CR(65)35, 9 August 1965; CR(65)38, 22 September 1965; CR(65)45, 5 November 1965. The US method of estimating the GNP of the satellites also caused some disagreements in the discussions: see AC/89-R/65, 5 April 1965. 99 NATO/CM(66)6, ‘Albania’, 21 January 1966. 100 NATO/CM(65)88, ‘Economic Review of Eastern European Countries and the SovietOccupied Zone of Germany’, 22 October 1965. 101 Reports ‘The Situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany’, in NATO/CM(65)35, 3 May 1965; CM(65)92, 24 November 1965; CM(66)38, 6 May 1966; CM(66)128, 2 December 1966; CM(67)26, 22 May 1967; CM(67)61, 21 November 1967. See also the economic reports CM(67)1, ‘Czechoslovakia’, 17 January 1967; CM(67)39, ‘Bulgaria’, 6 July 1967; CM(67)45, ‘Soviet Zone of Germany’, 4 August 1967; CM(67)67, ‘Hungary’, 10 November 1967; CM(68)31, ‘Rumania’, 11 July 1968; CM(68)32, ‘Poland’, 11 July 1968. Many notes by the US, Britain and West Germany on Eastern European countries, summer 1966, in AC/89-WP/191 and Ac/89-WP/197; the
US detected signs of disagreements within the Communist regimes over economic policy: AC/89-WP/191, 26 May 1966. See also AC/127-D/243, ‘The Development of Foreign Trade between the Soviet-occupied Zone of Germany and the USSR’, 25 January 1968. 102 NATO/CM(66)41, ‘The Yugoslav Economic Experiment’, 10 May 1966. See also AC/89-D/51(revised), ‘Review of the Yugoslav Experiment’, 15 March 1966. 103 NATO/CM(63)98, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 26 November 1963. 104 NATO/CM(64)29, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 24 April 1964. 105 NATO/CM(64)67, ‘Communist Economic Activities in the Developing Countries’, 7 August 1964. 106 The first strong signs of optimism became apparent in the Committee of Economic Advisers meetings which examined the 1963 report: see TNA/FO 371/172415/54, Potter to Laver, 11 April; FO 371/172419/121, UK delegation, report on NAC meeting, 17 June 1963. 107 NATO/CM(63)39, ‘The Economic Offensive of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in the LessDeveloped Countries’, 31 May 1963; CM(64)67, ‘Communist Economic Activities in the Developing Countries’, 7 August 1964. 108 Reports, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, NATO/CM(65)32, 27 April 1965; CM(65)94, 26 November 1965; CM(66)129, 7 December 1966. See also CM(66)1, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 5 January 1966. See, however, the apparently alarmist British paper to APAG arguing that China was the biggest threat, especially in Africa, in APAG(65)2, ‘Implications of Sino-Soviet Penetration in Black Africa’, 23 February 1965. 109 NATO/APAG(65)4, Note by the US Delegation, 18 March 1965. 110 NATO/CM(66)142, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 20 December 1966. 111 Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 180–94; Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 205–37. 112 Reports, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, NATO/CM(65)32, 27 April 1965; CM(65)94, 26 November 1965; CM(66)129, 7 December 1966; CM(66)1, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 5 January 1966. 113 NATO/CM(66)142, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 20 December 1966. 114 See the reports ‘The Situation in the Far East’, in NATO/CM(65)93, 23 November 1965; CM(66)45, 23 May 1966; CM(66)100, 22 November 1966; CM(67)27, 30 May 1967; CM(67)60, 20 November 1967; CM(68)17, 28 May 1968; CM(68)53, 25 October 1968. 115 NATO/CM(65)40, ‘Annual Political Appraisal’, 24 April 1965. 116 For more on Vietnam-related intra-NATO problems, see among others, Pedaliu, ‘Transatlantic Relations’. 117 NATO/CM(67)65, ‘Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy’, 29 November 1967. 118 Reports, ‘Communist Economic Activities in the Developing Countries’, NATO/CM(65)72, 15 September 1965; CM(67)55, 14 September 1967. On US and French assessment of Chinese potential to aid the Third World, see NATO/PO/65/90 and 154, Brosio to Permanent Representatives, 23 February and 17 March 1965. See also two US papers to the Economic Advisers: AC/89-WP/239, ‘The “Costs” of Soviet Economic Aid to Developing Countries’, 26 January 1968; AC/89-WP/248, Note, 20 March 1968. 119 NATO/CM(64)128, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 2 December 1964; see also TNA/FO 371/177815/46, Nicholls, memorandum on the APAG meeting of 1–4 October 1964.
120 NATO/CM(66)1, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 5 January 1966. A similar optimism regarding the loss of appeal of anti-Western attitudes in the Third World was also expressed by the Political Advisers: CM(65)130, ‘Indefinite Postponement of Second Afro-Asian Conference’, 26 November 1965. 121 NATO/CM(67)38, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 26 June 1967. 122 NATO/AC/127-D/56, 10 October 1960; AC/127-D/67, 15 May 1961; AC/127-D/79, 19 September 1961; AC/127-D/94, 23 February 1962; AC/127-D/97, 7 May 1962; AC/127D/100, 25 June 1962; AC/127-D/109, 15 October 1962; Documents, ‘NATO Countries’ Trade with Communist Countries’, NATO/CM(64)52, 29 June 1964; CM(65)55, 7 July 1965. 123 NATO/CM(62)143, ‘Policy towards East European Satellites’, 28 November 1962. The British noted that the document reproduced their concepts: TNA/FO 371/173378/87, Brief no. 3, ‘The Situation in East Europe’ (ministerial NAC, December 1963). 124 Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, pp. 404–5. 125 See for more, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, ‘Commerce as a British Cold War “Heresy”: the intra-NATO Debate on Trade with the Soviet Bloc, 1962–5’, in John Fisher, Effie Pedaliu and Richard Smith (eds), The Foreign Office, Commerce and British Foreign Policy since 1900, Vol. 2, forthcoming. 126 Hatzivassiliou, ‘Commerce as a British Cold War “Heresy”’. 127 Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: a Crisis of Credibility, 1966– 1967 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Ellison, The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis, p. 97; Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe, p. 191. 128 NATO/CVR(66)23, 24 and 25, 7 and 8 June 1966. 129 NATO/CR(66)28, 28 June 1966. For the NAC discussions of the report, see CR(66)32, 13 July 1966; CR(66)58, 16 November 1966; CR(66)60, 21 November 1966; CR(66)61, 25 November 1966; CR(66)63, 1 December 1966; PO/66/284 and 324, Brosio to Permanent Representatives, 20 June and 8 July 1966. See also the State Department’s guidance to the US delegation, mostly the point that NATO should not be ‘equated’ with the Warsaw Pact, in NARA, RG 59, Ball to Paris, 24 June, 12 and 20 September 1966, Central Files 1964–6, Def 4 NATO, Box 1568. 130 NATO/CM(66)84(final), Brosio, cover letter and Annexes A and B, 28 November 1966. 131 NARA, RG 59, Leddy to Rostow, Background paper, 11 October 1966, Central Files 1964–6, Def 4 NATO, Box 1568. 132 NATO/CM(66)84(final), ‘East/West Relations’, 28 November 1966. 133 On the December 1966 NAC and the road to the Harmel Reports, see Ellison, The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis, pp. 108–16; Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution, pp. 320–74. 134 NARA, RG 59, memorandum Vest to Myerson, 9 August 1966, and Katzenbach to Paris, 31 December 1966, Central Files 1964–6, NATO 3, Box 3271. 135 NARA, RG 59, Cleveland to Rusk, 17 November 1966, Central Files 1964–6, NATO 3, Box 3271. 136 NARA, RG 59, Cleveland to State Department, 14 October 1966, and Record (Brosio– Leddy), 16 November 1966, Central Files 1964–6, NATO 3, Box 3271. 137 NATO/CM(68)6, ‘The Significance of the Increase of Export Credits Granted to Communist Countries’, 26 February 1968.
4 On the road to détente, 1967–9 The Harmel Report, the Prague Spring and the dynamics of the Cold War The Harmel Report and East–West relations Defence and détente By 1966–7 NATO needed a new start. The prospect of détente seemed to be accepted in both East and West, but the alliance was in deep trouble in the aftermath of the French withdrawal, while Vietnam continued to burden intra-NATO relations. Behind all these, there were even bigger questions: What exactly was NATO? Could it survive its twentieth anniversary in 1969? And if it did, what was its role in the fabric of the West and in the new strategies of détente? The answers came with the Harmel Report, which was approved by the NAC in December 1967, together with the application of the flexible response strategy on the military field. The decisions of December 1967 marked a new phase of the alliance’s history, and have been admirably studied. They involved a simultaneous emphasis on the two pillars of defence and détente. The adoption of flexible response was a belated adjustment of NATO to more modern US military strategies, designed – or so it was hoped – to respond to the more complex situations arising in the Cold War. The new doctrine assumed that the Soviets did not want to provoke a global war. This meant that the alliance would have to guard against war by miscalculation, and also to ensure that in case of armed conflict it would have sufficient warning.1 Moreover, strong defence and allied unity were the preconditions for a détente policy, and assured many, including Brosio, who in the past were uncertain about the latter. On the other hand, it is interesting that since 1965,
the Warsaw Pact appeared to view NATO’s adoption of flexible response as a manifestation of a more aggressive Western strategy.2 Mutual suspicion continued to be a major feature of the Cold War even on the road to détente. The search for détente was combined with a renovation of NATO’s structure. The Harmel Report contained the Gaullist challenge by leading to the transformation of NATO into a more participatory alliance. The process started with the proposal of the Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel, for a reconsideration of NATO’s functions and role in the new international climate. This proposal, coming from a small European country, was supported by the Americans, who were eager to strengthen the Atlantic orientation of the Europeans in the face of the Gaullist ‘mutiny’. Thus, the Americans and the British managed to turn the crisis of the French withdrawal into an opportunity, while the process was also welcome to most continental West European statesmen, who wanted to retain NATO and the US guarantee. At the same time, the Harmel Report was a response to the demands of Western public opinion: by the mid-1960s a new post-war generation tended to see the alliance as a conservative and static structure, and the Harmel Report went a long way towards satisfying public demands for security, détente and relaxation of Cold War tensions, thus enhancing NATO’s legitimization.3 Indeed, both Harmel and the Americans referred to the détente policy as a way of making NATO more acceptable to the European Left (or, in American parlance, ‘liberal groups’).4 The Harmel Report involved the very identity of NATO. In the aftermath of the French withdrawal from NATO military command, and as the sub-groups studying the ‘future tasks’ of the alliance had begun their work, APAG also engaged in the search for answers. In June 1967 APAG reported on the ‘problems of balance within the Atlantic Alliance in the 1970s’. The advisory group noted that a problem of internal balance had existed in NATO from its very beginnings, since, in view of the sheer US power, the alliance members were de jure equal, but de facto unequal: ‘A new situation, however, slowly developed, mainly due to economic recovery and
the strengthening of the European partners of the Alliance. For psychological and political reasons the European members of the Alliance are thus no longer satisfied with the state of factual imbalance within the Alliance’. Since de facto equality of power between the US and the Europeans was an unrealistic prospect, APAG urged for the functional improvement of the alliance mechanisms. This required that the European members become more active and develop unity among them. Mostly, they should ‘feel less dependent, or dominated by the overwhelming power of the United States’. Still, APAG refrained from proposing an institutionalized ‘European pillar’ in the alliance. Moreover, a more balanced NATO had additional roles to play: ‘NATO is gradually evolving from a purely defensive organization to a political organ which may have special tasks in improving East/West relations and in contributing to the lessening of tensions in Europe.’5 These were fascinating ideas, facilitating the ongoing process of reorganization of the alliance. However, the APAG discussions of ‘the problems of balance within the Atlantic Alliance in the 1970s’ took place at Portaria, central Greece, from 18 to 21 April 1967, and thus ended on the very day of the military coup which toppled Greek democracy, brought the Colonels’ dictatorship to power and became a major embarrassment for the alliance. In its own way, this pointed to a failure: being taken off-guard, while meeting in a NATO country, on the very day when its army (or, even worse, a group of relatively low-rank army officers) toppled a NATO democracy was hardly the best way to prepare for the NATO of the 1970s. The laconic reference to the coup in the American report of the meeting reveals US embarrassment, and speaks for itself: ‘Although the Greek coup d’etat occurred before the formal conclusion of the APAG program, the substantive discussions had been completed and were thus unaffected by the political crisis’.6 Arguably, the fact that a meeting dealing with such a subject could be seen as ‘unaffected’ by such an event, was itself a bad sign for NATO analysis. The Harmel Report: the West and the Soviet world
This sub-chapter will focus on the aspects of the Harmel Report which involved NATO’s perceptions of its political role, of the Soviet opponent and of détente. Thus, it will mostly discuss the findings of Sub-groups One (East–West relations) and Two (les relations interalliées). These are among the most comprehensive texts of the post-war West. Defence was dealt by Sub-group Three, under the US Under-secretary of State, Foy D. Kohler, while the fourth Subgroup, under the Dutch Professor C. L. Patijn, examined out-of-area issues. The latter was bound to cause discomfort to many memberstates, more so because of Professor Patijn’s rush to put forward a NATO agenda in the Third World. However, the US was, as expected, very interested in this issue, and wanted the sub-group to raise it.7 The appointment of prominent personalities as rapporteurs was strongly supported by the US, in an effort to produce groundbreaking reports.8 It is important to focus on the personalities of the rapporteurs of Sub-groups One and Two. The former was under the direction of the Assistant Under-secretary of the Foreign Office, John Hugh Adam Watson, and of Klaus Schutz of the German Foreign Ministry. Watson was no ordinary diplomat. An analyst of exceptional qualities and a former official of the FO’s Information Research Department (and then Ambassador, among other countries, to Cuba), in 1968 he resigned from the FO to become an academic and one of the founding members of the British school of International Relations. Watson’s opus magnus was a book on the evolution of the ‘international society’, which reflected a specific understanding of international affairs, focusing on their organized structure.9 His contribution to the Harmel Report was essential: he radiated the preference for a structured Western policy, reflecting British pragmatism and experience of international affairs. Moreover, in Sub-group One the other member-states also appointed prominent personalities, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Helmut Sonnenfeldt from the US policy planning apparatus. In his famous book about the Soviet bloc, together with his suspicion about Soviet power, Brzezinski had appeared receptive to ‘forward’ views regarding
relations with Eastern Europe, which was bringing him rather close to (although not to an identical position with) the British. It is perhaps no coincidence that, in the State Department’s allocation of duties, Brzezinski was scheduled to work with Watson, and Sonnenfeldt with Schutz.10 By now, Brzezinski was also the US representative in APAG meetings. Despite the recent Anglo-American disagreement over credits to the Soviet bloc, it became possible for Watson to work with his American colleagues. US aims regarding Sub-group One were clear but flexible: the Americans wanted to strengthen allied unity in dealing with the East, noting that ‘[t]his does not mean rigid political alliance front toward East but rather a broadly attuned approach’. They also needed to recognize German sensitivities regarding the German question – hence the presence of a German rapporteur.11 During the meetings of the sub-group, but also in his correspondence with Kohler, Watson was careful to show that his views were compatible with American aims. The British accepted the notion of a loose coordination of Western policies, and the Americans were reassured about British ‘unilateralism’ towards Eastern Europe, which had embarrassed them in 1963–4.12 The resulting document embodied both the necessary respect for German sensitivities, as well as an Anglo-American convergence on détente and East–West trade. The rapporteur of Sub-group Two was a presence of pivotal importance in the debate for the future of NATO and of the Atlantic community. Paul-Henri Spaak effectively offset de Gaulle’s vision for Europe. He represented the huge part of Western European opinion which did not question the notion of the Atlantic community. De Gaulle was one of the greatest statesmen of the post-war world, the leader of a great power. However, in European integration, Spaak was a greater figure than the General. One of the ‘fathers of Europe’, a founder of the EEC, an outspoken exponent of European supranationalism (which de Gaulle rejected), he strongly stressed that Atlanticism and Europeanism were compatible and complementary, not antagonistic, options. No one could suggest that
Spaak, as a supporter of NATO, cared for Europe ‘less’ than de Gaulle. As Secretary-General of NATO, Spaak had been tormented by de Gaulle in 1958–61. In the mid-1960s, impatient at the French leader’s policies, he even suggested proposing an immediate reorganization of NATO and had to be restrained by the Americans, who did not want an open break with the French leader.13 Now, having just withdrawn from the Belgian political scene,14 he came forward as the embodiment of the ‘other alternative’ for Europe. In 1966, even as his party was moving to the opposition benches in Belgium, he swiftly rose to confront the French President’s withdrawal from NATO military command and to defend the alliance. Thus, even before the French note of withdrawal, Spaak told the Americans that the ‘fourteen’ should wait for de Gaulle to make his move and then immediately confront him with action in a ‘unified front’.15 Immediately after the official notification of French withdrawal, in a public speech, Spaak defended NATO, in the words of the Americans, ‘outspokenly’.16 He then indicated his readiness to serve in a high-level committee to help NATO, and continued his public interventions in favour of the alliance in the following months.17 Nor was Spaak alone in European opinion. In an impressive gesture, the leading French analyst Raymond Aron (a person who had come to NATO’s defence in previous instances as well) now published in Le Figaro a strong article criticizing de Gaulle and defending NATO’s role.18 Despite the discomfort of some member-states for his tendency to dominate the Harmel process,19 and although the Americans had to step in to discourage his idea of producing a single report rather than four separate ones,20 Spaak was more representative of the European intellectual mainstream than the French President. It is indicative that, during the drafting process, the French reacted against Spaak’s report, which he did not change but merely rephrased.21 Thus, Spaak’s report, dealing with the ‘soul’ of NATO during a difficult moment, needs to be examined first.
Spaak pointed to NATO’s role as an instrument of legitimization of a Western world based on institutionalization and interdependence. He noted that NATO had succeeded in containing the immediate Soviet threat in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This threat was not strictly military: NATO had been created to defend both territory and values. According to the preamble of the 1949 Washington Treaty, the founding members aimed to ‘sauvegarder la liberté de leurs peuples, leur héritage commun et leurs civilisations fondées sur les principes de la démocratie, les libertés individuelles et le régime du droit’. However, the former Secretary-General continued, the evolution of NATO had been dominated from the start by the need to meet the military threat. As a result, political consultation had been neglected, despite the recommendations of the Three Wise Men in 1956, which he quoted extensively. Still, even by the late 1960s, ‘chacun des pays de l’Alliance, exception faite pour les Etats-Unis, est incapable d’assurer sa défense s’il reste livré à ses propres forces’. Spaak expressed strong fears about Soviet aims: Soviet means were now more indirect (political, economic, cultural), and thus the threat still existed, albeit in different forms. Thus the alliance needed to respond to the prospect of détente, but also to ‘justify’ itself on levels additional to military realities, even on a long-term basis. Allied unity and coordination, including continuing cooperation with the US and Canada, were of prime importance. In this respect, Spaak stressed a point of catalytic importance: ‘C’est au sein de l’Alliance atlantique que les pays d’Europe peuvent espérer influencer la politique des Etats-Unis’. Spaak did not feel that the US was imposing policy on the Europeans in questions involving the NATO area. As for US unilateralism in out-of-area issues, he noted that the Europeans had only themselves to blame for their feebleness and timidity. He believed that this could be remedied by the union of Europe and by the strengthening of the EEC through British accession: this would allow Europe to become a real partner for the US. In other words, he suggested that even a united and strong Europe would remain part of the Atlantic community; it would not become a ‘middle-of-the-road’ option between East and West.22
Spaak made a strong point about the necessity of NATO, and he had the prestige and the authority to do so. Sub-group One, under Watson and Schutz, stressed that, apart from defence, the common aim of allied policy was to ‘develop plans and methods for eliminating the present unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe (which are not of our choosing) including the division of Germany’. This also involved an effort to ‘promote easier movement and intercourse between the countries of Europe’. These could not be attained through tension. Thus, the achievement of NATO’s aims required détente, which however should be pursued – and here the tradition of British pragmatism became more than evident – ‘by means of a persuasive, patient and undramatic policy’. The sub-group envisaged a European settlement, not merely coexistence. In fact, the document effectively described some of the basic principles which would, some years later, become dominant in the Helsinki process. The rapporteurs discussed Soviet motives in seeking détente: The economic practices followed by the East, although effective in the early stages of industrialization, are showing themselves inadequate to meet the needs of a more complex and technological economy; and several East European states have begun to understand that the further development they seek requires them to specialize. Since on the whole the best markets, technology and sources of supply are not within the communist grouping, increased exchanges with the West are likely to result.23 The rapporteurs noted that the Soviets still aimed to split the Atlantic alliance, and therefore the relaxation of tensions would be ‘a fluctuating process’ which would require much time. In such a climate of insecurity and evolution, NATO ‘remains an irreplaceable guarantor of security in Western Europe’, and the continuing cooperation between its North American and European members was an existential need:
The European members of the Alliance are not in a position to maintain their freedom and independence alone in face of the presence and power of the Soviet Union in its present manifestations; and a corresponding North American presence thus remains as necessary as when the Alliance was founded, in order to preserve the freedom of its European members. This contribution must not be limited to defence and deterrence: active North American participation is equally necessary in the process of utilizing the détente for achieving a peaceful order in Europe. Moreover, any general European settlement and security system, once achieved, will require the continuing support and cooperation of the United States. Therefore the participation of the United States and of Canada is of vital importance, both in working towards a new peaceful order in Europe, and in maintaining it afterwards.24 Together with the dual aim of détente and defence, Sub-group One stressed a third element, namely NATO solidarity towards West Germany: the division of Germany and Europe were ‘indissolubly’ connected. Thus, the NATO allies should extend the widest possible support to Bonn and avoid anything which could imply recognition of the GDR. On its part, Bonn should continue its effort to lower tensions with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Relations with the ‘Zone’ was an internal matter of West Germany: it was for Bonn to decide how it would integrate the East Germans in détente, and ‘there are not two German states’. On the other hand, a European settlement had to secure the acceptance and cooperation of the Soviet Union: our policy should therefore be not to set Eastern Europe against the Soviet Union but rather to involve both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in more constructive forms of cooperation which will be of greater advantage to both sides than the present confrontation.
The report also discussed the means that the West could employ in pursuing this settlement: bilateral contacts were important, but the NATO members should avoid giving opportunities to the Soviet bloc to play one Western country against the other. Multilateralism would play an increasingly important role, and thus allied unity would prove even more crucial. The sub-group stressed the importance of economic and cultural relations in ‘breaking down communist rigidity’ and affecting the ‘artificially isolated societies of the East’. However, these contacts would not ‘by themselves be sufficient to bring about a just and lasting settlement’. This would require political initiatives, including possibly a European conference, in which it was imperative that the US would participate.25 The report of Sub-group One was the most comprehensive NATO document on detente as an alliance strategy. This issue had troubled the alliance, but the report provided for widely acceptable answers regarding a process which was envisaged as long and difficult. On the other hand, the Americans, in a document which they circulated to the four rapporteurs in their final meeting of October 1967 in Ditchley Park, noted that Sub-group One had used careful language, but had once more reached agreement on principles. ‘The report masks, however, some very important differences of view and emphasis among the Allies’. The US document went on to mention Greek and Turkish discomfort with the détente concept, the German insistence that four-power responsibility for the German problem be maintained, and the fact that Britain was ‘more interested in pursuing new initiatives for negotiations with the East than in looking at the hard issues’ – a remnant of the Anglo-American disagreements about trade with the Soviet bloc in 1963–4.26 Thus, the Americans made clear that they were conscious of the limitations of the report. More importantly, the limits of the new strategy would become apparent only in the long term, mostly in the second half of the 1970s. Sub-group One stressed that ‘we must also ensure that a multilateral approach to a European settlement does not perpetuate the existing division in Europe or allow it to crystallise on its present lines’. However, it arguably was impossible to work with the Soviets
for a ‘settlement’ which would not crystallize the division of Europe. Still, in late 1967 NATO could only be content with the new levels of consensus reached through the Harmel Report. A major criterion for success in these things is whether they work in their given context. The Harmel Report did. Expanding the notions, 1968 The famous Reykjavik Signal of mid-1968, involving a NATO offer to negotiate with the Soviet bloc on troop reductions in Europe, has been extensively studied in available bibliography, and is correctly considered as an important manifestation of the new NATO strategy.27 Some of the fundamental political assumptions of this strategy also became clear in two APAG reports in 1968. These showed that the Western decision to pursue détente was based on a strong sense of Western preponderance on crucial levels: the economy, technology, political and social legitimization, and adaptability. In the first report, the Soviet leadership was described as ‘much more inward-looking, narrowly bureaucratic and ideologically perhaps more conservative than that of the Khrushchev era’. The NATO experts noted the increasing Soviet military and political capabilities to intervene globally (through the development of naval and airborne forces), but also stressed that the Soviet leaders appeared ‘cautious and hesitant in making moves in the field of foreign policy, and are reluctant to undertake any new extension of Soviet commitments’. These were interpreted as the reflection of a series of Soviet dilemmas, involving politics, ideology and the economy: In the longer term, the Soviet Union may be faced with an embarrassing internal dilemma. There is clear evidence that the gap between the present rigid and somewhat petrified political system and the developing Soviet society is widening and will continue to do so. Tensions will thus inevitably arise. Concomitants are a disaffected intelligentsia, restlessness of the nationalities
and the growing gap between generations. The Party is essentially in search for a rôle for itself, and has the uncomfortable feeling that the country is no longer moving completely in step with history. Externally, the Soviets become more and more aware of the considerable technological gap between themselves and the West. The current gap will widen in the future. Détente, APAG insisted, could speed things up in Eastern Europe, even if the local leaders aimed to resist change. Liberalization might even be speedier in the satellites than in the Soviet Union, thus creating a gap between the two components of the Soviet bloc. Détente could be promoted both on the bilateral and multilateral levels, including discussions on European security, and the new West German policy in Eastern Europe. It was stressed that a West German recognition of the Oder-Neisse line could further the process. The deepening Sino-Soviet split was seen as ‘a precondition, in the development of Eastern Europe towards greater independence’, and this also advocated in favour of a détente policy. Last but not least, APAG once more underlined the need for NATO unity, which was always regarded as a prerequisite of a détente policy: While there might, of course, be advantage in Western multiplicity of approach to the Soviets, the inherent danger should be avoided of stimulating Soviet belief in the possibility of splitting the West.28 Similar conclusions were included in the next APAG report of June 1968. The new meeting focused on European security at the insistence of the Europeans and the Canadians; the Americans wanted to discuss Asia. However, the US representatives were impressed by the extent of European agreement with their own ideas on concerted but small steps towards détente.29 Apart from the need for Western vigilance, it was stressed that any system of European security should take into account ‘the existing and developing political and especially ideological situation’. The process
of creating a new European security system would follow three phases: the first would involve ‘increasing contacts and striving for more confidence, which is the phase in which Europe finds itself at present’. The second would include negotiations for security measures, including arms control. In the third phase a new security arrangement could be reached, which might include the replacement of ‘existing alliances’. APAG took great care to stress that this could only be done by taking into account all factors, for example the increasing Soviet naval capabilities which pointed to the Kremlin’s ambition to play a more active global role: ‘Confrontation in Europe is thus clearly linked to the problem of global confrontation’. Still, Western public opinion should remain prudent and avoid being ‘deluded into thinking that the search for security was the same thing as being in possession of it’.30 Yet, the experts probably did not realize how soon NATO would pass through a further test. NATO analysis and the Prague Spring Identifying NATO’s problems The hope to encourage emancipation of the Eastern European countries from Moscow was one of NATO’s incentives for embracing détente. In spring 1968, the NATO Political Committee held a special session, with the participation of national experts, to discuss the evolution of intra-Communist relations and of the Warsaw Pact. The Committee noted the trend in Eastern Europe for greater diversity, and argued that NATO should intensify its efforts to encourage this.31 In May, at British suggestion, the expert working groups on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe held a joint meeting.32 A further higher-level meeting of experts was scheduled for midSeptember.33 Czechoslovakia and the GDR were the most advanced satellites economically and socially. An industrial society entailed high levels of social diversification, and a greater potential for reform and dissent. Obviously, this was an impossible hypothesis in the East
German regime, but Prague was a different case. Although belated in its reforms, Czechoslovakia was geographically adjacent to Western Europe and had a historical legacy of belonging to the West. Prague applied a policy of decentralization even under the Novotny regime, although the economic results were less impressive than expected.34 As an advanced economy, it emerged in 1968 as the NATO analysts’ best model of liberalization in the Soviet empire.35 The replacement of the Novotny regime by the team under Alexander Dubcek and the acceleration of the process of reform (the ‘Prague Spring’) led to the Warsaw Pact invasion of August 1968. The Soviet invasion and NATO’s reactions have been thoroughly studied.36 The Western powers kept hoping that the Soviets would not invade. Apart from expressing their wish that an invasion would be averted (and putting forward vague remarks about a possible adverse effect on East–West negotiations), the NATO powers did little during the crisis. On the other hand, it is difficult to see what NATO could have done: military intervention in a Warsaw Pact country was a doomsday scenario, and the Bundeswehr took great care to transfer its manoeuvres away from the Czechoslovak border. An attempt to intervene diplomatically could provide little tangible help to the Czechs. At least, in the Czechoslovak case, the Western powers avoided the infamy of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, when Radio Free Europe had contributed in inciting a revolt which the West could not aid. Anyway, by 1968 NATO’s internal reorganization was under way, and the new defence doctrine had not been fully implemented; the US was committed in Vietnam and a presidential election was imminent; there was discussion about reductions of NATO forces, widespread student turmoil had broken out in the West, and France went through the vast crisis of May 1968 which raised the spectre of internal destabilization. This was hardly the context for an active policy. For NATO, the challenge of the Czechoslovak crisis did not involve the scenario of Western action, which was anyway out of the question. NATO responses covered two fields: operational questions
and interpretation. These also involved the possibility of a Soviet invasion of the West under the cover of the Czechoslovak operation. We now know that during the invasion the Soviets had adopted a profoundly ‘defensive’ posture towards the West, and that their priority was to control the situation within Czechoslovakia.37 However, a defensive alliance such as NATO could not ignore the unfolding of such a major military operation by the strongest conventional army of the globe, so close to its borders. The crisis occurred in summer, when the alliance machinery was in a rather inactive state. Brosio himself was absent in an initial stage, and the relevant deliberations were made by the Acting Secretary-General, James A. Roberts. In early August, the SACEUR, General Lyman Lemnitzer, expressed his concern to the NAC that ‘the present situation provides an ideal cover for preparatory actions against the Central Region’.38 In subsequent weeks, the NATO Political Committee submitted to the NAC regular ‘political assessments’ on Soviet military movements. These benefited greatly from the ‘weekly political notes’ which the State Department was submitting since January 1968 to the new NATO Situation Centre.39 The Political Committee did not believe that a Soviet invasion of the West was imminent, and by early September reported that there was little danger of a spillover in other countries of Eastern Europe. However, it also noted the fears expressed in Romania or Yugoslavia.40 This close monitoring of the situation in Eastern Europe lasted until early 1969. The alliance also evaluated its own crisis management. This was crucial in the nexus of ‘defence and détente’ which NATO had decided to pursue. Especially in the context of a flexible response military doctrine, as the one NATO had adopted in 1967, it was imperative to make sure that the alliance would have sufficient advance warning and would not be taken by surprise. The Secretariat initiated this evaluation by 29 August.41 The problem assumed larger proportions because, predictably, many European NATO members, especially West Germany, were alarmed at the
speed of the Soviet operation, and were afraid that a Soviet invasion of Western Europe would unfold too quickly for NATO to have real strategic warning and to move military units from the US and Britain to the European battlefields. In this context, European NATO might consider defence as a lost cause and might refuse to make the needed defence effort, also required by the Harmel Report.42 Thus, these NATO evaluations were important to assure the allies that their fears were unsubstantiated. It is notable that the French, despite their withdrawal from the military command, took an active part in these discussions. The Council Operations and the Exercise Coordination Working Group studied this aspect and concluded that the overall response of the NATO machinery was adequate, although there was room for improvement. The working group noted that in the first phase of the crisis (January–August), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) had accurately assessed that an invasion of Czechoslovakia was probable, and that the Soviets would not use the crisis as a pretext to launch an attack in the Central Region. During the second phase (the events of 21 August), the picture was less satisfactory: three NATO governments had been warned about the invasion by the Soviet Ambassadors accredited in their capitals, but failed to inform NATO Headquarters, which learned the news from a Prague radio broadcast at 02.00 Brussels time. The only wire service teleprinter available at the new Situation Centre had been out of order. Yet, even this was irrelevant, because the competent officer, in accordance with the Standard Operations Procedures, had retired from his post at 01.20. After the first shock, during the third (post-invasion) phase, inputs from the national delegations increased sevenfold, but now assimilation of information became very difficult. It was stressed that the practice of disseminating all available information should continue (with some adjustments) because it offered to the smaller members guidelines to evaluate the situation. The NATO-wide Communications System had worked satisfactorily. The recommendations of the working group included, among others, the improvement of exchange of intelligence (‘in view of the
Organization’s inherent lack of an intelligence collection capability’) and of the dissemination of data, the automatization of the communications system, provision for continuous watch in the Situation Centre and requests which may today be considered trivial, such as ‘the acquisition of a high speed large volume Xerox machine for use in the Situation Centre’. In general, however, the working group noted the ‘increased effectiveness of the Alliance’s consultation machinery’.43 Thus, fears of an unpleasant ‘surprise’ were allayed. More important, however, was the problem of the origins and consequences of the crisis. What was the significance of the Soviet decision to invade? Did it mean that détente was impossible? These should be seen in connection with US and, to a lesser extent, British attitudes. Although they had started deliberations with the Soviets on strategic arms control, and had notified their allies that they would not resort to economic sanctions or ‘return to cold war measures’, the Americans considered calling an extraordinary NATO ministerial NAC or a Defence Ministers meeting. However, this proposal was not well received in NATO: in the NAC it was mostly the Belgian de Staercke who agreed, while the other Permanent Representatives argued that a spectacular meeting should provide spectacular results; in their absence (and it was impossible for NATO ‘to rescue Eastern European countries’), doubt about the value of Western institutions would be fuelled.44 On their part, the British, from the very start, moved along the lines of the declaration of Prime Minister Harold Wilson, that ‘détente must continue to be as important an objective for the West as defence’; the British preferred NATO to avoid moves ‘in the heat of the moment’. At their suggestion, the December ministerial NAC was moved to November, a formula which provided for a middle-of-the-way solution, and was accepted by the US and the other allies.45 The Americans also asked for contingency studies for areas which could be threatened by the Soviets (such as Austria, Romania, Yugoslavia). At the same time, the Americans were satisfied to note that the invasion had reinvigorated the alliance, since the members instinctively drew
together.46 Notably, even the French asked for consultations with the US on the Eastern European crisis.47 The NATO analyses of the crisis clearly showed its preference for détente. Reporting on the motives behind the Soviet invasion, the Council in Permanent Session – the NAC itself – referred to the multiplicity of Soviet motives: ideological, involving the monopoly of party power; political, since the Kremlin evidently had detected ‘a mortal threat to the coherence of the Soviet political system in Central Europe and thus to the European status quo’; security, including the need to safeguard the unity of the Warsaw Pact; economic, involving Dubcek’s policy of ‘escaping from overwhelming dependence on the Soviet-dominated COMECON system’, and of turning towards foreign investment and world markets. However, the most important motive was considered to be the danger of ‘contagion’ to other satellites, even the Ukraine. The Council concluded that the main motive for the invasion was ‘a defensive concern about a process of erosion of the political, economic and military integrity of the Warsaw Pact and socialist bloc, including adverse effects of this process within the USSR itself’. However, ‘the Soviets by this very action have created a new situation with profound implications for themselves and for the Alliance’.48 Notably, the initial draft of this report (by the Political Committee under J. Jaenicke) attracted some criticism by the British, who thought that it was ‘rather superficial’. Yet, the FCO understood the pressures of time in preparing the report, and commented: ‘Fifteennation drafting is always difficult and has been particularly so on this occasion’.49 This assessment about Soviet motives was repeated in the conclusions of the alliance working groups. Thus, the expert working group under W. Newton, reporting in November on Soviet bloc ‘trends’, pointed to the fundamentally defensive and ‘conservative’ posture of the Soviets. Indeed, in this document the employment of the term ‘conservatives’ to describe the Kremlin leaders became much more pronounced and political.50 On another level, the
economic experts, under A. Vincent, noted that the economic policies of Czechoslovakia included some salient features to which the Soviets objected. Thus, the reformist ‘Action Programme’ of the Czechoslovak Communist Party aimed to apply strictly economic criteria in policy-making (including the selection of managers for their technical competence rather than their political loyalties), lessening party domination of economic affairs. The Economic Advisers estimated that the Soviets saw this as the start of capitalist penetration of a communist economy, as an overture for a Czechoslovak turn to the West for financial support, and as a major danger of ‘contamination’ of the other satellites.51 Thus, NATO studies insisted that the motives of the Soviet bloc were clearly defensive: however unacceptable in moral and political terms, the invasion seemed to pose no immediate threat of general war. The other major question involved the prospects for East–West relations. Taking the lead, the Council in Permanent Session remarked that the invasion had not solved the fundamental Soviet problem in Eastern Europe. Indeed, it probably had intensified Soviet challenges in the long term, and ‘[t]he gap between rulers and ruled in the Eastern Europe satellites has increased’. However, in the short term ‘the Soviet Union, by its occupation of Czechoslovakia, has tightened its grip in Eastern Europe and reduced the prospects for disintegration or polycentrism in the Warsaw Pact area’. This was very important for NATO, since one of the alliance’s motives for moving on to détente was exactly to encourage such trends in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the Council pointed to additional implications: Moscow would now have to be much more concerned about internal security in its bloc, and would probably be less confident regarding the reliability of the satellite armies. Last but not least, the Council pointed to the dissatisfaction of Western Communist parties and to the damage done to Moscow in international public opinion. Regarding the implications for NATO, the Council expressed strong fears that the Soviets could be led to believe that violence pays off. The Council did not raise the spectre of a threat against NATO itself, but discussed the possibility of Soviet
pressures or use of force against Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania or even Austria. Stressing the usual point that the crisis had ‘emphasized the need for solidarity in the Alliance’ and that ‘the pursuit of détente must not be allowed to split the Alliance’, the Permanent Representatives noted that the invasion signified a serious setback for détente. However, they also concluded that ‘there is no need to re-define the two fundamental goals of defence and détente as set forth in the Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance’.52 This fundamental conclusion was identical to the findings of the alliance working groups. The Economic Advisers predicted that the Soviets would be more reluctant to allow their allies to engage in economic dealings with the West, but also insisted that Western trade and credits had stimulated the need for reform in the satellites, and thus the Western policy of détente should continue.53 The ‘trends’ report noted that the invasion had ‘seriously checked’ the movement towards reform and the assertion of national independence in the satellites. The expert working group predicted that the Soviet leadership would turn to more ‘conservative’ attitudes both on the political, cultural and the economic sphere – especially since the 1965 Soviet economic reforms had not produced the desired results. As for the international policy of the bloc, consolidation in Eastern Europe was seen as the main aim of the Kremlin, including the strengthening of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. The expert working group expressed fears about Soviet pressures against Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania, Finland and Austria. The experts placed their emphasis on the ‘doctrine of the Socialist Commonwealth’ (the Brezhnev doctrine), noting that the Kremlin had been rather vague about its geographical application. They thus posed a crucial question: even if the invasion was a defensive move, what did the Soviets consider as ‘defensive’? Would an intervention in Yugoslavia, Albania or even China fall outside this concept? The experts differentiated between the (rather improbable) danger of Soviet invasion of the West, and the
possibility of a new adventure in Eastern Europe. However, they appeared calm: There is no sign that Soviet foreign policy has abandoned its traditional and basic feature of avoiding incalculable risks. Nevertheless […], a disturbing element of uncertainty must remain […]. While the invasion created widespread and natural alarm and opened up new fields of uncertainty, it has not marked any fundamentally new orientation of Soviet policy towards the West in an aggressive or adventurous sense.54 The November 1968 ministerial session of the NAC was presided over by Willy Brandt. The NATO statesmen concluded that there was no immediate threat of a Soviet invasion of NATO territory. Both Brandt and the British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, took the lead in stressing that the restrictions to contacts with the Soviet bloc would have to be relaxed sooner or later. The NAC issued a communiqué referring to the ‘grave uncertainty’ of the situation which had arisen after the invasion. The Ministers pointed to the new Brezhnev doctrine, which allowed for interventions in other communist countries and led to fears about possible Soviet action in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. At the same time, attention was also paid to the defence effort, which satisfied the Americans.55 Perhaps, American satisfaction on the defence level played a role in the US decision, in December 1968, to resume high-visibility contacts with the Soviets. In the relevant US documents, it was stated that the decision had stemmed both from the appreciation of US interests, but also following NATO consultations.56 In January 1969 the British also notified the NAC that they would resume contacts on the ministerial level.57 Yet, as the British Permanent Representative, Sir Bernard Burrows, noted to the FO, it was impossible both to stop détente, and to continue pursuing it as if the Czech crisis had not happened: more analysis was needed.58
Contingency studies after the invasion By late 1968 the NATO analysts were confident that there was no military threat to the West, but they were less certain regarding Soviet intentions in the Soviet bloc or in the European and the Mediterranean ‘grey zones’ of the Cold War. Recent scholarship notes that there is no evidence of a Soviet plan to attack Romania,59 and with hindsight, it is possible to argue that these were excessive Western fears. On the other hand, as a defensive alliance, NATO could not ignore such scenarios. Contingency planning is a sign of effectiveness in a defensive structure, provided that it does not ‘construct’ non-existent dangers which lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. The question of possible Soviet action in Eastern Europe (Yugoslavia, Romania, Albania, Austria and Finland) was studied by the Senior Political Committee at the request of the NAC. The Economic Advisers also undertook special studies on the economic vulnerability of Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania.60 From the start, it had been decided that the process would not cover East Germany. Apart from expected West German sensitivities, there were additional problems which the British Representative, Burrows, stressed: this was not a regime likely to engage in liberalization; the Soviets would not have to invade, since they already had troops there; and a study would raise difficult questions about the role and special responsibilities of the US, Britain and France in the German question.61 Still, studying contingencies in the periphery of Europe was one of the very rare occasions when NATO dealt with such ‘grey areas’ of the Cold War (additionally, regions outside the treaty area) in terms of a probable war crisis. As Burrows remarked: Here again we have a narrow course to steer between a fullfledged NATO commitment, which is presumably impossible, and a revelation of disinterest which could encourage what we are hoping to prevent.62
NATO out-of-area contingency planning was natural to spark reactions by some members, and to raise difficult problems. The British undertook to write the text referring to the threat, in order to prevent endless discussion by the more reserved members – to whom the FCO referred, demeaningly, as ‘the weaker sisters of NATO’. On the other hand, the US itself had misgivings as to whether military action in these areas should be planned by NATO. The British preferred that the NATO reports cover the nature of the threat, and probable preventive measures, although the examination of alternatives in case deterrence failed, should be the subject of deliberations outside the Council. This was accepted, and as the British delegation reported to the FCO, ‘[t]he voices of the timorous were scarcely raised at all’.63 Contingency studies reached a climax in late March 1969, when Joachim Jaenicke, the head of the Senior Political Committee, presented a document covering all cases. Although today the balance of opinion is that the Brezhnev doctrine said little new (it merely used more direct wording),64 this was not the assumption of the NATO authorities. The Political Committee (based on the British draft) repeated that, despite Soviet aggressive language against West Germany, there was no threat of a Warsaw Pact invasion of NATO. However, the ‘apparently successful’ use of force in Czechoslovakia could tempt the Kremlin to think that violence pays off. The Political Committee insisted that the Brezhnev doctrine had severely complicated the strategic situation. The notion of ‘Socialist Commonwealth’ was an old concept in Soviet discourse, but it was now being projected in new terms, aiming to legitimize both the idea of limited sovereignty of these countries, and the possibility of Soviet armed intervention in them. The area which the doctrine covered was ill-defined: as things stood, NATO had to assume that the doctrine was applicable even for countries such as Yugoslavia, Albania and even China. Moreover, the political criteria for implementing the doctrine were also vague: what was, according to Soviet perceptions, a ‘socialist state’? Apart from the clear case of a Warsaw Pact country defecting from the bloc, or China (where the
doctrine apparently could not be applied simply because an invasion of the country was impossible), there were the cases of smaller European countries, where the attitude of the West could also play a role in deterring Soviet armed action.65 The Political Committee examined three Balkan countries: Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania (the report on their economic ‘vulnerability’ had been submitted to the NAC). Romania differed from Czechoslovakia: ‘the Rumanian leaders are innocent of the cardinal sin of “revisionism”, but guilty of the cardinal sin of “nationalism”’. However, the experts pointed out that the position of Romania, its rigidly ‘orthodox’ internal regime and the possible political cost of a new military operation, made an invasion improbable. Anyway, a Soviet move would not alter the balance of forces in Europe, and would not entail the expansion of Soviet control beyond the Warsaw Pact area. Yugoslavia was a special case: although it was seen by the Soviets as a country of the ‘socialist camp’ which had gone renegade, Soviet pressures in the past had proved ineffective, and Belgrade’s leadership of the nonaligned was a strong deterrent. Furthermore, the conquest of the mountainous Yugoslav interior would be a difficult operation, and the reaction of the West would be strong, exactly because a Soviet operation there would have serious repercussions in the Mediterranean and in NATO’s Southern Flank. Thus, the Political Committee envisaged a strong deterrent role for the West in the Yugoslav case, through ‘timely and appropriate preventive diplomacy’. The use of force was not mentioned. Moreover, subsequently the visit of Andrei Gromyko to Yugoslavia in September 1969 led to the reaffirmation of the principle of noninterference in bilateral relations and led to a relative relaxation regarding Soviet intentions towards this country. Last but not least, Albania did not constitute a serious challenge for Soviet policy: the Soviets feared reform in Eastern Europe, not an Albanian-style return to Stalinist rigidity.66 There was little prospect that the Kremlin would cause trouble in the Mediterranean. Although the Soviets supplied many Arab states
with arms, the Political Committee regarded it improbable that they would incite their Middle Eastern partners to further conflict. The experts turned their attention to the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, which complicated the tasks of the NATO forces in the area and increased political and military options for the Kremlin. As regards Central and Northern Europe – the neutral countries of Austria and Finland – the committee stressed that since neither was a ‘socialist country’ the doctrine could not be applicable to them, while the cost of a military operation in terms of world public opinion would be excessively high. Furthermore, the US, Britain and France were signatories to the Austrian State Treaty and thus a Soviet operation there could spark their reaction.67 Thus, the invasion of Czechoslovakia shook NATO and raised fears about Soviet intentions. However, NATO had no capability to intervene in, or to influence, a crisis involving a Warsaw Pact country, without opening the door to a Third World War scenario. According to the NATO analysts, it soon became clear that Moscow intended ‘merely’ to restore its control in its own alliance, not to expand. Although the invasion was unacceptable morally and politically, it was not interpreted as constituting a reason to change NATO’s détente policy. It remains for scholars to judge how far this attitude was ‘cynical’, or ‘prudent’. It probably was both. Planning for détente: prospects of East–West relations, 1968–9 Reaffirming the détente strategy Early in 1969, a new administration took over in Washington. If the Harmel Report had projected a clear view of détente as a Western strategy, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger elevated the notion to levels of unforeseen elaboration.68 Nixon and Kissinger knew that they would carry their NATO allies with them in their new policy. More importantly, they based their decisions on the assumption that the Soviet Union acted as a world power rather than as a centre of a
world revolution – namely that the Kremlin would behave ‘rationally/realistically’ in global affairs.69 Moreover, Kissinger had since 1965, in his book on the Western alliance, argued for a more participatory NATO, which would recognize the European post-war ascent, and would be able to adapt and evolve from a ‘defensive concept’ to a ‘political arrangement’.70 This, of course, had already been done, to a large extent, through the Harmel Report. However, the new US administration would bring its own thinking in the process and would provide for a notable elaboration of the new strategy. The advent of the Nixon–Kissinger détente strategy suited NATO. Indeed, the West’s incentives for détente were vividly confirmed in December 1968, in a study of the Economic Advisers comparing the economic situation in East and West as it appeared at the end of 1967. This confirmed that the West’s lead had been maintained. By the end of 1967 the Soviet Union and the satellites accounted for 10 per cent of the world’s population and for 19 per cent of the world output in terms of GNP. The figures for the NATO countries were 15 per cent of the world population, and an impressive 51 per cent of the world output. The GNP of NATO Europe alone was equal to the total output of the Soviet bloc, and the GNP of the Six EEC members matched that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet GNP was less than half of the American, and living standards much lower than in the West. More importantly, the Economic Advisers pointed to evidence that the Soviet lead inside the Communist world was much less clear compared to the US lead in the West: the Soviet GNP was 74 per cent of the total of the Warsaw Pact countries, but in terms of income per head the Soviet Union lagged behind Czechoslovakia and the GDR; the US GNP was 60 per cent of the NATO total, but income per head in the US was 1.8 times higher than that of the most advanced Western European countries.71 The Economic Advisers noted that agricultural production in 1966– 7 had improved the Soviet bloc countries’ overall performance, while industrial growth continued to be higher than in the West, and the cost from the invasion of Czechoslovakia could be absorbed easily.
However, the increasingly complex character of the Soviet bloc economies and the slowing down of growth had forced them to accept a degree of reform. The experts divided the Soviet bloc countries into two major categories: the ‘orthodox conservative’, aiming at ‘streamlining the existing system’ (USSR, GDR, Poland and Romania), and the more liberal, accepting some market elements (Czechoslovakia, Hungary and, surprisingly, Bulgaria). However, reform would be a long-term process, and the introduction of market elements in planned economies could be accompanied by challenges, such as inflation and social unrest. As for the foreign trade of the bloc, it had expanded in the same proportion as world trade, and had trebled between 1956 and 1967. The Soviet Union possessed enormous natural resources, and was less dependent on foreign trade, ‘but the small Communist states are’. The latter were increasingly interested in capital equipment from the West, and there had even been signs that Moscow feared that its satellites would become dependent on the capitalist countries. In the aftermath of the Czechoslovak crisis, it was expected that the Kremlin would insist on its full control through COMECON. This, however, could spark resistance not only from the usual suspect, Romania, but also from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.72 In other words, the Soviet bloc was described as economically strong but in trouble, and this seemed to confirm the advisability of a détente policy by the West. In view of these conclusions, the Economic Advisers took a special interest in the COMECON meetings of January 1969 in East Berlin (celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the Organization) and April 1969 in Moscow. Stressing the existence of many internal disagreements within the Soviet bloc, the Economic Advisers noted that the East Berlin meeting had not discussed integration, although the show of COMECON unity in Moscow satisfied the Kremlin. However, in both meetings it became apparent that this organization could not solve the economic problems of the Soviet bloc.73 At the same time, the Economic Advisers noted the increase of trade between NATO and Eastern European countries: NATO countries’ credits of over five years now were more than half of the total.74
At the same time, the NATO working groups were taking a special interest in the defence expenditures of the Soviet bloc countries. These studies confirmed that the military burden was greater for the Soviet bloc economies than the Western ones. However, Soviet defence spending was not regarded as a danger for the bloc’s stability. In 1969 the Americans noted that military competition with the West retarded Soviet growth, and this was a further incentive for Moscow to seek détente. Moreover, the Kremlin now had to replace obsolescent equipment. Still, the Soviets continued to give priority to defence over civilian industries. This derailed resources and people to high-tech defence projects, but the Soviet economy was still regarded as able to carry the burden. On their part, the West Germans pointed out that the Soviet Union was expected ‘to raise its defence expenditure beyond the rate of growth of its Gross National Product’.75 Allocation of resources was always a major problem of the Soviet economy, but this was the first time that the NATO experts pointed to a major problem of Soviet defence spending. The experts did not predict a Soviet economic collapse because of excessive defence expenditure, but pointed out that the problem was now qualitatively different than before. This also called for the continuation of the détente policies. This was the connotation of the ‘trends’ report of March 1969 as well. This document was drafted at a meeting of experts from twelve member-states, who addressed specific questions put to them before the meeting. It repeated that the invasion of Czechoslovakia had not solved the Kremlin’s East European problem. The report noted that Soviet policy was seeking a return to a Cold War ‘normalcy’ after the turmoil of the invasion. There was evidence of internal disagreements in the Soviet leadership, but this was regarded as natural at a time of stress and in the context of the Soviet collective leadership system. The experts were satisfied that the role of the military did not appear stronger following the invasion. On the other hand, the conservative tendencies of the Soviet leadership were strongly underlined: controls over the Soviet society were intensifying, including ‘a greater emphasis on doctrinal
orthodoxy, more insulation against foreign influences and a moderate increase in political vigilance’. Thus, the invasion of Czechoslovakia seemed to strengthen the conservative tendencies already apparent in the Kremlin, but this was also accompanied by a ‘continuing evidence of protest by youth and of dissidence among intellectuals’, as well as by an alienation of young people, even of workers. In this context, Soviet foreign policy was seen as a venture in conservatism. The Soviets wanted ‘to revert to the relationship with Western countries which they had enjoyed before August last year’, while they appeared willing to engage in discussions on European security and in bilateral US–Soviet negotiations on strategic arms. The usual plea for allied prudence and solidarity appeared again in the conclusions of the report.76 Similar conclusions on the prospects of the Soviet bloc were drawn during the APAG discussion of April 1969, on ‘the future of the Alliance in relation to long-term trends in Europe and North America’. The APAG report pointed to the many ‘uncertainties’ in the Soviet world, which made predictions difficult. There were groups within the Soviet Union itself (intellectuals, artists or managers), who were dissatisfied with the regime, while national minorities could also exert pressure. However, these were not enough to engineer political change in the foreseeable future, and much would depend on the success of economic reforms. Although some members of APAG felt that the Kremlin would prove able to keep things under control, others thought that in the long term reforms were ‘inevitable, however reluctant Soviet leaders would be to accept them’. All agreed that ‘[i]f changes took place, they would most probably be the result of developments inside Soviet society and not so much of direct influences coming from the outside world’. However, things were different in Eastern Europe, where the Soviets faced a set of practically insoluble problems.77 All these post-invasion studies (including national studies, such as the admirable British document on the long-term prospects for East– West relations78) converged to a clear conclusion. The picture of a ‘conservative’ Soviet leadership, forced to seek economic ‘reform’
within excessively narrow limits, and more generally the fact that the Soviet Union clearly faced significant long-term problems which could not be solved by its rigid system, arguably called for a more energetic and mobile Western policy. Preparing for East–West negotiations Together with reaffirming the détente strategy, the NATO working groups engaged in a comprehensive preparation for negotiations with the Soviet bloc. This process unfolded in the first half of 1969. In February the Political Committee noted that the member countries favoured a policy of gradual resumption of East–West contacts, which would not give the impression of condoning the invasion of Czechoslovakia. However, at that stage, the resumption of contacts involved cultural exchanges and ‘functional contacts, particularly in science and technology’. The NATO countries ‘are not resuming political contacts on a pre-August level’. Moreover, differentiation was being made between contact with the five aggressor states which mounted the attack on Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, Romania and Czechoslovakia itself. This, however, did not include ‘certain necessary contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union on questions involving world peace and order’, namely talks on strategic arms.79 At the same time, the NATO Secretariat prepared a study on the impact of East–West contacts on the ‘state of the alliance’, pointing out that negotiations with the Soviets called for increased allied unity, but also for an increased NATO interest in out-of-area issues.80 The Senior Political Committee then submitted two important documents on East–West relations. The first was prepared in March (largely based on a Canadian draft, one of the cases when the drafting was not made by one of the larger members81), and was agreed ad referendum. Following discussion in the ministerial NAC of April 1969, the document was revised and presented as a report by the Council in Permanent Session, namely as the most formal assessment possible. The May document also took into account
fresh information on the March meeting of the Warsaw Pact. Recent bibliography stresses that this meeting, a watershed for the Warsaw Pact, was a Soviet bloc attempt to imitate NATO’s search for a more participatory structure.82 In their final document of May, the Permanent Representatives argued that it was in the interest of the West to adopt a policy which, while not ‘condoning’ the invasion of Czechoslovakia, would still pursue détente. In this venture, full consultation would prove crucial. The aim was nothing less than the solution of the outstanding problems and the achievement of peace and stability. However, the Soviet understanding of ‘peaceful co-existence’ was not identical to the Western concept of détente: the Soviets evidently aimed to legitimize the division of Europe, ‘to erode the solidarity of the Alliance’ and effect the withdrawal of US troops from Europe, as well as to use increased contacts to secure Western technology. The invasion of Czechoslovakia revealed once more the limitations of détente. Still, the Soviet Union ‘continues to be realistic about the danger of nuclear war and is confronted with significant internal problems of resource allocation’. Moscow also seemed to favour a settlement in Vietnam, and to seek to avoid a new war in the Middle East. These were promising, provided that the West showed caution: The Allies’ search for a peaceful and lasting settlement in Europe is not in question; it is the only course in keeping with the nature of the Alliance itself. What is needed is adaptation to the current situation of the means by which this course is pursued. The contemporary setting does not conform to a state of affairs that can be characterized as either cold war or détente. Contradictory tendencies exist side by side in the Communist world; forces of change are in conflict with traditional attitudes and attachment to the status quo; dangers of coercion and opportunities for East– West co-operation are present simultaneously’.83 In this environment, the report continued, détente could only bear fruit in the long-term, and a ‘profound change within the USSR’
would need to take place before that. Thus NATO needed, most of all, to guard its unity: Even if some changes should occur within the USSR or in its methods of dealing with its Eastern European neighbours, the Allies will continue to face in the East an immense, centralised, modern industrial power with increasing economic and military capabilities and historic interests in the politics of Europe. Continued political solidarity and maintenance of sufficient defences are therefore an essential foundation not only for the security of the Allies but also for their pursuit of a just and lasting peace in Europe.84 In the May document, the second part also put forward policy guidelines for the member-states. These included, among others, the removal of restrictions upon East–West contacts which had been imposed after the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This should be done on a ‘deliberate, differentiated and gradual basis’. Member-states should also seek the expansion of relations with Czechoslovakia and Romania, and support Yugoslavia’s independent position. On East– West negotiations, NATO should support US–Soviet talks on the limitation of strategic weapons. Outstanding issues ‘should be seen in relation to each other’ (a different wording for Kissinger’s ‘linkage’). Public opinion should not be led to believe that the defence effort could be relaxed. As for a possible European Security Conference, the idea should be pursued with caution: any such conference should be well prepared in advance, and US participation should be assured. In this context, intra-NATO consultation should be developed, as this was the best way to preserve the alliance’s unity.85 Thus, in spring 1969 NATO took the definite decision to pursue détente, despite the invasion of Czechoslovakia. An enormous range of issues had to be examined: economic, technical and cultural contacts, which opened the prospect of piercing the Iron Curtain and encouraging the political evolution of the satellites; strategic arms
limitations talks; ‘mutual and balanced force reduction’ in Europe; measures to reduce tension (what in our days would be called ‘confidence building measures’); and the linkage between Western and Soviet priorities. This process was one of the elements of the new NATO political strategy in which the impact of the new US government was evident. As Kissinger had argued since 1965, the problem for NATO was not to debate, rather abstractly, about Soviet intentions, but to draw a ‘program for negotiations’ (or ‘a concrete and common program’ for talks) with the Kremlin.86 Again, as seen above, this was the intention of the Johnson administration and of NATO since 1966, but the extent and the specificity that Kissinger was now asking signalled a new phase of Western strategy. This was what NATO now did. In the summer and autumn of 1969 the NATO Senior Political Committee, under a new chairman, Frank E. Maestrone, examined the ‘list of issues’ which could be the subject of negotiations with the Soviet bloc, and the linkage between them, which would not allow the Soviets to ‘“dine à la carte” while at the same time consolidating the status quo in Europe’.87 Moreover, NATO now moved on to discuss Richard Nixon’s three suggestions for the improvement of alliance consultation: regular meetings of deputy Foreign Ministers; a new special planning group (different from APAG, which had an advisory role); and the setting up of a committee to study the needs of modern societies. The Nixon proposal started a new process of internal reorganization of NATO consultation, although the Americans themselves regarded Brosio’s idea of expanding APAG (rather than creating a new group) as rather conservative.88 This is the point to end the present book. The post-Harmel Report reorganization of NATO, and the post-1969 implementation of the détente policies, point to a new phase in the history both of the alliance and of the Cold War. In the new era, new issues would surface, in a radically different context, and would have to be dealt with through radically adjusted procedures and policies. New perceptions, orientations and also new dead ends would emerge. It was clear that, at least at that stage, détente would not entail the end
of the Cold War: it would be a different form of Cold War. By 1967–9 NATO had managed to overcome its internal crisis, decide on a new, comprehensive strategy and adjust to the changing circumstances of the post-war era. The alliance’s analysis would now have to follow developments in a different political environment. However, this is another story. Notes 1 John Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 151–93; Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: a Crisis of Credibility, 1966–1967 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 25–91. 2 See document 28, ‘Warsaw Pact Intelligence on NATO’s Strategy and Combat Readiness, 1965’, in Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne (eds), A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955–1991 (Budapest: Central European University, 2005), pp. 170–3. 3 James Ellison, The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963–1968 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 108–16 and 170–8; Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution, pp. 320–74; Andrew Priest, Kennedy, Johnson and NATO: Britain, America and the Dynamics of Alliance, 1962–68 (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 135–7; Andreas Wanger, ‘Crisis and Opportunity: NATO’s Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente 1966–1968’, Journal of Cold War Studies 6/1 (2004), pp. 22–74; Andreas Wenger, ‘NATO’s Transformation in the 1960s and the Ensuing Political Order in Europe’, and Jeremi Suri, ‘The Normative Resilience of NATO: a Community of Shared Values amid Public Discord’, in Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist and Anna Locher (eds), Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960s (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 223– 42 and 15–30 respectively; Frédéric Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), pp. 192–203. On the report’s wider impact see also Helga Haftendorn, ‘The Harmel Report and Its Impact on German Ostpolitik’, in Wilfried Loth and George Soutou (eds), The Making of Détente: Eastern Europe and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–75 (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 103–16. 4 FRUS, 1964–8, XIII, Record (Rusk–Harmel), 11 December 1967, and NSC, 590th meeting, 4 September 1968, pp. 646–8 and 749–54. 5 NATO/CM(67)38, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 26 June 1967. 6 NARA, RG 59, Rusk circular, 28 May 1967, Central Files 1967–9, Pol 3 NATO, Box 2355. 7 NARA, RG 59, Katzenbach to Paris, 11 April 1967, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1584; Cleveland to State Department, 11 September 1967, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1585. 8 NARA, RG 59, Cleveland to State Department, 6 March 1967, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1584.
9 Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: a Comparative Historical Analysis (London: Routledge, 1992). See also his obituary in The Times, 17 October 2007. 10 NARA, RG 59, Rusk to Paris, 28 May 1967, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1582. 11 NARA, RG 59, Katzenbach to Paris, 12 April 1967, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1584; McGhee (Bonn) to State Department, 14 April 1967 Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1586. 12 NARA, RG 59, Watson to Kohler, 14 June, and Kohler to Watson 13 July 1967, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1585. On the meetings of Sub-group One see NARA, RG 59, Cleveland to State Department, 8 and 12 May, and 29 June 1967, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1584. On the meeting of the rapporteurs, NARA, RG 59, Hillenbrand to State Department, 22 July 1967, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1585. 13 FRUS, 1964–8, XIII, Tyler to MacArthur, 2 April 1964, and Rusk to Brussels, 21 October 1965, pp. 31–4 and 260–1. Locher, Crisis? What Crisis?, pp. 34, 59, 102–3 and 134–5. 14 Michel Dumoulin, Spaak (Bruxelles: Éditions Racine, 1999), pp. 667–70. 15 NARA, RG 59, Knight (Brussels), to State Department, 5 March 1966, Central Files 1964–6, Def 4 NATO, Box 1574. 16 NARA, RG 59, Knight (Brussels), to State Department, 9 March 1966, Central Files 1964–6, Def 4 NATO, Box 1573. 17 NARA, RG 59, Knight (Brussels), to State Department, 16 March 1966, Central Files 1964–6, Def 4 NATO, Box 1573; Knight (Brussels), to State Department, 5 May 1966, Central Files 1964–6, Def 4 NATO, Box 1570; Knight (Brussels), to State Department, 9 May 1966, Central Files 1964–6, Def 4 NATO, Box 1569. 18 NARA, RG 59, Bohlen (Paris) to State Department, 4 April 1966, Central Files 1964–6, Def 4 NATO, Box 1572. For previous cases of Aron’s defence of NATO see NARA, RG 59, Houghton (Paris) to State Department, 16 March 1959, 740.5/3–1659, Box 3158; Houghton to State Department, 5 January 1961, 375/1–561, Box 631. 19 Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution, p. 343. 20 NARA, RG 59, Rusk to Paris, 16 September 1967, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1585. 21 FRUS, 1964–8, XIII, Record (Rusk–Harmel), 27 September 1967, pp. 617–19. See also NARA, RG 59, memorandum Hughes to Rusk, 2 November 1967, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1586. 22 Harmel Report, Sub-group Two, ‘Les relations interalliées’ (Spaak), 4 October 1967, in www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/80987.htm, assessed 28 September 2013. 23 NATO/AC/261-N/13(revised), Harmel Report, Sub-group One, ‘East–West Relations’ (Watson and Schutz), in www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/80986.htm, assessed 28 September 1013. 24 NATO/AC/261-N/13(revised), Harmel Report, Sub-group One, ‘East–West Relations’ (Watson and Schutz), in www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/80986.htm, assessed 28 September 1013. 25 NATO/AC/261-N/13(revised), Harmel Report, Sub-group One, ‘East–West Relations’ (Watson and Schutz), in www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/80986.htm, assessed 28 September 1013. 26 NARA, RG 59, memorandum, ‘The Future of the Alliance Study’, 16 October 1967, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1585.
27 Haftendorn, NATO and the Nuclear Revolution, p. 373; Andreas Wenger, ‘Crisis and Opportunity’. 28 NATO/CM(68)1, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 10 January 1968. See the American report of the meeting in NARA, RG 59, Rusk to Paris, 16 November 1967, Central Files 1967–9, Pol 3 NATO, Box 2355. 29 NARA, RG 59, Cargo to State Department, 2 February, and Rusk to Paris, 13 April 1968, Central Files 1967–9, Pol 3 NATO, Box 2355. 30 NATO/CM(68)25, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 11 June 1968. 31 NATO/PO/68/194, Brosio to Permanent Representatives, 28 March 1968. On the meeting of the Political Committee, see also TNA/FCO 28/22/12, minutes by Smith and R. D. Clift (the British expert who attended the meeting), 12 and March, and Bushell to Smith, 28 March 1968. 32 TNA/FCO 28/22/12, Smith to Bushell, 28 March and 2 April, and UK paper for the joint meeting, 2 May 1968. 33 TNA/FCO 28/23/12, Bushell to Smith, 24 July 1968; FCO 28/57/3, Warner to FO, 9 August 1968. 34 NATO/CM(67)1, ‘Czechoslovakia’, 17 January 1967. See also NATO/AC/89-D/54, ‘Review of the Economic Situation in Czechoslovakia’, 19 January 1967; AC/127-D/232, Note by Belgium on Czechoslovak foreign trade, 26 May 1967; AC/127-D/232–1, Note by West Germany, 6 July 1967. 35 NATO/CM(68)29, ‘The Role of the Economic Factor in Current Developments in Czechoslovakia’, 10 July 1968; AC/89-WP/255, Note by the US Delegation, 30 April 1968; AC/127-WP/221, ‘The Role of Economic Factors in the Developments in Czechoslovakia, 28 May 1968, and the comments by Britain, Italy and Canada. 36 On the 1968 crisis see, among others, Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), pp. 16–58; Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), pp. 207–9; Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II (New York: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 262–72; Kieran Williams, The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics, 1968–1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); documents 46–58 in Mastny and Byrne (eds), Cardboard Castle?, pp. 252–311; Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 164–212; Mark Kramer, ‘The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Brezhnev Doctrine’, in Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert and Detlef Junker (eds), 1968: the World Transformed (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 111–71; John G. McGinn, ‘The Politics of Collective Inaction: NATO’s Response to the Prague Spring’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 1/3 (1999), pp. 111–38; Vojtech Mastny, ‘Was 1968 a Strategic Watershed of the Cold War?’, Diplomatic History, 29/1(2005), pp. 149–77. On the role of the crisis in reinvigorating NATO defence see John G. McGinn, ‘NATO in the Aftermath of the 1968 Invasion of Czechoslovakia’, in Gustav Schmidt (ed.), A History of NATO: the First Fifty Years, Vol. 2 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 197–208. 37 Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine, pp. 40–58. 38 NATO/PO/68/420, Roberts to Permanent Secretaries, 6 August 1968. 39 NARA, RG 59, Rusk to NATO, 19 January 1968, and Katzenbach to NATO, 2 October 1968, Central Files 1967–9, Pol 2 NATO, Box 2354. The submission of these ‘notes’
stopped during the days of the crisis, but was resumed afterwards, and after October they were transmitted through the NATO-wide Communications System. 40 NATO/PO/68/430, 442, 452 and 474, Roberts to Permanent Representatives, 8, 13, 21 and 29 August 1968; PO/68/459 and 475 Brosio to Permanent Representatives, 22 August and 4 September 1968; PO/68/504, Jaenicke to Permanent Representatives, 23 September 1968. See also the brief in CR(68)42Annex, 12 September 1968 (meeting of 26 August). See also reports of the Political Committee’s meetings in TNA/FCO 41/225/3, Warner to Barnes, 22 August 1968, and Thomas to Alexander, 10 September 1968. 41 NATO/PO/68/473, Roberts to Permanent Representatives, 29 August 1968. 42 FRUS, 1964–8, XIII, NSC, 590th meeting, 4 September 1968, and Intelligence Memorandum No. 2049/68, 4 November 1968, pp. 749–54, 778–80. 43 NATO/CM(68)42, ‘Crisis Management Aspects of the Invasion of Czechoslovakia’, 25 September 1968. 44 TNA/FCO 41/175/5, Burrows to Barnes, 28 August 1968. 45 TNA/FCO 41/175/5, FO to NATO, 27 and 30 August, and minute (Barnes), 28 August 1968. See also NARA, RG 59, Cleveland to State Department, 30 August and 9 September 1968, Central Files 1967–9, NATO 3, Box 3158; Record (Rusk, Dean), 23 September 1968, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1588. 46 See, among others, FRUS, 1964–8, XVII, National Intelligence Estimate, 7 November 1968, pp. 102–12; FRUS, 1964–8, XIV, Weekly Summary, 15 November 1968; FRUS, 1964–8, XIII, Memorandum, Rusk’s dinner with the NATO Foreign Ministers and Brosio (New York), 7 October 1968, Intelligence Memorandum No. 2049/68, 4 November 1968, NATO Ministerial Meeting: Scope Paper, 7 November 1968, pp. 768–74, 778–80, 781–6; FRUS, 1969–76, State Department circular telegram, 12 September 1968, pp. 1–2. On the US demand for contingency studies, see FRUS, 1964–8, XVII, memorandum, Geddy to Katzenbach, 1 October 1968, pp. 80–94; FRUS, 1964–8, XIII, Rusk to US Delegation NATO, 16 October 1968, pp. 774–7. 47 NARA, RG 59, Rusk to Paris, 14 October 1968, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1589. 48 NATO/CM(68)43(final), ‘Political Implications of the Czechoslovakia Crisis’, 5 November 1968; CR(68)51 partII, 14 and 18 October 1968; CR(68)52 Annex, 17 October 1968. 49 TNA/FCO 41/175/5, Warner to Parsons, 27 September 1968. 50 NATO/CM(68)56, ‘Trends in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and their Policy Implications’, 5 November 1968. 51 NATO/CM(68)44, ‘Economic Implications of Recent Events in Czechoslovakia’, 27 September 1968. See also the papers by US, Britain, West Germany and Canada in AC/127-WP/229. 52 NATO/CM(68)43(final), 5 November 1968. 53 NATO/CM(68)44, 27 September 1968. 54 NATO/CM(68)56, 5 November 1968. 55 NATO/CVR(68)61 and 62, 15 November 1968. See also FRUS, 1964–8, XIII, Rusk (NATO) to State Department, 16 November 1968, pp. 790–2. 56 FRUS, 1964–8, XIV, State Department, circular telegram, 18 December 1968, pp. 786– 7. For the Senior Political Committee meeting on the issue of exchanges see also NARA, RG 59, Cleveland to State Department, 19 December 1968, Central Files 1967– 9, NATO 3, Box 3158.
57 TNA/FCO 28/574/16, Davidson to Cambridge, 14 January 1969. 58 TNA/FCO 41/450/10, Burrows to Stewart, 16 December 1968; FCO 28/574/14, Burrows to Parsons, 19 December 1968. 59 See Jordan Baev, ‘The Warsaw Pact and Southern Tier Conflicts, 1959–1969’, in Mary Ann Heiss and S. Victor Papacosma (eds), NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 2008), pp. 193–205. 60 NATO/CM(68)71, ‘Possible Developments of Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe and Related Areas’, 18 December 1968; CM(68)66, ‘Vulnerability and Economic Problems of Yugoslavia’, 8 November 1968; CM(69)14, ‘Vulnerability and Economic Problems of Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania’, 14 March 1969; AC/89-D/61(definitive), 23 April 1969, on a review on Yugoslavia. 61 TNA/FCO 41/175/5, Burrows to Parsons, 7 September 1968. 62 TNA/FCO 41/440/12, Burrows to Stewart, 6 January 1969, annual review for 1968. 63 TNA/FCO 41/450/10, Warner to Barnes, 21 November, Davidson to Barnes, 28 November, and minute (Barnes), 3 December 1968. 64 See Mastny, ‘The Warsaw Pact as History’, in Cardboard Castle, pp. 37–8. 65 NATO/CM(69)16, ‘Further Developments in Eastern Europe: Contingency Studies. Analysis of the Soviet Threat in Europe and the Mediterranean and Its Implications’, 26 March 1969. 66 NATO/CM(69)16, ‘Further Developments in Eastern Europe: Contingency Studies. Analysis of the Soviet Threat in Europe and the Mediterranean and Its Implications’, 26 March 1969. On the Gromyko visit, see NATO/CM(69)51, ‘Trends in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and Their Policy Implications’, 18 November 1969. 67 NATO/CM(69)16, ‘Further Developments in Eastern Europe: Contingency Studies. Analysis of the Soviet Threat in Europe and the Mediterranean and Its Implications’, 26 March 1969. 68 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: a Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 289– 305. 69 FRUS, 1969–76, XXIX, State Department circular, 26 March 1969, Editorial Note, and State Department to US Delegation NATO, 12 May 1969, pp. 2–8; FRUS, 1969–76, XXXIX, Kissinger to Nixon, 4 and 8 April 1969, pp. 3–6; FRUS, 1969–76, XII, National Intelligence Estimates 27 February 1969 and 17 July 1969, pp. 69–86 and 206–12. 70 Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 5– 11. 71 NATO/CM(68)70, ‘Economic Developments in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Countries’, 11 December 1968. See also AC/89-D/63, 23 June 1969 (on China) and AC/89-D/69, 19 December 1969 (on the USSR). 72 NATO/CM(68)70, ‘Economic Developments in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Countries’, 11 December 1968. See also AC/89-D/63, 23 June 1969 (on China) and AC/89-D/69, 19 December 1969 (on the USSR). 73 NATO/CM(69)4, ‘Assessment of the January 1969 COMECON Meetings’, 5 February 1969; CM(69)25, ‘The COMECON Meeting in Moscow, 23rd–24th April, 1969’, 11 June 1969. 74 See the reports on credits, in NATO/CM(68)49, 2 October 1968; CM(69)6, 10 February 1969; CM(69)35, 18 July 1969. 75 See NATO/CM(68)23, ‘Western Estimates of Defence Expenditure in Communist Countries’, 30 May 1968. On the same subject, see AC/89-R/97, 29 September 1967,
R/99, 23 November 1967, 101, 23 February 1968, R/105, 27 March 1968. On Soviet bloc defence expenditure see also AC/89-WP/240; AC/89-WP/246: AC/89-WP278, ‘Developments in the Soviet Economy, 1968–1969’ (US delegation), 10 September 1969; AC/89-WP/268, ‘The Effects of the Events in Czechoslovakia on the Soviet Bloc Economy’ (German delegation), 24 February 1969. 76 NATO/CM(69)13, ‘Trends in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and their Policy Implications’, 26 March 1969. 77 NATO/CM(69)30, ‘Atlantic Policy Advisory Group’, 25 June 1969. On the meetings of the group, see the American report in NARA, RG 59, Rogers, to Brussels, 26 April 1969, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1590. 78 See TNA/FCO 28/575/2, Stewart to Wilson (Moscow), 15 May 1969, transmitting FCO paper ‘The Longer Term Prospects for East–West Relations after the Czechoslovak Crisis’. The FCO paper argued that détente should continue, aiming to effect a European settlement, in which the Soviets would no longer seek to subvert the West. This, however, would not be accomplished in the five-to ten-year period covered by the paper. The FCO believed that existing pressures in the Soviet bloc would ‘beyond the time-scale of this paper’ begin to reduce ‘the ideological preoccupations in Soviet policy’. 79 NATO/CM(69)5, ‘East/West Contacts: Present and Prospective’, 10 February 1969. 80 NATO/PO/69/109, ‘Impact of Future East–West Relations on the State of the Alliance, 11 March 1969. See also PO/69/132, Brosio to Permanent Representatives, 15 March 1969. 81 TNA/FCO 28/576/7, Cambridge to Thomas, 21 February 1969. 82 See document 62, ‘New Secret Statutes of the Warsaw Pact (17 March 1969)’, in Mastny and Byrne (eds), Cardboard Castle?, pp. 323–30. The Warsaw Pact/Eastern European perspective of the road to détente started in the mid-1960s and has been studied: see documents 33–7 in Mastny and Byrne (eds), Cardboard Castle?, pp. 195– 214; Vojtech Mastny, ‘Learning from the Enemy – NATO as a Model for the Warsaw Pact’, in Schmidt (ed.), A History of NATO, Vol. 2, pp. 157–77; Douglas Selvage, ‘The Warsaw Pact and the European Security Conference, 1964–69’, in Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny and Christian Nuenlist (eds), Origins of the European Security System: the Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75 (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 85–106; Csaba Békés, ‘The Warsaw Pact and the CSCE Process from 1965 to 1970’, in Loth and Soutou (eds), The Making of Détente, pp. 201–20. 83 NATO/CM(69)18(final), ‘The State of East–West Relations and Its Implications for the Alliance’, 5 May 1969; see also CM(69)15, ‘East–West Relations’, 11 March 1969. The last sentence appears only in the May document. 84 NATO/CM(69)18(final), ‘The State of East–West Relations and Its Implications for the Alliance’, 5 May 1969. This passage did not appear in the March document. 85 NATO/CM(69)18(final), ‘The State of East–West Relations and Its Implications for the Alliance’, 5 May 1969. 86 Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, pp. 191 and 206. 87 NATO/CM(69)34, ‘List of Issues for Possible Negotiation with the East’, 14 July 1969; CM(69)39, ‘Follow-up to Paragraph 5 of Washington Communiqué: List of Issues for Possible Negotiations with the East’, 22 September 1969; CM(69)46, ‘List of Issues for Possible Negotiation with the East’, 21 October 1969. 88 NARA, RG 59, Rogers to Brussels, 19 April 1969, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1590; Cleveland to State Department, 22 May and 11 June 1969, Central Files
1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 2354.
5 Conclusions In his famous novels, John le Carré describes a world of Cold War espionage in which nobody could be absolutely certain about the loyalty of a colleague, or that someone was not being used (even unconsciously) by the enemy to provide false information, leading to flawed analysis. The established black-and-white picture of a polarized international system is thus complemented (though not necessarily replaced) by the parallel picture of a ‘grey’ world of images, hopes, deceptions and faints, or even, as Frank Herbert put it in his novels, of ‘faints within faints’. Indeed, le Carré’s Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, arguably the best spy novel of Western literature, is the story of an archival research, during which, amusingly, the researcher, the legendary George Smiley, also steals some documents necessary to form an accurate picture. Perhaps inevitably, the novel also touches upon the intellectual challenges that Cold War analysts faced: I once heard someone say morality was method. Do you hold with that? I suppose you wouldn’t. You would say that morality was vested in the aim, I expect. Difficult to know what one’s aims are, that’s the trouble, especially if you’re British. We can’t expect you people to determine our policy for us, can we? We can only ask you to further it. Correct? Tricky one, that.1 This, of course, is a literary narrative, but one should consider it when discussing NATO analysis in the 1950s and 1960s. After all, even in a book such as this one, which has been written rather ‘close’ to the documents, one needs to keep in mind the fluctuating nature of their relevance. This book is not only about facts, but mostly about estimations (and therefore underlying hopes and fears), conceptual frameworks, images and perceptions. The Cold War was
a contest which involved strategy, but also legitimization and the forms of organization of human society. The NATO experts, members of their national diplomatic establishments and therefore Cold Warriors in the first line of the battle, needed to balance between the need to uphold their lowest common denominator (namely, to protect the unity of the alliance), and to provide credible analysis to the alliance’s statesmen. They were also being asked to devise new forms of political consultation, unheard of in the context of a military alliance. Last but not least, they had to combine their national aims with the needs of an international structure dealing with such a multifaceted conflict as the Cold War. Inevitably, these raised problems of balance. In order to reach an overall interpretation of this process, scholars need to take into account various variables: the nature of the Cold War, the perception of the Soviet opponent (a perception which tended to change subtly but significantly with the passage of time), the fundamental characteristics of NATO, the climate of the era, the analysis tools available at that time and the intellectual limitations that these imposed. Perhaps, scholars also need to go, to some extent and prudently, ‘beyond’ the actual documents, or even to question their sources. This is part of the intellectual challenge of our era, when we try to understand a past which is so contemporary, but also refers to a world dramatically different than the one we face today. At the end of the day, it is crucial, on top of all these, to comprehend the limits of our own understanding of that past, yet recent era. NATO analysis of the Soviet world: trying to understand the Other In their studies of the Soviet world, the NATO analysts were usually torn between conflicting aims. They had to assess the long-term economic capabilities and social endurance of the Soviet bloc, based on evidence which often was inconclusive, and on statistics which always were unreliable. They had to interpret events as they unfolded, in the face of evidence which was usually conflicting, while
Soviet declarations were wrapped up in a doctrinaire discourse, which members of the liberal West did not fully understand and usually resented. They needed to find patterns to interpret Soviet policies and balance the emphasis on doctrine with Soviet quasiimperial pragmatism. They needed to point to certainties, when the very texture of their Western world allowed (and even encouraged) doubt. Last but not least, they had to take into account the realities of their era, and mostly the impetus of breathtaking change on all levels – economic, technological, social and psychological. Arguably, the NATO experts never fully solved this problem. Although one could discuss extensively whether the NATO experts had a good or a poor understanding of the ‘Russian mind’ (and one suspects that most scholars would probably side with the latter view), by the late 1960s they were much more able to follow Soviet developments than in the early 1950s. It is imperative to stress the nature of the majority of NATO reports, which also delineates some of their problems. These were records agreed between experts representing member-states, and thus the products both of an intellectual process and of an international negotiation. After the emergence of the expert working groups in the early 1960s and the decision of the Political Advisers not to review the reports, the anxiety of producing formally agreed records receded somehow, but the documents still aimed at putting forward a consensus between the member-states. The need to reach consensus among varying perceptions tended to filter out the bolder, unorthodox or minority views, and often resulted in homogenized, middle-of-the-road reports. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the larger members were reluctant to engage in full sharing of high-quality intelligence and insights, for fear of leakage. This meant, inevitably, that analysis in NATO, an intergovernmental organization, was slow and cumbersome. It also was less likely to produce groundbreaking views or breakthroughs, which usually stimulate dissent, and require someone ‘at the top’, competent, to make a decision and break the impasse, as Nixon and Kissinger did with regard to China in the late 1960s. In this respect, NATO analysis was always at a disadvantage compared to national
analyses and assessments. The NATO analysts (or the NAC itself) could never go to Beijing, either metaphorically or materially. This was one of the most significant limits of NATO analysis of its opponents. There is a fundamental pattern in the NATO reports which may allow the scholar to reach conclusions regarding their effectiveness. To put it simply, NATO analysis was more successful in assessing the long-term prospects of the Soviet economy and the political system, rather than in foreseeing (and providing warning for) specific Soviet political initiatives in the short term.2 The NATO reports almost constantly failed to foresee major Soviet moves, such as the Twentieth CPSU Congress, the invasion of Hungary, the building of the Berlin Wall or the Cuban missiles. Perhaps this is not surprising. The political initiatives of the ‘other side’ depend largely on the its own assessment of the situation (on which one can never be certain), and are often the products not only of a governmental system, but also of the worldviews, character and temper of specific individuals at the top; if one of these individuals is Khrushchev, with his idiosyncratic personality, prediction of political moves becomes even more problematic. This was a major irritant for the alliance: after all, Ministers needed accurate assessments in specific issues. However, one should not forget that this was a problem for national analysis as well. The Americans themselves, despite their huge resources in intelligence, had a similar difficulty of prediction. In 1955 during an NSC session, Eisenhower commented that ‘Communists simply do not react normally’.3 In 1964 a leading official of the United States Information Agency noted that the Soviet Union was ‘a land of paradox’.4 Yet, there was more than that. As the Americans noted regarding their own failures to predict the Kremlin’s moves: Capabilities of an industrial or military nature are, of course, another matter and to some extent can be roughly estimated for a considerable period in the future. In regard to policy, intentions etc., however, I doubt very much if the men in the Kremlin could give you a reasonable answer.5
This was exactly the case with NATO analysis as well. Predictions of Soviet political moves usually left much to be desired, but long-term economic and social trends concern the ‘deeper forces’, the wider functions of a social system and the huge forces of social inertia, and could be traced. The NATO experts consistently pointed to the enormous capabilities, political, economic and even psychological, of a superpower which combined the resources and the traditional geopolitical ambitions of Russia with the radiance of a centre of world revolution. However, they also pointed to fundamental weaknesses of the Soviet system, such as arbitrary rule, intellectual and administrative rigidity, the absence of a realistic price system, and the competition for resources between industry and consumption. These affected both the effectiveness and the legitimization of the regime, a crucial ingredient of a long Cold War. The NATO experts never doubted – even at the era of Soviet economic ascent, during the 1950s – that the West’s main advantage, its economic supremacy, would not be corroded. By the early 1960s, however, they stressed that Soviet growth would slow down: they strongly stated their confidence that the Western system was much more effective in dealing with the problems of modernity. The West could still lose the Cold War ‘great game’ of strategy, and thus had to remain vigilant. However, it was winning (or at least, it was not losing) the battle for legitimization. This was a major turning point for NATO analysis of the opponent. It may be important to insist on this level of NATO’s perceptions of the Soviet world. The alliance experts constantly indicated that the Soviet Union was an excessively centralized (or a totalitarian) state. This meant that decisions from the top – even absurd decisions – went down to the lower echelons of the system immediately and without debate or doubt, and thus were immediately implemented. It also meant that the Kremlin could arbitrarily channel its huge resources to industrial growth, without caring much about accountability. This kind of ‘efficiency’ was impossible in the Western political and social system, which lacked a dominant economic or social factor, and where debate played a catalytic role. The overcentralized Soviet structure seemed to score important successes in
the first post-war years, when it was urgent to achieve immediate reconstruction, aiming to cover fundamental needs of a population that had lost too much in the Second World War. This, together with the glory of its victory over Hitler, was why the Soviet system appeared more effective than the Western until the late 1950s. Yet, things became much more complicated in later stages, during the 1960s and beyond, when the emphasis of societies naturally moved from the coverage of fundamental needs to the issue of the quality of life. An excessively centralized system was in a position to accomplish growth much more easily in the war-depleted societies of the immediate post-war years, rather than in the developed, elaborate and more demanding societies of the 1960s. In the latter case, sustained growth presupposed technological progress (and thus, political and intellectual freedom), the ability to adjust and a degree of society-oriented debate, which had never been the strongest points of the Soviet system, either in its Stalinist form or later. In other words, the Soviet Union was a product of the age of the industrial belt, designed to stimulate large-scale growth from above, in a process which could easily be described as quasipharaonic. By the mid-1960s, there was strong evidence that it could not cope with the demands of the post-industrial society of the late third of the twentieth century.6 This was noted by the NATO reports, and formed the basis of the alliance analysts’ confidence after the early 1960s. As the Economic Advisers noted in 1965, ‘the rigid Soviet system of centralized planning becomes increasingly inadequate as the economy develops’.7 The NATO experts noted that it was impossible to direct a developed, elaborate and diversified economy exclusively from above; but the Soviet system knew no other way to function, and refused to search for one. Anyway, ‘another’ way of functioning would inevitably entail a turn to market forces, and to forms of intellectual and political pluralism which appeared unacceptable to the men in the Kremlin. Thus, the experts confidently pointed to the long-term prospects of the Western system in the struggle for ‘the soul of mankind’. The irony was that, in most cases, the recipients of
the NATO reports, the Ministers of the member-states, were more interested in assessment of specific policies, rather than of long-term trends. The focus of statesmen was slightly different than that of analysts or of academics. On the other hand, until the late 1960s, the alliance experts never doubted that the Soviet system enjoyed a significant degree of legitimization within the Soviet Union. Although it was difficult to measure ‘legitimization’ in a communist polity and in the peculiar social conditions of such a huge state, they insisted that the system enjoyed acceptance by the Soviet people. This is, perhaps, an indication of the high quality and the professionalism of their analysis. The NATO experts of the 1960s constantly stressed that the Soviet system represented – and at that time it did – a very dynamic actor in international affairs. Later on, of course, perceptions changed as the stagnation in the USSR grew. For example, in the early 1980s a notable book of the (American) Centre for Strategic and International Studies on Soviet Policies referred, in retrospect, to the system of ‘stable oligarchy’ that Brezhnev built, characterized by negotiation between various factions (in contrast to Khrushchev’s constant search for change). The publication noted the continuous ‘reforms’ of the Soviet economy, which, however, always avoided to attack the ‘central problem’; Soviet worldviews did not seem to change considerably, and thus failed to adjust to changing circumstances, and to solve recurring problems.8 And as contemporary scholarship puts it, ‘[a]ffected by the changes but slow to adapt, the Soviet system lumbered on, an industrial behemoth in post-industrial age’.9 In the end, for all its power, the Soviet Union and its empire collapsed from within, even if Kennan avoided to say ‘I told you so’. But Kennan was a bold analyst working in the system of the leading nation-state of the West; the NATO experts of the 1950s and 1960s, lower-ranking members of their diplomatic services negotiating among themselves, could not predict (and arguably it was not in their terms of reference to predict) the poisonous stagnation of the later Brezhnev era. Even if they had
predicted it, they would probably have been criticized for encouraging the NATO members to relax their defence effort. As for the Eastern European communist countries, initially (in the early 1950s) the NATO experts feared that the huge propaganda machines of totalitarian systems, combined with rapid post-war reconstruction, might make significant inroads to Eastern European public opinion. After the 1953 East Berlin riots, the NATO reports remained timid or indecisive, and effectively evaded the subject. It was only after the Hungarian Revolution in 1956 that they expressly pointed to the growing lack of legitimization of the regimes of the ‘satellites’, and this became even more pronounced after the early 1960s, when visible problems appeared in these countries’ economies because of unbalanced, dogmatically driven industrial growth. In any event, the NATO analysts constantly stressed the inability of the West to effect ‘roll back’ in the Kremlin’s East European empire. The memory of the infamous Radio Free Europe broadcasts in 1956 was not the only reason. Mostly, as experts of a defensive alliance, anxious to deter Soviet aggression, the NATO analysts were usually horrified at the thought of an out-of-area propaganda offensive beyond the Iron Curtain: this was outside NATO’s Cold War roles. Moreover, any similar suggestion was certain to spark huge internal disagreements, and endanger the analysts’ first and foremost term of reference, namely the need to uphold alliance unity. Last but not least, as members of a defensive alliance living in constant fear about the huge capabilities of its gigantic opponent, their priority constantly was to assess the consequences of Soviet initiatives for the NATO area, but not the opportunities for action in Eastern Europe. This was evident in all intra-Soviet bloc crises: in 1953 Berlin, in 1956 Hungary, after the building of the Berlin Wall, and in the 1968 Prague Spring. When the chips were down, the NATO experts automatically focused on the alliance’s prime responsibility, the treaty area. Throughout this period the NATO experts took communist aggression for granted, both in its military and political/economic forms. As people of their times, and as members of their national diplomatic services, they belonged to the ‘traditional’ or ‘orthodox’
school of thought on the Cold War. They often regarded Soviet policy as more rational, effective, well organized and determined than it actually was. As experts of a defensive alliance, striving to preserve the balance of power against an adversary who enjoyed conventional military superiority and the advantage of geography, they preferred to err on the side of caution. Thus, the alliance experts did not seek, especially in 1953–5, an ‘opportunity’ to end the Cold War. Such a quest would have been outside their terms of reference. Mostly, it could even endanger the unity of the alliance, since it would also spark intra-alliance disagreements: an alliance of sovereign states depended on consensus, and also needed an opponent to remain united. There are strange, and sometimes hidden, limits in perceptions, especially those involving such a complex process as the Cold War; mostly the fact that ‘people perceive what they expect to be present’.10 In other words, as happened with most intellectual processes of the Cold War, NATO analysis aimed to serve its dynamics, not to dispute them. This could only be done by a national policy-making process, and only under the leadership of an exceptionally strong analyst – for example Henry Kissinger. On the other hand, it is possible to detect an evolution of NATO viewpoints from the early 1950s until the late 1960s. There was a slight, gradual but unspoken change of perceptions from the rather alarmist views of 1951–2 to more functional positions. In the early 1950s, especially when the fearsome figure of Joseph Stalin was still present, it was expressly stated in NATO reports that the aim of the Soviet Union was ‘world domination’. In subsequent years, the experts noted that no change in Soviet aims was detectable, and thus at first sight it appears that this thesis remained unchanged. Yet, by the early 1960s the NATO experts reached more realistic positions, which did not place emphasis on the Dullesian interpretation about the unchanging nature of ‘Soviet totalitarianism’. They started understanding the Soviet system better, and consequently saw it with less fear or awe. By the late 1960s, the NATO documents no longer pointed to a ‘radical’, aggressive
revolutionary regime, but to a ‘conservative’ bureaucratic structure. The change was gradual and subtle, but apparent. It was part of the evolution of the West’s more general attitudes towards the opponent, which allowed, by 1967, a more structured and elaborate (and thus more difficult) search for simultaneous ‘defence and détente’. However, it would be incorrect to see the turn to détente policies as a kind of ‘happy ending’ of the NATO analysis story: the ‘story’ never ends, even if historians need to point to turning points or ‘breaks’ in order to structure their interpretations. Thus, in our case, the decision to pursue détente was not the end of the Cold War, and was destined to meet with its own dead ends in the late 1970s. By that time, new challenges would appear for NATO analysis. NATO analysis and NATO: the search for the West The function of NATO analysis within the alliance changed over time. This means that the theme of this book is a kind of ‘moving target’, something which always fascinates scholars. NATO analysis started in the years of the Korean War, when there was a pressing fear of a Soviet physical/military threat. As far as NATO’s major prerequisite – allied unity – was concerned, this was a rather ‘simple’ and easy period: under the perceived immediate threat of the Kremlin, NATO appeared rather homogeneous, sticking closely to the Americans, and its bureaucracy was small and usually of one mind. The initial reports of 1951–2 were too general in scope; one might even call them superficial. But over time, in the era of the ‘long haul’ and especially after Stalin’s death, the perception of the ‘threat’ changed in a qualitative manner: the military threat seemed more distant, but challenges now expanded and became political, economic, and also involved popular radiance and competition in the Third World. NATO analyses of the Cold War adversary proliferated and became more sophisticated and comprehensive (and sometimes even more scholarly). After the late 1950s, but mostly after the landmark of the Cuban missile crisis and during the search for détente, NATO
members tended to react differently to the common enemy. The loose unity of the Atlantic alliance (a major element of its claim for legitimization) could be more easily endangered in a climate of lessening of the immediate tensions. At any rate, in the 1960s, and especially after the rise of what has remained in NATO history as the ‘Gaullist challenge’, ‘unity’ was even less automatic, and had to be sought and cultivated. Thus came the emphasis of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations on consultation, cooperation and concern about out-of-area issues. NATO was less homogeneous: it was a community of sovereign states no longer frightened to death, but trying to find a common purpose outside the purely military necessities. In short, the process of the making of the NATO reports mirrors NATO’s own history, functions and evolution. It was an interactive process in the building of the Western community of nations; a part (although a small one) of the ‘making of the West’. Inevitably, a study on NATO analysis raises the question of the usefulness of the reports. Who read these papers? How useful were they, and to whom? This book has noted the importance of individual reports for the statesmen of the alliance and intra-allied deliberations: for example, the trends reports of December 1952 (the first comprehensive one), of December 1956 in the aftermath of Suez and Hungary, of April 1960 (although in a negative sense), of November 1960, of the Eastern European policy paper of November 1962, of the Permanent Council in 1966, and the reports in the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The major documents of economic comparisons also fall into this category. It could be argued, of course, that the ‘soothing’ effect of such reports (especially in times of crisis) was mostly the product of the statesmen’s desire to be soothed. But this was an integral characteristic of NATO analysis documents: they mirrored views, and did not propose plans for action. However, when one goes beyond the usefulness of specific reports, the discussion about the importance of alliance analysis as a process points to some additional interesting aspects of NATO. It can be assumed with reasonable certainty that the Ministers of the larger members of the alliance, especially the Americans and the British,
had little need for such papers. After all, their services were writing most of them. Similarly, the statesmen of France or West Germany also had access to crucial intelligence and information on the Soviet world, either through their own services or through bilateral exchanges with Washington. At the same time, excesses were not avoided. By the early 1960s each Minister received prior to the NAC session (and on top of his own Ministry’s briefs) a pack of NATO reports on the Soviet Union, the Soviet economy, Eastern Europe, the ‘economic offensive’, the Middle East, the Far East, Africa and Latin America, as well as the APAG reports. These amounted practically to the manuscript of a small book. The British FO tellingly assumed that the ‘summary’ and ‘conclusions’ sections of the reports are ‘probably all that Ministers will read’.11 The statesmen of the larger powers might not need to do even that. However, for the larger countries, the production of these reports presented a series of advantages: in 1965 the Johnson administration noted that the experts’ reports provided ‘an excellent semi-annual review of events. They are summarized for the Secretary for his use at the ministerial meetings and are distributed in their entirety to the appropriate bureaus and research offices in the Department’. It was also noted that national contributions supplemented US intelligence (this was a very polite comment since NATO intelligence was mostly based on the US), and the process provided opportunity to discuss the views of the allies.12 Thus, even for the larger members of the alliance, the NATO reports were useful. Even if their Ministers did not place much emphasis on them, the officials were strongly interested in this lowerlevel consultation process, which was instrumental in allowing for a convergence of national views on the international situation. Moreover, the NATO process offered to the larger members early lower-level (and thus more manageable) warning of the perceptions, fears, hopes and demands of their smaller Western allies. Things were radically different regarding the small and ‘mediumsized’ members of the alliance. As seen in this book, one of the major aims of the NATO reports was to provide analysis for (or to ‘educate’) the smaller members of the alliance. This was noted time
and time again, from the very start. As the British commented on the 1952 trends report: The NATO paper was largely educational in aim, being intended to carry on the process of enlightening the Governments of less wellinformed NATO Powers about the facts of Soviet life.13 There was more in this dimension than the hegemonism of the larger powers, or their ‘control’ over the smaller members. The NATO analysis process did not simply try to give the small members a semblance (or an illusion) of participation in the Western structure. Indeed, it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of these NATO reports for the small members. These states were often complaining about lack of consultation, but were also grateful for this process, which allowed them access to information which they could not possibly have through their own sources. The NATO reports provided them with invaluable intelligence on Soviet developments, trends or intentions, and thus helped them contain their inevitable sense of vulnerability or anxiety. Of course, the main importance of the alliance lay in the deterrence that it offered. However, the combination of deterrence and analysis (which otherwise they would not have) allowed the smaller members to face the enormous pressures of the Cold War with more confidence. This is an indication of the moderating influence that the Cold War alliances, and mostly NATO, exerted on the participants of the Cold War. Perhaps it is necessary to insist on this, and give a telling example. This author had the opportunity to study the reactions of a small Western country, Greece, in various instances of the Cold War, before and after its accession to NATO (1952). In 1948, when it tried to understand the Tito–Stalin split, Greek diplomacy was practically at a loss. In the midst of the Greek civil war, the Greek diplomats lacked adequate intelligence on the internal realities of the Soviet bloc, and were understandably incapable of evaluating declarations which were phrased in the idiosyncratic, dogmatic communist language of the late Stalinist period. The Greeks were desperately
turning from one source of information to the other, and the Foreign Ministry Archive is packed with reports (or mere rumours) of radically varying value, from cuttings of the international press to the expression of opinions of Western diplomats (and not always highranking diplomats, at that) from various ‘major’ capitals. The situation in Athens was chaotic, and it was only the presence of an analyst of exceptional quality (the Permanent Under-secretary of the Foreign Ministry, Panayiotis Pipinelis, who in 1952 would become Greece’s first Permanent Representative to NATO) that allowed the country to put things into perspective and form a realistic picture. Indeed, Pipinelis had been careful to establish a special committee in his Ministry, exactly to provide high-quality analysis to Ministers, and prevent them from giving in to panic, alarmism and confusion. On the contrary, after its accession to NATO, Greece did not face the same problem, at least to a comparable extent. After 1952, when facing international crises, there was much less confusion or panic in Athens’ responses. It still was hugely anxious about Cold War tensions (and always, as a minor and frontline member of the West, feared that it could be ‘abandoned’ by its larger allies). However, it felt that it was under the NATO guarantee, which (even if militarily never seemed fully effective against a Soviet bloc invasion) was a crucial political deterrence. Moreover, the country could now depend on a reliable input from the alliance in order to respond to an international crisis – even big ones, such as Hungary, the building of the Berlin Wall or Cuba. In other words, after 1952 the Greeks understood (or thought that they understood) international crises much better; the Cold War world was not as incomprehensible as it had appeared before.14 The difference, to a large extent, lay in their access to the NATO reports, which presented a credible picture of the international situation, something which they could never possess through their own means. Moreover, their participation in the ministerial sessions of the NAC allowed the Greek leaders to feel that they were part of a wider, institutionalized structure, and this also was instrumental in containing alarmism. Thus, it can be argued
that the NATO analysis/consultation process was extremely important, especially for the smaller members of the alliance. On the other hand, a study of NATO analysis has to address one of the major questions regarding the alliance: how far was this process dominated by the US? Conventional wisdom suggests that the US must have played a dominating role. And yet, replying to this question is anything but easy. It is clear that US inputs were crucial for the drafting of the NATO reports, if only because the other allies often lacked the necessary intelligence. It is also clear that, when the Americans wanted to show that the game was theirs, they could do it with immense ease. This happened early in 1953, and in the case of the autumn 1960 report on the Soviet Union, drafted with the participation of national officials. But they did not want to do it very often. Usually, or at least whenever they felt that they could do this with an acceptable cost to themselves (which was very often), the Americans exerted self-restraint in order to carry their allies with them. Indeed, initially, the Americans were rather sceptical about the wisdom of putting such reports forward. In 1952 they even faced a British threat to allow the American view to be expressed as a minority opinion! This US isolation, of course, was an exception; it was something that only the British could accomplish; it could not be done by the smaller powers or a combination of them. However, it is an indication of the self-restraint with which the Americans saw the whole process, even at the time of their perceived omnipotence in the early 1950s. Later on, in the Eisenhower and mostly in the Kennedy years, the Americans tried to encourage consultation within the alliance, even on out-of-area issues. Still, they were not prepared to ‘submit’ their global policy to the cumbersome NATO procedures, and they were eager, at least to some extent, to step back and allow their allies to express their opinion. In this respect, they were always anxious to let their British partners do much of the running. The functionalism with which the US approached the NATO analysis process allowed participation. It also helped the Americans assess the views of their allies, in an international process behind closed doors. In other words, the Americans could impose their views on
many levels, but preferred to use NATO as a vehicle for the emergence, whenever possible, of a concerted allied view. Yet, one also needs to take into account the very delicate position of the leader of the West in a voluntary alliance. An indicative example is offered by the comment of the US delegation in summer 1967, when reporting the discussion in the Political Advisers about the setting up of an ‘Atlantic Assembly’: the US representative tried ‘walking narrow line between expression strong US support for proposal and pressing issue so hard as to risk killing it entirely’.15 These, on the other hand, should not obscure the huge differences between NATO and US (or British) national analysis. The differences were perhaps subtle (for, at the end of the day, US and British analysis played a huge role in NATO analysis as well), but nevertheless they were crucial. The Americans, who had constant direct contact with the Soviet regime and various specialized agencies to study it, understood the Soviet Union much better and assumed a more functional attitude towards the Kremlin and its leaders. On the contrary, NATO analysis was the product of an international negotiation, and of the convergence of many national standpoints: this impeded an intellectual breakthrough. As Böker, the head of the regional expert working groups of the Political Advisers, noted to the Americans in 1962, ‘there was some tendency to paper over real differences of view rather than allow dissents to go into final paper, with result that some passages of reports represented least common denominator’.16 Thus, NATO analysis did not, and arguably could not, show the boldness of the US experts in discussing the currents which run beneath the austere surface of the Kremlin. The definite Western policy to move on to détente in 1966 had to be accepted by the US, although NATO assumed a very important role in preparing the West for its many demands. The definite Western policy to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet rift was not devised in NATO, and in a collective manner; it was devised in Washington, by the Nixon–Kissinger team in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This is crucial in assessing the potential (and the limits) of NATO analysis, compared to the abilities of the national policy of a
superpower to undertake radical initiatives, designed to redress the correlation of forces globally. This was a major difference between the analysis of a nation-state and of an alliance. Last but not least, one should take into account the limits of NATO consultation and analysis. The deficits of the process became obvious in this book. As Cleveland, the US Permanent Representative, commented in March 1967, the member-states were democracies, which, after reaching a foreign policy decision through painful processes at home, were reluctant to go through another process of bargaining with fourteen other governments: this ‘is almost more than the human spirit can bear’. Nor was the US blameless on this point, Cleveland continued. ‘But frankly, as an American representative at this table, I have been struck by the relative infrequency with which other NATO governments consult on real problems before they have already decided what to do’.17 This, anyway, was one of Spaak’s real problems in NATO. Lester Pearson also expressed his disappointment for the limited nature of allied consultation. On the other hand, we, as researchers studying the problem in the early twenty-first century, should not allow our own preferences or inflated expectations to colour the picture. It is true that a lot more needed to be done, but political consultation, a novel concept especially in peacetime, developed substantially within the alliance. In its first two decades, NATO proved quite exceptional in going beyond the narrower concepts of the national interest, and in bringing together many sovereign states, thus contributing to the building of the West. It would perhaps be futile to wonder on the extent that the NATO analysis process managed to break ‘ethnocentric’ perceptions and nationalist bias in favour of an international/transnational feeling of common values. In these matters, usually things do not work in terms of a clearly defined (much less an instant) transition from the one state of affairs to the other. This evidently was the case with NATO analysis as well. This is why it should be seen as a part of an ongoing process of the
‘building of the West’. NATO could, arguably, do more; but it would be a mistake to underestimate what it did accomplish. Let us, then, take a step back and try to reach a wider interpretation of NATO analysis. Of course, NATO’s main role was to provide deterrence and security. However, in the context of a long Cold War involving, among others, the forms of organization of human society, the analysis of the non-military capabilities of the adversary was a crucial aspect of the West’s response to the challenge that communism posed. NATO analysis was dominated by the two major characteristics of the organization: NATO’s defensive nature meant that its focus was on the preservation of the balance of power; by its very role, NATO was not seeking to devise an ‘offensive’, political or psychological (much less a military one), which could lead to victory in the Cold War. It could provide the shield which would allow the Americans to win the Cold War, but could not do so (and was not expected to do so) itself. On the other hand, its nature as an alliance of sovereign states meant that its highest priority was to preserve its unity; in an intergovernmental organization, this meant unanimity, a very difficult task. This accounts for the constant, even sometimes irritating, repetition of the calls for unity which dominate the conclusions of the NATO reports. As an alliance of sovereign states, NATO was – and could not but be – a rather complex and slow-moving institution, whose success in achieving its evolving and expanding mission required the help and cooperation of all its members. These fundamental characteristics determined the climate in the NAC and its working groups, as well as the conceptual framework (and thus the inevitable limits) of analysis documents. To put it more simply, these mean that NATO did not have an institutional existence of its own. It was the sum, or the lowest common denominator, of its members. Although its first secretarygenerals (mostly Spaak) would like to see it elevated to an ‘actor’ in international affairs, it never became such a thing. It did not have a ‘policy’ outside its narrow competence of the common defence, and it is debatable if it even had a ‘worldview’ of its own. Its worldview was the point of convergence of the worldviews of its members. But
it is exactly for this reason that NATO – including the process of its analysis of the Soviet enemy – was a crucial instrument of the institutionalization of the post-war West. Institutionalization referred to the West’s participatory character: a conclusion which still stands, even taking into account the unequal nature of the relationship between the US and the European allies. This institutionalization of the Western world was, in itself, a major element of its legitimization, which allowed it to win the Cold War. In this respect, NATO analysis of the Soviet Union does not only mirror NATO perceptions of the opponent, but also its perceptions of itself. The Cold War: so near, and so far away In a book about Western perceptions (both of the Soviet opponent, but, crucially, as has been argued, of the Western ‘self’ as well), one should keep in mind that the Cold War itself is, inevitably, a subject of these perceptions – the perceptions even of us who study it. Understanding a past era in its own terms is a challenge in any form of history writing. Historians strive to avoid hindsight, but also to avoid, in their effort to understand past cleavages, ending up legitimizing them. Perhaps, these dangers are sharper for the current generation of historians of the post-war world, for whom the Cold War is not a sufficiently ‘old’ event. The Cold War is so much contemporary, that if we take out our cellular phones and PCs, and if we are willing to overlook some slight differences in the shape of cars, we could walk in New York or London of the Cold War era without fully understanding that we are in a different time. Many of us were born and raised during the Cold War, and regard its fabric as part of our identities: this is why we get so upset when our students, born in the 1990s, so easily misunderstand its fundamentals.18 In Star Trek terms, sometimes we act as if we were the children of the Cold War, exiled in another timeline. On the other hand, hindsight, triumphalism or historical arrogance place additional traps. Sometimes, we tend to look down to the assumptions of that era, when it was taken for granted that the
survival of social systems presupposed prevalence, and when issues – strategic, political, economic or ideological – were often (though not always) sketched in terms of a zero-sum game. Still, the Cold War world was a relentless place. Perhaps the Western statesmen of those days were seeing the dangers more clearly than us, who can afford to be more detached and relaxed, exactly because ‘we now know’. The people of that time did not know the end of their story, and there is nothing to suggest that this end was predetermined or inevitable. It could go either way, and it was the West’s ability to deal with challenges – strategic, but also economic, social and political – that brought about this particular outcome. This is, perhaps, the most important conclusion of this book. Research on NATO analysis provides further justification of the thesis that the West prevailed in the Cold War, not only because it could deal with the strategic dilemma, but also because it proved more capable of dealing with the problems of modernity, namely, with the crisis of legitimization. It managed to do so, because it was politically conscious and value-oriented. For Cold War statesmen and analysts, the Cold War called for political, economic and social answers; Western identity was a precondition of survival, and NATO was not only a military tool, but also a pivotal element in the shaping of this Western identity. In essence, this book studies a process – understanding the Other – in which this feeling of belonging to the West was instrumental, exactly because this Other existed. I wonder if sometimes, in our days, we miss this – not the Other, but the stimulus for a comprehensive and progressive response to problems. Notes 1 John Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, 2nd edition (London and Sidney: Pan Books, 1975), p. 65. 2 See also Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, ‘Images of the Adversary: NATO Assessments of the Soviet Union, 1953–1964’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 11/2 (2009), pp. 110–12. 3 FRUS, 1955–7, XXVI, NSC, 234th meeting, 27 January 1955, p. 10. 4 FRUS, 1964–8, XIV, Wilson (Deputy Director, USIA) to Director Rowan, 1 June 1964, p. 77.
5 FRUS, 1952–4, VIII, memorandum (Merchant) to Dulles, 10 August 1954, p. 1246. 6 See also Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: an Economic History of the USSR from 1945 (London: Longman, 2003), p. 6. 7 NATO/CM(65)88, ‘Economic Review of Eastern European Countries and the SovietOccupied Zone of Germany’, 22 October 1965. 8 See Seweryn Bialer, ‘The Political System’, Robert W. Campbell, ‘The Economy’ and Adam B. Ulam, ‘The World Outside’, in Robert F. Byrnes (ed.), After Brezhnev: Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980s (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), pp. 1– 67, 68–124 and 345–422 respectively. 9 David G. Engerman, ‘The Romance of Economic Development and New Histories of the Cold War’, Diplomatic History, 28/1 (2004), p. 50. 10 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 68. 11 TNA/FO 371/128995/6, minute (Gallagher), 1 March 1957. 12 NARA, RG 59, Rusk to Paris, 11 March 1965, Central Files 1964–6, NATO 3, Box 3270. 13 TNA/FO 371/106529/5, Mason to Broadmead, 12 March 1953. 14 See, for example, Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, ‘Suez kai Huggaria: he Proslipsi tis Crisis stin Hellada’ [Suez and Hungary: the Reception of the Crisis in Greece], Market Without Frontiers (Athens) 12 (2007), pp. 324–47. 15 NARA, RG 59, Farley to State Department, 18 July 1967, Central Files 1967–9, Pol 3 NATO, Box 2355. 16 NARA, RG 59, Durbrow to State Department, 30 November 1962, 375/11–3062, Box 640. 17 NARA, RG 59, Cleveland to State Department, 8 March 1967, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO, Box 1584. 18 See for example John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: a New History (New York: Penguin, 2005), p. x.
List of sources Unpublished A NATO NATO Archives, Brussels, International Staff, 1949–69 C[-]-R records of NAC meetings (1949–52) C[-]-D documents submitted to NAC (1949–52) D-R records of the Council Deputies meetings (1949–52) D-D documents submitted to the Council Deputies (1949–52) CVR verbatim records of the NAC ministerial meetings (1952–69) CR records of the NAC meetings (1952–69) CM memoranda submitted to the NAC (1952–69) PO Private Office of the General Secretary (1955–69) AC/2 Political Working Group (1951–2) AC/10 Atlantic Community Committee (1951–2) AC/34 Working Group on Trends in Soviet Policy (taken over by AC/119 after 1957) AC/89 Working Group on Comparison of Economic Trends in the NATO and Soviet Countries AC/119 Committee of Political Advisers (1957–69) AC/127 Committee of Economic Advisers (1957–69) AC/214 Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (1962) APAG Atlantic Policy Advisory Group CT Committee of Three (1956) TSP Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy (1956) TYP Ten-Year Planning (1960–1) B British The National Archives, Kew Gardens, London
FO 371 Foreign Office, General Political correspondence FCO 28 Foreign and Commonwealth Office FCO 41 Foreign and Commonwealth Office C United States National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. State Department papers RG 59, Central Decimal Files 1950–4 and 1955–9, 740.5: Internal Political and National Defense Affairs, Europe RG 59, Central Decimal Files, 1960–3, 375: Major Western European Regional Organization – North Atlantic Organization RG 59, Central Files 1963, Pol 3 NATO; NATO 3 RG 59, Central Files 1964–6, Def 4 NATO; NATO 3; NATO 8–2 RG 59, Central Files 1967–9, Def 4 NATO; Pol 2 NATO; Pol 3 NATO; NATO 3 Published A NATO Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949–1954, at www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/index.htm, assessed 12 February 2011 Lord Ismay, Report to the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC in Bonn, ‘NATO: April 1952–April 1957’, May 1957, in www.nato.int/archives/ismayrep/index.htm, assessed 12 February 2011 NATO, Research Section, ‘The Evolution of NATO Political Consultation, 1949–1962’, 2 May 1963, NATO/NHO/63/1, www.nato.int/archives/docu/d630502e.htm, assessed 12 February 2011 Committee of the Three Wise Men, 1956, NATO Archives, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/75548.htm, assessed 28 September 2013
Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report), 1967, NATO Archives, www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/80830.htm, assessed 28 September 2013 B United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, (FRUS), Washington DC 1952–4, V part 1 (1983) 1952–4, VIII (1988) 1955–7, IV (1986) 1955–7, XXV (1990) 1955–7, XXVI (1989) 1958–60, VII, part 1 (1993) 1958–60, X, part 1 (1993) 1961–3, V (1998) 1961–3, XIII (1994) 1964–8, XIII (1995) 1964–8, XIV (2001) 1964–8, XVII (1996) 1969–76, XII (2006) 1969–76, XXIX (2007) 1969–76, XXXIX (2007)
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Index Acheson, Dean 26, 30, 31 Achilles, Theodore C. 22 Adenauer, Konrad 38 Administration, NATO 14–15 Agriculture, Soviet 42, 44, 77, 93, 97, 133, 139, 140, 181; Chinese 136 Aid, Soviet to the Third world 104–5, 107, 148–9; administration 56; comparison of 146; Western 108 Albania 22, 96–7, 179 Alphand, Hervé 22 Analysis, NATO: adjustments to process 126; areas of success and failure 195–6; back ground to NATO’s 11; change of tone 133; conflicting aims 194; focus of NATO 6; function of 199–200; intellectual challenge of 193–4; limitations 204; national 204; and NATO 199– 206; perception of Eastern Europe 198; perceptions of Soviet Union 196–8; quality of 108; restructuring 56–61; structural reform 71–6; understanding in context 205–6; understanding the Other 194–9; United States’ use 3; US domination 203–4; usefulness 200–2 analytical failures 51, 84–90, 98–104, 127 Annual Political Appraisals 60, 74 arms sales 55 arms sales and trade, Soviet 104–5, 106 Aron, Raymond 167 Atlantic Community Committee 24; impact on advisory committees 125 Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (APAG) 108–11; on developing world 149; on economic reform 141; ‘the future of the Alliance in relation to long-term trends in Europe and North America’ 183; ‘problems of balance within the Atlantic Alliance in the 1970s’ 164–5; reports on détente strategy 170–1; role of 124–5; on Sino-Soviet split 131; on Soviet economy 134; on Soviet foreign policy 129; on wars of national liberation 147 Austrian State Treaty 1955 39 authoritarianism 56 Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos 83 Balkan study 179 Ball, George 151 Bandung area 55 Beria, Lavrentii 37 Berlin 81–2, 88, 89–91 Berlin Wall 90 Beyen, Johan 34 Big Three drafting 35–6
Blankenhorn, Herbert 50 Bohlen, Charles 86–7 Böker, Alexander 101, 124, 125, 204 Brandt, Willy 177 Brezhnev doctrine 177, 178–9 Brezhnev, Leonid 127, 128, 145 Britain: focus on APAG 126; role in NATO 3–4, 13–14; stronger influence 26–7; threat to influence 85–7 British Global Strategy Paper 1952 24, 30 British Russia Committee 34, 36 Brosio, Manlio 129, 138, 148, 151–2, 153–4, 173, 186 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 7, 94, 143, 165–6 Bucharest Declaration 145 Bulganin, Nikolai 48–9 Bulgaria 22, 53, 137, 142, 143, 144 Burgess, Randolph W. 83 Burrows, Sir Bernard 177, 178 Casardi, Alberico 52, 72, 74, 86, 89 Central Europe 180 centralization, Soviet Union 77 Chervenkov, Vulko 53 China 100; agriculture and industry 136; contexts of study 98; development 45; and East– West trade, spring 1953 31–4; economic projections 79, 142; economy 135; French recognition of PRC 131; ideology 132; international activity 98–9; NATO’s analysis 12; offshore islands 100; poor intelligence 98; in Soviet policy 30; Sub-committee on Soviet Economic policy report 136; see also Sino-Soviet relationship China–United States confrontation 130 Chinese Five-Year Plan 1952 32 Chou Enlai 132 Churches, Eastern Europe 96 Cleveland, Harlan 123, 152, 153, 204 cohesion: NATO 56–7, 80, 82–3; Warsaw Pact 145 Cold War: changing character of 57; expectations of length of 25, 30; reflection on 206–7 collective leadership, Soviet Union 37 collectivization 93 colonial territories, independence 107 COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) 96, 97, 136, 181–2 Committee of Economic Advisers 60, 72, 78–80, 93; on agriculture 133; on China 98; demographic trends 137; on developing world 135; on Eastern Europe 144–5; economic comparison 1963 134–5; economic projections 142; impact of APAG 125; on oil 107; on Soviet trade 105 Committee of Political Advisers 60, 71–2, 81; 1957–62 78; analytical failures 84–91; Balkan study 179; on China 98–100; on détente 82–3, 84–5; on Eastern Europe 92, 94–6, 150; impact of APAG 125; on Poland 94–6; recording of disagreements 111; on Sino-Soviet split 101–4; Soviet trends report 1960 100–1 Committee of Technical Advisers 51, 56, 60, 108 Committee of Three Wise Men 56–61
Committee on Soviet Economic Policy 46, 72, 104, 106 Communications System 174 Communism: doctrinal differences 102; as monolithic 101; objectives 83; threat of 59 communist aggression, expectations of 198–9 comparison studies: 1963 134–5; 1967 180–1; economic growth, 1954–6 41–8; economic growth 1966 141–2; limitations 42, 44; long-term economic growth 78–80; March 1965 137–9; responses to 43, 45 compartmentalization of analysis 108, 124 conservatism, Soviet foreign policy 182–3 consultation 13, 41, 51, 56; attitudes to 89; expansion 75; extent of 73–4; importance of 60; limitations 204; strengthening 60, 125–6, 153, 186 contingency studies 177–80 cooperation: between advisory committees 72; cultural 60; economic and political 58–9, 60; European 79; flexibility vs. unanimity 74; non-military aspects 60, 75; political 74, 75; scientific 60; technical 60 Cosmelli, Giuseppe 36, 39–40, 48, 51, 52 Council Deputies, first report 21–3 Council in Permanent Session on East–West relations, report 1966 152–3 Council Operations 173–4 Couve de Murville, Maurice 84 CPSU congresses 26, 29, 30; 1956 48–51, 56, 104 CPSU, institutionalization 76 credits 149, 151, 154, 166 crisis management 173 Cuba, as burden to Soviet Union 134, 146 Cuban missile crisis 91, 129 cultural cooperation 60 cultural relations 169 Cultural Revolution 132 Cumming, Hugh 26–7, 34 ‘Current Appraisal of Soviet Strength,’ 1954 36 Cyprus 54 Czechoslovakia 22, 97, 106, 135, 137, 143, 144, 145, 172–6, 180; invasion 172–3, 174–6, 182 Davis, Dick 27 de Gasperi, Alcide 24 de Gaulle, Charles 75, 76, 82, 123, 151, 166, 167 de-Stalinization 49, 76; Chinese attitude to 99; Eastern Europe 52; responses to 61–2 de Staercke, André 50, 54, 174 decentralization, Soviet Union 78 defence, and détente 163–5 defence cooperation 59 defence expenditure, Soviet Union 47, 141, 182 demographic trends, Soviet Union 137 détente 82–5; acceptance of 163; decision to pursue 185; and defence 163–5; difficulties of 169–70; East–West negotiations 183–6; as essential to NATO 168–9; European 123–4; expanding notions of 170–1; importance of unity 130; incentives for 180–1; moves toward
152–4; as new strategy 154; opportunities of 150; perceived limitations 184–5; planning for 180–6; Soviet motives 168; as strategy 169, 180–3 deterrence 24, 57, 58–9, 179 developing world: and communist challenge 145–9; communist economic activities 148–9; Communist penetration 146–7; comparison study 1966 141–2; diversification 147–9; influencing 79–80; NATO interest in 12; NATO reliance on 56; Soviet economic offensive 40, 49, 104–8; Soviet foreign policy 104–6; Soviet policy 88; Soviet problems and opportunities 1963–4 145–7; Soviet setbacks 134; technical aid 146–7, 148–9; trade dependence 142; Western relations with 135 development, post-Stalin Soviet Union 37 disarmament 81, 85; nuclear 39 distrust, of peace offensive 38 Ditchley Park meeting 126, 169 diversification, developing world 147–9 domino theory 148 donor states 50 drafting process: control of 35–6; sharing 73 Dubcek, Alexander 172 Dulles, John Foster 31, 34, 41, 45–6, 49–50, 51, 55, 77 early years of NATO: 1951–2 21–5; 1952–3 26–34 East Germany 97, 143, 145, 172; discussions 21; NATO aims 55; perceptions of 93; prospects for change 52–3; riots 1953 38, 39 East–West cooperation 153–4 East–West negotiations, preparation for 183–6 East–West relations 129–30; 1962–7 150–4; 1968–9 180–6; Harmel Report 1967 163–71 East–West trade: discussion of 150–2; 1953 report 32–3; increased 81; post-Stalin 38 Eastern Europe: 1957–9 92–6; 1960–2 96–8; as burden to Soviet Union 134; categorizations 92–3; Churches 96; crises 52–6; de-Stalinization 52; differentiation between states 183–4; discussions 21–2; diversification 172; division of labour 106; economic problems 97, 143; economic vulnerability 178; fall of Khrushchev 144; focus on economies 144–5; industrial development 93; leadership changes 53; legitimacy 55; limits of Soviet control 95–6; nationalism 143–4; NATO’s analysis 12; perceptions of 92–3, 198; policy towards 150; political confidence 96; relationships with 185; reports on 94; scope of analysis 92; Soviet control 142–3; Soviet exploitation 93; as Soviet priority 80; Soviet threat to 176–7, 178; stability 143; support for Moscow 143; trade 150–1, 153, 154; trade exploitation 33 economic cooperation, in NATO 60 economic development: in NATO 60; as NATO’s role 31 economic growth: 1954–6 41–8; 1957–62 77; effects on world market 105; long-term 78– 80; pace of 140 economic monitoring, global South 50, 51 economic offensive 40, 49, 104–6; counter-measures 108; evaluation of threat 106–8 economic reforms, Soviet Union 181; 1965 140 economies, use of resources 45, 46 Eden, Anthony 28, 30 education 106, 147, 149 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 31, 82, 195
Erkin, Feridun Kemal 91 Europe, economic importance 43 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 60 European cooperation 79 European Defence Community (EDC) 22 European Economic Community (EEC) 79, 151 European Recovery Program (ERP) 8 European settlement, vision for 168, 169 European Treaty of Friendship 81 Exercise Coordination Working Group 173–4 Far East, reports on 148 Fenoaltea, Sergio 35, 36 five-power committee 84 flexibility vs. unanimity 74 flexible response 163 focus of NATO 4 food shortages 97 France: loss of influence 126; recognition of PRC 131; withdrawal from NATO command 163, 164 GDR see East Germany geographical focus 3 German rearmament 24, 39, 41 Germany, and détente 153 Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe 145 global South 50, 51 Gomulka, Wladyslaw 53, 94–5, 96 Great Leap Forward 98, 136 Greece: military coup 124, 164–5; participation 202–3 Gregh, François-Didier 72, 74, 108, 125, 136, 137 Gromyko, Andrei 80–1, 127, 179 Harmel, Pierre 163–4 Harmel Report 1967 124, 163–71, 180; context 163–4; NATO’s political role 165–70; rapporteurs 165–8; Subgroup One 166, 168–9; Sub-group Two 166; sub-groups 165–6 Herter, Christian 83 Holmes, Julius C. 57 Hooper, Robin 14, 85, 86, 87, 109, 125, 126 hot war, danger of 25, 30 Hoyer-Miller, Sir Frederick 14, 22, 26, 34 ‘Hundred Flowers’ campaign 99 Hungary 21–2, 52, 53–4, 55, 80, 92, 97, 143, 145 ideology 5–7, 97; China 132 imbalance, within NATO 164–5 India, Khrushchev’s visit 40
industrial development, Soviet Union 42, 46–7, 77, 105, 107, 133, 181; demands of 39; China 136 information collection 12–13 information policy 60 information sharing 13, 125, 174 intelligence failures 48–9, 51 intelligence sharing 174 intercontinental missiles 81 ‘interim report on political co-operation’ 74–5 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) 81 internal politics, Soviet Union 86, 109, 22, 29, 36–8, 48–9, 76–8, 127–8 internal tensions 28, 35, 56–7, 82–4, 88, 123–6; see also intra-NATO crisis; intra-NATO disputes International Staff 14–15 intra-NATO crisis, nature of 123 intra-NATO disputes, settlement mechanism 60 intra-NATO relations 82 invasion, fear of 173 Ismay, Lord 14, 15, 26, 32, 35, 41, 50, 51, 54, 57 Jaenicke, Joachim 125, 126, 175, 178 Johnson, Lyndon 152 Kennan, George 27, 102 Kennedy, John F. 76, 89 Khrushchev, Nikita 37, 40, 48, 49, 76–80; attitudes towards 77; effects of fall 129–30; fall of 127–8, 144; global role 88; NATO expectations of 85; unpredictability 81–2 Kissinger, Henry 4, 8, 180, 185 Kohler, Foy D. 165–6 Köprülü, Fuat 30, 34 Korea, stalemate 24 Korean armistice 38 Korean War 15; Sino-Soviet relationship 32 Kosygin, Alexei 127, 140 labour distribution 140 labour force, Soviet Union 137 labour mobility 137 Laloy, Jean 27, 87, 109, 110, 126 Lange, Halvard 24, 31, 34, 41, 50, 58, 84, 91 Latin America 149 leaks to press 36 legitimacy, Eastern Europe 55, 96 legitimization 109; Cold war as crisis of 5–7; NATO as instrument of 8–9; role of NATO 167; of Soviet regime 54–5, 92, 197 Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman 173 living standards 76 London Accords 1954 39
Long Telegram 25 Long-Term Planning Exercise 108 lowering of tension 39 Luns, Joseph 84, 91 Macmillan, Harold 88 Maestrone, Frank E. 186 Malenkov, Georgi 29, 37–8, 46 Malenkov–Khrushchev ‘duel’ 39 malpractice, Soviet public life 29 Mao Zedong 12, 32, 99, 102, 132 Marshall Plan 8–9 Martino, Gaetano 58 Mason, Heath 87 ‘massive retaliation’ strategy 81 Mediterranean 179–80 Middle East 55, 80, 104, 106, 145, 148, 180, 184 military aid 83, 104–5 military capabilities 47, 141; comparison 24; lessened emphasis on 79; reports of 23, 29; weapons modernization 83 military information, disclosure 22 military training 147 monthly reports, inception of 48 Morgan, Hugh 22, 26, 27 Multilateral Force (MLF) 76 multilateralism 169 Murray, Peter 86–7 mutual suspicion 163 Nagy, Imry 53 national analysis 204 national experts 88 national identities 97 national roads to socialism 143–5, 150 NATO: achievements 205; call for re-launch 50; defence dogma 152; evolving viewpoints 199; French withdrawal 163, 164; as observer 3; perceptions of Soviet Union 196–8; reform 1956–7 57; shifting emphasis 200; structural change 163–4; as subject of study 9– 15; understanding in context 205–6 NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Programme 60 NATO fund 50 NATO Political Committee 172 NATO reports: areas of success and failure 195–6; evolution of 200; nature of 194–5; usefulness 200–2 NATO’s problems, identifying 172–7 nature, of NATO 9–11 neutralism 39, 40, 80, 109 New Deal 5 Newton William M. 124
Nicholls, Sir John 126 Nixon, Richard 180, 186 non-military aspects, of NATO 24 non-military cooperation 60, 75 North Atlantic Council (NAC): biannual sessions 1; creation of administrative structure 14– 15; decision making 1, 3; meetings 1951 24; permanent session 26; tours d’orizon 41, 73 Northern Europe 180 nuclear capabilities 81 nuclear-free zones 81, 83 nuclear stalemate 104 oil 106–7 out-of-area contingency planning 178 out-of-area problems 12, 75, 83; Harmel Report 1967 165 out-of-area studies 73 Paris summit 1957 81, 84 participation 201–3 Patijn, C. L. 165 peace offensive 35, 38 peaceful coexistence 56, 184–5; theory of 147 Pearson Committee see Atlantic Community Committee Pearson, Lester B. 24, 34, 41, 51, 58, 61, 204 ‘Peoples’ Friendship University’ 106 People’s Republic of China (PRC) see China permanent Council, focus of 126 Permanent Representatives, on East–West relations 184–5 Pinay A. 45 Pineau Plan 51, 56, 108 Poland 22, 52, 53, 92, 94–5, 97, 143, 145 policy continuity, post-Stalin Soviet Union 37 policy making, as national competence 60 political appraisal, of NATO 60 political consultation 41, 50, 57, 82, 85 political cooperation 74, 75 political roles, of NATO 9–11, 165–70 polycentrism 143, 176 post-Stalin analysis 1953 36–7 post-Stalin era, 1953–5 34–48 post-war security crisis, as cause of Cold War 4–5 Poznan riots 53 Prague Spring 172 ‘problems of balance within the Atlantic Alliance in the 1970s’ 164–5 procedural changes 88 propaganda 39, 53, 54, 137–9 purpose, of NATO 10–11 Rapacki plan 81, 95
rapporteurs, Harmel Report 1967 165–8 ‘rectification’ campaign 99 regime continuity 49 regional groups 75 Reilly, Sir Patrick 86 relationships, within NATO 9; see also internal tensions Report of the Three 1956 56–61 report production 12–13 reports: compartmentalization 108; content of 22; object of 4–9; representativeness 72–3; shift of focus 36, 50 resources: access to 56; allocation of 182; control of 80; use of 45, 46 revolutionary democracy 147–9 Reykjavik Signal 170 rhetoric of liberation 53 Roberts, James A. 173 Roberts, Sir Frank 2, 14, 75, 84 Romania 21, 83, 145, 179 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 5 Rostow, Walt 109, 110, 125, 131–2 Rusk, Dean 76, 91, 125, 153 satellite nations see Eastern Europe Schuman Plan 15 Schumann, Robert 30 Schutz, Klaus 165–6 scientific cooperation 60 Secretaries-General 14 security challenges 5, 10 Selwyn Lloyd, John 50, 51 Senior Political Committee 186; on East–West relations 184–5 Seven Year Plan 136, 140–1 Seventh Five Year Plan 77–8 Seydoux, François 131 Shepilov, Dmitri 80 Shuckburgh, Evelyn 14, 74–5, 85–7, 123 Sino-Soviet relationship 85; 1952 report 25, 31–4; acknowledgement of split 130–3, 146; analytical failure 98–104; cooperation 40; risk of armed conflict 132; split 96, 97, 98, 101– 4, 130; see also China Six Day War 148 Skaug, Arne 26 social development, as NATO’s role 31 Socialist Commonwealth 179 Sonnenfeldt, Helmut 165–6 Soviet bloc: categorization 181; cohesion 80; NATO’s analysis 11 Soviet economy: 1957–62 76–80; 1963–5 133–7; comparison study 1965 137–9; failure to reform 1965–7 139–42; reforms 1965 140; see also comparison studies Soviet foreign policy 184–5; 1952 report 25; 1963–7 129–30; analysis 1957–60 80–4; conservatism 182–3; Eastern Europe 52–6, 176–7; effects of death of Stalin 33–4;
evaluation of threat 106–8; global activity 104–6; global South 50, 51; indecisiveness 90; instability 87–8; perceived aims 39; perceptions of 198–9; post-Stalin, 1953–5 38–41; shift of focus 50; South Asia 40; uncertainty 177–8; working group 1952 26–30 Soviet rule: resistance to 94–5; unpopularity 93, 94, 96 Soviet Union: ‘aims and means’ 24; coup 127; difficulties of monitoring 22; first report on 22–3; as liberator 107; limits of control 95–6; military capabilities 23, 29; offer to join NATO 35; stability 1957–62 76–80; stability 1963–7 127 Spaak, Paul-Henri 41, 50, 74–5, 83, 84, 166–8, 204; resignation 89 special advisors 57 special report 1960 87 specialized studies: background to 71; range of 73 Spofford, Charles M 22 Sputnik 81 Stalin, Joseph 4, 29, 33–4, 199 statistics, reliability of 42, 44, 98, 132 Steel, Sir Christopher 14, 57–8 Stephanopoulos, Stefanos 31 Stewart, Michael 177 Stikker, Dirk 24, 76, 89, 91, 110, 125, 126 Stoessel, Walter 44 Stoica Plan 81 strategic arms 184 structure, early years of NATO 21 Sub-committee on Soviet Economic Policy 139; on developing world 145–6; economic projections 141–2; report on China 136 Suez crisis 54, 55, 80 summit 1955 41; 1960 84–5 supranational cooperation 143–4 Supreme Economic Council 127 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) 174 suspicion 163 Sutton, Nigel E. P. 15 technical aid, Soviet to the Third World 106, 146–7, 148–9 technical cooperation 60 Ten-Year Planning exercise 6, 75, 108 Test Ban Treaty 129, 131 ‘the future of the Alliance in relation to long-term trends in Europe and North America’ 183 ‘The Thaw in Eastern Europe’ 52, 53–4 Third World: use of term 141; see also developing world threat perception 4 Three Wise Men 167 Tito, Josef 53, 95 totalitarian states, transition of power in 34–5 totalitarianism: and collectivism 37; and economic growth 43, 45, 46, 48, 61, 135; threat of 4; and use of resources 11 tours d’orizon, NAC 41, 73
trade: disagreements over 151–2; East–West 32–3, 150–1, 153, 154; view of Permanent Representatives 153 trade dependence, developing world 142 trade development 38, 104–5 training 147 transition of power 34–5, 36–7 transnational values 8 ‘trends and implications of Soviet policy,’ shift of focus 36 Twentieth Congress 1956 48–51, 56, 104 Twenty Year Plan 78 Ulbricht, Walter 88, 96 unanimity vs. flexibility 74 United States: attitude towards Khrushchev 77; crucial role 76; disagreements with policy 124; dominance 203–4; leadership and influence 8–9, 126; military aid 83; on Sino-Soviet split 103; working group 57 unity 55; calls for 10, 49, 81, 96, 129–30, 131, 171; and defence 163; importance of 61, 169; major prerequisite 200; strengthening 57, 58–9 van Vredenburgh, H. 42 van Zeeland, Paul 24, 34 Vietnam 123, 124, 130, 145, 147–9, 163, 184 Vincent, A. 125, 175 von Brentano, Heinrich 45, 51, 83, 92 war by proxy 25 war-sustaining capabilities 79 wars of national liberation 147 Warsaw Pact 9, 39–40, 172; consultation within 145; military manoeuvres 90 Washington Treaty 10, 14, 167 Watson, John Hugh Adam 165–6 weapons 47 weapons modernization 83 weekly political notes 173 West: legitimacy 8; threat perception 4 West Germany: accession to NATO 39; and Eastern Europe 143; increased role 126; solidarity towards 169 Western strategic embargo, effects of 33 wheat, imports and exports 139 wheat production 133–4 Wilson, Harold 174 Wigny, P. 83 working groups: Comparison of Economic Trends in NATO and European Communist Countries 43–4; monthly meetings 48; paper on China 31–4; on trends of Soviet policy 26–30, 33–4, 49, 52; United States 57 Xanthopoulos-Palamas, Christos 131, 138
Yugoslavia 95, 145, 179; discussions 21 Yugov, Anton 53 Zorlu, Fatin Rüştü 83