The Nagorno-Karabakh Confict

This book presents a comprehensive overview of the Nagorno-Karabakh
confict, the long-running dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over
the Armenian-majority region of Azerbaijan. It outlines the historical development of the dispute, explores the political and social aspects of the
confict, examines the wars over the territory including the war of 2020
which resulted in a signifcant Azerbaijani victory, and discusses the international dimensions.
M. Hakan Yavuz is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Utah,
USA.
Michael M. Gunter is a Professor of Political Science at Tennessee Technological University, USA.

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The Nagorno-Karabakh Confict
Historical and Political Perspectives

Edited by M. Hakan Yavuz and
Michael M. Gunter

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First published 2023
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© 2023 selection and editorial matter, M. Hakan Yavuz and Michael
M. Gunter; individual chapters, the contributors
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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
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ISBN: 978-1-032-19856-9 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-19858-3 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-26120-9 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209
Typeset in Times New Roman
by codeMantra

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Contents

Preface

ix

Introduction

1

M. H A K A N YAV U Z A N D M IC H A E L M. GU N T E R

PART I

Conceptual and Historical Origins

13

1

15

Karabakh: Historical Background
K A M A L A I M R A N L I - L OW E

2

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan and a Road to
Autonomy in Nagorno-Karabakh (1920–1923)

34

JA M I L H A SA N L I

3

Armenian Irredentist Nationalism and Its
Transformation into the Mass Karabakh Movement
“MIATSUM” (1965–1988)

59

E L DA R A BBA S OV

4

The Orientalizing of Azerbaijanis and
the Armenia–Azerbaijan Confict
FA R I D SH A F I Y E V

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88

vi

Contents

PART II

The First Karabakh War and the Consequences
5

Self-Determination or Territorial Integrity?
International Legal/Political Doctrines in Opposition
and Their Implications for Karabakh

113

115

M IC H A E L M. GU N T E R

6

The UN Security Council Resolutions on
Nagorno-Karabakh: View from Azerbaijan

130

SH A M K H A L A BI L OV A N D C E Y H U N M A H M U DLU

7

The Politics of Ceasefre and the Occupation

150

A R A Z A SL A N L I

8

The Nagorno-Karabakh Confict: International Law
Appraisal

168

FA R H A D M I R Z AY E V

9

International Law and the Changes in the Status Quo
of the Nagorno-Karabakh Confict in 2020

203

K A M A L M A K I L I -A L I Y E V

PART III

The Second Karabakh War and the Consequences

221

10 How Do We Explain Victory? The Karabakh
Campaign of 2020

223

E DWA R D J. E R IC K S ON

11 The Causes and Consequences of the Second Karabakh
War: September 27, 2021–November 10, 2021
A L I A SK E ROV A N D GU BA D I BA D O GH LU

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245

Contents

vii

PART IV

Foreign Policy and the Karabakh War

273

12 Turkish Foreign Policy and the Karabakh Confict

275

M. H A K A N YAV U Z

13 Georgia and the Second Karabakh War

303

E M I L AV DA L I A N I

14 The Role of the United States in the Armenia–
Azerbaijan Confict

321

E SM I R A JA FA ROVA

15 Russia’s Role in the Karabakh Confict

341

OR H A N GA FA R L I

16 Israel’s Foreign Policy toward the Karabakh Confict

366

M IC H A E L B . BI SH KU

17 Iran’s Policies Toward the Karabakh Confict

381

M E SI AGH A M A H A M M A DI A N D VA SI F H USE Y NOV

18 The Arab States and the Karabakh War

402

BR E N D ON J. CA N NON

19 The Nagorno-Karabakh War: Diaspora Politics in
Canadian Foreign Policy

420

OZ AY M E H M E T

439
447

Notes on Contributors
Index

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Preface

Nagorno-Karabakh constitutes a frozen, controversial, post-Soviet, ethnic
confict of great importance for regional and even international politics. As
such, it is also susceptible to the perception of bias and the arousal of strong
feelings on both sides. Not only should bias be avoided, but so too its mere
perception if at all possible. This is diffcult because people, no matter how
unbiased, can be perceived by others as being on “one side” or the other.
Thus, the editors recognize that this is a subject that gives rise to strong
feelings on both sides. They have done all they can to be even handed. Although they recognize that with some people perceptions of bias might still
exist, they feel that any such views are ill-founded. Indeed, they believe that
this volume will contribute to a better understanding of the entire situation.
In preparing the following chapters, the editors also have endeavored to
let their accomplished, multi-lingual authors speak for themselves as much
as possible instead of trying to standardize their English-language, literary styles. Accordingly, as long as these ensuing analyses were written in
readily understandable, objective English, the editors chose to leave them as
is, instead of engaging in ceaseless rehashing. This also means that all the
chapters do not have the same documentation style as long as they remain
consistent in whatever one they employ. Finally, of course, any resulting
errors in all this are the fault of the editors alone.

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Introduction
M. Hakan Yavuz and Michael M. Gunter

The struggle over the Karabakh region of Azerbaijan is about an important,
long-running, frozen/unfrozen confict between the Armenians and Turkic
Azerbaijanis over a relatively small, but symbolically important area in
the Caucasus. Thus, Karabakh has signifcant relevance for ethnic confict
studies in general, post-Soviet confict studies in particular, and great power
struggles involving Russia, Turkey, Iran, and even further afoot including
among others, the United States and the European Union. In addition, the
confict involves horrifc problems for refugees and IDPs. Karabakh also
has implications for the international oil and gas market transfer from
Azerbaijan (rich in oil from time immemorial) to outlets around the world.
Continuing confict over Karabakh might damage important international energy markets seeking to operate in, from, and to Baku. As such,
the oil and gas market and commerce in general demand a solution to the
Karabakh problem since continuation of the confict or even uncertainty
regarding it would jeopardize oil and gas transport. The most recent war
over Karabakh (September–November 2020) was won by Azerbaijan in part
by using drones as a very important weapon. This implies that drones might
be a very critical ingredient of fghting future wars. Thus, this interdisciplinary reference on Karabakh will impact many subject areas that are widely
taught and researched. This study’s importance also lies in its originality
because, in addition to its broad, inter-, and multi-disciplinary purview, it
will be the frst one written subsequent to the paradigmatic-changing war
fought in September–November 2020. Earlier studies are now more than a
decade old, and thus dated in their analyses. This new study will remedy this
gap in our knowledge.
However, before proceeding any further, let us note that the Caucasus—
where Karabakh is situated—lies between the Black and Caspian Seas,
athwart Europe, and Asia, at the northern edge of the Middle East, and
near one of the ends of the fabled Silk Road where today China’s imaginatively bold Belt and Road Initiative partially traverses. An incredible ethnic
and linguistic diversity lie within this rather small, but geographically
divided and largely mountainous region. Indeed, depending on how they are
counted, there are as many as 50–200 different ethnic groups and 5 different
DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-1
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2

M. Hakan Yavuz and Michael M. Gunter

language families including Indo-European (Armenian being one small
example) and Altaic (Azerbaijani being a larger representative).1
Karabakh itself is a small, landlocked area of varying sizes, depending
on whose precise narrative one hears, in the South Caucasus, now usually
referred to as Transcaucasia as distinct from the Russian North Caucasus
or Ciscaucasia. Many would divide Karabakh into three areas: Nagorno
(Mountainous) Karabakh, Lowland Karabakh to the south, and the eastern slopes of the Zangezur Mountains. Karabakh often is equated with
the administrative boundaries of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Russian
oblast of 4,400 square kilometers/ 1,700 square miles. However, the area of
the entire region comprises some 8,223 square kilometers or 3,175 miles.2
The region has been known as Karabakh (Black Garden) since the thirteenth century.
It is the smaller part known today as Nagorno-Karabakh, with its ethnic
Armenian majority, that was granted autonomy as an enclave within
Turkic-majority Azerbaijan in the early years of the Soviet Union. As long
as the Soviet Union remained strong and unifed, this arrangement worked.
However, as Ernest Gellner, the renowned scholar of nationalism, warned,
“not all nationalisms can be satisfed … because the satisfaction of some
spells the frustration of others.”3 When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991
and the Armenians won the ensuing war against Azerbaijan over Karabakh, the unrecognized de facto state that the Armenians eventually carved
out not only included the entire area of greater Karabakh, but seven more
surrounding districts of Azerbaijan. In fact, the Armenian-occupied area
of Nagorno-Karabakh covered 4,400 square kilometers, and with the
occupied territories it came to approximately 12,000 square kilometers,
representing 14% of Azerbaijan’s total area. Before the First Karabakh
War, some 120,000 Armenians lived in the Karabakh region. An estimated
700,000 Azeris were forced from Karabakh and the occupied territories as a
consequence of the invasion of the Azerbaijani territories. At the end of the
First Karabakh War, Armenian forces completely ethnically cleansed Azerbaijanis from their homes. The same Karabakh confict was the reason that
more than 400,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan and 250,000 Azerbaijanis
from Armenia were forced to leave their homes. The war resulted in major
human sufferings on both sides.
The cost of the confict has negatively affected the continuing existence
of Armenian communities across Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis in Armenia.
The occupying Armenian forces declared the Republic of Artsakh (refused
to use its indigenous name of Karabakh since it was an Azerbaijani name
for the region) to deny its Azerbaijani history. Not even the kin-state of Armenia legally recognized this de facto situation whose precedent challenged
the territorial integrity of every state on earth including Azerbaijan. Determined to regain its occupied territory, but long stymied not only by its opponents but its own divisions, Azerbaijan fnally recovered its lost territory in
the war won in 2020. However, illustrating the most recent deadly results of

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Introduction

3

this confict that suddenly unfroze in September–November 2020, Russian
President Vladimir Putin declared “there were more than 4,000 killed in
both countries … including civilians, 8,000 wounded and thousands driven
from their homes.”4
The meanings of the Karabakh region and confict differed signifcantly
between Azerbaijanis and Armenians. For Azerbaijan, the earlier loss of
Karabakh and the defeat in the frst war signifed their national humiliation,
wounded national identity, shattered ideals of territorial integrity, and the
failure of their state project. Azerbaijanis had gauged their state and the
success of the political leadership against the loss of Karabakh and prior
defeat. For Armenians, it symbolized their victory to protect what they saw
as a key historical center and to consolidate Armenian national identity
and state building. Using a longer historical lens, the Armenians saw the
earlier victory as revenge for Armenian massacres, also called “genocide,”
at the hands of the Ottoman Turks in the early twentieth century. Armenia’s
military victory against Azerbaijan emboldened the ties with the diaspora
of Armenian communities. It was an act in which the victim managed to
become victimizer. The Karabakh defeat constantly reminded the Azerbaijanis what they had lost, while the Karabakh victory reminded the
Armenians what they could achieve as they sought a strategy of “new wars,
new territories.” In the prior confict, the victorious Armenian army, fostered
an image of becoming the most powerful army in the Caucasus. Yet, this
military victory also facilitated a continuing fow of Armenians emigrating
to Russia, Europe, and the United States. While Armenia wanted to expand
its borders, many Armenians, especially those who were upper-middle class
and well educated, left their country for good.
The confict between Armenia and Azerbaijan progressed through several
stages. The frst concluded with the 1994 ceasefre agreement. Although
skirmishes and military movements continued along the contact lines, some
experts wrongfully labeled the situation as a “frozen” confict. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of the Minsk Group
assured the status quo in favor of Armenia for more than a quarter of a
century. The main issues with which the Minsk Group was tasked to address,
which were identifed and updated as the Madrid Principles of 2007-09, were
the return of the occupied territories (surrounding Karabakh); the future
status of Nagorno-Karabakh; the return of Azerbaijani refugees; and the
status of the “Lachin Corridor” (connecting Karabakh to Armenia).
During this period, while Armenia attempted to consolidate its military
occupation and aggravate the situation with humiliating rhetoric directed
against their enemy, Azerbaijan deployed its resources to prepare for
an eventual repeat of the war to liberate their territories and resuscitate
their national pride and identity. Azerbaijan cultivated its own rhetoric of
humiliation targeting Armenia. In short, Armenia won the war, but not
the peace and the confict drained resources from both countries. Neither the mediators not the hegemon, mainly Russia, sought to change the

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4

M. Hakan Yavuz and Michael M. Gunter

dynamics of bilateral relations and instead exploited the confict for their
own interests by selling weapons or pitting one side against the other. The
second stage of the confict was triggered as a result of a confrontation
between the two armies on the night of 2 and 3 April 2016. This was the
largest confrontation since the 1994 ceasefre and it lasted for four days.
Azerbaijan had tried repeatedly to unfreeze the confict. Therefore, a key
question to be explored in this book is when and under what conditions
do conficts frozen in tension thaw and unleash a new round of military
activity? Another is how did Armenia’s negative framing of the Azerbaijanis as lazy, backward, unpatriotic, and corrupt, in turn, shape Armenian
military and foreign policies?
The Karabakh Confict also has regional implications. Russia and Iran
have traditionally supported Armenia, whereas Turkey and Israel have
backed Azerbaijan. Zbigniew Brzezinski, among the most prominent
geostrategists of the contemporary era, focused on Western dominance at
the expense of Russia and China. In his 1997 work The Grand Chessboard:
American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, he called upon European powers to become involved in the Azeri-Armenian dispute on Baku’s
side. He wrote, “Azerbaijan is […] geopolitically critical. […] It can serve
as a corridor for Western access to the energy-rich Caspian Sea basin and
Central Asia.”5 Therefore, to weaken Russia’s position in the Caucasus, a
potent Azerbaijan is the catalyst to direct the debate among Russian’s Turkic populations. Armenia believes that it has no option but to depend on
Russia, as the country sustains a deep, ingrained suspicion toward Turkey
and Azerbaijan. Russia exploited this animosity and today major industries
and public utility frms in Armenia are owned by Russia. Russia protects
the borders of Armenia and, in turn, Armenia provides the locations for
Russian military bases. Russia would not prefer Armenia to develop closer
economic and political ties with the West. The continuation of the Karabakh confict serves Russian interests to control Armenia and Azerbaijan.
This explains why Russia will refuse to resolve conclusively the matter of
the Karabakh region in its own interests of keeping intact its regional role
as a mediator.
In addition, the Karabakh confict6 also constitutes the most recent
example of the continuing clash between the oft-opposed international
legal/political doctrines of self-determination and territorial integrity.7 The
United Nations Charter includes specifc references to self-determination in
Articles 1(2) and 55, and to territorial integrity in Article 2(4). Put simply,
self-determination refers to the right of a people to choose their own form
of government (usually independence), while territorial integrity means the
right of a state to maintain its existing borders.8 Thus, in the case of Karabakh, Armenia has supported the doctrine of self-determination because
the vast majority of its population is ethnic Armenian. On the other hand,
Azerbaijan has maintained the doctrine of territorial integrity because
Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan.9

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Introduction

5

In this up-to-date, multi-, and inter-disciplinary study, proven, objective
experts on the subject analyze it from all the main sides in light of the most
recent war over Karabakh that raged from September–November 2020.
Although there are past studies, no one has analyzed Karabakh in light of
this later war and in such a broad perspective that gives weight to all sides of
this confict. As already noted, this is a very appropriate time to reconsider
Karabakh in light of its signifcant importance for ethnic confict in general,
the post-Soviet Caucasus specifcally, and the most recent war just fought
over the area from September–November 2020. This will be a reference
book on the historical, social, and political aspects of the Karabakh issue
regarding its origins, development, and the current status of the confict
subsequent to the war in the autumn of 2020. Thus, the main themes will
stress these points as well as the importance of the Karabakh issue for the
future by considering its precedents and implications for other secessionist
wars, how such wars begin and end, the international legal precedents of
self-determination vs. territorial integrity, its implications for post-Soviet
developments and conficts, and the latest successful weapons developments
lessons from the recent war involving drones, among others. Clearly, this
up-to-date collection of chapters on Karabakh has importance in a number
of different areas.
The following 19 chapters are divided into four parts. The frst part
examines the region’s “Conceptual and Historical Origins.” Among the
questions highlighted are: What is the historical and political background
of Karabakh? How did Sovietization shape the regional identity? What
were the aspects of the cultural, demographic, and political development
under Soviet rule? How did the Soviet legacy and the nation-state building
project shape the Karabakh confict? What were the respective demands of
Armenians and Azerbaijanis before and after World War I? Thus, in Chapter 1, Kamala Imranli-Lowe, “Karabakh: Historical Background” presents
an outline of the historical and political history of Karabakh. It examines
major academic discourses on the subject and provides an insight into the
religious, ideological, and ethnic transformations during the medieval and
modern period. In Chapter 2, Jamil Hasanli, “The Sovietization of Azerbaijan and a Road to Autonomy in Nagorno-Karabakh (1920–1923)” maintains
that the truth regarding this hotly contested subject can easily be recovered
from numerous documents in which the military and diplomatic services
of the Russian Empire and Soviet Russia carefully registered the facts that
prove that the Nagorno-Karabakh region has never been part of Armenia
during Soviet times.
In Chapter 3, Eldar Abbasov uses insights gained from earning his PhD
from Moscow State University and working in the Russian Foreign Ministry
to analyze “Armenian Irredendist Nationalism and Its Transformation
into the Mass Karabakh Movement, ‘MIATSUM’ (1965–1988).” Abbasov
examines the historical process of the emergence and formation of Armenian Soviet irredentist nationalism, the purpose of which was the annexation

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6

M. Hakan Yavuz and Michael M. Gunter

of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and the Nakhichevan
ASSR, which are part of the Azerbaijan SSR, to the Armenian SSR. This
process began to take shape in the mid-1960s against the background of the
preparation and holding of events dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the
Armenian massacres in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 at the height of World
War I. However, before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, this process was sluggish and was mainly
expressed in appeals sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU by the
party leadership of Armenia, and representatives of the scientifc and creative intelligentsia of Armenia. The policy of perestroika and glasnost opened
up new opportunities for strengthening Armenian Irredentist Nationalism
and turning it into a mass Karabakh movement, or as Armenian historians
call it, “Miatsum” – “The Reunifcation of the ancestral Armenian lands.”
Chapter 4 by Farid Shafyev, “The Orientalizing of Azerbaijanis and the
Armenia-Azerbaijan Confict” investigates the image of Azerbaijanis and
Azerbaijan in the context of the Armenia-Azerbaijan confict in the Western
English language and Russian media. The author posits that Western and
Russian experts and journalists traditionally, beginning from 1905, viewed
the confict between Azerbaijanis and Armenians through an Orientalist
perspective that manifested certain biases toward Muslims by Western historians, literary experts, and journalists.
The second part of this book analyzes “The First Karabakh War and the
Consequences.” It asks what were the causes, events, and social, political,
and economic consequences of this First Karabakh War that coincided with
the collapse of the Soviet Union? Why did four earlier ceasefre attempts
fail but the most recent one (1994), before the 2020 war, prevail? How did
ideologies and confgurations of domestic politics and the regional system
drive the process for peace talks? Why did the international community
(e.g., OSCE, Minsk Group) fail to resolve the confict? Did the presence of
international mediation actually perpetuate the confict? What should be
the role of international intervention in such frozen or dormant conficts? In
Chapter 5, Michael M. Gunter, “Self-determination or Territorial Integrity?
International Legal/Political Doctrines in Opposition and Their Implications for Karabakh” demonstrates that the long-running, frozen-unfrozen
confict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Karabakh (Artsakh) constitutes the most recent example of the continuing clash between the oft-opposed
international legal/political doctrines of self-determination and territorial
integrity. Chapter 6 by Shamkhal Abilov and Ceyhun Mahmudlu, “The UN
Security Council Resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh” notes that during the
First Nagorno-Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the UN
Security Council adopted four resolutions, namely, 822, 853, 874, and 884,
as a result of the occupation of Azerbaijani regions that were outside of
the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast by Armenian forces.
The resolutions condemned the occupation of these Azerbaijani regions and
demanded respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore,

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Introduction

7

by these resolutions, the Security Council demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities and hostile acts that endangered peace and security in the
region, and the immediate, full, and unconditional withdrawal of all forces
from all the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.
In Chapter 7, Araz Aslanli, “The Politics of Ceasefre and the Occupation”
traces the ceasefre initiatives, agreements, and failures from 1988 to 1994
by focusing on the key political and military actors of the period. The main
question the chapter will seek to answer is why so many ceasefre agreements
failed and why and how did the 1994 ceasefre last close to three decades?
When and under what conditions are ceasefre agreements likely to prevail or
fail? Farhad Mirzayev writes in Chapter 8 on the “Nagorno-Karabakh Confict: International Law Appraisal.” Among other points, his chapter deals
with the question of the legality of the armed activities and legality of resort
to force by Azerbaijan. The analysis tackles this question in the context of
international obligations of states to settle international disputes amicably.
The central question addressed under this theme is whether Azerbaijan’s
commitment to the peace process within the OSCE Minsk Group precluded
its right to use force in self-defense. In Chapter 9, Kamal Makili-Aliyev
analyzes “International Law and the Changes in the Status Quo of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Confict in 2020.” This article reviews general international legal issues of the Nagorno-Karabakh confict, analyzes international
law and scholarship regarding the use of force by Azerbaijan during the
armed hostilities, and analyzes the new ceasefre agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan from the point of view of international law. While noting
the changes that the hostilities brought to the legal questions related to the
confict, the study critically reviews the current “use of force” discussion in
the scholarship and points to the fact that the aforementioned agreement is
actually a treaty under public international law.
Among the questions explored in Part III “The Second Karabakh War
and the Consequences” are: What were the causes of the recent war? How
did the war shape domestic and foreign policies of regional countries? What
elements of nationalist rhetoric of both Azerbaijan and Armenia were
signifcant in discourse about the Karabakh issue and how did this reignite
the confict? What were the failures that blocked fnding a peaceful compromise prior to the latest outbreak of hostilities? How did the Karabakh
confict draw in regional powers? In what ways has a peaceful solution of the
Karabakh confict been obstructed by local actors and/or regional countries
(i.e., Russia, France, Turkey, Iran)? Thus, in Chapter 10, Edward J. Erickson
(a retired Professor of Military History from the U.S Department of War
Studies at the Marine Corps University) in “How Do We Explain Victory:
The Karabakh Campaign of 2020” presents an analysis of the Azerbaijani
Army’s successful 2020 campaign to seize geographically and politically
important parts of Nagorno-Karabakh from the Armenian Army.
Then in Chapter 11, Ali Askerov and Gubad Ibadoglu in “The Causes
and Consequences of the Second Karabakh War” argue that the Second

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M. Hakan Yavuz and Michael M. Gunter

Karabakh War had several major causes. First, Azerbaijan believed that the
situation was ripe to restore its territorial integrity. Azerbaijan had persistently worked to create a power asymmetry in its own favor, and it was the
time to change the status quo in the region. The political leadership of Azerbaijan also aimed at gaining stronger national support to consolidate its
power in the country. Second, the Armenian leadership totally misread the
military and political balance of power between the two countries and had
faith in external forces to maintain its occupation. The rhetoric of Armenian
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was also a factor in destroying any hope
for a peaceful solution. Third, even if Russia was not interested in a new
war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it was indifferent to the war because
it wanted to facilitate its access to the Near East through new corridors
that would result from the war. Moscow also aimed to block the integration
of both Armenia and Azerbaijan with the West and keep them within the
sphere of its own infuence. In addition, Russian President Vladimir Putin
used the Karabakh War to further pull Turkey away from NATO. Finally,
Turkey was supportive of the Azerbaijan position because Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wanted to increase his state’s infuence in the
South Caucasus. More importantly, Turkey wanted to provide political and
strategic support to Azerbaijan in this historical moment to make up the
missed opportunities in the early 1990s. Erdogan’s aspirations to increase
his popularity in both Turkey and Azerbaijan also played a role in the confict escalation.
Part IV on “Foreign Policy and the Karabakh War” analyzes the
foreign-policy roles the United States, Russia, Israel, Iran, Egypt, and
Canada played. How have regional actors (Russia, Turkey, and Iran)
infuenced the confict? What were the major regional impacts of the war?
Did they further lead to fragmentation or remove the obstacles away from
possible regional cooperation? What are the prospects of a sustainable
peace after the current (2020) ceasefre? Therefore, in Chapter 12, “Turkish
Foreign Policy and the Karabakh Confict,” M. Hakan Yavuz examines the
evolution of Turkey’s policy toward the Karabakh confict by emphasizing
ideational and material factors. Although international media have blamed
Turkey for instigating the current confict, Turkey’s role has been limited
to the planning of the war, along with diplomatic and moral support. Yet,
under Erdogan’s leadership, Turkey has shifted from a passive to a more
active, supporting role for the cause of Azerbaijan. Thus, the question is
what mix of ideational, domestic political, and external factors of politics
and policy arose to drive this shift in Turkey’s role? Yavuz’s chapter focuses
on the following factors to explain the shift in Turkey’s foreign policy: (1)
the Turks’ view of the Azerbaijanis as ethnic kin whom they are obligated to
support; the coalition between Turkey’s nationalists and Erdogan played an
important role in Erdogan’s open support for Azerbaijan; (2) the fact that
Azerbaijan did not attack another country but sought instead to restore its
own territorial integrity—a cause seen by many Turks as morally and legally

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Introduction

9

just; (3) the ingrained and politically motivated feeling among the majority
of Turks that Armenia has always been subservient to Europe and Russia
in its quest to restore its status as a major power; and, most critically, (4) the
role of economic relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan. For example, the
Azerbaijani oil company, SOCAR, is the largest foreign investor in Turkey.
Moreover, Azerbaijan has been the key source for Turkey’s energy needs.
In Chapter 13, Emil Avdaliani, “Georgia and the Second Karabakh War”
explains how and why, though a neighbor to Armenia and Azerbaijan,
Georgia has traditionally expressed the least geopolitical interest in being
involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh confict. However, the 2020 war between
Baku and Yerevan changed the way Georgia viewed the confict and the
threats emanating from it. In Chapter 14, Esmira Jafarova. “The Role of
the United States in the Armenia–Azerbaijan Confict” explains how the
United States got the chance to engage with the three Caucasian republics
only upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The support for the territorial
integrity of all regional states has been the mainstream approach of the U.S.
policy. However, in the case of the Armenia-Azerbaijan confict, unequivocal U.S. support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity was often challenged
by the infuence of large Armenian lobby groups on the U.S. Congress and
other state institutions, which sometimes introduced “corrections” in the
U.S. approach to this confict for balancing purposes such as the imposition
of section 907 to the Freedom Support Act in the early 1990s. Chapter 15
by Orhan Gafarli, “The Russian Role in the Karabakh Confict” argues
that by constructing the South Caucasus region on the concept of the
center-periphery, Russia tries to maintain its regional power through frozen
conficts to increase its infuence on both sides. In addition, this chapter
focuses on how and why Russian foreign policy changed according to (A)
the First Karabakh War, 1991–1994, (B) the four-day war in 2016, and (C)
the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The chapter also examines Russia's
approaches for the solution of the Karabakh confict by focusing on the
“package plan,” “step by step plan,” “common state,” “land swap,” and
Madrid and Kazan Principles and what they mean for Russia.
In Chapter 16, Michael B. Bishku, “Israeli Foreign Policy toward the
Karabakh Confict” recounts how the breakup of the Soviet Union at the end
of the Cold War afforded Israel the opportunity of developing relations with
newly independent, post-Soviet states. Israel conceived of a new security
partnership, which is referred to as “Periphery 2.0,” including Azerbaijan,
as the two countries shared concerns regarding Iran. Meanwhile, Israel paid
far less attention to Armenia and disturbed that country with its refusal to
recognize the tragedy of the Armenians during World War I as a “genocide.” Following the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, as relations between
Israel and Turkey deteriorated, ties between Israel and Azerbaijan continued to thrive as Azerbaijan purchased more armaments from Israel, hoping
to regain Karabakh, while the Israelis bought substantial amounts of oil
from Azerbaijan. Currently, Israel is very pleased with having close security

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10

M. Hakan Yavuz and Michael M. Gunter

ties with a Muslim-populated country like Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijan is
able to enhance its relations with the United States through Israel and be
able to counter the Armenian lobby in Washington, D.C.
Chapter 17, authored by Mesiagha Mahammadi and Vasif Huseynov,
“Iran’s Policies toward the Karabakh Confict” analyzes how ethnic kinship
and family ties between the Iranian Azerbaijanis and the people of Republic of Azerbaijan, and the advance level of relations between Azerbaijan
on the one hand, and Turkey and Israel on the other hand, have been only
some of the factors that have affected Iran’s stance and policies toward the
Karabakh confict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Against the backdrop of these factors, Iran has followed a number of key objectives, such
as to prevent any extension of the confict inwards to its territories and to
block the intervention of the non-regional global powers such as the United
States and Israel in the settlement of the confict. Chapter 18, by Brendon
Cannon, “The Arab States and the Karabakh War” argues to date, the
connections, actions, and interests of Arab states such as Egypt, Qatar, and
the United Arab Emirates with the Caucasus region remain tenuous and
thus an understudied feld in international politics. With the resumption of
the Karabakh confict in 2020, however, certain Arab states showed a keen
interest in affecting the outcomes. However, these Arab interests had less to
do with the belligerent states and more to do with the role played by neighboring Turkey, and how the confict’s outcomes would affect distributions of
power across the Middle East. Finally, in Chapter 19, Ozay Mehmet, “The
Nagorno-Karabakh War: Diaspora Politics in Canadian Foreign Policy”
critically examines Ottawa's pro-Armenian policy in relation to the war over
Nagorno-Karabakh during the fall of 2020, emphasizing that it does not
follow the traditional Canadian foreign policy. Rather, this case has been
shaped by the Armenian diaspora in Canada. For reasons explained in the
chapter, the conduct of Canadian foreign policy in this case is inconsistent
with the Canadian reputation as a multicultural model that respects international law and human rights. The chapter also argues that this case fails
to promote solidarity within the NATO alliance and violates the UN rules.

Notes
1 The ancient and now assimilated Caucasian Albanians and Iberians (modern
Georgians), who have nothing to do with their spurious namesakes in Europe to
the West, add to the mixed, ethnic confusion. A further hint of the controversy
this subject can engender is revealed by the term Caucasian as a synonym for the
White race, as scientifcally this meaning is clearly of invalid authenticity.
2 On these fgures, see by Robert H. Hewsen, “The Meliks of Eastern Armenia:
A Preliminary Study,” Revue des etudes Armeniennes NS: IX, (1970), p. 288; and
Armenia: A Historical Atlas (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001), p.
264.
3 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, NY: Blackwell
Publishing, 2006), p. 2. In words that seem to have been written precisely for
Karabakh, Gellner continues,

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Introduction

11

This argument is further and immeasurably strengthened by the fact that
very many of the potential nations of this world live … not in compact territorial units but intermixed with each other in complex patterns. It follows
that a territorial political unit can only become ethnically homogeneous, in
such cases, if it either kills, or expels, or assimilates all non-nationals. Their
unwillingness to suffer such fates may make the peaceful implementation of
the nationalist principle diffcult.
Ibid.
4 “Hundreds of Dead Armenian Soldiers Shown in Nagorno-Karabakh,”
Novinite.com (Sofa News Agency), November 13, 2020, https://www.novinite.
com/articles/206519/Hundreds+of+Dead+Armenian+Soldiers+Shown+in+
Nagorno-Karabakh, accessed November 14, 2020.
5 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 46.
6 For background on Karabakh, see Svante E. Cornell, The Nagorno-Karabakh
Confict, Report no. 46, Department of East European Studies, Uppsala University, Sweden, 1999; Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan
through Peace and War (New York: New York University Press, 2003); and
Thomas Goltz, Azerbaijan Dairy: A Rogue Reporter’s Adventures in an OilRich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet Republic (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Press, 1998).
More recently, see Michael Kambeck and Sargis Ghazaryan, eds. Europe’s Next
Avoidable War: Nagorno-Karabakh (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); and
Arsene Saparov, From Confict to Autonomy in the Caucasus: The Soviet Union
and the Making of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh (London and
New York: Routledge, 2015), among others.
7 Other recent examples that involve various elements of the inherent contradiction
between these two conficting doctrines, but in each case have their unique characteristics it should be noted, include Kosovo, Eritrea, Western Sahara, East
Timor (Timor-Leste), Belize, Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), the
Basques, Biafra, Catalonia, Chechnya, Eastern Ukraine, the Kurds, Northern
Cyprus, and Scotland, among numerous others. For background on over 40
self-determination conficts including Karabakh outside the colonial context
that have appeared virtually impossible to settle, see Marc Weller, “Settling
Self-Determination Conficts: Recent Developments,” The European Journal of
International Law 20:1 (2009), pp. 111–164. For many further possible examples,
see James Minahan, Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996).
8 The legal doctrines of sovereignty meaning unlimited power or better just
independence, and uti possidetis meaning that old administrative colonial
boundaries would remain legal international boundaries upon independence
are closely related to and tend to reinforce the concept of territorial integrity.
In general, see Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th revised edition (London and New York; Routledge, 1997), pp.
17–18 and 162, 163. The most comprehensive analysis of statehood creation in
international law is arguably James R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
9 As Svante Cornell noted when the present confict was still in its earlier stages:
“The Armenians invoked the principle of peoples’ right to self-determination,
and the Azeris defended the principle of territorial integrity.” Nagorno-Karabakh
Confict, p. 25. Thomas de Waal concurred: “A resolution of the issue had
to reconcile the competing claims of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and
Karabakh’s self-determination (or, in blunter language, de facto secession).”
Black Garden, p. 255.

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Part I

Conceptual and Historical
Origins

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1

Karabakh
Historical Background
Kamala Imranli-Lowe

Introduction
Writing the history of Karabakh is just as diffcult an undertaking as
settling its confict involving Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is especially challenging when it comes to imagining the region’s distant past, which relies
heavily on extant manuscripts where the originals have been lost. These
sources, which have undergone repeated revisions by countless scribes to ft,
inter alia, contemporary political, ecclesiastical and ideological demands,
have been the major narratives used for (re-)constructions of the history
in later periods. The mixture of nationalist agendas connected with nation
and state-building with imperialistic ambitions in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries also created favourable grounds for further revisions
of the historical sources, bringing them into agreement with contemporary political goals. The appearance of print editions based on the extant
manuscripts and their translations, with the aim of raising the respective
masses’ awareness of their “historical homeland”, as well as the emergence
of new rewritten histories in this period, played an important role in the
territorial conficts between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early twentieth
century. The continuation of the Karabakh confict into the present day, on
the other hand, has further encouraged the use of history as a political tool.
It has also brought about primordialist approaches to historical research,
by constructing a historical ethnic link between the region and its population from time immemorial. The confict, and the connected retrospective
essentialisation of ethnicity, has made it almost impossible for scholars to
agree on a mutually acceptable history of Karabakh, and the issue is likely
to remain unresolved.
This chapter is an attempt to give an outline of the complicated political
history of Karabakh from the classical to the modern period. It draws
mainly on scholarly work, as well as offcial sources, but does not discuss
historical narratives, given the length of the period in question and of
this chapter. Hence, the chapter seeks to provide a brief description of the
political aspects of Karabakh’s history up until 1918–1920/1921, since when

DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-3
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16 Kamala Imranli-Lowe
the confict has entered state level with the emergence of the frst Azerbaijani and Armenian republics.

Ancient and Medieval Karabakh in Academic Discourse
“Karabakh” is the term by which is roughly understood the area of the
former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (province) and the seven
surrounding districts of Azerbaijan. Though the current stage of the confict started in the late 1980s, with the Armenian demands regarding the
transfer of the oblast from Soviet Azerbaijan to Soviet Armenia, it spread
into the adjacent districts in the 1990s. The contemporary understanding of
the “Karabakh” notion implies an area smaller than its historical designations in the late medieval and modern periods. As for the ancient and early
medieval periods, the area of contemporary Karabakh corresponded to
that of Orkhistena (Artsakh1) and partly Otene (Uti), provinces in Caucasian Albania, until the country came under Arab rule in 705. Academic discourse on the boundaries of Albania,2 as it is named in Greco-Latin sources,
in this period includes various views which can be grouped as follows:
•

•

•

The territory of Albania broadly corresponded to that of modern
Azerbaijan, reaching Derbent in the north-east and the modern-day
border between Azerbaijan and Georgia in the north-west, the Caspian
Sea in the east and the Araz River (Arax/Araxes) in the south (Minorsky
1953a, 504; Mamedova 2005, 273; Barthold 2012).
Artsakh and Uti provinces to the south of the Kur River were part
of Albania from the ancient to the early medieval periods, except for
the second century BCE–fourth century CE, when they were part of
Armenia (Hübschman 1904, 266; Eremian 1958a, 310; Trever 1959, 58).
Artsakh and Uti were originally parts of Armenia. Only in the late
fourth–ffth centuries CE did Albania extend southwards to include the
Armenian principalities between the Kur and Araz rivers (Adontz 1970,
173–179; Hewsen 2013, xxxi; Svazian 2015, 48–56).

The above-mentioned differences in views can be explained by conficting
and unclear information in the extant versions of classical and Armenian
sources with numerous interpolations in their manuscript bases, which in
their turn date from long after their lost originals. Also, most of the authors
were not contemporary to the events narrated, had not visited the places
described and relied on unverifed information from other sources. Some
authors did not use any written sources, and many narratives contained
legends and did not correspond to the realities of the period under consideration. Study of the political history of Albania has also suffered from
politically motivated readings of the sources, as well as inconsistencies in
reasoning and conficting views by the same scholars on the same subjects.
The issue is also complicated by the fact that for a long time historians have

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Karabakh: Historical Background

17

relied predominantly on the Armenian written tradition, while lacking
sources in Albanian. However, despite disagreements among scholars on
the boundaries of Albania, as explained above, there seems to be unanimous
agreement that the country covered the area roughly corresponding to that
of modern Azerbaijan in the fourth–ffth centuries CE, and included the
area of present-day Karabakh.
Albania was mainly populated by Caucasian-speaking Albanians, one of
the autochthonous peoples of the Caucasus whose nobility adopted Christianity in the fourth century. Albanians had their own alphabet of 52 phonemes, which was still in use in the thirteenth–fourteenth centuries (Eremian
1958b, 329), and a Bible translated into their language (Gevond 1862, 44;
Aleksidze 2003, 100–107). According to contemporary Arab geographers,
Albanian or al-Rāniyya was still the dominant language in Albania in the
tenth century (Minorsky 1953a, 504; Frye 2012; Vacca 2017, 30). Alongside Albanians, who are today considered to count among the ancestors
of modern Azerbaijanis, Albania was also populated by Iranian-speaking
Tats, Talysh and Kurds, and Turkic-speaking tribes.
The Arab conquest and spread of Islam, followed by the arrival of
Islamised Arab, Iranian and Turco-Mongol settlers, resulted in religious
and ethno-linguistic transformations in Albania. The fate of the Albanians,
especially their correlation with Armenians and Georgians due to their
Christian past, has been controversial. The controversies attach, essentially,
to the period up to which Albanian people existed as political entities and
had their own church.
Nicholas Marr (1915, 20–21) considered in his work some of the Christian Albanians assimilated by Armenians and Georgians by the eleventh
century. According to Il’ia Petrushevskii (1930, 8), the church in Albania
served as a tool for Armenianisation in the country. This became apparent
from the early eighth century, after the overthrow of the dyophysite Albanian Catholicos by the monophysite Armenian Catholicos with the help of
the Arab caliph. Suren Eremian (1958b, 328) wrote that the population in
the Albanian provinces of Artsakh and in most of Uti had already been
assimilated by Armenians by the time of the establishment of Arab rule
in the early eighth century. However, Eremian (1958c, 534) also referred
to “local feudals”, who were permitted by the Arabs to retain lands in the
mountains of Karabakh and southern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains,
as Udins-Albanians. The historian argued that the part of the Albanian
population that was not yet “ethnically and culturally” assimilated by the
Armenians and Georgians adopted Islam and was Turkicised by the Turkic
tribes, who later settled in its former territory. Thus, the Azerbaijani people
was formed (Eremian 1958b, 330). Accordingly, the Albanian Church has
been considered part of the Armenian Church since the seventh/early eighth
century (Eremian 1958b, 328).
Farida Mamedova (2005, 389–390, 616–619) considered that the majority
of Albanians living on the lower reaches of the Kur and Araz rivers were

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Kamala Imranli-Lowe

Islamised after the arrival of Arabs, and assimilated with Turkic-speaking
peoples who had been living in Albania since the early centuries CE. Their
number was increased by the new arrivals of Turkic tribes over the following
centuries. As for the Armenianisation process of the remaining Christian
Albanians, this historian is of the view that the process could only start
after the liquidation of the independent Albanian Catholicosate in the early
nineteenth century.
The thesis on the Albanian church being considered as part of the
Armenian church since the seventh/early eighth century, and the “ethnic
and cultural” assimilation of the Albanians in the medieval period, can
be challenged with a great deal of evidence from Armenian and Albanian
historical narratives. For example, The Chronicle by Matthew of Edessa
(2017, I, 2), an Armenian historian who lived in the eleventh–twelfth centuries, includes interesting data about the Albanian kings and catholicoses of
the tenth–eleventh centuries. The historian, inter alia, relates an invitation
to the “most praiseworthy Lord Yovhanne’s, kat’oghikos of the land of the
Aghuans [Albanians], and forty bishops with him” and “P’illipos, king of
the Aghuans, … the son of Goghazgak, son of Vach’agan, [from a line]
which had been kings of the land of the Aghuans” to attend the coronation
of “Gagik, son of Ashot” as the king of Armenia in the city of Ani in 961.
Matthew of Edessa (2017, II, 81) also contrasts the period when there existed
simultaneous Armenian catholicoses at the end of the eleventh and early
twelfth centuries to the stable situation in the Albanian Catholicosate in
the same period, writing that the church in Albania “remained unshaken
and secure, with its patriarchate and monarchy to the present [end of the
eleventh and early twelfth centuries]”.
The frst evidence concerns the period when, as a result of the gradual
weakening of the Arab caliphate, various political entities emerged in the
territories under Arab rule in the ninth century. They included Armenian
polities such as Kars, Ani and Vaspurakan in the territory of present-day Turkey, as well as Albanian ones such as Siunia (Siunik, Siwnik),
Khachen-Artsakh and Shaki (Sheki) in the territory of the former Albania.
The Christian rulers of these Albanian polities were the descendants of the
Mihranid dynasty (Imranli-Lowe 2020, 263). According to some authors,
the Mihranids were of Sasanian origin (Kagankatvatsi 1861/Dasxuranci
1961, III, 22; Krymsky 1938, 373; Barthold 1963, 673), while for some, they
were of Parthian descent (Minorsky 1958, 12; Vacca 2017, 219). The Mihranids, having adopted Christianity in the seventh century and intermarried
with local Albanian nobility, were called an “Albanian national dynasty”
by Vasily (also known as Wilhelm) Barthold (1963, 673; Minorsky 1953a,
504–529; Imranli-Lowe 2020, 263).
Contemporary Arabic authors referred to Albania as al-Rān (Arran) and
gave contradictory defnitions of the term. According to Barthold (2012),
as was the case in ancient times for Albania, the name Arran originally
referred to the whole region from Darband in the north-east to Tifis in the

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Karabakh: Historical Background 19
west and the Araz River in the south and south-west. Richard Frye (2012)
applied this notion to the area between the Kur and Araz rivers. Minorsky
(1958, 17–18) referred to “the two Arrans” on the northern and the southern
banks of the Kur River and mentioned that, in 950–1050, Arran referred to
the area south of the Kur River.
In 885/6 the Albanian/Arran kingdom was “partly restored” under King
Gregor-Hamam, who was descended from lords of two polities: Siunia and
Khachen. The boundaries of the kingdom extended from the eastern bank of
Lake Sevan in the west to Barda in the east, on the right bank of the Kur River,
and also included Kambisena-Shaki (Sheki) on the left bank (Kagankatvatsi
1861/Dasxuranci 1961, III, 21, 22; Krymsky 1938, 374–375; Mamedova 2005,
394–395; Draskhanakertsi 1986, 33, n.11, 136). The important role played
by Siunia among the Albanian polities, who provided Albania/Arran with
kings, lasted until 1166, when it passed to Khachen-Artsakh. The centre
of this polity, which Iosif Orbeli calls “a part of the ancient Albania” and
was ruled by Hasan Jalal from 1142, was the basin of Khachenchay and
partly that of the Tartar (Minorsky 1953a, 526; Orbeli 1963, 146). These
Albanian polities existed either as vassals or as parts of the Muslim states of
the Shirvanshahs, Sajids, Salarids, Shaddadids, Seljukids and Khwarazm in
the period from the ninth century to the late 1220s. Another Hasan Jalal in
the thirteenth century, who was described as the “king of Albania”, “great
guardian of borders of Albania”, “lord of Khachen and Arran”, “lord of
lords of Khachen” and with other titles on inscriptions dating from 1229 to
1296, declared his obedience to the Mongols in 1238/40. Khachen-Artsakh
remained the vassal of the Mongols till the rule of the Timurids in the late
fourteenth and early ffteenth centuries (Orbeli 1963, 150–158, 161; ImranliLowe 2020, 269, n.15, 274).
According to Frye (2012), under the Mongols Arran and Azerbaijan
(in present-day Iran) were joined together and ruled by single governors,
and the area between the Kur and Araz rivers came to be called Qarabağ
(Karabakh, meaning “black garden”, in Turkic). Mongol and Timurid
rule, which was followed by that of the Qara qoyunlu (Black sheep) and
Aq qoyunlu (White sheep), the confederations of the Turkic Oghuz tribes
from Eastern Anatolia, in the ffteenth century, strengthened the numerical
domination of Turkic peoples in the territory of the present-day Azerbaijan
Republic (Imranli-Lowe 2020, 269).

Karabakh in the Modern Period
Karabakh has witnessed important political developments in its modern
history. These include the rule of and rivalry between the states of the Turkic
Safavids and Ottomans, the domination of the Turkic Afsharid dynasty
under Nadir shah of Iran, and short-lived independence under Panah khan
of the Turkic Javanshir clan, which was followed by its annexation by Russia.
Each of these political changes had implications for the region’s future and

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Kamala Imranli-Lowe

for the peoples who inhabited it. The frst period of rivalry between the new
players, namely, the Safavids and the Ottomans, who entered the political
life of the Caucasus by contesting its possession in the sixteenth–eighteenth
centuries in a number of wars, did not avoid Karabakh. The region for
the most part of this period remained under the rule of the Safavids, with
about two decades of Ottoman rule between the Istanbul I (or Ferhat Pasha)
Treaty of 1590, when all of the southern Caucasus came under the Ottoman
dominion, and Istanbul II (or Nasuh Pasha) of 1612. Under the latter, the
Ottomans had to return the recently occupied territories by establishing the
borders of the Amasya Treaty of 1555, when most parts of southern Caucasus, including Karabakh, had remained under the rule of the Safavids (Kilic
2001, 77, 131, 145, 167–170, 199).
The Safavid administration was organised into thirteen provinces
or baylarbayliks (beglarbegliks) governed by baylarbayis (beglarbegis),
one of four classes of amirs of the frontiers, of which Tabriz, Chukhur-i
Sad, Qarabağ-Ganja (Karabakh-Ganja) and Shirvan – together termed
as “Azerbaijan” – covered the territories of present-day Azerbaijan and
Armenia, as well as parts of Iran, Turkey, Georgia and Dagestan. One of
these four provinces, namely Karabakh-Ganja, included the area between
the Kur and Araz rivers in the territory of present-day Azerbaijan, as well
as parts of Armenia and Georgia. During and after the time of Safavid
Shah Tahmasp I (1524–1576), Karabakh-Ganja baylarbaylik was governed
by the Ziyadoghlu family from Turkic Gajarid dynasty, except for a brief
period of Ottoman rule at the end of the sixteenth-early seventeenth centuries (Petrushevskii 1949, 122–124; Tadhkirat al-Muluk 1980, 44, 100–102,
164–168; Imranli-Lowe 2020, 271). The situation continued until the 1720s
when the province once again came under the Ottoman dominion following the Istanbul Treaty of 1724 between the Ottoman and Russian Empires,
which divided the southern Caucasus into Russian and Ottoman spheres.
However, this division did not last long, as between 1732 and 1736 the Safavids managed to reclaim the territories lost to the Russians and Ottomans
(Butkov 1869, I, 58–62, 110–113, 130–135).
In 1736 Nadir khan of the Turkic Afshar tribe and de facto ruler of the
Safavid state offcially put an end to the reign of the Safavid dynasty by
crowning himself Shah. The power of the Ziyadoghlu family, who were the
hereditary governors of the Karabakh-Ganja baylarbaylik, was diminished
by Nadir shah, as Ughurlu khan II Ziyadoghlu spoke out for the election of a
shah from the Safavid dynasty, although he accepted Nadir as a shah afterwards. Therefore, according to Petrushevskii (1949, 124), Nadir shah transferred the governance of some tribes and fve Albanian melikdoms [counties]
in Karabakh from Ughurlu khan II to Ibrahim khan, Nadir’s brother, who
was the baylarbayi [governor-general] and commander-in-chief of Azerbaijan, which covered the area of the above-mentioned four baylarbayliks.
These melikdoms had emerged in the ffteenth century in the area of the former Khachen-Artsakh principality under Qara qoyunlu ruler Jahan shah

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Karabakh: Historical Background 21
(1438–1467), who had granted the title of melik [count] to the descendants of
Hasan Jalal. Nadir shah also subjected some other tribes previously under
the rule of Ughurlu khan II to Teymuraz, the vali [governor; viceroy] of Kartli, and thus considerably diminished the area of the former’s rule, leaving
behind only the title of baylarbay of Ganja (Petrushevskii 1949, 124).
After Nadir shah’s death in 1747, there emerged a multitude of independent and semi-independent entities – the khanates and other smaller
principalities, together covering present-day Azerbaijan, Armenia and
southern Dagestan. One of these polities was the Karabakh khanate, founded
by Panah khan (1747/8–58/9) from the Turkic tribe of Javanshir. Panah khan
subjugated the fve Albanian melikdoms of Karabakh, namely Gulustan,
Jraberd, Khachen, Varanda and Dizak, as well as enlarging his domain at
the expense of the neighbouring khanates of Karadagh, Iravan and Nakhchyvan, and Azerbaijan baylarbaylik. The Karabakh khanate’s frst centre
was the Bayat castle built in 1748, from where it moved to Shahbulag castle
in 1752. The third and last capital of the khanate was Panahabad, founded
by Panah khan in the mid-eighteenth century and named after himself. This
was later changed to Shusha, its present name (Mirzə Adıgözəl bəy 1989, n.1,
40–41; Petrushevskii 1949, 136; Imranli [2005] 2006, 6, 11–14).
Panah khan was succeeded by his son Ibrahim as khan of Karabakh.
Under the Kurakchay Treaty, signed on 14 May 1805 between him and
Pavel Tsitsianov, commander-in-chief of the Russian forces in Caucasia, the
khanate was annexed by Russia (AKAK 1868, docs.1436–1437, 704–705).
This was also reaffrmed by the Gulustan Treaty of 12 October 1813 between
Russia and Persia. After the annexation, in 1822, the Karabakh khanate,
ruled by Mehdigulu khan (1806–1822) who succeeded his father Ibrahim
khan on the basis of the Kurakchay Treaty, was abolished and turned into
a province. In 1840 it was turned into the Shusha uezd (district) of the Caspian oblast (province) of the Russian Empire. On the basis of the further
administrative changes in 1868 and 1873, Karabakh was divided into four
uezds: Javanshir, Shusha, Jabrayil (Garyagin) and the Zangazur uezd of the
Elizavetpol guberniia (province) (Mil’man 1966, 67, 113, 156–157).
Karabakh, which was a political entity and a natural geographical whole,
was thus liquidated and dismembered, while the name itself was removed, as
was the case with Ganja, which was renamed Elizavetpol after the occupation
of the Ganja khanate by Russia in 1804. The Muslims, who constituted a
majority in Karabakh, came to be called Persians, Tatars, Turko-Tatars,
Azerbaijani Turks, Azerbaijani Tatars, Turks and, fnally, Azerbaijanis in
the period from Russian annexation, through the frst Azerbaijan Republic
and Soviet Azerbaijan, to the independent Azerbaijan Republic.
Under the preceding Turkic rule of the Caucasus, the Muslim and
Christian population of the region, including that of Karabakh, had suffered forced mass evictions, migrations, massacres and land confscations.
This also affected those who were suspected of collaborating or sympathising with the Ottomans and were therefore regarded as politically

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unreliable, especially under Safavid Shah Abbas I (1587–1629). The process
also continued under Nadir shah (1736–1747) (Petrushevskii 1949, 252–253,
124; Perry 1975, 206–208). The spread of Shi’ism in the southern Caucasus
during Safavid rule had also weakened Turkic self-consciousness among
the Turkic subjects of the empire. On the other hand, Ottoman and Safavid
rule had a signifcant cultural infuence on the region’s diverse population.
Many Christians, including Albanians, became Muslim, and the Turkic language was a lingua franca among its inhabitants. Nevertheless, the
independent Albanian Catholicosate with its fock on both banks of the Kur
River survived until the early nineteenth century. At this time, the southern
Caucasus, including Karabakh, came under Christian Russian rule, which
had an irreversible impact on the fate of the Christian Albanian population.
The Albanian Catholicosate was abolished and turned into a metropolitanate by the Russian authorities in 1815, while its dioceses were subordinated
to the Armenian Echmiadzin Catholicosate in 1836. This began the process
of the ideological, cultural and ethnic transformation of the Christian Albanians. Church schools, which came under the supervision of Echmiadzin,
started indoctrinating Armenian identity into the former fock of the
Albanian Catholicosate, which was also facilitated by the transfer of its
documents to Echmiadzin in 1836. Albanians came to be called and to identify themselves as Armenians, except for those Udins who continue living
in the Gabala and Oghuz districts of Azerbaijan and Zenobiani village in
Kakheti, Georgia. Everything related to Albanians came to be viewed and
interpreted as part of the “Armenian” nation, and Albanian and Armenian
histories were re-written to ft the new realities, thus almost exterminating
a whole identity and its past (Imranli [2005] 2006, 31–50; Mamedova 2005,
389–390; Imranli-Lowe 2015, 551–556).
Russian aims also included the creation of a Christian buffer zone along
its borders through the settlement of the loyal Christian population among
the Muslims of the occupied territories, which would separate the Muslims
of the southern Caucasus from their co-religionists in the Ottoman Empire
and Persia. This aim also found its refection, among other documents, in
the rescript dated 12 September 1801 addressed from Russian Emperor
Alexander to General-Lieutenant Carl Knorring. According to this document, it was reasonable to attract Armenians to the Russian borders as
one of the most reliable means of “establishing the numerical superiority of
Christians”, and to that end to “patronise Araratian Patriarchal monastery
of Echmiadzin and keep friendly relations with the head of this church”
(AKAK 1866, doc.548, 436). The idea found its fnal solution in the Treaty
of Turkmanchay of 10 February 1828 between Russia and Persia. Based
on Articles XV and XVI of the treaty, General Ivan Paskevich ordered the
settlement of Armenians “mainly in the Erevan and Nakhchyvan provinces,
and partly in Karabakh” (Enikolopov 1974, 119).
According to Russian statistics of 1810, Karabakh consisted of 79%
Muslims (9,500 families) and 21% “Christians” (2,500 families), interpreted

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Karabakh: Historical Background 23
as “Armenians” [read: Albanians] in the source (AKAK 1870, doc.37, 38–39).
However, owing to the resettlement of the Armenians from the Ottoman
Empire and Persia, and Albanians who had been relocated from Karabakh to Persia in the preceding centuries, as well as the exodus of Muslims
from Karabakh to Persia after the Russian occupation, the ratio of “Armenians”, who included both Armenianised Albanians and Armenian settlers,
increased from 21% in 1810 to 42% in 1916. In contrast, the ratio of Muslims
decreased from 79% in 1810 to 56% in 1916 (Butkov 1869, I, 385, II, 142;
AKAK 1870, doc.37, 38–39; Shavrov 1911, 59–60; Kavkazskii kalendar’ na
1917 god, 190–197; Imranli [2005] 2006, 17).
The implications of Russian rule are also connected with the Karabakh
confict itself, and include the construction of the “Nagorno-Karabakh”
(mountainous Karabakh) notion. The origins of this construct go back to
the conferences initiated by the Caucasian Viceroyalty in 1905–1916, with
the intention of establishing local bodies of self-administration. During
these conferences Armenian nationalists came up with the idea of separating
the mountainous parts of Elizavetpol guberniia from its plains. The plan
was later included in the Russian Ministry of Interior’s administrativeterritorial re-division project in the southern Caucasus in July 1917. The
idea was an expression both of the Armenian nationalist aim of constructing an Armenian homeland in the region with predominantly Armenian
units, and of Russian imperial ambitions. Its aim was, inter alia, to separate the places populated by Armenians in some areas of the mountainous
parts of Karabakh in the Javanshir, Shusha, Jabrayil and Zangazur uezds of
Elizavetpol guberniia. However, the Armenian-favoured re-division in the
southern Caucasus, including the re-division of the predominantly Muslim Elizavetpol guberniia into two new provinces, a Muslim-dominated
Elizavetpol and an Armenian-dominated Gandzak (Armenianised form
of Ganja) that intended to disrupt the compact neighbourhoods of the
Muslim-dominated administrative units and reduce them in number and
size, faced opposition from the Muslims. The clash of Armenian interests
with those of Muslims over the area of their future autonomies prevented
the realisation of the Armenian homeland project in the southern Caucasus,
Karabakh being one of its components (Imranli-Lowe 2014).

Karabakh Region and Confict in 1918–1921
The Karabakh confict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been ongoing
at state level since 1918, when the two countries were declared republics. At
public and popular levels however it predates 1918, with the frst violent clashes
taking place in 1905–1906 between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in various
parts of the southern Caucasus, including in Karabakh. According to the
Azerbaijani Independence Act, declared by the Azerbaijani National Council
on 28 May 1918, the area of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic would cover
“Southern and Eastern Transcaucasia [southern Caucasus]”.3 The leaders of

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the main Armenian political party, Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun (the
Armenian Revolutionary Federation, commonly referred to as Dashnaktsutiun [Federation]), adopted a decision to proclaim an Armenian republic
on 29 May 1918. But on 30 May, the Armenian National Council, declaring
itself “the supreme and only administration for the Armenian provinces”,
made no mention of independence or of a republic, and did not clarify in
geographical or administrative terms what “Armenian provinces” meant.
The terms “independence” and “republic” were used publicly only after
the signing of the Batumi Treaty with the Ottoman Empire on 4 June 1918
(Hovannisian 1967, 191), which made the Ottoman Empire the frst country to
have recognised Armenia as an independent state.
During discussion of the territorial issues between the Armenians and
the Azerbaijanis at the peace negotiations in Batumi from 11 May to 4 June
1918, the Armenian National Council (represented by Alexander Khatisian
(Khatisov), Ovannes Kachaznuni and Mikayel Papajanian) gave up its
claims to the Elizavetpol guberniia,4 including Karabakh (Avalov 1924, 57)5;
in return, the Azerbaijani National Council (represented by Mahammad
Amin Rasulzada and Mammad Hasan Hajynski) gave up its claims to the
town of Erevan, the rest of the Erevan and Echmiadzin uezds, which were
not under Ottoman control, and the New Bayazid uezd.6 As a result of this
agreement, Azerbaijan offcially conceded the town of Erevan to Armenia
on 29 May 1918,7 and Armenia’s government moved there on 19 July 1918
(Hovannisian 1967, 210).
Alongside the Ottoman Empire, Germany and Bolshevik Russia were
directly involved in the regional processes during the emergence of the three
republics, the third one being Georgia, which was declared as a republic on
26 May 1918. After the signing of the Armistice of Mudros on 30 October
1918 between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers, and that of
Compiègne on 11 November 1918 between Germany and the Allied Powers, the Ottoman Empire and Germany were replaced by Britain8 and to a
lesser degree by the United States as the main external actors in the region.
Britain, the Allied representative in the southern Caucasus, considered the
predominantly Muslim Elizavetpol guberniia, which included Karabakh,
part of Azerbaijan in the secret memorandum of the Foreign Offce’s Political
Intelligence Department of 1 November 1918, just one day after the Mudros
Armistice.9 The recognition of Khosrov bay Sultanov as the governorgeneral of Karabakh in Javanshir, Shusha, Jabrayil and Zangazur uezds by
the Allied Command in Baku on 3 April 1919, following his appointment to
this post by the Azerbaijani Government on 15 January 1919 (Hovannisian
1971, 170),10 was in line with the offcial British position on the Azerbaijani
territories expressed in the above-mentioned secret memorandum.
Britain not only recognised Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, it also
played an important role in signing an agreement between the Azerbaijani Government and the Armenians, who populated some areas in mountainous parts of Karabakh in Javanshir, Shusha and Jabrayil uezds, on 22

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25

August 1919. In accordance with this agreement, the Armenian-populated
sector of these uezds regarded itself to be within the boundaries of the Azerbaijan Republic and the uezds themselves were organised into a unit of the
Karabakh Governor-Generalship. In the Armenian-populated part of this
unit an administration of Armenians would be appointed with the rights
of all minorities guaranteed. The Armenians would enjoy rights of cultural
autonomy. The activities of the Armenian National Council would be regulated by the Government of the Azerbaijan Republic through Armenian
intermediaries11 (Hovannisian 1971, 186–187).
The reason for the British support of Azerbaijani position on Karabakh
was not only connected with the region’s predominantly Muslim population,
but also with the British policy, which aimed at achieving the confederation
of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia under the British infuence, keeping
open for the British the short route to Persia and serving to some extent as a
barrier to the southward expansion of Russia. Also, the British Fleet in the
Black Sea and the Anatolian Railway wholly or partly depended on Baku
oil, which was transported to the Black Sea port of Batumi (Butler and Bury
1962, doc.522, 578–579).
Despite the settlement of the problem with the Armenians in these three
uezds in Karabakh, the situation on the western half of its fourth Zangazur
uezd, where the Ottoman Armenian refugees were gathered, continued to
be unresolved. Colonel Claude Stokes, the British political offcer at Baku,
blamed France for supporting Armenian claims to Zangazur, linking it to
France’s interest in a copper mine in southern Zangazur and the Alat-Julfa
railway. Stokes expressed his concern that it seemed,
as a result of French and Armenian propaganda, the Allies will give
Armenia far more favourable treatment than Georgia or Azerbaijan
despite the fact that it has been the misconduct and dishonesty of the
Armenians which has prevented those concerned in trying to keep the
situation quiet from achieving success.
(Butler and Bury 1962, doc.522, 579)
The reason for the French support of Armenian claims to Zangazur in
Karabakh was that Britain supported the Armenian claims to Cilicia,
which was claimed by France, considering it to be a northern part of Syria.12
The clash of interests between Britain and France was also instrumental in
the French-advised Armenian opposition to the British-supported idea of
confederation of three southern Caucasian countries (Butler and Bury 1962,
doc.522, 578–579).
Meanwhile, the failure of Denikin’s campaign, the Entente’s ally
against Bolshevik Russia, in December 1919, and the growing threat of
Bolshevism, compelled the members of the League of Nations to recognise
the independence of Azerbaijan and Georgia de facto on 12 January 1920,
followed with the recognition of Armenia on 19 January 1920 (Unites States.

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Department of State 1946, 904, 899; Imranli 2006, 133–134). Despite the approaching Bolshevik menace from the north, Azerbaijan had sent its best
troops against Armenia in Karabakh, leaving its northern border without
enough defence. Olivier Wardrop, head of the British diplomatic mission
in the southern Caucasus, referring to Malik-Aslanov, Azerbaijani Minister of Trade and Communications, wrote to Earl Curzon, British Foreign
Secretary, on 26 March 1920 that the March troubles in Karabakh were the
result of the war supplies that the Allies had sent to Armenia, and begged
the Foreign Secretary to “deny this offcially in order to quell anti-Allied
agitation” (Butler and Bury 1962, doc.526, 582–583).
The Georgian representative to Istanbul, M. Rtzkhiladze, in his meeting
with Admiral John de Robeck, Commander of the Allied Mediterranean
Fleet and British High Commissioner in Istanbul, on 6 April 1920 also
touched upon the March events in Karabakh, mentioning that
consequent on the misguided policy of the Erivan Government in the
Karabagh district and the oppressive measures carried out against the
Tartar [Azerbaijani] population, the Azerbaijani Government had been
obliged to transfer troops to that district, and the northern frontiers
of the State were, in consequence, not suffciently well guarded for a
successful defence to be opposed to any Bolshevik force which might
advance south.
(Butler and Bury 1962, doc.531, 587)
Concern over the escalation of the confict between the two countries was
conveyed to Earl Curzon by Wardrop and Admiral de Robeck on 4 and
6 April 1920 respectively (Butler and Bury 1962, doc.530, 586, doc.531,
587). On 8 April, the British Foreign Secretary, in turn, met an Armenian deputation consisting of Bogos Nubar Pasha, Head of the Armenian
National Delegation representing the Ottoman Armenians at the Paris
Peace Conference, Erevan Archbishop and Avetis Aharonian, Head of the
Delegation of the Republic of Armenia at the Paris Peace Conference, and
“spoke to them in the strongest possible manner about foolish and indefensible conduct of their compatriots on North-Eastern frontiers of Armenia”
(Butler and Bury 1962, doc.533, 589). Curzon continued that the “detailed
list of outrages committed since beginning of year by Armenians on one
hand and Tartars [Azerbaijanis] on other” showed a “heavy balance against
Armenians”, and told them that “we were not at all keen about giving
them arms to fght Turks which they would almost certainly use to fght
Azerbaijan” (Butler and Bury 1962, doc.533, 589).
According to Wardrop’s letter of 12 April, the fghting between Armenia and Azerbaijan proceeded on an extended front and Azerbaijan seemed
“to be on the point of pro-Turk-Bolshevik attitude in despair of promised
Allied help” (Butler and Bury 1962, doc.536, 591). Here it should be mentioned that based on information given by Fuad Bey, Turkish general and

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former Ottoman Under-Secretary of State of War, Wardrop had written to
Earl Curzon on 12 March that “Mustapha Kemal has agreement with Lenin
to allow Bolsheviks free hand in North Caucasus and Azerbaijan in order
to secure free passage of arms for him” (Butler and Bury 1962, doc.515,
573). Although this information was denied by the Azerbaijani Government, Admiral de Robeck was convinced that an understanding existed
“if not between two Governments at least between Azerbaijan and Turkish
Nationalists” (Butler and Bury 1962, doc.519, 575–576).
On 28 April, Soviet rule was declared in Azerbaijan. On 30 April 1920,
the Azerbaijani Soviet Government sent a note to the Government of the
Armenian Republic demanding to “clear Karabakh13 and Zangazur from
your troops”, to “retreat to your own borders” and to “stop international
massacre”; otherwise Azerbaijan would consider itself in a situation of war
with Armenia (Guliev 1989, 41; Imranli 2006, 139). The note demonstrated
the Azerbaijani Soviet government’s position on Karabakh, including
Zangazur, which was regarded by Azerbaijan as being within its borders.
On 19 June 1920, Sergo Orjonikidze, Head of Kavburo (Kavkazskoe Biuro
Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (bol’shevikov) –
Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist
(Bolshevik) Party), in his letter to Georgii Chicherin, People’s Commissar
for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, informed that “Soviet rule was declared
in Karabakh and Zangazur and above-mentioned territories consider
themselves as parts of the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic”.14 (Guliev 1989, 49;
Imranli 2006, 140)
However, as it appears from the common opinion of Nariman Narimanov,
Head of the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee, Anastas Mikoian and
Viktor Naneishvili, members of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, Budu
Mdivani, member of Kavburo, and three representatives of the Revolutionary
Military Soviet of the Eleventh Red Army, which was sent to the Central
Committee of the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party on 10 July 1920,
Karabakh, including Zangazur was going to be declared “disputed” by Moscow. The above-mentioned representatives warned against this position:
The Muslim masses will consider this an unexpected change to the old
and [will regard the] inability of the Soviet power to secure Azerbaijan
within its previous borders as treason, Armeniaphilia or weakness on
the part of the Soviet power […] We warn the Centre against hesitations
in the issue of Karabakh and Zangazur in the interests of not turning
Azerbaijan into a bastard in the hands of the Red Army and distributing
[it] among the Armenians and Georgians, instead of creating a strong
centre and a base for class revolution in the East.
(Guliev 1989, 54–56)
One month after this warning, namely on 10 August 1920, the day when
Armenia signed the Sevres Treaty between Turkey and the Allied Powers, it

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also signed an agreement with Soviet Russia. Notwithstanding Azerbaijani
opposition,15 the agreement with Soviet Russia declared Karabakh, including
Zangazur “disputed” (Mnatsakanian 1957, doc.270, 384–385). Bolshevik
Russia’s stance on the Karabakh issue can be explained with its aims of
achieving the Sovietisation of Azerbaijan and Armenia: frst to satisfy the
Azerbaijani position on the region in order to achieve its Sovietisation, since
the Bolshevik forces were advancing from the East and it was important
to capture oil-rich Baku. After fulflment of this goal, it was necessary to
Sovietise Armenia, which required the satisfaction of Armenian claims
by declaring the territories which it recognised as “undisputed” parts of
Azerbaijan as “disputed”.
On 26 November 1920, Armenia issued a declaration rejecting the Sevres
Treaty, a Turkish prerequisite for the start of the peace negotiations. The
reason for this change was that, with the aim of occupying the territories
refected in the Sevres Treaty, Armenia had started a large-scale military
campaign against the Turks and despite Allied support it was defeated
and had to appeal to the Turkish Command with the proposal to start
peace negotiations. On 18 November, when the Armenian Government
had started peace negotiations with Kemalists, Alexander Khatisian (who
was appointed by the Armenian Government to negotiate peace with the
Kemalists), in his meeting with Colonel Claude Stokes, the British political
offcer at Baku, stated that the Armenian Government realised that it was
obliged to make peace either with the Turks or the Bolsheviks. It would
be preferable to make peace with the Turks and he inclined to the belief
that His Majesty’s Government would also prefer this. It considered
such a peace feasible as Armenia would be now content with much less
territory than was accorded to her by the Peace Treaty with Turkey.
(Butler and Bury 1962, doc.622, 648–649)
The peace negotiations were concluded, apparently with the approval
of the British Government, with the signing of the Gumru (Alexandropol) Treaty between Kemalist Turkey and the Armenian Republic
on 2 December 1920, represented by Dashnak Armenia’s representatives headed by former premier, Khatisian. Under this treaty, Dashnak
Armenia declared the Sevres Treaty annulled (Mnatsakanian 1957,
doc.294, 438–439; Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin anlaşmaları 1992, 3–4;
Imranli 2006, 145–146). Meanwhile, after the rejection of the Sevres
Treaty by Dashnak Armenia on 26 November, Soviet rule was declared in Armenia on 29 November 1920, and on 2 December, an
agreement was signed in Erevan between RSFSR in the person of
Boris Legran, plenipotentiary envoy of Soviet Russia in Dashnak Armenia, and the Republic of Armenia in the person of Dashnak Dro
Kanaian and Arutiun Terterian. According to this agreement, which
declared Armenia an “independent socialist republic”, Russian Soviet

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Government “recognised” Zangazur as “undisputed” part of “Socialist
Soviet Republic of Armenia” (Klyuchnikov and Sabanin 1928, doc.41, 75–
76; Mnatsakanian 1957, doc.295, 441–442; Imranli 2006, 148). Thus, Zangazur, one of four uezds of Karabakh, was frst recognised as “undisputed”
part of Soviet Azerbaijan immediately after Azerbaijan’s Sovietisation by
Bolshevik Russia. Then it was declared as “disputed” when the turn came
to Sovietise Armenia, and was fnally considered as “undisputed” part of
Armenia, when the latter was declared Soviet. Moreover, Muslim-dominated Nakhchyvan was also declared “undisputed” part of Soviet Armenia as was the rest of the Erevan guberniia.
Despite the inclusion of Nakhchyvan and Zangazur in Soviet Armenia,
the agreement had no mention of other three uezds of Karabakh, namely
the Javanshir, Shusha and Jabrayil uezds of Elizavetpol guberniia. Later,
on 26 December 1920, Armenia had to give up its claims to Nakhchyvan
in the Erevan guberniia, which it confrmed, inter alia, by signing the Kars
Treaty on 13 October 1921 with Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
According to Article 5 of this treaty, the governments of Turkey, Soviet
Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed that the Nakhchyvan province was an
autonomous territory under the patronage of Azerbaijan (Gaponenko
1960, doc.264, 423, 429; Imranli 2006, 167). Thus, the Soviet rule did
not fulfl the territorial expectations of the Armenian nationalists, so
on 18 February 1921, Dashnaks headed by Simon Vratzian carried out a
coup d’état in Erevan, which lasted until 2 April 1921 when the Dashnaks
were driven to Zangazur under Soviet pressure. According to Richard
Hovannisian (1996, 405–406), after getting assurance that Zangazur
would be “permanently incorporated into Soviet Armenia rather than
into Soviet Azerbaijan”, Dashnaks left for Persia on 16 July 1921, which
can be considered the date of the beginning of the second Sovietisation
of Armenia.

Notes
1 The frst time the word “Artsakh” was mentioned in Avesta in the sense of
“country, province of winds” (Mamedova 2005, 647).
2 The country is called Ran/Aran/Ardan in Pahlavi (Parthian/Sasanian), Rani in
Georgian, Aghuank in Armenian and Arran in Arabic sources.
3 Azərbaycan Respublikası Dövlət Arxivi (State Archive of the Azerbaijan
Republic; hereafter ARDA), fn 894, l 10, f 99, 2–3.
4 ARDA, fn 897, l 1, f 11, 236–236op.
5 ARDA, fn 897, l 1, f 11, 236–236op.
6 ARDA, fn 897, l 1, f 11, 246, 256–256op.
7 Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin İşlər İdarəsinin Siyasi Sənədlər Arxivi (Political Documents Archive of the Administrative Department of the
President of Azerbaijan; hereafter ARPİİSSA), fn 970, l 1, f 1, 51.
8 The British military control of the region lasted until 28 August 1919 (it stayed
longer in Batumi), when it was replaced by the British diplomatic mission
(Foreign Offce, The National Archives, London (hereafter FO), 371/7729,
17–18).

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9 Cabinet Offce, The National Archives, London (hereafter CAB), 24/69, “The
future settlement of Transcaucasia with special regard to British interests”, 1
November 1918, 61 (2).
10 ARDA, fn 970, l 1, f 65, 76.
11 ARDA, fn 897, l 1, f 31, 141–142.
12 FO 608/77, 403; FO 608/78, 550.
13 “Karabakh” here and in other documents to be quoted later refers to Javanshir,
Shusha and Jabrayil uezds.
14 ARPİİSSA, fn 1, l 1, f 18, 9op.
15 ARPİİSSA, fn 1, l 1, f 18, 13op.

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Sankt-Petersburg: Tipografia Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk.
Butler, Rohan and Bury, J. P. T., eds. 1962. Documents on British Foreign Policy
1919–1939, First Series, Vol. 12. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Offce.
Dasxuranci, Movses. 1961. The History of the Caucasian Albanians. Translated from
Old Armenian by C. J. F. Dowsett. London: Oxford University Press.

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Draskhanakertsi, Iovannes. 1986. Istoriia Armenii. Translated from Old Armenian
by M. Darbinian-Melikian. Erevan: Sovetakan grokh.
Enikolopov, Ivan. 1974. Griboedov i Vostok. 2nd rev. ed. Erevan: Izdatel’stvo ‘Ayastan’.
Eremian, S. T. 1958a. “Politicheskaia istoriia Albanii III–VII vv.” In Ocherki istorii
SSSR, edited by B. A. Rybakov, 310–323. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk
SSSR.
Eremian, S. T. 1958b. “Ideologiia i kul’tura Albanii III–VII vv.” In Ocherki istorii
SSSR, edited by B. A. Rybakov, 323–330. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk
SSSR.
Eremian, S. T. 1958c. “Azerbaidzhan (Albaniia) v period arabskogo vladychestva.”
In Ocherki istorii SSSR, edited by B. A. Rybakov, 530–536. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo
Akademii Nauk SSSR.
Frye, R. N. 2012. “Arran.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam. 2nd ed., edited by P. Bearman.
doi:10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_0736.
Gaponenko, L. S., G. K. Deev, N. N. Kalinin, I. K. Kolosovskiy, G. D. Obichkin,
and M. A. Kharlamov, eds. 1960. Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, Vol.4. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury.
Gevond, Vardapet. 1862. Istoriia khalifov. Translated from Old Armenian by K.
Patkanian. Sankt-Petersburg: Tipografia Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk.
Guliev, Danil, ed. 1989. K istorii obrazovaniia Nagorno-Karabakhskoi Avtonomnoi
Oblasti Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR (1918–1925). Dokumenty i materialy. Baku:
Azerbaidzhanskoe Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel’stvo.
Hewsen, Robert. 2013. “Editor’s Preface.” In Archbishop Sergius [Sargis]
Hasan-Jalaliants. A History of the Land of Artsakh [Karabagh and Ganje, 1722–
1827] (Patmutiun Aghuanits Ashkharkhi). Translated from Old Armenian by
Karen Ketendjian. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers.
Hovannisian, Richard. 1967. Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918. Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Hovannisian, Richard. 1971. The Republic of Armenia. Vol.1. The First Year, 1918–
1919. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Hovannisian, Richard. 1996. The Republic of Armenia. Vol.4. Between Crescent
and Sickle: Partition and Sovietization. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press.
Hübschmann, Joseph. 1904. Die Altarmenischen Ortsnamen. Strasbourg: Verlag von
Karl J. Trübner.
Imranli, Kamala. [2005] 2006. Chernaia sud’ba Chernogo Sada. Moscow:
Nauchno-izdatel’skii tsentr ‘Ladomir’.
Imranli, Kamala. 2006. Sozdanie armianskogo gosudarstva na Kavkaze: Istoki i
posledstviia. Moscow: Nauchno-izdatel’skii tsentr ‘Ladomir’.
Imranli-Lowe, Kamala. 2014. “The Provisional Government and the Armenian
Homeland Project.” Revolutionary Russia, 27(2): 132–156.
Imranli-Lowe, Kamala. 2015. “Reconstruction of the ‘Armenian Homeland’
Notion.” Middle Eastern Studies, 51(4): 540–562.
Imranli-Lowe, Kamala. 2020. “The Polities of the Caucasus and the Regional Powers
in the Medieval and Early Modern Period.” Caucasus Survey, 8(3): 258–277.
Kagankatvatsi, Moisei. 1861. Istoriia agvan. Translated from Old Armenian by K.
Patkanov. Sankt-Petersburg: Tipografia Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk.
Kavkazskii kalendar’ na 1917 god. 1916. Tifis: Tipografia Kantseliarii Namestnika
Y.I.V. na Kavkaze.

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Kilic, Remzi. 2001. XVI ve XVII yüzyıllarda Osmanlı-İran siyasi antlaşmaları.
Istanbul: Tez yayınları.
Kliuchnikov, Iu. V., and A. V.Sabanin, eds. 1928. Mezhdunarodnaia politika
noveishego vremeni v dogovorakh, notakh i deklaratsiiakh. Vol.1. Ot sniatiia blokady
s Sovetskoi Rossii do desiatiletiia Oktiabr’skoi Revoliutsii. No.1. Akty Sovetskoi
diplomatii. Moscow: Izdanie Litizdata NKID.
Krymsky, Agafangel. 1938. “Stranitsy iz istorii severnogo ili kavkazskogo
Azerbaidzhana (klassicheskoi Albanii). Sheki.” In Pamiati akademika N.Ia.
Marra (1864–1934), edited by I. I. Meshchaninov, 369–384. Moscow-Leningrad:
Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR.
Mamedova, Farida. 2005. Kavkazskaia Albaniia i albany. Baku: Tsentr Issledovanii
Kavkazkoi Albanii.
Marr, Nicholas. 1915. Kavkazskii kul’turnii mir i Armeniia. Petrograd: Senatskaia
Tipografia.
Matthew of Edessa. 2017. The Chronicle. Translated from Old Armenian by
R.Bedrosian. New Jersey.
Mil’man, Aron. 1966. Politicheskii stroi Azerbaidzhana v XIX–nachale XX vv. Baku:
Azərnəşr.
Minorsky, Vladimir. 1953a. “Caucasica IV.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and
African Studies, 15(3): 504–529. doi:10.1017/S0041977X00111462.
Minorsky, Vladimir. 1953b. Studies in Caucasian History. London: Taylor’s Foreign
Press.
Minorsky, Vladimir. 1958. A History of Sharvan and Darband in the 10th–11th Centuries. Cambridge: W.Heffer and Sons Ltd.
Mirzə Adıgözəl bəy. 1989. “Qarabağnamə.” In Qarabağnamələr, edited by Akif
Farzaliyev and Nazim Akhundov, 5–102. Baku: Yazıçı.
Mnatsakanian, A. N., A. M. Akopian, and G. M. Dallakian, eds. 1957. Velikaia
Oktiabr’skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia i pobeda sovetskoi vlasti v Armenii
(Sbornik dokumentov). Erevan: Aypetrat.
Orbeli, I. A. 1963. Izbrannye Trudy. Erevan: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk Armianskoi
SSR.
Perry, J. R. 1975. “Forced Migration in Iran during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries.” Iranian Studies, 8(4): 199–215.
Petrushevskii, Il’ia. 1930. “O dokhristianskikh verovaniiakh krest’ian
Nagornogo Karabakha.” Izvestiia Azerbaidzhanskogo Gosudarstvennogo
Nauchno-Issledovatel’skogo Instituta, 1(5): 1–43.
Petrushevskii, Il’ia. 1949. Ocherki po istorii feodal’nykh otnoshenii v Azerbaidzhane
i Armenii v XVI-nachale XIX vv. Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Leningradskogo
Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta.
Shavrov, Nicholas. 1911. Novaia ugroza russkomu delu v Zakavkaz’e: predstoiashchaia
rasprodazha Mugani inorodtsam. Saint Petersburg: Tipografia Redaktsii
periodicheskikh izdanii Ministerstva Finansov.
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v.n.e.).” In Albanica Caucasica I, edited by Alikber Аlikberov and Murtazali
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(1943) 1980. Translated and explained by V. Minorsky. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

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Trever, Kamilla. 1959. Ocherki no istorii i kul’ture Kavkazskoi Albanii. IV v. do n.e.–
VII v. n.e. Moscow-Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR.
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Dışişleri Bakanlığı yayınları.
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Government Printing Offce.
Vacca, Alison. 2017. Non-Muslim Provinces under Early Islam: Islamic Rule and
Iranian Legitimacy in Armenia and Caucasian Albania. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.

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2

The Sovietization of Azerbaijan
and a Road to Autonomy
in Nagorno-Karabakh
(1920–1923)
Jamil Hasanli

Introduction
The Second Karabakh War and the post-war period rekindled an interest
in the history of Nagorno-Karabakh. However, most publications grossly
distort both the pre-Soviet history of its unifcation with the Russian Empire
and the vicissitudes of Soviet history. The fact that some historians distort
or even falsify history cannot but cause concern and regret. I wonder who
profts from these distortions? Indeed, who needs history adjusted to the
current political context? The truth can easily be recovered from numerous documents in which the military and diplomatic services of the Russian
Empire and Soviet Russia carefully registered the facts and which are kept
in Russian, Azerbaijan, and Armenian archives. A number of historians
and politicians even in the post-war period doubts that Karabakh was part
of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in 1918–1920, while trying to create an alternative story related to the well-known Declaration of Nariman
Narimanov of December 1, 1920 and insists that Stalin transferred the
mountain part of Karabakh to Azerbaijan in 1921 (which is not true). The
Armenians claim to rely on archival documents, but instead of clarifying
the issue distort the far from simple circumstances even more. So, what was
the historical truth really like? The political destiny of Karabakh was largely
shaped by what happened in the 1920s in the Caucasus. In the frst months
of the region’s Sovietization, Moscow and its representatives in the Caucasus recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as an inalienable part of Azerbaijan.
In the spring of 1921, however, the Bolsheviks decided to fnd a plausible
pretext to transfer it to Armenia. With no plausible pretexts at hand, they
armed themselves with the formula “autonomy frst, then mobilization of
the local Armenians”; in July 1923, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous
Region (NKAR) was set up as part of the Azerbaijan SSR.

The First Steps of Soviet Power in Azerbaijan and Karabakh
On April 28, 1920, Soviet troops occupied Baku. Russian troops entered
Karabakh a month after they had occupied Baku; Azerbaijan lost its

DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-4
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Sovietization of Azerbaijan

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independence; sometime later this happened to Georgia and Armenia. In
this way, in two years, Russia, now Soviet Russia, regained its grip on the
South Caucasus. Soviet power detached bits and pieces of Azerbaijan’s territory. In the frst years of Soviet power, when the Center joined primordial
Azerbaijani lands to Armenia, Nariman Narimanov, unable to reconcile
himself to this injustice, wrote to Lenin to complain that the lands which
had, beyond a doubt, been part of Azerbaijan under the Musavat government had become disputed areas under Soviet power. He warned that the
common people were aware of all this and were discontented (for more
details on a road to autonomy of the Nagorno-Karabakh (1920–1923), see
also: Hasanli 2018, 117–157).1
On June 19, 1920, Nariman Narimanov, Budu Mdivani, Anastas Mikoyan,
and Avis Nurijanyan sent a telegram to Georgii Chicherin in which they
informed him of the Armenian Dashnak army’s onslaught and its success
in the Kazakh and Kedabek districts of Soviet Azerbaijan. A copy sent to
Grigorii (Sergo) Orjonikidze in Vladikavkaz contained the following telltale
passage:
The Armenians are in fact in a state of war with Azerbaijan. As for the
allegedly disputable Karabakh and Zangezur, which have become part
of Soviet Azerbaijan, we categorically state that these places should,
without doubt, in the future too, remain within Azerbaijan.2
On June 22, 1920, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, enraged by the
fact that the well-known Bolsheviks working in the Caucasus, Baku and, on
the whole, Azerbaijan were dead set against the Center’s policy, complained
to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party
(Bolsheviks)—CC RCP (B) about “the lack of discipline among the Baku
comrades and the scandalous contradiction between their actions and the
line of the CC” He wrote that if the disputed territories captured by Russia were transferred to Azerbaijan, an agreement with Armenia would be
impossible.3 People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin followed his
own, very specifc logic. He went on to explain to Lenin that “so far Russia is
not transferring these lands to the Armenians so as not to offend the Tatars.
When conditions for the Sovietization of Georgia and Armenia appear, the
problems will disappear of their own accord.”4 His numerous explanations
and telegrams sent to Lenin, Orjonikidze, and Narimanov make it abundantly clear: Karabakh was nothing but “small change” and bait in the talks
with Armenia.
Stronger Armenian claims to the mountainous part of Karabakh
forced those Bolsheviks who were well known in the Caucasus (Nariman
Narimanov, Budu Mdivani, Anastas Mikoyan, and Viktor Naneishvili)
and even members of the Military Council of the 11th Army, Iakov Vesnik,
Mikhael Levandovskii, and Boris Mikhaylov, to send a letter to the CC RCP
(B) which said:

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Jamil Hasanli
We believe that it is our duty to inform the CC of our concerted opinion about Karabakh and Zangezur; the decision which is planned as
intermediate in the talks with Armenia will contradict the interests of
the revolution in the Caucasus. Under the Musawat government, the
whole of Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan. The inseparable cultural
and economic ties between Karabakh and Zangezur and Baku, which
employed tens of thousands of workers from these provinces, and the
complete isolation of these provinces from Erevan were confrmed in
1919 by the Congress of Armenian Peasants of Karabakh which, even
under the Musavat regime (which was insufferable for the Armenians)
and despite provocation by Armenian agents, resolutely supported
complete unity with Azerbaijan on the condition that a peaceful life be
guaranteed for the Armenians.

The authors concluded that the Muslim masses would regard Soviet power
as perfdious if it proved unable to preserve the old borders of Azerbaijan.
They wrote that this would be taken as Armenian-philism or as the weakness
of Soviet power and warned against indecision in the question of Karabakh
and Zangezur “so as not to turn Azerbaijan into a mongrel supported by the
Red Army and handed out to the Armenians and Georgians.”5
In an effort to make Soviet recognition of Armenia look offcial Chicherin
tried to convince Orjonikidze that Soviet Russia needed a compromise with
the Dashnak government of Armenia:
The Azerbaijani government has described as disputable not only Karabakh and Zangezur, but also the Sharur-Daralaghez Uezd. The latter has
never been disputed and even the Musawat government always regarded
it as Armenian. Without it, Armenia will have practically nothing left.
After resisting for a long time, the Armenian delegation at the peace
talks agreed to accept Karabakh and Zangezur as disputed territories
in the hope of fnally acquiring large chunks of them. The delegation is
frm about the Sharur-Daralaghez Uezd. On the other hand, we need
an agreement with the Azerbaijani government so that our treaty with
Armenia does not contradict the demands of Azerbaijan. We ask you
to use your exceptional infuence in Baku to convince the Azerbaijani
government to yield on its demand to describe the Sharur-Daralaghez
Uezd as a disputed territory and limit it to Karabakh and Zangezur.6
After receiving Chicherin’s ciphered telegram of July 2, 1920 and discussing
the issue with newly appointed Envoy Plenipotentiary of Soviet Russia
to Armenia Boris Legran and Saak Ter-Gabrielyan, Sergo Orjonikidze
informed Moscow directly that
Azerbaijan insisted on the immediate and unconditional unifcation of
Karabakh and Zangezur. I think this should be done since economically

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both uezds are attached to Baku and have absolutely no ties with Erivan
(renamed Yerevan by a decree of the Central Executive Committee of
the Soviet Union on August 17, 1936—J.H.). The Bayazet Turkish Army,
which has wedged its way in, has made this especially obvious.
According to Comrade Gabrielyan, the Armenian delegation will
undoubtedly accept this. In this case, it will be possible to convince
Azerbaijan to drop its claims to the other regions. I think that Karabakh and Zangezur should be immediately united with Azerbaijan. I
will force Azerbaijan to grant autonomy to these regions; this should
be done by Azerbaijan, but in no way should this be mentioned in the
treaty.7
By means of another direct communiqué, Orjonikidze informed Lenin,
Stalin, and Chicherin in so many words that the Armenian government had
deliberately misinformed them:
Today Gabrielyan told me that the Armenian delegation will accept
immediate unifcation of Karabakh and Zangezur with Azerbaijan if
it drops its claims to the Sharur-Daralaghez Uezd and the Nakhchivan
Region. We have agreed among ourselves that when we are in Baku, we
will talk to Narimanov about this. You can see for yourself that there is
no lack of clarity or understanding. I assure you that we are fully aware
of our peaceful policy and are sticking to it. I am convinced, and this
is my deepest conviction, that to strengthen Soviet power in Azerbaijan
and to keep Baku in our control, we must join Nagorno-Karabakh; its
valley part is out of the question: it has always been Azeri and part of
Zangezur. Azerbaijan has guaranteed safety of the Armenians living
there. We shall grant autonomy and organize the Armenian population
without moving Muslim armed units there.
He deemed it necessary to warn:
Any other decision will shatter our position in Azerbaijan and will give
us nothing in Armenia. I know that we might need Armenia under
certain political circumstances. The decision rests with you; we shall
follow suit. Let me tell you that this treatment of Azerbaijan undermines our prestige among the broad masses of Azeris and creates fertile
soil for the efforts of our adversaries.8
After the April coup of 1920, Orjonikidze remained for some time on the
side of Azerbaijan, which was considered “Soviet power’s frstborn in the
Caucasus” in its relations with Georgia and Armenia. Some people in
Moscow did not like this; the irritation being especially obvious in the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Georgii Chicherin, who headed this
group, blackmailed Orjonikidze, whom he called a latent Orientalist and

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Jamil Hasanli

lover of the Muslims. Orjonikidze parried the attacks by saying that he had
nothing to do with Muslim nationalism and there was not a single Tatar
among his ancestors.9
Orjonikidze knew who was stirring up the trouble in the Center and had
to go directly to Nadezhda Allilueva, an offcial in the Council of People’s
Commissars and Stalin’s wife, with a request to tell Stalin that “Georgii
Chicherin and Lev Karakhan (Levon Karakhanyan) pushed me into a tight
corner once more.”10 Chicherin was of a different opinion; in a telegram to
Orjonikidze dated 8 July, he wrote:
We all know that the time will come for Armenia’s Sovietization; it is
too early to do this now. The best we can do now is to declare Karabakh and Zangezur disputed areas; to do this we need an agreement
from the Azerbaijani government. We badly need this; we should sign
an agreement with Armenia. The situation in the world demands this;
this can be done if we declare Karabakh and Zangezur, and only them,
disputed areas.11
Chicherin and Karakhan pushed the People’s Commissariat for Foreign
Affairs toward cooperation with Armenia at the expense of Azerbaijan. On
July 16, Orjonikidze, unable to withstand the pressure, telegraphed Lenin,
Stalin, and Chicherin with a request not to enter a peace treaty with Armenia
before the Azeri delegation arrived. He wrote: “The local comrades are very
concerned about the possibility of peace with Armenia without involving Azerbaijan.”12 Anastas Mikoyan, member of the Central Committee
Communist Party of Azerbaijan (Bolsheviks)—CC CPA, was of the same
opinion. On June 29, he wrote to Orjonikidze: “We are all enraged by the
Center’s policy toward Karabakh and Zangezur. You should also defend
our opinion in the Center. We have nothing against peace with Armenia but
not at the expense of Karabakh and Zangezur.”13
This shows that, strange as it may seem, Soviet Russia and Dashnakian
Armenia were engaged in secret negotiations about Azerbaijan, to which
it was not invited and to which it had not agreed. The developments in
Armenia copied what had happened with Georgia a month before: a lot of
interesting information had traveled in the ciphered parts of the telegram
Orjonikidze and Kirov had sent to Lenin and Stalin. They believed that
a treaty with Georgia without clarifying the position of Azerbaijan was
fraught with failure: “We want to know why we are signing a treaty with
Georgia and refusing to sign a treaty with friendly Azerbaijan. If you have
different plans for Azerbaijan, why are we being kept in the dark?” In the
ciphered part they warned:
You should not put forward the name of Karakhan as the author of
the Eastern policy. Here the Zakatala scandal (the reference is to the

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promise to transfer the Zakatala District to Georgia under the Moscow
Treaty of May 7, 1920.-J.H.) is interpreted as Armenian perfdy.14
Lev Karakhan, who flled the post of Deputy People’s Commissar for
Foreign Affairs, did play an important role in shaping and realizing the
anti-Azeri policy of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of Soviet
Russia. The ciphered and open documents of the time directly point to him
as the main plotter. Grigorii Orjonikidze wrote in an open letter: “Karabakh
is another Zakatala of our Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. An enormous
provocation is underway here: it is rumored that this is stirred up by the
Armenians in Moscow.”15
Despite the Center’s unprecedented pressure on Azerbaijan, the gap
between the Azeri and Armenian positions remained as wide as ever. The
talks between Kirov and People’s Commissar Mirza Davud Huseynov
and the Armenian representatives in Tifis ended in nothing. On August
6, he wrote to Chicherin that he had only convinced the Azeris to cede the
Sharur-Daralaghez Uezd to Armenia; the Azeris regarded the rest, that
is, the Nakhchivan Uezd, Ordubad, Julfa, Zangezur, and Karabakh, as
decidedly their own. The Armenian representatives were no less determined
to claim the regions. The Azeris argued that under the Musawat government
these regions had belonged to Azerbaijan and that, therefore, if it ceded
them, Soviet power would lose its prestige in the eyes of the Azeris, Iranians,
and Turks.16
On August 10, 1920, the talks in Moscow and Irevan ended in a treaty of
six articles, four of which dealt with a deliberately fanned territorial dispute
with Azerbaijan. Under Art 2, the troops of the Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic (RSFSR) occupied the disputed regions of Karabakh,
Zangezur, and Nakhchivan; the Armenian troops remained in a specifed strip. Art 3 said that “the occupation by Soviet troops of the disputed
territories did not predetermine the answer to the question about the rights
of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic
to these territories. The same article further stated that the temporary
occupation by the RSFSR of these territories was intended to create conditions conducive to a peaceful resolution of the territorial disputes between
Armenia and Azerbaijan; in the future, the issue, said the Treaty, would
be settled by means of a comprehensive agreement between the Republic
of Armenia and the RSFSR”17 Russia hastened to sign the treaty with
Armenia because, the same day, Turkey and the Entente signed the Sevres
Treaty, under which Armenia could have gained a lot. The Russian Soviet
diplomats feared, with good reason, that Armenia might be tempted and
would fall under the infuence of the Entente. Under pressure from Moscow,
the half-baked diplomatic document was signed; Armenia was promised
the Azeri lands previously transformed by Soviet Russia into disputed
territories.

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Jamil Hasanli

From the very frst days of Soviet power in Azerbaijan, much was done
to transform the primordial Azeri lands into disputed territories; this is
best illustrated by the Russian-Armenian treaty. On June 19 Narimanov,
Mdivani, Mikoian, and Avis Nurijanian sent a telegram to Chicherin,
which talked about the advance of the Dashnak army and its success in
Gazakh and Gedabey. A copy of this telegram was sent to Orjonikidze in
Vladikavkaz:
In any case, Azerbaijan cannot survive without Karabakh and Zangezur.
I think that we should invite an Azeri representative to Moscow to discuss all the issues related to Azerbaijan and Armenia before the treaty
with Armenia is signed; repetition of the Zakatala scandal stirred up by
Armenians will undermine our position here.18
Some people placed the stakes on Armenia in the territorial disputes between
the two republics; some of the top offcials in Moscow never hesitated to tell
lies and never shunned provocations. Long before the treaty was signed,
People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin wrote in his report to
Lenin:
The Azeri government has claimed Karabakh, Zangezur, and the
Sharur-Daralaghez Uezd along with Nakhchivan, Ordubad, and
Julfa… This combination should not be accomplished by Russian
hands—this is unacceptable. We should remain objective and unbiased.
It would be a fatal mistake for our Eastern policy to rely on one national
element against another national element. If we take any lands from
Armenia and transfer them to Azerbaijan, our policy in the East will
be distorted.19
Georgii Chicherin managed to present at least some of his ideas as offcial
and transform them into instructions for the Revolutionary Military
Council of the Caucasian Front sent in the name of the CC RCP (B) not
to let either Azeri or Armenian offcials into the disputed territories. The
territories described as disputed were in fact parts of Azerbaijan and were
still controlled by the Azeri authorities. This meant that Chicherin’s instructions were nothing more than a violation of Azerbaijan’s sovereign rights
and territorial integrity.
The new leaders of Azerbaijan found themselves in a quandary: on the
one hand, enticed by revolutionary zeal, Azeri Soviet power imagined
that it was close to Soviet Russia; on the other, Soviet Russia, the workers’ and peasants’ ally, detached the lands which had undoubtedly belonged
to Azerbaijan under the previous government. This looked ugly, even to
the Soviet offcials dispatched from Moscow to Azerbaijan. The injustice
was glaring. In a long report to Lenin, Nikolai Soloviev, one such person,

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who flled the post of Chairman of the Council of National Economy of
Azerbaijan SSR, wrote:
People pinned their hopes on Moscow, but the peace treaties with
Georgia and Armenia, under which chunks of Azeri territory with
Muslim population were transferred to these republics, shattered, if not
killed, these hopes. The Muslim masses concluded that Moscow had not
only captured Azerbaijan, but also increased Georgian and Armenian
territories at its expense.20
Solovyov added that,
the ordinary Muslims were puzzled, while certain members of the
Communist Party of Azerbaijan explained that the treaty had been
compiled on the instructions of infuential Armenians who flled high
posts in the Center and called themselves Communists while being
conscious or unconscious nationalists.21
Nariman Narimanov was enraged by Soviet Russia’s arbitrariness toward
Azerbaijan; he knew that these provocations had been devised and realized
by People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin (who since the summer
of 1919 had been dead set against Narimanov’s Eastern policy) and his deputy Lev Karakhan. Their posts as heads of the People’s Commissariat for
Foreign Affairs allowed them to shape and realize the foreign, especially
Eastern, policy of the Soviets. In his opposition to Chicherin, Narimanov
tried to rely on Lenin, who had pronounced many high-sounding words and
been lavish with his promises. Still expecting Lenin to be fair and unbiased,
he wrote to him in mid-July:
Comrade Chicherin’s telegram shows that you are receiving biased
information or that the Center has succumbed to those who are still
cooperating with what remains of Denikin’s crowd against Soviet
power in Azerbaijan. If the Center wants to sacrifce Azerbaijan and
keep Baku and its oil and renounce its Eastern policy, it is free to do
this.22
Narimanov warned Lenin in a very clear form that,
you will not be able to keep Baku separated from the rest of Azerbaijan
with the perfdious Dashnaks and Georgian Mensheviks as your neighbors. On the other hand, I would like to fnd out what the Center thinks
about us, the Muslims, and how it dealt with these important issues
without us. The Center was free to mistrust us, but such senior offcials
as Orjonikidze and Mdivani, likewise, disagree with its decision.23

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He openly told the head of the Soviet state about the fact that,
with its decision about Karabakh the Center deprived us of our weapon,
etc. It added plausibility to the provocative statements of the Musavat
Party, which is holding forth that the Muslim Communists allegedly sold
Azerbaijan to Russia, a country which recognizes the independence of
Armenia and Georgia and, at the same time, insists for some reason that
the areas which belonged beyond a doubt to Azerbaijan before Soviet
power, become disputable. Comrade Chicherin says that we should obey
the Center’s policy, but is the Center aware that it is using us as a screen?
We are told in plain terms: ‘You cannot secure the absolutely undisputed
territories, but you are holding forth about liberating the East’.24
In another letter to Lenin, Narimanov informed him about a serious threat
to Azerbaijan:
The situation is catastrophic. The Center has recognized Georgia
and Armenia as independent states and recognized Azerbaijan’s
independence. At the same time, the Center has transferred undisputed
Azeri territories to Armenia. Had they been transferred to Georgia,
public opinion could have been pacifed, but the fact that they were
given to Armenia and the Dashnaks is a fatal and irreparable mistake.
(For the letter of Narimanov to Lenin, see: Narimanov 1990, 117)
Soviet Russia preferred to ignore Narimanov’s resolute and sometimes
even oppositional stand; it followed the policy of humiliation of Azerbaijan devised by the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. On July 20,
Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin telegraphed Narimanov with a
great deal of sarcasm:
So far neither you, nor Orjonikidze have clarifed in your telegrams why
you and the local Communists are dissatisfed with the occupation of
Karabakh and Zangezur by Russian troops and why you want, without
fail, their formal annexation to Azerbaijan… We should establish good
relations with Armenia because if Turkey turns against us, Armenia,
even Armenia of the Dashnaks, will serve as an outpost of our struggle
against the advancing Turks.25
In another letter, Georgii Chicherin deemed it necessary to warn the
Politburo of the CC RCP (B) that relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia should be treated as part of Russia’s Turkish policy: “When discussing
the Azeri-Armenian disagreements, I have always pointed out that if the
Turks acquired aggressive trends in the Caucasus, Armenia will serve as a
barrier and will defend us.”26
As Soviet Russia was consolidating its position in Azerbaijan, the republic was gradually being turned into a toehold for the Bolsheviks’ regional

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policy; its natural resources and territories were used to lull the Georgian
and Armenian bourgeois republics and to create conditions conducive to
Sovietization of Armenia. On September 23, 1920, Boris Legran sent a
ciphered telegram to Lenin in which he described Soviet Russia’s intentions
regarding the Azeri territories: there is no danger in transferring Zangezur
and Nakhchivan to Armenia. The very idea that Russia needed these territories for its liberating military operations in the Turkish and Tabriz sectors
was utopian. One could not disagree with the territorial claims of Azerbaijan. Moscow’s objective and subjective considerations would undoubtedly
satisfy Azerbaijan; as for Karabakh, it was possible to insist on its unifcation with Azerbaijan.27 In another of his telegrams dated October 24, 1920,
this time addressed to Chicherin, Boris Legran described his agreements
with the Armenians regarding the Azeri territories:
The Armenians categorically insist that Nakhchivan and Zangezur immediately be recognized as theirs. I pointed out that without
Azerbaijan this issue cannot be resolved and that it can be raised only
if the Armenians drop their claims to Karabakh. After long discussions they agreed, with minor stipulations, to renounce their claims to
Karabakh.28
After a short while, however, late in November 1920 when Soviet power
had been established in Armenia, the struggle for the mountainous part of
Karabakh entered a new stage.

Why the Caucasian Bureau of Bolsheviks Treated the
Karabakh Issue as “Strictly Confdential”
As soon as Soviet power was established in Armenia on November 29, 1920,
the Communists returned the Karabakh issue to the political agenda. On
November 30, 1920, Chairman of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee
(Azrevcom) Nariman Narimanov and People’s Commissar for Foreign
Affairs Mirza Davud Huseynov congratulated the Armenian Revolutionary
Committee in a telegram. The telegram, however, did not entirely correspond
to the decision adopted by the joint meeting of the Politburo and Orgburo
of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan held on November 30.
Nariman Narimanov’s speech at the grand meeting of the Baku Soviet on
the occasion of establishing Soviet power in Armenia and the Declaration
he read on December 1, 1920 also contained certain contradictions. The
document said that, Soviet Azerbaijan,
declares that from this time on territorial issues will never cause
bloodshed between two peoples who have been neighbors for centuries;
the territories of the Zangezur and Nakhchivan uezds are an inalienable
part of Soviet Armenia. The toiling peasants of Nagorno-Karabakh are
granted the right to complete self-determination; all military actions in

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Zangezur are being suspended, while the troops of Soviet Azerbaijan
are being pulled out.29

It should be said that the Declaration of 1 December contradicts the
decisions of the CC CPA (B) of 4 and 30 November. On November 4,
1920, after discussing the Russian-Armenian treaty, the meeting of the
Politburo of the CC CPA (B) attended by Stalin and Orjonikidze decided
that “the suggestion that Nakhchivan and Zangezur should be transferred
to Armenia is disadvantageous both politically and strategically.” On November 30, 1920, however, the CC CPA (B) passed a decision on the transfer of Zangezur to Armenia (the Nakhchivan issue was not discussed).
Several days later, on December 2, Envoy Plenipotentiary of the RSFSR
in Armenia Boris Legran pointed out that Soviet Russia had recognized
only the transfer of Zangezur (out of the three territories mentioned
above) as legal.30 The Declaration Narimanov read on 1 December mentioned Nakhchivan in addition to Zangezur as the territories transferred
to Armenia. Jörg Baberowki of Humboldt University asserts that in the
summer of 1920 Narimanov under the pressure of Orjonikidze agreed to
transfer Zangezur, Karabakh and Nakhchivan to Armenia (see: Baberowski 2010, 237).
The text which appeared in the Baku newspapers had been falsifed by
Orjonikidze. On December 1, he informed Legran and People’s Commissar
for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR Georgii Chicherin of the following in
a ciphered telegram: “Azerbaijan has already responded and transferred
Nakhchivan, Zangezur, and Nagorno-Karabakh to Soviet Armenia.”31
On December 2, in another telegram, he informed Lenin and Stalin of the
following: “Yesterday Azerbaijan announced that Nakhichevan, Zangezur,
and Nagorno-Karabakh were transferred to Soviet Armenia.”32 On Stalin’s initiative, two days later “good news” appeared in Pravda. Stalin’s
article based on a distorted telegram written when Soviet power was established in Armenia, which appeared on the same day in Izvestia, was later
included in Volume IV of Stalin’s Works and reappeared in the collection
of articles Vneshnyaya politika SSSR (Foreign Policy of the USSR). It still
remains a favorite with certain authors.33 The question arises: was Grigorii
Orjonikidze misinformed, or was it a lie? When Soviet power was established in Dilijan, Sergo Orjonikidze discussed the issues mentioned in the
Declaration of the government of Azerbaijan with Amayak Nazaretyan by
direct telephone line and said in particular that
today, the Soviet gathered for its gala meeting in Baku where Narimanov
read the Declaration of the government of Azerbaijan, which pointed
out that there were no longer borders between Soviet Armenia and
Azerbaijan. From this day on, the territory of the Zangezur and
Nakhchivan uezds has become an inalienable part of Soviet Armenia.
The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh have been granted the right to

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self-determination. The riches of Azerbaijan—oil and kerosene—have
become the riches of both republics.
Overjoyed, Nazaretyan exclaimed: “We shall start shouting in the press:
Bravo, Azeris!”34
Did anyone in Armenia see the real text of the Declaration? We know
that the text signed by Narimanov and Huseynov was telegraphed to the
Armenian Revolutionary Committee. After reading the document, Askanaz
Mravyan (a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee) informed
the Armenian representative in Moscow Saak Ter-Gabrielyan that Azerbaijan had announced that Zangezur and Nakhchivan had been united [with
Armenia] and that a referendum would take place in Nagorno-Karabakh.35
Why did Narimanov suggest in his Declaration that Zangezur be transferred to Armenia? The idea belonged to the Politburo of the CC RCP (B).
Grigorii Orjonikidze was behind this Declaration; this means that the man
convinced that Zangezur belonged to Azerbaijan suddenly changed his
mind. Why? He wanted to drive a wedge between Azerbaijan and Turkey
to reduce to naught Turkey’s potential threat to Azerbaijan. On November
23, 1920, Stalin, while traveling from Baku to Moscow, used a direct line
from Rostov-on-Don to inform Lenin that, according to Orjonikidze, the
Turks’ desire to establish a common border between Turkey and Azerbaijan
looked threatening and that the Turkish plans could be upturned by transferring Zangezur to Armenia.36 This explains why the Turks regarded the
treaty between Soviet Russia and Dashnak Armenia and friendly relations
between these countries when Armenia became Soviet to be an obstacle on
Turkey’s road to the Muslim peoples of the Caucasus.37
Back on November 4, 1920, during his “famous” trip to the Caucasus, Stalin attended a joint meeting of the CC CPA (B) and the Caucasian Bureau of
the CC RCP (B), which listened to Legran’s report on the situation in Armenia and passed a decision. Point “b” of the document, which related to the
discussed treaty between Russia and Armenia, said the following:
To inform, at the same time, that the Politburo insists that the point
on the transfer of Nakhichevan and Zangezur (suggested by Moscow.
—J.H.) is not advantageous either politically or strategically and can
only be carried out in an emergency.
Point “d” instructed Nariman Narimanov to substantiate the Politburo’s
opinion about Nakhchivan and Zangezur.38
This meant that there was no Karabakh problem at all initially, which
was why it was not discussed. On November 20, 1920, a diplomatic mission
of Soviet Russia arrived in Erivan to monitor the talks between Turkey and
Armenia underway in Gumri (Alexandropol) and to sort out Armenia’s
territorial claims to Azerbaijan and Georgia. People’s Commissar for
Foreign Affairs Georgii Chicherin was informed that “today, the continued

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existence of the Armenian people depends not so much on military force as
on diplomacy. We should abandon party romanticism and arm ourselves
with grim realism.”39
Despite the fact that on December 1, 1920, Nariman Narimanov made
public the Declaration of the Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan,
Nakhchivan and Karabakh (both its valley and mountain parts) still belonged
to Azerbaijan. Under the Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921, between Soviet
Russia and Kemalist Turkey, the Nakhchivan Region became an autonomous territory as a protectorate of Azerbaijan on the condition that it would
never cede protectorate to a third state. This revived the problem of the
mountainous part of Karabakh as an urgent issue between Azerbaijan and
Armenia.
On June 3, 1921, members of the Caucasian Bureau, Grigorii Orjonikidze,
Philip Makharadze, Nariman Narimanov, Alexandr Myasnikov (Martuni),
Ivan Orakhelashvili, Amayak Nazaretyan, and Iurii Figatner, candidate
for bureau member, Secretary of the CC of the Azerbaijan CP Grigorii
Kaminsky, and member of the CC of the Communist Party of Georgia,
Shalva Eliava, attended a plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the
CC RCP (B).
Its evening sitting was expected to discuss three questions:
1 the Azerbaijani issue;
2 the issue of Zangezur;
3 the nomads.
Protocol No. 6 deals with the decisions on the frst and third points;
the second was discussed separately in the Addendum to the Protocol,
40
which started all the trouble. First, as distinct from Protocol No. 6,
the decision on Zangezur, which consisted of seven points, was marked
as “strictly confdential.” Second, of the seven points only six dealt with
Zangezur, while Point 5 said: “The declaration of the Armenian government should mention that Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Armenia.”41
This meant that Armenia was “strictly confdentially” instructed to issue
a government Declaration saying that Nagorno-Karabakh belonged to
Armenia.
On 12 June, the Council of People’s Commissars (CPC) of Armenia issued
a decree on joining the mountainous part of Karabakh to Armenia. The
decree said:
Proceeding from the declaration of the Revolutionary Committee of the
Socialist Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan and from the agreement between
the socialist republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is declared that
from this time on Nagorno-Karabakh has become an inalienable part
of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia.42

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The same day, Myasnikov and Karabekyan signed the document; three days
later, on June 15, it was discussed by the CC CP of Armenia, which passed
the following decision: “The decree on the unifcation of Nagorno-Karabakh
and Soviet Armenia should be published.” The same sitting discussed the
ffth point of its agenda on dispatching a representative to Karabakh; it was
decided “to send Comrade Mravyan together with Pirumov, Akop Ionisyan,
Ter-Simonyan, and a group of other comrades to Karabakh;”43 the government issued a corresponding decree, which the Armenian Revolutionary
Committee published a week later, on June 19. Askanaz Mravyan was
appointed chargé d’affaires extraordinaire in Nagorno-Karabakh.
In fact, the frst step in this direction was made after the Moscow Treaty
of 1921 when the government came up with a document of six points entitled The Basic Premises on Uniting Nagorno-Karabakh and the Republic
of Armenia. It said that the mountainous part was separated from Lower
Karabakh by a low mountain range. Convinced that this mountain range
should be joined to Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenians argued that, frst,
this zone was allegedly used by the Armenians and, second, there were strips
of arable land. Article 5 of the document is especially interesting. It reads:
The transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to the Republic of Armenia should
be naturally accompanied by the transfer of so-called Kurdistan, a
narrow mountainous strip between Karabakh and Zangezur. It’s very
specifc location and the nationalist sentiments of its population, however, might cause certain problems.44
On June 26, the CPC of Azerbaijan discussed Aliheydar Karaev’s report about
his trip to Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhchivan and decided that the Armenian
claims to Nagorno-Karabakh should be studied and summarized in a detailed
report to the Council.45 On 27 June, Narimanov, in fulfllment of the decision,
informed Orjonikidze and Myasnikov by telegraph that the CPC of Azerbaijan had unanimously deemed the unilateral decision on Nagorno-Karabakh
passed by the Armenian Revolutionary Committee without discussion at the
CPC of Armenia and the arrival of Askanaz Mravyan in Nagorno-Karabakh
as envoy extraordinary of Armenia to be an unprecedented political and tactical mistake. It was also requested that Mravyan be immediately recalled.
On June 27, a joint sitting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC of
the Communist Party of Azerbaijan discussed the problem of borders
between Azerbaijan and Armenia and dismissed the Nagorno-Karabakh
issue raised by Alexandr Bekzadyan as untenable in view of the region’s
obvious economic bias toward Azerbaijan. Likewise, it was administratively
and economically untenable to divide the localities with Armenian and
Azeri populations between the two republics. On the basis of Narimanov’s
Declaration, Aliheydar Shirvani, instructed by Narimanov, 46 informed
Huseynov in Tifis of this decision. His message said in part:

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The Council of People’s Commissars has agreed with the decision.
Comrade Narimanov asked me to inform you that the question must
be resolved in this way, otherwise the Council will divest itself of all
of its responsibilities, since if this is the way Soviet Armenia wishes to
make a good impression on the Dashnaks and the non-party masses,
we should bear in mind that by the same token we will be reviving antiSoviet groups in Azerbaijan similar to the Dashnaks.

At this point Narimanov took the receiver and said to Huseynov: “Tell them
that this is the unanimous opinion of Politburo and Orgburo. My declaration, to which they refer, merely said: ‘Nagorno-Karabakh is being granted
the right to free self-determination.’” Nariman Narimanov said: “Today we
sent you a telegram, with copies to Sergo, Myasnikov, and Karaev, to inform
you that Comrade Mravyan has been recalled from Karabakh.” Narimanov
asked Huseynov to tell Orjonikidze that “our Armenian comrades are only
thinking about the territory and are not concerned about the wellbeing
of the poorest Armenian and Muslim groups or about strengthening the
revolution.”47
Who allowed the Armenians to speak in the name of the Azeri leaders?
Later, however it turned out that it had been Sergo Orjonikidze and Sergei
Kirov who gave the Armenians this permission. Having concentrated real
power in the Caucasus, they were looking for ways to transfer Karabakh to
Armenia. It was they who handed Narimanov the telegram on 26 June with
Bekzadyan’s idea about dividing Karabakh on national-ethnic grounds.
The telegram read:
If you want to know our opinion, it is the following: to smooth out
the friction and establish genuinely friendly relations when dealing
with the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, we should be guided by the principle that none of the Armenian villages should be united with Azerbaijan, just as none of the Muslim villages should become part of
Armenia.48
The same day, June 27, Huseynov, on Narimanov’s instructions, moved the
issue to the Caucasian Bureau, which ruled the following:
An extraordinary plenum of the Caucasian Bureau of the CC RCP (B)
must be convened immediately. The following telegram should be sent
to comrades Narimanov and Myasnikov: ‘The Presidium of the Caucasian Bureau of the CC RCP (B) suggests that when you receive this
you must immediately depart to attend the extraordinary plenum of the
Caucasian Bureau to discuss delimitation of the republics. There are six
members of the Caucasian Bureau in Tifis; if you fail to arrive, their
decision will be considered fnal, therefore we insist that you go there
at once.’49

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On June 28, the CPC met once more under Narimanov’s chairmanship.
Myasnikov’s Declaration, which proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh part
of the Armenian SSR, was declined; the meeting discussed the possibility of recalling Mravyan, extraordinary representative of Armenia in
Nagorno-Karabakh. After this, Narimanov departed to Tifis to attend the
plenary meeting of the Caucasian Bureau of the CC RCP (B) scheduled for
July 4, 1921.

How the Myth of Stalin Appeared in the Fate of Karabakh
On July 4, however, at another plenum of the Caucasian Bureau attended
by Stalin, Kirov, future head of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan (three
weeks later he would have to become Secretary of the CC CP of Azerbaijan—J.H.), and Orjonikidze (the Transcaucasus republics’ curator) voted
for the following resolution: “To include (italics mine—J.H.) NagornoKarabakh in the Armenian SSR and limit the plebiscite to the mountainous part.”50 The plenary session was attended by member of the CC RCP
(B) Stalin and members of its Caucasian Bureau Orjonikidze, Makharadze,
Narimanov, Myasnikov, Kirov, Nazaretyan, Orakhelashvili, Figatner;
Breitman (Secretary of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee
of the Russian Young Communist League), and members of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Georgia Tsintsadze,
Mdivani, and Svanidze. The discussion revealed two opposite opinions. The
participants were invited to vote for the following:
a
b
c
d

Karabakh should remain (italics mine—J.H.) part of Azerbaijan
(Narimanov, Makharadze, and Nazaretyan voted “for”; Orjonikidze,
Myasnikov, Kirov, and Figatner, “against”);
The plebiscite should be carried out throughout the entire territory
of Karabakh among the Armenians and Muslims (Narimanov and
Makharadze voted “for”).
The mountainous part of Karabakh should be joined to Armenia
(Orjonikidze, Myasnikov, Figatner, and Kirov voted “for”).
The plebiscite should be carried out only in Upper Karabakh
(Orjonikidze, Myasnikov, Figatner, Kirov, and Nazaretyan voted
“for”).51

The protocol contains a note: Comrade Orakhelashvili was absent when the
vote on Karabakh was taken. This was a much more honest position than
that of future Secretaries of the CC of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan
Kirov and Orjonikidze, who repeatedly demanded in their telegrams to
Lenin and Chicherin that both the valley and the mountainous part of
Karabakh be left in Azerbaijan. They voted “for” on the two last points.
The adopted decision violated Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. This made
people wonder why Orjonikidze and Kirov, who several months earlier

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“could not imagine Azerbaijan without Karabakh,” changed their minds in
June 1921 and voted against Azerbaijan at the 4 July sitting of the Caucasian
Bureau. Were they guided by the Center’s secret instructions?
Here is an explanation: the Moscow Treaty of March 16, 1921, between
Soviet Russia and Turkey (with a point which preserved Nakhchivan within
Azerbaijan on the condition that Azerbaijan would never cede protectorate
to a third state) turned Nagorno-Karabakh into a target of secret and then
open discussions at the Caucasian Bureau in June-July 1921 and triggered
attempts to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia by force.
The text and the political sense of the decision of the Caucasian Bureau
of 4 July was frequently falsifed and misinterpreted. The Armenian authors
performed a “minor” operation by replacing the verb “include” with the
verb “keep within.” Nariman Narimanov stated resolutely that “because
the Karabakh issue is so important to Azerbaijan, I believe it necessary to
transfer the fnal decision on it to the CC RCP.” It was thanks to his protest
that the meeting arrived at the following decision: “Since the Karabakh issue
has caused serious disagreements, the Caucasian Bureau of the CC RCP (B)
believes it advisable to transfer the fnal decision to the CC RCP (B).”52 This
meant that the same sitting discussed the Karabakh issue as Point 5 of the
agenda; the decision passed by a majority vote after Narimanov’s statement
(Point 6) annulled the previous results.
This issue was never discussed in the CC RCP (B) because, frst,
Orjonikidze had renounced his previous erroneous position and, relying on
Nazaretyan, demanded that the decisions of the previous plenary session
on Karabakh be revised.53 On 5 July the plenary session of the Caucasian
Bureau adopted the following decisions on Point 2 of the agenda in view of
the frm position of Narimanov and Orjonikidze’s retreat from his previous
stand:
a

b
c
d

proceeding from the need to maintain national peace between the
Muslims and the Armenians, the economic ties between Upper and
Lower Karabakh, and its constant contacts with Azerbaijan, NagornoKarabakh should be left (italics mine.-J.H.) within the Azerbaijan
S.S.R. with broad regional autonomy and its administrative center in
the town of Shusha, which belongs to the autonomous region (for—4;
abstained—3);
the CC of Azerbaijan should be instructed to identify the boundaries of
the autonomous region and present the results to the Caucasian Bureau
of the CC RCP (B) for approval;
the Presidium of the Caucasian Bureau of the CC should be instructed
to talk to the CC of Armenia and the CC of Azerbaijan about a candidate for the post of commissar extraordinary of Nagorno-Karabakh;
the CC of Azerbaijan should be instructed to identify the volume of
rights of the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh and present the result to
the Caucasian Bureau of the CC for approval.54

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When commenting on the repeal of the frst “fair decision” on the
Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian side referred to Stalin’s unexpected
arrival in Tifis. Stalin had allegedly pulled the strings for the Azeris in his
usual manner. We have established that Stalin had arrived in Tifis earlier,
late in June and could not, therefore, suddenly arrive at the plenary meeting
of the Caucasian Bureau of the CC RCP (B) on 5 July. Why do the Armenian historians, who falsify the historical documents of the Caucasian
Bureau, implicate Stalin in “keeping” (“transferring” being their favorite
term) Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan? Because the crimes perpetrated under Stalin give the Armenians a chance to present themselves as
victims of the totalitarian regime and create the semblance of “fairness
restored.”
The Armenian authors and politicians who accuse Stalin of all misfortunes are fully aware of the truth about these dramatic sittings of the Caucasian Bureau of the CC RCP (B). Protocols No. 11 (the plenary session
of the Caucasian Bureau of 4 July) and No. 12 (the 5 July session) provide
an absolutely clear picture. Stalin, who was present at both sessions, said
nothing about Karabakh.55 Some of the Armenian authors, however,
wrote (for obvious reasons) that it was Narimanov, not Nazaretyan, who
together with Orjonikidze put the question back on the agenda on 5 July
(see: Melik-Shakhnazarov 2009, 311). In their joint article, which appeared
in Moscow, Vladimir Zakharov and Sergey Sarkisyan revived the erroneous
statement that Nagorno-Karabakh had not been transferred to Azerbaijan
until 5 July and associated this decision with Stalin’s name (see: Zakharov
and Sarkisyan 2009, 221). According to the Armenian historian Valerii
Tunyan,
when assessing the meeting of the Caucasian Bureau of July 5, 1921,
it is necessary to keep in mind the programmed nature of the solution
of the Karabakh issue: the absence of a vote, a strong-willed decision,
the imposition of the idea of a plebiscite, the change in the composition
of the invited persons, the identity of the initiators of the revision of
the decision on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Ordjonikidze could
be forced to review the decision only on the instructions of the higher
leadership of the Chicherin-Lenin bundle, or on behalf of the Central
Committee of the Russian Communist Party. In the role of the guide
of the higher leadership, Stalin could act, using his importance and
infuence.
(Tunyan, 2018, 254)
The other Armenian historian Rem Kazanjyan writes:
according to the protocols, Stalin already took part in the meetings of
the Caucasian Bureau on July 2 and 3, 1921, having the opportunity, as a
higher party member of the Central Committee of the RCP, to infuence

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the course of solving a particular issue in the right direction, without
bringing the matter to July 5.
(Kazandzhyan 1997, 23).

It is a well-known fact, however, that Stalin had been in Tifis since the end
of June 1921. Why did Stalin come to Tifis in late June 1921? Anyone seeking an answer should look at the documents of the plenary meeting of the
CC CP (B) of Georgia held on the same day as the plenum of the Caucasian
Bureau of the CC RCP (B). On 7 July, the plenary meeting of the Caucasian
Bureau, at which Stalin was also present, was still in session. The plenary
meeting also discussed two more issues on its agenda (On the Press and On
the Cheka of Georgia) before moving on to the main issue which brought
Stalin from Nalchik to Tifis, namely, changes in the leadership of Georgia.
Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia Philip Makharadze
pursued a relatively independent policy; he clashed with Orjonikidze and,
in general, was not a favorite with the CC CPR (B). Under the pretext of the
far from simple situation in the country, Stalin suggested that he should be
replaced by Budu Mdivani. The majority (six votes “for” and four abstentions; together with the votes cast by the members of the Caucasian Bureau,
nine votes “for” and four abstentions) made Budu Mdivani head of the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia.
For many years, Armenian and some Russian historians looked in vain
for Karabakh’s impact on this situation. Stalin, however, came to Georgia
to replace the more or less independent Philip Makharadze, who had quarreled with Orjonikidze, with the more pliable Budu Mdivani. In November
1921, Orjonikidze raised the question of removing Makharadze not only
from Georgia but from the Caucasus on the whole. On November 2, he wrote
to Lenin and Stalin once more: “Philip should be immediately removed
from the Caucasus.” On July 19, 1921, after discussing the decision of the
Caucasian Bureau of 5 July and Nariman Narimanov’s trip to Tifis, the
Presidium of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) of Azerbaijan ruled
that “Nagorno-Karabakh remains an inalienable part of Soviet Azerbaijan
with the right to internal self-administration within the Soviet Constitution
with the regional Executive Committee as its governing body.”56 Moreover, in his report, Narimanov spoke about the administrative borders
between Azerbaijan and its Transcaucasian neighbors and informed that
Nagorno-Karabakh remained an inalienable part of Soviet Azerbaijan
within the Soviet Constitution with the right to self-administration. On July
20, the day after the meeting of the Presidium of the CEC of Azerbaijan
and after hearing what Aliheydar Karaev had to say about the situation in
Karabakh, the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CPA (B) decided to set up
a commission of representatives of the people’s commissariats of internal
affairs, justice, and foreign affairs to draft a constitution of the autonomous
region.57

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After 5 July, it was rumored that the Armenians had been evicted from
Karabakh to Armenia (Levon Mirzoyan mentioned in his report that
the rumors were started by nationalist-minded Armenians); gradually
this “information” reached the Caucasian Bureau of the CC RCP (B). It
should be said that all those who were displeased with the decisions of
the Caucasian Bureau of 5 July acted through Sergei Kirov (when he was
elected First Secretary of the CC of the Community Party of Azerbaijan). In August 1921, Secretary of the Caucasian Bureau Figatner wrote to
Kirov that allegedly after the decision of the Caucasian Bureau of 5 July
to keep Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan, “many Armenian villages
were moved from Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia.”58 After receiving this
information, Kirov immediately asked Karaev and Mirzoyan (who were in
Karabakh) to clarify it. They answered that there was an opposite trend:
in the frst months of Sovietization of Azerbaijan Muslims started moving
away from Karabakh to other places. In mid-August 1921, when talking on
the phone to Orjonikidze, Alexandr Myasnikov said that treatment of the
Karabakh issue in Armenia had become more or less loyal.59
The decision of the Caucasian Bureau on an autonomous status for the
mountainous part of Karabakh forced the Center to closely follow the
relevant developments. In a letter to Sergei Kirov, First Secretary of the CC
CPA (B), dated 22 May, 1922, Stalin wrote the following with a great deal of
sarcasm: “They say that Fonstein, a ‘native’ of Karabakh, represents it in the
Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan.”60 In his letter dated 18 June,
Kirov explained to Stalin that he had been deluded and listed the members
who represented Karabakh at the CEC.61 At the same time, the Center was
playing into the hands of the Armenians; it tried to prevent subordination of
the party organization of Karabakh to the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.
On August 1, 1922, however, Kirov and Matyushin, who headed the organizational department of CC CPA (B), telegraphed to Moscow: “The territory
of Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan, while its party organization is part of the
CP of Azerbaijan”62
On July 7, 1923, the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan
crowned three years of preparatory work with a decree on setting up the
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) as part of the Republic of Azerbaijan. This is how the struggle over the territorial affliation of
Nagorno-Karabakh which began in the frst years of Soviet power in the
Transcaucasus ended. The decree signed by Mir Bashir Gasymov, deputy
chair of the CEC of Azerbaijan, Mahmud Khanbudagov, secretary of the
CEC announced that, elimination of national oppression and inequality, no
matter what form it takes, and replacement of national hostility and hatred
with the international solidarity of workers and fraternal cooperation of
peoples in a common state union is one of the key tasks of the workerspeasants’ revolution and Soviet power. To execute this task, “the Azerbaijani
Central Executive Committee of Soviets resolves: 1. to make the Armenian

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part of Mountainous Karabakh an autonomous district, as a constituent
part of the Azerbaijani SSR, with its center in a locality of Khankendi.”63
On 27 May 27, 1924, Nariman Narimanov wrote the following to Stalin:
Under Mirzoyan’s strong pressure, Nagorno-Karabakh was made an
autonomous region. I was not able to accomplish this, not because I was
against the autonomy, but because the Armenian peasants themselves
did not want this. Meanwhile, Mirzoyan, assisted by the Dashnak teachers, tilled the soil and pushed the decision through the Transcaucasian
Territorial Committee.
(Narimanov 1992, 59)
He knew that the trouble for Azerbaijan did not stop there; he predicted
that the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh was the beginning of a future
tragedy.

Conclusion
The Sovietization of Azerbaijan started with territorial losses. From the
frst days of the April occupation of the territory of the republic, it became the object of “compensations” within the framework of the Soviet
political approach in the South Caucasus. Embraced by Soviet Russia,
Azerbaijan began losing not only its freedom but also its land. The analysis shows that longtime allegations that Karabakh belongs to Armenian lands as well as allegations that Stalin took Karabakh away from
Armenia and gave it to Azerbaijan and other empty talk have nothing
to do with the historical truth. Study of the documents and materials of
the 1920s for this chapter reaffrms the groundlessness of these claims.
Such a brazen lie about the recent history of Karabakh is explained by
attempts to justify occupation of Azerbaijani lands by Armenia over the
past few years. A long-term tragedy initiated by the provision of autonomy to Mountainous Karabakh had its roots, as Narimanov used to say,
in trusting strangers. In effect, a delayed-action bomb was placed under
Azerbaijani statehood, in order to cause an explosion when Russia left
the Caucasus. Orjonikidze’s idea “to declare autonomy in Karabakh and
organize the Armenian population” in July 1920 passed the test of time.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Karabakh question became an
effcient mechanism of controlling the region in Russia’s hands. In 1923,
“a delayed action bomb with a clock-operated mechanism” was set to snap
into action as soon as Soviet Russia pulled out of the Caucasus. Grigorii
Orjonikidze’s idea formulated in July 1920 of “autonomy for Karabakh
and organization of the Armenian population” has passed the test of time
to become Russia’s lever of control in the region after the Soviet Union
disappeared from the world map.

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Notes
1 For more detail, see: “Results of Soviet Construction in Azerbaijan,” Report
of Narimanov to Lenin. September 15, 1921, Russian State Archives of SocialPolitical History (RGASPI), fn. 5, l. 1, f. 1219, 12; Letter of N. Narimanov to
Lenin, Archives of Political Documents at the Administration of the President
of the Azerbaijan Republic (APDUDPAR), fn. 609, l. 1, f. 71, 51.
2 Telegram of Narimanov, Mdivani, Mikoyan, Nurijanyan to Chicherin. June 19,
1920, State Archives of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SARA), fn. 28, l. 1, f. 211, 115.
3 See: Letter of the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)—
(CC RCP (B)), June 22, 1920, APDUDPAR, fn. 1, l. 1, f. 2a, 9.
4 Chicherin’s reply to Lenin’s inquiry. June 1920, RGASPI, fn. 2, l. 1, f. 1451, 1.
5 Letter of Narimanov, Mdivani, Mikoyan, Naneishvili, Vesnik, Levandovskii
and Mikhaylov to the CC RCP (B). July 10, 1920, APDUDPAR, fn. 1, l. 44, f.
118, 25–27.
6 Chicherin’s ciphered telegram to Orjonikidze. July 2, 1920, RGASPI, fn. 85, l. 3c,
f. 2, 3.
7 Orjonikidze’s reply on direct line to G. Chicherin’s telegram of 2 July about the
disputed territories claimed by Azerbaijan and Armenia. July 1920, RGASPI, fn.
85, l. 3c, f. 2, 6.
8 Direct reminder to Lenin, Stalin and Chicherin. July 1920, RGASPI, fn. 85, l. 3c,
f. 2, 8–9.
9 See: Telegram from Orjonikidze to Chicherin. 1920, RGASPI, fn. 64, l. 1, f. 17,
53.
10 Direct note to Nadezhda Allilueva. July 7, 1920, RGASPI, fn. 85, l. 3c, f. 2, 20.
11 Telegram from Chicherin to Orjonikidze. July 8, 1920, RGASPI, fn. 64, l. 1, f. 17,
60.
12 Telegram from Orjonikidze to Lenin, Stalin and Chicherin. July 16, 1920,
RGASPI, fn. 85, l. 3c, f. 2, 12.
13 Telegram of A. Mikoyan to Orjonikidze. June 29, 1920, RGASPI, fn. 64, l. 1, f.
17, 134.
14 Ciphered telegram of Orjonikidze and Kirov to Lenin and Stalin. June 12, 1920,
RGASPI, fn. 85, l. 2c, f. 2, 9–11.
15 Telegram from Orjonikidze to Chicherin. 1920, RGASPI, fn. 64, l. 1, f. 17, 304.
16 See: Letter of Kirov to Chicherin. August 6, 1920, RGASPI, fn. 80, l. 4, fn. 102k,
1–2.
17 See: Treaty between the RSFSR and the Republic of Armenia. August 10, 1920,
APDUDPAR, fn. 1, l. 169, f. 249/II, 11–12.
18 Telegram from Narimanov, Mdivani, Mikoian, and Nurijanian to Chicherin,
June 19, 1920, SARA, fn. 28, l. 1, f. 211, 115.
19 Copy of a memo to Lenin. June 29, 1920, APDUDPAR, fn. 1, l. 1, f. 2a, 13–14.
20 Information of Nikolai Soloviev to Vladimir Lenin “Our Policy in Azerbaijan in
Two Months (May–June) after the Coup. 1920, RGASPI, fn. 17, l. 84, f. 58, 15.
21 Ibid.
22 Letter of Narimanov to Lenin, July 1920, APDUDP AR, fn. 609, l. 1, f. 71, 41.
23 İbid, 41–42.
24 Ibid, 42.
25 Urgent telegram of Chicherin to Narimanov. July 20, 1920, RGASPI, fn. 5, l. 1,
f. 2097, 1.
26 Letter of Chicherin to the Politburo of the CC RCP (B). October 5, 1920, Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), fn. 04, l. 39, f. 232, f.
52987, 40.

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27 See: Boris Legran’s telegram to Vladimir Lenin. September 23, 1920, RGASPI,
fn. 5, l. 1, f. 21, 144.
28 Secret telegram of Legran to Chicherin. October 24, 1920, RGASPI, fn. 5, l. 1, f.
2178, 20.
29 Kommunist, December 2, 1920.
30 See: Radiogram of Legran to Orjonikidze. December 2, 1920, RGASPI, fn. 85, l.
14, f. 33, 16.
31 Orjonikidze’s ciphered telegram to Legran and Chicherin. December 1,1920,
RGASPI, fn. 85, l. 14, f. 33, 12.
32 Orjonikidze’s letter to Lenin and Stalin, December 2, 1920. RGASPI, fn. 85, l.
14, f. 33, 20.
33 See: Izvestia, December 4, 1920.
34 Conversation between Amayak Nazaretyan and Sergo Orjonikidze by direct
telephone line. December 1, 1920, RGASPI, fn. 85, l. 14, f. 37, 1.
35 See: From a member of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee (Mravyan) to
representative of Soviet Armenia Ter-Gabrielyan. December 4, 1921, AVP RF,
fn. 04, l. 39, f. 232, f. 53001, 14.
36 See: Conversation between Stalin and Lenin by direct line. November 23, 1920,
AVP RF, fn. 04, l. 39, f. 232, f. 52987, 47.
37 See: Letter of Legran to Chicherin. December 22, 1920, RGASPI, fn. 5, l. 1, f.
212733, 5.
38 See: Protocol No. 4 of the joint meeting of the CC CP (B) of Azerbaijan and
Caucasian Bureau. November 4, 1920, APDUDPAR, fn. 1, l. 1, f. 22, 20.
39 The Diplomatic Representatives of Soviet Russia in Erivan to People’s
Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin. November 1920, SARA, fn. 28, l. 1, f.
38, 15.
40 See: Protocol No. 6 of the evening sitting of the plenary session of the Caucasian
Bureau of the CC RCP (B). June 3, 1921, RGASPI, fn. 64, l. 1, f. 1, 76op.
41 Addendum to Protocol No. 6 of the evening sitting of the plenary session of the
Caucasian Bureau of the CC RCP (B). June 3. 1921, RGASPI, fn. 64, l. 1, f. 1, 77.
42 Bakinskii rabochii, June 22, 1921.
43 Protocol No. 8 of the meeting of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Armenia.
June 15, 1921, RGASPI, fn. 64, l. 1, fn. 105, 11op.
44 See: The Basic Premises on Uniting Nagorno-Karabakh and the Republic of
Armenia. 1921, RGASPI, fn. 64, l. 1, f. 137, 7-7op.
45 See: Protocol of a sitting of the Council of People’s Commissars of Azerbaijan.
June 26, 1921, SARA, fn. 411, l. 1, f. 12, 1.
46 See: Protocol No. 20 of the sitting of the Politburo and Orgburo of the CC CP (B)
of Azerbaijan. June 27, 1921, APDUDPAR, fn. 1, l. 74, f. 1231, 64.
47 Conversation of Shirvani and Narimanov by direct phone line with Mirza
Davud Huseynov. June 27, 1921, RGASPI, fn. 64, l. 1, f. 215, 14.
48 Telegram of Orjonikidze and Kirov to Narimanov. June 26, 1921, RGASPI, fn.
85, l. 18, f. 229, 1–2.
49 Protocol No. 5 of a sitting of the Presidium of the Caucasian Bureau of the CC
RCP (B). June 27, 1921, RGASPI, fn. 64, l. 1, f. 2, 73.
50 Protocol No. 11 of the evening sitting of the plenary session of the Caucasian
Bureau of the CC RCP (B). July 4, 1921, RGASPI, fn. 64, l. 1, f. 1, 118.
51 See: Ibid.
52 Ibid., 114.
53 See: Protocol No. 12 of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the CC
RCP (B). July 5, 1921, RGASPI, fn. 64, l. 1, f. 1, 122.
54 See: Ibid.

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55 See: Protocol No. 8 of the plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the CC
RCP (B). July 2–3, 921, RGASPI, fn. 64, l. 1, fn. 1, 87–88; Protocol No. 8 of the
plenary session of the Caucasian Bureau of the CC RCP (B) with representatives
of local party organizations and trade unions. July 2–3, 1921, RGASPI, fn. 85, l.
18, f. 59, 14.
56 Protocol of a sitting of the CEC of Azerbaijan. July 19, 1921, RGASPI, fn. 64, l.
1, f. 31, 122.
57 See: Protocol No. 22 of the meeting of the Political and Organizational Bureau
of the CC CP (B) of Azerbaijan. July 20, 1921. APDUDP AR, fn. 1, l. 2, f. 18, 94;
RGASPI, fn. 64, l. 1, f. 92, 51.
58 Information supplied by Secretary of the Caucasian Bureau of the CC RCP (B)
Figatner to Kirov. August 1921, APD UDP AR, fn. 1, l. 129, f. 107, 58.
59 See: Myasnikov’s talk with Orjonikidze by direct telephone line. August 1921,
RGASPI, fn. 85, l. 18, f. 177, 4.
60 Stalin’s letter about the situation in the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and the
representative of Karabakh in the CEC of Azerbaijan. May 22, 1922, RGASPI,
fn. 558, l. 11, f. 746, 1.
61 See: Kirov’s confdential letter to Stalin. June 18, 1922, RGASPI, fn. 558, l. 11, f.
746, 2.
62 Telegram sent by Kirov and Matyushin to the CC RCP (B). August 1, 1922,
RGASPI, fn. 80, l. 25, f. 2, 1.
63 Decree of the CEC of Azerbaijan, “Formation of the Autonomous District of
Mountainous Karabakh,” July 7, 1923, SARA, fn. 379, l. 3, f. 73, 135.

References
Archives
Archives of Political Documents at the Administration of the President of the
Azerbaijan Republic (APDUDPAR)
Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (AVP RF)
State Archives of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SARA)
Russian State Archives of Social-Political History (RGASPI)
Publications
Baberowski, Jörg. 2010. Vrag est vezde. Stalinism na Kavkaze. Moscow, ROSSPEN.
(Baberowski, Jörg. 2003. Der Feind ist überall: Stalinismus im Kaukasus. Munich,
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt).
Hasanli, Jamil. 2018. The Sovietization of Azerbaijan: The South Caucasus in the
Triangle of Russia, Turkey, and Iran, 1920–1922. Salt Lake City, The University
of Utah Press.
Kazandzhyan, Rem. 1997. K predystorii samoopredeleniya Nagornogo Karabakha.
Moscow, Verlag nicht ermittelbar.
Melik-Shakhnazarov, Grant. 2009. “Politizatsia istorii kak istochnik napryazheniya
mezhnatsionalnykh otnosheniy,” in: Mayendorfskaya deklaratsia 2 noyabrya 2008
goda i situatsiya vokrug Nagornogo Karabakha, Collection of articles. Moscow,
Russkaia panorama.
Narimanov, Nariman.1990. K istorii nashey revolutsii v okrainakh (Letter to I.V.
Stalin). Baku, Azerneshr.

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Narimanov, Nariman. 1992. K istorii nashey revolutsii v okrainakh (Pismo I.V.
Stalinu). Baku, Azerneshr.
Tunyan, Varerii. 2018. Fal’sifkatsiya istorii vosstanovleniya armyanskoy gosudarstvennosti v azerbaydzhanskoy istoriografi. Yerevan, Izdatel’stvo-vo YEGU.
Zakharov, Vladimir and Sergey Sarkisyan. 2009. “Azerbaidzhano-karabakhskiy
konfikt: istoki i sovremennost,” in: Mayendorfskaya deklaratsia 2 noyabrya 2008
goda i situastiya vokrug Nagornogo Karabakha, Collection of articles. Moscow,
Russkaia panorama.

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3

Armenian Irredentist
Nationalism and Its
Transformation into the
Mass Karabakh Movement
“MIATSUM” (1965‒1988)
Eldar Abbasov

The rise of the wave of Armenian irredentist nationalism in the USSR began
in the frst half of the 1960s of the last century, and coincided with the end
of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, which was provoked by the
attempt of the political leadership of the USSR to place nuclear-tipped
missiles on the territory of Cuba in response to the US deployment of
medium-range ballistic missiles “Jupiter” in Turkey in 1961. Despite the resolution of the crisis by political and diplomatic efforts, Moscow continued
to consider Turkey ‒ a member of NATO a source of threat on the southern
borders of the USSR, and by all means sought to discredit it in the eyes of the
world community. It was during this period that the term so-called “Armenian genocide” was introduced into scientifc circulation in the Armenian
Soviet historiography. In Soviet Armenia, the frst publication on this topic
appeared in 1963, and in the period from 1963 to 1965, only four articles
were published on this issue.1 It is very likely that the course of this issue
was given by offcial Moscow as an effective means of propaganda against
Turkey and pressure on it. This was not a new tactic of Moscow against Turkey. Back in the summer of 1945, it was on the instructions of Josef Stalin
that the Georgian and Armenian SSR put forward territorial claims to the
eastern provinces of Turkey. Thus, the Soviet Union wanted to expand its
southern borders by 26,000 km2, 20,500,000 km2 of which was planned to be
transferred to Armenia, and 5500 thousand km2 to Georgia.2
The aim of the Armenian irredentist nationalism was clearly expressed in
the address of the leader of the Karabakh movement Igor Muradyan to the
Central Committee of the CPSU on June 19, 1986. Igor Muradyan wrote that
the Armenian issue, which provides for the return of the ancestral, historical
territories to Soviet Armenia, was not resolved either during the years of
world wars, or during periods of detente in the world. The Armenian question has two aspects ‒ international and domestic. The international aspect
is the return of the ancestral Armenian lands located within the borders of
modern Turkey to its rightful owner ‒ the Armenian people in the person
of its sole representative ‒ Soviet Armenia, which is the national state of
the Armenians and the representative of the interests of the Armenians of
the whole world, who consider it their homeland. In this regard, he stated
DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-5
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Eldar Abbasov

that the right of the Armenian people to establish an independent state in
these historically Armenian territories was recognized by the Government
of Soviet Russia by the Decree of December 29, 1917 on Turkish Armenia.
However, the rights of the Armenian people to these territories due to the
current international situation, the policy of Turkey and its NATO allies,
primarily the US, cannot be realized at present. Referring to the second –
the internal aspect of the Armenian issue, Igor Muradyan wrote:
The internal aspect is the return to Soviet Armenia of the original
Armenian lands ‒ Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh (historical Artsakh), which, due to a number of historical circumstances, are
located within the borders of the Union Republic – the Azerbaijan
SSR. These lands include the territory of the Nakhichevan ASSR,
the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, as well as the Kelbajar,
Lachin, Shahumyan, Dashkesan and the southern part of the Khanlar
administrative districts of the Azerbaijan SSR, a total of about 16.0
thousand square meters. km, or 18.5% of the territory of this federal
republic.3
The process of the birth and formation of Armenian Soviet irredentist
nationalism took place against the background of the preparation and holding of events dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the tragic events of 1915 in
the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. The initiator and organizer
of the anniversary events was the political leadership of the Armenian SSR.
A special role in this process belongs to the First Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia, Yakov Zarobyan. In
the autumn of 1964, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Armenia obtained permission from the Central Committee of the CPSU to
celebrate the 50th anniversary of the events of 1915 in the capital of Soviet
Armenia and agreed with it on a list of relevant commemorative events.
The party leadership of Armenia, in its appeal to the Central Committee of
the CPSU, justifed the need to mark the memorable date in the Armenian
SSR as a counter-measure, since “foreign Armenian reactionary forces seek
to mark this date for selfsh and provocative purposes”. Based on this, the
party leadership of Armenia noted that “we consider it appropriate to mark
the 50th anniversary of this date under the sign of propaganda of the triumph of the Leninist national policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union”. In this regard, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Armenia has outlined the following activities: (1) to
present widely in the press and on the radio articles and materials in which
to refect from the class and Marxist-Leninist positions the attitude to the
events; to promote the struggle of the Soviet people for world peace and the
policy of friendship of peoples, steadily pursued by the CPSU and the Soviet
government, to expose the provocative actions of the imperialists and their
agents ‒ Dashnaks, inciting national enmity; (2) to hold a meeting of public

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representatives in Yerevan in April 1965, dedicated to the 50th anniversary
of this date, with the agenda: “The October Revolution and the Rebirth of
the Armenian people”; (3) erect an obelisk in memory of the Armenians who
died in the First World War in Yerevan; (4) to organize festivals of Soviet
flms and exhibitions of Soviet Armenian books in the spring of 1965 in
major foreign Armenian colonies, to send delegations of representatives of
scientists, literature and art workers to foreign Armenian colonies to promote the achievements of Soviet Armenia.4
The favor and goodwill of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the request
of the party leadership of Armenia in connection with the events dedicated
to the 50th anniversary of the events of 1915, revived the nationalist-minded
forces ‒ representatives of the intelligentsia and students. This is eloquently
evidenced by the report of the Chairman of the KGB under the Council of
Ministers of the USSR Vladimir Semichastny to the Central Committee of
the CPSU (for the Ideological Department), which noted that in connection
with the approaching date of the fftieth anniversary of the events of 1915 in
the Ottoman Empire, individuals from among the intelligentsia and youth
allow nationalistic manifestations. Even the penetration of nationalist sentiments among high school students of some secondary schools in the city of
Yerevan and certain districts of the republic was recorded. The chairman of
the KGB informed the Central Committee of the CPSU that
in January 1964, an anti-Soviet nationalist group of young people was
discovered in the city of Yerevan. 7 of the most active members of the
group who carried out hostile work were brought to criminal responsibility, and preventive measures were taken against 71 people.5
One of the main and effective methods of promoting nationalist views and
forming an irredentist movement among young people was the production and distribution of illegal leafets. They mainly demanded the return
of the Armenian lands that were part of Turkey and the annexation of the
Nakhichevan ASSR and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region
(NKAR) to the Armenian SSR. The distribution of leafets calling for the
seizure of “native Armenian lands” from Turkey and Azerbaijan was so popular in Armenia in the mid-60s of the last century that even schoolchildren in
the Armenian capital were included in this process. In the summer of 1965,
students with leafets were detained in Yerevan by the Police Department
of the Ministry of Public Order Protection of the Armenian SSR. Vladimir
Semichastny reported this shocking fact to the chairman of the Ideological
Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU Pyotr Demichev:
Under the impression of the April events in May-June of this year, the
facts of the distribution of leafets by secondary school students were
noted. For example, on June 2 of this year, offcers of the Police Department of the Ministry of Public Order of the Armenian SSR detained

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Eldar Abbasov
a minor Nagapetyan, a student of the 7th grade, who was distributing
leafets about the return of Armenian lands with her friend Sarkisyan,
a 5th grade high school student. During the survey, it turned out that
Nagapetyan, Sarkisyan and other students, under the impression of
the April events, produced and distributed about 100 leafets, and 47 of
them were seized during their detention.6

The dynamics of the spread and expansion of Armenian irredentist nationalism in the Armenian SSR was clearly shown in the KGB reference sent to
the Central Committee of the CPSU on May 16, 1966. The reference noted
that if in 1963 six leafets were printed and distributed on the territory of
the republic about the need to annex Western Armenia (Eastern Anatolia),
Nakhichevan and Nagorno – Karabakh to the Armenian SSR, in 1964 ‒
577, in 1965 ‒ 2038, and already in 1966 the number of such leafets increased
to a record level ‒ 10902.7
The Central Committee of the CPSU was well aware that the reason for
the emergence and spread of nationalist sentiments in the republic is the
weak ideological work of the Central Committee of the CPSU of Armenia
and its leadership personally. Therefore, in February 1966, Moscow decided
to change the party leadership of Armenia. Curiously, the opening of the
XXIV Congress of the Communist Party of Armenia was scheduled for
March 3, 1966. As a rule, organizational issues were considered at the plenum immediately after the congress. However, the Central Committee of
the CPSU decided to change the leadership of the Central Committee of the
CP of Armenia a month before the congress. On February 5, with the participation of the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Ivan Kapitonov,
a plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU of Armenia was held in
Yerevan, at which Yakov Zarobyan was relieved of his duties as the frst
Secretary and a member of the bureau of the Central Committee of the
CPSU of Armenia and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Armenian SSR Anton Kochinyan was elected as the new frst Secretary.8
However, the change of political leadership in Armenia did not lead
to a decrease in the intensity of nationalism in the republic. The wave of
nationalism after the changes in the highest political echelon of Armenia
had moved to a new stage. The main directions of Armenian nationalism
were still territorial claims made to the Azerbaijani SSR against the background of the publication and distribution of nationalist literature, as well
as the open propaganda of the ideology of the Dashnaktsutyun Party. In
February 1966, a letter signed by 21 old Armenian Bolsheviks was sent
to the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
Leonid Brezhnev, Mikhail Suslov, Alexei Kosygin, Nikolai Shvernik and
Anastas Mikoyan, in which the authors informed the political leadership
of the country about the dangerous nationalist atmosphere in Armenia and
demanded urgent intervention:

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It is alarming situation in the capital of Armenia – Yerevan. The capital
is again fooded with nationalist leafets printed in the printing house,
calling for a new mass demonstration on the opening day of the CPSU
Congress (it was the XXIII Congress of the CPSU – E. A.) with the demand to return Karabakh and Nakhichevan to Armenia… We strongly
ask the Central Committee of the CPSU to remove the vicious leadership, create an ideological-Leninist leadership, improve the atmosphere
infected with Dashnak Nazism, and raise the authority of the Communist Party of Armenia, which was glorious in the past.9
The disturbing symptoms of nationalism, about which the old Bolsheviks wrote with concern in a letter to the members of the Presidium of
the Central Committee of the CPSU, were refected in the collective appeal of representatives of the creative intelligentsia, scientists and artists of
the Armenian SSR to the XXIII Congress of the CPSU (March 29–April
6, 1966), which raised the question of the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh
and the Nakhichevan ASSR to the Armenian SSR. At the same time, the
authors of the letter covered themselves with demagogic statements inherent in the representatives of the Armenian intelligentsia that “this decision
of the country’s leadership will contribute to the further strengthening of
brotherhood and friendship between the peoples, [and] once again demonstrate the triumph of Lenin’s national policy”. After reading the letter, the
head of the sector of the Department of Party and Organizational Work
of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Yuri Starchenko, asked the USSR
Foreign Ministry to prepare a certifcate on the legal status of the Nakhichevan ASSR in the context of the Soviet-Turkish treaties. The certifcate
signed by the head of the Middle East Department Sergey Kiktev and the
head of the Contract and Legal Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry
Oleg Khlestov was submitted to the Central Committee of the CPSU on
May 31. It stated that the status of Nakhichevan as an autonomous territory within Azerbaijan was determined by the relevant articles of the Treaty
of Friendship and Brotherhood between the RSFSR and Turkey of March
16, 1921 and the Treaty of Friendship between Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia, on the one hand, and Turkey, on the other, signed with the participation of the RSFSR on October 13, 1921. Based on this, the authors of the
reference stressed that
the revision of the status of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic would be a departure from the contractual obligations
assumed by the Soviet Union under the above-mentioned agreements.
At the same time, this step could lead to an aggravation of Soviet-Turkish relations. The Turkish side could qualify the revision of the status
of Nakhichevan as a violation of these agreements and use this circumstance to annul them.10

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Eldar Abbasov

The secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU in September 1966,
after discussing the appeal of a group of scientists and cultural fgures of
the Armenian SSR addressed to the XXIII Congress of the CPSU, sent it
to the Central Committee of the CP of Armenia for consideration. What
is surprising in this story is that Moscow pretended not to notice the real
inspirers and organizers of this appeal in the person of the highest party
leadership of Armenia. This conclusion clearly follows from the response
letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU, signed by the First Secretary
of the Central Committee of the CP of the Armenian SSR Anton Kochinyan
and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Armenian SSR Badal
Muradyan. In it, the nationalist sentiments propagated by representatives
of science and culture were not condemned but encouraged. Distorting and
one-sidedly covering the history of the creation of the Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Region and the Nakhichevan ASSR as part of the Azerbaijan
SSR, the authors of the letter proposed to attach them to the Armenian
SSR:
In our opinion, it would be advisable to consider and resolve positively
the issue of the transfer of Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh to
the Armenian SSR, while the Nakhichevan ASSR could maintain its
autonomy within the Armenian SSR, on the territory of which it is
located. However, if the return of Nakhichevan to the Armenian SSR
at the present stage will be associated with certain diffculties, then the
return of Nagorno-Karabakh to the Armenian SSR is not associated
with any diffculties and can be carried out painlessly.11
Moscow’s liberal, cautious and sometimes indecisive attitude to the manifestation of Armenian irredentist nationalism gave the Armenian party
leadership the opportunity to behave more confdently when interpreting the issues of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and the
Nakhichevan ASSR. Such a mood was also created among the scientifc
and creative intelligentsia by the party organization of Armenia. There is
no doubt that at the direction of the Republican party organization in the
late autumn of 1966, a number of institutes of the Academy of Sciences of
the Armenian SSR appealed to the Central Committee of the CPSU with
support for the initiative of the Central Committee of the CP of Armenia in
the issue of annexation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and
the Nakhichevan ASSR to Armenia.
On November 14, the reporting and election meeting of the party
organization of the Oriental Studies Sector of the Armenian SSR Academy
of Sciences, having considered the issue of transferring the NKAR and the
Nakhichevan ASSR to the Armenian SSR, issued a decision stating that
the party organization supports the initiative of the Central Committee
of the CP of Armenia in the issue of the return of Karabakh and

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Nakhichevan to the Armenian SSR and requests the Central Committee
of the CPSU to accelerate a positive solution to this issue.12
A week later, on November 21, a party meeting of the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography was held, which stated:
The party meeting of the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography of
the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR reacted with deep satisfaction to the news that the Central Committee of the CPSU is dealing
with the issue of the reunifcation of the Karabakh Autonomous Region
and the Nakhichevan ASSR with the Armenian SSR. Communist scientists ‒ the entire staff of the Institute warmly supports the initiative of
the Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Armenia and expresses confdence that this issue will be
resolved historically fairly and in full accordance with the spirit of
Lenin’s national policy.13
A meeting of the party organization of the Institute of History of the
Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR was held on November 24 to
discuss the transfer of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and the
Nakhichevan ASSR to the Armenian SSR and to express its support for the
position of the Central Committee of the CP of Armenia on this issue. The
adopted resolution once again distorted the essence of the Declaration of
the Government of Azerbaijan, which was announced on December 1, 1920
by Nariman Narimanov:
It is well known that Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan are an
integral part of the original cradle of the Armenian people, who have
lived here for many centuries and created their own culture. It was
from this immutable fact that the government of Soviet Azerbaijan
proceeded, which in its declaration of November 30, 1920, declared
Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan to be integral parts of Soviet
Armenia.14
The document went on to state that
however, on July 5, 1921, the matter was reconsidered. The principles
of Lenin’s national policy were violated, and the question received a
completely unfair solution. The Armenian people were artifcially
separated from their signifcant part, which had long lived with them a
single national-economic life in the regions of Armenia – Nakhichevan
and Karabakh.15
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66 Eldar Abbasov
demagogic and populist phrases that the transfer of the above-mentioned
territories by Azerbaijan to Armenia would contribute to strengthening the
friendship of the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples:
We are deeply convinced that the reunifcation of Karabakh and
Nakhichevan with the Armenian SSR will undoubtedly contribute to
the further strengthening of the centuries-old friendship of the fraternal Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples. With this deep conviction, we
appeal to the Leninist Central Committee of the CPSU and the Central
Committee of the CP of Armenia, believing that they will meet this
cherished dream of our people.16
The unpunished spread of nationalist sentiments in the Armenian society
and the promotion of territorial claims against the neighboring republic by
the end of 1966 became threatening and could destabilize the situation in
both republics, where the mixed Armenian-Azerbaijani population lived.
The study of archival documents allows us to conclude that the Central
Committee of the CPSU did not suffciently pay attention to this issue and
did not fully realize the extent of the threat lurking in Armenian nationalism. After reviewing the appeals received to the Central Committee of
the CPSU from the institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian
SSR on the transfer of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and
the Nakhichevan ASSR from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR, on
December 7, 1966, the head of the Department of Organizational and Party
Work, Ivan Kapitonov, instructed his deputy Boris Moralev and the head of
the sector of the Republics of Transcaucasia, Yuri Starchenko, to deal with
this issue.17
In early 1967, the frst and second secretaries of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of Armenia, Anton Kochinyan and Georgy
Ter-Gazaryants, were invited to the Central Committee of the CPSU to
discuss the current situation around the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous
Region and the Nakhichevan ASSR in Armenian society. It is interesting
that the conversation with them was conducted not by the top leadership
of the CPSU Central Committee at the level of the Politburo, but by the
deputy head of the Department of Organizational and Party Work of the
CPSU Central Committee Boris Moralev and the head of the sector of the
Republics of Transcaucasia of the Department of Organizational and Party
Work of the CPSU Central Committee Yuri Starchenko. As a result of the
conversation, a memorandum was drawn up for the Central Committee of
the CPSU, which stated:
The extracts received by the Central Committee of the CPSU from
the resolutions of the party meetings of the Institute of History, the
Institute of Archeology and Ethnography, as well as the Oriental Studies Sector of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR raise the

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issue of transferring the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and
the Nakhichevan ASSR from Azerbaijan to Armenia. On this issue, a
conversation was held in the Department of Organizational and Party
Work of the Central Committee of the CPSU with the secretaries of
the Central Committee of the CP of Armenia, Comrades Kochinyan
A. E. and Ter-Gazaryan G. A. We believe that this consideration of the
documents can be completed and attached to the previously submitted
materials of similar content.18
Soon, the fre of Armenian irredentist nationalism, ignited in the Armenian
SSR, spread to the territory of neighboring Azerbaijan. The emissaries
from among the Armenian creative intelligentsia chose the NKAR and the
areas of compact residence of Armenians in Azerbaijan as the object of
their propaganda work. In June 1965, a group of communists from 13 responsible employees of the NKAR addressed a letter to the highest political leadership of the USSR ‒ General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of
the USSR Alexei Kosygin and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR Anastas Mikoyan. The appeal was organized by
Bagrat Ulubabyan, Executive Secretary of the branch of the Azerbaijan
Writers’ Union. Hiding behind the alleged lag of Nagorno-Karabakh in
socio-economic development, the authors of the appeal asked to transfer
the region from Azerbaijan to Armenia. For further investigation and resolution of the issues set out in the letter, the appeal was forwarded on July 20,
1965 from the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of
the CP of Azerbaijan.19 The letter was discussed at a meeting of the bureau
of the Central Committee of the CP of Azerbaijan and it was decided to send
the responsible employees of the party and the government of the republic
to the region to study the situation and take the necessary measures on
the spot. Soon, the ministers of the relevant sectors of the national economy, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Azerbaijan SSR Enver
Alikhanov and Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Azerbaijan Khasay Vezirov visited Nagorno-Karabakh. And after
them, the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Azerbaijan, Pyotr Elistratov, arrived in Nagorno-Karabakh. After studying the situation on the ground and summarizing the proposals
received from the regional authorities, a decision was made at the government level on additional investment for the development of certain areas of
the NKAR economy.
On September 23, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the
CP of Azerbaijan sent a certifcate on the state of socio-economic and cultural development of the NKAR and on the additional measures taken to
further develop the region. The certifcate stated that the volume of capital
investments in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1965 was 80% higher than their volume
in 1964. For clarity and persuasiveness, the reference made a comparative

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68 Eldar Abbasov
analysis of the socio-economic development of the NKAR with the Nakhichevan ASSR. In the period from 1961 to 1965, the volume of state capital
investments in the national economy of the NKAR amounted to 12.8 million
rubles, while for the same period of time, the volume of capital investments
in the Nakhichevan ASSR, whose population is 22% larger, amounted to
only 12.3 million rubles. During the period under review, 48,000 m2 of housing was put into operation in the NKAR, and 37.5 m 2 in the Nakhichevan
ASSR.20
However, the group of 13 was not satisfed with the reaction of Moscow to
its appeal and the measures taken by the party bodies and the government
of the republic, since their goal, ultimately, was not the socio-economic
and cultural development of Nagorno-Karabakh, but its transfer to the
Armenian SSR. Therefore, on September 22, under the signature of Bagrat
Ulubabyan, Grigory Stepanyan, Sergey Shakaryan and Lazar Gasparyan,
a new appeal was sent on behalf of the group of 13 Communists to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which read:
We have written to the Central Committee of the CPSU about the
alarming situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. But the discussion of our
letter was handled by those who were supposed to keep the answer. We
believe in the Central Committee of the CPSU and look forward to a
fair discussion of the issue of our region.21
According to the authors of the letter, a fair discussion of the issue of
Nagorno-Karabakh could only be its transfer to the Armenian SSR. In a
new, repeated appeal to the Central Committee of the CPSU, the responsible employees of the region openly stated this:
Why can’t the Armenian Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh
be with the republic of its main people, with the Soviet socialist republic
fourishing next to it? Why is it legal, the only fair demand hurts someone’s interests, someone seems to be nationalism?.22
The letter was forwarded from the Central Committee of the CPSU to the
Central Committee of the CP of Azerbaijan to study the issues set out in it
and make appropriate decisions. The head of the Republican party organization Veli Akhundov, in turn, instructed the frst secretary of the regional
party committee Gurgen Melkumyan to take serious measures against
party and Soviet workers, cultural fgures who appealed to Moscow with a
demand to annex Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. The appeal of the group
of 13 Communists was discussed in detail at a meeting of the bureau of the
regional party committee with the participation of the Second Secretary
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Pyotr
Elistratov, held on December 9, 1965. At the bureau, it was noted that most
of the facts stated in the letters were not true and were not confrmed when

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they were examined. In this regard, the bureau decided to condemn the
actions of the group of 13 Communists, which were expressed in the drafting of a group letter with a proposal to join the NKAR to the Armenian
SSR.23 By the decision of the bureau of the regional party committee, the
executive secretary of the regional department of the Union of Writers of
Azerbaijan Bagrat Ulubabyan was reprimanded and entered in his personal
fle. The editor of the newspaper Sovetakan Karabakh, Lazar Gasparyan, the
chairman of the Stepanakert City Executive Committee Sergey Shakaryan
and the senior editor of the regional radio control Grigory Stepanyan were
dismissed from their posts, and the other signatories were warned.
In July 1969, a change of political leadership took place in Azerbaijan.
On the recommendation of Moscow, at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, 46-year-old Heydar Aliyev, who
previously worked as the chairman of the KGB of Azerbaijan, was elected
the frst secretary of the Republican party organization. Being a professional security offcer, he was well aware of the irredentist mood of a group
of Armenian intellectuals, both in Armenia and among the Armenian population of Azerbaijan. In order to slow down the growth of Armenian irredentist nationalism in Azerbaijan, in particular in the Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Region, it was important to strengthen the ideological work
by sending a loyal party leader to Baku. The frst step in this direction was
the removal of the secretary of the regional party committee for ideological
work, A. N. Harutyunyan. On December 13, 1972, the second Secretary of
the Central Committee of the CPSU of Azerbaijan, Sergey Kozlov, sent a
letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU, in which it was noted that
in recent years, as a result of the weakening of the leadership of the ideological work on the part of the Nagorno-Karabakh Regional Committee
of the CPSU of Azerbaijan, there are serious shortcomings in the activities of organizations and institutions related to the political education of
the masses. In this regard, the Central Committee of the CP of Azerbaijan
proposed to strengthen this area of work and recommended the Central
Committee of the CPSU to replace A. N. Harutyunyan as the secretary
of the regional committee for ideological work with 49-year-old Mezhlum
Gasparyan.24
Another step to improve the situation in the NKAR and stop the wave
of Armenian irredentist nationalism in the region was the change of the
head of the party organization of Nagorno-Karabakh. On September 14,
1973, the frst Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, sent an information letter to the Central
Committee of the CPSU, in which he noted the weak leadership of the
regional party organization by its frst secretary, Hrant Melkumyan. In
this regard, Heydar Aliyev proposed to transfer Hrant Melkumyan to the
post of secretary of the Azerbaijan Council of Trade Unions (ASPS), and
40-year-old Boris Kevorkov to the post of frst secretary of the regional
party committee.25

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After the change of the frst secretary and the secretary for ideological
work of the regional committee, the turn came to the second secretary.
As a rule, to the post of the second secretary of the regional committee
of Nagorno-Karabakh on the recommendation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, ethnic Russians were elected.
On November 27, 1974, Heydar Aliyev sent an offcial letter to the Central
Committee of the CPSU, informing Moscow about the unsatisfactory work
of the second secretary of the regional party Committee, N. I. Volodin. The
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan considered the
proposal of the Nagorno-Karabakh Regional party Committee, and proposed 50-year-old Valentin Bogoslovsky for the post of second secretary of
the regional committee.26
By replacing the entire top of the party organization of Nagorno-Karabakh
and appointing trusted cadres loyal to Baku to leadership positions in
the region, Heydar Aliyev ensured the functionality and combativeness
of the party power in the fght against Armenian irredentist nationalism.
An important milestone on this path was the March 1975 plenum of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Regional Committee of the Communist Party of
Azerbaijan, which condemned the nationalist sentiments among a number
of responsible employees of the party and Soviet authorities. Addressing
supporters of the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia, hiding
behind demagogic statements about the lag of the region in socio-economic
and cultural development about the insuffcient allocation of capital investments by the Azerbaijani authorities to the economy of the region, Boris
Kevorkov announced at the plenum striking fgures indicating the rise of the
economy of Nagorno-Karabakh. He noted that in comparison with 1960, in
1973, the total social product per capita in the NKAR increased by 250%,
the growth rate of industrial production increased by 281%, the volume of
allocated capital investments by 417%, the volume of trade turnover ‒ by
279%, the scale of consumer services for the population by 550%, and the
volume of expenditures on social and cultural events per capita-by 220%.27
From the point of view of the correct formulation of ideological work,
the plenum of the Nagorno-Karabakh Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan was considered a model of principled education of
the Soviet people and the formation of their moral image, not only on the
scale of the region and the republic, but also throughout the country. Telling
about the ideological hardening of the Soviet people, about their moral
character, the newspaper Pravda highlighted in its editorial the signifcance
of the plenum and wrote:
The plenum of the Nagorno-Karabakh Regional Committee of the
Communist Party of Azerbaijan strongly condemned the unprincipled
position of the former bureau in relation to certain politically immature people who allowed the idealization of antiquity, the glorifcation
of patriarchy, and the departure from party class positions in the

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assessment of historical events. Communist idealism presupposes an
irreconcilability, to any ideological distortions and concessions, to
views hostile to socialism. It is inseparable from the Bolshevik principle
in the evaluation of facts and phenomena.28
The plenum of the Nagorno-Karabakh regional Committee of the CP of
Azerbaijan and the report delivered by the frst secretary of the regional
Committee of the party Boris Kevorkov, as well as the mention of it in
the editorial of the Central Committee of the CPSU, had the effect of an
exploding bomb in the society of the Armenian intelligentsia, representatives of science and culture, who were carriers of the ideas of irredentism.
The Central Committee of the CPSU and its organ of the newspaper Pravda
began to receive a stream of letters and telegrams condemning the report of
the frst Secretary of the Nagorno-Karabakh Regional Party Committee.
Condemning the speech of Boris Kevorkov at the plenum, the Armenian
irredentists in their appeals covered themselves with concern for the friendship between the Armenian and Azerbaijani peoples, considered his speech
harmful and causing irreparable damage to the strengthening of friendship
between the two peoples. The famous Armenian poet Silva Kaputikyan, in
a telegram sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU and to the editorial
offce of the newspaper Pravda, expressed her indignation at the speech of
B. S. Kevorkov at the regional Committee plenum and the editorial of the
newspaper Pravda, in which the plenum of the Nagorno-Karabakh Regional
Party Committee was mentioned as a positive example in strengthening
the struggle for communist ideals. In connection with this circumstance,
she asked the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU to
intervene in the alarming situation himself:
The question is not only that the civil concern of respected people, old
communists, learned writers, war veterans has been ignored, but above
all that the current situation in Karabakh is so serious and complex
that it is impossible to defne it with a few lines of the advanced Pravda.
Therefore, dear Leonid Ilyich, we ask you to pay immediate attention to
the current problem of Nagorno-Karabakh.29
The change of the political leadership of the USSR in March 1985 and the
coming to power of the 54-year-old young and energetic Mikhail Gorbachev,
who became the conductor of the policy of Glasnost and Perestroika,
contributed to the rise of a new wave of the Armenian irredentist movement
under the slogan “Miatsum” ‒ “The reunifcation of the ancestral Armenian
lands”. The leader and organizer of this movement was a young economist
Igor Muradyan, who decided to justify the need for the annexation of the
Armenian-populated regions of Azerbaijan to Armenia by economic factors. He managed to enlist the support of the well-known Soviet economist
of Armenian origin and Mikhail Gorbachev’s assistant on economic issues,

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Abel Aganbegyan. According to I. Muradyan himself, before putting his
signature under the address addressed to the highest political leadership
of the USSR and delegates of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU, he spent
four hours with A. Aganbegyan, and during this time about two liters of
vodka were drunk.30 The signed address two days before the beginning of
the XXVII Congress of the CPSU – on February 24, 1986 was transferred to
the Central Committee of the CPSU
The need to join the NKAR and the Nakhichevan ASSR to Armenia was
considered in the appeal from the point of view of creating and developing
a single territorial-industrial complex of the Armenian SSR. The authors of
the letter noted that
Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan lag far behind in terms of the
development of productive forces from the neighboring regions of the
Armenian SSR, which are similar to them in terms of natural and
transport conditions. Meanwhile, Nakhichevan, located in the center
of historical Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, adjacent to it, could
receive more accelerated and effective development as part of the
Armenian territorial-industrial complex.31
The analysis of the letter gives reason to believe that its content was
really infuenced by a large dose of alcohol consumed by Academician A.
Aganbekyan and researcher of the State Planning Institute of the Armenian
SSR I. Muradyan. For it is not diffcult to guess that with suffcient capital
investment, it is possible to develop all industries, the agricultural sector, the
transport and energy network of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Nakhichevan
ASSR within Azerbaijan. This did not require the separation of these two
regions of the Azerbaijan SSR and their annexation to the Armenian SSR.
The authors of the appeal were invited to the Central Committee of the
CPSU, where they were interviewed by instructors of the Department of
Organizational and Party Work V. I. Polyakov and V. I. Romanov. It was
explained to the applicants that territorial claims to the fraternal republics
do not contribute to the strengthening of international friendship between
peoples, the rapprochement of nations, and the education of workers in the
spirit of communism.32
Four months after the end of the XXVII Congress of the CPSU on
June 19, 1986, Igor Muradyan handed over to the Central Committee of
the CPSU a new letter on 6 sheets, signed by 20 well-known economists of
Armenia.33 The letter was addressed to the top leadership of the USSR,
and a copy was sent to the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Armenia, Karen Demirchian. The letter was accompanied by a voluminous report on 231 typewritten sheets, prepared by I.
Muradyan and entitled “Study of the conditions for the formation of the
Armenian territorial-industrial complex, including Nakhichevan and
Nagorno-Karabakh”.34 The necessity of joining the Nakhichevan ASSR

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and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Republic to the Armenian SSR
for economic reasons was considered in a more detailed form. The work
performed by I. Muradyan consisted of an introduction, two sections, 33
paragraphs, conclusion, bibliography and appendices. In other words, the
work resembled, at frst glance, a complete research work, applying for the
degree of Doctor of Economic Sciences. However, even a cursory acquaintance with this “study” convinces that it at best deserves a diploma work of
a student of the Faculty of Economics of a medium-level university. There
is every reason to believe that none of the 20 doctors of sciences who signed
the letter of appeal read the “work” of Igor Muradyan.
On January 20, 1987, under the signature of seven well-known Armenian
writers and representatives of the creative intelligentsia, the Central
Committee of the CPSU received another appeal addressed to the General
Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev. In order
to emphasize the political status of each signatory of the letter of appeal in
society and to make a serious impression on the country’s leadership, all
of their regalia were indicated and listed before their surnames: people’s
Actress of the USSR, Hero of Socialist Labor, professor ‒ Gohar Mikaelovna
Gasparya; poet, laureate of the state prizes of the USSR and the Armenian
SSR ‒ Gevorg Emin; poet, laureate of the State Prize of the USSR, laureate of the Isaakian Prize, Honored Cultural Worker of the Armenian
SSR and the Georgian SSR ‒ Silva Kaputikyan; artist, winner of the state
prizes of the USSR and the Armenian SSR, People’s Artist of the Armenian
SSR ‒ Hakob Hakobyan; actor, People’s Artist of the USSR, twice winner
of the state Prize of the Armenian SSR-Sos Sargsyan; flm director, People’s Artist of the USSR, winner of the State Prize of the Armenian SSR ‒
Henri Malyan; and writer, winner of the state Prizes of the USSR and the
Armenian SSR ‒ Hrant Matevosyan. The letter of appeal to the country’s
leadership noted that
due to a number of historical circumstances, the native Armenian region of Nagorno-Karabakh was included in the Azerbaijan SSR... Armenians are the indigenous population of Nagorno – Karabakh... and
in all, without exception, the wars waged by Russia with the eastern
despotists, the Armenian population of the region, which determined
the pro-Russian orientation of the entire Armenian people, acted on
the side of the Russian army-liberator, organizing numerous armed detachments. By the will of history Nagorno Karabakh became the frst
Armenian region to be annexed to Russia under the Gulistan Treaty of
1813.35
The annexation of the Karabakh Khanate, founded by Panakh Khan of
the Janshir Turkic tribe, to Russia under the Gulistan Peace Treaty of
October 12 (24), 1813, is considered in Armenian historiography to be the
frst stage of the entry of Eastern Armenia into the Russian Empire. It

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should be emphasized that there is not a single mention of either Armenia
or the Armenians in the treaty. Russian historian, academician LieutenantGeneral of the Russian Imperial Army Nikolai Fedorovich Dubrovin in his
fundamental work on the Caucasus, among other khanates that became
part of the Russian Empire according to the Gulistan Treaty, considered the
Karabakh Khanate to be a Muslim province of Transcaucasia.36 The vast
majority of the population of the Karabakh Khanate were Azerbaijanis. In
a note submitted on July 19, 1811 to the Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia O. P. Kozodavlev describing Georgia and some other regions of the Caucasus, it was indicated that 12,000 families lived in the Karabakh domain,
of which 2500 were Armenian, and the rest were Tatars or Mohammedans.37 (that is, the Azerbaijanis ‒ E. A.)
On February 13, 1987, a letter from seven well-known Armenian writers and representatives of the creative intelligentsia was forwarded from the
Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the CP of
Armenia for further consideration. The response of the Central Committee
of the CP of Armenia dated April 20, 1987, signed by the Secretary of the
Central Committee Robert Arzumanyan, stated that the authors of the letter were invited to the Central Committee of the CP of Armenia, where they
had a conversation on the issue of the annexation of the Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Region of the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR. During
the conversation, a number of authors of the letter (G. Matevosyan, A.
Hakobyan, G. Malyan, G. Emin) stated that they had been rash and hasty
in signing such a document.38 The Central Committee of the CPSU agreed
with the measures taken by the Central Committee of the CP of Armenia
and decided to complete the consideration of this letter.39
Contrary to the expectations of I. Muradyan and his team, neither
appeals signed by well-known economic scientists, nor representatives of
the creative intelligentsia, nor high-ranking military leaders in the Central
Committee of the CPSU led to the desired results in revising the existing
borders between the Armenian and Azerbaijani SSR. The issue raised by
the Armenian irredentists was not even included in the agenda of any party
events. Another campaign of I. Muradyan and his team of 15 graduate students of the State Planning Institute of the Armenian SSR was to collect signatures of the Armenian population of the Armenian SSR and the NKAR
demanding the “reunifcation” of Nakhichevan and the NKAR. According
to the organizers, this event, like a plebiscite, was supposed to legitimize
the struggle of the Armenian irredentists and provide a legal basis for their
demands for the separation of part of its territory from Azerbaijan. This is
how the frst president of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
and the second President of Armenia, Robert Kocharian, described the
beginning of the campaign to collect signatures for “Miatsum”:
The initiative to collect signatures appeared in Yerevan and very
quickly covered Karabakh. The process was launched by the Armenian

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intelligentsia – mostly natives of Karabakh, who for various reasons
live outside of it. Everyone heard the names of Zori Balayan, Bagrat
Ulubabyan, and Igor Muradyan, but the movement had no formal
structure – it was spontaneous, like a forest fre: like a fame that broke
out in a dry forest, it spreads rapidly and uncontrollably, capturing
everything around.40
The frst fve volumes with 53,000 signatures collected in the Armenian
SSR were handed over to the Central Committee of the CPSU on July 13,
1987.41 The cover letter was dated January 25, 1987. This gives reason to
conclude that the campaign for the collection of signatures was launched
by Igor Muradyan in the winter. The letter, which was attached to the ffth
volume of signatures, blamed all the troubles and tragedies of the Armenian
people on Turkey, and noted that “under the pressure of imperialist Turkey, the Armenian historical regions of Nakhichevan and Karabakh were
artifcially declared autonomous divisions of the Azerbaijan SSR”.42 In
this regard, the author urged the country’s leadership “in the name of the
triumph of historical justice, in the name of fulflling Lenin’s precepts on the
reunifcation of the Armenian historical regions of Nagorno-Karabakh and
Nakhichevan with Socialist Armenia”.43
The next batch of collected signatures in the amount of 10 thousands
was sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU on August 24, 1987 with
a cover letter of the same content as the previous one.44 It should be noted
that until the beginning of autumn, the campaign to collect signatures
was conducted exclusively in Armenia. However, starting in the summer
of 1987, separate groups of NKAR Armenians became active in the administrative center of Stepanakert and other districts of the region. The
frst batch of collected signatures in the NKAR and Shahumyan district of the Azerbaijan SSR was handed to the Central Committee of the
CPSU on September 16, 1987 with a cover letter addressed to Mikhail
Gorbachev, signed by I. Muradyan. It was dominated by the socio-economic and ethno-demographic aspects of the argument for the transfer of
Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. The letter noted that
a single Armenian socialist nation was formed in the USSR, including
both the Armenians of Soviet Armenia and other compactly living groups
of the Armenian population, among which the native Armenian region of
Nagorno-Karabakh occupies a special place. In this regard, I. Muradyan
suggested:
Given the current ethnic and demographic situation, it is advisable
to include Nagorno-Karabakh in the Armenian SSR as an integral
part of it, which will ensure the Armenian population of the region
not only cultural and ethnic, but also socio-economic unity with the
socialist Armenian nation within its historical borders within the
USSR.45

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The release of Heydar Aliyev at the October (1987) Plenum of the Central
Committee of the CPSU from the duties of the First Deputy Chairman of
the Council of Ministers of the USSR and a member of the Politburo gave
confdence to the organizers of the “Miatsum” movement in the imminent
positive solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and encouraged them
to take a new step to form and send to Moscow a delegation from among
the Armenian population of the NKAR. Under the leadership of Igor
Muradyan, a small delegation of the NKAR was formed in November
1987. Accompanied by Igor Muradyan and Emil Abrahamyan, the delegation arrived in Moscow. However, they did not manage to meet with the
responsible staff of the Central Committee of the CPSU. On November 19,
Igor Muradyan handed over to the Central Committee of the CPSU another
batch of signatures with a note addressed to the Secretary of the Central
Committee of the CPSU and a member of the Politburo Alexander Yakovlev. The short message, written in the handwriting of Igor Muradyan, read:
“Dear Alexander Nikolaevich, we present for your consideration the
signatures of 3,000 residents of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian
SSR (mostly natives of Nagorno-Karabakh) in connection with the
request to reunite our native land with Soviet Armenia”.46 The Central
Committee of the CPSU informed the Central Committee of the CP
of Armenia about the visit of Igor Muradyan and instructed it to hold
a serious conversation with him. Upon returning to Yerevan, Igor
Muradyan was invited to the Central Committee of the CP of Armenia.
The Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Armenia Robert
Arzumanyan held a routine conversation with him, which was reported
to the Central Committee of the CPSU.47
Following the frst delegation, on December 1, another delegation from the
NKAO arrived in Moscow, which was formed and accompanied by Artur
Mkrtchyan. The delegation was received by the head of the reception room
of the Central Committee of the CPSU A. Krynin.48 At this meeting, the
next batch of collected signatures among the Armenian population of
the NKAO was handed over to the Central Committee of the CPSU. The
organizers considered the meeting very successful and decided to continue
this practice. The ideologist of the Karabakh Movement, publicist Zori
Balayan, called the meeting a fantastic success.
A month later, in early January 1988, Igor Muradyan arrived in Moscow
with a large delegation from the NKAR. The delegation was in Moscow
from 5 to 12 January. A special “instruction” with the delegates was conducted in a Moscow apartment by Zori Balayan and Igor Muradyan. The
delegation was received by the candidate for the Politburo of the Central
Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR Pyotr Demichev and the head of the newly
created sub-department of Interethnic relations of the Central Committee

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of the CPSU Vyacheslav Mikhailov. At the end of the meeting, expressing
the point of view of the party and the state, based on the Constitution of
the USSR and the Union republics, P. Demichev stated the impossibility of
revising the existing borders between the republics.
In early February, a new delegation was formed from among the representatives of the creative intelligentsia of Nagorno-Karabakh to be sent to
Moscow. On February 13, in the capital, the delegation was received by the
head of the sub-department of Interethnic Relations of the Department of
Party and Organizational Work of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Vyacheslav Mikhailov. Once again, he repeated the position of the Central
Committee of the CPSU on the Karabakh issue and made it clear that it was
impossible to transfer the NKAR from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian
SSR. Not satisfed with the results, right after the meeting, the delegation
sent a telegram to the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The most surprising thing in the telegram is the false and hypocritical statements about
the state of the Armenian population in Azerbaijan:
In fact, there is a genocide of the Armenian population by creating conditions that force Armenians to leave their thousand-year-old homes,
monuments of Armenian history and culture are being destroyed and
desecrated, nationalist propaganda is being conducted, the Armenian
population is being humiliated, insulted, and oppressed. There are
excesses, murders and rapes on national grounds, Armenian settlements are being emptied and populated by Azerbaijanis.49
In early February, meetings were held at all enterprises and organizations
of the NKAR, where, at the request of the workers, they discussed the issue
of “reunifcation” of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region with
Armenia. The decision to demand the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to
the Armenian SSR was sent to Moscow. In parallel with the February 8
meetings, activists of the Karabakh Movement organized a campaign to
send telegrams to the Central Committee of the CPSU on behalf of individual citizens of the Armenian population of the NKAR demanding the
“reunifcation” of Nagorno-Karabakh with the Armenian SSR, as well as
the creation and dispatch to the region of a special commission of the Central
Committee of the CPSU to study the public opinion of the population on
this issue. Telegrams were sent from Stepanakert, Martuni, Mardakert and
Hadrut.50 A specifc text was prepared for each district, but the content of all
the telegrams was reduced to one thing – the “reunifcation” of the NKAR.
In order to intimidate the Kremlin and attract the attention of the country’s
leadership to the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh, in a number of appeals to the
Central Committee of the CPSU and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of
the USSR, responsible employees of the party-Soviet authorities deliberately
exaggerated the situation in the region and did not hesitate to artifcially try

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to create a stir around the NKAR. A telegram addressed to the Chairman of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A. A. Gromyko, sent by a
group of employees of the regional fnance department, said:
The situation of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh has deteriorated extremely. Party activists, heads of enterprises and organizations
are constantly threatened by the frst secretary of the regional committee Kevorkov, the second Secretary of the Central Committee of
the CP of Azerbaijan Konovalov, other representatives of the Central
Committee of the CP and the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan. We
ask for your urgent intervention in the fate of the Armenian population
of Nagorno-Karabakh. Do not allow a second Armenian genocide.51
However, the country’s leadership did not particularly react to such “heartbreaking” appeals of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. This
behavior of Moscow, on the one hand, upset and irritated the activists and
supporters of “Miatsum”, while on the other hand, pushed them to search
for new methods of infuencing the Kremlin. Finally, the activists, having
secured the support of the overwhelming majority of the top party-Soviet
authorities of the region, decided to move to the open phase of the process
of annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh to the Armenian SSR. Thus, in the
second half of February 1988, a mechanism was prepared for the transition
to a new, open phase of the movement.
The frst secretary of the regional party committee, Boris Kevorkov, in
contrast to the supporters of the “Miatsum” movement, soberly assessed
the situation and understood the futility and danger of separatist activities.
He stood out for his loyalty to Baku and aroused the rage and anger of
Armenian nationalists. Being an irreconcilable opponent of the annexation
of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia and a staunch supporter of the peaceful and prosperous life of the Armenian population of the NKAO as part
of Azerbaijan, he constantly informed the party leadership of the republic
about the developments in the region.
At frst, offcial Baku desperately tried to prevent the spread and
expansion of the Karabakh movement by its own forces and means without the help of Moscow. However, in early February, the party leadership
of Azerbaijan realized the need to enlist the support of the Kremlin, and
appealed to the Central Committee of the CPSU. Central Committee
Secretary Anatoly Lukyanov, referring to Mikhail Gorbachev, said that the
Central Committee of the CPSU is not considering, and will not consider,
the issue of the reunifcation of the NKAR with Armenia.52 Immediately,
offcial Baku informed the regional party organization about the position
of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh.
B. Kevorkov, in turn, gathered the responsible employees of the party and
state apparatus in the regional committee, and brought to their attention
that the issue of joining the NKAR to Armenia is not on the agenda of the

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Central Committee of the CPSU, that this issue is not being considered by
Moscow, and will not be considered. In addition, B. Kevorkov mobilized
communists from among the opponents of “Miatsum” and sent them to the
districts of the region to explain the position of offcial Moscow. Contrary to
expectations, this event of the regional party organization gave absolutely
the opposite effect. The position of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
which became public, immediately infuriated the supporters of “Miatsum”.
They urged the population to boycott events with the participation of B. Kevorkov’s envoys in every possible way and to continue the campaign to send
telegrams to the Central Committee of the CPSU. In one of the collective
telegrams sent from Stepanakert to the Central Committee of the CPSU, it
was said:
The frst secretary of the Nagorno-Karabakh Regional Committee of
the CP of Azerbaijan, comrade. B. S. Kevrkov has mobilized the regional
committee apparatus and other party and Soviet workers who are obedient to him and sends them to the districts and villages of the region,
where they speak to the population and declare on behalf of the Central
Committee of the CPSU that the reunifcation of Nagorno-Karabakh
with Armenia is not being considered and will not be considered. Thus
terrorizing the population, demanding that the collection of signatures
and the sending of telegrams to Moscow be stopped, they declare
that Nagorno-Karabakh was, is and will be part of the Azerbaijani
SSR. If this terror is not suspended, it can lead to clearly undesirable
consequences.53
In order to consolidate forces against the growing separatism, on February
11, the second Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Azerbaijan,
Vasily Konovalov, accompanied by the head of the Department of
Administrative Bodies of the Central Committee of the CP of Azerbaijan,
Muhammad Asadov, and the Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the republic, Nariman Imranov, arrived in Stepanakert. On the same day, at night, a
meeting of the bureau of the regional party committee was held, at which
the head of the regional party organization Boris Kevorkov, warning party
functionaries who support the “Miatsum” movement, threatened that “I
will turn Karabakh into an Armenian cemetery if you do not refuse to
reunite”.54 The bureau decided on February 12 to hold a meeting for party
and economic activists of the city of Stepanakert. The leadership of the
Republican party organization sent “reinforcements” to Stepanakert for the
successful implementation of the city party-economic activists meeting. So,
on the morning of February 12, the secretaries of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, Ramiz Mehdiyev and Telman Orujev,
arrived in Stepanakert.
The party and economic activists gathered in the hall of the City
committee of the party, to which the heads and secretaries of the party

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and trade union organizations of enterprises and organizations were invited. In his speech, the frst secretary of the regional party committee B.
Kevorkov qualifed everything that was happening in the region as the actions of individual extremists and nationalists, whose actions are alien to
the international spirit of the Karabakh people. In conclusion, he turned to
V. Konovalov and offcially assured him that Karabakh was, is and will forever remain part of Azerbaijan, as it is a truly Azerbaijani land with its own
history. The situation changed dramatically when a number of supporters
of the “Miatsum” movement began to come to the podium uninvited and
denounce the position of the leadership of the party organization of the
region. As a result, the meeting of the party and economic activists of the
city was disrupted.
Following this, a group of 38 workers of the party-Soviet apparatus
of the region sent a telegram to the Central Committee of the CPSU addressed to M. S. Gorbachev and to the chairman of the KGB of the USSR
V. M. Chebrikov, in which the event held by the regional committee with
the participation of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CP of
Azerbaijan was called a performance that failed miserably. For a detailed
and thorough study of the situation, they asked the country’s leadership to
create and send a special commission to the region.55
On February 13, 1988, in Stepanakert, on Lenin Square, the frst rally
of many thousands of workers of the city took place, which lasted an hour
and a half. Participants of the rally, hiding behind slogans for perestroika,
glasnost, friendship of peoples, Lenin’s national policy, shouted “Miatsum”.
Despite the fact that the rally was held in a calm atmosphere without any
excesses, a division of internal troops under the command of Major General
Vladislav Safonov arrived in Stepanakert to maintain public order.
Another crowded rally was held on February 16, at which the members of
the fourth delegation of the NKAO, who had just returned from Moscow,
actively spoke. A member of the Karabakh delegation, Armen Hakobyan,
in his speech at the rally referring to the legitimate process of the NKAR’s
secession from Azerbaijan, admitted that in Moscow, at one of the private
meetings, the delegation members were told that the only way to implement
the demands of the Karabakh people would be the decision of the session
of the regional Council. In this regard, he appealed to the deputies of the
regional Council of People’s Deputies who were present on the square with
a request to speak and demand the convocation of an extraordinary session
of the Council of People’s Deputies of the NKAR. This proposal was met
with a storm of applause from the protesters.
Immediately, under the leadership of the deputy of the regional council ‒ the director of the Stepanakert plant of building materials Arkady
Manucharov, who headed the Karabakh movement in the region, an initiative group was created to convene an extraordinary session of the regional
Council and a campaign was launched to collect signatures. The Council of
People’s Deputies of the NKAO consisted of 149 deputies. In order to ensure

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the necessary number of one-third of the deputy corps, it was necessary
to at least enlist the support of 50 deputies. The initiative group managed
to collect 87 written statements of deputies within two days. In parallel,
meetings and sessions of the village, district and Stepanakert city councils
were held, at which decisions were unanimously made on the reunifcation
of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia and demands were made for the holding of a session of the Regional Council. The regional Executive Committee
had no choice but to make a decision to convene an extraordinary session
of the Council of People’s Deputies of the NKAO. As a result, the Regional
Executive Committee decided to convene an extraordinary session on
February 20, 1988 at 16: 00.
As soon as Baku learned about the decision of the Regional Executive
Committee to convene an extraordinary session of the Council of People’s
Deputies of the NKAO, the frst secretary of the Central Committee of the
CPSU of Azerbaijan, Kamran Bagirov, contacted the Central Committee
of the CPSU, reported on the current explosive situation in the region and
asked for the urgent intervention of the Center. Moscow sent Viktor Yashin,
an instructor of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of
the CPSU, to Baku. Given the relatively low rank and level of the seconded
Moscow representative, it can be concluded that the Central Committee of
the CPSU either was not suffciently informed about the true state of affairs
in the NKAO, or did not understand the seriousness and danger of the situation, and did not imagine the possible development of events and their
consequences. Most likely, Moscow really did not attach importance to the
Karabakh issue and did not suffciently assess the seriousness of the situation in the region. This is clearly seen from Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech
at the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on
March 3, 1988:
But let’s pay tribute to ourselves. In three years, the Central Committee
received 500 letters on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh alone. Then the
delegations went to Moscow. And we had a routine reaction. These,
they say, there “the Armenians will not share everything in any way”,
etc. This is a routine, unft approach to such a sensitive issue. We didn’t
see it in a timely manner.56
On February 20, K. M. Bagirov, members of the bureau of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, and V. M. Yashin, an
instructor of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of
the CPSU, who arrived from Moscow, arrived in Stepanakert to talk to
the communist deputies on the spot and persuade them to abandon their
rash decisions. By the time of the arrival of the high party leadership from
Baku, additional police forces had been drawn up from the nearby Azerbaijani districts to ensure order and security in the regional center. Upon
arrival in Stepanakert with the participation of K. M. Bagirov, a meeting of

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the bureau of the regional party committee was held, where it was decided
to convene a meeting with a part of the party and economic activists of
the NKAO to conduct explanatory work. At this meeting, K. M. Bagirov
insisted on adopting a draft decision prepared in advance by the bureau
of the regional party committee, in which the responsibility for the current situation was entirely assigned to the party organization of the region.
However, the bureau did not agree with such a draft, and it was not adopted.
After an unsuccessful meeting of the bureau of the regional party committee, K. M. Bagirov, V. M. Yashin, B. S. Kevorkov and members of the bureau
of the Central Committee of the CP of Azerbaijan and the regional party
Committee went to the meeting room of the regional council where 111 deputies out of 149 had already gathered. Thirty-nine deputies, mostly Azerbaijanis from Shusha and Martakert districts, ignored the session. K. M. Bagirov
and V. M. Yashin tried to persuade the deputies to refrain from holding the
session and cancel it. One of the participants of the extraordinary session of
the regional council, the secretary of the party organization of the largest
industrial enterprise of the NKAO, the Karabakh Silk Combine, Robert Kocharyan, described in his memoirs the desperate efforts of Kamran Bagirov
and Viktor Yashin to persuade the deputies to cancel the session:
By the evening, we were able to secure a quorum, and the session started
at 21:00. The square in front of the regional executive committee building was crowded with people. Bagirov, Yashin, Kevorkov, as well as
members of the bureau of the regional party committee, unexpectedly
came to the session. Bagirov was the frst to speak. He spoke about the
fraternal friendship of our peoples, how we have lived together happily
for 70 years side by side in Azerbaijan, and that [now] a small group of
irresponsible nationalists incites the people to rash actions. He promised to correct all the mistakes made in relation to the region as soon as
possible. He stressed that the session does not have the right to resolve
territorial issues and that Karabakh will remain part of Azerbaijan.
Yashin also spoke in the same vein. In response, the deputies began
to speak. They spoke emotionally about the systematic infringement
of the interests of the region and that the session has the right to
make decisions on absolutely all issues related to the NKAO. Bagirov
and Yashin often interrupted the speakers, poured out promises and
declared that the problems of the region would henceforth be the focus
of Baku’s attention. However, all their efforts to change the course of
the session were in vain.57
Having failed to achieve success, K. M. Bagirov, V. M. Yashin, B. S.
Kevorkov and their accompanying bureau members left the meeting hall of
the regional executive Committee and the session continued its work. The
question “On the petition to the Supreme Soviets of the Azerbaijan SSR and
the Armenian SSR for the transfer of the NKAR from the Azerbaijan SSR

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to the Armenian SSR” was put up for discussion at the session. After all the
speeches, the session unanimously adopted a decision that read:
After hearing and discussing the speeches of the deputies of the
Regional Council of People’s Deputies of the NKAR on the petition to
the Supreme Soviets of the Azerbaijan SSR and the Armenian SSR on
the transfer of the NKAR from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian
SSR, the extraordinary session of the Nagorno-Karabakh Regional
Council of People’s Deputies decided: To meet the wishes of the NKAR
workers, to ask the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR and the
Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR to show a deep understanding
of the aspirations of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh
and to resolve the issue of transferring the NKAR from the Azerbaijan
SSR to the Armenian SSR, and at the same time to petition the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR for a positive solution to the issue of transferring the
NKAO from the Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian SSR.58
Thus, the decision of the extraordinary session of the Council of People’s
Deputies of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region gave legitimacy
to the “Miatsum” movement and became a landmark event in the history
of not only the Armenian population of the region, but also in the history
of the world’s Armenians. However, at this fateful moment, neither the
deputies nor the activists of the “Miatsum” movement could even think that
a new tragic page was opening in the history of the Armenian people, which,
as the subsequent course of events showed, would bring them many troubles
and sufferings.
Soon after the transition of the Karabakh movement by the decision of
the regional council to the open phase, clashes between Azerbaijanis and
Armenians began both in Azerbaijan and in Armenia. As a result, even
before the collapse of the USSR, 165,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis left Armenia,
and 350,000 Armenians left Azerbaijan. After the collapse of the USSR and
the formation of independent states on the ruins of the Soviet Empire, a
war broke out between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh,
which ended with the defeat of Azerbaijan and the loss of not only the
NKAR, but also seven districts around Nagorno-Karabakh. The war
claimed about 30,000 lives on both sides. Unfortunately, the armistice signed
in May 1994 between Azerbaijan and Armenia did not lead to a full-fedged
peace treaty for 26 years due to Armenia’s intransigence on the status of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Thanks to their victory in the First Karabakh War
and the support of Russia, the Armenian leaders long behaved like victors,
ignoring the four UN Security Council resolutions on the liberation of the
occupied territories of Azerbaijan, and grossly violating international law.
This behavior of the Armenian leadership ultimately led to a new war,
which began on September 27, 2020 and lasted for 44 days. The war ended
not only with the liberation by the Azerbaijani army of all the occupied

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seven regions, but also ending the occupation of part of the territory of
the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, including the ancient city of Shusha. The trilateral Statement signed by Armenian Prime
Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on November 9, 2020 is regarded by Armenian experts as an act of Armenia’s surrender, which threatens the
existence of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. In contrast, the Azerbaijani leadership believes that the trilateral Declaration,
fnally, after more than 30 years of confrontation, opens the way for the
Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh to live in peace.

Notes
1 Akopyan, S. M. Genocid armyan v osmanskoj imperii i otvetstvennost’ imperialisticheskoj Germanii ‒ Istoriko-flologicheskij zhurnal ‒ 1, Erevan, 1963; Nersisyan,
M. G. Genocid zapadnyh armyan v 1915 godu ‒ Istoriko-flologicheskij zhurnal ‒ 2,
Erevan, 1965; Dokumenty mladotureckogo komiteta o genocide zapadnyh armyan
v 1915 ‒1916 gg. ‒ Izvestiya Akademii nauk Armyanskoj SSR. Obshchestvennye
nauki ‒ 3, Erevan, 1965; Saakyan, R. G. Genocid armyan (v Turcii v gody pervoj
mirovoj vojny) v ocenke peredovoj obshchestvennosti ‒ Izvestiya Akademii nauk
Armyanskoj SSR. Obshchestvennye nauki ‒ 4, Erevan, 1965.
2 See.: Hasanli Jamil. Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945–1953.
Lexington Books, 2011, p. 127
3 Igor Muradyan. Study of the conditions for the formation of the Armenian
territorial-industrial complex, including Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh.
June 19, 1986 ‒ Russian State Archive of Modern History (hereinafter – RGANI),
foundation 100, record 5, volume 627, p. 12.
4 Information letter of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CP of
Armenia to the Central Committee of the CPSU signed by the First Secretary of
the Central Committee of the CP of Armenia Ya. Zarobyan. November 13, 1964 ‒
Genocid armyan: otvetstvennost’ Turcii i obyazatel’stva mirovogo soobshchestva.
Tom 2. Chast’ 2. M., 2005. S. 17.
5 Memo of the Chairman of the KGB at the Council of Ministers of the USSR
V.Semichastny to the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the
Chairman of the Ideological Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU
P. Demichev. September 6, 1965 ‒ RGANI f. 5, r. 30, v. 462, p. 4.
6 İbid., p. 95 ‒96.
7 Information on the distribution of anti-Soviet materials and the identifcation of
their authors by the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the Armenian SSR
for 1963 ‒1965. May 16, 1966 ‒ RGANI, f. 5, r. 58, v. 3, p. 4.
8 See: “Kommunist” (Erevan) No. 31. February 6, 1966.
9 Letter of the old Bolsheviks of Armenia to the members of the Presidium of the
Central Committee of the CPSU. February 19, 1966 ‒ RGANI, f. 100, r. 6, v. 372,
p. 43.
10 Nakhichevan ASSR in the Soviet-Turkish treaties. Reference prepared by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR on May 31, 1966 ‒ RGANI, f. 5, r. 58, v.
3, p. 8.

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11 Letter of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Armenia
A. Kochinyan and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Armenian SSR
B. Muradyan to the Central Committee of the CPSU dated September 30, 1966
‒ Bor’ba armyan za vossoedinenie NKAO s Armeniej. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov. Erevan, 2011. S. 66.
12 Extract from the resolution of the reporting and election meeting of the party
organization of the Oriental Studies Sector of the Armenian SSR Academy of
Sciences. November 14, 1966 ‒ RGANI, f. 100, r. 5, v. 623, p. 5.
13 Extract from the resolution of the Party Assembly of the Institute of Archeology
and Ethnography of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences of November 21,
1966 ‒ RGANI, f. 100. r 5. v. 623. p. 4.
14 Resolution adopted at the meeting of the party organization of the Institute
of History of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences. November 24, 1966
(Protocol No. l 9) ‒ RGANI, f. 100. r. 5, v. 623, p. 6.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 7.
17 Note by I. Kapitonov to Moralev B. N. and Starchenko Yu. M. December 7, 1966 ‒
RGANI, f. 100, r. 5, v. 623, p. 2.
18 Memo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the conversation with the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CP of Armenia Comrades Kochinyan
A. E. and Ter-Gazaryants G. A. dated March 14, 1967 ‒ RGANI, f. 100. r. 5, v.
623, p. 1.
19 The Central Committee of the CPSU to the Secretary of the Central Committee
of the CP of Azerbaijan P. M. Elistratov. July 20, 1965. ‒ Archive of political documents under the Administration of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan
(hereinafter-APDUDPAR, f. 1, r. 52, v. 232, p. 60–64.
20 Letter from V. Akhundov to the Central Committee of the CPSU. September 23,
1965. ‒ APDUDPAR, f. 1, op. 52, d. 194, l. 107.
21 Letter on behalf of the group of 13 Communists signed by B. Ulubabyan, G.
Stepanyan, S. Shakaryan and L. Gasparyan to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU dated September 22, 1965 ‒ RGANI, f. 100, r. 5, v. 622, p. 117.
22 Ibid., p. 116.
23 Resolution of the Regional Committee of Nagorno-Karabakh of the CP of
Azerbaijan “On the letter of the group of Communists of Nagorno-Karabakh
addressed to the Central Committee of the CPSU”. December 12, 1965. ‒
APDUDPAR, f. 1, r. 53, v. 265, p. 40.
24 Information letter signed by S. V. Kozlov to the Central Committee of the CPSU.
December 13, 1972 ‒ APDUDPAR, f. 1, r. 59, v. 177, p. 1.
25 Information letter signed by G. Aliyev to the Central Committee of the CPSU.
September 14, 1973 ‒ APDUDPAR, f. 1, r. 60, v. 150, v. 92–93.
26 Information letter signed by G. Aliyev to the Central Committee of the CPSU.
November 27, 1974-APDUDPAR, f. 1, r. 61, v. 164, p. 148.
27 Kevorkov B. S. On the tasks of the regional party organization for the further
improvement of the international education of workers. Report at the plenum of
the regional Committee of the CP of Azerbaijan. March 21, 1975 ‒ “Sovietakan
Karabakh” (Stepanakert) No. 69. March 23, 1975.
28 The source of our power ‒ Pravda No. 149. May 29, 1975.
29 Telegram from Sylvie Kaputikyan to the Central Committee of the CPSU
addressed to L. I. Brezhnev, copy: to the editorial offce of the newspaper
Pravda and the bureau of the Central Committee of the CP of Armenia. June 5,

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30
31

32
33

34
35

36
37

38

39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Eldar Abbasov
1975 ‒ Bor’ba armyan za vossoedinenie NKAO s Armeniej. Sbornik dokumentov i
materialov. S. 99.
Tomas de Waal. Chernyj sad. Armeniya i Azerbajdzhan mezhdu mirom i vojnoj.
M., 2005. S. 38.
Address of academicians of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. Aganbegyan, T.
S. Khachaturov, I. L. Knunyants, M. H. Chailakhyan and others to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev, Chairman
of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet A. A. Gromyko, delegates of
the XXVII Congress of the CPSU. February 24, 1986 ‒ RGANI, f. 100, r. 5.
v. 622. p. 41.
Reference of the Central Committee of the CPSU. March 18, 1986 ‒ RGANI, f.
100, r. 5, v. 622, p. 39–40.
Letter from Armenian economic scientists (20 signatures in total) to the
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU M. S. Gorbachev, to
the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A. A. Gromyko, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. I. Ryzhkov,
a copy – to the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP of Armenia
K. S. Demirchian. June 19, 1986 ‒ RGANI, f. 100, r. 5, v. 627, p. 1–6.
Igor Muradyan. Study of the conditions for the formation of the Armenian
Territorial-industrial complex, including Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh.
June 19, 1986 ‒ RGANI, f. 100, r. 5, v. 627, p. 7–239.
Letter of the representatives of the creative intelligentsia of Armenia (G.
Gasparyan, G. Emin, S. Kaputikyan, A. Hakobyan, S. Sarkisyan, G. Malyan
and G. Matevosyan) to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of
the CPSU M. S. Gorbachev. January 20, 1987 ‒ RGANI, f. 100, r. 5. v. 683,
p. 113–114.
See: Dubrovin N.F. Istoriya vojny i vladychestva russkih na Kavkaze. SPb, 1871.
T.1. Kn.2. S. 225–226.
A note presented to the Minister of Internal Affairs of Russia O. P. Kozodavlev,
describing Georgia and some other regions of the Caucasus. July 19, 1811 ‒
Prisoedinenie Vostochnoj Armenii k Rossii, T. I (1801–1813).Sbornik dokumentov (Sost. C.P. Agayan, S.A. Ter-Avakimova, D.A. Muradyan, V.A. Diloyan. AN
ArmSSR, In-t istorii). Erevan, 1972. S. 562.
Response of the Central Committee of the CP of Armenia to the letter of the
Central Committee of the CPSU 028851/01 of February 13, 1987. April 20, 1987 ‒
RGANI, f. 100, r. 5, v. 683, p. 111.
Reference of the Central Committee of the CPSU. April 30, 1987 ‒ RGANI, f.
100, r. 5, v. 683. p. 110.
Kocharyan R. Zhizn’ i svoboda. Avtobiografya eks-prezidenta Armenii i
Karabaha. M., 2019. S. 56.
See: Letters on the reunifcation of the native Armenian lands of Nakhichevan
and Nagorno-Karabakh with Soviet Armenia. July, 1987 ‒ RGANI, f. 100, r. 5,
v. 630, p. 1ob.
Cover letter to the signatures addressed to the General Secretary of the CPSU
Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev dated January 25, 1987-RGANI, f. 100, r.
5, v. 630, p. 6.
Ibid., p. 7.
See: To the Central Committee of the CPSU, General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev. August 24, 1987 ‒ RGANI, f. 100, r. 5, v. 630, p. 28–32.
Igor Muradyan’s address to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee
M. S. Gorbachev. September 16, 1987 ‒ RGANI, f. 100, r. 5, v. 632, p. 5.

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46 Igor Muradyan’s address to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the
CPSU, member of the Politburo A. N. Yakovlev. November 11, 1987 ‒ RGANI,
f. 100, r. 5, v. 636, p. 1.
47 Ibid.
48 Arutyunyan V.B. Sobytiya v Nagornom Karabahe. Khronika. Chast’ I. Fevral’
1988 g. – Yanvar’ 1989 g. Erevan, 1990. S. 32.
49 Telegram of the Karabakh delegation of representatives of the creative intelligentsia of the NKAO to the Central Committee of the CPSU M. S. Gorbachev, E.
K. Ligachev, A. N. Yakovlev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet A. A. Gromyko, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. I.
Ryzhkov. February 13, 1988 ‒ RGANI, f. 100, r. 5, v. 639, p. 48–49.
50 See: Telegrams of the Armenian population of the NKAO to the Central
Committee of the CPSU. February 9–12, 1988 ‒ RGANI, f. 100, r. 5, v. 638, p.
12– 26, 28–39, 41–57, 59–65, 67–80, 82–94, 96–113, 115–124, 134–140.
51 Telegram of a group of employees of the Financial Department of the NKAO
to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A. A.
Gromyko dated February 14, 1988 ‒ RGANI, f. 100, r. 5. v. 639, p. 58.
52 Brutenc, K.N. Nesbyvsheesya. Neravnodushnye zametki o perestrojke. M., 2005.
S. 338.
53 Collective telegrams of the residents of Stepanakert to the Central Committee
of the CPSU M. S. Gorbachev. February 12, 1988 ‒ RGANI, f. 100, r. 5, v. 638, p.
131–138.
54 Collective telegram of the leading employees of the party-Soviet apparatus of
the NKAO to the Central Committee of the CPSU M. S. Gorbachev, Chairman
of the KGB of the SSR V. M. Chebrikov. February 13, 1988 ‒ RGANI, f. 100, r.
5, v. 639, p. 36.
55 See: Collective telegram of the leading employees of the party-Soviet apparatus
of the NKAO to the Central Committee of the CPSU M. S. Gorbachev, Chairman
of the KGB of the SSR V. M. Chebrikov. February 13, 1988 ‒ RGANI, f. 100, r.
5, v. 639, p. 33–38.
56 From the speeches of M. S. Gorbachev at the meeting of the Politburo of the
Central Committee of the CPSU on March 3, 1988 ‒ Gorbachev M.S. Sobranie
sochinenij. T.9. Noyabr’ 1987 – Mart 1988. M., 2009. S. 234
57 Kocharyan, R. Zhizn’ i svoboda. Avtobiografya eks-prezidenta Armenii i
Karabaha. S. 60.
58 The decision of the extraordinary session of the Council of People’s Deputies of
the NKAO of the XX convocation “On the petition to the Supreme Soviets of the
Azerbaijan SSR and the Armenian SSR on the transfer of the NKAO from the
Azerbaijan SSR to the Armenian”. February 20, 1988 ‒ “Sovetskiy Karabakh”
No. 43. February 21, 1988.

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4

The Orientalizing of
Azerbaijanis and the
Armenia–Azerbaijan Confict
Farid Shafyev

Introduction
The Second Karabakh War with all modern warfare employed, had another battleground – information. From the beginning of the modern
confict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the international coverage and
perception had no less signifcance than the real situation. Unleashed offcially on 13 February 1988 in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region
of the Soviet Azerbaijan by a group of Armenian nationalists demanding
miatsum – an Armenian language term for unifcation with Armenia –
the confict had profound academic, media and popular misperceptions. The history of the region, religious connotations, causes of the
confict, victimhood and other important topics became the subject of
heated debate within public and scholarly discourse about the confict
(Broers, 2019).
Understanding the confict itself and surrounding perceptions require
in depth analysis of the origin of the ongoing confict within its historical
and cultural context. English language academic literature has relatively
rich items on Armenian history characterized by admiration about a small
Christian nation squeezed between the mountains of the Caucasus. Popular
media coverage is even more palpitating about frst Christians who survived centuries of oppressive Islamic environment and especially Turkish
“oppression.” These were starting points for any analysis when the Armenian
question surfaced in the age of nationalism – during the second half of the
nineteenth century. Such approach would explain much of the public Western perception about the confict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis –
from the frst clashes in 1905 until today. Islam, the Ottoman Empire and
related stereotypes played important roles in the coverage of the confict –
from superfcial journalistic dispatches to serious scholarly research. I argue
that strong Orientalist stereotypes greatly distorted the historical data, and
relegated the Azerbaijanis as a Muslim, Turkic-speaking ethnic group in
an unfavorable light versus the Christian Armenians in both Western and
Russian media and academic discourse despite the fact that the confict had
no religious connotation.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-6
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Orientalist Understanding of the Confict
The narrative about the Armenian-Azerbaijani confict in Western media
and academic literature is overwhelmingly pro-Armenian and repeats clichés of Armenian historians. One can fnd a similar trend in Russian coverage of the confict. Any attempt to cast doubt on the entrenched history of
Armenia and Armenians faces the accusation of revisionism or denialism,
and scholars, especially in Western academia, risk their career and suffer
from well-organized attacks by Armenian activists, which are frequently
supported by Western and Russian scholarly communities (Evinch, 2005,
Mamigonian, 2015, Mukhanov, 2020).
In a nutshell, the Armenian narrative revolves around the following major
arguments (ArmenianInstitute.org.uk, Armenianmuseum.org, Croissant,
1998, Avedian, 2012, Cheterian, 2015, Baghdassarian, 2020, Tchilingirian,
2020, Mirabile, 2021):
– Armenians for centuries were oppressed by Muslims, especially by
Turks (here modern-day Azerbaijanis also regarded as Turks as it was
their self-identifcation in today’s Republic of Azerbaijan until 1936);
– Turks were always “genocidal” toward Armenians which resulted in
massacres during 1890–1915 in Anatolia;
– In addition, Islamic “jihadism” was unleashed against Armenians in
the Caucasus since 1905;
– These Turkic genocidal tendencies and Muslim “jihadism” repeatedly
occurred, including in the Second Karabakh War;
– Historical Armenian lands encompassed a big part of the territories
in Anatolia and the South Caucasus, including Nagorno-Karabakh,
which was unjustly assigned by Soviet leader Josef Stalin to Azerbaijan
in 1921;
– Armenians were discriminated against in Soviet Azerbaijan, and had
worse socio-economic conditions than Azerbaijanis;
– Armenians peaceful struggle for freedom was met by violence and
pogrom in Sumgayit in February 1988;
– The First Karabakh War (1988–1994) was merely the Armenian response
to insecurity caused by Azerbaijani aggressiveness;
– The Second Karabakh War was an Azerbaijani-Turkish jihadist alliance
against small democratic Armenia.
Before addressing these arguments-clichés, I would like to analyze the
theoretical context of confict-related narrative. Interestingly enough, the
Armenian narrative enjoys support from two opposite groups – Christian
fundamentalists and liberals. An even more extraordinary fact is that this
phenomenon is also observed both in the West and Russia. In this regard,
the Armenian-Azerbaijani confict is unique and sharply different from
other post-Soviet conficts such as in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The

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90 Farid Shafyev
West as a whole support the territorial integrity of Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine, seeing Moscow’s imperialistic ambitions in the form of support to
separatist movements in these three countries. Despite the fact that Russia
has a military base in Armenia and both countries are members of the same
political-military alliance, Western politicians, experts and journalists tend
to be ambiguous about supporting Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
The frst explanation, which comes into mind for this situation, is the
religious factor. Azerbaijan is a Muslim majority country, unlike Armenia
and all other above-mentioned post-Soviet countries involved in territorial
conficts. However, it is consensus in the expert community that the confict
between Armenia and Azerbaijan does not have religious connotations,
although especially Armenian lobby groups view and exploit it through
a religious narrative. For example, the Armenian National Committee of
America regularly sends messages, tweets and other public announcements
to American policy-makers highlighting the Armenian Christian affliation
(for example, ANCA twitter account, @ANCA_DC). Armenian lobbyists
regularly remind the US and European governments that they were the frst
Christian nation and shy away from acknowledging friendly relations with
Russia and Iran.
More scrutinized analysis of the trend in the West and Russia with regard
to the Armenia-Azerbaijani confict warrants a broader scope of arguments.
The application of several theories stemming from the philosophy of knowledge explains this phenomenon. Michel Foucault, Edward Said, Antonio
Gramsci, Benedict Anderson and a few other thinkers must be employed to
understand the dominant perception formed over the course of more than
hundred years since the beginning of animosity between the Armenians and
Azerbaijanis in 1905. Said’s Orientalism in particular is the key framework
to unpack this narrative.
I dismiss the sometimes-quoted theory of ancient hatred (Laycock,
2020). Historical data is scarce if not almost non-existent about the ethnic clashes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis (in pre-twentieth-century
documents Azerbaijanis were referred to by Russian as “Tatars” or “Turks”
by Westerners). “Classic” medieval wars involving Armenians cannot be
counted as ethnic confict, but even they are few. Those which are referred
to, for example, the forced Armenian deportations realized by Safavid Shah
Abbas in the seventeenth century and Agha Mahammad Shah Gajar in the
eighteenth century, after close scrutiny, reveal the fact that those incidents
affected not only Armenians, but also other peoples, including Muslims
(Imranli-Lowe, 2016). Despite the modern narrative about century-old
oppression of Armenians by Muslim rulers, this Christian group was
called by the Ottomans “milleti sadika” (loyal people) which signifes the
trust and relative harmony in relations between them (Gunter, 2011, Ekinci,
2014). In Persia, Armenians had also enjoyed privileges, though certainly,
as Christians had to abide by some discriminatory rules, such as jizya – an
elevated tax imposed on all non-Muslims according to Sharia Law.

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With the conquest of the South Caucasus by Russia in the frst quarter of the nineteenth century, which Armenians not only welcomed but
actively supported, they became a privileged group, while Muslims,
including Azerbaijanis, were deprived of previous positions. For example,
Russian authorities preferred recruiting Armenians to local administration (Mostashari, 2006). Azerbaijanis were called “Tatars” by Russians and
self-identifed themselves as “Turks” or “Muslims.” These ethnic markers
explain many stereotypes and biases against them by Russian and Western
media. Cultural predisposition is at the core of the process of the Orientalizing of Azerbaijanis.
The concept of Orientalism formulated by Edward Said (1978) with regard to Western imperial discourse on the Islamic world with the application of clichéd perceptions focuses mostly on persistent prejudices against
Arabic peoples and their history and culture. The Ottoman Empire is
overall absent in Said’s Orientalism as are other signifcant Muslim majority states such as the Safavid and Qajar Iranian states or Mughal India.
However, in the view of several scholars these historical entities received
similar Eurocentric treatment from Western academia, which fall into the
category of Orientalism (Bryce, 2013, Eldem, 2015). British, French, Spanish
and other European thinkers, following their imperial rulers, regarded
peoples in Africa, Asia and America as wild tribes which should be “civilized” through both Christianization and colonization. The Western scholars applied their own mold and values to evaluate Ottomans and later the
Republican Turks, frequently accusing them of barbarism, but occasionally praising them for modernization and Westernization. In 1853, Russian
tsar Nicholas I suggested to Great Britain to deal with the Ottomans as
“the sick man of Europe” and such sentiments continue even today whenever discussion emerges on Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU)
(Livanios, 2006). Despite the fact that the Ottoman Turks had never been
colonized, “the Europeans’ attitude toward the Ottoman Empire in terms of
the political language used and the policies pursued was no different from
the ones toward the colonized world” (Erdagoz, 2019, p. 2). In the nineteenth
century the issue of rescuing Christian minorities from the Ottoman yoke
became the acute topic in European capitals and the so-called Eastern and
Armenian questions were brought to the agenda of imperial powers.
The connections between Orientalism and the construction of the stereotypic image of the “terrible Turks” were reinforced during World War I,
when the British, French and Russian empires collided with the Ottoman.
This affected the modern categorization of the events in 1915 as “genocide”
when Armenians were deported from Eastern Anatolia to secure the frontline against invading Russian troops, which Armenian rebels supported.
After the end of World War I, the demonization of Turks was forgotten,
but reentered the academic and political discourse by the end of the Cold
War with the emergence of independent Armenia. Embedded Orientalism
fourished especially in the context of Armenian territorial claims against

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Farid Shafyev

Azerbaijan and Turkey, Turkey’s bid for EU membership, and more independent policy under the incumbent president Recep Tayyib Erdogan.
Armenian diaspora activists resorted to aggressive anti-Turkish and
anti-Azerbaijan campaigns with typical Orientalization, advancing clichés about “terrible Turks” against the frst Christian nation, i.e. Armenia. The complex history of the region was reduced to a white-and-black
picture with a few “essential” traits (Yavuz, 2014). Anyone, especially in
Western academia who disagrees with questioning the validity of the claim
of the 1915 “genocide” might lose his or her tenure and even face criminal
charges. For example, Switzerland and France have enacted relevant legislation criminalizing the so-called denial of genocide or alternative historical narratives based on research that rejects the legal description of these
events as genocide (ECHR, 2013). Severe ostracism might fall upon scholars questioning major arguments entrenched in Western or Russian expert
communities with regard to the history of Karabakh too. Strong Orientalist
stereotypes continue dominating the discourse, and affect the perception of
the Armenia-Azerbaijani confict as well.
Another reason for Western and Russian support to the Armenian question revolves around imperial projects, which at various times coincided
with the attempts of Armenians to create independent statehood. The
ancient Armenian kingdom lost its sovereign status by A.D. 428, but its history has assumed signifcance, beginning from the eighteenth century for
both Armenian nationalists and imperial strategists, who eyed the territories
of the Ottoman Empire and Persia. The reconstruction of the “Armenian
homeland” with vast areas from the Mediterranean to Karabakh is the result
of only two centuries discourse, and did not exist in the Mediaeval or Ancient
periods (Imranli-Lowe, 2015). This is exactly when a more mythologized and
even hypertrophied history of Armenia along with “Great Armenia” maps
with extended boundaries made inroads into Russia and Europe. The Armenian Church and clericals proved instrumental in this process
In the 1670s, Armenian Catholicos Jacob (Akop) IV decided to send a
mission to Europe, which was eventually assigned to Israel Ori (1658–1711)
from Zangezur (the Sunik region in modern-day Armenia). Having settled
in Europe, Israel Ori approached the courts in Vienna, Paris and Vatican,
soliciting their support for Armenian statehood but received no assurances. In 1701, Israel Ori managed to deliver a letter to Russian tsar Peter
the Great, who promised to render necessary assistance (Ezov, 1898). The
Russian military campaign in the Caucasus in 1722 was successful, but after
Peter the Great’s death, the Russian army left the region and only returned
a century later. It seemed that Israel Ori’s mission was mainly supported by
Armenian clerics and many aspects of the interaction between Ori and Peter
the Great were distorted and mythologized later by the Armenian-Russian
historian Gerasim Ezov (Ekozyants, 2020).
The national history of the “Armenian homeland” from the Mediterranean to Karabakh was promoted by Mikayel Chamchyants (1738–1823),

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an Armenian Catholic monk. According to Kevork Bardakjian (1976),
Chamchyants mixed the historical accounts with “frequently accepted
sheer legends” (p.17). Nevertheless, the Armenian “histories” and maps
matched the goal of imperial strategists. Armenian archbishop and prelate of the Russian-Armenian community Iosef Argutinskiy (1743–1801) and
Count Ivan Lazarev (Ovanes Lazarian) (1735–1801) supplied the Russian
court with maps and memos (Pollock, 2006). During the frst part of the
nineteenth century Russia conquered the territory of the South Caucasus
and looked increasingly at the Ottoman lands. In the war of 1877–1878 St.
Petersburg occupied Kars.
The Russian administration conducted several campaigns of Armenian
settlement to the newly conquered territories, frst in Crimea after the
Russian-Turkish War of 1768–1774 (Ezov, 1901) and later to the South
Caucasus after a series of Russian-Turkish and Russia-Qajar wars ended by
1829 (Mostahsari, 2006, Shafyev, 2018). The Russian military campaigns
and Armenian settlement projects were accompanied by historical claims on
the newly acquired territories. This policy was continued during the Soviet
Union. After World War II, Josef Stalin demanded the Kars and Ardahan
regions from Turkey, and subsequently the Soviets launched the campaign
by Armenian and Georgian historians to claim the Turkish eastern provinces (Hasanli, 2011b). Exactly during this time such terms as “Western” and
“Eastern Armenia” entered the academic lexicon. These geographic names,
non-existing historically, bear irredentist agenda and were manipulated by
Armenian historians and diaspora activists with regard to other historical
regions. For example, Nakhichevan, part of modern Azerbaijan, is presented as the location of the Biblical Noah and Armenian homeland, though
it is clear that during the Biblical times no Armenian settled in Nakhichevan
and no such name existed in antiquity. Connecting Nakhichevan’s etymology to Armenian origin and affliating with Christianity is a well-designed
move to solicit the support of Christian brethren.
Overall, the history as it is known in the mainstream Western and Russian
scholarship is greatly infuenced by the nationalist narrative promoted by
the Armenian Church, a narrative, which was only manufactured during
last 300 years. Frequently, the existence of Armenian churches and monasteries in the Middle East and Caucasus were used by Armenian nationalist
historians as a marker of “homeland” despite the fact that many religious
communities overlapped and co-existed with other communities. One of
such Christian communities was the Caucasian Albanians, a theory, which
many Western experts believe Azerbaijan falsely promoted for political
purposes (de Waal, 11 November 2020). However, as Gerard Toal and John
Loughlin (2013) observe:
the Armenian Church has a long and complicated geographical
footprint across the Middle East, Anatolia and Caucasus…. [C]hurches,
graveyards and religious stones are taken as evidence of original

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Farid Shafyev
ownership of territories under dispute and the basis for making claims
to territories that may not otherwise be under dispute. Such discourses
seek to imagine territory as sacred space, sacred not simply for its religious meaning but more broadly as the ancient patrimony of the modern
nation (p.170).

It is known that Caucasian Albania had its own church – with the medieval
center in Gandzasar, located in the present day Karabakh region of
Azerbaijan – which became gradually subordinated to the Armenian
Catholicosate, and eventually abolished by the order of the Russian tsar in
1836. The remnants of Albanian liturgical books, known to modern scholars
as palimpsests, manifest the evidence that Albanian written texts were
erased or embroidered in order to write on them again in other languages,
primarily in Armenian (Maisak, 2010). Azerbaijan’s narrative related to the
Caucasian Albania has some faws but the subject is not developed and the
source base remains limited.
In the meantime, many Armenian historical claims also have shaky ground.
Other relatively modern “historical” discoveries are the ancient Armenian
settlements, especially related to the reign of the Armenian king Tigranes
the Second (140–55 BC), which are promoted by Armenian historians as
territorial markers. Tigranes’ territorial acquisitions, mostly short-lived
and lost after his death, are taken by Armenian nationalists as evidence
of an ancient Armenian presence in the vast area of the Middle East and
the Caucasus. Armenian historians claim that several “Tigranakerts,” cities
established by Tigranes, existed from ancient times, and quite suspiciously
those settlements were recently discovered in Karabakh, Nakhichevan and
other areas which Armenian scholars claim to be ancient Armenian land.
In the complexity and uncertainty of the ancient history of the region, local
nationalistic discourses are being dealt with not only through the prism of
“imagined communities” (Andersen, 1991) but also “imagined geographies”
(Said, 1979).
One of the key Armenian historical discourses focuses on Armenian
ancient statehood as the frst Christian one – an argument which has also
some opponents, who believe the frst Christian state was Ethiopia (Woldegaber and Portella, 2012). The centrality lies not only in the fact of pioneering Christendom at state level, but more in the victimhood of Armenians
surrounded for the past millennium by hostile Muslim states. However, this
narrative about animosity was mostly promoted by the Armenian Church.
During the Russian-sponsored campaign of Armenian resettlement from
the Qajar state to the Russian Caucasus in 1828–1831, many Armenian
peasants resisted relocation (Glinka, 1831). It was mostly clergymen who
persuaded ordinary Armenians to leave their established settlements.
Firouzeh Mostashari (2006, p. 41) believes that force was used to ensure
the departure of Armenians from Persia. Similar trends can be observed in
the Armenian resettlement from the Ottoman Empire, which followed in

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1829–1832. The Porte accused the Russian army and the Armenian clergy
of forcing people to immigrate to Russia (Ozcan, 2011). Discontent among
Armenians made them return back to the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian
Caucasus administration shut down the border in 1831 to prevent an outfow
of population (Sherry, 2007, pp. 65–71). Armenian habitation in the territory
of medieval Persia and Turkey was characterized by coexistence and synergy
with locals rather than by animosity. The narrative of permanent hostility
is greatly infuenced by religious authorities supported by both Western and
Russian clericals and imperial strategists.
While it is easy to comprehend why right-wing Christian groups and activists support Armenians as religious brethren, the marriage of liberals with
the Armenian narrative, which also includes irredentist territorial claims
(Ambrosio, 2001), raises some questions, which I will try to answer. This
trend can be observed already in the nineteenth century and was related to
the Western and Russian perception of the Orient, especially Turks. Hakan
Yavuz (2014) questions:
Why did both Christian scholars and Enlightenment thinkers want so
badly to see an end to the Ottoman presence in Europe? European powers became less tolerant of ‘Turkey-in Europe’ in the nineteenth century
than in earlier centuries. Ironically, it was in the ‘liberal’ and ‘secular’
era that European leaders asked how was it possible that an Islamic
entity could rule Christian populations in Europe’s backyard? (p. 114)
European liberalism has close linkages with an idea of “civilizing mission,”
and for that matter, can be considered as another offshoot of Christian
missionary campaign within Western colonialism. Spreading the words of
Christ was transformed into the British “white man’s burden” (Hitchens,
2004) and French “mission civilisatrice” (Burrows, 1986). Many liberal
thinkers of the nineteenth century supported the idea that European civilization is not only superior to others but also has messianic duties. Western
liberalism in the nineteenth century denied equal rights for many so-called
backward societies, proceeding from reasoning voiced by philosophers like
John Stuart Mill, who believed that those societies like children did not
reach “the maturity of their faculties” (Mill, 2009, p. 19). This colonial attitude has been applied to Turks as Oriental barbarians. French philosophers
had similar attitudes to the Ottoman culture. Voltaire described the Turks
as tyrants who destroyed Europe’s heritage. Armenian nationalists like
quoting French novelist Victor Hugo: “Wherever the Turkish hoof trods, no
grass grows” (Koloyan-Keuhnelian, 2020).
Armenian publisher and scholar Arshag Mahdesian wrote in 1917:
The Armenians, as the protagonists of western ideals, and as the frst
nation to embrace Christianity, have rendered remarkable services to
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mankind. They have been depicted by impartial observers as intellectually, morally, and physically superior to most of the races surrounding
them, or as “the Anglo-Saxons of the Orient.”
(Mahdesian, 1917, p. 448)

The British Prime Minister and the leader of the Liberal Party William
Gladstone (1808–1898) defned the Turks as “the one great anti-human
specimen of humanity” (Çiçek, 2006). Victorian Britain deplored Turkish
“barbarianism” at the same time the English media had moral arguments
over the Irish Potato Famine and Opium Wars in China. This sentiment
was prevalent during World War I too. The Turk remained “at heart the
untutored nomad he ever was” and “animal incapable of adopting Western
civilization as the African negro in the Eastern and the Indian savage in
the Western hemisphere had proved themselves to be” (Auchterlonie, 2001,
p. 11). British liberals, such as Lord James Bryce (1838–1922), a member of
parliament and the author of the Blue Book on Ottoman atrocities against
Armenians during World War I, was often employed in circulating disingenuous depictions of the Turks and the Ottoman Empire (Erdagoz, 2019).
The European psyche on the Turks was greatly infuenced by the Ottoman
siege of Vienna in the seventeenth century, and it is not coincidence that the
incumbent prime minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan exploited similar
rhetoric during the Second Karabakh War in 2020, warning that “Europe
should wait for Turkey near Vienna” (Turkeygazette, 2020).
While in the nineteenth century Britain saw in the Ottomans the balancing power to Russia, during World War I, aligned with Russia, British
interest in dismembering the Ottoman Empire had selfsh goals to extend
its own empire. As Indian subaltern historian Dipesh Chakrabarty (2002,
p. 85) pointed out, “it is, in fact, one of the ironies of British history that the
British became political liberals at home at the same time as they became
imperialists abroad.” British images of the victimized Armenians in the
Ottoman Empire carry the imperialistic view of a civilizing mission and
imperial “protectiveness” (Laychock, 2009). The Western liberal narrative,
especially during the frst part of the twentieth century, should be considered in the parlance of Antonio Gramsci’s theory of liberal imperialism,
which today continues in the form of neoliberalism and paternalism, especially with regard to the Muslim world (Taylor, 2010, Salem, 2021). Eventually it brings us to Edward Said’s Orientalist understanding of the history
of Ottoman-Armenian relations, greatly infuenced by Western and Russian
imperialism.
Russia had also a strong school of Orientalism (Oye, 2010), and many
Russians, including the liberal-minded poet Alexander Pushkin, supported the Russian conquest of the Caucasus (Layton, 1994). Renowned
Russian writer Fyodor Dostoyevsky advocated a messianic Russian role to
free Christians in the Ottoman Empire and the whole Orient, and subsequently justifed an expansionist policy (Sahni, 1997, pp. 71–90). Russian

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liberals echoed similar views and legitimized the Russian acquisition of the
Caucasus. Russian imperial historians such as Potto and Velichko used extensively the notion of the “civilizing mission” to advance Russian rule in
the Caucasus against Qajar and Ottoman infuences (Shafyev, 2018, p. 41).
In 1905, when the frst violent clashes broke out between Armenians and
Azerbaijanis the contemporary Western and Russian media displayed an
anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim tone. Observers nearly always blamed “Tatar
gangs” (Le Matin, 1905) for the violence, describing a clash as “part of that
wider feud between modern ideas and Asiatic barbarism” (Villari, 1906, p.
191). According to American historian Tadeusz Swietochowski (1995, pp.
41–42), “the events were reported in the world press generally with a tone of
partiality towards the Armenian.”
Soviet authorities continued the colonialism-infuenced policy by terming
many Muslim ethnic groups in the Soviet Union as backward people (otstaliye narody) (Oye, 2014), including Azerbaijanis and other Turkic-speaking
groups, which, according to Josef Stalin, lacked developed proletariat (Tolstov, 1947). Completely different treatment was applied to Christian peoples
such as Armenians in the South Caucasus.
In this regard, it is a completely false assumption adopted in Western
and Russian academia following the Armenian claim that the Soviet leader
Joseph Stalin assigned Karabakh to Azerbaijan. This story was propelled
by Armenian nationalists in order to demonize the territorial arrangement
made in 1921 under the alleged infuence of Stalin. Experts in Soviet studies
know well that in 1921 Stalin did not possess the power which he enjoyed
later in the 1930s. Stalin was among several communists, including some
Armenians, who adopted decisions to keep the region within Azerbaijan.
Armenian scholar Arsen Saparov believes that
there is no direct evidence of Stalin doing or saying something in those 12
days in the summer of 1921 that [resulted in this decision on Karabakh].
A lot of people just assume that since Stalin was an evil person, it would
be typical of someone evil to take a decision like that.
(quoted from Samayan, 2018)
Moreover, Soviet archives indicate that the decision was made to leave
(ostavit in Russian) Karabakh within Azerbaijan, which means it had
already belonged to Azerbaijan (Hasanli, 2011a). Further, claims by
Armenian nationalists that Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh lived worse
than Azerbaijanis during the Soviet period have not been supported by
socio-economic data (Yamskov, 1991).
One of the strongest misperceptions about the modern confict between
Armenians and Azerbaijanis is that it began by violence in Sumgait on 27–29
February 1988. The cliché revolves around the stereotype that the peaceful
Armenian protest was met by the Azerbaijanis’ pogrom. However, careful
research reveals that the violent stage of the confict began in the fall of 1987

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(De Waal, 2003), and that the Armenian petition to Moscow (Fuller, 1987,
BBC, 2013) was followed by the expulsion of the Azerbaijani population
from Armenia prior to the Sumgait event (Brogan, 1998, BBC, 2005). The
frst two victims of the confict – Ali Hajiyev and Bakhtiyar Guliyev were
two Azerbaijanis killed in Askeran. In the threshold of the riot in Sumgait,
the Deputy Soviet Prosecutor General A. Katusev speaking on central TV
told the audience about the killing, specifcally naming the nationality of
those killed (Zverev 1996). This announcement may have acted as a catalyst
of violence, which offcially claimed the lives of 26 Armenians (others claim
hundreds) and 6 Azerbaijanis. During the same year of 1988, about 100
Azerbaijanis lost their life in Armenia, and Armenian nationalists called
for the purge of all Azerbaijanis from Armenia (AOD, 1989). Eventually,
all Azerbaijanis were completely cleansed from Armenia and Armenians
expelled from Azerbaijan (UNHCR (1996) estimates 185,000 Azerbaijani
refugees from Armenia and 299,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan).
When the modern confict began in 1988, many liberals in the West and in
the Soviet Union regarded it as an opportunity to dismantle the Soviet system. Therefore, they tended to support the Armenian nationalist movement
in Karabakh as “reformist” (BBC, 2013) while the Soviet authorities tried to
preserve the existing ethno-territorial administration. However, this division
between liberals and Soviet conservatives refected neither the nature of the
confict nor its legal and moral dilemmas (Shafyev, 2016). Soviet dissident
and Nobel Prize Winner Andrei Sakharov, whose wife Elena Bonner was
an ethnic Armenian as well as several other public activists such as Galina
Starovoytova launched a campaign, supporting Armenian demands for unifcation with Nagorno-Karabakh. Only later, after the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991, did Armenian nationalists change their tactic and put forward the idea of self-determination for Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh,
realizing that the idea of unifcation was not well received by the international community. As Stephen Saideman and Wiliam Ayres (2008) write,
“while its actions on the ground helped create what was in effect a union
of the two territories, Armenia’s diplomatic strategy was to put pressure
on Azerbaijan for denying Karabakhis their rights to self-determination”
(p.84).
Once the Soviet Union collapsed, offcial Russian authorities under the
leadership of Boris Yeltsin returned to classic imperial “divide and rule”
policy and aligned with Armenia. This was especially “relevant” when
Azerbaijan with pro-Turkic nationalist and pro-Western president Abulfaz
Elchibey demanded the full withdrawal of all Russian military forces and
bases from Azerbaijan in the summer of 1992. Moscow had withdrawn its
forces in February 1993, and in April 1993 the Azerbaijani region of Kalbajar
was occupied by Armenia. This was the frst in a series of territorial losses
which led to the fall of the Elchibey government and the adoption of four
United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding the withdrawal of
occupying forces from Azerbaijan.

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Armenian occupation, accompanied by ethnic cleansing and massacres,
was met by a highly “permissive international environment” (Ambrosio,
2001). While the Armenian irredentist project was rejected formally by the
international community, including the United States and Russia, in fact
many politicians in the West and Russia welcomed it. In the United States
this happened due to the support of the well-organized Armenian lobby
despite the fact that Azerbaijan was a loser in the war. This was characterized by President Elchibey and supported by Western experts as “proWestern” (Shafyev, 2021). As Thomas Ambrosio (2001, p. 155) notes,
By defnition victims cannot be aggressors. The Armenian-American
lobby campaign successfully defected charges of irredentism and put
the blame for the Nagorno-Karabakh confict on the Azerbaijanis.
Russian impetus for Armenian support was geopolitical, stemming from
its centuries old interests in the South Caucasus, which modern Russia
considers as its “near abroad” and spheres of infuence. In the context of
Azerbaijan’s independent foreign policy under Abulfaz Elchibey (1992–
1993) and Heydar Aliyev (1993–2003), Moscow’s decision was “logical” and
later was only “highlighted with a growing military alliance between Yerevan and Moscow” (Ambrosio, 2001, p. 168). As a matter of fact, Armenia is
unique in the post-Cold War era as both the United States and Russia for
albeit different reasons, domestic lobbying and geopolitical interests respectively, tolerated and even informally supported the Armenian occupation.
Moscow’s grand design for control in the post-Soviet area met the backing
of Russian liberals (Torbakov 2003). This trend once again was exhibited
during the Second Karabakh War. Russian liberals sided with Russian
imperialist-minded politicians and experts. As Alexander Tsipko questions:
It would seem that people professing liberal European values should
have been happy that this time the Russian leadership strictly followed the rule of law, recognized the legitimate right of Azerbaijan to
restore its territorial integrity, and the annexation of seven regions of
Azerbaijan to Nagorno-Karabakh during the 1989–1994 war years [as
being] not only illegal, but also humanly immoral.
(Tsipko, 2020)
Many Russian liberals manifested limitation of their liberal mindset when
it came to Russian territorial ambitions. This subject became recently
heatedly debated with regard to Alexey Navalny, the Russian human rights
activist who supported the Russian annexation of Crimea, military actions
in Georgia and the pejorative narrative about the Caucasians (kavkaztsy).
Some experts justify his views as political pragmatism to solicit Russian
popular support (Gessen, 2021). However, I will agree with Alexander
Tsipko, who gives his own explanation, which fts the concept of Orientalism:

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For them [Russian liberals], Azerbaijanis are half-people, Muslims; for
them religious fanaticism on the basis of Islam is indeed more aggressive
in nature than Christian clericalism and fanaticism. Behind the liberalism of our intelligentsia is not just atheism, but atheistic messianism,
the perception of modern human history as a confrontation between
religion and godlessness.
(Tsipko, 2020)

These sentiments perfectly echo the views of many Russian liberals of the
nineteenth century, which tolerated the brutal conquest of the Caucasus,
expulsion of Muslims, including the massive resettlement of Circassians in
the 1860s, and other massacres. Modern Russian scholars justify the Russian
control over the Caucasus and Central Asia through similar messianic views
or security concerns. For example, Vadim Mukhanov (2020), an expert of
the Russian State Institute of International Relations, wrote in the European
History Quarterly, that Russia conducted a kind of “civilizing mission” in
the Mugan region of Azerbaijan referring to the settlement of Russians
there in the end of the nineteenth century.
However, it is also true that continued stereotyping of Azerbaijanis as
Muslim fanatics did not fnd support among both Western and Russian policy-makers as it is a well-known fact that offcial authorities in Baku do
not tolerate Islamic militants and thus enacted legislation to enforce the
completely secular nature of the state institutions, including education. The
international community as a whole accepted the Azerbaijani’s military
campaign in September–November 2020 as fully legitimate and justifable
under international law, though it called for a ceasefre, constraints and
other formal terms pronounced usually in cases of armed conficts.
In the meantime, it is also the fact that a cohort of Western scholars,
experts, and journalists writing about the confict solely focused on geopolitics and history but remained largely silent on the most important element –
namely international law – because it did not ft the pro-Armenian narrative
(Shafyev, 2020b). The fundamental principle of the Western approach in
academic discourse about the Armenia–Azerbaijan confict was at best to
fnd a “balance” (de Waal, 2003, Broers, 2019): in such a complicated and
bloody confict, both sides should be responsible. International NGOs dealing with confict resolution took a similar approach. Thus the “balanced
approach” became the sacred cow. As a result, the balanced approach of
mediators and international experts has perpetuated and protracted the
confict, which fnally erupted in September 2020 (Shafyev, 2020a). Western
media and scholars long ago jettisoned a term of “occupation” to describe
the status of Azerbaijani territories under Armenian control, though from
the perspective of international law this was exactly the term used in the
United Nations Security Council resolutions. Instead, the more “balanced”
term “disputed” was used and being used which created the false impression of equivalence. It might be justifable from the historical perspective

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where Western experts fnd more comfort in the domain of international
law, which holds Armenia responsible for the occupation of Azerbaijani territories (ECHR, 2015).
The Second Karabakh War, which lasted 44 days, re-opened an old repertoire of Orientalist clichés about the confict. A starting point lays in the
basic defnitions, for example, as mentioned earlier, “disputed territory” or
Christian-Muslim standoff. The road to the latest war was also described
as the failure of the negotiations from both sides while it was Armenia,
which abandoned the Madrid Principles accepted in 2007–2009 as a basis
for future implementation (Baunov, 2020, Cutler, 2020). There was hope
with the current Armenian leader Nikol Pashinyan when he came to power
in 2018, but the events demonstrated, unlike another accepted cliché, that
“a democratic popular mandate does not necessarily correlate with pacifst
inclinations. Mass democracy can, just as well, stimulate and reward politicians’ nationalist militancy” (Socor, 2021). It was Pashinyan who revived
the miatsum-unifcation slogan in August 2019, which made the negotiations
meaningless.
The Western and Russian media have also spotlighted the AzerbaijaniTurkish alliance, frequently in terms of neo-Ottomanism, mostly ignoring the fact that Armenia had enjoyed military support from Moscow for
three decades, which became decisive in the last days of the war. Russia
did not interfere directly in the confict, probably out of fear of Turkish
involvement, and tolerated Azerbaijan’s operation until it approached
Khankendi (Stepanakert), the capital of the former Nagorno-Karabakh
region. However, after the war it became clear that Russia delivered a
massive amount of weapons to Armenia before (Kucera, 2020) and during
the war (Bryen, 2020), and even encouraged Yerevan to use its exported
Iskander missile against Azerbaijan (Soylu, 2021). Since 1994, Russia has
systematically supplied Armenia with free or zero credit-based military
equipment to consolidate Armenia’s territorial gains in occupied territories of Azerbaijan (Asgarli and Abay 2020, Horowitz, 2020). The Armenian diaspora chanted slogans about “the Turkish-Azerbaijani attack”
trying to show Armenia as a weak party and small actor versus powerful
neighbors harassing it, even frequently claiming the danger of “genocide”
recurrence. However, all military actions happened on the territory of
Azerbaijan. The crossing of the Armenian international border would
have triggered direct Russian interference due to its military alliance with
Yerevan.
Much stronger emphasis in international coverage was related to the
Christian Armenian heritage. The main lobby organization in the United
States, the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA, 26 October
2020) tweeted: “Armenia – the world’s 1st Christian nation – is under attack
and in danger of annihilation. At risk of a 2nd genocide. Stop Turkish and
Azerbaijani aggression against this landlocked, blocked genocide-survivor
state, an ancient cradle of Christianity and modern democracy.” This tweet

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carries all typical clichés which in one or another form were disseminated in
Western media, covering the Second Karabakh War.
While during the war, some Armenian churches were damaged including
Gazanchesots in Shusha, loss of Azerbaijani cultural heritage clearly was
much more massive once the dreadful situation in the liberated territories
became known to the international media (Efendi, 2021). About 67 mosques
and hundreds of museums and graveyards, all were pillaged and destroyed.
However, the main focus of the Western and Russia media remains Christian heritage (Berberian 2020, McGreevy, 2020). During the war certain
Western institutions such as Columbia University and the University of California in Los Angeles, media outlets and individual journalists, promoted
a one-sided view of the war (See report published by The Greater Middle
East, 2020) holding discussions without Azerbaijani participants. An even
more worrisome trend after the Second Karabakh War is that unlike previous years, Western media outlets refused to grant the Azerbaijani side a
right of reply (Shafyev and Jafarova, 2020). While the Azerbaijani attitude
toward the Armenian heritage contains some controversy (de Waal, 2020),
the scale of destruction on both sides is not comparable. As Taras Kuzio
(2021) highlights,
There are three components to the human rights abuses that have
occurred in the war for Nagorno-Karabakh. These include ethnic
cleansing, the abuse of civilians and prisoners of war, and cultural
vandalism. Ethnic cleansing has been largely ignored in reports about
confict in the former USSR. An online search will return many articles
about human rights abuses committed by Azerbaijan against Armenian
prisoners of war. At the same time, it is diffcult to fnd a single article
about the human rights violations inficted on Azerbaijani prisoners
by their Armenian captors. Similarly, every article on the internet on
cultural destruction is concerned with threats to Armenian cultural
heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh.
The false equivalence was also put forward with regard to civilian casualties and the treatment of the prisoners of war (POWs). While the focus
of the Western media was about the acts of the Azerbaijani army (for
example, Ostrovsky, 2020), data by international human rights organizations, especially by Amnesty International (2021), illustrate that Armenian
mistreatment of POWs such as deliberate fring on civilian residences far
from the frontline and other war crimes prevailed on the Armenian side
with 52 Armenians and 94 Azerbaijanis killed. In addition to targeting
civilian settlements during the fatal clashes, Armenia’s military attempted
to hit Azerbaijan’s largest hydropower station with big water reservoirs
located in the central city of Mingachevir. If this had occurred, it might
have caused ecological disaster on a regional scale. The largest massacres
of civilians during both wars, such as in Khojaly in February 1992, still

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remain unaccountable regarding responsibility, denied by all governments
in Armenia, including Nikol Pashinyan’s, dubbed as “democratic” by Western media.
The discussion about past tragedies, ethnic cleansings and war crimes
frequently carry the infuence of “whataboutism” from both sides, while
both ethnic groups suffered from violence and destruction. But the premises for discussion of these issues in the Western and Russian media are
based on false historical narratives, one-sided focus on the Azerbaijani side
replete with Orientalist stereotypes and ill-intended ignorance of international law. The Armenia–Azerbaijan confict represents a rare case in which
the Russian and Western positions converge. On the surface, this can be
explained by factors such as the Armenian diaspora, and even Christian
solidarity, but deeper down, Turkophobic sentiments echo the old imperial
rivalries (Shafyev, 2020c).
As was the case previously, during the Second Karabakh War, both
Russian and Western liberals and right-wing Christian groups allied with
each other to support Armenia. During the critical stage of the war, Thomas
de Waal (23 October 2020), who would have otherwise severely criticized
Russia’s human rights record and her involvement in conficts in Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine, wrote that “it’s getting late for Russia to intervene
directly on the ground to save [the] Armenian side from potential collapse.
If that’s the case, Putin is basically accepting the damage to Russia’s standing in the region.” Anna Ohanian (2020), in her article titled “Russia and
the West Still Need Each Other in Nagorno-Karabakh” for the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, called for united Western-Russian
efforts against Azerbaijan and Turkey. Several prominent Western liberals,
such as Noam Chomsky, Bernard-Henri Levy and others, appealed for a
halt to the “jihadist Turco-Azerbaijani alliance” (Levy, 2020).
Such discussion frequently was facilitated by Armenian interlocutors
and information was delivered with bias against Azerbaijan, highlighting
falsely “jihadist” motives versus Armenian “peaceful democratic revolution”
(Barsamian, 2020). International law was perverted to promote the illegal
regime established by Armenia in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.
Moreover, the old narrative about “ancient hatred” was revived by a number
of liberal intellectuals who posited that Azerbaijanis and Armenians lived in
“confictual coexistence” (Compare letters signed by Western liberal thinkers
and published in the LA Review of Books (2020) with the NY Review of Books
(1990)). Most Western intellectuals had very rudimentary knowledge about
the history of the confict and ignored the fate of many Azerbaijanis expelled
and massacred by the Armenian side. Armenian nationalists in diaspora were
successful in weaponizing several elements: history, religion, victimhood
and liberalism in order to promote their irredentist project (Shafyev, 2021),
which instigated more nationalism in Armenia itself and made the country
a monoethnic state, “cleaned of [Azerbaijanis’] weed” (Panossian, 2006, p.
281). Those Western and Russian liberals did a big disservice to the Armenian

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statehood, which, due to extreme nationalism, developed distorted democratic institutions (Rutland, 1994). This pattern of nationalism – a mixture
of irredentism and ethnic purity – affected the whole Armenian society and
brought the country to the deepest crisis in its modern history. Dr. Andrey
Kortunov, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council,
believes that the most urgent and important task for Armenia “is not even
to reform the political system, but to mobilize around a new national idea,
leading society away from the destructive temptations of endless irredentism”
(2021). Unfortunately, what in essence is the irredentist project, promoted by
Armenian nationalists at home and in diaspora, enjoys support among both
the Western and Russian intellectual elites.

Conclusion
The Armenian-Azerbaijani confict with a bit more than hundred years
history and 30 years into its modern phase claimed thousands of lives and
inficted huge material and moral damage to the respective countries. Both
societies suffer from historical traumas and continue disseminating mutually exclusive narratives. However, the two countries are not equal in terms
of legal accountability. Armenian nationalists advanced territorial claims
and Armenia occupied the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan for almost 30 years. While the confict caused war crimes, ethnic cleansing and destruction in both countries, the moral judgment should derive
from international legal norms, which have two distinctive sides, occupier
and its victim.
The Western and Russian academic and public discourse with regard to
this confict is uniquely blended with an anti-Azerbaijani undertone, which
is embedded in strong Orientalist clichés and rooted in Islamophobia and
Turcophobia. Christian right and Liberal left spectrums in the West and
Russia, due to the closeness of ideas of Christian missionary and liberal
messianism, tend to support Armenian historical narratives, which were
promoted for the last three centuries by the Armenian Church and clergymen. These narratives were employed by imperial strategists in Russia
and Western capitals for their own colonial agenda, frequently disregarding
the fate of the people in the region, including Armenians themselves. The
narrative of ancient animosity and “ethnic incompatibility” (a term used by
ex-president of Armenia Robert Kocharian) is a fake argument.
In this regard, the Second Karabakh War (27.09–10.11.2020) was not different in terms of coverage in Western and Russian media than the frst
one (1988–1994). While Azerbaijan managed to liberate a big part of its
formerly occupied territories, legitimate security concerns over the fate of
the region remain in public discourse in Azerbaijan, Armenia and other
major regional and global actors. The future lies in a radical revision of
approaches to the outstanding political issues. No less important is the rectifcation of the historical record of the confict and history of the region.

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Scholars should employ a different set of tools available within postcolonial
discourse such as subaltern studies. This will require the radical shake-up of
accepted clichés and stereotypes.

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Part II

The First Karabakh War
and the Consequences

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5

Self-Determination or
Territorial Integrity?
International Legal/Political
Doctrines in Opposition and
Their Implications for Karabakh
Michael M. Gunter

Introduction
The long-running, frozen-unfrozen confict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Karabakh (Artsakh)1 constitutes the most recent example of the
continuing clash between the oft-opposed international legal/political doctrines of self-determination and territorial integrity.2 The United Nations
Charter includes specifc references to self-determination in Articles 1(2)
and 55, and to territorial integrity in Article 2(4). Put simply, self-determination refers to the right of a people to choose their own form of government (usually independence), while territorial integrity means the right of
a state to maintain its existing borders.3 Thus, in the case of Karabakh,
Armenia has supported the doctrine of self-determination because the vast
majority of its population is ethnic Armenian. On the other hand, Azerbaijan has maintained the doctrine of territorial integrity because Karabakh
is part of Azerbaijan.4 Illustrating the most recent deadly results of this
confict that suddenly unfroze in September-November 2020, Russian president Vladimir Putin declared “there were more than 4,000 killed in both
countries … including civilians, 8,000 wounded and thousands driven from
their homes.”5
Which doctrine takes precedence? In its famous “Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,”6 the United
Nations gave a defnitive answer to this question. While proclaiming in
paragraph 2 of this celebrated Resolution that “all peoples have the right
of self-determination,” the General Assembly warned in paragraph 6 that
“any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and
the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” This defnitive interpretation or “safeguard clause” that territorial integrity supersedes self-determination has been reiterated on several occasions, in particular by the “UN
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations,”7 which was adopted by consensus and “is considered
DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-8
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to be the authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter.”8 The Helsinki
Final Act of 1975 that recognized Europe’s existing borders resulting from
World War II also prominently recognized this interpretation.9 In 1993, the
United Nations World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna concurred, when it specifcally declared the right of self-determination “shall
not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States.”10
It is true that the two Human Rights Covenants on (1) Civil and Political Rights and (2) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which entered into
force in 1976 both declared, “All peoples have the right of self-determination: By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” without any
specifc mention of territorial integrity.11 However, from the drafting history
of these two international treaties and a systematic interpretation of their
full texts, it is clear that in the sense of secession, self-determination is not a
right of minorities in existing states, even when they might have a relatively
obvious territorial basis within the existing, larger state. As James Crawford
concludes,
Outside the colonial context, the principle of self-determination is not
recognized as giving rise to unilateral rights of secession by parts of
independent States… . Self-determination for peoples or groups within
the State is to be achieved by participation in its constitutional system,
and on the basis of respect for its territorial integrity12
Joshua Castellino adds,
The law as it stands suggests that uti possidetis juris [original] lines may
be modifed [only] by consent … between sovereign states. … Non-state
actors have no explicit right in international law to demand or even raise
questions of territorial adjustment, rendering the territorial aspects of
self-determination relatively meaningless.13
Furthermore, in the territorial dispute between the African states of
Burkina Faso and Mali, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) also
recognized the obligation to respect existing borders in cases of state succession—which of course aptly describes the dispute between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over Karabakh—by declaring, “There is no doubt that the obligation to respect pre-existing international frontiers in the event of a State
succession derives from a general rule of international law.”14 Similarly, the
Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission that was established in
1991 by the initiative of the European Community supported by the United
States and the former Soviet Union to render opinions on matters arising

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from the dissolution of Yugoslavia pronounced, “Except where otherwise
agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers protected by international
law. This conclusion follows from the principle of respect for the territorial
status quo.”15
In addition, the UN General Assembly Declaration on Minorities—while
granting certain rights to individual members of ethnic, linguistic or cultural minorities to have their language and identity respected by the state in
which they resided—emphasized the preservation of the existing state’s territorial integrity. Thus, Article 8(4) of the Declaration declared, “Nothing
in the present Declaration may be construed as permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States.”16
Indeed, any right of self-determination or secession is not mentioned in the
Declaration on Minorities.
International law gives no justifcation to a “kin-state” pursuing
irredentism to intervene by force under the claim of protecting portions of
the population of other states with which they have some type of ethnic
affliation. The UN General Assembly Resolution on the Inadmissibility
of Intervention specifcally declares, “No State has the right to intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any State.”17 Understandably, states which create international
law and draw up international treaties or declarations in the frst place are
not in the business of committing suicide. Redrawing internationally recognized borders by force contravenes international law as defned by the
UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act that recognized Europe’s existing
borders resulting from World War II.
Indeed, the same reasoning has been used by the West to oppose Russia’s
annexation of Crimea in 2014 as well as Moscow’s earlier recognition in
2008 of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s secession and independence from
Georgia, which, of course, borders on Armenia and Azerbaijan. Thus, the
doctrine of territorial integrity clearly trumps that of self-determination in
the case of Karabakh. Indeed, not a single state in the world recognizes (or
recognized) Karabakh as an independent state or part of Armenia, not even
Armenia, its progenitor and protector.

Additional Reasoning
The international legal doctrines of sovereignty, state succession, and uti
possidetis give further defnition to territorial integrity. Jean Bodin originally defned sovereignty in 1576 as a defense for the unlimited power of the
French king. Thus, sovereignty means a state’s lawful and exclusive control
of its territory with the authority to govern, make laws, and enforce laws for
all persons, property, and events within its territory. As the eminent Swiss
jurist Max Huber noted in the famous Isle of Palmas case in 1928 involving

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a dispute between the United States and the Netherlands concerning who
owned or possessed sovereignty over an island between the Indonesian and
Philippine archipelagoes, sovereignty amounts to independence or the right
to exercise in a territory the powers of a state to the exclusion of any other
state.18 The UN Charter declares in Article 2(1) that “the Organization is
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.” Related
elements of sovereignty such as exclusive territorial jurisdiction, state immunity, and the immunity of diplomatic agents are also strongly upheld by
all states and thus reinforce the doctrine.
As already discussed in the case of Burkina Faso and Mali, state succession is another principle of international law that relates to and helps to
defne the opposing doctrines of self-determination and territorial integrity.
Put simply, state succession deals with the legal consequences of a change of
sovereignty over territory. The failure of the two draft Vienna conventions
(treaties) of 1978 and 198319 to codify the existing customary international
law on the issue has created no small amount of confusion and controversy.
The specifc cases of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Germany resulting from the end of the Cold War in the 1990s added to this uncertainty
as different conclusions and resulting precedents emerged. An analysis of
these developments, of course, is beyond the scope of this chapter. Suffce
it to note, however, that the current miasma of Karabakh is one specifc
result of the political consequences of the breakup of the Soviet Union and
the state succession that occurred. Armenia and Azerbaijan were 2 of the
15 internationally recognized states that emerged from the collapse of the
Soviet Union. As such, both of these newly independent Caucasian states
assumed all the rights under international law possessed by states, members
too of the United Nations. Their territorial integrity was obviously among
these rights despite the controversies involving the overall doctrine of state
succession.
As noted above, the legal doctrine of uti possidetis (literally in Latin “as
you possess under law [so you shall continue to possess]”) is closely related
to the doctrine of territorial integrity or maybe best understood as an aspect
of the latter. Beginning as a specifc example of regional or non-universal
international law (admittedly a literal contradiction in terms and therefore
originally not as solid a principle as other modes of territorial succession
and acquisition), the doctrine of uti possidetis arose early in the nineteenth
century during the disintegration of the Spanish colonial empire in Latin
America in the interests of stability and peace. In civil Roman law, the
term referred to a judicial pronouncement to preserve the existing state of
possession over immovable property pending further litigation. Thus, the
principle began to be used to mean that old administrative colonial boundaries would remain legal international boundaries upon independence.
In the twentieth century, the International Court of Justice also referred
to the principle of uti possidetis in cases involving borders during decolonization in Africa. The frontier dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali

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referred to above is a specifc example. In this case, the ICJ referred to “the
obligation to respect pre-existing international frontiers in the event of a
State succession … whether or not the rule is expressed in the formula of uti
possidetis,” and thus by implication that this principle prevails even over the
right of self-determination of peoples.20 Legal cases based on uti possidetis
have also been raised between Asian states. The famous Temple of Preah
Vihear Case21 between Cambodia and Thailand in 1962 and the Rann of
Kutch arbitration22 between India and Pakistan in 1968 are two specifc
examples. Furthermore, in the matter of state succession regarding the former Yugoslavia, the Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission
noted: “Uti possidetis, though initially applied in settling decolonization
issues in America and Africa, is today recognized as a general principle, as
stated by the International Court of Justice.”23
On the other hand, Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia in 1993 after a checkered colonial history and 30 years of subsequent civil war, raised questions
about the sanctity of African borders and the principle of uti possidetis.24
However, given the fact that Eritrea was originally a separate Italian colony
forcibly attached to Ethiopia after World War II, some have argued that
Eritrea’s independence actually did not violate the principle of uti possidetis, but rather belatedly reinforced it. Furthermore, Ethiopia fnally had
agreed to Eritrea’s independence.
Nevertheless, the case of Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia obviously has
elements contradicting the principle of uti possidetis and territorial integrity that might be applicable to the case of Karabakh. However, one might
also argue that when a rule of law works well in most cases but causes a
problem in a rare incident like this, the best solution may be to turn a blind
eye to violations of the rule. Indeed, in some municipal (domestic) law
systems, legal authorities sometimes exercise a certain amount of discretion
on whether or not to prosecute. Moreover, as will be analyzed below, there
is nothing in international law that prohibits secession. International law
eventually will recognize the winner of a civil war as legitimate. Indeed,
traditionally in international law and still so today, the formation of a new
state was simply a matter of fact, not law.25 Therefore, in this case, of course,
Eritrea won its independence by force of arms, not by any legal right of
self-determination. The same basic reasoning applies to Kosovo’s successful
secession from Serbia.26 This political fact, of course, shows the ultimate
limitation of analyzing such cases as Karabakh solely in terms of the international legal doctrines of self-determination and territorial integrity.
In addition to these weighty limitations on the doctrine of selfdetermination as applied to Karabakh in light of the superseding doctrine
of territorial integrity, the doctrine of self-determination is even more
restricted in actual legal practice. For example, who precisely are the selves
or peoples who have the right of self-determination and what precisely is
it they can determine? As a legal doctrine—with the exceptions of the now
only historical case of South Africa under the apartheid regime that ended

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in the early 1990s27 and the continuing case of the Palestinians28 —selfdetermination in the practice of the United Nations can only be exercised
by trust and non-self-governing territories (i.e. colonies), which have not yet
achieved independence. In addition, and most importantly for Karabakh by
implication, self-determination may be exercised by a territory only within
its already existing administrative boundaries inherited from the colonial
power, without any breakup of the state’s territorial integrity. Accordingly,
since Karabakh was legally a part of Azerbaijan which was not a colonial power, Karabakh was not eligible for self-determination on its own.
Although some might argue that this amounted to a double standard, it was
still the international legal reality.
Indeed, given that the decolonization process has virtually come to an end
and barring a newly agreed upon further legal defnition not likely to occur,
it must be concluded that self-determination has largely become a doctrine
of only historical interest. Ironically, given these facts, self-determination
as a legal doctrine remains applicable only to the few remaining bits and
pieces of former colonial empires such as Pitcairn Island’s 50 odd inhabitants, while lying beyond the reach of such large, well-defned entities as the
35 million or so Kurds or the ethnic Armenians in Karabakh who unfortunately for their rights inhabit various other states whose territorial integrity
prohibit them any legal right of self-determination.

Future Possibilities
On the other hand, using the exceptional examples of the Black majority in apartheid era South Africa and the Palestinians in territorial limbo both referred to above, the United Nations might also
theoretically single out Karabakh as entitled to self-determination.
Similarly, after World War I, the right of self-determination was granted by
some treaties to the inhabitants of a few territories in central and eastern
Europe. For example, the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 provided for a plebiscite in Upper Silesia to determine whether it should become part of
Germany or Poland. However, nobody has ever suggested such special
treatment for Karabakh.
Of course, this constraining legal defnition does not prohibit secessionist movements claiming the unilateral political right of self-determination
as indeed the Armenians have regarding Karabakh. To make such a claim
legally valid, however, the secessionist entity must win its civil war or possibly have the existing state countenance the secession peacefully as indeed
occurred when Norway seceded from Sweden in 1905. As noted above,
Eritrea and Kosovo succeeded in so doing, while Karabakh did not.29
Neither does this inhibiting legal defnition prevent various proposed
distinctions between “internal” self-determination as some sort of right to
implement real democracy or autonomy for a group contained within an
existing state (see above) and “external” self-determination defned in most

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30

cases as independence for the group concerned. However, to equate the
right of “internal” self-determination with democracy would seem merely
verbal legerdemain and not any real solution to the defnitional dilemma.
Thus, although a great deal has been written about these possibilities
concerning the meaning of self-determination, they do not constitute legal
rights that currently would be applicable to Karabakh.
Nevertheless, in recent years, counter trends have suggested a loosening of
the strict legal defnitions discussed so far. This line of reasoning leads along
the path of soft (developing) law or de lege ferenda, relating to the law as it
ought to be or is to be developed, in contrast to de lege lata, i.e. according to
the law currently in force. On January 25, 2001, for example, Prince HansAdam II of Liechtenstein, speaking before the International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS), a prominent British think tank, suggested the coming necessity for a more fexible attitude toward the doctrine of territorial
integrity.
Let us accept the fact that states have lifecycles similar to those of
human beings who created them. Hardly any Member State of the
United Nations has existed within its present borders for longer than
fve generations. The attempt to freeze human evolution has in the
past been a futile responsibility and has probably brought about more
violence, rather than if such a process had been controlled peacefully.
Restrictions on self-determination threaten not only democracy itself
but the state which seeks its legitimation in democracy.31
Remedial secession is a proposed principle that if a specifc people living in
the territory of a larger state is egregiously misrepresented within that larger
state and there is no remedy for the situation, then, as a last resort, this
oppressed people have a right to remedial secession. Under such circumstances, the larger state loses its right to its territorial integrity. Although
remedial secession is discussed in the scholarly literature, the consensus
of most is that it is not a legal right to achieve external self-determination
(independence) outside the colonial context.32 Interestingly, the Supreme
Court of Canada, in its lengthy and useful discussion of the international
legal status of secession, basically agreed with this reasoning when it ruled
that Quebec did “not enjoy a right at international law to effect the secession
of Quebec from Canada unilaterally.”33
Nevertheless, the increasingly legally binding rules on maintaining and
furthering human rights may ultimately challenge the territorial integrity
of a state grossly violating human rights.34 Humanitarian intervention, for
example, is actions by states, international organizations, or other international groups to intervene, often with coercive force, to prevent human
suffering without necessarily obtaining the consent of the state involved. The
emerging Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine holds that when domestic
methods for protection against massive violations of human rights are

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ignored or fail, other states have a responsibility to intervene in the domestic
affairs of the state where the abuses are occurring to provide security. Such
actions might be seen as enforcing some sort of self-determination, while
contradicting the Westphalian doctrines of state sovereignty and territorial
integrity. As two UN offcials have attested, this “marks the coming of age
of the imperative of action in the face of human right abuses, over the citadels of state sovereignty.”35 Although such initiatives might eventually create a broader, more fexible application of the doctrines of sovereignty and
territorial integrity, to date they have not. Territorial integrity still trumps
self-determination.
Furthermore, how legitimate are such initiatives when employed only
selectively? For example, why was intervention against Serbia in Kosovo
(1998–1999) and Libya (2011) justifed, while in Rwanda (1994) and Syria
(2011–present) it was not? How massive do the violations against human
rights have to be before intervention is justifed? Who decides to implement
intervention? In the past, some states have employed humanitarian intervention as a mere pretext for their own selfsh interests of state. In the case of
Karabakh, the Organization for Security and Cooperation’s (OSCE) Minsk
Group tasked to facilitate communication between Armenia and Azerbaijan to fnd a negotiated solution to the confict has failed because neither
Armenia nor Azerbaijan wanted to compromise. As Svante Cornell noted
when the confict was beginning again in 1991, “there seems to have been
no-one in a power position, in any of the republics, at any time, that was
interested in a dialogue and a peaceful resolution of the confict through
compromise.”36

Conclusion
The rugged mountainous geography of the Caucasus region partially explains the confict over Karabakh.37 Thus, the mountain ranges and watershed lines dictated small political units and their unique political
boundaries. What roads that existed were often barely passable. When the
Russians conquered the region early in the nineteenth century, they did create larger provinces or governorates, but at the lower levels kept the old,
smaller frontiers dictated by geography. This perpetuated a bewildering
ethnic and religious mix of people that ignited with the coming of nationalism by the end of the nineteenth century.
Karabakh with its Christian Armenian majority and Muslim Tatar
(Turkic) minority was one of the regions where ethnic/nationalist conficts
arose. In 1905, there was a particularly violent Armenian-Tatar War. The
regional geography made access to Karabakh considerably easier from the
east than from the West where virtually impassable mountains lay. These
geographic facts favored placement of Armenian-majority Karabakh
within Muslim majority Azerbaijan. Thus, the Bolshevik approach to the
Karabakh problem became an eclectic stew of several ingredients involving

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a genuine attempt to solve the problem, pursuing Bolshevik aims, and
attempting to satisfy the conficting interests of Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The disputed area of Karabakh was left under Azeri control with limited
Armenian autonomy. Although the compromise satisfed neither adversary,
as long as the Soviet Union stood strong these ancient conficts remained
obscured. However, once Soviet power began to weaken in the late 1980s,
the submerged confict reemerged and quickly degenerated into war. Indeed,
nothing could more easily testify to the disintegration of the once mighty
Soviet Union than internal civil war within its existing boundaries. Even
bloodier wars resulted with the breakup of communist Yugoslavia. Despite
all the damning Western rhetoric against communism, few had appreciated
how it had dampened and even dropped into the memory hole these ancient
conficts that were now resurfacing.
In surveying the opposing internationally legal doctrines of selfdetermination and territorial integrity’s implications for Karabakh, this
chapter has concluded that the latter trumps the former. However, as was also
noted, there is nothing in international law that prohibits secession from an
existing state. Neither is there any rule of international law which prohibits
the existing state from crushing the secession. International law simply will
recognize the winner of such struggles as legitimate.38 Thus, in Kosovo and
Eritrea, cases with similarities to Karabakh, these former possessions of
Serbia and Ethiopia won their independence by force of arms. South Sudan,
East Timor, and Bangladesh are similar examples. Although resort to war
violates UN Charter Article 2(4), “All Members [of the UN] shall refrain
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state,” in such cases one might counter by citing UN
Article 51, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs.” Thus, in the
end attempting to further parse the distinction between self-determination
and territorial integrity leads to the conclusion that force of arms becomes
determinative, while recourse to legal doctrines secondary.
In an attempt to suggest a peaceful compromise based both on international law and political realities, one recent study has recommended the
famous example of the Aland Islands located half way between Sweden and
Finland at the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia.39 For many centuries, the
Swedish-speaking Aland Islands were, together with mainland Finland,
part of Sweden. In 1809, however, following its defeat during the Napoleonic Wars, Sweden was forced to cede Finland to Russia. The Aland Islands, along with the rest of Finland, became an autonomous Grand Duchy
of the Russian Empire, with the Tsar as Grand Duke. (The Islands were
also famously placed under an international servitude not to be fortifed
by an annex to the Treaty of Paris in 1856, but that narrative is beyond the
scope of this article.) When the Tsar collapsed in 1917, Finland became independent. Sweden, the “kin-state,” claimed the islands on the basis of selfdetermination, while Finland averred its sovereignty based on maintaining

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its territorial integrity. Under the auspices of the League of Nations, the
Aland Islands successfully became an autonomous region of Finland, but
were granted a very high level of self-government.
However, given the volatility of Caucasian politics compared to those in
the Scandinavian states, whether such a solution would work for Karabakh remains problematic. Indeed, autonomy for Karabakh is exactly the
solution that failed and led to the most recent war in 2020. Thus, we seem
to need what another observer has termed “a bolder approach,” along the
lines post-World-War-II Europe has apparently fnally achieved. “The problem “can only be solved if borders lose their signifcance.”40 Only in such
a seemingly utopian world, would Karabakh fnd security. Unfortunately,
that time does not appear imminent.

Notes
1 For background on Karabakh, see Svante E. Cornell, The Nagorno-Karabakh
Confict, Report no. 46, Department of East European Studies, Uppsala University, Sweden, 1999; Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan
through Peace and War (New York: New York University Press, 2003); Gerard
J. Libaridian, ed., The Karabakh File: Documents and Facts on the Question of
Mountainous Karabakh, 1918–1988 (Cambridge: Zoryan Institute, 1988); and
Thomas Goltz, Azerbaijan Dairy: A Rogue Reporter’s Adventures in an Oil-rich,
War-torn, Post-Soviet Republic (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Press, 1998). More
recently, see Michael Kambeck and Sargis Ghazaryan, eds., Europe’s Next
Avoidable War: Nagorno-Karabakh (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); and
Arsene Saparov, From Confict to Autonomy in the Caucasus: The Soviet Union
and the Making of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh (London and
New York: Routledge, 2015).
2 Other recent examples that involve various elements of the inherent contradiction between these two conficting doctrines, but in each case have their unique
characteristics it should be noted, include Kosovo, Eritrea, Western Sahara,
East Timor (Timor-Leste), Belize, Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),
the Basques, Biafra, Catalonia, Chechnya, Eastern Ukraine, the Kurds, Northern Cyprus, and Scotland, among numerous others. For background on over
40 self-determination conficts including Karabakh outside the colonial context
that have appeared virtually impossible to settle, see Marc Weller, “Settling
Self-determination Conficts: Recent Developments,” The European Journal of
International Law 20:1 (2009), pp. 111–164. For many further possible examples,
see James Minahan, Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary National Movements (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996).
3 The legal doctrines of sovereignty meaning unlimited power or better just
independence, and uti possidetis meaning that old administrative colonial
boundaries would remain legal international boundaries upon independence
are closely related to and tend to reinforce the concept of territorial integrity.
In general, see Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th revised ed. (London and New York; Routledge, 1997), pp. 17–18
and 162, 163. For an encompassing historical approach to the concept of sovereignty, see Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999). For further analysis, see below. The most
comprehensive analysis of statehood creation in international law is arguably

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James R. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006).
As Svante Cornell noted when the present confict was still in its earlier stages:
“The Armenians invoked the principle of peoples’ right to self-determination,
and the Azeris defended the principle of territorial integrity.” Nagorno-Karabakh
Confict, p. 25. Thomas de Waal concurred: “A resolution of the issue had to reconcile the competing claims of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and Karabakh’s
self-determination (or, in blunter language, de facto secession).” Black Garden,
p. 255.
“Hundreds of Dead Armenian Soldiers Shown in Nagorno-Karabakh,”
Novinite.com (Sofa News Agency), November 13, 2020, https://www.novinite.
com/articles/206519/Hundreds+of+Dead+Armenian+Soldiers+Shown+in+Nagorno-Karabakh, accessed November 14, 2020.
UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), December 14, 1960.
UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), October 24, 1970.
Boleslaw A. Boczek, The A to Z of International Law (Lanham: The Scarecrow
Press, Inc., 2010), p. 114.
See “Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act,” Helsinki
1975, https://www.osce.org/fles/f/documents/5/c/39501.pdf accessed December
7, 2020. While Principle VIII of the Helsinki Final Act proclaims the right of
self-determination, Principle IV calls for states to refrain from acting “against
the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating
State,” and Principle III emphasizes the inviolability of state frontiers.”
UN World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action, June 25, 1993, as cited in International Legal Materials 32 (1993), pp.
1661, 1665. However, it should be noted that this Declaration added that the
sanctity of their territorial integrity assumed States “conducting themselves in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and [internal] self-determination
of peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind.” Ibid.
UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI), December 16, 1966.
Crawford, Creation of States in International Law, pp. 415, 417.
Joshua Castellino, “Territorial Integrity and the ‘Right’ to Self-Determination:
An Examination of the Conceptual Tools.” Brooklyn Journal of International
Law 33:2 (2008), p. 566. “Internal self-determination, in the sense of the recognition of cultural identity and internal self-government for different groups or
peoples within the State,” that is some type of meaningful autonomy, is the recommended solution. Crawford, Creation of States in International Law, p. 418.
See above and below.
ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 566.
Opinion No. 3 of 11 January 1992, cited in International Legal Materials 31
(1992), p. 1499.
UN General Assembly Resolution 47/134, December 18, 1992.
UN General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX), December 21, 1965, https://legal.
un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ga_2131-xx/ga_2131-xx_e.pdf, accessed April 16, 2021. The
UN Declaration on Friendly Relations referred to above, repeats this principle
in practically the same language.
Island of Palmas Arbitration, United Nations Reports of International Arbitral
Awards II, 1928, p. 829. This case is best known for its defnition of prescription
as a mode of territorial acquisition as well as its mention of the problem of intertemporal law.
Texts in International Legal Materials 17 (1978), p. 1488; and International Legal
Materials 23 (1983), p. 306.

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20
21
22
23
24

25

26

27

28
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ICJ Rep., 1986, p. 566.
ICJ Rep., 1962.
17 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 1.
Opinion No. 3 of 11 January 1992, cited in International Legal Materials 31
(1992), pp. 1499–1500.
Eyassu Gayim, The Eritrean Question: The Confict between the Right of SelfDetermination and the Interest of States (Uppsala: Iustus Folag, 1993). East
Timor (Timor-Leste) went through a similar process of Portuguese colonization
until 1975 followed by annexation by neighboring Indonesia claiming territorial integrity, and fnally independence in 2002. Western Sahara, a similar case,
remains disputed between an indigenous population claiming self-determination following the end of Spanish colonization in 1975 and neighboring Morocco
claiming sovereignty through territorial integrity.
On this point, see Lassa F.L. Oppenheim (1858–1919), regarded by many as the
father of modern international law, particularly its positivist school: Robert
Jennings and Arthur Watts, eds., Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. 1, 9th ed.
(London: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 677.
For background, see Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The
Kosovo Report: Confict, International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000). The secession of Bangladesh (East Pakistan) from Pakistan in 1971 proved successful because of India’s military support for the breakup
of its existential enemy. Turkey’s continuing solitary support for the potential
separation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus from internationally recognized (Greek) Cyprus represents an additional exception to the generally recognized doctrine of territorial integrity. Indeed, in this case, Turkey’s position would
seem a double standard given its support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
Incongruously with its long-established legal practice regarding an existing
state’s territorial integrity, many UN General Assembly resolutions declared
the Black majority inhabitants of apartheid era South Africa were entitled to
self-determination. See, for example, UN General Assembly Resolutions 2396
(XXIII), 1969; and 31/61, 1976.
Since 1970, the UN General Assembly has also frequently proclaimed that the
Palestinians are entitled to self-determination. See, for example, UN General
Assembly Resolutions 2672 C (XXV), 1971; 3236 (XXIX), 1975; and 33/23, 1979.
For a list of 21 “unsuccessful attempts at secession … by groups or territories
within independent States” including Karabakh, see Crawford, Creation of
States in International Law, p. 403. Subsequently, however, two of these then
unsuccessful attempts, South Sudan and Kosovo, have now become independent. History does not stand still.
One day after it had virtually equated self-determination for colonial entities with
complete independence in UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), December
14, 1960; UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), December 15, 1960 stated
that self-determination might also result in “free association” or “integration” with
another state. The Cook Islands’ association with New Zealand is an example of
the frst option, while the former independent states of Texas and Hawaii becoming
states in the United States might be cited as an example of the second. The UN
Declaration on Friendly Relations referred to above added a fourth possible outcome for self-determination, “Any other political status freely determined by the
people of the territory in question.” UN General Resolution 2625 (XXV), October
24, 1970. Suffce to say, independence has almost always been the preference.

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31 Cited in “Self-determination and the Future of Democracy,” tamilnation.org/
selfdetermination/index.htm, accessed December 8, 2020. This site contains
a great deal of information about “more than 2000 thousand ethnic groups
but only 192 states,” which theoretically might claim self-determination and
independence.
32 On these points, see Jure Vidmar, “Remedial Secession in International Law:
Theory and (Lack of) Practice.” St. Anthony’s International Review 6:1 (2010),
pp. 37–56; and Turgut Kerem Tuncel, “The Karabakh Confict and the Lawfare of Armenia: Armenia’s Campaign for Remedial Secession (I).” Center for
Eurasian Studies (AVIM), October 27, 2020, https://avim.org.tr/en/Analiz …,
accessed December 22, 2020.
33 Supreme Court of Canada, “Reference re Secession of Quebec.” [1998] 2 S.C.R.
217, Case number 25506 Supreme Court Judgments, https://scc-csc.lexum.com/
scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/1643/index.do, accessed April 10, 2021. The Court did
elaborate that a
state whose government represents the whole of the people or peoples resident within its territory, on a basis of equality and without discrimination,
and respects the principles of self-determination in its internal arrangements
is entitled to maintain its territorial integrity under international law and
have that territorial integrity recognized by other states.
Ibid.

34
35
36

37

38
39
40

This reasoning might imply that a territory denied such rights might have a right
to secede.
Martha Finnemore, The Purposes of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use
of Force (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
Shashi Tharoor and Sam Daws, “Humanitarian Intervention: Getting Past the
Reefs.” World Policy Journal 18:2 (Summer 2001), p. 23.
Cornell, Nagorno-Karabakh Confict, p. 27. See also de Waal, Black Garden, p.
83, interview on December 5, 2000, where he cites Vyacheslav Mikhailov, the
Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s adviser on nationalities
in Mikhail Gorbachev’s time and who had hundreds of conversations while traveling between the two republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1988, “I didn’t
meet a single Armenian or a single Azerbaijani who held a compromise position
on this question, from shepherds to academicians.”
Much of the following discussion is based on Arsene Saparov, From Confict to
Autonomy in the Caucasus: The Soviet Union and the Making of Abhazia, South
Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh (New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 90–177. See
also Arsene Saparov’s earlier, “Why Autonomy? The Making of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region 1918–1925.” Europe-Asia Studies 64 (March 2012), pp.
281–323.
Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, p. 78.
See Kamal Makili-Aliyev, Contested Territory and International Law: A Comparative Study of the Nagorno-Karabakh Confict and the Aland Islands Precedent
(London and New York: Routledge, 2020).
Frank Engel, “The Karabakh Dilemma: Right to Self-Determination, Imperative of Territorial Integrity, or a Caucasian New Deal?” in Michael Kambeck
and Sargis Ghazaryan, eds. Europe’s Next Avoidable War: Nagorno-Karabakh
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 207, 209. Lessening the signifcance
of borders has similarities with what many years ago Karl Deutsch termed a

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Michael M. Gunter

security community, that is an area where relations are predictably peaceful and
war for solving problems is inconceivable. Political Community and the North
American Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience
(Princeton: Princeton University, 1957).

References
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Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission. Opinion No. 3 of 11 January
1992, cited in International Legal Materials 31 (1992), p. 1499.
Cornell, Svante E. The Nagorno-Karabakh Confict. Report No. 46. Department of
East European Studies. Uppsala University, Sweden, 1999.
Crawford, James R. The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006.
Deutsch Karl. Political Community and the North American Area: International
Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton University, 1957.
Engel, Frank. “The Karabakh Dilemma: Right to Self-Determination, Imperative
of Territorial Integrity, or a Caucasian New Deal?” in Michael Kambeck and
Sargis Ghazaryan, eds. Europe’s Next Avoidable War: Nagorno-Karabakh. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
Finnemore, Martha. The Purposes of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of
Force. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003.
Gayim, Eyassu. The Eritrean Question: The Confict between the Right of Self-Determination and the Interest of States. Uppsala: Iustus Folag, 1993.
Goltz, Thomas. Azerbaijan Dairy: A Rogue Reporter’s Adventures in an Oil-rich,
War-torn, Post-Soviet Republic. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Press, 1998.
“Hundreds of Dead Armenian Soldiers Shown in Nagorno-Karabakh.” Novinite.com (Sofa News Agency), November 13, 2020, https://www.novinite.com/
articles/206519/Hundreds+of+Dead+Armenian+Soldiers+Shown+in+NagornoKarabakh, accessed November 14, 2020.
ICJ Reports (Burkina Faso vs. Mail). 1986, p. 566.
ICJ Reps. 1962.
Independent International Commission on Kosovo. The Kosovo Report: Confict,
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Jennings, Robert and Arthur Watts, eds. Oppenheim’s International Law. vol. 1, 9th
ed. London: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Kambeck, Michael and Sargis Ghazaryan, eds. Europe’s Next Avoidable War:
Nagorno-Karabakh. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

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Krasner, Stephen D. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Libaridian, Gerard J, ed. The Karabakh File: Documents and Facts on the Question
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Makili-Aliyev, Kamal. Contested Territory and International Law: A Comparative
Study of the Nagorno-Karabakh Confict and the Aland Islands Precedent. London
and New York: Routledge, 2020.
Malanczuk, Peter. Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th revised
edition. London and New York: Routledge, 1997.
Minahan, James. Nations without States: A Historical Dictionary of Contemporary
National Movements. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996.
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Saparov, Arsene. “Why Autonomy? The Making of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region 1918–1925.” Europe-Asia Studies 64 (March 2012), pp. 281–323.
Saparov, Arsene. From Confict to Autonomy in the Caucasus: The Soviet Union and
the Making of Abhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh. New York: Routledge, 2015.
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Vidmar, Jure. “Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of)
Practice.” St. Anthony’s International Review 6:1 (2010), pp. 37–56.
Waal, Thomas de. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War.
New York: New York University Press, 2003.
Weller, Marc. “Settling Self-determination Conficts: Recent Developments.” The
European Journal of International Law 20:1 (2009), pp. 111–164.

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6

The UN Security
Council Resolutions on
Nagorno-Karabakh
View from Azerbaijan
Shamkhal Abilov and Ceyhun Mahmudlu

Introduction
The confict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh
region was one of the most controversial issues of the modern history of
the South Caucasus until the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020.
Nagorno-Karabakh has been a historical territory of Azerbaijan and the majority of its population was ethnic Azerbaijanis for the past several centuries.
The Armenian population could prevail only during the last two centuries after
the settlement of the Armenians in this region as a result of the treaties signed
between Russian-Persian and Russian-Ottoman empires at the beginning of
the nineteenth century. Although the Versailles Peace Conference recognized
Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic of 1918–
1920, Armenia did not abandon its demand on the territory (Altstadt 1992,
102). After two years’ controversies between Azerbaijan and Armenia, when
the South Caucasus countries became part of the Soviet Union at the beginning of 1920s, Nagorno-Karabakh was again fagged as a topic of discussion.
Therefore, while referring to pre-existing reality, the plenum of the Kavbureau CC RCP(b) (Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian
Communist Party of the Bolsheviks) decided to leave Nagorno-Karabakh
within the territory of Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic according to the
decree of the July 5, 1921 (Baguirov 2008, 5). Further in 1923, it was granted
with an autonomous status (Saparov 2012, 315).
On the eve of the collapse of Soviet Union at the end of 1980s, the Regional
Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh decided to transfer the region to the sovereignty of Armenia, which was rejected not only by Azerbaijan SSR, but also
by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU
with reference to the Article 78 of the USSR Constitution. The Article 78
clearly signifed that territorial alterations were unacceptable without the
agreement of the affected union republic (Krüger 2010, 18). Despite this fact,
Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh followed a secessionist policy and began
to create their political structures with the direct support of the Armenian
SSR. They elected a Congress of Authorized Representatives of the Population of the NKAO in the summer of 1989. The congress was comprised

DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-9
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exclusively of Armenian deputies, elected by local soviets or by village
councils. On 24 August of 1989, the congress elected a National Council,
featuring 78 members, and its Presidium became the de facto government
of Karabakh. Furthermore, the Armenian side used the Soviet Law of 3
April 1990 “on the Procedures for Resolving Questions Related to the Secession of Union Republics from the USSR” as a legal basis to justify its
separatist actions. These endeavors explicitly violated not only the abovementioned article of the Soviet Constitution, but also the 1990 April Law per
se (Dədəyev et al. 2014, 123–124).
The termination of the USSR in 1991 was followed with several ethnic
conficts and war escalations within its former borderline. As a result, the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict stemming from territorial claims of Armenia
on historical Azerbaijani lands broke out into a hot war from 1991 to 1994.
From 1994 until the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020, which is
also labeled as “44-Days War” or “Patriotic War”, Armenia violated the
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan by the occupation of 20% of its lands,
maintained an unconstitutional government over Karabakh, and forced approximately 1 million Azerbaijanis to leave their homelands (Abilov and
Isayev 2016, 293–294).
During the First Nagorno-Karabakh War the UN Security Council
adopted 4 resolutions, which condemned the occupation of the regions of
Azerbaijan and demanded respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity and cessation of hostilities and hostile acts that endangered peace and
security in the region, and the immediate, full and unconditional withdrawal
of all occupying forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan. However, the UN Security Council resolutions were reduced to dust by further
occupation of Azerbaijani territories by the Armenian side. In this regard,
the aim of this chapter is to investigate the resolutions of the UN Security
Council concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh confict, analyze whether these
resolutions had a binding effect over the conficting parties in general, fnd
out what was the positions and argumentations of the parties regarding to
the resolutions and try to answer the question why didn’t the members of the
UN Security Council push parties of the confict for the implementation of the
above mentioned 4 resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh?

UN Security Council Resolution 822
On April 30, 1993, at its 3205th session, the United Nations Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 822, which condemned the occupation of
the Kalbajar region of Azerbaijan, situated outside of Nagorno-Karabakh,
and demanded respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. In that resolution, the Security Council further demanded the immediate
cessation of hostilities and hostile acts that endangered peace and security
in the region, and the immediate, full and unconditional withdrawal of all
occupying forces from not only the Kalbajar region but also all the occupied

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territories of Azerbaijan. The Council also requested the Secretary General,
in consultation with the Chairman-in-Offce of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe as well as the Chairman of the Minsk Group of
the Conference “to assess the situation in the region, in particular in the Kalbajar district of Azerbaijan, and to submit a further report to the Council”
(Resolution 822).
It should be mentioned that the Kalbajar region (area: 1,936 sq. km.,
population: 58,000) was not part of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous
Oblast, and no Armenians have lived there at any time throughout history
(Sheets 2012). As a place of great strategic importance for both sides in
the confict, it is a sliver of Azerbaijan land situated between the northwest part of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia (De Waal 2003, 211). After
the occupation of Kalbajar by Armenian forces, Nagorno-Karabakh lost
its enclave status within the territory of Azerbaijan and was attached de
facto to Armenia with a 60 miles long and 30 miles wide land stretch (Bonner 1993).
The major offensive on the Kalbajar region by Armenian forces began
on March 27, 1993. The defense by Azerbaijan was very poorly planned,
and no reinforcements were sent to assist. However, the Armenian side was
highly motivated. The main attack on the Kalbajar region came not from
the Nagorno-Karabakh military units but from the West, the Vardenis
region of Armenia. Consequently, Armenians captured the Kalbajar region
on April 3 without military losses (De Waal 2003, 211). Armenia justifed its
capture with the pretext that it was establishing a “security belt” to protect
Nagorno-Karabakh (Sheets 2012).
During the attack on Kalbajar, several violations of the rules of war
were perpetrated by the Armenian forces, such as the forced displacement of civilians, indiscriminate fre, and hostage taking. Within a week,
an estimated 60,000 civilians, roughly equal numbers of Kurds and
Azerbaijanis, had been forced to fee their homes (Human Rights Watch
1994, 8–9). In the words of the US Department of State Human Rights
Country Report, “They [the Armenian forces] drove out the inhabitants
and looted and burned the provincial capitals and most of the villages
of these regions” (McDowall 2004, 493). According to Human Rights
Watch, initially the civilian population of the Kalbajar region was allowed to fee, but after a while it became clear that all escape routes were
closed, “except those over the treacherous Murov Mountains” (Human
Rights Watch 1994, 11). As Thomas de Waal puts it, “a new desperate
tide of refugees set off in fight, this time along the only route the Armenians had left open: the ffty miles of snowy road north across the Murov
Mountains” (De Waal 2003, 212). As a result, civil population, many of
them Azerbaijani Kurds who lived in there for centuries, perished while
feeing over the Murov Mountains (De Waal 2010, 121). On the question
of the feeing Kurdish population, Human Rights Watch (1994, 11) stated
the following:

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Despite Armenian reports to the contrary, there is no evidence to support allegations that Kurds living either in Lachin or Kalbajar provinces
supported the Armenian seizure of those areas or that large numbers
of Kurds remained in the provinces after they fell to Armenian forces
and sought to set up an autonomous Kurdish region. All Kurds fed,
together with the Azeri population.
An American journalist Thomas Goltz went further and wrote that after
the occupation of Kalbajar, the Kurdish community in the region appealed
to Kurds around the world for help in stopping the aggression and the
occupation of Azerbaijan by Armenia, and in preventing the slaughtering
and looting of the civilian population. The appeal read as follows:
We call on the world Kurdish community to join us, the Kurds of Azerbaijan, to start a massive, international campaign of solidarity to free
our country from aggression and occupation! We call on you to help
us save our ancient homeland in Azerbaijan in the name of justice and
peace!.
(Goltz 1998, 346)
Consequently, within a few short weeks, the civilian population of Kalbajar
was ethnically cleansed and expelled from its native land by Armenian
forces, resulting in a vast number of IDPs living in unbearable conditions and a humanitarian crisis in Azerbaijan. According to a report by
the Azerbaijan State Committee on Refugees in April 1993, 9,582 families
from the region were registered and were settled in schools, summer camps,
hotels and also in tents (Human Rights Watch 1994, 15).
The capture of Kalbajar led to the formation of another land corridor, after Lachin, between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. However, Armenia
was faced with a heavy diplomatic cost. The occupation of the region by
Armenians, with the help of outside forces, brought widespread international condemnation. As mentioned above, 28 days after the operation, UN
Security Council passed Resolution 822, which demanded the cessation
of hostilities. According to Thomas de Waal (2003, 213), “while calling on
both sides to cease hostilities, the resolution singled out the Armenian side
and demanded an ‘immediate withdrawal of all occupying forces’ from
Kalbajar”.
However, Armenians deny any involvement by military forces of the
Armenian Republic in the occupation of the Kalbajar region. They accuse
Azerbaijan of misinterpreting UN Security Council resolutions in order
to mislead the international community. Accordingly, they argue that the
resolutions never referred to Armenia as an “aggressor” or “occupier”,
and claim that Resolution 822 stated that the armed confict was between
Azerbaijan and “local Armenian forces” in Nagorno-Karabakh, “which
distinguished Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh as immediate parties

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to the confict” (Avetisyan 2012). However, the principal attack during
the Kalbajar operation came mainly from the Western part of the region,
from the territory of Armenia rather than from the Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenians, and “marked the increasingly blatant involvement of the
Armenian state in the war” (Cornell 2011, 73). Regarding this, De Waal
(2003, 211) also narrates that “The main thrust of the Armenian attack
came from the west, from the Vardenis region of Armenia – although this
was denied at the time for political reasons”. Strong evidence, such as
Armenian military ID cards, call-up papers to active service, passports,
vacation cards, discharge tickets and petitions captured by Azerbaijan military units, plus the testimonies of soldiers of the 555th separate Motor
Rife Regiments of Armenia (Sadigbeyli 2009, 349; Human Rights Watch
1994, 69) also proves that not only Armenia but also outside forces, namely
soldiers from the Russian 7th Army, were involved in the occupation of the
Kalbajar region. Thomas de Waal (2003, 213–316–317) wrote the following
on this:
A military map captured by the Azerbaijanis and dated 1 April 1993,
had belonged to a Major S. O. Barsegian. The dates on the map showed
that Barsegian had been on the shores of Lake Sevan on 2 March,
crossed the Armenia-Azerbaijan border at 4:30 p.m. on 27 March,
and headed toward Kalbajar. Azad Isazade, formerly of Azerbaijan’s
Defense Ministry, has a copy of the map… The Azerbaijani Security
Ministry later released an audiocassette of an intercepted radio conversation between an offcer speaking very pure Russian and a heavily
accented Armenian.
Human Rights Watch said with respect to this matter that according to
radio intercepts released by the government of Azerbaijan, troops belonging to the 128th Regiment of the 7th Russian Army were involved in the
occupation of Kalbajar. Human Rights Watch also said that after listening
to the tapes, the UN Representative in Baku, Mahmoud Al-Said, who was
fuent in Russian, confrmed that native Russian speakers were on it (Human Rights Watch 1994, 8).
Furthermore, the direct involvement of Armenian forces in the occupation of Kalbajar was proved by Western news agencies. On April 8, The
Independent wrote, “[i]t is Armenia that invaded Azerbaijani territory”, and
a week later, on April 14, The Times also wrote that “[o]ne thing is certain:
the [Kalbajar] region was attacked from Armenia itself, to the west, as well
as from Nagorno-Karabakh to the east”. On April 22, Agency France Presse
reported that “Azerbaijan has suffered a series of setbacks in the war after
Armenia carried out a major offensive early this month…”. In turn, The
Washington Post agreed with other news agencies and reported on April
28 that “[t]he war involving the former Soviet Republics of Armenia and
Azerbaijan has moved into a dangerous new phase…” (Sadigbeyli 2009, 350).

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In addition, the OSCE Minsk Group also recognized that the confict was
between two states, Armenia and Azerbaijan, which “adjusted timetable
of urgent steps to implement United Nations Security Council Resolutions
822 (1993) and 853 (1993)” dated September 28, 1993 (Sadigbeyli 2009, 355).
Meanwhile, the Minsk Group set in motion a negotiation process between
the parties to the confict according to the Baker Rules, named after US
Secretary of State James Baker, and this recognized only two “principal
parties” to the confict – Armenia and Azerbaijan (Huseynov 2009).
Special emphasis should also be placed on the concept of “invasion”, as
stated in Resolution 822 as “latest invasion of the Kalbajar district of the
Republic of Azerbaijan by local Armenian forces” (Resolution 822). Armenians
argue that it should be referred to as an “internal confict” between Azerbaijan
and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, rather than a confict between Armenia
and Azerbaijan. However, according to the international law terms the word
“invasion” is mainly used for the international confict that was adopted in
1974 by the General Assembly of UN, which states that armed aggression
against a sovereign state takes place as a result of
[t]he invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of
another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force
of the territory of another State or part thereof.
(Sadigbeyli 2009, 354)
By admitting that they had assisted in the occupation of the Kalbajar region,
when Deputy Foreign Minister, Libardian said, “we give them whatever is
necessary for their security and survival. That includes sugar, four, electricity, small arms, tanks and the surface-to-air missile systems” (Bonner 1993).
The occupation also gave neighboring countries an impetus to put pressure on Armenia to stop its aggression against Azerbaijan and begin negotiating a peaceful solution to the confict. After the invasion of Kalbajar,
Turkey immediately closed its border with Armenia (Shiriyev and Davies
2013, 186). The occupation of further Azerbaijani territories, such as the
Jabrayil, Gubatli and Zengilan regions, by Armenian forces also alarmed
Iran. In his letter addressed to the UN Secretary General, Mr. Ali Akbar
Vilayati, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs called on the UN to “…
take immediate and effective measures to implement Security Council Resolutions 822 (1993) … and decisively compel the aggressive forces to accept
a cease-fre and to withdraw to the internationally recognized borders”
(Sadigbeyli 2009, 364–365; Letter from the Charge d’Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran).
Russia also pointed to the tripartite peace talks in which Russia, Turkey and the USA were involved, which was later called the “3+1 initiative”
when the Italian Minsk Group chair joined the discussion. This initiative
demanded the withdrawal of Armenian military forces from the Kalbajar

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region and set a timetable for the start of a two-month ceasefre and the
resumption of new peace talks. Azerbaijan and Armenia accepted the peace
plan, but in May 1993 Armenia rejected it on the pretext that it did not mention anything about security guarantees for Karabakh Armenians (Baser
2008, 92). Robert Kocharian, chairman of the Nagorno-Karabakh State
Defense Committee, commented that,
…A peace-bringing to the region should take into account the essential
interests of the Karabakh people…Because of that, Karabakh leadership’s answer to the trilateral initiatives a call upon the world community
to respect the right of the people of Karabakh to guard their security,
though they noticed the lack of security in the initiative.
(Human Rights Watch 1994, 17–18)
Svante Cornell construes the rejection of the peace initiative by the
Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians as an excuse, a pretext used by the
Armenian government “for pursuing its own goals and avoiding a diplomatic
embarrassment” (Cornell 2001, 85). The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians
later accepted the plan, on June 14, after pressure was put on them by the
Armenian Government, but they asked for a month’s delay in implementing
it. However, UN Security Council Resolution 822 and the “3+1 initiative”
were reduced to dust when Armenian forces occupied Aghdam in July 1993
(Human Rights Watch 1994, 18).

UN Security Council Resolution 853
The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 853 during its
3259th session on July 29, 1993. This Resolution was based on the report submitted on July 27, 1993 by the Chairman of the Minsk Group of the CSCE
(now OSCE) (S/25184). While reaffrming Security Council Resolution 822,
Resolution 853 expressed the UN Security Council’s deep concern about
the deterioration in relations between the two parties to the confict, the
Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic, and the tensions
between them, which had the potential of endangering peace and security
in the region. According to Resolution 853, the Security Council reaffrmed
the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic,
condemned the capture of the Aghdam region and other occupied areas
of Azerbaijan, and demanded the immediate cessation of all hostilities and
the withdrawal of the occupying forces from Aghdam and other occupied
regions of the Azerbaijan Republic without any conditions. Furthermore,
in order to achieve a peaceful solution to the confict, the Security Council
endorsed the continuing efforts of the Minsk Group, including efforts to
implement previous resolutions, and requested that the Secretary-General,
in consultation with the Chairman-in-Offce of the CSCE as well as the

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Chairman of the Minsk Group, continue to report to the Council on the
situation (Resolution 853).
It is noteworthy that when the Security Council adopted Resolution 853,
it did so using its authority under Articles 33 and 34 in Chapter VI of the
Charter of the United Nations (Sadigbeyli 2009, 366), which indicates that
the Security Council may investigate any dispute if there is a threat to the
maintenance of international peace and security; shall seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or the peaceful means of their
own choice; and call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means
(Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter).
As mentioned above, Resolution 853 was accepted following the occupation of the Aghdam region of Azerbaijan on July 23, 1993. Geographically
situated outside the boundaries of former NKAO about 30 kilometers
northeast of Stepanakert, it covers an area of 1,094 sq. km and, until the
occupation, had a population of approximately 153,000 people, who were
mainly ethnic Azerbaijanis (Babanly 2013).
Capturing Aghdam gave Armenians the chance to control a strategic
strip of territory on the east side of Nagorno-Karabakh, and it was also
important for the Armenian leaders, who considered it a key area for
attacks from Azerbaijan against Armenian military objectives situated in
Askeran, Agdere and Khankendi. Additionally, Armenians thought that
by occupying one of the largest regions of Azerbaijan in the eastern part
of Nagorno-Karabakh, they “would change the course of the whole war”
(Babanly 2013). Therefore, the Armenians used the political turmoil and
disarray in the capital city of Azerbaijan in the summer of 1993 as an opportunity, and they managed to capture Aghdam after the withdrawal of the
Azerbaijani military units from the front line. These units were led by Surat
Huseynov, a revolutionary military leader who demanded the resignation of
President Elchibey. After a long and heavy fghting that lasted over a month,
the Armenian forces fnally seized Aghdam on July 23 (Cornell 2001, 89).
According to Human Rights Watch, after capturing Aghdam the
Armenian forces perpetrated serious violations of the rules of war, including
“hostage-taking, indiscriminate fre, and the forcible displacement of civilians” (Human Rights Watch 1994, 19). Human Rights Watch also reported
that for several weeks, Aghdam and the villages surrounding it were looted
and burned systematically (Human Rights Watch 1994, 27). On this last
point, The New York Times wrote that “a soldier strutted out of a house
carrying a porcelain sink and a wrench in one hand, while another flled the
sidecar of his motorcycle with the contents of someone's garage. A tanker
truck wheeled into town and headed for the wine and cognac factory” (Bonner 1993). Quoting a Western diplomat active in the OSCE Minsk Group,
Human Rights Watch said that “the burning and looting of Aghdam was
not the result of undisciplined troops, but was a well-orchestrated plan

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organized by Karabakh authorities in Stepanakert” (Human Rights Watch
1994, 27).
During the offensive, Armenian aggressors occupied 883 sq. km. of the
total 1094 sq. km. territory of Aghdam, including one city and 80 villages.
The material damage caused by the occupation of Aghdam was estimated
at $6.179 billion (Trend, July 23, 2020). During the one-month offensive by
the Armenian forces, 5,897 Azerbaijanis died in Aghdam, considered one of
the deadliest episodes of the Nagorno-Karabakh War between Azerbaijan
and Armenia. According to a report by the US Refugee Committee, 128,584
residents of Aghdam became IDPs (Babanly 2013; Global IDP Database of
the Norwegian Refugee Council 2005, 29).
The Armenians denied the offensive against the Aghdam region of
Azerbaijan. They argued that their forces had just taken defensive action.
Referring to the Armenian government, Vafa Guluzade, a senior adviser to
the then President of Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elchibey, said that
I spoke with Yerevan today… And offcials there are once more hiding
behind the fction that they do not control the forces in Karabakh. It
is clear that they are trying to stir up more chaos in Azerbaijan as a
pretext not to fulfll the terms of the peace plan.
(The New York Times, June 13, 1993)
Human Rights Watch also reported that “eyewitness accounts, however,
clearly refute their denials” (Human Rights Watch 1994, 21). The US State
Department stated that the Aghdam attack “cannot be justifed on the
grounds of legitimate self-defense” (Migdalovitz 2003, 4).
As a result, following the occupation of Aghdam on July 23, 1993, the UN
Security Council adopted its Resolution 853, which was based on the report
by the Chairman of the Minsk Group. For its part, Azerbaijan immediately
declared that it accepted the Resolution. However, Armenia accused the
Minsk Group of favoring Azerbaijan and said that the decision in Resolution
853 was biased. Therefore, despite the demands by the UN Security Council
to cease all hostilities and immediately withdraw from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan, the Armenians strengthened their offensive and occupied
further Azerbaijani territories in the following months (Gurbuz 2003).

UN Security Council Resolution 874
UN Security Council Resolution 874 was adopted unanimously on October 14, 1993 at the 3292nd Security Council session. The Resolution was
based on a letter dated October 1, 1993 by the Chairman of the OSCE Minsk
Group on Nagorno-Karabakh and addressed to the President of the Security
Council (S/26522). Essentially, it mainly addressed the message contained in
Security Council Resolutions 822 of April 30, 1993 and 853 of July 29, 1993.
After reaffrming Resolutions 822 and 853, the Security Council expressed its

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concern regarding developments in the confict in the Nagorno-Karabakh
region between the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic, which
would endanger peace and security in the region, as well as threaten the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force
for the acquisition of territory. The Resolution also called upon the parties to
the confict to observe the ceasefre established as a result of the direct contacts undertaken with the assistance of the Government of the Russian Federation, in support of the CSCE Minsk Group. The Council also requested
the Secretary-General, the Chairman-in-Offce of the CSCE and the Chairman of the CSCE Minsk Conference “to continue to report to the Council
on the progress of the Minsk process and on all aspects of the situation on
the ground, and on present and future cooperation between the CSCE and
the United Nations in this regard” (Resolution 874). It is noteworthy that
while accepting Resolution 874, the Security Council exercised its authority
under Article 34 in Chapter VI of the UN charter, which deals with regional
peace and security (Sadigbeyli 2009, 366).
While reiterating its support for the peace process, the Security Council
called “for the immediate implementation of the reciprocal and urgent steps
provided for in the CSCE Minsk Group’s Adjusted timetable, including the
withdrawal of forces from recently occupied territories and the removal
of all obstacles to communications and transportation” (Resolution 874).
According to Human Rights Watch, Armenia agreed to the proposal, but
the authorities of Karbakh delayed responding. However, Azerbaijan rejected it because the “Adjusted Timetable” that was set by the Minsk Group
“linked the withdrawal of Karabakh Armenian forces from occupied
Azerbaijani territory with the lifting of Azerbaijan’s embargo of Armenia.
The Azerbaijani government complained of being treated like “the defeated
side” (Human Rights Watch 1994, 39).
As mentioned above, the content of Resolution 874 was similar to that of
previous resolutions that were adopted after the occupation of the Kalbajar
and Aghdam regions of Azerbaijan. The issue was still highlighted as a
confict between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and did
not describe the Republic of Armenia as an aggressor country. On the
other hand, it is controversial that unlike previous resolutions, which were
adopted directly after the occupation of two different regions of Azerbaijan,
namely Kalbajar and Aghdam, which are geographically located beyond
the border of the former NKAO, Resolution 874 did not mention anything
about the three regions of Azerbaijan occupied between August and October
1993. However, the names of the captured regions were also mentioned in
Resolutions 822 and 853.
Despite UN Security Council Resolutions 822 and 853, which demanded
an immediate withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied Kalbajar
and Aghdam regions, Armenian forces seized three more provinces of
Azerbaijan that are located south of Nagorno-Karabakh between August
and October 1993 (Babanly 2012). As soon as Aghdam was captured on July

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140 Shamkhal Abilov and Ceyhun Mahmudlu
23, 1993, Armenian forces began their offensive on Fuzuli, which was important for both sides because of its geopolitical location, as it was the gateway
to the southwestern regions of Azerbaijan: Jebrail, Qubatli and Zengilan. If
such a land strip were in the hands of Azerbaijan, Armenia would have to
fght in two fronts (Cornell 2001, 90–91). Therefore, Armenia concentrated
all its forces in this area. Consequently, Armenian forces seized Fuzuli and
Jebrail on August 23 and Qubatli on August 31, 1993 (Babanly 2012). Despite the accusation of Armenia by Azerbaijan for occupation of large territory of Azerbaijan that situated outside the border of NKAO, Armenia was
arguing that Nagorno-Karabakh forces, not forces of Armenian Republic,
did the capturing (The New York Times, August 19, 1993). However, according to Human Rights Watch, “during the August 1993 Karabakh Armenian offensive, there were several reports of involvement by troops from the
Republic of Armenia. These forces reportedly committed serious human
rights abuses” (Human Rights Watch 1994, 30).
The Armenians justifed their occupation of these provinces by arguing
that they had to defend themselves from hostile artillery fre originating
in those regions. However, their forces took these large, strategically vital
areas without facing almost any resistance. In this regard, Thomas de Waal
explains that
the Armenians preceded all their offensives with a crude propaganda
campaign, insisting that they were acting in self-defense against heavily
defended positions. In fact, on most occasions, they walked into empty
towns and villages after the Azerbaijanis had fed.
(De Waal 2003, 215)
A Western diplomat who visited the region during the offensive defned the
Azerbaijani defenses as “nil”: “It is not a matter of whether the Armenians
can take the region, but when” (The New York Times, August 24, 1993).
During the occupation of these three provinces, the Armenian forces systematically committed several violations of the rule of law, including forced
displacement, indiscriminate fre, taking hostages, and burning and looting
(Human Rights Watch 1994, 29). The occupation caused the second-largest refugee crisis in Azerbaijan after the infux of the civilian population
from Lachin, Kalbajar and Aghdam. Tens of thousands of civilians were
displaced, including 133,725 people in Fuzuli, 58,834 in Jebrail, and 31,276 in
Gubadli (Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council 2005, 29).
Following the occupation of the southern regions of Azerbaijan, Iran
denounced Armenian aggression and demanded the immediate withdrawal
from all occupied regions. The Iranian Foreign Minister also stressed that
Tehran “would not remain silent vis-a-vis growing unrest across Iranian
borders” (The New York Times, September 8, 1993). Turkey also reacted to
the Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan. According to The New York
Times, Turkey’s Prime Minister, Tansu Chiller, warned Armenia when she

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said that Turkey would not “sit with its arms crossed” if the Armenians
continued their “aggression” against the Azerbaijanis, who are ethnically
akin to the Turks (Schmemann 1993). Russia also demanded cessation of
the military action, “noting that it was unjustifed because Azeris were
no longer a threat” (Migdalovitz 2003, 4). The Russian government also
mediated a ceasefre agreement between the parties to the confict on August 31 (Babanly 2013). As the result of the occupation of three southern
regions Azerbaijan also issued a letter to UN, which resulted in the acceptance of the Resolution 874 by the Security Council on 14 May 1993 that
was expressing its general views about the situation in the region. Nevertheless, the Armenian forces developed its offensive toward the Zangazur
region of Azerbaijan again considering these entire attempts as “null”. As
it was stated, similar to the previous two resolutions, “the Security Council’s appeal was put to the test shortly thereafter, when a new round of
fghting broke out along the Azerbaijani-Iranian border in late October”
(Croissant 1998, 64).

UN Security Council Resolution 884
At its 3313th meeting, on November 12, 1993, the UN Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 884 that was based on the letter from the
Chairman-in-Offce of the Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh, particularly on the occupation of the Zengilan district and the city of Goradiz in
the Azerbaijan Republic, to the President of the Security Council and its
enclosures (S/26718), which was dated 9 November 1993. While reaffrming
its previous Resolutions 822 of April 30, 1993, 853 of July 29, 1993, and 874
of October 14, 1993, in this Resolution the Security Council also expressed
its serious concern at how the confict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region
of Azerbaijan had developed, and at how the tensions between the parties to
the confict, Armenia and Azerbaijan, could endanger regional peace and
security. Furthermore, the Security Council reaffrmed the inviolability of
international borders and the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force,
and also the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic.
It demanded the immediate cessation of armed hostilities and other hostile
acts, as well as the withdrawal of military forces from all the occupied regions of Azerbaijan, including Zengilan and the city of Goradiz, in accordance with the adjusted timetable. Moreover, the Security Council reiterated
its request to the Secretary General, the Chairman-in-Offce of the CSCE,
and the Chairman of the Minsk Group to continue reporting to the Council about the progress of the Minsk process and all aspects of the confict
(Resolution 884).
As mentioned earlier, Resolution 884 was adopted after the Zengilan
district and the Azerbaijani city of Goradiz had been overrun in the joint
offensive from Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh in late October 1993.
According to Human Rights Watch, the main objective of the offensive was

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142 Shamkhal Abilov and Ceyhun Mahmudlu
to seize the rail junction at Goradiz and therefore leave the inhabitants of
Zengilan and military units of Azerbaijan without their main escape route.
By doing this, Armenian forces would control a major bridge into Iran.
Referring to several foreign aid workers and diplomats in Zengilan, Human
Rights Watch indicated that, before the offensive on Zengilan, Armenians
ordered the region’s population to leave the area, broadcasting their message
on the radio on October 23. Inhabitants, who got information about this
managed to escape to Iran by the Goradiz Bridge. However, later on, the
bridge was subsequently destroyed and refugees of Zengilan were forced to
fee across the Aras River, where most of them drowned, becoming part of
the 1 million-refugee camp of Azerbaijan (Human Rights Watch 1994, 40).
Zengilan, with 33,890 inhabitants and a territory of 707 sq. km., was
the last occupied region of Azerbaijan (Today.az, October 29, 2009). As a
result of this offensive, all the remaining territory of Azerbaijan between
Karabakh and the Aras River was in the hands of Armenian forces. During
the occupation of Zengilan, Armenians forced the civil population to evacuate the region, took many hostages, killed civilians by fring indiscriminately, and looted and burned their property (Human Rights Watch 1994,
39). According to the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Global IDP Database,
34,797 inhabitants of Zengilan became IDPs and settled in the various
regions of Azerbaijan (Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee
Council 2005, 29). During the offensive 9 pre-school establishments, 19 primary schools, 15 secondary schools, technical schools, music schools, 35
libraries, 8 culture houses, 23 clubs and 22 flm projectors were destroyed in
Zengilan region (Today.az, October 29, 2009).
Following the offensive against the last occupied regions of Azerbaijan,
the Chairman of the CSCE Council expressed his concern over the development of the confict and highlighted that the “[a]cquisition of territory by
force can never be condoned or accepted as a basis for territorial claims” on
October 26, 1993. Regarding to the offensive, a declaration that was approved
by the nine countries of the Minsk Group on November 4, 1993, stood on
the same line and stated, “no acquisition of territory by force can be recognized, and the occupation of territory cannot be used to obtain international recognition or to impose a change of legal status”. In addition, three
days later, on November 9, the European Union in its statement reiterated,
“the importance it attaches to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
the Republic of Azerbaijan, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE”
(Annex to the letter from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to
the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, 23 May 2013, 8).
The Minsk Group also issued a new timetable for “urgent measures”. Resolution 884, accepted on November 12, 1993 by the Security Council, condemned the offensive on Zengilan and called on the parties to the confict
to implement the “urgent measures” issued by the Minsk Group in order to
end the confict (Human Rights Watch 1994, 79–80). However, this had no
positive impact on the withdrawal of occupying forces from the territories

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of Azerbaijan. During that time, the Armenians already reached their maximum territorial extension and occupied 20% of Azerbaijan’s territory.

Conclusion
During the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, that lasted 44 days between 27
September and 10 November 2020, there was a saying that ‘while liberating
the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijan National Army is fulflling the UN Security Council resolutions, that have been on paper for 27
years’. In this regard, the questions arise, why were UN Security Council resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh not implemented? Or why didn’t the members
of the UN Security Council push parties of the confict for the implementation
of the above-mentioned 4 resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh? Thus, it is important to mention briefy that there are legal and political factors that led
to the failure of the UN Security Council to implement its resolutions on
Nagorno-Karabakh in order to end the confict between the two parties and
end the violation of the internationally recognized territories of Azerbaijan.
While analyzing legal factors that avoid the implementation of the UN
Security Council resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh it is signifcant to look
at their nature, whether they have binding effect or not. According to the
scholars the binding effect of the resolutions accepted by Security Council
of the UN is related to international peace and security, which includes enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that indicates “the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42,
to maintain or restore international peace and security” (Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter). The effects of the resolutions differ in accordance
to their type and characteristics. It is assumed that the word ‘resolution’ is
used in the practice of the UN in a generic meaning, which covers ‘recommendations’ and ‘decisions’ that also are vague and changeable in meaning.
However, the generally accepted approach is that ‘decision’ is mainly used
for the binding resolutions while ‘recommendations’ for non-binding resolutions. “All in all, it seems that the binding or non-binding nature of a
resolution (decision or recommendation) also covers determinations made
therein; a determination made in a recommendation is not binding, whereas
a determination made in a decision is” (Oberg 2006, 880–891).
In this regard, it is argued that even though the strong and decisive language is used in the Security Council resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh in
order to show the frm position of the UN on the confict between Armenia
and Azerbaijan, these resolutions were not accepted under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, but as it mentioned before under the Article 34 of Chapter VI of the UN Charter (Sadigbeyli 2009, 366), which indicates that the
Security Council may investigate any dispute if there is a threat to the
maintenance of international peace and security; shall seek a solution by

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144 Shamkhal Abilov and Ceyhun Mahmudlu
negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, restore to regional agencies or arrangements, or the peaceful means
of their own choice; and call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such
means. Therefore, while referring to the above-mentioned analysis it is possible to generalize that the UN Security Council resolutions on NagornoKarabakh have a recommendation character, which means that they do not
have binding effect.
However, the main argumentation of this study is that the main obstacle
for the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions on
Nagorno-Karabakh is political rather than legal, which is related to the
political interests of the Security Council members on the conficts, mainly
Russia, the USA, and France that are also co-chair countries of the OSCE
Minsk Group and act as a peace broker over the dispute of NagornoKarabakh since the frst Nagorno-Karabakh War. It was assumed that the
aim of these countries was to keep the stability in order to preserve their
national interests in the region rather than to provide a forum for the ongoing
negotiation process and bring out the peaceful settlement of the confict.
By participating in the negotiation process Russia wanted to strengthen
its hegemony as one of the main regional players and play an active role
in the regional issues in order to persuade national interests in its “Near
Abroad”. This became particularly apparent from the beginning that while
involving the mediation process by the Minsk Group, Russia intended not
to let any international institution or state to hamper its interest toward
the region. The conduction of unilateral mediation attempts and signing
of the cease-fre under the auspice of Russia is a clear example for this aim
of Russia (Cornell 2001, 99). On the other hand, the interests of the USA in
the region connected with the hope to expand its political and economic
infuence to the region and diversify its oil productions and transportation
routes (Jacoby 2005, 32). After the 9/11, the USA was seeing the region as a
signifcant geo-political area for its position in the Middle East. Therefore,
it began to intensify its military presence in the region and conduct military cooperation with the new independent states of the region (Laruelle
and Peyrouse 2009, 29). France in its turn supported the interests of the
European Union since “some kind of European intercession was required to
resolve the region’s major economic problems” (Nuriyev 2011).
Meanwhile, the large Armenian Diasporas existing in these countries
play signifcantly crucial roles in the policy and commitment of these countries toward the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh confict. Thomas de
Waal, in this regard, states that, “Powerful Armenian lobbies in France,
Russia and the United States also make relations with Yerevan a matter
of domestic politics and not just foreign policy in each country” (De Waal
2010). Along with possessing large Armenian Diasporas, these countries
also sided with Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh War. Russia, which
is the main political and military ally of the Armenia, was not only the main
supporter during the Nagorno-Karabakh War, but also directly involved in

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occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan and massacred the civil Azerbaijanis in Khojali. It is also noteworthy to mention that Armenia is a member
of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), an intergovernmental military alliance that was initiated by Russia after the collapse of Soviet
Union with the aim of maintaining its political and military interests in the
region (Abilov 2018, 156). Besides, Russia also possesses a military base in
the Gyumri region of Armenia, situated next to the border of Azerbaijan.
It is also said that Russia will set up a joint air force in Armenia within the
framework of the CSTO (Kucera 2013) and Yerevan “frequently claimed
to have de facto protectorate-metropolis relations with Moscow” (Garibov
2015, 89). In this regard, Armenia is literally joining its military forces with
Russia.
On the other hand, the USA government backed Armenia during the
Nagorno-Karabakh War and accepted Azerbaijan as an “aggressor”
country. With the support of the Armenian Diaspora the USA Congress
approved the Section 907 that restricted governmental assistance of the
USA to Azerbaijan through the Freedom Support Act. This unfair decision
of the USA Congress continued until 2001, when the USA president George
W. Bush decided to waive it due to its military cooperation with Azerbaijan.
However, it does not mean that the Congress will not reassert its policy on
Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. As for France, it revealed itself as a
best supporter of Armenia in its “holy war” for the recognition of the events
of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire as genocide and illustrated its pro-Armenian
position in the Nagorno-Karabakh confict.
Among the legal and political obstacles for the implementation of the
UN Security Council resolutions, the Armenian side also never put forward a constructive approach for the resolution of the confict peacefully
and consistently violated the ceasefre agreement of 1994 while targeting
civilians along the borderlines. This was one of the main factors for the
failure of the negotiation process and hindered the implementation of the
resolutions.
Armenian ferocities and arbitrariness reached its peak in the last two
years, signifcantly blocking peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
confict. Examples include, the more aggressive and intractable action of
the Armenian government, like an intention to cement the acquisitions of
those occupied territories beyond Nagorno-Karabakh permanently, repudiation of the “Basic Principles” that had been initiated by the OSCE Minsk
Group and accepted by both parties to the confict, planning to move the
administrative center of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic from
Khankendi to Shusha, the cultural capital of Azerbaijan, illegal settlement
of Armenians from different part of the world in the internationally recognized territories of Azerbaijan, as well as changing the toponyms and falsifcation of the historical monuments triggered the tension between the sides.
In addition, at a rally in Khankendi on August 5, 2019, Armenian Prime
Minister Nikol Pashinyan declared, “Artsakh is Armenia, and that’s it”.

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This destroyed the possibility of serious further negotiation. Furthermore,
Armenian Defense Minister David Tonoyan said in New York in March
2020 that the policy “new war for new territories” replaced that of “territory for peace”, still further undermining any peaceful resolution. However,
the attack against the Tovuz region in the summer of 2020 that is situated
out of the conficting zone and violating internationally recognized borders
of Azerbaijan since that time became the last straw to break the status-quo
in the region. Targeting oil and gas export pipelines passing through the
Tovuz district was threatening European energy security. In this regard, a
fragile ceasefre was established, although frequently broken in subsequent
months by Armenia.
That is why, as a countermeasure of the Armenian aggression against
Azerbaijan, on September 27, with the counter-offensive operation along
the entire front the Azerbaijani Army started the liberation of the territories, which had been occupied by Armenia in the wake of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in the early 1990s. The war that lasted 44 days depicted
the strength of the Azerbaijani Army and ended with the decisive victory of
Azerbaijan. By December 1, Azerbaijan had restored its territorial integrity
as the result of the Trilateral Statement between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and
Russia that was signed on November 10, 2020, right after the liberation of
Shusha, the cultural capital of Azerbaijan. This “44-Days War” brought an
end to the long-lasting occupation of all occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

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7

The Politics of Ceasefre and
the Occupation
Araz Aslanli

Introduction
The war, which resumed between Armenia and Azerbaijan on September
27, 2020 and ended on November 10, 2020, illuminated the reasons behind
failed diplomatic attempts for achieving a longer lasting ceasefre along with
resolving defnitively the Armenia-Azerbaijan confict and its critical issues.
The frst serious mediation attempt to halt persistent skirmishes in the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict zone, which was propelled as the Soviet Union
dissolved, was initiated by Boris Yeltsin and Nursultan Nazarbayev in
September 1991. Although this mediation generated some bilateral compromises, the downing of a helicopter on November 20, 1991, carrying
Azerbaijani high-ranking offcials, accompanied by Kazakh and Russian
observers from the area under Armenian occupation, not only ended this
diplomatic process, but also exacerbated tensions.
Some subsequent attempts such as Iran’s, as analyzed below, also failed
without signing any agreement, and others failed even after agreements
were signed. The war atmosphere, which intensifed consistently since 1992,
was eased with an armistice negotiated through Russian mediation in May
1994. However, this agreement did not actually halt warzone fre. Ceasefre
violations frequently occurred, gradually eroding the validity and intent of
the armistice while increasing the probability of a new round of war.
The Minsk Group process, which started in 1992, seemed more hopeful
until the end of the 1990s, as mediators presented general principles of
peace and options to solve the confict conclusively. In late 1997, prospects
appeared reasonable for resolving outstanding issues that had infamed hostilities in the past. This was an important moment as Armenia’s president
Levon Ter-Petroyan stopped just short of agreeing to the principle of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
In the 2000s, the Minsk Group shifted its efforts primarily toward
freezing the confict in its status quo under the aegis of the tripartite
chairmanship representing France, Russia, and the US. But, the nine-day
Russo-Georgian War in August 2008 between Georgia, Russia and the
Russian-backed self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia

DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-10
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Politics of Ceasefre and Occupation 151
awakened observers to the problems and complacency of allowing a confict to remain dormant or frozen without pursuing a defnitive resolution.
It was only natural to assume the Armenia-Azerbaijan confict would ignite
inevitably within the near future, which was the case when a new round of
violence erupted on the frontlines in April 2016. The renewed violence subsided after four days, but with no progress in negotiations as the tripartite
chairing nations stayed with the status quo in the confict.
From 2016 to the outbreak of war in 2020, there were numerous exchanges
of threatening military rhetoric and signs of combat preparations, but there
also were signs that Russia and the Western powers desired a path for
peace and resolution coinciding with the rise of Nikol Pashinyan’s power
in Armenia.
This chapter will summarize the various attempts to achieve a ceasefre
and a lasting peace during the 20 years leading up to the 2020 war between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, and why they persistently failed.

The Nature of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Confict
In order to set the stage for why attempts to resolve and reconcile the two
states involved failed repeatedly, some background is essential. Although
there are numerous claims regarding the historical roots of why the confict
remained frozen or dormant during the time of the USSR, the foundations
point to the beginning of the twentieth century. While there had been relatively small conficts occasionally, the confict only escalated in tandem with
the USSR’s dissolution in 1991 and led quickly afterward to the 1992 War.
The claims about the confict’s durability range from those who have seen
it as a tool of Russia’s policy of keeping the Caucasus under its control to
Armenia’s expansionist aspirations (i.e. the dream of establishing a Greater
Armenia reaching to the coast of three seas). There are those who claim that
the current status of the Armenian population is the result of the struggle
they waged for exclusive rights as well as those who believe that the confict
is entirely due to the persecution of the Armenians by the Turks throughout
history or the unifcation of the Karabakh region with Azerbaijan during
Stalin’s rule. Finally, there are those who interpret it more broadly as part of
imperialist games in the region or as a Huntingtonian clash of civilizations.
Taking a technical view of the confict within the international law framework, one can clearly notice that Armenia’s expansionist policy of and its
occupation of Azerbaijani territories constituted the greatest tensions at the
confict’s core.
Undoubtedly, the confict emerged at the time when Russia sought to
establish an outpost in the region, aided by a fow of migrants and the signing of agreements after the wars between Russia and the Ottomans as well
as between Russia and the Gajars. At the end of the nineteenth century,
the relations of the imperialist powers with the region coincided with the
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Armenia. Subsequently, the disputes between nations, fomented by Tsarist
Russia, added tension to the confict’s foundation. The creation of an artifcial entity—the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast/NKAO)—
at the time of the Soviet Union’s formation defed Azerbaijan’s will and
interests. The historical dynamics would return 75 years later as the USSR
collapsed and fractured.
When the confict escalated in the latter part of the 1980s, the intensifed
tensions were due to Armenia’s insistence on annexing the Karabakh
region, which historically had been determined to be part of Azerbaijan.
This would set the stage for the confict in the closing years of the twentieth
century. In examining the core of the fve initiatives of Armenia between
1920 and 1965, everyone has dictated that Azerbaijan’s Karabakh region
be absorbed into Armenia. For example, demonstrations in 1988 were
dominated by the slogan proclaiming “Miatsum”, the Armenian word for
unifcation. On February 20, 1988, tensions fared when the [former] NKAO
of Azerbaijan decided to leave Azerbaijan and join Armenia (Kocharyan
2018). On December 1, 1989, the Armenian parliament voted to annex the
disputed territory, a decision that technically remains in effect. Incidentally,
it was illegal from the perspective of Soviet law at the time, and it should be
mentioned that the Supreme Soviet annulled this decision. On one hand,
Armenia laid bare its expansionist intentions but, on the other hand, modulated its tactics in the hopes of quelling any challenges by international legal
experts, particularly as Armenia joined the United Nations as an independent member. Armenia, which earlier did not hesitate to express that reasons
for the confict with Azerbaijan were connected to its own ambitions for
acquiring and expanding its territorial boundaries, decided on an indirect
approach. The Republic of Armenia’s offcial position was to deemphasize
the presence of a military confict and instead make the case that Azerbaijan had hampered Armenia’s quest for its integrity as an independent
nation-state. Yet, the words of a moderate temperament were not refected
in Armenia’s foreign policy objectives which emphasized an aggressive,
expansionist approach. On September 26, 2015, Armenia’s former president
Serzh Sargsyan, speaking on the 100th anniversary of the Armenian allegations of genocide, proclaimed that Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to Armenia.
In August 2019, the Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan reinforced
the sentiment, declaring that “Artsakh [Karabakh] is Armenia!” essentially
negating attempts to negotiate a peaceful resolution. This occurred despite
widespread acknowledgment by international organizations, including the
UN, in formal resolutions, that Armenia had occupied unlawfully territories that belonged rightly to Azerbaijan.
Although Armenia characterized the Azerbaijani territories under its
occupation as equivalent to an independent state, it went ahead regardless, acting to annex them de facto, a move obviously acknowledged as
such by the political actors, economic players and the general public of
Armenia.

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Politics of Ceasefre and Occupation 153

Initiatives in the Dissolution Process of the USSR
When the USSR was being dissolved, Moscow offcials acted to de-escalate
tensions arising from Armenia’s territorial claims against Azerbaijan. On
February 20, 1988, the [former] NKAO’s Regional Council parliament,
in which all but 30 of the 140 members were Armenians, voted to leave
Azerbaijan and unite with Armenia (Cornell 1999). On the following day,
the Soviet Union’s Central Committee of the Communist Party rejected the
request as illegal considering the existing legal arrangement which stipulated
the NKAO’s status (Pravda, February 24, 1988).
On July 12, 1988, NKAO, acting independently of the regional assembly,
moved to separate from Azerbaijan and unite with Armenia. The Presidential Council of the Supreme Soviet convened six days later and ruled out the
possibility of changing the borders and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan
and Armenia. The Council cited the Soviet Constitution’s Article 78, which
specifed that “the border of any Soviet republic cannot be changed without
its consent”.
A few months later (January 12, 1989), Moscow offcials created the
provisional Special Management Committee to act as the region’s administrators. On November 28, 1989, the responsibilities were shifted to the
Azerbaijani government. Armenia’s parliament responded on December 1,
1989 by approving the annexation of NKAO, a decision not supported in the
international legal community (de Waal 2003, 290).
Until August 1991, when the USSR collapsed, Moscow offcials sought to
prevent the Armenia-Azerbaijani confict from becoming a full-blown war
but there was no consistent strategy to address the most urgent concerns of
territorial integrity. Following the respective declarations of independence
for the two former Soviet states, the new Russian Federation’s frst attempt
at offcial mediation occurred, when Russian president Boris Yeltsin and
Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s president, met in Baku on September 20, 1991. Both leaders also visited Khankendi and Yerevan in the hopes
of formalizing the negotiations and peace talks began three days later in
the southern Russian city of Jeleznovodsk. The Russian and Kazakhstan
presidents guaranteed the subsequent agreement between Armenia and
Azerbaijan (UN 1991), which included terms for a ceasefre, Armenia’s
recognition of the former NKAO as part of Azerbaijan and provisions for
the region’s autonomy in governance.
Following a second round of talks, held in a small village in the Ijevan
region on the Azerbaijan-Armenia border, a statement was released,
indicating that “the vicious circle based on murder and revenge must be
stopped”. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s representatives invited observers from
Russia and Kazakhstan to investigate claims that Armenia had violated the
terms of the original ceasefre, which were confrmed. Tragedy, however,
short circuited any progress that could have been realized from the new
round of talks. On November 20, 1991, an air contingent carrying members

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of the Azerbaijani government, justice and security offcials (including State
Secretary Tofg Ismailov, Deputy Prime Minister Zülfü Hacıyev, Interior
Minister Mehemmed Esedov, Attorney General İsmet Qayıbov); Kazakh
and Russian observers (including Kazakhstan’s Deputy Interior Minister
Sanlal Dasumovich Serikov and two Russian generals); journalists and others was shot down over Armenian-controlled territory. Not one passenger
survived. Diplomatic efforts collapsed entirely, negating the progress gained
from the frst two rounds of talks (BBC 2005).

1992: Internationalization and Transformation of the Confict
into War Parallel to Peace Initiatives
At a January 30, 1992 meeting in Prague for the organization now known
as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which
included Armenia and Azerbaijan, the confict became a priority issue.
Proposals for mediation drafted by Iran were rejected by both countries
in February 1992. Later that month, the European Parliament convened
in Strasbourg and decided to send observers to the region. On February
20, 1992, the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia met with their
counterpart in Moscow, where they announced their agreement to end
hostilities and lift the blockade over the settlement areas.
However, Armenia did not respond to diplomatic efforts, including a
February 24, 1992 visit by the Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayeti,
who attempted to mediate the terms for a new ceasefre. Two days later, one
of the largest massacres related to the confict occurred, when Armenia’s
armed forces and the 366th CIS regiment murdered between 200 and an
estimated 1,000 ethnic Azerbaijani civilians in Khojaly (Human Rights
Watch 1992; Newsweek, March, 16, 1992; The New York Times, March, 3,
1992; The Guardian, September, 2, 1993).
Just a few days later, the confict garnered attention at the highest
international diplomatic levels when the UN General Assembly agreed to
admit Azerbaijan and Armenia as members. Immediately afterward, citing
Article 39 of the UN Charter, Azerbaijan appealed to the UN Security
Council to intervene and facilitate negotiations to end hostilities as soon as
possible. In mid-March 1992, the UN Secretary General dispatched a delegation headed by the former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to observe
and compile a follow up report. Meanwhile, the OSCE Council of Foreign
Ministers (then known as the CSCE), with representatives of both countries
involved in the confict as well as nine other nations, including the US, met
in Helsinki on March 24, 1992. They met to assess the Khojaly massacre and
to implement the declaration for an international conference to be held in
Minsk, Belarus, during July of that year, for resolving the confict (OSCE
1992), and with Italian representative Mario Rafaelli appointed to chair the
conference.

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Politics of Ceasefre and Occupation 155
Deciding not to intervene directly, the UN Security Council backed the
Minsk Conference efforts (Sarkisyan 1998, 59), and the frst meeting took
place in Rome on April 1, 1992, while another set of delegates went to
Baku. Meanwhile, Iran sought to try again setting up mediation in late
April 1992, and on May 7, a trilateral meeting was held in Tehran with
Azerbaijani Parliament Speaker (also then deputy president) Yagub Mammadov, Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Iranian President
Hashimi Rafsanjani. The meeting led to a formal statement of eight articles for Armenia and Azerbaijan but just one day later, on May 17, the
Armenian army occupied Shusha, a strategic city in the Karabakh region,
and Lachin, which connected the region to Armenia. The sudden hostilities left many skeptical about Iran’s genuine desire for mediation along
with Armenia’s disregard for patience to see if the diplomatic process
could take hold.
When the OSCE Senior Offcials Committee convened in Helsinki on
May 21, the representatives of 51 countries, but not Armenia, voted in
favor of the draft document proposed by the Vance team, emphasizing
Azerbaijan’s claim to territorial integrity as well as the withdrawal of
all foreign military forces from the region. However, the proposal did
not advance to a conclusive vote, as the members split on Armenia’s request for including former NKAO Armenians—in effect, representing
an autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh Republic—in the third round of the
Rome talks, which were to begin in late June, followed by a fourth round
in July.
On August 26, 1992, Nazarbayev, then the Kazakhstan president, tried
to organize a new ceasefre agreement, which was codifed a day later in
the Alma-Ata Declaration and a week afterward in the Ijevan protocol,
signed on September 3 by the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Armenia and
Kazakhstan. But, as with previous diplomatic efforts, Armenia withdrew
shortly after from the Alma-Ata Declaration, leaving behind yet another
path for a peaceful resolution.
Russia stepped in with its own attempt almost immediately after, and,
on September 25, defense ministers of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia and
Georgia signed yet another ceasefre agreement in Sochi (Aslanli 2015, 67).
This agreement fell apart quickly, as Armenia and Azerbaijan exchanged
accusations about ceasefre violations while Armenia demanded the former
NKAO Armenians who were residing in Azerbaijan be allowed to send
representatives to the diplomatic negotiations.
The process continued to founder for the remainder of 1992, despite
persistent efforts to restart the negotiations. There also were further
delays in the Minsk Conference efforts, as Armenia did not retreat from
the demands, including the participation of former NKAO Armenians,
which had short-circuited every previous attempt at negotiations since the
beginning of the year.

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Failed Minsk Process, Invasion and Ineffective UNSC
Resolutions
In early 1993, nations along with regional and international organizations
continued to explore options for resolving the Karabakh confict but they
also collapsed as with previous efforts. One of the most prominent efforts
occurred on January 3, 1993, when then US President George H. W. Bush
and Russian president Boris Yeltsin jointly invited the parties to negotiate
a solution within the framework of the principles outlined in the OSCE
(formerly CSCE) efforts (Los Angeles Times, January 5, 1993). This set
the stage for talks in Rome on February 20, 1993, with representatives of
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, and the US, along with Mario Rafarelli representing the Minsk Conference. The agreement stipulated observers being
permitted to assess the actions in the region along with a ceasefre. A month
later, on March 27, hostilities erupted, when Armenian forces attacked the
Kalbajar district of Azerbaijan. A week later, on April 3, the district was
under Armenian occupation, which was widely condemned abroad (Cafersoy 2001, 85). When the OSCE (then CSCE) Senior Offcials Committee met
in late April in Prague, it called for Armenia to leave Kalbajar as a condition
for proceeding with peace talks within the Minsk Conference framework.
But, Armenia’s vote against the proposal blocked it from being formally
adopted. At the same time, on April 30, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 822 calling upon Armenian forces to withdraw
immediately from Kalbajar as well as other occupied areas. It also reiterated
UN support for the principles of inviolability of internationally recognized
borders, independence of all states and respect for territorial integrity and
rejection of the practice of land acquisition by force (UN 1993a).
Three days later, Yeltsin announced that Russia, Turkey and the US
would renew efforts to negotiate a peace under the OSCE (CSCE) framework as well as call for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Kalbajar
by May 14. Azerbaijan accepted the terms of the negotiated deal on May 17
but Armenia refused once again. Another attempt came in early June with
a two-day meeting of representatives from nine OSCE (CSCE) countries,
which resulted in an emergency action plan to implement UN Resolution
822 and to continue attempts to locate a resolution within the OSCE framework. The agreement again called upon Armenia to withdraw by June 15
and complete the process fve days later, to be followed by the arrival of 50
international observers at the beginning of July (Chorbajan, Donabedian
and Mutafan 1995, 36). The intentions were to resume negotiations on
points as highlighted in the Minsk Conference framework, by August 7.
This time, Armenia signed the plan but also noted that some forces in the
occupied regions were out of its control, and it would require an additional
month to carry out the evacuation of Kalbajar.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan’s government was in turmoil. In 1993, the fourth
government since Azerbaijan had gained independence in 1991 collapsed

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Politics of Ceasefre and Occupation 157
on June 4 after government forces failed to disarm paramilitary forces.
Armenia saw this as an opportunistic distraction so it could renew its efforts
to lay claim to the Nagorno-Karabakh territories. By June 28, Armenian
forces occupied the Aghdere district of Azerbaijan and by July 24, they
occupied a large part of the Azeri Aghdam district. Five days later, the
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 853 (UN 1993b), augmenting its
earlier one calling upon Armenian forces to withdraw from Kalbajar as well
as districts of Aghdere and Aghdam.
Armenia, meanwhile, continued advancing its invasion, launching attacks in
August on the Fuzuli and Jabrayil districts, renewing the alarm of the UN Security Council. Madeline Albright, the US representative, asked that Armenia
should take steps in the implementation of UN Security Council
Resolutions 822 and 853 regarding the conficts in the NagornoKarabakh region of Azerbaijan, end the attacks on the Fuzuli districts
of Azerbaijan, and abandon the previously occupied Kalbajar, Aghdam
and other districts.
Every diplomatic effort seemed powerless and moot, despite visits to Armenia and Azerbaijan by Rafarelli as head of the Minsk Conference Group.
Armenia rejected all initiatives as it advanced forces in other districts
including Gubatly. Meanwhile, in Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev was positioned
to become the country’s new president, promising that his administration
would be committed to regaining district territories that had been lost to
Armenia. Another Minsk Group attempt to implement an emergency action
plan failed in late September. The UN Security Council adopted yet another
statement on the crisis: Resolution 874 on October 14.
In summarizing 13 items, this latest UN Security Council resolution
cited the two previous resolutions related to the previous occupation of
Azerbaijani districts as well as materials from the Minsk Group and statements reinforcing the acknowledgment of the independence and territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan and other states, and the call for the “immediate
and unconditional withdrawal from the occupied territories” of Azerbaijan.
Without a specifed set of sanctions, the diplomatic efforts did not dissuade
Armenia from continuing its attacks. With the occupation of Horadiz
on October 23 and the Zengilan district by November 1, nearly all of the
historical territories encompassing the Karabakh region including the former NKAO districts were occupied by Armenian forces.
At the Minsk Group meeting held in November 1993, the nine nations
unanimously condemned the hostilities, demanding that the occupation end
immediately to clear the way for actions specifed in the UNSC resolutions
to be implemented and negotiations to start on the territories in question.
The proposal essentially replicated the terms of earlier attempts that had
been rebuffed by Armenia. After Armenian forces had occupied Horadiz

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and Zangilan, the UN Security Council added Resolution 884 on November
11, the fourth adopted in 1993 and again resembling the ineffectual preceding resolutions (UN 1993d). Every effort had fallen without making an
impact, revealing how impotent both the Minsk Group and the UN Security
Council had been in persuading both parties to come mutually to the table
for diplomatic negotiations. Armenia barely acknowledged the legitimacy
of any declaration or resolution calling for the end to the hostilities. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan, in the midst of its own domestic political crisis triggered
by military setbacks in attacks against rebel warlords, was not suitably
prepared to reverse the advances the Armenian forces had made.

The Process to a Ceasefre in 1994
Prior to negotiating an armistice that would hold as hostilities ebbed in
the Karabakh confict, one could assume that Armenia and Azerbaijan
were caught up in their own psychological traps. Armenia insisted that a
military campaign would be the only way to place its demands directly into
the negotiations for a peace and ceasefre. Azerbaijan had initially sought
a diplomatic settlement but then the country also had to contend with lingering remnants of old Soviet authority. Suret Huseynov, a former troop
commander in Nagorno-Karabakh, was fred by then Azerbaijani president
Abulfaz Elchibey, a former Soviet dissident. But, Huseynov gathered the
paramilitary forces that ousted Elchibey and cleared the way for Heydar
Aliyev to become acting president. Aliyev had committed to defending
militarily Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and reclaiming the districts that
Armenian forces had occupied. The war persisted in the frst months of
1994 but combat fatigue eventually affected the respective domestic political environments in both countries. The costs had outweighed the gains and
both countries’ resolve would pivot in the spring of 1994, leading to the frst
ceasefre to hold in May.
Russia had attempted to keep the war under its control, preferring to
mediate and monitor the ceasefre as an external player while embedding its
own military and regional political power interests in shaping the direction
for a stable peace (Cafersoy 2000). These factors became critical in the 1994
armistice with Russian and OSCE participation, which included Russia as a
member state of the Minsk Group. But, Russia also leveraged its presence in
the process as an opportunity to reclaim some of the geopolitical infuence
it had prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan, on the other
hand, did not want to enhance Russian infuence nor allow Russia to set
the parameters for negotiations primarily as opposed to allowing Russia to
operate only within the framework of international or regional organizations. In this context, the President of the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan
(operating as the representative of the Inter-Parliamentary Council of the
Commonwealth of Independent States) and the Special Representative of the
Russian President visited Azerbaijan and Armenia, respectively, between

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Politics of Ceasefre and Occupation 159
March 31 and April 4 to set the broader outlines of mediation (Toropygin
2019, 73) When the CIS Presidents’ Summit convened in Moscow on April
15, the heads of the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments met with Yeltsin, which followed with a declaration focusing on the status of events in the
Nagorno-Karabakh region.
The pace of diplomatic background activity picked up, with an OSCE
delegation visiting the region at the end of April. On May 4, representatives
from the Kyrgyzstan parliament and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
met with the heads of parliament from Armenia and Azerbaijan, along with
representatives of the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of the former
NKAO in Bishkek. The meeting which followed the framework of the CIS
Inter-Parliamentary Council led on May 5 to the Bishkek Protocol, which
would form the basis of the ceasefre agreement (UN 1994). At the outset,
the protocol acknowledged the authorities of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the
mediator states, and, most notably, only the Armenian representatives (separatists) of the former NKAO. Responding to the omission of Azerbaijanis
with regard to the former NKAO, Afyaddin Jalilov, vice-chairman of the
Azerbaijan National Assembly, returned to Baku without signing the protocol, despite prior assurances that the document would only involve the
signatories of the two nations involved in the confict. Vladimir Kazimirov,
a Russian Foreign Ministry offcial, went to Baku in the hopes of securing
Azerbaijan’s approval. The protocol was signed as Azerbaijan had originally intended and the NKAO would be referenced in the document with
the lesser status of interested party, and by having the representative of the
Azerbaijani community included as well. Rasul Guliyev, chairman of the
Azerbaijan National Assembly, signed the amended version.
The Bishkek Protocol briefy stated that the confict in and around the
former NKAO had harmed the Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples and other
peoples of the region and, therefore, supported the cessation of hostilities
and the reconciliation process, as outlined at the CIS Presidents’ Summit
on April 14, as well as the efforts of the Inter-Parliamentary Council. The
protocol also indicated the decisions taken by the UN Security Council and
the OSCE on the resolution of the confict (mainly UNSC’s resolutions 822,
853, 874 and 884) should be implemented. The protocol essentially encompassed the language of earlier attempts to end the confict, including the
protocol signed in Moscow by the defense ministers of Azerbaijan, Armenia
and Russia on February 18. The protocol outlined the ceasefre beginning
on May 8 as well as a broader call for displaced refugees to return to their
homes. The ceasefre took hold on May 12, three days after the respective
defense ministers formally signed the document.

From the 1994 Ceasefre to the 2020 War
The ceasefre, nevertheless, did not quell the respective efforts of both
countries from ascertaining their interests. Armenia and Azerbaijan saw

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the ceasefre as an opportunity to replenish their severely depleted military
resources and rehabilitate their economies. For Azerbaijan, the objectives
were eliminating internal political instabilities, developing energy projects
and strengthening its foreign policy profle, including an active presence in
regional and international organizations. Armenia saw the ceasefre as an
opportunity to perpetuate its military gains and to gain legal status for the
territories it occupied during the war.
Vladimir Kazimirov, the Russian representative to the Minsk Group,
frequently visited Azerbaijan and Armenia in June and July of that year,
in the hopes of strengthening the terms of the ceasefre and concluding
negotiations on a grand political agreement to resolve the confict (Abasov
and Khachatrian 2006, 46). Although Azerbaijan, under this agreement,
would have gained the opportunity to liberate other territories from Armenian occupation, the Azerbaijani delegation refused because the proposal
excluded the former NKAO and Lachin districts, including Shusha, from its
sovereign control. Furthermore, Azerbaijan hesitated to permit Russia to
have too large a military and political presence in the affairs of the affected
region. Subsequently, Azerbaijani leaders in Baku reached out to Western
powers and the OSCE in helping mediate the terms of a fnal agreement.
The Western states opposed Russia’s attempts to increase its infuence in
the Caucasus, and, expectedly, they objected to Russia’s demand to grant its
military forces the status of a UN peacekeeping force. Likewise, statements
by the governments of the US, the UK, Germany and Turkey amplifed this
point. The US’ CIS representative James Collins declared that the American
government would not allow the deployment of armed forces of any state to
the confict zone to act solely and that they prioritized seeking the solution
for the confict within the framework as defned by the OSCE. The concerns would be echoed in the OSCE’s Budapest Summit in December, which
followed the failure of the Moscow negotiations in the summer of 1994 when
Russian offcials had hoped to ink a grand political bargain for the confict while acting as sole mediator. The OSCE Senior Offcials Committee
agreed on September 16 with the concerns which had been voiced variously
by the Azerbaijani government as well as Western powers that any peacekeeping forces dispatched to the region should be multinational (Gasparyan
1999). A month later, the rotating president of OSCE at the time, Italian
Deputy Foreign Minister Antonio Martino, coordinated the terms of the
peacekeeping operations, which would include 3,000 soldiers and essential
military hardware. Any participating nation-state in the peacekeeping force
would be allowed a maximum of 30% representation and the Minsk Group
would be responsible for coordinating the operations and fow of personnel
for the purposes of peacekeeping.
In the OSCE Budapest Summit at the end of 1994, the organizational
structure of the Minsk Group was revamped from a single-term presidency
to a co-chair system. While Russia was conferred the status of permanent
co-chair, the summit delegations also decided that NATO and Russia should

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Politics of Ceasefre and Occupation 161
form a joint peacekeeping force to be placed frst in the confict zone
between Armenia and Azerbaijan (specifcally, in the Azerbaijani territories occupied by Armenia). The OSCE hoped that this arrangement
would be seen as a mutually acceptable compromise between those who
were concerned that Russia might exert far more infuence than other nation-states in resolving the confict and those who wanted to strengthen
the viability of the OSCE framework in reconciling the problems between
Armenia and Azerbaijan with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh region
(Sarkisyan 1998, 55).
Meanwhile, the question of making the ceasefre permanent had yet
to be resolved. Prior attempts had barely lasted long enough to make the
necessary corrections. This led to yet another multilateral agreement on
February 6, 1995, achieved with the co-chairs representing Russia and Sweden leading the Minsk Group efforts (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May, 13, 2019).
The ceasefre, more or less, lasted until a new outbreak of hostilities in April
2016, although in the interim, there always were occasional bursts of fre
between both sides. The scope of some ceasefre violations had been defned
so widely that many observers wondered between 1994 and 2016 when a new
war would be launched. One skirmish occurred in March 2008, following
a vigorously contested presidential election in Armenia, which led to the
UN General Assembly adopting Resolution 62–243 on March 14 demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces (UN 2008). In January
and September 2009, Armenia again attempted to attack in the direction of
Aghdam but withdrew with losses in both instances.
More skirmishes occurred after unsuccessful mediation attempts in
Moscow in 2010, once again incurring heavy losses for Armenia. Despite
calls from the Minsk Group for restraint, additional skirmishes took
place in August and September. Fears of a new war also were heightened
in November 2014, when the Armenian army was conducting military
exercises in the territory of Azerbaijan in violation of international law. An
Armenian army helicopter fying close to Azerbaijani civilian settlements
was shot down by the Azerbaijani army (BBC 2014), leading to some of the
most prolonged exchange of fre in the confict since 1994.
Although the ceasefre was violated almost every day after May 1994, the
worries about a full-blown war peaked in the April 2016 skirmishes (Shiriyev 2017). The war, which Azerbaijan and Armenia accused each other of
instigating, lasted four days before Russia’s mediation took hold. Both sides
suffered approximately the same number of casualties, estimated between
100 and 500 for each country. Numerous governments and international
organizations including the UN, OSCE and EU along with the governments
of US, Russia and Turkey condemned the renewed war. Many regional
states including Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Pakistan also
expressed their support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. After the April
2016 War, Russia intensifed its mediation efforts between the parties, with
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov leading the plan. Both sides saw the plan as

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162 Araz Aslanli
hopefully positive but nevertheless not coming to fruition as both countries
did not trust each other in their capacity to honor the terms.
The latest round of negotiations took on a similar environment of uncertainty as had been the case in the early 1990s.
The most substantial efforts in negotiations during the interim occurred
with the Madrid Principles, as adopted by the OSCE Minsk in 2009. The
principles included returning the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territories
to Azerbaijani control, along with provisional guarantees for security and
self-governance in setting an interim status for the affected territories. The
Principles also stipulated a corridor to connect Armenia to the Karabakh
area. The Principles left open the process for a permanent determination
of the legal status through a “legally blinding expression of will”, as well
as legal provisions to allow all displaced individuals and refugees to return
to their original locations of residence. Finally, the Principles called for
international security guarantees up to and including a peacekeeping force
(https://www.osce.org/mg/51152. 10 July 2009).
In the spring of 2020 Pashinyan and the Armenian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs abandoned the Madrid Principles, thereby ending ten years of
negotiation on the document which both sides had accepted in principle.
This followed Pashinyan’s August 5, 2019 exhortation for unifcation (that
is Karabakh is Armenia) and an earlier declaration by Defence Minister
David Tonoyan referencing a new war about new territories (March 30,
2019).
By July 2020, the probability of new hostilities increased dramatically.
Azerbaijani offcial sources, who were confrmed by their Turkish and
Russian counterparts as well as former Armenian President Robert
Kocharyan, said that Armenian forces provoked the newest skirmishes
(ARKA 2020). Armenia countered, indicating that clashes started on July
20 because Azerbaijan forces breached the Armenian border with Jeeps
but the claim was not ascertained. Some observers believed that a target
was in the Tovuz region of Azerbaijan, which represents the energy transit
corridors connecting Azerbaijan to the West via Georgia. An Azerbaijani
high-ranking general’s death in the latest round of hostilities also sparked
emotions in Azerbaijani public opinion briefy.
After the July provocation, Azerbaijan voiced its dissatisfaction about the
transportation of military munitions from Russia to Armenia, an indicator
that Armenia, indeed, was preparing for a broader war. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, in a phone conversation with Russian president Vladimir
Putin in August, asked to clarify the issue. Aliyev also spoke about his
country’s worries that Armenia was preparing for a new war before the UN
General Assembly in September. He asked that the UN put more pressure
on Armenia to abide by and act accordingly upon the four existing resolutions regarding the Karabakh confict.
Diplomatic pleas went unanswered and a new Karabakh War began in
the early hours of September 27. The latest hostilities accelerated at a faster

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Politics of Ceasefre and Occupation 163
pace than in the frst war during the 1990s. Three ceasefre attempts (October
10, 17 and 26) with Russia, France and the US acting as mediators also went
unanswered (New York Times, October 17, 2020). The prospects for compromise were bleak. Armenia advanced its case for its national foreign policy as
carrying out new wars for new territories, which this time targeted civilian
settlements far from the confict zone. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, insisted that
any agreement take into account the four standing resolutions passed by
the UN Security Council, which called for the repatriation of the Armenian-occupied territories to Azerbaijan’s control. Thus, the probability that
one side would prevail with a far more defnitive result than in the last war
was high as well.
Unlike, in the 1990s, when its domestic political situation was unstable
and its military was not well equipped or funded, Azerbaijan entered the
2020 war in a stronger position, while enjoying a favorable ally in Turkey to
counteract Russia’s infuence and presence. In the war’s fnal days, the outcome became apparent, as Azerbaijani forces liberated Shusha, a strategic
victory with acute symbolic meaning for Azerbaijani identity, and cleared
the way to retake Khankendi a few kilometers away. On November 9, the
expectations that the war was about to end with a total military defeat of
Armenia were confrmed by three incidents. First, a Russian helicopter was
shot down on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border with an Azerbaijani missile.
Second, Armenian-launched Iskander missiles targeting Shusha and Baku
were intercepted and destroyed before landing. Third, messages on social
media from Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan indicated that a “peace
agreement under heavy conditions” was being signed, which occurred on
November 10.
The agreement terms confrmed Azerbaijan’s conclusive defeat of Armenia, with the liberation of all contested and occupied territories and the
deployment of a Russian peacekeeping force in the region. Armenian governmental offcials attempted to frame the terms as positively as possible,
noting that the agreement preserved Armenian sovereignty, albeit without
the territories it had occupied since 1994. Nevertheless, the latest armistice,
when viewed in context with what transpired in the last quarter century,
makes evident that much work remains to be accomplished in drafting a
comprehensive plan for a sustainable, durable peace.

Conclusion
Although one can trace the historical roots of the Armenia-Azerbaijan
confict back at least two centuries, the most consequential period occurred
in short periods at both ends of the twentieth century—in particular, the
ten years spanning the latter half of the 1980s and the frst half of the 1990s.
While the confict escalated particularly in the last four years of the Soviet
Union’s existence, the skirmishes in 1990 and 1991 accelerated into a fullscale war in 1992. Regional and international powers had hoped to keep

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164 Araz Aslanli
the confict at a simmering stage while preventing it from boiling over into
a full-blown war, even as there were diplomatic opportunities to explore
solutions through negotiations in a geopolitical climate that had shifted the
spheres of infuence with the Soviet collapse. When the parties acted with
the feeling of “completing their historical missions” or “compensating what
they paid for”, the war was prosecuted, only to end with a ceasefre in 1994
that did not come about easily, save for the reason of combat fatigue amidst
circumstances of depleted resources for both the Armenian and Azerbaijani
militaries.
In the 1990s, Azerbaijan claimed that the Nagorno-Karabakh region
legally and historically belonged to her, believing that diplomatic means
would affrm this. On the other hand, Armenia sought to exercise its own
claim through invasion, concluding that the Karabakh region was naturally
a part of Greater Armenia, a position supported by Russia and Iran, both
militarily and diplomatically. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, had the diplomatic and military support of Turkey, although such backing was not as
pronounced or as direct as in the case of Russia with Armenia. Another
key counterpoint centered, respectively, on economic and political concerns, with Western powers eying prospects of lucrative partnerships with
Azerbaijan because of the country’s generous stock of natural resources as
well as the political infuence of a deeply coordinated network of Armenian
lobby groups with legislatures and parliaments in the Western powers. The
pall of exhaustion led to the signing of the armistice in 1994 but there also
was no articulated path to negotiating a sustainable peace. The situation
ended in a deadlock, a frozen state where likely a new war eventually would
be triggered.
There are numerous reasons why so many ceasefre attempts, peace
negotiations and solution processes failed, in addition to just those directly
involving Armenia and/or Azerbaijan. Undoubtedly, the unconditional
extremes respectively taken up by both nations made compromise extremely
diffcult to achieve. Both countries were responding to embedded, subconscious traces of untreated and unresolved historical traumas, entrenched
ethnic nationalism and fresh wounds opened up from decades-old scabs
that accompanied the destruction of community and widespread casualties
on both sides. Together, these factors constituted a foreboding psychological obstacle in terms of preparing a mindset conducive to effective bilateral
diplomatic engagement.
Meanwhile, foreign powers, inadvertently and deliberately in some
instances, have perpetuated this complex of psychological obstacles through
their misinformed intentions of intervention in the confict, without acknowledging that their acts could trigger mutual hatred and ignite uncontrollable
forces of extreme nationalism. Thus, mediators failed to uphold their duty
by appreciating clearly such embedded manifestations in the affairs and
interests defning the nations in the South Caucasus. Global rivalries were
translated into struggles for controlling the diplomatic engagement in the

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Politics of Ceasefre and Occupation 165
region, mainly for the purpose of status quo, which inhibited the process
and the environment for fostering a durable resolution to a confict that had
stood for at least two centuries.
In particular, Russia had dodged the confict’s entrenched parameters,
at the beginning and the end of its 75-year existence as the Soviet Union.
Simply, Russia, by successfully implementing a strategy of divide and rule,
kept control in the South Caucasus, exploiting the factors of Armenia’s territorial claims against Azerbaijan and the always present probability of hostilities or full-blown war. But, the situation also was never mitigated by the
approach nor the diplomatic stances taken up by the UN, OSCE and other
international and regional organizations, which believed they could resolve
the confict. The UN Security Council failed to make serious attempts to
implement the four resolutions adopted in 1993 or to advocate sanctions
that might have compelled Armenia to come in good faith to the bargaining
table. In 2020, as the Second Karabakh War erupted, the four resolutions
were still active but they barely registered as a usable foundation in attempts
to prevent war from erupting.
Despite efforts and resolutions calling upon Armenia to vacate the
affected territories by the UN General Assembly, the European Parliament,
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly, Armenia did not cede even a modicum of consideration to the efforts. Furthermore, none of the great powers or regional
actors followed up by persuading Armenia to reconsider their stance or even
to chastise Armenian efforts to sabotage any of the mediation attempts,
which often were serious and substantial. Ceasefre violations were generally smaller in scale and reconcilable without jeopardizing ongoing efforts
to achieve a comprehensive sustainable peace plan. After 1994, the closest
the parties arrived at an acceptable plan was in 1997 with a progressive
solution proposed by the OSCE Minsk Group and which was accepted by
both countries. However, Armenia’s president Ter-Petrosyan, who accepted
the plan, resigned in February 1998 and his successor Robert Kocharyan
immediately renounced the process. In 1999, direct (non-mediator) negotiations between the parties, which were facilitated by a proposal from the
Clinton Administration in Washington, D.C., were on the verge of culminating in a peace agreement at the OSCE Istanbul Summit. But, a domestic
terrorist attack by Armenians against their country’s parliament on October
27 abruptly ended the negotiations (New York Times, October, 28, 1999).
In the second half of the 2000s, negotiations proceeded more along the
lines of preserving the frozen confict status than in resolving the issues
at the heart of the confict. The political will for reconciliation had been
diluted, with frustrations being vented in occasionally hot outbursts on the
frontlines. In its place, Azerbaijani offcials spoke more often about military
action to ensure the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions,
while Armenia government representatives talked more about the objective
of new wars for new lands. The war, which began on September 27, 2020,

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was inevitable, given that every nation-state, including the two at the heart
of the confict, defaulted to actions and rhetoric, which merely preserved a
status quo without resolving any of the entrenched issues in the context of
realistic policies.

References
Abasov, Ali, Haroutiun Khachatrian. The Karabakh Confict Variants of Settlement:
Concepts and Reality, 3rd ed. (Baku-Yerevan, 2006): Areat-Noyan Tapan.
‘Armenian Authorities Did Everything to Make War in Nagorno-Karabakh
Inevitable, Ex-President Kocharyan Says,’ Arka (5 December 2020), http://arka.
am/en/news/politics/armenian_authorities_did_everything_to_make_war_in_
nagorno_karabakh_inevitable_ex_president_kocharya/
Aslanli, Araz. Karabağ Sorunu ve Türkiye-Ermenistan İlişkileri [Karabakh Confict
and Turkey-Armenia Relations] (Ankara, 2015): Berikan.
‘Azerbaijan Downs Armenian Helicopter,’ BBC (12 November 2014), https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-30025296.
‘The Bishkek Protocol,’ United Nations (1994), https://peacemaker.un.org/
armeniaazerbaijan-bishkekprotocol94
Bloodshed in the Caucasus: Escalation of the Armed Confict in Nagorno Karabakh
(Helsinki, 1992): Human Rights Watch.
Boudreaux, Richard. “Despite Appeals, Karabakh Battles Rage”, Los Angeles
Times (5 January 1993).
Cafersoy, Nazim. Elçibey Dönemi Azerbaycan Dış Politikası (Haziran 1992–Haziran
1993) [Azerbaijan Foreign Policy during the Elchibey Period (June 1992–June
1993)] (Ankara, 2001): ASAM.
Cafersoy, Nazim. Eyalet-merkez düzeyinden eşit statüye: Azerbaycan-Rusya ilişkileri (1991–2000) [From Region-Center Relationship Level to Equal Status:
Azerbaijan-Russia Relations (1991–2000)] (Ankara, 2000): ASAM.
Chorbajan, Levon, Patrik Donabedian and Claude Mutafan. The Caucasian Knot:
The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno Karabagh (London, 1995): Zed Books.
Cornell, Svante E. The Nagorno-Karabakh Confict. Report No. 46 (Uppsala, 1999):
Uppsala University, Department of East European Studies.
de Waal, Thomas. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War
(New York, 2003): New York University Press.
‘The Face of a Massacre,’ Newsweek (16 March 1992).
Gasparyan, Arsen. ‘Dinamika Karabakskovo Konfikta; Rol Rossiskoy Federasii v
Evo Uregulirovanii,’ Central Asian and the Caucasus (1999), 6, https://www.ca-c.
org/journal/cac-06-1999/gasparyan.shtml
‘General Assembly Adopts Resolution Reaffrming Territorial Integrity of Azerbaijan, Demanding Withdrawal of All Armenian Forces,’ United Nations (14 March
2008), https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/ga10693.doc.htm.
‘Helsinki Additional Meeting of the CSCE Council 24 March 1992 Summary of
Conclusions,’ OSCE (1992), http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1992/03/4150_
en.pdf.
‘Ilham Aliyev Delivered a Speech at General Debates of 75th Session of United
Nations General Assembly in a Video Format,’ President of the Republic of Azerbaijan (24 September 2020), https://en.president.az/articles/40937.

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Politics of Ceasefre and Occupation 167
‘Joint Statement of the Heads of State in Tehran,’ United Nations (1992), https://
peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ArmeniaAzerbaijanIran_
JointStatementHeadsofState1992.pdf
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August 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/news/newsid_3681000/3681079.
stm
Kocharyan, Robert. Жизнь и свобода: Автобиография экс-президента Армении
и Карабаха [Life and Freedom: Autobiography of ex-President of Armenia and
Karabakh] (Moscow, 2018): Интеллектуальная литература.
‘Massacre by Armenians,’ The New York Times (3 March 1992).
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Nagorno-Karabakh], Nezavisimaya Gazeta (13 May 2019).
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Politics in the Region] (Yerevan, 1998): Армянский Центр Стратегических и
Национальных Исследований.
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Toropygin, A. V. and Торопыгин, А. В. ‘Бишкекский протокол. Как это было:
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Comments], Eurasian Integration: Economics, Law, Politics (2019), 1(1), 71–78.
Trianovski, Anton. ‘Armenia and Azerbaijan Reach New Cease-Fire for
Nagorno-Karabakh,’ The New York Times (17 October 2020), https://www.
nytimes.com/2020/10/17/world/europe/armenia-azerbaijan-truce-nagornokarabakh.html
Wines, Michael. ‘Prime Minister and Others Slain in Armenian Siege’. The New
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sites/peacemaker.un.org/fles/Azerbaijan_ZheleznovodskDeclaration1991.pdf

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8

The Nagorno-Karabakh
Confict
International Law Appraisal
Farhad Mirzayev

History of the Confict
The confict over Nagorno-Karabakh, a historic land of Azerbaijan, started
after collapse of the Russian Empire in the beginning of the twentieth century, when Armenia brought territorial claims against Azerbaijan and
heavy fghts took place all over the borders of two unrecognised states. At
the end of WWI in 1918, before consideration of its recognition as an independent state by the League of Nations, Azerbaijan was mandated to Britain.1 The British Governor-General Thomson of Baku, who was representing
the allied forces of the Entente, recognised Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan,
and approved the appointment of an Azerbaijani national as a Governor of
Karabakh.2 Thompson called upon Armenian armed forces to immediately
leave Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur (currently the Syunik region of Armenia) and assisted in the restoration of Baku’s administration in the regions.3
Immediately after granting the British mandate and restoration of
Azerbaijani control over Karabakh, the Armenian elders of Karabakh
offcially recognised the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh
upon the condition of a national-cultural autonomy to the Armenian population of Karabakh.4 The Paris Peace Conference later accepted and
recognised Azerbaijan’s claims to the region.5
However, after the occupation of Azerbaijan and Armenia by Soviet
Russia in 1920, Armenia brought new claims with respect to Karabakh.
After lengthy debates and pursuant to the opinion of Armenian leaders supporting the existence of strong economic ties of Karabakh with
Azerbaijan on 5 July 1921, the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee
of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks made a decision to keep the
Nagorno-Karabakh region within Azerbaijan’s boundaries.6 The decision
also instructed the Azerbaijan authorities to determine the boundaries of
the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO).7
In December 1922 the Presidium of the Central Committee of the
Azerbaijan SSR Communist Party made a decision on the establishment
of autonomy covering only the mountainous part of Karabakh. This decision was reaffrmed in the Resolution of the Committee of 2 July 1923.8

DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-11
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169

As a result, autonomy with the total area of 4,400 square kilometres without any territorial connection with Armenia was established within the
Azerbaijan SSR. The territory and boundaries of the NKAO were defned
with an intention of encompassing the majority of the Armenian population through including Armenian villages and settlements and excluding
Azerbaijani ones.9 As a result, by 1989 the Armenian population of the
NKAO constituted over 76% versus 21% of the Azerbaijani population.10
During the late 1980s, the last years of the Soviet Empire, the nationalistic
forces came to power in Armenia and commenced an aggressive campaign
on the occupation of Karabakh. Armenia was characterised as more violent
and chaotic at the beginning of the confict in 1988 where the innocent
Azerbaijanis were killed during pogroms in November and December.11
The hostility between Azerbaijan and Armenia commenced in 1987 with
the forceful expatriation of ethnic Azerbaijanis from their historic lands in
Armenia, and as a result, over 300,000 Azerbaijanis left the Armenian SSR
and over 200 people were killed in this violent exodus.12
The initial stage of the “war of laws” started when on 20 February
1988 the 20th Congress of NKAO’s Armenian Delegates made a decision
to secede from the Azerbaijan SSR and unify with the Armenian SSR.13
The decision was made without the Azerbaijani delegates. The Congress
of Armenian Delegates appealed to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with
the request to approve the secession decision. However, on 13 June 1988,
acting in full compliance with the norms of Soviet legislation, the Supreme
Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR declared illegal the decision of the Congress
of Armenian Delegates of Nagorno-Karabakh.14 In response, the radical
nationalistic authorities of the Armenian SSR undertook reciprocal measures. On 15 June 1988 the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR enacted the
Resolution approving the decision of the Congress of Armenian Delegates
on unifcation of the NKAO of the Azerbaijan SSR with the Armenian SSR,
and submitted a request to Moscow’s leadership to support this decision.15
The follow-up resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
Azerbaijan SSR recognised as void and unconstitutional the secession
decision of the NKAO’s legislature as contradicting Azerbaijan’s and the
USSR’s legislation.16 The culmination of the confict took place when the
Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR adopted the Act “On unifcation of the
Armenian SSR and the NKAO”.17 In January 1990 the Armenian Supreme
Soviet voted to include Nagorno-Karabakh in the programme of its budget
and this step was another move by Armenia within the “war of laws”. It is
notable since Armenia, which had been denying its direct involvement in
the Nagorno-Karabakh confict since its commencement, undertook certain provocative illegal steps for the legitimisation of its claims to NKAO
and made a unilateral decision on unifcation. It can be argued that the
1 December 1989 Decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR
and other acts were evidence of the direct involvement of Armenia in the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict since the frst days.

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Farhad Mirzayev

Soviet Constitutional Law
Since international law refers the issues of self-determination to the internal
jurisdiction of states it is important to briefy analyse the USSR’s domestic
legislation.18 Armenia’s action within the “war of laws” was an unprecedented step contradicting the norms and principles of the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws. The Supreme Soviet authorities expressly recognised
the absence of any grounds for a change of the boundaries and territorial
frameworks of the Azerbaijan SSR and the Armenian SSR. In fact, Armenia’s actions were unprecedented attempts to redraw the territorial map
of the USSR.19 On 23 March 1988 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of
the USSR in its Resolution “On measures relating to the application of the
Union republics with respect to the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, the
Azerbaijan SSR and the Armenian SSR” recognised it as being unacceptable to resolve the complicated territorial issues through the self-established
entities that were trying to affect decisions of the supreme state authorities of the USSR.20 Thus, the Presidium declared void and null the actions
aimed at the illegal change of the Soviet republics’ boundaries, which were
in confict with the USSR Constitution.21 During the plenary session of the
USSR Supreme Soviet on 18 July 1988 it was reaffrmed that the NagornoKarabakh region had to be preserved within the Azerbaijan SSR and the
Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev blamed Armenians in undermining
the communist regime and his policy of perestroika.22
In the Resolution dated 18 July 1988 “On decisions of the Supreme Soviets of the Armenian SSR and the Azerbaijan SSR regarding NagornoKarabakh issue” the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR declared
the change of the boundaries of the Azerbaijan SSR and the Armenian SSR
as being constitutionally inadmissible under Article 78 of the USSR Constitution stipulating that territories of the union republics could not be changed
without their consent.23 Finally, the Resolution of the Presidium of 10 January 1990 “On incompliance of the acts of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR on Nagorno-Karabakh of 1 December 1989 and 9th January
1990 with USSR Constitution” reaffrmed that the declaration on unifcation
of Nagorno-Karabakh with the Armenian SSR without the consent of the
Azerbaijan SSR was a serious breach of Article 78 of the USSR Constitution.24 On 27 November 1991 the Constitutional Supervisory Committee of
the USSR declared the 1 December 1989 Act of the Armenian SSR on unifcation with the NKAO void and illegal.25 The positions of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet and the Constitutional Supervisory Committee of the USSR
are strong grounds to argue that since the beginning the actions of Armenia
against Azerbaijan were illegal and a grave violation of the Soviet legislation.
The central Moscow authorities reacted with mass criticism and called
it an extremist attempt to violate Soviet laws.26 Pursuant to Article 78 of
the USSR Constitution that imposed a restriction on territorial changes of
Soviet republics without their express consent, the Supreme Soviet of the

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USSR on 18 July 1988 made a decision to keep Nagorno-Karabakh within
the Azerbaijan SSR.27 However, the Soviet leadership established a direct
central administration of Moscow in the NKAO. On 24 March 1988 the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union made a
decision to appoint Arkady Volsky as a representative of the central Soviet
Government in the NKAO.28 Having established a direct administration of
the Moscow central authorities and through support of the Armenian forces,
Volsky created favourable conditions for the Armenian militarised groups
to serve as foundation for further occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh.29
On 28 November 1989 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR abolished Volsky’s
commission and replaced it with the Republican Organisation Committee
(Orgcom) of the Azerbaijan SSR.30 The main goal of the Orgcom was the
restoration of the Azerbaijan SSR’s jurisdiction over the autonomous region
and the re-establishment of the local self-governing bodies. However, facing the military resistance of the Armenian armed groups Orgcom was not
able to achieve its main goal. On 10 December 1991 immediately after the
proclamation of independence by Azerbaijan, the Armenian separatists
of Nagorno-Karabakh held a referendum without the participation of the
Azerbaijani population of Nagorno-Karabakh, which at that time constituted 20% of the total population of Nagorno-Karabakh and proclaimed
independence from Azerbaijan.31 The so-called “referendum” on unifcation with Armenia was just a collection of signatures from the NKAO’s
farms and factories.32
The Declaration of Independence of “the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”
(“NKR”) of 2 September 1991 proclaiming the secession from Azerbaijan
was a serious breach of the Soviet Constitution since legislation providing
for those territories of the Union republics could not be changed without
their consent and their boundaries could be changed only upon the achievement of mutual consent of the relevant republics that had to be approved
by the offcial authorities of the USSR. Like the USSR Constitution, both
the Azerbaijan SSR and the Armenian SSR constitutions prohibited the
change of territory or boundaries without the express consent of these
Soviet republics.33 Under the Law of the Azerbaijan SSR on the NKAO
the boundaries of this autonomous region could not be changed without
Azerbaijan’s consent.
Immediately after the collapse of the USSR, Armenia and its military
proxy forces in Nagorno-Karabakh fnanced by the Armenian diaspora and
with great support of the former Soviet and now Russian regular armed
forces still stationed in the region, commenced the active military phase
against Azerbaijan through portraying it as a liberation movement of the
Karabakhi Armenians. NKAO and seven adjacent regions of Kalbajar,
Lachin, Aghdam, Fizuli, Zangilan, Qubadli and Jabrail were occupied
by the Armenian armed forces and its proxies. The UN Security Council
reacted to this occupation by its four Resolutions Nos. 822, 853, 874 and
884 demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces

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172 Farhad Mirzayev
from the occupied territories.34 It resulted not only in the loss of 20% of
Azerbaijan’s territory constituting 890 towns, villages and settlements, 1
million refugees and IDPs, but also in multibillion losses and the deaths
of 25,000 and the injury of 50,000 Azerbaijanis.35 The exodus of IDPs in
Azerbaijan as a result of the Armenian occupation was the biggest one in
Europe since the end of WWII.36
The 1977 USSR Constitution preceded by the 1924 and 1936 constitutions
explicitly determined the holders of the secession right, limiting their number
to the 15 Soviet republics, constitutional parts of the USSR.37 NKAO was
an autonomous region within the Azerbaijan SSR and clearly had no secession right under the 1977 USSR Constitution in contrast to the Azerbaijan
SSR and the Armenian SSR along with the other 13 Soviet republics.
Only after the declaration of independence by Azerbaijan in response
to the illegal actions of the Armenian Supreme Soviet and the declaration of independence by Nagorno-Karabakh on 2 September 1991, did the
Azerbaijan legislature pass the Act revoking the NKAO on 26 November
1991.38 Azerbaijan justifed it as a response to the aggressive and illegal
actions of Armenia.39

International Law
One of the main arguments of Armenia was that there were not any grounds
for newly independent Azerbaijan to claim succession to Azerbaijan SSR’s
boundaries even though modern independent Azerbaijan had declared
itself as a successor state of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR)
that existed in 1918–1920 in its 1991 Independence Declaration.40 Based on
this contorted reasoning, it is claimed that Nagorno-Karabakh was not a
part of ADR and was a disputed territory.41
In this case it should be referred to the principle of stability of boundary treaties that was further incorporated in Article 62 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.42 The stability of boundary treaties regardless of the fundamental change of circumstances is a norm of customary international law.43 This has been incorporated into the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of International Treaties (Article 62) which is widely
recognised as a scope of norms of customary international law.44 Although
there are some views that the principle on the stability of boundary treaties
can be applied only with respect to the external boundaries of the USSR,
in this case it also should be applied to the status of Soviet republics under
Soviet legislation. All republics of the USSR being parts of the Union had
exact internal borders with each other. It was affrmed in Article 78 of the
USSR Constitution that the territories and boundaries of Soviet republics
could not be changed without their consent and all boundaries between
them should be changed only in accordance with their mutual consent and
under the bilateral treaties which should be approved afterwards by the Union’s central authorities.

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No agreements regarding the change of the territories or boundaries between Azerbaijan and Armenia were ever signed and ratifed. The
boundaries between these two Soviet republics were clearly defned in the
beginning of the last century.45 The numerous boundary treaties between
these republics affrmed the fnal demarcation and delimitation of the borders between them. In the case of Azerbaijan, along with such internal
agreements with respect to the change of borders with three Soviet republics
(RSFSR, Armenian SSR and Georgian SSR), there is still a valid multilateral
treaty referred to as the Treaty of Kars concluded among Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia with the Turkish Republic.46 In fact, neither Azerbaijan
SSR, nor independent Azerbaijan ever expressed its consent to the secession
of Nagorno-Karabakh or its territorial transfer to Armenia or its predecessor, the Armenian SSR.
It is necessary to refer to the Soviet laws providing an express right to
secession to the 15 Soviet republics, which can be defned based on the 1977
USSR Constitution (article 72) and the established internal administrative
borders among these republics. The administrative borders of the former
15 USSR republics encompassed the territories which they proclaimed as
their state territories after their declaration of independence upon the collapse of the Soviet Union. Most of self-proclaimed separatist units in the
post-Soviet area who declared their secession from the former USSR republics were integral parts of those republics under the latest 1977 Soviet Constitution.47 Under the 1977 USSR Constitution, Nagorno-Karabakh was
an autonomous region of the Azerbaijan SSR. The Badinter Commission
on Yugoslavia in its Opinions No. 2 and 3, clearly stressed that only those
Yugoslav republics were entitled to exercise the right to secession who were
granted it under the SRFY Constitution.48 As it has been already emphasised, NKAO did not and could not exercise such right under the USSR’s
1991 Secession Law.
In the case of the USSR, the Constitution of which prohibited the change
of territory and boundaries of the union republics (Article 78), such reference should be considered as a ground for the application of uti possidetis
juris towards the boundaries of Azerbaijan inherited from the Azerbaijan
SSR. As it was mentioned previously, the same provisions were in the SFRY
Constitution, and the Badinter Commission took it as a ground for strengthening the justifcation for the application of uti possidetis juris towards the
administrative boundaries of the former constitutional units of SFRY.49
The provision on the right of secession by the Soviet Constitution granting such right to the Union republics is essential for application of the
principle uti possidetis juris. Professor Malcolm N. Shaw rightly comments
that uti possidetis is operable only in cases where the internal administrative borders were expressly defned, especially in a federal state.50 In fact,
in the federative-type states, administrative units enjoyed much autonomy
and possessed clearly defned administrative borders. In the case of the
USSR, the references to the constitutional right to secession are important

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for determining the status of the administrative units and the scope of their
rights over the territories that they possessed.
It can be argued that the provisions of the USSR Constitution stipulating
the right to secession of the “sovereign Union republics” as well the ones
proclaiming the impossibility of the change of such republics’ territories,
served as a solid ground for consensual application of the principle of uti
possidetis juris transforming the former administrative borders into the
international boundaries of the newly independent states. The reference to
the secession right and other relevant provisions of the USSR Constitution,
at the top of the hierarchy of legal instruments, should not raise any doubts
about the explicit delimitation of the administrative boundaries within the
Soviet Union and at the highest state level.
The Republic of Azerbaijan was recognised by the international community within its existing boundaries that include also the Nagorno-Karabakh
region. Such position has been explicitly expressed by the PACE Special Rapporteur David Atkinson who emphasised that the boundaries of Azerbaijan
were recognised by the international community in 1991 upon the recognition of its independence and defnitely included the Nagorno-Karabakh
region.51
The Armenian side often refers to the right to external self-determination of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh as a justifcation for the territorial claims to Azerbaijan. There are some thoughts that
self-determination is a strong ground for the changes of boundaries in the
post-Soviet area.52 It should be frst defned whether the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh is a people for the purposes of the right to
self-determination. As it was mentioned before there is no explicit defnition of “people” under International Law. However, it should be argued that
the Armenian population could not be regarded as a “people” since it does
not include the Azerbaijani population forcefully expelled from NagornoKarabakh. It is obvious that under International Law the right to external
self-determination cannot be granted to all peoples, groups or minorities.
This has been clearly addressed by UN Special Rapporteur Asbjorn Eide
who emphasised that it is highly negative to claim that all peoples of all territories have the right to such self-determination.53 If to go far beyond the
existing interpretation of the term “people” in modern International Law
and refer to Hans Kelsen’s understanding of “people” as a state,54 then no
legitimate grounds for the self-determination of the Armenian population
of the Nagorno-Karabakh region can be produced by Armenia.
Even the “remedial theory” to external self-determination granting the
secession right to minorities arising as a response to the gross violation
of their rights or prevention of their right to exercise their internal selfdetermination55 is not applicable to the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh
confict. There are suffcient facts and arguments confrming the absence of
any evidence on the violation of the rights of the Armenian population of
Nagorno-Karabakh by the central Azerbaijan authorities.

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Therefore, it should be argued that if no grounds for the external selfdetermination exist, the reference should be made to the principle of uti
possidetis preserving Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and boundaries.
It can be argued that in the case of Azerbaijan the Council of Europe explicitly defned that in case of a confict between these two principles, the
right to self-determination can be exercised only without violation of the
principle of territorial integrity and only through the peaceful means. In
response to the request of Azerbaijan’s delegation, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe stated that exercise of the right to self-determination should comply with all norms and principles of International
Law including the principle of territorial integrity.56 The Committee further
stated that the right to self-determination can be exercised only through
peaceful negotiations, and the use of force for the occupation of territory
cannot be recognised as legal.57 Therefore, after the UNSC the Council of
Europe was the second authoritative organisation that confrmed that in the
case of Nagorno-Karabakh the use of force is not acceptable for the exercise of external self-determination by the Armenians through the violation
of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. It should be noted that the NagornoKarabakh Armenians did not try even to negotiate peacefully their right
to self-determination with the central Baku authorities. Instead they chose
the military way to secede from Azerbaijan and even went far beyond this
through the occupation of additional surrounding Azerbaijani territories.
Since the beginning of the confict Azerbaijan has chosen a denial policy
through non-recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as a party to the confict
and rejecting all arguments in favour of external self-determination of
the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. For instance, the 10
December 1991 referendum in Armenian populated Nagorno-Karabakh that
announced NKAO as an independent state was never accepted or approved
by Azerbaijan or any of its state authorities. Azerbaijan basically demanded
the liberation of the occupied territories and the negotiation of the status
of Nagorno-Karabakh, but with the primary condition of preserving its
territorial integrity and inviolability of internationally recognised boundaries that includes also Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan has been relying
much on International Law and the position of the international community recognising its territorial integrity and boundaries. The occupation of
Azerbaijani territories was expressly condemned in the UN SC Resolutions
822, 853, 874 and 884, UN GA Resolutions 48/11, 60/285 and 62/243; PACE
Resolutions 1059, 1119, 1416, 1553 and 2085, EU Parliament Resolutions 2216
and 2315; OIC Resolutions 21/9, 25/9, 10/11, 10/37, 9/39, 10/42, 10/43, 4/43 and
12/46, etc.58
Moreover, by occupying the Azerbaijani territories for many years which
resulted in ethnic cleansing, mass destruction of Azerbaijani cultural and
religious establishments, heritage and property in those occupied territories
Armenia is in a breach of its obligations to prohibit and eliminate discrimination, and guarantee enjoyment of cultural rights by Azerbaijanis under

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Articles 1, 2 and 5 of the 1969 International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Both Armenia (1993) and
Azerbaijan (1996) joined and ratifed CERD and accepted International
Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction, which gives grounds to Azerbaijan to
bring Armenia to the ICJ.

Effective Control and Occupation by Armenia
In accordance with international law, if a territory is under occupation,
then the norms of international humanitarian law are applied, and the
party occupying this territory is fully responsible for violation of the norms
of international law. Despite Armenia’s denial of its role, and intention to
introduce Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent party of the confict, the
former’s direct involvement in the occupation of the Azerbaijani territories
and the exercise of control over them never caused any doubts. The landmark case in this regard is the Decision of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) in the case of Chiragov and others v. Armenia (2015), where
pursuant to the claim of the Azerbaijani IDPs from Lachin, the ECHR
clearly determined that from the very frst day of the confict Armenia exercised effective control over the self-proclaimed “NKR” and the latter entity
can in no way be considered an independent state, and there is the highest
degree of integration between Armenia and the “NKR”.59 The ECHR in
its earlier Zalyan, Sargsyan and Serobyan v. Armenia case in 2016 also confrmed this fact about “complete political, military and fnancial control”
by Armenia over the so-called formation of “NKR”.60 This was again reaffrmed by the ECHR in 2016 in the case of Muradyan v Armenia, where the
Court reaffrmed Armenia’s full responsibility for international violations
in the occupied territories, including the European Convention on Human
Rights.61
For almost 30 years of the occupation of the Azerbaijani territories,
Armenia committed various crimes under international law62 including
illegal settlement of Syrian and Lebanese Armenians in the occupied territories for the purposes of changing the demographic situation and attempting
to create a fait accompli,63 drug traffcking,64 illegal arms trading,65 money
laundering,66 urbicide by wiping out completely Azerbaijani cities and other
settlements,67 pillage, destruction of historical and cultural heritage68 and
environmental crimes.69

Territorial Integrity and Uti Possidetis v. Self-Determination
The issues of changing borders as a result of secession without the intervention
of other states are the subject falling under the scope of the constitutional
law of a concerned state.70 As a clear example the reference should be made
to Catalonia’s attempts to secede from Spain, where the issue was considered
exclusively within the framework of the constitutional law of Spain, which

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is confrmed by the decision of the Constitutional Court of Spain from 2017
on the non-constitutionality of the secession of Catalonia.71 A similar situation was in the case of Quebec’s attempts to secede from Canada, where
the Supreme Court of Canada also confrmed the inadmissibility of such
secession within the framework of Canadian constitutional law.72
In addition, the need for a constitutional right to secession was especially
emphasised by the Badinter Commission in the case of recognition of the
legitimacy of secession on the part of only six former constitutional units
of the SFRY, but not individual autonomous subjects.73 The international
community has recognised that only those units that have been granted
such a right by the Yugoslav constitution have the right of secession.74
Similarly, the Soviet Constitution granted the right of secession to only 15
union republics. Therefore, Armenia’s arguments that Nagorno-Karabakh
was never a part of Azerbaijan and it lawfully seceded from the USSR under
the Soviet laws are groundless.
The Badinter Commission’s opinions on the confict of external selfdetermination and uti possidetis in the case of Yugoslavia confrm the inadmissibility on the use of external self-determination for the change of
existing boundaries of newly independent states that were constitutional
units of the SFRY.75 Undoubtedly, there are many similarities between these
two socialist federations, their constitutions and federative organisation
structures. Like the collapse of Yugoslavia,76 in the course of the USSR’s
dissolution the international community did not recognise the right of autonomous republics and oblasts to external self-determination.77 In the case
of Yugoslavia, it was expressly stated that the former autonomous units,
being parts of the six former constitutional units of the SFRY, were entitled
to the right to external self-determination neither under the SFRY Constitution (which lacked any provisions on secession right of the autonomous
units) nor under modern international law protecting territorial integrity
and internationally recognised boundaries of sovereign states.78 The Badinter Commission referred to the 1974 SFRY Constitution, which stipulated
that territories and borders of the four constitutional units of the SFRY
could not be changed without their consent.79
An identical stance can be applied to the USSR republics, where article
78 of the 1977 USSR Constitution expressly provided that the territories of
the Soviet republics could not be changed without their consent.80 While
the NKAO was not entitled under the Soviet Constitution to the secession
right, claims on the exercise of the right to secession from Azerbaijan upon
the USSR’s dissolution are groundless. As opined by some commentators,
there could be no “secession from secession” by the autonomous units of the
former Soviet republics since these units have a right to secession neither
under domestic laws nor under international law.81 As mentioned above,
the position of various states and international organisations remains
unchanged and there is no support for external self-determination impairing the territorial integrity of existing sovereign states.82

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In fact, the dissolution of the USSR was more peaceful than that of the
SFRY. Under the provisions of the Soviet Constitution which granted the
secession right to the former 15 constitutional units of the USSR within
their former administrative borders, they peacefully agreed on the transformation of such borders into the international boundaries of newly independent states. Such decision was expressly refected in numerous bilateral
and multilateral treaties and instruments initiated and signed within the CIS
format. Armenia signed and joined all these agreements without a single
reservation, which means an express agreement to recognise Azerbaijan’s
international boundaries within the former administrative borders of the
Azerbaijan SSR. Under the principle of uti possidetis Nagorno-Karabakh is
a part of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Considering the historical background
of the USSR collapse, the whole process of delimitation of the boundaries
of the former Soviet republics clearly indicates that the former constitutive
parts of the USSR agreed to apply the principle of uti possidetis juris with
respect to their boundaries and territories.
Debates over the determination of boundaries of the newly established
CIS member states strongly encouraged the parties involved to fx their
positions in the agreements that would guarantee the inviolability of boundaries existing within the former USSR.83 Most of the former Soviet republics
supporting the idea of inviolability of frontiers relied on instability in the
region, threats to the peace and security, and common principles of international law. Even the EC Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern
Europe and Soviet Union of 16 December 1991 explicitly stated the respect
of all existing boundaries that could be changed only through and upon
achievement of mutual consent.84
Therefore, it can be argued that uti possidetis juris has a consensual
nature in the case of the post-Soviet area, since upon exercising their right
to self-determination the former USSR republics agreed on the transformation of the former administrative borders into the international boundaries
of the newly independent states. Due to the fact that internal administrative
borders within the USSR as a federative state were explicitly determined
and expressly guaranteed by the constitutional right to secession and the
states further agreed on transformation of such borders into the international boundaries, it can be argued that the principle of uti possidetis juris
was indeed applied and that it has solid grounds to prevail over the right
to external self-determination by former autonomous units. The same
approach is taken by scholars who argue that in the case of the USSR and
the SFRY it was nothing but the application of the principle of uti possidetis
juris.85
Article 5 of the 8 December 1991 Agreement on the establishment of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) signed in Minsk proclaimed
that the Parties should recognise and respect the territorial integrity and
the inviolability of existing boundaries within the CIS.86 It was reaffrmed
in the 21 December 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration signed by the 11 former

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republics of the former USSR with a follow-up upon Georgia’s joining to
all these instruments. This Declaration affrms the obligations of member
states of the CIS to recognise and respect the territorial integrity and the
inviolability of the existing boundaries of the member states.87
The CIS Charter signed and approved by all member states on 22 January 1993 in Minsk in article 3 affrms a respect of the territorial integrity of
member states and recognition of the existing boundaries, i.e. the transformation of the former administrative borders of the former USSR republics
into international boundaries.88 Moreover, in 1994 the member states of the
CIS signed the new Declaration “On Respect of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability of Boundaries of Member States” which reinforced
the application of the principle of uti possidetis juris to the territory and
boundaries of the former USSR republics.89
It is surprising that Armenia violated its obligations both under the
UN Charter and the CIS Charter as well as numerous international treaties signed and entered within the CIS through the occupation of 20% of
Azerbaijan’s territory through the use of force90 and also kept those territories under occupation for some 30 years. Obviously, by signing the UN
Charter, the CIS Foundation Agreement, the Almaty Declaration, the CIS
Charter and a number of other relevant legal instruments without any reservations, Armenia has recognised the territorial integrity and inviolability
of boundaries of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which certainly legally implies
that Nagorno-Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan.91
International law recognises any attempts to infringe the peace and
the security as a serious violation of the UN Charter. Such actions will
be declared illegal by the UNSC as occurred in the case of the Katangese
province of Congo.92 Moreover, international law does not permit secession
as a tool for the re-drawing of the recognised international boundaries as
was expressed in Advisory Opinion No 2 of the Badinter Commission.93
One should also refer to the position of the international community in the
Aaland dispute, where it was stated that the compromise to national minorities with respect to the secession from the society and the state to which they
belong on the basis of lingual, religious and ethnic differences would result
in the accession of anarchy in the international arena which in its own turn
contradicts the concept of state as a territorial and political unit.94
In the Reference re Secession of Quebec case the Supreme Court of
Canada stated that although the population of Quebec could be qualifed
as a people, it was not entitled to the right of external self-determination
under international law impairing the territorial integrity of sovereign Canada. However, it should seek self-determination within the existing state.95
In the Katangese People’s Congress v. Zaire case the African Commission of Human Rights emphasised that the exercise of self-determination
by Katanga should comply with the factors of sovereignty and territorial
integrity of Zaire.96 The same position was taken by the ECHR in the United
Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey where it was stated that the

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minorities’ rights to self-determination should be exercised within the state
boundaries of Turkey on a mutual basis with the democratic restructuring
and without damaging the territorial integrity of Turkey.97
Clearly, the self-proclaimed “NKR” never exercised self-determination
and has no statehood features under the Montevideo Convention. The
ECHR in various cases expressly defned that the Republic of Armenia is
exercising a full effective control over the “NKR” and the latter lacks any
attributes of statehood.98

Three Decade Long Peace Talks and OSCE
Minsk Group’s Failure
With the mediation of Russia in May 1994 the conficting sides signed the
Bishkek Protocol on Cease-Fire that put an end to the First Karabakh
War.99 Under pressure of the world’s leading states the Nagorno-Karabakh
confict was then submitted to the CSCE (OSCE) for further peaceful settlement. For these purposes, the OSCE established the Minsk Group on 24
March 1992 in the course of the meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs
in Helsinki.100 Italy was the frst Chair of the Minsk Group and undertook
several attempts to settle the confict in 1993.101 However, the aggressive military campaign of Armenia diminished the attempts of the peace mediation
by the Minsk Group in early 1993. Another subsequent chairman of the
Minsk Group was Sweden. During the Budapest summit on 5–6 December
1994, Russia became a permanent co-chairman.102 On 21 April 1995 Sweden
was replaced by Finland, but after the Lisbon summit on 2–3 December
1996 the number of permanent co-chairmen became three. Since the Lisbon
summit Russia, France and the US have become permanent co-chairmen
of the Minsk Group.103 Other regional players like Turkey and Iran proposed their mediation services. However, due to certain problems between
Armenia and Turkey and between Azerbaijan and Iran such mediation was
never able to positively effect the settlement of the conficts.104
Since 1994 all the confict resolution proposals of the mediators were
based on either the “package deal” or the “phased deal” settlement.105 While
the “package deal” settlement implied fnding simultaneous solutions for
all aspects of the confict, including the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the
“phased deal” referred to resolution in stages starting with de-occupation
of the surrounding regions by Armenia, restoring communications and only
after all negotiating the status of the breakaway region. In fact, the “package
deal” meant the status for Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange of other occupied surrounding territories, while the “phased deal” implied the liberation
of the territories in exchange of the status. Thus, for over three decades of its
mediation services the OSCE Minsk Group was not able to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh confict and the UN Security Council resolutions remained
unenforced. The “Key West Talks” took place in 1999. They referred to
the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the six surrounding occupied

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territories of Azerbaijan, granting a special status to Nagorno-Karabakh
within Azerbaijan, and keeping the Lachin corridor in the latter’s control.
This plan was to be guaranteed by international peace-keeping forces.106
However, the “Key West Talks” became another lost opportunity due to the
non-constructive position of Armenia, which opted out from all “Key West”
agreements.107 In addition, the various so-called “Goble Plan”, “Common
State”, “Kazan formula”, “Madrid principles” and “Lavrov Plan” confict
settlement proposals were never mutually accepted by the parties.108 Most
of these peace plans were never disclosed to the public and some were even
offcially denied, but information from various diplomatic and political
sources provides an overall impression what was a subject of each such settlement proposal.
“Goble Plan” (1994). This plan named after the American diplomat
implied the fnal solution of the Karabakh confict based on the exchange
of equal size territories between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It envisaged the
return of the occupied regions of Azerbaijan and exchange of a part of the
Meghri region in the south of Armenia (border of Iran) with the Lachin
corridor linking Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia.109
“Common State” (1998). Implied creation of a confederative state between
Azerbaijan and so-called “NKR”. It was immediately rejected by Azerbaijan
as the one contributing into independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. Under
this plan all outstanding issues should be settled simultaneously.110
“Key West Talks” (1999). Implied liberation of fve or six occupied territories and their return to Azerbaijan except for Lachin and immediate discussion on conducting an independence referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh
and its timing.111
“Madrid Principles” (2007). The Basic Principles set up demilitarisation of the confict zone and provided an interim status for NagornoKarabakh with guarantees for security and self-governance for local
Armenians. Under this plan it was required to guarantee the security of
the Lachin corridor and determine its status through a referendum. The
plan also provided the return of all IDPs and a necessity of deploying
peacekeeping forces.112
“Kazan Formula” (2011). This implied the liberation of all occupied
regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange for Azerbaijan’s lifting
the economic blockade of Armenia with a full resumption of the economic
and humanitarian cooperation. This plan also provided for the return of all
IDPs and refugees to their homes, demilitarisation of the liberated districts,
signing of a non-use of force agreement, deploying peacekeepers and postponing the status issue for an uncertain time.113
“Lavrov Plan” (2018–2019). This plan provided a phased withdrawal
by Armenia from the occupied surrounding territories and deploying the
Russian peacekeeping forces as a guarantee for the Karabakh Armenians’
security. Under this plan 5 out of 7 occupied surrounding territories except
for Lachin and Kalbajar which would remain under Armenian control to

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guarantee a safety of transit from Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh had to
be returned to Azerbaijan. It also provided that Nagorno-Karabakh’s fnal
status and the return of Azerbaijani IDPs should be postponed.114
Only once in 1997 did Armenia and Azerbaijan come close to the settlement of the confict when the former Armenian President Levon
Ter-Petrosyan expressed consent with the OSCE Minsk Group proposal
on the “phased deal”, a stepwise plan implying the liberation of six occupied Azerbaijani regions, returning of IDPs, determining the status of
Shusha and Lachin, and, fnally determining the legal status of NagornoKarabakh.115 However, the Armenian opposition comprised of the ethnic
Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh and led by Robert Kocharyan forced
Ter-Petrosyan to resign. Armenia offcially negated all the arrangements
made by Ter-Petrosyan previously expressed on behalf of Armenia during
the Minsk Group peace process. The Karabakhi Armenians’ reign commenced in Armenia from that time, which lasted until Nikol Pashinyan’s
election as prime minister of Armenia in 2018.
As a party who strongly committed to the principle of amicable settlement of disputes and patiently waiting for this confict’s peaceful settlement
for almost 26 years, Azerbaijan was not satisfed with no progress in the
peace talks and heavily criticised the Minsk Group for passiveness and lack
of actions.116 It could be argued that the OSCE Minsk Group’s failure contributed to the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It was clearly
stressed by the Azerbaijani president during his meeting with the Minsk
Group co-chairs in the aftermath of the war that they had failed to prevent
this war and solve the confict for all these years.117

2020 Escalation, Second Karabakh War and 10 November
Tripartite Ceasefre Agreement
At the peak of the global war with the COVID-19 pandemic, starting
from 12 July 2020 the world was also witnessing a tragic escalation of the
confict between the two former Soviet republics in the South Caucasus.
Both countries faced serious challenges and the negative coronavirus statistics had been rather stable for some time. However, in July 2020 the
Armenian regular armed forces attacked Azerbaijani border territory in
the Tovuz region. Although the two countries had had an unresolved
confict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan for decades,
and at that time Armenia still illegally occupied 20% of Azerbaijani
territory, the clash provoked by Armenia took place at the Azerbaijani-Armenian border. This was quite unusual, since for all these years
any escalations between the rivals took place only in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2020, Armenia proclaimed the so-called “Tonoyan
Doctrine”, a strategy to capture further territory of Azerbaijan in a bid
to force the latter to accede to the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and
its surrounding regions.118 Further, Armenian PM Pashinyan’s statement

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“Artsakh [Karabakh] is Armenia, and that’s it!” and attendance at “NKR
President” Arayik Arutunyan’s inauguration in Shusha heavily contributed to the escalation with Azerbaijan.119 This strategy was further juxtaposed with continued attacks on Azerbaijan’s civilian population in the
border regions.
The July events in the Tovuz region of Azerbaijan were qualifed as
military aggression against Azerbaijan.120 This was a violation of the fundamental principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter such
as the principle of the non-use of force, the principle of inviolability of state
frontiers, the principle of the territorial integrity of states and the principle
of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is also necessary
to recall the numerous conventions and regional agreements to which
Armenia had joined within the framework of the Council of Europe, OSCE
and other international organisations.
Numerous warnings by Azerbaijan and calls to the international community to urge Armenia to stop continuous attacks on Azerbaijani civilians and military objectives were not heard. President Ilham Aliyev
addressed these issues and Azerbaijan’s concerns at the 75th Session of
the United Nations General Assembly, where he noted that legal action
would be taken against those responsible.121 Armenian attacks – including those carried out by their proxies – continued after President Ilham
Aliyev’s address. An attack on Azerbaijani armed forces between July-September 2020 was qualifed by the latter as an act of aggression.122
The position of the International Court of Justice for such cases was
clearly expressed in the Nicaragua case, where the Court determined that
military action of regular armed forces of one state in relation to the international borders of another state is an armed attack and aggression.123
Therefore, the attacks by the regular Armenian armed forces and their
proxies against Azerbaijani armed forces and civilians were precisely
qualifed as an act of aggression against Azerbaijan. The military action
initiated by Azerbaijan on 27 September 2020 was an adequate and proportionate response to the continued act of aggression by Armenia. Azerbaijan in its turn invoked its inherent right to self-defence under Article
51 of UN Charter.124
All Azerbaijani military operations were conducted strictly within
the requirements of the international humanitarian laws and the Geneva
Conventions. The civilian population of Nagorno-Karabakh was warned to
stay away from any military facilities and infrastructure of the occupying
forces.125 However, between 27 September 2020 and 10 November 2020, the
Armenian attacks on Azerbaijan’s cities, villages and settlements resulted
in losses among civilians and extensive damages to civilian property and
infrastructure.126 The world’s leading international criminal law experts
have qualifed these attacks as war crimes incurring individual criminal
responsibility under international law, since they killed 100 Azerbaijani
civilians and injured 416 others.127

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184 Farhad Mirzayev
The 2020 war phase commenced from the implementation of unlawful
Armenian policies and the hostilities took place exclusively on Azerbaijan’s
sovereign soil.128 Azerbaijan argued that the deployment of a large number of Armenian troops and armaments in Azerbaijan’s sovereign territory,
qualifes Armenia as the aggressor pursuing annexationist objectives.129
Azerbaijan claims that Armenia attempted to unlawfully incorporate the
occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven adjacent districts, change
their demographic composition, prevent the return of Azerbaijani IDPs
to their homes, and exploit and pillage their natural resources and other
wealth.130 Along with ongoing destruction and appropriation of property,
and the targeting of civilians and civilian objects, Armenia was responsible
for the committing of war crimes during the First Karabakh War (1988–
1994) and the Second Karabakh War (27 September 2020–10 November
2020). During such attacks Armenia ignored international humanitarian
law requirements, the principle of distinction prohibiting indiscriminate attacks on non-combatants (civilians) and destruction of civilian
objects.131 Such indiscriminate attacks may be qualifed as an intentional
attack directed against civilians.132 Direct attacks on civilians and civilian objects in Ganja, Barda, Tartar and other cities of Azerbaijan can be
clearly seen from the indiscriminate character of the weapons used such
as reactive and ballistic missiles.133 Launching Iskander ballistic missiles
of mass destruction on Azerbaijan attempting to destroy the whole cities
of Baku and Shusha is another vivid example of the deliberate character of
Armenia’s war crimes.134
The Second Karabakh War, also called the “44 days war”, ended up with
the Russian brokered ceasefre agreement signed on 10 November 2020
by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia.135 The tripartite statement itself is a
short and ambiguous agreement demonstrating the uncompromising position the parties took and what efforts were made to urge them to sign such
an agreement. There is no doubt that this is not the standard humanitarian ceasefre agreement that the parties have concluded three times before.
In the meantime, it hardly could be qualifed as a peace agreement. It is
rather an act of capitulation with the participation and guarantees of a third
party.136 The referred Agreement establishes an immediate ceasefre, placing the Russian peacekeeping forces between the conficting parties for the
period of fve years, and put an obligation on the parties to unblock the
communication blockade by granting a “Lachin corridor”137 to the Armenians under the control of Russian peacekeepers and a “Zangezur (Sunyik)
corridor”138 to Azerbaijan to unblock the Nakhchivan Autonomous
Republic of Azerbaijan. Under the Agreement the “Center for Control over
the Ceasefre” has been established with joint military representations of
Russia and Turkey monitoring the overall situation.139 The Agreement itself
does not contain anything about the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, while a
small portion of Karabakh is still controlled by Armenia backed up now by
the Russian peacekeepers.

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Remedial Secession?
For the implementation of a legitimate secession, several grounds are
required: (i) the existence of clearly provided constitutional and legislative
mechanisms and/or (ii) the consent of the parent state itself to the implementation of the secession on the part of a particular entity.140 The frst case
is the USSR and SFRY, where the right to secede of the constitutional units
was enshrined at the constitutional level.141 The second case is a successful
secession took place as a result of obtaining approval from the parent states
like separation of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965,142 Eritrea from Ethiopia
in 1993143 and breakaway of Montenegro from the Yugoslav union state with
Serbia.144
In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh none of these grounds ever existed,
since under the Soviet law, there was no constitutional right to secession for
the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO). In addition, since
the beginning of the confict until today, the Azerbaijani authorities have
never expressed support and consent to the secession of Nagorno-Karabakh
from Azerbaijan. Today we often come across the groundless statements
that Nagorno-Karabakh was never a part of independent Azerbaijan and
that it allegedly exercised its right to self-determination and seceded from
Azerbaijan.145
First, as we can see, there was not one of the conditions for the legitimate secession of the NKAO in accordance with the Soviet and Azerbaijani
constitutional law. Second, in accordance with uti possidetis principle, the
former administrative borders of the Soviet republics were transformed into
the international borders of newly independent states.146
In the absence of legal grounds for legitimate secession, Armenia actively
promotes the so-called theory of “remedial secession” that allows certain
groups (minorities) to create their own independent state if they are subject
to grave human rights violations.147 The “Remedial Secession” is qualifed as
a right to unilateral secession as a response to “most extreme case” of severe
violations of fundamental human rights as a last resort. Supporters of this
theory refer to the Quebec case where the Supreme Court of Canada ruled:
“A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the
form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in only the most
extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defned circumstances”.148
According to the supporters of this theory, the denial of the right to
internal self-determination, mass scale crimes against peace and security
and crimes against humanity and war crimes by the mother state are serious grounds for “remedial secession”. Proponents of this theory refer to the
statements of two judges, Risdal and Wildhaber (not the decision itself, but
the position of individual judges) in the Luizidou v Turkey case (1995), considered by the European Court of Human Rights, where they stated that the
peoples can exercise the right to external self-determination (secession) if
their rights are systematically and fagrantly violated or if they are removed

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186 Farhad Mirzayev
from government by non-democratic and discriminatory methods.149 A relatively small number of international lawyers believe that the right to secession can arise only if the central authorities of a sovereign state stubbornly
deny and obstruct the people in the exercise of their rights and freedoms,
periodically violate them and reject the idea of coexistence within the existing state. As other justifcations, the supporters of this theory cite the case
of the declaration of independence of Kosovo and the secession of South
Sudan, which allegedly exercised the right to secession in connection with
the scale of crimes against these subjects.150
It should be noted right away that this theory has not received wide
support in international law and is strongly criticised due to its inconsistency, which gives an additional reason for various speculations and poses
a serious threat to the sovereignty of existing independent states. The right
to “remedial secession” is not a peremptory or even a norm of customary
international law.151 In addition, there is no extensive practice of states whose
interests are directly affected by this issue (affected states) in relation to such
a right to give it the character of a rule of customary international law. Even
references to those isolated cases, the “remedial secession” application is not
convincing enough from the international law perspective. According to the
supporters of this theory, the most critical case is Kosovo’s independence
which was a result of the grave war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed by the Serbian armed forces.152 However, practically all countries in their declarations on the recognition of Kosovo have declared that
this is a “special case”, i.e. is not a general rule. In addition, the International
Court of Justice in its 2010 Advisory Opinion on the declaration of independence of Kosovo generally found it inappropriate to consider the issue
of “remedial secession”, apparently due to the lack of support for this theory
in international law.153
Despite Armenia’s claims, the “remedial theory” granting the secession right to minorities arising as a response to the grave violation of their
rights or prevention of their rights to exercise their right to internal selfdetermination, it is not applicable to the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh.
There are suffcient facts and arguments confrming the absence of any
evidence on such violation of rights of the Armenian population of
Nagorno-Karabakh by the central Azerbaijan authorities.
Nevertheless, it is absolutely clear that in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh,
since the establishment of the autonomous unit within Azerbaijan SSR in
1923, the Armenian population that became a majority during the twentieth century for the whole history of NKAO until commencement of the
war between Armenia and Azerbaijan had a wide scope of rights and freedoms. No serious gross violations of the rights of the Armenian population
of NKAO were recorded at that time. The rights of the Armenian population of NKAO to internal self-determination were exercised in full scope
without any limitations and obstacles from Azerbaijan central authorities.
The rights to use the Armenian language and culture were confrmed in

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almost all legal acts of the Azerbaijan SSR starting from the Constitution
up to specifc codes of the republic.154 The activity and paperwork of all
state organs, including but not limited to the prosecutor’s offce, courts, and
administrative managements of public organisations, education institutions
and cultural centres were in the Armenian language. Moreover, the radio
and TV broadcasting as well as newspapers and magazines were also in the
Armenian language.155
Since the establishment of NKAO most of the public administration,
legislative and communist party’s managerial positions were in the hands
of Armenians, and Armenian was the offcial language of the public management and economic activity in NKAO.156 Therefore, it can be strongly
argued that no mass scale discrimination took place in NKAO by the
central Azerbaijan authorities. On the other hand, all of these Armenian
rights seriously contributed to the immigration of the Azerbaijani population from the region. It is accepted and supported by some writers that
even if any problems existed within NKAO in the past, any claims had not
to be put forward against Baku, but against the local Armenians who ruled
in NKAO since the frst days of its creation.157 The fact of there being a
majority of Armenians in NKAO also played a huge role in such prevailing
positions of Armenians in the autonomous region.
There was also no evidence of violence in the region by the Azerbaijani population. In contrast, the historical facts testify that the massive
settlement of Karabakh by the ethnic Armenians took place by Tsarist
Russia and Soviet communist authorities.158 Such policy of the massive resettlement of various minorities all around the USSR carried out by Stalin
was exercised against the background of unreal “Soviet communist brotherhood of nations”.159 It is interesting that even Robert Kocharyan, the former
leader of the “NKR” and later the president of Armenia in his interview
confrmed that Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh were not living in bad
conditions both from political and socio-economic points of view. He specifcally pointed out that “something unexplainable [had] driven Armenians
to independence”.160
Nothing in the historical and factual evidence argue in favour of the long
fght of the Armenian population of NKAO for the exercise of their right to
external self-determination which they have deserved due to the gross violation of their rights by Azerbaijani authorities. As one Western commentator emphasised, the “Armenian campaign had been carefully planned well in
advance”, and the intensifed militarisation of the Armenian community of
Nagorno-Karabakh was a part of such plan, and, obviously “Azerbaijanis
were caught unaware” by such sudden development of the situation around
NKAO.161
Even if “remedial secession” is recognised in international law, then
the most critical question would be what kind of violations by Azerbaijan
could Armenia be in a position to refer to for such remedial secession of
Nagorno-Karabakh. As it has been mentioned above, in the case of the

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188 Farhad Mirzayev
Armenian national minority of Nagorno-Karabakh, there are compelling
arguments indicating the absence of any such facts of infringement of the
rights of the Armenian ethnic minority by the Azerbaijani authorities.
Since the formation of the NKAO as part of the Azerbaijan SSR in 1923,
the Armenian population of the region, which turned into the majority during the twentieth century, throughout the entire time until the beginning of
hostilities in the early 1990s of the last century, had broad rights and freedoms. There was no evidence of the violation of the rights of the Armenians
of Nagorno-Karabakh. In contrast, they exercised in full their right to
internal self-determination without any impediments from the Azerbaijani
authorities.
Unlike Armenia neither in the First Karabakh War in the early 1990s,
nor in the Second Karabakh War, were there massive and fundamental
violations of international law committed by Azerbaijan. There is no evidence that Azerbaijan committed grave crimes against peace and humanity
or war crimes against civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh. On the other hand,
Armenia did commit the Khojaly massacre in 1992 and the 2020 shelling of
the civilian population in various cities of Azerbaijan. The violent actions
of Armenia and its proxies in Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding
regions which led to death of thousands people and exodus of 700,000 people
were nothing, but intentional ethnic cleansing similar to those committed in
former Yugoslavia or Rwanda.162
All these have been recognised and affrmed by many leading international
organisations. The assertions of the Armenian side that, having started the
current military campaign, Azerbaijan has granted Nagorno-Karabakh the
right to “remedial secession” does not stand up to criticism. Azerbaijan’s
actions were the exercise of its inherent right to self-defence under Article 51
of the UN Charter aimed at liberating the occupied territories in response
to 30 years of occupation and continuing attacks against civilians and military objectives. In the course of the Second Karabakh War, Azerbaijan
transparently demonstrated to the whole world that even in a military operation, it remains committed to the norms and requirements of international
humanitarian law and its only target is the army and military equipment
of the occupying forces. To summarise, it can be argued that there are no
grounds for demanding the “remedial secession” for Nagorno-Karabakh
under international law.

No Grounds for Recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh
The process of creation of a state in International Law (i) must not be the
result of a violation of international law and (ii) must strictly comply with
the legal criteria of statehood.163 However, the recognition of a state is not
a state-forming factor. In other words, states do not arise by virtue of their
recognition by other states. The EC’s Badinter Commission in its conclusions No. 1 and 10, clearly defned that recognition is a purely “declarative

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action carried out at the discretion of states”, which also “must comply with
the mandatory requirements of general international law”.164
As part of customary international law, the obligation of States not to recognise the consequences of misconduct is enshrined in article 41 (2) of the
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.165
The referred Article states that “No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of article 40, nor
render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation”.166 In turn, a serious
violation under article 40 means violations of peremptory norms of general international law, which also include norms regarding the non-use of
force. This is also confrmed in the offcial commentary on article 40 of the
Articles on State Responsibility, which considers aggression as one example
of a serious violation by States of an obligation arising from a peremptory
norm of general international law.167
Considering that the very process of the formation of the “NKR” was
the outcome of the use of force, violent ethnic cleansing of Azerbaijanis,
violation of the territorial integrity and internationally recognised borders
of Azerbaijan, as well as the violation of the fundamental rights of about
700,000 displaced Azerbaijanis, the recognition of the “NKR” by any state
would contradict its international legal obligations.168 The process of creating the “NKR” is a consequence of the use of force, ethnic cleansing and
military aggression,169 and the fact of the aggression and occupation of
these territories by Armenia was confrmed by numerous international resolutions and declarations.170
The classic historic example of illegal recognition is the recognition of
the state of Manchukuo (Manchuria) by El Salvador, Germany, Hungary,
Italy and Japan.171 The Lytton Commission examined this for the purposes
of inadmissibility of the recognition of territorial acquisitions by military
means as well as their consequences.172 It is a similar situation in case of
the “NKR”, where the full effective control by Armenia was confrmed by
the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Chiragov and others
v. Armenia173 and some other previously referred cases.174 In this case, the
recognition of the “NKR” as an independent state, which arose as a result
of illegal territorial acquisitions through the use of force resulted in ethnic
cleansing, will be qualifed as a violation of the sovereignty, as well as the
territorial integrity and international borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
It shall be also referred to the ICJ’s 2010 Kosovo Advisory Opinion.175 In its
Opinion the Court clearly determined that the declaration of independence
through the unlawful use of force and violation of fundamental norms of
international law would always be contrary to international law.176
If any entity unilaterally declares its independence, but does not meet the
criteria for statehood, then its recognition will be considered premature recognition and contrary to international law.177 In other words, before making
a decision on recognition, the states shall determine for themselves how such
an entity, which has declared itself independent, meets the requirements of

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Farhad Mirzayev

statehood. The criteria for statehood are refected in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933.178 In accordance with
Art. 1 of the Montevideo Convention, the state must meet the following
criteria: (a) permanent population; (b) a certain territory; (c) government
and (d) the ability to enter into relationships with other states.179 If we apply
these criteria to the “NKR”, then at this stage there is no compliance with
any criterion. As discussed above the territory of the “NKR” is the territory
of a sovereign Azerbaijani state occupied by the use of force. The population of the “NKR” can hardly be referred to as a people for the purposes of
the right to self-determination, since the will of the Azerbaijani part of the
population living in these territories before the occupation is not taken into
account due to ethnic cleansing by Armenians, and moreover, some of the
so-called people of the NKR are illegally settled Armenians from Lebanon
and Syria, which fundamentally contradicts the requirements of the 1949
Geneva Conventions on international humanitarian law.180
In the case of “NKR”, serious questions also arise about the existence
of an independent government capable of making decisions independent of
external forces. As for the ability to enter into relations with other states,
this feature also requires a level of independence and the manifestation of
independent will, since in the absence of free will and the subordination of
the will to another state, there can be no question of such an ability. This
was clearly confrmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice in
the 1931 Austro-German Custom Union case.181
The lack of sovereign will of the “NKR” and its complete subordination to the will of the Republic of Armenia was confrmed by the ECHR
in Chiragov and others v. Armenia case.182 In the ECHR opinion, Armenia’s
effective control over the “NKR” is expressed in all manifestations of state
administration, which undoubtedly excludes the existence of independent
will for the goals of an effective government, as well as the ability to enter
into relations with other states.183 Therefore, the recognition of the “NKR”
will be considered premature and consequently violating the requirements
of international law. However, even if Nagorno-Karabakh is recognised
by any state, everything will end up with the same scenario as for Kosovo,
Abkhazia or South Ossetia which can in no way be considered as effective
and well-established states.

End of the Story?
Despite execution of the 10 November 2020 Tripartite Agreement, the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict is far from any fnal settlement. A small part of
Nagorno-Karabakh is still controlled by Armenia and its proxies, who now
have external protection from the Russian peacekeepers. Nor has its status been agreed between the conficting parties; it remains one of the most
critical unresolved questions. The current delimitation and demarcation of
boundaries between Armenia and Azerbaijan is another diffcult challenge

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on the way to the establishment of peace and stability in the South Caucasus region. Moreover, landmines planted by Armenian armed forces in
every single inch of formerly occupied Azerbaijani territories and refusal to
share the landmine maps constitute another serious war crime by Armenia
undermining the whole confict settlement process. For example, in the
de-occupied Aghdam region, the Armenian armed forces had planted
97,000 landmines (12 lorries), and the map indicating their location was only
handed over to Azerbaijan in an exchange for 15 Armenian war prisoners.184
Since Azerbaijan has a quite solid base of arguments and evidence on
committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, and economic and
environmental damages caused by almost 30 years of Armenian occupation,
Azerbaijan shall endeavour to hold the Armenian leadership responsible
under international law. Only the full de-occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh
from the Armenian armed forces and restoring jurisdiction of Azerbaijan
over its internationally recognised territory, deblocking the communications and return of all IDPs to their homes could bring the conficting
parties very close to a fnal settlement and end of this sanguinary confict.

Notes
1 Балаев, A. (1990). Национальное Демократическое Движение в 1917–1929
[Balayev, A. National Democratic Movement in 1917–1929]. Baku: Elm, pp. 40–
51. (In Russian).
2 Swietochowski, T. (1995). Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition.
New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 75–76.
3 Altstadt, A. (1992). Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule.
Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, p. 100; Arslanian, A.H. (1996). Britain and
the Transcaucasian Nationalities during Russian Civil War. In: R.G. Suny,
ed., Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, p. 303.
4 Altstadt (n 3), p. 102; Swietochowski (n 3), pp. 75–76; Галстян, Д. (2021).
Признанием Советских Границ Армения Признает Карабах Азербайджаном
[Galstyan, D. By Recognising Soviet Borders, Armenia Recognises Karabakh Being Azerbaijani]. Sputnik Armenia, [online]. Available at: https://m.
ru.armeniasputnik.am/politics/20210521/27630901/Priznaniem-sovetskikhgranits-Armeniya-priznaet-Karabakh-Azerbaydzhanom.html [Accessed 25
May 2021] (In Russian).
5 Potier, T. (2001). Confict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia: A
Legal Appraisal. The Hague, Boston: Kluwer Law International, p. 2; Cornell S.
(1999). The Nagorno-Karabakh Confict. Uppsala, Department of East European
Studies, [online]. Available at: https://is.muni.cz/el/fss/jaro2019/POL587/um/
Cornell_The_Nagorno-Karabakh_Confict.pdf [Accessed 18 June 2021].
6 Protocol of the Meeting of the Plenum of the Transcaucasian Bureau of Central
Committee of the Communist Party of RSFSR (5 July 1921). Baku: State
Historical Archives of Azerbaijan Republic. f1, op 2, d 25. p. 16 (In Russian);
Correspondence between Mikoyan, Ordjonekidze and Narimanov. (1920).
Baku: Central State Archives of Soviet Azerbaijan Republic (ЦГАОР). АР, ф.28,
оп.1, д.99. p. 115 (In Russian).
7 Altstadt, A. (1988). Nagorno-Karabakh – ‘Apple of Discord’ in Azerbaijan SSR.
Central Asia Survey, 7, p. 66.

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8 ИсторияСозданияНагорно-КарабахскойАвтономнойОбласти Азербайджанской
ССР 1918–1925 Документы и Материалы [History of Establishment of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of Azerbaijan SSR 1918–1925] (1989). Documents and Materials. Baku: Azerneshr. pp. 152–153 (In Russian).
9 Chorbajian, L. et al. (1994). The Caucasian knot: The History and Geopolitics of
Nagorno-Karabakh. London: Zed Books, p. 13.
10 Национальный Состав Населения СССР Статистика Переписи Населения
Союза [The National Composition of USSR. Statistics of the Union’s Population
Census]. Baku: Azerneshr 1989. p. 22 (In Russian).
11 Юнусов, А. (1991). Погромы в Армении в 1988–1989 [Yunusov, A. Pogroms in
Armenia in 1988–1989]. Journal Ekspress-Khronika, 9(186), p.19. (In Russian);
De Waal, T. (2003). Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and
War. New York, London: New York University Press, p. 60.
12 Azərbaycanda Qaçqınlar və Məcburi Köckünlər haqqında Statistik Məlumatlar [The Statistical Information about Refugees and IDPs in Azerbaijan]. (2000).
Baku: State Statistics Committee. p. 2 (In Azerbaijani).
13 NKAO Decision on Unifcation with the Armenian SSR. (21 February 1988).
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16 Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan SSR ‘On Unconstitutional Action in NKAO’. (26 August 1989). Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet
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19 De Waal (n 11), pp. 10–11.
20 Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR ‘On measures relating to the application of the union republics with respect to the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan SSR and Armenian SSR’. (23 March 1988). Bulletin
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21 Mirzayev, Application of Uti Possidetis (n 19), pp. 14–18.
22 Malkasian, M. (1996). Gha-ra-bagh!: The Emergence of the National Democratic
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24 Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR ‘On Incompliance of
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26 TASS Information Agency. (1988). In: J. Libaridian. 1st ed. Documents and Facts
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27 Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (n 24).
28 Ibid.
29 Moscow Home Service. (18 January 1989) at 16:00 GMT. SU/0364 B/4. (In
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30 Мирзоев, Ф. (2004). Актуальные Проблемы Изменения Государственных
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31 Russian Radio. (13 December 1991) at 22:00 GMT. SU/1256 B/9. (In Russian).
32 De Waal (n 11), pp. 19–20.
33 Маркедонов, С. (2007). Советский Кавказ в 1970-е годы: Предчувствие
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34 UN SC Res. 822 (1993) (30 April 1993) UN Doc. S/ES/4; UN SC Res. 853 (1993)
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Doc. S/ES/874; UN SC Res. 884 (1993).
35 State Committee on Refugees and IDPs of the Republic of Azerbaijan (2005).
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36 UNHCR (2002). Statistical Yearbook. UNYB 20–22. [online]. Available at:
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37 Unger, A. (1981). Constitutional Development in USSR. London: Methuen, p. 60.
38 Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan No 279-XII “On Revoking the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast” (26 November 1991). [online]. Available at: http://www.e-qanun.az/framework/6783 [Accessed 19 June 2021].
39 Zverev, A. (2021). Ethnic Conficts in the Caucasus 1988–1994. In: B. Coppieters,
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41 Ibid.
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57 Ibid.
58 UN Security Council Resolutions No 822, 853, 874 and 884 (n 35); UN GA Res.
60/285 (15 September 2006) (2006) A/RES/60/285; UN GA Res. 62/243 (25 April
2008) (2008) A/RES?62/243; PACE Resolution No 1119 (1997); PACE Resolution
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59 Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [2015] ECHR. 176; Cornell, S. and Shaffer, B.
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60 Zalyan, Sargsyan and Serobyan v. Armenia [2016] ECHR. 214.
61 Muradyan v Armenia [2016] ECHR, 124.
62 Azercosmos OJSC and Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan (2019). Illegal Activities in the Territories of Azerbaijan under Armenia’s
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63 Letter of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs to the OSCE Permanent Council
on the OSCE Minsk Group Fact-Finding Mission to the Occupied Territories
of Azerbaijan Surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh (2010). OSCE Field Assessment Mission Report (NK)(A/59/747-S/2005/187, Annex I, p. 5. [online]. Available at: http://www.osce.org/mg/76209?download=true [Accessed 01 June 2021];
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65 UNSC (2013). Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1973(2011) Concerning Libya. UN Doc S/2013/99.
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85 Shaw, Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries (n 51), pp. 478–507; Mirzayev,
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86 Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States
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87 Alma-Ata Declaration (1992). International Law Materials, 31, p. 148.
88 The Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States Adopted on 22 January 1993 (1995. International Law Materials, 34, p. 128.
89 15 April 1994 CIS Declaration on Respect of Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity
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90 Mirzayev, F. (2005). Azerbaijan on the Crossroads: Legal Evaluation of the
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91 İbayev, V. (2006). Ermənistan-Azərbaycan Dağlıq Qarabağ Münaqişəsi Beynəlxalq Hüquq Müstəvisində [İbayev, V. Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh
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92 UNSC Res. 169 (24 November 1961) UN Doc. (S/5002).
93 Opinion No 2 (n 49), pp.183–185.
94 Reports of International Commission of Jurists and the Committee of Rapporteurs of the League of Nations (1921). League of Nations Council Documents. Doc No B7:21/68/106 9–21. p. 28.
95 Secession of Quebec (n 70), p. 217.
96 Katangese People’s (n 82), p. 389.
97 United Communist Party of Turkey (n 83), pp. 26–27.
98 Chiragov (n 60), pp. 168, 181–185; Sargsyan v Azerbaijan (2015), Zalyan (n 61), p.
214; Muradyan (n 62), p. 124.
99 Full Text in Russian in Barsegov (n 26), pp. 709–711.
100 Abilov, S. (2018). OSCE Minsk Group: Proposals and Failure, the View from
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101 Ibid.
102 Cavanaugh, C. (2016). OSCE and the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process. Security and Human Rights, 27, pp. 422–441.
103 Ibid.
104 Mekhtiyev, A. (1994). The Karabakh Problem Has Finally Been Internationalised. Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, 14 (45), pp. 23; Croissant, M.
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106 International Crisis Group (2007). Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War. Europe
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107 Cavanaugh, C. (2011). Both Presidents Were Sincere in Their Desire to Move
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121 Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s Address at 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. (2020). [video]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=yQOr6XF3xxY [Accessed 2 June 2021].
122 Ibid.
123 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v
United States) [1986] ICJ Reports, 14.
124 In Nicaragua v. United States (n 124), the ICJ expressly determined that military action of regular armed forces of one state in relation to the international
borders of another state is an armed attack and aggression.
125 Warnings to the civilian population were broadcasted in three languages (Armenian, Russian and Azerbaijani) through all possible communication means
and published in media through the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence.
126 Kay, S., Becker, D. and Kern. J. (2021). Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh
Confict. Targeting of Civilians in Azerbaijan (September–November 2020). Interim Report. London: 9 Bedford Row, p. 7.
127 Ibid., p. 7.
128 Azerbaijan’s political and military authorities issued statements that the Republic of Azerbaijan had no military targets in the territory of Armenia. See
Second Interim Report of the Human Rights Commissioner (October 2020), p. 5.
[online]. Available at: https://ombudsman.az/en/view/news/1946/the-second-interim-report-of-the-commissioner-for-human-rights-ombudsperson-of-the-republic-of-azerbaijan-on-recent-armenian-provocations [Accessed 22 June
2021].
129 Letter dated 1 October 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan
to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General United Nations (16
October 2020). A/75/379-S/2020/965.
130 Letter dated 10 July 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General United Nations (13 July
2020). A/74/946–S/2020/704.
131 Prosecutor v Martić, [2007] ICTY IT-95-11-T, 116.
132 Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar (Appeals Judgement) [2008] ICTY IT-01–42-A, 275;
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić (Appeals Judgement) [203] ICTY CVO/P.I.S/ 807e,
132.
133 Galić (n 133), p. 132; Targeting of Civilians in Azerbaijan (n 127), p. 18.
134 Foreign Policy News (2021). Russia Allegedly Used Iskander-M Ballistic Missiles Against Azerbaijan. [online]. Available at: https://
foreignpolicynews.org/2021/04/05/russia-allegedly-used-iskander-m-ballistic-missiles-against-azerbaijan [Accessed 17 June 2021]; Aliyev, J. (2021). Azerbaijan: Armenia Hit Shusha with “Deadly” Missiles. Anadoly Agency. [online].
Available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/azerbaijan-armenia-hit-shusha-with-deadly-missiles/2206525 [Accessed 3 June 2021].
135 The Full Text of 10 November 2020 Tripartite Statement (Agreement) was published in Russian at the offcial website of the Russian President on 10 November 2020. [online]. Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64384
[Accessed 20 June 2021].
136 Мирзоев, Ф. (2020). На Всей Территории Карабаха Должны Действовать
Азербайджанские Законы [Mirzayev, F. Azerbaijani Laws Are Applicable on
the Entire Territory of Karabakh]. Zerkalo Newspaper. [online]. Available at:
https://m.zerkalo.az/glavy-iv-rajonov-v-nagornom-karabahe-dolzhny-naznachatsya-tsentralnymi-vlastyami-v-baku-ekspert-o-trehstoronnem-soglashenii/?f bclid=IwAR34VPjj7M0O6wpPpIKFLxWTigffiY5cWBbk-c0ci_VX0Cm4yhZjNx9jzZQ [Accessed 02 May 2021] (In Russian); Ахмедов,
Ф. (2020). Соглашение от 10 Ноября – Это Юридический Документ о

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200 Farhad Mirzayev

137
138
139

140

141
142
143
144
145

146
147
148
149
150

151

Полном Восстановлении Территориальной Целостности Азербайджана
[Ahmadov, F. Agreement of November 10-This is a Legal Document on
the Full Restoration of the Territorial Integrity of Azerbaijan]. 1news.
az. [online]. Available at: https://1news.az/news/20201118033303471-Farid-A k h me dov-Sog lashen ie - ot-10 -noyabr ya- eto -y u r id iche sk i i- dok ument-o-polnom-vosstanovlenii-territorialnoi-tselostnosti-Azerbaidzhana
[Accessed 02 May 2021] (In Russian).
Narrow 5 km width land strip connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia.
A territory of Armenia separating Azerbaijan’s mainland with it’s the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic exclave given by the Central Moscow Authorities to Armenia in 1920s. See Balayev (n 1).
Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (2021). Russian-Turkish Armistice Control Center opened in Azerbaijan. Statement of 30 January 2021.
[online]. Available at: http://eng.mil.ru/en/russian_peacekeeping_forces/news/
more.htm?id=12341496@egNews [Accessed 17 June 2021].
Kohen, M. (2006). Secession: International Law Perspectives. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 300–312; Castellino, J. (2000). The Secession
of Bangladesh in International Law: Setting New Standards. Asian Yearbook
of International Law, 7, p. 83; Borgen, K. Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination, Secession and Recognition. American Society of International Law Insights, 12, p. 2; Crawford, J. (2006). The Creation of States in
International Law. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 390.
Mullerson, R. (1993). New Developments in the Former USSR and Yugoslavia.
Virginia Journal of International Law, 33, p. 299.
Fletcher, N.M. (1969). The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, pp. 17–82.
Brownlie, I. (1979). African Boundaries – A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia. London: C Hurst & Company, p. 9; Goy, R. (1993), L’Independence de
l’Erythree [Independence of Eritrea]. AFDI, 39, p. 350. (In French).
Vidmar, J. (2007). Montenegro’s Path to Independence: A Study of Self-Determination, Statehood and Recognition. Hanse Law Review, 3(1), pp. 73–102.
Paylan, S. (2020). Remedial Secession and the Responsibility to Protect:
The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh. Opinion Juris. [online]. Available at: http://
opiniojuris.org/2020/12/23/remedial-secession-and-the-responsibility-to-protect-the-case-of-nagorno-karabakh [Accessed 12 June 2021].
M. Shaw, Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries (n 51), pp. 478–492; Mirzayev,
Application of Uti Possidetis (n 18), pp. 12–23.
Paylan (n 139).
Secession of Quebec (n 71), p. 133; Abel, M. (2020) Is There a Right to Secession
in International Law? E-International Relations. [online]. Available at: https://
www.e-ir.info/pdf/84268 [Accessed 12 July 2021].
Loizidou v. Turkey (Concurring Opinion of Judge Wildhaber Joined by Judge
Ryssdal) [1996] ECHR, p. 24.
Fierstein, D. (2008). Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence: An Incident Analysis of Legality, Policy and Future Implications. Boston University International Law Journal, 26, pp. 417–442; Know, C. (2012). The Secession of South
Sudan: A Case Study in African Sovereignty and International Recognition.
St Jospeh, College of Saint Benedict and Saint John’s University 2012. [online].
Available at: http://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/polsci_students/1 [Accessed 7
June 2021].
Vidmar, J. (2010). Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack
of) Practice. International Review, 6(1), pp. 37–66; Meester, D. (2011). The International Court of Justice’s Kosovo Case: Assessing the Current State of

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161
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International Legal Opinion on Remedial Secession. Canadian Yearbook of
International Law, 48, pp. 215–254.
Bolton, G. and Visoka, G. (2019). Recognizing Kosovo’s independence: Remedial
Secession or Earned Sovereignty? Oxford: Oxford University SEESOX Occasion Paper, pp. 11–10; Meller, S. (2011–2012). The Kosovo Case: An Argument
for a Remedial Declaration of Independence. The Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 40, p. 833; Sterio, M. (2015). Self-Determination
and Secession Under International Law: The New Framework New Framework. Cleveland, Cleveland State University Law Faculty Articles and Essays,
p. 847.
Kosovo Advisory Opinion (n 71), p. 141; Fierstein (n 151), pp. 428–442.
Mirzayev, Azerbaijan on the Crossroads (n 91), pp. 53–72.
UNCERD (1999). Second Report of States Parties Due in 1999: Azerbaijan. UN
Doc CERD/C/350/Add.1/6.
Ibid.
Aldstadt, A. (1994). O Patria Mia: National Confict in Mountainous Karabagh. In: W.R. Duncan and G.P. Holman eds., Ethnic Nationalism and Regional
Confict. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 115–116; Abdullayev, A. (2001). Dağlıq
Qarabağ: Əsasız İddialar, Hadisələr, Faciələr [Abdullayev, A. Nagorno-Karabakh: Groundless Claims, Events, Tragedies]. Baku: Murercim, pp. 78–79 (In
Azerbaijani); Rieff, D. (1997). Case Study in Ethnic Strife (Nagorno-Karabakh). Foreign Affairs, 76(2). [online]. Available at: http://www.cilicia.com/armo19e.html [Accessed 17 May 2008].
Mahmudov, Y. and Shukurov, K. (2005). Garabagh: Real History Facts Documents. Baku: Tahsil, pp. 307–330.
Cornell, S. (2002). Autonomy as a Source of Confict: Caucasian Conficts in
Theoretical Perspective. World Politics, 2, pp. 245–276; Nassibli, N. (1998). The
Karabagh Problem: Old Stubbornness and New Hopes. In: U.S. Institute of
Peace Conference. [online]. Washington, D.C. Available at: http://www.zerbaijan.com/Azerbaijani/nasibzade.htm [Accessed on 27 May 2021]; Slezkine, Y.
(1994). USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted
Ethnic Particularism. Slavic Review, 53(2), pp. 414–452.
“Moment of Truth” Programme of the 1st Ostankino TV Channel and Kocharyan, R. (10 January 1994); Арутюнян, В. (1990). События в Нагорном
Карабахе: Хроника, Февраль 1988 – Январь 1989 [Arutyunyan, V. Events in
Nagorno-Karabakh: Chronics, February 1988–January 1989]. Vol. V. Yerevan:
Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences Publishing House. p. 271. (In Russian).
De Waal (n 12), pp. 15–18.
Kuzio, T. (2021) Human Rights in the Two Karabakh Wars. New Easter Europe. [online]. Available at: https://neweasterneurope.eu/2021/02/16/humanrights-in-the-two-karabakh-wars [Accessed 19 July 2021].
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933). [online]. Available at: http://www.taiwandocuments.org/montevideo01.htm [Accessed 9 June
2021]; State Defned (1986). In: Restatement of the Law, Third of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Washington, DC: The American Law Institute
Publishers, p. 201.
EC Yugoslav Arbitration Commission (1992). Opinion No 1. International Law
Materials. 31. p. 1494; EC Yugoslav Arbitration Commission (1992). Opinion
No 10. International Law Materials. 31. p. 1525.
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001). UN
Doc. A/RES/56/83, 53 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 43, Supp. (No. 10) A/56/10
(IV.E.1).
Ibid.

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167 UN International Law Commission (2001). Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third
Session. General Assembly, Offcial Records, Fifty-ffth Session, Supplement
No. 10 (A/56/10); Crawford, J. (2002). The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. Introduction, Text and Commentaries. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 245–249.
168 Мирзоев, Ф. и Ахмедов, Ф. (2020) “Ремедиальная Сецессия”: Правомерность
и Последствия Признания Независимости Нагорного Карабаха [Mirzayev, F.
and Ahmadov, F. “Remedial Secession”: Legality and Consequences of Nagorno-Karabakh Recognition]. Rosbalt. [online]. Available at: https://www.
rosbalt.ru/world/2020/11/03/1871326.html [Accessed 3 June 2021].
169 Chiragov (n 59), pp. 13, 29, 58,172.
170 See the resolutions of UNSC, UNGA, PACE, Europarliament and OIC (n 59).
171 Rea, G.B. (1935). The Case for Manchukuo. New York: D. Appleton-Century
Company, pp. 120–227; Matsumoto, S. (2017). Manchukuo and the Self-Declared SADR. International Law of Recognition and the Sahara Issue. Policy
Paper. [online]. Available at: https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/fles/
PP%20-%2002–21%20%28%20Soji%20Matsumoto%29.pdf [Accessed 02 June
2021].
172 Lytton Commission (1932). Manchuria. Report of 02 November 1932. HL
Deb vol 85 cc976–1000. [online]. Available at: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1932/nov/02/manchuria-report-of-the-lytton-commission
[Accessed 20 June 2021].
173 Chiragov (n 60), p. 168.
174 Zalyan (n 61), p. 214; Muradyan (n 62), p. 124.
175 Kosovo Advisory Opinion (n 71).
176 Ibid., pp. 80–81
177 Lauterpacht, H. (1944). Recognition of States in International Law. The Yale
Law Journal, 53(3), pp. 385–458.
178 Montevideo Convention (n 164).
179 Ibid.
180 Mirzayev, Resettlement of Lebanese Armenians (n 64).
181 Austro-German Customs Union [1931] P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, 41.
182 Chiragov (n 60), p. 186.
183 Ibid., p. 156.
184 The Guardian (2021). Azerbaijan Swaps 15 Armenian PoWs for Map of Landmines. [online]. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/13/
azerbaijan-swaps-15-armenian-pows-for-map-of-landmines [Accessed 20 June
2021]; Reuters (2021). Azerbaijan Swaps 15 Armenian Prisoners for Map Showing Landmines. [online]. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/azerbaijan-swaps-15-armenian-prisoners-map-showing-landmines-2021–06–12
[Accessed 20 June 2021].

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9

International Law and the
Changes in the Status Quo
of the Nagorno-Karabakh
Confict in 2020
Kamal Makili-Aliyev

Introduction
During the fall of 2020, the Nagorno-Karabakh confict went into a phase
of active hostilities, which turned out to be most violent in the history of the
confict since war frst broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the
beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, the result of the hostilities was fundamental change in the territorial status quo of the confict, that has not occurred
since Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a ceasefre agreement in 1994.
The analysis of the confict from the international law perspective has
never been very popular in the English-language scholarship, with very few
authors (including me) that focused on various aspects of the confict. For
example, a notable work by Heiko Krüger (2010) is one of the rare exceptions
of the comprehensive analysis from the point of view of public international
law. In my early works I have looked at the questions of international
humanitarian law and international criminal law in the Nagorno-Karabakh
confict (Makili-Aliyev 2008), analyzed the confict form the perspective
of the international legal instruments that address this situation (MakiliAliyev 2013), drawn parallels between the Åland islands precedent and
the Nagorno-Karabakh confict (Makili-Aliyev 2018) and then made a
comprehensive comparative analysis between Ålandic precedent and the
Nagorno-Karabakh case from the perspective of public international law
and confict resolution (Makili-Aliyev 2020).
However, due to the fundamental changes in the dynamics and the
territorial status quo of the confict, it is an appropriate time to review
international legal issues that are associated with the Nagorno-Karabakh
confict and address the outstanding legal questions that these changes
brought with them. In this study I will: (1) review general international legal
issues that are still relevant to the Nagorno-Karabakh confict, (2) analyze
international law and scholarship regarding the use of force by Azerbaijan
in the fall of 2020, (3) analyze, from the point of view of public international
law, the new ceasefre agreement that was concluded in the aftermath of
the hostilities in the fall of 2020 and focus on the legal consequences for the

DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-12
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confict. This study will depart from the questions surrounding the role of
Armenia in the confict.

Armenian Role in the Confict from the Point of View of
International Law
The international community has condemned the occupation of the
territories of Azerbaijan and the aggression of Armenia several times in various international legal documents and called for (and even demanded) the
withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from the occupied territories on several such occasions. Most notable of these legal documents are four United
Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 of 1993 (UN
1993a, 1993b, 1993c, 1993d). Moreover, similar resolutions and declarations
were adopted by the UN General Assembly, European Parliament, Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe, Organization of Islamic Cooperation
(PACE 2005; OIC 2008; United Nations 2008; European Parliament 2010, paras. 8, 11, 41) and even NATO, that mentions in its declaration the unresolved
conficts in Nagorno-Karabakh as well as Georgia and Moldova in a long
list of security challenges facing the organization. The document clearly singles out territorial integrity of internationally recognized states as the guiding
principle for their peaceful resolution. Moreover, that document makes no
references to the right of peoples to self-determination which has been championed by the Armenian side of the confict (NATO 2012, para. 47) and will
be discussed further in this study.
Despite the condemnation of the international community, no practical
steps have been taken to resolve the occupation, casting doubt on the
international law itself. Some in the scholarship have even questioned
the international organizations on their assessments of the situation in
Nagorno-Karabakh, alleging that all their decisions and resolutions have
political rather than legal motivation and Armenia is not an aggressor and
occupant of the neighboring state’s territories in the Nagorno-Karabakh
confict and simply a kinstate trying to aid its national minority in a diffcult
situation (Avakian 2015). In my previous research I have refected on a body
of evidence that proves otherwise (Makili-Aliyev 2020, 5–8). However, the
scholarly debate became practically irrelevant after the matter was decided
by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).
ECHR tackled this question already in 2015 via its judgment in the
Chiragov and Others v. Armenia case. In its Grand Chamber judgment,
the court touches upon the relevant international law and citing Article 42
of Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The
Hague, 18 October 1907 (the 1907 Hague Regulations) concludes that:
...occupation within the meaning of the 1907 Hague Regulations exists
when a state exercises actual authority over the territory, or part of
the territory, of an enemy state. The requirement of actual authority

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is widely considered to be synonymous to that of effective control.
Military occupation is considered to exist in a territory, or part of a
territory, if the following elements can be demonstrated: the presence
of foreign troops, which are in a position to exercise effective control
without the consent of the sovereign. According to widespread expert
opinion physical presence of foreign troops is a sine qua non requirement of occupation, i.e. occupation is not conceivable without “boots
on the ground” therefore forces exercising naval or air control through
a naval or air blockade do not suffce.
(ECHR 2015, para. 96)
Indeed, occupation is a state when foreign troops on the ground exercise
effective control over territory or its parts without consent of the sovereign
state. Further, the Court determines that for the purposes of the case it
was deciding it is: “...necessary to assess whether [Armenia] exercises effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories as a
whole” (para. 170). This necessity was explained by the court as a means to
determine Armenia’s jurisdiction in the case. Furthermore, ECHR:
...fnds it established that the Republic of Armenia, through its military
presence and the provision of military equipment and expertise, has
been signifcantly involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh confict from
an early date. This military support has been – and continues to be –
decisive for the conquest of and continued control over the territories in
issue... (para. 180)
Thus, the Court has also established the “boots on the ground” requirement
it referred to in the relevant international law previously in its judgment. In
paragraph 186 of the case the Court comes to the defnite conclusion that
“...the ‘NKR’ and its administration survives by virtue of the military, political, fnancial and other support given to it by Armenia which, consequently,
exercises effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding
territories...” (para. 186).
Consequently, the ECHR has established that since the beginning of the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict Armenia has been involved in it militarily and
maintained the effective control by means of (but not limited to) its military
forces on the ground and that, in accordance with international law provided
by the Court itself, amounts to the occupation of the sovereign territory of
Azerbaijan. Even though ECHR was not asked to give such an evaluation
of the situation in the Chiragov and Others v. Armenia case, the necessity
to establish the facts has enabled the Court to determine the situation on
the occupied territories of Azerbaijan on the grounds of international law.
However, while Armenia’s involvement as an occupant and an aggressor
was proven by the ECHR, the situation on the ground has changed since the
fall of 2020 and will be discussed further in this study.

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Relevance of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination to the
Nagorno-Karabakh Confict
It must be mentioned that in the scholarship and discourse on the resolution
of the Nagorno-Karabakh confict there are often views expressed that
principles of territorial integrity and the right of peoples to self-determination
are in collision. The parties to the confict often argue over the superiority of
one of the principles over the other. All such claims and views are incorrect
by defnition. The same goes to some incorrect assumptions that territorial
integrity does not mean inviolability of borders.
To start from the beginning, it has to be pointed out that the majority
of the grounding principles of international law are refected in the UN
Charter and long constitute customary international law. (Thus they are
binding for all the states in the world). The same applies to the famed
principle of territorial integrity (Kohen 2006, 6 et seq.). Generally, this principle was included in the UN Charter in 1945 (United Nations 1945, art.
2[4]) with the aim not to repeat the World War II (and predecessor wars’)
experience and to prevent the eruption of aggressive and occupational
wars of states against each other. The further development of this principle is linked with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the then Conference for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (predecessor of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe). This document proclaims the respect
to territorial integrity of participating States and prohibits use of force and
military occupation of territory, declaring that no occupation or acquisition
can be recognized as legal. Moreover, norms of international law that cover
inviolability of borders constitute a part of principle of territorial integrity
and that is confrmed by the same Helsinki Final Act (OSCE 1975, 1: III and
IV) Thus, the principle of territorial integrity means not only inviolability
of borders but even wider range of sub-principles. That includes even the
internal matters and not only international relations of the states concerned
(Kohen 2006, 7). These principles apply to Armenia through international
treaty law, while they are also binding for all the states in the world as norms
of customary international law.
When it comes to right of peoples to self-determination in its broader sense,
it was frst refected in the UN Charter (United Nations 1945, art. 1[2]). In
this broader sense it became practically inapplicable after the decolonization
in the 1960s–1970s. Moreover, it was included in the UN Charter specifcally with the purpose of fnal abolition of colonialism and imperialism. The
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples is particularly indicating in this sense. In its paragraph 2 it confrms
the decolonization context of the self-determination as a principle: “All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development” (United Nations 1960, para. 2). At the same time,
it adds that: “Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the

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national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations” (para. 6).
Basically, this indicates that, even in this context, self-determination cannot
be a reason for a violation of other principles of international law, namely
territorial integrity. Such an approach is supported further by the UN Declaration on principles of international law that acknowledges that the realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
aims inter alia at bringing a speedy end to colonialism and specifcally points
out the “colonial peoples” (United Nations 1970). However, by the end of
the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, when the Nagorno-Karabakh confict began, the process of decolonization was long over. In international
legal discourse similar views further point to the fact that self-determination
was almost entirely limited to the process of decolonization (Potier 2001, 30;
Crisan 2015, 112; Makili-Aliyev 2020, 18–19).
Moreover, Nagorno-Karabakh was never a colony and the Armenian
population residing there is in fact a national (ethnic) minority on the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan and not any kind of “colonial people”.
Armenians as peoples in the meaning of the UN Charter have already
exercised their right to self-determination in the Republic of Armenia. In
accordance with international law, minorities do not have right to selfdetermination in the broader sense due to the fact that their “nation”
(people) has already exercised the right to self-determination in their own
territory. In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh confict this territory is the
Republic of Armenia (Makili-Aliyev 2020, 19–20). Nor did the population of
Nagorno-Karabakh constitute a separate people of a state during the Soviet
period to be entitled to the external right to self-determination (Krüger
2010, 55–56). All this makes the principle of right of peoples to self-determination in its broader sense and from the legal point of view inapplicable to
the Nagorno-Karabakh confict.
It is evident then, that the confusion about the collision of principles
was created by the misinterpretation of the international law. Important
to note, is that in my previous research, I have already explained why the
right of peoples to self-determination is not a “right to secession” and how
the internal aspect of self-determination can in fact be applicable to the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict and can help in its resolution (Makili-Aliyev
2020, 20–24, 68–73, 90–101).

Legitimacy and Status of So-called “Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic” from the Perspective of Soviet Legislation and
International Law
Even though there are no peoples in Nagorno-Karabakh to claim the right to
self-determination and somehow justify a secession, there are still arguments
coming mainly from the Armenian politicians and even some Armenian
researchers that the so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” (“NKR”) has

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become an independent state using its right to secession provided by the Soviet
legislation for the autonomous regions including former Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Oblast’ (NKAO) (Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United
Nations Offce 2005, 7 et seq.; Avakian 2015).
However, the close examination of the Soviet legislation shows a different
picture. The USSR Constitution of 1977 in its Article 72 provided that each
Union Republic (Armenia and Azerbaijan were such republics before the
dissolution of the USSR) shall retain the right to freely secede from the
USSR. Moreover, in Article 76 it explicitly states that a Union Republic is a
sovereign Soviet Socialist state that has united with other Soviet Republics
in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Furthermore, former NKAO, it
appears, was not a “sovereign” and according to Articles 82 and 86 of the
aforementioned constitution was a constituent part of the Union Republic; in
our case Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. In addition, Article 78 of the
1977 USSR Constitution provides that the territory of the Union Republic
may not be altered without its consent. Even the boundaries between Union
Republics could have been changed only by their own mutual agreement
and still this agreement was subject to ratifcation by the USSR (Potier 2001,
39–40).
However, in 1990 on the brink of the dissolution of the USSR, the Law
on Procedures for Resolving Questions Related to the Secession of Union
Republics from the USSR (Law on Secession) was adopted. This law
provided in its Article 3 that:
In the Union republic that has within it autonomous republics, autonomous provinces and autonomous regions, the referendum shall be held
separately in each autonomous unit. The peoples of autonomous republics
and autonomous formations shall retain the right to decide independently
the question of staying in the USSR or in the seceding Union republic, as
well as to raise the question of their own legal state status. In a Union
republic whose territory includes areas with concentration of national
groups that make up the majority of the population in a given locality,
the results of the voting in these localities shall be considered separately
during the determination of the referendum result.
(Hannum 1993, 754)
This particular piece of legislation is being used by the separatists in
Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenian government to justify the creation of
“NKR”. While it is true that such a law was adopted by the Soviet Union, it
has many legal problems with both its existence and implementation. First
of all, as it can be seen from the above, it clearly contradicts the superior
legal act – the 1977 Constitution of the USSR and thus, it was unconstitutional by defnition. Second, as Tim Potier points out, this law was adopted
in an attempt to slow down, at the time, the momentum of the secession of

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the Baltic States from the Soviet Union and only later became relevant to
other Union Republics (Potier 2001, 40).
Legal researchers that have studied and analyzed the text of the law and that
of the 1977 Constitution of the USSR are pointing out that in addition to mentioned contradictions, the law itself was not implemented properly and the requirements of this law were not properly met. Moreover, the law provided for
such a complex, cumbersome and disadvantageous procedure, which would
not only have a successful secession delayed for years but could even have
made it impossible (Krüger 2010, 28–39). This is especially important, as the
truth of the matter is that the procedure under the Law on Secession adopted
in 1990 was so complicated and required so many years to implement, that
none of the former Soviet Union republics has successfully implemented it,
taking into account that the USSR has effectively ceased to exist on 26 December 1991. Thus, the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic has become an
independent state by virtue of the dissolution of Soviet Union and under the
principle uti possidetis juris Nagorno-Karabakh was a constituent part of the
new Republic of Azerbaijan (Potier 2001, 41; Krüger 2010, 37).
In her study of uti possidetis principle in regard to problematic situations
in post-Soviet space Anne Peters makes a conclusion that:
...older administrative lines stemming from the pre-independence era
(e.g. Soviet era) cannot be opposed against the currently existing ‘mother’
states (e.g. CIS states) if they are not acknowledged in their domestic law
as it stands, too. Neither does uti possidetis apply on the basis of factual
control over a territory, in the absence of a formal administrative line.
(Peters 2014, 136)
That fair conclusion when taken in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh confict means that the Nagorno-Karabakh separatists can’t argue that because
Azerbaijan did not have total or effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh
in turbulent times of the USSR’s dissolution, uti possidetis principle did not
apply to Nagorno-Karabakh as part of the territory of Azerbaijan.
Interestingly, even the proponents of the independence of so-called
“NKR” agree that the arguments under the Law on Secession are less than
credible. For example, William Slomanson suggests that:
...[Nagorno-Karabakh] abandon its exclusive reliance on its interpretation of the... 1990 Soviet statute... There is no multilateral treaty
on secession. There never will be. That would be political suicide.
An alternative source of international law – state practice – does not
provide an expedient yardstick for measuring the legitimacy of unilateral secessions... [T]he right to self-determination does not include a
general right to secession...
(Slomanson 2012, 41)

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210 Kamal Makili-Aliyev
Moreover, Slomanson advises against using the case of Kosovo as well, due
to the fact that the International Court of Justice did not consider the questions of statehood and right to secession of Kosovo (42).
Furthermore, another claim that in accordance with the Montevideo Convention of 1933 the self-proclaimed so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”
should be recognized on the international level, has earlier been proven as
groundless (Makili-Aliyev 2020, 27–29), confrming the fact that the socalled “NKR” does not in any way qualify for the status of an independent
state and cannot even be treated as a de facto state or a state-like entity.

UN Security Council’s Resolutions and the Questions of
Self-defense and Use of Force Raised in Connection to the
Hostilities in 2020
From the start of the confict and frst actions of Armenia that aimed at
the annexation of the parts of Azerbaijan’s sovereign territory, the UN
Security Council has adopted four resolutions that were mentioned earlier
(UN 1993a, 1993b, 1993c, 1993d), In these resolutions the Security Council
demands the withdrawal of all occupying forces from the territories of Azerbaijan (Krüger 2010, 106). Many authors that have been analyzing these
resolutions come to similar conclusions that actions of Armenia cannot
be justifed under international law, that Armenia is an occupying power
and that the Security Council recognized that fact and demanded the withdrawal of Armenian armed forces (e.g., Cornell 1999, 32; Krüger 2010, 106;
Qasimova 2010, 83).
Thus, it is quite obvious, that the analysis of the UN Security Council’s
resolutions provides us with an open and clear message that the Armenian
forces conducting occupation should have been withdrawn a long time ago.
Moreover, it is commonly known from the UN Charter Article 25 that the
Security Council Resolutions are obligatory for the implementation for all
the UN member-states (United Nations 1945), including the Republic of
Armenia. Moreover, the UN Security Council has enough powers to make
any state comply with its resolutions (United Nations 1945, arts. 41–42),
especially a state engaged in aggression against other states. The conduct
of Armenia clearly fts the defnition of aggression as clarifed by the UN
General Assembly Resolution 3314 (United Nations 1974, arts. 1, 3[a]).
While it can be argued that the provisions of 1974 UN General Assembly
resolution were strong recommendations of the international community to
the UN Security Council and were of non-binding character in 1993, however, much time has passed since, and the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court of 1998 has emerged, offcially making aggression an
international crime (Rome Statute 1998, 5[1][d]). Even more importantly, by
2001 it was universally accepted that aggression is an unlawful act and prohibition of such act has acquired the status of jus cogens norms (ILC 2001,
283–284, paras. 4–5).

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Unfortunately, none of the mentioned facts were considered by the UN
Security Council as a reason to make Armenia comply with the Council’s
own decisions and start procedures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
and so the aggression was allowed to continue. The inaction of the UN
Security Council was interpreted by the Republic of Azerbaijan to mean
that it still retains the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The article declares that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security….
(United Nations 1945, art. 51)
It has to be pointed out that Azerbaijan recognizes this right in its own legislation, providing in Article 28 of its military doctrine that:
[Azerbaijan] maintains its right to use all necessary means, including
application of military force, to restore its territorial integrity according to the norms and principles of international law, if the Republic of
Armenia continues to hold under occupation the part of the territory of
the Republic of Azerbaijan and refuses to liberate occupied territories
in the framework of political resolution of the problem.
(Qasimova 2010, 92)
Moreover, the state using self-defense is quite free to act on its own
discretion. As Yoram Dinstein accurately suggests: “The acting State
unilaterally determines whether the occasion calls for the use of forcible
measures in self-defence, and, if so, what specifc steps ought to be taken”
(Dinstein 2011, 234). The only requirement that Article 51 bestows upon a
state in question is a reporting to the UN Security Council:
...[m]easures taken by Members in the exercise of this right to selfdefence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority or responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as
it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security.
(United Nations 1945, art. 51)
The only matter that is questionable here is what “until” actually means in
the understanding of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Thomas Plofchan examining the limits of right to self-defense as early as in 1992, in connection with
Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990, comes to solid conclusions that:

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212 Kamal Makili-Aliyev
...an examination of legislative history demonstrates that the framers
of the U.N. Charter intended that the right of self-defense should exist
at all times unless the Security Council were to specifcally prohibit
its exercise... The right of self-defense is fundamental and can only be
limited if State action is in direct contravention of the purposes and
principles of the Charter, or if the Security Council takes explicit action
to limit this right.
(Plofchan 1992, 372–373)
Malvina Halberstam tackling the issue in question similarly concludes that:
It is diffcult to believe that some 180 states would have agreed to give
up the most fundamental attribute of sovereignty, the right to use force
in self-defense, to an international body, and particularly one like the
Security Council....[More] plausible interpretation of Article 51 is that a
state retains the right of self-defense until the Security Council has taken
measures that have succeeded in restoring international peace and security. This interpretation is overwhelmingly confrmed by the legislative history of Article 51.
(Halberstam 1996, 248)
In this sense the legal argumentation adopted by Azerbaijan could be summarized as that until the UN Security Council decides to restore peace and
security in the situation of the Nagorno-Karabakh confict using means
available to it under UN Charter and achieves that goal successfully,
Azerbaijan maintains its right to self-defense, provided that it will inform
the UN Security Council of the measures it is taking. At the same time,
UN Security Council has set no limitations on Azerbaijan regarding the
right of self-defense. With that in mind, all actions of Azerbaijan to recover
its territories from occupation should be considered as the exercise of the
“inherent” right to self-defense. Azerbaijan maintained that position during
the escalation of hostilities in the fall of 2020 (Permanent Representative of
Azerbaijan to the United Nations 2020, 2).
However, this position was questioned by some legal scholars and confrmed by others. The debate generally revolved around the interpretation
of the principles of public international law with regard to the prohibition of
use of force (United Nations 1945, art. 2[4]). Tom Ruys and Felipe Rodriguez
Silvestre argued in November 2020, right after the new ceasefre agreement
was concluded between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia (Statement 2020),
that Azerbaijan’s claim that it had a right to exercise self-defense during the
hostilities in the fall of 2020, wasn’t satisfactory. Ruys and Silvestre argued
that it is doubtful that an unlawful occupation can be regarded as a “continuing” armed attack permitting the use of self-defense at any given point
in time (e.g., years after occupation). In their argumentation, Ruys and Silvestre pointed to the “continuing character” of occupation as an event but

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argued that this does not necessarily imply a “continuing armed attack”.
They argued instead that Article 51 of the UN Charter refers to the attack
as “occurring”, suggesting that it has a ratione temporis dimension, that becomes meaningless should the right to self-defense not be perceived as necessarily having “immediacy requirement”. Moreover, they believe and argue
that the prohibition of use of force is not connected solely to the protection
of territorial sovereignty but exists also to safeguard international peace and
security and human lives, and that implies that the prohibition of solving
disputes by military means extends even to the situation of territorial disputes or “frozen” armed conficts. Thus, they argue, based on the examples
from state practice, the Nagorno-Karabakh confict as a territorial dispute
could not have provoked Azerbaijan’s right to self-defense as the situation
of status quo there was relatively peaceful for an extended amount of time.
Therefore, they argued, the argumentation that unlawful occupation can
support the legality of self-defense because this occupation is a “continuing
armed attack” cannot be accepted (Ruys and Silvestre 2020).
A similar position was taken by another duo of scholars. Bernard KnollTudor and Daniel Müller argued in EJIL:Talk! that because the hostilities
in the fall of 2020 were between two recognized states (Armenia and Azerbaijan), Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, that prohibits the use force between
such states, should apply in full to this situation. They believe that the fact
of illegal occupation of territory by one state, does not necessarily mean
that the rightful owner can arbitrarily use enforcement (military) action as
it will challenge the overall architecture of preservation of peace. Moreover,
they argue that Azerbaijan’s actions, on one hand, are problematic from the
points of view of immediacy, necessity and proportionality and, on the other
hand, they claimed (interestingly, based on the argumentation of Ruy and
Silvestre) that continued occupation cannot be equated to the “continued
attack”. Nor, in their view, can Azerbaijan base its enforcement action on
the Security Council resolutions of 1993 (mentioned above), as they contain
no authorization for such action. They concluded that a valid claim over
land does not per se justify the use of force (Knoll-Tudor and Müller 2020).
Yet, a third pair of scholars that commented on the issue, took an
opposite stance. Dapo Akande and Antonios Tzanakopoulos criticized the
position of Ruys and others from the point of view of an incorrectly formulated question. Akande and Tzanakopoulos argued that the right question
is not if the unlawful occupation constitutes a continuing armed attack, but
if any occupation as a direct consequence of an armed attack, constitutes
a continuing armed attack. They have also argued that there is a difference
between a territorial dispute where a claim was made but no force was used
and another situation where one party creates or escalates the territorial
dispute by invasion and occupation of the disputed territory. Moreover,
they argue that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have practically
equated notions of “armed attack” and “aggression” in its case law, which
needs to be taken into account when considering invasion and occupation.

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Kamal Makili-Aliyev

They also argue that the necessity criterion in self-defense is very important
as it can also refer not only to immediacy of self-defense but also to the
situation of a last resort. In their view, prolonged occupation with no visible chances for peaceful resolutions constitutes such a last resort situation
(Akande and Tzanakopoulos 2020).
The argumentation provided by Akande and Tzanakopoulos presents
as much more compelling than the argumentation of other scholars for
several reasons. First, the argumentation provided by their opponents that
the prohibition of use of force in international law is primarily connected
to the maintenance of peace and security and that in some cases the protection of territorial integrity by any means will challenge the architecture
of sustainable peace, cannot be accepted as valid. A simple refection on
the fact that the principle of territorial integrity in the UN Charter does
not have any exceptions, while non-use of force principle has two exceptions (Security Council authorization and self-defense), is already a clear
indicator of a shaky ground under the assumption that Ruys and other
made. It is obvious that the UN Charter accepts the necessity to use force
in some cases, making the notion of peace a non-absolute category. Arguing a contrario and assuming the opposite, would make the inclusion of
right to self-defense into UN Charter meaningless in the frst place. If the
point of the UN Charter is “peace by any means”, then the logical reaction
of any state to an invasion should be non-use of force (non-engagement
with an aggressor) and further reliance on the international community
(represented by UN Security Council) to restore the situation to previous
status quo or, alternatively, to keep the situation as it is for the sake of continued peace. The result of such a theoretical exercise puts under question
not only the right to self-defense, but also principles of sovereignty and
sovereign equality of the states (United Nations 1945, art. 2[1, 4, 7]) as only
the members of the UN Security Council would then hold a monopoly on
the use of force. Thus, the validity of the theoretical argumentation provided by Ruys and Silvestre and supported by Knoll-Tudor and Müller is
fundamentally challenged.
Second, the opponents of Akande and Tzanakopoulos, rely on the
understanding that territorial disputes should not be solved through the
use of force, to which the counter argument is grounded in the difference
between the territorial dispute where the force was not used and the situation of the occupation. However, there is another dimension here connected
to the notion of a “genuine” territorial dispute that was put forward by the
Ruys and Silvestre (2020). They try to preempt the argumentation that the
dispute is not “genuine” if no claim was put forward by the occupying state.
However, it should be instead argued, that it is not the claim or counterclaim
that proves that the dispute exists, it is rather the uncertainty from the point
of view of international law and the state practice that should be indicative
here. Otherwise, any casual public proclamation or a verbal claim on the
state level (e.g., populist nationalistic claims aimed at the internal audiences)

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can be considered a territorial dispute. In cases such as Nagorno-Karabakh, where there is a clear confrmation of the unlawful occupation (ECHR
2015) and recognition of this fact by the member-states of the UN in form of
the Security Council resolutions of 1993, labeling the territory as disputed
is incorrect by defnition, as from the point of view of international law no
dispute exists – Nagorno-Karabakh is a recognized territory of Azerbaijan.
Thus, it is incorrect to equate a proven unlawful occupation of the sovereign
territory with a territorial dispute within the meaning of the UN Charter
and UN General Assembly resolutions.
Lastly, the argument between the aforementioned scholars seems to boil
down to the argument about if the unlawful occupation actually constitutes “continuing armed attack” to justify the self-defense under Article
51 of the UN Charter. The problem here seems to be in the differences of
the understanding of the “occupation” which allows the scholars to interpret its properties in ways that ft their respective arguments. Akande and
Tzankopoulos (2020) argue that occupation is a form of aggression that
is continuing by defnition and recognized by the ICJ as an armed attack.
Their opponents, on the other hand, understand occupation as a process
that has started as an attack, but not necessarily continuing as an attack,
due to the fact that hostilities usually cease on the occupied territory,
especially in the protracted occupations. Thus, the occupation is argued
to be different and separate from an armed attack per se (Knoll-Tudor
and Müller 2020; Ruys and Silvestre 2020). What all of the aforementioned scholars seem to ignore is that the military occupation is actually
a legal regime and it may be helpful to treat it as such – as a complex
and multidimensional event. Instead of trying to equate the occupation
to a notion of an aggression or compare it with a notion of an attack,
it is more helpful to look at the ECHR’s confrmation (discussed above)
that in accordance with the 1907 Hague Regulations military occupation
is characterized by effective control of the occupying state and physical
military presence of that state on the foreign territory (ECHR 2015, para.
96). The second requirement of physical military presence means that for
the situation to be classifed as an occupation, it is always necessary to
have military troops on the ground on the territory of the state against
its sovereign will. However, such military action of the troops across the
border is by defnition an “armed attack” (ICJ 1986, para. 195). Hence,
while the occupation continues, so continues the presence of military
troops and, consequently, armed attack continues as well. It is not a legal
regime of occupation that constitutes a “continuing armed attack”, but
it is one of its necessary requirements (military troops on the ground)
that constitutes an armed attack that is continuing for the duration of the
occupation.
As it can be seen from the above, the analysis of the law and scholarship
indicates that Azerbaijan’s claim to the right to self-defense during the hostilities in the fall of 2020 should be considered valid. It is then necessary to

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216 Kamal Makili-Aliyev
consider the changes that happened after Azerbaijan has exercised its right
to self-defense.

International Legal Perspective on the Changes in the Status
Quo After the New Ceasefre Agreement between Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Russia Concluded in 2020
The full-scale hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan that broke out
in the fall of 2020 have ended with the new ceasefre agreement concluded
on November 10, 2020. The period after this agreement is marked by nearly
absolute absence of any kind of active hostilities, including low-intensity
hostilities that have persisted after the ceasefre agreement of 1994 between
Armenia and Azerbaijan and occasionally turned into more active fareups (Makili-Aliyev 2020, 4–5), In many ways, this is due to the fact that the
agreement introduced the Russian peacekeeping mission on the remnants
of territory of Nagorno-Karabakh that were still controlled by the Armenian armed forces. In accordance with the agreement, the peacekeeping
forces of Russia are deployed along the line of contact between Armenia
and Azerbaijan that existed on November 10, 2020 and along the so-called
“Lachin Corridor” – a fve-kilometer-wide strip of land with a road in the
middle, running from the border of Armenia to the exclave of NagornoKarabakh surrounded by the line of contact (Statement 2020, paras. 3 and
6). Moreover, the agreement covered the return of the regions surrounding
the former NKAO to the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan. These were the regions
that Azerbaijan has not taken control over during the previous hostilities,
namely, the Agdam, Kalbajar and Lachin regions (or “districts” as per the
agreement) (paras. 2 and 6). The transfer of regions to the jurisdiction of
Azerbaijan was carried out within close deadlines and by December 2020
Azerbaijan took control over these territories.
Such profound changes in the territorial status quo and the access of a third
state to the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh have consequently affected the
questions of effective control and jurisdiction. It is clear now that the previous ECHR (2015) ruling is no longer as relevant to the present situation on
the ground. Azerbaijan has regained jurisdiction and effective control over
most of the territories that it did not control in 2015. The rest of the territory
of Azerbaijan that still has presence of Armenian troops on it, however, now
also hosts the military presence of Russia. This makes an interesting situation where the effective control over this remaining territory is exercised collectively by Armenia and Russia. For example, the new ceasefre agreement
explicitly points to the exclusive control of Russian military over the “Lachin Corridor” (Statement 2020, para. 6). This arrangement will last at least
until November 2025 as the Russian peacekeepers’ presence is limited by the
fve-year term that can be prolonged indefnitely in the absence of an objection from any of the parties to the agreement (para. 4). Meanwhile, it is diffcult to see the delimitation of control between Russia and Armenia because

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there are no legal documents regulating the mandate of the Russian peacekeepers, making the balance between powers of Armenia and Russia in this
territory very diffcult to distinguish. Furthermore, the new ceasefre agreement includes the provision on the withdrawal of the Armenian troops from
the territory in question, however, does not set a concrete deadline (para. 4).
This further indicates that, at least in theory, the control of Armenia over
the territory will diminish in favor of Russia. However, such an uncertain
situation will create a lot of legal questions with regards to the jurisdiction
over the territory and responsibility for the well-being of its population.
Moreover, apart from the withdrawal of Armenian armed forces, there are
other obligations under the agreement that remain to be fulflled: (1) the
return of all internally displaced persons and refugees; (2) mutual return
of all the detained persons; (3) re-opening of all economic and transport
communications (paras. 7–9). Those provisions are not fully explained in
the agreement and are not subjects to strict deadlines (unlike the return of
regions to Azerbaijan). This makes them dependent on separate agreements
between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia.
On the other hand, the new ceasefre agreement, albeit being called a
“statement”, is obviously a treaty in the understanding of international law.
The ICJ have long ago explained that regardless of the format or the name
of the document, when states enter into commitments toward each other –
they conclude a treaty (ICJ 1994). In practice, the parties of the “statement”
have demonstrated by their treatment of the document that they consider its
obligations as binding under international law and that means that any disagreements on its implementation can be submitted to the ICJ if the parties
so wished. This demonstrates a clear contrast with the previous ceasefre
agreement of 1994, that was constantly violated and did not include that
many substantive obligations. Now the parties have even more incentives to
settle arguments peacefully by using an international arbitration if they so
wish.

Conclusion
In this study I have reviewed the outstanding legal issues in the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict in the changed situation after the active hostilities during the fall of 2020. I have confrmed that from the point of view
of international law Armenia’s role in the confict is of the aggressor and
occupying power. Moreover, I was able to show that the idea that at the heart
of this confict there is a collision between principles of territorial integrity
and self-determination of peoples (usually featured by political scientists)
is not valid and that those two principles of international law are very well
aligned, not least due to the fact that the right of peoples to self-determination is not a “right to secession”. Such a right does not exist in international
law. Furthermore, Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh being a minority on
the territory of Azerbaijan do not have a right to self-determination in the

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218 Kamal Makili-Aliyev
understanding of the UN Charter. I have also confrmed that the idea of
secession of Nagorno-Karabakh based on the Soviet legislation is not valid
as the requirements of the Soviet Law on Secession of 1990 were never fulflled by any of the territories of the former Soviet Union and the law itself
was unconstitutional.
I have further analyzed the right of Azerbaijan to self-defense in the
context of the protracted occupation from the Armenian side. Through the
analysis of the international law and contemporary scholarship I challenge
the idea that the principles of international law embedded in the UN Charter aim primarily at the maintenance of peace and that territorial integrity
cannot be seen as a valid reason to disturb peace in order to restore the
integrity of the state. I point to the fact that such a position would question
the rationale of the right to self-defense itself as well as sovereignty and
sovereign equality of the states. Moreover, I point to the fact that because
Nagorno-Karabakh is clearly recognized under international law as territory of Azerbaijan, the territory itself can hardly be a matter of a dispute within the meaning of the UN Charter. I further explain that there is
a misunderstanding in the scholarship of the relation between a military
occupation and an armed attack. One of the properties of the occupation is physical presence of the military forces on the territory of another
state without its consent and that in itself is an armed attack. This attack
becomes continuing for the duration of the occupation making Azerbaijan’s
claim to self-defense valid.
Furthermore, I analyzed the treaty between Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Russia that ended the hostilities in the fall of 2020. I point to the important
changes that led to the questions of effective control over parts of the
territory that remained outside of jurisdiction of Azerbaijan and on the
unresolved obligations between the parties. One important outcome of the
treaty is that it opened the way to resolution of the legal issues between
Armenia and Azerbaijan through the use of international arbitration.

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Peters, Anne. 2014. “The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris. How Relevant is it for
Issues of Secession?” In Self-Determination and Secession in International Law,
edited by Christian Walter, Antje Von Ungern-Sternberg and Kavus Abushov,
95–137. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198702375.
001.0001
Plofchan, Thomas. 1992. “Article 51: Limits on Self-Defense.” Michigan Journal of
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Confict.” Perceptions XV(Spring–Summer): 75–98.
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ICJ (International Court of Justice). 1986. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
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RES/62/243.

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Part III

The Second Karabakh War
and the Consequences

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10 How Do We Explain Victory?
The Karabakh Campaign
of 2020
Edward J. Erickson

Introduction
How do we explain victory? How do we explain Azerbaijan’s stunning
strategic victory in the autumn of 2020 in what has come to be called the
44-Day War or the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War? The most pervasive
explanation today is “The bigger and better equipped Azerbaijani army,
backed by Turkey, overwhelmed the smaller and obsolescent Armenian
force” (Reynolds 2021). While it is true the Azerbaijani armed forces were
certainly larger and better equipped, military history demonstrates that
such factors do not automatically guarantee battlefeld victories. Much
depends on training and motivation. Moreover, as late as mid-December
2020, the respected British defence publisher Jane’s wrote the Azerbaijani
Army “remains hampered by corruption and a highly politicized offcer
corps. It lacks a consistent and coordinated training programme for individual soldiers and small and larger units, which are especially lacking in
combined arms/joint service training” (Azerbaijan – Army 2020, 2). If we
combine these assertions we are left with the question, “How did a large
but clumsy force, supposedly led by politicized offcers and poorly trained,
achieve such a resounding Azerbaijani victory?”
This chapter presents a military analysis of the Azerbaijani Armed
Forces’ successful 2020 campaign to seize geographically and politically
important parts of Karabakh from the Armenian Army. The campaign
was indeed a resounding military success and this explanation is presented using a military vocabulary and military concepts to establish an
overall context and timeline for understanding that success. At the highest levels, the Azerbaijani strategic objective of recovering large portions
of Armenian-occupied territory proved achievable in terms of balancing
military ends, ways, and means. Moreover, the Azerbaijani Armed Forces’
joint planning, preparation, and combat effectiveness proved effective and
decisive compared to its Armenian opponent. This was achieved through
an extended period of Turkish military assistance which was a critically
important combat multiplier for the Azerbaijanis but it also refected the
acquisition of selected capabilities and capacities chosen by Azerbaijan.

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Ultimately, the success of Azerbaijan’s 2020 campaign in Karabakh was the
result of a sustained period of professionalization of its military institutions
and complementary acquisition decisions.

Background
The fractious history between Armenia and Azerbaijan dates back to the
dissolution of the Russian Empire in 1917 when both polities briefy became
independent before being overrun by the Ottoman Army in 1918. However,
by 1920, Armenia lost a war against Mustafa Kemal’s Turkish Nationalists
and both republics were soon absorbed into the Soviet Union. Upon the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, both republics regained independence and problems immediately reignited over ownership of Karabakh
and Nakhchivan, both of which were an internationally recognized part of
Azerbaijan.
The First Karabakh War was fought from 1992 through 1994 and resulted
in the loss of the mountainous Karabakh region to Armenia. Fighting was
heavy, casualties here high, and civilian victimization was rampant, but
the war was overshadowed by the conficts in the former Yugoslavia, which
seemed to capture a larger share of the world’s attention. The Armenians
were better trained and more highly motivated, and inficted a major defeat
on the new Azerbaijani Army. Since that time, tensions remain high along
the Line of Contact (LoC) which separated the combatants and violations
of the ceasefre have broken out episodically (but repeatedly) along the LoC.
The most serious occurred over a four-day period, from April 1 to April 4,
2016, ending in another ceasefre on April 5 (Armenia – Armed Forces).
This was the largest outbreak of fghting since 1994 and Azerbaijan came
off as the putative winner, although having suffered more casualties than
the Armenians.
Taking advantage of a provocation, the Azerbaijani Army attacked
across the LoC in the early morning of April 2, 2016, with its elite 52nd
Special Forces (SF) Brigade, and two motorized rife brigades. Their objective was to seize two villages, Talish and Madagis, 3 kilometres beyond
the LoC with a supporting attack on Horadiz (Azerbaijan – Army 2020,
6). They were successful in seizing eight square kilometres of territory,
including Talish, but took heavy casualties. The commander and the principal staff of the SF brigade were killed in action. Although Azerbaijani
losses were severe, the operation provided proof that the army could operate its weapons systems and manage a modern close battle. It was an
opportunity to assess the success of Azerbaijan’s quest to build a modern
professional army. In this regard, it most likely served Azerbaijan much
like the Spanish Civil War served Hitler and Mussolini as a testing ground
for weapons and tactics. A small victory, perhaps, but one that clearly
indicated that Azerbaijan was on the right track to modernize its armed
forces.

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Military Cooperation and Modernization
Turkey and the newly independent Republic of Azerbaijan established a formal agreement for mutual military cooperation in 1992 (Oztarsu 2011, 2).
Further agreements were signed in 1996, and a 1999 agreement extended
fnancial aid to Azerbaijan and brought Azerbaijani soldiers to Kosovo
under Turkish command. In 2000, Turkey began to export modern weapons to Azerbaijan. This was followed by a major effort of the Azerbaijani
Ministry of Defence to modernize and reform the armed forces. This was
a belated recognition that the Armenian armed forces maintained a qualitative edge over Azerbaijani forces (Bosbotinis 2007). The priority of this
effort was to recast the military from a Soviet style force to a NATO style
force, including embracing NATO compatible doctrines and acquiring
modern equipment. Oil and gas revenues subsidized these efforts.
In 2010 Turkey and Azerbaijan signed a Strategic Partnership and Mutual
Support (SPMS) agreement (Huseynov 2020a, 1). Under this agreement the
Turks provided more robust professional military education and training
opportunities for the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, including joint training
exercises. In 2018, there were seven joint exercises and, in 2019, 13 more
joint exercises. The joint manoeuvres in late July and early August 2020
involved up to 11,000 Turkish personnel and tested the combat readiness of
Azerbaijani forces, fre support coordination, and military staff profciency
in planning and operations (Huseynov 2020a, 1). These annual exercises took
place in the province of Nakhchivan, which is adjacent to Turkey but disconnected from Azerbaijan itself. In fact, the Turkish Armed Forces in 2020
maintained active military training cooperation activities including sending
training teams to partner nations and training military personnel from 61
countries in Turkish military institutions (Military Training Cooperation
2020). In an email to the author, January 31, 2021, retired Turkish Army
colonel Dr. Mesut Uyar noted, “Hundreds of Azerbaijani offcers graduated
from the Turkish military academies. The Azerbaijani Military Academy
and General Staff College were founded by the Turkish military and for a
period of time most of the lecturers and trainers were Turkish offcers.” The
success of this endeavour owes much to the fact that Turks and Azerbaijanis
share a common Turkic language and have close cultural and historic ties.
In addition to Turkey, Azerbaijan receives signifcant military assistance
from Israel. Israel established diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan in 1992
and the relationship has broadened since then. Azerbaijan is a major energy
supplier to Israel and the relationship has matured into a full scale military
cooperation and modernization programme. In 2012, Azerbaijan purchased
$1.6 billion worth of weapons from Israeli Aerospace Industries (Avdaliani
2020). The Azerbaijanis followed up in 2016 with an additional $5 billion and
in 2017 another $127 million; most of this went to purchase unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) and satellite technology (Karčić 2021). Moreover, the Israelis have helped equip Azerbaijan’s Special Forces, installed security systems

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in Azerbaijani airports, and upgraded tanks and armoured vehicles. Even
for energy rich Azerbaijan the partnership is expensive but it resulted in
the acquisition of very modern military capabilities. The United States has
also maintained a durable security assistance programme with Azerbaijan
which brought numbers of Azerbaijani offcers and NCOs to the United
States for training, while their Armenian counterparts were trained in Russia. Moreover, in 2019, United States security assistance funding to Azerbaijan amounted to over $100 million while Armenia received around $4.2
million (US Allocated $100 million 2021). The “value-added” of western
Turkish, Israeli, and American military assistance in comparison with Russian military assistance should not be understated.

Azerbaijani Military Capabilities and Capacity
In the autumn of 2020, Azerbaijan had well-developed capabilities (what
they could do) matched by signifcant capacity (the extent to which they
could do it). Most of the army’s conventional military equipment inventory
is composed of upgraded Soviet or more modern Russian systems, including
T-90 and upgraded T-72 tanks, BMP and BTR APCs, and self-propelled
and towed artillery. However, the priority of the acquisition programme in
the last ten years has focussed more narrowly on UAVs, ballistic missiles,
and air defence systems. Tactically, Azerbaijan acquired a precision strike
capability which allowed its soldiers to pinpoint and destroy almost anything within range of its UAV systems. Equally as important, Azerbaijan
purchased a large number of advanced ballistic missiles which complemented their longer ranging UAVs, effectively giving them operational level
reach. This enabled Azerbaijan’s military to conduct what is called the Deep
Battle (operations beyond the immediate tactical battlefeld into the enemy’s
rear areas) (Brito and Boring 2018, 233–238; Watling and Kaushal 2020).
It is important to consider that capability acquisition and capacity development involves resource allocation, particularly funding, time and by
assigning the most qualifed personnel to the effort. While it is certain that
Azerbaijan increased selected precision strike capabilities matched by increased capacity, the recent war clearly demonstrated that the armed forces
were unable to develop corresponding capabilities in conventional units.
This is self-evident from watching videos of Azerbaijani infantry and armoured units being destroyed through their own inept tactics and incompetence. Post-war estimates of losses and casualties are equally damning. We
may infer from this evidence that Azerbaijan’s choice of capability investment was asymmetric and weighted towards precision strike systems that
would be useful only in certain situations.
Defence analysts also point to the critical capability of Azerbaijani UAVs
and satellites as battlefeld sensors which enabled the precision targeting
of enemy positions and assets (Watling and Kaushal 2020). These sensors
multiplied the effectiveness of Azerbaijan’s UAVs, ballistic missiles, and

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older guided missile systems giving Azerbaijan both close-range tactical
strike capabilities matched by long-range operational level strike capabilities. These complementary precision strike capabilities proved to be a
game changer tactically, which enabled the Azerbaijanis to overcome wellprepared Armenian defences on the high ground, and at a higher level of
war, an operational game changer which enabled them to isolate the battle
space.
In terms of capacity, it is estimated that the Azerbaijani Air Force has a
large and robust UAV feet including 36 Turkish Bayraktar TB2 UAVs (armed
with Roketsan MAM-L laser-guided munitions), 48 Israeli Harop loitering
munitions, and a large number of Israeli Orbiter 1K loitering munitions,
Elbit Hermes 450/900, SkyStriker, and Aerostar UAVs (Azerbaijan – Air
Force 2020, 11–12). These UAV systems are operated by the air force and
the country locally manufactures Israeli Orbiter and Aerostar UAVs under
license as well. The Azerbaijani Air Force missile inventory includes the
modern Israeli Lora ballistic missile (four launchers and 50 missiles), old
Soviet SS-11s, and the Israeli Extra guided missile system (six launchers and
50 missiles) (Shiakh and Rumbaugh 2020).
Azerbaijan also invested in building a signifcant Special Operations Force
(SOF) capability which complements its UAV and BM capability. Americans today often associate SOF with anti-terrorism operations and raids,
such as the one which killed Osama bin Laden. However, well-trained SOF
teams can extend battlefeld operations deep into the enemy’s rear areas to
target and destroy command and control networks, critical infrastructure,
and air defence systems. Turkish military assistance has been instrumental
in developing the Azerbaijani SOF capability. Joint exercises in 2018 stressed
joint interoperability and trained Azerbaijani personnel in the operation
of Turkish weapons while a 2018 “Command-Staff War Game” training
exercise replicated SOF operations in mountainous terrain integrated with
electronic warfare and precision munitions (Azerbaijan – Special Operations Forces 2020, 2). Over the course of 2019, 13 joint SOF exercises were
conducted with Turkish and Georgian SOF forces (Azerbaijan – Special
Operations Forces 2020, 2). The Azerbaijani Special Operations capability
is composed of a SOF Command with four SOF commando units and a
special naval warfare SOF unit.
Similarly to the United States, the Azerbaijani President is the
Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of Defence is nominally a presidentially appointed civilian. However, unlike the United States which has a
chairman of its joint staff, Azerbaijan employs a classic general staff in the
Turkish and German model. While civilians may not consider command
and staff organizations and their profciency as defned capabilities, professional soldiers would insist that these surely are. The multiplying effect
of professional military staffs began with the advent of the Great Prussian
General Staff in 1806 and can be traced through a historical continuum
to the present day (Hughes and DiNardo 2018, 6–9). The highest ranking

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Azerbaijani military member is the Chief of the General Staff, who is also
the First Deputy Minister of Defence (Ministry of Defence 2021). The
Chief of the General Staff leads a joint staff composed of staff offcers from
the army, the air force, and navy, as well as offcers specializing in SOF,
personnel, and logistics. The commanders of the army and the air force
serve as the chief’s principal deputies. A professional war college supports
the education and training of the offcers of the general staff. Importantly,
over the past 30 years, the Azerbaijani General Staff has been transformed
from a Soviet-style general staff to a more Western NATO-style general staff
(Ministry of Defence 2021). This transformation is largely due to the infuence of Turkish military cooperation which implemented offcer exchanges,
provided training teams, and educated Azerbaijani offcers in Turkish professional military educational institutions.
Professional NATO Ministry of Defence-level military staffs today are
capable of long range strategic planning, integrating the acquisition of
hardware into warfghting doctrines and training, establishing compatible
multi-echelon training programmes, creating campaign plans, and assigning and supervising combat missions to subordinate major headquarters.
In effect, a professional military staff can establish and balance realistic,
achievable ends, ways, and means. This is no small task. Subordinate army
and air force staffs are similarly organized and trained for war. As the
reader will come to understand, the Azerbaijani military staffs planned and
executed a remarkably successful operational level campaign that recovered
much of Armenian-occupied Karabakh in the autumn of 2020.

The Military Balance
At the strategic level, the Republic of Azerbaijan clearly is more powerful
in every meaningful way than the Republic of Armenia. A simple on-line
scan of the American CIA Fact Books reveals much and the numbers speak
for themselves. In 2019, Azerbaijan had 10,300,000 citizens, a median age
of 32.6 years, a youth unemployment rate of 13.4%, a population below the
poverty line of 4.9%, a real GDP of $145.2 billion, and an industrialized economic sector of 53.5% (CIA Fact Book 2021). Azerbaijan exported around
720,000 barrels of crude oil a day as well as producing large amounts of
natural gas. According to the CIA, in 2019, Azerbaijan spent 4% of its GDP
on defence which provided approximately 67,000 total active military personnel; 56,000 Army; 2,500 Navy; 8,500 Air Force. In 2019, Armenia had
3,000,000 citizens, a median age of 36.6 years, a youth unemployment rate of
36.3%, a population below the poverty line of 32%, a real GDP of $40.4 billion, and an industrialized economic sector of 28.2% (CIA Fact Book 2021).
According to the CIA, in 2019, Armenia spent 4% of its GDP on defence
which provided approximately 45,000 active military personnel; 42,000
Army; 3,000 Air Force/Air Defence. The demographic, economic, resource,
and military advantages enjoyed by Azerbaijan are immediately evident.

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In terms of the operational military balance, the force disparity is equally
lopsided. Given the CIA’s economic data, Azerbaijan spent about $5.8 billion
per annum while Armenia spent $1.6 billion per annum on defence related
matters. Much of the Azerbaijani spending obviously went into equipment.
At the beginning of the 2020 war, Azerbaijan had 582 main battle tanks, 588
infantry fghting vehicles, 637 armoured personnel carriers, 640 artillery
systems (tube and rocket), 35 aircraft, and 104 helicopters, while Armenia
had 325 main battle tanks, 300 infantry fghting vehicles, 236 armoured personnel carriers, 280 artillery systems (tube and rocket), 21 aircraft, and 31
helicopters (Kofman 2021, 5). Only in surface to air missile (SAM) systems
did Armenia have a numbers advantage of 194 to 78. Critical to this analysis, according to Jane’s Azerbaijan deployed 14 medium-altitude long endurance UAVs.
The Azerbaijani Army uses a corps and brigade organizational structure
rather than a NATO corps and division structure and there are fve army
corps in the army (Azerbaijan – Army 2020, 7–10). The army corps headquarters are located as follows: I Corps in Barda, the II Corps in Beylagan,
the III Corps in Shamkir, the IV Corps in Baku, and the V Corps (Separate)
in Nakhchivan. In the summer of 2020, each army corps was composed of
fve brigades of mixed types. The army has three organized general support
artillery brigades (long range cannon and rocket artillery), of which two are
assigned to the II Corps and one is located with the V Corps (Separate). In
modern military history, the positioning of an army’s heavy artillery preordains where the army’s priority of effort lies and the importance of the
assignment of two of the Azerbaijani Army’s three artillery brigades to the
II Corps will become evident.
Unlike Azerbaijan, which modernized its forces for precision strike-based
offensive operations, Armenia put the bulk of its available defence funds
into defensive forces. In the twenty-frst century the Armenian Air Force
purchased and deployed S-300 SAMs, Buk-M1–2 SAMs, and Tor-M2KM
SAMs, giving them a robust and integrated air defence system (Armenia –
Air Force 2020, 3). These were augmented by purchasing large quantities
of shoulder launched man-portable SAMs as well. Armenia also purchased
a few Russian ground attack aircraft to replace aging Soviet era aircraft.
The Armenian ground forces spent its available funds upgrading old Soviet tanks and artillery, improving communications equipment, and enhancing anti-tank systems. In terms of new capability, the Armenian Army
purchased a small number of modern Russian Iskander-E (SS-26) surface-to-surface short range ballistic missile system to complement their aging feet of Scud-Bs (SS-1C) and Scarab (SS-21) surface-to-surface ballistic
missiles.
Four of Armenia’s fve army corps are deployed along the border with
Azerbaijan. However, two face east along the LoC and two more face southwest against Nakhchivan. The ffth army corps faces Turkey. In military
terms this placed the Armenian Army at great disadvantage because it

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could not concentrate the bulk of its forces against its principal enemy –
the Azerbaijani Army. Moreover, at the tactical level in Armenian-occupied
Karabakh (known to the Armenians as the Republic of Artsakh) the
Armenian Army maintained a separate force called the Artsakh Defence
Army, which was essentially a force equivalent to a NATO army division.
The headquarters of this force is in the Artsakh capital, Stepanakert
(Xankändi), and is composed of three motorized rife brigades, a tank regiment, a command and control battalion, and an electronic warfare battalion
(Armenia – Army 2020, 12). The Artsakh Defence Army reportedly received
priority with light arms, heavy artillery, tanks, and armoured vehicles from
its parent Armenian Army. Over the past 30 years, the Armenian Army in
Karabakh invested heavily in fortifcations, such as bunkers, strong points,
entrenchments, and protected positions for armoured vehicles and artillery.
This seemed to be a good investment because the fortifcations signifcantly
enhanced the defensibility of the naturally rugged mountainous terrain
in eastern Karabakh. In fact, the diffculties that the Azerbaijani Army
encountered in the April 2016 clash seemed to validate the expenditure and
effort.
As 2020 approached, what could be said about the condition and deployment of the Armenian Army? First, only a portion of its strength was available against an attack on Karabakh. Second, it was equipped with weapons
which were of little use in combating the Azerbaijani Army, particularly
with regard to its networked and expensive air defence system which was
useless when confronted with small UAVs and ballistic missiles. Third, the
Armenians failed to recognize the progress towards professionalization
and modernization that the Azerbaijani forces had developed which led to
overconfdence and perhaps even complacency. Fourth, the inherent defensive mind-set and weapons inventories of the Armenian Army left it unable to conduct successful offensive counter-attacks to regain lost ground
immediately. Cumulatively, these factors doomed Armenia to defeat in
detail. On the “other side of the hill,” as we will see, the Azerbaijani military
deployed a more NATO-like army capable of modern doctrinal campaign
design and planning aligned with ultra-modern UAV tactics and technology
(Shahbazov 2020).

Azerbaijani Campaign Planning
At the present time Azerbaijan’s military forces have not revealed the specifcs of their grand strategy or their operational campaign plan. However,
there is a wealth of open source information and reporting about the tactical situation as it progressed for 44 days during the confict. From this it
is possible to reconstruct the basic outline of their campaign design and
overall plan. It is important to keep in mind that, in military doctrinal
terminology, a campaign is a deliberate series of battles and encounters
designed to achieve a strategic outcome. It appears that this campaign was

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designed to achieve a strategic outcome of liberating a substantial part of
Armenian-occupied Karabakh.
In the case of designing the Azerbaijani campaign, the geography of
Karabakh is critical to understanding the parameters of the Azerbaijani
campaign plan (See Map 1). The Aras (Araxe) River originates in Turkey
and fows east to the Caspian Sea. As the river leaves the mountainous region
along the Iranian border, it forms a wide and fat valley in southern Karabakh. Even though the LoC and villages behind it were heavily fortifed by
the Artsakh Defence Army, the Aras Valley is what military planners see as
an operational level avenue of approach. Large-scale forces can mass and
manoeuvre through the open terrain. To the north, and centred on the capital city of Stepanakert, the remainder of the Artsakh is composed of high
and rugged mountains which are unsuitable for large-scale conventional
military operations. While the rugged terrain favoured the Armenians, it
also imposed a signifcant strategic and operational liability on the Artsakh
defenders in the form of the Lachin (Laçın) corridor. The corridor contains
a single all-weather southwest-to-northeast road which runs from the town
of Lachin bordering Armenia to Stepanakert; it is the only major road
between Armenia and Karabakh. Assuming that one controls the Aras
River Valley, possession of the Lachin corridor (or the ability to interdict
the corridor) effectively blocks the entry of goods into Artsakh itself. It is
essential at this point to understand that the town of Shushi (Şuşa/Shusha)
sits on high ground adjacent to, and dominating, the Lachin-Stepanakert
road. In military terminology Shushi represents what is called key terrain
which must be controlled to assure operational success.
A NATO planning staff designing a campaign would immediately select
Shushi as the operational objective of the campaign. The planning staff
would consider such factors as the ability to sustain casualties and weather,
which would further infuence the course of action. It would be clear to any
NATO staff offcer that the isolation of the central mass of Artsakh was
Azerbaijan’s strategic end state gained through a campaign designed to seize
or interdict the Lachin corridor. Achieving that objective isolates Artsakh
and would immediately put Azerbaijani negotiators in a position to dictate
the terms of a settlement or cease fre. The planning window would consider
that winter weather would degrade signifcantly Azerbaijan’s feet of UAVs;
therefore the campaign had to be completed before weather imposed constraints on the operations. Campaign termination as winter weather developed would also limit the ability of Armenia to conduct a counteroffensive
and, moreover, prevent external Russian forces from timely intervention.
Therefore, it is likely that timing the campaign to end in late November was
a planning parameter.
It is self-evident that the Azerbaijani campaign plan composed two phases
with the main effort in the south. In the frst phase the main effort envisioned
the seizure of the Aras Valley to establish a base for further operations. In
this phase smaller supporting attacks in north and east Artsakh would serve

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Map 1 Operational Avenues of Approach.

to fx Armenian forces in place and prevent the Artsakh Defence Army’s ability to shift reserves against the Azerbaijani main effort. The second phase
would then push north into the rough mountainous terrain to seize Shushi.

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Possession of Shushi represented the military end state placing Azerbaijan
in a position to demand a cease fre or settlement on Azerbaijani terms.
Failing that, the Azerbaijani Army would be in an operationally favourable
position to complete the conquest of Artsakh in the spring of 2021.
A key element of the Azerbaijani campaign plan was the army’s ability
to plan and to conduct limited Deep Battle operations. Deep Battle originated in the 1980s during the Cold War when United States Army planners
conceptually planned to separate and isolate front line Soviet forces from
reinforcements and resupply by interdicting their lines of communications.
This would enable NATO forces to fght and destroy ever-diminishing numbers of Soviet forces. It is known that Azerbaijani planners intended to isolate the Artsakh Defence Army tactically and operationally by conducting
Deep Battle operations using ballistic missiles, SOF, and long range UAVs.
American general David Petraeus famously noted that “Luck is the intersection of preparation and opportunity.” In the autumn of 2020, Azerbaijan did
not just get lucky and overwhelm the Artsakh Defence Army simply with
superior numbers and more modern weapons. The Azerbaijanis deliberately
procured, over a ten year period, particular types of weapons, trained
selected units of their forces for particular types of operations, wrote a particular type of Deep Battle campaign plan, and waited for the opportunity
to put all of these endeavours together.

The Road to War July–September 2020
Between 2016 and 2020, tensions along the LoC remained high and clashes
between the opposing forces broke out frequently, characterized particularly
by artillery barrages on the opposing side’s bunkers and positions. In July
2020, a more substantial skirmish erupted when the Armenians undertook
to restore a disused border checkpoint near Movses in the Tavush District.
Both sides blame the other for the outbreak of hostilities and a two-day clash
began on July 12, 2020 involving artillery and UAV strikes (Huseynov 2020b,
8–9). Casualties were limited to about 20 on each side, but an Azerbaijani
major general was killed. Armenia claimed that it shot down 13 Azerbaijani
UAVs, including Orbiter 2 and 3, and Harop systems (Ripley and Cranny-Evans 2021, 4). It is unknown whether these reports were correct but Major
General Daniel Balayan, head of Armenia’s Military Aviation Institute, asserted the fghting had proven the Azerbaijani UAVs to be “almost powerless
in the face of the skilful air defence… of the Armenian Army” (Ripley and
Cranny-Evans 2021, 1). Based on this, British defence analysts reasoned that
the Armenian forces felt suffciently prepared to defeat Azerbaijani UAVs.
Nothing could have been farther from the truth.
It is obvious that Azerbaijan drew different conclusions from these
actions and the government prepared for war. In a speech on September 16, Azerbaijani Minister of Defence Colonel General Zakir Hasanov
announced that his forces stood ready to liberate the Armenian-occupied

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territories and had achieved a high state of readiness (Azerbaijani army
ready to liberate, Azernews, September 17, 2020). Azerbaijani media and
news sources increased their coverage of reported Armenian provocations
along the LoC. On September 19, Hasanov met with his staff and ordered his
forces to prepare for winter operations and to prepare logistically for combat
operations, including instructions for Covid-19 precautions for military personnel (Azerbaijani Army ready to suppress, Azernews, September 19, 2020).
Ministry of Defence offcials inspected military border detachments the next
day and the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced that Turkey would back
Azerbaijan if Armenia violated its territory. Azerbaijan called up reservists
for active duty on September 21, announced that a soldier had been killed
along the LoC, and that an Armenian UAV had been shot down; according
to the Azerbaijanis serious provocations were increasing by the day (Reservists in Azerbaijan, Azernews, September 21, 2020). The Azerbaijani Army
held tactical exercises two days later which included tanks and artillery units
conducting live-fre training. On September 26, the Ministry of Defence reported that Armenian forces had violated the ceasefre 48 times within the
previous 24 hours (Armenia violates ceasefre, Azernews, September 26,
2020). The accuracy of these reports is contested and may have been part of
an Azerbaijani information campaign to rally public support. In any case,
the next day, Minister of Defence Hasanov reported that Armenia had attacked Azerbaijan and that fghting erupted along the entire LoC. President
Ilham Aliyev declared a state of martial law in western Azerbaijan and announced that seven villages had already been liberated.
It is hard to pinpoint the exact time and places where what is called the
44-Day War started; but there is agreement that it began on September 27,
2020. The Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence announced that it was conducting a major counter-offensive in reaction to Armenian incursions and provocations but nothing could be farther from the truth. From the limited media
reporting in August and September it is evident that Azerbaijan mobilized
and made preparations in advance for offensive warfare. It is equally evident that the government increased reporting on Armenian provocations
along the LoC but whether these were real or constructed as a casus belli is
unclear today. What is clear is the well-prepared Azerbaijani military had
concentrated its forces in advance and in preparation for the execution of its
offensive campaign plan.

The Early Phase of the Campaign
In late December 2020, after the end of hostilities, President Aliyev
announced that the Azerbaijani offensive had carried the name Iron
Fist (Iron Fist Operation, Trend News Agency, December 29, 2020). It is
uncertain whether this was the actual name used by the army’s planners to
identify the campaign plan or whether Iron Fist is simply a media by-line.
In any case, by locating the daily progress of the army’s offensive through

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Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence news releases, the opening of the campaign
reveals itself. The II Corps, under the command of Lieutenant General Mais
Barkhudaroz, conducted the army’s main effort attacking southwest into
the lower Aras Valley. The main effort tracks with the assignments and
location of the army’s general support artillery and rocket brigades, which
were needed to weight offensive operations. Additional supporting attacks
were conducted by Lieutenant General Rovshan Akbarov’s III Corps and
Major General Hikmet Hasanov’s I Corps against Armenian fortifcations
in the Republic of Artsakh’s mountainous north and northeast respectively.
The army’s SOF units, under the command of Lieutenant General Hikmet
Mirzayev, appear to have deployed mostly in the II Corps zone of operations
(Azernews, September 27–30, 2020, passim). The offensive operations of the
II Corps were designed to seize control of the Aras Valley foor while the
supporting attacks of the I Corps and III Corps were designed to tie down
Armenian Army units from deploying south to reinforce the ongoing battles
in the Aras Valley. These forces were under the overall command of Colonel
General Karam Mustafayev, who is listed on the Azerbaijani Ministry of
Defence webpage as the Commander of the Combined Arms Army (MOD
webpage, February 1, 2021). Lieutenant General Ramiz Tahirov served as
Mustafayev’s counterpart Commander of the Azerbaijani Air Force.
At higher organizational levels, the Azerbaijani Chief of the General
Staff, Colonel General Necmeddin Sadikov was relieved of his responsibilities two days after the outbreak of hostilities, September 29, 2020, for reasons that are unverifed. In an email to the author, Professor Jamil Hasanli,
January 30, 2020, noted that the most popular opinion asserts that Sadikov
was too close to the Russians, and the Russians were sympathetic to the
Armenians. Moreover, it has been suggested that Sadikov’s close associates
were also relieved, and that they were all interned for the duration of the war.
Publically, Sadikov’s biography was removed from the Azerbaijani Ministry
of Defence’s webpage on October 1, 2020 and Azerbaijan announced on
January 28, 2021 that Sadikov had retired from the army. Russian newspapers reported that he had undergone open heart surgery in Moscow
(Azerbaijani MoD: Najmeddin Sadikov, Apa News Agency, January 28,
2021). The question of “Who led and supervised the Azerbaijani General
Staff?” must be asked. The Russian and Armenian press reported that three
high ranking Turkish generals participated in the conduct of planning and
executing the campaign from the Baku headquarters but this is unproven
(Sassounian 2020). In the absence of a chief of the general staff, the Russian
press reported that Turkish Lieutenant General Şeref Ongay, Major General
Bahtiyar Ersay, and Major General Göksel Kahya spent some time during
September and October in Baku in a senior-level advisory capacity.
Did Turkish generals supersede Sadikov to run Azerbaijan’s war? Readers will have to wait for the actual answer. However, in an email to the
author, January 31, 2021, Professor Uyar noted that it is important to consider that Azerbaijan initiated the purge of Soviet/Russian trained offcers

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with the retirement of Colonel General Safar Abiyev in 2013. Effectively,
Turkish educated Azerbaijani offcers had already achieved majority by the
middle of the decade. The author’s opinion is that it is very likely that the
Azerbaijani general staff received advice in real time from the Turks but it is
unlikely that Turkish generals were actually in command of the campaign.
A more compelling question is “Who were the pilots of the UAVs and who
was in charge of precision strike operations?” It may be that Azerbaijan
hired Bayraktar company’s civilian UAV pilots and also Bayraktar's experts
to lead the UAV effort; but, again, the world will have to wait for the answers
to these questions.
On the frst day of the Azerbaijani offensive (September 27, 2020) army
artillery and air force UAVs targeted the Armenian Osa (SA-8) and Strela-10
(SA-13) mobile short-range air defence systems and subsequently targeted
S-300 launchers, 2K12 SAM batteries, and long-range air defence radars
(Roblin 2020). Like Coalition campaigns in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, this gave
the Azerbaijanis free rein to employ their large feet of UAVs to the fullest extent. On the ground, the Azerbaijani combined arms units (infantry,
tanks, artillery, and combat engineers) made contact with the defenders
along the contested parts of the LoC and attacked the Armenian fortifed
positions. This was very costly and early reports indicated that the Azerbaijanis suffered heavy casualties in both personnel and equipment (tanks and
armoured vehicles). The Armenians struck back by shelling and rocketing
Azerbaijani cities and towns; Barda, Shamkir, Sabkirkend, and Horadiz
were all hit hard. Azerbaijan reciprocated by shelling Stepanakert, Shushi,
Jabrayil (Cäbryıl), and Zangilan (Zängilan) with artillery and rockets. The
Azerbaijani cities of Ganja and Terter (Tärtär), as well as the contested town
of Ağdam (Aghdam), would be shelled repeatedly during the next two weeks.
The destruction of Armenian equipment, especially tanks and armoured
vehicles, from precision strikes from the Turkish drones and the loitering
munitions was covered by the international media and remains a source on
instant on-line information today. In return, the Armenian anti-tank missile systems and artillery inficted much damage and many casualties on the
advancing Azerbaijani Army. However, at the time, other than watching
video clips of precision strikes, the outside world was unable to determine
the course of the battles.
For the frst three days, the opposing armies hammered away at each
other with the Azerbaijanis bearing the brunt of the losses in attacks on
heavily fortifed Armenian positions. However, while the front-line soldiers
were engaged in a deadly close-in fght, the Azerbaijanis were also waging a longer-range Deep Battle to isolate the battlefeld. For this fght the
Azerbaijanis used their Israeli ballistic missiles and their Turkish Bayraktar
TB2 UAVs, which gave them the ability to strike into Armenia itself.
Reporting by open source media noted that Azerbaijani ballistic missiles
struck the town of Martakert on September 30 and the Armenian city of
Gavar in the Gegharkunik District three days later (Aravot, September 30

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and October 3, 2020). Gegharkunik lies deep in Armenia and Martakert
lies on the road from Stepanakert to the north-eastern front. It was also
reported that the Azerbaijanis employed Israeli Lora short-range ballistic missiles to destroy bridges on the main road connecting Armenia with
Artsakh (Shahbazov 2020; Trevithick 2020). Within Artsakh itself Azerbaijan launched paralysing interdiction attacks along the Armenian tactical
(or battlefeld) lines of communications. Cumulatively, the behind-the-lines
destruction of logistical nodes, supplies, and munitions rapidly affected the
front-line Armenian combat troops as they began to run out of these vital
commodities with which to fght and sustain themselves (Azernews, September 27–30, 2020, passim).
It is a doctrinal principal that battles and campaigns reach a culmination
point where one side achieves a decisive superiority over the other and the
tactical balance irretrievably shifts. In his well-received book The Tipping
Point, published in 2000, author Malcolm Gladwell reached a similar conclusion about epidemics; there comes a point where it cannot be stopped. It
appears that the culmination point of the early parts of the campaign was
reached on October 3, by which date the Armenians had lost hundreds of
tanks, artillery pieces and multiple launch rocket systems, and unarmoured
trucks and vehicles. Moreover, they had lost a large number of ammunition
depots, a dozen command posts, and large amounts of munitions and food
supplies in truck convoys destroyed along the lines of communications.
October 3, 2020 marked the frst public announcement from President
Aliyev’s offce noting that villages near Talish, Fizuli (Füzuli), and Jabrayil
had been liberated. Aliyev also announced that Armenian rifemen were
abandoning their positions under heavy Azerbaijani fre in Agdere (Ağdärä).
Importantly, Aliyev congratulated I Army Corps commander Hikmet
Hasanov on the liberation of Madagiz (Mataghis). Two days later the government announced the liberation of three more villages in Jabrayil. It is
evident from the content and tone of these announcements that the war had
already shifted in favour of Azerbaijan.
By October 7, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence reported that
Armenian regiments in the Aras Valley were suffering serious shortages
of food, fuel, and ammunition causing wide-spread desertion (Azernews,
September 30–October 7, 2020, passim). Over the next two days the ministry reported more villages liberated and that Armenian units attempting to withdraw or move during the daytime were invariably attacked
from the air and destroyed. Throughout this period and, in the following
weeks, the Armenians continued to pound Azerbaijani towns and cities
with ballistic missiles and rockets. The Armenian Army launched counter-attacks to regain territory which failed badly. The Azerbaijani armed
forces clearly had the operational and tactical initiative at this point in the
campaign. By October 10 Azerbaijan had liberated Jabrayil and many of
the surrounding villages, in effect penetrating the Armenian’s main line
of defence. Azerbaijani media reported that, after abandoning qualities of

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armoured vehicles and equipment, defeated Armenian regiments withdrew
northward towards the town of Hadrut. Advances were also announced in
the Khojavand and Fuzuli districts and, in the Aras Valley, the II Corps
pushed towards Zangilan (Azernews, October 7–10, 2020, passim).
The Azerbaijani Army closely pursued the retreating Armenians towards
Hadrut and, by October 13, had seized the heights overlooking the town.
The details of the battle are not clear but within two days the Azerbaijani’s
controlled the town and the surrounding high ground. This victory put
Azerbaijan in a tactical position to advance on Shushi. However, the army
had to fnish clearing the Aras Valley in order to assure the advance could
be safely supported logistically. Conventional assaults cleared Khojavand
(Martuni) and Fuzuli. A brief Russian-brokered humanitarian cease-fre
on October 18 did not materially slow the Azerbaijani advances. By October
20, the II Corps liberated Zangilan and its hinterlands and, on October 23,
President Aliyev announced that the Angband (Aghband/Ağbänd) Settlement had been liberated assuring that 100% of the Iranian border was
secured by the army (Azernews, October 10–20, 2020, passim). We can infer
from these announcements that the II Corps had achieved control over the
upper and lower Aras Valley. An American-brokered humanitarian ceasefre on October 26 broke down almost immediately. Thus, near the end of
October 2020, the Azerbaijani Armed Forces successfully completed, but at
great cost in soldiers and equipment, the frst phase of the campaign.

The Final Phase of the Campaign
The actual architecture of command in use by Azerbaijani Army during the
44-Day War remains unclear. However, it is known that Azerbaijan formed
a “Joint Corps” under the command of Special Forces Lieutenant General
Hikmet Mirzayev for the fnal phase of the campaign. On November 8, 2020,
the Azerbaijani newspapers reported that President Aliyev made a congratulatory phone to call to General Mirzayev, the “commander of the Joint
Corps” which had liberated Shushi (Azernews, October 9, 2020, passim).
The Joint Corps was composed predominantly of Mirzayev’s Special Forces
units and would be termed by NATO planners as a special purpose task
force. In any case, Azerbaijani Special Forces pushed north from Hadrut
taking the village of Chanakhchi (Avetaranots) on October 29, putting them
within 20 kilometres of Shushi. However, the existing road network did not
connect the towns directly forcing the lightly equipped Special Forces to
attack west across rugged mountains. Nevertheless, by November 4, the
Azerbaijanis had cut the Lachin-Stepanakert road three kilometres south
of Shushi. Azerbaijani artillery and rockets had pounded the Armenian
defenders in Shushi intermittently for weeks, but it intensifed now for the
fnal assault.
The fnal assault began on November 4 and, according to the media
was very bloody. Supported by conventional army artillery and air force

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precision strikes, Azerbaijani Special Forces scaled the high ground to
the west of the town the next day; entering the town of Shushi itself on
November 6 (Azernews, November 4–6, 2020, passim). Two days later President Aliyev announced the victory while General Mirzayev’s Special Forces
soldiers pushed their perimeter several more kilometres north of Shushi and
attacked east to seize the town of Suşakand. Azerbaijan’s Armed Forces’
victory at Shushi signalled the completion of the campaign and led to the
termination of the war on terms dictated by Azerbaijan.
On November 9, 2020, President Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol
Pashinyan, and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an agreement
ending hostilities (Azernews, November 10, 2020, passim). They announced
that the Russian-brokered agreement would go into effect the next day with
Russian peacekeepers deploying to secure the Lachin corridor. Much to the
surprise of many, the agreement went far beyond a simple cease-fre, effectively amounting to an instrument of unconditional surrender with Armenia
ceding large areas of Artsakh to Azerbaijan. Under the terms of the agreement, the areas already liberated by Azerbaijan would remain under its
control. Armenia further pledged to withdraw from the Ağdam District by
November 20, the Kalbajar District by November 25, and the Lachin District by December 1 (See Map 2). There were other clauses as well, with the
most important for Azerbaijan being the creation of a guaranteed overland
transit link with Nakhchivan and, for Armenia, a Russian-patrolled and
guaranteed corridor from Lachin to Stepanakert. This was a stunning and
utterly unpredicted outcome which reduced the land area of the Republic
of Artsakh by two-thirds and left it isolated and dependent on an easily
interdictable corridor. The agreement left the government of Prime Minister
Pashinyan signifcantly weakened politically and in danger of total collapse.

Campaign Analysis
Much has been published already about the tactical lessons of the 44-Day
War, including predictions about the supposedly diminishing future value
of armoured vehicles, the value-added of relatively inexpensive UAVs and
loitering munitions, and the high number of equipment losses incurred
when precision strike munitions are employed (Kofman 2020). However,
we might keep in mind that many similar predictions were made after the
Arab-Israeli War of 1973 suggesting that armour and ground attack aircraft
were no longer survivable on the modern battlefeld. I will leave predictions
to other authors. Rather, then, what can we say about the Azerbaijani campaign itself?
First, the effect of the Turkish military cooperation effort over a sustained period has been very successful. Military cooperation can never
improve every capability or increase capacity to 100%. It is always subject
to funding constraints and to the vested interests of the parties themselves.
While the performance of the Azerbaijani conventional forces appears less

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Map 2 Peace Agreement.

than stellar, especially at battalion level and below, it refects the military
priorities of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. By deliberate choice Azerbaijan
selected certain capabilities over others. The Azerbaijani Air Force invested
heavily in UAVs and ballistic missiles while the Azerbaijani Army invested
heavily in Special Forces and command and staff training and education (at
the expense of its conventional manoeuvre forces). Although some of this
success can be attributed to the Israelis most can be credited to the Turks.
Second, the apparent campaign plan balanced ends, ways, and means in an
effective manner. The army concentrated its main conventional manoeuvre
forces, reinforced by SOF and UAVs, in the Aras Valley avenue of approach
where it fought a deliberate series of battles to secure a base from which

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to advance north. The obvious selection of Shushi as the objective of the
campaign was designed to put the entire Armenian Army remaining in
Artsakh and, indeed the Republic of Artsakh itself, in an untenable position of extreme danger. The seizure of Shushi led to an immediate cession
of hostilities on terms dictated by President Aliyev. In military terms, the
Azerbaijani campaign’s objective was geographically oriented rather than
force oriented (i.e. focussed on a town rather than on the destruction of the
Armenian Army) and led directly to the successful conclusion of the war.
Third, the Azerbaijanis leveraged their UAV capability tactically but they
also leveraged their UAV and ballistic missile capabilities at the operational
level of war. Reading Azerbaijani day-by-day news releases from the
Ministry of Defence, it is clear that the Armenian forces in Artsakh were
weakened seriously through the Azerbaijani interdiction of their operational and tactical lines of communications. It is beyond doubt that many
of the Armenian forces in Artsakh ran out of ammunition, food, fuel, and
other military supplies at critical moments. This is not a new approach to
war, having been used from Normandy in 1944 to Kuwait in 1991. But it
is somewhat surprising that the Azerbaijanis even attempted to conduct a
Deep Battle operation. It is probable that the Azerbaijanis did not achieve
all that they wanted to do in this regard but their success was, to a certain
extent, evident on the battlefeld.
Fourth, the most decisive strategic outcomes result from campaign plans
that put the enemy in an operational position from which they cannot recover.
The seizure of Shushi achieved that because the shattered Armenian Army
did not have the strength to recover the town. Moreover, by simply holding
Shushi, it would only have been a matter of time before the surviving Armenian forces in Artsakh would have had to surrender unconditionally. The
agreement signed by Prime Minister Pashinyan defnitively proves this point.
Fifth, in terms of “jointness” the Azerbaijani Air Force, Army, and Navy
appear to have fought well together. We cannot yet today know the full
extent of their joint coordination but it is self-evident, for example, that the
Air Force UAVs directly and successfully supported Army units in contact.
It is clear, for example, that a Joint Corps (a special joint task force) was
activated under the command of Special Forces commander Lieutenant
General Mirzayev for the advance and seizure of Shushi. Mirzayev’s Joint
Corps combined forces and assets from several services successfully during
the fnal battles of the war.
Lastly, combat is the province of the unknown and of uncertainty, and
there is no “sure thing” in war. Carl von Clausewitz’s magnum opus On War
is all about this phenomenon. It is also true that an army does not have to
be twice as good or three times as large as the enemy to win battles. Rather,
an army fundamentally must concentrate its assets in places and at times
where it can achieve a decisive superiority. The Azerbaijanis concentrated
a relatively small number of modern precision strike and sensor assets on
critical Armenian combat assets and capabilities. Within several days of

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242 Edward J. Erickson
the advent of hostilities the Azerbaijanis had achieved mastery of the battle
space which gave them freedom of action and the initiative. In layman’s
terminology ̶ Azerbaijan owned the battlefeld. This is no small accomplishment for any armed force and is, of itself, noteworthy.
This is not to say that the Azerbaijani Armed Forces performed fawlessly;
they did not. But the sum total of what they did right exceeded the sum total of their mistakes. In understanding how that battlefeld victory came
about, analysing what a military gets right is essential. This chapter does
not render judgements on such infammatory non-military subjects such as
humanitarian concerns, war crimes, or long-standing cultural and historic
issues between the two countries. Neither does it judge the validity of the
territorial claims over Karabakh of Armenian and Azerbaijan. None of
these things affected the military planning and execution of the Azerbaijani
campaign. Finally, because no authentic evidence has come forth regarding
the supposed employment by Azerbaijan of Syrian-based mercenaries, this
issue is not considered in this chapter. For what it is worth, given the kind
of campaign that was waged by Azerbaijan, there was little scope for the
tactical skill sets of such combatants.

Conclusion
It is beyond doubt that the Azerbaijani Armed Forces’ successful 2020
campaign to seize geographically and politically important parts of Karabakh from the Armenian Army was a resounding success. The strategic
objective of recovering a large portion of Armenian-occupied territory
proved achievable in terms of balancing military ends, ways, and means.
Moreover, the Azerbaijani Armed Forces’ joint planning, preparation,
and combat effectiveness proved effective and decisive compared to its
Armenian opponent. This was achieved through an extended period of
Turkish military assistance which was a critically important combat multiplier for the Azerbaijanis but it also refects the choices in capability and
capacity development chosen by Azerbaijan. Ultimately, the success of
Azerbaijan’s 2020 campaign in Karabakh was the result of a sustained period of professionalization of its military institutions and complementary
acquisition decisions.

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Shiakh, Shaan and Wes Rumbaugh. 2020. “The Air and Missile War in Karabakh:
Lessons for the future of strike and defense.” Center for Strategic and International
Studies. December 8, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/air-and-missile-warkarabakh-lessons-future-strike-and-defense, accessed January 27, 2021.
Trevithick, Joseph. 2020. “Video points to Azerbaijan’s frst use of Israeli-made
Ballistic Missile against Armenia.” The War Zone. October 2, 2020.
“US Allocated $100 million in security aid to Azerbaijan in 2018–2019.” Institute of
Armenian Studies. University of Southern California. July 17, 2019, https://armenian.usc.edu/us-allocates-100-million-in-security-aid-to-azerbaijan/, accessed on
February 2, 2021.
Watling, Jack and Sidharth Kaushal. 2020. “The democratization of precision
strike in the Nagorno Karabakh confict.” Commentary. Royal United Services
Institute. October 22, 2020, https://rusi.org/commentary/democratisation-precision-strike-karabakh-confict, accessed on January 27, 2021.

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11 The Causes and Consequences
of the Second Karabakh War
September 27, 2021–November
10, 2021
Ali Askerov and Gubad Ibadoghlu
Introduction
This chapter discusses the causes and consequences of the Second
Karabakh War, which began on September 27, 2020 and lasted only 44
days, without addressing the complex history of the Nagorno-Karabakh
confict. The 44-day war has changed the frm status quo in the Southern
Caucasus (or Transcaucasia) formed by the ceasefre agreement between
Azerbaijan and Armenia signed in May 1994. Although the 1994 ceasefre
had been repeatedly violated since its inception, none of them had a signifcant effect on its permanent nature. Even the 2016 April War with its
devastating effects lasted only four days before it was terminated through
Russia’s intervention. Likewise, the Tovuz clashes of 2020 between Armenia and Azerbaijan lasted only a few days without affecting the deadlock
in negotiations in any way.
The start of the Second Karabakh War came as a surprise to many at
least because of its mostly dormant history of the past nearly 30 years. Yet
analysts had warned about the misleading peace on various occasions. The
recent brief wars of April 2016 and July 2020 were not evaluated by Armenia
and the international mediators, especially the co-chairs of the Minsk
Group – with the exception of Russia – correctly. Azerbaijan’s frm
stance and its readiness for the renewal of war had been ignored and
underestimated.
The main causes of the war are associated with both international and
domestic circumstances. The OCSE Minsk Group co-chairs have proved
to be ineffective in mediating the negotiations between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. They chose to manage the confict for decades not to let intense
violence erupt and engulf the region and eventually their policy failed. Yet it
is hard to claim that Russia, a Minsk Group co-chair, had the same agenda.
We claim that Russia has always had its own secret agenda and its presence
in the Minsk Group was nothing but a part of its own undeclared Karabakh
policy which is discussed below.
Another noteworthy cause of the Second Karabakh War was Armenia’s
reluctance to consider Azerbaijan’s demands. Armenia had complicated the

DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-15
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negotiation process by insisting on adding the administration of the occupied lands to the sides of negotiation. This demand was on and off at various times which diminished Armenia’s dependability as a party to negotiate
with. Moreover, Armenia’s massive military armament had raised its confdence in promoting the status quo in the region which was unacceptable to
Azerbaijan.
However, both the people and the political leadership of Azerbaijan were
dissatisfed with the situation. People had never lost the memory of atrocities in Khojaly and other towns in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.
The fact that every eighth person in Azerbaijan was an internally displaced
person contributed to keeping the memory alive. This created some pressure
on the government the head of which had periodically made statements that
Azerbaijan would liberate its lands through military means if negotiations
failed. His warnings had been regarded as ultimatums by Armenia which
periodically accused Azerbaijan of taking a destructive position.
The gradual growth of the conditions of “no war, no peace” into a state
of being ready for an explosion was not properly assessed and addressed by
Armenia and the OSCE Minsk Group. Azerbaijan, as a victim of the confict, got tired of being a loser and every time showed its dissatisfaction with
the current state of affairs. Its call for justice was ignored until the Second
Karabakh War, which Baku needed to restore justice and the country’s territorial integrity.
The Second Karabakh War that was brief and destructive with drastic changes in the geopolitical realities of the region had numerous major
causes. Some of the causes were related to domestic and regional issues,
while others were related to international conditions. The consequences
of the war have affected the sides of the war, the disputed territory, and
neighboring countries, both politically and economically. This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the main causes and consequences of the Second
Karabakh War.

Cause One: Ripeness of the Situation or Readiness for War
The peace process, which started after the ceasefre agreement signed in
May 1994, failed despite a long series of negotiations between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, mostly sponsored by the OSCE Minsk Group. The dynamics
of the peace process are analyzed in various works, but the truth is simple
and apologetic: no progress was made in the past 26 years. The institution
of the mediated negotiation, in place since the early 1990s, had completely
failed without making any tangible progress. First efforts of mediation
started in the early 1990s and shifted to the mediated negotiation stage in
1994 under the aegis of the OSCE Minsk Group. In September 2020, the
situation was ripe for the renewal of large-scale war in Karabakh as it was
apparent that Azerbaijan completely lost all hope of a peaceful resolution to
the Nagorno-Karabakh confict.

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Paradoxically, the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan was recognized by
the main international organizations and states, including its neighbors, but
Armenia – the aggressor – received more support than Azerbaijan from the
West, which allowed it to continue to control the lands of the latter. Simple
statements and recommendations of third parties about the futility of war
in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh confict did not make any
contribution to the peace process, and Azerbaijan considered them more
destructive than useful. By the end of 2020, Azerbaijan required no or minimal foreign involvement in a new potential armed confict to be able to act
decisively without facing any decelerating external interference. The process
of the US presidential elections and unfavorable economic conditions in the
world due to the pandemic created a favorable situation for Azerbaijan,
diverted attention from the confict zone, and created adverse conditions
for the Western countries which would otherwise be willing to participate in
the regional developments more readily. The insignifcant external interest
in getting actively involved in the issue created advantageous conditions for
Azerbaijan to launch a fast and decisive war.
Some scholars have tried to explain the onset willingness of Armenia and
Azerbaijan to negotiate their differences in the early 1990s with ripeness
theory (Mooradian and Druckman 1999). Put forth by William Zarman
(2000), ripeness theory is intended to explain that when the conficting parties fnd themselves in a painful deadlock from which none of them can
rise to victory, they seek a way out which usually leads to a round table for
negotiation. The research conducted by Mooradian and Druckman (1999)
concluded that a mutually hurting stalemate was a condition for negotiating a ceasefre and reduced violence between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In
reality, however, by the time Armenia and Azerbaijan concluded a truce in
May 1994, Armenia had gained Azerbaijani territories more than double of
the size of Nagorno-Karabakh. In other words, Armenia rose to a decisive
victory when the ceasefre became effective and since that point it had tried
to keep all of the territories that already were under the control of Armenia’s
troops or negotiate some part of the occupied territories for a political status of another. Since the mediators chose not to differentiate between the
aggressor and victim, the nature of the negotiations excluded the sense of
justice. Azerbaijan, the disadvantaged party, had no choice but patiently
working toward changing the stubborn status-quo until the time was ripe
to reclaim the lost land by force. In other words, it was Azerbaijan that had
to decide when it was time to restore its territorial integrity, using the same
means that the aggressor had used in the early 1990s, and when the nation
was ready for that. Apparently, Azerbaijan decided that the late September
of 2020 was the time to return the occupied lands.
By means of the two brief but bloody wars in April 2016 and July 2020,
Azerbaijan managed to collect abundant information about the capacity of
the Armenian military which ensured Baku that it had military superiority
over Armenia. Eliminating potential dangers coming from the Kremlin

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was the only major issue for Azerbaijan as Russia and Armenia are part of
the same security alliance called the Collective Security Treaty Agreement.
More importantly, Russia’s support for Armenia throughout the Karabakh confict is notorious, even though Russia has been one of the co-chairs
of the Minsk Group. Unlike politicians, analysts have discussed these two
controversial identities of Russia related to the same issue (Tchantouridze
2008).
The time was apt for negotiating the subject of Russia’s impartiality
with the Kremlin before resuming wide-scale military attacks on the
Armenian military in the occupied lands. Russia’s unhappiness with Armenia’s pro-Western political orientation due to Prime Minister Nikol
Pashinyan’s policies worked in favor of Azerbaijan. It is diffcult to say
what kind of changes Moscow exactly wanted in Armenia, but it is clear
that it did want to punish Pashinyan through his removal from the offce.
Coming to power through popular vote after the revolutionary movement
was the main power of Pashinyan who exercised strong popular support.
This was clear in Russia just like in Armenia, and the Kremlin hoped
that some military failure in Karabakh could cost Pashinyan his power.
What is not clear yet is to what extent Russia agreed on Azerbaijan’s
military advance. Although this point is not clear, some judgments can
be made based on both President Aliyev’s occasional declarations and
Russia’s well-anticipated intervention on November 9, 2020. President
Aliyev had made some statements on the national media that without
liberating the city of Shusha Azerbaijan’s victory would not be complete,
thus signaling the point where Azerbaijan would stop. Also, exactly after
Shusha was liberated by Azerbaijan on November 8, 2020, Russia started
to step in by slow movements. It is most likely that Russia and Azerbaijan agreed on it beforehand and more so Russia had let Azerbaijan know
until when the Kremlin would tolerate the advancement of the Azerbaijani troops.
Russia was also in search of new gains with acquiring a new status in
Nagorno-Karabakh, although it is not clear if this was also negotiated before
the war started. However, the solid point is that Russia acquired that status
very abruptly after intervening into the confict at midnight on November
9, 2020. After a couple of hours of negotiations, which is extremely short
for this type of protracted confict, President Aliyev, President Putin, and
Prime Minister Pashinyan signed a nine-point trilateral agreement that
gave the Kremlin the right to station Russian troops in Karabakh to participate in peacekeeping operations. This agreement will be discussed in more
detail below in the consequences section. It is important to note here that
Russia has pushed out of the game the other two co-chairs of the Minsk
Group – the US and France. More importantly, Russia’s role in the war as
an independent from the Minsk Group actor has clearly indicated that the
Kremlin always enjoyed a special status in regard to this confict and had
always had its own separate Karabakh agenda.

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Cause Two: Failure of the International Mediation
The mediated negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan had lasted
decades without any results. The most notable products of the numerous
meetings were the expressions of hope for a breakthrough in negotiations.
The OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs were mostly concerned with keeping the
process within manageable boundaries without making a thorough assessment of the situation.
The negotiations over the issue were deadlocked after each government
change in Armenia. Although Armenia has been ruled by numerous different governments since 1994, which caused an unstable approach to the problem, the main Armenian leaders that complicated the problem and delayed
its resolution were Robert Kocharyan and Serj Sarksyan. With Pashinyan as
prime minister, hope for a breakthrough in negotiations resumed. President
Aliyev and Prime Minister Pashinyan agreed, in Dushanbe, in September
2018, to reduce tensions and establish a joint hotline, which helped reduce
ceasefre violations (Sanamyan 2018). However, Pashinyan gradually used
different rhetoric on the Karabakh issue, which demonstrated his unwillingness to compromise, most likely under pressure from domestic and international factors. Initially patient Baku could not stand this. By the third
anniversary of the April 2016 war, despite glimmers of hope following the
handover of power in Armenia, the main observation was that the way forward in the confict resolution process could be deadlocked again.

Cause Three: Loss of Trust
Azerbaijan had completely lost its trust in Armenia, as Prime Minister
Pashinyan frequently changed both Armenia’s position and his approach
to the problem. Pashinyan initially stated that he would not negotiate on
behalf of Nagorno-Karabakh because he was not elected by the people of
Nagorno-Karabakh. However, having consolidated his power, he seemed
to have reverted back to a “business as usual” approach, both in terms of
dragging out negotiations and ensuring the opposition that Karabakh was
a priority for Armenia. While doing so, Armenia still relied on Russian
backing in Armenian security policy decisions. Yerevan tried to get closer
to Moscow by sending a military-humanitarian mission to Syria (although
Pashinyan explained this differently) (TASS, March 28, 2019), and receiving a new Russian loan for the purchase of four Su-30SM supermaneuverable fghter jets (Kommersant, Feb. 1, 2019). On the other hand, Pashinyan
insisted on his Western orientation of the policy. Yet he failed to use a balance of power policy to safely implement his government’s policies, in which
Russia’s intolerance toward those who value the West was also effective.
Pashinyan’s conficting messaging to Azerbaijan prompted the latter to change its policy. When the Yerevan offcials had publicly rejected
the basic tenet of the ongoing negotiations – Armenia’s withdrawal from

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the occupied territories of Azerbaijan – Azerbaijan hardened its policies.
Armenian National Security Service Director Artur Vanetsyan publicly
stated on February 27, 2019, “this is our clear message to all Armenians and
the whole world: not an inch of land will be conceded,” while the resettlement of Armenians took place in the occupied territories (Askarov 2019).
Eventually, it turned out that there was a discrepancy between the statements of Armenian politicians and Armenia’s military capabilities.
Indeed, Russia also lost its confdence in Pashinyan’s government, which
made an impression that Armenia was moving closer to Moscow because
of the Russian military bases in Armenia as its security guarantees, also
critical to blocking military options for Azerbaijan. Armenian offcials
occasionally stated that Russian military presence in the Caucasus region
was the most important factor for a non-resumption of military hostilities
in the region (Sputnik February 21, 2019). Yet Armenia felt confdent in military terms asserting that it would go on the offensive if hostilities resume
(Massispost.com February 26, 2019).
Armenia’s tenacious Karabakh policies made the Azerbaijani government increasingly lose its confdence in the new Armenian leadership as a
dependable partner to make a deal with, although pockets of hope remained
until the late times, as illustrated by the March 29, 2019 face-to-face meeting
between Aliyev and Pashinyan (Mammadov 2019). But as Armenia returned
to pre-“Velvet Revolution” policies and negotiating tactics, Azerbaijan, in
turn, looked for new ways to block Armenian participation in various benefcial regional projects as well as seeking to raise the costs on Yerevan for
sustaining its occupation. Notably, Azerbaijan conducted several largescale military exercises, in which the scenarios included tasks for preparing
an offensive operation (Azernews.az, March 8). The joint military exercise of
Azerbaijani and Turkish troops was a signal to Armenia, which had missed
the opportunity of assessing it rightly. This later gave a rise to rumors that
Turks fought in Karabakh which shadowed the splendid military success of
Azerbaijani fghters.

Cause Four: Emotional and Psychological Burden
For decades, Azerbaijan bore the extremely heavy emotional and psychological burden of the defeat in the First Karabakh War. First, it had lost its
Nagorno-Karabakh region to Armenia and then seven surrounding regions
one after another, all in 1992–1993. Almost one-eighth of the republic’s
population has become internally displaced people who had faced all types
of moral and material hardships for many years. The worse, Azerbaijani
people developed a syndrome of losers and trauma because they could not
come to terms with their fate. One of the reasons was that they lost the
war to Armenians with whom they had historical hostilities. Therefore,
Azerbaijanis, especially the youth, had wanted to change the situation.
One of the signals for that came from Mubariz Ibrahimov, a soldier, who

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attacked an Armenian military unit alone killing dozens. The legacy of the
First Karabakh War had eventually developed into unmatched patriotism
that led to heroism in the Second Karabakh War.
Before the 44-day war started, the Azerbaijani leadership had put serious efforts to keep the Azerbaijani concerns about the situation around
the occupied lands and its rejections to the status quo constantly alive.
Understandably, time worked against Azerbaijan as the unrecognized
Armenian entity in the occupied lands had acted as an independent state
exerting full effective control over the region. Azerbaijan’s inability to exercise its jurisdiction in Nagorno-Karabakh and the other occupied lands had
narrowed Baku’s choices down to military measures.

Cause Five: Military Readiness
Azerbaijan had persistently worked to create a power asymmetry in its own
favor until the moment when it believed that it was the time to change the
status quo in the region. Azerbaijan’s military capabilities had increased
signifcantly before the war. Yet Armenia had also worked to replenish its
arsenal with sophisticated weapons. For example, it purchased most advanced military technology like Iskander missiles from Russia to deter
Azerbaijan from its aspirations to liberate its occupied territories. Armenia also created strong military fortifcations in the occupied lands which
pushed them to believe in their invincibility. Yet Russia did not let Armenia use Iskander missiles against Azerbaijan and, most likely, the latter
knew about this before and during the war. However, there are other views
around this issue.
Prime Minister Pashinyan recently said that Armenia used Iskander
missiles against Azerbaijan, but most of them did not explode, noting
that only 10% of those missiles fred at best. Pashinyan’s contemptuous
words about Russia’s most high-tech missiles have infuriated the Kremlin,
which is stepping up its covert campaign against him by supporting the
opposition.
Russsia’s allegedly clandestine efforts resulted in a military memorandum by Onik Gasparyan, commander-in-chief of the Armenian army, to
Pashinyan, demanding that he resign. Pashinyan, in return, signed an order
to remove Gasparyan from the offce which was not approved by President
Sarkisyan twice. Involvement of the military in the politics exacerbated the
situation in Armenia leading the supporters of Pashinyan to rally in the
streets of Yerevan.

Cause Six: Power Consolidation
The Nagorno-Karabakh confict has been an important factor in both
Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s internal politics. The Karabakh card has
especially been very effective in changing governments in Armenia. Serj

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Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan, former presidents of Armenia, represented the Karabakh clan who had successfully used the Karabakh problem
for their political career. Although Pashinyan’s approach to the Karabakh problem was somehow different when he came to power, the four-day
April 2016 war catalyzed the transition of power in Armenia, through a
popular revolution, from long-ruling Serzh Sargsyan to reformist Nikol
Pashinyan.
With each regime change in Armenia, Azerbaijan’s hopes for the solution of the confict also changed. In May 2018, when Pashinyan came to
power, hopes were renewed again. However, over time, Pakhinyan began to approach the Karabakh problem more harshly. His controversial messages on the Karabakh issue were a sign of a dilemma formed
under pressure from the opposition in Armenia. Initially, the regime
transition in Yerevan inspired some limited optimism regarding the
prospect of resolving the confict (Mammadov 2018). In response, Azerbaijan did not attempt to retake any portion of its occupied territories while internal unrest consumed Armenia. Baku’s rationale was to
not interrupt Pashinyan’s efforts to clean up the Sargsyan clan, widely
seen as responsible for numerous grave crimes against Azerbaijani civilians and inherently uninterested in actually reaching a peace deal.
Baku’s position was also supported by a widely shared belief that Pashinyan would work to achieve normalcy with neighbors in order to
underpin his promises of democracy, reforms, and economic growth
(Morgan 2018).
The later developments showed that Pashinyan either was unable to
do what he originally wanted to do in Karabakh, or he had no intent to
bring any changes and also used the Karabakh topic for political purposes.
In any case, Pashinyan’s approach to the Karabakh confict prior to the
renewal of the war in 2020 can be summed up by his own expression of
“Karabakh is Armenia, period.” This was the very moment when Pashinyan completely deviated from his original ideals and yielded to the Armenian ultranationalist stance in order to consolidate his power. Before
starting the war in the feld, President Aliyev declared Azerbaijan’s position at Russia’s high-level Valdai conference before an audience including
Russian President Vladimir Putin: “Karabakh is Azerbaijan – exclamation point!” (Kucera 2019). Aliyev’s words, aimed at obtaining stronger
national support to strengthen his power in the country, have been very
effective. They were delivered at a right time in a right place to achieve
some superiority in the Karabakh rhetoric and more popular support in
the country. Although President Aliyev had occasionally used the Karabakh card for the purpose of internal politics, this time he wanted to demonstrate his determination to all the actors, including Putin and Pashinyan,
as well as to the people of Azerbaijan. Ultimately, the decisions in the
course of the war made by President Aliyev alone earned him tremendous
national support.

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Cause Seven: Russia’s Interests
Russia played an undeniable role in escalating the Nagorno-Karabakh
confict in the early 1990s and in managing it in accordance with its interests until the outbreak of the Second Karabakh War (Askerov 2020). The
Kremlin wanted a new war to happen and stay under its control. Russia’s
interest in the former Soviet republics is well known as the Kremlin wants
to keep them within the sphere of its infuence. Dynamic international, regional, and domestic circumstances force Russia from time to time to adjust
its policies to the new realities in order to maintain its superior position.
Russia has vital geopolitical interests in the South Caucasus, and therefore
the Kremlin works diligently to make the states in this region dependent
on itself. In this sense, Russia had played an exceptional role in reshaping
the Karabakh confict in the early 1990s through which it has infuenced
both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia has completely submitted to Russia, fully relying on it for security. Azerbaijan, however, has been very careful not to provoke Russia, recognizing its hegemonic role in the Caucasus
(Yavuz and Huseynov 2021).
In 2020, Russia used its old political means in a new fashion to satisfy its
interests in the region. The changing conditions in Armenia with Pashinyan’s
pro-Western orientation were against Russia’s interests and the Kremlin
would not tolerate this. A war that the Kremlin could control would be a
good option for Russia to fortify its position in the region. Russia’s plans
to subdue the unruly pro-Western Pashinyan played a signifcant role in
the renewal of the war. Russia wanted to force Pashinyan to abandon his
pro-Western orientation by reminding him of Armenia’s dependence on
Russia for its security. Ousting him from offce was among the options but
wide public support allowed Pashinyan to survive. Yet the policies of Pashinyan’s government contributed to the formation of Russian policy toward
Karabakh during the period of active military operations.
At the same time, Russia wanted to demonstrate its utmost importance
in the region. The target audience for Russia was the parties to the confict
(Armenia and Azerbaijan), the West, especially the other two OSCE Minsk
Group co-chairs (the US and France), and all of the countries within Russia’s
sphere of infuence. When the armed confict ended on November 9, 2020,
Russia emerged from the confict as a real winner, since it alone dictated
the terms of peace, forcing Armenia and Azerbaijan to nod and the other
two co-chairs of the Minsk Group to watch Russia’s actions. The only state
that Russia pretended to take into account was Turkey, but the Kremlin did
not allow Ankara to have any peacekeeping forces in the region, thereby
holding sole power in the region in its hands. Russia redeployed its forces
to Azerbaijani territories after 26 years, which is an astounding victory for
the Kremlin. This is currently not being properly assessed due to Russia’s
peacekeeping role, although Russian forces in the region have begun to act
as a government. It is quite ostensible that today Russian peacekeeping

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forces exercise more jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh than Azerbaijan.
The situation may change in the future in either direction since the political
conditions in the region are unstable.
Arguably, Russia was also interested in a new war between Armenia
and Azerbaijan because it wanted to shorten its access to the Near East
through new corridors that would result from the war. On the other hand,
this would enable the Kremlin to slow down, if not block completely,
the integration of both Armenia and Azerbaijan to the West and keep
them within the sphere of its own infuence. Deploying Russian troops in
Karabakh under the designation of peacekeeping forces would increase
Russia’s leverage in the region. The plans of the Kremlin also included diminishing Georgia’s geostrategic importance in the region by making new
regional arrangements. Moscow’s readiness to create a new alternative
route to the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey transportation corridor, which
was outside of Russia’s control, would be fed by a new war in the South
Caucasus.
The economic aspects of a new war in Karabakh were also important to
Russia, since a controllable warfare would mean selling more weapons and
ammunition to the parties in confict. This war had been under Russia’s
control since its inception, and the Kremlin was confdent it could stop it the
moment it saw as being suitable. Therefore, the war also related to Russia’s
calculations for economic gains which were immediate and projected. The
immediate gains came from the sale of weapons and ammunition, while the
projected gains are based on the future projects made possible by the geopolitical changes in the region.

Cause Eight: Nationalism and Patriotism in Azerbaijan
The people of Azerbaijan wanted this war to take place regardless of
its results, since the consequences of the First Karabakh War were very
shameful for them. The bitter memories of the people were very alive
because of the traumas such as the Khojaly massacre of 1992, as well as
because of the huge number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) who
suffered from the consequences of the Armenian aggression. Therefore,
nationalistic and patriotic sentiments among the people of Azerbaijan
were high, and the public constantly wanted a war for the liberation of
the occupied lands and the restoration of their honor, but the political and
socio-economic conditions in the country were not ripe for this for a long
time. Yet the numerous promises of the President of Azerbaijan at different
times to return the occupied lands by means of war demanded new and
more decisive steps.
The political leadership of Azerbaijan was aware that the atrocities of
the First Karabakh War never had disappeared from the memories of
Azerbaijanis, who considered the return of the occupied lands a matter
of honor and dignity. The shooting of Major General Polad Hashimov by

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an Armenian sniper July 12, 2020 and his personal stories, which many
social media users describe as a courageous and honest man, increased the
mobilizing patriotic energy of the people in Azerbaijan and demanded that
the government liberate the occupied territories. With the support of the
population and even some pressure from the public, President Aliyev was
able to make serous decisions with greater courage.

Cause Nine: External Interest in War
Some foreign actors other than Russia were also interested in waking
up the dormant confict. These interested states were Turkey and Israel.
For decades, Turkey has made tremendous diplomatic efforts to help
Azerbaijan restore its territorial integrity. Four UN Security Council
resolutions of 1993 in support of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity were
the result of Turkey’s diplomatic efforts. However, those documents have
never been implemented (Askerov 2015; 2020). The mediation efforts of
the OSCE Minsk Group have also proved extremely ineffective in achieving some positive changes regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh confict
(Askerov 2015).
By 2020, Turkey became increasingly interested in war as it wanted to
continue its efforts to restore justice in the region and increase its infuence in the South Caucasus. It is well known that, despite strong cultural
ties with Azerbaijan, Turkey did not play a signifcant role in the First
Karabakh War of the early 1990s militarily, yielding the arena to the Armenian forces, which enjoyed very strong military support from Russia
(Askerov 2015; 2020). In 2020, the strategic partnership between Turkey
and Azerbaijan was at its peak and Turkey was ready to provide political
and strategic support to Azerbaijan in this historical moment to make up
for lost opportunities in the early 1990s. A new war in 2020 would also be
a great opportunity for Turkey to test and sell its new weapons like the
Bayraktar TB 2, in addition to creating a new platform for cooperation
with Russia. More importantly, President Erdogan’s desire to increase his
popularity in both Turkey and Azerbaijan also played a role in escalating
the confict.
Ready to support Azerbaijan, Israel was also interested in resuming the
war. Israel’s main interest was to forge a strong strategic partnership with
Azerbaijan, which might be used against Iran when necessary. Israel was
ready to support Azerbaijan with intelligence and its modern weapons like
kamikaze drones. Political support from Turkey and Israel and their new
military technologies presented to Azerbaijan prompted Baku to resort
to war as a means of returning the occupied lands and achieving strategic
superiority over its rival.
As a result of the political struggle between new and old ruling elites in
Armenia, political and military governance was weakened. The effect of
this in renewal of the war was twofold. First, the Armenian government

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wanted to divert public attention from internal problems to the external
ones. Secondly, Azerbaijan considered the situation favorable for taking
decisive steps. It is clear that the causes discussed here are not exhaustive,
but they are the main ones that led to the war, which ended in 44 days with
serious consequences discussed below.

The Consequences of the Second Karabakh War
The war offcially halted on November 9, 2020, producing a nine-point trilateral document signed by the heads of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia,
but does not mention anything about the political status of NagornoKarabakh. Four months after the end of the 44-day Karabakh War, the
impacts of the armed confict on the conficting parties and the region are
profound. Each party to the confict and those who were passively involved
in the war are infuenced by the war differently. The consequences of war
can be assessed both economically and politically at the national and regional levels.
The restoration of existing communication lines and the commissioning
of new ones, provided for in Article 91 (Trilateral Statement, November 10,
2020) of the tripartite declaration on the ceasefre, can be considered one
of the main consequences of the Karabakh War for the region in the economic sphere. The deal calls for a corridor linking Karabakh to Armenia
proper, the 10-mile-long Lachin corridor. In return Armenia also accepted
to ensure the unimpeded 30-mile-long corridor between Azerbaijan and
its exclave Nakhchivan, with the latter obtaining a direct territorial link to
Turkey. Meanwhile, representatives of the Russian railway which controls
Armenian railways until 2038 recently visited the Meghri region of Armenia
to assess the possibilities of the reopening of the Nakhchivan – Meghri –
Azerbaijan railway.

Increased Russian Infuence in the Caucasus
Ending the war by a joint statement of President Aliyev, Prime Minister
Pashinyan, and President Putin (Trilateral Statement, November 10, 2020)2,
the subsequent achievement of a ceasefre in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the
deployment of Russian troops in the confict zone under cover of peacekeeping forces increased Russia’s infuence and control over the region
and the dependence of Azerbaijan and Armenia on Russia. The war has
weakened the relations of both Azerbaijan and Armenia with the West.
The joint statement serves the purpose of the ceasefre temporarily, and
the failure to conclude a fnal peace agreement suggests that tensions and
uncertainty in the region will continue for a long time. The projected control of Russian peacekeepers over the behavior of the parties to the confict
for at least fve years and the regulation of military-political and transport

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communication relations in the region will expand Russia’s participation
in political decision-making in both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Because the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict remains unsettled, Azerbaijan and Armenia
will not be able to implement serious projects in the near future without
reckoning with the Kremlin.
On November 18, 2021, the OSCE Minsk Group’s co-chairs from the US
and France met with their colleagues in Moscow (Daily News, November 18,
2021) which took place more than a week after the agreement was reached.3
Obviously, the West was a bit late to understand that week’s signifcance
after the ceasefre agreement was signed since Russian “peacekeepers” were
already in the South Caucasus region. Russia has been taking large-scale
practical steps to expand its presence in the region from the frst days of the
ceasefre. Its presence in the region for such a long time as fve years is also
a sign that democratic changes are not likely to occur in Azerbaijan. Now,
the only promising ally for the West in the South Caucasus is Georgia where
government revenues come mainly from declining transit revenues. Besides,
France’s4 (apnews.com, November 25, 2020) highly harsh anti-Azerbaijani
stance on the Second Karabakh War, the Dutch parliament’s decision5 to
impose sanctions on Turkey and Azerbaijan, and the threats from the US
have increased the anti-Western public opinion in Azerbaijan. It seems that
the West is also pushing the Azerbaijani people toward Russia. However,
the West can now have peace regarding the security of natural gas and oil
pipelines from the Caspian Sea region to Europe, as the threats of Armenia
have been eliminated.

Weakening Relations with the West
The new realities in the region affect both Azerbaijan’s and Armenian’s
relations with the West. It is likely that Azerbaijan will take both Russia’s and
Turkey’s positions into account while formulating its foreign policies, while
Armenia will continue to be dependent on Russia. Most likely, Azerbaijan
will completely abandon the course of integration into the Euro-Atlantic
space.
At the very least, Azerbaijan, which is working on a strategic partnership
agreement with the European Union (EU), will postpone this work for an
indeterminate period. Anti-Azerbaijani positions and calls from the West
during the 44-day war, including the pro-Armenian positions of the OSCE
Minsk Group’s co-chairs as well as calls for sanctions against Azerbaijan
and Turkey, and the attempts to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an
independent state in the US House of Representatives and in the French
Senate may not only cause some changes in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, but
also growth of anti-Western sentiments among the population. Ultimately,
these will not only weaken the course of Azerbaijan’s integration with the
West, but also reduce confdence in Western democracy. Ironically, this is
exactly what Russia wanted to accomplish.

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Armenia Cultivates Relations Simultaneously with Russia and
the West
In November 2017, Armenia signed a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the EU, which differed from the draft of
the Association Agreement. Despite the main distinction, which did not allow Armenia’s entering of a free trade area, it still revived hopes for deepening Westernization in all spheres (Armenia–EU Partnership, November
2017).6 As expected, the Armenian “Velvet Revolution” in April–May 2018
served as an additional impetus for the agenda of the Agreement. On March
1, 2021, CEPA entered into force. It has now been ratifed by the Republic
of Armenia, all EU member states, and the European Parliament (CEPA,
March 2021).7
Boris Navasardian states that the new Armenian government turned out
to be extremely ineffective in their interaction with European structures
and showed indecisiveness regarding the matter of institutional reforms
(Navasardian 2021, 10). As for Azerbaijan, a long-awaited European Union–
Azerbaijani strategic partnership agreement was not signed.

Opportunities for Azerbaijan to Diversify its Cargo
Transportation
Undoubtedly, the changes in this area, along with the re-establishment of
lines and junctions in the transport infrastructure of the South Caucasus,
will have a signifcant impact on intra-country and intercountry, as well
as intra-regional and interregional trade and economic relations. This will
create opportunities for Azerbaijan to diversify its cargo transportation to
the West via Turkey and to the South via Iran. Also, Azerbaijan’s shortterm and medium-term expenditures and long-term revenues as a transit country in the region will be increased. The new developments in the
regional transportation will allow the formation of competition between the
existing Baku-Tbilisi-Kars and the new Baku-Nakhchivan-Kars, as well as
the existing Baku-Astara-Tehran and Baku-Nakhchivan-Tehran railways,
and ultimately optimize cost and time elements in freight and passenger
transportation.

Armenia Gains Access to Turkey, Iran, and Russia
The trilateral agreement has created some opportunities for Armenia in
economic terms. The Armenian railways can be connected to the Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars railway from Gyumri and Ijevan. This will provide
Armenia with direct access from Gyumri to Turkey, and from Ijevan to
Georgia and Russia via the Baku-Tbilisi railway. The implementation of
Article 9 of the ceasefre agreement allows Armenia to transport goods by
railways to Iran and back via Nakhchivan which is part of Azerbaijan.

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Finally, the implementation of Article 9 can also contribute to the
development of transport links between the South Caucasus and Central
Asia at the interregional level, provided that Azerbaijan is on the transition route for China’s “One Belt, One Road” project, the “Lapis-Lazuli
Transportation Corridor,” and “North-South Transportation Corridor”
(India-Iran-Russia). Within the framework of the Europe-Caucasia-Asia
Transportation Corridor, more than 50 million tons of goods are carried annually through the territory of Azerbaijan. The resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict, which is located in the midst of such important nodal points, is important, in particular because the transportation of
goods by rail from Armenia to Central Asia and back can be provided by
transit through the territory of Azerbaijan.

War Effects on the Economy of Azerbaijan and Armenia
Ending the war will undoubtedly have effects on the economy of both
Azerbaijan and Armenia. Azerbaijan’s increase in military spending forced
Armenia to follow its example. But while Azerbaijan's oil-rich economy has
not been over-hit, it has posed a signifcant fnancial burden on Armenia8
(Ibadoglu 2021). Even in the post-war period, rising military, social, and
health spending in Azerbaijan and Armenia will limit the ability of the state
budget to allocate suffcient funds to other important areas. The governments will feel this diffculty signifcantly during the formation of the 2021
budget. On the other hand, investments in the restoration of dilapidated
infrastructure for Azerbaijan, as well as housing for internally displaced
people (IDPs) returning home, will increase government spending and
investment in the economy of Azerbaijan. Despite the fact that it will stimulate economic growth, it can be concluded that covering military spending
in the medium and long term creates additional challenges for the economies of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

The Composition of Foreign Trade Relations
Will Change Steadily
With regard to investment and trade relations, changes in foreign policy will
lead to signifcant changes in international trade relations and investment
cooperation. The current situation in Nagorno-Karabakh will also have a
signifcant impact on the region’s international and domestic integration
processes. Nevertheless, the Second Karabakh War will not lead to significant changes in the composition of Azerbaijan’s export trading partners;
Italy, Turkey, and Israel will remain the main buyers of oil and gas. As for
imports, Russia, Turkey, and China will continue to be the main trading
partners, but trade relations with Western countries, which rank in the next
places, are expected to weaken.

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As for Armenia, the Second Karabakh War will not lead to signifcant
changes in the composition of Armenia’s imports with Russia and will
increase the share of Russian military goods in total trade turnover. Some
offcials in Armenia are hopeful for reconciliation with Turkey. The foreign
minister of Armenia, Ara Ayvazyan noted that his country is not building its foreign policy against any third party, including Turkey (greekcitytimes.com, March 2021).9 The Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia
Armen Grigoryan refused to describe Turkey as an enemy state. In response
to the question on whether “Turkey is another enemy state for Armenia?”
Grigoryan noted, “If we are going to open up, then there should be some
corrections in our approaches, and we are working in that direction.” When
pressed further on whether Turkey is an enemy state, he said that it would
not be right to state unequivocally that there is no threat from Turkey, but
the events in the region also create opportunities. It looks like Armenia is
going to start bilateral trade relations with Turkey and if this happens, the
foreign trade composition of Armenia will change signifcantly.
Economist Suren Parsyan stated that access to the Turkish and Azerbaijani markets for Armenian producers can theoretically have a positive effect
on Armenia’s economy. Currently, the volume of products exported from
Armenia to Turkey amounts to an average of $2 million a year. The reverse
fow from Turkey to Armenia averages $260 million a year (www.evnreport.com March 09, 2021).10 As for exporting to Azerbaijan, Parsyan stated
that exported goods from Armenia include minerals (such as copper and
molybdenum) and light industrial products (cigarettes, canned food, etc.).
Azerbaijan is in a more competitive position for these products because of
its larger population and economies of scale. However, the history of the
confict is likely to inhibit the demand for Armenian goods in Azerbaijan.

Increase Military Expenditures in Both Countries
Most likely, in the near future, Azerbaijan and Armenia will continue to
purchase innovative equipment and weapons from Russia to renew and
modernize their lost military equipment and machinery due to the recent
war. This will lead to a reduction in the share of Western countries in the
composition of imports, including arms imports. Although Azerbaijan and
Armenia are in dire need of Western technology in the context of investment
cooperation, it will not be easy to attract investment from the West during
the post-war period, especially in the liberated territories. The deployment
of Russian troops in Karabakh under the guise of peacekeeping operations
and the possibility of creating a military base in the region in the future
will undoubtedly worsen the investment attractiveness and business performance of Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Hi-tech weapon systems bought with oil revenue ultimately tipped the
balance11 in Azerbaijan (Ibadoglu 2021). Yet the war will likely hurt doing
business and the credit rating for both countries due to uncertainties created

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in the post-war times. Without a solid peace agreement, the actual uncertainty will increase during this and subsequent years. The scenario in which
Armenia or Azerbaijan starts a war today is much less probable than during
any given year of the last three decades. This marginal probability is likely
to decrease as time passes from the peace deal. However, a lasting peace
agreement has not yet been concluded between the two sides to the confict.

Consequences for Azerbaijan
The post-war realities contain for Azerbaijan more opportunities than risks.
An infrastructure rehabilitation program will be implemented to the highest
standards in the territories returned to Azerbaijan, and they will be re-populated by the Azerbaijani people. The settlement of more than 10,000 square
kilometers of territory liberated by Azerbaijan as a result of the Karabakh War and the restoration of the local economy could lead to signifcant
changes. This will stimulate economic growth in the capital and its environs
with the return of hundreds of thousands of IDPs from Baku and Sumgayit
cities and Absheron district, as well as the resumption of business in the liberated areas. Thousands of hectares of agricultural land and water resources
have been returned to the economy of Azerbaijan. The development of the
fertile lands of Upper Karabakh and the Kalbajar-Lachin economic regions, which include Zangilan and Gubadli, and their absolute and comparative advantages that will emerge over time, will contribute to the national
economy by encouraging both economic regions to compete with other
economic regions of Azerbaijan. Minerals have returned to the Azerbaijani
economy and there are little to no factors today stopping Azerbaijan from
active inclusion of the above in its extractive industry. The occupied lands
also possess various rich deposits of mineral resources: two gold, four mercury, two chromite, one lead-zinc, one copper, and one antimony (Mustafayeva and Garayev 2013, 57–58).
One of the consequences of the war is the increase in Azerbaijan’s state
expenditures. According to preliminary estimates, the restoration of infrastructure in the liberated territories, and the resettlement of the population
there will cost Azerbaijan at least USD 50 billion. Thus, according to the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), as the result of the aggression, the total material cost and economic damage are estimated around
USD 53.5 billion (Azerbaijan Human Development Report 2000, 52). This
amount means the four-year budget of Azerbaijan. If 20% of the budget is
spent for this purpose each year, then it will take 18 years to pay the required
amount. 2.2 billion manats have been allocated from the 2021 budget for the
restoration of the territories, which is a small amount, especially for the frst
year. Therefore, in order to cope with this task faster, it is necessary for the
Azerbaijani government to share its costs with the private sector, foreign
investors, and international organizations. Because of this economic loss in
the occupied regions, nearly 7000 establishments were closed, which were

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providing 24% of the grain revenues, 41% of liqueur production, 46% of the
potato growth, 18% of the meat production, and 34% of the milk production
of the economy of Azerbaijan (Dadayev et al. 2014, 203).
Since Azerbaijan has obtained a land connection to the Nakhichevan
exclave, the restoration of transport and communication lines will play an
important role in the development of Nakhchivan. The restoration of transport and communication lines provided for in Article 9 of the joint statement can lead to the restoration of railways and highways, which have not
been used for 30 years, connecting Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, and it will
play an important role in the development of Nakhchivan, which has been
under blockade until now. Such a favorable geographical position for Nakhchivan will allow it not only to restore relations with Azerbaijan, but also to
establish transport links between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Turkey and
Iran via Nakhchivan.

Consequences for Armenia
The war has had harsh results for Armenia. During the 44-day war, at least
3,000 Armenians were killed. The Armenian military released the names of
1,690 soldiers who died. Many hundreds remain missing, and hundreds of
bodies have not yet been identifed or found. These fgures paint a sad and
gloomy portrait of the cost of the war for Armenia. However, the ceasefre
conditions also offer some opportunities to Armenia.
Armenia will have railway access to Russia via Azerbaijan and to Iran via
the Nakhchivan Autonomous region. The Armenia – Turkey border may be
opened. The new Minister of Economy of Armenia stated12 the following
on November 28, 2020: “Opening the borders will provide wide opportunities. Our exporters will be able to export their products to Russia or other
countries through more convenient roads than we have now. Turkish ports
will be open to us, and many wide opportunities will be provided. It’s possible that the Azerbaijani market will be open for us and ours for them”
(YouTube channel News, Nov. 2020).

Consequences for Nagorno-Karabakh
Victorious Azerbaijani president Aliyev said that Nagorno-Karabakh will
not have political status, and we can still observe some uncertainty around
this issue. Therefore, here we will not dwell on the current developments in
detail. The unrecognized Karabakh regime has lost nearly 75% of the prewar territory held under its control. About 25% was lost in the fghting and
the remainder handed over in accordance with the terms of the November
10 cease-fre agreement. The territorial losses include about one-third of
the Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh autonomy’s territory, including nearly
all of Hadrut, and parts of Shusha, Askeran, Xocavend, and Agdara districts. As a result, out of 36 hydropower plants only 6 are currently in the

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territories controlled by Russian peacekeepers. As for agriculture, now
Azerbaijan controls up to 95,000 hectares of arable land. In 2019, unrecognized Karabakh produced 118,000 ton of grain, which was consumed locally
and mainly exported to Armenia. Before the war, unrecognized Karabakh
fully satisfed its needs for electricity, and now Azerbaijan supplies electricity to unrecognized Karabakh. Karabakh also receives additional volumes of grain from Russia (Poghosyan 2020).13 From the words of President
Aliyev and some economic events in the regions, it can be concluded that
Nagorno-Karabakh will gradually integrate into Azerbaijan. However, the
presence of Russia and pre-war political structures in the region raise certain doubts.

Consequences for Russia
The most important part of the deal for Russia is the geopolitical one, as it
strengthened its position in the region by deploying its troops to Azerbaijan for
the frst time in about 26 years. Today, Russian peacekeeping forces in the region act like a government. Russia also has numerous economic gains provided
by the trilateral statement, for example, the right to deliver goods to and from
Armenia through Azerbaijan. The implementation of Article 9 of the tripartite
ceasefre14 will facilitate the transportation of military and civilian cargo from
Russia to Armenia through the territory of Azerbaijan. Thus, the Black Sea
part of the Caucasus railway network, which is still theoretically possible to
restore, will lose its practical signifcance. Nevertheless, sensing this danger, the
Abkhazian parliament sent an appeal to the Russian Duma to open the unused
Ochamchire-Zugdidi line between Abkhazia and Georgia (www.sputnik-abkhazia.ru, Feb 2021).15 However, the restoration of this part of the railway depends not only on Russia but also on Georgia. Such an agreement between the
two countries, which currently do not have diplomatic relations, seems impossible. According to the Georgian expert16 (Khevtsuriani 2021), even if Russia
goes for it, Georgia will not agree because Georgia does not want to become
dependent on Russia. In this case, Russia will have to transport cargo to Armenia and back through Azerbaijan. Obviously, if everything goes as intended,
all participants will beneft from regional integration, albeit asymmetrically.
Another consequence of the war is that the competitiveness of Russian goods are increasing. It is in the Kremlin’s interest to restore all
these transport networks and increase the access of the South Caucasus railway transport infrastructure to and from the region through new
ones because the main trading partner of Armenia and Azerbaijan in
imports is Russia. Restoration of the transport network will increase the
competitiveness of Russian goods transported to Armenia and Azerbaijan at a lower cost. Duty-free trade between the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries will ensure the competitive advantage
of Russian goods over Turkish goods in the markets of both countries. In any case, the Armenian market will be subject to the expansion

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of Russian-Turkish goods, which will strengthen Armenia's dependence on
both countries.
Russia is gaining bargaining power and advantages against the US, EU,
and China. Article 9 of the joint statement signed by Russia with the leaders
of Azerbaijan and Armenia states that “all economic and transport links
in the region shall be unblocked. The Republic of Armenia shall provide
for transport communication between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic in order to
organize the unhindered movement of citizens, vehicles, and goods in both
directions. Control over transport shall be exercised by the bodies of the
Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia. By
agreement of the Parties, the construction of new transport communications
linking the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic with the western regions of
Azerbaijan shall be provided.” Thus, Russia, which has taken control of
key transport and communications routes in the South Caucasus, will be
able to infuence the global freight chain, such as the international NorthSouth and regional East-West transport corridors. Russia can achieve this
by controlling access to the transport hubs passing through Khudafarin
and Nakhichevan and can easily provide access to the Middle East by controlling the means of transport and communication in these areas. This
will bring Russia closer to its main geopolitical goal in the South. In this
case, the importance of the existing international transport infrastructure
between Georgia and Azerbaijan, which is more integrated into the West
in the region, decreases for both countries. Russia, which is positioned in
the strategic crossroad between East-West and North-South transportation
corridors, is gaining bargaining power and advantages against the US, EU,
and China in the long-term period (Aslanli 2021).17

Consequences for Turkey
Turkey is Azerbaijan’s most important strategic partner, and the two
countries share close ethnic and linguistic ties. During the Second Karabakh
War, Azerbaijan’s offensive received strong diplomatic, political, military,
and logistical support from Turkey. Turkey’s military advisory support
to Azerbaijan in the Second Karabakh War played a signifcant role for
Azerbaijan’s recent victory against Armenia after a 30-year-long effort.
One of the expectations of Ankara from the Second Karabakh War
was to establish a military base in in Azerbaijan. On November 11, 2020,
Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar and his Russian counterpart, Sergei
Shoigu, signed an agreement to establish a joint ceasefre-monitoring center
in Azerbaijani controlled territories (Tass.com, Nov 2020).18 In this regard,
Turkey’s parliament on November 17, 2020, approved the deployment of
troops to join Russian forces at an observation post in Nagorno-Karabakh after Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a Russian-brokered ceasefre deal
to end fghting over the enclave (Reuters.com, Nov 2020).19 On February

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2, 2021, Russia and Turkey opened a joint military center in Azerbaijan.
Turkey’s military power created a situation of balance of power in the South
Caucasus region.
The Second Karabakh War is likely to accelerate the military, political,
economic, and cultural integration process between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Indeed, having a sphere of infuence in the South Caucasus, Turkey now
has more prospects for strengthening it. Turkey’s close economic ties with
Azerbaijanis is likely to further expand, and access to the Armenian market
may increase. This could strengthen both the economic and political power
of Turkey in the South Caucasus.
Turkey and the Nakhichevan region of Azerbaijan will have a direct transportation connection with Azerbaijan and Central Asian countries, in addition to the present Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. Also, Azerbaijani lands lay in
a transition route for China’s “One Belt, One Road” project, “Lapis-Lazuli
Transportation Corridor,” and “North-South Transportation Corridor”
(India-Iran-Russia). Within the framework of the Europe-Caucasia-Asia
Transportation Corridor, more than 50 million tons of goods are carried
annually through the Azerbaijani lands. The resolution of the confict in
the region, which lays in the middle of such important connection points, is
important.
Boris Navasardian stated that Turkey tried to compensate for its formal
non-participation in negotiations by strengthening its military presence in
Azerbaijan and along the Western borders of Armenia. Moreover, unlike in
previous years, Ankara’s role cannot be assessed as a kind of Euro-Atlantic representative (Navasardian 2020).20 It is impossible to agree with this
statement. First, Turkey called on the Minsk Group to hold talks on the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict on October 26, 2020. Turkish Foreign Ministry
Spokesman Hami Aksoy said in his statement that “in order for the efforts
of the Minsk Group co-chairs to yield results, we see the need for goal-oriented talks in line with UN Security Council resolutions and international
laws that aim for lasting peace, taking into consideration Armenia’s violations” (Gumrukcuy 2020).21 Second, Turkey made this call as one of the 11
members of the Minsk Group (https://www.osce.org).22 Finally, the war and
the truce have exposed the weakness of international institutions, particularly the fact that Western governments are more focused on arms sales and
the support of powerful lobbies with specifc geopolitical interests than on
broader human-rights guarantees.

Conclusion
Azerbaijan won a brilliant victory over Armenia in the Second Karabakh
War. Russia and Turkey have strengthened their political and military
positions in the region, Iran and the West have found themselves out
of the game, and international law has not justifed itself. As Yavuz and
Huseynov (2020) put it, “The war and the truce have exposed the weakness

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of international institutions, particularly the fact that Western governments
focus more on arms sales and the support of powerful lobbies with specifc
geopolitical interests than on broader human-rights guarantees”.23
Confict resolution does not mean forcibly imposing a solution on one of
the parties to the confict, since the loser will try to change the status quo as
soon as the right time comes. The failure of international mediation in this
case has been transparent. Of course, here the problem should not be seen in
the framework of mediation as an institution, but it should be examined in
the framework of how the institution was organized and used. It should be
noted that Armenia’s main supporter in the First Karabakh War – Russia
– has been an integral part of international mediation efforts since the 1994
ceasefre. The same Russia is the only country that today has peacekeeping
troops in the region. It might be an exaggeration to say that the wars in
Nagorno-Karabakh were Russian wars, but it can certainly be argued that
Russia managed these wars the way it wanted. Although the situation is
somehow different today and this confict is not under Russia’s monopoly
alone, it is happening not because of Western states and international organizations, but because of Turkey and Turkish realities. However, Russia’s
superior status on this issue is still very visible.
The trilateral agreement, signed on November 10, 2020, gives Russia
the right to keep its troops in Karabakh for fve years with the possibility of extension, but Russia has already begun to act as a sovereign in
Nagorno-Karabakh. In that case, it seems the region is under the jurisdiction of Russia and it is the real winner in this war. However, there is hope
for a better future. If Armenia and Azerbaijan try to forget old hostilities,
abandoning their thirst for revenge, and manage to start economic cooperation, they will gradually leave the problems behind and look to the future
with optimism. Cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan will lead to
more cooperation due to mutual benefts. But is such cooperation possible?
This is theoretically possible, and the two countries have worked together
quite well in the past. However, there are some major external problems.
The frst external problem is that Armenia and Turkey need to solve their
problems. Secret negotiations took place in the late 2000s, when Armenia
and Turkey made serious efforts to establish harmonious relations. They
even signed a secret protocol in Zurich, Switzerland on the details of this
rapprochement, but ultimately the agreement never materialized. The deal
included the establishment of diplomatic relations between Turkey and
Armenia, and the opening of borders between the two states. But there were
two main problems that got in the way of the deal. The frst was Armenia’s
precondition for Turkey’s recognition of the so-called Armenian genocide of 1915, and the second was the withdrawal of Armenian troops from
Nagorno-Karabakh – a demand from Turkey. Now, in 2021, the conditions
for trilateral cooperation are more favorable. The key state, whose decisions
would play a decisive role in this, is Armenia. Apparently, Armenia’s ability
to abandon banal nationalism and unfounded calls for revenge will lead it

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to a new stage of development. If this happens, the entire region will enter a
state of lasting peace and prosperity.
Another external problem is related to the Russian factor. Russian
accession to such cooperation is necessary to avoid potential problems and
increase multilateral benefts. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that Russia
will abandon its secret, but continuing ambitions in the region, thereby
allowing both Armenia and Azerbaijan to strengthen their independence.
When it comes to Russia’s strategic interests, it is almost impossible to
infuence the tough stance and uncompromising policy of the Kremlin.
Only granting Russia an extraordinary status in the region undermining
the true independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan would make peace in
the region lasting. Today, mutual dislike and discord between Armenia and
Azerbaijan serve the interests of Russia.

Notes
1 Statement by President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the
Republic of Armenia and President of the Russian Federation, November 10,
2020, http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/64384
2 Statement by President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the
Republic of Armenia and President of the Russian Federation, November 10,
2020, http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/64384
3 “Minsk Group Members Meet to Discuss Karabakh Deal ‘Ambiguities,’” Daily
News, November 18, 2020 https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/
minsk-group-members-meet-to-discuss-karabakh-deal-ambiguities
4 “French Senate Pushes Paris to Recognize Nagorno-Karabakh,” November
25, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/paris-azerbaijan-france-armenia-yerevan04dc8732aa04a17e2adca821c296e69b
5 “Dutch Parliament Adopts Resolutions on Imposing Sanctions against
Aliyev and Erdoğan,” November 17, 2020, https://gagrule.net/dutch-parliament-adopts-resolutions-on-imposing-sanctions-against-aliyev-and-erdogan/
6 “Armenia-EU Partnership.” Offcial Website of the RA Ministry of Foreign
Relations. Updated on 19.03.2021, https://www.mfa.am/en/bilateral-relations/eu
7 European Union-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership
Agreement (CEPA) Entered into Force. https://www.eureporter.co/world/
armenia/2021/03/02/eu-and-armenia-comprehensive-and-enhanced-partnership-agreement-enters-into-force/
8 Gubad Ibadoglu, “Why Azerbaijan Won?” November 17, 2020, https://iwpr.net/
global-voices/why-azerbaijan-won
9 “Armenian FM: Developing Trilateral Cooperation with Greece and Cyprus
Is on the Agenda,” March 29, 2021, https://greekcitytimes.com/2021/03/29/
armenian-trilateral-greece-cyprus/
10 “Opening Borders: Armenia’s Economic Risks,” March 09 2021, https://www.
evnreport.com/politics/opening-borders-armenia-s-economic-risks
11 Gubad Ibadoglu, “Why Azerbaijan Won?” https://iwpr.net/global-voices/
why-azerbaijan-won
12 Speech of Ministry of Economy of Armenia in Youtube channel News, Premiered on 28 Nov 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTHZSSh7U6s
13 Benyamin Poghosyan, Chairman, Center for Political and Economic Strategic
Studies, “Economic Consequences of the Second Karabakh War for Armenia,”

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14
15

16

17
18
19

20
21
22

23

Ali Askerov and Gubad Ibadoghlu

December 14, 2020, https://ccbs.news/en/article/2330/?fbclid=IwAR0p1XB9lyeNNz1PrtVLknJOHV7E7SOqQ3F74cwe68ZRjgpJG-vrcrARp2U
http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/64384
“Experts Assess the Prospects for the Opening of Russia’s Communications with
Armenia via Abkhazia,” February 11, 2021, https://sputnik-abkhazia.ru/caucasus/20210211/1031816845/Eksperty-otsenili-perspektivy-otkrytiya-zhd-soobscheniya-Rossii-s-Armeniey-cherez-Abkhaziyu.html
“Amiran Khevtsuriani: Abkhazian Railway Makes Georgia Dependent on Russia,” February 15, 2021, https://zen.yandex.ru/media/arminfo/amiran-hevcuriani-abhazskaia-jeleznaia-doroga-sdelaet-gruziiu-zavisimoi-ot-rossii602a2fcbb498705a81fc3517
Kenan Aslanli, “A Multidimensional Approach to the Karabakh War: Internal,
External, and Energy Aspects?” CIFE Policy Paper No.113, February 15, 2021.
“Russia, Turkey Agree Creation of Nagorno-Karabakh Ceasefre Monitoring
Center,” November 11, 2020, https://tass.com/world/1222765
“Turkish Parliament Approves Troop Observer Deployment to Karabakh,”
November 17, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-armenia-azerbaijan-turkey/turkish-parliament-approves-troop-observer-deployment-to-karabakh-idUSKBN27X2NQ
Boris Navasardian, “War with Azerbaijan Weakened Relations with the West,
Strategist Westernization Report 2021,” https://www.strategeast.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/StrategEast-Westernization-Report-2021.pdf
“Turkey Says Goal-Oriented Talks Needed for Minsk Group Efforts to Yield
Results,” October 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/instant-article/
idAFL8N2HH5NT
The Minsk Group is headed by a co-chairmanship consisting of France, Russia,
and the US. Furthermore, the Minsk Group also includes the following participating states: Belarus, Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Turkey as well as
Armenia and Azerbaijan. https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/108306
Yavuz and Huseynov, “The Second Karabakh War,” Middle East Policy, Vol.
XXVII, Issue 4, Winter 2020.

References
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Part IV

Foreign Policy and the
Karabakh War

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12 Turkish Foreign Policy and the
Karabakh Confict
M. Hakan Yavuz

The Second Karabakh War between Armenians and Azerbaijanis was
fought over claims to the mountainous region of Nagorno-Karabakh, during
which thousands of people were killed and many homes, bridges, religious
sites, and schools destroyed. While Azerbaijan has focused on maintaining
its territorial integrity and freeing its internationally recognized territories
from occupation, Armenia has insisted on the principle of self-determination for the Karabakh Armenians (Asenbauer, 1996). This latest war was a
response to the failure of the frst one (1992–1994) to resolve these territorial
disputes (Yavuz and Huseynov, 2020). In the First Karabakh War, Armenia
occupied seven districts of Azerbaijan, adjacent to its Karabakh region. The
Armenian occupation resulted in 30,000 deaths and the ethnic cleansing of
700,000 Azerbaijanis from Karabakh and the surrounding region. It was a
devastating defeat for the newly independent Azerbaijani state. As a result,
Azerbaijan’s morale was shattered and a major portion of its population
displaced, emphasizing how the rattled Azerbaijani identity took on a profoundly resentful tone toward Armenians (Swietochowski, 1985; Altstadt,
1992; Fuller, 1994). The loss of the cradle of Azerbaijani culture, the city
of Shusha, combined with collective guilt and shame sowed the seeds for a
new phase of nation-state building, with the goal of liberating ancient cities
and restoring them to Azerbaijan. While Azerbaijani society was paralyzed
by defeat, Armenia, emboldened by victory, refused to compromise. This
transformed peace negotiations into a means of protecting the status quo
and consolidating the occupation. Armenia established a subordinate structure in the occupied territories called the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
(also known as the Republic of Artsakh), with the hope of winning international recognition and thus legitimizing the occupation (Chorbajian, 2001).
To the disappointment of the Karabakh Armenians, this entity was never
recognized by any United Nations member, including Armenia itself.
Azerbaijan has insisted that it was ready to offer Nagorno-Karabakh the
highest degree of autonomy within its internationally recognized borders.
But, the Armenian side rejected autonomy, wanting to annex the region and
adjacent territories to Armenia. Azerbaijan pinned its hopes on the international community and diplomacy to restore its territories; it waited for
26 years, but these hopes were dashed. After clashes erupted in July 2020,
the Azerbaijani leadership decided that another war was the only way to

DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-17
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reclaim its territories. Armenia provided the necessary pretext by attacking
Azerbaijan on September 27, 2020. The humanitarian catastrophe experienced during the 44-day war could have been avoided had Armenian politicians sought a compromise.
The territories over which the two sides have been unable to come to terms
are recognized by the international community as part of the Republic of
Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh never had the mandate to defne its own
demographic or geographic borders and had always remained part of Azerbaijan. When it became an autonomous region on July 7, 1923 with the
decision of the Central Executive Committee of Soviet Azerbaijan, it was
surrounded by seven provinces of Azerbaijan. When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, the region had about 189,085 inhabitants, which
was composed of Armenians (145,450) and Azerbaijanis (40,688), along with
Russians, Kurds, and Greeks.1 In contrast, the population of the seven surrounding provinces always remained 100% Azerbaijani. Meanwhile, the
position of the international community has been based on four United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions (822, 853, 874, and 884), which
were adopted in 1993. The UN resolutions recognized Nagorno-Karabakh
and the surrounding regions as part of the Republic of Azerbaijan and called
for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian armed forces
from the occupied territories. Similar statements have been made since
then by many other international institutions including the UN General
Assembly. However, the UNSC resolutions have never been implemented,
and negotiations between the two countries have failed to deliver any breakthrough. Against this backdrop, tensions gradually intensifed, leading to
the existing respective troubles for both countries.
To explain the causes and consequences of the Second Karabakh War,
which started on September 27 and ended with the Russian-imposed truce
on November 9, 2020, we briefy examine (1) the dominant Armenian
political thinking and its effects on the Karabakh issue; (2) the causes of
the current war through process-tracing of the major events; (3) the role of
the two major regional powers (Turkey and Russia); (4) Armenia’s framing
of the Second Karabakh War as the “Clash of Civilizations”; and (5) the
nine-item truce agreement and its potential consequences.

Armenia’s Political Thinking: Love of Russia versus
Hate of Turks
Armenia’s independence occurred within the framework of the confict and
combat over Karabakh. Therefore, no events shaped the founding philosophy
of the newly independent Armenia as much as the Karabakh issue and the
essential need for the contested territories to secede from Azerbaijan. Many
Armenian leaders linked their political reputations to framing the issue either
as the cause for Karabakh independence or as a fghter and advocate in the
Karabakh War. Simply, Karabakh predominantly defned Armenia’s foreign

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277

policy and domestic politics—the ideal put forth by Armenian intellectuals as
Hai Dat, the Armenian Cause, which was incorporated into the declaration
of Armenia’s independence in 1991.2 Likewise, the preamble to the Armenian
constitution puts forth the ideal in similar language.
Instead of acting pragmatically, the newly independent Armenia was
obsessed by Hai Dat, with the notable exception being the administration of
Levon Ter-Petrossian, as the essential condition for pursuing its nationalistic dreams.3 When Armenian foreign minister Vardan Oskanian announced
the primacy of Hai Dat, he identifed three pillars supporting this policy
theme. They included recognizing the events of 1915 as genocide; restoring
territories in present-day Turkey and Azerbaijan that were once inhabited
by Armenians, and unifying Karabakh with Armenia because it always had
been populated and ruled by Armenians and consequently the principle
of self-determination legitimized such a policy. Armenia justifed this policy line as an appropriate defense measure to counter the existential threat
from Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenia could only overcome such a threat
by becoming “the strategic extension of Russia” (Grigoryan, 2018, 854). An
Armenian during my visit to Yerevan summed it up as “Armenia cannot
survive without Russia” and therefore it must become the outpost of Russia
against Turks.

Russia as Savior
Rafael Ishkhanian wrote a comprehensive treatise criticizing the trend of
Armenia’s obsessive fear of the Turks along with attempts to frame and
understand the entire scope of Armenia’s modern history on the basis of genocide discourse. He criticized Armenian political thinking which relied on
the participation of the great powers to secure the destiny of the Armenian
nation. In a landmark 1989 article titled, “The Law of Excluding the Third
Force,” he expanded on the problems of Russophile thinking in Armenia:
Who told you that Russia is the savior of the Armenian people? Russia
itself has never said that. This, my fellow citizens, is your invention. It
is you who have placed your hopes on those powers and are now disillusioned…. The Russians are refusing to accept your defnition of their
interests, but you insist on teaching them. It also does not make sense to
be enemies with Russia. Not to rely on Russia, not to make plans based
on its power does not at all mean to be enemies with Russia. Let us be
friends, but let us not rely on them, be fully devoted to them, believe so
much that they are our saviors. Let us re-Armenianize Armenia, let us
be our own nation.
(Ishkhanian, 1999, 31–33)
Armenia’s liberation plans, according to Rafael Ishkhanian, always have
been based on the ideal of a “third force.” That is, some external power(s),

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either Russia or a European nation, to augment Armenia’s efforts to survive and/or expand its territories to strengthen a buffer against the Turkish
threat. Ishkhanian argues that Armenia’s dependence on foreign powers has
resulted in more suffering to the entire nation than the process of liberation.
This view can be best summed up as: “The patriotism of Armenians is the
love of Russians and hatred of Turks.” Ishkhanian dismisses this dominant
view, instead calling upon Armenia to “cut its umbilical cord from Russia”
as a frst step to real independence (Ishkhanian, 1999, 22). He contends that
Armenia’s survival does not depend on Russia but rather on having good
relations with its neighbors, especially Turkey.
One persistent pillar of Armenian nationalism in and outside the country
is the belief that Armenia cannot survive against the Turks without Russia’s
support. This thinking is widespread among the Armenian political and
diplomatic establishment. For instance, Ruben Shugarian, Armenia’s frst
ambassador to the US, after the republic gained independence in 1991,
explains,
Our ties with Russia are something innate and natural for all Armenians,
particularly those residing on the territory of the Republic and the CIS.
Its components are common cultural-spiritual values and the traditional perception of Russia as the most signifcant regional ally and
protector of Armenia’s security.
(Quoted in Mirzoyan, 2010, 22)
Armen Garo (Karekan Pastermadjian), a leading nationalist and later the
Armenia ambassador to the US in (1918–1920), adds:
Without Russia’s active assistance, we will not have the opportunity
to half-way realize our national ideal: to have our own homeland,
independent or even semi-independent, where our people will have the
chance to live and work, away from the Turkish sword. From this perspective our ‘red brothers’ in Yerevan are standing on more realistic
ground.
(Quoted in Panossian, 2006, 192)
Even after the Second Karabakh War, which resulted in Armenia’s defeat,
the political and diplomatic establishment in Armenia has yet to revise their
view of Russia because they still expect Russia to deliver the Karabakh
region to Armenia. This dominant narrative, which was criticized by Rafael
Ishkhanian in the early 1990s, still informs the majority of Armenians’
thinking. Ishkhanian argues, as summarized by Grigoryan, that “the
worst calamities visited upon the Armenian people were the result of chasing unrealistic goals vis-à-vis the neighbors and relying on third parties to
achieve them” (Grigoryan, 2018, 846). Ishkhanian does not view modern
Turkey as an existential threat and he has called upon Armenians to protect

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279

and preserve their nation’s independence by not becoming dependent on
Russia. Ter-Petrossian, the frst president of independent Armenia, rejected
the ideological lines of Hai Dat calling instead for a civic-minded Armenian
state maintaining good relations with its neighbors (Ter-Petrossian, 2018).
The Karabakh War reconfgured the Armenian ideological discussions, and
the nationalists, who were led by the political leaders of Karabakh, took
control of the state until Nikol Pashinyan came to power.
Victory in the First Karabakh War enhances this image that Russia is
“the only savior of Armenia.” This thinking also transformed Armenian
nationalism into becoming more self-confdent and assertive vis-à-vis Turkey
and Azerbaijani. Yet, the same Armenia, due to its aspirations to unify with
the Karabakh region, also became the outpost of Russia in the Caucasus.
Given Armenian demography vis-à-vis Azerbaijan, which resulted in the
major military victory and the occupation of 20% of Azerbaijani territories
in the 1990s, Armenian individual and communal identity coalesced around
a militarized and self-assured national-body. After the First Karabakh War,
Armenian intellectuals and politicians agreed nearly unanimously that
“not even an inch” of territory would be returned to the Azerbaijani Turks
(Geukjian, 2012). This uncompromising position was built on a narrative
of an invincible army that could go all the way to Baku. Such a narrative
shaped the Armenian political position for the next quarter century, as
Armenians constructed an image of the Azerbaijani Turk as lazy, cowardly
and uncivilized. The criticism and the potential problems were all negated,
or at least ignored, and the majority of Armenians rallied around this new
form of victorious and conquering Armenian nationalism. The First Karabakh War signifed the rebirth of Armenia as an aspiring hegemon in the
Caucasus with hopes of crushing its neighbors. As a result, a large number
of Armenians either in the global diaspora or inside Armenia have been dedicated to adding their own voice and resources to achieve Armenia’s vision
of victorious nationalism. The military victory in the 1990s provided an opportunity for Armenians to reimagine themselves as instrumental pieces
of the mythologized Armenian body as a potent entity. One of the results
of this cognitive transformation was the “otherization” of the Azerbaijanis
as lackadaisical, backward Turks. The enmity toward Azerbaijanis carried
dehumanizing consequences and effectively blocked any political compromise or even sincere acknowledgment of the sufferings of Azerbaijani refugees. The Armenian elite never imagined the possibility that Azerbaijan
could fght and regain these territories; the Armenians became hostage to
their nationalistic worldview. As events in 2020 showed, the Armenian stubbornness would prove costly.
Before the Velvet Revolution in Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan was a leading critic of Armenia’s pro-Russian foreign policy (Iskandaryan, 2018). As
a member of the parliament he voted against Armenia’s accession to the
Russian dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). He campaigned for
Armenia to leave the EEU and develop closer relations with the European

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Union. Pashinyan’s worldview has been shaped by his admiration of
European economic and cultural development. He treats Europe as the
future of what Armenia should become. Yet, just like the new Armenian
political elite, he has regarded everything Soviet or Russian as backward,
imperialistic, and undemocratic. As prime minister, Pashinyan reversed his
thinking about Russia by insisting that Armenia’s security situation constrained its foreign policy options. Furthermore, not only Pashinyan but
many Armenian foreign policy scholars also insisted that Armenia does not
have any alternative but to rely on Russia and remain as a Russian “outpost”
in the Caucasus. This group insists that Armenia’s geography determines its
foreign policy because it is sandwiched between two hostile neighbors, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Thus, these geographic circumstances force Armenia
to rely on Russia (Iskandaryan, 2019). Moreover, the majority of Armenians
believed that Moscow would defend Armenia militarily if it were attacked by
either of these two states. For instance, Col. Andrey Ruzinsky, commander
of the 102nd Military Base at Gyumri in Armenia, indicated Russian readiness to “armed confict against Azerbaijan if it decides to restore jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh by force” (Petersen, 2013). Russia never has
hesitated to limit Armenia’s foreign policy options by using the Turkish or
Azerbaijani threat card (Coyle, 2021). Armenians view Turkey as an existential enemy of the Armenian people and in order to remove this danger they
accept the role of being a vassal for Russia. However, this essentialist view
totally ignores the fact that Armenian irredentist nationalism, its occupation of Karabakh and its surrounding regions, made it reliant on Russia.
This factor of nationalism more than its geographic position had tainted
Armenian foreign policy options beyond acknowledging geopolitical realism. Armenia would have many more foreign policy options if it ceded its
dream of nullifying the terms of the Treaty of Sevres or if it accepted the
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
While the Armenian desire to annex Karabakh and its surroundings
removed any option for Armenian foreign policy but to rely on Russia, the
occupation of Azerbaijani territories remained the primary determinant of
Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. This issue shaped Baku’s foreign policy strategies and tactics between Russia and the West. While Azerbaijan expected to
receive support from the US and Europe against Armenian occupation of its
territories, when this support did not materialize as Western powers instead
supported Armenia, Azerbaijan had to reconfgure its foreign policy and
adopt a more neutral, pro-Turkey, and pro-Russian stance. Baku’s strategic
gravitation toward Russia was an outcome of its desire to preserve its territorial integrity and end the Armenian occupation (Valiyev and Mamishova,
2019). Baku painfully witnessed how Russia had fragmented and crippled
Georgia and Ukraine before the eyes of the Western powers.
One should note that Russian foreign policy in the Caucasus comprises
three parts. First, Armenia is the closest military and political ally of Russia
bereft of any option but to rely on Russia for its security and economic

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well-being. Second, the Karabakh confict became a bargaining chip to prevent an Azerbaijani drift to the Western camp and, as a result, keep the
country under Moscow’s infuence. Third, the Karabakh confict was used
to remind everyone in the region to recognize Russia as the hegemon with
still formidable power to (de)stabilize the region.
Very few scholars and politicians saw the potential costs of Armenian
aspirations to unify with the Karabakh region. Armenia’s infuential global
diaspora members have either rallied for the recognition of the Karabakh
republic as an independent state or supported its unifcation with Armenia (Minasyan, 2017). Levon Ter-Petrossian, Armenia’s frst president and
a man who stood out as a thoughtful statesman, called for compromise,
in addition to establishing relations with Turkey. However, the Armenian
diaspora refused, and Ter-Petrossian had to resign from his post in 1998.
He was replaced by the Karabakh nationalist leader Robert Kocharian,
who rejected any compromise with Azerbaijan. Ter-Petrossian had told
Armenians,
It happened in Bosnia. The Serbs lost everything. I don’t think that the
maintenance of the status quo is a real option. … I do not think that
Karabakh is capable of forcing Azerbaijan to its knees, because it will
have to seize Baku.
(Cited in Laitin and Suny, 1999, 166)
His prudent, visionary reading of the region’s deeply rooted sociopolitical
forces guided him to call for peaceful coexistence and compromise in the
Karabakh confict. But, irredentist Armenian nationalist leaders rejected
Ter-Petrossian’s calls, and he subsequently was sidelined (Ter-Petrossian
and Grigoryan, 2017). The maximalist demands of the Armenians blocked
an assortment of potential pathways for productive negotiations.

Recent Fighting
Several factors have sustained this confict and its most recent eruption: (1)
the failure over the past 26 years of the Minsk Group of the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the main international
mission tasked with the coordination of the peace negotiations between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, to resolve the confict; (2) the aggressive rhetoric of Nikol Pashinyan, the current prime minister of Armenia, who has
declared that Karabakh is part of Armenia; (3) the July 2020 skirmishes that
resulted in the killing of an Azerbaijani general, along with several military
offcials; (4) pressure from the Azerbaijani public on their government to
restore their territorial integrity; and (5) Turkey, under Erdoğan’s leadership, has shifted its policy from a diplomatic focus to full military support
of Azerbaijan’s efforts to reclaim its territorial integrity in the contested
Karabakh region. In fact, the Azerbaijani army was preparing for the war

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not only with technologically high-end weapons but also training its troops
to free its territories.
The Minsk Group, co-chaired by the US, Russia, and France, failed to
resolve the confict, according to the principles and norms of the OSCE,
the UN Charter, and the UNSC resolutions.4 Armenia’s desire to consolidate control over not only the region that previously belonged to
the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast but also seven adjacent
Azerbaijani districts, discouraged Armenia from meaningfully participating in the negotiation process. The settlement formulas proposed by the
Minsk Group, based on the UNSC resolutions, were not welcomed by the
Armenian government, because they would have meant the withdrawal of
Armenian military forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories. On the
other hand, Armenia interpreted the geopolitical situation in the region as a
sign of continuous Russian support for the existence of Azerbaijani territories under the control of Armenia. The subsequent Armenian governments
failed to read the changes in the geopolitical environment of the wider South
Caucasus region, especially in trilateral relations among Russia, Azerbaijan,
and Turkey.
Russia has taken a leading role by demonstrating that the Caucasus is
legitimately inside its backyard as a national interest, therefore conveying the right to negotiate a solution to this confict. Russia’s alliance with
Armenia within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),
Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia, and the existence of a Russian
military base in the territories of Armenia further complicate the international dynamics to the detriment of efforts to resolve the Armenia-Azerbaijan confict. The impasse has aggravated the animus on both sides and
imparted a false sense of security to Armenians who saw Russian support
as a signal that the occupied territories are part of their country and that the
issue had already been resolved.
Russia also has been the main supplier of arms to both Armenia and
Azerbaijan. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), a think tank that monitors military spending worldwide,
oil-rich Azerbaijan spent more than $24 billion on arms between 2008 and
2018. Armenia, with limited resources, has received cheaper and older
Russian weaponry, some donated. It spent a mere $4 billion during the same
period, but allocated one-ffth of its annual state budget to spending on
arms. Nevertheless, the alliance with Russia allowed Armenia to acquire
otherwise expensive arms without excessive cost burdens, signifcantly
strengthening the country’s defensive capabilities.
The 2016 border clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia resulted
in signifcant human losses and a loss of territories. The war exposed the
weaknesses of Azerbaijan, and Armenia became more assured about its
military’s capabilities. For instance, when Russia proposed a major peace
plan in 2016 it was rejected by Armenia. After the clashes in 2016, Russian
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, a Russian-Armenian with deep sympathies

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toward Armenian causes, proposed a compromise plan that comprised two
parts ensuring the Karabakh region would have special status. Armenia
would return the fve adjacent regions to Azerbaijan and keep the Lachin
and Karavajar districts until a fnal status on Karabakh would be decided
in a referendum. This plan, which could have avoided the disastrous defeat
of the Armenian forces in 2020, was rejected by Armenia. In 2017, the de
facto authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh renamed the enclave the Republic
of Artsakh, by utilizing its medieval Armenian name to deny any claim of
the Azerbaijanis.
Consequently, Ilham Aliyev concluded that there was no hope for a diplomatic solution. Azerbaijan lobbied to solve the Karabakh problem according to the international legal principle of territorial integrity. It engaged in
various diplomatic initiatives to put pressure on Armenia. Baku lobbied at
the UN, parliaments in European countries and numerous international
organizations. Washington and Brussels refused to guarantee the territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan in rejecting the Azerbaijani diplomatic initiatives.
When the UN General Assembly voted on Resolution 10693 (passed on
March 14, 2008), which confrmed Azerbaijan’s claim on territorial integrity and demanded the withdrawal of all Armenian forces from the occupied territories, the US and France vetoed the resolution with nearly every
European Union member abstaining. When the US and European countries imposed sanctions against Russia over the annexation and occupation
of Crimea, Aliyev unsuccessfully asked the same countries to do the same
against Armenia.
Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008, which resulted in the loss of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia and crippled the Georgian state, had incurred major regional consequences. It became clear that no country could expect any external help if they face a security problem with Russia. In addition, Russia made
it clear that it would support separatism and secessionism as political strategies to promote its hegemonic position. No European country resisted the
practice of Russian occupation and some EU countries, such as France, tried
to use the confict to promote their own interest by appeasing Putin. Western inaction over the fragmentation of Georgia was a wake-up call for Baku.
Russia sought to legitimize its actions on the principle of self-determination
in Georgia, and later in Crimea on the principle of territorial integrity. These
developments disturbed Baku, especially when Armenia supported Russia’s
annexation of Crimea. These events, however, encouraged Azerbaijan not to
seek an alliance with the West that might anger Russia. Rather, Aliyev pursued a policy of moderating Russia’s perspective on Azerbaijan as a friendly
country that is sensitive toward Russia’s historical fears and concerns.
The timing proved signifcant, given the policies of Pashinyan in Armenia,
who came to power in 2018 via a popular uprising with the goal of developing closer ties with the West to counterbalance Russian infuence (Batashvili, 2019). Pashinyan represented a signifcant break from the hardline
Karabakh Armenians who had dominated the state of Armenia since the

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war in the 1990s. At the outset, he signaled an intent to resolve the confict,
which the Azerbaijani government welcomed. According to recently declassifed information, the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan at that time
had engaged in secret negotiations over the settlement process.5 However,
after consolidating his power at home, Pashinyan abruptly abandoned this
approach and called for the unifcation of Karabakh and Armenia, declaring, “Karabakh is Armenia, period.”6 Unlike the previous Armenian leadership, he worked hard to destroy the framework of the Minsk Group and
rejected the step-by-step process.7
Pashinyan’s irredentist rhetoric not only angered the Azerbaijanis, it also
provided the reason for Azerbaijani political opposition groups to challenge
their own government on the following grievance: thirty years of events in
which historical cities of Azerbaijan identity were ceded to Armenia, outcomes that implied the confict had been resolved in favor of the Armenians.
Pashinyan’s raw nationalist rhetoric on behalf of his country, which included
calling eastern Turkey an “historic land of Armenia,” angered the Turkish government as well. Tensions reached unprecedented levels when the Armenian
government offcially marked the hundredth anniversary of the defunct Treaty
of Sevres, which would have dismantled the Ottoman Empire at the end of the
wars in 1920 and divided Ottoman territories, including Turkey, into several
pieces.8 The treaty was never entered into force and was replaced by the Treaty
of Lausanne of 1923.9 But, in August 2020, Pashinyan proclaimed the Treaty of
Sevres as historical fact and announced, “We are bound by duty to remember
it, realize its importance and follow its message.”10 Amplifying this stance, Armenian defense minister Davit Tonoyan called for “new wars for new territories” during a meeting in New York City with representatives of the Armenian
diaspora.11 The Turkish security establishment read these statements as Pashinyan’s intent to spread the confict to Turkey and, provoked by Pashinyan’s
confrontational rhetoric, Ankara decided to openly support Azerbaijan.
Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani public and government apparently concluded that peace negotiations were never going to result in the return of
their occupied territories. The point was confrmed in their view by attacks
on civilians and the killing of a popular Azerbaijani general and his colleagues in a missile attack near the previously negotiated ceasefre lines
of July 2020.12 The Armenian attack was a test run to gauge Azerbaijani
resolve. It activated public opinion in Azerbaijan, propelled by the public display of grief at the funerals of the fallen soldiers and then by a massive demonstration in Baku and other towns demanding a corresponding
response to Armenia’s aggression. Protesters shouted, “Liberation of Karabakh” and “Martyrs do not die; the homeland will not be divided.” Some
protesters reached the parliament in Baku, caused some damage and called
upon the government to act. The pro-war protests signaled a public concern that the government of Azerbaijan was not taking the confict seriously
enough to fght for the repatriation of the contested territories. The protests strengthened the hand of the Azerbaijani political opposition, which

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echoed the public sentiment in favor of decisive action. Thus, Azerbaijanis
bonded quickly around the premises and prospects of nationalism, igniting
dormant passions behind the goal of integrating the occupied territories
into the homeland. The Armenian government celebrated its military victory and Pashinyan orchestrated a ceremony where medals were presented
to military personnel who participated in combat against Azerbaijan.
The Azerbaijani government used all available means to cut the Gordian
knot and end its national humiliation. Pashinyan’s visit to Karabakh on August 5, 2019, and his open declaration that it was part of Armenia erased realistic hopes for a peaceful solution. Turkey concluded that there was no room
for a peaceful resolution and thus supported the Azerbaijani right to defend
its territories. Turkey was worried about the potential for public anger to
deepen the leadership crisis in Azerbaijan and lead the most powerful Caucasian country into a downward spiral into uncontrollable political crises.13
Pashinyan’s statements about Karabakh, his visit to the city of Shusha—considered by Azerbaijanis to be the cradle of their culture—and his declaration
that Shusha would remain part of Armenia portended the forthcoming war.

Turkey’s Role
Turkey’s foreign policy toward Azerbaijan has been guided by three principles (Ergun, 2020). The frst is support for Azerbaijani political, military
and economic independence against Russian aspirations. The second is
support of Azerbaijani territorial integrity and sovereignty over Karabakh.
The third is participation in Azerbaijani oil production and engaging in
export trade over Turkey (Abilov, 2015). During the First Karabakh War,
Turkey supported Azerbaijan diplomatically in international organizations, especially at the UN. Due to public pressure, Turkey closed its border with Armenia in response to the Armenian occupation of Karabakh
and adjacent regions. Ankara also refused to establish diplomatic relations
with Armenia. Turkey’s political leaders, such as Süleyman Demirel, whose
personality was shaped by the Cold War, hesitated about pursuing a proactive foreign policy in the Caucasus because of concerns about possible
Soviet/Russian reactions. Thus Ankara hardly pursued any policy which
could be understood as a provocation against Moscow. Turgut Özal also
worried about Russian and American pressure and hesitated to militarily
support Azerbaijan. Until the 2000s, Turkey’s foreign policy relied on career
diplomats and offcials with foreign ministry experience, as they remained
above the political pressures of public opinion and focused on policy decisions to serve the state’s principal interests. During that time, Turkey’s policy responses accounted for other matters, such as the presence of the PKK
and the civil wars in former Yugoslavian territories, as evidenced by the
coverage in Turkish media. However, when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP
government came to power in 2002, Turkish public opinion and the political
leaders became more important in the making of the foreign policy.

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Although international media and Armenian representatives, along with
France, have blamed Turkey for instigating the current confict, there is no
concrete evidence that would suggest this. Erdoğan’s combative personality
and his international posture have subjected him to criticism in Europe and
the Middle East (Yavuz, 2020, 2021). True, Erdoğan never hesitates to use
gunboat diplomacy whenever he deems it necessary. However, he did not
instigate this confict and was not involved in the ceasefre negotiations. Yet,
he also exposed the Minsk Group’s failures and Armenian intentions to annex the occupied territories. Indeed, he has fully supported Azerbaijan, offering to provide whatever assistance the country needs—a position that aligns
with both Azerbaijani and Turkish public opinion. Indeed, Erdoğan has always been critical of the failure of former Turkish leaders to act resolutely
on the side of Azerbaijan. His position refects a sense of guilt on the part of
the Turkish state for failing to help Azerbaijan during its most fateful period
in the early 1990s, a point to which Erdoğan has referred previously. For instance, Turgut Ozal, then Turkish president, during the height of the war in
the 1990s, refused to offer aid to Azerbaijan and declared, “Azerbaijanis are
closer to Iranian culture and they are Shia; we are Sunni.”14

The Protocols
After the Russian-Georgian War, Russia compelled Azerbaijan and
Armenia to sign the Moscow Declaration in 2008 to fnd a political solution to the Karabakh confict.15 Just after the disastrous war in Georgia,
Russia wanted to project a global image as peacemaker (Ismailzade, 2008;
Pashayeva, 2009). Meanwhile, Russia’s main goal sought to keep the Minsk
Group out of the negotiations, thereby clearing the way for Russia to set
the tone for negotiations and actions in the Caucasus. In order to contain
Russian infuence in the region, the US pressured Turkey to open its border
with Armenia and establish diplomatic relations. Ankara moved forward
by signing a set of documents with Armenia in 2009 (Mikhelidze, 2010).
The goal was to open the borders with Armenia that were closed because of
the Armenian invasion of Azerbaijani territories, and establish diplomatic
relations between the two countries. The Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan
reacted to the protocols by claiming that Turkey’s decision “directly contradicts the national interests of Azerbaijan and overshadows the spirit of
brotherly relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey built on deep historical roots.”16 The Azerbaijani government worried that with the opening of
borders between Turkey and Armenia, the result would end the isolation
of Armenia. Thus, Azerbaijan would lose crucial leverage to infuence any
talks on the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh.17
Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev was resolute:
We are getting a lot of offcial and non-offcial information about what’s
happening between Turkey and Armenia. This is a deal between two

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sovereign countries, and we have no strategy to stop or impede it, but
we, the Azerbaijani people, want to know the answer to one very simple
question: Is the Nagorno-Karabakh confict a pre-condition for the rapprochement process or not?
(Cited in Shiriyev and Davies, 2013)
In response to criticism of the protocols from the opposition parties, which
ignored the question of Armenian occupation of the Azerbaijani territories,
Erdoğan, then Turkish prime minister, visited Baku in May 2009 and spoke
to the Azerbaijan parliament: “Our borders were closed after the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh. We will not open borders as long as the occupation continues. Who says this? The Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic
says this. Can there be any guarantee here apart from this?” (Welt, 2012).
Despite these maneuvers, Turkey had no option but to sign the protocols
because it was under pressure from the US, a move the Turkish Foreign Ministry insisted might be the way to enhance Turkey’s position in the Caucasus
for several reasons. Turkey would be better positioned to counter charges of
genocide with regard to the events of 1915, pacify the radical and anti-Turkish
Armenian diaspora, which was mostly dominated by the nationalist Dashnak
Party (Armenian Revolutionary Federation), and encourage Armenia to move
farther away from Russian infuence and establish trust and confdence in adding Turkey to the Karabakh negotiations (Yavuzb, 2020, 345–365). On October 10, 2009, in Zurich Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish foreign minister, and
Edward Nalbandyan, the Armenian foreign minister, signed two protocols:
the Protocol on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and the Protocol on
the Development of Bilateral Relations. According to the Protocols, the borders between the two countries would be opened within two months after the
protocols were ratifed by the respective parliaments. But, the protocols did
not mention the occupation of Karabakh and the seven regions of Azerbaijan.
Despite Turkey’s public commitments to Azerbaijan, Turkey uncoupled the
Karabakh issue from its relations with Armenia. Şükrü Elekdağ said, “these
protocols have no chance of ratifcation since the parliament would never open
the border with Armenia as long as the territories of Azerbaijan are under
occupation.” The signing of the protocols angered and mobilized Azerbaijan.
According to Baku, opening the border would end Armenia’s economic and
physical isolation (especially after the Russian-Georgian War which stopped
the fow of goods between Russia and Armenia) and Azerbaijan would have no
choice but to agree to the dictates of Armenia. Aliyev responded,
I am absolutely convinced that the resolution of the Karabakh confict
and the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border must proceed in a parallel fashion... Between these two processes there is no offcial link, but
an unoffcial one exists. This tie must be preserved and the two questions must be resolved in a parallel fashion and at the same time.
(Cited Shiriyev and Davies, 2013, 199)

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The Armenian constitutional court, however, provided the excuse for Turkey
to distance itself from the Protocols. The court, in examining the international treaties before ratifcation by parliament, issued its interpretation, as
based on the preamble to the Armenian constitution and to the country’s
declaration of independence. The Court approved the Protocols, based on
the following points (Mikhelidze, 2010):
1 The Republic of Armenia must carry the goals set by the Constitution
of Armenia and the Declaration of Independence to work toward the
international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and
Western Armenia.
2 Implementation of these Protocols does not imply Armenia’s recognition of the existing Turkish-Armenian border, as established by the 1921
Treaty of Kars.
3 The protocols with Turkey are bilateral in nature and cannot be linked
to the Karabakh issue.18
The Turkish Foreign Ministry rejected the Armenian court’s interpretation,
adding in a statement that “this decision contains preconditions and restrictive provisions which impair the letter and spirit of the protocols.”19 The
Armenian government rejected the move to recognize the border between
Turkey and Armenia, which led to open debate in the Turkish parliament
and the media. One of the key items in the Protocols was “the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries defned by relevant
treaties of international law.”
Baku used persuasive means, including its oil pipeline, over Turkey, along
with the volumes of Azerbaijani oil companies’ investments, to mobilize Turkish public opinion against the diplomatic overtures intended to open relations
between Turkey and Armenia. Eventually, the Turkish government retreated
from the protocols and submitted to Baku’s inclinations. This crisis showed
Baku that it could deploy Turkish public opinion to strengthen Azerbaijan’s
relationship with Turkey.

Turkey and the Second Karabakh War
Several factors serve to clarify Turkey’s shift from indifference toward
Azerbaijan to full support as a strategic partner: (1) the Turks’ view of
the Azerbaijanis as ethnic kin whom they are obligated to support; (2)
the fact that Azerbaijan is not attacking another country but seeking to
restore its own territorial integrity—a cause that for many Turks is morally and legally just; (3) the ingrained and politically motivated feeling
among the majority of Turks that Armenia has always been subservient
to Europe and Russia in its quest to restore its status as a major power;
and, most critically, (4) the role of economic relations between Turkey and
Azerbaijan.

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The recent wave of nationalism is behind Turkey’s current assertive foreign policy. As its public opinion stances have become more nationalistic, so
have the policies of its government. Erdoğan, for example, has allied himself
with the nationalist party of Devlet Bahçeli to secure a majority bloc in parliament and in presidential elections. This alliance has had a major impact
on foreign policy. The Karabakh confict has provided an opportunity for
Erdoğan to display his nationalist qualifcations and enhance his legitimacy
before Turkey’s nationalist voters (Arisan, 2020).20 Moreover, from the perspective of international law, Turkey has had frm ground upon which to
choose siding with Azerbaijan.
As Armenians have worked tirelessly to see their suffering during World
War I recognized as genocide, the Turkish public has consistently distanced
itself from the Armenians, whom they regard as a convenient tool in the
hands of Turkey’s enemies to weaken the country and destroy its hard-earned
positive image (Yavuz, 2020b, 345–365). Unfortunately, the use of Armenian
suffering by the US Congress or the European Parliament against Turkey in
well publicized formal resolutions has not helped to elucidate an unbiased
historical account of what occurred in regard to Turkish consciousness and
diplomacy in the region (Cannon, 2016). Whenever these countries have
thought they were aggrieved because of Turkey’s actions, both historical
and current, the response has often been to frame it as Turkey’s unwillingness to recognize the events of 1915 as genocide.
Perceived as abusing the historical record by acknowledging that atrocities affected all groups in the relevant territories during the wars, contemporary generations of Turks have chafed at the insistence of Armenians to
return repeatedly to the events of 1915 as the source of their grievances.
Moreover, Armenian attempts to justify the occupation and ethnic cleansing of Azerbaijanis as revenge for the events of 1915 have forced the Turkish
public to identify with the cause of Azerbaijan. Erdoğan, in this instance,
is not shaping public opinion but responding to it. Rather than seeking to
pause and understand the societal image and standing of Armenia and Armenians in Turkey, more than a few experts and scholars are quick to blame
Erdoğan for antagonizing this particular confict.
Finally, the economic and geopolitical situation compels Turkey to support Azerbaijan. Although Turkey and Azerbaijan describe their relationship in terms of “one nation with two states.” their economic interdependence
has played a critical role in changing its dynamics (Ismayilov, 2016).21 As a
growing economy and population, Turkey is an energy-dependent country
that buys most of its oil and gas from Azerbaijan. Moreover, major Azerbaijani oil and gas pipelines pass through Turkey, which has been collecting
fees from them. The two countries built the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and
two pipelines to integrate their economies, and Azerbaijan is the biggest
investor in the Turkish energy sector. Its state-owned oil company (SOCAR)
owns the biggest refneries in Izmir. The trade volume between the two
countries is close to $5 billion and likely to increase to $15 billion by 2024.

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As Turkey becomes more dependent on Azerbaijani oil and gas, its foreign
policy will refect these facts. Economics also clarifes the general understanding behind Turkey’s unquestioned support for Azerbaijan, but it does
not explain why the 2020 war erupted.

Russian Infuence and Control
The Caucasus is a region of global economic signifcance, as gas and oil
pipelines run throughout Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Georgia has had
poor relations with Russia since the 2008 war, which resulted in the fragmentation of Georgian territory when Russia occupied and recognized the
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Azerbaijan has pursued
a sophisticated foreign policy by recognizing Russia’s hegemonic role in
the Caucasus, and Baku has taken care not to provoke Russia. Yet, while
President Aliyev has developed cordial relations with Putin, he has also cultivated ties with Turkey, Israel, and major European countries. In return,
Russia has tried to keep Azerbaijan close, emphasizing to Aliyev that Moscow holds “the key to the Karabakh confict.”
A major cause of instability in the Caucasus seems to be Russian imperialist nostalgia (Gatagova, 2020). Russia still sees itself as a great power and
treats the Caucasus as its backyard. Moscow’s heavy-handed imperialist
policies, however, have resulted in the loss of Ukraine and Georgia and the
possible loss of Azerbaijan. According to Armenians including Pashinyan,
Russia’s main goal has been to keep the Karabakh confict in limbo so that
it can reduce Armenia to a vassal state while ensuring Baku does not follow
a foreign policy independent of Russian interests (Batashvili, 2019). Russia
has a military base in Gymri, Armenia, and Armenia’s borders with Turkey
and Azerbaijan have been closed since 1993 as a result of the frst Karabakh
confict. This, in turn, has been deleterious for Armenia’s economy. Its
able-bodied young people are emigrating to Russia, Europe, and the US.
The more vulnerable and isolated Armenia becomes, the more it risks lapsing into the vassal status that Russia desires. Armenia is the poorest state
in the Caucasus, with failing infrastructure and a shrinking population,
evidence of how irredentist Armenian nationalism has destroyed the country’s social fabric and well-being and compromised its independence from
Russia.
Upon Russia’s arrival in the Caucasus in the nineteenth century, its main
challenger was Iran, followed by the Ottoman Empire. Today, its successor,
Turkey, enjoys excellent economic relations with Georgia and has close ties
with many north Caucasian Muslim communities. Turkey is home to more
than fve million Muslims from the north Caucasus who were ethnically
cleansed or deported by Tsarist Russia (Celikpala, 2005). As Russia is seeking to restrain Turkey’s efforts in Syria, Turkey is also seeking to expand its
infuence in Russia’s southern and most vulnerable border regions. Presently, the Russia-Turkey relationship has been damaged by disputes over

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Syria and Libya, though the two regularly fnd some common ground for
addressing their differences. Erdoğan and Putin have evinced a certain
respect for each other despite numerous disagreements between them.
Turkey has never recognized the Russian annexation of Crimea and
defends, albeit quietly, the rights of the Crimean Tatars. As Russia becomes
more dependent on oil and gas—a commodity whose market prices have
declined, not only because of the pandemic, but also because of green-energy
commitments around the world—it is becoming economically more vulnerable. Today, Russia sells raw materials and buys most of its goods from
China. This is not the global image it prefers to portray, and Turkey is
not what it was in the early twentieth century—the sick man of Europe.
As Russia continues to anger the people of the Caucasus with its excessive
aggressions, it will ironically open up more opportunity spaces for Turkey
and other countries in the region to exploit.

Shadows from the Past
During the 44-day war, the Russian public overwhelmingly remained on
the side of the Armenians. This indicates the entrenched prejudice against
the Turks in Russian political consciousness. The enduring rivalry between
Turkey and Russia is important to understand, as it reveals the orientation of
the current Karabakh confict. In Russia’s national myth and character, the
Turks, in general, and Turkey, in particular, have taken a historical role of
signifcant geopolitical consequence. Russia and the Ottoman Empire were
at war in 1569–1570, 1676–1681, 1687–1699, 1710–1713, 1736–1739, 1768–1774,
1787–1792, 1806–1807, 1809–1812, 1828–1829, 1853–1855, 1877–1878 and 1914–
1917 (Kurat, 1999). Yet, Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey were allies. Lenin
economically and militarily supported the Turkish War of independence
against European imperialist forces.22 Moreover, the contemporary borders
of the Caucasus were, more or less, determined as a result of negotiations
between Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Vladimir Lenin (Gürün, 1991). Turkey
remains the principal destination for persecuted Muslims from Russia and its
former Central Asian Soviet republics. Moreover, Turkey is the guarantor of
two autonomous regions: Ajaria in Georgia and Nakhichevan in Azerbaijan
(Murtazaoğlu, 2004). Contrary to some claims that Turkey is seeking to enter
the Caucasus and challenge the Russian position there, Ottoman Turkey was
in the Caucasus long before the Russians arrived there in the nineteenth century (Allen and Paul Muratoff., 2011).
As Russia expanded its eastern and southern borders into the territories previously held by Turkic groups, its history and identity were shaped
by these long series of conficts. The perception of Russian threats comes
from these wars that each Turkish student encounters in studying history at
school. Russia has remained the enemy in the construction of the Turkish
nationalist identity since this image was consolidated with the Cold War.
When the author was a student in the provincial town of Bayburt in the

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1970s, the aggressive colonizing image of Russia as the Turks’ main enemy
was part of both the offcial and unoffcial curricula. Relations between
Erdoğan and Putin are rooted in this historical background. Although history does not explain everything, the constructed memories and images
of the past do play an important role in how the two sides see each other.
Today, neither Turkey nor Russia can completely free itself from the images
of the past. Nor is either country captive to its past. Perceptions of Russia
are much better than they were previously in Turkey, while any residual
negative images might easily be mobilized to explain Russia’s imperialist
designs in the Caucasus or the Middle East.
Moreover, there is a shared feeling in Europe and the US, though perhaps
not in Baku or Ankara, that Russia is a declining power in the Caucasus.
Turkey has been careful not to challenge Russia directly, but Ankara is
also acutely aware of Russia’s limitations in the region. If Russia allies
itself completely with Armenia or fails to respect the territorial integrity
of Azerbaijan, it is more likely to lose Azerbaijan and turn Armenia into
a garrison state in the service of Russia. Today, Azerbaijan is much richer
and more developed than in the 1990s, when it was defeated and lost 20%
of its territories. Azerbaijan’s military is also better trained and its morale
projects national confdence.

Pashinyan’s “Clash of Civilizations”?
The Armenians portray Azerbaijanis as Turks and treat them as the children of the Oriental Ottoman Empire. On the basis of religion, they present
themselves as European. David Laitin and Ronald Suny explain that “much
of Armenian identity is wrapped up in what they have suffered at the hands
of the Turks, and since the Azerbaijanis are “Turks” (Azerbaijani is a Turkic
language), hostility felt toward one people is transferred to another” (Laitin
and Suny, 1999, 147). Azerbaijani Turks were not part of the Ottoman
Empire in the nineteenth century and were never involved in the events of
1915, which the Armenians consider as genocide. This hostility has been
regularly activated to justify Armenian irredentist nationalism. During
the Karabakh confict of the early 1990s, Laitin and Suny note, “Armenian
militias along with civilian compatriots systematically cleansed the corridors separating Armenia from Karabakh [of its indigenous Azerbaijani
population] in a cold-blooded campaign” (Laitin and Suny, 1999, 153). The
hatred of Turks was thereby transferred to the Azerbaijanis who became the
victims of systematic killings and ethnic cleansing.
Pashinyan prefers to portray the confict as a war between Muslims and
Christians, claiming that the Turks had to be stopped in Karabakh or they
would have tried to seize Vienna again.23 Although Armenia worked to
frame the war as a clash of Islam versus Christianity and presented itself
as the outpost of Christianity against Islamic terrorism, very few radical
groups adopted this line of propaganda. For instance, European fascists

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and some extremist factions rushed to defend the Armenian cause not
because they see them as correct but rather because they are Christian.
For instance, in October 2020, Marc de Cacqueray-Valmenier, the leader
of the French extreme-right group Zouaves Paris, declared on his social
media accounts that he had left to fght alongside the Christian Armenians
in Nagorno-Karabakh against Muslims. This irresponsible response to the
war was expressed at the highest level in France, when President Emmanuel
Macron openly supported Armenian occupation of the Azerbaijani territories and deliberately tried to portray the confict as a religious one by
insisting that Syrian jihadists are fghting on the side of Azerbaijani troops.
Pashinyan’s rhetoric echoes that of two convicted genocidal Serbian
leaders: Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadcic. Pashinyan wants to
defend his occupation of another country and ethnic cleansing of 700,000
people on the basis of orientalist images of Muslims and Turks. Yet, in
this confict, the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully supporting (Christian)
Armenia.24 Meanwhile, Turkey, Israel, Great Britain and Hungary have
supported Azerbaijan. This is neither a religious nor a civilizational war.25
The rhetoric ignores that this is a war over territory and a confict involving rival nationalist movements. Pashinyan has claimed that Armenia is
defending the West against Turkey because Turkey wants once again to be
at the gates of Vienna. The expressions of orientalism and otherization of
the Azerbaijani Turks recycle repugnant motifs that the historical record
has refuted. In order to gain the sympathy of other countries, Pashinyan
presents the confict between Christian Armenia and Muslim Azerbaijan as
a “civilizational front line,” even though Shia Iran stands with Armenia in
the dispute. In many surveys and studies, Azerbaijan is consistently recognized as a predominantly secular country, similar to Finland or Vietnam.
There have been several threads of persistent disinformation throughout the war. The frst is attributed to French president Macron. Apparently catering to Armenian-origin voters in the upcoming 2022 French
presidential elections, he claims that Syrian-Islamist mercenaries are
fghting on the Azerbaijani side. However, this disinformation was frst
planted and spread by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, and Macron picked it up. Rather than being sensitive to global justice, international law, and norms, France has supported the occupation of Karabakh
for 26 years. Erdoğan has angered Macron by exposing French intentions
in Karabakh as well as in Libya. Meanwhile, Armenians from France,
the US, Canada, and Lebanon have joined the fght, and those who have
died in the confict have been acclaimed as heroes in social media posts.
But, there is yet to be any evidence of a Syrian fghter fatality in Karabakh. This calculated stream of disinformation, similar in respects to the
claim of chemical weapons raised before the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, has
been advanced not only by France, but also by Russian interests. When
the ceasefre was signed on November 9, 2020, neither France nor Russia
raised the issue of mercenaries.

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Moreover, in order to mobilize the Armenian diaspora around the world,
Pashinyan has portrayed Armenia once again as a victim of Turkey, vulnerable to being wiped off the global map. The Armenian president and prime
minister presented the Karabakh War as “the continuation of the genocide
against the Armenian people.”26 This instrumentalization of past human suffering is an unmistakable example of how a victim can become the victimizer
under specifc circumstances when it seeks to use the scars of healed wounds
to justify a new round of retribution. Regrettably, the Armenian offcials have
selective memories, failing to accept the worst atrocities of the 1991–1994
Karabakh War, such as a series of massacres carried out in Khojaly and elsewhere, in which hundreds of innocent Azerbaijani civilians were murdered.

Russian-infuenced Truce
Russia has always maneuvered to exploit the fears and insecurities of both
sides in a confict to promote its own interests while seeking to preserve its
status as the hegemon of the Caucasus. More than the Azerbaijanis, it has
been the Armenians who relied on and demanded a Russian presence in the
Caucasus, which Russia has sought to legitimize on its own accord. Facing
a decisive defeat and the loss of the entire Karabakh area to the Azerbaijani
army, Armenia had no option but to ask for Russia’s assistance. Russia
used its leverage over Azerbaijan to prevent complete control of Karabakh
by Azerbaijan, as refected in the truce that was imposed on November 9
and signed by Putin, Aliyev, and Pashinyan. Armenia had no option but to
capitulate to Russian demands, while Azerbaijan reluctantly agreed, even as
they took control of the contested region. Armenia had long ago accepted
vassal status under Russian protection, but a historical analysis of conficts
in the region leads to the following conclusion: Russia consistently exploits
the fears of these ethnic groups by pitting one against another. Whenever
Russian troops enter a region under the pretext of peacekeeping (as in the
case in Georgia), it becomes much more diffcult to get rid of them. In the
Caucasus, the idea of Russian troops as peacekeepers is an oxymoron;
Russia is always tempted to behave unilaterally with the hope of reclaiming some level of imperialist intentions. Moscow never sought a solution to
the confict but rather a framework for managing it to advance its interests.
The current truce agreement is just that: a vague, open-ended, unclarifed
instrument to deepen the Russian presence in the region.
The nine-point truce agreement portends historical signifcance, as it will
become the foundation for the fnal peace treaty.27 As news of the truce
spread, celebrations broke out in Azerbaijani cities, while protests, unrest
and chaos reigned in the Armenian capital of Yerevan, with people pouring
into the streets, chanting, “Where is Nicol? Where is that traitor?” Armenian
opposition parties, including nationalist diaspora communities, have called
for the Pashinyan government to resign. Azerbaijan won the war, but Russia
did not allow it to be translated into a full diplomatic victory, which would

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encompass recognizing the claim of territorial integrity and sovereignty of
Azerbaijan. Still, Azerbaijan recovered the territories around Karabakh,
including 30% of the former Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region. Of
course, this carries the caveat that Russian troops will guarantee the truce.
Azerbaijan liberated its most important cultural center, Shusha, allowing displaced Azerbaijanis from the frst Karabakh War to return to their
homes—constituting a symbolic strategic victory for Azerbaijan. Russia is
also a winner; it crafted the truce while saving Armenia from total defeat.
Moreover, it will deploy close to 2,000 troops in the confict zone as a peacekeeping force—meaning a Russian presence not only in Armenia but also in
formerly occupied Azerbaijani territories.
Meanwhile, Armenia bears the greatest losses. It paid a heavy price by losing thousands of soldiers, resources and territory, along with the failure of its
state institutions to be honest to its population about the war conditions. The
poorly trained, inadequately armed Armenian forces had no feasible option
but to withdraw. Armenia paid the greatest price because of the failure of its
politicians, who refused to compromise and differentiate the circumstances of
the possible from the desirable. Armenia cared little for the well-being of its
people, with the exception of those cliques who were the most loyal to the ruling government and most fnancially capable. Armenia could have salvaged
much better terms had they pursued diplomacy after their military victory in
1994. However, with this new (2020) truce, there is no mention of an autonomous Karabakh nor any recognition of its political status. For example, in
his address, President Aliyev announced to the nation, “What happened to
the [political] status? The status has gone to hell. No status. And there won’t
be any status. It won’t happen as long as I am president.” However, the widespread belief among Armenians is that there will be some form of cultural
autonomy regarding Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
There are several consequences of the 44-day war and the truce agreement:
•

•

First, although Turkey is not mentioned in the truce agreement, the
country stepped forward from the back channels to be a partner to the
center for monitoring the ceasefre between the parties. Azerbaijan has
insisted on including Turkey, and President Aliyev made it clear that
Turkey’s military role in Karabakh is inevitable and indispensable. Yet,
due to Armenian opposition and Russian reluctance, Turkey’s role has
not been fully articulated in the agreement. Nevertheless, Turkey stands
as the second-most prominent regional power in shaping the outcome.
On November 11, 2020, Turkish defense minister Hulusi Akar and his
Russian counterpart, Sergei Shoigu, signed an agreement to establish a
joint ceasefre-monitoring center in Azerbaijani-controlled territories.
Second, the war and the truce have exposed the weakness of international institutions, particularly the fact that Western governments focus
more on arms sales and the support of powerful lobbies with specifc
geopolitical interests than on broader human-rights guarantees. This

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•

•

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M. Hakan Yavuz
realization may encourage players in other frozen (dormant) conficts
to take matters into their own hands without relying on the support or
guidance of international institutions.
Third, the Karabakh War has already transformed the balance of power
in the region. As Russia crafted and imposed a truce agreement resulting
in the surrender of Armenia, this, in turn, has angered many in Armenia
and its diaspora. As a result, there are some angry calls to shift dramatically the orientation of Armenia away from Russia. These calls will have
little impact because Armenia cannot turn against Russia for reasons of
economy, energy and security. Russia is aware of Armenia’s dependence
and does not want to make an enemy of Azerbaijan. If Armenia fails to
improve its economy, this would compel its able and young population to
move away; its cities could become virtual ghost towns without an able
labor force to sustain basic services. The truce agreement has prompted
intense soul searching in Armenia and critical thinking about the balance
of risks and benefts associated with irredentist nationalism.
The worst act during the war occurred when Armenia emptied Karabakh of its civilian Armenian population, weakening Karabakh’s claim
to autonomy more than its defeat on the battlefeld had accomplished.
According to the International Crisis Group, one-half of the population
and 90% of children, women and the elderly have fed to Armenia.28 There
was no resistance to their leaving. Only 60% returned back to Karabakh.
Fourth, as far as Azerbaijan is concerned, it won the war on the battlefeld but has yet to advance its claim at the negotiating table to assume
full control over the former Nagorno-Karabakh region. The truce
agreement is open-ended, and many people have genuine concerns
about the presence of Russian troops in Azerbaijan. In other word, the
future of Karabakh will be determined between Azerbaijan and Russia.
Fifth, Azerbaijan obtained a land connection to the Nakhichevan
enclave. After a fnal peace settlement is signed, there is a good chance
that these two economies could be integrated to improve the daily lives
of their people.
Sixth, Azerbaijan lost the First Karabakh War because of deep political divisions within the Azerbaijani elite, that were aggravated by
perceptions of a weakened, chastened national consciousness, felt both
among the elite and of the general citizenry in the country (Goltz, 1998).
However, the Karabakh confict profoundly shaped the Azerbaijani
state formation and this state, in turn, engaged the Second Karabakh
War. The ongoing occupation and the conditions of more than 1 million
displaced Azerbaijanis accentuated a collective sense of shame and
humiliation among the population. This sentiment and the accompanying soul-searching process defned the organic center of nation and
state-building in Azerbaijan. It was Karabakh which propelled the
national consciousness, and Azerbaijani nationalism has been imbued
by the Karabakh confict as it set the stage for the Second Karabakh

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War. In the course of the confict and continued occupation, the state
and nation were redefned and ultimately merged into a single entity.
The defeat in the First Karabakh War solely accelerated the Azerbaijani
process of state- and nation-building. The victory over Armenia and the
liberation of territories have enhanced the legitimacy of the Azerbaijani
state and rehabilitated the prestige of its military institution, along with
the presidency of Ilham Aliyev, who prepared the army and mobilized
the nation to liberate its lands and restore Azerbaijani dignity.
Finally, the Karabakh War suggests that frozen conficts are likely to
be reactivated with little advance notice or preparation. International
institutions should address genuine concerns rather than focus on the
status quo. As a result of the failure of the negotiations mediated by the
OSCE’s Minsk Group beginning in the mid-1990s, the Azerbaijani public had become disillusioned and gradually consolidated their resolve to
make amends on the defeat they suffered during the frst war.

Conclusion
The war did not resolve the confict but the dimensions of it have been
transformed. The Second Karabakh War ended for the time being the sense
of national humiliation among Azerbaijanis but it also did not bring the
confict to an end with a sustainable peace. The 44-day war shifted the confict from an Azerbaijani vs. Armenian one to an Azerbaijani vs Russian
confict. This could produce a fresh round of complicated consequences
for Azerbaijan, especially as the shift also took on a wider regional dimension with Turkey’s gradually expanding presence in the region’s geopolitical
affairs.
Azerbaijan freed the formerly occupied seven districts and 30% of the
Karabakh region. The Republic of Armenia, a Russian ally, was defeated
resoundingly. Moreover, the war exposed just how outdated Russian military technology is. As a new military actor, Turkey entered the equation in
the South Caucasus as an Azerbaijan ally and key supporter of the Georgian
republic. Although the war will not heal or ameliorate the deep geopolitical
wounds in this region, it did restore a modicum of justice for the Azerbaijani
public, which had been persecuted, ethnically cleansed, and humiliated by
previous events surrounding this confict. The wounds will not heal, given
that a majority of the Armenian population left the war zone despite calls
from local Armenian authorities in Khankendi (Stepanakert) to remain.
Those Armenians who departed from the region, because they could not
tolerate living under Azerbaijani sovereignty, left behind serious damage
and environmental destruction. International and Armenian news outlets
have reported variously that Armenians burned their homes, gardens, and
nearby forest areas surrounding Kelbajar and other regions before the territories were to be handed over to Azerbaijan. These scorched earth measures

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defying the option to live side by side with the “Turks” (a pejorative term
chosen deliberately by Armenians) elude rational analysis and undermine
any hope of coexistence.
Ankara should also realize that Armenia’s political culture emanates from
ancient stories and myths as well as modern conspiracy theories about Turkey and the Turks. It will take several generations to overcome and neutralize the ingrained homegrown, Russian supported brand of Turkophobia that
is evident in Armenia. Furthermore, the country will continue to rely on
Russia to realize its aspirations. Turkey is not in the position to reverse this
dominant mentality so it must work with Russia in order to cope with Armenia on the diplomatic front. Does Armenia want to remain a garrison state
of Russia or become a truly independent state capable of cultivating good relations with its neighbors, including Turkey? If Turkey seeks to facilitate the
domestic debate within Armenia on the matter of that country’s choosing a
strategic alliance with Russia predicated upon Armenian hatred of Turks,
Turkey could take unilateral steps to help “cure” Armenia’s fears regarding Turkey. But, one must also realize that Armenia not only constitutes the
Republic of Armenia but also counts on the support and infuence of the
regional and global Armenian diaspora, which has been fed anti-Turkish
sentiments predominantly by the Dashnak Party. In the end, Turkey may or
may not be able to overcome anti-Turkish sentiments, given how historically
entrenched they have been. Ankara should probably treat Armenia as a state
in the midst of transition and leave it to Armenian communities to carry out
the debate about Russia and Turkey on their own grounds.
As far as Azerbaijan is concerned, Ankara must remain fully committed
to sustaining its policy support for Azerbaijani territorial integrity. Therefore, Ankara should continue to develop its Caucasus policies in terms of
roads, energy pipelines, and free-economic zones in close cooperation with
Azerbaijan as well as with the Republic of Georgia.
The main obstacle to achieving coexistence persists, as past events always have been portrayed to exclude consideration of the other side. Despite
these actions, however, there is hope for regional cooperation among the
three South Caucasian states (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) if they
set aside nationalist rhetoric to recognize that regional integration mutually
would improve the economic and social conditions for their citizens. The
fnal peace treaty for Karabakh should address the genuine concerns of all
parties and recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. It should also
provide political-cultural space for Armenians to carry out their own local
governance. If no party is satisfed with the terms in a fnal deal, the risk of
resentment sparking a new round of confict will increase. Armenians and
Azerbaijanis should commit to developing a shared language to acknowledge each other’s fears constructively and provide the essential space for
their respective desires to be realized within the scope of international law.

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Notes
1 More on the last population census, see http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/rnkarabax.html.
2 Armenia’s Declaration of Independence, which was published in 1991, rejected
the 1921 Treaty of Moscow and the Treaty of Kars between the Soviet Union and
Turkey by claiming that it surrendered Armenian territories to Turkey. Thus, the
Declaration rejects the boundaries between Turkey and Armenia, and it contained a clause on the task of the Armenian state to work toward the recognition
of the Armenian genocide.
3 More on Hai Dat, see https://jamestown.org/program/irredentism-entersarmenias-foreign-policy/
4 For more on the Minsk Group negotiations, see Esmira Jafarova, “Evaluating
the OSCE Minsk Group’s Mediation of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Confict.”
2020, Center for Analysis of International Relations (Vienna), https://www.
institutfuersicherheit.at/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/ISP-Working-PaperEsmira-JAFAROVA-Evaluating-the-OSCE-Minsk-Group%E2%80%99smediation-of-the-Armenia%E2%80%93Azerbaijan-confict.pdf
5 Haqqin.az, “Secret Talks between the Envoys of Nikol Pashinyan and Ilham
Aliyev” (September 24, 2020), https://haqqin.az/news/190193.
6 Eurasianet, “Pashinyan Calls for Unifcation between Armenia and Karabakh.” August 6, 2020, https://eurasianet.org/pashinyan-calls-for-unifcationbetween-armenia-and-karabakh.
7 “Farid Shafyev Comments on Armenia’s Refusal from Madrid Principles.” September 4, 2020, Azərbaycan24, https://www.azerbaycan24.com/en/
farid-shafyev-comments-on-armenia-s-refusal-from-madridprinciples/
8 Gerard Libaridian, a leading scholar on Armenian foreign policy and former
adviser to President Ter Petrosiyan, criticized Pashinyan’s remarks. He called
these statements equivalent to a declaration of a diplomatic war, See Gerard
Labaridian, “Step, This Time a Big Step Back.” Aravot, September 2, 2020
https://www.aravot-ru.am/2020/09/02/335325/.
9 The Treaty of Alexandrapol (Gümrü in Turkish; 3 December 1920) between
Turkey and Armenia annulled the Treaty of Sevres. Moreover, the Treaty of
Kars (October 1921) between Turkey and the Armenian Soviet Government also
annulled the terms of the Sevres Treaty.
10 Panorama, “Pashinyan: Treaty of Sevres Continues to be a Historical Fact.”
August 8, 2020, https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2020/08/10/PashinyanTreaty-of-Sevres/2341518.
11 Asbarez.com, “‘New Territories in the Event of New War,’ Says Defense
Minister.” April 1, 2019, http://asbarez.com/178701/new-territories-in-theevent-of-new-war-says-defense-minister/.
12 Jamestown Foundation, “Armenia-Azerbaijan Confict Escalates with
Intense Border Confrontation.” July 14, 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/
armenia-azerbaijan-confict-escalates-with-intense-border-confrontation/.
13 Interview with a high-ranking Turkish government offcial, November 19, 2020.
14 See Ozal’s statement, Milliyet, February 16, 1990.
15 Shahin Abbasov, “Azerbaijan: Reaction in Baku Muted to Moscow Declaration on Nagorno-Karabakh.” eurasianet.org, (2008); http://www.eurasianet.org/
departments/insight/articles/eav110308.shtml.
16 Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 12.10.2009, http://mfa.gov.az/eng/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=580.

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17 “Azerbaijan Threatens Turkey over Armenia Agreement”, Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty, 21.10.2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/Azerbaijan_Threatens_
Turkey_Over_Armenia_Agreement/1857198.html.
18 More on the decision of the Armenian Constitutional Court, see, http://www.
concourt.am/english/decisions/common/pdf/850.pdf
19 Hurriyet, January 18, 2010.
20 Some scholars suggest that especially in the last decade, Erdoğan has returned
to the nationalist discourse of his former political party (National Salvation
Party [MSP]) which is the representative of the ideology of Milli Görüş (National
Outlook) where Islamism is articulated with nationalism to a great extent.
21 It was Abulfaz Elchibey who coined the motto, “one nation, two states” to
describe the deep emotional connection between Turkey and Azerbaijan. See
Elchibey’s statement https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=owzJop9MzqE
For more on the relations between the two states, see Murad Ismayilov and Norman A. Graham (2016).
22 A monument constructed by Italian sculptor Pietro Canonica and opened in
1928 in Taksim Square, Istanbul recognizes this fact. The monument was built
to commemorate the formation of the Turkish Republic. The monument has
two sides. One side incorporates military and civilian aspects of Ataturk. The
other side honors two Russian generals (Mikhail Vasilyevic Frunze and Marshal Kliment Yefremovic Vorosilove) in recognition of the Russian military and
fnancial aid to the Turkish War of Independence.
23 France24, “‘Turkey Has a Clear Objective of Reinstating the Turkish Empire’,
Armenian PM Says.” October 2, 2020, https://www.france24.com/en/20201002turkey-has-a-clear-objective-of-reinstating-the-turkish-empire-armenian-pmsays.
24 For more on the relations between Iran and Armenia, see Maziar Motemedi,
“Iran’s Delicate Balancing Act in the Nagorno-Karabakh Confict.” Aljazeera,
October 5, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/5/iran-nk
25 Jamestown Foundation, “Armenian-Azerbaijani Confict: Clash of Civilizations?”
October 13, 2020, https://jamestown.org/program/armenian-azerbaijani-confict
-clash-of-civilizations/.
26 Ben Judah, “Armenian President Wants NATO to Explain Turkey’s Involvement
in Nagorno-Karabakh.” October 17, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/armenia-president-armen-sarkissian-nato-turkey-involvement-nagorno
-karabakh/
27 The Truce Agreement of November 9, 2020 represents more than an end to the
confict, as it provides a framework for negotiating future treaties.
28 For more information, see https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-confict/reducing-human-cost-new-nagorno-karabakhwar.

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13 Georgia and the Second
Karabakh War
Emil Avdaliani

The Second Karabakh War of 2020 brought about tectonic changes to the
geopolitical landscape of the post-1994 South Caucasus – the year when the
frst Karabakh War ended. Connectivity patterns stopped to operate as they
used to in Soviet times and both warring sides, Armenia and Azerbaijan,
began contemplating strategies on how to either keep or reverse the established status quo.
The 2020 war tested not only the resilience of Armenia and Azerbaijan,
but more so the geopolitical positions of the neighboring states. In comparison with the First Karabakh War and numerous subsequent escalations
since, the intensity of the 2020 confict as well as involvement of regional
actors, primarily Turkey and later on Russia, defed all expectation, inextricably linking outside powers to the developments on the ground. Turkey
notably increased its diplomatic and military support for Azerbaijan
becoming Azerbaijan’s source of victory.1 Iran’s at times preferential ties
with Armenia, which over decades caused concerns in Baku, were also
tested, resulting in signifcant geopolitical changes along Iran’s northern
border and Tehran’s shift in rhetoric.2 Russia, which traditionally aspired
to strike a balance between the two sides, also found itself in a troubled
position where it was no longer able to maintain the status quo because
of Azerbaijan’s military superiority over Armenia and the latter’s unwillingness to make changes to its policy of refusing concessions unless they
are ties to the advancement of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status and its eventual
independence from Azerbaijan.
An interesting case study, however, was the neighboring Georgia, which
perhaps was the most vulnerable to the effects of the Armenia-Azerbaijan
clashes.3 The reasons for this range from a purely geographic context
to potentially combustible Armenia-Azerbaijani ethnic rivalry within
Georgian borders. The Armenian and Azeri minority communities are the
largest in the country and although there are cases of coexistence and even
cohabitation in several villages, towns and cities,4 most communities remain
largely separate largely concentrated in the Javakheti and Kvemo Kartli
regions of Georgia. This separation is a cause for concern as it feeds rivalry
and even open antagonism between the two communities, which potentially
DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-18
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could lead to a large-scale ethnic confagration. Moreover, Georgia also
serves as geographically the shortest way for Armenia and Azerbaijan to
receive armaments from abroad (primarily Russia and Turkey). This reality
has placed offcial Tbilisi in an uncomfortable position since the break-up
of the Soviet Union.
Tbilisi’s “loyalties” were regularly tested and criticized at times by both
Armenia and Azerbaijan. For instance, in July 2020, right after the battles
in Azerbaijan’s Tovuz region, the Azerbaijani media accused Georgia of
letting shipments of weapons sent to Armenia from Serbia transit through
Georgia. According to the allegations, those were rocket launchers and
trucks, which were reportedly used by Armenia in Tovuz.5 Though later
on September 19, Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev dropped the claims
in an interview announcing that “Georgia acted like a very reliable partner” by “not allowing the transportation of weapons to Armenia through
its territory”,6 Georgia’s uncomfortable position in the context of the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict was once again underlined.
Armenia on the contrary was unhappy, though not protesting it offcially, about long routes the shipment of weapons from Russia through Iran
usually took. Though the reason is Georgia’s decision to close air-traffc to
Russian military planes because of complicated Georgian-Russian relations
since 2008, it nevertheless caused occasional frictions in Armenia-Georgia
ties. Therefore, when in autumn 2020 the war in Karabakh erupted this
geographic dilemma underlined Georgia’s geopolitical vulnerabilities:
increased chances of undermining bilateral relations with either Armenia
and Azerbaijan or both simultaneously.
Both Yerevan and Baku continued to keep a close watch on Tbilisi for
perceived favoritism. To forestall any allegations, on October 3 Georgia’s
National Security Council issued a statement that the country temporarily suspended the transport of military cargo to both countries through
Georgian land and air space.7 No restrictions were imposed on civil or
humanitarian freight.
However, though the offcial Yerevan abstained from making allegations,
ordinary Armenians cast doubt on Tbilisi’s position of neutrality. Data
drawn from fightradar24 indicated that Azerbaijan’s planes frequently fy
through Georgian airspace to and from Israel and Turkey.8 Additionally,
Russia’s military intelligence agency GRU disseminated information alleging that Georgia allowed Turkish weapons to be provided to Azerbaijan
through its airspace despite Tbilisi’s clear policy of banning such transits to
either side.9 Though no evidence suggested that the planes were transporting arms to Azerbaijan, this fed into the overall perception held by many
in Armenia that Georgia had always been secretly supporting Azerbaijan’s
efforts to restore its territorial integrity.
There was also an issue of Russia seeking a transit through the Georgian
territory to reach Armenia. This could have taken place through the provisions of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) protocols which

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aim at securing the borders of member states, one of which is Armenia. In
case the fghting spilled over onto Armenian soil, Moscow would have every
legal ground to request a direct land/air corridor. Since Azerbaijan would
have been against letting Russian troops through its territory, while transit
through Iran would take much longer time (provided Tehran agreed to such
a scenario) seeking a corridor through Georgia seemed a real possibility.
Such a scenario may have had devastating consequences for Tbilisi fraught
with numerous geopolitical dangers as the shortest supply route to Armenia
would most likely go through Georgia’s Russia-controlled region of South
Ossetia. Then the route would either go through Tbilisi or, alternatively,
through Samtskhe-Javakheti, the region potentially prone to instability.
The sighting of Russian troops in the region – where in the 1990s the mostly
Armenian population was often accused of silently seeking independence
from Tbilisi,10 possibly with Russian help – would have evoked historic
grievances and traumas in Tbilisi. If Tbilisi offcially granted Russian transit, it would have also caused widespread protests across the country, which
the ruling government mostly likely would have been unable to survive.

Altered Geopolitical Balance of Power
Georgia, a long-aspiring NATO and EU candidate, has often portrayed itself
as the bastion of Western infuence in the region. But the Second Karabakh
War revealed the lack of the regional security architecture when neither
the collective West nor the OSCE’s Minsk Group (with Russia, France and
the US as co-chairs) offered any viable solution to the confict. This, much
to Tbilisi’s chagrin, indicated the worsening geopolitical situation around
Georgia when the West was increasingly distancing itself from the region.
Though in the initial stage of the confict Russia remained passive, it
eventually re-asserted itself. What remained as a fxture was the sidelining
of the collective West. For instance, Russia’s and Turkey’s plans to (re-)open
trade routes which would increase the regional connectivity, potentially further sidelined the collective West. This concerned not only the actual infrastructure projects. The collective West’s limited presence is also seen in the
way the Western peacemaking standards and confict resolution methods
are being trumped by Russian alternatives. The sidelining of the West also
concerns actual long-term political visions for the South Caucasus. Russia’s
vision is versatile: a mixture of economic measures to keep Armenia and
Azerbaijan closer, partly through military moves such as physical presence
on Armenian and Azerbaijani soil, and partly through fostering one-to-one
bilateral ties.
Turkey’s vision is similar along with its pursuit of regional infrastructure
development. Moreover, at the political level the suggestion on creating a
six-nation pact involving the South Caucasus states plus Russia, Turkey and
Iran, could be seen as yet another example of growing Western political
regress from the region.

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The war also changed Georgia’s perception of the South Caucasus.
If previously the region increasingly was being attached to the West, the
West’s distancing and the action of the regional powers now signals a different development. Though since the end of the Soviet Union the South
Caucasus has held a strategically important position in the calculus of
regional powers, it has not been high on the agenda of regional powers’ foreign policy. From serving as a periphery to greater geopolitical games, the
Second Karabakh War results ushered in a major tectonic change: the Caspian basin and the South Caucasus have become inextricably linked to the
Middle East. Russia and Turkey, which have increased their footprint in the
Middle East over the past decade, and now look at the South Caucasus as
a part of a great geopolitical game from the Mediterranean to the Caspian
region. Ankara and Moscow now make their strategic moves in the South
Caucasus within the context of the developments in the Middle East. This
portends more challenges to Georgia as the South Caucasus could be subject to geopolitical trade-offs. It also means that the space has been elevated
in status; it now occupies a near primary geopolitical theater for Turkey,
Russia and the West.
What concretely disturbs political minds in Tbilisi is that after the war,
Russia increased its military presence in the region by adding nearly 2,000
peacekeepers in Karabakh – effectively establishing a new military outpost.
Moscow now enjoys an unchallengeable position in the region with its military bases in Armenia and in Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.
This allows Russia to establish control over the South Caucasus corridor,
which includes critical pipeline and railroad infrastructure spanning from
the Caspian to the Black Sea via Georgian territory. For Tbilisi this means
that Russian troops are now essentially closing in on Georgia from all sides
and could easily disrupt regional connectivity, the backbone of Georgia’s
geopolitical importance to both China and the collective West.
Georgia's political elites view the Russian peacekeeping force in Karabakh
with much suspicion because of the country's own experience of hosting
Russian troops in the early 1990s. One of the conclusions is that Russian
peacekeeping forces are a good tool for solidifying Moscow's geopolitical
positions in the neighborhood. Considering the unwillingness to withdraw from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, for Tbilisi the Russian presence in
Karabakh is more of a long-term than short-term perspective.
Tbilisi also understands that Russia will likely play a long game where in
order to persuade Azerbaijan to allow the Russian peacekeeping mission to
remain on its soil beyond the end of 2025, it will use various tools such as
incidents on the contact line in Karabakh, and revanchist calls from whatever government in Armenia there will be at that time. If this fails, a more
concrete plan could be extensive supplies of military hardware to Armenia
which will be used to build a battle-ready military capable of offensive
operations, a useful tool for the Kremlin to secure its continued presence
in the confict zone. Context always differs, but much similar developments

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were taking place in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the 1990s and early
2000s. Instability provided Russia with perfect opportunities to interfere
and play a subtle game by increasing distrust between Tbilisi on the one
hand and Sokhumi and Tskhinvali on the other.
Overall, Russia’s policies toward Georgia’s two regions represented a
building bloc in Russia’s emerging grand strategy since the early 1990s –
namely the use of confict zones across the post-Soviet space for keeping
Moldova, Ukraine, and the South Caucasus away from NATO and the EU
often through the deliberate stoking of separatist conficts. This policy has
been successful so far, as the EU and NATO have refrained from extending
membership to Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.11 In the Karabakh case,
the West is largely absent, but Turkish infuence has been on the rise, so
Russia had to step in to keep Ankara at bay, and not let Baku gain control
over its entire territory as it would free Azerbaijan from the existent geopolitical shackles. Seen from this perspective, the Russian move to place its
peacekeepers in Karabakh fts into the overall strategy of keeping its neighborhood from third countries. So far, all signs indicate the Russian troops
in Karabakh are likely to seek a near-permanent position.
Another important post-Karabakh War development for Georgia has
been the issue of re-opening the Soviet-era railways. The restoration of the
old routes follows Soviet patterns. For instance, there were two corridors
from Azerbaijan to Armenia and both guaranteed the connection to Turkey
via the Nakhchivan exclave. One route was from Ijevan, a town and urban
municipal community in Armenia, and Yerevan, and the second southern one through Zangilan. The two corridors were fully operational in the
Soviet period, but were completely closed since the early 1990s, as a result of
the Karabakh confict. The closing of these routes constrained Russia’s and
Turkey’s ability to penetrate the South Caucasus.
Various economic and military conditions apply as to which side prefers
the opening of one of the corridors. Armenia is more willing to open up the
northern route, while Azerbaijan would support the southern alternative.
From Baku’s perspective, the latter corridor would go through the newly
claimed territories, as a result of the Second Karabakh War, and a narrow
swath of Armenian land which would make it easier to control security-wise.
For Yerevan the restoration of the northern railway section would be
more proftable as most of the route is in a working condition. The line runs
from Yeraskh, a village in Armenia’s Ararat province, into Nakhchivan and
then enters into southern Armenia to Azerbaijan proper and heads north
into Russia.
Over the past three decades, Georgia served as a major lifeline for Armenia
as it connected the country to Russia. Trains from Armenia head only north
to Tbilisi, and trade with Russia is made via the Georgian Military Highway.
But the road is largely unreliable often closed due to natural cataclysms such
as snow and landslides. Though Armenian leadership has been searching
for additional routes to the Georgian one, for the moment Yerevan seems

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to be more interested in the railway openings rather than road routes. After
all, an alternative to the Georgian road route would be the one through
Azerbaijan or some 900 km more, which would be less proftable economically for Armenian and Russian businesses.
In Georgia’s case the potential gains are not as clear cut. The country
benefts from being the only connection route between Armenia and Russia.
Alternatives could naturally bite at transit revenues. To hold the initiative Georgia might play the Abkhazia Railway card. Long-supported by
Armenia and Russia, the opening of this Soviet-era connection would have
to go through Georgia’s Moscow-controlled Abkhazia. This raises numerous questions as to which stamps – Georgian or Abkhazian – would have to
be on offcial documentation. Georgia always wanted this issue to be linked
to the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian territory, and to the
return of the displaced ethnic Georgian population of Abkhazia, who constituted a majority of the pre-confict Abkhazian population. Furthermore,
economic benefts from the project are far from clear as gains of using the
railway for Armenia-Russia trade might not suffce to cover the restoration
and operation of the route. Still, the Russians have been consistent in their
efforts to bring the connection back to life. Various reports from previous
years hinted at parts of the Abkhaz section being cleared and near-ready for
operation.
If previously the opening of the Abkhaz section would bring about
deterioration of Georgia’s relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey because
of probable Russian military supplies to Gyumri today following the
Karabakh War, Tbilisi is unencumbered. In the new geopolitical context,
when Azerbaijan itself plans to allow Russian transit to Armenia, this may
become a less sensitive issue for Azerbaijan. This context serves as a potential for the Abkhaz railway re-opening. The connection will be important to
Armenia, serving as an alternative for securing the link to Russia through a
friendly Georgia as opposed to the planned railway line which would go via
Azerbaijan – always a precarious route considering the unresolved issue of
the Karabakh confict.
Still, Georgian pre-conditions for opening the railway laid out above are
unlikely to change signifcantly. There is also a potential blowback from the
Georgian opposition forces. The issue is politically charged, which could galvanize large sections of the population to stage street protests. In a time when
the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party experiences public discontent inside
the country, engaging the talks on the Abkhaz railway re-opening could be
especially damaging. There is also a wider issue at stake: Georgia’s ally the US
will be strongly against the re-establishment of the railway through Abkhazia
as it would re-connect Russia with Iran, Washington’s geopolitical nemesis.
Furthermore, how far the Russians would like to go in pushing for the restoration of the Abkhaz railway is also unknown. Economically its benefts
are questionable. Moscow is also afraid that the operation of the link would
boost economic ties between Sokhumi and Tbilisi and could potentially

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lead to some sorts of rapprochement. Any such scenarios would bite at Russia’s geopolitical standing.
Another potentially signifcant development following the November
2020 tripartite agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia is the
emerging Nakhchivan corridor.12 Turkey is set to gain a land corridor from
Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan to the rest of Azerbaijan via Armenia.
The stipulation in the document reads: “Armenia guarantees the security
of transport links … [for] unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles, and
cargo in both directions”. Moreover, “Transport control is exercised by the
Border Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia. By agreement of
the parties, the construction of new transport communications connecting
the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and Azerbaijan's western regions
will be provided”.13
This would allow Turkey to anchor its infuence in Azerbaijan, on the
Caspian seashore and perhaps, in the longer term, look even further toward
the wider Central Asian region. Ankara had this vision since the establishment of the Turkish republic following World War I, when measures were
taken to obtain a direct land corridor to Nakhchivan. A special relationship
was cultivated with Iran in the 1930s to guarantee the security of Turkish
interests in Nakhchivan.
As said, Ankara has been long looking at using the Nakhchivan corridor
for geopolitical purposes. In 2020 the Turkish government announced the
plans to build a railway14 to Nakhchivan following the earlier announcement of a gas pipeline15 construction to the exclave. Usually this higher level
of connectivity would be a boon for other landlocked regions. But in the
South Caucasus it could also be a cause of geopolitical separation and even
isolation as lager states pursue their respective geopolitical agenda for connectivity. For decades, Armenia was cut from regional pipelines, roads and
a major railway connecting the Caspian and Black Sea and Turkey.
As the stipulation on the Nakhchivan corridor was announced, many
began wondering whether Georgia’s transit capabilities would be challenged. In the short and medium major reshuffing in the region’s connectivity patterns it is hard to fathom as Baku and Ankara already have the
well-functioning railway and pipeline infrastructure, which runs through
Georgia. This is also buttressed by Georgia being engaged in the offcial
trilateral partnership with Turkey and Azerbaijan since its inaugural meeting in 2012. The endurance of the format has been proved by changes of governments and region-wide geopolitical transformations over the last decade
and despite Russian military pressure the Georgian transit proved effective.
To become operational major unresolved issues around the Nakhchivan
corridor should frst be addressed: will the road be open only to Turks and
Azerbaijanis? It is for the moment unlikely that Azerbaijan and Turkey will
be willing to commit large fnancial resources to rebuild links through the
Armenian territory. Moreover, will control over the route through the Armenian territory fall under the tripartite administrative regime or solely

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under Russian surveillance? One could also imagine constant incidents
along the corridor as Armenia will remain unhappy with the stipulation,
even though transit fees could soften Yerevan’s position. There is also a
wider geopolitical question of why should Russia be interested in the operation of the Nakhchivan corridor? Restoration of Soviet-era links discussed
above ft neatly into the Russian attempts of further integrating the South
Caucasus into its connectivity patterns, namely the north-south vector of
railroads and pipelines.
The decrease in the use of the Georgian transit would also have a negative
economic impact on the country as around 5% of its GDP emanates from
transit-related income. To this is directly related the infow of foreign direct
investments (FDI) into the country16 as the largest FDIs into Georgia were
generally linked to the trans-regional infrastructure projects. Even a partial
loss of transit potential would negate Georgia the infow possibility.
A modest forecast on the effectiveness of the Nakhchivan corridor would
be that the link will be operating frst perhaps only for local connections –
limited trade from Azerbaijan proper with the exclave to avoid using the
Iran connection. The emergence of a major corridor through Nakhchivan
is likely to happen if at least a meaningful improvement of Turkey-Armenia
relations takes place. Even in case of the corridor becoming fully operational with the Chinese transit passing through it, as the Turkish politicians
argued, both Georgian and Nakhchivan routes might not be in fact openly
rival routes. In fact, an opposite scenario might develop where the two
routes could be complementary in nature.
The prospects of new transit routes denting at Georgia’s transit capabilities
could also serve as a good motivator for successive Georgian governments
to develop the country’s transit potential. This could include improvement
and enlargement of the east-west highway, which connects effectively the
Caspian basin with the Black Sea and Turkey. Not least important could
be the expansion of existing and construction of new ports on Georgia’s
Black seashore. Enlargement of the Batumi and Poti ports has already been
announced. The stalled construction of the Anaklia deep sea port could see
another possibility for construction17 within the context of quickly evolving
connectivity patterns in the South Caucasus and Tbilisi’s determination to
remain at the center of transit routes.
Yet another dimension of importance for Georgia’s evolving geopolitical position has been numerous calls by the Turkish side for the six-party
union between the three South Caucasus countries plus Iran, Russia, and
Turkey itself. Presented by the Turkish side, it follows earlier similar initiatives such as the Pact for Stability and Cooperation in the South Caucasus
in the 1990s. Similar initiatives usually gain support from Russia, Turkey
and Iran. All three feel pressured by the collective West, which make them
opt for measures which would limit or even undermine Western infuence
in the South Caucasus. Georgia thus fnds itself at odds with the regional
initiatives mainly because of its Western aspirations, but also because of

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Russian pressure. It would be hard to fathom that Tbilisi cooperates with
a state which has troops deployed on its soil and has two embassies, one in
Sokhumi, another in Tskhinvali. Moreover, it is unlikely that Russia would
allow restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia by withdrawing its
troops from Georgia. Thence comes the suspicion with which Tbilisi usually
looks at these ideas.18
The Second Karabakh War results have also brought about discussions
in Georgia at both analytical and government levels on the need to address
the country's defciencies in the military sphere. The air defense system has
been the weakest spot in Georgia's defense. The 2008 war with Russia highlighted the holes in this area when Russia with its obvious aerial superiority
easily targeted and destroyed Georgia's defense capabilities. This lack of air
defense was the single most important defciency which led to the defeat of
2008.
The Second Karabakh War highlighted the need to address the issue
in a timely manner. Even before the confict broke out, in September 2020
Georgia signed an agreement with representatives from the defense concern
Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, which belonged to the Israeli Ministry
of Defense.19 Successful use of drones by Azerbaijan showed the need to
buy and perhaps in the longer term even develop domestic production of
similar capabilities. What was also uncomfortable for Tbilisi was that the
major supplier of combat drones to Azerbaijan was Georgia’s other neighbor, Turkey. This underlined Tbilisi's insecurities because in case of a military confict the country is surrounded by militarily and technologically far
superior armies.
As argued above, the growth of Russian power along Georgia’s borders
is of grave concern for Tbilisi. But in the longer term the robust Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance could be also an irritant as the war changed the
very fabric of Georgia’s geopolitical position vis-à-vis Ankara and Baku.
Previously Tbilisi enjoyed the benefts of Armenia's seclusion and Baku and
Ankara needed Tbilisi. In the aftermath of the 2020 war, however, much has
changed. Georgia from now on is unlikely to serve as the only transit for
Azerbaijan and Turkey, which potentially is fraught with relative diminution of Georgia's bargaining clout.
Despite Tbilisi’s institutional connections to Turkey and Azerbaijan,
there is greater civilizational affnity for Armenia, whose own historical
narrative would appear to mirror Georgia’s in certain ways. Both are culturally distinctive, ancient Christian nations, which for millennia fought off
invaders and worked on keeping its religious uniqueness. And yet Baku's
victory is nevertheless seen as a somewhat positive geopolitical development
in Georgia. Long constrained by its own separatist conficts in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, Tbilisi has been actively crusading against separatism
in the region.
Baku's victory is regarded by many as a vindication of the concept of state
sovereignty in the region prone to bloody territorial conficts. For Tbilisi,

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Nagorno-Karabakh also was an irritant because of an informal axis which
was being entertained between the separatist regions of Abkhazia, South
Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Contacts were timid, but they caused tensions in Tbilisi which often appealed to Yerevan to forestall the contacts.
Though it is unlikely that Tbilisi would be considering a military solution to
its territorial questions, Baku's victory nevertheless underlined the need to
pay larger attention to the development of the national army. It also showed
that territorial conficts could be resolved through the military

Internal Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh
Beyond Georgia’s geographic dilemma, decline of the West’s infuence and the
South Caucasus’ overall elevation in geopolitical signifcance, another aspect
of grave concern for Tbilisi was the large Armenian and Azerbaijani communities living in Georgia. Though both ethnic groups have lived comfortably
together, the Second Karabakh War heightened tensions inside the country. A
small protest or demonstration by either of the ethnic group could have turned
into inter-communal fghting. For instance, on October 1,300 protesters from
the ethnic Armenian community held a rally outside Georgia’s pro-opposition Mtavari Arkhi TV offce, protesting against the channel’s presumably
“pro-Azerbaijani” coverage of the ongoing Azerbaijani-Armenian clashes.20
In another instance of potential spillover in the mostly Armenianpopulated southern region of Georgia, Samtskhe-Javakheti, the locals began
assembling goods and even enlisting to go fght in Karabakh, while others
even managed to temporarily block Georgia’s border with Turkey. This
caused fears and concerns among Georgian politicians and the society at
large. Meanwhile, Georgian politicians of Armenian and Azerbaijani background in some cases openly voiced their support for either of the warring
parties of the Nagorno-Karabakh confict. For instance, Ruslan Gadjiev,
an MP in the Georgian Parliament from the ruling party Georgian Dream
(GD), voiced his support for the Azerbaijani government in the ongoing military confrontation. A candidate of Armenian background from the UNM,
Melik Raisyan, said that
The entire Armenian people, including us, the Javakh people, will stand
up for the freedom and rights of Armenia and Artsakh, as before, both
at the moment and in the future. In Armenia and Artsakh, they must be
sure that we are ready to help not only with words and materials, but if
there is a need to pick up arms and fght against human-hating tribes.21
Enzel Mkoyan, an ethnic Armenian MP who at the time was running independently for the 2020 parliamentary elections from the
Ninotsminda-Akhalkalaki constituency, toned down the sentiments by
responding to the desire of ethnic Armenian youth living in Javakheti to
volunteer in Nagorno-Karabakh, urging them: “Do not take certain steps

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and do not interfere with the Armenian army in carrying out its sacred
mission”.22
Those statements nevertheless emboldened ethnic Armenians and
Azerbaijanis to get actively involved either through military volunteering
or fnancing. Azer Suleymanov, an MP from UNM, in his Facebook post
also indirectly called on the Azerbaijani population living in Georgia to get
involved in the confict:
You can be sure that our compatriots in Georgia, as they voluntarily
participated in the Karabakh and Abkhazia wars in the 1990s, are now
ready for any challenge to the territorial integrity of our National State,
Azerbaijan, and our Great Motherland, Georgia.23
Dispatching products to those in need in the confict zone was one of the
activities. For instance, the Armenian population in Akhalkalaki and
Ninotsminda began collecting tires, food and medicine in order to help
Armenian soldiers, though, some media reports indicated that the Georgian
border guards refused to allow the trucks to pass, an allegation later refuted
by the Armenian embassy in Georgia.24 The channel TV9 reported that
approximately 1,000 protesters demanded that the Ninotsminda-Bavra crossing point between Georgia and Armenia be fully operational for the humanitarian aid to be sent to Armenia. TV9 also reported that in Ninotsminda
and Akhalkalaki, youth registration for volunteering in the war has started in
support of Armenia.25
On 29 September, the central road connecting Georgia with Turkey was
blocked by the local population.26 A primary motivator was that Georgia
did not allow them to help Armenian soldiers and victims while the road for
Azerbaijan was open. Samkhretis Karibche, a media resource from southern Georgia, quoted one of the demonstrators: “We read on Facebook that
Georgia opened the road for Azerbaijan easily while we hardly managed to
send food yesterday. We want to know why Georgia does not allow us to help
Armenian soldiers”.27 AliQ Media and the Akhalkalaki-based TV channel
ATV 12 reported similar reasons for the road blockage.28 These sentiments
penetrated the Armenian public in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. On
30 September, the Armenian politician and head of the Republican Party
of Nagorno-Karabakh, Karen Ohanjanyan, argued that Georgia passes
military goods from Turkey to Azerbaijan and stated that Javakheti should
declare independence from Georgia.
The heightened nationalistic sentiments even posed a direct threat to the
trans-regional infrastructure. On September 29, 2020, fber-optic cables
of underground telecommunication of international importance that provided Armenia with the internet were damaged.29 Ethnic Azerbaijani youth
and students living in Georgia rallied in support of Azerbaijan in central
Tbilisi, near the monument to Heydar Aliyev with banners “Karabakh is
Azerbaijan”. Some even claimed that they were ready to join the army and

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314 Emil Avdaliani
go to war. Rumors also swirled that Vahagan Chakhalyan, who has been
famous for his separatist activities in the Javakheti region and was even
imprisoned in 2008, could have been among those who joined the Armenian
army.
The war also helped to reinvigorate the nationalist rhetoric among some
overall marginal political parties. The Alliance of Patriots, an openly
pro-Kremlin party which was represented in the Georgian parliament of
2016–2020, exploited the escalation of confict to amplify its anti-Turkish
and anti-Azerbaijani campaign. This effectively meant shifting the focus
from the Russian control of Georgia’s two regions, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, to the existing problems Georgia has with Azerbaijan and Turkey,
both Tbilisi’s strategic partners, by heightening historic grievances that both
countries currently have with parts of historical Georgian lands within their
borders. This shift in rhetoric came amid a sensitive unresolved border issue
Georgia still has with Azerbaijan, namely, the border-stridden orthodox
David Gareja monastery complex. Samvel Petrosyan, the then Majoritarian
candidate of the Alliance of Patriots said that the threat to Georgia is
Azerbaijan “since it is Azerbaijan today that occupied the Georgian territory where the Georgian historical monument David Gareji is located”.30
Exploitation of religious sentiments amid the ongoing Karabakh War was
a tactic to gain political points among nationalistically charged population
groups. The rhetoric spurred a series of comments by politicians, experts, as
well as various articles in newspapers on the need to tackle the problem of
potentially purposefully damaging political rhetoric. Other actors too tried
to use the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan confict and complicate Tbilisi’s
relations with Baku. The “Georgian March”, an ultra-nationalist party, held
a rally near the Azerbaijani border and even handed an ultimatum to the
authorities in Baku to hand back parts of the David Gareja monastery.
Both political parties enjoy meager support among the Georgian public,
but they nevertheless receive large media coverage. The latter was spurred
by the fact that the Georgian authorities launched at that time a full-scale
investigation into an allegedly purposeful hand-over of Georgian territories
to the Azerbaijani side, reportedly in exchange for money. While it is diffcult
to argue whether there was a calculated pro-Russian narrative behind their
anti-Turkish and anti-Azerbaijani rhetoric, it nevertheless could potentially
have harmed Tbilisi’s ties with Ankara and Baku. The geopolitical axis of
Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan serves as a backbone to the South Caucasus
corridor – the very project which circumvents Russia and therefore is targeted by Moscow.
Political reactions from members of the Georgian ruling party, Georgian
Dream, and opposition forces were in line with the country’s geopolitical
interests, the strict observance of neutrality. The then MP Irakli Sesiashvili
from GD, serving also as Parliamentary Defense and Security Committee
Chairman, stated:

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Our Foreign Ministry is constantly in touch with its counterparts…
urging for peace and ceasefre. If the [Armenian and Azerbaijani] sides
wish Georgia to participate in peace talks, we are fully ready, … but
unfortunately today we cannot see the signs of it. The international
community is involved [in the process] and we could also get involved
if needed. We are ready in any direction, [including] humanitarian, to
assist both parties…31
Mixed reactions were caused by the former Georgian president Mikheil
Saakashvili’s statement that de-jure Nagorno-Karabakh was a part of
Azerbaijan: “My position is unequivocal and is based on the principle of
territorial integrity, which implies that Nagorno-Karabakh is a sovereign
territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan…”.32 The statement alienated large
parts of the ethnic Armenian population from Saakashvili and his party,
United National Movement, while ethnic Azerbaijanis seemed jubilant.
The confict also showcased Georgia’s vulnerabilities in the propaganda
realm and defciencies in expertise regarding the confict.33 The latter
included the occasional use of incorrect terms as well as mistranslations. An
example was a mistake by another opposition channel, Formula TV, which
mistranslated the Roman Catholic Pope Francis regarding the status of NK.
Later, following protests on social media, the channel corrected the report.
This led to allegations that since both channels are connected to the UNM
and Saakashvili himself, the moves by the channels could have been orchestrated from above, especially in the light of Saakashvili’s above statement.
Meanwhile, new disinformation appeared in the Azerbaijani media, arguing that in the support of Azerbaijan, Tbilisi TV Tower and Liberty Bridge
were lightened in the colors of the Azerbaijani fag. This was shared by the
different Azerbaijani and Armenian media outlets. In fact, of course, after
the renewal of armed confict in Karabakh, neither the Tbilisi TV Tower
nor the Liberty Bridge was lightened in the colors of Azerbaijani fag. The
last time this happened was on 28 May 2020 when Azerbaijan celebrated the
establishment of the First Democratic Republic.34
The vulnerability of Georgia to malign propaganda was further underlined
when numerous fake accounts with Armenian surnames on Facebook and
other social networks inundated the Georgian internet segment propagating
hatred toward Georgians. Local NGOs helped to dissipate the danger and
the Armenian embassy in Tbilisi even released a special statement regarding
the matter. Allegations were spread of those accounts’ foreign provenance.
Therefore, Tbilisi’s policy toward the confict has been quite straightforward: avoiding being pulled into the Armenia-Azerbaijan clashes and acrimonious diplomatic exchanges and holding direct diplomatic contact with
both Baku and Yerevan with the aim to facilitate the minimization of the
effects of the fghting and its potential threat to Georgia. Thence come rare
efforts by the Georgian government to mediate the confict.

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Opportune Moment for Mediation
Georgia’s longstanding policy on the Karabakh confict has been one that
can best be described as passive neutrality. It has developed good ties with
both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and has abstained from playing an active
political role in settling the confict. For successive Georgian governments
active involvement was fraught with the risk of being dragged into the confict where such heavyweights as Russia and European powers rarely managed to make Yerevan and Baku reach compromises. In other words, for
Tbilisi risks of active positioning far outweighed meager geopolitical benefts this policy could bring.35
Nevertheless, during the Second Karabakh War, Georgia, because of
potential geopolitical threats, saw the need to play a more active diplomatic
game, which could be best described as a shift from a neutral position to
active neutrality. Indeed, as a neighbor to both states Tbilisi aimed to play
a positive role in alleviating the mutual distrust between both Baku and
Yerevan and also to limit geopolitical threats to regional security, namely
transit routes and internal threats emanating from potential communal
infghting between Armenian and Azerbaijani populations. This served
as a background to the September 30 announcement by the then Georgian
Prime Minister, Giorgi Gakharia, regarding the initiative to host potential bilateral Armenia-Azerbaijani talks in Tbilisi, thereby facilitating the
peace process.36 Later, the National Security Council of Georgia released
the statement reiterating the support for peace and stability in the region.37
In fact, Georgia’s willingness to play a mediating role was present in
other cases. For instance, in 2016 during Armenia-Azerbaijan military
escalation, statements by Georgian politicians were made to underline the
country’s unique position to bring both parties to the negotiating table.38
But the timing for presenting the initiative in 2020 was more propitious and
as argued above, there were practical geopolitical reasons to seek an active
diplomatic position. While world leaders were actively calling for a ceasefre
between Baku and Yerevan, no groundbreaking diplomatic activity to stop
the renewed clashes was taking place. Even Russia, traditionally the biggest external player with military and economic tools to force a compromise
on both parties, was noticeably absent from diplomatic activity throughout the frst several weeks. Indeed, if during the 2016 clashes, Moscow had
intervened after the fourth day of fghting, in the autumn of 2020 Russia
abstained from diplomacy beyond simple diplomatic formulas on the need
to stop fghting.
Moreover, other players too were at a disadvantageous position. Turkey
was supporting Azerbaijan, which excluded the possibility of Ankara playing a mediating role because of Yerevan’s active resistance. Iran’s close ties
with Armenia caused concerns in Baku, which from Baku’s perspective,
limited Tehran’s chances for active and, what is more important, rather
neutral diplomacy. Further afeld from the region, Western leaders seemed

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mostly pre-occupied with the internal issues (whether it was the US elections, pandemic-related troubles in the EU, ongoing protests in Belarus,
etc.). China’s involvement was limited to diplomatic statements on the need
to stop to the fghting. There is also a question of how realistic were the
hopes for the collective West and China to be more active in the confict.
Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan were closely linked to Europe or other
global players to expect any major outside involvement.
Thus, there was a certain diplomatic vacuum Georgia sought to fll. One
advantage Georgia possessed over Russia or other regional powers was
that it was closer to being a truly neutral actor interested in de-escalation.
However, to play an active diplomatic role, hard geopolitical power matters.
Georgia’s weight is not as large as is usually necessary for a country to pursue a strong mediating role. Even the experience of larger states proves how
futile at times it was to bring both Armenia and Azerbaijan to the negotiating
table. For instance, Iran was unable to pursue a successful mediation work
between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the 1990s. Even Russia was often unable to strike a balance between the two sides, which often caused criticism
in Baku and Yerevan. In the 2020 war, for instance, the Russian mediating
role publicly failed at least once as did the West’s half-hearted attempts.
Additionally, mutual distrust between Baku and Yerevan was the biggest
obstacle. These realities, quite understandably, limited Tbilisi’s chances for
a successful mediation.
Thus, what Georgia sought was not a grandiose ambition of replacing
Russia or other major powers in a major negotiating capacity. Nor did it
entertain ideas of being involved in a potential peacekeeping mandate. As
Tbilisi’s strategic interests have long been fxed on the safe operation of pipeline and railway infrastructure, Georgia’ overriding interest was to build
bridges between Yerevan and Baku, which would lead to de-escalation.
Indeed, the July 2020 fghting served as a good example of how a confict
could have harmed Georgia’s transit capabilities when the Tovuz region,
which borders on a part of Georgia’s south-east border, became an epicenter
of active warfare with the potential spill-over effect; second, the large infrastructure (pipelines, a major railway, roads) which runs through the region
and connects the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea region also were threatened.39
This showed that the Armenia-Azerbaijani confict, traditionally thought to
be focused on/around Nagorno-Karabakh could be played out elsewhere,
especially near the Georgian border. Moreover, since Georgia had benefted
fnancially as a transit state, more expansive military operations could have
directly hit the country’s transit potential and fnances.

Conclusion
Georgia's political elites view the foreign peacekeeping force in Karabakh
with much suspicion because of the country's own experience of hosting
Russian troops in the early 1990s. One of the conclusions is that Russian

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Emil Avdaliani

peacekeeping forces are a good tool for solidifying Moscow's geopolitical
positions along its borders. Considering the unwillingness to leave Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, the Russian presence in Karabakh is more of long-term
than short-term perspective.
Though a neighbor to Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia has traditionally expressed the least geopolitical interest in being involved in the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict. The 2020 war between Baku and Yerevan and
the threats emanating from it, however, changed the way Georgia viewed
the confict. Challenges ranged from internal to external. The Armenian and
Azerbaijani ethnic minorities in Georgia were engaged in various activities to
provide direct support for the warring sides. Another novelty in the Georgian
approach was an active diplomacy stressing Tbilisi’s potential to play a positive role in alleviating the mutual distrust between Baku and Yerevan and
limiting geopolitical threats to regional security. The war also burst into the
open Georgia’s geographic dilemma, serving as a quickest way for Armenia
and Azerbaijan to receive armaments from abroad. It tested the country’s
relations with both neighbors and required a high-level diplomatic maneuvering. More importantly for Georgia are larger, regional-level results of the
Second Karabakh War. The emerging Nakhichevan corridor brought about
multiple discussions on Georgia’s transit role. Though not directly threatening the country’s regional hub position, the development nevertheless showed
the need for further development of the road and railway infrastructure. The
Second Karabakh War tested Georgia internally, accentuated the country’s
unfavorable position and propelled the military and political establishment
to adjust to the changing dynamics in the South Caucasus.
Tbilisi will continue abstaining from joining or supporting any of the
confronting sides. Even internally Georgia’s major political parties avoided
making radical statements. Rather, pronouncements were mostly limited
to the general necessity of upholding the peace in the South Caucasus.
Nevertheless, a two-pronged threat to Georgia will continue to exist: frst,
a potential internal spill-over effect on the local Armenian and Azerbaijani
communities, and also the potential threat to Georgia’s southern border,
the pipelines and other major transit infrastructure. For Tbilisi there is an
undeniable trajectory of the Armenian-Azerbaijani confict showing no
future lack of tensions. Over time new challenges will emerge as the region
is slowly entering the era of great power competition.

Notes
1 Toksabay, Ece. (2020, October 14). “Turkish arms sales to Azerbaijan surged
before Nagorno-Karabakh fghting”. https://www.reuters.com/article/armeniaazerbaijan-turkey-arms-int-idUSKBN26Z230
2 Avdaliani, E. (2021, February 21). “Iran in the South Caucasus: Adjustment
and evolution”. https://rusi.org/commentary/iran-south-caucasus-adjustmentand-evolution?page=2

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3 Seskuria, N. (2020, September 29). “The Nagorno-Karabakh confict and the challenge for Georgia”. RUSI. https://rusi.org/commentary/
nagorno-karabakh-confict-and-challenge-georgia
4 “Armenians And Azeris Live in Harmony in Georgian Village”. (2020,
November 11). https://www.rferl.org/a/armenians-and-azerbaijanis-live-in-harmony-in-georgian-village-/30942579.html
5 “Минометы для бомбардировок Товуза выслала Сербия с помощью Грузии”.
(2020, July 19). Haqqin.az. https://haqqin.az/news/184175
6 “Azerbaijan’s Aliyev praises Georgia for not allowing arms transit to Armenia”.
(2020, September 21). Civil.ge https://civil.ge/archives/369389
7 https://www.interpressnews.ge/ka/article/621643-sakartvelos-erovnuli-usaprtxoebis-sabcho-azerbaijansa-da-somxets-shoris-samxedro-dapirispirebastan-da-shekmnil-vitarebastan-dakavshirebit-gancxadebas-avrcelebs
8 https://www.panarmenian.net/arm/news/287005/
9 https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4537733#id1962785
10 Remler, P. (2020, October 20). “Russia’s stony path in the South Caucasus”. https://
carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/20/russia-s-stony-path-in-south-caucasuspub-82993
11 Avdaliani, E. (2020, December). “Russia and the dilemma of separatist territories”. UA: Ukraine Analytica. 4 (22), pp. 28–30.
12 Avdaliani, E. (2020, November 23). “The emerging Nakhichevan corridor”.
Caucasus Watch. https://caucasuswatch.de/news/3277.html
13 “Pashinyan, Aliyev and Putin sign agreement to end Karabakh War”. (2020,
November 9). https://armenianweekly.com/2020/11/09/pashinyan-aliyev-andputin-sign-agreement-to-end-karabakh-war/
14 “Turkey’s infrastructure projects, investments total almost $6B in 2020”.
(2020, November 12). TRT. https://www.trtworld.com/business/turkey-sinfrastructure-projects-investments-total-almost-6b-in-2020-41399
15 O’Byrne, D. “Turkey to build gas pipeline to supply Nakhchivan”. (2020, June
11). https://eurasianet.org/turkey-to-build-gas-pipeline-to-supply-nakhchivan
16 Anjaparidze, Z. (2021, February 16). “The Second Karabakh War and Georgia’s threatened transit role”. https://jamestown.org/program/the-secondkarabakh-war-and-georgias-threatened-transit-role/
17 “Will Georgia still build the ambitious Anaklia port? New tender in the works”.
(2021, March 5). https://jam-news.net/will-georgia-still-build-the-ambitiousanaklia-port-new-tender-in-the-works/
18 “Georgian Foreign Minister visits Turkey”. (2021, March 3). Civil.ge. https://
civil.ge/archives/403002
19 Daly, J. (2020, October 5). “Georgia buys Israeli-made air-defense system, unsettlingMoscow”.https://jamesown.org/program/georgia-buys-israeli-made-air-defensesystem-unsettling-moscow/
20 “Tbilisi Armenians Rally against Mtavari Arkhi TV’s ‘Pro-Azerbaijani’ coverage”. (2020, October 1). Civil.ge. https://civil.ge/archives/372330
21 “მელიქ რაისიანი: ჩვენ სომხეთისა და ყარაბაღის თავისუფლებას ვუჭერთ
მხარს”. (2020, September 28). Jnews.ge. https://ka.jnews.ge/?p=8082
22 Ayvazyan, A. (2020, October 1). “How the escalation in Karabakh has
affected Armenians living in Georgia”. Jamnews. https://jam-news.net/georgiajavakheti-saakashvili-armenia-azerbaijan-karabakh-war/
23 “Ethnic Azeri MPs of Georgian Parliament Back Baku amid Karabakh
Clashes”. (2020, September 29). Civil.ge. https://civil.ge/archives/371145
24 “Armenian Embassy to Georgia rejects internet allegations that Georgia hindering fuel, humanitarian aid imports to Armenia”. (2020, October 6). Agenda.
ge. https://agenda.ge/en/news/2020/3111

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25 “Georgian-Turkish border crossing blocked last night”. (2020, September 30).
OC-Media. https://oc-media.org/live-updates-stepanakert-reportedly-hit-fromthe-air-as-fourth-day-of-fghting-begins/
26 “რის გამო გადაკეტეს ჯავახეთში საქართველო-თურქეთის გზა”. (2020, September 30). https://netgazeti.ge/news/485898/
27 “რატომ გადაკეტეს გზა კარწახის საბაჟოსთან – ადგილობრივების
განმარტებები”. (2020, September 30). http://sknews.ge/ka/old/29535
28 “Disinformation related to Georgia’s position on Karabakh confict in Armenian and Azerbaijani Media”. (2020, October 6). https://idf.ge/en/disinformation
-karabakh_confict
29 “Investigation launched into damaged fber-optic cables that supplied Georgia, Armenia with internet”. (2020, October 2). Agenda. https://agenda.ge/en/
news/2020/3067
30 Ayvazyan, A. (2020, October 1). “How the escalation in Karaakh has affected
Armenians living in Georgia”. Jamnews. https://jam-news.net/georgia-javakheti
-saakashvili-armenia-azerbaijan-karabakh-war/
31 “In Quotes: Georgian politicians on Nagorno-Karabakh developments”. (2020,
October 29). Civil.ge. https://civil.ge/archives/371383
32 “In Quotes: Georgian politicians on Nagorno-Karabakh developments”. (2020,
October 29). Civil.ge. https://civil.ge/archives/371383
33 https://medium.com/dfrlab/pro-kremlin-actors-cast-doubt-on-georgias-neutrality-in-nagorno-karabakh-confict-1b7c57ac557d
34 “Disinformation related to Georgia’s position on Karabakh Confict in
Armenian and Azerbaijani media”. (2020, October 6). https://idf.ge/en/
disinformation-karabakh_confict
35 Scrivener, A. (2020, October 22). “COLCHIS: Georgia’s Karabakh conundrum”.
https://intellinews.com/colchis-georgia-s-karabakh-conundrum-194771/
36 Lomsadze, G. (2020, October 6). “Armenia and Azerbaijan to Georgian mediation: Thanks, but no thanks”. Eurasianet. https://eurasianet.org/armeniaand-azerbaijan-to-georgian-mediation-thanks-but-no-thanks
37 “National Security Council of Georgia releases statement on military confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia”. (2020, October 3). Interpressnews. https://
www.interpressnews.ge/en/article/109509-national-security-council-of-georgiareleases-statement-on-military-confrontation-between-azerbaijan-andarmenia/
38 როლი ყარაბაღის კონფლიქტში” (2016, May 6). http://reporter.ge/%E1%83%
A1%E1%83%90%E1%83%A5%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%97%E1%83%
95%E1%83%94%E1%83%9A%E1%83%9D%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%A0%E1%83
%9D%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98-%E1%83%A7%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83
%90%E1%83%91%E1%83%90%E1%83%A6/.
39 Avdaliani, E. (2020, November 13). “Turkey’s win-win strategy in the Nagorno-Karabakh confict”. BESA. https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/
turkey-nagorno-karabakh-strategy/.

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14 The Role of the United States
in the Armenia–Azerbaijan
Confict
Esmira Jafarova

Introduction
The Armenia–Azerbaijan confict was among the most intractable ones in
the post-Soviet space. The continuation of the confict, which lingered on for
about three decades, was assisted by the international community, specifcally, the OSCE Minsk Group. As one of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk
Group and a global superpower, the role of the U.S.A. in the Armenia–
Azerbaijan confict deserves academic attention. This chapter aims to delve
into this particular issue. In an attempt to highlight the U.S. role in the
confict, the chapter will cover the early years of U.S. engagement with the
South Caucasus, its interest in the energy and geopolitics of the region,
lobby politics, as well as subsequent U.S. disengagement and its low-key
political profle in confict resolution. The chapter will also suggest that the
role of the U.S.A. in the Armenia–Azerbaijan confict may not have been as
conspicuous as those of the regional players, who have more invested interests in regional affairs.
Having looked into these and other relevant factors, including the role of
the U.S.A. in the 44-day Karabakh War, the chapter will draw conclusions
in this regard. Specifcally, it will conclude that, having conceded the political role in delivering a fnal resolution to the confict to the warring parties
themselves, as well as to regional players such as Russia and Turkey, the
U.S.A. might from now on be more engaged in post-confict rehabilitation
in the liberated Azerbaijani territories and in supporting long-term peace
and cooperation initiatives in the South Caucasus.

Discovering the Region
The U.S.A., as an external player, was introduced to the three republics
only after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and became one of the
very frst states to recognize their independence. However, the realization of the region’s peculiarities did not happen immediately as the U.S.A.
followed a one-size-fts-all type of policy toward all of the former Soviet
republics, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Rumer, Sokolsky,

DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-19
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Esmira Jafarova

and Stronski 2017). Recalibration of the defnitive U.S. strategy toward the
South Caucasus took some time to happen.
The early 1990s, therefore, did not witness a high profle of the U.S.A.
in the region, but were remembered as a period of efforts to understand
the region and its relevance in strategic, economic, and security terms.
Moreover, it is also assumed that organizational problems in the U.S.
administration in the early years of dealing with the region added up to
confusion about how best to address this part of the world. In 1992–1996,
relevant topics in regard to the newly independent states were said to be
tackled by different governmental structures (Kasim 2012, 232). It was
only after gradually garnering awareness of the South Caucasus that the
U.S.A. formed its own—although still often inconsistent—policy attitude
that enabled it to secure infuence on a variety of matters of strategic and
economic importance.
One way of engaging with the states of the South Caucasus was through
assistance to the state-building efforts of the region’s states, the promotion
of democracy, and the facilitation of their integration into the community of Western states, objectives that were set as the factors that would
strengthen the South Caucasus republics’ independence. To this end, the
U.S.A. strongly backed these states’ inclusion in the NATO Partnership for
Peace (PfP) program in 1994 and contributed economic and other kinds of
aid to the republics (Jafarova 2015, 106).
When it came to the conficts plaguing the region, and specifcally the
Armenia–Azerbaijan confict, the U.S.A., although overtly supporting the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of all regional states, did not, however,
assume a high-profle in actually facilitating the achievement of a fnal resolution. This role was mostly left for the OSCE Minsk Group, regional powers, and the conficting parties themselves.
Engaging with the Region: Energy and Geopolitics
The volte face in the U.S.’s attitude toward the South Caucasus happened
with the signing of the “Contract of the Century” in 1994 and the opening of the Caspian oil and gas resources for international exploration that
underscored the importance of the South Caucasus as an energy-rich
region. The exploitation of the Caspian hydrocarbon resources had to
provide alternative sources and routes for energy and contribute to the diversifcation of Europe’s energy needs. It was through this very logic that
the U.S.A. extended its full and unequivocal support to the development
of long-term cooperation in the energy feld in the region, and with Azerbaijan in particular. The U.S.A. backed the construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline, which, at the time, was politically motivated and
fnancially more expensive compared with other alternatives, including if
the main export pipeline transited through Russian territory. The Baku–
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an important milestone in securing the region’s stance as an energy hub
capable of providing alternative sources and routes for energy.
In the same vein, the U.S.A. also supported the construction of the Baku–
Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline, as well as the Southern Gas Corridor that,
besides consolidating Azerbaijan’s role as an exporter not only of oil, but
also of natural gas, also added to the efforts for the diversifcation of sources
and routes of energy for Europe. The Southern Gas Corridor, which was
completed on December 31, 2020, contributes greatly to the decarbonization
efforts of the continent and will contribute to the energy security of Italy as
well as countries in southeastern Europe. Through the SGC, Azerbaijan
will also assist in the continent’s efforts to decrease carbon emissions. The
support extended by the U.S.A. to the SGC during the initiation and entire
duration of the construction process was instrumental to make this multimillion-dollar project happen. The U.S. interest in supporting the region’s
increasing profle as an energy producer was also conditioned by the commercial interests of the U.S. companies to do business in this new region,
full of opportunities.
Beyond economic considerations, however, the South Caucasus is also
attractive in a strategic sense. The region, at the crossroads of Europe and
Asia, borders Russia, Iran, and a NATO member, Turkey, and is also a
vital transit location to access Central Asia’s vast hydrocarbon resources.
In his address on July 21, 1997, Strobe Talbot depicted the Caspian area as
a “strategically vital” region that has to become part of the EuroAtlantic
Community, and which the U.S.A. could no longer neglect (Nation 2007,
10). As Cornell (2005, 115) also put it: “Its [read: South Caucasus] proximity
to Russia, Iran and the Middle East is the primary facet of this importance.”
The strategic value of the South Caucasus became more apparent after the
tragic terrorist acts of 9/11 that spurred U.S. actions in Afghanistan, Iraq,
and the further Middle East. Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia supported
the U.S. “war on terror,” providing troops and aligning with the allied coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (Nichol 2010). The South Caucasus
region started to gain more attention on the foreign policy agenda of the
U.S.A., with occasional inconsistencies in the policy approach nevertheless
still persisting.
Azerbaijani relations with the U.S.A. therefore thrived over the years,
with cooperation on energy issues constituting the core of bilateral relations.
As was noted above, U.S. support was indispensable in building the Baku–
Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline and in the coming into being of the Southern
Gas Corridor. This support attests to the importance the U.S.A. attaches
to Azerbaijan’s potential to offer diversifcation of sources and routes of
hydrocarbon resources that would reduce dependence on a single source of
energy. Energy diplomacy was therefore an important component of U.S.
engagement with Azerbaijan. The U.S. support to energy projects stemming
from Azerbaijan also aimed at supporting the establishment of an east-west
corridor through which access to the region’s oil and gas resources for the

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West would be ensured. Beyond economic factors, it is also known that
Azerbaijan’s strategic location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, as well
as its geographic proximity to Iran, also conditioned continuing U.S. interest in the country. However, when it came to Iran’s role in the transportation
of the region’s energy resources, the U.S. position was rather rigid in not
welcoming Iran’s participation (Kasim 2012, 232).
Although it may have seemed that the U.S. policy toward the region
changed after the 2008 August War in Georgia, in reality, the policy
of the U.S.A. in regard to the South Caucasus was mostly described as
“managing the status-quo rather than seeking breakthroughs or launching new initiatives.” The bold diplomatic initiative of the U.S.A. to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey did not bear fruit and the
U.S. focus afterwards lay in prevention of a new confict in the region
(Rumer, Sokolsky, and Stronski 2017). This issue will be discussed later in
the chapter.
Lobby politics and U.S. Relations with Azerbaijan
It appears in retrospect that, concerning the business interests of all three
republics of the South Caucasus, those of Azerbaijan should have attracted
more attention from the U.S.A. Although one would expect the U.S.A. to
express unequivocal and stronger support to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity,1 which would inevitably strengthen the relations between the two countries, their relations remained bumpy owing to the introduction in 1992 of
Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act (FSA) (“Statement on Signing the
FREEDOM Support Act” 1992)2 by pro-Armenian lobby groups in the U.S.
Congress. The U.S. policy toward Azerbaijan fell victim to its own domestic
constraints. Because of this clause, Azerbaijan was deprived of all kinds of
assistance, including military, that all other post-Soviet countries received
from the U.S.A.
The purpose of Section 907 was said to be to exert punitive measures
against Azerbaijan unless it was “taking demonstrable steps to cease
all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabakh” (“Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act [Public
Law 102–511]” 1992), although in reality it was Azerbaijan that suffered
from the occupation of about 20% of its territories. Both Armenia and
Georgia were receiving substantial U.S. fnancial aid through the Freedom
Support Act, while Azerbaijan was the only country, that perhaps was most
in need of assistance due to the devastating socio-economic consequences
of the war with Armenia, to be stripped of this opportunity due to the pressure from the Armenian diaspora. Azerbaijan’s objections notwithstanding,
this amendment, which epitomized the unjust sanctions policy of the U.S.A.
against Azerbaijan, remained in force up until 2001, when the U.S. Senate
fnally adopted a waiver of the section in view of Azerbaijan’s unwavering
support to the U.S. war on terror and the country’s strategic signifcance

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Role of the United States in the Confict 325
against the backdrop of the U.S. anti-terror operations in Afghanistan
(Nichol 2010, 17).3 Azerbaijan also made military contributions to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Section 907 still remains in force; however,
since 2001 it has been waived annually.
In addition to Section 907, the U.S.A. continued to remain disengaged from
the actual issues plaguing Azerbaijan since its early independence, including, as mentioned before, the fact of the occupation of its territories. Related
developments included Washington’s backing of the Turkish–Armenian
protocols on rapprochement in 2009 and its insistence on decoupling this
process from the Nagorno-Karabakh issue; problems with the appointment
of Ambassador Matthew Bryza as the U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan in
20114 after a long hiatus with no U.S. Ambassador in the country; and confrontational political rhetoric between the two countries during the Obama
administration over issues relating to human rights and civil society, which
ushered in further disengagement from the region and Azerbaijan. All attest
to the inconsistencies of U.S. policy toward Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan did not
hide its disappointment with such vicissitudes of U.S. policy. The U.S. disengagement policy also continued well into Trump presidency. This will be
discussed further below.

First Karabakh War and U.S. Policy toward the
Armenia–Azerbaijan Confict
When Azerbaijan and Armenia became independent from the Soviet Union
in 1991, their independence did not mark the beginning of peaceful and
prosperous relations in the South Caucasus. A tinderbox of confict erupted
between the two states and the First Karabakh War resulted in the occupation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven adjacent regions of
Azerbaijan by Armenia, while the four UN Security Council resolutions
(822, 853, 874, 884) demanding the liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani
territories were ignored for the entire duration of the confict.
During the war, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Azerbaijanis were
displaced from the region and tens of thousands on both sides died. The
negotiation process between Armenia and Azerbaijan continued for almost
three decades following the establishment of the OSCE Minsk Group in 1992
(“Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries” 2009). The
Minsk Group, co-chaired by the U.S.A., France, and Russia, explored many
avenues to fnd a solution to the confict. However, the confict remained
intractable and did not lend itself to a peaceful solution through diplomacy
and good offces.
In the early years, the U.S.A. did not demonstrate any high profle in regard to the confict. According to some estimations, the U.S.A. was not only
not cautious toward Russia’s role in the former Soviet space, but also fostered
hopes that Russia might be successful in the pursuance of its Atlanticist policy that would eventually bring Russia closer to the West. This thinking did

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not bring higher U.S. engagement in confict resolution, and it remained
confned to its role within the OSCE Minsk Group (Kasim 2012, 233). The
U.S. policy toward confict resolution in the region has been pretty straightforward, but also a balancing act between the interests of the conficting
parties themselves, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and those of the regional
powers, especially Russia. The U.S.A. has always been vocal in backing the
territorial integrity of all the region’s states, although the expression of this
support has taken different forms.
In the case of the Armenia–Azerbaijan confict, although the U.S.A.
has continually expressed its support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity,
including through various documents,5 the infuence of large Armenian
lobby groups on Congress and other state institutions has constrained
stronger U.S. support for Azerbaijan’s cause for its territorial integrity.
This in fact meant that, as one of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk
Group, the U.S.A., although always supportive of the peaceful resolution
of the confict, still emphasized that the solution had to be forged by the
parties themselves. This, in turn, entailed equivalizing the victim and the
occupier, and turning a blind eye to the fact of the occupation of Azerbaijani territories. Over the years, the expression of the U.S. position on the
solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh confict has usually happened along the
following lines:
The United States supports the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan
and holds that the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh is a matter of
negotiation between the parties with the aim of achieving a lasting
and comprehensive political resolution of the confict. The United
States remains committed to fnding a peaceful settlement of the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict through the Minsk Group process.
(Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs 2008)
This position remained unchanged through the years the peace process
was happening under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group. This language never entailed any punitive measures or sanctions against Armenia, which kept about 20% of Azerbaijani territories under occupation
for three decades. On the contrary, as noted above, the imposition of
Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act in the early 1990s under pressure from Armenian lobby groups further aggravated Azerbaijan’s predicament, having deprived the country of an important share of U.S.
support in the face of all of the challenges caused by the fact of the occupation of its territories. However, after the commencement of the annual waiver in 2001, there were also some U.S. policies that were directed
at mitigating the consequences resulting from the imposition of Section
907, including demining assistance and separate capacity-building assistance to Azerbaijan for border and maritime security (Welt and Bowen
2021, 20).

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Role of the United States in the Confict 327
Initiatives
However, there were also some initiatives introduced by the U.S.A. to systematize the negotiation process. “The Baker rules” that established the
format of negotiations and defned Azerbaijan and Armenia as the main
negotiating parties and the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities
of the Nagorno-Karabakh region as the interested parties formed perhaps the most signifcant attempt by the U.S.A. thus far to infuence the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict resolution process (Kasim 2012, 235).
In 1992, an American analyst and expert on Russia, Paul Goble, proposed
what was later recognized as the “Goble plan” that entailed the territorial
exchange formula: transferring to Armenia parts of the Nagorno-Karabakh
region, including the Lachin corridor, in exchange for transferring the Mehri
corridor to Azerbaijan, which would eventually link Azerbaijan’s main territory with the Nakhchivan exclave. The plan, which was laid out in Goble’s
article “Coping with the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis” that was published in
1992, stated:
Consequently, the various participants need to begin to consider the
possibility of a territorial swap including the following concessions:
sending part of the NKAO to Armenia, with the area controlling
the headwaters of the river fowing to Baku and areas of Azerbaijani
population remaining in Azerbaijani hands; and transferring the
Armenian-controlled land bridge between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan
to Azerbaijani control.
(Goble 1992)
This plan, supported by then President George H. W. Bush, was however
rejected by both parties to the confict (Naumkin 2020).
In the mid-1990s, former U.S. representative to the CSCE Minsk Group
Ambassador John Maresca proposed his vision for the resolution of the
Armenia–Azerbaijan confict. In his work titled “Lost Opportunities in
Negotiating the Confict over Nagorno-Karabakh,” Maresca underscored
his ideas related to the resolution of the confict and proposed that the
U.S.A. play an “important support role for a peacekeeping operation, and
might have a few civilian advisers somewhere in its structure.” He also noted
that the U.S.A. should take the role of a “major mediator, encourager and
facilitator of a solution” while maintaining impartiality. The appointment
of a Special U.S. Envoy with access to the higher decision-making echelons
in Washington, Moscow, and the regional capitals, was proposed to be benefcial to all sides. Maresca’s vision, however, was not accepted (Maresca
1996, 497).
During the beginning of the energy projects in the region, one of the possible routes was via the territory of Armenia. The U.S.A. called this route a
“peace pipeline.” However, the acceptance of this route was not possible due

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to Azerbaijan’s rejection. In 1997, the U.S.A., as one of the Minsk Group
Co-Chairs, participated in the formulation of the three proposals (known as
the package solution, step-by-step solution, or common state solution)6 that
envisaged different solutions to the confict. None of these proposals were,
however, accepted by either conficting party.
Direct Meetings
Following the failure of the OSCE Minsk Group proposals, the U.S.A.
engaged in fostering direct meetings and negotiations between the parties.
One of the landmark events in this regard became the meeting in Key West,
Florida, in 2001 between the late President of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev,
and Robert Kocharyan through the facilitation of President George W.
Bush. However, despite the expectations, the meeting failed to produce any
tangible result in terms of confict resolution.
After the failure of three OSCE Minsk Group proposals and the meeting in Key West, the U.S.A., as one of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs, facilitated more direct talks between the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia. The
“Prague process,” launched in 2004, envisaged direct and regular contacts
between the foreign ministers of the conficting parties. Regular direct talks
between the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia with the facilitation of the
OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs led to drafting of the so-called “basic principles” for further negotiation during the presidential meeting in Kazan in
2005 (“Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War” 2007, 2).
These “basic principles” were later refned and presented as the “Madrid
Principles” that contained a roadmap to the peaceful resolution of the confict. The principles called for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the
occupied districts adjacent to the Nagorno-Karabakh region (with special
modalities for the Lachin and Kelbajar districts); opening of transport and
other communications; and resumption of trade relations, while establishing
an interim international security arrangement for the Nagorno-Karabakh
region until a vote on its status could take place (“Nagorno-Karabakh:
Risking War” 2007; “Armenia and Azerbaijan: A Season of Risks” 2013).
However, disagreements still remained, including over the modalities of a
“referendum” or “population vote” for defning the future legal status of
the region (“Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War” 2007, 5).7 In July 2009, the
U.S.A., along with the other Minsk Group Co-Chairs, having met on the
margins of the G-8 Summit in L’Aquila, issued a joint statement expressing
support to the previously agreed formulas for the resolution of the confict
(“Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries” 2009).
Turkey–Armenia Protocols and U.S. Disengagement
In 2009, the U.S.A. initiated the process of Turkey–Armenia rapprochement
in circumvention of the Armenia–Azerbaijan confict. Turkey had closed

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Role of the United States in the Confict 329
its borders with Armenia in 1993 in retaliation for Armenia’s occupation
of Azerbaijani territories. The U.S.A. wanted Ankara to ratify protocols
on normalizing Turkish–Armenian relations by detaching this issue from
the progress toward a solution of the Armenia–Azerbaijan confict. Supporting Turkish–Armenian normalization without due consideration to
Azerbaijan’s concerns over its territorial integrity caused resentment and
estrangement in Azerbaijan. In an interview with The Wall Street Journal,
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said:
There is a common understanding in the region that there should be a
frst step by Armenia to start the liberation of the occupied territories…
If the two issues are disconnected, then probably Armenia will freeze
negotiations with Azerbaijan (over Nagorno Karabakh).
(Champion, Walker, and Fidler 2010)
Turkey–Armenia rapprochement did not happen, however; the U.S.’s attempt to achieve normalization between the two while remaining deaf to
Azerbaijan’s predicament in fact showed that even the U.S.’s business and
economic interest in Azerbaijan did not deliver the stronger support by that
country to Azerbaijan’s position in the confict.
Moreover, the U.S.A. did not welcome Azerbaijan’s stance on the Turkish–
Armenian protocols. Instead of exerting at least some pressure on Armenia
to return Azerbaijan’s occupied territories, the U.S.A. opted for shifting
the blame onto Azerbaijan and, in April 2010, President Ilham Aliyev was
not invited to the Nuclear Summit in Washington D.C., whereas the President of Armenia, Serj Sarkissian, participated in the event (Socor 2010).
Relations between the two countries were not at their best following these
developments. However, the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Azerbaijan in July 2010, was a signifcant move to mend the frayed
relations between the U.S.A. and Azerbaijan (“Ilham Aliyev Received U.S.
State Secretary Hillary Clinton” 2010).
As was noted before, the U.S.A. mostly self-limited its role to that of being
one of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs. The only time the U.S.A. acted
as a sole mediator between the parties was the Key West meeting of April
2001, which, as noted above, was unsuccessful. Against all odds, voices also
began to be heard in U.S. political thought about attaching more priority
to Azerbaijan, given its increasing role as a staunch U.S. ally in the region.
In this regard, calls for increased U.S. attention to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh confict were also made. Stephen Blank noted that:
The Karabakh problem, which the Armenian lobby has successfully exploited in the US Congress, prevents the U.S. from gaining the full value
of Azerbaijan's pro-western stance. Because of this Karabakh negatively
affects coalition effectiveness in Iraq and further afeld…. As long as
it remains unresolved, the Karabakh problem perpetuates the South

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Caucasus' stratus as a major center for organized crime, drug traffcking,
and corruption. It directly undermines reform, regional trade, and economic and social development across the South Caucasus, rendering the
region a fragile partner in the war against terrorism. A frm U.S. stance
on the Karabakh issue will send a clear message to both Iran and Russia
that their freedom to foment trouble in the South Caucasus is at an end.
(Starr 2004)
Nevertheless, such epiphanies did not result in a stronger U.S. role in the
Armenia–Azerbaijan confict or more support to Azerbaijan’s territorial
integrity. After the failure of the Turkish–Armenian protocols, the U.S.A.
pursued a policy of disengagement from the Armenia–Azerbaijan confict,
which continued throughout the Obama Administration, the foreign policy
focus of which lay in dealing with other priority issues such as Afghanistan,
Iraq, the Middle East peace process, the Iran nuclear deal, etc. Despite
initial expectations, prioritization of confict resolution between Armenia
and Azerbaijan did not happen during the Obama administration. Quite the
contrary: the U.S. Congress’ direct aid to the Nagorno-Karabakh region,
while keeping Section 907 against Azerbaijan in force, also became another
source of estrangement for Azerbaijan (Ambrosio 2011, 17).
Some scholars also concur that the U.S.A. had little to no interest in the
region, nor did it have any policy for dealing with the security challenges
therein. An evaluation of potential security challenges in the region performed in 2013 described the Armenia–Azerbaijan confict as a “thirdtier” confict and therefore dealing with it did not constitute a priority for
the U.S.A. This position implied that, should a renewed confict erupt in
Nagorno-Karabakh, this would have had only a modicum of effect on U.S.
interests. This approach to the confict remained unchanged throughout
2014 and 2015 (Blank 2015, 100).
This lack of interest, in fact, indicated that the most important issue for
Azerbaijan—its territorial integrity—had little strategic value for the U.S.A.
The perception that the U.S.A. should not assume a higher profle in confict
resolution in the Caucasus and Central Asia, thereby leaving the leading
role to Russia in this regard, dominated strategic thinking among those U.S.
offcials shaping the country’s policy toward Eurasia (Blank 2015, 100).
This conscious disengagement from the pressing issues in the South
Caucasus once again demonstrated that the Obama Administration pursued a “selective commitment” to this or other regions based on its priorities. The war in Afghanistan and a “reset” policy with Russia in the
aftermath of the 2008 August War also certainly contributed to this policy.
Fatigue with foreign interventions, fnancial concerns, and tardy recovery
from the effects of the global fnancial crisis were among the many factors
that further consolidated estrangement from Eurasian affairs. As a result
of this disinterest in the security predicament of the South Caucasus, the
U.S.A. accentuated its role as merely one of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs,

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Role of the United States in the Confict 331
with the latter entity facing frequent criticism from Azerbaijan for doing
an ineffective job (Blank 2015, 104). More than once, Azerbaijan attempted
to broach the issue with the United Nations in an effort to push the Minsk
Group toward doing a better job than simply maintaining the status quo.
In April 2016, in the aftermath of the Four-day War, the U.S. position was
also rather standard, merely sticking to the pre-existing clichés of the negotiation process under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group. At his press
conference on the occasion of the completion of his duties as an interim U.S.
Co-Chair of the Minsk Group, Richard Hoagland outlined the principles
for confict resolution adhered to by the U.S.A., which basically were the
same “basic principles” negotiated within the Minsk Group (Asbarez 2017).
Although his comments were at some point portrayed by the Armenian side
as supportive of Azerbaijan (Sanamyan 2017), this once again testifed to
the common knowledge that the U.S.A. did not consider any role for itself
in confict resolution other than that of one of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs.
Misperception of the strategic importance of the South Caucasus region,
as well as misrepresentation of the potential explosiveness of the lingering
conficts therein, including frst and foremost the Armenia–Azerbaijan confict, proved to be a fatal miscalculation. The four-day April War in 2016
and the 44-day Karabakh War in 2020 became the violent coda to the decades-long, lingering confict. This passive approach to the Armenia–Azerbaijan confict continued during the Trump Administration, which mostly
pursued a policy of U.S. retrenchment around the world, with the Middle
East possibly being the only example where the Trump Administration
sought to focus more.
However, despite the clear U.S. low profle regarding the Armenia–Azerbaijan confict, the former’s position was also solid in regard to the non-recognition of the illegal regime in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Assurances
in this regard were again delivered in 2020 after the adoption of a resolution
by the Minnesota State Senate on the “recognition” of the illegal regime created in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. The U.S. State Department
said in its statement that:
US policy has not changed. The United States does not recognize
Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent and sovereign state. As a
co-chair country of the OSCE Minsk Group, the United States remains
strongly committed to helping the sides achieve a lasting peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh confict that is based on Helsinki Final
Act principles of non-use or threat of force, territorial integrity, and
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and will remain fully
engaged in the efforts of the Minsk Group to achieve this goal.
(Zeynalova 2020)
Some authors have suggested that the U.S. disengagement from actively
dealing with the issues of the region is related to the fact that the “U.S.A. has

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important security and economic interests in the South Caucasus; however,
none of them is vital.” While also acknowledging that the “United States
has important interests in the South Caucasus… success will depend on
careful balancing of U.S. interests and resources… [a] great deal of patience,
and acceptance that change will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary”
(Rumer, Sokolsky, and Stronski 2017). Realizing the perils of continued
U.S. disengagement from the security affairs of this strategically important
region, pundits and practitioners in the feld increasingly started to advocate
for a more hands-on approach by the U.S.A. As the former Ambassador to
Azerbaijan, Robert Cekuta, noted:
…Acting to address the protracted confict in Nagorno-Karabakh
would promote peace and stability in the Greater Caspian Region,
i.e., in Central Asia as well as in the South Caucasus. It would be
in the national interest of the United States as set out in the Trump
Administration’s own strategy statements...
(Cekuta 2020)
Another U.S. expert on the region, Stephen Blank, underscored that the
U.S.A. has to realize the importance of resolving the Armenia–Azerbaijan
confict, since the next violence in the region could threaten important
European energy infrastructure and regional security. He therefore argued
that “Washington must renounce its policy of moralistic disengagement and
come to grip with realities” (Blank 2014). It is clear that there was also an
acknowledgement in the scholarly community that “the U.S.A. remains diplomatically disengaged from the region, weakening its position and limiting
its ability to make real headway in dealing with this ongoing confict”
(Breedlove 2020).

44-day-Karabakh War and the U.S.A.
The 44-day Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan that lasted
44 days from September 27 to November 10, 2020, changed the entrenched
realities on the ground. The inability of the international community under
the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group to facilitate a fnal resolution to the
confict through peace negotiations had led to the next outbreak of military
hostilities.
One could assert that this war happened owing to the unconstructive position and denialism, across the entire duration of the peace process, of the
leadership of Armenia who fouted four UN Security Council resolutions
(822, 853, 974, and 884) calling for the de-occupation of Azerbaijani territories. Armenia’s unconstructive position on the confict was further exacerbated after Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan came to power following the
change of government in 2018.

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Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan embraced an ever-stronger militaristic
rhetoric. At a rally in occupied Khankendi he declared that “Karabakh
is Armenia and period” (Jafarova 2020a), initiated the revival of a dangerous miatsum (unifcation) ideology (Kucera 2019) in regard to the
Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan as well as the organization of
so-called “parliamentary and presidential elections” in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan; and visited the historic Azerbaijani city of Shusha in May
2020 to conduct a so-called “inauguration” ceremony for the illegal regime
established therein. These actions, doubtlessly also inspired by Armenian
(now former) Defense Minister David Tonoyan’s vow in early 2019 to wage
“new wars for new territories” (Abrahamyan 2019), became more dangerous
with the attack against the Tovuz district of Azerbaijan in July 2020, the
increase of illegal settlements in Azerbaijan’s occupied territories, and the
rejection of the Madrid Principles that demanded the return of the occupied
territories to Azerbaijan—principles that had been endorsed by both parties and the Co-Chairs (World Today News 2020).
The U.S. position of disengagement from the confict continued during
the 44-dayKarabakh War. In addition to the U.S. disengagement from the
South Caucasus, the war itself also coincided with the presidential race in
the U.S.A. as well as the country’s struggle to curb and deal with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic that had plagued the world since
late 2019. This distracted the U.S.A. even more from international affairs
including, obviously, what was happening between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
On September 27, 2020, the U.S. State Department “expressed alarm at
reports of large-scale military action along the Line of Contact and condemned in the strongest terms this escalation of violence.” In response to
the outbreak of violence, many members of Congress issued statements. On
October 1, the U.S.A., alongside Russia and France, made a trilateral statement that urged the “immediate cessation of hostilities between relevant
military forces” and called on the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan “to
commit without delay to resuming substantive negotiations, in good faith
and without preconditions” (Welt and Bowen 2021, 17). Subsequent statements made by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs on the ongoing war were
along similar lines. On October 23, 2020, after a long hiatus, the U.S.A.
stepped up once again to initiate a direct meeting between the warring parties in search of a ceasefre. The foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan
met in Washington with mediation by U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo. By then, there had already been a meeting in Moscow that agreed on
a humanitarian ceasefre, but that was immediately violated by Armenia,
which attacked Ganja with deadly missiles (Jafarova 2020b). On October 18,
2020, another ceasefre was agreed—and also violated immediately.
At the end of the meeting in Washington, a trilateral joint statement was
issued, which stated that the “United States facilitated intensive negotiations … to move Armenia and Azerbaijan closer to a peaceful resolution of
the Nagorno-Karabakh confict.” President Trump also congratulated the

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conficting parties on the U.S.-brokered ceasefre (Welt and Bowen 2021,
17). However, this ceasefre also did not last as the parties went into a
full-scale confict in the aftermath. The signing of an agreement on November 10, 2020, with the mediation of the Russian Federation, fnally
ended the military hostilities. The agreement envisaged the full de-occupation of Azerbaijani territories and outlined the contours of peaceful
co-existence in the South Caucasus. In response to the November agreement, Secretary of State Pompeo noted that “ending the recent fghting is
only a frst step toward achieving a peaceful negotiated settlement of the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict.” His statement also said that the U.S.A. plans
to extend $5 million to the affected population in the aftermath of the war
(Welt and Bowen 2021, 18).
Overall, the position expressed and the messages delivered by the Trump
Administration in regard to the military hostilities during the 44-day
Karabakh War were again more or less along the classical position maintained by the U.S.A. throughout the entire duration of the Armenia–Azerbaijan confict. The statement made by the then presidential candidate Joe
Biden regarding the military hostilities was also rather blunt in indicating
the U.S.’s passivity during the war:
Inexplicably, the Trump Administration has been largely passive, and
disengaged, throughout this recent period of escalation. Since the
outbreak of hostilities on September 27, neither President Trump not
Secretary of State Pompeo has placed a single phone call to the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, even as the region goes up in fames.
Rather than delegating the diplomacy to Moscow, the administration
must get more involved, at the highest levels, by working with our
European partners to de-escalate the fghting and return the two sides
to negotiations.
(“Nagorno-Karabakh—Statement by Vice President Joe Biden” 2020)
Now that the war is over, the region’s countries are anticipating new realities that will enable them to turn the dark pages of their shared history
and move forward. The November 10 Agreement contained nine important provisions and, besides ending the hostilities, envisaged the de-occupation of all remaining territories of Azerbaijan (Aghdam, Lachin, and
Kelbajar) and the deployment of a peacekeeping contingent from the Russian Federation, in parallel with the Armenian armed forces’ withdrawal
(Article 4) and the opening of all economic and transport communications
in the region (Article 9). The Joint Peacekeeping Monitoring Center that
was established by the agreement involves equal numbers of military servicemen from Russia and Turkey, which started monitoring operations using drones on January 30, 2021. For the frst time since the dissolution of the
U.S.S.R., NATO member Turkey assumed a greater role in the management
of the Armenia–Azerbaijan confict, with boots on the ground, that many

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Role of the United States in the Confict 335
envisage having a stabilizing and balancing effect on the overall security
architecture of the South Caucasus.
The parties have already met, in January and February 2021 in Moscow,
to initiate the opening of all transport (railways and roads through the
Zangezur corridor) and economic communications in the region, and work
is in progress in this regard. Azerbaijan has vowed to rebuild from scratch
all of the liberated lands and cooperate with companies from friendly countries for this purpose. In his recent meeting with the Minister of Economy
of Azerbaijan, Mikayil Jabbarov, in January 2021, the U.S. Ambassador to
Azerbaijan, Earle Litzenberger, said that the U.S. companies were also ready
to participate in the restoration of the liberated territories of Azerbaijan
(APA News Agency 2021). However, the vortex of lobby politics that resulted
in the adoption of the infamous Section 907 against Azerbaijan immediately
waded in to blame the Ambassador for taking sides; a statement released
by the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) stated that the
Ambassador should explain “whether he is in fact pushing U.S. investments
in areas of Artsakh seized by Azerbaijan” (Asbarez 2021). It seems that U.S.
policy and its efforts may, even in the post-confict rehabilitation period,
once again fall victim to its own lobby politics. We will simply have to wait
and see.
In conclusion, the U.S.A. did not have a strong political role in the fnal
resolution of the Armenia–Azerbaijan confict and suffced itself with
a self-restricted role as one of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs. This also
explained the U.S. stance during the 44-day Karabakh War. The U.S.
approach toward and position on the Armenia–Azerbaijan confict could be
therefore be summarized in the following way: (1) support to the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, but emphasis on
resolving the confict by the parties themselves via dialog and negotiations;
(2) U.S. role mostly within the OSCE Minsk Group format; (3) a balance
between the interests of an important economic partner, Azerbaijan, and
lobby politics that skewed in Armenia’s favor; and (4) a geopolitical determinant, deference to the leading role of regional powers in the resolution
of the confict. The combined effect of all the above factors was to deliver a
low-key and often inconsistent U.S. policy toward the Armenia–Azerbaijan
confict that, having been left unattended for about three decades, erupted
into and found a resolution through new bloodshed.

Conclusion
This chapter has tried to highlight the U.S. role in the Armenia–Azerbaijan
confict. In order to do so, the chapter frst examined the early U.S.
engagement with the region, its role in confict resolution after the First
Karabakh War, and its position during the 44-day Karabakh War. Although
economic (energy) and geopolitical determinants widely shaped the U.S. attitude to the South Caucasus and the region’s signifcance for the U.S.A.

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leaped after the 9/11 tragedy, the U.S.A. still opted to maintain a low profle
when it came to dealing with the most intractable confict in the region, that
between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Despite the region’s growing importance, the U.S.’s policy toward confict resolution was mostly inconsistent and often left the initiative for
confict resolution to third parties. Regardless of Azerbaijan’s growing
signifcance as a strategic and energy partner, the U.S.A. was, nevertheless, careful to avoid actions that might be interpreted as openly favoring
Azerbaijan. The U.S.A. mostly confned its own role to being one of the
Minsk Group Co-chairs; however, its impartiality was often compromised
by the lobbying efforts of the Armenian diaspora in the U.S.A. The overall
U.S. approach to the Armenia–Azerbaijan confict was primarily shaped
by the dictates of high politics that entailed the avoidance of antagonizing
Russia and of domestic variables that affected U.S. policy in this regard.
This resulted in the conscious U.S disengagement from confict resolution
that lasted, more or less, for the entire duration of the Armenia–Azerbaijan
confict.
A similar position was also demonstrated during the 44-day Karabakh
War that, through military means, effectively ended the decades-long, protracted confict. The agreement signed on November 10, 2021, consolidated
the leading roles of the regional powers, Russia, and this time also Turkey,
in the management of the confict. The U.S.A., alongside France and Russia
as the other two Minsk Group Co-Chairs, kept on the back burner the
political processes that could have ended the war. The U.S.A. largely maintained its previous role and position in this regard. However, there is still
hope that, in the decisive post-confict rehabilitation period, the U.S.A. will
fnd a proper niche for itself in terms of contributing to the establishment of
lasting peace and cooperation in the South Caucasus.

Notes
1 More on the First Karabakh War will be discussed in the next section.
2 The Freedom Support Act was adopted on 24 October, 1992 and aimed at
extending various fnancial and other sorts of assistance to post-Soviet states
to help with their transitions to a market economy, support a free market and
democracy.
3 Azerbaijan authorized overfight rights, allowed intelligence support and use of
its bases. With the start of air operations in Afghanistan on 06 October, 2001,
President Aliyev supported coalition actions in a phone conversation with Secretary Powell on 09 October, and with President Bush on 30 October, 2001. In
November 2002 Azerbaijan deployed 30 troops in support of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan.
4 Ambassador M. Bryza was a former U.S. co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group.
After long controversies in the Senate which were conditioned by the attempts of
Armenian lobby-backed senators, such as Robert Menendez of New Jersey and
Barbara Boxer of California to block his candidature, in 2010 he was appointed

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Role of the United States in the Confict 337
by President Obama as the U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan and was confrmed
by the White House as a “recess appointment.” However, in January 2012 M.
Bryza had to leave his position because the Senate refused to confrm his nomination under the pressures of Armenian lobby groups.
5 For example, the U.S. Department of State, in its human rights report on
Armenia for the year 2006, states: “Armenia continues to occupy the Azerbaijani
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding Azerbaijani territories.”
The similar report on Azerbaijan also emphasizes this fact: “Armenian forces
controlled most of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as large portions of adjacent
Azerbaijani territory” and “Armenia continues to occupy the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding Azerbaijani territories”
(“2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices” 2006). Relevant statements and resolutions adopted on state and federal levels also contain recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
6 In 1997, the co-chairs initiated famous three proposals—the so-called “package” variant, “step-by-step” or “phased,” and “common state” proposals—
that envisaged a negotiated solution to the confict. The “package” approach
aimed at achieving a solution for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal
of its armed forces by Armenia and an agreement on the fnal status of the
Nagorno-Karabakh region in one stage. The “phased” solution implied the
cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of armed forces by Armenia in the frst
place, to be followed by negotiations on the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh
region. The third, and most contentious, “common state” proposal promoted
the idea of the Nagorno-Karabakh region becoming a state-territorial formation in the form of a republic constituting a common state with Azerbaijan
within its internationally recognized borders. All three proposals failed to
build a base for a negotiated solution, owing to the parties’ different security
considerations and preferences for one or other model of confict resolution
(Broers 2005).
7 The parties’ opinions, however, differed widely on constituencies, modalities, and the scope of the potential vote on the region’s status, with Azerbaijan
expressing reservations that: (1) IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh should have
equally participated in the vote and, therefore, should previously be returned to
the occupied areas; and (2) according to Article 3 of the Azerbaijani Constitution,
any vote that could result in the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh should
be a nationwide referendum. Azerbaijan was nevertheless ready to give the Nagorno-Karabakh region the highest degree of autonomy within its internationally recognized borders. The Madrid Principles underwent another revision as,
on the basis of these principles, the co-chairs, in 2009–2012, proposed six additional elements:
• creating an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh that provides guarantees for security and self-governance;
• returning the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani
control;
• building a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh;
• determining the fnal legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally
binding expression of will;
• upholding the right of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees
to return to their former places of residence; and
• granting the parties international security guarantees that would include
a peacekeeping operation (“Digging out of Deadlock in Nagorno-Karabakh” 2019).

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15 Russia’s Role in the Karabakh
Confict
Orhan Gafarli1

Introduction
The Caucasus policy followed by Russia has traditionally been examined in
academic studies within the scope of a nineteenth-century defnition of ‘backyard’ geopolitical security. From that period forward, the southern borders
of Tsarist Russia were determined by the 1805 Kurekchay Agreement, as
signed with the Karabakh Khanate and the 1828 Turkmenchay Agreement
reached with Iran (Yavuz & Huseynov, 2020, s. 104). Such borders comprised the regional defnition of ‘Transcaucasia’ (beyond the Caucasus) as
the door and border of the Russian Empire to the south (Elibegova, 2009, s.
69). Tsarist Russia made the South Caucasus an important military region
to maintain balance against the Ottoman and Iranian empires and to realize
its expansionist ambitions (Kuznetsov, 2012, стр. 173–174).
Tsarist Russia turned the Caucasus into a refuge for groups escaping from
a confict steeped in clashes over cultural roots in Iran and the Ottoman
Empire and the project of Christian evangelism, which had multiple geographical, ethnic, and religious considerations. Since the nineteenth century, the migration of Armenian and Kurdish ethnocultural groups from
Iran and the Ottoman Empire, as encouraged by Saint Petersburg, caused
cultural shifts in the region (Aliyev, 1987, стр. 60). The expansion of the
Russian Empire into the region, on the one hand, threatened Iran and, on
the other hand, enabled the opening of a new front outside the Balkans and
the Black Sea in wars against the Ottoman Empire.
Russia’s settlement in the ‘Transcaucasia’ region, that is, beyond the
Caucasus mountains, in the context of its classical military geopolitical strategy, eliminated threats at its southern borders (Ismailov & Papava, 2006, 11).
But the wars between the indigenous peoples and Saint Petersburg in the
North Caucasus geographical region have yet to cease. The domination
established over the South Caucasus helped cut geographical connections
between the North Caucasus and the Ottoman Empire. In the nineteenth
century, the Imam Shamil operation involving Chechen and Dagestan peoples in the North Caucasus (Hamburg, Sanders, & Tucker, 2004, 60) and the
continuation of the negotiated exile of Circassians to the Ottoman Empire
bolstered Saint Petersburg’s political domination in the region.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-20
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Since the nineteenth century, the domination by the Russian Empire in
the South Caucasus; the establishment of the administrative governance
of Guberniya such as Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Elizabethpol (Gancha)
(Ismailov & Papava, 2006, 22–23); and its design on the region’s cultural
character were achieved through population exchanges. The Russian
Empire, beyond its domination of the Caucasus, was able to establish a
naval base with the aim of turning the Caspian Sea between this region and
Central Asia into a Russian maritime post.
By annexing this region, Tsarist Russia controlled the door to the Middle
East for the Ottoman and Iranian empires. Having settled in the region,
from such a geopolitical historical perspective, Tsarist Russia gained strategic superiority in its foreign policy against its southern neighbors, the
Ottomans and Iran, by securing the South Caucasus region for its own
interests in creating a safe corridor to access warm seas for its trading and
economic powers.
Tsarist Russia’s imperial policy shared traits with the perspectives
of the rival Ottoman and Persian empires, which Russia defned as the
‘other’ and which acknowledged Russia’s status as protector of the Christian communities. Tsarist Russia considered its protection of the Eastern
(Orthodox) Christian peoples in the east as legitimate, in congruence with
Eastern Roman imperial ideology that gave Russia its identity. Likewise,
fulflling Tsarist Russia’s dream of becoming history’s third Rome meant
taking on the geographical and ideological heritage of the Byzantine
Empire. Such identity and ideological ownership motivated the Russian
Empire’s eastward expansionist policies, enabling it to shape the South
Caucasus in its view. The expansionist objectives were: (1) defend the
Christian minority, (2) conduct population settlement and deportations,
(3) control roads to the Middle East. However, in the nineteenth century
Tsarist Russia struggled with the domestic cost of wars of geographic expansion, on the one hand, and was facing demands from domestic socialist movements for equality and social justice on the other. In 1917, the
messianic Orthodox policies of Tsarist Russia ended with the February
and October revolutions.
As a result of the collapse of the Russian Empire, independent and democratic states such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia in the South
Caucasus were formed on May 27–28, 1918, but problems arose when drawing the national borders between these countries. Likewise, the migration
engineering policy of Tsarist Russia in the South Caucasus up to the early
twentieth century had turned the region into a minefeld between the
Muslim and Christian communities. This situation led to brief border wars
between Azerbaijan and Armenia as well as between Georgia and Armenia.
The Ottoman Empire, Germany, and Britain attempted to ward off the
Georgia–Armenia War in 1919 and the Azerbaijan–Armenia War a year
later. Subsequently, under the infuence of Soviet Russia, the coming to
power of Bolshevik governments in Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1920 and

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the establishment of Soviet Socialist Republics drew the respective national
borders (Jamil, 2011).
Tsarist Russia and Soviet Russia shared a messianic foreign policy ideology. Messianism among the Soviets was fed by Marxist ideology and aimed
to bring the October Revolution to the east, in order to save the working
class. Before bringing the revolution to the peoples living in the Caucasus,
Iran, Central Asia, and Turkey, that is to the south of Russia, and to the east
of Europe, it was necessary to lay the foundations for the process leading to
the socialist revolution by supporting the bourgeois revolution as emphasized by Lenin. For realizing these plans, after the Bolsheviks took power
in Baku, Azerbaijan was where the Turkish Communist and Justice parties
affliated with Iran were established. Likewise, the aim of the Congress of
the Peoples of the East, held in Baku on September 1–17, 1920, was to introduce Iran and Turkey to the principles of Soviet Russia’s October Revolution
(Suzdaltsev, 2020, s. 57–58). Moscow’s support for the War of Independence
led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his allies was followed by developments
such as the addressing of the Ankara Grand National Assembly, which was
established in Turkey in 1920. It should be noted that the anti-British discourse expressed by Atatürk, who was leader of the Ankara Grand National
Assembly during this period, refected that of Soviet Russia, both geopolitically and ideologically (Hirst, 2013, s. 214–215). Settled in the South Caucasus since 1920, Soviet Russia determined the boundaries of the region
with the Moscow and Kars Treaties, as signed with the Grand National
Assembly of Turkey in 1921 (Topal, 2018, s. 323).
The expansionist policies of Russia, constructed over territorial space in
Byzantine lands with the Orthodox Christian identity in the geopolitical
mind, led to the emergence and sealing of social representations such as
the ‘Transcaucasia,’ ‘backyard,’ and ‘near abroad’ doctrines in the foreign
policy (Hale, 2003, s. 193–194).

The Soviet Union’s Periphery Policy and
the Nagorno-Karabakh Confict
Socio-ethnic conficts between the peoples deepened in the Soviet Union,
which began to dissolve with the socio-economic foundations of ‘Glasnost’
and ‘Perestroika’ reforms, as initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985.
Especially at the periphery of Soviet Russia, in regions such as Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh in the South Caucasus, socio-ethnic
discriminatory movements damaged the spirit of friendship and unity between
the peoples. By 1987, the tension between Azerbaijanis and Armenians in
Armenia (in its region) and then the forced migration of Azerbaijanis to
Azerbaijan, and the Sumgait, Baku, and Gancha incidents that took place
on February 27, 1988, manifested itself by triggering the discriminatory
and independence movement of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh (Waal,
2005, s. 40–41). The tensions had always been there, since the Soviet era

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began seven decades earlier but now rapidly shifting sentiments in the region
brought the dormant tensions quickly to the fore.
It should also be taken into account that the nationalist and ethnic movements, which hastened the collapse of the Soviet Union, embodied cultural
and class dimensions. Although Soviet Union ideology was predicated on
erasing class distinctions and resolving class contradictions, the formation
of new Soviet elites as a class had progressively widened economic and cultural gaps for the more than 70 years spanning the Soviet era. The paradox
had never been treated: the insensitivity of the central elite hegemony to the
peripheries within the union countries and the rampant frequency of inequalities set the formula for the invigorated nationalist wave. The fact that
the Soviet Union was governed from Moscow and had received information
about the developments in Karabakh from the administrations of Armenia
and Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republics, which were members of the
union, prevented a timely proportional response to the potential existential
problems of the USSR. The autonomy status granted to Nagorno-Karabakh
by the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic in 1923 was ratifed 13 years
later in the new Constitution of the Soviet Union, which stipulated the
autonomy of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Administration
(Nagorno Karabakhskaya Avtonomnaya Oblast (NKAO)) in this region.
Khankendi (Stenapakert) was the capital city of Nagorno-Karabakh, with
an area of about 44,000 square meters. The majority of the population of
Nagorno-Karabakh, that is 80%, comprised ethnic Armenians. Likewise,
during this period, Armenians were settled not only in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan but also in Baku and other regions (Ponomarov,
2010, стр. 208).
On February 20, 1988, the Armenian nationalist movement demanded the
People’s Assembly accept a declaration for the separation of NKAO from
the Soviet Union administration and Azerbaijan (SSR) and its unifcation
with Armenia (SSR) (Barsegov, 2008, p. 665). While the Armenian Soviet
administration viewed this request positively, the Headquarters of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union rejected the demands of the NKAO
and the Armenian SSR. There appears to have been several reasons for this.
First, this request by NKAO surprised Moscow because the central government already has set precedent on border or land changes. Examples
include the addition of territory to North Ossetia in 1944, the transfer of
the Crimean region from Soviet Russia to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954, and
the Kalmyk Region becoming an autonomous oblast in 1957 (Markedonov,
2018, s. 129–130). Thus, changes were always initiated by the Central Committee of the Soviet Union or its leaders.
The acceptance of such a declaration by the people’s assembly of the
NKAO in 1988 and its presentation to Moscow was a novelty. The Soviet
Union’s desire to preserve the status quo by remaining indecisive in the face
of this request originated from the concern that similar ideas would spread to
other regions. This concern was shown not to be unfounded by the emergence

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of the desire of the Socialist Autonomous region of Abkhazia to leave Georgia (SSR) in 1989 (Markedonov, 2018, s. 131). Moscow’s status quo attitude
did not solve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, but, at the same time, it should
be emphasized that the reason the Nagorno-Karabakh confict was seen as a
problem between Azerbaijan and Armenia, not between Baku and Khankendi
alone, was that Yerevan had actively supported the confict since 1988 and its
attitude towards the unifcation of these lands with Armenia (SSR). Likewise,
the main purpose of the separatist movement among Armenians living in
Nagorno-Karabakh was not to be independent but to realize the ‘Miatsum’2
ideal for Armenia (SSR) (Miarka, 2019, s. 43–44). It would be wrong to ignore
the open support for Nagorno-Karabakh’s desire to unite with Armenia by
Yerevan and to regard the Nagorno-Karabakh issue as an Azerbaijani internal confict. Moscow could not ignore the calls from the Armenian SSR and
the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh to the central administration
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other institutions for unifcation. Another important issue was that Nagorno-Karabakh was seen as
part of the solution for the current problem. The reason why Azerbaijan and
Russia did not see the Armenian Enclave as a side in this confict was that the
Armenian SSR had a leading role.
Soon after, Gorbachev addressed the Karabakh issue by calling Yerevan and
sending his advisor K. Brutents, who was an ethnic Armenian, to Khankendi.
The Karabakh issue was discussed at a Politburo session in Moscow. “We got
information about the position of both leaders. Azerbaijani leader Kamran
Bagirov [1982–1988] insisted on Moscow’s guarantees regarding the unchanging status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian leader Karen Demirchyan suggested examining the decision” (Gorbachev, 1996, s. 333–340). At the meetings
of the Supreme Councils of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Soviet Union, it
was understood that the request of the NKAO Regional People’s Assembly
and the arguments of Baku and Yerevan on this issue should be evaluated by
Moscow, as Gorbachev recalls (Gorbachev, 1996, s. 335).
While the protests for the unifcation of Karabakh continued, Demirchyan,
then president of the Armenian SSR, stated that the borders would not
change due to Moscow’s desire to preserve the status quo, and that if they
did it would harm the friendship between the peoples. Meanwhile, at the
Politburo on February 29, 1988, Gorbachev reiterated that the status quo
with regard to Karabakh was correct and he emphasized that the demonstrations in Armenia were peaceful (Waal, 2005, s. 49). On the same date,
Gorbachev published a call to the peoples of Azerbaijan and Armenia, urging peace be sustained.
At the same time, Gorbachev met with advisor Georgiy Shakhnazarov,
Silva Kaputikyan, and Armenian intellectual Zori Balayan. By examining this meeting using different sources, in his book entitled Black Garden,
Thomas de Waal writes that Balayan and Kaputikyan pressured Gorbachev
to change his position by tapping into Russian reservations about the fate
of the geopolitical map, as viewed through the threats of pan-Turkist and

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346 Orhan Gafarli
pan-Turanian theses. which originated in Turkey. In addition, Kaputikyan’s
relationship with Gorbachev’s wife, Raisa Gorbacheva, is also noted.
Shakhnazarov also stressed the need to raise the status of the NKAO
rather than allow it to merge with Armenia (Waal, 2005, s. 96). Although
Shakhnazarov was a Karabakh Armenian, his position as an intellectual
was more oriented toward his party than other considerations.
Shakhnazarov’s proposal was taken seriously in Moscow and on May
28, 1988, work started on a new constitution for the Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Region within the borders of Azerbaijan. As Waal emphasized, the new president of Nagorno-Karabakh, Khenrikh Pogasyan, had
already formed the new constitution in his mind. The region would have
almost the same status as the countries in the union (Waal, 2005, s. 96).
The status conferred upon Nagorno-Karabakh within the borders of
Azerbaijan suggested that Khankendi would continue to have political contact with Moscow and would be supported economically by it. Gorbachev
and his entourage believed that the Azerbaijani–Armenian confict could be
ended by identifying mutual economic benefts. The Karabakh Committee,
formed by Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh, however, disrupted
Moscow’s plans and set out to free the region from Azerbaijan’s control. The
political and nationalist discourse articulated by the Karabakh Committee
in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh also excluded those Armenian politicians and intellectuals who tolerated Azerbaijan. Opposing this committee
would expose Armenians to the risk of being lynched. The Moscow central
committee, trying to prevent the process from spiraling out of control,
appointed Arkadiy Volskiy to Nagorno-Karabakh for a tenure of six
months (Waal, 2005, s. 102–103). However, these efforts by Moscow to solve
the Nagorno-Karabakh problem were fruitless. Between 1988 and 1990,
conficts continued to erupt between both communities.
On January 12, 1989, a meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR was held, chaired by Gorbachev. In a report of this meeting,
it was accepted that “in order to prevent further deterioration of ethnic
relations and to stabilize the situation in this region, it was deemed appropriate to temporarily introduce a special form of government by the
Presidency of the Supreme Soviet in accordance with the Constitution of
the USSR.” It was also underlined that the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region should maintain its status as such within the Azerbaijan SSR
(Barsegov, 2008, pp. 670–71). Nevertheless, by the 1990s, it became more
diffcult for the Soviet Union to maintain status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The replacement by Abdurrahman Vezirov (1988–90) due to
the poor health of the Azerbaijan Central Committee Chairman Bagirov
set off a competition between political groups in Baku that emboldened
them to act aggressively. Despite the fact that the Azerbaijan People’s
Front, which was established in 1988, comprised social democratic and nationalist groups, nationalists managed to control the political agenda The
Soviet Union attempted to provide support regarding the Karabakh issue

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in order to prevent the Popular Front from coming to power in Azerbaijan
and to keep the central administration in Baku alive. While the USSR offered this support, it should not have ignored Armenia. Although Moscow
tried to maintain the delicate balance between Baku and Yerevan, it was
not successful. In 1989–1990, the Azerbaijan People’s Front strengthened,
as it organized massive protests and strikes against the central administration in Baku. These actions, led by Abulfaz Elcibey, produced anti-Armenian rhetoric that resonated in the country, despite Moscow’s efforts to
maintain relations with the current leadership of the Azerbaijan SSR and
prevent the leaders of the Popular Front Movement from gaining political power in Baku. The USSR Central Committee intervened to stop the
People’s Front’s protests. On January 20, 1990, additional Soviet troops
entered Baku to stop the protests, which accelerated the division between
the Central Committee of the Soviet Union and the Azerbaijani political
elite. Ayaz Mutellibov (1990–92), who was in power in the Azerbaijan SSR
at the time, saw relations with Moscow as signifcant and tried to keep communication lines open. Between April 30 and May 15, 1991, Mutellibov and
Boris Yeltsin carried out the ‘Ring’ military operation (Операция Кольцо)
to ensure Moscow’s support for the administration in Baku. The Russian
SFSR stood by Azerbaijan and tried to oppose Armenian nationalists in
Karabakh (Nebolsina, 2019, s. 156).
In 1988–1991, the status quo policy of the Soviet Union and later the
Russian SFSR regarding Karabakh was sustained, although the new
Russian Federation moved to try to resolve the confict seriously within its
frst year of existence. Boris Yeltsin (1990–1999), together with the head of
Kazakhstan SSR, Nursultan Nazarbayev (1991–2019), attempted to mediate
and establish conditions for normalization. Yeltsin and Nazarbayev visited
Baku and then Khankendi and Yerivan. On September 23, 1991, a joint declaration was made in the city of Zheleznovodsk in the North Caucasus with
representatives from Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian enclave,
and Azerbaijan participating (Gasanova, 2018, s. 217). Parallel to these
meetings, after the independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan on September
21 and October 18, 1991, respectively, the confict in Karabakh erupted
into a full-scale war. Russia tried to step up mediation: “The parties have
requested to establish a ceasefre in order to create the necessary conditions
for the resolution of the confict before January 1, 1992, to stop all unconstitutional actions of Azerbaijan and Armenia against Nagorno-Karabakh, to
recognize the powers of legitimate authorities, and to withdraw all armed
formations from the confict zone” (Gasımlı, 2010, s. 198–99). The parties agreed to a peacekeeping group comprising representatives of Russia
and Kazakhstan in the confict zone. This group was expected to start on
October 1, 1999.
However, these attempts failed and the process collapsed after the
observers in the Karabakh region died in a helicopter crash. Azerbaijan
and Armenia accused each other of shooting down the helicopter. The local

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Armenian-led Nagorno-Karabakh earlier declared its independence on
September 2, 1991 (Melik-Shakhnazarov, 2018, s. 142). With the failure of
the Russian SRSC’s peace talks in 1991 and the declaration of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the agenda changed for Moscow.

The First Nagorno-Karabakh War
With the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
through the Belovezhskaya Accord by the Russian Federation, Belarus, and
Ukraine, a new form of regional cooperation emerged. Russia’s aim was to
ease the pain of the Soviet Union’s collapse but also to assure some form
of presence in territory that it once controlled. Azerbaijan and Armenia
joined this union in hopes of attracting Moscow to their respective position.
However, attempts by the Armenian administration in Nagorno-Karabakh
to join the new union were rejected. The Russian Federation did not abandon its status quo policy. Given the possibility of similar problems arising
in other states in the CIS, none of them had the intention of aligning with
Armenia or the Armenian administration in Nagorno-Karabakh.
In 1992, peace and ceasefre negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh
confict were occurring beyond the USSR or regional level by involving the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (Zourabian,
2006, s. 254). On March 24, 1992, the CSCE3 convened in Helsinki with
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Germany, Italy, France, the US, Turkey, the
Czech, and Slovak Federal Republic, Sweden, and Russia attending, thereby
making the Karabakh negotiation process an international endeavor. During
the 1992–1994 Karabakh War, relations deteriorated between Azerbaijan
and Russia. Russia’s 366th motorized infantry regiment, which was stationed
in Khojaly, supported the Karabakh Armenian separatist forces. That support resulted in the Khojaly massacre of Azerbaijanis on February 25, 1992
(Goltz, 1998, 125). Ayaz Müttelibov fell from power after the Khojaly massacre and was replaced by Abulfez Elchibey. The pro-Russian groups lost
the power they had in Azerbaijani domestic politics. As a result of domestic politics in Azerbaijan, Russia implicitly supported Armenia in Karabakh. In 1993, the failure of the Elchibey government to manage the confict
and political pressures at home and the temporary appointment of Heydar
Aliyev as the head of the parliament did not prevent Azerbaijan losing territory, but it did ensure a ceasefre. Within two years, Azerbaijan had lost
seven regions in and around Nagorno-Karabakh: Kalbajar, Lachin, Fuzili,
Aghdam, Jabrayil, Gubadli, and Zengilan. By supporting the Armenian
administration in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia also had managed to create a security buffer encircling these seven regions. Finally, a ceasefre was
signed by the defense ministers of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Armenian
government in Nagorno-Karabakh under Russia’s mediation in Bishkek on
May 12, 1994.

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The Russian Federation’s Mediation Policy: From the First
Karabakh War to the Second
It should be emphasized that Russia supported bringing the Karabakh
confict that emerged between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1992 to the
attention of the OSCE. As stated by the Russian representative of the OSCE
Minsk Group, Vladimir Kazimorov, the reason why Russian Foreign
Minister Andrei Kozyrev favored seeking a solution to the Karabakh problem through the OSCE was that he did not believe that the Minsk Group
would be closely interested in this problem or would try to solve it. This
issue would ultimately be left to Russia, but the fnancial support needed to
solve this problem could also be obtained from the OSCE (Kazimirov, 2009,
s. 36). However, the strategy Kozyrev planned would not work as he had
intended. In particular, the US policy of expansion into the region within
the framework of Clinton’s foreign policy doctrine would begin to take
shape. Azerbaijan’s rich energy resources in the Caspian Sea and its possibility of becoming a transit corridor between Asia and Europe in the South
Caucasus heightened US interest in this region and made it necessary to
ensure stability for the sake of investments by transnational energy companies (Zarifan, 2015, s. 4–5). Azerbaijan decided to develop closer economic
cooperation with the West.
On September 7, 1992, the Azerbaijani government signed an agreement
with British Petroleum (BP) and Statoil concerning the possible development of the Guneshli, Chirag, and Shah Deniz oil felds. On October 1,
1992, similar agreements were signed with Pennzoil and Ramco Oil Services
(Ipek, 2009, 231). In June 1993, additional agreements were planned to be
signed at a general meeting with oil and gas multinational company representatives. It is no coincidence that with the establishment of the TRASECA
intergovernmental commission in 1993, which includes the former Soviet as
well as EU countries, a platform was created for building upon transportation, trade, and energy relations between Asia and Europe (Gafarli, 2021).
Communication and transportation between Central Asia and Europe
through the South Caucasus and projects to help preserve stability and
peace in the region were discussed while bypassing the Russian Federation.
It had become necessary to establish a ceasefre in Nagorno-Karabakh to
facilitate the exploitation of the natural gas and oil resources in Azerbaijan
and their sales abroad. After Abulfaz Elchibey4 (1992–93), who was in power
for a year, left his post in 1993, and chair of the parliament, Heydar Aliyev5
(1993–2003), was elected president, it became a priority for Azerbaijan to
mend relations with Russia and to invite Western companies to invest in
energy resources. Meanwhile, the fact that Russia facilitated a ceasefre
between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1994 and that it was the only country that could assist in the negotiations carried out within the framework
of the OSCE Minsk Group showed that Moscow was poised as a primary

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infuential power in the region. Contrary to Kozyrev’s expectations, the US
and European countries were seeking to expand their infuence in the region
and drive Russia from the project. Kazyrov had premised his expectations
on the pledges for a non-expansionist policy in the region that the US had
articulated to the Kremlin.
After the ceasefre was achieved with the signatures of the defense ministries of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the administration in Nagorno-Karabakh
in 1994, the sustainability of Russia’s infuence in the South Caucasus in the
eyes of the Western countries was seen as dangerous. Therefore, the OSCE
Minsk Group and Turkey, as expressed by Kazimirov, were expected to play
a larger role in this process. The US was concerned that in the short term
the Russian peacekeeping force could be deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh
as part of its policy of expanding into the South Caucasus. Likewise, immediately after the ceasefre between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1994, both
countries cooperated with NATO, abiding by the framework of The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. As a result of this program, NATO and
OSCE activity in the South Caucasus expanded.
Also, it should be noted that Russia was uncomfortable with US involvement in the region and the sense of humiliation regarding Moscow’s role in
setting the ceasefre. Moscow’s request to representatives of the confict to reinforce their commitments to the ceasefre every three months stemmed from
the need to remind regularly that this process had been achieved through
Russian mediation (Kazimirov, 2009). Moreover, Kazimirov, in an interview
with a Moscow newspaper, criticized the Minsk Group, following the instructions of Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev (Kazimirov, 2009, s. 219).
What is interesting is that in the same year Kozyrev described the role of
the OSCE in his article in Foreign Affairs, stating, “The OSCE should have
the central role in transforming the Post Confrontational system of Euro
Atlantic cooperation into a truly stable, democratic regime” (Kozyrev, 1994,
65). However, Kozyrev also notes an important problem from the Russian
point of view.
As for NATO, the ‘PfP’ proposal achieved the aim of bringing Russia
closer to the alliance for the time being. But, this program was not
intended to stimulate NATO-centrism among the alliance’s policymakers or NATO-mania among candidates [impatiently waiting] for
membership. Both were seeking proof that the Russian government was
allegedly changing its foreign policy to suit its nationalist opposition.
(Kozyrev, 1994, 65)
Reading between the lines, Kozyrev wanted to signal that Russia closely
monitored the activities of the West in the region and regarded NATO’s
activities in its sphere of infuence negatively
As Kozyrev emphasized, the internationalization of the Karabakh
confict and the activation of economic, cultural, and military relations

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between the US and European countries in 1994–1996 in order to reduce
the infuence of Russia in the South Caucasus motivated nationalist changes
in Russian foreign policy. In 1996, Kozyrev was removed from his post
and was replaced by Yevgeniy Primakov, the head of the Russian Foreign
Intelligence Bureau. Primakov had previously been nominated as a member
of the Soviet Union Politburo and became President of the Oriental Studies
and World Economy and International Relations Institutes at the Russian
Academy of Sciences. His appointment signaled the end of the liberal era in
Russian politics and the beginning of one in which more national interests
were pursued. Likewise, the appointment of Primakov as minister of foreign
affairs of Russia showed how Kozyrev prescient was two years prior.
After Primakov’s appointment, the most important action to be taken by
Azerbaijan was to remove his name from the list of criminals involved in
the ‘Black January incidents of January 20, 1990. Primakov was convicted
of ordering the entry of the Alliance Army into the Azerbaijan SSR, which
resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people. Heydar Aliyev’s removal of
Primakov provided an opportunity to normalize relations between Moscow
and Baku (Kazimirov, 2009). Similarly, in 1994–1996, Russia had struggled
to maintain the balance between Azerbaijan and Armenia. It was expected
that Azerbaijan would rapidly open up to the world energy market after
the ceasefre and would achieve economical/political stability. Azerbaijan
was also expected to strengthen its relations with the US and European
countries and deepen the ties of friendship and brotherhood with Turkey to
refect a cordial bilateral relationship.
Primakov sought to articulate his concern about the Nagorno-Karabakh
issue, the region’s most important problem, by visiting the South Caucasus. In order to maintain Russia’s preservation of infuence in the region,
it was seen as essential to visit Baku, Khankendi, and Yerevan. In 1996,
Russia sought to sustain its position by exchanging prisoners in Azerbaijan,
Nagorno-Karabakh, and Armenia. We still do not know exactly whether
or not Primakov had come from his role as head of Russian foreign intelligence with a clear picture of the region, or if it was a gesture of gratitude
for Heydar Aliyev’s decision to expunge Primakov’s charges for the 1990
incident.
The transportation of Azerbaijani prisoners from Nagorno-Karabakh
and Armenia to Baku on May 8, 1996, on Heydar Aliyev’s birthday, was a
turning point in Russia’s regional policy. After meetings with Aliyev and the
foreign minister at that time, Hasan Hasanov, Primakov deemed it appropriate that the statement be made after the prisoner exchange be presented
bilaterally by Aliyev and Petrosyan. It was thanks to Russia that Yerevan
was not regarded as a party in the dispute fve years later, despite the pressure exerted by the administrative head of Nagorno-Karabakh, Robert
Kocaryan (Kazimirov, 2009). Primakov’s acceptance of Aliyev’s request
was the most prominent diplomatic victory Baku had achieved after the
First Karabakh War.

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If we examine relations between Azerbaijan and Russia by comparing the
periods of Kozyrev and Primakov, we can see the shift in favor of Baku. In
1992–1994, coinciding with the period of Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev,
chaos prevailed in Azerbaijani domestic politics and relations with Moscow
were severely strained. A few months after the ceasefre between Azerbaijan
and Armenia in 1994, the First Chechen War erupted in the North Caucasus,
where Russia faced a separatist movement. With the coming to power of
Primakov in 1996, the ongoing Chechen War coincided with the shift of
Russia’s attitude towards Azerbaijan. Likewise, there was support, due in
part to a transit line from Turkey to Chechnya through Azerbaijan and
Georgia. At the same time, while Russia was contending with the Chechen
issue, it also was paradoxical for Russia to pursue a policy associated
with the opposite intentions against Azerbaijan and Armenia. Thus, from
Kazyrov to Primakov, we can surmise that the change in Russia’s Karabakh
policy is linked to the internal dynamics of Russia and the events in the
North Caucasus. In addition, the fact that Primakov and Aliyev both were
former Soviet era leaders provided opportunities for mutual understanding.
It is necessary to consider both factors and compare and evaluate them.

Russia’s Role in Mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan
within the Context of the OSCE ‘Minsk Group’
In 1996, at the Lisbon summit of the OSCE, a declaration to ensure the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan was accepted (Milanova, 2003, s. 11). Along
with the four resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council concerning
the Karabakh confict, Azerbaijan’s diplomatic hand was strengthened in
international public opinion. In the same year, Azerbaijan also registered
a diplomatic victory with the aid of Russia, the most important supporter
of Armenia, as a result of which the administration in Nagorno-Karabakh
was no longer considered a party to the confict. In 1997, based on the principles of the OSCE Lisbon summit, a peace plan was proposed concerning
the gradual return of Azerbaijani lands, excluding Nagorno-Karabakh and
the Lachin corridor, within the framework of the ‘step-by-step’ peace plan
(Ziyadov, 2010, s. 114–115). This peace plan would later be announced in
2009 as the Madrid Principles by the OSCE.
Along with the diplomatic negotiations conducted within the context
of the OSCE serious changes were occurring in Armenia’s domestic policy. In 1998, Robert Kocaryan, who was elected as Armenian president,
took a pro-Russian line, focused on eliminating the problems in political
relations between Moscow and Yerevan and developing military cooperation, knowing that Russia was the reason why the administration in
Nagorno-Karabakh had been excluded from the talks. In the same year,
the Minsk Group proposed a ‘common state’ model to Azerbaijan and
Armenia for solving the confict (Ismailzade, 2011, s. 3). According to this
scenario, Nagorno-Karabakh would become a state with equal status

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within the Azerbaijan Republic (Pokalova, 2015, s. 75), thereby meaning that
Azerbaijan would maintain its integrity by uniting with Nagorno-Karabakh
as a federation. Likewise, as a similar model, the ‘state within the state’
model had been proposed earlier (in 1989) by recommending that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh be amended with a new constitution. Of course,
then, it was envisaged that Khankendi was to be given almost the same
degree of communication and representation status as Baku by the central
government of the Soviet Union.
Following the terrorist attack in the Armenian parliament on October 27,
1999, negotiations between Baku and Yerevan were halted. After Kocaryan
came to power in Armenia, he precipitated the “Karabakhization” of
Armenian internal policy (Ziyadov, 2010, s. 116). Bilateral talks on priority issues discussed between Petrosyan and Aliyev were omitted from the
agenda. Moreover, Kocharyan’s efforts to secure Moscow’s continued participation in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks did not yield satisfactory
results.
There were similar changes in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Russia.
In 1998, Igor Ivanov was appointed as the new foreign minister while Primakov continued to serve as prime minister. At the end of 1999, Yeltsin left
offce due to health reasons and was replaced by Vladimir Putin, the prime
minister. During this period, Russia also faced the Second Chechen War
and naturally turned its attention to the North Caucasus. Thus, Russia was
unable to devote suffcient time to problems in the South Caucasus.
However, the emphasis on the CIS in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept
adopted in 2000 showed that Moscow eventually would return to the geopolitics of the South Caucasus. This foreign policy concept was interpreted
as: “If we touch on the difference in Russian foreign policy from the previous period, we can say that realism is in frst place,” as stated by then
Foreign Minister Ivanov (Ivanov, 2002, s. 121). Subsequently, Ivanov defned
realism as follows: “Evaluating own possibilities, determining clear goals
and realistic view of the international situation” (Ivanov, 2002, s. 121).
Kozyrev tried to present the new Russian foreign policy in the context
of the interests of his own state, rather than in the context of the idealist
or international community interest of the time. Within the CIS framework, Moscow aimed not only to develop economic and political integration relations but also to establish military alliances (Ivanov, 2002, s. 129).
Similarly, Ivanov referred to a more realistic foreign policy in relations with
the former Soviet countries as required by the interests of the state. As seen
from Ivanov’s assessments, Russia aimed to focus on a more realistic policy
and, predictably, on the protection of geopolitical interests in the region.
To achieve all this, the priority for Russia was to end the war in the North
Caucasus. Likewise, when we look at the reasons why the Second Chechen
War lasted so long, the preparation and training of Chechen troops in the
Pankisi region of Georgia and the treatment of wounded Chechen soldiers
in Azerbaijan were important issues that disturbed Russia. Ending the civil

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war in the North Caucasus was possible with the support of Georgia and
Azerbaijan by exerting tighter border controls. As noted earlier, Tsarist
Russia also considered it geopolitically important to dominate the South
Caucasus in order to suppress the uprisings that broke out under the leadership of Imam Shamil in the North Caucasus.
Between 1998 and 2000, a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh confict
and the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the seven regions around
it were on the agenda of the Western states interested in integrating the
South Caucasus into the Trans-Atlantic region. Azerbaijan agreed with
Western energy companies on the construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan
oil pipeline, known as the ‘contract of the century,’ and operations of the
mines (Aras, 2006, s. 41–42). Furthermore, in 2001, when the presidents of
Azerbaijan and Armenia met under the auspices of the Minsk Group in Key
West, Florida, the ‘land swap’ scenario prepared in Paris was proposed for
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh confict (Huseynov, 2010, s. 15).
Meanwhile, Armenia could not turn the military victory it achieved in
the South Caucasus to its advantage at the diplomatic table. Azerbaijan’s
energy transportation to Europe through Georgia and Turkey, investments
in the transportation sector, and its role in the realization of international
projects such as TRACECA (the international transport program involving the European Union and 12 member states of the Eastern European,
Caucasian, and Central Asian region) were drawing the West’s attention.
These projects brought Azerbaijan closer to the political elites in the Western capitals of Paris, Berlin, London, and Washington. On the other hand,
political instability in Armenia and the civil war in Russia involving the
North Caucasus continued with little momentum for reconciliation.
The plan, as orchestrated by American diplomat Paul Goble, was compatible with the ‘step-by-step’ peace plan proposed previously within the OSCE
framework. However, it also suggested a territorial change. The frst stage of
the plan was to gradually resolve the problem by revising and remapping the
Lachin–Kalbajar corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia
and the corridor connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan (Huseynov, 2010,
s. 10–11). Such a corridor change, that is, the opening up of land transportation between Azerbaijan and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic and
similar transportation security between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh,
suggested the potential for achieving geopolitical trust in the short and
medium term. Predictably, this plan prepared in the West and the opening up of land transportation between Turkey and the region mainly would
disturb Russia. Such a land exchange would lead to a change in borders,
as drawn by the Moscow Treaty signed by the Soviet Union and Turkey in
1921. The change in the geopolitical composition of the South Caucasus,
which had lasted for nearly nine decades, would adversely affect Russia’s
regional policy interests. Although this agreement might appear positive for
Azerbaijan in terms of its relations with Turkey and the West, it also engendered a threat to Heydar Aliyev’s power regarding Karabakh’s future in the

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medium and long term and in the absence of a clear timetable for the evacuation of the seven Azerbaijani regions occupied by Armenia. Due to this
agreement, the Aliyev administration was accused of treason by the rising
voices of the Azerbaijani political opposition. Thus, Baku refused to sign
this agreement, so as not to upset Russia, on the one hand, and to refute the
accusations of the Popular Front in Azerbaijan on the other.

Russia’s View of the 2001 Key West Summit and the ‘Land
Swap’ Peace Plan
The failure of the Key West summit in 2001 did not mean that the roles in
the Karabakh confict for France and the US, member states of the Minsk
Group, had diminished. Over time, France stood as Europe’s representative in the region within the Minsk Group. But, Putin, who came to power
in Russia in 2000, reverted to policies for ending the Chechen Civil War,
accelerating the integration processes with the CIS countries, and stopping
NATO’s expansion into the region.
On October 7, 2002, Russia endeavored to maintain its military presence
in the region by establishing the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) with seven former Soviet countries. According to the Foreign Policy
Security Concept adopted by Russia, the region was defned as ‘near abroad’
and its strategic importance was highlighted (Weinstein, 2007, s. 167–168).
As emphasized in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation in
2000, 2008, and 2013, Russia aimed to develop its relations with the countries in the region both bilaterally and within the framework of the CIS.
Since the 2000s, major steps have been taken to improve relations between
Russia and Armenia. The roles that Putin and Kocaryan played in the rapprochement of the two countries were momentous. While Armenia provided
security within the framework of the CSTO, it was also trying to establish
bilateral military cooperation with Russia. After 2000, the presence of the
Russian army in Armenia made Yerevan the only ally of Moscow in the
region. While Azerbaijan was scaling down military and security relations
with Russia, Armenia was trying to boost the Russian presence within its
borders. The South Caucasus was being propelled towards the emergence
of geopolitical polarization. In the 2000s, economic, political, and military
relations were established between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey; cooperation between Russia, Armenia, and Iran was the most important counterpoint to this.
After George W. Bush became US president in 2001, the wave of Color
Revolutions broke out in the former Soviet region. One of the frst countries to catch this wave was Georgia in 2003. Mikhail Saakashvili, who
came to power after the Color Revolution, quickly oriented his country
towards the West. Following the death of Heydar Aliyevin 2003, his son
Ilham Aliyev took power in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, in 2002, after Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the Justice and Development Party, came to

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power in Turkey as prime minister, Western-oriented policies expanded in
the region. It was clear that further development of the relationship between
Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia would unsettle Russia. In light of these
developments, the shifting of the European Union’s relations with the
countries of the region to a new level within the framework of the Eastern
Partnership (2009) led to Russia’s infuence in the South Caucasus being
diminished.
In parallel with these geopolitical developments, the Madrid Principles
began to take shape with clearer proposals in terms of timing and solution, but not that much different from the ‘step-by-step’ and ‘package’ plans
prepared within the framework of the Minsk Group in 2007. The Madrid
Plan emerged as a result of two-year diplomatic negotiations that had commenced in 2005, mostly led by France, a member of the OSCE Minsk Group
(Gasımlı, 2010, s. 216). Prior to the meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan
and Armenia to be held in Paris, information about the content of the
Madrid Principles was announced in the Armenian press without revealing
the source. According to the Madrid Principles, Armenia would evacuate
fve regions around Nagorno-Karabakh that it occupied, and the Lachin
and Kalbajar corridor would be placed under the control of the UN peacekeeping force. The status of Khankendi was to be negotiated in the next
phase. It was envisaged that Azerbaijanis would return to the regions to be
eventually evacuated by Armenia.
At frst glance, the Madrid Principles were perceived as a reasonable
plan for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh confict. However, this plan
included many points problematic for both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Armenia expressed its unease about the lack of defnition of the status of
Nagorno-Karabakh. Nor did Armenia want to evacuate the regions that
were designated as security buffer circles before the status of Nagorno-Karabakh was determined. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, had a clear stance on
the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku emphasized that the independence
of Nagorno-Karabakh could not be discussed in any alternatives. These
negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which had lasted for almost
ten years within the framework of Madrid Principles, were led mostly by
the US and France, and occasionally by Russia, trying to urge the parties
to approach a solution. But, Russia was not disposed towards a solution
to the Karabakh confict in the form of a Western-led peace plan and, as
discussed in the next section, it would propose its own plan similar to the
Madrid Principles.

Russia Returns to the South Caucasus in 2008
The war between Russia and Georgia, which started on August 8, 2008,
signaled that Moscow had changed its approach to its South Caucasus
policy, following another important regional development, which was the
diplomatic process between Turkey and Armenia in the previous year.

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Turkey began negotiations with Serzh Sargsyan during his term as the prime
minister of Armenia and when Sargsyan became president (2008–2018),
negotiations between Armenia and Turkey expanded. Turkey and Russia
were working to increase their infuence in the South Caucasus in various
directions: Russia, with its initiatives post-2008, and Turkey, with the Zurich
Protocols signed to open the border with Armenia in 2009.
Meanwhile, the Zurich Protocols led to deteriorating relations between
Azerbaijan and Turkey (Shiriyev, 2016, 10). Azerbaijan objected to the
reopening of the Turkish–Armenian border, a closure which had opened
the door to the occupation of Kalbajar in 1993. As a result of pressure from
Azerbaijan, Ankara abandoned this plan. Although Russia expressed a
favorable view of the opening of the Turkish–Armenian border, it is likely
that Moscow and Baku were negotiating behind the scenes to establish
their own accord, which aggravated Azerbaijan’s unease about its relations with both countries and potential conficts and contradictions. The
opening of the Turkish–Armenian border for Azerbaijan could risk the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict spinning out of Azerbaijan’s control and
Armenia fnally emerging from its regional isolation Likewise, Aliyev
envisioned that Azerbaijan’s strategy of isolating Armenia regarding the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue required Turkey’s support. To reiterate, the
Russian–Georgian War in 2008 and attempts to open the Armenian–Turkish border in 2009 presented a fresh tactical convergence for Azerbaijan
and Russia. In addition, Azerbaijan’s objection to the project calling for
natural gas from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to be transported to Europe
via NABUCCO pleased Russia. According to Wikileaks documents, Aliyev
expressed his unease to Turkey’s energy minister Taner Yildiz about the
implications of the NABUCCO natural gas pipeline (Düven, 2010). As a
result, Turkey renounced its open border policy with Armenia, the crisis
between Ankara and Baku ended, and the pre-existing geopolitical dialog
in bilateral relations was reestablished.
As of 2008, with Russia’s increased presence in the South Caucasus after
the war with Georgia, Aliyev moved on the Karabakh problem in order
to improve his international image as peacemaker (Hirose, 2014, s. 13).
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (2008–2012) and later Putin, who was
elected president in 2012, initiated numerous meetings with the presidents
of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Sochi. As seen in the Wikileaks documents
concerning Aliyev’s meetings with foreign diplomats, Medvedev hoped to
resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh confict just before the end of his presidency.
Aliyev expressed that Medvedev was willing to solve the problem, but Putin
had his own plan regarding this issue so hence mixed signals that prevented
continuity in the ongoing diplomatic process (Hurriyet, 2010).
Under Medvedev’s leadership, the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia
held “10 tête-à-tête meetings over 18 months” (Freizer, 2014, s. 111). According
to Waal, the parties did not agree on many items at the fnal meeting. Azerbaijan did not support the Russian peacekeeping plan and objected to many

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details. For example, Azerbaijan had objections even about the width of the
corridor passing through Lachin and Kalbajar, which connect Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia. Meanwhile, Armenia emphasized that it would not evacuate the occupied areas without a guarantee about Nagorno-Karabakh’s
status (de Waal, 2011). The solution scenario, referred to as the Kazan Principles, agreed upon by the presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia
during Medvedev’s tenure in 2011 and proposed by Lavrov, ultimately failed
(Shiriyev, 2017, 61). It would be accurate to regard the 2011 Kazan peace articles as a mere reworking of the Madrid Principles. But, the important point
to be noted here is that these negotiations, carried out under the auspices of
Russia, started with the Moscow Declaration between Azerbaijan, Armenia,
and Russia in 2008. It was noteworthy that Russia sought to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem under its own leadership and nearly accomplished
it on its own, outside the sphere of the Minsk Group. But, Russia explained
that it still took into account the basic principles of the OSCE Minsk Group,
after every declaration and meeting were accepted in tripartite form.
After Putin returned to the presidency in 2012, the Karabakh issue
remained a priority for Russia, even as trilateral relations between
Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia continued to develop. In 2012, the foreign
ministers of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia met in the city of Trabzon,
which played a symbolic role in 1918 when these countries were on the
path to gaining independence, to sign a declaration of cooperation, which
extended to economic, political, and military dimensions.6
Since 1994, Azerbaijan has tried to avoid political polarization in the region.
This balanced foreign policy strategy, which started under the premiership of
Heydar Aliyev, has continued during his son’s tenure. Ilham Aliyev has always sought to maintain cordial relations with Russia by focusing on the economic dimensions of their relationship. The war between Georgia and Russia
in 2008 reinforced the conviction that political polarization would threaten
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all three states in the region. In particular, Azerbaijan had no desire to endure what Georgia had experienced in
the bitter war with Russia. Thus, in avoiding a climate of polarization, Azerbaijan has attached great importance to its relationships with Europe and the
US Afro purposes of a tactical balance in its relationship with Russia.
The failure of the Zurich Protocols between Turkey and Armenia in 2009
ensured ongoing pressure by Azerbaijan in the confict by maintaining its economic and political blockade on Yerevan. However, the pressure solidifed
Armenia’s ties to Russia, which enabled Moscow to reclaim a hegemonic position in the region. The fact that the Azerbaijani government pursued this intricate balance and supported Armenia’s dependence upon Russia facilitated
a rapprochement between Moscow and Baku. The belief among the Aliyev
government as well as the Azerbaijani political elite for this posturing stems
from acknowledging the near-impossibility of Armenians abandoning Karabakh on their own accord. If Armenia was not going to cede voluntarily the
Azerbaijani territories it had occupied, then Azerbaijan’s position concluded

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that Armenia would be dependent on Russia and a solution to the problem
only could be possible with pressure coming from Moscow.
When Ilham Aliyev came to power in 2003, Azerbaijan’s military budget
was only $175 million. By 2013, it had risen to $3.7 billion. Azerbaijan had
purchased weapons from Israel, South Korea, Turkey, and Russia to fortify
its arsenal. In 2013, Russia sold $1 billion worth of weapons to Azerbaijan.
In 2011–2016, Azerbaijan bought $5 billion worth of weapons from Israel,
including an air defense system. Azerbaijan was also currying cooperation
with Russia to balance its foreign military trade. As Aliyev cited in 2018,
the arms trade volume between Azerbaijan and Russia was worth close
to $5 billion (Chernenko, 2019). The Azerbaijani army had strengthened
its branches with anti-tank missiles, the S-300 air defense system, attack
helicopters, and an unmanned air defense system (Suleymanov, 2013). By
2018, additional foreign trade relations between Azerbaijan and Russia
reached a value of $2.5 billion (Ria Novosti, 2019).
Russia’s intention regarding the development of military cooperation in
its relations with Armenia has not changed during the same period. In the
National Security Strategic Document accepted by Armenia in 2007, it was
envisaged that the military cooperation with Russia would be deepened and
diversifed. In 2010, based on the 1995 military agreement between Russia
with Armenia, the presence of the military bases in Gyumri was extended
until 2044. The provision of Russia’s interests in Article 3 of this agreement was expanded with assurances about sustaining Armenia’s security
(Abrahamyan, 2015). In 2014, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Armenia
worked on their relations in a new framework of integration and cooperation by establishing the Eurasian Economic Union. The economic and
military strengthening of Azerbaijan, as well as the development of its military and commercial relations with Russia, were watched with concern by
Armenia. Russia’s sale of weapons to Armenia—viewed as its strategic military ally in the region—and Azerbaijan’s changing the balance in the region
for its own beneft worried Yerevan, which objected to Moscow for allowing
such a balance to be manifested. In 2016, Russia eased Armenian concerns
with a loan of $200 million so that Yerevan could bolster its military arsenal
(Abrahamyan, 2018). Although Russia attempted to achieve balance in its
policy toward Azerbaijan and Armenia, the arming of both countries and
the sharpened warlike rhetoric expressed by their respective leaders led to
the Four-Day Karabakh War (April 1–4) in 2016. Subsequently, Yerevan
purchased individual night vision and thermal imaging devices, motion
sensors, laser reconnaissance devices, and unmanned aerial vehicles from
Russia, in preparing for a new round of combat.

2016’s Renewed Kazan Principles and the Lavrov Plan
The negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the 2008–2016
period were carried out according to the Madrid Principles. But, the

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two opposing sides could not agree on several issues including a referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh, the evacuation of the seven Azerbaijani districts occupied by Armenia, and peacekeeping operations. The failure of
the peace proposals submitted by both Washington and Paris at meetings
in Washington in 2013, in Sochi on August 10, 2014, in Paris on October
27, 2014, and in Sweden on December 19, 2015 made apparent that a new
war would be fought. The Four-Day War in 2016, as mentioned above,
showed how frozen conficts in the region could rapidly heat up into fullscale hostilities. Subsequently, Azerbaijan regained some strategic points
in Karabakh, showing its encouragement and determination regarding how
decisions taken by the UN Security Council could be carried out, in the
event that the problem was not solved. Russia was aware that whenever a
new Karabakh War would break out, it would have to respond to Armenia’s
demand for support, and that the balance it established between Azerbaijan
and Armenia would be disrupted.
After the Four-Day War, Putin proposed a revised version of the Kazan
model to Aliyev and Sargsyan in Moscow on July 22, 2016. According to
this new model, Armenia would evacuate the seven regions of Azerbaijan
it occupied and Russian peacekeeping forces would be positioned along
the Lachin–Kalbajar corridor in Nagorno-Karabakh. Supposedly then,
the social and economic situation between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the
Karabakh region would improve and the refugees could return to their
homes. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh was to be frozen at least for the
near foreseeable period. To accomplish this plan, Armenia would have
to act and Azerbaijan would have to approve the presence of the Russian
peacekeeping force. But, the opposing parties blamed each other for its
failure, which made nearly certain that another war would eventually be
fought.
In 2018, Armenia’s change in government was unexpected within
the Russian view. Armenia’s transition to a parliamentary system and
Pashinyan’s coming to power as a result of the Color Revolution provided
a historic chance for Aliyev in the race between Baku and Yerevan to bring
Moscow onto its side. Although the Pashinyan government conveyed that
security-based cooperation with Russia would not change, there was a distinct cooling of relations between the two countries. In 2020, Pashinyan
published Armenia’s new national security policy document without changing any of the previous provisions (Khalatyan, 2020). Azerbaijan, sensing
an opening, took initiatives to contribute to regional security and cooperation between Iran and Russia by developing the north–south transportation
route project in order to expand the economic dimension of its relations
with Russia (Gafarli, 2021).
After the Russo-Turkish crisis in Syria in 2016 triggered by Turkey’s shooting down of a Russian plane, bilateral relations between Turkey and Russia
were restored and developed through strategic energy projects such as the
Turkish Movement and Akkuyu Nuclear stations and Ankara’s purchase of

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the Russian S-400 air defense system. This rapprochement between Turkey
and Russia, as well as a mutual solution-oriented attitude expressed by both
parties on bilateral and regional issues, favored Azerbaijan. Viewing the
administration in Armenia as Western oriented or as the second Saakashvili
form (echoing a Georgia) or the Maidan case in Ukraine could translate to
the possibility that Russia would not be so supportive of Armenia in any
new Karabakh War. Thus, Azerbaijan was able to encircle Armenia politically in the South Caucasus in addition to the ongoing economic blockade.
The 44-day Second Karabakh War that broke out in October 2020 arose
from a deconstructive approach Armenia had taken to attempt resolving the
Nagorno-Karabakh problem, along with its refusal to accept the Madrid
Principles or the Lavrov plan of 2016, the distance in discussions between
the Armenian and Russian political administrations, and the harassing use
of armed fre by the NKAO in the occupied territory. The Second Karabakh
War, as argued for by the Azerbaijani side, was aimed at self-defense against
the harassment of shooting as well as to reclaim the occupied territories.
Considering the geopolitical conjuncture, the Second Karabakh War for
Armenia could have resulted in either a complete defeat or a Blitzkrieg-like
strategic victory. With a diplomatic ‘Blitzkrieg’ move, Armenia could have
imposed the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh upon the international
community, similar to the case in Kosovo, and could have eliminated many
political elements dependent on Russia. But, this war did not go as Armenia
had envisioned. Amidst the 2020 events of contentious US elections, the
COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s decision not to interfere in Azerbaijan’s
internal affairs and the international community’s inability to implement
the active UN Security Council resolutions paved the way for Baku to
achieve a decisive military victory.
On November 9, 2020, a ceasefre was signed with Russia as mediator.
Armenia evacuated the territories it occupied, as demanded by Azerbaijan.
Russian peacekeepers ensured the security of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as
the Kalbajar and Lachin corridors. With the fve-year ceasefre declaration,
Armenia also agreed to Azerbaijan’s opening a corridor with Nakhichevan.
At the same time, Turkey’s ceasefre monitoring group arrived in Karabakh.

Conclusion
If one looks at the role of Russia in the Second Karabakh War as well as in
the confict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in general since 1992, Russia
has re-established its military presence in the region by restoring its preferred geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus region and safeguarding its national security in its ‘backyard’ or ‘near abroad.’ Russia has sent
approximately 2,000 peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh, in addition to
the 2,000 soldiers already at the 102nd military base in Gyumri, Armenia,
thereby reaching a total of 4,000. By doubling its military presence in the
South Caucasus, Russia has achieved a ceasefre in its position as the main

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power in this sensitive confict and demonstrated that it is the only power
able to implement a solution, at least for the time being. Russia also has
shown continuity in its policy by adopting a status quo attitude in resolving
the border dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan and has succeeded in
making both sides dependent on Russia.
After the Second Karabakh War, Russia has demonstrated that it is the
only global actor that can achieve peace in the South Caucasus and that
there is always the possibility of another war in the event of a geopolitical vacuum. In the period ahead, Azerbaijan and Armenia are obliged to
maintain good relations with Moscow in order to avoid the painful experience endured by Ukraine and Georgia. But, despite the growth of Russia’s
strength in the South Caucasus, for the frst time in almost 100 years, the
Kremlin also has recognized Turkey’s military presence in the region. There
are disadvantages for Russia in accepting Turkey’s position but nevertheless
Russia maintains its status as the only country that has managed to allay at
least some Armenian fears about a real or imagined Turkish threat. In summary, Armenia is aware that the guarantor of its security and sovereignty
for the foreseeable period will be Russia, not a Western ally.
The status quo in the region after the Second Karabakh War and the
absence of any solution in terms of the long-term status of Nagorno-Karabakh
will ensure the continuity of Russia’s military presence in this region. The
deployment of Russian peacekeeping troops will be renewed every fve
years, unless either or both Azerbaijan and Armenia object to such a move.
The initiatives of the OSCE Minsk Group mediators will also have to be
renewed. Although Azerbaijan has won the Second Karabakh War, it still
has not achieved a durable peace capable of putting its mind or security
interests at ease.

Notes
1 Post-Doc Researcher at the Research Center for International Political and
Economic Relations (IPER) at Ankara University (Turkey), ORCID Num:
0000-0002-8890-2038
2 The ideal is of a great and united Armenia again.
3 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) changed its name
to Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 1995.
https://www.osce.org/secretariat/52527#:~:text=At%20last%20month’s%20
Budapest%20Summit,operation%20in%20Europe%20(OSCE).
4 Leader of the Azerbaijan National Front Movement.
5 Heydar Aliyev was deputy chairman (1964-67) and chairman (1967-69) of the regional KGB, secretary (1969-87) of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, member
of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, and frst deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR
(1983-87). In 1991-1993, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Nakhchivan
Autonomous Republic and Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet (Milli
Mejlis) of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
6 ‘‘The Trabzon Declaration by the ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Republic of Turkey,’’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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of the Republic of Turkey, June 8, 2012. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/trabzon--declaration-of-the-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-azerbaijan_-georgiaand-the-republic-of-turkey_-08-june2012_-trabzon.en.mfa

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16 Israel’s Foreign Policy toward
the Karabakh Confict1
Michael B. Bishku

Introduction: Israel’s Interests in the South Caucasus
Region – Expanding Ties in the Post-Cold War World and
“Periphery 2.0”
Writing in October 2020 during the Second Karabakh War, Zev Chafets, an
advisor to the late-Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (1977–1983), noted
that there was a brawl over the Karabakh issue between Israeli Armenians,
who had earlier protested the sale of weapons to Azerbaijan at the Knesset,
and Israeli Azeri Jews on the road between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem (Breiner,
2020). However, he continues that despite this episode, “most people here [in
Israel] have never heard of … [the place] and have no interests in who wins
control of the long-disputed territory” (Chafets, 2020). While the Israeli government has developed a close relationship with Azerbaijan since the end of
the Cold War, its position on Karabakh has been somewhat inconsistent or
muted. On March 14, 2008 in a vote in the United Nations General Assembly
on Resolution GA/10693 reaffrming the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan
and demanding the withdrawal of all Armenian forces, which was passed
39 to 7, with 100 abstentions, Israel was in the last group. The United States,
France and Russia voted against, in support of Armenia, while Georgia and
a number of Arab and Muslim states, including Turkey voted for the resolution; Iran was absent (United Nations, Press Release, 2008). However, on
a visit to Baku in June 2009 Israel’s President Shimon Peres (2007–2014) affrmed Israel’s support for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan (Murinson,
2009). Ephraim Sneh, who was involved in the beginning of the relations between Israel and Azerbaijan, writing in Al-Monitor in 2016, claims that the
Israeli government has remained silent in international forums regarding the
confict between Armenia and Azerbaijan as it does not want to raise the issue of occupation and draw parallels with the West Bank (Sneh, 2016).
Chafets, mentioned above, who is sympathetic to the Armenians, points
out the “fact that Israel gets more than oil from Azerbaijan.” He continues:
The country shares a border with Iran, Israel’s arch enemy. At the very
least that makes Baku an important source for intelligence gathering.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-21
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There are also reports that it is a potential launching pad for the Israeli
air force. That makes Azerbaijan a rare and valuable asset, one that
Israel is not going to abandon. Armenia has no such realpolitik value
to Israel.
(Chafets, 2020)
Also, Armenia’s connections with Iran, with which it has a very small border, are regarded with suspicion by Israel (and the United States); indeed,
in May 2002, the U.S. State Department warned that at least one Armenian company, Lizin, based in Karabakh, was suspected of collaborating
with Iran on nuclear projects (Çağaptay and Murinson, 2005). Furthermore, in January 2010, WikiLeaks reveals that U.S. Deputy Secretary of
State John D. Negroponte threatened Armenia’s President Serzh Sargsyan
(2008–2018) with a cutoff of American assistance and export restrictions
unless his country behaved and agreed to allow U.S. inspectors to visit unannounced following the alleged transfer of arms to Iran (IRAN: Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, 2010). At the same time, Azerbaijan is very important
geopolitically for the United States as the export of its energy resources
reduces the dependency on Russia of countries in southern Europe (Silberstein, 2020).
During much of the latter part of the Cold War era, as a result of the 1967
and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars, Israel had no formal relations with most of the
Communist world and the majority of countries in Africa. The collapse of
Communist rule in eastern Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Union
at the end of the Cold War as well as the Oslo Accords with the Palestine
Liberation Organization shortly after afforded Israel the opportunity of
re-establishing relations with countries that had severed ties, or never had
them, and developing relations with newly independent states. During the
late 1950s, Israel established what Yoel Guzansky refers to as “Periphery
1.0,” informal arrangements to enhance security, intelligence-sharing and
economic relations with Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia, neighboring regional
states with political infuence, enabling Israel to outfank its adversarial
Arab immediate neighbors. “Periphery 1.0” deteriorated as Emperor Haile
Selassie and Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi were overthrown during the
1970s, but Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel, while Jordan no longer
engaged in confict (Guzansky, 2014, pp. 101–104). With the end of the Cold
War, two trilateral relationships developed during the 1990s – one composed of Russia, Iran and Armenia and the other of Turkey, Azerbaijan
and Israel; the former developed as Armenia is dependent upon Russia for
military and economic assistance and upon Iran for political support and
as one of two outlets for that landlocked country, while the other included
three “garrison states” – countries “whose political and territorial integrity
is threatened by internal ethno-national confict or secessionist movements”
(Murinson, 2010, p. 4) and developed with American support. “Periphery

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2.0” is “more of an ad hoc set of partnerships” and connected solely to Israel
rather than all the cooperating partners, though it has a similar underlying
rationale; it includes Greece, Cyprus, Azerbaijan and – at least until Sudan
agreed to normalize relations with Israel in October 2020 – South Sudan.
Following the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010 as relations between Israel
and Turkey deteriorated ties between Israel and both Greece and Cyprus
improved, while Israel-Azerbaijani relations continued to thrive (Guzansky,
2014 pp. 104–110).
Since 1994, one of the main goals of Azerbaijani foreign policy has
been to recover Karabakh and other territories lost to Armenia. Gallia
Lindenstraus, a senior research fellow at Tel Aviv University’s Institute for
National Security Studies, writing in 2015, pointed out that Azerbaijan did
not rule out a return to war if negotiations failed to resolve the dispute and
that it was “preparing for such a confict, in part through its relations with
Israel” (Lindenstraus, 2015, pp. 70–71). Also, Azerbaijan has regarded the
Jewish groups and the Israeli lobby as an effective counterweight to the
Armenian lobby to promote its interests in Washington (Ismayilov, 2013,
pp. 70–71).

Israel’s Relations with Armenia: Consistent Refusal to Accept
Armenian Claims of “Genocide”
Israel established goodwill with Armenia even before that country achieved
its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Following a massive earthquake in November 1988, the Israelis sent a rescue team and set up a military hospital in addition to fying hundreds of Armenian amputees to Israel
for fttings of prosthetic limbs (Sachar, 1999, p. 334). Israel and Armenia
established diplomatic relations in April 1992. Israel sought to economize
regarding foreign missions and for over two decades following Armenia’s independence preferred to have its ambassador in Georgia handle affairs with
Armenia until a separate position was established at the Foreign Ministry
in Jerusalem in 2017. As for Armenia, until it established an embassy in
Tel Aviv in September 2020, it preferred to set up embassies frst in countries with populations of the Armenian diaspora; it had its ambassador to
France handle affairs with Israel until a separate position was established
at the Foreign Ministry in Yerevan in March 2018, while in the Middle East
embassies were set up in Egypt, Iran and Syria in 1992, Lebanon in 1994 and
Iraq in 2000 (Armenia, MFA, 2001, “Bilateral Relations”).2
Relations between Israel and Armenia under Presidents Levon
Ter-Petrosyan (1991–1998) and Robert Kocharyan (1998–2008) were rather
ordinary, but the Armenians were irritated by Israel’s reluctance to recognize their tragedy during World War I as a genocide. The most important
reason this was the case was that Israel did not want to offend Turkey; such
has continued to be the situation even when political relations with Turkey
have been chilly as both countries value their economic ties. Nevertheless,

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there have been Israeli academics and politicians who have been agitating
for recognition. In March 2000, at an academic conference in Philadelphia, 126 Holocaust scholars, including Israeli professors Yehuda Bauer
and Israel Charny signed a document affrming the “incontestable fact”
of the Armenian tragedy as a “genocide” and urging the Western democratic governments to offcially recognize such (Auron, 2003, Appendix D,
pp. 311–314). A month later, in a speech at the Armenian Memorial Day
(April 24) gathering in Jerusalem, Israel’s Minister of Education Yossi Sarid
related that he read as a child Austrian Jewish writer Franz Werfel’s novel
The Forty Days of Musa Dagh (published in 1933), based on a 53-day siege of
Armenians who resisted relocation in 1915, while using the word “genocide”
(Auron, 2003, Appendix A, pp. 297–299). However, this pronouncement
went beyond his country’s offcial policy.
Indeed, a year later, on the eve of an offcial visit to Turkey, Israel’s
then-Foreign Minister Shimon Peres asserted in an interview in the
English-language Turkish Daily News that it was up to academics not governments to have a historical or philosophical position regarding the issue of
the treatment of the Armenians under Ottoman rule and admitting that “It
was a tragedy what the Armenian went through, but not a genocide” (Auron,
2003, p. 124). In 2003, Rivka Cohen, Israel’s Ambassador to Georgia (2001–
2005), serving as her country’s envoy to Armenia made a distinction between
the Jewish Holocaust and the Armenian “tragedy” at a press conference in
Yerevan; the former, Cohen stated, was “a unique phenomenon, since it had
always been planned and aimed to destroy a whole nation” (Fisk, 2005, p.
326). Armenia sent a note of protest to the Israeli government contending
that while “‘crimes against humanity’ might have different characteristics,
the statement by Cohen had the appearance of either rejecting or belittling the
Armenian “‘genocide.’” Israel responded that
it had never tried to deny or diminish the reality of events … or the great
suffering undergone by the Armenian people. [However,] investigation
of this sensitive subject must be approached through public discussion
and dialogue between historians based, of course, on documents and
facts.
(Armenia, MFA, 2001, “Bilateral Relations with Israel”)
This issue would arise again in bilateral Israeli-Armenian relations and in
local politics in Israel.
Both Presidents Ter-Petrosyan and Kocharyan and their respective foreign
ministers Vahan Papazian (1993–1996) and Vartan Oskanian (1998–2008)
made working visits to Israel. In December 1994, Papzian signed a bilateral
agreement on cooperation in the felds of culture, science and education,
while Ter-Petrosyan visited the Jewish state (with Papazian) in November
1995 to attend the funeral of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. In
October 1998, Oskanian signed an agreement in the feld of healthcare,

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while in January 2000, Kocharyan did the same with one on reciprocal protection of investments (Rosen, 2006). President Serzh Sargsyan (2008–2018)
visited Israel in May 2005, when he was minister of defense; his delegation
included Garegin II, the Armenian Catholicos (patriarch), who referred
to the visit as “the beginning of a new era in relations between the Jews
and Armenians” and Ara Abrahamian, head of the World Congress of
Armenians, who commented that “The relations between our countries are
obviously at [an] unsatisfactory level and there is a necessity to develop them”
(Rosen, 2006). In November 2005, Israel’s Chief Rabbi Yonah Metzger,
visited the Armenian Memorial for the “genocide” in Yerevan and stated
“It is impossible to recollect what happened with the Armenians in Turkey
without shedding tears.” He was accompanied by a member of the Knesset
(parliament) Yuri Stern, who used the word “genocide” in his comments.
The Israeli embassy in Azerbaijan immediately announced that the Israeli
position remained unchanged and that the comments of the Rabbi and member of the Knesset “have an informal character” (Rosen, 2006). Sargsyan
never visited Israel when he was president, but other bilateral agreements
were signed during his tenure: One in the feld of agriculture in May 2012,
one on mutual assistance in customs matters in November 2014, and two
in July 2017 that were signed by Israel’s Minister of Regional Cooperation
Tzachi Hanegbi; those dealt with (1) the abolition of visa requirements for
those holding diplomatic passports and (2) double taxation and prevention
of fscal evasion on income taxes. However, there were no visits to Israel of
Armenian senior government offcials from Sargsyan’s trip in 2005 and one
by Armenia’s Foreign Minister Eduard Nalbandian (2008–2018) in March
2015.3 At the same time, the diamond trade between Israel and Armenia
disappeared as Israel’s diamond magnate Uzbekistan-born Lev Leviev
shut down his cutting factory in Nor Hachn, located 60 kilometers north of
Yerevan, in 2007 (Danielyan, 2009).
On March 6, 2015, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Nalbandian, who had previously served as his country’s ambassador to Israel from 2000–2008, on a
working visit to Jerusalem to attend a performance of that city’s Symphony
Orchestra to commemorate the centenary of what Armenians referred to as
the “genocide,” and to lobby for Israel’s offcial recognition of such, said,
“Few nations have as many similarities as Armenians and Jews do … having
endured genocides and been scattered around the world, we are proud of
restoring our statehoods in the 20th century” (Danielyan, 2015). Nalbandian
held talks with Israel’s President Reuven Rivlin, who had called for Israeli
recognition of the Armenian tragedy as a “genocide” when he was Speaker
of the Knesset in 2012. According to the Armenian Foreign Ministry, the
Foreign Minister and President emphasized the need to “invigorate political
dialogue” between their countries and that the Armenian and Israeli people shared a “common responsibility to prevent crimes against humanity”
(Danielyan, 2015). Nalbandian’s visit to Israel was followed up in July 2017
by one by Israel’s Minister of Regional Cooperation Hanegbi, a key fgure

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in the Likud Party of Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu (2009–
2021), who stated that his goal was to make relations “mutually benefcial in
many felds” (Avdaliani, 2017).
In November 2017, Nalbandian made an offcial visit to Israel. He met with
Netanyahu, who held the prime minister and foreign minister portfolios, as
well as Minister of Regional Cooperation Hanegbi, Minister of Jerusalem
Affairs Ze’ev Elkin, Chairman of the Knesset Yuli Edelstein, and Vice Chairwoman of the Knesset Tali Ploskov, who was Chair of the Armenia-Israel
Parliamentary Friendship Group. Matters discussed included bilateral
trade and economic ties and possible joint ventures in information technology, science, education, tourism and agriculture. Nalbandian also visited the Armenian Patriarch (Armenia, MFA, “Nalbandian’s Meeting with
Netanyahu,” 2017). In an interview with Israel’s Public Broadcasting Corporation, Nalbandian was asked if he would describe his visit as “rare.”
He turned the question around and stated that it “is very rare to receive an
Israeli foreign minister in Armenia” – indeed, none have visited that country as yet – and noted that every Armenian foreign minister had paid visits
to Israel. Nalbandian asserted that majority public opinion in Israel favored
recognition of the Armenian tragedy as a “genocide” and pointed out that
Chairman Edelstein told him that it was important for the Knesset to do so.
When Nalbandian was asked when a resident Armenian ambassador would
be appointed to Israel, he stated that his country’s position was that they
would do so once Israel agreed to reciprocate. He pointed out that especially
given Turkey’s and Azerbaijan’s blockade that friendly relations with Iran
(and Georgia) were very important for Armenia and that such ties with the
former was not an obstacle to having cordial bilateral relations with Israel;
Nalbandian also denied the contention of the interviewer that Karabakh
was regarded as being Azerbaijani territory by the international community (Armenia, MFA, “Interview of Nalbandian,” 2019). In February 2018,
the Israeli Knesset rejected in a preliminary vote such a bill introduced by
Yair Lapid, of the centrist Yesh Atid Party (“Israeli Knesset Rejects Bill,”
2018) and once again in June 2018, Tamar Zandberg, of the left-wing Meretz
Party, was forced to withdraw legislation after the governing coalition and
Foreign Ministry demanded that the word “genocide” was replaced with
“tragedy” (Lis, 2018).
In August 2018, Alexander Ben-Zvi, Deputy Director General and
Director of the Eurasia Department of Israel’s Foreign Ministry met with
Armenia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, who had
assumed offce a few months earlier and had previously been Armenia’s
Ambassador to the United Nations, in Yerevan, where they discussed possibilities of cooperation in areas of culture, science and education as well
as the Syrian Civil War and mutual support for continued negotiations
regarding the Karabakh confict the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk process chaired by France, Russia and
the United States (Armenia, MFA, “Foreign Minister Received Deputy

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Director General,” 2018). Relations had calmed down following an incident
a year earlier (July 2017) in which members of an Israeli delegation from
Aeronautics Defense Systems in Baku illegally carried out a live fre test on
two drones at the behest of the Azerbaijani military that reportedly went
off course and lightly wounded two Armenian soldiers. Israel’s Defense
Ministry suspended the company’s export license (Gross, 2017).
In March 2019, a delegation headed by Armenia’s Deputy Foreign
Minister Grigor Hovhannisyan visited Israel for consultations on bilateral political and economic issues as well as developments in the Middle
East and Caucasus regions. These talks included Armenia’s Ambassador
to Israel, Armen Smbatyan, and Honorary Consul, Tsolag Momjian and on
the Israeli side Minister of Jerusalem Affairs Elkin, Deputy Speaker of the
Knesset Ploskov, and the Political Director of the Foreign Ministry, Alon
Ushpiz. The Armenian delegation also visited Yad Vashem and participated
in the opening ceremony of the annual Armenian-Israeli cultural festival as
well as meeting with the Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem and representatives of the Armenian community in that city (Armenia, MFA, “Political
Consultation between Foreign Ministries,” 2019).
While diplomatic interactions with Israel have become more frequent
under the government of Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan who
came to offce in May 2018 following anti-government protests known as
the “Velvet Revolution” that led to the resignation of President Sargsyan
who was attempting to stay in power under a parliamentary system, the
Armenian government also has begun expanding relations with Iran, especially in the economic sector. Pashinyan is interested in limiting his country’s almost total dependence on Russia for energy supplies, while Iran is
concerned with circumventing U.S. sanctions; the latter is also interested in
improving relations with Azerbaijan, which is probably part of the incentive
for Armenia to expand ties with Israel. While rigid political axes developed
following the end of the Cold War, diplomatic connections seemed to be
getting to be more fuid before the Second Karabakh War.

Israel’s Relations with Azerbaijan: A Connection in the
Muslim World and a Means to Counter Iran in a Geostrategic
Manner
Israel and Azerbaijan established diplomatic relations in April 1992, the
same month as Jerusalem did so with Armenia. At the time, Azerbaijan was
in the midst of the First Karabakh War and just two months later, elected its
frst non-Communist President Abulfaz Elchibey, who was a great admirer
of Israel (and Turkey); as the leader of the Popular Front, he supported
self-determination for Azeris living in northwestern Iran and called the
Iranian governments “a regime based on fanaticism,” while Iranian newspapers referred to him as a “Zionist” (Pope, 1992, p. 13 and Sneider, 1992,
p. 2). Given the importance of these relations, it is surprising that a resident

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ambassador was not appointed for two years. Instead, a 24-year-old army
veteran with no diplomatic experience (Benny Haddad) represented Israeli
interests in Azerbaijan; while he was given the task of promoting Jewish
immigration to Israel (Yaari, 1993, p. 28), there were unconfrmed reports
that the Israelis were supplying Azerbaijan with arms, perhaps including
stinger missiles (Hunter, 1992, pp. 12–13). Meanwhile, Israel opened an
embassy in Azerbaijan in February 1993 (Aras, 1998, p. 73), but did not
have a resident ambassador (Eliezer Yotvat) in Baku until March 1994. By
that time, Haydar Aliyev (1993–2003) had replaced Elchibey as Azerbaijan’s
president. Azerbaijan has yet to reciprocate with an embassy in Tel Aviv,
though it does maintain an unoffcial channel of communications through
the Israeli offces of Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) (Lindenstrauss, 2015, p.
70). As a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation since 1992,
Azerbaijan has embassies in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon,
Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey,
where it has two consulates.4 Israel has valued diplomatic relations with a
number of new countries following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the
end of the Cold War, especially Muslim-populated countries; indeed, Israel
established embassies in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, while
the former two countries have representation in Tel Aviv (Bishku, 2012, pp.
927–940 and Bishku, 2015, pp. 172–175).
In March 1994, Bakcell, was established as a joint venture when the
Israel’s government-owned telecommunications company Bezeq bought a
share in Azerbaijan’s telephone system (Abilov, 2009, p. 155). The following year, an Israeli journalist noted that goods from his country from cell
phones to beer and ice cream were ubiquitous in Azerbaijan (Bourtman,
2006, pp. 4–5). This initial investment and trade in consumer items was
followed up with strategic ties that have remained somewhat secretive. In
August 1995, it was reported in Iran’s Islamic Republic News Agency that
the Israelis had sent a mission to Azerbaijan to train security agents, something the Azerbaijani government denied (Aras, 1998, p. 73). According to
Jane’s Defence Weekly, in late 1996, Israel was a “major provider of battlefeld aviation, artillery, anti-tank, and anti-infantry weapons” (Çağaptay
and Murinson, 2005). Given these reports and offcial denials, it is important to note that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, who succeeded his
father in 2003, was quoted in a 2009 leaked U.S. diplomatic cable asserting
that relations with Israel’s were “like an iceberg, nine tenths … below the
surface” (Grove, 2012). And indeed, by that time, Israel and Azerbaijan had
not signed any formal agreements.
In August 1997, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a brief
stop in Baku to meet the elder Aliyev on the way back from a trip to Japan
and South Korea. During the visit, the Israeli leader spoke of what Israel and
Azerbaijan had in common and how he found “great hope” in that the two
countries have relationships as Israel had “with Turkey, with Jordan, with
Egypt, between the Jewish state and predominantly Muslim states” (Aras,

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Michael B. Bishku

1998, p. 74). Netanyahu and Aliyev discussed the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil
pipeline project, completed in 2006 and through which Israel would receive
a share of Azerbaijani oil – today approximately 40% of its imported crude
(Guzansky, p. 108) – as well as cooperation on regional security threats
(Bashirova and Sözen, 2017, p. 30). Between 1999 and 2014, there were 28
diplomatic visits between the two countries – none by the Aliyev’s, however, although Haydar Aliyev attended the funeral of Israel Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin’s in 1995 – that have also concerned matters outside of security
among which include agriculture, economic development, medicine, transportation and tourism (Murinson, 2014, p.15). In fact, in September 2014,
Moshe Ya’alon trip to Azerbaijan marked the frst by an Israeli Defense
Minister to the region since the breakup of the Soviet Union (Murinson,
2014, p. 19). Yet security issues have gained the most attention of scholars
and journalists as a large share of the two countries’ trade relations involves
Israel purchasing oil, while Azerbaijan purchases weaponry and technical
assistance connected with security. Indeed, Soner Çağaptay and Alexander
Murinson point out that following Netanyahu’s visit, Israel not only cooperated closely with, but also provided training for, the Azerbaijani intelligence
service and security for Azerbaijan’s president during foreign visits; they
also state that, according to some reliable though unnamed sources, that
Israel might have set up electronic listening stations along the Caspian Sea
and on the Iranian border (Çağaptay and Murinson, 2005). As for cooperation with Turkey, in 2004, the Azerbaijani and Israeli press reported that
an undisclosed weapons system was sent to Turkey to be assembled and
delivered to Azerbaijan. Israeli, Turkish and Azerbaijani offcials denied the
report (Bourtman, 2006, p. 3).
Writing in 2006, in an article entitled “Israel and Azerbaijan’s Furtive
Embrace,” Ilya Bourtman stated that Iran and Israel were playing “a catand-mouse game” in Azerbaijan; he asserted that they both had “vast
espionage networks” in the country (Bourtman, 2006, p. 7). Also, Iran
has attempted unsuccessfully to attack Israeli diplomats or Jewish sites in
Azerbaijan. For example, in May 2008, Azerbaijan, on a tip from Israel’s
Mossad, foiled a joint Iranian-Lebanese Hezbollah plot to target the Israeli
embassy and Jewish sites in Baku in retaliation for the car bombing in
Damascus a few months earlier of Imad Mughniyah, responsible for a number of terrorist attacks since the 1980s (Rotella, 2009), and in January 2012,
Azerbaijan broke up an Iranian plot to assassinate Michael Lotem, the
Israeli ambassador to that country (Lomsadze, 2012). A month later, Iran
accused Azerbaijan of assisting Israeli agents in the assassination of Iranian
nuclear scientists (Ismayilov, 2013, p. 74). In addition to intelligence sharing, Israel and Azerbaijan expanded economic cooperation. In the autumn
of 2011, in its frst venture abroad, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan
(SOCAR) bought a 5% share in Med Ashdod, Israel’s only economically
viable oil feld (Abbasov, 2012).

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In February 2012, the two countries solidifed their strategic partnership
with Azerbaijan’s ratifcation of the purchase of U.S.$1.6 billion worth – the
largest in that South Caucasus country’s history – of Israeli armaments. It
included a Barak-8 surface-to-air missile system, 75 missiles, an EL/M-2080
Green Pine air search radar system, Gabriel-5 ship-to-ship missiles, fve
Heron drones, and 5 Searcher drones (Ismayilov, 2013, p. 72). Previously,
in 2010, Israel had upgraded Azerbaijan’s Russian T-72 tanks, built in the
1970s (Göksel, 2015, p. 669) and according to the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Azerbaijan already had in its possession
Israeli drones, anti-tank missiles, rocket launchers and howitzer and mortar
systems (Ismayilov, 2013, pp. 72–73). Stratfor, the geopolitical intelligence
platform, which emphasized that it was important that the news of the $1.6
billion deal became known when Israel’s President Shimon Peres was holding talks on regional security issues with Georgia’s Foreign Minister Grigol
Vashadze, had the following to say about the agreement:
It is diffcult to believe that the United States and Israel are not coordinating their activities in the Caucasus. The sale to Azerbaijan affects
Iran, and Israel is not likely to undercut Washington’s positions vis-àvis Tehran. Nor is Israel likely to go against U.S. policy in Moscow’s
regard, and the Georgian talks and arms sale to Azerbaijan also affect
Russia. It can be assumed that the U.S. has approved the initiatives.
(“Azerbaijan’s Arms Deal,” 2012)
According to Iran’s Fars News Agency, Azerbaijan was warned not to allow
its “territories to be used by Israel for terrorist attacks” (“Azerbaijan’s Arms
Deal,” 2012). In March 2012, Israelis and Azerbaijanis organized a joint
venture to produce drones (“Odd, but Useful Allies,” 2012) and the following year, another one to manufacture unmanned military vehicles in Baku
(Shaffer, 2013). From 2012 to 2015, Azerbaijan reportedly bought some
$4 billion more of Israeli armaments (Lindenstrauss, 2015, p. 70). While
Azerbaijan had been one of eight Muslim countries that strongly opposed
Israel’s military campaign in 2006 Lebanon War (Ismayilov, 2013, p.74), it
did not publicly criticize Israel in the 2014 Gaza War and did not suspend
fights of AZAL to Tel Aviv during that confict even though American carriers did so temporarily (Bashirova and Sözen, 2017, p. 31).
Azerbaijan is able to lobby for its interests with the assistance pro-Israeli
American politicians and Jewish and Christian religious leaders and
activists. While Azerbaijan has no embassy in Israel, it publicizes its close
ties with the Jewish state through its diplomatic mission in Washington,
D.C. For example, in March 2017, Azerbaijan’s Ambassador to the United
States Elin Suleymanov spoke at the annual meeting of the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), while a celebration of the 70th anniversary of Israel’s independence in Washington, D.C. in April 2018 attended

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376 Michael B. Bishku
by American politicians and members of Jewish-American groups also emphasized that country’s friendship with Azerbaijan (Tibon, 2018). Such activities and its purchases of Israeli weapons, which amounted to more than
U.S.$5 billion worth by 2016, have beneftted Azerbaijan politically in both
Israel and the United States (Tharoor, 2015).
According to SIPRI, from 2015 to 2020, Israel became the top supplier
of arms to Azerbaijan with sales of more than $740 million (“Israel Under
Diplomatic Fire,” 2020), supplying some 60% of Azerbaijan’s arms imports
(Edwards, 2020). In December 2016, Netanyahu visited Azerbaijan on a
stopover on the way to Kazakhstan and signed four cooperation agreements, one of which called for the creation of a joint economic commission,
but none dealt with military cooperation or arms sales (Shiriev, 2016). Israeli
equipment, especially Harop suicide drones and Spike anti-tank missiles,
had proven benefcial in a four-day war against Armenia in April of that
year when Azerbaijan was able to regain a small amount of territory it had
lost to Armenia in First Karabakh War (Avdaliani, 2017). The effectiveness
of Israeli weaponry in that confict subsequently encouraged Kazakhstan to
sign an agreement with Israel to jointly manufacture drones (Shiriev, 2016).
A little over four years later, Azerbaijan would have greater success in
the Second Karabakh War. The Azerbaijanis would also employ Bayraktar
drones manufactured in Turkey as well as Israeli-manufactured Harop
drones and cluster bombs. Just before the war began, in late September
2020, at least four Ilyushin Il-76 operated by the Azerbaijani cargo airline Silk Way, which provides service for Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry,
few between Israel’s Uvda military airbase in the Negev and Baku, while
other aircraft in the Silk Way feet were fying back and forth between the
Azerbaijani capital and either Ankara or Istanbul (Melman, 2020). Armenia
withdrew its ambassador from Israel in early October 2020, just two weeks
after opening its embassy in Tel Aviv. Israel’s President Reuven Rivlin spoke
with his Armenian counterpart Armen Sargsyan and “expressed his sorrow
at the outbreak of the violence … and the loss of life on both sides,” while
adding that Israel would be willing to send Armenia humanitarian aid and
expressing the hope that the Armenian ambassador would return “soon”
(“Israel Under Diplomatic Fire,” 2020). Armenia’s President Pashinyan
scoffed at the offer of Israeli humanitarian aid and warned that while Israel
and Turkey were both supporting Azerbaijan that sometime later Turkey
would turn against Israel (Edwards, 2020).

Conclusion: Pragmatism Rules
Yaakov Amidror, a former Israeli National Security Advisor remarked following the second Karabakh War that Israel “does not have any interest or idea
who should control” that disputed territory, but that geopolitical concerns
of Israel and Azerbaijan will continue to draw them together in friendly relations (Lobel, 2020).5 Indeed, those two countries have developed a strategic

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partnership over almost the last three decades that has endured while the Jewish state’s relations with Armenia have been quite mundane and especially
in recent years somewhat problematic at times. While Armenia has gotten
Lebanon and Syria to recognize offcially the tragedy of World War I as a
“genocide,” it has had no success with other Middle Eastern countries including Israel much to Yerevan’s dismay. Armenia is very dependent on Russia
economically and militarily and needs Iran for political support, trade and as
an overland outlet. It also relies on political and economic assistance from its
Diaspora, especially in Western Europe and North America. Azerbaijan has
a better economy and much more fexibility in foreign affairs. It is a member
of the Non-Aligned Movement and has good relations with both Turkey and
Israel. Azerbaijan has been able to build up its military posture through cooperation with those latter two countries, while Israel and Jewish groups have
facilitated relations with the United States.

Notes
1 Portions of this chapter have appeared in the Journal of South Asian and Middle
Eastern Studies under the title “Israel and Armenia: So Near Experientially, But
So Far Away Geopolitically,” Vol. 44, No. 2 (Winter 2021).
2 Armenia now has embassies in Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates
as well. Egypt, Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq have embassies in Armenia along
with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.
3 Murinson (2014), p. 24 states that in June 2014, Anna Azari, the head of the
Central Europe department of the Israel’s Foreign Ministry visited Yerevan for
diplomatic consultations, while asserting that despite Armenia’s irritation, Israel would continue to sell arms to Azerbaijan. This visit is not mentioned in
Avdaliani (2017), who claims that no Israeli senior government offcial visited
Armenia from 2012 (no specifc name is mentioned) until July 2017.
4 All of those countries, except Lebanon, in addition to Kuwait, Libya, Palestine
and Sudan have embassies in Baku.
5 Amidror was Israel’s National Security Advisor from 2011–2013.

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17 Iran’s Policies Toward the
Karabakh Confict
Mesiagha Mahammadi and Vasif Huseynov

Introduction
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s position in the Nagorno-Karabakh confict
has been inextricably linked to its relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan
since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the Soviet era, Iran’s policies in
the South Caucasus region sought to overcome the constraints of Soviet
domination with hopes of establishing its own relations with the states in
the area. But, the situation also was not entirely unfavorable for Iran. The
stability along the country’s northern borders under the Soviet rule accommodated Tehran’s efforts to direct its attention to more pressing challenges
along the eastern, southern and southwestern perimeters.
The Soviet Union’s dissolution and the emergence of independent states
in the South Caucasus opened up more comprehensive Iranian engagement
in the region but Tehran also was uncertain at the outset about recognizing the independence of newly founded states. But, Iran fnally recognized
the independence of the Armenian and Azerbaijani on December 25, 1991.
Prior to formal recognition, Iran had already launched direct contacts with
the new leaders of both countries through exploratory visits. For example,
in 1990, Iran’s then President Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani visited Baku to
initiate bilateral negotiations.
The outbreak of the violent territorial confict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over the Karabakh region at that time challenged Iran’s policy
choices. Although Tehran, at the beginning, opted not to engage in the confict, Iranian leaders eventually decided to focus on the confict, as it involved
two substantial northern neighbors. Ethnic kinship and family ties between
the Iranian Azerbaijanis and the people of the Republic of Azerbaijan along
with acknowledging Azerbaijan’s relationships with Turkey and Israel have
factored into Iran’s policies regarding the confict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. As Kaleji (2020) explains, Iran’s policy framework opposes any
ethnic geopolitical confguration that condones separatism, which plains
why “Iran never recognized the independence of Karabakh, Abkhazia and
South Ossetia in spite of good and close relations between Iran and Armenia
and also Iran and the Russian Federation.” Kaleji adds that Iran’s approach

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Mesiagha Mahammadi and Vasif Huseynov

has been consistent as well with Chechnya, Dagestan in North Caucasus
and in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Iran’s objectives also have sought to prevent any expansion of the confict into its territories and to block the intervention of non-regional global
powers in settling the confict. Tehran, seeking to ensure the US did not
enter the confict directly along with NATO members and Israel in hopes of
cultivating outside infuence in the South Caucasus, supported other multilateral frameworks for settling the confict, such as including only those
neighboring states in the region either in arrangements of 3+2 (i.e., Russia,
Turkey and Iran + Armenia and Azerbaijan) or 3+3 (i.e., Russia, Turkey and
Iran + Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia).
Tehran’s challenges have been complicated, often of its own doing.
Some Iranian experts have interpreted Tehran’s position toward and views
about the Karabakh confict as “never clearly and transparently declared”
and “refected different and sometimes contradictory statements” (Gaffari, Veysinejad, and Taghipur, 2012, 99). For some Iranian analysts, this
conundrum was likely the outcome of inconsistent, contradictory policies
articulated by different Iranian governments about the Karabakh question. As explained later, other factors enter in this equation to elucidate
why despite its intentions, Iran has failed to become an impactful player
in resolving the confict. In summary, Iran has failed to leverage its unique
status in the region to achieve a substantial diplomatic role. As Kaleji
(2020) explains,
[it is] only Iran among the three neighbors [Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia] of the region that has sustainable diplomatic relations with all
three countries of the South Caucasus including Armenia and Georgia
as the two Christian countries and Republic of Azerbaijan as the
Muslim and Shia country.
Daragahi (2020) extends the background about Tehran’s conundrum in
fnding a space for cordial relations with Baku, noting that Iran’s second
language is “effectively Azeri,” and its religious affnities reside more with
“majority Shia Muslim Azerbaijan than with Orthodox Christian Armenia.”
Daragahi adds that Azerbaijan has worried about Iran’s Shia ideology infltrating its borders while Iran worried about Azeri nationalism taking hold
in its communities, a fear augmented by Iranian concerns about Baku’s willingness to cooperate with American and Israeli intelligence reconnaissance
missions. Iran’s Azeris are perhaps the country’s most powerful minority
group. Supreme Leader Khamenei has an Azeri father, while opposition
fgure Mir-Hossein Mousavi, who has been under house arrest since 2011, is
also of Azeri descent. Azeris dominate the major northern cities of Tabriz
and Orumieh from a demographic perspective and have a strong commercial presence in Tehran. Daragahi neatly summarizes Iran’s fundamental
conundrum, explaining that

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though relations between Tehran and Baku have warmed up in recent
years, Iran’s leaders remain far more comfortable with the weak, landlocked, and impoverished Armenia—allied by necessity with Russia—
than they are with Azerbaijan—an oil-wealthy, well-connected
autocracy that is a veritable United Arab Emirates on the Caspian Sea.
After the First Karabakh War, Iran had several major unique factors but
missed building upon them in terms of reconfguring its role in the South
Caucasus. Ramezanzadeh (1996) explains the advantages Iran had at
the time included possessing nearly half of global oil and gas resources.
Likewise, he cites the dominance of the Arab language and character in the
region (with the exception of Iran and Turkey) and Islam being the sole but
key connecting feature between Iran and the regional countries. Iran’s geographical position on the region’s margin also matters, as it
is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf
and the Gulf of Oman. All its countries have access to the sea. Insofar as none is landlocked, in this regard they are not dependent on one
another.
(Ramezanzadeh, 1996)
It appears that in 2021, Iran’s geopolitical capacity to leverage advantages
has changed little, if at all.
This chapter highlights how the 44-day war between Armenia and
Azerbaijan in the fall of 2020 has opened a new chapter. The relevant time
frame covers shake ups in Iran’s policies concerning the confict, ranging
from supporting Azerbaijan in the early 1990s to declaring support for the
status quo, which was set by the Russia-brokered ceasefre agreement in
May 1994. The chapter sheds light also on the motivation and challenges of
Iran’s attempts to play a mediating role between the two conficting states,
during the First and Second Karabakh Wars. It concludes that, although
Iran has managed, to a considerable degree, to prevent any adverse effect
of the confict on its domestic stability, it has largely failed in its mediation
efforts, to the detriment of Tehran’s regional ambitions.

Factors that Affected Iran’s Position in the Karabakh Confict
In the early years of the confict, Tehran believed it was a manageable
territorial dispute that could be resolved through third-party mediation.
Ramezanzadeh (1996) explains that Iran wanted a quick solution because
it worried that any prolonged hostilities would embolden Russia to act
independently without accounting for Iranian interests, especially as the
post-Soviet military doctrine “unequivocally … considers its strategic borders in Central Asia to be contiguous to Iran and Afghanistan and, in the
Caucasus, to Iran and Turkey.” Also, Iran was concerned about its capacities

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to house more refugees, given that it already had given sanctuary to millions
from wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. After some 200,000 people who fed
the fghting in the ethnic Azeri community of Nakhichevan toward Iranian
borders, then Iranian President Hashimi Rafsanjani announced paradoxically that while Iran supported the refugees in their plight it was in the best
mutual interests for displaced persons to return to Azerbaijani territory
(Ramezanzadeh, 1996). Iran also was seeking balances that realistically
seemed unfeasible of achieving, such as defending the rights of territorial
integrity for both Armenia and Azerbaijan while hoping not to jeopardize
its access to Europe and simultaneously contain Turkey’s presence in the
region. The circumstances were poised to give
Iran an opportunity to oppose Turkish and US policies in the region,
and of the inconsistencies in Russian policies, [thereby making Iran] the
only regional player which has both incentives and the opportunity to
play a mediating role by taking a visibly impartial stand in the confict.
(Ramezanzadeh, 1996)
In May 1992, Iran’s efforts, orchestrated by then president Rafsanjani,
resulted in a provisional peace agreement between the then acting president
of Azerbaijan, Yagub Mammadov and Levon Ter-Petrossian, Armenia’s
frst president of the independent republic. But, the conficting interests of
external parties in a territorial issue affecting Iran’s border zone—the occupation of Shusha by Armenians which occurred just a day after the parties
had concluded the agreement in Tehran—changed the confict for Tehran’s
concerns. It would be another fve years before Iran’s mediation efforts in
the region would fnd success, specifcally Tajikistan where the government
reached a peace agreement with the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT).
That succeeded, according to Kaleji (2020), because of Russia’s involvement. Mahmud Vaezi, then deputy foreign minister of Iran who had been a
mediator in the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, explains the
shift in Tehran’s position:
The Karabakh dispute, contrary to other similar disputes, is very complicated and its resolution requires management, patience and collective rationality. The dimensions of the dispute have expanded to such
an extent that they have become intertwined with the interests of some
international and regional great powers. Therefore, the will of the two
countries is not enough to end the dispute.
(Vaezi, 2008)
Returning to the First Karabakh War, it was evident that both main parties were intransigent in their positions. Armenia’s military confdence was
bolstered by its victory as the country pursued either annexation or formal recognition of a new independent state covering Nagorno-Karabakh,

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both options that Azerbaijan refused to entertain even as starting points in
diplomatic negotiations.
On the one hand, Iran, trying to reconcile its own conundrum aggravated
by the immovable positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan, sought to prevent
Western countries and corresponding transnational corporate interests
from obtaining access to the Caspian Sea and to keep their regional ally
Turkey at bay. The possibility of Western cultural, economic, political and
ideological infuence growing in the South Caucasus in the post-Soviet
period was perceived as an imminent threat in Tehran where major strategists were contemplating how to counter any such prospects (Mahammadi,
2017, 238–239). On the other hand, Iran sounded more cooperative toward
Russia and was open to relations with Moscow on regional geopolitical
issues, though Iranians were keen not to allow Russians to dominate the
region and sideline Tehran in the process.
Regarding the 1990s, Avdaliani (2021) explains that Iran did not see political capital arising from extending their relationship with Azerbaijan,
which attempted to soothe the pains of its war with Armenia with sentiments
of nationalism and patriotism that could eventually resonate with ethnic
Azerbaijanis in Iran. Abulfaz Elchibey, then the president of Azerbaijan
who promoted the ideal of a “Greater Azerbaijan,” “embraced pan-Turkic
ideas and tried to reach out to ethnic kin in Iran” (Avdaliani, 2021). To
counter this, Tehran sought to develop closer relations with Christian
Armenia, a departure from previous stances taken by the Islamic Republic. This shift led to what became known as the Tehran-Moscow-Yerevan geopolitical axis (Dugin, 2000, 352). According to Iranian
political analysts, this axis represented a defensive move as a balancing
act against threats posed by the US-Israel-Turkey-Azerbaijan geopolitical axis. “By forming the Tehran-Moscow-Yerevan axis, Iran sought
to reduce the role of Israel and US in the region” (Bozrgmehri and
Tabatabai, 2017). Iran also saw opportunities among Armenian lobby
groups in the Western countries to counter anti-Iran activities of the
Jewish lobby.
These developments in the 1990s shaped Iran–Armenia relations into
a nuanced geostrategic partnership, which, at one time, Iranian offcials
denied as existing. This would have inevitable consequences for Iran’s policies in the Karabakh confict. Tehran defended these relations as an asset
to play an effective mediating role in resolving the confict. For example, a
report, published by the Iranian government-affliated Irib News Agency
on October 10, 2016, indicated that, in contrast to Russia and Turkey, Iran
did not support either of the parties in the confict, and, therefore, was more
suited to being a mediator to coordinate the resolution process. For another
group of Iranian experts, Turkey and Russia, in their respective support
for parties in the confict, were prioritizing their parochial interests, which
threatened the region’s prospects for peace and security (Kouhi, Esfahani
and Haqpanah, 2017).

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It is important to note that Iran’s approach to the geopolitics of the
South Caucasus has been affected by forces of historical memory. This
has been refected in the “17 cities of the Caucasus” thesis put forward
by Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei in the early years of the confict.
The thesis contends that the South Caucasus cities over which Iran lost
control under the Russia—Persia treaties of Gulistan of 1813 and Turkmenchay of 1828—currently are part of the sovereign territories of the
regional republics. According to Khamenei, Yerevan, in parallel with
Baku, is an old Iranian city, and this necessitates a balanced approach
in relations with. An online report published by the Iranian Diplomacy
Group on April 3, 2013, suggests some Iranians believe that the peoples
of those 17 Caucasian cities are, in fact, willing to unite with Iran. Although the “17 cities of the Caucasus” thesis has lost its signifcance in
Iranian politics over the last few years, it gained fresh momentum following the jubilant parade Azerbaijan held after the Second Karabakh
War where Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recited a poem that
fguratively lamented the division of the historical Azerbaijani territories into two parts (North and South) under the Treaty of Turkmenchay
of 1828.
Iran’s relations with Armenia have been primarily affected by mutual
ethnocultural ties and joint efforts to counter Turkey’s regional infuence,
but there also are more factors that have been affecting Iran’s relations with
Azerbaijan. Irrespective of the religious and cultural closeness between
Iran and Azerbaijan and, probably because of, the existence of a sizable
ethnic Azerbaijani minority in Iran, the relations between the two countries
have been problematic. For example, Iranian political expert Ilaha Kulayi
explains,
Despite the existence of cultural and religious ties, Iran’s relations
with Azerbaijan have never been friendly and at desired level. Political
relations between the two countries have always been infuenced by the
strategic relations of the Republic of Azerbaijan with the United States,
Turkey and Israel, as well as the dispute over the legal status of the Caspian Sea.
(Kulayi, 2010, 87)
The negative factors are not limited to those Kulayi cited. The list can
be expanded to encompass Iran’s refusal to downgrade its relations with
Armenia despite the latter’s occupation of 20% of Azerbaijani territories, the
well-established secular model of governance in the Republic of Azerbaijan,
and the infuence of Azerbaijan on the process of ethnic self-awareness
among Iranian Azerbaijanis. The ethnic-Azerbaijani minority dimension
of bilateral relations has played an impactful role. Iran had to consider
pro-Azerbaijani sentiments of this sizable minority in its policymaking
concerning the Karabakh confict. On the other hand, Iranian leaders have

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sought to prevent the confict from encouraging pro-Azerbaijani nationalist
groups mobilizing within Iran and thereby unsettling the domestic politics.
For many observers, the Karabakh confict has propelled a national-cultural movement among Iranian Azerbaijanis. Ethnic Azerbaijani
activists, despite Iran’s reiteration of its recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, have criticized Iran’s support for Azerbaijan as inadequate.
Social unrest in the Azerbaijani provinces of Iran has been countered by
Iranian security agencies, with activists arrested. The demands underlying
this social mobilization have been reiterated by ethnic-Azerbaijani members of parliament, intellectuals, clergy and even military service personnel. As rightly noted by Brenda Shaffer, the Karabakh confict mobilized
the Iranian Azerbaijanis (Shaffer, 2017, 119). This frightens Iranian leaders,
who see the rise of nationalist (Turkic) self-awareness as a threat to Iran’s
national security. According to Iranian expert Bahram Amir Ahmadian
and colleagues,
Today, Iran’s biggest fear is the idea of Turkism coming from the north
of the Araz River… Therefore, one of the reasons for Iran’s rapprochement with Armenia is the fear of Turkism in the region. At the same
time, Iran is concerned about the strengthening of the Republic of
Azerbaijan.
(Ahmadian, Rzazada, and Corf, 2016, 25)
It is worth noting that not only Turkism but also Azerbaijanism, an ideology promoted under Heydar Aliyev’s presidency (1993–2003) in Azerbaijan,
caused concerns and aggravated sentiments of inferiority among Iranian
leaders.
As mentioned above, the secular model internalized by post-Soviet
Azerbaijani governments also has caused problems in Iran–Azerbaijan
relations. For Iran, Azerbaijan could have become the second Shia state
in the world following its separation from the Soviet Union. It seems this
displeasure about Azerbaijan’s choice for secularism has been also offcially
communicated by the Iranian side to Azerbaijani leaders, since President
Heydar Aliyev clearly stated Azerbaijan’s position, in 2001, in his meeting
with Hassan Ruhani, then Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security
Council:
We do and will continue to follow the path of secular statehood. We
cannot go back. After the independence of Azerbaijan, it is enshrined in
our Constitution that freedom of conscience in Azerbaijan is provided.
Religion has been banned for 70 years [under the Soviet rule]. There
were only 16 mosques in Azerbaijan. But now there are 236 mosques.
That is, [if] anyone wants to worship, there are mosques everywhere.
Nobody forbids anything. But our religion is separate from the state.
We are going and will go this way. Having said that, I want you to know

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the real situation in Azerbaijan. Armenia is not a Muslim country [but]
you are making friendship with them. We are Muslims and we love our
religion, but we follow a secular path. We are establishing mutually
benefcial relations with all countries of the world. Because it is very
important for an independent, young state, for a state whose 20 percent
of territories are under occupation (Azerbaijani newspaper Azərbaycan,
July 21, 2001).

During the same meeting, Iran reinforced its policy of exporting the
Islamic revolution although not as strongly as it had previously communicated. Accordingly, Iran tried to elevate the position of the Islamic Party
of Azerbaijan in the socio-political life of the country and provided it with
ideological and fnancial assistance. This link with Iran and the party was
confrmed by the decision of an Azerbaijani court in 1995. The leaders of
the party were jailed, and the party was banned by decree of the Azerbaijani
Supreme Court.
Iran continued to work with various Shiite Islamist groups in Azerbaijan
as well as with the banned Islamic party which continued to operate unoffcially despite the judicial decrees. Tehran reacted to the restrictive measures
the Azerbaijani authorities took against the mobilization of Islamic groups
in the Nardaran village, a settlement close to Baku and popular with the
conservative and radical groups. Iranian experts and the media have repeatedly accused the Azerbaijani government of fghting Islam and Shiism. The
policy of multiculturalism pursued at the offcial level during the presidency
of President Ilham Aliyev was likewise assessed as an “attack on the Shiite
identity” (Heshmati, 2015).
Attempting to manipulate the Azerbaijani people’s emotions about the
occupation of Karabakh and raise discontent among the people against
Western-linked foreign policies toward Azerbaijan, pro-Iranian Islamist
groups criticized the Azerbaijani government for entrusting the resolution
of the confict to pro-Armenian Christian countries (i.e., co-chairs of the
OSCE Minsk Group). In recent years, numerous events in Iran with Islamists
from Azerbaijan participating accused the Azerbaijani government of not
using the potential of the religious population and stressed that Karabakh
can be liberated only with the “Shiite spirit.” As the Second Karabakh War
was being waged, Iranian politician Mohammad Javad Jamali, former senior member of the Iranian parliament’s national security and foreign policy
commission, told Al Jazeera that the Minsk Group failed in its primary
goal of ending the confict, adding, “We believe those who foment the killings, especially the US and Israel, would like the fres of confict to remain
afame.” Jamali added that only a United Nations organized effort could
absorb and synthesize “the intricate geopolitical, historical and ethnic factors involved” to avoid causing more pain to the people who happen to live
in one of the region’s most consequential strategic areas. To reiterate, the
Minsk Group refused to acknowledge or support Iran’s frst attempt to

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broker a ceasefre and peace agreement in 1992, an attitude that “may have
resulted from an apprehension that any support for Iran’s initiatives would
weaken Turkey’s position in the region” (Ramezanzadeh, 1996).
Similar sentiments have been observed by Iranian experts as well. For
example, Mortaza Ashraf and Moctaba Ashraf conclude that:
The situation in the Karabakh region has played a dual role in the
activities of Islamist movements in [Azerbaijan]: on the one hand, the
Muslim nation of Azerbaijan understands that the Christian world,
led by Russia, the United States and France, supports Armenia’s position [in the Karabakh confict]. This factor strengthens the position of
Islamic movements with anti-American agendas in Azerbaijan. On the
other hand, the relations of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Armenia
and the criticism of these relations by the Azerbaijani society, especially
its secular members, cause problems for the activities of the Shiite Islamist movements (Mortaza Ashraf and Moctaba Ashraf, 2015, 49).
One factor impacting Iran’s position on the Karabakh issue has been
friendly relations between Azerbaijan and Israel. This has always been
“a favorite topic” in the criticism of Azerbaijan’s foreign policies among
Iranian political-diplomatic circles, clerics, media and the expert community. For most Iranian observers, Israel seeks to get a foothold across
the Iranian borders by building close relations with Azerbaijan. Iranians
feared the use of the Azerbaijani territory as a transit zone to enter Iran, as
they alleged in incidents in which an Israeli killed Iranian nuclear scientists
along with the launch of Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from the
Azerbaijani territory for the purpose of entering Iranian airspace. These
experiences also have justifed Iran’s closer political and economic relations
with Armenia and its ambiguous policies on the Karabakh confict. There
was a standard answer Iranian experts and politicians gave to the question
of why Iran is cooperating with Karabakh-occupying Armenia, when asked
by Azerbaijanis. The answer accordingly was: “And you are having close
relations with Quds-occupying Israel.”
Iran’s position on the Nagorno-Karabakh confict also has been affected
by prolonged negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea and the
joint exploitation of Caspian hydrocarbon resources by Azerbaijan and
transnational companies. After the signing of the “Treaty of the Century”
in 1994, as it became widely known, Iranians expressed their dissatisfaction with Azerbaijan’s policy of cooperation with the West, demonstratively
boosting relations with Armenia. Iran used the Armenian factor and the fact
of occupation of Karabakh as a means of pressure to dissuade Azerbaijan’s
position in negotiations on the status of the Caspian Sea and its stubborn
insistence was one of the reasons for why the negotiations took so long. Only
after the signing of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea in
2018, Iran lost this playing card to exert pressure on Azerbaijan. Hereafter,

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Iran went to sign agreements with Azerbaijan on joint activities along the
Caspian Sea shoreline.
Finally, the infuence of the Armenian community in Iran on Tehran’s
policy toward the Nagorno-Karabakh confict should be noted. There are
various fgures on the number of Iranian Armenians (between 70,000 and
200,000), but most of them (about 150,000) have left the country since the
Islamic Revolution, and now their number is hardly more than 60,000. The
Armenian community enjoys cultural, religious and political rights (including the allocation of two seats in the country’s parliament) and can take
an active role in the socio-political affairs of the country (Talibli, 2016,
133–135).
Although no concrete facts have been obtained about the direct impact
of Iranian Armenians on the country’s policy on the Karabakh confict,
no sentiment of dissatisfaction has ever been recorded among them in connection to the Karabakh policies of the Iranian government. Moreover,
they face no obstacles to carry out information campaigns concerning the
Nagorno-Karabakh confict (including books, articles, presentations, conferences, etc.). The Armenian community in Iran has some role, however, in
the rapid development of the Iranian-Armenian relations. President Hassan
Rouhani, during his visit to Yerevan in late 2016, called Iranian Armenians
“a strong bridge between the two countries” and highlighted that the sides
“must use this opportunity to deepen and strengthen relations.” In summary, Iran’s policies about the Nagorno-Karabakh confict have taken on
multifaceted dimensions that can sway from agreement to contradiction
rather easily.

Second Karabakh War and Iran
The 44-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan brought swift changes to
the geopolitics of the South Caucasus and, as such, opened a new chapter
in Iran’s policies concerning the Karabakh confict. When hostilities broke
out, Tehran called for a ceasefre in order to resolve the confict through
peaceful means and once again declared its readiness to play a mediating
role between the two sides. This statement was in line with Iran’s previous policies which favored the status quo since the First Karabakh War.
Confdently reiterating its traditional position, Iran, seemingly, thought
of the skirmishes as temporary without any potential to upend the local
situation.
As fghting swept over the entire Karabakh region and Azerbaijan
advanced rapidly against the backdrop of Russia’s refusal to directly intervene, Tehran felt compelled to reconsider its approach, especially as the government observed the country’s Azerbaijani community. Iranian offcials,
including Foreign Ministry spokesperson Said Xatibzada, government
spokesperson Ali Rabii and Ali Akbar Vilayeti, the foreign policy advisor
of Iran’s Supreme Leader. spoke of supporting the liberation of the occupied

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Azerbaijani territories and respect for the territorial integrity of each side in
addition to their traditional calls for peaceful resolution.
Rabii told a news conference on September 29, 2020 that “they are watching the confict in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan
with attention and concern,” adding,
the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the protection and offcial recognition of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan
is very clear, and the Iranian government has repeatedly stressed this
legal right in the framework of international law and UN resolutions.
We also believe that there is a peaceful solution to the confict between
the two neighboring countries—Azerbaijan and Armenia, and that
Iran, Turkey and Russia can help these two neighbors in the implementation of UN resolutions.
Despite the fact that he used the word “repeatedly,” the reference to the UN
Security Council resolutions in this context could be considered a novelty
in terms of Iran’s position. It is noteworthy that the solution to the problem
within the framework of known resolutions was later refected in statements
by other Iranian public fgures, diplomats and experts.
This position was infuenced by new factors. Tehran had no interest in
supporting the government of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan,
who was considered a “man of the West” and who opened an embassy in
Israel. It is no coincidence that in a telephone conversation with Pashinyan on September 30, 2020, Iranian President Rouhani stressed the need to
resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh confict “on the basis of international law
and the principle of territorial integrity.”
This neutrality, which favored the Azerbaijani side, was also necessitated
by the mobilization of the Azerbaijani community in Iran. For example, +according to unoffcial reports, thousands of Iranian Azerbaijanis applied to
Azerbaijan’s diplomatic representatives in Iran declaring readiness to join the
Azerbaijani army in the Karabakh War. Almost every day in the course of the
war, Iranian Azerbaijanis traveled to the border zone along the Aras River.
watching the fght across the border, singing patriotic songs and applauding
the successes of the Azerbaijani army. The videos from these gatherings went
viral in Azerbaijani social media circles.
This public support was also attested to by numerous pro-Azerbaijani
demonstrations organized by Iranian Azerbaijanis. On October 1, 2020,
there were such demonstrations in many cities (e.g., Tabriz, Ardabil and
Zanjan) of Azerbaijani provinces in Iran and in Tehran. The participants
chanted slogans such as “Karabakh is ours and will continue to be so!,”
“Protection of Armenia is a crime!” as well as demanding the government
to shut down the Nurduz checkpoint on the Armenia–Iran border. It is
important to note that Iranian media (including the offcial news agency
IRNA and the semi-offcial Fars information agency), in contrast to former

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such demonstrations which were rarely covered, did in fact report on these
latest events. This media coverage can be also interpreted as the government’s permission for their organization. It is worth recalling that during
the Tovuz clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan in July 2020, less than
three months before the 44-day war, the attempts of South Azerbaijanis
to carry out similar demonstrations were resolutely countered by Iranian
security forces.
Simultaneously with the mass demonstrations, the representatives
(imams) of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in four predominantly Azerbaijani provinces of Iran (East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan,
Ardabil and Zanjan) issued a joint statement expressing their full support
for the Republic of Azerbaijan. “There is no doubt that Karabakh belongs
to Azerbaijan, is occupied and must be returned to Azerbaijan,” the statement read. “The steps taken by the Azerbaijani government to return the
occupied territory are completely legal and in accordance with Sharia law,
thus trying to implement UN resolutions.” It also welcomed Azerbaijan’s
military achievements, glorifed the martyrs and expressed hope that justice
would soon prevail.
On October 2, members of the Iranian parliament from the four
above-mentioned provinces issued a joint statement indicating that “the
Republic of Azerbaijan supports the Muslim people and the oppressed
Shiites of Karabakh.” The statement referred to four UN Security Council
resolutions on the confict and called on the country’s foreign ministry to
use this framework and generate public awareness. Despite such statements
of support, in the early days of hostilities, one of the most discussed topics
in both Azerbaijan and Iran was the issue of transporting military cargo via
the territories of Iran to Armenia. The dissemination of video and photos
on social media networks and websites, as well as news about the alleged
burning of cars traveling to Armenia by Iranian Azerbaijanis, intensifed
Azeri passions. Despite the denials by the Iranian embassy in Azerbaijan,
the foreign ministry and other offcial bodies of Iran, the discussions did
not subside. In response, Iranian state television broadcast an investigative report on the issue, showing cargo being transported from the port of
Anzali to the Nurduz customs checkpoint on the border with Armenia, and,
as such, rejecting the allegations about the transportation of military cargo.
At the same time, in order to prevent rumors, the deputy governor of East
Azerbaijan in Iran stated that they had ordered the cars to be stopped at
the Iranian border. On October 2, the Iranian Customs Committee issued a
special statement stating that they did not allow the transportation of military cargo through the country.
The Azerbaijani-Armenian War generated a wave of analyses and forecasts. In addition, the Institute for Strategic Studies under the Iranian
Advisory Council organized a seminar on the events in Karabakh, and
the Iran-Eurasia Institute organized a webinar. In general, the discussions
focused on the infuence of external forces on the confict. Some saw it as an

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“Israeli affair,” while some viewed it as a Turkish-Russian confrontation,
and others as a Turkish-French (or European) confrontation. In general, the
traditional geopolitical approach prevailed in the views of Iranian political
circles and the expert community on the Karabakh confict. Iran was concerned about the growing infuence of outside forces in the region, including
rival Turkey, the possible impact of the process on the country, as well as the
possibility of radical jihadist groups entering the region through the confict. The latter issue gradually came to the fore in directing Iran’s approach
to the war.
Increasing international activity around the confict, especially in the
context of Russia’s active role in the process, the Iranian leadership raised
the matter of impact of the Azerbaijani-Armenian War on regional security
and the emergence of takfri radical groups in the region. This position was
clearly stated in a speech by Rouhani at a government meeting on October
7. Rouhani called Azerbaijan a “brother” and Armenia a “neighbor” and
said they respected the rights of the Azerbaijani people. Nevertheless, he
particularly emphasized three issues: (1) the targeting of missiles on Iranian
territory; (2) the deployment of radical terrorist groups closer to the Iranian
border “under various pretexts”; (3) the threat of war turning into a regional
confict. Focusing on the issue of terrorists, Rouhani said that they would
not allow them to approach the Iranian border. Following this speech, the
number of articles in the Iranian media about the alleged involvement of
mercenaries from Syria in the Karabakh War increased.
It should be noted that this topic was also mentioned in Rouhani’s telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October
10. Rouhani said that “the participation of terrorists in the Karabakh
war is dangerous for Iran, Russia and the whole region,” adding. “the
possible intervention of some third countries in the confict will prolong
the crisis.”
Later, an article with the headline “Iran’s clear message about the presence of terrorists in the Karabakh crisis” was published on the website of
the offcial Irib News Agency on October 13. The article quoted Rouhani as
saying that Iran has sent a clear message to its northern neighbors, and that
the use of terrorists in the Karabakh War was a “reality impossible to be
denied.” The article divides “terrorists recruited by Ankara into the war on
the Azerbaijani side” into two groups: (1) extremist nationalist “wolves”; (2)
Takfri-Salaf groups brought from Syria (Jabhat al-Nusra, Nureddin Zangi,
Ahrar al-Sham, Faylaq al-Sham, Sultan Murad Brigade, etc.).
Following the Iranian president’s speech, the media linked with the
reformist political wing published articles against religious fgures who
made statements in support of Azerbaijan. The Shargh newspaper, the most
infuential media outlet in the reformist camp, on October 3, published an
article headlined, “Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan,” which condemned
the clerics’ interference in foreign policy. Seeing the seriousness of the disputes, the governor of East Azerbaijan stated that the position of the imams

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corresponded to the offcial position. The governor of Ardabil also issued a
statement supporting the imam of the province.
Domestic political struggle had also an impact on Iran’s diplomatic initiatives in the Karabakh confict. In the early days of the war, Iran announced
that it was preparing a different settlement plan for the confict. However,
no further actions followed. The Iranian media criticized the foreign ministry, accusing it of inaction and failure to protect the country’s interests
in the region. Later, Rouhani appointed Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas
Araghchi as special envoy on the issue, authorizing him to discuss Iran’s
plan with stakeholders. Iran’s settlement plan, although never made public
and not fully known, was believed to be based on three principles, according to leaked information to the media and statements by several Iranian
offcials:
1 Ensure the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan (end occupation of territories of Azerbaijan).
2 Protect minority rights.
3 End hostilities and launch negotiations with the help of infuential countries in the region.
In late October, Araghchi visited Baku, Moscow, Yerevan and Ankara to
discuss the plan and on October 28, Aliyev received a delegation led by
Abbas Araghchi. Congratulating the government on the Azerbaijani military’s victory, the Iranian offcial said he bowed to all the martyrs who
sacrifced their lives on this path. In the following days, Araghchi met with
representatives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as Pashinyan in Armenia, and with Erdogan in Turkey.
Commenting on his deputy’s visit, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad
Zarif confrmed that the purpose of the visit was to discuss Iran’s settlement proposal with the relevant stakeholders. “In this context, we tried
to achieve these goals and hold consultations without trying to compete with other existing mechanisms such as the Minsk Group,” Zarif
told the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) news agency on
November 1.
One of the important points of our country’s initiative is that it is not
only seeking a temporary ceasefre but also a move towards resolving
the conficts based on a framework that begins with the declaration of
commitment of both sides to a set of principles and then it continues
with measures, especially the withdrawal of the occupying forces from
all the occupied territories
Zarif said. Following the visit, Araghchi told reporters that Iran is “waiting
for a response from the four countries in a short time to complete it [the
initiative] in a way that is accepted by all and paves the way for resolving the

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crisis.” He admitted that the implementation of this initiative would not be
an “easy” task.
In the following days, Iran’s initiative lost momentum and disappeared.
The details of the plan and the reaction of the four countries visited by
Araghchi were not made public. In a televised speech on November 3, 2020,
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said, “All the Azerbaijani territories occupied by Armenia must be liberated and returned to Azerbaijan,”
Khamenei stressed. Second, seeking to strike some balance between the
two sides, he voiced some concerns about the Armenian community of
Karabakh, stating the security of those people must be ensured. Finally, he
warned against mercenaries allegedly deployed in the war, vowing, “They
should not come close to the Iranian border, and if they do, they will certainly be dealt with decisively.”
Khamenei’s statement was welcomed by Azerbaijan’s Deputy Foreign
Minister Khalaf Khalafov. In a telephone conversation with Iran’s ambassador to Baku, he expressed gratitude to these “important and fair” remarks
which he said were based on “friendship and brotherhood” between the two
neighboring countries. According to reports, in this conversation, Khalafov
also thanked Iran for the proposed settlement and emphasized the importance of immediate implementation of the agreements reached in the course
of Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s visit to Baku. This
confrms that Azerbaijan had actually welcomed Iran’s initiative, which
favored removing occupied forces from the affected Azerbaijani territories.
But, Armenian leaders opposed the Iranian proposal.
Iranian leaders worried about potential spillover of the fghting into their
territory and it was evident in mid-October that the country’s military was
put on heightened alert levels. High-ranking Iranian offcers visited the border region, as well as various units of the Iranian Army and the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were brought to the area. All this was
widely covered by the Iranian media, along with a propaganda campaign.
On October 24–25, the Iranian Army’s Land Forces, with the participation
of the 164th Rapid Attack Brigade based in Piranshahr, as well as artillery
and unmanned aerial vehicles, held a one-day military training on the country’s northwestern border to “demonstrate combat readiness and strength.”
Iran was particularly concerned about escalation into a regional war,
which could change the geopolitics of the South Caucasus and bring in
Turkey, Iran’s historical rival, as a competitive regional player. For example,
Mohammad Pakpour, Brigadier-General and Commander of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps Ground Forces, declared support to the territorial integrity of the regional states and explained his opposition to any
type of forceful occupation, adding, “any change to the regional border
geopolitics is a red line for us.” Apparently, Iran feared that the next stage
of the process (under the control of Turkey) would begin after Azerbaijan
had fully regained control of its state borders. For example, popular Iranian
politician Abdullah Ramazanzadeh issued a statement of caution: “Sultan

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Mesiagha Mahammadi and Vasif Huseynov

Erdogan wants to draw us into another regional confict. We have to be
careful!”
Similar reactions were noted, following the Baku victory parade on
December 10, when Erdogan’s poem “Arazı ayırdılar” was recited, which,
in Azerbaijani, fguratively can be translated as, “They divided the territory of Azerbaijan along the Aras River.” This drew strong reactions from
many Iranian offcials, politicians, clerics and the military. Iranian Foreign
Minister Zarif said that Erdogan’s reading of the poem in Baku was “wrong”
and that no one had “the right to talk about [Iranian] Azerbaijan.” The
Turkish ambassador to Tehran was then summoned to the Iranian Foreign
Ministry but after several days of heated discussions, the Iranian president
fnally commented on the issue, saying he did not believe Erdogan was trying to touch Iran’s territorial integrity while reading the poem. Although
discussions on the issue have become softer since the statement, concerns
remain about Iran’s role and position in the South Caucasus after the Second Karabakh War.
Nevertheless, the ceasefre deal signed by the leaders of Azerbaijan,
Armenia and Russia on November 10 was welcomed by Iran. Iranian
Foreign Ministry expressed hope that the agreement would create conditions for peace and security in the region. At the same time, the head of
the Iranian presidential administration Mahmoud Vaezi said that Iran was
pleased with the statement and expressed confdence that the confict would
be resolved on the basis of international norms and the principle of territorial integrity.
Addressing his nation on November 20, Aliyev touched upon Azerbaijani–
Iranian relations, stating that Iran is a friendly nation and brother, and,
for example, had agreed to close its airspace at our request and not permit
Armenia to bring weapons via Iranian territory during the military operations. On December 9, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov paid
his frst offcial visit to Iran after the war. During his meetings with Iranian
leaders, it was noted that the liberation of Azerbaijani territories and the
restoration of the border between the two countries created fresh opportunities for cooperation projects.
In late January 2021, Azerbaijan was visited by Iranian Foreign Minister
Zarif as part of his regional tour to fve countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia,
Georgia, Russia and Turkey), which was proposed by Azerbaijani and
Turkish leaders to come together in a joint regional platform. The proposed
six-party platform was reported to be the main focus of discussions during
the visit.
During the tour, on January 25, Zarif was received by Aliyev and the
Iranian offcial congratulated his host on the victory while emphasizing the importance of regional cooperation in the six-party platform. In
turn, Aliyev expressed his desire to see Iranian companies participate in
the reconstruction of the liberated territories. Zarif, who left Baku for
Moscow, arrived in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and its Julfa

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railway station on January 30, after visiting Yerevan, Tbilisi and Ankara.
The visit to this railway station was read as Iranian support to the unblocking of regional transportation and communication links, as Julfa station
was situated on the Iranian–Armenian railway during the Soviet era. Kaleji
(2020), citing reports in the published memoirs of regional fgures including
Abulfaz Elchibey, Heydar Aliyev and Hashemi Rafsanjani, notes that during the hostilities surrounding the First Karabakh War, Iran provided “residents of Nakhchivan with gas, electricity and basic goods from early 1990s
and hosted thousands of Azerbaijanis displaced by war.” If Iran is to realize
any geoeconomic gains from its role in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan will
matter when it comes to transit routes in the “North–South economic corridor, stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Baltic ports” (Avdaliani, 2021),
as will Russian efforts to rehabilitate its railway system, which “could turn
Tehran into a major benefciary as it will allow the expansion of trade ties
with the region and Russia.”
It should be noted that Iran views the six-party platform as a kind of realization of its 3 + 3 proposal, which it once insisted on, but now was concerned
about the new regional situation but also struggled about determining its
place in the new order. But, for the frst time in the Second Karabakh War,
Iran openly declared that Azerbaijan had the right to liberate the occupied
territories. In particular, the statement of the country’s Supreme Leader in
support of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan resonated among the parties to the confict and the general public of Iran.

Conclusion
The collapse of the Soviet Union gave Iran an opening to revive its historical
links with the countries of the South Caucasus and establish some infuence
over the region. One major test for Iran’s ambitions occurred at the outset
of the post-Soviet period, as sparked by the outbreak of the First Armenia–
Azerbaijan War. Tehran initially viewed the confict as a minor territorial
dispute between two states which had peacefully coexisted for centuries
under Russian control. This analysis soon proved to be unrealistic. Iran’s
attempts to mediate between the sides were not successful and eventually it
was Russia who succeeded to push both countries to a durable ceasefre in
mid-1994.
The analysis here has focused on the aftermath of the First Karabakh
War of the early 1990s, the factors that infuenced the policies of the Iranian
governments toward the confict and, fnally, Iran’s corresponding policies
during and after the Second Karabakh War. But, the Iranian governments
pursued ambiguous policies regarding the Karabakh confict, which was
partly why Tehran could not play an impactful role in the resolution process. Thus, Tehran, up to the Second Karabakh War, refused to take a clear
position, instead preferring to limit itself to declaring support to international efforts to peacefully resolve the confict. In parallel, Tehran, in fact,

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Mesiagha Mahammadi and Vasif Huseynov

looked to be more interested in prolonging the status quo established by the
1990s ceasefre agreement.
This is borne out by considerations of Iran’s South Caucasus foreign policy as viewed by the three Iranian presidential administrations coinciding
with the span of time between the First and Second Karabakh Wars. The
Khatami administration viewed the South Caucasus as a civilizational-cultural arena within the framework of the “Dialogue among Civilizations”
theory, while during Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the policy context was
elevated to strengthen Iran’s ability to counter the presence of Western
interests in the region with a “Look East” strategy (Azizi and Hamidfar,
2021). Meanwhile, the Rouhani administration, emphasizing the desire for
stability and security for all of the region’s nations, has focused on a diplomatic-political approach. None of the three presidential administrations
succeeded because they failed to account fully for US infuence upon South
Caucasus allies while taking extra cautions not to trigger Russia’s willingness to take on a more active “near abroad” role (Azizi and Hamidfar, 2021).
This situation did change somewhat on a delayed response after the
launch of the Second Karabakh War on September 27, 2020. Again, in a
way similar to the beginning of the hostilities in the early 1990s, Tehran
believed the fghting would be temporary without potential to usurp the
regional situation. As initial skirmishes expanded to full-scale war between
the sides, Iran was alarmed by the implications affecting the geopolitics of
the South Caucasus and eventually Iran’s national security.1 The change
in Iranian perspective, according to Avdaliani (2021), acknowledged that
Iran viewed continuing its Armenian support could trigger Azerbaijan,
now militarily stronger than in the First Karabakh War, to strengthen its
alliance with Turkey. This then would have negative impacts for keeping
open transportation routes to Russia open and compromise Iran’s place in
the Caspian Basin. Nevertheless, Avdaliani adds that poor relations with
Azerbaijan would more likely lead to the negative outcomes that have worried Iran, even if they seem, for the moment, to be remote possibilities. In
addition, one must consider the backdrop of Azerbaijan’s successes on the
battlefeld, Russia’s refusal to directly intervene in the fghting, and, not
less importantly, the mobilization of the Iranian Azerbaijanis demanding
the Iranian government to support Azerbaijan. Tehran, for the frst time
in the post-Soviet period, called for the restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, and, as such, the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the
Karabakh region. This support was reiterated by top offcials of the Iranian
government in various platforms and highly appreciated by the Azerbaijani
side. But, even as Rouhani tried to strike a balance with Iran’s neighbors and
achieve some degree of cordiality in diplomatic communications, its efforts
with the Karabakh crisis barely moved the needle. Walking the “tightrope”
to maintain status quo, various Iranian offcials failed to specify the defnition of “occupied areas” in calling for the end of the Armenian occupation
of the contested territories (Gulf International Forum, 2020).

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Iran also welcomed the Russia-brokered trilateral ceasefre accord signed
on November 10, 2020. The Iranian leaders expressed interest in the six-country (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia + Turkey, Iran and Russia) regional
cooperation platform proposed by the Azerbaijani and Turkish leaders after the war. Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif, visiting the countries proposed
to take part in this platform in early 2021, communicated Iran’s support.
Ending his visit by visiting the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Julfa railway station at the Azerbaijan–Iranian border, Zarif
likewise reiterated Iran’s support to the unblocking of regional transportation and communication links which was one of the major developments
brought about by the 44-day war. The question remains as to what actions
Iran will take to back up its statements embracing post-war realities in the
region as it seeks to play a more active role in formulating a new regional
confguration. To summarize, “Iran’s approach toward the Karabakh issue
was on the one hand, subject to the broader concepts in Iranian foreign policy and on the other hand, impacted by the nature of Iran’s relations with
the great powers”. Tehran has yet to fgure out how to counter the presence
and impact of Azerbaijan and Turkey, given that its insistence on the status
quo previously had ended in strengthening Armenia’s hands (Basar, 2020).
As much as Tehran tried to rely on its passive formulation of the principle for territorial integrity in the hopes that both Azerbaijan and Turkey
would, respectively, acknowledge that access to Nakhchivan or to Asian
consumer and business markets required passing through Iranian territory,
the Iranian leaders failed to (or refused to) consider the full manifestations
of an Azerbaijani victory in Karabakh or the Azeri resolve to make amends
for its defeat in the First Karabakh War (Basar, 2020).

Note
1 Friday Prayer leaders serving as representatives of Iran’s Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in four predominantly Turkic-populated provinces—West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Ardebil and Zanjan—publicly
voiced support in a joint statement for Azeri efforts to end the “occupation”
of Nagorno-Karabakh. They described the Republic of Azerbaijan as a “[Shia]
household country” and its actions to “recapture” the disputed territory
“completely lawful and religiously legitimate.” This unprecedented stance
was later echoed by Ali Akbar Velayati, current international affairs advisor
to Khamenei, who pointed out four UN Security Council resolutions (passed
from April to November 1993) calling for withdrawal of Armenian forces
from occupied Azeri lands and the fate of “around 7 cities in south Azerbaijan
occupied by Armenia.” See Gulf International Forum. https://gulff.org/
iran-and-the-nagorno-karabakh-confict-preserving-the-status-quo/.

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18 The Arab States
and the Karabakh War
Brendon J. Cannon

Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to situate the national interests of Arab
Middle East states within the context of the 2020 Azerbaijan-Armenia confict in Nagorno-Karabakh. To date, the connections, actions and interests
of Arab states with the Caucasus region remain an understudied feld in
international politics. This is because connections between the two geographically distinct regions have been tenuous until recently.
With the resumption in confict in 2020, certain Arab states showed a
keen interest in the confict, at times attempting to affect outcomes. This
chapter, therefore, flls a critical gap in the literature on the confict as well
as the literature on the international relations of Arab states. Providing an
analysis of the interests and activities of extra-regional state in conficts
is important given their potential to infuence outcomes in favor of one
belligerent or another. In turn, cataloging the role of external states, in
this case Arab Middle East states, in extra-regional conficts provides evidence of power struggles at an inter-regional or even international level.
As Miholjcic (2020, 157) noted, “In every military confict, alliances and
foreign support can have a signifcant effect on opposing parties and the
outcomes of military clashes. That is why analysis of international responses to local conficts must be considered when discussing seemingly
insignifcant consequences of disputes between smaller states in the context of world politics and affairs.” By defning and analyzing the, at times,
conficting interests of Arab states in the Caucasus, the chapter shows that
their genesis had less to do with the belligerents and more to do with Turkey, and how the confict’s outcomes would affect distributions of power
across the Middle East.
Because the Arab Middle East is highly diverse, the chapter will use
the case studies of three important states—the United Arab Emirates
(UAE), Qatar and Egypt—in order to sketch the genesis and diversity of
Arab interests, paying particular attention to the role played by the regime
security (regime survival), particularly as it is confated with (or antithetical
to) national interests and state security. In addition, the capabilities and

DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-23
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The Arab States and the Karabakh War

403

resources of these three states, as deployed in order to affect outcomes in the
Caucasus confict, will be outlined and analyzed.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section one examines the distributions
of power in the Middle East, taking into account the increase in power of the
Arab Gulf states as well as Turkey over the past two decades, and the relative decline of Egypt. The role played by ideological fault lines since the 2011
Arab Uprisings is also contextualized. Section two explores the Arab Middle East-Caucasus nexus, highlighting relations between the two belligerent
parties—Azerbaijan and Armenia—and the three Arab states in the lead-up
to the Nagorno-Karabakh confict. The third section will explore the security burdens and interests of the UAE, Qatar and Egypt, paying attention
to the role played by Turkey in informing these interests. The penultimate
section analyzes the results, describing how the respective actions taken by
Abu Dhabi, Doha and Cairo during the Nagorno-Karabakh confict were
predicated by the security interests of their regimes, particularly as they
related to their perceptions vis-à-vis the rising power of Turkey as well as
the limitations of their own power capabilities. The fnal section concludes
the chapter.

Distributions of Power in the Middle East
Scholars of international relations (IR) generally hold that the world is
an anarchical system of states with fnite amounts of power on hand. As
such, the control of power and its largely zero-sum nature remain the
bedrock of IR theories (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Snidal 1991; Mearsheimer 2014). In this anarchical global system, signifcant changes to
distributions of power—shifting from one state to another state or grouping of states—over a relatively short period of time create greater uncertainty, thus making the global state system even more anarchical. This
is compounded by shifting power distributions on the sub-global or regional level. This often manifests itself as a security dilemma, a situation in which actions taken by a state to increase its own security cause
reactions from other states, which, in turn, lead to a decrease rather than
an increase in the original state’s security (Tang 2009). This can be particularly pronounced at the regional level in what scholars term regional
security complexes. These are “sets of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization or both are so inter-linked that their security problems cannot be reasonably analyzed or resolved apart from one
another” (Buzan and Weaver 43–45).
The Middle East forms a distinct regional security complex. While it
exhibits many of the same features as other such complexes, the Middle East
is peculiar in three distinct ways. First, it has no hegemonic state. Instead,
the Middle East has seen the rise and fall of multiple would-be hegemons
since the end of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of independent Arab
states. Second, and relatedly, rather than anarchy, the global environment

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Brendon J. Cannon

for the Middle East may better be termed hierarchy. That is, the Middle
East is highly penetrated by external great powers. These both constrain
the actions of Middle East leaders as well as provide the resources needed to
counter threats, either domestic or external. Third, regime survival in Arab
states is often confated with state/national security. In other words, actions
are taken to counter perceived threats in order to ensure regime survival
(Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2019, 250–251).
In the Middle East, which has no natural hegemon, only would-be
hegemons, the shifts in economic and military power are felt intensely. This
is because below the constraining hierarchy of the security umbrella of the
US, the global environment remains anarchy for the Middle East. Indeed, the
current US penetration of the Middle East constrains some actions, but not
all. Rather, as Middle East states—both Arab and non-Arab—gain or lose
power, the quest for regional hegemony remains constant.1 Regional groupings or loose alliances can be formed by states along broad ideological and/
or political lines, but these are less important than regime interests, as seen in
Saudi Arabia’s tacit support of Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War against
an Iran-backed, but Arab Hezbollah; or the decades of mutual mistrust between Baathist Syria and Baathist Iraq. Though sectarianism and ideological
divisions have sharpened since the 2011 Arab Uprisings, the alignments of
power—as well as the paramountcy of the state system in the Middle East—
continue to be informed by the security interests as perceived by Arab regimes (Calculli 2015).
The Caucasus confict in late 2020 witnessed a tussle between Arab and
non-Arab states involved in a newly minted Middle East power confguration.
This occurred for three reasons. First, the power of the Arab Gulf States, fueled by the sale of hydrocarbons, had increased exponentially over the course
of the 2000s, providing Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser degree, the UAE with
the cause and means to make claims to the leadership of the Arab world. This
was possible because of increases in their relative power and the corresponding decline in power of formerly formidable (and larger and more populous)
states, Iraq and Egypt. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 saw off the Baathist
regime and led to a decrease in Iraq’s state power and led to a relative increase
in both Iranian as well as Arab Gulf states’ power. The popular protests that
occurred as part of the 2011 Arab Uprisings led to the end of decades-old
regimes in Tunisia and Libya as well as a civil war in Syria. In Egypt, the
25-year-old military-supported regime of President Hosni Mubarak was overthrown and was followed by an extended period of political and economic
crisis, as detailed below, that accelerated Egypt’s already precipitous decline
from the heights of power it enjoyed during the 1960s.
Second, the decrease in power of formerly powerful Arab states as a result
of the US invasion of Iraq and then the Arab Uprisings allowed the UAE
and Saudi Arabia to adopt policies and strategies to protect their respective regimes and, at the same time, upend the novel political accommodations in Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere. Their subsequent adventurism and

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risky foreign policy actions in the conficts in Yemen and Libya should be
understood from this perspective.
The third development was the rise of Turkey—a non-Arab Middle East
state—and, as importantly, its return to the political and strategic spaces
of the Middle East in ways not experienced for over 100 years. This point
requires some explanation given its centrality to the topic. To wit, Turkey’s
new-found interest in its backyard is a product of its loss of an empire, its
diffcult birth as a state and its Cold War history. Turkey, for example, bandwagoned with the US and became a NATO member in 1952 in order to protect its hard-won territorial sovereignty, indeed its very existence, from its
age-old enemy, Russia. But Turkey’s alignment with the West did not result
in a corresponding openness in terms of political opportunity spaces and
markets. Rather Turkey’s leaders championed policies of economic autarky
that led to heavy state intervention and regulation.
When Turkey did begin to liberalize—its economy under Turgut Ozal in
the early 1980s, and then politically during the 1990s—it found itself unencumbered by the economic strictures of what had been an ongoing European
integration project (correspondingly, Turkey became only a passive
benefciary), but offering a range of goods and services at a particular price
and of a quality that the bloc desired. In addition, as the Cold War ended,
Turkish businesses, particularly construction and Mittelstand producers of
goods (the so-called Anatolian Tigers), began to look to the markets in the
east and south, particularly in Central Asia and the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region. In essence, because Turkey’s economy had developed
along a particular, somewhat isolated trajectory while at the same time
adopting many of the free market, capitalist trappings of the West, it found
itself with a relatively robust economy accustomed to frequent shocks that
certainly outperformed those of its neighbors to the east and produced goods
that underpriced those of its Western counterparts (Cannon 2021, 127–129).
The rise of an economically and militarily powerful Turkey was accompanied by Ankara’s resurgent economic as well as political interests in its
near abroad (the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and sub-Saharan
Africa). As Turkish power expanded, propelled in part by ideological affnity between the post-2002 mildly Islamist rulers of Turkey—the Justice and
Development Party (JDP)—and Muslim Brotherhood (MB) political communities across the Arab Middle East, it led some Arab regimes to question
Ankara’s motives and role.
During the reign of the JDP’s leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey
generally supported movements informed by political Islam. This, along
with Ankara’s vocal support of Palestinian movements such as Hamas, led
some in Ankara to see Turkey as a potential contender to lead the Muslim
World, harking back to Ottoman times and thereby pitting Turkey squarely
against Saudi Arabia, the state that currently claims this moniker (Fuller
2020). Particularly after the 2011 Arab Uprisings and the rise of a shortlived (and Ankara-supported) MB-led government in Egypt, the UAE as

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well as Saudi Arabia felt increasing discomfort and actively intervened
to replace Cairo’s Islamists with a military-led government. This dealt
Turkey’s regional ambitions a blow and struck a rancorous tone in relations between these Gulf monarchies and Ankara. Yet, in the decade since
the Arab Uprisings, Turkey has reasserted itself across the region, both in
reaction to conficts along its borders and on account of competitive and
aggressive Turkish foreign policies meant to expand its regional role and
infuence (Yavuz 2020).
First, Turkey established zones of infuence in Syria and bolstered its
presence in northern Iraq to combat Kurdish irredentism and related political violence.2 Turkey also became involved in the civil war in Libya and
quickly shaped signifcant outcomes that led to a 2020 ceasefre that favored the Turkish-backed government. Turkey’s outreach to sub-Saharan
Africa also gathered steam, as Turkey’s government-linked conglomerates
sold weapons and built infrastructure while Ankara established itself as a
resident power in the Horn of Africa (Rossiter and Cannon 2019; Donelli
2021; Cannon 2021). In the eastern Mediterranean, Egypt sparred with
Turkey over the exploration and exploitation of huge reserves of natural
gas. The dispute pitted Turkey against not only Egypt but Greece and the
Republic of Cyprus. Throughout 2020, Turkey deployed naval vessels to
protect its exploratory maritime efforts. In response, Greece and Egypt
separately deployed their own vessels to shadow the Turkish ships. While
not a Mediterranean state, Abu Dhabi’s leadership struck an increasingly
strident tone on the issue and the UAE signed defense cooperation agreements with Greece and Cyprus in 2020 while continuing to support Egyptian claims to the gas felds.

Arab Middle East-Caucasus Nexus
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have maintained generally cordial and
working relations with the Arab Middle East. Azerbaijan, for example, has
embassies in almost every Arab state.3 Azerbaijan is, after all, a Muslim
majority state—albeit Shi’a rather than Sunni—and possesses large deposits of oil and natural gas. It was thus an obvious destination for hydrocarbon rich Arab Gulf states interested in potentially lucrative joint ventures.
Armenia, on the other hand, is a small, resource-poor and landlocked
Christian-majority state. It is thus not a natural partner for Arab states,
particularly the more conservative Gulf monarchies. Indeed, Arab states
such as the UAE sided with Azerbaijan during the First Nagorno-Karabakh
War (1988–1994), with the UAE’s ambassador to Baku confrming the UAE’s
full support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity as late as 2018 (Lmahamad
2020). Arab states like the UAE and Egypt have ties to Azerbaijan through
the OIC, and hydrocarbon-producing Arab states would also liaise with
Azerbaijan at OPEC+.

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In Armenia’s case, its large diaspora was the lodestar for its diplomatic
endeavors after its separation from the Soviet Union in 1991. Lebanon, Syria
and Egypt—all possessing a centuries-old Armenian presence—offered
natural political and economic bridges in a way that France and the US
did in the West. Egypt’s ties with Armenia, for instance, were established
in March 1992 and Yerevan established its frst embassy in the Arab Middle
East in Cairo in that same year with Egypt following suit in 1993. Unlike the
UAE and other Arab states, Egypt reportedly adopted a neutral position
on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue after the frst war, thus placating Yerevan
as well as Egypt’s own small Armenian population. In the Persian Gulf,
Armenia publicly maintains three embassies, the most important being its
embassy in Abu Dhabi, which also acts as its accredited mission for Saudi
Arabia. The missions in Doha and Kuwait City, by contrast, maintain a
relatively low profle with websites hosted by Facebook.
Despite diplomatically recognizing one another since 1998, the UAE and
Armenia only exchanged ambassadors in 2012. The uptick in their relations,
on the one hand, and between Armenia and Egypt on the other, occurred after the 2011 Arab Uprisings that swept Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak
from power and resulted in the election of the MB-affliated Mohamed
Morsi in 2012. Erdoğan, Turkey’s prime minister at the time, visited Egypt
as well as Tunisia and Libya, in 2011 and fostered a close relationship with
Morsi. Both Qatar and Turkey, albeit separately and without coordination,
offered fnancial assistance, development aid and diplomatic support to the
MB-dominated government in 2012. Morsi was, nevertheless, overthrown
in 2013, and Turkey’s as well as Qatar’s relations with Egypt’s new rulers,
led by the former military strongman Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, soured quickly
as Cairo won much-needed support from the virulently anti-MB Arab Gulf
States of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The reactions that followed in Cairo
and Abu Dhabi were meant to destroy the infuence of the MB on domestic
politics in Egypt and limit the political roles of Turkey and Qatar.
The UAE and Armenia exchanged ambassadors in 2012, as noted, and
proceeded to sign numerous economic agreements, going so far as to describe their relationship as akin to a strategic partnership in 2017. In 2019,
Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE and the most powerful of the seven
emirates, also reportedly made preparations to recognize the “Armenian
Genocide,” a reference to the events as 1915, which saw the deaths and deportations of thousands of Ottoman Armenians during World War I. This
is a pet project of both the state of Armenia and the Armenian diaspora.
They insist the events of 1915 amounted to genocide and have launched a
sustained campaign to lobby states to recognize the events of 1915 as such
(Gunter 2011; Cannon 2016). Having Abu Dhabi recognize the events would
have been a diplomatic coup for Armenia and further demonstrated Abu
Dhabi’s frm support of Armenia as well as its adversarial relationship with
Turkey.4

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In the aftermath of the 2013 overthrow of Morsi in Egypt, the power
of using the historical matter to shame and demonize Turkey, on the one
hand, and please Armenia, on the other, proved too much for Cairo.
Numerous articles were published condemning Turkey’s government for
genocide denial. The Egyptian parliament introduced a resolution calling
for recognition of the Armenian Genocide in 2016 and an Arabic-language
documentary flm, Who Killed the Armenians?, was also produced in Egypt.
Though the parliamentary resolution never passed, the issue remained alive,
and President Sisi referenced the highly politicized issue during his address
at the 2019 Munich Security Dialogue when he highlighted Egypt’s hosting
of Armenians “after the genocide” (Egypt Today staff 2019).

Security Burdens and Regime Survival
While the Middle East exhibits unique characteristics in terms of foreign
policy development, in many ways the region’s states vary little from states
outside the region: the leaders and policymakers of these states make choices
that are limited by the amount, proximity and tiered nature of their security
burdens. This includes not just “hard” security matters, but economic and
social matters as well. States engaged in relations with other states to hedge
against and counter these security burdens, which are necessarily impacted
by a state’s geographic location and history as well as population. They are
also impacted, as noted previously, by shifts in distributions of power within
the region.
All states can be said to have national security interests that infuence
the policies of governments and/or leaders vis-à-vis internal and external
threats, regardless of their genesis.5 However, many Arab states exhibit
national interests that are not truly national, but rather are meant to counter threats in order to ensure regime survival. Indeed, in all three states,
though for different reasons, regime security is paramount and is equated
with national security. If the threat is internal, as is the case in states like
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the leaders may attempt bandwagoning with
external states as both Cairo and Riyadh have done for decades with the
US (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami 2019, 255). In the cases of the UAE and
Qatar where internal threats are less pronounced and external threats more
so, the ruling families of the al-Nahyans in Abu Dhabi and the Al-Thanis
in Doha have, respectively, sought to build alliances and—in the case of
the UAE—expand their military might exponentially (Yates 2020). Both
regimes have also relied on the US security umbrella in the Persian Gulf.
As such, the UAE, Qatar and Egypt are primarily interested in regime
survival and therefore in developments and alignments that may further
their sovereignty of action, territorial integrity and, correspondingly, increase their share of fnite power within the Middle East regional security
complex.

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The United Arab Emirates
The security of the UAE and that of its regime are reliant to a large degree
on its ability to export its signifcant share of hydrocarbons, mainly oil.
Given the UAE’s geographic position as well as its reliance on the export of
oil, maritime shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea must
remain open. For the UAE, throughout its frst four decades of existence,
this has meant the Strait of Hormuz has been the primary security concern. However, with natural changes in leadership after the death of the
UAE’s founder, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan in 2004, coupled with a
steady increase in wealth, the UAE’s leaders have placed increasing emphasis on its extra-regional and international standing as a small-to-medium
power (Ulrichsen 2016). Accordingly, the UAE’s leadership has overseen an
extensive overhaul of the country’s armed forces and intensifed its weapons
acquisition programs.
The US’ security umbrella in the Persian Gulf makes the UAE and its
ruling families less insecure in a highly volatile neighborhood. The close
US-UAE relationship, dating back to the Cold War, has ensured the UAE’s
survival in the face of threats from larger neighbors such as Saudi Arabia,
Iraq and Iran. In turn, the UAE’s emphasis on developing a highly tolerant
society, a stable economy, a capable military, and close relations with other
US allies, including (in mid-2020) Israel, have meant the UAE is generally
understood to be a reliable partner for Washington.
Beyond regime security and stability for the country via the sale of hydrocarbons, the UAE’s leadership worries deeply about the threat of militant Islam (Yates 2020, 63–66). The breakdown in the regional order following the
2011 Arab Spring uprisings led the UAE to adopt a more assertive and interventionist foreign policy ranging from Libya to Egypt to Yemen to counter
what it perceived as Islamist threats to its security. It culminated in the severance of relations with Qatar, a fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member, by the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in 2017. The UAE accused Qatar
of supporting MB causes linked to political violence in places ranging from
Somalia to Egypt to Palestine. When Turkey strengthened its relations with
Qatar by stationing more troops in the country and expanding its military
facility there, the UAE’s leadership quickly perceived the threats facing the
country to now be double-barreled, pitting the Arab World led by the UAE
and Saudi Arabia against the Turks and the Iranians. This had a spillover
effect in the wider region as Turkey and the UAE sparred, often using proxy
forces, in Somalia, Libya and, to a lesser degree, in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Qatar
Qatar has played a powerful role in the politics of the Middle East for over
two decades despite its small size and population. Answers regarding the
impetus, objectives and trajectory Qatar’s foreign policy may be found in

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the consistent attempts of its rulers to protect their sovereignty of action
as well as their territorial integrity from Saudi Arabia (Roberts 2017). For
instance, the Al-Thani rulers of Qatar engineered and then used the 1992
defense cooperation agreement with the US as a tool to discourage any overt
meddling by a much larger and more powerful Saudi Arabia. By providing
land for a massive US air and military base at Al-Udeid, Qatar’s rulers felt
more assured of their regime’s survival. At the same time, they have used
the soft power tools at the disposal of their compact, hierarchical, massively
wealthy (on account of gas deposits) state to ensure its indispensability to
multiple, powerful states.6
Qatar’s actions in support of political Islam, particularly its funding of
MB-linked causes and Doha’s offers of asylum to MB leaders, led directly
to the GCC crisis of 2017–2020.7 During this latest GCC crisis, as Qatar’s
neighbors attempted to close its land, sea and air borders, Turkey and Iran
stepped in to fll the void, providing much needed deliveries of food, aid
and other critical goods by air, along with Turkey’s aforementioned redeployment of a small number of soldiers. The combination of economic and
political support by Turkey for Qatar incensed its three Gulf Arab neighbors and led directly to a diplomatic froideur. Relatedly, it is worth noting
that the UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s relations had been strained with Turkey
since Ankara’s support of MB-linked political movements in the aftermath
of 2011. It was the moves made by Turkey in support of Qatar in 2017, however, particularly the upgrade in troop numbers, that saw the development
of new, confrontational foreign policies instituted by Arab states against
Turkish interests in third countries such as Somalia, Libya and Sudan. It
also marked the beginning of negative media reports about Turkey, a boycott of Turkish media and goods and a string of statements condemning
Turkish interference in Arab affairs.8
Egypt
A focus on four essential starting points, namely, geography, interests,
the Cold War and the leaders of Egypt is required in order to properly
understand and perceive the foreign relations of contemporary Egypt (Chen
2011). Located at the nexus of Europe, Asia and Africa, Egypt’s geography—facing both the Mediterranean world and the Indian Ocean world—
determines the fundamentals of its international relations. Egypt also has
worn, and still wishes to wear, the mantle of protector of the Arab nation.
Egypt’s relations, as a client state, with frst the Soviet Union and then the
US, also continue to infuence its foreign policy choices, particularly given
its reliance on American military and economic aid. Lastly, the power of
Egypt’s titular leaders since the 1950s—Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak and Sisi—
dictate the direction of Egyptian international relations. Post-2011, however,

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a critical new variable has been added: the role of Saudi Arabia and the
UAE in Egypt’s international relations, as the Saudis and Emiratis have become the bank whereby Egypt funds much of its regional ambitions.
Underneath all of this is the issue of regime security versus national security. In other words, it is possible to understand the foreign policies of Egypt
only by integrating internal domestic political factors and complexities in
international dynamics (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami 2014). Egypt presents
a particularly stark picture here, one that was amply demonstrated circa
2011–2013 when a majority of Egyptians revolted against the decades-long
rule of Mubarak, then catapulted Morsi and the MB to power, only to have
another popular revolt supported by the army (this time) overthrow Morsi
and return a military clique to power. Dentice (2020) noted, “From Nasser
to al-Sisi, Egypt adopted a security approach to explain its foreign policy
in order to protect its national interests abroad and to expand its regional
leverage and soft power in the MENA region as a whole.” But the mandarins
in Cairo must also craft a careful strategy to maintain the existing balance
domestically and to contain any threat to regional order.
Egypt has weakened considerably since its days as would-be hegemon
in the 1960s. A combination of explosive population growth and a corresponding lack of economic restructuring means that Egypt’s statist economy remains better suited to Cold War times than the early twenty-frst
century. Given Egypt’s perennial economic crises which, in turn, sparked
the overthrow of Mubarak, the rise of Morsi (supported by Turkey and Qatar) and the subsequent installment of Sisi, Egypt’s leaders have gravitated
to the richer Arab Gulf States as their regional patrons. In turn, they have
adopted political positions favored by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Egypt, for
example, joined the three GCC states in boycotting Qatar. Egypt’s leaders also distanced themselves from Erdoğan’s Turkey given its support
of Morsi and the MB as well as Ankara’s stance on gas in the eastern
Mediterranean.
The preceding sections on the national security interests of the UAE,
Qatar and Egypt exhibit two commonalities. The frst is the primacy of
regime security and the fact that regime security is equated with national
security in all three states. The second commonality is Turkey. For both
Egypt and the UAE, Turkey’s growing power and assertiveness, be it in the
eastern Mediterranean or in the Caucasus, demonstrate not so much evidence of Ankara’s Ottoman-era tendencies for control, but rather what the
leaders in Cairo and Abu Dhabi perceive to be the vulnerability of their
regimes to causes linked with political Islam that have been supported, at
least nominally, by Ankara. For Qatar, Turkey’s support during the GCC
crisis—substantive as well as symbolic—offered the small state another
powerful patron and source of protection against its larger and more formidable neighbors.

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Confict in the Caucasus and the Arab Middle East
The confict lasting from late September to early November 2020 pitted
Azerbaijan against Armenia over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. The
background of this confict and other particulars are covered at length
elsewhere in this book. Suffce to say, the confict resulted in a decisive
victory for Azerbaijan and a resounding defeat for Armenia. Azerbaijan
was supported by Turkey, militarily as well as politically, and Ankara’s
assistance, including Turkish-made drones contributed substantially to the
outcome. In addition, Azerbaijan’s close relations with Israel, particularly
its purchases of Israeli-made kamikaze drones and the digital terrain models (DTM) of Nagorno-Karabakh by Israeli defense companies, enabled it
to collect intelligence effectively and make precision missile strikes.
Armenia, in contrast, was supported by Russia and the majority of members of the OSCE Minsk Group, to include France and the US. Yet, this
potentially powerful array of support was in reality nominal, consisting
of calls for ceasefres and attempts to implement them. It was only after
Azeri forces looked likely to seize Armenian territory proper that Russia
stepped in and forced a ceasefre on the warring parties, one that established
Azerbaijan’s battlefeld victories and reestablished Baku’s land bridge to its
Nakhichevan exclave for the frst time in over three decades.
The UAE, Qatar and Egypt acted, for the most part, in a similar fashion
to their Western counterparts vis-à-vis the confict. They decried the confict, calling for its peaceful resolution and urged the belligerents to cease
hostilities. Beneath the diplomatic utterances, nevertheless, were undercurrents of support for either Armenia or Azerbaijan or, to put it more bluntly,
for or against Azerbaijan’s patron and Armenia’s nemesis, Turkey.
The United Arab Emirates
The UAE’s largest and wealthiest emirate, Abu Dhabi, adopted a proactive approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh confict in order to affect outcomes. Abu Dhabi’s leadership held a pro-Yerevan position because they
understood that the crisis could create problems for Turkey. Abu Dhabi’s
rulers saw Turkey backing Azerbaijan against Armenia, which was backed
by the might of Russia, including over 40,000 Russian troops stationed on
Armenian soil. The perception was that Turkey may be able to tilt outcomes
in its favor in a distant proxy war in Libya, for example, but not one against a
Russian-backed state on the very borders of Russia. As events showed, however, this was a miscalculation on the part of the UAE. Russia failed to support Armenia in its efforts to maintain control over Nagorno-Karabakh, an
enclave that is internationally recognized to be part of Azerbaijan, despite
the status quo lasting from 1988 until 2020.
Immediately after the November 9, 2020 ceasefre agreement, Armenian
President Armen Sarkissian visited Abu Dhabi for a “working visit.” Abu

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Dhabi’s de facto ruler, the Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of
the UAE Armed Forces, Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, affrmed the UAE’s
support for the ceasefre, reportedly expressing “hope that the ‘comprehensive
ceasefre’ agreement between the two countries—both friends to the UAE—
would be a step towards a lasting, stable peace that turns the page on this confict and reinforces the foundations of stability in the Caucasus” (WAM 2020).
Both leaders also noted they remained committed to “developing relations in
a way that achieves the mutual interests of the two countries and their peoples,” and Armenia’s president thanked the UAE for the role the UAE played
in providing support to unspecifed countries and peoples (WAM 2020).
The president may have been referencing the Russian-made T-72 tanks, as
many as 300, sent to Armenia at the outset of the confict reportedly by Abu
Dhabi.9 If the UAE’s rulers did purchase the Russian-made tanks, it would
be telling for three reasons. First, it would demonstrate the importance the
UAE places on its relations with Russia. By coming to Armenia’s aid, as
Russia’s proxy, Abu Dhabi showed it reliability as a partner for Moscow,
particularly given the diplomatic spat with Azerbaijan that ensued after Russia’s large weapons sales to Armenia in 2016. Second, it would show the UAE
acting as a facilitator for the delivery of Russian arms to a politically sensitive region. Third, Abu Dhabi’s willingness to send armaments would clearly
signal its support for Armenia in the confict. The third point requires explanation, however. That is, Abu Dhabi, like Moscow, maintains good relations
with both Yerevan and Baku. The UAE’s actions supporting Armenia should
therefore not necessarily be construed as anti-Azerbaijan, per se. Rather the
aim of Abu Dhabi’s ire, given its regime’s overriding security interests and
anti-MB stance, was Turkey. Turkey’s actions in Qatar, Syria, Libya and the
Horn of Africa over the course of the 2010s—all perceived as threatening by
Abu Dhabi’s leaders—meant the UAE took action to support Armenia in
order to hurt Turkey. As Bruno (2020) noted, “Ultimately, the UAE would
consider Turkey’s support for Baku as dangerous, and would see a decided
beneft in backing Armenia, which might put Abu Dhabi closer to Russia.”
Qatar
Qatar’s leadership took an interest in the confict for two reasons. First,
Qatar fancies itself as a mediator par excellence, one with a global reach.
There is some truth in this. Qatar has mediated between the Taliban and
the US as well as the Palestinian factions Fateh and Hamas. It also negotiated a cessation in hostilities and then sent soldiers to police the contested border between Eritrea and Djibouti. Qatar’s strengths as a confict
negotiator come from a combination of its massive wealth, independent
foreign policies (as distinct from its Gulf state neighbors) and its ability to
offer fnancial inducements to warring parties (Barakat 2012). Accordingly,
Qatar reportedly offered to mediate early in the confict, as did Georgia
and Iran. One avenue it pursued was through Iran. Specifcally, Qatar’s

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ambassador to Iran visited the Armenian embassy in Tehran and asked the
ambassador, Artashes Tumanyan, to deliver a letter from Qatar’s emir to
President Sarkissian. Whether this was done in concert with Iran is unclear,
but Qatari mediation efforts likely failed for the same reason Georgian and
Iranian ones did: Azerbaijan understood it possessed the military edge over
Armenia—on account of Turkish and Israeli military and intelligence support—and therefore was in no mood to talk.
The second reason Qatar took an active interest in the war was its relationship with Turkey. Much has been written on this so-called alliance of
MB supporters (Aras and Akpınar 2017; Gause 2017). Nevertheless, much
of the literature has viewed Turkey-Qatar relations through the lens of the
GCC crisis, seeing cooperation and collusion in places like Sudan, Somalia
and Libya where there was little to none.10 In the Caucasus, Qatar (unlike
Turkey) has good relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Thus, Doha
cannot be said to have actively supported Turkey or either of the belligerents. Indeed, once Doha realized it would be unable to mediate in the confict and thereby fulfll one of its national interests—to be an indispensable
small state for larger powers—Qatar chose to favor the middle ground. In
doing so, it maintained its good relations with Ankara, Baku and Yerevan.
The reporting of Al-Jazeera, an international Arabic news channel based
in Doha, on the confict is worth noting. Al-Jazeera is often seen as an arm
of the Qatari state, but this conclusion is suspect for a number of reasons.
Al-Jazeera’s reporting is not necessarily refective of the positions of Qatar’s
ruler.11 That Al-Jazeera covered the confict was also not surprising given its
truly international reach. Its coverage was neutral (as opposed to pro-Armenian) as was that of its related think-tank, the Al-Jazeera Center for Studies.
Indeed, a report issued on October 10, 2020 about Turkey’s regional strategy
defended Turkey’s actions in the Caucasus but cautioned that Ankara may
overextend itself and, thus, may incorrectly assess the clout of its opponent
in a future crisis.
Egypt
Egypt’s Foreign Ministry, like Saudi Arabia’s, issued a statement calling for
the peaceful resolution of the confict and for outside powers not to intervene. Egypt’s strong relations with Armenia coupled with Egyptian leaders’
mistrust of Turkey led Cairo to side privately with Armenia. Demonstrating
their mutual support of one another against Turkey, the Armenian Ministry of Foreign affairs issued a special statement on August 15, 2020 criticizing Turkey’s “destabilizing activities” in the eastern Mediterranean, and
expressing its full support to Greece, Cyprus and, implicitly, Egypt. On
September 12, just prior to the commencement of the confict, Armenia’s
foreign minister made a high-profle visit to Egypt where he commended
his Egyptian counterparts for their “commitment to peace” in Libya and
affrmed Armenia’s solidarity with Egypt in the eastern Mediterranean.

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Egypt’s and Armenia’s foreign ministers both decried Turkey’s undermining
of peace and stability across the wider region (Snell 2020).
Despite Armenia’s efforts and the sympathies of Egypt’s leaders, Cairo
failed to generate any material support for Armenia that may have affected
outcomes in the confict.12 This was the case for reasons related to the
interests of Egypt’s regime leaders. First, Sisi and his cadre continued to
deal with major unrest across the country. A long-simmering insurgency in
Sinai involving elements related to the Islamic State (IS, or Daesh) continued alongside incidents of unrest related to the overthrow of Egypt’s frst
popularly elected government in 2013. Second, Egypt’s neighbors remained a
source of problems. Armed combat in Libya’s civil war may have ended, but
the 2020 ceasefre remained shaky and refected the victory of Tripoli’s government, using Turkish arms, over the eastern forces of Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, backed by Egypt and the UAE. To Egypt’s south, Sudan remained
in turmoil engendered by the popular overthrow of President Omar al-Bashir
in 2019 after 30 years in power. As threateningly—and even more diffcult
for Egypt to address effectively—was the flling of a giant dam in Ethiopia,
which threatens to massively impede the fow of water from the Blue Nile to
Egypt, thus threatening livelihoods and Egypt’s largely Nile-based economy.
Third, Egypt remains fscally weak and therefore reliant on Riyadh and Abu
Dhabi for fnancial support. Egypt’s providing of materiel to Armenia would
have been too little to affect outcomes, would have angered Baku as well as
Ankara and would have done little to bolster the security of Egypt’s regime.
Egypt’s leaders were not the only interested spectators in the unfolding
confict in the Caucasus. Unlike the First Karabakh War, the clashes that
took place in late 2020 piqued the interest of many Egyptians because of
Turkey’s role.13 Many Egyptians view Turkey as a troublemaker in the eastern Mediterranean region. They therefore perceived Turkey’s actions in
Nagorno-Karabakh as another example of aggressive Turkish foreign policy, informed by and using Turkish nationalist as well as Islamist rhetoric in
order to increase Ankara’s infuence not just in eastern Mediterranean, but
in the Caucasus.14 Egyptian interest in the confict reportedly led to several
online and television exposes and discussions. A proliferation of commentaries and stories also featured in newspapers, detailing (with opprobrium)
Turkey’s actions in the Caucasus and linking them to Syria and Libya (Majid 2020; Qasim 2020). Particularly interesting to Egyptians—given similarities to recent occurrences in Libya—were reports that Turkey had sent
Syrian mercenaries to Nagorno-Karabakh in support of Azeri forces.
The idea that the confict might become a quagmire, a confict akin to
Syria’s decade-long war, and draw in Turkey reportedly gained traction in certain circles in Egypt.15 The idea was that by bleeding Turkey in the Caucasus
Ankara’s ability to meddle effectively in the eastern Mediterranean and Libya
would be limited, thereby resulting in greater Egyptian autonomy of action—
backed by Emirati monetary and material support—in its near abroad. Turkey’s worsening economic situation also provided evidence to some in the

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416 Brendon J. Cannon
Arab Middle East that Turkey would be unable to continue its quest for infuence for long, particularly as states like Egypt and the UAE reacted, either be
rearming and/or supporting anti-Turkey proxies (Qasim 2020).16

Conclusion
Being geographically separate and inhabiting a separate regional security
complex, the fact that Arab Middle East states took an active interest in the
confict in Nagorno-Karabakh is telling and refects recent shifts in distributions of power, more activist foreign policies and issues related to regime survival. The research demonstrates that the confict between Azerbaijan and
Armenia as well as its local repercussions would not, in and of themselves,
have drawn in the interests and capabilities of Egypt, Qatar and the UAE.
Rather, it was the confict’s outcomes and their potential effects on distributions of power across the Middle East that led these Arab states to eschew
spectatorship for more active involvement. Cairo’s, Abu Dhabi’s and Doha’s
actions, in turn, were predicated by the titular role played in the Caucasus
confict by Turkey. Egypt and the UAE both adopted pro-Armenia positions
not because Cairo and Abu Dhabi supported the Armenian occupation of
Nagorno-Karabakh, but because they hoped the confict would cut Turkey
down to size. Qatar, contrariwise, adopted a studied neutrality that demonstrated its good relations with the two belligerents as well as their backers,
Iran and Russia in the case of Armenia, and Turkey in the case of Azerbaijan.

Notes
1 For a detailed study on how this struggle for Middle Eastern regional hegemony
is playing out extra-regionally in the Horn of Africa, see Cannon and Donelli
(2019) and Donelli and Cannon (2021).
2 For a study on Turkey’s shifting interests and progressive establishment of zones
and infuence, see Cannon, et al. (2018); Köstem (2020).
3 Azerbaijan does not currently operate embassies in Syria, Oman and Yemen.
4 Reports are inconclusive as to Abu Dhabi’s offcial recognition. Nevertheless,
the prospect of Abu Dhabi’s recognition was warmly welcomed in Yerevan and
by the Armenian diaspora.
5 A state’s extant and enduring security burdens often, but not always, defne its
strategic choices. Security burdens are often divided into two tiers: frst-tier
security burdens can be understood as those coming from states possessing the
extant and enduring capability and intent to cause catastrophic harm to the
national security of the state in question. Second-tier security burdens may be
defned as those emanating from states possessing the possible capability and
intent to cause enduring, extant, and serious harm to the national security of a
country (Donelli and Cannon, 2021, 12–14).
6 David Roberts (2017b) noted that Qatar has “sought to harness the post-Cold
War zeitgeist to forge the Qatari state as a mediator, a font of soft power in
the sporting, media, and educational arenas, and as a state enmeshed in an ever-thickening web of international relations via its liquefed natural gas (LNG)
shipments to states like the United Kingdom, China, Japan, and South Korea.”

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7 For example, in 2014 and as a prelude to the 2017-2020 GCC crisis, Saudi Arabia
threatened to blockade Qatar by land and sea unless it cut its ties with the Muslim
Brotherhood, close Al Jazeera, and expel local branches of two US think tanks,
the Brookings Doha Center and the Rand Qatar Policy Institute. See David
Hearst (2014, March 9). Saudi Arabia Threatens to Lay Siege to Qatar: Cooperation or Confrontation?, Huffngton Post. https://www.huffngtonpost.com/
david-hearst/saudi-arabia-threatens-to_b_4930518.html.
8 For example, on August 1, 2020, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Anwar Gargash tweeted “The provocative statement of the Turkish Minister of
Defense is a new [failure for] his country’s diplomacy…Relations are not managed with threats and intrusions, and there is no place for colonial illusions
at this time, and it is more appropriate for Turkey to stop interfering in Arab
affairs.”
9 The reporting remains unverifed (see, for example, Intelligence Online 2020).
10 For a corrective to this view, see Cannon (2019, 33).
11 Giorgio Cafero, CEO of Gulf State Analytics, personal interview (online) with
author, February 25, 2021.
12 Ahmed Kandil, Head of International Affairs Unit and Head of Energy Studies
Program, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, personal
interview (online) with author, March 8, 2021.
13 The interest generated in the confict was not limited to Egypt. After the outbreak in hostilities, Arab News, an English-language daily newspaper published
in Saudi Arabia, published an October 2, 2020 interview with Mher Margaryan,
Armenia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, in which he pleaded with the
world not to let another genocide happen to the Armenians. Armenian claims
that Turkey was seeking to continue the “genocide” in Nagorno-Karabakh on
October 4, 2020. Arab News also reported on its website on October 4, 2020
that a Twitter poll showed that almost half of Arab readers believed Turkey was
behind the escalation in confict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
14 Ahmed Kandil, personal interview (online) with author, March 8, 2021.
15 Ahmed Kandil, personal interview (online) with author, March 8, 2021.
16 This theory has had currency in the West as well as the Arab Middle East for
over a decade. In 2010, Turkey’s economy was in good shape and its reputation intact across the Middle East. Nevertheless, an International Crisis Group
report concluded that “Ankara has many balls in the air and sometimes promises
more than it can deliver, over-sells what it has achieved and seeks a role far away
when critical problems remain unsolved at home.” In 2020, a report concluded:
“Over the past year, Turkey has taken extensive and at times provocative actions
to expand its presence along its periphery in the Mediterranean and the Levant,
and outward into the greater Mediterranean, Red Sea and Horn of Africa—a
pattern that resembles the country’s mighty predecessor, the Ottoman Empire.
But to maintain this kind of momentum, Turkey must have a strong economy.
If it can weather this fnancial storm, it can pursue its ambitions of becoming a
regional power. If not, then Erdoğan will have to fght just to maintain the gains
Turkey has made so far” (Rose, 2020).

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19 The Nagorno-Karabakh War
Diaspora Politics in Canadian
Foreign Policy1
Ozay Mehmet

Introduction
Traditionally Canadian foreign policy is designed to project Canada
as a loyal partner in the dominant western alliances of the day. This
has included participating on the allied side of both world wars, actively
participating in the United Nations and NATO, defending democratic-capitalist causes during the Cold War, and making military, diplomatic, and fnancial commitments to help promote global stability and
justice in the modern era of terrorism and rogue states
(https://thecanadaguide.com/basics/foreign-policy/
accessed on 3/11/2020).
This chapter critically examines the pro-Armenian policy in relation to the
war over Nagorno-Karabakh during fall 2020, emphasizing that it does not
follow the traditional Canadian foreign policy as outlined above. Rather,
this case has been shaped by the Armenian diaspora in Canada. For reasons explained in the chapter, the conduct of Canadian foreign policy in this
case is inconsistent with the Canadian reputation as a multicultural model
that respects international law and human rights. The chapter also argues
that this case fails to promote solidarity within the NATO alliance and in
the UN.
The chapter is organized in fve Parts as follows: Part I is an Introduction.
Part II examines selected cases of Best Practice in Canadian foreign policy, which has earned Canada a well-deserved and favorable image abroad.
These Best Practice cases illustrate and justify an independent Canadian
foreign policy, to the maximum degree possible. More generally, Canadian
foreign policy has followed the lead of bigger powers. Accordingly, Part III
examines the case for an independent foreign policy. It is found that, as a
middle-level power, Canada is seriously constrained by fnancial and military resources for a fully independent foreign policy. Even more seriously, it
is found that a new domestic threat to independent Canadian foreign policy
exists, namely, Diaspora ethnic politics. This is documented in Part IV, the

DOI: 10.4324/9781003261209-24
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core of the chapter, based on the war in fall 2020 over Nagorno-Karabakh
and undue infuence of the Armenian diaspora lobby in this case. Finally,
Part V will highlight the principal conclusions of the chapter.

Best Practice versus Traditionalism in
Canadian Foreign Policy
Canadian foreign policy has oscillated between exceptionalism approaching Best Practice and Traditionalism whereby policymaking has been by
proxy, following the lead of Westminster or Washington. In the former,
Canada has demonstrated a rare, admirable case of independent voice,
whereas in the latter, more traditional situation Canada lacked independence. In the frst section of this Part, we shall examine some examples
of the Best Practice, and in the second section we shall similarly look at
traditionalism.
A historical review of Canada’s foreign policy is outside the scope of this
chapter. However, over the course of the last century, it may be argued that
Canada’s foreign policy has been best when Ottawa acted from a principled
Canadian perspective, going against instructions or guidance from London,
Washington or elsewhere. Four selected cases will now be reviewed briefy to
illustrate Best Practice: (1) The Chanak Affair, 1922, (2) Pierre E. Trudeau’s
China policy, (3) Cuba 1976, and (4) former PM Chretien’s refusal to join in
the invasion of Iraq in deference to the Bush Administration.
The Chanak Affair, End of Colonialism
On 9 September 1922, the Turkish National army, led by Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk, liberated Izmir, pushing out to sea the invading Greek army. Then,
the Turkish forces marched north to confront the British soldiers guarding
Gallipoli. At the little town Canakkale on the Asian side, a renewed war
loomed pitting Britain and Kemalist Turkey. Fatigued after years of fghting, neither side wished a new war.
PM Lloyd George in London had different ideas. Ready to fght the
upstart Kemalist regime, he was short of soldiers and immediately appealed
to the British Empire to dispatch soldiers for a new war against Turkey.
Affrmative replies came, as anticipated, from Australia, New Zealand, and
South Africa. But not from Ottawa.
Thus, the Chanak Affair (Allen, 1961: Chap. XXVIII), as it is known in
Canadian history, exploded, ultimately bringing down Lloyd George. War
was averted, and soon an Armistice deal was reached, paving the way for
a comprehensive Peace Treaty negotiated between the Allies and the new
Kemalist Turkey.
How this outcome was reached out of the Chanak Affair is to be found in
the personality of Mackenzie King, the independent-minded Prime Minister
in Ottawa. He was a proud man with a strange obsession for spiritualism,

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422 Ozay Mehmet
spending much time in his Gatineau estate in seances communicating with
his beloved dead mother.
Due to an error, the telegram from London asking troops did not frst reach
him; instead, he learned the news from newspapers. Shocked, he did not, as
expected, say “Ready, Aye, Ready” to reporters who asked him if Canada
was about to go to war against Turkey. “Parliament will decide” is what he
said, playing instead a delaying tactic. The Governor General, the Opposition
and pro-British lobby were furious. But King held his ground. The Canadian
Parliament was in summer recess and delay was inevitable. In the end, Lloyd
George did not get his way; he resigned, and war was averted. King’s indirect
rejection of troops prevailed, with a surprisingly positive outcome.
In 1931 the British Parliament passed the Statue of Westminster, and
British colonialism ended in Canada. The exceptional voice of independent
Canadian foreign policy opened a door to the future Commonwealth, burying the legacy of a subservient colonial past. The age of imperial wars now
belonged to history.
Trudeau’s China Policy
In 1968 Trudeau became Canada’s prime minister. In foreign affairs, his
top priority was normalizing relations with the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). Diplomatic relations between the PRC and Canada were established
on 13 October 1970. On 25 October 1971, the PRC took its seat at the UN
and Taiwan was expelled.
Trudeau’s independent China initiative was epoch-making. It directly
encouraged Richard Nixon on 21 February 1972 to become the frst US
president to visit Mao. This opened the door to normalization of US-China
relations after 25 years of estrangement. Full diplomatic relations were
restored in 1979.
In October 1973, at the height of Trudomania, Pierre Elliot Trudeau,
offcially visited the Chinese Leader Mao Zedong in Beijing, in old age,
known then as the Great Helmsman. Communist China was going through
a bloody Cultural Revolution. A power struggle was ongoing, fnally resulting in the passing of effective power to Deng Xiaoping.
Trudeau Visits Cuba
In 1976 Pierre E. Trudeau broke new ground once again, becoming the
frst Western leader to visit Fidel Castro in revolutionary Cuba. The threeday visit was cordial and generated a warm, friendly relationship. Back
in Ottawa, John Diefenbaker, leader of the Opposition, was angry and
criticized Trudeau for ignoring Cuba’s involvement in the Angolan War.
Subsequently, Trudeau took a step backward, cutting relations with Cuba,
but nevertheless Trudeau’s 1976 visit was a signifcant act of independence
in Canadian foreign policymaking.

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Saying No to Bush on Iraq But Getting Involved in Syria
1 Perhaps the greatest act of independent Canadian foreign policymaking
was PM Jean Chretien’s rejection of a request by the US President George
W Bush to join in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Chretien opposed the
Blair-Bush plan. It was illegal as it lacked UN approval. Regime-change
in Baghdad, brutally toppling Saddam Hussein was unjustifed. It was
very costly, politically, and in human lives. Iraq has been in turmoil
ever since; the region has been destabilized by millions of death and displacement. It also directly led to Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism
that has continued to this day.
The Blair-Bush invasion was a Neocon Big Lie. Dick Cheney at the
Pentagon led the invasion with false information and lies. There were
no weapons of mass destruction. Saddam was a brutal dictator; his
regime held Iraq together by force. After the invasion and removal
of Saddam, the US-led coalition failed to bring democracy to Iraq.
Indeed, the country descended into chaos. Jihadist terrorism started,
frst with Al Qaeda, then the Islamic State (ISIL) and the Syrian Civil
War. These waves of terrorism were products of the US-led Coalition
which bore moral responsibility for millions of human lives lost or
displaced.
In the end, Canada did join the US-led coalition by sending troops
to Afghanistan early in 2002 and fnally ending in 2014. Ottawa also
participated, on a smaller scale, in confronting ISIL in Iraq and Syria.
This was really a sideshow of “a slow-burn confict between Iran and
the USA” (National Post, 11/1/2021).
2 The Syrian mission displeased Ankara as it seemed Canada was
supporting groups which Ankara considered terrorist. The latest cause
of friction occurred in October 2019, when Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring in northeastern Syria. This cross-border military
incursion targeted the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish terrorist organization, while creating a safe zone along the Turkish-Syrian
border. Turkey hoped this zone would house some of the 4 million Syrian refugees Turkey is hosting at a huge cost to the Turkish nation. In
addition, Turkey has a huge terrorist problem and expects support, at
least sympathy from NATO allies like Canada. For the Turkish government, the SDF is simply a cover for the Syrian-Kurdish YPG, a Syrian extension of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Even
though the PKK is accepted as a terrorist organization by Canada and
the USA, it appeared to Ankara as if Canada were actively supporting
it and ignoring the fact that the PKK has been fghting the Turkish state
inside Turkey for decades, and more recently in Syria.
In the end, the Canadian mission in Syria ended in a military sense, shifting
to a more humanitarian character. Signifcantly, after the Liberal victory

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over PM Stephen Harper, the Justin Trudeau government announced and
implemented a policy of accepting 25,000 Syrian refugees into Canada.
The US-led invasions and adventures in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria are
highly questionable acts of aggressive warfare or policing the world for the
US interest. Beyond regime change, the USA has made no secret of its primary interest in securing and controlling oil felds or keeping a watchful eye
on Iran. Canadian foreign policy should not facilitate such American interests, any more than British imperial interests of the past. Chretien’s brave
stand in 2003 was a mark of a sovereignty, an act of principled policymaking
in global affairs worthy of applause. It is a wonderful, but short-lived example of how an independent Canadian voice can make a difference in building
a more peaceful world.
The four cases above demonstrate that, when there is determined leadership in Ottawa, independent foreign policy emerges. That is when Canada shines in global affairs, displaying courage and creativity and winning
much praise around the globe. Sadly, such handling of Canadian foreign
policy did not occur regarding Karabakh.
Prior to 1931, there was no Canadian foreign policy, only foreign policy
made in Westminster, London. Even after this date, Ottawa has principally
followed Westminster or Washington in formulating foreign policy. The
lead of London is historical, a form of emotional link to the Crown as the
Queen of Canada; in the case of Washington, it is commercial, designed to
protect the largest bilateral trading in the world from the Cold War to the
contemporary threats of terrorism and rogue states. Canadian troops have
joined the US-led Coalition of the Willing to send troops as peacekeepers
to Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, and elsewhere. Within NATO, Canada has
always followed the lead of the USA or Britain.
The following selection of three examples provides greater detail of the
traditional Canadian foreign policy, effectively by proxy.
1 When the Makarios Coup in Cyprus occurred at Christmas, 1963, with
an attack on the Turkish community by Greek forces and the Partnership Republic was violently destroyed, the All-Greek regime emerged.
At that time, L.B. Pearson was the Canadian envoy at the UN. Canada had no embassy in Cyprus, and virtually no knowledge about that
island except whatever London provided. Suddenly, Pearson played a
vital role in 1964, shaping the UN role in the Cyprus dispute. It was
all premediated, foreign policy by proxy, with input from London
and Washington, where the Makarios Coup and breakup of the 1960
Republic, had been planned and manipulated (Sonyel in Dodd, 1999,
esp. pp. 25–26).
Acting with the USA and British as a guarantor of the newly
independent Republic of Cyprus, Pearson shepherded the creation
of peace-keeping and peace-making for Cyprus, effectively adopting a blind eye to the Makarios Coup and the mass-scale violation of

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constitutional order and human rights violations. Under UN Res. 164
of March 1964, Canadian troops were dispatched to Cyprus, “with
the consent” of the Makarios regime, in effect giving legitimacy to the
Makarios regime, the aggressor. Even though a Green Line boundary
was set up between the warring ethnic Turks and Greeks on the island
for peacekeeping, peace-making under the “good offces” mission of
the UN Secretary General was doomed from the start since Res. 164
had given recognition to the aggressor. A six-month term was chosen
for peacekeeping, expecting a quick end to the Makarios Coup. Half
a century later, the UNSG peacekeeping mission drags on, while the
peacemaking is routinely renewed every six months. This sad tale of
UN failed mediation, most recently in Crans-Montana, Switzerland
(http://www.uncyprustalks.org/after-failure-of-crans-montana-talkswhat-next-for-cyprus-peace-process/ accessed on 3/11/2020) was the
product of the faulty decision-making by the UNSC in March 1964 of
rewarding the aggressor. In later Resolutions, the principle of political
equality of Turkish and Greek Cypriots was acknowledged. However,
Makarios and his successors ever since have insisted on the confrmation of the All-Greek regime, rejecting all else.
The fact is that Britain, the USA, and especially the European powers, have generally adopted a pro-Greek stance, accepting the Greek
Cypriot regime into the EU and ignoring the constitutional rights of the
Turkish side under the 1960 Independence agreements. As a result of
Pearson’s actions at the UN, Britain maintained its two sovereign bases
in Cyprus, while US President Lyndon B. Johnson stopped Turkey from
using its intervention rights on the island to come to the protection
of the Turkish community. Johnson’s action pushed the then Turkish
prime minister Ismet Inonu to launch a strategic shift away from NATO
toward rapprochement with Russia that has continued to this day.
2 Another notable example of Canadian foreign policy by proxy is the
case of Palestine. Traditionally, Canada has followed the USA to support Israel while paying lip-service to Palestinian rights. Under PM
Harper, Ottawa’s pro-Israel policy was especially strong, designed to
win the Jewish Canadian vote. It also stemmed from Harper’s Biblical
faith seeing the Holocaust as the greatest evil, tied with his willingness to equate anti-Zionism with anti-Israel sentiment. Thus, Harper
partially “criminalized” criticism of Israel (https://theneoconzionistreport.fandom.com/wiki/Criminalizing_Criticism_of_Israel_in_
Canada......accessed on 14/12/2020) and donated $0.5 million to the
Gulenist inter-faith institute in the Ottawa suburb of Kanata (Yavuz
and Balci, eds., 2018). Somewhat surprisingly, after Justin Trudeau
won against Harper, traditional Canadian support of Israel continued,
undoubtedly refecting the strength of the Jewish lobby in foreign affairs at the Prime Minister’s Offce at the expense of the Global Affairs
bureaucracy.

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Canada’s Israeli policy has not been cost-free. For example, in
June 2020, Canada lost a temporary seat on the UN Security Council, largely due to its traditional pro-Israeli voting. Nevertheless, the
fact that Canada considers West Bank settlements on Palestinian land
“inconsistent” with international law is often opposed to a handful of
countries supporting the lead of the USA in protecting Israel.
3 A third case of foreign policy by proxy is the technology war launched
by the USA against China to protect American intellectual property in
the Silicon Valley. US trade sanctions are extra-territorial, an aggressive
case of forcing third countries to abide by US laws. Extra-territoriality
conficts with national laws as well as such trade blocs as the EU (https://
www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/653618/EXPO_
STU(2020)653618_EN.pdf...accessed on 3/1/2021). They go against rulebased WTO multilateralism, which, of course the Trump administration
has systematically ignored. American extra-territoriality has long been a
problem in Canada, the latest being the Meng case.
On December 1, 2019, Meng Wanzhou, the CEO of the Chinese technology giant Huawei, was arrested by Canadian police on American
request. Subsequently, the USA requested her extradition. Since she
committed no crime in Canada and there was no Interpol warrant for
her arrest, Meng could not be extradited. She has since been detained in
Vancouver in house arrest.
In the meantime, China has retaliated, tit-for-tat, by arresting Canadian citizens in China on dubious charges of spying. Michael Kovrig
and Michael Spavor are businessmen. No legal evidence exists to justify
their detention. China is displeased with Canada acting as a proxy for
the USA. A stalemate has resulted whereby the future of Canada-China
relations stands in limbo. Families of Canadians arrested in China.
have requested the unconditional release of Meng, hoping that this
would result in the Canadians’ release. Ottawa, however, is unable to
act for fear of upsetting USA. In the end, Ottawa waits for the USA to
settle this dispute and free Canadians, victims of tit-for-tat diplomacy.
Canadian nation-building is a story of economic development. However,
Canada’s development has been driven more by American than home-grown
entrepreneurial activity. Canada did not produce its own Carnegies,
Rockefellers, or Vanderbilts. Moreover, Canadian business elites from the
Family Compact era have been “happy to be bought by a bigger American
competitor” (McQuaig, 2019: 6). “Silent Surrender” (Levitt, 1970) has
turned Canada into a branch-plant economy. It was a problem in the 1960s
and 1970s when the Watkins Report bluntly stated: “Foreign ownership is
still the norm for large companies in Canada, giving a continuing branchplant character to the Canadian economy typical of a less-developed country” (quoted in McQuaig, ibid.: 7). During the COVID-19 Pandemic in
early 2021, Canada found itself facing a critical vaccine shortage. Without

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domestic vaccine-producing capacity, Canada was shut out of the EU and
US vaccine supply and Ottawa had to seek WHO COVAX help normally
intended for developing countries’ beneft. Canadian vulnerability is real,
and as the Meng case refects, American dominance is damaging today. It is
counter-productive for Canadian policymaking, and it is equally undesirable for the conduct of global affairs for a better world.

A More Independent Canadian Foreign Policy
A recent major book on the politics of Canadian foreign policy has concluded
that, increasingly it is being shaped by domestic imperatives (Nossel et al.,
2015). This implies a more made-in-Canada foreign policy. But who speaks
for Canada? What exactly are Canadian values promoted on the global level?
Canada is a multinational country, having emerged out of a FrenchEnglish dualism in the aftermath of the Centennial in 1967, thanks to an
open-door Immigration policy based on merit without regard to race or
religion. What matters is not what immigrants wear on their head, but what
is in their head. As a nation of immigrants, diversity is a distinctive character of Canada. While ethnic diversity is consistent with multiculturalism, the
fact is that some ethnic groups may be more infuential than others, giving
rise to tensions and conficts within the Canadian multicultural mosaic (see
further below). Equal treatment of ethnic differences, no less than the traditional Anglo-French tensions, must be reconciled for harmony and peace.
A Confederation of 10 Provinces and vast Territories extending to the
Artic North, historically Canada has depended for its prosperity on waves
of natural resource exploitation. In colonial times, prior to 1914 in the
days of pioneers and Fur Trade, Canada was “hewers of wood, drawers of
water,” its trade linked to London. With the emergence of the USA, this
colonial pattern gradually shifted to a North-South axis, American markets
and investment delinking Canada from Britain, and Washington replacing
London as the nerve center of foreign policymaking. Now, up to 90% of
Canadian exports enter the USA, and likewise American investment fuels
Canada’s economy. Attempts to diversify Canadian trade to Europe or the
Asia-Pacifc have had little success. A more diversifed trade would mean
less dependence on the USA, and a more independent foreign policy. At
the end of the day, however, resource constraints, as noted above, exercise a
dominant role in Canadian capacity to go it alone globally.
Ideally, Canada is a strong voice of multilateralism in global affairs. That
means a principled and evenhanded support of the UN system in defense
of human rights and confict resolution in accordance with international
law and conventions. In the unsettled post-Pandemic world, an independent
Canadian voice in global affairs may be needed, more than ever before.
But there is a resource constraint on a fully independent Canadian
foreign policy: As a middle-range power, the amount of fnancial and military resources Ottawa can, and indeed should, mobilize for foreign policy is

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limited. It must, therefore, rely on its NATO allies and multilateralism, such
as the UN agencies, to offset resource constraints. It follows that Canada
should not readily sacrifce its NATO allies, nor abandon international law,
especially UNSC resolutions for the expediency of domestic imperatives. A
pragmatic solution to resource constraint is the model of like-minded Nordic
countries. In this context, it is important, in cases of clear Canadian interest,
to differ from Washington or London. Examples have been cited above to
make the case that where this has been implemented, it served Canada well,
earning the country a positive image internationally. As documented above,
it served Canada well, earning the country a positive image internationally.
However, there is a major problem in this direction: The role of ethnic
lobbies in Canada. Some academics have pointed out the dangers of diaspora
politics in Canada (https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-dangerous-game-of-diaspora-politics/article544912/ … accessed on 15/12/2020). Canadian foreign policy must not become hostage to ethnic lobbies, pursuing
non-Canadian objectives.
Extreme violence occurred in Washington on 6 January 2021 where a
bloody insurrection occurred on Capitol Hill, incited by no less than the US
president himself. This was a direct assault on American democracy aimed
at overturning the free will of the people in an attempt to enable Trump to
remain in the White House. Is such a case of extreme violence imaginable
in Canada? Extreme ethnic violence, while unlikely, is possible. More likely,
political violence may erupt, undertaken by such a group as the ASALA,
the Armenian terrorist organization. At least one authority (Bell, 2005)
has argued that Canada “nurtures” and “exports” ASALA-type terrorism.
Bell has shown (ibid., pp. 22–25), how extensively Armenian terrorists shed
blood in Canada. Regretfully, as explained below, Canadian security and
political authorities, as well as the news media, have responded by a general
appeasement policy, turning Canada into a terrorists’ “safe haven” (Bell,
ibid., 38).
Appeasement policy reached its climax under Francois-Philippe Champagne’s tenure at Global Affairs during the Nagorno-Karabakh War
when Canadian foreign policymaking effectively became a hostage of the
Armenian Canadian diaspora. Champagne’s riding of Saint Maurice has a
small, but active Armenian community, centered on the local church. This
is typical of Armenian Canadians who have been active in Canadian politics for a long time. It is worth examining this fact in detail leading to the
Nagorno-Karabakh case.

Diaspora-Led Foreign Policy: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1989/1990, Canada
opened diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia. In 1997 an
honorary consulate was opened in Yerevan in 1991, while diplomatic relations between Ottawa and Yerevan have been handled through Canada’s

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embassy in Moscow. Similarly, the Canadian embassy in Ankara handled
relations with Baku. As two NATO allies, it is self-evident that Ottawa has
more signifcant relations with Turkey, covering military cooperation and
peace-keeping operations in several countries. This is exemplifed by the
Canadian diplomatic mission in Ankara.
In diplomatic relations, by contrast, Canada’s relations with Armenia
are far from being globally signifcant. Nor are economic or strategic relations major. It follows, therefore, that Canadian foreign policy on Armenian
issues must be primarily an extension of domestic political agenda.
In mid-October 2020, at the height of the Azerbaijan-Armenia War over
Nagorno-Karabakh (what the Armenians call the Republic of Artsakh), the
government of Justin Trudeau took a highly pro-Armenian policy stance:
The foreign affairs Minister Champagne announced, with immediate effect,
suspension of sensor technology exports to Turkey, pending a review of
the export permit issued earlier to a Canadian frm. Signifcantly in this
case, action preceded the review of facts. PM Trudeau later stated that he
talked to the Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan about this subject,
declaring that Canada is working with allies to “put an end to the violence”
over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. He also talked to Turkish
president Recep Tayyip President Erdogan, stressing the need for peaceful
resolution of the confict.
The sudden and immediate suspension imposed on Turkey, understandably, offended Turkey. Turkish authorities, who were not consulted about
the matter, declared that the Canadian suspension was contrary to the spirit
and letter of NATO alliance, since both Turkey and Canada are members.
They also voiced strong objection about the fact that the Canadian decision
was taken to appease the Canadian Armenian Diaspora who asked that
the Canadian government recognize “the Republic of Artsakh.” In addition, they alleged that Turkey sent combat F16 jets, drones equipped with
Canadian sensor technology, military advisers, and Syrian jihadist mercenaries to help Azerbaijan forces. These allegations were denied by Ankara
which, from the start of hostilities never hid its unconditional support for
Azerbaijan. Turkish authorities declared strict guidelines governed the
use of imported Canadian military equipment. It was also added that the
Turkish drone BAYRAKTAR TB2 was using local technology, effectively
denying Canadian/Armenian allegations. Signifcantly, Turkey has now
become one of the leading countries producing UAVs, unmanned aviation
vehicles with its own technology.
The Armenian lobby’s anti-Turkey campaign in Ottawa was a politically
motivated public relations (PR) war. As the confict over Nagorno-Karabakh
raged, in Ottawa the Armenian lobby and friends accelerated their efforts
to score points in the public propaganda arena. Newspapers published
opinion pieces by pro-Armenian pundits. Stories about donations by
Armenian-origin celebrities were prominently advertised. The national
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sympathetic interview with the Armenian ambassador compared to a frosty
one with the Turkish ambassador.
Diasporic Armenian groups went on the offensive to infuence policy. Ethnic groups are part of the Canadian multicultural mosaic. They
enrich Canadian life so long as they stick to cultural agenda. But some
ethnic organizations are often extensions of homeland politics. Greek or
Armenian and other ethnic groups use clubs, religious institutions to promote and sustain homeland political or military objectives. In some cases,
these objectives may coincide or reinforce Canadian interests, for example
NATO solidarity. In most cases, however, homeland politics may refect
irredentist or terrorist aims. In some cases, such imported politics may be
targeting other ethnic groups, maligning them, or spreading hate in pursuit
of some irredentist ideology back home.
Such was largely the case of the war over Nagorno-Karabakh. No less
than Russian president Vladimir Putin himself declared that in this war,
Armenia was occupying Azerbaijani land. Thus, wisely, Russia, which had
a defense treaty obligation toward Armenia, stayed out. In Canada, however, the diaspora Armenian lobbies actively joined the war, ignoring international law, forcefully attempting to harness Canadian foreign policy as an
extension of irredentist Armenian objectives.
This effort was the continuation of the traditional appeasement policy in
Ottawa, seeking to accommodate Armenian demands. Turkey and Azerbaijan were targets of a huge publicity blitz urging the Canadian government to
adopt a pro-Armenian stance. The appeasement policy had worked in the
past (as explained further below), so, it could be expected to work yet again
in the Nagorno-Karabakh case.
The highlight of the Canadian Armenian publicity blitz in Ottawa was a
mischievous Motion introduced in the Canadian Senate by a Greek- origin
Senator who asked that the Canadian government immediately recognize
“the Republic of Artsakh” and condemn Turkey-Azerbaijan for the war.
Fortunately, most Senators knew better, and rejected this one-sided Motion.
Meantime, Ankara pursued its total support of Azerbaijan. Beyond allout moral support to Baku (in line with the One Nation, Two Countries doctrine), Turkish support was primarily in military training and development
of Azerbaijan forces, a process which lasted several years prior to the War. It
is quite true that drones inficted serious damage to the Armenian air force.
However, Azerbaijan most likely used its own drones developed from Israeli
technology bought prior to the War. Canada, of course, dared not accuse
Israel of aiding Azerbaijan. Ottawa simply looked the other way in this case.
Turkey supported Azerbaijan simply because the aggressor in this confict
is clearly Armenia, going back to 1991 when the Soviet Union disintegrated.
Some 16% of Azerbaijani territory has been under Armenian occupation
since the early 1990. More than a million Azerbaijan citizens have been displaced and are refugees in their own land. Most signifcantly, international
law, based on UN Security Council resolutions, have demanded immediate

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and complete Armenian withdrawal from Azerbaijan territory. For almost
three decades the Minsk Trio [Russia, France, and USA] have attempted,
in vain, to uphold international law, always failing because of Armenian
objections.
Why did Canada take such a strong, pro-Armenian stand over the fghting in Nagorno-Karabakh? Some may argue that Canada stands always for
peace and against war, which is why Canada refused involvement in Iraq.
The Iraq case is irrelevant. No one asked or wanted Canada to get involved
in the Armenian-Azerbaijan War. The issue is not one of war or peace. It is
rather one of international law which Canada, otherwise proudly claims to
support. Under international law, there is no such entity as “the Republic of
Artsakh”; the disputed territory is part of Azerbaijan.
The pro-Armenia stance adopted by the Trudeau government is full of
contradictions. First and foremost, it is inconsistent with international law,
which Canada has at least a moral obligation to uphold. Second, it violates
international human rights as it rewards the aggressor/occupier. Canada
in this case failed to distinguish between aggressor and victim. Some even
go so far as to argue that Canada objected to killing Armenians using
Canadian technology. This type of moral preference is hypocritical. All killing (Azerbaijan or Armenian is wrong), but that is what happens in war. The
key fact of the case is that it was not proven that Canadian technology was
indeed used. Acting on accusations by an ethnic lobby renders Canadian
foreign policy a tool of ethnic politics.
Third, the manner of suspension of sensor technology export to Turkey
was questionable. It should have at least been taken following a fact-fnding
review verifying the fact, and not before it. For one thing, Israeli military
technology was bought and used by Azerbaijan forces. Turkey rejected the
accusation, and the Turkish press announced the use of Turkish home-made
sensor technology.
The hasty way the Canadian suspension was announced appeared
as an appeasement act in deference to the Armenian lobby in Canada.
Furthermore, it went against the NATO spirit which requires solidarity and
cooperation among members. Of course, neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan
is a NATO member, and, therefore, it can be argued that Canada had no
NATO obligations in this war. This argument, however, does not justify the
ethnic preference displayed by Ottawa. Armenia is in the Russian zone of
infuence. It has a defense pact with Russia which has a signifcant military
base in Armenia. Hypothetically speaking, were Armenia to attack Turkey,
would Canada reject its NATO obligation to come to Turkey’s aid? This is
not an idle question as Armenia has irredentist claims against Turkey. The
Armenian constitution designates Eastern Anatolia as “Western Armenia,”
a claim deeply supported by the Diaspora groups in Canada and elsewhere,
as well as Armenian terrorist organizations like ASALA.
Signifcantly, President Putin has adopted a far more balanced stance
on the confict than Canada. Putin declared that the Russian defensive

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guarantee of Armenia did not apply in this confict since the War was
outside Armenia. At a minimum, Ottawa should follow a neutral policy in
ethnic conficts, strongly avoiding ethnic preference. That is an essential
pre-condition for being a respected voice of peace, human rights, and stability in global affairs.
Ottomanization of Canadian Foreign Policy
But who exactly determines Canadian foreign policy? To what extend does
it refect Canadian interest as opposed to ethnic bias? That means, it should
not be subordinated to domestic ethnic diaspora lobbies. However, as noted
above, foreign policymaking may face a new threat: Ethnic fragmentation or
more aptly Ottomanization. This is a case of undue infuence by Canadian
Armenian lobbies, imported from the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire.
The Ottoman Empire, in its last hundred years, faced constant rebellion
when Christian minorities in the Balkans demanded independence, with
European support. Greece was the frst to win its independence in 1829. Afterwards, the Bulgars, Serbs, and Romanians followed. Typically, Russia,
the Ottoman’s arch enemy, supported the Balkan people (Yavuz and Blumi,
2013). Millions of Ottoman Muslims perished in the Balkan conficts or
were expelled and became refugees, the survivors fooding into Anatolia
(McCarthy, 1995). At the Empire’s weakest phase prior to 1914 and during WWI, the Armenians in Anatolia rose in revolt, again with Russian
support.
The lesson here is that a multinational state may be torn asunder from
within: That happens when ethnic minority nationalism goes violent.
Churches, youth, and cultural associations take on political roles, even
actively aiding and abetting rebellion and urging the population to treason.
In the decades prior to WWI that is exactly what happened in Anatolia.
The Ottoman government faced an organized general rebellion and massscale treason aimed at dismemberment of the state. This point has been
well-made in a memorial for Colonel Altikat, by Paul Heinbecker, a former
Canadian ambassador to Germany and the United Nations, and a former
Deputy Minister, Global Affairs, Canada:
Canada cannot survive as a multicultural, diversity-valuing society if
national, ethnic, or religious groups import their conficts into Canada.
Diaspora politics is the tinder of a fre that could consume not just those
who ignite it, but all of us.
(Quoted in a Speech at the Senate by Senator Boehm on 10/12/2020)
The case of Ottoman Armenian rebellion against the Ottomans requires
elaboration. Evidently, what little is known of this case in Canada, is almost
all from anti-Turkish sources. How many Canadian politicians, for example, know the Armenian terrorists’ attack on major banks in Istanbul in

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1896 to win the support of European powers for the “Armenian Cause”? Or
know the long list of Armenian rebellions in Erzurum, Sassun, Zeitun, and
elsewhere? (Gürün, 1985: 127–162).
Unlike the ethnic minorities of the Ottoman Balkans, the bulk of the
Armenian rebellion took place in Anatolia, the Turkish homeland. In
addition, the timing of the rebellion was crucial, given that the Turkish
nation was fghting an existential war. At the start of WWI, the Tsarist
armies attacked Eastern Anatolia at a time when the British and French
were planning their joint attack at Gallipoli. The Ottoman army, badly led
by the War Minister Enver Pasha, suffered a huge disaster at Sarıkamış,
when the Russian army, including Armenian volunteers, won a victory over
the Ottomans, and penetrated deep into Eastern Anatolia. At this critical
juncture, the Armenian rebels set up a government in Van after massacring
the Turkish citizens (McCarthy, 2006). They also started a rebellion in
Cicilia, encouraged in this by Britain and France (Ğüçlü, 2010). In response,
the Ottoman government arrested and imprisoned Armenian intellectuals
on charges of treason. The Ottoman military relocated the Armenian population out of the warzone. Large numbers of innocent victims perished due
to starvation, disease, and banditry. All people in Anatolia suffered. This is
what Armenians, especially in the Diaspora, call their “Genocide.” Selective acknowledgement of human suffering is ethically unjustifed, refecting
ethnic bias. Canada should refrain from such ethnic bias.
In the bloody WWI era, the Turks (not the Ottomans) ultimately won, but
only as result of four more years of fghting for their homeland (1919–1922), in
the Turkish War of Independence led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. After the
Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the Russians evacuated Eastern Anatolia in disarray, and the Kemalist forces liberated Eastern Anatolia. Armenian armies
retreated into Soviet Armenia, while the surviving Ottoman Armenians
moved initially to Syria and Lebanon, and then to Europe, France and fnally
to the USA and Canada. This is how diaspora Armenian politics emerged in
those countries.
Canada is unlikely to suffer an Armenian rebellion. But it is not free from
terror and violence (Bell, 2005). ASALA, the Armenian terrorist organization, has carried out several organized crimes around the globe as well as
on Canadian soil, murdering Turkish diplomats, ostensibly in revenge for
their expulsion from Ottoman Turkey in 1915 (Gürün, 1985; Lewy, 2005).
In Ottawa there is a monument in the memory of Col. Attila Altikat who
was murdered in cold blood by Armenian terrorists in 1981, the frst act
of terrorism in Canada. Perpetrators of this crime have never been found;
Canadian justice remains undone. The Altikat murder was followed by
numerous other attacks on Turkish diplomats at the Turkish embassy in
Ottawa, severely injuring innocent Turkish offcials, including the Turkish
commercial counsellor K. Kani Güngör and Canadian security guards.
In Toronto, Armenian terrorists attacked the city subway injuring large
numbers of Canadians.

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In retrospect, it appears that a silent policy of appeasement has been
followed. In 2004 a Private Members Bill, Motion 380, with only a few MPs
present, was adopted as government policy. This Motion recognizes the
1915 relocation of Ottoman Armenians as “Genocide,” making the Canadian government one of the few Western powers to do so offcially. Every
year, on 25 April, the Canadian PM issues a statement expressing solidarity
with the Armenian Diaspora.
The Turkish Canadian community, after years of lobbying, fnally managed to get approval for a memorial monument for Col. Altikat. Land for
the monument was donated by the National Capital Commission. However,
Turkey shouldered the cost of building the monument at the spot, opposite
the Champlain Bridge, where the Colonel was murdered by Armenian terrorists and where it could only be named “Fallen Diplomats.” The Turkish
Canadian community, sponsor of the project, holds annual memorials in
remembrance of Col. Altikat in front of the monument, always reminding
Canadian authorities of justice undone in this cold-blooded murder case.
Terrorism should have no place in Canada. It has bloodied communities
in Quebec, where the FLQ crisis erupted in 1971, and Sikh terrorism led to
the Air India bombing in 1985, which killed 329 innocent passengers. Ethnic
diaspora politics in Canada is organized, with a criminal link in a highly
secretive world, imbedded in community networks, nurtured by fund-raising and cultural festivals and events as fronts, and political lobbying (Singh
2012). It has been deadly as in the case of the Armenian ASALA whereby
hired killers entered Canada on several deadly assignments, undetected by
security or intelligence services. The sad fact is that Canadian politicians
and security forces seem to have been either unaware or duped by Armenian
propaganda and misinformation. Few know the relevant Ottoman history
of the Armenian rebellion and treason. False claims have surrounded the
tragic events of 1915 from the beginning (Orel and Yuca, 1996), and it is a
campaign that continues to this day, apparently to feed a Diaspora hungry
for self-identity even when based on misinformation, especially brainwashing of the youth (Toumani, 2014).
Ethnic terrorism cannot be dealt with by a policy of appeasement on the
part of Canadian police or policymakers. The Canadian press media as well
has generally adopted such an appeasement policy (Bell, 2005). The RCMP
is still investigating the Altikat fle, after four decades. As mentioned above,
the Turkish Canadian community organizes each year a Memorial keeping
Atlikat’s memory alive and requesting that justice be done for him.
The appeasement policy of Canada regarding the Armenian Diaspora is
complex. It appears it is nurtured by fnancial contributions coming to (otherwise) worthy causes in Canadian life. Several such cases can be given. A leading example is the Canadian Museum of Human Rights in Canada. Initially,
it was to be a Holocaust Museum for Jewish victims of Hitler’s Genocide.
Palestinians, Canadian First Nations, and other minorities were virtually
ignored. With big funding from wealthy Canadian Armenians, the case of

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Ottoman Armenians has also been prominently displayed, accommodating
Armenian demands for rewriting History. That is divisive in terms of the
Canadian multiculturalism in as much as it refects ethnic preference, in this
case amounting to favoritism for Canadian Armenians, or worse, putting
Human Rights for sale, and allowing Armenian donors to defne Canada’s
offcial understanding of rights in global conficts (https://humanrights.ca/
news/canadian-museum-for-human-rights-and-armenian-genocide-museum-institute-sign-memorandum-of...accessed on 3/11/2020).
Other notable Armenian funding has gone into genocide study centers
(e. g. the Zoryan Institute) to keep alive a steady program of anti-Turkish
publishing and disseminating information to perpetuate the identity politics of the Diaspora. During the Nagorno-Karabakh War loud noises were
spreading from such sources of a “Second Genocide.” Funds were raised,
including from notables in the flm industry, such as Kardashian, and volunteers recruited to go and join the fghting in the “existential” war with the
Armenian army. Some municipalities, with no role in foreign affairs, but
with signifcant Armenian diaspora populations, adopted pro-Armenian
motions recognizing the “Republic of Artsakh.”
It is against this background of offcial appeasement and accommodation
that the latest Canadian policy on Nagorno-Karabakh War 2020 must be
analyzed and evaluated. It is a policy stand at variance with the Best Practice as outlined above when Canada acted independently, and it runs the
risk of Ottomanizing foreign policymaking.

Conclusion
Independent voice, whenever expressed, has served Canada well. In cases
where it has been used, as shown above, it has amounted to Best Practice. For resource constraints, Best Practice may not always be feasible in
Canadian foreign policy beftting a middle-level power committed to multilateralism. It should be utilized as an ideal and practiced wisely in defense
of a principled pursuit of Canada’s own national interest in line with human
rights and international law.
From the review above, the following lessons for future, principled
Canadian foreign policy emerge as guidelines in cases of foreign ethnic
confict:
1 Imperial/hegemonic wars should be avoided. Canada has done well to
stay out of Lloyd George’s 1922 adventure, and similarly PM Chretien
wisely rejected the illegal US-led invasion of Iraq.
2 Canada should be on the side of international law, especially UNSC
resolutions, as in the case of the Armenian-Azerbaijan confict. It is
un-Canadian to promote irredentist objectives, however infuential
diaspora Armenian lobbies might be in Canada. On this basis, the
pro-Armenian foreign policy in Ottawa was unjustifed. Appeasement of

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terrorism or supporting irredentism is not a policy to uphold Canadian
values.
3 Multilateralism suits Canada well, as both a middle-level power and
a multi-cultural country. In this context, in addition to cooperation
within the UN system, it is important to uphold the NATO alliance.
Canadian policymakers in international affairs may not always be able
to go it alone, but they should work closely within NATO to develop
and sustain an independent voice. At home, it would be totally inconsistent if foreign policy is determined, or even signifcantly infuenced,
by narrow ethnic politics, such as the Armenian Diaspora. Canada’s
best interest in promotion Human Rights and international rule of law
would be compromised. Ethnic bias should have no place in independent Canadian foreign policy.
This principled approach fts extremely well with such conficts as
Nagorno-Karabakh. Accommodating the Armenian diaspora interests
as former FM Francois Philippe Champagne2 has done, was ill-advised,
and his removal from offce was warranted. Instead, Canada should promote peacemaking and normalization of relations, for example, between
Turkey and Armenia. Even though, the Swiss Protocols in 2009 regarding Turkish-Armenian normalization (https://www.rferl.org/a/Turkey_
Armenia_To_Sign_Landmark_Agreement_To_Normalize_Ties/1848293.
html accessed on 3/11/2020) may be moribund, now that Armenia and Azerbaijan have signed a peace deal, Ankara and Yerevan should be encouraged
to seek normalization without any ethnic bias.

Notes
1 Grateful thanks for comments on an earlier draft of the study by several friends,
including Tareq Ismael, Balkan Devlen, and Bilgin Buberoglu. The author is
fully responsible for all opinions expressed.
2 Champagne was removed in a cabinet shuffe on 12 January 2021, effectively
demoted. Hopefully, this demotion signals a healthier foreign policy in Ottawa,
including better Canada-Turkey relations. The new FM is Marc Garneau, the
frst Canadian in space.

References
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and Why? Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
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1912–1913 and Their Sociopolitical Implications, Salt Lake City: University of
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Notes on Contributors

Eldar Abbasov, PhD from the Lomonosov Moscow State University in 1988.
In 1989–1991, he worked as a senior lecturer at the Department of History
of the National Research Technological University “MISIS”. In 1991, he
was invited to the Department for the Service of the Diplomatic Corps of
the Russian Foreign Ministry, where he worked until 1995. From 1996 to
2015, he worked in the field of business, simultaneously engaged in scientific ­activities. His research interests include the recent political history of
Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Russia. He is fluent in the English and Turkish
languages.
Shamkhal Abilov is currently affiliated with the Department of International Relations, Azerbaijan Tourism and Management University, Baku,
Azerbaijan. He also is a PhD candidate at Humboldt University in Berlin. Abilov received his BA from the International Relations Department
of ­Qafqaz University in 2008 and his MA from the Leipzig University and
University of Vienna in 2011 in the field of Global Studies. Abilov’s research
interests are Azerbaijan, Conflict Studies, Caspian Studies (Caucasus &
Central Asia) and to some extend also Urban Studies, Ethnicity & Nationalism. Abilov is the author of various academic articles related to his research
interests and co-author of the book titled Karabakh in 99 Questions.
Ali Askerov, PhD, teaches peace studies at the Department of Peace and
Conflict Studies, UNC – Greensboro. His interests are peace education,
ethnic conflicts, political violence, human rights, international morality,
and the history of political ideas. He is an author of numerous books and
articles.
Araz Aslanli is a lecturer in the Academy of the State Customs Committee, Azerbaijan State University of Economics (UNEC), and Khazar University. He is a head of the Caucasus Center for International Relations and
Strategic Studies (QAFSAM). He has published six books and many articles
on the Karabakh issue and the foreign policy of Azerbaijan.
Emil Avdaliani is a Professor at the European University and Ilia
State University in Tibilisi, Georgia. He received his PhD from Ivane
­Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Faculty of Humanities in 2016. He
published books on Coin as a Means of Propaganda According to Georgian

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Notes on Contributors

Numismatics. Tbilisi, 2020; Georgia and Silk Roads (VI-XIII cc.). Tbilisi,
2019; ­E ntrepreneurship in late XIX-early XX century Georgia. Tbilisi, 2018;
and Rome, Byzantium and the Imperial Defense System (IV-VII cc.). Tbilisi,
2017. He is currently writing a book on the modern history of the Southern
Caucasus.
Michael B. Bishku is a Professor of Middle Eastern History at Augusta
University in Georgia. He is a former President of both the American
­Council for the Study of Islamic Societies and the Association of Global
South Studies and is currently on the Board of Advisors for the Oxford
Bibliographies Online for Islamic Studies. Dr. Bishku has also taught
at Boğaziçi University in Istanbul and is a Schusterman Fellow in ­Israel
Studies at Brandeis University. He has published numerous articles on
the history and politics of the South Caucasus and Middle East especially in the area of foreign policy, including among many others “The
South Caucasus Republics: Relations with the U.S. and EU” (Middle East
Policy, 2015), “The Interactions and Experiences of the Armenians and
Jews in the O
­ ttoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey from the Young
Turk ­Revolution of 1908 to the Present” (Nationalism and Ethnic Politics,
2017), and “Are Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Israel’s Benjamin
­Netanyahu ‘Two Sides of the Same Coin’?” (Journal of South Asian and
Middle Eastern Studies, 2019).
Brendon Cannon is Assistant Professor of International Security at the
Institute of International & Civil Security (IICS), Khalifa University, Abu
Dhabi, UAE. He earned a PhD in Political Science with an emphasis on
International Relations at the University of Utah, USA (2009). His research
interests include regional security in the Middle East and eastern Africa, the
role of extant and enduring security burdens on international relations in
the Western Indian Ocean region, and Turkish foreign policy in the ­Middle
East and Africa. He is the author of multiple articles appearing in ­African
Security, Defence Studies, Third World Quarterly and African Security
­
Review.
Edward Erickson is a Professor of International Relations at Antalya Bilim
University, Antalya, Turkey and a retired Professor of Military H
­ istory
from the Department of War Studies at the Marine Corps University. He
retired from the U.S. Army as a lieutenant colonel with multiple combat
tours in the field artillery and additional experiences as a foreign area ­officer
specializing in the Middle East. Dr. Erickson earned a PhD in history from
the University of Leeds in the UK and is recognized as an authority on
the World War I in the Middle East and Turkish military policy. He has
published over ten books and many articles on the Turkish and Ottoman
military as well as counterinsurgency.
His books include: The Turkish War of Independence, A Military History,
1919–1923; A Global History of Relocation in Counterinsurgency Warfare
(London: Bloomsbury Academic Press, 2020); A Soldier’s Kipling, Poetry
and the Profession of Arms (Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Books, 2018);

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­ alestine, The Ottoman Campaigns of 1914–1918 (Barnsley, UK: Pen and
P
Sword Books, 2016); Gallipoli, Command under Fire (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2015); Ottomans and Armenians, A Study in Counterinsurgency (New
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013); A Military History of the Ottomans, from
Osman to Ataturk, co-author with Mesut Uyar (Westport, Connecticut:
Praeger Publishers, 2009); A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World
War (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publications Group, 2000).
Orhan Gafarli holds a PhD in International Relations from Ankara
University and specializes in Russian-Turkish relation and the wider
­
­Eurasian region. A former doctoral fellow at the Davis Center for Russian
and Eurasian Center, Harvard University (2017–2018), Dr. Gafarli currently
works with the Ankara Policy Center in Turkey. Previously, he cooperated with several analytical centers, including the Foreign Policy Center in
­Moscow, BILGESAM in Ankara, and the Future for Advanced Research &
Studies think tank in Abu Dhabi. He speaks English, Russian, Turkish, and
Azerbaijani.
Michael M. Gunter is a professor of political science at T
­ennessee
Technological University in Cookeville, Tennessee. He is also the
­
­Secretary-General of the EU Turkey Civic Commission (EUTCC) headquartered in Brussels. In the past he taught courses for many years during
the summer at the International University in Vienna, as well as courses
on Kurdish and Middle Eastern politics, among others, for the U.S.
­Government Areas Studies Program and U.S. Department of State ­Foreign
­Service Institute in Washington, DC. He is the author of 10 critically praised
scholarly books on the Kurdish question, and editor or co-editor of 9 more
books on the Kurds, among others, including two books and numerous
­articles on the ­Armenians. He has published numerous scholarly articles
on the Kurds and many other issues including the Armenians in such leading scholarly ­periodicals as the Middle East Journal, Middle East Policy,
Middle East Quarterly, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, Orient,
Journal of A
­ rmenian S
­ tudies, Orbis, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs,
Maghreb Review, Sociology of Islam, American Journal of International Law,
International Organization, World Affairs, Journal of International Affairs
­(Columbia University), Brown Journal of World Affairs, Columbia Journal
of Transnational Law, ­Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Current
­History, Third World Quarterly, International Journal of Turkish Studies,
­Insight Turkey, Turkish Studies, ­Terrorism: An International Journal, and
Arms Control, among numerous others. His most recent books are The Kurds
in the Middle East: Enduring Problems and New Dynamics, co-ed. (Lanham,
MD: Lexington, 2020); Kurdish Autonomy and U.S. Foreign Policy, co-ed.
(New York and Bern: Peter Lang, 2020); The Kurds: A Divided Nation in
Search of a State, 3rd ed. (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2019);
­Routledge Handbook on the Kurds, ed. (London & New York: Routledge,
2019); ­Historical D
­ ictionary of the Kurds, 3rd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2018); Kurdish Issues: Essays in Honor of Robert W. Olson, ed.

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Notes on Contributors

(Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2016); Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria
in Peace and War (London: Hurst Publications, 2014); and Armenian History
and the Question of Genocide (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
Jamil Hasanli is a professor of modern history of the Caucasus and
­Russia. Hasanli was a public policy scholar at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 2011 and 2020 (Washington, DC); and
­Reagan-­Fascell Democracy Fellows of the National Endowment for Democracy in 2019 (­Washington, DC). He was a visiting professor at East
China Normal ­University in Shanghai. Hasanli has published 35 books.
His recent books are: At the Dawn of the Cold War: The Soviet-American Crisis over Iranian Azerbaijan, 1941–1946 (Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006); Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War,
1945–1953 (Boulder: Lexington Books, 2011); Khrushchev's Thaw and
National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954–1959 (Boulder: Lexington
Books, 2014); Foreign Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1918–1920. The
Difficult Road to Western Integration (New York: Routledge, 2016); The
Sovietization of Azerbaijan: The South C
­ aucasus in the Triangle of Russia, Turkey, and Iran, 1920–1922 (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah
Press, 2018); Leadership and Nationalism in Azerbaijan: Ali Mardan bey
Topchibashov, Founder and Creator (New York: Routledge, 2018); Soviet
Policy in Xinjiang: Stalin and the National Movement in Eastern Turkistan
(Boulder: Lexington Books, 2020).
Vasif Huseynov is a senior advisor at the Baku-based Center of A
­ nalysis
of International Relations (AIR Center). He holds BA in International
­Relations from the Academy of Public Administration (Azerbaijan), MA
in Global Political Economy from the University of Kassel (Germany), and
PhD in Political Science from the University of Goettingen (Germany).
Gubad Ibadoghlu is a political economist and a senior policy analyst for
social and economic studies at Azerbaijan’s Economic Research Center,
a Baku-based NGO that promotes economic development and good governance. His research focuses on politics on natural resources and revenue
management. He was a researcher at the Higher Economic School, W
­ arsaw
in 1999/2000, at Central European University, Budapest in 2004/2005, in
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2008/2009, at Duke
­University in 2015/2016, at Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton in
2017/2018 ­Academic Years. Since September 2018, he is based at R
­ utgers
University, and teaching four courses in the Spring Semester in the
­
­Department of P
­ olitical Science. Additionally, he is an affiliating postdoc
fellow in the ­Rutgers Center for European Studies.
Kamala Imranli-Lowe is the author of several different publications on
the history of the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, including historical, political, and cultural aspects of the Karabakh conflict and its coverage by the
Western media. She was awarded a PhD degree from the Centre for Russian,
European, and Eurasian Studies (CREES), the University of Birmingham,
UK, in 2013. Her PhD thesis dealt with the territorial conflicts between the

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443

first Armenian and Azerbaijani republics in 1918–1920/21. Since completing
her one-year Research Fellowship in 2014 at the University of Birmingham,
she has continued her professional activities independently as an Honorary
Research Fellow at the University of Birmingham in 2015–2018 and without
affiliation since then.
Dr. Esmira Jafarova is a Board Member of the Center of Analysis of
­International Relations (AIR Center), Baku, Azerbaijan. She holds a PhD
from the University of Vienna, Austria and an MA degree from the ­Central
European University (CEU), Budapest, Hungary. She is the author of the
book titled Conflict Resolution in South Caucasus: Challenges to ­International
Efforts, by Lexington Books, 2015.
Mesiagha Mahammadi is a senior advisor at the Baku-based Center of
Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center). Previously he worked for
Baku Higher Combined Arms Command School as Associate Professor,
Institute of Oriental Studies as Head of Department of Iran Philology and
for the Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) as a senior fellow.
Ceyhun Mahmudlu is a founder and a President of Caspian Research
­Institute (CASPRI). He is also a visiting professor at Cornell University,
­Department of Government. His research interest covers energy geopolitics,
regional security, peace and conflict resolution, cyber security, nationalism, and Islam in greater Caspian region. Ceyhun Mahmudlu is a co-editor of Azerbaijani and Beyond: Perspectives on the Construction of National
Identity (Verlag Dr. Köster, 2017) and co-author of Karabakh in 99 Questions(CBA, Baku, 2014). Currently, he is working on the book project State,
Law and Islam in Azerbaijan (on changing religious policy in Post-Soviet
Azerbaijan). Ceyhun Mahmudlu is an author of number of policy briefs and
scholarly articles. His recent scholarly works have appeared at Renewable
and Sustainable Energy Review, Energies, Sustainability, Energy Strategy
Review, Problems of Post-Communism, and so on. Prior to CASPRI, he was
a visiting scholar at the Department of Central Eurasian Studies of Indiana
University. From 2012 to 2015, he was a founder and a director of Center for
Security and Energy Research at Qafqaz University, Azerbaijan.
Kamal Makili-Aliyev is an associate professor in international law and
human rights at Malmö University, a lecturer in human rights at U
­ niversity
of Gothenburg and an affiliated researcher at Raoul Wallenberg Institute of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. With his primary research interests
located in fields of international law and international relations he previously
held positions as vice-rector of Lomonosov Moscow State ­University Baku
Branch, a senior research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies (Azerbaijan) and a senior legal advisor at the Constitutional Court of ­A zerbaijan. He
is a Fellow of National Security Institute in Amherst, MA (USA).
Ozay Mehmet, PhD (Toronto), Distinguished Research Professor,
­International Affairs/Economics, Senior Fellow, Modern Turkish Studies,
Carleton University, Ottawa (mehmet5010@rogers.com). Ozay Mehmet is
a Canadian of Turkish-Cypriot origin: married, has three sons, and lives

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Notes on Contributors

in Ottawa with wife Karen (part-time in North Cyprus). He was educated
in Cyprus, London School of Economics (1959–62), and he received his
MA and PhD in economics at the University of Toronto (on a Canadian
Commonwealth Scholarship). He has taught at various Canadian universities [Windsor, York, Toronto, Ottawa, and Carleton]. He is the author of
more than 20 academic books and over 100 articles in academic j­ournals.
He is ­currently Senior Fellow/Lead Scholar of the Centre in Modern ­Turkish
Studies, ­Norman Patterson School of International Affairs at Carleton
­University. Professionally, Ozay Mehmet is a specialist in economic development, with special reference to Asian Tigers, Turkey, and Cyprus. He has
consulted extensively for several international development agencies including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Canadian ­International
­Development Agency, Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation,
many UN agencies (ILO, WHO, UNDP), and others. His projects have
been funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Council of Canada,
­International Development Research Agency, Conference Board of Canada,
and Asia Pacific Foundation. Some of his books are: Westernizing the Third
World (1st ed in 1995 Routledge, several editions, hardcover and paperback);
Islamic Identity and Development (1st ed in 1990, several editions, translated
into other language); Towards a fair Global Labor Market (1999, Routledge –
with ­
Errol Mendes and Robert Sinding); Sustainability of Microstates:
The Case of North Cyprus (University of Utah Press, 2010); The Southern
­E nergy Corridor: Turkey’s Role in European Energy Security (Springer 2018);
­Modern Geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean: ­Hydrocarbons in the Age
of Energy Transformation (Springer 2020).
Farhad Mirzayev, PhD, Leicester, Graduate of the Baku State U
­ niversity
(Azerbaijan). Holds LLM from the University of Nottingham, MBA from
the University of Cambridge, and PhD in Law from the University of Leicester where he was supervised by Prof. Malcolm Shaw. Did an executive legal
education at the Harvard University. Practicing international lawyer with
over 23 years’ experience in public and private international law in CIS &
Russia, UK, and the Middle East. Has an extensive experience in representing clients in international arbitrations. Principal of BM Morrison Partners
international law firm since 2011 with offices in London, Dubai, Baku, and
Moscow. Author of over a hundred articles and papers on public and private
international law. Ranked as one of the top leading lawyers by leading international legal guides such as Chambers, Legal500, IFLR1000.
Farid Shafiyev is Chairman of the Baku-based Centre of Analysis
of ­
International Relations, and Adjunct Lecturer at ADA University,
­A zerbaijan. He holds a PhD from Carleton University and an MPA from
Harvard Kennedy School of Government, as well as a Bachelor of Law
and Diploma in History from Baku State University. He is the author of
­Resettling the Borderlands: State Relocations and Ethnic Conflict in the
South Caucasus (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2018), edited volume

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445

­ zerbaijan’s Geopolitical Landscape, 1991–2018 (Karolinium Press, 2020),
A
and numerous articles and op-eds.
M. Hakan Yavuz, currently a Professor of Political Science at the
­University of Utah, works secularism, ethnic conflict, ethnic cleansing,
and genocide, transnational Islamic networks, civil society, and the public sphere. Professor Yavuz’s publications includes M. Hakan Yavuz, Nostalgia for the Empire: The Politics of neo-Ottomanism (New York: ­Oxford
­University Press, 2020); M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political ­Identity in ­Turkey
­(Oxford U
­ niversity Press, 2003); M. Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim
­Democracy in ­Turkey (Cambridge University Press, 2009); M. ­Hakan Yavuz,
­Toward and ­Islamic Enlightenment: The Gülen Movement (New York: Oxford
­University Press, 2013); with Bayram Balci, Turkey’s July 15th Coup: What
Happened and Why? (University of Utah Press, 2017); with Peter Sluglett,
eds. D
­ iplomacy and War: 1877–78 Russo-Ottoman Wars and the Treaty
of Berlin (­University of Utah Press, 2011); with Isa Blumi, eds., War and
­Diplomacy: The ­Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Treaty of ­Berlin
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah, 2013); with Feroz ­Ahmad, eds, War and
Collapse: World War I and the Ottoman State (Salt Lake City: ­University of
Utah Press, 2015).

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Index

Abiyev, S. 236
Abkhazia 283, 290, 306–308
Aghdam 137–138, 139–140, 156
Ajaria 291
Akar, H. 295
Akbarov, R. 235
al-Bahyan, M. B. Z. 413
Al Jazeera 414
Aland Islands 123–124
Albania 16–17
Albanian Catholicosate 17–18, 22, 94
Albanian melikdoms 21
Albanians 17, 94; Aghuans 18
Albright, Madeline 156
Ali Akbar Velayeti 154
Aliyev, H. 69–70, 76, 328, 348, 349,
351–352, 356, 358, 373–374
Aliyev, I. 84, 162–163, 183, 234, 237–
239, 248, 252, 254–255, 283, 286–287,
294–295, 304, 329, 356, 357–359, 388,
396
Alma-Ata Declaration 155
Amidror, y. 376
Amnesty International 102
Arab states 10
Araghchi, A. 394–395
Armenian/Artsakh Armed Forces
(Second Karabakh War) 228–230,
233–242
Armenian Christian (and Catholicism)
92–96, 104, 293–294, 370
Armenian Diaspora 143–145
Armenian irredentist nationalism 5–6,
292
Armenian National Committee of
America (ANCA) 90, 101–102
Armenian National Council 24
Arran 18
Artsakh 16, 17, 60, 182–183

Arutunyan, A. 183
Arzumanyan, R. 74
ASALA movement (Canada) 428, 431,
433–434; Altikat, A. 433–434
Atatürk, M. K. 343
Azerbaijan Armed Forces (Second
Karabakh War) 224–242
Azerbaijan baylarbaylik 21
Azerbaijani Independence
Act (1918) 23
Bagirov, K. M. 81–82, 345
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline
322–323, 354
Balayan, Z. 345–346
Barkhudaroz, M. 235
Blank, S. 329–330
Bodin, J. 117–118
Bolshevik control of Karabakh 28; of
Nakhchyvan and Zangazur 28–29
Brezhnev, L. 67
Bryce, Lord James 96
Brzezinski, Z. 4
Bush, G. H. W. 156, 327
Bush, G. W. 328, 356
Cacqueray-Valmenier, M. de 293
Canada 420–436; Armenian diaspora
relations 429–432; best practice
foreign policy 421–424; China policy
422, 426; Cuba 422; diaspora-led
foreign policy 428–432; Iraq invasions
(2003) 423; mulilateralism foreign
policy 426–428; Ottomanization
of foreign policy 432–435; Second
Karabakh War 429–432; Syria 423;
traditionalist foreign policy 424–427
Castellino, J. 116
Caucasian Bureau 46–50, 52–53

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Index

causes, Second Karabakh War (2020)
245–256; emotional and psychological
burden 250–251; external interest in
war 255–256; failure of international
mediation 249; loss of trust 249–250;
military readiness 251; nationalism
and patriotism in Azerbaijan 254–255;
power consolidation 251–252; ripeness
and readiness for war 246–249;
Russia’s interests 253–254
Cekuta, R. 332
Central Committee of the Russian
Communist Party (CC RCP) 35–36,
45, 47–51, 52, 62, 70–71, 77–83;
Armenian Bolsheviks 47, 52, 60–62,
67–68, 71–72, 74–75, 77–80, 82–83;
Azerbaijan Bolsheviks 38, 45–46, 52,
53, 67, 69–70, 81–82, 130
Chafets, Z. 366–367
Chakhalyan, V. 314–315
Chamchyants, M. 92–93
Champagne, F. P. 428–429
Chanak Affair 421–422
Chechnya 352
Chicherin, G. 35, 36–38, 40–46, 49
Choen, R. 369
Chretien, J. 423
clash of civilizations 292–294
Clinton, H. 329
Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) 145, 282, 304, 356
Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) 178–179
Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration
Commission 116–117, 119
Conficts in Karabakh 1–2; ancient
and medieval history 16–19; confict
(1918–1921) 23–29, 168–169, 342–343;
modern period history 19–23; premodern conficts 90–91, 341–342; 21st
century 103–104; Four-day war (April
2016) 331, 359–360
consequences, Second Karabakh War
(2020) 256–261; Armenia access to
Turkey, Iran and Russia 258–259;
Armenia relations with Russia and
West 258; cargo transportation
diversifcation with Azerbaijan 258;
foreign trade composition 259–260;
military expenditures in Armenia and
Azerbaijan 260–261; Russian infuence
in the Caucasus 256–257; war effects
on Azerbaijani and Armenian
economies 259; weakening relations
with the West 257

Cornell, S. 122
Council of People’s Commissars (CPC),
Armenia 46–47
Crawford, J. 116
Crimea 117, 283, 291
Cuban Missile Crisis 59
Cyprus 424–425
Darband 16, 18
Dashnaks (Armenia) 36, 38, 40, 45–48,
287, 298
Davutoglu, A. 287
de Waal, T. 134, 140, 345–346
Demichev, P. 77
Demirchyan, K. 72, 345
Denikin 25
Dostoyevsky, F. 96
Echmiadzin Catholicosate 22
Egypt 407–408, 410–411,
414–416
Elchibey, A. 98, 348, 385
Elekdağ, S. 287
Elistratov, P. 67–68
Elizavetpol guberniia 23–24
Erdogan, R. T. 8–9, 285–286,
355–356, 396
Eremian S. 17
Eritrea 119
Eurasian Economic Union 279–280
European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) 176, 215; Chiragov and
others v. Armenia (2015) 176, 190,
204–205; Katangese People’s Congress
v. Zaire 179; Luizidou v. Turkey case
(1995) 185; Muradyan v. Armenia
(2016) 176; United Communist Party
of Turkey and Others v. Turkey 179–
180; Zalyan, Sargsyan and Serobyan v.
Armenia (2016) 176
European liberalism 95–96
European Union 91, 257–258, 307,
354; Comprehensive and Enhanced
Partnership Agreement (CEPA) 258;
TRASECA 349, 354
Events of 1915 60–61, 91–92, 151, 287,
289, 368–370, 434
First Karabakh War (1994) 2, 3–4, 83,
99, 131–146, 158–159, 224, 250–251,
254, 279, 296–297, 325–326, 348;
Bishkek Protocol 159; ceasefre 158–
159; CIS Presidents’ Summit 159–161
France 25, 145, 286, 293; support of
Armenian claims 25

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Index
Freedom Support Act 9, 145, 324–325,
327; Section 901 324–325, 327
Garo, A. 278
Gasparyan, M. 69
Gasparyan, O. 251
Gellner, E. 2
George, D. L. 421–422
Georgia 38, 59, 117, 283, 290, 298,
303–318, 342, 356, 357–358; Internal
Georgia 312–315; Armenian
population and unrest 312–315;
Azerbaijani ethnic population
and unrest 313–315; Alliance of
Patriots 314; diplomatic opportunity
(mediation), Second Karabakh War
316–317
Gladstone, W. 96
Goble, P. 327
Goltz, T. 133
Goradiz 141–142
Gorbachev, M. 6, 71–72, 73, 75, 78, 81,
171, 343, 345–346
Gulf Cooperation Council 410
Gulistan Peace Treaty (1813) 73–74;
Karabakh Khanate 73–74
Gulustan Treaty 21
Guzansky, Y. 367
Hague Regulations (1907) 204–205, 215
Hai Dat (Armenian Cause) 277
Hakobyan, A. 80
Hanegbi, T. 370–371
Hans-Adam II, Prince 121
Hasanov, H. 235, 237
Hasanov, Z. 233
Hashimov, P. 254–255
Helsinki Final Act of 1975 116, 117, 206
Hoagland, R. 331
Human Rights Watch 132–134, 137–138
humanitarian intervention 121–122
Huseynov, M. D. 43–44, 48
International Court of Justice (ICJ)
116–119, 183, 213–214, 217
International Law 172–176, 188–190,
204–205, 216–217; Armenian role
204–205; Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts 189; International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (CERD) 176;
Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties 172; Treaty of
Kars 173

449

Iran 10, 140, 154–155, 258–259, 372–376,
381–399; Armenian relations 385–387,
389–390; Azerbaijani relations
383–385, 387–389; Azerbaijan and
Israel 389; Iranian Advisory Council
393; Iranian Azerbaijanis 391–392;
Karabakh confict (1992–2020) 383–
390; Second Karabakh War 390–397;
Tehran-Moscow-Yerevan geopolitical
axis 385
Ishkhanian, R. 277–279
Israel 10, 255, 366–377; Armenian
relations 368–372; Azerbaijani
relations 372–376; energy diplomacy
373–374; Periphery 1.0 367–368
Jabrayil 21, 23–24, 29, 30
Jamali, M. J. 388–389
Kalbajar 133–135, 156, 357, 360
Kaputikyan, S. 345–346
Karabakh-Ganja 20
Karabakh Governor-Generalship 25
Karabakh Khanate 21, 341
Karadcic, K. 293
Karaev, A. 47, 52
Kazanjyan, V. 51
Kazimirov, V. 160, 349–350
Kevorkov, B. 71, 78–80, 82
KGB 61
Khachen 18
Khalafov, K. 395
Khamenei, A. 382, 395
Khlestov, O. 63
Khojaly 102–103, 145
King, M. 421–422
Kirov, S. 49, 53
Kocharian, R. 165, 187, 249, 251–252,
281, 328, 369–370
Kochinyan, A. 66–67
Kosygin, N. 67
Kozlov, S. 69
Kozyrev, A. 349–352
Kurakchay Treaty 21
Kurds 133
Kurekchay Agreement 341
Lachin corridor 231, 238–239, 256, 283,
357–358, 360
Lavrov, S. 161, 282–283
Legran, B. 43
Lenin, V. 35, 41
Lindenstraus, G. 368
Litzenberger, E. 335
Lukyanov, A. 78

Uploaded by S. M. Safi

450 Index
Mahdesian, A. 95–96
Makharadze, P. 52
Mamedova, F. 17–18
Manucharov, A. 80
Maresca, J. 327
Marr N. 17
Mass Karabakh Movement
(MIATSUM) (1965–1988) 59–84,
88–89
Mdivani, B. 35, 40
Medvedev, D. 357–358
Meghri region (Armenia) 256
Melkumyan, G. 69
Metzger, Y. 370
Middle East 402–416; Caucasus nexus
406–407; distribution of power 403–
406; Second Karabakh War 412–416;
security burdens 408
Mikhailov, V. 77
Mikhaylov, Boris 35
Mikoyan, A. 35, 38, 40, 67
Milosevic, S. 293
Minsk Group 3, 122, 135–145, 150–158,
160–161, 179, 180–182, 253, 257, 265,
281–282, 305, 321, 325–331, 336,
349–356, 412
Mirzayev, H. 235, 238
Mirzoyan, L. 53
Mkoyan, E. 312–313
Morsi, M. 411
Moscow Declaration (2008) 286, 358
Moscow Treaty (March 16, 1921) 47, 50,
63, 354
Mravyan, A. 47
Mubarak, H. 407, 411
Muradyan, I. 59–60, 71–72, 75–77
Muslim Brotherhood 407, 411
Muslim relations 372–376
Muslim sentiment (Azerbaijan) 99–100
Mustafayev, K. 235
Mutellibov, A. 347
Myasnikov, Alexandr (Martuni) 46, 53
Nagorno Karabakh (1920–1923) 5,
34–55
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
(NKAO) 16, 80–81, 130–131, 151–152,
153–155, 168–169, 175–176, 185–188,
276, 282, 344–348
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous
Region (NKAR) 34–35, 53–54, 61,
63–64, 67–78, 82–83
Nakhchivan corridor (enclave) 37, 39,
44, 60, 62–64, 72–73, 75, 291, 296,
309–310, 354, 399

Nalbandian, E. 370–371
Naneishvili, Viktor 27, 35
Narimanov, N. 35, 40–42, 43–46, 47–49,
50, 54, 65
national consequences, Second
Karabakh War (2020) 261–267;
Armenia 262; Azerbaijan 261–262;
Nagorno-Karabakh 262–263; Russia
263–264; Turkey 264–265
NATO 59, 204, 307, 322, 350, 420, 427,
431; Partnership for Peace Program
322, 350
Nazarbayev, N. 154–155, 347
Nazaretyan, A. 44–45
Negroponte, J. 367
neo-Ottomanism 101
Netanyahu, B. 371, 373–374
North Caucasus 347–348
Obama Administration 330
Orakhelashvili, I. 49
Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE,
formerly CSCE) 3, 122, 135–145,
154–155, 165–166, 180–182, 245–249,
348; Budapest Summit 159–161;
Common State 181; Goble Talks 181,
354; Kazan Formula 179, 359–361;
Key West Talks 180–181, 327, 329,
355–356; Lavrov Plan 181–182;
Madrid Principles 162, 181, 328,
352–353, 356
Organization of Islamic Cooperation 373
Oriental Studies Sector, Armenian SSR,
Academy of Sciences 64–65; Institute
of Archaeology and Ethnography
65, 66–67; Institute of History of the
Academy of Sciences 65–66; Armenia
nationalism 64–80, 97–98, 104; see
also Mass Karabakh
Orientalist perspective 6, 88–105;
Azerbaijan 88–105; Said, E. 91
Orjonikidze, S. 36–39, 44–45,
48–49, 52, 54
Orkhistena 16
Oskanian, V. 369–370
Otene 16
Ottoman Empire 6, 24, 91, 94–95, 96–97,
151, 284, 289, 291, 341–342, 432–433
Ozal, T. 285–286
Pact for Stability and Cooperation in the
South Caucasus 310
Palestinians 425–426
Papazian, V. 369–370

Uploaded by S. M. Safi

Index
Pashinyan, N. 8, 84, 145–146, 152, 162,
163, 239, 248–252, 256, 279–280,
283–285, 292–295, 332–333, 360, 372,
391
Peres, S. 369, 374
Petrosyan, S. 314, 369
Pogasyan, K. 346
Pompeo, M. 333
Popular Front Movement 346–347
Primakov, Y. 351–352
Pushkin, A. 96
Putin, V. 3, 84, 115, 248, 256, 294–295,
356, 358
Qarabağ-Ganja 20
Qatar 409–410, 413–414
Rafsanjani. H. 155, 381, 383
railway corridor (Europe-Caucasia-Asia
Transportation Corridor) 258–259,
265, 307–308; Abkhazia
Railway 308
Raisyan, M. 312
Ramazanzadeh, A. 395–396
remedial secession 174, 185–188; Quebec
case (Supreme Court of Canada) 185
Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
121–122
right to self-defense 213–214, 218
Rivlin, R. 376
Rouhani, H. 387–388, 390–391,
393–394
Russia 22–23, 100–101, 135–136,
153–154, 163–165, 248–251, 253–259,
263–267, 277–285, 290–297, 304–318,
341–362
Russian Administration, Armenian
settlement (18th century) 93
Ruzinsky, A. 280
Saakashvili, M. 356
Sadikov, N. 235
Sargsyan, S. 251–252, 367, 370
Sarkisyan, S. 249–250, 329
Second Karabakh War (2020) 1, 5,
83–84, 96, 99, 101–102, 130–131, 143,
182–184, 288–290, 297–298, 303–318,
332–335, 361–362; campaign analysis
239–242; campaign planning 230–233;
capabilities and capacity 226–228;
culmination point 237; general staff
227–228, 234–236; generals 235–236;
lead-up to war (1994-2020) 159–166,
182–184, 216–217, 223–242, 245–267;
marginalization of pro-Russian

451

offcers 235–236; media coverage
of Second Karabakh War 102–104;
military balance 228–230; military
cooperation 225–226; phases of
military campaign 230–239; war
strategy 230–233, 239–241
self-determination 115–128, 174, 176–
180, 206–207; de lege ferenda 121; de
lege lata 121
Semichastny, V. 61–62
Sesiashvili, I. 314
Sevres Treaty 27, 284
Shakaryan, S. 69
Shakhnazarov, G. 345–346
Shirvani, A. 47
Shoigu, S. 295
Shugarian, R. 278
Shusha 21, 23–24, 29, 30, 102, 146, 183,
275
Sisi, A. F. 407–408
Siunia/Siunik/Siwnik 18
Sneh, E. 366
SOCAR 9, 289–290
Soloviev, N. 40–41
South Caucasus 256–257, 290–291,
305–318, 322–323, 342–343, 404;
energy diplomacy 323–324, 349–350,
356–359; Iran policy 397–399
South Ossetia 117, 283, 290, 305,
306–307, 311
Southern Gas Corridor 323
sovereignty 117–118, 19, 190;
Montevideo Convention on the Rights
and Duties of States (1933) 190
Soviet rule, Azerbaijan 27
Soviet Russia and Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic
(RSFSR) 39, 341–342, 343–348
Soviet Union, dissolution of 131,
153–154, 169–172, 208–209
Stalin, J. 45, 49–54, 93, 97
Starchenko, Y. 63, 66–67
Stepanyan, G. 69
Stern, Y. 370
Succession of Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 177–178,
185–186
Suleymanov, A. 313
Suleymanov, E. 375–376
Sumgait Event 96–97
Tahirov, R. 235
Talbot, S. 323
Ter-Gabrielyan, Saak 36, 45
Ter-Gazaryants, G. 66–67

Uploaded by S. M. Safi

452

Index

Ter-Petrosyan, L. 155, 182, 277, 279, 281
territorial integrity 120–128, 175,
176–180, 214–215, 330
territorial status quo (2020) 216–217
Tigranes the Second 94
Tonoyan D. 146
Tonoyan Doctrine 179
Transcaucasia 341
Treaty of Friendship between Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia 63
Treaty of Lausanne 284
Treaty of Versailles (1919) 120, 130
Tripartite Agreement (10 November
2020) 146, 184, 190–191, 334–335, 399
Trudeau, J. 424, 425
Trudeau, P. 422
Trump, D. 333–334
Tunyan, R. 51–52
Turkey 8–10, 28, 37, 39, 91, 140–141,
255, 258–260, 264–267, 275–299, 305,
309, 342–343, 360–361, 376, 386,
395–396, 404–406, 411–412, 414,
421–422, 423, 429–431; Azerbaijan
foreign policy 285–286, 288–290;
general foreign policy 275–299,
328–332, 356–357; Russian-infuenced
truce 294–297; Second Karabakh War
288–290, 395–396; Zurich Protocols,
The 288, 328–332, 357–358
Turkmanchay Treaty 22, 341
Udins 17, 22
Ulubabyan, B. 69
United Arab Emirates 10, 406–408,
412–413
United Kingdom (Britain) 24–25, 26–27,
95–96; recognition of Karabakh as
Azerbaijani 25
United Nations Charter 4, 6, 143–144,
158–159, 161, 165–166, 179, 188,
206–207, 210–215; Article 51,
211–213, 282; Chapter 7 of UN
Charter 143–144, 211; Declaration
on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples
115; Declaration on Principles
of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations
115–116; General Assembly
Declaration on Minorities 117;
General Assembly Resolution on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention 117;
Human Rights Covenants on Civil

and Political Rights and Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights 116; self
determination (Articles 1(2) and 55 4,
206–207; territorial integrity (Article
2(4)) 4, 123, 213; World Conference
on Human Rights 116
United Nations resolutions 6, 131–158,
210–216, 276, 283, 325; Resolution
822 131–136, 156; Resolution 853
136–138; Resolution 874 138–141,
157; Resolution 884 141–143, 158;
ceasefre initiatives (1988–1994) 7,
158–159; Resolution 10693 283, 366
United States 9, 286, 321–336, 404, 408,
423–424, 427–428; Baker rules 327;
Goble plan 327, 354; energy diplomacy
323–324, 327–328, 335–336, 354–355;
Second Karabakh War 332–335
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
226–227, 233–236, 240–241
U.S. Department of State 132,
331–332, 367
US-Israel-Turkey-Azerbaijan
geopolitical axis 385
USSR Constitutional Law 170–172,
208–209
USSR (Article 72) 173, 208
USSR (Article 76) 208
USSR (Article 78) 130, 170–171, 178,
208–209
uti possidetis juris 118–119, 173–175,
176–180, 209–210; Badinter
Commission 177, 179, 188–189; Rann
of Kutch arbitration 119; Temple of
Preah Vihear Case 119
Valyeti, A. A. 154
Vance, C. 153
Vanetsyan. A. 250
Vezirov, K. 67
Wanzhou, N. 426
Wardroom, O. 26–27
World War I 91–92, 96
Yashin, V. 81, 82
Yeltsin, B. 150, 154, 156, 347
Yildiz, T. 357
Zakatala Scandal 38, 40
Zangezur 21, 23–29, 35–37, 43–46;
Protocol No. 6 46
Zarif, J. 395–396, 399
Zarobyan, Y. 60, 62
Zengilan 142

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