STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY
XXVII

NATURALISM
AND
DEONTOLOGY
An Essay on the Problems of Ethics
by
D. A. R O H A T Y N

Roosevelt University
Chicago, Illinois

1975
MOUTON
THF. H A G U E • P A R I S

©Copyright 1975 in The Netherlands
Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, The Hague
No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print,
photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the
publishers.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 73-92240

ISBN: 90 279 3233 6

Rohatyn: Naturalism and Deontology:

ERRATA

p.
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32,
51,
86,
98,
98,
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119,

1. 19, delete extreme left-hand bracket from the logical formula
fn. 120, read 'prepositions' as 'prop.ositions'
1. 14, change last word on line from 'to' to 'now'
fn. 81, 5th line, read'Searly'as'Searle'
fn. 81,1. 10, read 'Promising' as 'promising'
1. 5, delete the word 'a'
fn. 94, 3rd line, read 'dagmatists' as 'dogmatists'
fn. 94,4th line, delete second occurrence of '1' in 'Evil'
1. 26, change 'of to 'on'
entry under Baker, change '229' to '299' in pagination

For Stevie,
who knows all about meta-meta stuff

PREFACE

The critics will have no trouble dissecting this work. They will find
hyperbole, vagueness, lack of sound argument and sometimes of argument itself, sloppiness, discontinuity, and even misinterpretation.
Since enemies are always more numerous than friends, one must suspect, indeed expect, the worst. Dire prognostications about the nonfuture of this book are probably correct, but at the same time they
are of very little interest. The main, and perhaps the only redeeming
feature of the present volume is that it raises issues which philosophy
has, to its own embarrassment, neglected. As long as the neglect does
not continue, there will be no reason for further shame. If some of the
ideas (for which no originality is claimed, by the way) presented here
receive a more thorough trial, the effort made will be rewarded. If
not, then it will be up to future generations to see to it that the effort
was not wasted, if they dare.
Without John Donnelly, not one page here would have been written. His patience in reading, and painstakingly criticizing, every draft
and early version of each chapter made it possible for it to be done, let
alone possess any conceivable merit. The responsibility for mistakes
and defects is of course entirely our own; but without his help, they
would have been far more numerous, and infinitely graver in consequence. Only his assistance enabled numerous personal obstacles and
limitations to be overcome.
Without the patient support, encouragement and above all, deep
and continued friendship of the person to w h o m this little treatise is
dedicated, life would not be worthwhile.
D.A.R.
Chicago
January, 1973

CONTENTS

Preface
I
II

VII

Introductory

1

Protreptic Logic

9

III

How to Prove the Principle of Utility

22

IV

The Searlian Challenge

66

V

Postlogue

107

Bibliography

116

Index

126

I
INTRODUCTORY

Is there a permanent, logical gulf separating statements of fact ('is')
from propositions expressing value ('ought')? A corresponding question
has explicitly concerned philosophers ever since Hume's famous remark proposing the very distinction. 1 Today this is considered in
some quarters the fundamental problem of ethics, in that the construction of a valid theory of obligation within a cognitivist framework seems dependent upon supplying a successful counter-instance
to the 'is-ought' disjunction, before it can be begun or certified as
rational.
One may wonder why the concept of obligation should be boosted
so prominently. Undoubtedly, the work of Kant and Kant's effect on
ethics are reasons why obligation looms so greatly in contemporary
ethical discussion. From one angle, moreover, moral philosophy 'reduces' to a theory of obligation. Suppose that the ethical standard to
which one subscribes is the Good. Is it then not incumbent to pursue
the Good? Therefore, would it not be odd for a person (let alone a
philosopher) to say "x is good, but do not pursue (bring about, realize,
obtain, enjoy) x"? Would this not contradict the plausible maxim
that bonum faciendum ('the good is to be done')? Regardless whether
one identifies the good with pleasure, or happiness, or something else,
it would be startling simultaneously to admit that an JC is worth having,
in some sense, and yet not go on to recommend that x, to oneself as
well as to (many or all) other moral agents. It would be exceedingly
strange to make such a judgment, regardless of any other logical concerns external to the issue under consideration. This point is not

i
D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1 8 8 8 ) , 4 6 9 - 4 7 0 . We shall briefly discuss Hume's own contribution to the 'is-ought' dispute in Chapter III, 36-37, 4 3 .

2

INTRODUCTORY

affected in case good is wrongly identified with something else; indeed
G. E. Moore plus a number of recent philosophers hold that 'good'
is in principle mistakenly identified with anything else. From such a
perspective it is easy to see why ethics seems (ordinarily) t o imply a
theory of obligation, at bottom.
However, this 'reduction' is mistaken, for the following reasons:
(1) It would be equally odd to hold that it is someone's duty to
pursue his own pleasure or happiness, even within the context of a
"self-realization" ethic. Since Kant and Mill, attention has been paid
to the idea of "self-regarding duties", 2 but whether any such obligations do exist, or it is fruitful to think so, 3 remains largely a muddle.
Moreover, making the attainment of one's own satisfaction a matter
of obligation is redundant, inasmuch as it will be pursued wholeheartedly and by virtually every individual, and at nearly all times, with no
exhortation necessary, 4 provided there is an opportunity to do so.
The truth to the doctrine of psychological hedonism is that people
will usually seek out that which they conceive to be their own good,
or in their own interest, regardless whether this happens to enjoy the
benefit of a moral stamp of approval, or not. The problem is often to
convince people to be willing to make what are eventually, if ever,
perceived as worthwhile sacrifices (subordinations of one's own welfare), generally in the name of the rights and interests of others, of
mankind, or one's community.
(2) It is likewise odd to contend that it is everyone's duty to promote the well-being of others, although this is maintained by utilitarians. 5 Odd, because it tries to link together two incompatible positions: hedonism and altruism. Perhaps there is an explanation for this,
2 The terminology (self-regarding duties) occurs initially in Kant, but is used
for a special purpose, and with an idiosyncratic meaning. See the "third example" in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.
3 For discussion, see Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed., reissue
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 7, 327-331; and Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 311-318.
4 Compare Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Section I, paragraph 11.
s See R . T a y l o r , Good and Evil (London: Macmillan, 1970), 8 9 - 9 0 , 9 2 , for
critique.

INTRODUCTORY

3

but in the first blush it is as peculiar to opt f o r a combination

of

hedonism and altruism, as it is to a f f i r m that x is g o o d , but that x
should not be f o l l o w e d or realized, at one and the same time. 6
(3)

Consider the statement S: " x is worthy o f approval, but d o not

go after x".

S seems implausible, even self-contradictory; but is

it? Only if w e accept a version o f the so-called "universalizability ( o r
generalization)
detectable. If

thesis".

Here

again

Kant's

philosophic

w e simply deny outright that the

impact

is

universalizability-

criterion ( o r , e.g. Hare's "prescriptivism") is the proper foundation f o r
ethics, then there is nothing to carp about, f o r there are then no
general rules, applying t o all men in similar situations; no
paribus

ceteris

clauses, in other words. This undermines utilitarianism, t o o ,

even in its most primitive formulation, f o r there is always at least one
principle o f distributive justice at w o r k , namely, 'the greatest happiness o f the greatest number'.
This objection

cuts deeper

generalization-argument
applies, f o r almost

any

than merely

denying, e.g. that the

always and without

conflict or exception

proponent

of

universalizability would

be

willing to concede that much; to be defended, all S requires is that w e
be open

to possible alternative 'systems' o f ethics — o f which there are

examples, which neither make explicit use o f generalization-principles,
nor implicitly rest on them (e.g. Nietzsche). Sometimes these theories
are so distinctive as to resist classification, altogether.

(4)

" x deserves approval, but shun it as a g o a l " may even make per-

fectly g o o d sense within, e.g. the framework o f a Stoic position,
according to which it would not be worth the e f f o r t and/or pain that
must be endured in order to reach x. Or take a moral " s k e p t i c " , w h o
is reluctant to advise either himself or others what to do, owing to his
conviction that both speculative and practical certainty as to whether
any x is indeed meritorious, is unattainable.
(5)

Unsimilarly, an "existentialist" is usually convinced that he has

n o right

to tell other people what t o do, because that w o u l d be " b a d

f a i t h " , made worse b y actually f o l l o w i n g his counsel; he may there-

6 We presuppose that no clash of e.g. duties operates at the time when such an
edict might or would take effect.

4

INTRODUCTORY

fore refuse to issue any guide entertaining a well worked out notion
of e.g. the good, without necessarily arresting or looking askance at
such edicts in general.
(6) Finally, recalling Aristotle, one might remonstrate that there is a
marked difference between 'the Good' and what is good for us as individuals; perhaps it is only the latter that we can ascertain with any
degree of reliability. Therefore we have no universal basis f r o m which
to tell people in absolute and imperative terms what they should be
at, morally speaking.
For all these reasons, we do not see that ethics can be glibly "reduced"
to a theory of obligation, making anything left over derivative
therefrom. Viewing ethics as wholly contained by deontology
demands much further argument. Therefore, while the fact-value
"split" in value-theory is a matter of extreme urgency and significance,
the 'is-ought' question, which is logically subordinate thereto, is not
nearly so crucial to ethics as is frequently suggested.
For this very reason, repeated inability to resolve the riddle posed
by the 'is-ought' dilemma becomes more frustrating. Such failure is all
the more embarrassing in that an adequate deontology is not the sole
or overwhelming criterion for a workable ethic, as we have just seen.
Let us then surmount, if possible, the 'is-ought' obstacle, by focusing
upon three successive attempts to deal with specific deontological
questions.
These are, respectively: the exhortation to philosophy known as
the "protreptic argument", stemming f r o m Aristotle; the " p r o o f ' of
the principle of utility in the writings of J. S. Mill; and the very
recent, celebrated attempt by Searle to "derive" an 'ought' f r o m an 'is'
via the example of promising, which concept is created as a "speech
act". We shall expound, partly defend, and at the same time undertake extensive revision of each thesis to be examined; evaluate their
intrinsic acceptability; and lastly, in the Postlogue, take up fresh
challenges, and ferret out implications of the results achieved.
One interesting common feature is that all three arguments selected do generate a multitude of "large questions" about philosophy,
ones that demand responses, in their own right: should we study or
" d o " philosophy, and if so, why? What does the denial that the first
premise of an ethical theory can be put on a sound logical footing tell
us about the "meaning" of life, the trust to be placed in philosophical

INTRODUCTORY

5

approaches thereto? What limitations govern moral philosophy as an
inquiry, and how do these condition reflective attitudes toward
"everyday" language? What are the advantages, and the drawbacks, of
currently favored methods in each of these areas? And so on. All these
items are of intrinsic importance, and all will receive their due. The
three major topics are therefore all gratifying in their range and depth.
The chapters which follow are each self-contained explorations.
Yet we should be remiss not to prepare for the onslaught, with a few
needed preliminary remarks.
The 'is-ought' controversy is treated most sophisticatedly, as well
as directly, by Searle. Searle's "derivation" at its climactic moment,
amounts to a logical transition from a neutral description of agreeing
to do something, to the morally decisive assessment that it ought to
be done. The example chosen by Searle is a straightforward and
familiar one: one's obligation to pay a debt, as contracted and expressed by a verbal promise or "speech act". This requires essentially
no further explanation beyond the complete commentary provided in
Chapter IV, and in the Postlogue.
We consider next an assumption whose dramatic and initial "intuitive" plausibility is great: namely, the "necessity" to philosophize (a
thesis originally propounded, from all available evidence, by Aristotle). If it can be demonstrated that philosophizing is a necessary
occupation, pursuit, activity, life-dimension or undertaking, then it is
possible to conclude that we "must" philosophize, i.e. that all men are
under a sort of Socratic obligation (e.g. to themselves). This result
would surely function as both a normative and a descriptive doctrine,
simultaneously. Moreover, it would act as a kind of theorem, thereby
enjoying all of the logical force connected with more usual apodictic
pronouncements. Such a feat, if but once accomplished, would in
addition successfully bridge the 'is-ought' chasm. After a detailed
examination of the scope and merits of this famous but neglected
argument, we show that (regrettably) it is fallacious. One can already
see that the attempt to narrow the "gap" between 'is' and 'ought' is
much older than the classic, initial explicit formulation in Hume.
What Hume pioneered was the denial of a legitimate passage between
'is' and 'ought', which makes the effort to carry out that deduction by
invoking the 'special case' of philosophy all the more intriguing.
The "protreptic argument" as attributed to Aristotle might also be
summarized in the following dictum: "we have no choice whether or

6

INTRODUCTORY

not to philosophize; the only choice is whether we shall do it well or
badly". 7 Presumably, one always prefers to do something well rather
than badly, //one prefers to do it at all; here, there is no decision as to
whether one shall be a philospher or not; so the choice, if there is one,
never rests with us, anyway; what then remains is the injunction to
become as good a philosopher as one can, which men may obey by
some kind of natural or inborn impulse, rather than (say) under duress.
While this formulation accords with much of Aristotle's thought, it
does not do the protreptic argument justice, when independently
formulated. For one thing, do we philosophize willy-nilly, as this
version of the argument contends? There is certainly room for doubt.
Secondly, the thrust of protreptic thinking is to get men to philosophize; this kind of moral exhortation would be pointless and out of
place, if men already did engage in reflection. Thirdly, if men do
philosophize, perhaps they ought not to; this is at once an application
both of Moore's 'open-question' argument (the companion to the
'naturalistic fallacy') and numerous other statements of the supposed
'is-ought' cleavage, whose general validity is under examination here. So
the J. otreptic argument invites early refutation, if not demolition.
Moreover, it is not clear that men would always do something well
rather than poorly. The duffer who shoots eighteen holes on the
weekend has no desire to golf like a champion, although he may
admire those who do, even go so far as to study their techniques.
Philosophy matters more than golf; or does it? That contention is also
at stake in the protreptic argument, and therefore has no business
being an implicit assumption of it. It is also not necessarily a matter of
choice whether we philosophize well or ill; it could be largely a matter
of talent, and therefore either a 'gift' or native aptitude. Are philosophers made or born? Are athletes? We can in time make ourselves
somewhat better golfers by practicing diligently out on the links, and
likewise better philosophers by much hard work, but even after all
that, the duffer will as likely rival Nicklaus, as we match Plato. This
analogy may not hold up eternally, but it lasts long enough to indicate
that philosophy is not (except for logic) a skill, any more than poetry

1 The writer is indebted to Fr. Vincent G. Potter, SJ, for extended and very
fruitful discussion of this feature (among many) of the protreptic argument.
(Fr. Potter is of course not responsible for any conclusions reached here, nor
even for endorsement of the method of treatment we have adopted.)

INTRODUCTORY

7

(as opposed to mere versification) is. So philosophy is not something
acquired by mere repetition, mastery of a technique, or the inculcation of a fixed testing-procedure. There is about as much "method in
the madness" of philosophy as there is to writing sonnets. This in turn
casts aspersions upon the idea that philosophy is performed, so to
speak, by us, whether we will it or not. This just looks empirically
false, no matter how generously we define 'philosophy', or make
allowances for its sporadic appearance.
We can see from even an inadequate presentation of the protreptic
argument that it yields much material for close and pertinacious
study. For example, it might be thought that if philosophy is somehow compulsory, then this rules out or precludes its being obligatory.
But this depends upon (a) conflating logical with physical compulsion,
and (b) failing to see the connection between logical and moral
norms. 8 Once these concepts are elucidated (below, Chapter II, and
Postlogue), and corresponding confusions dissipated, the protreptic
argument is only reinforced, not quenched. For this reason alone,
although we do determine it to be invalid, the protreptic argument is
hard to extinguish. 9
Mill's relationship to the 'is-ought' quandary is more indirect, yet
compellingly discernible. For, if the moral code known as utilitarianism can be logically grounded, then the obligation, not only to
maximize utility in the world (what J. J. C. Smart calls "acting
optimifically"), 1 0 but also to uphold the standard of utility (or the
true morality) against all rivals or contenders in ethics, is enjoined.
For Mill it would be intellectually binding upon all those whose pro8 That there is such a connection is fiercely maintained by Kant, and prominently exploited by Peirce, to give but two examples.
9 Fr. Potter has suggested (in conversation) that in this respect the protreptic
argument resembles the ontological argument, or is equally precious; "you can't
kill it". We agree. This expression is a way of preserving its integrity and reputation, indeed elevating them, without thereby having to subscribe to it. For an
argument can be false, yet edifying; noble, yet incorrcct. The protreptic
argument in our judgment, is both. Yet in our evaluation it remains nevertheless
a "classic", albeit one with few champions - and no previous antagonists!
10 J. J. C. Smart, "Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism",
Philosophical
Quarterly, 6(1956), 354; repr. in M. D. Bayles, Contemporary
Utilitarianism
(Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday, 1968), 115. Compare J. S. Mill, "Utilitarianism", in J. M. Robson, ed., Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society (Toronto:
Univ. of Toronto Press, 1969), 226.

8

INTRODUCTORY

fessional responsibility it is to reason meticulously a b o u t n o r m s , e.g.
philosophers.
If any or all of these concerted attacks achieve the desired result,
then the 'is-ought' cleavage will be shown t o be an 'untenable dualism',
t o b o r r o w Dewey's expression. That is the main thrust of the present
w o r k , and an indication of the drift of its besetting themes: the reconciliation of ethical naturalism with d e o n t o l o g y .
Searle writes at one point of desiring t o p r o d u c e an indefinite
n u m b e r of counter-examples t o the thesis that one c a n n o t correctly
extract an ' o u g h t ' f r o m an 'is'. 1 1 The p r o t r e p t i c argument and the
' p r o o f of utility are unique a t t e m p t s t o furnish such significant materials, although our interpretations d o not uniformly cast these in a
favorable light. In the end, neither Aristotle's nor Mill's " o b l i q u e "
derivations w o r k o u t ; Searle's does. These all would remain challenging enterprises, even in abject failure. In this respect t h e y resemble the
standard set of proofs for G o d ' s existence. Every generation of thinkers, as Kant very perceptively observed, takes u p the task of " r e f u t a t i o n " of " t r a d i t i o n a l " or "classical" arguments a n e w . 1 2 This certainly
applies t o a sympathetic reading of the arguments presented b y
Aristotle and Mill; and if Searle's e f f o r t goes appropriately rewarded,
it t o o will soon deserve a p e r m a n e n t place in the hierarchy, owing t o
its soundness.

11 See below, page 100.
12 KcirV A639, 640, 641/B667, 668, 669. See also A135/B174;
A850-851 /B878-879; A462-464/B490-492; and esp. A341/B399; A797/B825.

II
PROTREPTIC LOGIC

Is philosophy indispensable? Is philosophy inescapable? Is it a
" m u s t " ? Is it a necessity?
These are all equally ambiguous questions. Indispensable? To
whom? When? And what for? Inescapable? By whom? And for how
long? A " m u s t " ? In the same sense as "you must go to see XYZ
playing Hamlet"? Not quite. A "necessity"? Of what? Of life? Of
individual existence? For the survival of the species? For the flourishing of a culture? For the aspirations of a civilization?
If the answer to any or all of these questions is negative, that does
not mean that we should cease being interested in philosophy. But if
any or all can be defended, that is, given a positive reply, then it may
be asserted that we have an obligation to do, or to continue doing,
philosophy. A simple yes or no answer is premature, for the questions
each admit of a variety of interpretations. Moreover, it is unclear to
whom they each address themselves. Just who are " w e " who have an
obligation to philosophize? Moreover, a positive answer to any
member of the original set of questions posed above in no way sheds
any light on what kind of philosopher anyone is supposed to be or to
become, or remain. Nothing is implied about what one is to hold; only
that philosophy is worthwhile as an activity, and presumably, is so in
itself, or for its own sake.
This means that any conclusions regarding the imperative to do
philosophy will be contentless, or adirectional, with regard to specific
positions. The overall question, namely whether philosophy is a justifiable undertaking, is metaphilosophical, i.e. it is logically prior to
"doing" philosophy itself.
If the original group of questions is collectively ambiguous, the
overriding issue as just formulated suffers from similar defects, as well.
Justifiable? To whom? When? For what purpose? And so on. If an

10

PROTREPT1C LOGIC

answer is forthcoming to these successive challenges, to be both fulfilling and thorough it must deal effectively with the vexed concept of
justifiability. For present purposes this issue will be restricted to
whether there is any compelling reason for all individuals to pursue
philosophy.
One ambiguity we shall dispose of immediately. We distinguish
'reason' from 'urge' or 'need'. A man's personal reason for practicing
philosophic inquiry may stem from some biological or psychological
drive; this may well be what Aristotle meant when he declared that
"all men by nature desire to know". 1 But that does not prove by
itself that they should. If knowledge is desirable, then it is so on
'independent' grounds. 2 On the other hand, if one cannot prove the
'value' of philosophy to any given individual, this does not automatically license the inference that philosophy is intellectually dispensable.
There are no logical implications whatsoever in the failure to demonstrate that philosophy ought to have some place in the lives of individual persons, although there may be numerous (and grave) cultural
ramifications thereof.
To show whether philosophy is indeed a necessity, let us center on
one strong piece of reasoning in particular, that known as the "protreptic argument". The invention of this argument is credited to
Aristotle, on the strength of a lost dialogue of which only fragments
have been left behind. 3 We are not concerned with whether Aristotle
enunciated the protreptic argument, nor with whether he was the first

1 Metaphysics I, L, 9 8 0 a 2 1 .
2 Mill's ' p r o o f attempts to counter-example just this restatement of the
'is-ought' dichotomy (see below, Ch. III).
3 For details, see I. Duering, Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction (Goeteborg (-Studia Graeca et Latina 12, 1961), and W. G. Rabinowitz, Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Sources of its Reconstruction
(Berkeley
and Los Angeles) (= Univ. of California Publications in Classical Philology 16,
1957). The "protreptic argument" appears to have occurred for the first time in
one of the Alexandrian commentators on Aristotle (who was, to be sure, attempting a meticulous textual reconstruction). But modern scholarship concludes that the closest that Aristotle himself came to recommending such a
hortatory approach was in a fragment which in pertinent part reads: "for, we
ought not to avoid (or shun) philosophy". See A. H. Chroust, Aristotle-. Protrepticus, A Reconstruction
(Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press,
1964), 23, 38.

PR0TRF.PT1C LOGIC

11

to do so; we are interested in the argument itself, not in the murky
historical details, however fascinating. 4
We shall now examine the protreptic argument in its myriad versions and reformulations. According to the protreptic argument:
either it is necessary to philosophize or it is not ; if it is, then it is; if it
is not, then it is; therefore, it is necessary to philosophize. 5 Here the
protreptic argument (hereafter PA) analyzes into three distinct parts:
premise, pattern of sentential reasoning, and conclusion. The pattern
followed, along natural deduction lines, is one of setting up for disjunction elimination (dis elim) and then carrying through. (Alternately know as a variant of the "constructive dilemma".)
In order to see the various possibilities more perspicuously, we
shall resort to logical notation to assist us with the entire exercise.
First, let us list the four alternative construals as presented by the
premise: namely, ( l ) i t is necessary to philosophize; (2) it is not
necessary to philosophize (which does not mean that one should not
philosophize, either); (3) it is necessary not to philosophize (this is
much stronger than (2), and not entailed by it); (4) it is not necessary
not to philosophize (which does not mean that one should philosophize, either).
What is contested is whether anyone has an obligation to philosophize; yet the PA is usually stated, not in deontic, but in strictly
modal terms. The gambit is no doubt to produce an even more cogent
PA than circumstance requires. This strategy of "overproof" is also in
keeping with the purely logical character of the PA; for whether there
is an obligation to " d o " philosophy belongs to the domain of moral
philosophy; whereas, the PA attempts to circumvent the problems
that would be generated in designating the issue as an explicitly ethical
one. The latter-day Nietzschean critique of the "will to truth" as a
mere "philosopher's prejuduce" shows that the PA, if it is to be
successful, must avoid direct encounters with such problematic areas.
By retreating to logic, the PA can hope to win converts to philosophy
through the force of its apodictic pronouncements, using methods and
4

See W. Jaeger, Aristotle, 2nd ed., tr. R. Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1948), and J. D. Monan, S. J., Moral Knowledge and its Methodology
in Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).
5 See A. H. Chroust, Aristotle: Protrepticus, A Reconstruction
3, 48-49. For a
Stoic version of the protreptic argument as applied to the alleged indispensability of logic. See Epictetus, Discourses, Bk II, Ch XXV.

12

PROTREPTIC LOGIC

techniques with which everyone will agree. This strategy appears more
promising than a head-on approach to such a delicate subject as "why
study philosophy?" (which we interpret as equivalent, at the initial or
introductory stage only, to philosophizing itself).
Returning t o our four alternatives, we may represent each by
letting N stand for logical necessity, and the two-place predicate, pxy
(unbound), for 'x philosophizes^'; the rest is self-explanatory: 6
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

N
-N
N
-.V

(x)
(*)
(*)
(x)

(Ey)
(Ey)
(y)
(y)

(pxy
(pxy
-(pxy
-(pxy

We conceive philosophy, minimally speaking, to involve an intentional
relationship, one between a given person and what (for lack of a
better word) may be termed a subject-matter. 7 There is nothing prejudicial t o schools, systems or doctrines in construing philosophy in
the manner we suggest; furthermore, the PA is grounded without
making any favorable or unfavorable reference, either to philosophers
or major distinguishing ideas and tenets within the field. The PA
requires none of this extra-logical baggage in order to get started.
Aristotle's main premise, is that "either it is necessary to philosophize or it is n o t " ; i.e. either (1) or (2). Verbally there is some lingering doubt as to whether "not necessary" might mean "superfluous",
but if so, then the premise would be: either (1) or (3); which is plainly
false. On the other hand, the premise as we accept it, namely, either
(1) or (2), is tautologous. From this it is already clear wherefrom the
PA's surface plausibility is derived!
As a new approximation to the PA's main premise, we might write:
(the wedge V stands for inclusive disjunction)
(5)

N(x)

(Ey)

(pxy v -N (x)

(Ey)

(pxy.

While this is a logically valid formula, to represent the " e i t h e r . . . o r "
component of the premise, something else must serve as the indicator
6

We omit the use of corners to highlight use-and-mention, hybrid expressions.
For, philosophy is not a 'property' of anything. One does not "philosophize" in thin air; the activity always takes an object; including, sometimes,
itself (denoted by i ^ z , the reflexive relation). And it is always deliberate, even
when orginally acted upon inadvertently.
7

PROTREPTIC LOGIC

13

of exclusive disjunction or alternation. Since "either p or q" (but not
both) is equivalent to saying that " p if and only if the negation of q",
or "p = -q", (5) can be scrapped in favor of
(6)

N (x)

(Ey) 0xy = -- N (x)

(Ey)0xy,

which in turn reduces to
(7)

N(x)

(Ey) <pxy=N(x)

(Ey)

Qxy,

or the simple extensional equivalence of (1) with itself. Once again, a
bare tautology, which eliminates the need to go through the "argument"; for there is none to speak of, here. As (1) puts it, it is necessary to philosophize, and that is that. Small wonder that the PA is
so recurrently popular!
Since (7) demands no further reasoning, it follows either that (5) is
about as close to the PA as we can get, or else that some other
combination of elements from (1) through (4) is required, to accurately portray the drift of the argument. So let us follow through on (5),
for it is instructive on just this transition from premise to protreptic
conclusion. The set-up which the PA uses is that of dis elim. Since (1)
follows trivially from (1), the first half of the disjunction, the remaining question is, how to logically squeeze out (1) from (2), its negation? How to pass from the second disjunct in (5),
-N(x)

(Ey)

(pxy

to the desired conclusion,
N(x)

(Ey)

(pxy,

as the PA demands? Ancient rhetoricians who practiced this venerable
art, and perfected it to a high degree, labeled the procedure "miraculous consequence"; it can be schematized as: (-A -+ A) -*• A; in
words, if the negation of a formula (or variable) entails that formula,
then that formula is entailed by the conditional which has the negation of the formula as antecedent and the formula as consequent. This
is a variant of reductio ad absurdum, which is just what the PA needs
at this decisive juncture.

14

PROTRI-PTIC LOGIC

Can a "miraculous consequence" be elicited from (2), to produce
(1)? Aristotle, strangely enough, thought that not, quite independently of the controversial PA, and gave a number of arguments designed
to discredit the notion of "miraculous consequence" altogether; these
may be found in the Prior Analytics,8 But even a "miraculous consequence" would be of no avail, for ultimately the PA depends, when its
logical form is sufficiently expanded, on reasoning which cannot be
formalized; it is at this point that the hope of sheerly logical demonstration leaves off, and another kind of debate begins.
For, what does it mean to say that "if it is not necessary to
philosophize, it (still or yet) is necessary?" Only this: that in order to
arrive at the conclusion that philosophy is not a 'necessary' undertaking, we must engage in philosophical inquiry, if only to determine
that much. It would be lame to assert that such argumentation is
somehow 'prephilosophical'; its character is roughly philosophical, i.e.
self-questioning, reflective, and so on. If the issue cannot be settled
without actually engaging in philosophical projects of some sort, then
the PA will commit us to the tacit realization that philosophy is logically "inescapable", 9 and so succeed.
Is, then, the PA valid? Or does it beg its own question? It cannot
be proved by formal logical means alone, which dashes its proud
methodological hopes. It can only make its appeal on (quasi-) philosophical terms, but not on terms which are alleged to be logically
antecedent to philosophical reasoning and scrutiny.
The PA therefore represents a philosophically entrenched position,
which cannot dispel dissent by the power of deductive inference
alone. Yet it does seem curiously compelling. Why? Because the grip
which the PA enjoys is due to overlooking the factor of time.
Suppose for the sake of argument that philosophy is indeed a 'necessity', or the intellectual equivalent of bread and water. For how
long does it remain such? Are we bound to pursue philosophy "forever", that is, for as long as we live; or is there some shorter period of
our mortal existence during which time philosophy is manda-

8 See W. Kneale, "Aristotle and the Consequents
Mirabilis", Journal of
Hellenic Studies 77, Part 1 (1957), 62-66. Kneale's formalization of the
"miraculous consequence" is neither modal nor deontic, however.
'
See W. and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1962), 97.

P R O T R E P T I C LOGIC

15

tory? And if so, what period might that be, and how long does it
last? Or is any answer both individual and indefinite? Could it be a
one-time occurrence for one man, and on similar principles, another
man's career? The PAis unable to say.
Moreover, what if it turns out that an impartial investigation upholds (2), i.e. the non-necessity of philosophy, what then? Grant that
for the length of time that it takes to discover the "answer", one is a
philosopher; but is there any compelling reason why one should stay
in that condition, especially now that one knows how "unnecessary"
philosophy really is? Can the PA survive such a paradoxical result, if
forthcoming? Or would the PA be forced to affirm tacitly that "once
a philosopher, always a philosopher" regardless what changes the
philosopher makes in the way he orients his life — such as dropping
philosophy, or taking up another avocation? Here too, the PA is
silent. Furthermore, if one does conclude (2), must it be on 'philosophic' grounds? Are these the only legitimate reasons possible why
philosophy should not be, or continue to be, a part of a man's life? If
so, then it is obvious why philosophy should be thought indispensable:
for the ground-rules forbid a non-philosophic rejection, or else claim in
advance that any and every refutation of philosophy will be philosophic in tenor.
A hypothesized counter-example becomes pertinent: Jones may
decide against entering into philosophy because he feels that in a
world filled with suffering it is wrong for him to sit by doing
"nothing" while people are dying of starvation, disease, in war, and so
forth - people he could be helping, instead of e.g. sitting by the
fireplace reading books. Even Aristotle points out that the existence
of philosophy implies the universal attainment of leisure, as distinct
from e.g. mankind having to cope with the necessities of sheer physical survival. 10 Is Jones' decision a "philosophical" deliberation? Hardly. It is about philosophy, but since Jones is virtually ignorant of
philosophy itself, his choice cannot be said to have been made on a
philosophic basis — Jones has at best only a vague, superficial idea of
what he would be getting into if he studied philosophy. Jones' decision is based on reasons, and it may well be considered "moral", or
in conformity with certain familiar precepts, but it cannot be said to

io

See Metaphysics,

I, 1, 9 8 1 b 2 0 f f .

16

PROTREPTIC LOGIC

be the outcome of philosophic training, 11 unless this very episode be
taken as a rude baptism. Oddly, Jones' deliberation upon his own
scale of values and priorities makes him feel obligated to resist and
refuse the opportunity to philosophize, for the time being, at any
rate.
The Jones case seems to undercut the PA. So does the PA'S deep
conceptual association with the phenomenenon of intellectual conversion. Philosophers quite naturally have a refined, yet heavily vested
interest in philosophy and, therefore, are most anxious to display the
PA. Take St. Augustine, who in his Confessions recounts twice
(Bk. Ill, Ch. iv; Bk. VIII, Ch. vii) that he was led to philosophy
through reading a (now lost) dialogue of Cicero's called the Hortensius
— one which, from all available evidence, was inspired by, and directly
modelled upon, Aristotle's Protreptikos. But, as St. Augustine recalls
the story of his introduction into the earnest philosophic life, he is
already long since — and irrevocably so — a philosopher. As we
become aware of his attachment, we grow skeptical concerning his
impartiality, although not his sincerity. St. Augustine's experience
may well have been indelibly shaped by Ciceronian thought and style.
When one's acquaintance with philosophy is in retrospect destined to
be a lasting relationship, however, one's permanent outlook appears
hopelessly subjective, even to the most sympathetic observer.
Nothing so far implies that there is not a wealth of good reasons
for pursuing the philosophic and/or contemplative ideal. The question
is rather whether there is something — anything — which would
permit one to soundly infer that philosophy is a "must", i.e. a (selfregarding) duty.
The only recourse is to review the presentation insisted on at the
outset, and to renew the endeavor to make sense out of the drift of
the PA in formal logical terms. Accordingly, we abandon (5) and
select a fresh pair of alternatives. Now (1) is fixed as one of the
disjuncts; this leaves only (3) as a likely co-disjunct, even though such
a combination appears to yield a patent logical falsehood. Rather than
giving up on the PA prematurely, let us attempt to come up with a
formulation which will triumph, but less cheaply and less dearly than
i'
This "training" or education need not be formal, of course. We hypothesize that Jones is seriously entertaining this proposal for the very first (and
perhaps last) time.

PROTREPTIC LOGIC

17

the version which culminated in (6) and (7) did. As a first approximation:
(8)

N(x)

(Ey)

(pxy v N (x)

(y)

-(pxy

Second approximation: apply to (8) and explicate, i.e. replace it with
an expression which captures the " e i t h e r . . . o r " aspect:
(9)

N(x)

(Ey)

<pxy=-N(x)

(y)-

(pxy

(9) reads: either it is necessary to philosophize or it is necessary not to
philosophize; 1 2 as remarked before, this is simply invalid; (9) would
produce a contradiction if it were allowed into any (otherwise consistent) system of (modal) logic. It is an "all or nothing" proposition,
which is false simply upon verbal inspection, preliminary to any logical reconstruction. (9) is simply too strong an equivalence, to be held.
So we fall back upon the logically weaker ( 8 ) , 1 3 which states
that: it is necessary to philosophize, or it is necessary not to philosophize. Logically odd, this, but not as futile as (9). (8) is worth looking
into, if only because its allure is derived from the way in which it
capitalizes or trades upon the ambiguity in the word "necessity", as
indeed suggesting the opposite of "superfluity". There is, therefore,
something of the flavor of an 'either-or' left to (8), in that it insinuates
that philosophy is worthwhile — or it is worthless! [see above, page
12].
Can logic take the hint? At least (8) enables us to finally carry out
the actual reasoning followed by the PA, in logical terms. As such,
however, (8) turns out to be a distinct disappointment. From it
follows:
(10)

(x) (Ey)

(pxy v (x)

(y)

.(pxy,

and thence, employing free variables,
>2 Equivalently, it is necessary to philospphize if and only if it is not
necessary not to philosophize "(1) if and only if (4).'
13 In conditional form, it may be seen that (8) is the right half of the
biconditional (9). For, (8) is equivalent to the implication (8') -N (x)
(Ey)
0xy DN (x)
-0xy, which in turn is equivalent to its transposition, (8") -N (x)

(y) -<pxy DN (*) (Ey) <i>xy. But (.9) is equivalent to (9') N (x) (Ey) 0xy D-N (x)
(y) -0xy

& -N (*) O ) - 0xy

DN

(x) (Ey) 0xy.

So, (9) is stronger than (8).

18
(11)

PROTREPTIC LOGIC

(Ey)

(pxyv{y)

-0xy"

The nub of the problem has now been exposed. Once again, a
set-up for dis elim is used. One half of the desired result falls readily
into place, with the cooperation of the first disjunct. But '(y)-(pxy' is
in direct contradiction to \Ey) 0xy\ by definition. So to derive any
kind of conclusion from (11) is out of the question. If it were possible
to insert an additional premise, such as
(12)

0)

-0xyD(Ey)

0xy,

it would then be possible to grind out the first half of (11),
(13)

(Ey)

0xy15

by modus ponens from the second part of the disjunct; but the nearest
we can approach to this is
(14)

-0)

-(pxy 3 (Ey)

(pxy,

which follows from (11) by successive steps of implication and transposition, respectively. But alas, (13) is not to be, and so the PA goes
awry and remains simply unsupportable, logically speaking. (13) cannot be derived for some arbitrary variable (and therefore a universal)
x. 1 5
The trouble with (8) is not that it is invalid; quite the contrary.
(11) shows that (8), too, is a tautology; it is a cleverly concealed or
veiled analytic proposition, but no less analytic for that.
The fundamental defect of the PA is that its premise is empty, and
thus compatible with whatever other conclusions we may reach. In
fact, nothing follows from the premise at all; and this explains the
PA'S unique attraction. For its considerable charm and impressiveness
14 The steps to be used in the derivation involve the rules of necessity
elimination and universal quantifier elimination, respectively. Note too that (8)
amounts to asserting, and in the inclusive sense, '(1) or (3)', which becomes
tautologous, much as '(1) or (2)' shows itself to be.
15 The meaning of (13) would be that there is a philosophy to which something else is related (in this instance, a person; for example, [(£Vz)] (Ey) Qay,
using constants). The necessity of this relation would not automatically be a
consequence, however, 'p' does not entail 'Np'.

PROTREPTIC LOGIC

19

in luring (new) philosophers over to its side lie more in its vacuousness than in its pretensions to precision; and it is just this quality
which insures unhesitating adoption of its main premise at the initial
stage of the dispute.
But how could anyone ever be duped into accepting the PA? The
reason is that the PA, although a standard item of the philosophic
repertoire, especially at the so-called 'introductory' level, was heretofore taken for granted, and consequently left entirely unexamined.
The p a ' s non-cogent persuasiveness is heightened by its being expressly addressed to philosophers, adepts, would-be philosophers, and unintensely non-philosophical critics of philosophy. But the last-named
are not in any position (owing to lack of training) to effectively
challenge the PA; while philosophers and aspiring philosophers alike
fail to take the initiative needed to "see through" the PA, inasmuch as
it does provide a convenient "paralogism" to help justify their occupation or defend the status of their profession, to themselves as well as
to others. Strikingly, the history of philosophy does not mention any
opposition (on any grounds) to the PA. Silence is after all a tacit form
of assent. The presumption is, then, that no philosopher has ever wanted to mount a serious challenge to the PA, since this would either be
logically self-defeating, or else tend to undermine one's own discipline.
No universally binding norm exists for cultivating philosophic
endeavors; one can be exacted only at the considerable expense of total
loss of extra-logical significance. To have a future, or to improve itself,
the PA must (even if imprudently) eschew logic, in favor of an intrinsically philosophical 'position' which it can manage to work out on its
own; say, a final commitment to emulating the "rational ideal". To look
after its own welfare, the PA inevitably has to risk dealing in philosophy 'proper', even though this means including values unlikely to
meet with total favor or approval.
The PA inadvertently teaches itself that "directionality" or bias in
philosophy is inescapable. How to discriminate between and among
biases, or to evaluate respective acceptability, then becomes the first
(and perhaps last) lesson of philosophy proper. Whether one judges it
to be worth one's time depends on the quality of the biases to which
one is exposed. Total neutrality in philosophy is a fiction; it is neither
possible nor desirable. 1 6 A given philosophic approach is philosophy's
16

Cf. Kant, KdrV,

A xi n.\ A 7 5 1 / / B 7 7 9 ; A 7 5 6 / B 784; A 8 5 6 / B 884.

20

PROTREPTIC

LOGIC

own best and in the end its only available form of advertisement. This
is a conviction, one rendered unshakable by the PA'S own notable
failure. Hence the idea of a "presuppositionless" philosophy is at once
misguided and misconceived.
The PA attempts to triumph by generating an insoluble paradox of
self-reference. Instead, the PA is caught in its own trap. Our own
strategy in attacking the PA amounts to this: either it is a logical
truth, or it is not. Since it is not, (a) the PA is not what it is intended
to be; (b) even if the PA were defensible on some non-logical ground,
its support should itself have to derive or emanate from an already
entrenched philosophical outlook. Whereas, refutation or rejection of
philosophy need not be philosophically based or inspired — consider,
e.g. the "Jones case". If a successful challenge to the PA must come
from "within" some specific line of philosophy, this still does not
succeed in demonstrating the "necessity" of philosophy, nor in establishing a straightforward deontic consequence which would tumble
out therefrom, as an application of an elementary modal principle.
Why? Because the acceptance (or dismissal) of the "philosophic
life" [as e.g. virtuous] requires its own embryonic moral theory, which
inevitably will be partial to certain kinds of activity, and thereby
exclude or disapprove of certain others. But the PA seeks to impose a
universal injunction which will cut across the boundaries separating
contrasting or competing (philosophical) positions, by imparting a
putative logical necessity (from which an obligation could be logically
manufactured; which purportedly bids all men to inquire, although it
does not stipulate the form or content of such investigation, and
indeed does not wish to prejudice the issue).
What destroys the high-minded goal, if not the universal appeal, of
the PA, is its naive sense of the non-controversial, in seeking to reach
and thereby justify an unimpeachable, because extra-philosophic,
tenet which (consequently) no one is permitted to disregard, one
which allegedly both stands above and somehow precedes the rest of
philosophy, encouraging logical as well as moral devotion. The PA is
simply unequal to this task, whereas philosophy itself may not be; but
only philosophy. That is what makes the "defense" of philosophy so
aggravatingly circular, yet so perennially fascinating.
Summing up: (5) is provable, but neither one of its disjuncts is a
theorem. So, the deductive scheme which the PA seeks to foster,
instead founders. Either the PA is invalid, like (9), or harmlessly tau-

PROTRI:PTIC LOGIC

2J

tologous, like (8). In any case, the PA may not be used to impose
philosophy upon the untutored. Its logical impact is nil. Its rhetorical
success is incommensurate with its lack of cogency. 1 7 A defense of
the philosophic life, if to be sought at all, must lie elsewhere; namely,
within some philosophic approach, perhaps one not as yet devised;
perhaps one never to be f o u n d ! The door remains open, for either
defense or r e f u t a t i o n . 1 8 One warning: the idea of establishing a
"presuppositionless" philosophy looks to be at once misguided and in
principle radically misconceived. For once, looks may not be deceptive.

17

See Aristotle, Rhetoric,

II, 23, I 3 9 9 b 3 3 .

18 One possible line of indirect proof of the PA might be to rebuff our entire
account by showing that it is an instance of what the PA terms humanly ineluctable, namely, philosophizing. But this could at most serve to corroborate,
not confirm, the inescapability of philosophy, since it would only dispose of our
presentation and its objections.

Ill

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

John Stuart Mill writes that "a doctrine is not judged at all until it is
judged in its best fo.m". 1 We should remember this advice in examining the highly controversial subject of Mill's own alleged " p r o o f ' of
the principle of utility, as offered in the fourth chapter of Utilitarianism. We shall see that it is not easy to answer with a straightforward
"yes or no" the question as to whether Mill has succeeded in establishing his ethical theory on a sound logical footing; how we evaluate Mill
depends (1) upon what standards of proof we are willing to adopt,
and consequently (2) upon how we judge the standards which Mill
employs. In this respect we should agree with Hall2 that Mill's own
investigation is centered around an exploration of the term 'proof in
the context of ethical first principles. Therefore the first part of our
own inquiry will be devoted to cataloguing the various senses of
' p r o o f , and inspecting each to see whether or not the form of proof
specified under each heading is actually used by Mill, or is applicable
to Mill's own undertaking. 3
But even if the meaning of 'proof were fixed and invariable for
the purposes of evaluating Mill's proof, the problem of Mill's success or
failure in this project would yet leave open the question of "absolute"
success or failure. Mill's supposed inability to carry the proof out
to a legitimate conclusion does not determine once and for all
1 J. S. Mill, "Sedgwick's Discourse", in Essays on Ethics, Religion
and
Society, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 52.
Henceforth we shall refer to this collection of Mill's writings as EERS and
include the item and page reference.
2 E. W. Hall, "The 'Proof' of Utility in Bcntham and Mill", reprinted in
J. B. Schneewind, ed., Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1968), 157.
3
For full quotation of Mill's Proof see page 45, below.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

23

that there is no logically supportable "foundation" for ethics; nor
does the narrower conclusion, that in any case "proofs" of utility as an
ethical norm are impossible, follow. After one reading of Mill it is easy
to become discouraged, and so to generalize from a negative conclusion about Mill's proof, to ethical proofs generally. However, even
if Mill's proof does not satisfy certain stringent, logical requirements,
it is very far indeed from being an exasperating disappointment. It
may not be the "best form" of proof possible, but it does come
exceedingly close. This is what we intend to show.
Mill himself makes clear that logically deductive proofs in ethics
are out of the question. Speaking of the principle of utility, he flatly
states his plan to furnish
. . . such proof as it is susceptible of. It is evident that this cannot
proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the term. Questions
ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof. Whatever can
proved to be good, must be so by being shown to be a means
something admitted to be good without proof. 4

be
of
be
to

Mill goes on to provide illustrations: can health, or pleasure, be proved
to be good? No; for these ends do not lend themselves to further
rational argument. If two or more parties to an ethical dispute agree
concerning "ultimate ends", then certain progress can be made in
reaching accord on "intermediate propositions" contained in the network of an ethical theory. But what if there is no such agreement? Then it becomes impossible to produce "what is commonly
understood by p r o o f ' , 5 according to Mill. The natural temptation is
to conclude from this that (1) one first principle is as justifiable as any
other; (2) that such agreement as may be enjoyed depends upon the
ability of one party to persuade the other of the "truth" of some
position; (3) that to "admit" something to be good and yet not
demand a proof of same, amounts to an espousal of the self-evidence
of key ethical doctrines, or in effect their "intuitional" basis.
But Mill explicitly resists all three of these temptations! While strict
proofs may not be feasible, he argues that it would be incorrect to
infer of every ethical theory

4
s

J. S. Mill, "Utilitarianism", (1861), in EERS,
J. S. Mill, "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 208.

207-208.

24

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

. . . that its acceptance or rejection must depend on blind impulse, or
arbitrary choice. There is a larger meaning of the word ' p r o o f , in which
this question is as amenable to it as any other of the disputed questions of philosophy. The subject is within the cognizance of the
rational faculty; and neither does that faculty deal with it solely in the
way of intuition. Considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof. 6
What this "larger" sense of 'proof is, and how far Mill fulfills his
pledge to formulate the philosophy of utilitarianism with an acceptable alternative to "proof in the ordinary and popular meaning of the
term", we shall attempt to discover. Let us begin with the word
itself. Unfortunately, Mill takes his reader's understanding of 'proof
for granted, and therefore fails to explain himself precisely. One
possible meaning of 'proof is:
(a) evidence sufficient (or contributing) to establish a fact, or to
establish the truth of a statement; the action of such assimilated evidence in convincing the mind, demonstrating or producing belief in
the certainty of something.
Mill relies on this sense of 'proof in discussing the empirical
grounds (e.g. the design argument) for arguing to the existence of a
Supreme Being or Creator. 7 Meaning (a) demands publicly shared
standards of testimony, but it also enforces the role of individual
conviction, and so is compatible with another, more "personal" sense
of ' p r o o f , according to which the term signifies:
(b) the action or fact of passing through or having experience of
something; also, knowledge derived from this; individual observation
and confirmation of an antecedently formulated hypothesis. 8
Consulting the dictionary is only a first step. For we want to
distinguish a cogent argument from one which is merely convincing. A
cogent argument need not be persuasive, while a convincing one may
6 EERS 208. For commentary, see J. M. Robson, The Improvement
of
Mankind: The Social and Political Thought of J. S. Mill (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1968), 155-156; Alan Ryan, John Stuart Mill (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), 188.
7 See "Theism", in EERS, 462, 469, 470. For discussion, see H. J. McCloskey,
John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study (London: Macmillan, 1971), 165.
8 Definitions (a) and (b), respectively, condensed and arranged from the OED.
This abbreviated listing is anything but exhaustive.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

25

be false. Nonetheless, (a) already implicitly guards against construals
which would permit "demonstrations" from counting as 'proofs' without either evidential support or other forms of reliable empirical
testing and confirmation. 9
Mill opts for something closer to (b), despite pronounced antipathy for anything which reeks of "partiality", or a policy which
advocates personal expediency over t r u t h . 1 0 Mill's own endeavor, as
the previous quotation (page 24, above) makes clear, then becomes
that of putting sense (b) of 'proof on a sound footing. The principle
of utility is not meant to be deductively inferred, for this is well-nigh
impossible. The proof of utility will seek its own special validity in the
broader but equally challenging sense of appealing to one's observation, reflection and introspection; the raw material for this operation
is supplied by the " f u n d " of human experience. 1 1 The " t e s t " is empirical, and is intended to transcend "personal" knowledge, and to be
(potentially) universally applicable. The result becomes an inductive
generalization from the lessons taught by Erfahrung.
Allegiance to (b) shows that Mill wishes to avoid having to 'prove'
an abstraction; he wants to be able to appeal to utilitarianism in
operation, as an effective principle which has been activated and
which is "in the world", rather than merely on the drawing b o a r d . 1 2
So, while the theoretical underpinning of utility as an ethical
standard is at stake, Mill prudently disdains the possibility of producing a strictly logical proof. He would find himself compelled to forgo
' p r o o f in the currently accepted sense of metamathematics, 1 3 were
he propounding his views today. Mill expressly repudiates any such
9 That Mill does have such a sense of ' p r o o f vividly before him is attested by,
e.g. his opening remarks in "Utility of Religion", EERS, 403.
10 See "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 243, 257n.
11 EERS, 224-225, 237-238. We may observe that if Mill's appropriation of
(b) is successful, the outcome will be a psychologically true proposition, or an
insight into the workings of human nature. See below, p. 57.
12 For the genesis and overall character of this "empirical" strain in Mill's
philosophy, see "Autobiography", in Autobiography
and Other Writings (henceforth ' A O W ' ) , ed. J. Stillinger (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 13, 20,
134-135, 162.
13 Where ' p r o o f means: a deduction, or array of steps, each one of which is
either an (agreed-upon) axiom of logic, or else follows from a previous step by
means of an accepted rule of logical inference. The last such step is usually
known as a 'theorem'.

26

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

attempt to "prove" the first principle of utility; and wisely so, since it
is more than plausible to maintain that such efforts are always
doomed to failure in ethics, and must therefore be rejected wholesale,
as indeed, Mill does at the very o u t s e t . 1 4 For the ideal of mathematical proof is simply inappropriate, or an unrealistically high expectation,
in ethics. 1 5 Moreover, the variety of axioms and the necessary rules of
correct deduction to be employed must be deliberated upon and
chosen; this is why logic is itself considered a "normative science",
and tells why Mill's remark concerning agreement on ultimate ends
applies even to such august areas as metalogical proof-theory. The
definitions supplied by the dictionary indicate that an empirical or
evidential test is more in keeping with common parlance concerning the
meaning of ' p r o o f than is the technical, abstract climate of logic and
mathematics. This is not to disparage either logic or c o m m o n sense;
but as Mill points out, there is an "equivalent" to providing strict
proof, which the case of the principle of utility may fit. Since Mill
firmly believes that " . . . right and wrong, as well as t r u t h and falsehood, are questions of observation and e x p e r i e n c e " , 1 6 it is fair to
assume that Mill's own attempt to prove the principle of utility will be
empirical in character, in line with his very qualified acceptance of
" p o p u l a r " thought on this matter. Just what this empirical character
is, and what it dictates, we shall determine later.
Now that we have covered a motley of meanings of the term
' p r o o f , let us examine the various strategies of proof, in order to
pinpoint the sort of proof with which Mill is experimenting in
Utilitarianism. We shall proceed to furnish all the methods which may
come into play, and to ascertain whether (and if so, to what e x t e n t )
Mill chose to avail himself of each kind. This will be followed by a
direct examination of the " p r o o f ' of utility itself.

14
See M. Mandelbaum, "Two Moot Issues in Mill's Utilitarianism", in
J. B. Schneewind, ed., Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays, 232h48.
is
For further remarks on the limitations imposed upon proofs in ethics and
in philosophy, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1,3, 1094b 24ff, and I, 7,
1098a 25ff; and Kant, KdrV, A734-A736/B762-764.
16 J. S. Mill, "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 206. See also ibid., 220 on the
meaning of 'right' and 'wrong' respectively; and ibid., 205 on the problem of
finding a criterion for right and wrong actions. Compare Kant, KdrV
A476/B504.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

27

T Y P E S OF P H I L O S O P H I C P R O O F

1. Strictly Psychological
Bentham claims that a proof of one's first principle is "impossible",
because he fears the danger of an infinite logical regress; but he simultaneously claims that it is "needless". 17 This is because Bentham sees
the conditions of human life, and in particular the biological make-up
and psychological nature of human beings, as unalterable, and so,
morally inescapable. Pleasure and pain are the "two sovereign
masters" of nature, under whose thumb we exist. There is no alternative but to follow their dictates, and satisfy one's cravings. Bentham
makes the transition, sometimes thought to be logically illicit,
between psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism, by affirming
that only pleasure and pain can " . . . point out what we ought to do,
as well as to determine what we shall do". 1 8
Is there a mistake here? There would appear to be. For Bentham
exaggerates the hold that pleasure and pain do in fact exert upon us.
Mill points out that men are able to defer their pleasure, 19 even to
sacrifice it on particular occasions, although he does not conceive of
their being prepared to forgo their own general happiness or wellbeing; 20 nor is he particularly sensitive to the ethics of aversion or
"renunciation" which, as a nineteenth-century moralist, he was bound
to encounter in literature. 21 Mill also has quick praise for "readiness to
encounter pain and especially labour" 2 2 and encourages what he
takes to be the virtue of applying oneself to "disagreeable" and
"irksome" chores, such as school work. 2 3
17 J. Bentham, An Introduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
ed. L. J. Lafleur (New York: Hafner, 1948), 4.
18 J. Bentham, An Introduction
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1.
19 J. S. Mill, "Nature", in EERS, 395.
20 J. S. Mill, On the Logic of the Moral Sciences, ed. H. M. Magid, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 147-148. (A System of Logic, Book VI, Chapter xii,
paragraph 7).
21 J. S. Mill, "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 214.
22 J. S. Mill, "Autobiography", in AOW, 30.
23 AOW, 34. Compare the essay on "Civilisation" (1836), any edition, paragraph # 2 7 , on the conditions for heroism. On the incomparability of the
phenomena of pleasure and pain, see "Utilitarianism" in EERS, 237 (compare
Plato, Phaedo 60B).

28

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY

And yet, despite the preponderance of such statements, Mill is
equally quick to defend Bentham's position by asserting that "to
desire anything except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant is a
physical and metaphysical impossibility". 24 This unmodified thesis
cannot logically survive such counterinstantial phenomena as sadomasochism, or the self-directed death wish. 2 5 Therefore, insofar as
both Bentham and Mill are making a factual claim, it is too strong,
hence false.
But there is a second error committed by Bentham here, in conflating the human conditions for morality, or what Hall calls the
requirement of "psychological realism", 26 with what Mill terms the
"criteria" of morality and conduct. 2 7 The conditions for morality
logically precede any reasoned attempt to formulate criteria; but moral
criteria, on Bentham's view, merely collapse into a description of the
raw materials of morality: namely, human "passions". In emphasizing
the importance of human wants and needs as factors for the moral
philosopher to consider, Bentham establishes himself as what today
would be called a "descriptivist". But Bentham's easy-going transference
between psychological and ethical hedonism 2 8 is as straightforward as
it is invalid. What is demanded here, in order to shore up Bentham's
weak logic on this point, is a bridge notion, such as that of "prima
facie" desirability. 29 The introduction of this concept permits one to
say that human desires, motivated as they (in large measure) are by
pleasant and painful associations, may supply a hoped-for clue as to
what is normatively desirable, or even intrinsically valuable. Desire
"points" to desirability, but not infallibly so: for, as in law, a "prima
24 "Utilitarianism" in EERS, 238. For discussion, see H. A. Prichard, Moral
Obligation, ed. Sir W. D. Ross, new int. J. O. Urmson (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1968), 49, 53; and H. J. McCloskey, John Stuart Mill: A Critical
Study
(London: Macmillan, 1971), 69.
25 R . T a y l o r , in Good and Evil (London: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 206, 242,
would add "self-hatred" to these examples.
2« E. W. Hall, "The 'Proof' of Utility in Bentham and Mill", in J. B. Schneewind, ed., Mill: A collection of Critical Essays, 161. See below, pp. 4 7 , 52.
27 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 234, 237, 240.
28 For the origin of this distinction, see H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics,
7th ed., reissued (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 40, 412.
29 See R. J. Fogelin, Evidence and Meaning (New York: Humanities Press,
1967), 179-180 and p. 179n2. Compare R . T a y l o r , Good and Evil (London:
Macmillan, 1970), 136.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

29

facie" case is "defeasible", or can be overturned (e.g. by submitting
fresh evidence).
Bentham's approach is also suspect because it trades upon converse
Kantianism: instead of the surface plausibility of "ought implies can",
Bentham operates on the strange assumption that "can implies
ought". What can this mean? As Aristotle says of the life of uninterrupted contemplation that it would be "too high for m a n " , 3 0 so
Bentham avers that it is foolish to goad or exhort people to reach "impossible" goals. But in what sense are they impossible? Not in the
logical sense, since only contradictions are ruled out thereby. Not in
the technological sense, either, since in this domain, progress steadily
obliterates previously held notions as to what could or could not be
done, almost routinely. This leaves Bentham with impossibility in the
sense of a violation of the laws of nature (insofar as they are
known). 3 1
But it is difficult to imagine any transgression of such laws which
might have any ethical i/npact. If a man were to jump from a high
place and go up instead of coming down, this would be astonishing,
and indeed a violation (or suspension) of the law of universal gravitation, but what could its moral content be? 32 Besides, just like
technological improvements, the supposed boundaries of what is
thought humanly possible are ever-receding (take the case of the fourminute mile barrier). Moreover, there is a justifiable sense in which we
expect a man's "reach to exceed his grasp", 3 3 and lay down moral
legislation accordingly. We likewise know that people do not usually
live up to the ideal that may be set for them by a religious leader,
prophet or reformer, yet we hope that they may be inspired to do better
than if their own sense of limitation, feebleness, and lack of selfmastery had been pandered to outright. 3 4 This consideration is
30 Nicomachean Ethics, x, 7, 1177 b 26.
31 But, "man necessarily obeys the laws of nature", having no other choice, as
Mill writes in "Nature", in EERS, 379.
32
Spinoza's theory of conatus would, no doubt, provide at least one ready
answer.
33 See A. Edel, Method in Ethical Theory (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1963), 344, on "distancing". Also see R. Taylor, Good and Evil (London:
Macmillan, 1970), 138.
34 See R. B. Brandt, "Towards a Credible Form of Utilitarianism", reprinted
in M. D. Bayles, ed., Contemporary Utilitarianism (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, 1968), 172n7.

30

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

beyond Bentham's purview. Hence the psychological " p r o o f '
hedonism is decisively flawed.
2.

of

Reductionism

This is another Benthamite tactic. Like Mill, Bentham concedes that the
basis for action is frequently deferred pleasure; but when this is conceived under an ostensibly nonutilitarian code of conduct, Bentham
calls it "utility misapplied". 3 5 The illustration Bentham selects is that
of the religious ascetic, who hopes to enter heaven and enjoy eternal
bliss.
What Mill in another context calls the "living b e l i e f ' 3 6 which
regulates a person's conduct (as opposed to that to which he gives his
purely verbal assent), is considered by Bentham to be just the principle of utility (together with any rules subordinate thereto) in all
cases, and no other. So utilitarianism is not merely the best ethic, but
the only ethic! It is not necessary for Bentham to accuse selfproclaimed practitioners of rival moral codes of some form of hypocrisy; it is sufficient, and less risky, for him to point out that the
underlying structure of their supposedly distinct systems is in reality
nothing if not utilitarian.
Mill continues the Benthamite policy, in declaiming that
"utilitarian arguments are indispensable" to all "a priori moralists",
especially Kantians. 3 7 Mill's own specific comparison may or may not
be far-fetched, but it is primarily an attempt to undermine an opponent's position by arguing that it coincides with one's own, and so
is not really opposed to anything at all. The impression that Mill is
following this line of attack is confirmed by his hostile remarks elsewhere concerning asceticism, in particular. 3 8 It is therefore not
surprising that somewhere along the line, Mill should be rebuked for
daring to deny the presence of legitimate alternatives to utilitarianism.
One recent writer is exceedingly stern with Mill, contending that he
35 J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
9, 12,13.
36 J. S. Mill, "On Liberty", mAOW, 389.
37 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 207; also see 249; and "Coleridge", in EERS
159 (in AOW, p. 304). For comment, see A. Ryan, John Stuart Mill, 209-210,
and H. J. McCloskey, John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study, 59, 84.
38 J. S. Mill, Inaugural Address (London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer,
1867), 78. See below, page 38 ff.; 39n71;also 55nl37, 64.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY

31

labored for page after page to convince his readers of what plainly is
not so: that hedonism is what all men believe anyway, that it is the
very basis of Judeo-Christian morality, the basis of law, and that it
incorporates perfectly the traditional concepts of duty derived from
these sources. 39
These charges relate to Mill's sustained effort to clear the name of
utilitarianism, in Chapter II of Utilitarianism, and to shield it from
abusive interpretations. Writing six years after the first publication of
that work, Mill recommended, in an address on higher education, the
edification to be gained by a thorough grounding in classical philosophical works (and especially ethics) Pupils, Mill reflects,
. . . should be made acquainted with the principal systems of moral
philosophy which have existed and been practically operative among
mankind, and should hear what there is to be said for each: the
Aristotelian, the Epicurean, the Stoic, the Judaic, the Christian in the
various modes of its interpretation . . . (the student) should be made
familiar with the different standards of right and wrong which have
been taken as the basis of ethics; general utility, natural justice, a
moral sense, principles of practical reason. . . . there is not one of
these systems which has not its good side; not one from which there is
not something to be learned . . . . 4 0
While this represents a platitudinously "safe" educational philosophy,
it certainly is not the thing we should expect to find, if Mill is bent on
minimizing the differences between utilitarianism and competing
ethical schools of thought. Mill sounds more like Hegel here than like
Bentham. "One-sideness" and "half-truths" were a life-long concern of Mill's; 41 and it is characteristic of Mill to point out that one
way to overcome the then-incipient "two cultures" curricular mentality would be to instruct in the arts, including the ancient languages,
and to impart the natural sciences in depth. (This should offset any
impression that the quote above might be discounted as a mere isolated occurrence.) Furthermore, while Mill is at times only too happy to
39 R. Taylor, Good and Evil, 92.
t o J. S. Mill, Inaugural Address, 12. See also "Autobiography", in AOW, 98,
119, 130-131. On the value of studying logic and mathematics, see ibid., 13, 20;
and Inaugural Address, esp. 43, 46-49, 52-55, 57-58. For comments, see
J. M. Robson, The Improvement of Mankind, 169-171.
41 J. S. Mill, "Bentham", in AOW, 222-223; in EERS, 85-86; also, "Whewell
on Moral Philosophy", in EERS, 177-178.

32

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

quote Bentham's typical derision of certain ethical standpoints, 42
it is a deprecation which Mill accomplishes without making the
slightest hint that the supposed source of the alleged weakness of
contrasting ethical viewpoints is that they do not really contrast with
utilitarian principles, but only pretend to be logically independent
therefrom.
While reductionism certainly has its shortcomings, we conclude
that both Bentham and Mill pursue it so half-heartedly (or so inconstantly) that it may be ruled out as a means of characterizing Mill's
proof-strategy. There is sufficient evidence from Mill's writings to
conclude that he would not subscribe to such an approach, were it
offered to him.
3.

Principle

of the

Absolute

This idea derives from the mathematician E. W. Beth. The principle of
the absolute, or PAB for short, stands for a classic (but fallacious)
pattern of reasoning, which Beth found to be tacitly invoked at
various crucial stages of the history of philosophical speculation, and
with widespread applications in metaphysics, economics, physics, and
ethics. The PAB maintains that: (Ex) (Ey) Rxy -*• (Ea) (z)
((z J=a — (Rza DRaz))', where a is any constant, Rxy (unbound)
stands for any relation (two-termed predicate), and the arrow symbolizes entailment. 4 3
In words, the PAB amounts to the metaphysical thesis (or paralogism) that certain relationships are not transitive. An example would
be Aristotle's highest (or supreme) good, 4 4 which resurfaces in many
later writers, including Mill. 4S The concept of the summum bonum
can be mapped onto Beth's PAB by letting a equal it, while Rxy

42 J. Bentham, An Introduction
to the Principle of Morals and
Legislation,
17-1 8M 1.
43 E. W. Beth, "The Prehistory of Research into Foundations", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 3 (1952-1953), 66; The Foundations
of
Mathematics, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1965), 9. Beth's notation is
slightly revised here.
44 Nicomachean Ethics I, 2, 1094 a 23.
45 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 205.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

33

represents "x is desired for the sake of y". The conclusion which the
PAB then reaches is that there exist things which are desirable for
their own sakes, or at least one such item. The PAB is therefore used
to "justify" the concept of an end-in-itself, or more generally that of
intrinsic value. (Mill prefers the misleading expression "intrinsic usefulness".) 4 6
Is it then possible to contend that Mill might be resting his case on
the P A B ? Initially one would think not, since the P A B is presented
formally, and we have seen that Mill eschews logical proof. However,
the logical form of the PAB is there only for the sake of elegance and
perspicuity; its couching throughout various phases of philosophic
thought has been predominantly discursive. Nothing prevents Mill
from arguing, albeit without the assistance of logical apparatus, that
some relations, notably those involving the Good, are intransitive. But
did Mill in fact do so? No; on the contrary, Mill has puzzled many a
commentator by insisting that virtue, and not utility, is what is desirable for its own sake. 4 7
To be sure, Mill considers utility to be "the foundation of
virtue", 4 8 and also holds that "the object of virtue" is to bring about
"the multiplication of happiness", on a utilitarian reading of d u t y . 4 9
Strangely, he still insists on upholding the independent merits of
virtue, as against deriving it from or making it fully consonant with the
standard enjoined by utilitarian consideration. The oddity becomes all
the more striking when we encounter Mill maintaining that
" . . . pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as
ends" although he quickly amends this by adding that "desirable
things . . . are as numerous in the utilitarian as any other scheme".
This passage makes sense only if one takes Mill to be drawing a very fine
distinction between desirable things and things desirable as ends; for
he goes on to tell us that things may possess two kinds of desirability;
"inherent", or as "means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain". 5 0 Since only the latter have any direct relation to
46
"Autobiography", in AOW, 3 0 , 1 1 3 .
47
"Utilitarianism", in EERS, 235. Compare ibid., 2 1 3 , 2 1 4 , 2 1 8 , 2 5 7 « on the
"impartial" and "disinterested" qualities of any properly utilitarian assessment;
also ibid., 2 2 3 , 225. For discussion, see A. Ryan, John Stuart Mill, 2 1 0 .
"8
"Obituary of Bentham", Appendix B, in EERS, 491.
"9
"Utilitarianism", in EERS, 220.
so EERS, 2 1 0 , which is the source of all of the immediately preceding quotes.

34

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

the utilitarian norm, what Mill is granting here is that certain nonutilitarian things are desirable in themselves (but not as ends; at least,
not as utilitarian ends!)
This interpretation is supported by Mill's comment that "the ingredients of happiness are very various", although Mill immediately
undercuts his own precise distinction by suggesting that desirable
things may serve not only as means but as "part of the end", i.e.
happiness, or that which the principle of utility seeks the widest
possible dissemination of among mankind! 51 If this seems vexed, it
but reflects the abundant confusions in Mill's text, which for once
seem ineradicable. 52
Suffice it to remark that the PAB, while perhaps functioning behind the scenes in Mill's elevation of virtue to a place of theoretical
supremacy in ethics, is not used to argue on behalf of utility as an
ethical ultimate, for that very reason. This is a fortunate piece of
restraint on Mill's part, since, as Beth shows, the PAB turns out to be
logically invalid, 53 despite an appearance of formal correctness.
4. Indirect Proof
To be considered next is the method of challenge proposed by Hume,
who opined that " 'tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction
of the whole world to the scratching of my finger". Hume meant that
it is not the function of reason to decide these things; that this is the
heart's, and not the mind's, department. Reason concerns itself only
with relations of ideas or matters of fact, while ethics does not occupy
itself with matters involving knowledge at all. This is what Hume was
driving at, we feel. 54 So, while 'proof of an ethical doctrine is logically ruled out, so too is disproof; or as Bentham put it, proof is
"needless". There is no reason why we should not adopt whatever
si EERS, 235, which is the source of the last two quotes. For an excellent
explanation of the Greatest Happiness Principle, as stated ibid., 214-216, and
recapitulated ibid., 257-258, see A. Edel, Method in Ethical Theory, 353.
52 Another case in point would be Mill on the threefold relationship between
and among happiness, utility, and human desires ("Utilitarianism", in EERS,
234-235, 237), which we shall explore later. See below, p. 56.
53 For counter-examples see E. W. Beth, The Foundations of Mathematics, 11.
54 See D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1888), 416. For discussion, see R. Taylor, Good and Evil, 150.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY

35

ethical platform may suit our fancy. Mill however warned us that we
should not fall prey to the natural temptation to consider all candidates for the title of ethical first principles as being on the same level,
because then to favor or choose any one over all the others would
have to involve a sheerly "arbitrary" selection.
But suppose we follow out Hume here. Must we subsequently
sacrifice all moral principles? How can we evaluate moral systems?
There may still be three criteria: (1) internal consistency; 55 (2)
whether the ethic meets with our (e.g. temperamental) approval or
not; 5 5 (3) the collective interests of mankind, which serve to check
wayward or idiosyncratic formulations of precepts governing moral
action. 5 6 All of these would accord with a Humean outlook; but both
(1) and (3) render Hume's appeal to the supposed ineffectiveness of
reason as a moral arbitrator transparently false. For only reason can
deal with logical coherence. And "reasonable" is a just name for any
ethics that pays heed to the conflicts between individual and social
aims, while attempting to work out and resolve clashes which arise
whenever divergent goals are simultaneously and thus incompatibly
pursued by individual members of society. That reason is not always
up to this task, we freely grant. But no other aspect of human consciousness is capable of dealing with such problems, or even of grasping their very intricacy, in the first place.
These considerations vindicate Mill in his strenuous search for a
non-intuitional grounding of the principle of utility. They also serve
to dispose of the method of indirect proof, as employed by Hume.
Mill simply never adhered to such a technique, in spite of its interesting ramifications. But perhaps Hume's more famously definitive
rejection of proof in ethics might provide a hint as to Mill's actual
tactics. Let us examine that next.

55 See B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1945), 182, 773. See also W . D . H u d s o n , Modern Moral Philosophy
(NewYork: Doubleday, 1970), 129-131, on emotivism.
56 See R. Taylor, Good and Evil, 89, 92; J. Dewey, Theory of the Moral Life,
ed. A. Isenberg (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 95. "Collective
interest" is opposed to the development of crude theories of egoism, or
maximum self-aggrandizement. See "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 243, 257n.

36

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

5. 'Is'vs.

'Ought'

Is Mill deliberately attempting to cross Hume's line between 'is'-statements, or propositions of fact, and 'ought'-assertions, expressing
obligations?57 In short, is Mill defying the "ban" on deriving an
'ought' from an is'? 58 Or is it that Mill unwittingly stumbles upon the
ground of Hume's injunction, and in so doing commits a supposed
fallacy?
There are many issues to be untangled here. First, we postpone the
'is-ought' question itself to the ensuing chapter where we shall look at
it in the framework of the Searlian derivation. Second, Mill was
unacquainted with Hume's own version of the 'is-ought' distinction, for
a number of reasons, the most decisive of which is that Mill never read
Hume's Treatise.59 But Mill did read, and admire, Hume's first Inquiry , 6 0 as well as a number of Hume's lesser but (at that time)
better-known works.61 His general estimate of Hume was quite low,
however: Mill thought of him as a sophistical genius, clever without
being shallow, but devoid of honesty or any sense of philosophic
integrity and responsibility for the conclusions which he, Hume,
adopted. 62 Hume, unlike the succession of nineteenth century figures
57

D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 469-470.
58 For more recent clarifications of the 'is-ought' cleavage, see R.M. Hare, The
Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 29, 44; and Freedom and
Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 186. For discussion, refer to
W. D. Hudson,
Modern
Moral
Philosophy
(New
York:
Doubleday,
1970), 249-265, and for papers on Hume, to W. D. Hudson, ed., The Is-Ought
Question (London: Macmillan, 1969), 35-80.
59
After its original publication (1739-1740), Hume's Treatise was not reedited again until the centennial commemoration anticipated by the Green and
Grose edition (1874-1875) of Hume's works, which appeared one year after
Mill's death. Not only was Hume's philosophic reputation (as opposed to his
fame as an historian) at a low ebb throughout the century after his death, but
his works were not widely disseminated until Green's commentary helped to
revive and stimulate interest in them, during the period of the Idealist movement in Great Britain. So it is hardly surprising that Mill should not have been
familiar with Hume's Treatise although it had been republished and was available.

60 See remarks in "Theism", in EERS, 470. For Mill's comments on the value
of 'negative logic', see "Autobiography", in AOW, 14-15, and "On Liberty", in
AOW, 393.
61 See "Autobiography", in AOW, 6, 7, 44.
62 See the scathing attack on Hume in " B e n t h a m " , in AOW, 216-217; in
EERS, 80 and 80«.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

37

whom Mill had occasion to bludgeon for having "trespassed" 6 3 into
philosophy, had ability, but lacked discipline and character, according to Mill.
Against such a background, it is astonishing to find that Mill
"repeats" in his own way the 'is-ought' distinction. It is fair to say that
Mill arrived at this independently of Hume, although Mill cannot be
credited here with any originality. 64
The passages in which Mill elaborates an 'is-ought' split of one or
another kind are as follows:
(i) Referring to the systematic ambiguity inherent in the term
'nature' and its cognates, Mill distinguishes several meanings, including
one " . . . in which Nature does not stand for what is, but for what
ought to be; or for the rule or standard of what ought to b e " . 6 5
Because the term 'nature' is used so unthinkingly by many, or without
an appreciation of qualitative differences, which are simply ridden
over, Mill deems it necessary to protest against the derivation of unwarranted conclusions concerning the standard of human action. By
harnessing the 'is-ought' separation, Mill goes on to argue that "conformity to nature, has no connection whatever with right and
wrong". 6 6
(ii) In his Logic, Mill states emphatically that:
propositions of science assert a matter of fact: an existence, a coexistence, a succession, or a resemblance. The propositions . . . (of the
"art of life") do not assert that anything is, but enjoin or recommend
that something should be. They are a class by themselves. A proposition
of which the predicate is expressed by the words ought or should be, is
generically different from one which is expressed by is or will be. It is
true that, in the largest sense of the words, even these propositions
assert something as a matter of fact. The fact affirmed in them is, that the
conduct recommended excites
the feeling of approbation (in the

63 See "Autobiography", in AOW, 120, where this observation is made of
Sedgwick.
64
On the Continent, Ritschl and his disciples and followers were busy inventing the 'fact-value' distinction, as a new consequence of Kant's dichotomy between noumena and phenomena, at about this time. See below, p. 70.
65
"Nature", in EERS, 377. This passage has been heretofore neglected in the
vast Mill-literature, even though it is easily accessible.
66 EERS, 400.

38

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

speaker). This, however, does not go to the bottom of the matter,
f o r . . . (this) is no sufficient reason why other people should
approve. 67
This passage is self-explanatory. In it we find Mill dividing propositions into two classes, normative and scientific, and insisting that
there is a "generic difference" between the two. This is in effect to
note that to "derive" an 'ought' from an 'is' involves an unjustifiable
inference.
(iii) In an early essay, Mill attacks a writer for confusing
. . . two distinct, though nearly connected, questions; the standard or
test of moral obligation, and the origin of our moral sentiments. It is

one question what rule we ought to obey, and why; another question
how our feelings of approbation and disapprobation actually originate.
The former is the fundamental question of practical morals; the latter
is a problem in mental philosophy. 68

(iv) In Utilitarianism, Mill picks up each of these themes. With regard
to the concept of justice, he asserts that " . . . there is no necessary
connection between the question of its origin, and that of its binding
force". 6 9 On the question of asceticism, especially that with an
ulterior or selfish motive in view, Mill has harsher words in store:
ascetics " . . . may be an inspiriting proof of what men can do, but

67 J. S. Mill, On the Logicof the Moral Sciences, 144-145. (A System of Logic,
Book VI, Chapter xii, paragraph 6.) All italics in original [see R. H. Popkin, "A
Note on the 'Proof of Utility in J. S. Mill", Ethics, vol. 61 (1950-1951),
66-68], Mill reaffirms the 'is-ought' distinction shortly thereafter, as part of a
deliberate contrast between the offices of natural science and social psychology,
respectively (On the Logic of the Moral Sciences, 146; A System of Logic, VI,
xii, 6).
68 J. S. Mill, "Blakey's History of Moral 'Science", in EERS, 26. Italics in
original.
69 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 240. Mill continues: "That a feeling is bestowed
upon us by Nature does not necessarily legitimate all its promptings" (ibidem).
But see ibid.; 230, on the naturalness of moral feelings. [For discussion, see
J. M. Robson, The Improvement of Mankind, 133«43, 149]. For Mill's additional usage of "binding force" (or "binding efficacy") of a norm, see ibid., 227,
229, 233, 251.

HOW TO PROVK THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

assuredly not an example of what they should",70
tions are self-regarding. 71

39

i.e. if their inten-

(v) Mill also reminds the reader of the force of moral inertia by
pointing out that " . . . we may will from habit what we no longer
desire for itself, or desire only because we will it". 7 2 Habits, reinforced
by long associations, make us "persevere", as Mill says, long after
the course of action we follow has "ceased to be pleasurable". 7 3 This
tendency is in itself neither good or bad, but takes its moral valence
from the activity itself, or the end toward which it is directed. So it is
important that we discern for ourselves some proper guidelines for
action, even if only as a retroactive validation of patterns of behavior
already made stable and fixed by previous training. It is also clear from
Mill's policy on 'is-ought' that he regards human beings as capable of
discarding the principles on which they may have previously acted.
Consequently, men have the ability to revise their conceptions of
righteous conduct and incorporate them in their lives. This means that
Mill cannot afford to take very seriously Bentham's psychologicalcwm-ethical hedonism, in the end.
(vi) Mill distinguishes between laws which ought to exist and those
which do exist, pointing out that the two classes are not identical, nor
do their respective members coincide completely. 7 4

70 EERS, 217. Italics in original.
71 "The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of
sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only refuses to
admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which does not increase, or
tent1 to increase, the sum total of happiness, it considers as wasted". ("Utilitariar n", in EERS, 218). See above, page 30.
72 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 238. But compare "Whewell on Moral Philosophy", in EERS, 184«: " . . . the good of others becomes our pleasure because
we have learned to find pleasure in it".
73 On the Logic of the Moral Sciences, 16-17. (A System of Logic, Book VI,
Chapter xii, paragraph 4.) For discussion, see G. W. Spence, "The Psychology
Behind J. S. Mill's 'Proof ", Philosophy, 43 (1968), 25.
74 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 245. Another overlooked passage in the critical
literature on Mill.

40

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

(vii) Mill draws a distinction between a "rule of action" and its
"motive", 75 which enables him to respond to those critics of utilitarianism who assail it for its very "exacting" standard of high-minded,
disinterested behavior. 76 It is not easy to see the 'is-ought' at work
here without detailed explanation. What Mill is getting at is that people
do not need to follow consciously the doctrine of utility ('ought') in
order to promote it ('is') in the course of going about their ordinary
affairs. Mill concludes that attaining the utilitarian standard is not
superhuman, unrealistic, or a back-breaking goal. Conformity to
antecedently established regulations will perceptibly further its
achievement, while action based upon deliberate acceptance of the
utilitarian position is unnecessary in no fewer than 99 percent of the
cases, Mill confidently avers. This is one reason why Mill brands as absurd the antiutilitarian complaint that most situations leave too little
time to perform "calculations" of the probable effects of doing A, as
opposed to B.77 Calculation is usually not needed; trust your "instincts", i.e. the accumulated wisdom garnered from past experience,
and you will be doing all right, even from a utilitarian point of view,
nearly all of the time.
These ideas would be noteworthy, even in the absence of a tacit
appeal to the is-ought gap. For one thing, Mill is again minimizing the
differences between contrasting ethical standpoints, 7 8 but this time,
at the expense of his own (utilitarian) ethics! For another, Mill is
convinced that the "raw materials" of morality — human agents — are
the most significant moral factors, while moral philosophers occupy a
decidedly subsidiary role. People can be moral without philosophy;
but philosophy depends on people. 7 9 Moral philosophers do little or
75 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 219.
76 For a pessimistic account of human motivation, see Mill, "Utility of Religion", in EERS, 4 1 0 . For an appreciative response to Mill's dilemma, see
H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 87.
77 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 224-225, 229. See A. Ryan, John Stuart Mill,
220-221, for comment. And, for discussion of Mill's ridicule of the "Nautical
Almanack" approach to morality, see V. J. McGill, The Idea of Happiness
(Washington, D.C.: Frederick Praeger, 1967), 125; H. J. McCloskey, John Stuart
Mill: A Critical Study, 76-77, and J. J. C. Smart, " E x t r e m e and Restricted
Utilitarianism", Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1956), 346, 349, 350 (repr. in M. D.
Bayles, ed., Contemporary Utilitarianism, 103, 108, 109).
78
79

See "Utilitarianism", in EERS, esp. 207, 230, 249.
This point is entirely overlooked by many writers, such as Bernard

HOW TO PROVli THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

41

nothing "with" or " f o r " them, unless their moral proclivities have
already been developed to some degree - and by then, the most
demanding moral philosopher may find little or nothing in their proceedings to correct. 80
This is an odd thing for Mill to hold, not only considering his
lifelong preoccupation with social reform, but also his stress on
becoming aware of the animating impulses and springs of action, in
order either to justify or else replace them. That the philosopher (as
opposed to the parent or preacher) steps into the picture at a comparatively late date, whether historically or in the span of an individual's own "moral career", is incontestable. But the claim that the
philosopher need not, as it happens, exert much pressure for change,
or improvement, is debatable. In Chapter III of Utilitarianism Mill
extols the virtue of "conscience", 81 comprising the agent's selfpolicing moral habits, which are strong but slow to take root. But Mill
feels as though the activity of philosophy, as the articulator of moral
obligation, the spokesman for conscience, and the guide to right conduct, 8 2 were downright superfluous! 'People will do all right for
themselves, if you leave them alone' seems to be his m o t t o . 8 3
The concealed allusion to the 'is-ought' distinction only makes
matters worse, however. In the " p r o o f ' itself Mill is often accused of
committing the "fallacy of composition", by arguing from the alleged
goodness of individual desires to the overall good of everyone, as if
pleasure or happiness could simply be combined additively, and then
Williams, in Morality: An Introduction
to Ethics (New York: Harper & Row,
1972), esp. 93,100-101, 104-107, who are mistakenly convinced that in order to
act in conformity with utilitarian precepts, one must be a utilitarian or at any
rate think like one. This is a very common error. Of course, Mill's position is
perplexing, since (if correct) it does away with the distinctiveness of, hence the
need for, a codification of utilitarian (as opposed to e.g. Christian) morality.
This Williams does notice (ibid., 91, 102).
80 The strongest support for this view (and the 'self-undermining' interpretation of Mill's conception of the role of philosophy) is afforded by Mill's
insightful remarks on immorality,
for which see "Utilitarianism", in EERS,
esp. 225, 229.
81 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, esp. 225, 229-231, 246. For discussion, see
A . R y a n , John Stuart Mill, 113; J. M. Robson, The Improvement
of Mankind, 149.
82 See "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 259; also, "Nature", in EERS, 379.
83 And yet, Mill recognizes a need to train people to desire virtue: see
"Utilitarianism", in EERS, 239. For further oscillations, see below, page 47.

42

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY

s u m m e d . 8 4 O n e recent writer

85

has e v e n c o u n t e d u p as m a n y as three

possible (and d i s t i n c t ) fallacies s u p p o s e d l y occurring in the p r o o f !

86

Mill might have called u p o n his favorite a n a l o g y , that o f c h e m i c a l
c o m b i n a t i o n ( c f . Moore's principle o f 'organic unities'), and n o t i c e d
that w h e n separate "units" are b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r , t h e y

"transform"

o n e a n o t h e r , s o that the result is n o t a l w a y s t h e same in either q u a l i t y
or q u a n t i t y as the original, u n u n i t e d c o m p o n e n t s ( t h e m i x t u r e o f
equal parts o f a l c o h o l and w a t e r is a ready paradigm). B u t s o m e h o w ,
Mill felt that the "ingredients" o f s o c i e t y , n a m e l y individuals, underw e n t n o such change in being " m i x e d " t o g e t h e r as a tribe, c o m m u n i t y , state or n a t i o n , or else he s h o u l d have spared h i m s e l f a c o s t l y
m i s t a k e . What m i s t a k e ? T o find o u t , w e s h o u l d q u o t e Mill:
. . . n o s y s t e m o f ethics requires that the sole m o t i v e of all w e d o shall
be a feeling o f d u t y ; o n t h e contrary, n i n e t y - n i n e h u n d r e d t h s of all
84 For discussion, see the following: C. Wellman, "A Reinterpretation of
Mill's Proof", Ethics, 69 (1958-1959), 273-274; A. W. Levi, "A Study in the
Social Philosophy of John Stuart Mill" (Chicago: University of Chicago
Libraries, 1940), 34-35; C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, reissue
(Paterson, N. J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1959), 184; F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies,
2nd ed., new int. R. Wollheim (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 113-114nl; «3;
J. P. Day, "On Proving Utilitarianism", repr. in J. B. Schneewind, ed., Mill. A
Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 204-206;
D. P. Dryer, "Mill's Utilitarianism", in EERS, lxxxii-lxxxiii; E. W. Hall, "The
'Proof of Utility in Bentham and Mill", in J. B. Schneewind, ed., Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays, 146, 162; P. Haezrahi, " T h e Desired and the Desirable",
Analysis,
vol. 10 (1949-1950), 40-48; D. Mitchell, "Mill's Theory of Value",
Theoria 36 (1970), 112-113; G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 2nd ed. (Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 104-105; J. Seth, " T h e Alleged
Fallacies in Mill's 'Utilitarianism' ", Philosophical Review 17 (1908), 471, who
quotes Dewey as attributing to Mill the corresponding "fallacy of division";
W. H. Long, "The Legend of Mill's 'Proofs' ", Southern Journal of Philosophy 5
(1967), 36, 40; and S. K. Wertz, "Composition and Mill's Utilitarian Principle",
The Personalist 52 (1971), 417-431. (Wertz, applying the ' p r o o f to Mill's theory
of society, concludes that it makes 'general welfare' a precondition for 'personal
welfare*. This is compatible with, although not deducible from, cither of the
readings of the ' p r o o f presented below, pages 57ff, 60ff.).
85 See H. J. McCloskey, John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study, 61-64, esp 62.
The fallacies "enumerated" are those of composition, equivocation and irrelevant proof, respectively.
86 The 'false (or imperfect) analogy' critique of Mill's proof is held by
numerous critics, including, among recent authors, V. J. McGill in The Idea of
Happiness, 129.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

43

our actions are done from other motives, and rightly so done, if the
rule of duty (i.e. utility) does not condemn them. 87
Message: if you do not tamper or interfere with private actions done
for purely private benefit, then public benefit will (indirectly) be
served. No wonder that Mill does not consider utility to be "exacting"
too much from us! But the error here is parallel to one made by the
classical laissez-faire economists. It rests on the conveniently sanguine
assumption that conflicts between individual and general "will" do
not (as a matter of contingent fact) arise, leaving the "atoms" of
society free to pursue enlightened self-interest: enlightened only
because they realize that in helping themselves, they are somehow also
helping others. 88 Even if this assumption were borne out in practice,
the theory for that very reason would be left all the more unprotected
from hypothetical exceptions. But this Mill fails to perceive; or
perhaps he considers it a mere technicality; as a result, he simply slurs
over it. This area of vulnerability aggravates Mill's failure to see that
his arguments in effect make utilitarianism (if not ethics in general)
well-nigh dispensable: a most curious argument for a philosopher
committed to a ratiocinative ideal to be making about his own discipline!
Whatever the consequences brought on by Mill's appropriation of
the 'is-ought' distinction, a violation of that distinction is not one of
them. 8 9 Hume, it may be noted, fashioned an 'is-ought' division just
once, and in such a manner as to leave his intentions open to vast
speculation. Whereas, Mill iterates the 'is-ought' at least half a dozen
times, and leaves little room for doubt or unclarity in interpretation.
Inasmuch as Mill devotes an entire book of his Logic to the stock topic
87 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 219; compare ibid., 246, re duty. [In all of the
passages quoted in this section (5.), italics are in the original; the parenthetical
remarks are supplied.] Mill repeats this idea stating that "the great majority of
good actions are intended, not for the benefit of the world, but for that of
individuals, of which the good of the world is made up" {ibid., in EERS, 220).
See our remarks above (page 41) on the fallacy of composition, and (page 43)
on the economic theory which underlies Mill's smug complacency.
88 For this idea, see esp. "Whewell on Mo.ral Philosophy", in EERS, 184 and
184«; "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 218, 259.
89 For further discussion of some of the passages treated above in (iii) - (vii),
see M. Mandelbaum, "Two Moot Issues in Mill's Utilitarianism", in J. B. Schneewind, ed„ Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays 226-227, «39 and «40.

44

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

of fallacies, including (a) false analogies, 90 (b) the place of metaphors
in reasoning, 91 (c) ambiguous terms and other confusions, 9 2 it stands
to reason that Mill is a thinker of pronounced sensitivity on the subject of "fallacies" in general. This susceptibility shows through even in
the way in which Mill composed his books; his manner of writing them
is a testimony to painstaking carefulness. 9 3 However, there is no
guarantee against fallibility, as the author of On Liberty realized only
too well. Or should have.
6.

Inconsequentialism

Before coming to the " p r o o f ' itself, we should dispose of another
strange but intriguing argument, one a bit like that of Hume
(4. above). We shall call this the argument from inconsequentialism.
The inconsequentialist argument takes as its foundation Mill's
admission that 95 percent of mankind are forced to do without
happiness, 9 4 and even seem to get along or be contented without
it. 9 5 If so, then proving the principle of utility, as the coping stone of
an ethical theory, is so moot, so academic, that one would have to be a
boor or a pedant to object! This is reminiscent of Aristotle's attempt
to dismiss the problem of the external world by remarking that to
prove the existence of "nature" Would be a waste of time, since
everybody knows that it exists, unless "blind" or unable to t h i n k . 9 6
Proving the principle of utility is then a trivial matter, since the goal it
sets up (happiness, whose content can be variously defined) is both
agreeable and ««available to nearly all. No one would object to the
pursuit of happiness, since it actively concerns hardly anyone!

90 A System of Logic, Book V, Chapter v, paragraph 7. Mill divides false analogies into two categories: those which claim a non-existent resemblance, and
those which exaggerate it, thereby "overrating its probative force" even though
the resemblance drawn may, in respect of some limited number of similar
properties, be just.
91 A System of Logic, V, v, 7.
92 A System of Logic, V, vii, 1. These passages are rarely if ever mentioned,
let alone discussed, in the vast secondary literature on Mill.
93 See "Autobiography", inAOW, 74, 114, 132-133, 147-150, 158.
94 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 217. See also ibid., 214.
95 EERS, 215. For comment, see McGill, The Idea of Happiness, 127.
96 Physics, II, 1, 193 a 2-7.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

45

This strategy, far from rescuing Mill's proof, would only consign it
to oblivion. What Mill could say by way of rebuttal is that: (a) his
ethical works are addressed, for the time being at least, to the remaining 5 percent of mankind who happen to be favorably disposed
with regard to "external good fortune", that necessary preliminary to
the happy life; 9 7 (b) it is not the claim of utilitarians that their morality is followed universally, but only, that the world would be a better
place to live in if such precepts were more widely heeded than they
are. 9 8 This is a reaffirmation of the is-ought distinction, in its "real vs.
ideal" variation. On behalf of Mill, then, it could be said that the
proof occupies a position of considerable importance.
We have dealt with aspects of Mill's ethical theory in order to
provide necessary backdrop; we have scoured possible proof-strategies,
some of which Mill dabbles with, others which we eliminated altogether. Now to turn to the full statement of Mill's proof, and accompanying reconstruction:
The

"Proof"

The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that
people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that
people hear it; and so of the other sources of our experience. In like
manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that
anything is desirable is that people actually do desire it. If the end
which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory
and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever
convince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the
general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he
believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however,
being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of,
but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good, that
each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general
happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness
has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct and, consequently, one of the criteria of morality. 99

97 Cf. Nicomachean Ethics, 1099 a 31 - 1099^9.
98 See B. Russell, "John Stuart Mill", reprinted in J. B. Schneewind, ed., Mill:
A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 21.
99 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 234. Italics in original.

46

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY
COMMENTARY

We see here Mill attempting an "empirical" rather than a logical proof,
a proof based on the "sources of our experience". 1 0 0 Nonetheless the
proof has certain logical features, which shall be elucidated. That Mill
intends to carry out an appeal to factual observation is borne out by a
later remark in the same chapter (IV) of Utilitarianism, to the effect
that what humans desire, is a question to be decided "upon evidence". 101 There is nothing initially startling about this, except that
Mill, in finally claiming that what humans desire is pleasure, does not
try to ascertain this by "fact and experience" so much as by manipulation and dialectic. This is because of Mill's philosophical equation
between pleasure and happiness, 102 about which more will be said
later.
Our procedure here shall be four-fold: (i) interpretation; (ii) clarification of (i); (iii) defense of (i), and consequently of Mill, against
various lines of criticism; (iv) new criticisms of our own, coupled with
formalization of (i).
Interpretation
On the whole, Mill is saying that desire is a necessary, although not a
sufficient, condition for desirability. In referring to 'desire' Mill means
only the presence or existence of desire, but this is to jump ahead of
the story. 103 Later, we shall clarify this interpretation of the proof
by exhibiting its logical structure. The point made by Mill's proof
resembles, e.g. Aristotle's dictum that "thought by itself moves
100 p o r a clear-cut occurrence of the term ' p r o o f having exactly this
meaning, see "On Liberty", in AOW, 426, where the context surrounds the
controversial notion of "self-regarding" duties i.e. to oneself. For clarification on
that topic, see "Autobiography", in AOW, 113.
101

"Utilitarianism", in EERS,

237.

102 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 237. See below, pp. 55-57.
103 See N. Kretzmann, "Desire as Proof of Desirability". Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1958), 255; defended against Moore's strictures, ibid., 257. More recently,
see D. Mitchell, "Mill's Theory of Value", 103-105. For critique, see J. Margolis, "Mill's Utilitarianism Again", Australasian
Journal of Philosophy
45
(1967), 179, repr. in Values and Conduct (New York: Oxford University Press,
1971), 153.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

47

nothing", 1 0 4 or Locke's statement that " . . . if we never desired
something we should never do anything". 1 0 5 For Mill, in short,
'ought (sometimes) implies do, in actual fact'. This recalls Hall and the
related tenet of "psychological realism", 1 0 6 although a number of
other writers reaffirm the same point in their own w a y . 1 0 7
The question here is not primarily one of judgment as to what is
desirable, but concerns its subsequent wholesale pursuit. 1 0 8 As Aristotle might say, one's life-goal is primarily to be or become good,
and not merely to know the good, or apprehend it intellectually, even
though the latter activity is perhaps an indispensable, logical prerequisite for being good. Mill concurs most emphatically.
So our initial task is to shed some light on this vexed pair, desire
and desirability. This brings us to the sphere of clarification proper.
Clarification
What does 'desirable' mean? Here are two principal significations:
(a) Worthy to be desired; to be wished for; often standing for the
qualities which cause a thing to be desired; pleasant, delectable,
choice, excellent, goodly.
(b) Characterized by or full of desire. 1 0 9
Mill is often charged with illegitimate use of the term 'desirable',
employing it as though it meant 'capable of being desired' rather than
lot
Nicomachean Ethics VI, 2, 1139 a 36.
105 Quoted in H. A. Prichard, Moral Obligation, 194.
106 E. W. Hall, "The 'Proof' of Utility in Bentham and Mill", in J. B. Schneewind,ed., Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays, esp. 161. See above, p. 28; below,
p. 52.
107
J. Narveson,Morality and Utility (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967),
284; H.W.Johnstone, Jr., Philosophy and Argument (University Park, Pa.:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1959), 78; M. G. Singer, Generalization in
Ethics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 266; V. C. Punzo, Reflective Naturalism (New York: Macmillan, 1969), 83; R. J. Fogelin, Evidence and Meaning
(New York: Humanities Press, 1967), 179-180; A. R. Louch, Explanation and
Human Action (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966), 67; A. I. Melden, Free Action
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), 19, 52; and R. Taylor, Good and
Evil, 136.
108
See B. Lang and G. Stahl, "Mill's 'Howlers' and the Logic of Naturalism",
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (1968-1969), 563-564.
109 Condensed and arranged from the OED.

48

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY

'normatively desirable'. 110 To lodge this objection, however, is to
legislate the meaning of the term, or to express an opinion as to what
its philosophical currency should be. The normative sense of 'desirable' is covered by the first sentence, perhaps even the first clause
only, of (a): "worthy (or fit) to be desired; to be wished for". The
second part of (a) stands apart; so does (b). So now there are at least
three major significations of 'desirable'.
We shall see momentarily that there is yet another possible meaning to be added to the list. But the first question which confronts us
is: did Mill use the word 'desirable' in an unsupportable sense? When
this question is asked, it is usually begged, by restricting the permissible range of 'desirable' to the first clause of (a). There are many
occasions when Mill employs the term in just this sense; and listing a
sampling of these serves to dispel the facile notion that Mill's English
was hopelessly confused. As examples take Mill's
(1) explanation as to why it is "desirable" that he should set
down his memoirs; 111
(2) description of actions taken on behalf of candidates for political office whom he thought it "desirable" for the populace to
elect; 1 1 2
(3) recognition of the vain hope of ever being able to make a
complete and accurate estimate of the consequences of following any
given line of conduct, as yet being a "desirable" thing to attempt to
enumerate exhaustively; 113
(4) reasons offered as to why it is "desirable" to promote a
scientific approach to the problems of morals; 1 1 4
(5) discussion of the "desirable" ends aimed at by the framers of

no
See G . E . M o o r e , Principia Ethica,Th\
also 123. For discussion, see
D. P. Dryer, "Mill's Utilitarianism", in EERS, lxxiv; and F„ Sosa, "Mill's
Utilitarianism", in J. M. Smith and E. Sosa, eds., Mill's Utilitarianism: Text and
Criticism (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1969), 155-157.
Hi
"Autobiography", in AOW, 3.
H2
AOW, 184.
113
"Whewell on Moral Philosophy", in EERS, 180. For further clarification
of the consequentialist position, see "Sedgwick's Discourse", in EERS, 69; for
commentary, see H. J. McCloskey, John Stuart Mill: A Critical Study, 47, 75;
and M. Stocker, "Consequentialism and its Complexities", American
Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1969), 276-289.
lit

On the Logic of the Moral Sciences, 6;A System of Logic, VI, i, 1.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

49

moral rules, the craftsmen of the Art of Life, who in addition possess
the ability to formulate an hierarchical order of "desirable" things,
and who, when they are not specifically dealing with the most general
principles governing conduct, are permitted to take "desirableness" of
certain agreed-upon goals for granted. 1 1 5
The weight of evidence makes it improbable that Mill should
simply have erred in one instance, while using the word 'desirable'
"correctly" or in a manner more pleasing to fastidious tastes, at nearly
all other times. However, we already noticed certain muddles in Mill's
employment of 'desirability' in relation to the question of ends and
means. 1 1 6 So it remains possible, perhaps even plausible, to contend
that in the " p r o o f ' Mill is not (necessarily) using 'desirable' in a
strictly normative sense. 1 1 7
However, it is false to persist in arguing that just because Mill's use
of 'desirable' in the context of the proof may not have been parallel
to that of clause one of definition (a), above, that it therefore was
improper. Mill is not inventing for himself a new meaning which will
enable him to smuggle into the proof some extra, otherwise concealed
premises. The apparent flexibility in Mill's usage happens to be real;
but it is sanctioned by the elasticity inherent in the word itself. Moreover, the kind of usage to which Mill appealed was so common or
"ordinary" that, as in the case of the term ' p r o o f , Mill did not feel
called upon to produce any special elaboration as to his own meaning.
In retrospect, this was regrettable, since it gave rise to numerous
115
On the Logic of the Moral Sciences, 144-146; A System
of
Logic, VI, xii, 6. See also ibid., 142, on the framing of rules and comparison of
ends as 'desirable'. (A System of Logic, VI, xii, 4.)
116 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 210. But on "the ultimate end" of ethics (the
principle of utility, or its equivalent), Mill is unequivocal in his employment of
"desirable" (ibid., in EERS, 214). The same holds good for Mill's treatment of
virtue, as both "desired and desirable", and as "desirable" both for its own sake,
and on account of its consequences (ibid., in EERS, 235).
i"
But Mill does use 'desirable' in an unquestionably normative sense, in at
least the following three places: "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 111 ("the more
desirable pleasure", and foregoing remarks, ibidem, on kinds of pleasure);
ibid., 246, where "desirable" action is contrasted with what is right, and what
ought to be done with that which is merely "laudable"; "Coleridge", in
EERS, 160 (in AOW, 305), where Mill asks whether or not it is "desirable" to
derive theology from philosophy. Also see "On Liberty", in AOW, 371, 372,
396, 407, 409, 414, 424, 449, 456. Cf. "Theism", in EERS, 445, 446.

50

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY

serious misunderstandings. The immediate assignment, then, is to
develop sharper as well as more sensitive instruments for contextual
explications of passages in such classic philosophic writings. And so, to
unearth Mill's own meaning in the course of the proof, let us consider
the following sentence:
Cleopatra was a desirable woman.

(S)

No one will disagree with the contention that (5) is true. Yet if (S) is
true, then (5) can hardly be a normative statement. As a normative
statement (S) would be false; 1 1 8 consult Shakespeare, or a Roman
historian. Cleopatra was not desirable at all in the normative sense,
not only because of certain personal deficiencies, but because Mark
Antony's love affair with her proved to be the ruination of both, and
did not do very much for Roman civilization. Yet if (S) is true, then
in what sense is it true? In precisely the 'outlawed' sense according to
which 'desirable' means 'capable of being desired': just ask Mark
Antony, who was "full of desire" (sense (b)) for Cleopatra, as
well! The second clause of (a), "the qualities which cause a thing to
be desired", is likewise an acceptable rendering; it might also happen
to be true that Cleopatra was "full of desire". And this leads to an
important distinction. In the foregoing account, in claiming that (S)
would be false on a normative interpretation of 'desirable', we have
performed an evaluation. Some people may disagree with it. But that
likewise pertains to 'desirable' in the sense recognized by the second
clause of (a). Not everyone might find Cleopatra desirable: for, some
people would not desire her! Cleopatra is 'capable of being desired' by
some, but not by others. If someone told us that Cleopatra was not
his type of woman, he would be justified in inferring that she was, so
far as he was concerned, not desirable, or even undesirable.
This too is inescapably an evaluation, but one of a different kind
than the more 'strictly' moral one. It is what one writer calls an
"appreciative judgment"; 1 1 9 whereas, to say, along with (b), that
Cleopatra was full of desire, is to make a psychobiographical statement, one theoretically capable of verification. This in companion
lis
We are assuming here that normative statements can be or are "cognitive"
in content, which is just what a "naturalist" such as Mill would do, too.
us
J. Margolis, Values and Conduct, 21ft., 127. These are person-relative values.

HOW TO PROVK THI: PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

51

terms is a "finding". 120 Only sense (b) of 'desirable' is free from the
evaluative labelling that characterizes any assessment made under
either clause of (a). This classification effectively avoids prevarication.
This explains why 'desirable' is used to cover more ground than
just what is 'fit to be desired', and why any such narrowing down of
its meaning is bound to be artificial (and probably less helpful) than
becoming reconciled to the systematic ambiguity of 'desirable'. Besides, the ordinary perlocutionary effect of calling something desirable
is that both the speaker and the utterer will (try to) pursue it. To be
desirable must therefore in part signify that any further exhortations
would usually be superfluous. This shows that the logical separation
between the concepts of desire and desirability, respectively, is the
product of a strange sort of dialectical artifice.
The upshot of this abbreviated semantic investigation registers
thusly: Mill is using, as Moore thought, 'desirable' to mean 'capable of
being desired'. But this does not automatically vitiate Mill's result, or
make it "unphilosophical" in character, or consign it to low status.
Mill is again very careful to remind his readers, in the opening two
paragraphs of Chapter IV, of the limitations on the kind of proof
possible; 121 and in the proof itself this comes out in the cryptic
remark "all the proof which the case admits o f ' or "which it is
possible to require"; or which may be salvaged.
Before getting into the logical basis of the proof, we must consider
the suggestion made by Sidgwick, 122 and picked up by two later
authors, 1 2 3 with respect to a possible "third [or fourth] sense" of
'desirable', one midway between 'ought to be desired' and 'capable of
being desired'. For Sidgwick, the 'good' is equated with whatever is
preferred, 1 2 4 i.e. with
120
J. Margolis, Values and Conduct, 21ff, 127. These are empirical prepositions.
121 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 234. For negative comment, see R. Taylor,
Good and Evil, 89.
122
H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 111, who is the source of the
quotation below, on page 52. See also D. Mitchell, "Mill's Theory of
Value", 106. For Sidgwick's own attempt to prove the principle of utility, see
The Methods of Ethics, 418-422.
123 c. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, 174-175; M. Mandelbaum,
"Two Moot Issues in Mill's Utilitarianism", in J. B. Schneewind, ed.,
Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays, 231«47.
124 h . Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 127. Preference and preferability
serve to explain Sidgwick's wider-than-the-normative sense of 'desirable'.

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HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

what would be desired, with strength proportioned to the degree of
desirability, if it were judged attainable by voluntary action, supposing the desirer to possess a perfect forecast, emotional as well as
intellectual, of the state of attainment or fruition.
As Broad considers Sidgwick to be making a "very important point",
and as Sidgwick is among the legions who have debunked Mill's
proof, 1 2 5 let us examine this conception carefully. What is Sidgwick
trying to accomplish? At least this much: he would sufficiently dilute
the norm of 'what ought to be desired', until it harmonizes with, or
is in some kind of proportion to, the amount of human effort required
to reach any goal. Sidgwick is in effect trying to satisfy Hall's criterion
of "psychological realism". The third sense of 'desirable' is meant to
steer between the dual extremes of "high ideals" and "base instincts",
respectively. Its designs are unwaveringly practical.
In postulating this third sense of 'desirable', Sidgwick cogently
anticipates the three-fold structure of the human personality as
expounded by Freud. Here 'capable of being desired' (or of arousing
desire) corresponds to the role played by the id, 'ought to be
desired' parallels the function exercised by the super-ego; and
Sidgwick's third sense of 'desirable', which adjusts itself to the conflicts and tensions between these two, delineates well the job performed by the ego (or 'reality principle') in Freud's psychoanalytical
theory. This "positively ideal meaning" of desirable, as Broad calls it,
is a mediator, whose task it is to determine what, as Sidgwick puts it,
is "attainable by voluntary action". However, unlike Freud's three
psychic principles, each of which is defined independently, Sidgwick's
"third sense" of 'desirable' is derivative from the first two, or is conceptually dependent upon them. Another fruitful comparison might
be one between Sidgwick's third sense and the "compromise" involved in making choices or decisions, and then, traditionally, calling
the object or outcome of choice 'good'. 1 2 6 This would likewise correspond to the psychology of "rationalization", in modern terms.
Analogies aside, when Sidgwick speaks of "strength proportioned
125 H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 387-389. For criticism of Sidgwick,
see P. Zinkernagel, "Revaluations of J. S. Mill's Ethical Proof', Theoria 18
(1952), 70-77.
126
See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III, 2, 1112 a 18; III, 3, 1112 b 16,
a
1113 5; III, 4, 1113 a 15, and 1113 b l, the last of which, compare with x, 2,
passim.

HOW TO PROVF THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY

53

to the degree of desirability", which sense of desirability does he envision? It cannot be his own (third) sense, or else the definition would
be circular; but Sidgwick leaves us entirely hanging as to which of the
other two senses it might be. This is another indication that the "positively ideal meaning" of 'desirable' is too weak, in the absence of
further elucidation, to stand on its own. In its efforts to be realistic
and reasonable, it only succeeds in begging or postponing the major
question.
Still another hint of the weakness of Sidgwick's problematic
attempt to arbitrate between 'ought' and 'can', is that Moore's openquestion argument 1 2 7 can sensibly be applied an indefinite number
of times to the judgments yielded by this ethically interesting analogue of the Freudian ego or reality-principle. A Moorean will always
be able to intelligently retaliate that what is desirable on any other
semantic interpretation is not normatively desirable, and that is that.
(Unless, contingently, something desirable in another fashion is also
desirable on normative grounds.) In that case, Sidgwick's new meaning
turns out to be useless. Instead of steering between two extremes, it
makes us unable to disregard the imperative claims to which the deontologist clings. 128
Finally, Sidgwick himself realizes that no one does or can "possess
a perfect forecast" of the consequences of his action, making his a
most unrealistic definition. Often we must "make d o " with much less
than comprehensive information, in trying to adjudicate between
alternative courses of action. Hence Sidgwick's "ideal" definition is so
ideal as to be, for all practical purposes, simply inapplicable. This is
not a trifling objection; it lies at the heart of many a guarded critique

127
G . E . M o o r e , Principia Ethica, 15-17. For its application to Mill, see
J. M. Robson, The Improvement of Mankind, 15 8« 111.
128
Sidgwick would vigorously disagree with this estimate; like Freud, he
would consider the imperatives of desire to exact a much stronger dominion,
not merely psychologically but also intellectually. He writes: " . . . we too easily
think that we ought to do what wc very much wish to do". And this trenchant
observation: "Whatever we desire we are apt to pronounce desirable" ( T h e
Methods of Ethics, 209, 339, respectively).
Sidgwick is rightly alert to the tendency to collapse a norm into the perlocutionary effects wrought by calling something a norm; and the predilection
for making something into a norm, merely because it happens to stimulate
desires. See above, pp. 27-30, 51.

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HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

of utilitarianism as a standard of conduct, and so there is no reason
why it should not be brought to bear against Sidgwick, t o o . 1 2 9
Therefore, we may regard Sidgwick's derivative sense of 'desirable'
as having no ultimate impact on Mill's proof. But the overriding issue
is not just Mill's proof, but the proof of utility in general, and how it
may be improved. This is why Sidgwick's proposition is worthy of
scrutiny, although not adoption.
From Sidgwick, we turn now to an additional vital criticism raised
by Moore, which has heretofore gone unnoticed.
Criticisms
"Pleasure", writes Moore, "is not what I desire, it is not what I want;
it is something which I already have, before I can want anything." 1 3 0
What Moore claims is that it is preposterous to say that one desires
pleasure; such a way of looking at things embodies a category
mistake. What we may desire are pleasurable experiences, events,
objects, 1 3 1 or states-of-affairs; but not pleasure by itself. As a logical
analysis, this seems impeccable; but phenomenologically, consider
Nietzsche's vigilant counter-testimony, to the effect that "in the end
one loves one's desire, and no longer the thing desired", 1 3 2 or the
popular song which describes "falling in love with love". The essence
of man may well be desire; 1 3 3 but since desire takes an object, and is
not usually reflexive, the object it takes will be distinct from itself.
This is both grammatically and empirically correct, and helps to shore
up Moore's objection. The criticism made by Moore is meant to
strike down not only the proof, but also a good deal of the utilitarian
program. Sidgwick even anticipates Moore's challenge, by discovering

129
See "Whewell on Moral Philosophy", in EERS, 180, for Mill's low estimation of this objection. Mill asks rhetorically: " . . . because we cannot foresee
everything, is there no such thing as foresight? "
130 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 71. For agreement, see McGill, The Idea of
Happiness, 168 and L. Freed, "A New Review of Principia Ethica", Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1956), 322.
131 See "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 212 (and ibid, 211-212, on t h e ' u n desirable').
132 Beyond Good and Evil, §175. For 'desire', Nietzsche uses Begierde.
133 Plato, Symposium 205D; Spinoza, Ethica, Part III, "The Affects", Def. I,
and Part IV, Prop. XVIII.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

55

the "paradox" of hedonism, 134 according to which happiness and
pleasure are never secured directly, or by aiming at them, but only by
engaging in other activities which bring about happiness and pleasure
as by-products or fillips.
Mill is hardly unaware of this paradox. For he accepts this view
whole-heartedly! "Those only are happy", Mill declares, "who have
their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness . . . ask yourself whether you are happy, and you cease to be
s o " . 1 3 5 The secret to happiness is, not to allow the carefully inculcated "habit of analysis" on intellectual questions to "wear away the
feelings". 1 3 6 Nothing erodes joy more than self-consciousness;
nothing disturbs emotional well-being more than sudden lack of
spontaneity. Mill's Hegelianesque observations 137 suffice to mollify
Moore's and Sidgwick's antagonism, insofar as Mill actually reinforces
their position.
There is no real area of disagreement here. But a second, related
criticism of Mill is that he allegedly tries to "sneak" the proof across
by (erroneously) claiming that happiness (or pleasure) is the only
thing that men do desire. (This is perhaps the origin of Nietzsche's
cruel jibe that mankind does not desire happiness — only the English
do that.) Were this allegation true, Mill would be guilty of a reductive
approach, similar to the Benthamite tactic examined earlier, in
sect. 2. He would have committed a fallacy which the open-question
argument is designed to exploit: that of holding that because men
allegedly desire something, therefore we may straightaway conclude
that they should do so. Moore asks rhetorically, "are not bad desires
also possible?" 138 Mill's " p r o o f ' is the target for demolition there.

134 The Methods of Ethics, 136; discussed by Broad, Five Types of Ethical
Theory, 192. This "paradox" is not meant to be logically damaging to hedonism, nor is it in fact a fatal blow.
135 "Autobiography", in AOW, 85-86.
136 AOW, p. 83. Compare "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 230, on the "dissolving
force of analysis".
137 "I will add that in this condition of the world, paradoxical as the assertion may be, the conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attainable." ("Utilitarianism", in
EERS, 217).
138 Principia Ethica, 67. Italics in original. Compare Plato on "bad pleasures",
at Republic, VI, 505C. For comments, see D. Mitchell, "Mill's Theory of

56

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

Yes, bad desires are possible. But we have already noted that Mill
allows for the existence of " . . . desirable things . . . as numerous in
the utilitarian as in any other scheme". 1 3 9 While "all action is for the
sake of some end", 1 4 0 Mill is prepared to acknowledge the diversity
of ends entertained by men. He lists "love of money, or power, or
fame" 141
as commonplace desires; insists on the prizeworthy
character of virtue, quite apart from personal or other gain which may
accrue to the doer of virtuous deeds; 1 4 2 and expresses skeptical
doubts as to the possibility of showing happiness to be the "sole
criterion" of morality (see especially the last sentence of the "proof'),
for which purpose it would be
. . . necessary to show, not only that people desire happiness, but that
they never desire anything else. Now it is palpable that they do desire
things which, in common language, are decidedly distinguished from
happiness. 1 4 3
There is only one passage in Utilitarianism which can be cited
against Mill, and indeed it does display a wealth of tricky dialectic,
much more so than the proof! 144 Mill starts out by affirming that
Value", 101-102, and L. M. Loring, "Moore's Criticism of Mill", Ratio 9
(1967), 86-87.
139 "Utilitarianism" in EERS, 210. Also: "Utilitarians are quite aware that
there are other desirable possessions and qualities besides virtue, and are
perfectly willing to allow to all of them their full w o r t h " (ibid., 221). Note the
occurrence of the term 'desirable' both in this passage and in the one footnoted
immediately above, in the text. Compare pp. 33-34, above.
140 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 206. For remarks, see H. A. Prichard, Moral
Obligation, 42, 112.
141 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 237. In "Sedgwick's Discourse", in EERS, 62,
Mill also lists "feelings of ambition", power over others, and a number of others,
besides.
142 EERS, 235. For discussion, see M. Mandelbaum, "On Interpreting Mill's
Utilitarianism", Journal of the History of Philosophy 6 (1968), 35, 42-46.
143 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 234-235. (Mill gives the desire to be virtuous
as his illustration; see also ibid., 239). This helps to dispose of the "happy slave"
type of objection, for which see, e.g., A. Maclntyre, A Short History of Ethics
(New York: MacMillan, 1966) 237-238, who invokes the 'is-ought' distinction
and incorporates it in his attack, only to discard it moments later (Maclntyre,
240) in favor of an onslaught on the alleged vagueness of pleasure (or happiness)
as a moral criterion!
144 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, esp. 236.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

57

" . . . there is in reality nothing desired except happiness", 1 4 5 but
quickly amends this to read: " . . . human nature is so constituted as to
desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or means of happiness", which appears initially as an empirical hypothesis, its status
that of a "psychologically true opinion". Mill then repeats his modest
argument that "we can have no other proof, and we require no other,
that these are the only things desirable". 146 By inserting in his formula
the clause "a means of happiness", Mill leaves open the door to other
'goods' besides happiness itself, while holding in reserve the privilege
of a dialectical reconstruction of what it is that human beings "really"
want. In no case is there an abuse of language, although the "facts"
are strained to serve Mill's own purpose. But there is another aspect to
this argument concerning desire in relation to happiness that will best
be understood only after formalization of Mill's " p r o o f ' ; accordingly
we now approach that topic directly, in hopes of making several contributions toward an understanding of the " p r o o f ' .
Formalization and Final Criticisms
As we have observed, Mill finds formal logical proof of ethical
standards repugnant; and we are in fundamental agreement with his
aversion. However, it is worthwhile to state formally the content of
the proof. This is philosophically appropriate, and does not at all
violate the spirit in which Mill's own endeavor is promulgated. 1 4 7 An
initial version of the proof, couched in formal terms, reads as follows:
(jc) 0 0 Dxy

[ • (Ez) Az & (z

- (z) (Ex) Dxz)]

where Dxy (unbound) stands for 'x desires^', Az (unbound) stands
for 'z is desirable', and the arrow denotes logical entailment, while the
square operator represents logical necessity.
Notice that there are no restrictions placed on the subject or object

145

EERS, p. 237.

146
"Utilitarianism", in EERS, 2 3 7 , is the source of all three of the preceding
quotations. Note 'desirable' occurring at the tag end of the third.
147 See "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 257/1, 258n, for Mill's o w n general attitude
toward ("scientific") "deductive proof". Also see "Sedgwick's Discourse", in
EERS, 62, for further corresponding remarks on 'disproof.

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HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY

of desire; the proof does not discuss or require them, in order to "go
through". While desire is treated here as (minimally) a two-termed
relation, desirability is regarded as a property. And by 'desirability' we
now do mean "in the normative sense", since otherwise the proposition expressed becomes trivial: for if anyone desires anything, it
follows that there is something which is capable of being desired, or
has qualities which would excite desire, and so on.
In transferring to the normative meaning of 'desirable', it might be
thought that we have left Mill behind. The proof as formulated above
is definitely stronger than Mill's ipsissima verba, but it is supported by
what Mill says elsewhere, as we shall see when we come to offer our
own criticisms, below. Moreover, if the present revised version of the
proof is justified, then, as a logical consequence thereof, Mill's own
version is likewise validated.
In words, the formalized proof says that: for all x and y, if x
desires y, this entails that (1) there necessarily exists a z such that z is
desirable and (2) if z is distinct from y , then this in turn entails that it
is not the case that for all z there exists an x such that x desires z.
In less stilted language, the proof amounts to the following: if
there are desires, then there must be something desirable. Or to put it
another way: if anything is desired, then something must be desirable.
The qualifications with which this proof is packed, avoid most (if not
all) of the pitfalls into which Mill is frequently accused of stumbling.
For example, some scholars maintain that Mill simply equates what is
desired with what is desirable. 1 4 8 To do so would indeed be fallacious, as Moore insists. 1 4 9 But Mill can be exonerated from the old
charge of postulating the desired as (extensionally or intensionally)
equivalent to the desirable. 1S0 For, the proof as just stated makes it
clear that ( l ) t h e desirable is distinct from the desired and (2) it is
false that there must ever be someone who desires what is desirable.
The second denial affects, by logical implication, items of contingent
status: in other words, the desirable is possibly what is desired in
148 See A. Stroll, "Mill's Fallacy", Dialogue, vol. Ill (1964-1965), 385-389,
400-404, esp. 404. Stroll's mistake is to infer that Mill is fastening exclusively
on particular desires, instead of upon desire as such, or generally speaking.
149 Principia Ethica, 73,123.
iso E . W . H a l l ,
"The 'Proof of Utility in Bentham and Mill", in
J. B. Schneewind,ed., Mill: A Collection of-Critical Essays 150, 154. For further
discussion see our "Hall and Mill's P r o o f ' , Southwestern Journal of Philosophy
2 (1971), 113-118.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

59

specific instances, but is not necessarily so; similarly, it may be that
someone desires the desirable, but it does not have to be so. Possibly,
yes; necessarily, no. The categories are kept separate.
What is necessarily so, is that the very existence of desires means
that there is something which is desirable. This is, as we interpret
the proof, a logical " m u s t " , and moreover the only one which
is present. This explains our preliminary diagnosis of Mill (pp. 46-47
above): namely, desires furnish, by their sheer natural existence, a
necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for the desirability of a
given item.
This is a minimal statement of the proof. Although it is stronger
than Mill's own formulation, which incidentally drops no hint of entailment or modality of any kind, an even stronger version can be
devised, which will j u m p far ahead of Mill. For an explanation of this,
we must return now to the substantive question Mill raises (and
answers) in Chapter IV of Utilitarianism-. "What is it that all men
uniformly desire? Pleasure." 151 But Mill artfully transforms "pleasure"
into either happiness itself, or else a means toward the promotion of
happiness, as we previously elaborated. So happiness alone is what is
universally desired; and quite apart from subordinate desires for other
things. These subsidiary desires vary f r o m person t o person, but their
idiosyncratic nature is overcome by examining the one end which is
held in common by all men, although often quite diversely
pursued.152
Happiness, then, is a special case falling under the general heading
of desire. And it is but a tautology to equate happiness with the
desirable (normatively, as well as in any other sense); happiness is
desirable by definition, and to argue against this is to betray gross
ignorance (e.g. of semantics). This is the point Mill is making, in a
tortured way, near the conclusion of Chapter IV. 1 5 3 It enables us to
isi
For critique, see R. Taylor, Good and Evil, 89, 154; D. Mitchell, "Mill's
Theory of Value", 107-108. On the (false) identification of pleasure with the
good, see Plato, Republic, VI, 505C; G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 125, 59;
M. Warnock, Ethics Since 1900, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press,
1966), 19.
152 Compare the remarks made by Aristotle, Nicomachean
Ethics I, 4,
1095 a 16-21, and I, 7, 1097 b 23-24.
153 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 237, 238. For comment, see D. Mitchell,
"Mill's Theory of Value", 111. For Mill's equation of 'happiness' with 'desirable'

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HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY

reinvoke the proof, as follows: in the special case where happiness is
what is desired, the statement is shortened, letting the constant a
stand for happiness, to:
•

(Ez) Az & (z= a & (jc) (z) Dxz)

Notice that this formulation still permits a range of values (desirable
objects) to z, each one of which will be identified with, or at least lead
to, happiness. This is Mill's form of multiplicity-within-unity; or
moral pluralism within a monistic, eudaimonistic 154 framework.
This is a maximal statement of the proof, according to which the
desired is extensionally equivalent to the desirable — but only in the
special case where 'the desired' is considered predicator for 'happiness'.
The original equation (page 57) might then read:
(x) O ) Dxy
[• (Ez) Az&(zfy
-»• (z) (x) Dxz)]
We may now see why so many of Mill's opponents have been
misled into thinking that Mill altogether collapses 'the desirable' into
'what is desired'. This impression comes about as a result of Mill's
focus on the paramount ethical topic of (human) happiness and wellbeing, under the guise of the principle of utility, i.e. the greatest
happiness principle. The maximal version of the proof, which is not
cautiously formed, is simply false. Mill knew this as well as his philosophical enemies; but he chose not to emphasize the importance of
failing to hedge disproof properly. Why? We cannot say with assurance
what Mill's reasons may have been; perhaps he thought the subject
of happiness would be of such prime concern as to obliterate any
rival dimensions. Under whose intense light might the proof be
scrutinized if not by someone sharing Mill's eudaimonistic outlook?
Those who subject Mill to criticism ordinarily extract and isolate
the " p r o o f ' from its utilitarian context, and so consider it on its

see "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 257-258n. Mill regards this as purely a linguistic
matter, not as a conceptual issue or philosophical problem to be handled.
Consequently, it is easy for him to procure universal verbal agreement, for what
that may be worth, on the universality of the desire for happiness.
154 For comments, see Margolis, "Mill's Utilitarianism Again", Values and
Conduct, 158, and McGill, The Idea of Happiness, 121,142.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

61

"independent" merits. Hence the maximal version becomes plainly
unacceptable; yet Mill's own version would be closer to that (see
page 60), only shorn of its modal operator. Whereas, the minimal
version we presented first (see page 57), which states a necessary but
//(sufficient condition for desirability (in contrast to the maximal
version, which, left unqualified, simply goes factually overboard), is
eminently defensible quite independently of Mill, and so may henceforth be looked upon as that version of the proof which he permanently (albeit most awkwardly) bequeathed to philosophy; not least
because it is free from the specific commitments of Mill's own ethical
theory or detachable therefrom.
One remaining question is whether or not, having been rescued
from oblivion, the minimal proof is sound. The answer, on a strictly
logical basis, is no; but the counter-examples required to unseat the
proof are most revealing in their own right. The aspirations of many
an ethical theory are bound up with the fate of the minimal proof, as
we shall see shortly.
The proof fails to "go through" under two possible conditions. The
first is the circumstance in which nobody happens to desire anything. If
there are no desires, then what is the point of setting something up as
normatively desirable? And, if no desires exist, then nothing can be
desired, either; for this would involve a 'degenerate' relational predicate, or one for which there is no instantiation available. While the
objects of desire might still possess certain desire-arousing qualities,
they would be dormant properties. One might compare this to Aristotle's "pure potency", or to the existential-metaphysical concept of
Nothingness — if such allusions to the "unthinkable" are spurs to
one's imagination.
On 'strict' logical grounds, the minimal proof actually "succeeds"
in a desireless-state, since the pioof is couched in the form of a
necessary conditional whose antecedent (in this particular substitution
instance) would'tum out to be false. This illustrates one minor shortcoming of putting the proof in formal terms: namely, the unresolved
dilemma of counterfactual conditionals. 155 No one would even bother
1

ss
In this (hypothetical) case, one of the paradoxes of material implication
appears, but only because the set of desires (whether only the human, or ranging
over "sentient beings" in general, as Mill occasionally prefers) happens to be
empty, to form a null class. But then Mill's proof would never be formulated, since
the question as to what is desirable (in any sense of the term) would simply

62

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

to formulate the proof, if earnestly convinced that no such thing as was
being postulated existed. But this is a pragmatic consideration, not a
logical one. The logically possible world of no desires at all makes out
an exceedingly damaging prospect for ethics, since it rules out desirability (in the normative sense) in one stroke. 156 Fortunately, it is
unreal. As long as there are people, there will be desires; for people just
do harbor desires, indeed a multitude of them. 1 5 7 This is why Mill
ties his proof, at every step along the way, to the level of fact, observation, experience, and evidence. It is also why Mill claims that the
sheer existence of desires entails (or implies) something about what is
desirable: namely, that it exists, even if it never happens to coincide
with the object of any desire. 1 S 8
This brings us to the second, ultimately more damaging, refutation: suppose that (a) what is correctly judged desirable (one or more
items, but at least one) did not exist; or, (b) all (human) desires were
for things that are not desirable (that is, for things other than what is
desirable, including both the undesirable and the non-desirable). Both
(a) and (b) may be the case simultaneously, as well.
Since the consequent of the minimal proof is a conjunction, by
falsifying any one of its conjuncts one already falsities the entire,
putatively necessary conditional. Now, (b) alone cannot really accomplish this, since the minimal proof already provides for the case in
which the desirable is in fact not desired. What (b) postulates is an
indefinite temporal extension of a dismal and frustrating situation,
in which (presumably) the desirable exists and is there for the asking,
but somehow is never located or fastened upon. The effect of (b) is
never arise. But this is a "pragmatic" or "extra-logical" factor, as we remark
below on p. 62.
156 On the assumption that desire is a necessary condition for desirability,
which is, after all, what the " p r o o f ' in any version seeks to establish.
157 The " p r o o f " would not work, i.e. would fail to institute a norm, in a
possible world governed exclusively by the ideal of, e.g. ascetic withdrawal, or
Stoic apatheia. The question is: is such a world a desiderate (on moral, psychological or even religious grounds), or is it but a "second-best", . . . a defeated form
of response to the frustration of a multitude of significant, unsatisfied desires
previously harbored in this world?
158 Whereas, happiness is the one thing that is both universally desired and
normatively desirable. This enables Mill to advance to his clinching step, which
completes the attempted demonstration for the advanced or 'special case', i.e.
the maximal proof. Both versions of the " p r o o f ' maintain flatly that desires (by

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY

63

not to destroy the proof, but to make meliorism impossible, and so
dash all hopes for moral "progress".
The real blow is dealt by (a), and by (a) alone. What if it should
happen that nothing this-worldly is desirable? This is a direct challenge, not only to the minimal proof, but also to Mill's chief contention, that the presence of desire insures, or makes indubitable, the existence of something desirable (not necessarily ever corresponding to
what is in fact desired, by errant mankind). If (a) holds, then the
" p r o o f ' is invalidated.
Stated in modern terms, what if no "moral values" exist? Then
any human desires must be directed to the "wrong" thing; for there is
no "right" object for them to be directed toward. Just as Mill, in
claiming that desires for what is unpleasant could not occur, 1 S 9 was
unable to foresee the insights of later psychology into "deviance", so
here it is inconceivable to him that moral "values" might be "dead",
or that e.g. "nihilism" could be taken seriously. In neither case does
this come about merely because Mill is an intellectual victim of his
own historical era; these possibilities Mill also systematically rules out,
by means of the premises and underlying assumptions generated in
his ethics, which reflectively preclude a plunge into moral "nihilism".
To cite one relevant example: Mill would support what is today
called "negative utilitarianism", 1 6 0 which seeks as its principal goal
the prevention of suffering and misery, rather than concentration
upon the increase or promotion of happiness. Mill's remarks on this
subject are instructive for present purposes. Initially he explains that
. . . Utility . . . holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend
to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness. . . . By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of
pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. 161
So far, Mill upholds both negative and what might be termed "positive" utilitarianism: both the furtherance of the highest good, and the
definition) are not devoid of normative significance, or morally 'neutral' (in the
generic sense). This residue is valid, whatever.the fate of the " p r o o f " .
159 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 237-238.
160 For the origin of this term, see R. N. Smart, "Negative Utilitarianism",
Mind 67 (1958), 542-543. The original idea is credited to Sir Karl Popper.
161 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 210. In "Sedgwick's Discourse", in EERS, 59,
Mill writes: "As soon as a child has the idea of voluntarily producing pain or
pleasure to any one person, he has an accurate notion of utility."

64

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

prevention of what Urmson has dubbed summum malum.
restates as much when he specifies the good life by way of

162

Mill

. . . the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all
other things are desirable . . . an existence exempt as far as possible
from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments . . . 163
Here again, positive and negative utility thrive together, even complement one another. But Mill soon becomes compelled to take a glance
at the circumstances in which men's existence is unfortunately not as
"rich . . . in enjoyments" as either they or Mill would like. Often
happiness is to be simply forsworn, either out of necessity (see
remarks above, on inconsequentialism, under Sect. 6.), or as a matter
of deliberate policy — here enters the ethics of duty, or renunciation.
Mill now argues, consistently with both his utilitarianism and his disapproval of asceticism, that
. . . if no happiness is to be had at all by human beings, the attainment
of it cannot be the end of morality, or of any rational conduct. 164
A similar remark could be made concerning that strange state of affairs
in which men, as it happened, would not desire anything, not because
their desires had already been fulfilled or satisfied, but out of permanent torpor, so to speak. Mill pleads on behalf of the utilitarian
cause, by pointing out that utilitarian theory is prepared for the
worst; for inertia or renunciation of life,
. . . since utility includes not solely the pursuit of happiness, but the
prevention or mitigation of unhappiness; and if the former aim be
chimerical, there will be all the greater scope and more imperative
need for the latter, so long at least as mankind think fit to live, and do
not take refuge in the simultaneous act of suicide . . . 165
"...so long...as mankind think to live". That is the touchstone. As an
optimist, Mill believes there is something to live for, even if it has
162 J. O. Urmson, "Saints and Heroes", in A. I. Melden, ed., Essays in Moral
Philosophy (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958), 209.
163 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 214. Note the occurrence of 'desirable'.
164 "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 214. Cf. above, pages 30, 38, 39n 71, 55n, 137.
165 EERS, 214. This should not be confused with stoicism; Mill does take the
pains to distinguish and differentiate his own stand from that of the Stoics, at
various turns. See, e.g. "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 218, 221.

HOW TO PROVE THE PRINCIPLE O F UTILITY

65

yet to be discovered (or created). 166 And that is why, short of a
totally desperate situation, he is willing to defend the goals outlined in
his "proof'. This is also additional textual support for all versions
of the "proof'.
Aside from the suggestions posed by "nihilism" and by the "death"
of all moral values in contemporary thought, the (minimal) "proof'
does indeed work. Where and how it may break down is a testimony
to its own philosophic character, and the lengths to which one must
go in order to try to defeat the proof, splitting open its deepest
presuppositions in the process. 167 That is why, although the "proof'
is by no means an unqualified success, and does not in the end stand
up to all of the most rigorous tests, it does repay close, detailed
reappraisal. Mill's "proof', in spite of exasperating evasiveness, does
come remarkably close. For the "proof' limns precisely those most
fundamental and pervasive clashes of outlook as well as temperament
in ethics, showing therein the sources of the divisions between different
types of moral mentality. These irreconcilable antagonisms go beyond
the coping powers of logic, reason or the tools of discursive philosophy. They can only be adumbrated.
166 it should be borne in mind that Mill himself was an agnostic, so this
statement is not intended to prejudice opinion in favor of the alleged need for,
e.g. a "religious" understanding of life's meaning or significance.
167 St. Thomas' ethics is remarkably similar to Mill's, in at least one highly
instructive respect: for St. Thomas, " . . . even if we grant the existence of a
natural desire for a complete and all-satisfying good, it does not necessarily
follow that the desire is capable of fulfillment. B u t . . . Aquinas presupposes. . .
that human nature has been created by a personal God who would not have
created it with an unavoidable impulse towards a non-existent good, or a good
incapable of being attained". (F. C. Copleston, Aquinas [Baltimore: Penguin
Books, 1955], 202.) Inasmuch as Mill's resolution of the Problem of Evil (see
Three Essays on Religion, esp. Theism) involves placing a severe limit on God's
power, therein denying His omnipotence, it is clear that here Mill and St.
Thomas would part theological company. This raises the interesting issue as to
whether Mill, as a self-styled agnostic humanist, can ultimately defend his entrenched moral optimism; more generally, whether meliorism, once divested of
divine guarantees, can justify its continued presence. Incidentally, Mill would
not hold, as Aquinas does, " . . . that we would desire nothing at all, were there
not an ultimate or supreme good for Man" (Copleston, ibidem), b u t it is striking
to find possible counter-examples to the " p r o o f ' recurring elsewhere. The continuity in outlook is no doubt partly due to the remolded Aristotelian naturalism
which Aquinas inherits and adopts. It is also reminiscent of the PAB (above, pp.
32-34).

IV
THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

I

The most exciting recent development in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy has been the growth of 'philosophy of language', and
with it the rise of "speech acts", whose application to moral controversies is largely the work of Searle. 1 Searle's own interest in the
'is-ought' fork is not significantly concerned with either historical
illumination or textual criticism, whereas our own involvement with
both is more intimate. This preoccupation (esp. in Ch. Ill) has
been both methodological and philosophical, and marks one extensive difference between our own approach and that of Searle.
Nevertheless, from his own perspective, Searle's viewpoint is amply
justified; for this reason, Searle does not hesitate when confronted by
questions such as: what did e.g. Hume accomplish in formulating the
'is-ought' distinction? 2 Did he intend adherence to a new canon of
logic? Do his own procedures in ethics belie strict fidelity to the 'isought' principle? Since Hare and others have restated the 'is-ought'
distinction and made it independent from Hume, Searle finds it quite
unnecessary to delve into such problems of exegetical scholarship.
On Searle's own terms, this exclusion is understandable; for the
'is-ought' distinction is so pervasive in contemporary thought that a
battery of nearly synonymous appellations has by now made its way into common parlance: Factual vs. Normative, Descriptive vs. Evaluative,
1

J. R. Searle, "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'
Philosophical Review 73
(1964), 43-58; and Speech Act
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1969) Ch. 8, 175-198. For critique, see esp. R. M. Hare, "Descriptivism",
Proceedings of the British Academy 49 (1963), 115-134; and "The Promising
Game", Revue Internationale de Philosophic 18 (1964), 398-412.
2 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 43«2; Speech Acts 1 7 5 n l , 1 7 6 n l .

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

67

Fact-Value "gap", all suggest themselves. Another source (besides
Hume) for the philosophical institutionalization of large-scale versions
of the 'is-ought' "barrier" is undoubtedly Moore, and in particular the
"open-question argument", together with the "naturalistic fallacy", as
Moore presented them. 3 We shall return to the open-question argument later, and point out its bearing on Searle's attempted derivation,
and what the strengths and weaknesses of invoking it against Searle
are. (Like Searle, we shall confine ourselves to critical points, and not
discuss here the meaning and status of these ideas as they occur in
Moore's own writings.)
Two logical priorities: First, the precise meaning and import of the
'is-ought' distinction itself. Second, the tasks and the self-imposed
restrictions of the "engaged" moral philosopher. Both command
initial discussion; both will be incorporated into the substantive treatment of Searle, as well as in our final reflections.
II

The 'is-ought' "law" amounts to the following: ( l ) i t is fallacious to
infer that something ought to be the case4 from the claim that it is
the case; (2) the converse inference likewise does not go through.
Thus a radical separation between these two categories is effected. At
first sight this looks so simple that one must wonder: (i) how anybody
could ever be accused of transgressing against it; (ii) how one could
take umbrage at the 'is-ought' cleavage in the first place. But let us
unpack the formulation above, examining (2) first.
The reason why (2) is considered fallacious is that the logical conditional formed by 'if x ought to be, then x is' may have a true
antecedent but a false consequent, thereby falsifying the whole
implication. For there are many things or states-of-affairs which
ought to be, yet are not: peace in the world, a cure for cancer, a
chicken in every pot. These desirables do not exist, at least not yet, or
not constantly. The deontic categories simply give no logical assurance as to the (contingent) and uninterrupted reality of the objects or
conditions which they so designate.
3

G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 15-17.

4 In Hare's version, descriptive premises cannot logically yield a normative
conclusion; or, wherever there is a normative conclusion, there must be at least
one normative premise. We shall rely on our own formulations, however.

68

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

One might try to argue that 'ought to be' is sometimes equivalent
to 'should be', and then contend that since 'should be' means 'probably will be' (as in "it should rain today"), the 'ought-is' chasm has
been bridged. But this is nothing more than illicit capitalization on the
ambiguity of 'ought to be'. For it is clear that 'ought' does not ever
mean 'what shall most likely occur', but expresses e.g. the worthiness
of some object or event to be, or have the opportunity to be, realized.
Hare (among others) has stressed the close connection between ethical
statements and imperatives. If we say that 'Mr. X ought to be the next
president' this is legitimately construed as equivalent to "Let Mr. X be
the next president". It likewise does register a wish on the part of the
speaker, or the person who subscribes to the idea that Mr. X should
become the next president: namely, 'would that Mr. X were the next
president'. So 'ought' statements can (sometimes) be translated into
expressions of desire or preference. This precludes confusion, in that
it shows that there is no logically necessary connection between what
somebody wants and what (alas) may happen to be the case. Wanting
Mr. X to be president will not suffice to boost him into office. It may
well influence or motivate future conduct, however; but "wishing
alone won't make it so".
Another reinterpretation of the 'ought-is' putative fallacy would
elaborately retool the 'is-' component. This might take one of two
forms: (a) making a distinction between potency and act; (b) collapsing the 'ideal' into the 'real', and so closing the gulf between them.
According to (a), what ought to be the case, while it does not
automatically tell us what actually exists, does tell us what the real
possibilities are. So "ought implies can be". This heralds a Leibnizian
theology or metaphysics, whose temporalized consequences are plainly unacceptable. For example, we cannot know whether there is a
potential cure for a specific disease until such time as a cure is actually
produced. Retrospectively endowed with perfect hindsight, the thesis
becomes trivial. Similarly, we cannot know whether it is possible for
any man to run a 3-minute mile, unless it is ever done. The actual
entails the possible, but the non-actual tells little or nothing about
what we should like to know, concerning the future.
It is customary to distinguish between and among three senses of
the term 'possible' and its cognates: the logical, natural (the known
laws of nature, as in physics), and technological, respectively.
Which of these is meant, when the 'is-' part is subject to redefi-

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

69

nition? If merely the logical, then anything short of contradiction 'is'!
Now, for ought to imply is where 'is' refers to sheer logical possibility,
is unobjectionable, inasmuch as it is virtually devoid of content. We do
not need 'ought' to discover what is logically possible, anyway. But no
other candidate for the transition from 'ought' to 'is' can carry
itself through with any plausibility. If someone actually ran a
3-minute mile, then and only then would we know that the laws of
nature, i.e. human biological nature, do make such a feat possible. But
not beforehand. Likewise, if a cure for a certain disease is ever found,
it will then be correct to state that a cure is technologically possible.
But no sooner.
It is impossible (in principle) to make intelligible predictions of the
possible, in advance. Of course, as e.g. milers do get closer and closer
to breaking the 3-minute barrier, as medical scientists progress in their
work, intelligently optimistic prognostications will no doubt be
formulated. But by that time, the achievement or solution is either
well in hand, or must already be "in the works". There still will be
objective doubt and lingering uncertainty until the goal is actually
reached, however.
According to (b), the is ought distinction never even arises, because
the only use of 'is' considered germane is that of 'ideal reality'. 'Man is
a rational animal' does not mean that he is so most of the time, nor
that most men do develop and fulfill their rational capacities. 'Man is
rational' means that man is rational only at his "highest", "best", and
most "distinctive". So the 'is-ought' distinction allegedly topples: one
might justly speak instead of an 'ought-ought'. Here, whatever ought to
be, is; for within the system in which the 'ideal' is promulgated, the
'is' is treated honorifically, or else not at all.
There is something to this position. An art critic says (e.g.) Rembrandt's paintings are "representative" of seventeenth century art in
Holland. They are not, if one considers the dozens of forgotten Dutch
painters who were living at the same time; but the standards set by
experts and competent judges in this field are different. The superior,
not the "average" is taken as the yardstick of typicality. This procedure, and the policy linguistically expressed by it, are justified aesthetically, if not historically. One does not regret that Rembrandt's paintings hang in the art galleries, or usurp displays of the canvasses of
many less gifted artists.
The best (or most prominent) men, events and things also serve as

70

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

a proper guide in other areas, e.g. in the discipline of history, with
its loosely formulated principles of narrative-selection. Now, the sense
of 'is' which (b) asks us to observe is of this kind. But this merely
agrees with the proponent of a rigid 'is-ought' distinction, by redefining
'is'; in effect converting it into an 'ought', as if the 'is' had been a
concealed norm, all along. Therefore, refining the meaning of 'is' in no
way disposes of the 'is-ought' problem, although the technique is both
subtle and sensitive. Equating the real with the ideal tacitly admits the
validity of the distinction, in that this revised formulation casts the is
as a disguised ought. Theoretically, one category drops out altogether.
Searle himself might object to both (a) and (b) on the grounds of
their being "metaphysical" or depending upon metaphysical outlooks. 5 The charge is accurate, but it is ineffective, inasmuch as the
'is-ought' is itself the belated product of a "metaphysical" stance, or one
with such presuppositions (e.g. Kant's noumena-phenomena split, one
ancestor of the fact-value gap). Hence it was necessary to examine all
aspects of (2) in pertinent detail. The passage from 'ought' to 'is' is
not fallacious on all construals. As a general injunction (2) has merit,
for its honest exceptions are either uninteresting or else harmless.
Now let us pass on to (1). Pre critically, the 'is-ought' ban looks
highly plausible. One usually wants to deny (for example) that "might
makes right", while admitting that might (unfortunately) does dictate conditions, as frequently we experience them. "Whatever is, is
right" is likewise obnoxious, unless it is sheer comedy. The "openquestion argument" of Moore, is meant to forestall certifying such
dangerous doctrines, to prevent them from becoming intellectually
respectable. The once-controversial precepts of Social Darwinism,
with its facile equation of "higher" (meaning "more evolved") with
"better", furnish an illustration of the kind of conclusion which the
'is-ought' fork effectively blocks. Moral: one is not permitted to "read
o f f ' ethical conclusions from factual data; the facts may well be
unalterable, but only a metaphysical and historical optimist, a Leibniz
5

Speech Acts 197. "Whatever ought to be, is" is most characteristically
Fichtean, although Searle does not have Fichte in mind. On 'ought' (or 'should')
and 'must', see Mill, "Utilitarianism", in EERS, 251. On Fichte, see J. Dewey,
The Quest for Certainty, 2nd ed. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960), 62.
On the perils of going from 'ought' to 'is', and on the reverse transference
between e.g. 'is' and 'must', see R. J. Fogelin, Evidence and Meaning, 170-171,
176-177. Also see Kant, KdrV A319/B375; A633/B661; A547-548/B575-576.

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

71

or a Hegel, would glibly maintain that the "whole" or the general
state of affairs which the "facts" describe, is all to the good. There
would seem to be something drastically wrong — logically speaking about entertaining any such ideas.
Notice that the 'is-ought' ban is meant to halt the inference that x
ought to be, from the assertion that x (already) is. The logical validity
of passing from 'is' to 'ought' is assailed. If one were to urge, e.g. that
all legal regulations currently in force should remain in effect (and be
vigorously prosecuted) merely because they exist, or independently of
their respective merit, one would be committing a logical mistake. 6
For surely there are everywhere bad as well as obsolete laws, laws
which are now in force but which should be amended, modified,
repealed or just plain ignored, by the authorities. The Greeks (especially Aristotle) alleged, for metaphysical reasons, that the concept of
an 'unjust law' was a contradiction in terms, since laws introduced
harmony and limit (which are good) into a situation previously and
otherwise incoherent or chaotic. But if the Greeks could not also
recognize that there were bad laws, it would have made little sense to
praise Socrates for his courage in breaking the Athenian laws against
impiety and corruption of the youth. Such praise was not bestowed
from outside, by "neutral" observers, or at a much later time; it was
conferred by, e.g. Plato, upon his intellectual master.
One might hold that even bad laws should not be broken, as Socrates warily advances in the Crito. But this is not just because the laws
exist, but is based on what their existence supposedly means to the
(Athenian) community. Breaking the laws, even unjust ones, is a
serious business, because it tends to weaken the institution(s) on
which society is built; to reduce social cohesion, trust, reciprocity,
and so forth. The presence of the laws themselves, promotes little in
the way of respect; whereas, regard for the overall consequences of
breaking laws, which is conceptually quite different from doing
obeisance to their very existence, may well foster high respect. Yet this
is not germane — ethically conclusive imperatives such as 'Obey the laws'

6 There is an implicit norm operating here, i.e. dedication to fair, honest and
impartial inquiry, which begs or precedes the 'is-ought' dichotomy, indirectly.
Compare Kant, on the "reprehensibility" of deriving 'ought' (legal impositions)
from 'is' (real-politics), at KdrV A319/B375; also see A547/B575, and
A633/B661. On commitment of this sort see below, page 106 n. 103.

72

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

or 'Do not break the laws' are not psychologically or socially entailed.
An 'is' does not have to entail an 'ought' for it may well be that
ought-judgments are somehow functions of the process of accumulation of (pertinent) is-statements. But consider Hume's own famously
analogous causal model about inferring (from the constant conjunction of A and B). This does not mean that A did not cause B, or that
B occurs uncaused, or that constant conjunction is not one factor
relied upon in claiming that A caused B\ indeed, for Hume, it is the
only possible criterion. But (perception of) the constant conjunction
of A and B is logically insufficient to deduce that A caused B. This
condition is a roundabout way of restating the elementary post hoc,
ergo propter hoc fallacy. The 'is-ought' disjunction is similar in form,
and for that reason appears prima facie valid. Note that while (as we
shall see) the 'is-ought' dichotomy does not hold up universally, it still
earns a badge for guarding against fake "derivations" of what ought to
be, from what is or is alleged to be. The 'is-ought' cleavage at most
enjoys approximately the status of a regulative, as opposed to a constitutive, principle. 7 And it retains heuristic value, in spite of not being
a universally valid proscription.

Ill

Now to our second issue: the domain of ethics and its methods. It is
commonplace nowadays to differentiate between first-order moral
discourse on the one hand, and metaethics on the other. 8 We must
examine certain ramifications of this distinction. It is important in its
own right, and has immense bearing on the 'is-ought' debate. The issue
is this: ( l ) i s there really such a thing as metaethics? and if so,
(2) what does its existence as a discipline imply about "ethics", or the
subject to which metaethics ostensibly refers? Our contention is that
metaethics, if its place can be justxtiea, portends the "death" of
ethics: not just the end of moral philosophy, but even that of moral

7 KdrV A616, 619/B644,
see "How to Derive 'Ought'
8 See H. D. Aiken, Reason
6-10, 24 ff.: W.D.Hudson,
Reflective Naturalism, 3.

647. For an appeal to the distinction, much-revised,
from 'Is' ", 55 and 55n7; Speech Acts, 33.
and Conduct (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962),
Modern Moral Philosophy,
1, 12ff.; V. C. Punzo,

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

73

discourse in general. Moral philosophers have not faced this issue
squarely as yet, because they have failed to appreciate the threat
which metaethics poses to ethics itself. Let us see why.
"Just because philosophy is second-order talk, it implies the existence of the first-order talk which it is about", writes Hudson. 9 The
smug confidence behind such a view is logical, yet not entirely reliable. Consider: 'All ethical statements are nothing but propaganda'.
Logically this makes no sense, since "propaganda" stands out only by
contrast with something which is not propaganda; the above statement cannot itself be propagandistic, at the risk of circularity. The
canon of early empiricism, 'All knowledge is derived through senseexperience', is in a similar bind: indeed, it "proves" that there are at
least two sources of knowledge, one of which is not sense-experience;
or else the canon above leads to a vicious regress. In a similar way the
claim that (moral) philosophy logically "presupposes" 10 the existence
of a universe of discourse with which it concerns itself, seems correct.
In philosophy, the domain of ethical statements is usually identified
by the appearance of clusters of terms such as 'right', 'good', 'ought',
words expressing praise and blame, and the like. These vocabularyitems are a permanent feature of moral discourse, with a few variations; they are found everywhere.
Yet it is entirely probable that all actual ethical statements do
contain an inexpungeable element of propaganda. It would then be in
order to speak of the null class, formed by 'non-propagandistic ethical
statements', a concept which would remain perfectly intelligible.
Consider, e.g. Vico's thesis that 'All discourse is metaphorical'. 1 1 How
can this be? Does not 'metaphor' depend upon something "concrete",
or non-metaphorical, to be applied intelligibly? Perhaps; but there is
no logical guarantee that the non-metaphorical exists.12 'Metaphor'
implies only that there is a concept of the non-metaphorical, not that
9

W. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 13.
10 Hudson, Modem Moral Philosophy, 14.
11 To avoid a self-referential paradox, one might term this sentence the sole
exception to its own universal predication, understanding it to mean 'All other
discourse is metaphorical'.
12 A theological parallel: Aquinas' Third Way, the argument from
'contingency' to 'necessity', with no corresponding guarantee of instantiations.
For both notions, compare the problems with "analogous predication" in medieval semantics.

74

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

there is anything "out there". It makes perfectly good sense to describe "all" discourse as being permeated with metaphors (not to
mention all philosophy!);for the set of non-metaphors may just be
empty, like the class of honest politicians in a generous ontology.
Unless Hudson can redefine 'existence' in such a way as to mean
or include only concepts, his quoted statement on page 73 is theorethically falsified. Moral philosophy in this sense implies only the idea of
first-order "talk", not such talk itself. Hudson borrows from Wittgenstein's doctrine that technical philosophic language is always "parasitic" upon natural language, so that (some) philosophic problems can
be "dissolved" through the "therapy" of discovering how the impetus
towards the technical sphere occurred. Instead of resorting to technical language at all, Wittgenstein seeks to refresh our memories, and bids
us recall how we learned concepts which, as philosophers, we aspire or
pretend to handle with more sophisticated (but, it is alleged, ultimately fruitless) methods. 13 If a Hudson were to follow this genetic
line of advice thoroughly, he would have to give up on metaethics
entirely. (This has not yet occurred to any of the proponents of
metaethics, of whose theories Hudson is a very able expositor as well
as occasional partisan.)
It is sometimes alleged that metaethics neither is nor can ever
remain "normatively neutral". The thought behind this otherwise
puzzling charge is that metaethics happens, in fact, to arise from a
definite philosophic tradition, with its own commitments, its own
view of the nature and limits of knowledge, and very settled opinions
as to the methods which are sanctioned for use in philosophy. Sociologically, true; philosophically perhaps pointless. For a self-proclaimed
metaethician may at least try to remain morally "uncommitted",
if this is how he restricts the 'proper function' of philosophy in this
turbulent area. To argue that one's commitments stand regardless of
stated intentions and their most rigorous and thoroughgoing execution, is to lean upon the old Jamesian twist, whereby the logic of
agnosticism, or lack of commitment, is itself taken as representing a
commitment. 1 4 But perhaps it is the only one necessary (or desir-

13 Philosophical Investigations, Part I,§ 77.
14 c f . "The Will to Believe" (1896).This is not merely a taxonomic dodge, or
a self-referential rebuttal, in the way that James employs it, since it refers to
"our passional nature" and appeals to crisis-situations. See below, page 97.

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

75

able) to make, where 'lack of commitment' is tantamount, if not
equivalent, to 'deliberately refraining from commitment'. Moreover,
lack of commitment is no more of a commitment than atheism can be
said to be a form of religious belief! Lack of commitment is merely
generic commitment, not substantive. It is only a form of attacking
some problem, of addressing oneself to it. When a philosopher claims
normative impartiality, his expression of intent must be honored, just
so long as he actually carries out this non-commitment with logical
scrupulosity and care. It is hyper-critical to deny that on many occasions, non-commitment is or can be a real philosophical variable, not
merely an apparent one. 15
15

Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy,
14. E. M. Zemach, in an important
attack entitled "Ought, Is, and a Game Called 'Promise' ", Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1971), 61-63, contends that Searle's derivation, while valid, is trivial(!)
and therefore useless. [This is predicated on a false opposition set up between language and, e.g. society, which Zemach then foists upon Searle's whole
theory of "speech acts", thereby emptying it of empirical content, as well as
robbing it of potential applications. A similar defect vitiates F. S. McNeilly's
"Pre-Moral Appraisals", Philosophical Review 81 (1972), 63-81.] Zemach cleverly argues that the compulsion to engage in moralizing is, if genuine, a social one,
and therefore amounts to a physical (external) necessity which, being purely
contingent, does nothing except to eliminate one's freedom to commit oneself
to certain performances. If we cannot help but be moral, in the generic sense,
then being moral involves no special merit on our part. This is because the
'cannot' here is purportedly causal, not logical or moral. And it does not matter
whether the cause is social pressure, with its folkways and mores and the relentless process of socialization and conditioning, or stems from some bio-psychological propensity in man (e.g., 'man is by nature a political animal/social being').
Zemach in effect transposes "ought implies c a n " into its contrapositive:
"cannot implies do not have to".
The answer to this would-be infringement upon human responsibility is that
if we cannot 'opt out', this does not mean that all (or any) of our choices are
dictated; only their framework or setting. One could as well say that Shakespeare had to write King Lear because he could not abscond from English. In
that case, why is no one else able to duplicate such a feat, let alone be thought
compelled to do so?
Of course, Zemach, Ralls [A. Ralls, "The Game of Life", Philosophical
Quarterly 16 (1966), 23-34, esp. 24] and Gewirth [A. Gewirth, "Must One Play
the Moral Language-Game?" .4 m m a m Philosophical
Quarterly
7 (1970),
107-118, esp. I l l ] , are all quite right, that one can on occasion depart from a
particular situation, e.g. playing chess or baseball. But: (1) The "game of life" or
morality is not a hyperbolic extension of such contexts, but instead constitutes
a global conceptual unification of them; (2) Zemach's counter-example of the

76

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

Neutrality is or can be genuine; it need not be spurious. Genuine
neutrality in metaethics, however, undermines the very subject which
breathes life into it; its effects are anything but beneficial. For to
begin with, the age-old question "What ought to be (or be
done)?" drops out of sight. The metaethician, whose task is made
abruptly coextensive with that of the moral philosopher, busies himself with examining the meaning of moral expressions, and little more.
The metaethician does not pass judgment. Nor does he advise, urge,
exhort, recommend, prompt, or persuade. He refrains from the employment of these techniques, not necessarily because he thinks they
are deceitful, or subordinate to some other approach, but because
(1) he considers it no part of his business to do that, and (2) the tools
of reasoning which he has available are not equipped for such a job.
Nor does the metaethician wish to widen his collection, or change his
route. He proceeds only with utmost caution, and along a narrow path.
The outcome is philosophical 'schizophrenia'. The metaethician
does not unify, but instead fragments his own experience. Putting on
his philosophical hat, he is content to sift and analyze. Putting on his
street cap, he engages himself in first-order moral discourse, not
qua philosopher, but in a strictly "amateur" capacity. His participation in affairs of life remains uninformed, which is another philosophically objectionable phenomenon. If "What ought I to d o ? " is not a
physician who interrupts a chess game to attend to a sick patient is answered by
Searle's discussion of conflicting duties (Speech Acts, 1 8 0 n l ) ; (3) N o t every
contingency is, is meant to be, or needs to be exhaustively covered in advance
(even if this is in principle possible). The rules of chess do not include a provision (irrelevant on the face of it) for what to do in case, e.g. an emergency
appendectomy intervenes, precisely because that is a non-chess emergency, and
because the context (chess is a 'game') makes it virtually transparent what does
or does not usually take precedence over the continuation of a given chessmatch; (4) Moreover, Zemach's stipulations amount to an ignoratio elenchus, in
that the commitment discussed in Searle's derivation has already been made;
therefore (ex hypothesf),
any 'detached' or 'anthropological' speculation (see
below, pages 78, 82«, 83-88, 92-95, 114-115ff.) is logically out of the question,
even for a bystander, commenting upon the scene. In short, Zemach peculiarly
misses the significance of the Wittgensteinian 'forms of life' upon which Searle
(tacitly) rests; just as overconcentration on technical fine-points (e.g. irrelevant
"transinstitutional rule" constructions), makes Zemach fail to appreciate the
moral eainesty of promising. It is grotesque and evasive to pretend to criticize institutions in general, when one is not really inclined to attack promising, in particular; probably, because it is so invulnerable.

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

77

question for philosophers, then who is left to answer it? The misguided, the incompetent; the demagogue, the quack, the illiterate; and
the various spokesmen for class- or special interests; including those
who may claim to speak on behalf of, e.g. the scientific community. If
sustained philosophical reflection is declared either "off limits", or of
negligible worth, for the purpose of facing human contingencies, then
we face an implicit admission of the sterility of philosophy. Metaethics drives us to this conclusion. It may indeed be correct — but
then it is true of ethics (and value-theory) only insofar as it is under
the spell of such haunting metaethical shibboleths, and permanently
unable to extricate itself.
But the sinister implications of metaethics do not end there. Consider how a metaethician might reply to the points just lodged. He
could say, "I am clarifying ethical discourse, but also for the purpose
of making our thinking on these matters clearer". This is roughly
Hare's position. Now Hare acknowledges that (1) ethics as he conceives of it involves decision-making; (2) it is no part of the business
of philosophy to dictate, or even to suggest, what steps should be
taken in ethics, but only to limn their logical form, "after the fact".
So ethics appears to survive and indeed flourish, and not to suffer
encroachment. Now, the objective of "clarity" is admirable, like "simplicity" (parsimony) in science, or "elegance" in logic. But it is also a
vague criterion, and sometimes amounts to a matter of aesthetic taste
and personal preference. No one is against clarity; but one man's
clarity may be another's obscurity. An impressionistic attempt is sometimes made at this point to appropriate great philosophers under the
banner of metaethics. (This technique harks back to James' cleverly
anachronistic labelling of such figures as Mill and Spinoza as
"pragmatists".) No doubt, e.g. Socrates was consistently in favor of
clarity, as his apparent quest for definitions or search for essences may
attest. But does this exhaust either Socrates' contribution or the extent of his commitment?' No; only the metaethician's. Is the attainment of clarity enough? No; not even for purposes of Hareian analysis.
Hare's own telling admission that ethics and metaethics logically
part company whenever the issue of 'what shall I do?' is joined, shows
almost immediately that, in virtue of self-imposed restrictions, metaethics is morally impotent. However, as Hudson aptly points out,
no one — philosophers included — can "opt out of moralizing". Therefore it is imperative that something be done to put "moralizing" on a

78

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

more rational footing, rather than simplv allow the untrained, the
representative of vested interests, or the rabble-rouser to toy with
something so vital.
Then again, perhaps Hudson is incorrect: for maybe, in succinct
terms, ethics does not "exist", but is a mere mental monstrosity or
accretion. Perhaps it is but an illusion, a mirage, a shabby fraud (yet
to be exposed). What could this entail? It may dictate a colossal
reform of language, like that which Hudson himself envisions with
respect to the free-will problem: 1 6 a progressive shrinkage in the
vocabulary of ethics, until finally the entire 'language of morals'
simply disappears, because it has become, in Wittgenstein's word,
"obsolete". It will not be replaced by any other language-game, but
will simply die out, just as whole languages sometimes do, only with
no survivor or successor. This would require a massive reform in both
word and thought, which in turn would influence many attitudes and
institutions, e.g. legal punishment. Like ancient mythic accounts of
the origin of the universe, the very terminology of ethics might in
time become a relic, a museum piece; or a superstition, properly
belonging to the prescientific stage of human intellectual development, and a fit subject for antiquarians only.
If this sounds frightening, it should. The spectre is alarming, but it
is a consequence of the orientation of metaethics. For metaethics is,
as has been observed, a kind of logical anthropology of ethics. 1 7 The
ramifications of this have slipped by unnoticed. In particular the
detachment of the metaethician, who observes what goes on in moral
settings, without ever becoming actively involved as an agent, 18
is striking. He is uniformly a spectator, not a celebrant. He
surveys existing customs and institutions with an "unprejudiced"
eye. He is a spectator, but never a judge, either. 19 He is an ex16 Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy,
363-365; see Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations,
I, § 23; also I. Berlin, "Historical Inevitability" repr. in
Four Essays on Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 41-117.
17 Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 320-329.
!8 Whereas, this is not always the case in anthropology: the scientist must
sometimes undergo initiation-rites, in order to be admitted to the 'group' and so
conduct his research; and there are times when he participates (willingly) in the
life of, e.g. the tribe, and not just to further his own understanding of their
habits or behavior.
is The discussion below of the psychology revealed by the metaethical stance

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

79

ception to Hudson's rule; for he does manage to "opt out", and
professionally he is not inclined to opt back in, if it can be avoided. If
he does join the fold, he then abjures (by his own standards) philosophy. If he philosophizes, to that extent he does not live; he dwells
apart, like Plato's "spectator of time and eternity". This is the pragmatic paradox facing him, and the source of a logical 'neurosis' of
sorts brought on by his extravagantly speciaized activity.
The horizons of thought permit one to speculate that there is an
"all-embracing" viewpoint. Yet each person is "victimized" to some
extent by training and conditioning. Only a fool thinks that we can
completely escape our own, e.g. cultural and parental inheritance. We
cannot; if this were genuinely possible, we should still be bound to
or by some set of values, just as the metaethician is in the course of his
own work. No man is devoid of an ethic, whether he passively imbibes
the received wisdom of his time and place, or restructures it. So while
neutrality is logically open, it is psychologically beyond us; the metaethician is only deluding himself if he believes otherwise. Parochiality
can be trimmed, but never overcome entirely, as Chapter II already
demonstrated in an equally formal context.
The metaethician's official proclamation therefore runs to the
effect that qua philosopher he is not (or refuses to be) morally of one
or another conviction. This means either that when he is of some
persuasion, he is not (at that moment) opining as a philosopher: a
condition already derided; or else that, instead of at least leaving
ethics to non-philosophers, the manifesto makes one suspect that
ethics does not exist, i.e. that moral philosophy has no subject matter.
So then forget about providing justifications for human actions;
dismiss them as necessarily inadequate. At the very best, "moralizing"
becomes nothing but a minute (but purposeless) examination of
"first-order discourse". So ethics degenerates into the talking point
of view: there is your talk, and his talk, and theirs, but no rational
arbitration between and among conflicting views. This shows the
brutal extent of a(metaethically unimproved) depiction of a "moral reality". The end product is defeat, not insight; surrender to the given,
rather than (logically supportable) edification. The situation appears
provisionally hopeless yet possible and consistent.
is not identified with any one figure, but is meant to illuminate some essential
characteristics of metaethics as an enterprise. Also see below, pages 102ff., on
the metaethical position re the limiting cases of pure theorizing.

80

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE
IV

Against this depressing background, let us now attend to the mechanics o f Searle's derivation of 'ought' from 'is'. Searle's aim is to fasten
upon cases in which the descriptive and normative elements are so
inextricably intertwined that, as Searle points out, separating them in
order to preserve the universality of the 'is-ought' distinction at all
costs would render that thesis "trivial". 2 0 Promise-making and
promise-keeping are chosen as the vehicles for the derivation. 2 1
Searle's hypothetical counter-example concerns payment of a debt.
He does not specify whether (or h o w ) the debt had previously been
incurred; the sole background for the "derivation" is the (dutyincurring) utterance expressing a promise, in this case involving the
intention to (re-)pay the m o n e y . 2 2 Searle then moves to the "tautologous" 2 3 conclusion that, since Jones is (fact) under an obligation
(at the time t, when the promise is contracted) to pay Smith $5, that
Jones ought (evaluation) to pay Smith $5. Searle is justly credited
even by Hare with combining "clarity and elegance" in obtaining the
result. 2 4 In his book Speech Acts, Searle revises his derivation by
adding or inserting various ceteris paribus clauses to eliminate possi-

20 Speech Acts, 184.
21 See J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, 2nd ed., ed. J. O. Urmson and
G. J. Wamock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), esp. 98-99, 242, for background; Speech Acts, 57-62, on sincerity-conditions, and the relationship
between promising and intention. We confess misgivings over one of Searle's
criteria for promising, which runs to the effect that: "it is not obvious" to both
promiser and promisee that the promiser will do the thing (to be) promised "in
the normal course of events" (Speech Acts, 59.). What about, e.g., a marriage
proposal? (Possibly a poor counter-example!)
22 Speech Acts, 65.
23 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 50,56; Speech Acts, 185: " . . . the
tautology that one ought to keep one's promises is only one of a class of similar
tautologies concerning institutionalized forms of obligation". Searle remarks
(Speech Acts, 179nl) that the transition from 'descriptive' to 'evaluative' already takes place as soon as the term 'obligation' is introduced, in step 3 of the
derivation given below (page 81, n. 26). This indicates that promising is not
the sole avenue for exposing the exclusivity-claim of the putative is-ought disjunction as untenable. It is instead merely representative of a much wider class
or cross section of cases, just as Searle himself hopes.
24 Hare, "The Promising Game", 398.

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

81

ble " e x t e n u a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s " , 2 5 while expanding and a m p l i f y i n g
his original f o r m u l a t i o n . 2 6
25 Speech Acts, 188-198, defends all of these policies and maneuvers against
various criticisms.
26 Following Searle's own numbering, and incorporating his qualifications
appropriately hedging the argument, the latest form of the complete derivation
(see Speech Acts, 177-182) looks like this:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Jones uttered the words, "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars",
la. Under certain conditions C anyone who utters the words (sentence),
"I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars" promises to pay
Smith five dollars.
1 b. Conditions C obtain.
Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
2a. All promises are acts of placing oneself under (undertaking) an obligation to do the thing promised.
Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five
dollars.
3a. All those who place themselves under an obligation are (at the time
when they so place themselves) under an obligation.
Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
4a. If one is under an obligation to do something, then as regards that
obligation one ought to do what one is under an obligation to do.
Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.

Although step 5 completes the derivation, Searle regards the transition from
descriptive to evaluative already to have been made at step 3 (see Speech Acts,
179«1). As a further gloss on his own derivation, Searle remarks that he could
have begun by inserting "an even more ground-floor premise" than step 1,
namely, an alternative form of 16 which reads "Jones uttered the phonetic
sequence . . . " followed by the phonetic equivalent (or break-down) of the
sentence quoted in 1 (and in la). (See Speech Acts, 182, and "How to Derive
'Ought' from 'Is' ", 49). Finally, Searle considers two alternative formulations
of his last step, namely (see Speech Acts, 181):
5'
5"

As regards his obligation to pay Smith five dollars, Jones ought to pay
Smith five dollars.
All things considered, Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.

The advantage of 5' is that it follows directly from 4; whereas 5 " requires an
intermediate step, which 4a supplies. This is meant to dispel any doubt as to the
meaning or interpretation of 5; yet it has the infelicitous ring of a mere hypothetical imperative to it. For this reason, 5, which is blunter and more flatfooted, is in the end also preferable.
For a presentation and evaluation of Searle's original (1964) derivation, see
J. Narveson, Morality and Utility, 190ff.
Narveson's critique depends upon making a sharp separation between expressive verbal acts on the one hand, and represented institutions (such as obli-

82

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

We take up below some familiar (and unfamiliar) objections to
Searle's entire procedure.
( 1 ) Consider the opposition provoked by Moore's "open-question
argument". Should Jones pay Smith $5? To this there is n o immediate
reply; for it requires an act o f evaluation which is independent from
all the facts. Perhaps Smith might use the $5 for the furtherance
of some evil, so that e.g. o n utilitarian grounds, if we knew Smith's
intentions in advance, we should not pay him the m o n e y , since it
could lead to undesirable consequences. N o t knowing what Smith
may want to do with the m o n e y is n o excuse; we should find out just
what his plans are, and from sources more reliable than Smith might
b e . 2 7 Smith may not trust Jones either, but such considerations are
irrelevant. 28
gation) on the other; a dichotomy which is both false and artificial. However,
Narveson does (correctly) draw attention to (a) the relational character of, e.g.
promising; (b) the "incorporation" of values in institutions and their corresponding facts; (c) the question as to whether promising is an institutional arrangement which is "worth practicing"; yet without ever descending into
anything remotely resembling the anthropological argument. But the fact that
promise-keeping is worthwhile, and therefore is to be upheld, confers upon
Searle's example the qualities of unique charm as well as power. Its penetration
stems from its being so highly unexceptionable. What Narveson cannot bring
himself to accept is that, under the proper circumstances, the performed utterance does indeed "create" the commitment. Therefore, he fails to comprehend
the theory of speech acts; and so its forcefulness is entirely wasted on him.
We shall forgo entirely discussion of certain recent nit-picking critiques of
Searle's derivation: viz., that promising is to be distinguished, in hair-splitting
fashion, from e.g. assurance, reassurance and the like; or that deductions might
obtain only between propositions, and not hold among illocutionary forces,
even though both may have their appropriate linguistic expression, which in
each case is essential to them.
27 Compare the case of the borrowed weapon in Republic, I, 331C.
28 It is likewise of no concern how and why Jones came to promise Smith $5.
If Jones borrowed the money, then there is (as opposed to a gift) an explicit
contract. If Jones freely decides to commit himself to bestow the money on
Smith (e.g. as an act of charity), he is still bound, although perhaps morally
rather than legally. These details all belong to Jones' biography, personality,
motivation, and so forth. They do not affect the status of his promise, except
insofar as Smith's interests (or better still, rights) are directly concerned. A
promise can, of course, be mutual: as when countries promise not to start a war
with one another. So, if one side unilaterally breaks the reciprocal agreement,
the other is no longer bound to uphold it. The Hobbesian predicament (state of
nature) is then encountered.

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

83

This approach insinuates that the open-question argument applies
only when we have not yet gathered all pertinent data. In this respect
it is not a plea for an independent value-test, but only a demand for
what Stevenson calls "comprehensiveness". 2 9 So its own ground-rules
are defeated by the situations which allow it to be intelligently
invoked. Also, Searle has really anticipated the open-question argument; for he takes the pains to exclude cases involving conflict of
obligations, with one duty taking precedence over another; or where
honoring an obligation leads to disaster, for the agent, the person to
whom the agent is responsible, or others affected. 3 0 Searle provides a
sampling of such empirical data, whose applicability on certain occasions is undeniable. But it is singularly to Searle's advantage that he is
challenging a universal thesis, which means that one complex counterexample, loaded with any stipulations one cares to throw in (or likewise exclude), is fair g a m e . 3 1 So we may add the factual supposition
that Smith's later intentions are (known to be) benign.
The fiats Searle excercises are in no way unreasonable. The same
cannot be said on behalf of the open-question argument. For the
open-question must eventually draw a closing answer, if not for
"theorists", then at least to the satisfaction of agents. There is no
"infinite regress" in moral thinking, or else decisions and actions
might never occur, for better or worse. This may seem a swift and
ungracious exit from metaethics, but the urgent and pressing dilemmas
of life do oft make for clumsy responses! 3 2
This should suffice to dispose of the open-question argument,
which for some reason had never been raised as a possible rejoinder to
Searle, although effective and formidable in its own bailiwick.
(2) The anthropological objection: developed by Hare and Flew,
respectively. Searle counters it by observing that it had already been
refuted in the original (1964) paper; 3 3 and then through iteration of
29
See Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy,
130.
30 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 46-47 and 4 7 « 5 , esp. clause (4a); Speech
Acts, 1 8 0 and nl. Compare H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 3 0 5 and n2.
31

"How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 43. Refer to page 98, below.
32
Yet, as Searle remarks, in a quite different context: "confronted with a
case he has never seen before, the agent knows what to d o " (Speech Acts, 4 2 ) .
If this is true in the moral arena, too, then.it likewise scores against the tempting infinite-regress option as a theoretical tendency.
33 Speech Acts, 197« 1; see "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 51-51, 5 7 « 8 .

84

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

an appeal to the distinction between internal and external criticism, in
a manner reminiscent of Rawls. 3 4
Searle contends that "of all the arguments used against the original
(1964) proof, the argument from anthropology is both the most
common and the w e a k e s t " . 3 5 But Searle's rebuttal has its own significant shortcomings, and is in need of repair. Searle believes that the
anthropological critique of the institution of promises misses the
mark, in that it is an implied criticism o / t h e institution as a whole,
which is radically different in character from criticism of promises
made within the bounds of that institution. One may approve, disapprove, adopt whatever attitude toward promises generally, without
abandoning a willingness to describe or characterize promises as being
s u c h . 3 6 One can wish to alter, without thereby mutilating; nor does
understanding entail total endorsement.
However, it is also possible to criticize an institution from
"inside", not only in isolated instances, but all the time. Someone
could say that he approves of marriage (the family) as the basic social
unit, but that he has never seen a union between two people which he
would consider loving, wholesome, emotionally healthy, fulfilling for
both partners, and so on. If an institution were thoroughly unsound in
practice, it might not last very long, unless accompanied by stern
religious or legal enforcements. So it would be odd, but utterly consistent, for someone to swear by the institution, while acknowledging
that in practice it never does manage to fulfill certain hopes and expectations, not even partially or peripherally.
This amounts to an 'ideal-real' chasm, and can be made conceptually plausible. But Searle feels that one may either criticize the institution, or else just features associated with it. One is crucial, the other
not. But a middle road can be taken, as we have just s e e n . 3 7 Therefore

34 Speech Acts, 188-189, 196-197; "How to Derive 'Ought" from 'Is' ", 55nl.
35 Speech Acts, 197.
36 Cf. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 116-119. For a counter-example,
see below, pp. 85-86.
37 In some cases, to criticize one rule 'governing a practice' would be, in effect,
to challenge the entire practice, if that were the only rule it had, or if that rule
were so essential that to change it even slightly would be to destroy or drastically
alter the practice (e.g. the scoring rules of a sport or game). This defect deters
Rawls, as has been noted by Lyons.

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

85

we cannot share Searle's low estimate 38 of the force of the anthropological objection, whose merits also may be illustrated as follows:
Consider the so-called "laws of warfare" as set forth in the GenevaConvention and the Hague agreements. These are meant (a) to recognize the (sad) reality of armed hostility, and (b) to prescribe a code
of conduct to be followed by participants in any military struggle,
with respect both to each other and to civilians and bystanders.
Accordingly it is correct to describe e.g. the behavior of combatsoldiers as falling into one of two patterns: compliance with the regulations governing warfare, or nonadherence to one or more of those
laws. 39 Moreover, consider the laws dealing with propriety in land,
naval or air engagements. This specifies e.g. when fire may be returned:
it recognizes only purely defensive warfare, i.e. reacting to overt
aggression. Now suppose that we encounter a pacifist, who condemns
all wars as unjust undertakings. He feels that there should be international laws against (i.e. prohibiting) warfare, not laws which (to his
mind) positively sanction warfare, by in effect stipulating what constitutes "proper" conduct within them, clause (a) above notwithstanding. It is easy for him to conclude that since all war is a crime,
any war must be criminal, as well; and so too must specific acts of
war, as carried out by whatever party or side. The same applies to
so-called "war crimes".
Is it logically feasible for such an individual to describe the legal
practices of which he disapproves only in morally "neutral" terms?
Searle might say yes, because, Somatically speaking, understanding a
practice is a logical prerequisite for criticizing it, or its "foundations".
But to describe is one thing; to describe without (simultaneously)
condemning, is quite another. 4 0 One can report "he (x) thought it
was his duty to fire at the 'enemy' and did so", and one can even
explain in a neutral idiom how doing that (sometimes) results in the
award of a medal. 4 1 But can a pacifist admit that it was x's duty,
38
39
Acts,
40

Speech Acts, Ch. 8, esp. 188-189, 193, 196-197.
One can of course obey (or break) a rule without knowing it (see Speech
41-42). This fact does not allow one to violate a rule with impunity.
The condemnation may of course be tacit, or indirect.
See R. M. Hare, "Descriptivism", Proceedings of the British
Academy,
49 (1963), 121; repr. in W. D. Hudson, ed„ The Is-Ought Question, 246;
for discussion see ibid., editor's introduction, 29, and W. D. Hudson, Modern
Moral Philosophy,
295. Hare overlooks the important fact that experts or
'competent judges' (to employ Mill's phrase) are quite likely to agree on an

86

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

according to the pacifist's own value-hierarchy? Hardly. If one is
opposed to the institutions of war and warfare, one has no recourse
but to describe events, if at all, by /-¿'describing them in indirect discourse: which is just what Searle accuses some of his critics of doing in
making their (allegedly irrelevant) reformulations of his derivation. 4 Similarlv. if one does not accept promising, for whatever strange
reason, 4 3 as an institutional arrangement, then it follows that one
cannot countenance specific promises qua promises (i.e. as being
promises). They become null and void. So viewed, although the institution of promising does (unfortunately) exist, it should not. And this
time the 'ought' "interferes" with the 'is', rather than remaining logically distant. For ideally (sic) there would be no such thing as promising; therefore it would be inconsistent to in effect morally to
acknowledge the presence of an alternative, indeed a contradictory
commitment. The only resort is the linguistic expedient of quotation
marks: or else to refer carefully to only the psychology of the promiser, never to the (disputed) moral value of the object, relation or
interpersonal transaction (this keeps the 'ought' artificially separated
from the 'is', however, which again plays right into Searle's hands).
We suggest that 'ought' and 'is' do not always remain without some
kind of reciprocal or mutual influence. Therefore, we would strongly
agree with Searle that "the urge to read the metaphysical distinction
between Fact and Value back into language as a thesis about valid
entailment relations must inevitably run up against counter-examples. . . " . 4 4 But so must aspects of Searle's urge to combat it, as just
shown.
In short, we cannot concur with Searle's rigid separation between
"internal" and "external" criticism of an institution, which is as
mistaken in its way as the universal, negative thesis about correctly
deriving an 'ought' from an 'is'. For, if one criticizes an institution as a
evaluation, in the case of wine-tasting, as well as when it comes to awarding
medals for military valor. Only in philosophy is unanimity seemingly impossible
to procure, and even then not in principle, we daresay.
42
Speech Acts, esp. 197.
43 Part of the force behind Searle's reasoning stems from the fact that promising
does indeed pass moral muster, i.e. is a worthwhile practice, or at least very
unexceptionable.
44 Speech Acts, 197. See above, p. 70.

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

87

whole, one is then logically inclined not to tolerate those forms of
conduct which exhibit the institution in operation. One does not, as
Searle thinks, have to "throw all institutions overboard" (as opposed
to "standing on the deck") 4 S in order to be against some institutions
in their entirety, and therefore be opposed to any and all behavior
which perpetuates the institution, or which is in accordance with
its oft-suppressed valuational framework. Moreover, there is not even a
"paradox" contained in being dead-set against "everything", whether
one of a logical or pragmatic kind. Searle states, quite rightly, that if
one debunks every institution, and every practice falling under an
institutional heading, one is morally compelled to refrain from participating in any activities considered "characteristically human", so
that one finds it well-nigh impossible to "live by" any creed, whatsoever. 46 Perhaps suicide remains, as an option.
This attack resembles Russell's charge that skepticism is inconsistent, because the skeptic must renounce doubt in order to join the
rest of mankind, or else risk condemnation as insincere. Hume's famous
anticipatory reply is sufficient to rebut such a charge: "As an agent, I
am quite satisfied in the point;but as a philosopher who has some share
of curiosity . . . I want to learn the foundation . . . ". 47 In Hume's
case, his "curiosity, I will not say skepticism" directly concerned the
meaning of causality. Adjusting to Searle's context, the same point
can be reworked. If an institution turns out not to have a "foundation" of some appropriate kind, then, while people may follow its
provisions from custom or habit, the thinker who reaches a destructive conclusion will naturally recommend overthrow, replacement, or
disposal. At the very least, he will eschew subscribing to it, and as a
matter of principle, will evaluate or judge people (himself included)
45 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 57h8; Speech Acts, 186/)l. Italics
supplied.
46 Speech Acts, 186« 1: "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 57/i8. This is a
refreshing, quasi-religious apologetic coming from a tough-minded, resolutely
analytic thinker.
47 D. Hume, An Inquiry Concrring Human Understanding, ed. C. W. Hendcl
(Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1955), 52. For the accusation by Russell, see A
History of Western Philosophy, 672. There is a latent intellectual 'schizophrenia'
in Hume, too. (See above, pages , 76-77.) One might question, of course,
whether it is even psychologically possible to be as "diffident of philosophical
doubts", as of one's "philosophical conviction". (A Treatise of Human
Nature, 273).

88

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

accordingly. Whereas, to fail to draw the implications of one's
thought-out position, or else not to incorporate them in one's own
moral code, would amount to a compromise of integrity, and so an
abrogation of philosophic
responsibility. So perhaps we must 'go
down with the ship', or come to a bitter end, if there is no good
institution to rescue us. The ramifications of our revival of the anthropological argument, and our attempt to put some bite into it, should not
now mislead the reader into thinking that Searle's derivation is inadequate, 4 8 or beyond successful restoration. It requires none.
Searle's own rejection of "anthropologism" rests on two further
points: (1) his appropriation of Austin's notion of a performative
utterance, in particular the illocutionary act; 4 9 (2) Miss Anscombe's
distinction between "brute" and "institutional" facts. s 0 We shall later
apply (1) to Hare's version of the anthropological ploy. 5 1 Temporarily we shall concentrate on some additional arguments, then return to
(1), by way of (2).
Searle maintains that there is no such thing as a detached usage of
the word 'promise'. There are many "unserious" usages, e.g. by actors
in a play; or in the context of a practical joke; but purportedly, no
disengaged yet "serious" use of 'promise' exists. The import of the
4

8 One of Searle's critics shares our contention concerning the possibility of
"internal" (as opposed to "external") criticism of an institution. However, he
gives Searle's work far too little shrift, and falsely charges him with separating
the linguistic from the moral order. See Margolis, Values and Conduct, 88-90,
and esp. 90, 215-216^25. For Searle's own position on language and ethics, sec
Speech Acts, 176-177, 193, 197-198. Margolis and Searle arc at least in accord
that under the appropriate conditions, linguistic commitments do entail moral
commitments, although moral commitments do not (usually) entail corresponding linguistic ones (see Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 490).
49 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 58, 58n9.
so "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 55, 55«6; Speech Acts, 50-53, 50«1;
see G.E.M.Anscombe, "On Brute Facts", Analysis
18 (1957-1958), 69-72.
Searle is only helped, not hindered, by the contention that brute facts do not
'exist' or are of dubious status, i.e., that every fact is somehow an institutional
fact, insofar as it can be described. This allegation depends, however, either on a
Kantian theory of language in relation to reality, or else upon the kind of oratio
obliqua method for handling factual imputations which Searle outlaws. In any
case, collapsing the distinction between brute and institutional facts, respectively, inadvertently serves to aid and abet the Searlian cause, we think.
51 Hare, "The Promising Game", 411; see Hudson, Modern Moral
Philosophy,
286-287. See below, page 99, esp. n 86.

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

89

use-mention distinction does not apply, then, to the case of promising. 52 Searle trenchantly comments that " . . . speaking a language . . . consists of performing speech acts according to rules, and
there is no separating those speech acts from the commitments which
form essential parts of t h e m " . 5 3 This strikes a blow on behalf of descriptivism, yet oddly enough, Mrs. Foot is as critical of Searle, if not
more so, than Hare. 54 Therefore let us briefly examine Mrs. Foot's
a t t a c k 5 5 on Searle.

V

Mrs. Foot states a general philosophical agreement with H a r e , 5 6 then
tries to supply a counter-example which would destroy Searle's
attempt to negotiate between the 'is' and the 'ought'. Inasmuch as
Searle has not answered any of Mrs. Foot's criticisms, we shall work
this out entirely on our own.
Mrs. Foot's basic misgiving about Searle's attempted derivation is
that Searle wants to " . . . deduce an 'ought' statement f r o m premises
that are 'internal' to a particular institution, and this is not how 'ought'
statements are used". Her (lone) illustration: duelling. 5 7 Suppose
someone disapproves of duelling. Then is he honor-bound to engage in
a duel, if he promises to do it? Mrs. Foot says no. Why? Oddly, because of what she calls the "evil social consequences of the institu-

52 Speech Acts, 193; see Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy.
286-287.
53 Speech Acts, 198.
54 See P. Foot, ed., Theories of Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press,
1967), 9-12.
55 Theories of Ethics, introduction, 11.
56 See Hare's paper, "Meaning and Speech Acts", in Philosophical Review 79
(1970), 3-24, esp. 7-12. This is a direct commentary on Searle's "Meaning and
Speech Acts", ibid., 71 (1962), 423-432. For a critique of Hare, see G. J. Warnock, "Hare on Meaning and Speech Acts", ibid.,&\ (1972), 80-84. Also a
leading descriptivist, Warnock has never commented extensively on Searle's
derivation itself.
57 It seems peculiar, not to say irrelevant, to try to deflate Searle's
counter-example with a counter-example; for Searle is only challenging the
universality of the is-ought thesis, not its legitimate applicability to a wide range
of given cases. Mrs. Foot by-passes this difficulty, however. See below, page 100
n 87.

90

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

tion" of duelling, rather than because of an intrinsic impropriety. The
following queries are in order:
(a) If someone disapproves of duelling, for any reason, would it
not be logically odd, in Nowell-Smith's revealing terminology, for him
to so pledge himself in the first place?
(b) If someone disapproved of duelling on other than Mrs. Foot's
utilitarian grounds, would he still be committed to following through
on his promise to duel an adversary? Or are the negative "consequences" of duelling the sole possible reason for rejecting .y's claim
that x should carry out x's promise to take part in a duel? Mrs. Foot
leaves no hint as to the possible reservations.
(c) Is the manner in which 'ought' statements "are used" so
simple to determine? Searle devotes much of Speech Acts to finding
out the way in which obligations do function in language; but
Mrs. Foot nowhere explains what she thinks they consist in, or how
they might operate in discourse.
(d) If x commits himself to fighting a duel, and if competent
judges besides x (e.g. moral philosophers) agree that duelling is "evil"
and should be done away with, made illegal, or simply no longer
practiced, is their determination overridingly binding upon xl
(e) If jc promises to do what is morally forbidden (e.g. duelling),
is* automatically enjoined from carrying out his promise? Searle rightly observes that there is no fixed method for resolving this troubled
issue — it is context-relative, i.e. depends on what was promised, and
on the effect (on e.g. the institution of promising) of breaking one's
promise, or not keeping one's word. 5 8 W. D. Ross, for example,
would maintain that we have a prima-facie obligation to carry out our
promise, for otherwise our word means nothing and none of us shall
(or should) be trusted anymore in the future. (In the case of duelling,
however, this consideration has little weight, since there may not be
any future to contemplate for the two participants, or at least for one
of them!) von Wright 59 at one time held, based on modal-deontic
principles, that even a promise to do the forbidden is logically contra-

58 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'
48. For a contrasting viewpoint, see
Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Section I, 5 th paragraph from
conclusion.
59 G. H. von Wright, An Essay in Modal Logic (Amsterdam: North-Holland,
1951), Ch. V, 39-40, and n2.

THF SUARLIAN CHALLENG1-

91

dictory. hence itself something forbidden. In a more recent paper, von
Wright 60 displays greater sensitivity; like Searle, he has become persuaded that there is no general way to confidently handle such cases in
advance. Finally. Sidgwick 61 rightly observes that a decision will
largely depend upon the factor of time: e.g. did one learn (or become
convinced) that duelling was forbidden before or after making the
promise.'
Someone who knows this beforehand, or "discovers" it almost
concurrently with making the promise, is in a strange fix: for he is
hypocritical (or egotistic) if he attemps to withdraw from the duel,
but behaves logically oddly if he chooses to follow through. Someone
who finds out that he is to do the forbidden only after having made
the promise, is in less of a bind. He might well be exonerated from
blame, if he refused to duel. Perhaps he was even unwittingly duped.
(Hintikka, 62 for example, in an extensive formal presentation of
obligation-concepts, fails to notice the importance of the timeelement: proving the shortcoming of the deontic operators, as Margolis
for one charges, 63 and also showing the need for the development of
an adequate tense-logic for moral categories.)
At any rate, Mrs. Foot is very far from having slashed Searle's
putative proof. 64 Her jeers are misplaced; for Searle is the best friend
the descriptivists ever had. Now let us return to "brute facts".

VI

Searle naturally claims that promising functions only within the context of (moral) institutions. Now institutions surely exist. But, corre60 G. H. von Wright, "On Promises", Theoria
291-293.

28 (1962), 277-297, esp.

61
Sidgwick, The Methods
of Ethics,
305«2. Compare Searle,
Speech
Acts, 1 8 0 n l , which echoes Ross.
62 J. Hintikka, "Deontic Logic and Its Philosophical Morals", in Models for
Modalities
(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1969), 184-214,
esp. 206ft'.
63 Margolis, Values and Conduct, 59-62 (for Margolis' remarks on Searle, see
esp. 88-90).
64 See further criticism, in H. Meynell, "The Objectivity of Value Judgments",
Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1971),
118-131.

92

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

sponding to them, are there really institutional facts, as Searle, following Miss Anscombe, seeks to enumerate? The anthropological critique (which Searle underestimates) emerges in distinct opposition
again. Perhaps Hume was right: truth consists only either in relations
of ideas, or in matters of (brute) fact, so that it is neither true nor
false that x owes the grocer money for sending x a quantity of edibles.
The institutional arrangement or implicit contract is undeniably there,
as Hume himself concedes. 65 But how do we interpret its ontological
status; or has it any?
Let us imagine a redescription of events which would omit reference to any institutions, whatsoever. It would be couched strictly in
the language of brute fact. Such a translation would do away with all
but the "purely physicalistic" aspect of things. Imagine a terse
account of a funeral: 66 several human organisms clustered about a
box of wood, gesticulating, emitting a series of cadences; raising the
box of wood, spreading earth, lowering the box of wood under the
ground, starting a fire, and then moving away from the wooden box in
a patterned arrangement, and departing. This account is crude, but
can be refined to please more fastidious "physicalists". But it is in
principle unsatisfactory as an account, because it is grossly incomplete. It does not explain or motivate the event; it does not enable us to
infer or distinguish what is going on, except by subtle jests, which
belie the very endeavor to systematically expunge reference to e.g.
human purposes and customs. In attempting to retreat behind a
facade of brute fact, such a linguistic reform only inadvertently
emphasizes its own contrast with an equally valid but complementary
dimension of human experience and its expression (description) in
language. So, something is definitely lost in translation! By eliminating
the descriptions of funerals, descriptions to which we are accustomed,
in favor of linguistic pseudo-austerity, the clever polemicist can
present a brief directed against (supposed) superstition and sentimentality. But denial of their existence would be self-cancelling.
The anthropological critique, then, embodies a curious denial that
'institutions' as a concept represents any "ultimate" state-of-affairs.
And postulated rules (allegedly) can always be rewritten or refor65 See Hume, /I Treatise of Human Nature, 490.
66 What follows, caricatures a parodizing literary technique effectively
employed by, e.g. Voltaire and Tolstoy. The theme is death; the method, understatement.

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

93

mulated in such a way as to wipe out their specifically institutional
character. This is a drastic, negative ontological claim, and it invokes a
rude principle of parsimony for proposed "explanatory models". The
anthropological argument declares that while to speak of institutions
as facts may be all right, to discuss institutions/ facts is to commit a
serious category mistake. Even institutions are to be redescribed, in
order just to count as facts; and this approach underlies even Searle's
own relatively "brute" starting point, namely the "phonetic sequence" 67 uttered in making a verbal promise.
In defense of Searle, we shall rephrase more acceptably his dogma
about the absence (non-existence) of any detached standpoint, with
respect to promising. For even if such an impartial vantage point
could be discovered, it would have to co-exist along with the evaluative, although one could nonetheless try to distinguish it from the
evaluative in principle. 6 8 So, a detached sense of 'promise' can but
operate together with a committed one, thereby creating a paradox
which manages to reduce the pretensions of the anthropologicallyinspired critique, even while its rationale is rescued from oblivion.
Consider one further difficulty: so-called 'value-loaded' words.
For example, what does one term the configuration made by one stick
nailed to another, shorter stick at a perpendicular angle, and at a small
distance below the top of the vertically planted stick? It is called a
cross. But to paraphrase the old song, a cross is not just a cross. The
symbolic component of the cross is not adequately understood in
talking about e.g. erecting or planting two pieces of wood; unless it is
slyly being denigrated all the while. In some cultures, the cross might
have a different (or no discernible) meaning - but such a caveat is

67 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 49; Speech Acts, 182. Compare Hume,
A Treatise of Human Nature, esp. 522, 524, 525; and see H. A. Prichard, Moral
Obligation, 172, 176, 177, 178. "Phonetic sequence" drives an unfortunate
wedge between linguistic form and moral content, instead of welding them together. But of course Searle does refrain from thence considering 'institutional
facts' as an unwholesome accretion to their brute analogues.
68 Hare, "Descriptivism", 117-118, 121-122. Such a move does not have to be
accompanied by an anthropologically-styled critique. For example, a medal for
military bravery could plausibly be bestowed by the enemy, as a token of their
admiration or respect for courage, heroism and valor, although not for (the
successful completion of) the military mission. So the 'external' and 'internal'
points of view may coincide, rather than conflict.

94

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

pointless, although highly obtrusive. For some cultures (and individuals) are sensitive to its conventional meaning, and that is what
counts.
The anthropologistic critique succeeds only if we ignore this, or
make the bizarre and wholesale claim that moral discourse is somehow
an aberration. What is "real" can then only be the physical facts, e.g. a
T-shaped piece of wood, planted at a certain longitude and latitude,
and established from time t onward. (But if everything else is thought
merely the figment of an overworked imagination, 69 then why not
that, too?)
This line of all-out attack might have a strong appeal, in an "age of
science". But it is really an unwarranted extension, as James might
say, of a guasi-scientific viewpoint. Anthropologism has gotten unglued, and exceeded its applicable boundaries. A 'Stop' sign would not
mean anything to a Martian, but what does that imply? Only that
Martians do not have any traffic regulations. 70 This surely cannot
indicate to men that automobiles on city streets are but the product
of ontological hallucinations. If logic cannot stop both reductionism
and relativism in their tracks, then facts should take over and do it.
The alleged primacy of e.g. physical science is, by simple parity of
reasoning, likewise subject to disengaged close criticism. Nothing can
be "privileged" or exempt therefrom, if that strategy is to remain both
honest and thoroughgoing, linguistically or otherwise.
Why should we consider brute facts fundamental, and institutional
ones derivative, instead of vice versa? There may be reasons for it, but
at bottom this is nothing more than one epistemological prejudice, or
preference. Every description is or involves an interpretation — even
the one which is "correct". And yet, in ethics, some philosophers
persist in believing that the ineradicable presence of interpretation
must vitiate everything else: witness Nietzsche's "there are no moral
phenomena, only a moral interpretation of phenomena". 7 1 But there
69 Such a world-view is eloquently elaborated by L. Wittgenstein, in "A
Lecture on Ethics", Philosophical Review 74 (1965) 3-12. It is, however, preposterous. And see above, page 78.
70 Cf. Wittgenstein on "forms of life".
71 Beyond
Good and Evil, § 108. For 'interpretation', Nietzsche uses
Ausdeutung.
Compare Hamlet's conventionalist thesis, "nothing is either good
or bad, but thinking makes it so". This fosters the idea that moral standards "are
all in the mind". So, then, is everything else: 'reality', 'pain' whatever. Then as-

95

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE
is

still

one

fresh

anthropologically-minded

rebuttal

of

Searle

to

c o m m a n d our attention.
VII
Lastly, t h e n , w e s h o u l d scrutinize Hare's vigorous critique o f Searle's
bridging o f t h e descriptive-normative gap,
Hare's

views might

be

initially labelled

72

prior t o o u r c o n c l u s i o n .
as

"commending

vs. all

c o m e r s " . Hare insists that t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a description and
an e v a l u a t i o n is o n e o b t a i n i n g

b e t w e e n t w o separate orders.

Evalua-

t i o n s and descriptions m a y g o t o g e t h e r ; as w h e n praising s o m e t h i n g as
a 'good' (or as ' g o o d ' o f its k i n d ) in virtue o f its having certain properties.

73

T h e having o f t h o s e properties, h o w e v e r , is s o m e t h i n g logi-

cally and n o t m e r e l y o p e r a t i o n a l l y distinct f r o m being called ' g o o d ' ( b y
dint o f having t h e m ) . Grinding o u t any 'ought' t h e n requires a separate or i n d e p e n d e n t logical step o f j u d g m e n t , even t h o u g h the respective acts o f describing and evaluating m a y o c c u r s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , or go
hand-in-hand. Moral w o r d s are t h e r e f o r e " s u p e r v e n i e n t " u p o n descriptions. This is the m o t i v a t i o n f o r Hare's " n o n c o g n i t i v i s t " s t a n c e . 7 4
sertions are either trivially true or else conceptually contrastless, hence impossible or unutterable.
72 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 44n3.
73 Cf. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy,
126-127, on the Stevensonian
"second pattern of analysis".
74 See Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy,
164, 297, 298; R. M. Hare, The
Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 80, 131. The concept of
'supervenience' is hopelessly muddled. If it means that 'values depend upon
facts', where 'depend' has a logical emphasis, then it boosts the stock of naturalism. Yet Hare rejects naturalism, by relying on independent tests of value, moral
disagreement, open-question arguments, and other tactics. Moreover, Hare's
appropriation of Leibniz' law of 'identity of indiscernibles' works on behalf of
naturalism, too; for it would be logically odd (to say the least) for the same
observer (spectator, judge) to evaluate A as 'good' (or 'beautiful') and B as 'bad'
(or 'ugly') if A and B are two objects (say) identical in all respects (e.g. physical
properties), except for being different specimens, or coordinated by a different
spatiotemporal location. This cannot be explained away by referring to such
human variables as the 'occasions of experience' (Aristotle and Aquinas, among
others, discuss this), because this only accounts for the occurrence, while doing
nothing to substantiate or sanction issued judgments. Identity of indiscernibles
is perfectly harmonious with supervenience, but neither is compatible with
«on-naturalism. Yet Hare proclaims all three doctrines, and moreover considers
them mutually and essentially related.

96

THE SEARL1AN CHALLENGE
What can this reveal a b o u t the use o f moral terms? Can it e x p l a i n

how

t o use t h e m ? Or is this left up t o t h e idiosyncratic j u d g m e n t o f

the

individual? A p p a r e n t l y ,

yes.

Dewey's

dichotomy

between

"prizing" and "appraising" 7 5 recalls Hare in s o m e r e s p e c t s , 7 6 y e t deliberately retains a strong c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n (a) initial desire and
( b ) that w h i c h is approved u p o n r e f l e c t i o n . Hare w o u l d utterly d e t a c h
the t w o . But then what criteria,

if a n y , can ever be supplied f o r the

correct use o f moral w o r d s ? This is a c o m p r e s s e d , logical-linguisticgenetic

reproach

against

Hare.

It c u t s a bit d e e p e r t h a n a mere

c o m p l a i n t c o n c e r n i n g f r e e d o m t o f o r m u l a t e u n i q u e , high-level t h e o r i e s
that Mrs. F o o t brings up, alluding t o b o t h N i e t z s c h e
machus.

78

Mrs. F o o t

77

and Thrasy-

is under the i m p r e s s i o n that Hare m u s t d e n y

that. e.g. N i e t z s c h e is a moral p h i l o s o p h e r , i n a s m u c h as N i e t z s c h e ' s
'will-to-power' is n o t m e a n t t o b e ( n o r c o u l d it b e ) universalized.
Since N i e t z s c h e is recognized as a moralist, s o m e t h i n g p r e s u m a b l y m u s t
be w r o n g w i t h Hare's prescriptivist criteria, as applied t o historical
figures and theories. N i e t z s c h e d o e s try t o reverse ordinary c o n c e p t i o n s o f right

and

w r o n g — so d o e s T h r a s y m a c h u s , perhaps also

Like Stevenson, and possibly Hume, Hare perceives that values are parasitic
upon natural conditions. Like Hare, D. H. Monro, in Empiricism and Ethics
(Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1967), sees that the relation
between our moral rubrics and states-of-affairs is not accidental, but arises in
part from uniformity in human personality traits and patterns, as well as from
stability in the environmental surroundings in which we live. These twin phenomena (human nature and the outside world) are rich in potential norms for
conduct, yet none of these writers considers it justified to move from, e.g. the
"second pattern of analysis" to something less modest, or less cautious. The
underlying reason for this is the feeling that human perspective too readily and
too facilely tends to dictate morality. (Cf. Spinoza, Ethics, Part IV, prop, viii.)
To launch an Austinian rebuttal: 'the human perspective'? Is there any other
kind? Even for the naturalist (such as Mill) who includes 'sentient creation' in
his purview, every "spokesman" will be unavoidably human, and therefore
(?) hopelessly provincial in outlook. But if this is a valid objection to naturalist
ethics, then it counts against nearly every constructive venture in human history, and automatically nullifies all future prospects. See also above page 85-86
w41 and page 93 «68.
75 J. Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1939), 5,32.
76 Cf. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 165, 268.
77 P. Foot, "Moral Arguments", Mind 67 (1958), 513.
78 p. Foot, "Moral Beliefs", repr. in W. D. Hudson (ed.), The Is-Ought
Question, 209-212, and in P. Foot (cd.), Theories of Ethics, 96-99.

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

97

Machiavelli. 79 But denial is not the same thing as flight; nor is negation to be mistaken for lack of interest. Nietzsche is n o less (and n o
more) a moralist, even on Hare's terms, than a positivist is in some
sense a metaphysician, or the atheist a religious thinker of sorts.
Generically, the same set of problems is grappled with; merely the
solutions proposed are novel. (Compare above, page 74ff.).
The kind of criticism which really does puncture Hare's attempt to
categorially distinguish moral f r o m non-moral words is at once more
and less sophisticated. To call 'good' something which is nearly universally condemned as bad or evil is at least understandable; whereas,
to call it 'super erogatory' or 'happy' or 'prudential' or 'skilled', would
not even be intelligible. To so describe e.g. the My Lai massacre
would be to commit a genuine category error, to make no logical
sense whatsoever; whereas, to call the My Lai massacre 'good' makes
perfect sense, indeed it would have to, for anyone meaningfully to
deny that, and denominate the events which took place there as
b a d . 8 0 As with truth and falsity, 'good' requires a correlative term in
order to be applicable. Value-theory demands (minimally) a twovalued matrix of its own. But if moral words are "supervenient", then
we cannot know how to properly apply them, for they have been
amputated
from the rest of the language, just as Moore cut off
'good' and deemed it a simple, non-natural property or quality.
Whether (and why) we want to call My Lai good or bad might be
an "open-question". Yet a wide range or cluster of (by common consent) 'moral terms' simply would not apply here at all. Just as filling
in the blank in "My Lai incident was
" with 'nitrogenous' would
make no logical sense. So too would inserting 'teleological' or 'equitable', although these are (by agreement) moral terms. To maintain
that My Lai was desirable, virtuous, pleasant or benevolent, is at least
logically (if not evaluatively) appropriate. If this were not so, then to
judge My Lai as undesirable, unpleasant, vicious, outrageous, unfriendly or horrendous would cease to exert any meaning, logical or moral.
Also, one would then be unable to explain the prevalent phenomenon
of differences of opinion. No doubt moral terms sometimes are supervenient upon descriptions, for argument's sake. But Searle's quest is
79 See Hare, "The Promising Game", 4 0 9 .
80 We are assuming 'pre-established' meanings for at least a small battery of
(so-called) ethical terms as is only reasonable to do.

98

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

for one, just one 'is-ought' counter-example; a debating point to be
remembered. (Recall page 83).
The vulnerable spot in Hare's ethics has been dented here; for
Searle is dealing primarily with philosophy of language. 8 1 So the
baselessness of Hare's charges depends upon considerations which go
well beyond Searle's own immediate problematic. Here are the
wider consequences which flow from a refutation of the typical prescriptivist program:
1. The time has come for a radical reappraisal of non-naturalist,
non-cognitivist ethics, which has cast a very large and brooding
shadow for over seventy years. If there are rules (which Searle does
spell out) for the correct (not necessarily morally irreproachable), i.e.
the logically responsible use of key ethical vocabulary, 8 2 then the
exaggerated sort of debunking performed first by Moore, then by
emotivism, and subsequently by Hare, Nowell-Smith, and others in
our time, will be doomed once and for all.
2. Moral terms are not always employed superveniently, and so
there is a limit, if not a downright handicap, to invoking Moorean
"intuition" and the corresponding "isolation-test" of value. These
must on occasion yield to moral conclusions derivable from the facts,
including the exceedingly complex facts of human nature: witness the
direction taken in Mill's " p r o o f ' . Such a triumph is tempered only by
the realization that moral psychology is a vast and soberingly difficult
undertaking. 8 3
3. The burden of proof has been shifted: it now rests upon those
81 Speech Acts, 3-4, 176-177. Searle docs alas logically subordinate cthical to
linguistic concerns, in that he views the 'is-ought' distinction (as well as
its correction) as tumbling out of general semantic viewpoints. (See below,
page 100.) Searle's discussion of the relationship between philosophy of
language and ethics is arbitrarily distorted by D.H. Ruben, "Searly on Institutional
Obligation", The Monist 56 (1972), 600-611, esp. 601-602, 608. This is
especially unfortunate in light of Ruben's own recognition that the rules which
enable Searle to formulate his derivation are as complex as the situation they
describe (ibid., 606). This does not entail that 'promising' is an unilluminating
category in which to frame moral rules; for'Promising'also engenders the larger
but coterminous concept of responsibility.
82 Speech Acts, 57-62.
83 See G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy", Philosophy
33
(1958), 1-19, repr. in W. D. Hudson, cd., The Is-Ought Question, 175-195; also
R. Taylor, Good and Evil.

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

99

who unthinkingly repeat the catchwords and slogans of twentiethcentury ethics, offering only a stale rehash of, e.g. the opaque and
logically disastrous "naturalistic fallacy", 8 4 an uncritical acceptance
of which either fails or just refuses to ponder what is entailed by
clinging to that once-stirring Moorean thesis of a modern analysis.
Rejection of the doctrine (and criterion) of supervenience is already implicit in Searle's own ridicule of the anthropological or
'detached' reportorial standpoint as non-existent. 85 For to supervene
means first to withdraw from, and then to impose, judgment. According to Searle, the first step is impossible. 86 Promising is, moreover,
quite commonplace and mundane, as Searle points out: rarely is it the
terribly dramatic event that e.g. the social contract portrays it to be.
And the punishment for failure to comply with one's own promise
usually does fit the crime, as Hobbes and Kant alike observe. A breach
of etiquette leads to mild embarrassment; not paying a debt, to a fine
or jail; disappointing someone who matters, to regret; an indiscretion,
to disapprobation; cruelty, to remorse; disloyalty, to unhappiness.
Promises are sometimes quite "important", but they are not "paradigmatic" (as philosophers often suppose) of obligation. 87 Nor does

84 See Speech Acts, 132-136, for an intriguing review of that subject; also
R. J. Fogelin, Evidence and Meaning, 122-129, esp. 124; A. Edel, Method in
Ethical Theory,
Ch. V, 111-138, esp. 123; E. H. Duncan, "Has Anybody
Committed the Naturalistic Fallacy?" Southern
Journal of Philosophy
8
(1970), 49-55; D. P. Gauthier, "Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy", American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1967), 315-320; B. H. Baumrin, "Is there a Naturalistic
Fallacy?", ibid. 5 (1968), 79-89; and the classic article by W.K. Frankena.
"The Naturalistic Fallacy", Mind 48 0 9 3 9 ) , 4 6 4 ^ 7 7 .
85 See the provision in Speech Acts, 57-62, 5 7 n l , 193, 18-181, 1 8 0 n l ; "How
to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' " , 44-45. For comments, see Hare, "The Promising
Game", 399, and Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 286-287. See also Hume,
A Treatise of Human Nature, 523-524. See above, pages 93ff., as well.
86 Searle wavers between ruling out such a move logically, linguistically, or
even psychologically (or on all three grounds). Speech Acts, 197, ultimately
makes the criterion a logical one, by stipulating that "non-serious occurrences"
of the utterance of a promise, while making reformulation in indirect discourse
feasible, do not affect the status of the derivation, since they do not count
among the conditions for a genuine speech act of promising, anyway.
87 Speech Acts, 188. See Margolis, Values and Conduct, 95; G. J. Warnock,
The Object of Morality (London: Methuen, 1971), 96-1 13. D. H. Ruben mis-

100

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

Searle need that. On the contrary, the position of relying on special
circumstances, or o n an exeptional moral category, could then be
ignored with impunity by the 'is-ought' dichotomy enthusiast, even
within the province of deontology, and certainly outside it.
It is tempting to maintain that if Searle's derivation actually goes
through for something as highly "ordinary" as the illocutionary act of
promising, there is doubtless a large group of performative utterances,
for which similar empirico-logical derivations can be produced or repeated. Such optimism must be empirically buttressed, for not to
comb or pause to survey the evidence in each individual case would
be to commit a variant of the fallacy of composition. The experiment
must suggest itself as a future project, for Searle himself writes engagingly about generating an indefinite number o f proofs such as the one
he does construct. 8 8 Once done, the strongest possible link between
Searle's theory of language and directly normative ethical concerns
will have been forged, after all.

interprets the modesty of this position, and so goes on to argue that: (1) Searle's
optimism over the possibility of generating further counter-examples to the
is-ought "fork" is unjustified, perhaps unjustifiable (see "Searle on Institutional
Obligation", 601, 609nl5, 611); (2) Searle's derivation is based on ignoring a
supposed distinction between external and internal "reason-producing" items,
items which may account for one's conduct (ibid., 610). Actually, Searle
deliberately slides the two categories together when reflecting on the domain
of institutional obligation, as his critique of anthropologjzing makes evident.
Also, Ruben is misled by excessive concentration on situational conflicts, and
erects these into counter-examples to Searle's counter-example (ibid., 606-607,
608-609), a procedure about as successful, i.e. as misplaced, as Mrs. Foot's
similarly uninspired technique. Despite this exercise in irrelevancy, Ruben does
recognize that "morally speaking" (ibid., 608), an individual does, or is meant
to, take "responsibility" in the promising-context which Searle delineates: but,
he takes responsibility because he realizes that the specific rules do indeed bind
or apply to him; whereas, Ruben makes the notion of responsibility both logically and temporally antecedent to moral rules, whose status in turn is (falsely)
thought to be conditioned thereby. This is an interesting reversal of what might
be dubbed the 'fallacy of awareness' (or self-consciousness).
88 "How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is' ", 43, 56; and see Speech Acts, 185
(quoted above, page 80m23).

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

101

VIII

We proceed with a few necessary, decidedly unfashionable, and
"post-Searlian" conclusions. We have gained an understanding from
this chapter that either ethics or metaethics must "go". But which to
retain, and which to drop? Which claims, which discipline to honor;
which field to reject?
We now attempt to deliver two original blows against the unjustly
dominant tendencies and ambitions of metaethics. First, let us recall
the stress which metaethics itself quite properly places on the fact
that any "second-order" investigation is logically derivative from, and
therefore lost without, a correspondingly flourishing "first-order"
level of activity, i.e. moral discourse. 89 This 'theoretical underpinning' of metaethics is all but forgotten when 'theory-construction'
takes place, however. A metaethical theory then becomes defective;
inevitably, it winds up being hopelessly "out of touch" with the very
thing it supposedly studies. ^ T h i s mistake is not human, but deliberate
or built-in weakness. For metaethics is characteristically found as a
branch of "technical" philosophy which is several removes from
ethical language. Consequently, metaethics is by design oblivious to
the content of moral discourse, and instead concentrates exclusively
on isolating, distinguishing and elucidating the purely formal features
of moral "talk". This is subsequently defended as constituting the
only legitimate area of "professional" interest for philosophers. Just
as logic studies and regulates correct patterns of reasoning, and is not
concerned (except incidentally) with concrete deductions, this "reduction" of ethics to metaethics eschews classical as well as concrete
problems of moral life, remaining content to outline the typology of
moral discourse as its sole enterprise. Small wonder that the dispensation
of practical advice or of guidelines for human conduct is rarely caseexamined, and if so only by accident. Ethics (=meteathics) neither creates, discovers, applies, urges or recommends norms; it sits back and
examines their formal relations and structure alone; it but yields
pronouncements concerning the logical fitness of whatever is pro-

89 Above, pages 72-79.
90 Especially emotivism, which claims to be "closely attuned" to the talking
point of view, to moral/linguistic bedrock. See Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 114, 119, 122-123, 132-133, 144, 147, for discussion.

102

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

posed to it. 9 1 Displaying any deeper moral concern is, professionally
speaking, considered "bad form".
The outcome of such policy is "gamesmanship". Even the influential G. E. Moore would deplore that, but his healthy respect for
"casuistry" in ethics has disappeared today. 92 So the moral temperament has grown sluggish; the intellectual muscles, unaccustomed to
exercise, have become torpid and atrophic. Occasionally 9 3 a philosopher (in the Anglo-American "school" of analysis) will address
himself to a moral dilemma, but only in a pitiful way, because the
spectacle afforded by the contemporary philosophical scene demands
that an interest in genuine moral issues be prefaced by an apology,
which is tantamount to forswearing even the provisional establishment
of a norm and therefore bound to be ineffective from the outset. 9 4
The result: passionate commitment to a welter of technicalities,
building up to the grand anti-climax — refusal to cultivate a sound
moral 'point of view'. No mandates: for (meta-)ethics cannot, by selfimposed restriction, exhibit or generate any; indeed, its own most
cherished interests preclude accomplishing that. If conclusions do
crop up, they are faultlessly spontaneous, haphazard, prejudiced or
simply adventitious!
The rusting and withering away of ethics began more than thirtyfive years ago with a pejorative dictum that the "problems of men"
were pseudo-problems, or at least not worthy of philosophic attention. The technique has changed, but the manner is the same as ever. We
are still in the fell clutch of positivism, beset by its lingering after-

91 A succinct restriction of t h e f u n c t i o n of ethics t o this (and n o o t h e r ) task
may be gleaned f r o m C. D. Broad's synopsis of Kantian ethics, in Five Types of
Ethical Theory, 123.
92 G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 4-5. For a terse but appreciative observation,
see J. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, 2nd. ed. (New York: The M o d e m
Library, 1930), 222n.
93 The strictures which follow are perfectly general in scope; they do not
"indict" anyone in particular. Nor do they covertly attack straw men, however.
94 Richard Taylor is a marked exception; but Taylor is in self-styled rebellion
against metaethics and its pretensions. However, Taylor regards 'casuistry' in t h e
same disparaging way as, say, Kant treats the dagmatists and the conflict over the
antinomies of speculative cosmology. See Good and k'vill, 163-172.

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

103

effects. 9S The "one-sided diet" 9 6 which metaethics provides perceptibly
leads to a professionally irresponsible burial of "first-order" issues, as well as their "second-order" clarification and possible
"third-order" resolution. Metaethics is accountable for its own demise,
in continuing to insist (bankruptedly) that its paramount concern resides with first-level "talk".
If the livelihood of metaethics does depend on the domain of
"talk", then why is there no current source for fruitful metaethical
contemplation? Because the initial modesty and unassuming character
of metaethics have turned into arrogant disregard for everything save
the proliferation of harmless logical minutiae. To identify and discriminate the logical properties of certain kinds of discourse may be endlessly fascinating, 97 but to make it the main business is to select materials poorly; to elevate it into an end-in-itself shows bad judgment, as
well as bad taste. 9 8 Metaethicians may protest that it is somehow impossible to ever get back to the first-order setting, once one has advanced
to the second-order realm of reflection. But that is precisely the permanent, irreparable effect of pursuing a grossly mistaken methodologyThe second major consideration which mitigates against metaethics
is the absurd pomposity of its (self-appointed) analogy with, e.g.
metamathematics. 9 9 If this analogy is taken at all seriously, then,
since the vocabulary of first-order moral discourse, like that of a
standard logical object-language, is sufficiently "powerful" or "rich",
we have a right to expect rigorous theorems resembling soundness,
compactness and completeness, or of such "limiting" proofs as
Goedel's incompleteness theorem, or the Skolem-Loewenheim

95 Not surprisingly, emotivists such as P. Edwards sincerely continue to
endeavor to scrap ethics, altogether, absurd as the proposal sounds.
96 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations,
I, § 593.
97 See Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy
188-195, on, e.g. Hare's most
recent attempt in this field.
98 These are opinions, of course. But there are opinions and then there are
opinions. Moreover, ours are distinctive, unduplicated. Nor are they 'metaphilosophical', except insofar as any reflective discourse about philosophy is considered such. In that sense, 'metaphilosophy' is but the name for an extension of
philosophy, but does not designate an autonomous subdiscipline or branch of
some kind. It enjoys no separate status. See above, Ch. II.
99 But not with 'metaphysics'. Heaven forbid!

104

THI- S E A R L I A N C H A L L L N G L

theorem. Metaethics must then be able to sufficiently "tighten up"
the morphology o f ethical discourse; to arrange formation rules,
transformation rules, rules for well-formed formulas; or in short, to
supply the nucleus of a deductive system. But metaethics can never
provide the systematic apparatus of metalogic, although some
misguided proponents did attempt to champion just such a lost
cause. Furthermore, even if such a literal interpretation were plausible, it would suffer from the undesirable (but intrinsic) consequence
that the semantic model for, or interpretation of, the syntax fabricated out of ethical language, is not entirely under the control of
would-be manipulators. 100 The reason for the failure is parallel to
what non-standard analysis engenders in metamathematics. If
metaethics were really like metalogic in its principles and operations,
nothing would be ultimately gained from its sham of rigor, because
the semantic construal of any elaborate (meta-)ethical theory would
turn out to remain potentially as ambiguous as b e f o r e . 1 0 1 Deviations
from a fixed ("standard") interpretation or its isomorphs would then
run as widely variegated in metaethics as those already encountered in
non-standard analysis. The philosopher's dream of total precision
therefore overshoots its mark, backfiring completely. As Whitehead
once said, "exactness is a fake". Some vision.
Moreover, what about finding analogues to all the well-known logical
paradoxes? Harnessing type-theory, or any other method specifically
designed to alleviate such projected difficulties in logic, would theoretically leave behind a never-ending spiral (or hierarchy) of ethical
metalanguages. Metaethics would lose its privileged place, and become
just another link in an infinite series of object-languages. Inasmuch as
the Leibnizian hope for producing a shared, universal metalanguage
was never realized, and is indeed known to be mathematically impossible (Goedel's and Tarski's chief results), it follows that metaethics could only occupy the beginning slot of a vast chain of
conceptual metalanguages of morals. Formalization on a massive
scale would bring on an unwelcome entourage, a maze in which the
100

T h e reason being, that the data-field is t o o vast and t o o unsystematic to

be summarized or recapitulated adequately by a f e w 'air-tight' rules. (NowellSmith is sensitive to this nuance, whereas Castañeda is a n y t h i n g but.)
101

This problem

likewise

renders exaggerated

philosophico-semantic

pre-

o c c u p a t i o n with metamathematics simply much ado about nothing. 1'or its e f f e c t s
on ethical t h e o r y , consult e.g. the w o r k o f Hallden, M c N a u g h t o n , others.

THE SEARLIAN CHALLENGE

105

supposedly unique status of metaethics would rapidly become lost,
and so find its claims dashed by its own pretensions. The usefulness
of 'metaethics' as a rubric would likewise dissipate in the face of e.g.
metametametametametametametametaethics, which makes no nonlogical sense, and which undoubtedly has no discernible subject
matter falling under it (for what is metametametametametametametametaethics, in turn?). Whereas, in mathematical logic, no matter how
long the chain gets, its links always have their own distinct conceptual
identity attached to them. 1 0 2 Now, the term 'metametaethics' still
does make sense; it means, or in unfamiliar prose refers to e.g. history of recent moral philosophy. But once we ascend further than just
two "metas", the words come to mean progressively less and less;
finally, nothing. So the 'meta' in 'metaethics' is both bizarre and
ultimately disadvantageous.
Since no one-to-one correspondence between logic and ethics
exists, the visions and aspirations of metaethics amount to silly
fancies. 'Metaethics' is merely a puff of noise and smoke. Metaethics
has, we believe, perpetrated an unthought-out, hasty, logically fraudulent exit from both the "timeless" and the urgent and pressing questions of life and moral reflection. The road back to those issues has
been responsibly (if obliquely) paved by examining Searle's challenging demolition of the quintessential metaethical tenet. Improved and
amended by some arguments we have adduced on Searle's behalf in
this chapter, as presented in overall support of his speech-act derivation, we may express finally some cautious optimism over the prospects for the recovery, indeed the resurrection, of once august topics
as 'the good life' as future elements of dispassionate ethical rumination.

IX

Contemporary preoccupation with metaethics at the expense of
normative ethics has led to an intolerable situation in which the parasite is steadily disemboweling its decayed host. Before a remedy can
be dispensed for this ill, the arguments of metaethics must be met and
overcome on their own ground, so that "traditional" ethico-philo102

This is why mathematicians do not " w o r r y " about such untoward develop-

ments; while ethicians have more reason to do so!

106

THl- SFARLIAN CHALLENGE

sophic concerns may be safely and legitimately r e s u m e d . 1 0 3 For
'metaethics' is not merely dangerous; it is fruitless, confusing, misleading. and logically untenable in the extreme.
For t o o long now, metaethics has falsely traded upon the alleged
invulnerability of "Hume's F o r k " , in many different guises. As a preliminary hypothesis, the 'is-ought' disjunction may be heuristic (see
page 72). However, t o prematurely confer quasi-axiomatic status upon
it and its value-theoretic correlates invites eventual refutation, which
is what Searle has, we think, achieved. Prior thereto, philosophy in
our time heard largely weak, intellectually half-hearted dissent, 104
which deservedly (albeit regrettably) was quashed. Searle's accomplishment forbids continuation of such cavalier treatment.
Wittgenstein, too, observed that philosophy does not form a
"super-order" among "super-concepts"; 1 0 5 for there is no "secondorder philosophy" 106 at all. Metaethics' most prized and subtle theses
are bogus, and so its most significant lessons are but negative and
self-exposing. Philosophy often ends in frustration. But somehow we
always renew and redouble our e f f o r t .

i°3
This of course incorporates a 'value' in its own right: namely intellectual
integrity. But it is hardly an embarrassing one! See above, page 71 n. 6.
104
See e.g. W. K. Frankena, "On Saying the Ethical Thing", in J. H. Gill, ed.,
Philosophy
Today No. I (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 250-278, esp. 251.
Frankena accepts the metaethics ethics split, thereby making his proposal
for a "normative metaethics" seem contradictory, or just self-defeating.
105
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, I,§ 97.
106 Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, I, § 1 2 1 . This is a part of
Wittgenstein's "technique" of "therapy"; but it can be divorced therefrom,
and recommended independently. See above, page 103, on levels of inquiry.

V
POSTLOGUE

This section consists of replies to possible objections, on various
topics covered throughout this study.
(1) Does the "protreptic argument" conflate logical with ethical
categories?
If there were any semantic confusion prevalent here, it would be
shouldered by the PA, not by us. But there is a connection between
modal and moral necessity. This may be seen in strictly logical terms
from the following premises: (a) 'it is necessary that p' entails 'p'
which is a trivial modal theorem; (b) it is not the case that: 'p is
obligatory' entails 'p', which is an equally unexceptionable deontic
principle, since an 'ought' does not logically necessitate an 'is'. Moreover, it would be pointless to make an action 1 morally incumbent
upon someone if its performance, i.e. the result thereof, were already
a reality. Imperatives of duty are future-oriented, in that they demand
that something be made the case. Therefore, (b) is as securely a
theorem as (a) is.
But from (a) and (b) together, the following is deducible: (c): i f ' p
is necessary', then 'it is possible that p is obligatory'. This means that
the connection between logical and moral necessity is not sheerly
fortuitous. Moreover, (c) can be strengthened. For, since 'q' entails 'it
is possible that q', and 'it is possible that q' entails 'it is possibly
necessary that q\ it follows as a modal rule that: 'É/' entails 'it is
possibly necessary that q\ Putting these together, we deduce from (c)
the following: (d): it is possible that ' "it is necessary that p " entails

l
The term 'action' is construed to include 'acts of omission', and also to
make room for thoughts, feelings, or very nearly anything that might conceivably form the basis for an imperative of duty, i.e. an obligation-statement.

108

POSTLOGUE

"it is possible that p is obligatory" '. In a more succinct, symbolic
formulation, (d) comes out as:
-N-(Np-*— N-

Op),

where the arrow represents entailment, and where '-N-f stands for 'it
is possible that r\
While both (c) and (d) may appear weak, they at least serve to
falsify such assertions as : 'it is necessary that p' entails that 'it is not
the case that p is obligatory'. To put it another way, it is not the case
that for all x, 'x is necessary' entails 'x is not obligatory', and f r o m
the denial of this entailment relation, we are entitled to derive the
possibility of some x which is both logically necessary and morally
obligatory; quantificationally, expressible as (e):
- N - (Ex) (Nx & Ox).
Something precise but limited follows: namely that moral obligations
constitute a sub-class of all necessary truths, relations or connections. 2 The PA claims, as we have interpreted it, to arrive at a result
which embodies both of these simultaneously. Such a claim cannot be
immediately ruled out. The PA'S conclusion may just be b o t h necessarily true and morally obligatory (although we have contended that it
happens to be neither).
(2) Suppose for the sake of argument that the PA did turn out to
be logically valid. Would it not be self-destructive, since what we
"cannot help doing" relieves one of the burden of "having" to philosophize, and thus of the responsibility for beginning (or maintaining)
controlled, disciplined reflection?
Since the PA does not reach its desired conclusion, this question is
academic. The significant parallel between moral and modal necessity
is not one which imposes any physical restraints on an individual's
ability to choose a definite course of action for himself, since it does
not involve, e.g. causal necessity. Logical truths "constrain" us to
recognize their veracity; they " c o m p e l " a certain "propositional atti2

T o express this contention more c x a c t l y , ' n e c e s s i t y ' i s a necessary (but not a
sufficient) condition for something's being 'obligatory'. Symbolically, -Np
entails -Op\ or the contrapositive Op entails Np.

POSTLOGUE

109

t u d e " , i n Quine's apt phrase. We may defy them, but only at our peril.
Obligations demand fulfillment, but notoriously they often fail to
obtain it. This does not mean that we are " f r e e " not to live up to our
obligations. Similarly, while we often deviate in our thinking from
accordance with, e.g. the laws of logic, this does not make them any
less nomic. 3 The canons of deductive inference compel intellectually; they do not "brainwash" or bind in chains. The relationship
between such norms and any corresponding moral obligations does
not insure (alas) that we shall perform up to expectations, to begin
with; and so, free-will is left unjeopardized.
Neither logical nor ethical "compulsion" intrudes upon volition or
choice. Otherwise, we should be both infallible intellectually, and
(automatically) incapable of ever making missteps, morally! But " t o
err is h u m a n " . And to be able to err, whether logically or morally,
signalizes that human freedom is not encroached upon. Total rectitude alone would endanger free-will.
Returning to the question: what if the PA were not fallacious, but
correct? What would follow? Only that we may not shrink f r o m philosophy; that sooner or later, even if only for a very brief duration, we
must engage in philosophy, whether we desire to or not. 4 And to
extricate ourselves f r o m possible further pursuit of philosophy, or to
prevent its taking hold of us permanently, we must likewise come up
with a (reasoned) approach which enables us to renounce philosophy

3 We are free to create (or discover) alternative systems of logic, or at least to
reformulate known or existing rules. A similar freedom does prevail in ethics,
and when it is proposed or taken advantage of, it is called moral (political,
social, religious, aesthetic) reform. This occurrence only involves replacement of
one standard by another. The possible denial of "all" standards might itself be
reprimanded as constituting, paradoxically or inconsistently, a standard of one
kind. But it could equally legitimately be regarded as a 'meta-standard', or else
as a "degenerate case" of standards, once invoked. The logic of this position is
both peculiar and ambiguous, but not perforce inconsistent or incoherent.
4 The gist of the PA's conclusion is then the prediction of an event which (it is
alleged) must take place eventually, at some moment or other in the course of
any given person's life. So the PA's theorem might be considered a 'synthetic a
priori' truth, having the force of logic behind it, and yet simultaneously a
description of a state of affairs (to be) realized in the world. 'Synthetic a priori'
is, however, a vexed if not dubious category, and the PA is already saddled with
enough logical encumbrances.

110

POSTLOGUE

"forever" — this calls for and reinforces the PA'S own line. But there is
no dilemma here: for if this is all that the PA enjoins, or can "prove",
then it is not a very strong or cogent exhortation to philosophy, after
all.
(3) Are there not many things which we have to do, but which
are not good; consequently, is not the probative force of the PA overestimated?
Indeed, the PA is not successful, on other grounds. But in fairness,
(3), with its tacit appeal to e.g. "necessary evils", is weak. For to call
something by that name is a blunder, or virtually a contradiction in
terms. People must often make sacrifices, but consider, e.g. Mill's
contention that worthwhile sacrifices are to occur within the overall
context of promotion of some good, or at the very least be for the
sake of preventing an evil — not serving as its accomplice. For otherwise the moral enterprise would make very little sense. Also,
(3) ignores that the PA is a logical paean, and so conceives of philosophizing as a virtuous activity. (See above, Ch. II, page 20). If someone wishes to dispute that presumption, he is not even in a position to
listen to the PA, much less to appreciate its pseudo-logical drift. Moreover, to affirm that 'X is good, but do not pursue X1 sounds logically
odd. It calls for an explanation, in the absence of which it is selfdefeating. We might under certain circumstances say 'X is good, but Y
is better, so pursue Y in preference to A". Or else the issue might be
whether there is even time to pursue X, given competing moral
pressures. Classically, X might also conflict with some (other) duty Z
which could demand immediate attention, or which at least would
take momentary precedence over X. But unless such qualifications are
introduced, 'X is good, but do not pursue A" remains an aberration.
So, if philosophy is good or at any rate a good, then (3)'s implicit
criticism misses the mark, as our introductory discussion in Ch. I
(pages 1-4) might also show.
(4) Does not the "derivation" of 'ought' from 'is' founder
because 'ought' is used indiscriminately?
No. The meaning of 'ought'is fairly straightforward. The PA wishes
to impose an obligation to study philosophy ; while Searle presents a
hypothetical case in which one is under self-imposed obligation to make
good a promise, or one's word. Mill's problem is more complex, because
(a) he upholds the 'is-ought' dichotomy, and does not try to limit or
circumvent this distinction; (b) nonetheless he attempts to lay down a

POSTLOGUE

111

foundation for ethics, and to establish a "binding" norm; (c) he holds
that it is not necessary to (consiously) subscribe to a utilitarian standard,
in order to promote the end which utility always prescribes, as in
Smart's "acting optimifically". However, what emerges from the
study of Mill's writings, as well as from an examination of his " p r o o f '
and its underlying reasoning, is a purported obligation to pledge one's
intellectual allegiance to utilitarianism, upon recognizing the truth or
validity of that ethical doctrine. In short, the obligation is: to be a
proponent or defender of utilitarianism, over and above either following its precepts, or at least always conducting oneself compatibly
and conformably therewith. The duty is quite restricted in scope.
Note that in each case, the reference range of the moral injunction
arrived at (or pretended to) differs. The PA is, or would like to be,
imperative for everybody. Searle's promiser is an individual, and only
he actually incurs the obligation, relative to the promisee. Mill however realizes that a few men, namely moralists, philosophers, and
highly reflective persons, have the ability to understand the theory of
utilitarianism. All are capable of obeying or heeding it without much
thought or deliberation; indeed, unconsciously. Common people do
have duties, but their duties do not include the special additional ones
imposed upon the inquirer or thinker. These peculiar intellectualist
obligations Mill's proof fastens upon, albeit indirectly. By contrast,
the PA does not wish to draw distinctions between philosophers and
"simple men" with respect to the dramatic question, 'to philosophize
or not to philosophize'. [These remarks serve, too, to clarify the
thematic unity of the present work, and to trace a thread running
through each of the foregoing chapters.]
A few more points:
I. Since obligations generally refer to purposes beyond themselves, we are unable to accept the concept of duty taken as an endin-itself, or to confer upon it intrinsic value. Herein lies part of the
motivation behind our Ch. I deflation of 'obligation' as a candidate
for the title of central ethical category.
II. Verbally, an obligation is anything which we "are bound to
do or to forbear from doing", whether undertaken contractually, via
an oath, or through some other means. This includes duties which
have no special legal basis, as well as ones which we naturally enter
upon, without profound evaluation and subsequent assent; or which
are genetically incurred upon minimal socialization, involving the in-

112

POSTLOGUE

culcation and internalization of accepted norms of conduct.
III. The open-question "why am I obligated to perform suchand-such?" is a meaningful one; it could not be so, if obligations were
really surds or ultimate resting points, i.e. first principles of ethics (as
indeed Kant and others have thought). Not only is the "why"question meaningful; it often draws an answer, and one more illuminating than merely "well, you are, and that is all". This means that
obligations alone are not sufficient for an ethical theory to be comprehensive, including those exasperatingly unclear versions of intuitionism, which rest on the most tenuous of visual analogies.
(5) Granted that in each instance we are dealing with some form
of obligation. What then is the place of such substitute terms as 'must'
and 'should', alongside of 'ought'?
'Must' and 'should' are allied to 'ought', or even synonymous for
some purposes. Consider the following.
(A) You ought to clean out the garage today.
(B) You should clean out the garage today.
(A) and (B) are intensionally equivalent. Now, 'must' may strike one
as being stronger in force than 'ought'. If so, then any comparison
becomes merely a matter of degree. But even this does not hold up
uniformly. For, while
(C) You must clean out the garage today
appears more urgent than either (A) or (B), by the same token
(D) You ought to go to the ball game today
strikes us as at least as forceful as, if not more so, than
(E) You must go to the ball game today
is. The term 'must' in (E) could well mean "you owe it to yourself to
see the ball game today", in which case it would properly be construed
as expressing a self-regarding duty. But it might also be interpreted "if
you want to enjoy yourself, go to the ball game today", i.e. as a
hypothetical imperative. This in itself illustrates that there are
thoroughly approved ends lying "beyond" the pale of duty proper.

POSTLOGUE

113

Or, (E) might be idiomatically retranslated as "(If you want to) do
yourself a favor, go to the ball game today". This shows clearly that
(E), despite employing the term 'must', is by no means necessarily a
sterner 'command' than (D); probably just the contrary.
How we regard the meaning of ancillary expressions such as 'must'
and 'should' becomes then largely a matter of taste. 'Ought' is the key
word, and any variants encountered are as if purely stylistic. It is open
to anyone to specify a technical or precise meaning for each of the
auxiliary words that crop up, in relation to some larger theory,
logical strategy or special distinction. Our own more limited purposes
simply do not require any such maneuver. Besides, discriminating
between 'oughts' and obligations seems to us a distinction without a
corresponding difference.
(6) What is the upshot of this work? Is it sometimes legitimate to
draw an 'ought' inference categorically from an 'is', and, if so, what
does this result imply for philosophy?
If we are correct in supporting and sifting out the pros and cons of
Searle's "derivation", then it is correct to conclude to (or infer)
an 'ought' from an 'is', in some cases. The universal ban on moving
from the level of description to that of evaluation has therefore been
negated, even though the is-ought distinction (like the analytic/synthetic split) remains pedagogically useful, as one introduction to key
ethical problems. Undoubtedly there do remain many fallacious deductions of 'ought' from 'is', scattered throughout ethics and its
history, for which the is-ought "gap" still serves usefully as an effective barrier or blockade: but the underlying theory has severe limitations and to that extent is erroneous.
In select cases, e.g. promising, it would be more elegant (as well as
accurate) to say that 'is'-statements embody logically inseparable
'ought'-propositions. This is quite faithful to Searle's own endeavor,
inasmuch as he claims that the transition from "you are under an
obligation to pay Jones $5" (putative description) to the judgment
that " y o u ought to pay Jones $5" is a strictly logical one, yet so
minimal in scope that we are entitled to say that the two sentences
have the same meaning. 5
s
A similar view is developed by D. Z. Phillips and H. O. Mounce, in Moral
Practices (New York: Schocken Books, 1970), Appendix 2, 119-124, on the
subject of "Moral Practices and Miss Anscombe's Grocer".

114

POSTLOGUE

What about omens for the future? If we have been even partially
successful, then the way has been pointed out at last for resumption of
large-scale ethical concerns and systematization, with which classical
moral philosophers (such as Mill) previously were occupied. Contemporary analytic thought has unwisely chosen to abandon or leave
behind this field, owing to unwarranted self-assurance that normative
ethics is no longer possible, or indeed, that it never was possible. This
trend has been most unfortunate. We hope this work shall help lead
philosophers to a much-needed reversal of form and interest.
( 7 ) Searle denies that "external" criticism of, e.g. an institution is
possible. Yet it is acknowledged that "internal" vs. "external" criticism can be logically distinguished, and that both kinds involve
genuinely alternate postures. But, (i) can someone remain a purely
"internal" critic without gradually leaning in the direction of the
"detached anthropological standpoint"? And, (ii) cannot someone be
said to be an "external" critic, yet accept an institution as (morally)
applicable, or as binding upon himself? (See above, page 84ff.)
It is possible to stay "inside"; for example, to approve in general of
banking (and with no large or vested interest therein), yet at the same
time observe that the bank business is at any time replete with a
multitude of swindlers, thieves, dishonest brokers, who corrupt it and
thereby soil its reputation. One is not necessarily led therefrom to a
wholesale condemnation of banking as an institution. One may remain
an internal critic and yet be pro-banking, in spite o f sordid truths. This
example answers (i) affirmatively, in effect.
The answer to (ii) is also yes; but someone who does do this
usually risks being deemed or branded a hypocrite. Take the case of an
avowed Marxist who buys a house. This action, as the Marxist should
realize, conflicts with his theoretical disdain for the institution of
private property. Yet it would be foolish to deny that people can, and
often do, act against their own most cherished beliefs. Besides, the
Marxist, in turn, could retaliate as follows: ( 1 ) revolution now! (2) as
long as the institution of land-ownership continues in existence, one is
forced to go along with the unyielding mechanism, or else, withdraw
from society altogether, move to a commune or leave civilization,
if such escape is personally feasible. 6 (3) Marxism is only part of the
6

I f a Marxist bought his house and t h e n , realizing what he had done, sold it

immediately, he could be easily forgiven his " t r a n s g r e s s i o n " . B u t i f he held on

POSTLOGUE

115

valuational framework within which one formulates a code of personal conduct. Marxists also have wives and children to think about,
or lingering "bourgeois" commitments and attachments. Even such
qualifications do not entirely remove the sting; the Marxist may still
seem insincere, especially if "deeds speak louder than words". The
protestations above might only (inadvertently) show that the
Marxist's theoretical and political professions were outweighed by his
private actions, or that he was not "really" a Marxist after all. The
accuracy of the description is a very delicate matter, and perceptions
are bound to differ; judgments cannot be hard-and-fast. So while (ii)
likewise can be answered affirmatively, its route is exceedingly treacherous.

to his private domicile for an extended period of time, his doctrinal integrity
would become questionable, or severely compromised. "What is done cannot be
u n d o n e " is false, provided we allow for mitigation, or atonement for previous
deeds. Even so, a Marxist who owns his own home would not be a very
thorough-going one, and this would shed negative moral light on his personal
demeanor. So (in)consistency does play a considerable and warranted role in the
formation of moral judgments, as Kant forcefully maintained.

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126

INDEX OF NAMES

A n s c o m b e , G. V. M.. 88. 9 2 , 9 8 n ,
113n
A n t o n y , Mark. 50
Aquinas. St. T h o m a s , 6 5 n , 73n, 9 5 n
Aristotle, 4 - 6 , 8, 10, 12, 1 4 - 1 5 ,
2 I n , 2 6 n , 29, 3 1 - 3 2 , 4 4 , 4 5 n ,
4 6 - 4 7 , 52n, 5 9 n , 6 1 , 7 1 , 9 5 n
Augustine, St., 16
Austin, J. L., 8On, 88, 96n
B e n t h a m , J., 2 7 - 3 2 , 39, 55
Berlin, I., 78n
Beth. E. W„ 32. 34
Broad, C. D.. 4 2 n , 51n, 52, 1 0 2 n
Castañeda, H. N., 104n
Cicero, 16
C l e o p a t r a , 50
Copleston, F. C., 6 5 n
Darwinism, 70
Dewey, J., 8, 35n, 4 2 n , 7 0 n ,
102n
Donnelly, J., vii
Edwards, P., 103n
Epietetus, 1 In
Epicurean, 31
Fichte, J. G., 70n
Elew, A. G. N „ 83
F o o t , P., 8 9 - 9 1 , 9 6 , lOOn
F r a n k e n a , W. K., 9 9 n , 106n
F r e u d , S„ 52, 53
Goedel, K., 103, 104
Green, T. H., 3 6 n
Grose, T. H., 36n

96,

Hall, E. W., 22, 2 8 , 4 2 n , 4 7 , 5 2 , 58n
Hallden, S., I 0 4 n
Hamlet, 9, 9 4 n

Hare, R. M., 6 6 , 6 7 n , 77, 8 0 , 83.
8 5 n , 88, 89, 9 3 n , 9 5 - 9 8 , 1 0 3 n
Hegel, G. W. F., 31, 55, 71
Hintikka, K. J. J., 91
Hobbes, T., 8 2 n , 9 9
H u d s o n , W. D., 7 3 - 7 4 , 7 7 - 7 9
H u m e , D„ 1, 5, 3 4 - 3 6 , 4 3 , 6 6 - 6 7 ,
72, 87, 8 8 n , 9 2 , 9 3 n , 9 6 n , 106
James, W., 74, 7 7 , 9 4
Kant, I., 1 - 3 , 7n, 8, 19n, 2 6 n n , 2 9 ,
30, 7 0 , 7 I n , 7 2 n , 8 8 n , 9 0 n , 9 9 ,
1 0 2 n n , 112, 115n
Leibniz, G. W„ 70, 9 5 n , 104
Locke, J., 4 7
L o e w e n h e i m , L., 103
Lyons, D., 8 4 n
Machiavelli, N., 9 7
Macintyre, A., 56n
Margolis, J., 8 8 n , 91
Marxist, 114 115
M c N a u g h t o n , R., 104n
Mill, J. S., 2, 4 , 7, 8, lOn, Ch. Ill passim, 77, 8 5 n , 9 6 n , 9 8 , 110, 111,
114
M o n r o , D. H., 9 6 n
Moore, G. E „ 2, 6, 4 2 , 4 8 n ,
5 3 - 5 5 , 5 8 , 5 9 n , 6 7 , 70,
9 7 - 9 9 , 102
Narveson, J., 8 I n
Nicklaus, J., 6

51,
82,

Nietzsche, F., 3, 11, 5 4 , 5 5 , 9 4 , 9 6 ,
97
Nowell-Smith, P. H., 9 0 , 9 8 , 104n
Peirce, C. S., 7n

I N D E X OK N A M E S
Plato, 6, 2 7 n , 5 4 n , 5 5 n , 5 9 n , 71, 79,
82n
P o p p e r , Sir K., 63n
P o t t e r , V. G., SJ, 6 n , 7n
Quine, W. V. O., 109
Rawls, J., 84
Rembrandt, 69
Ritschl, A., 3 7 n
Ross, Sir W. D., 9 0 , 9 I n
R u b e n , D. H., 9 8 n , 9 9 n
Russell, B., 35n, 4 5 n , 87
Searle, J. R „ 4 , 5, 8, 36, Ch. IV passim, 110. I l l , 114
Shakespeare, W„ 50, 75n 9 4 n
Sidgwick, H„ 2 8 n , 5 1 - 5 5 , 91
Skolem, T.. 103
S m a r t , J. J. C „ 7n, 111
Socrates, 5, 71, 77, 85

127

Spinoza, B., 2 9 n , 5 4 n , 77, 9 6 n
Stevenson, C. L „ 8 3 , 9 5 n , 9 6 n
Stoics, 3, 31, 6 2 n , 6 4 n
Tarski, A., 104
Taylor, R., 2 5 n , 3 1 n , 1 0 2 n
Thrasymachus, 96
T o l s t o y , L., 9 2 n
l l r m s o n , J. O., 64
Vico, G., 73
Voltaire, 9 2 n
Warnock, G. J., 8 9 n , 9 9 n
Wertz, S. K . , 4 2 n
Whitehead, A. N., 104
Williams, B., 4 0 n
Wittgenstein, L., 74, 7 6 n , 78, 9 4 n ,
103n. 106
Wright, G. H. v o n . 9 0 , 9 1
Z e m a c h , E. M., 75n

128

INDEX OF SPECIAL TOPICS

Absolute, principle of the, 32, 34
Anthropological a r g u m e n t , 76n, 78,
8 2 n , 8 3 - 8 8 , 9 2 - 9 5 , 9 9 , lOOn,
114-115
Commitment,
intellectual,
5-7,
Ch. II passim,
63 -65, 7 4 - 7 5 ,
102, 106, 111
Desirable, m e a n i n g of, 28, 4 7 - 5 1 ,
58, 62
Facts, b r u t e i>s. institutional, 9 2 - 9 5
Free-will, 78, 1 0 8 - 1 0 9
H e d o n i s m , p a r a d o x of, 55
Inconsequentialist a r g u m e n t , 4 4 - 4 5
Is-ought derivation, 8 I n , et passim
Is-ought distinction, passim
H u m e a n d Mill o n , 3 6 - 4 4
Meaning of, 7 0 - 7 2
Metaethics,
critique
of,
72-79,
101-106
M c t a p h i l o s o p h y , Ch. II; 103«
Moral t e r m i n o l o g y , correct use of,
96-98
Naturalistic fallacy, 6 7 , 9 9
Obligation, Ch. II passim; also 1 - 8 ;
philosophical, 6 3 - 6 5 , 111
Open-question
a r g u m e n t , 53, 6 7 ,

8 2 - 8 3 , 9 7 , 110
Ought-is fallacy, 6 7 - 7 0
Oughts, 1 1 0 - 1 1 3
Paradox, of h e d o n i s m , 55
Positivism, 9 7 , 102
Promising, 5, 7 5 - 7 6 n , 8 0 - 8 2 , 8 6 n ,
88, 8 9 - 91, 9 8 - 9 9
P r o o f , Mill's, Ch. Ill passim; csp. 4 5
ff.
clarification, 4 7 - 5 4
criticisms, 54 - 57
f o r m a l i z a t i o n , 57 ff., 6 0 ff.
indirect p r o o f , 3 4 - 3 5
mathematical proof, 2 5 - 2 6 ,
32, 57
'proof,' meaning
of t e r m ,
23-26
psychological, 2 7 - 3 0
Protreptic a r g u m e n t , 5 - 7 , Ch. II,
107-110
Rcductionism,
in
contemporary
cthics, 7 2 ff., 101 f f .
in d e o n t o l o g y , 1 - 4 , 110
in Mill's p r o o f , 3 0 - 3 2
Supervenicncc,
critique
of,
95n,
9 6 - 9 8 , 99