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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.
The Soviet Battlefield Development Plan
(SBDP)
VOLUME VIII
Missions vs Capabilities (U)
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AT€-?₽-2680-t}5-83-VOL VIII
(ITAC TN M8760XWP)
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
The Soviet Battlefield Development Plan
(SBDP)
VOLUME УШ
Missions vs Capabilities (U)
__________AUTHORS
b6________
I b6
(Typist:! b6
DATE OF PUBLICATION
1 November 1982
Information Cutoff Date
October 1982
This product was prepared by the Red Team and approved
by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Department of the Army,
WARNING NOTICE
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-DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT-CHIEF-OF STAFF FOR INTELL-tGENCE
WASHINGTON.ОС 20310
RCH.YTO
ATTENTION 0Г
D AMI-FIR
1 November 1982
SUBJECT: Soviet Battlefield Development Plan <SBDP)
SEE DISTRIBUTION
1.	The volume you are now reading is only one part of a multi-volume effort
titled the Soviet Battlefield Development Plan (SBDP). The SBDP is an attempt
to provide an integrated and comprehensive analysis of Soviet military think-
ing, doctrine, and combined arms force development for the present and the
future, extending out to the turn of the century. Thus, it should allow Army
doctrine and combat developers to have a Ibng-range.view of the competition
they face, so that they may design U.S. Army doctrine and forces in a dynamic
perspective. Thereby they can exploit Soviet doctrine and force modernization
to give the U.S. Army advantages in equipment, weapons, training, and tactics.
2.	The SBDP is a forecast of Soviet force development for "combined arms"
operations in land warfare as we believe the Soviet "General Staff intends, it
is, therefore, not primarily a prediction but rather more an attempt to under-
stand the Soviet General Staff’s vision of the next two decades for planning
and programming. It is an attempt to provide a Soviet view, not a U.S. mirror
image. The Soviet ’General Staff does not have an "Air Land Battle" doctrine.
It has a "combined arms" doctrine of warfare under the conditions of both
conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. While there is much in
common between the two doctrines, the differences are far more important to
understand.
3.	The basic assumption for the SBDP is the probable Soviet assumption that
there will be no significant adverse changes in the present international,
order which will cause major alterations in the Soviet development strategy
for combined arms forces. The SBDP does take into account economic and demo-
graphic constraints that are reasonably predictable by Soviet planners..
Further, it also tries to anticipate the impact of new technologies on force
development.
4.	Since combined arms operations in Europe are clearly the central issue
for Soviet planners, the equipment, organizational, and operational forecasts
contained in the SBDP relate primarily to Soviet forces in the European
theater. However, since these planners must also worry about the Far East,
Southwest Asia, and power projection to non-contiguous regions, these noti-
European concerns are also treated but to a lesser degree.
This page is Unclassified
( 0348
DAMI-FIR	'	1 November 1952
SUBJECT: "Soviet Battlefield Development Plan (SBDP)
5.	Because Soviet combined arms doctrine is not conceptually restricted to the
theater of operations but also concerns the "rear," that is, the entire conti-
nental USSR as a mobilization and production base, the SBDP deals with this
aspect of force planning. Preparation of the "rear" for both nuclear and non-
nuclear conflict is seen by the General Staff as the sine qua non and the first
step in an all combined arms force development.
6.	The SBDP consists of eight volumes and an Executive Summary. These eight
volumes are organized to provide an interpretive framework within which to
integrate and analyze the large quantity of intelligence information we have on
Soviet ground forces.
7.	The following provides a brief overview of this interpretive framework:
a.	Volume I explores the ideological and historical heritage which shapes
the perspectives of Soviet military planners.
b.	Volume II flows logically from Volume I showing how ideology and history
combine in the Soviet militarization of the homeland, i.e., the preparation of
the "rear” for war.
c.	Volume III presents an "order of battle" listing of, and forecast for,
the ground force structure which has resulted from the ideological and histori-
cal factors reviewed in the two preceding volumes.
d.	Volume IV discusses the equipment used by the forces described in
Volume III and forecasts developments in these weapons out to the year 2000.
e.	Volume V discusses the present organization and operations of the ground
forces and also presents long-range forecasts in these areas.
f.	Volume VI reviews high level command and control trends for these forces
and looks at how the Soviets, intend to increase their force projection capabil-
ity over the next two decades.
g.	Volume VII is a study of Soviet exercises and what they might infer
about actual war missions.
h.	Finally, Volume VIII is an attempt to compare Soviet missions with their
present capabilities. Such an analysis gives us a stronger sense -of the require-
ments the General Staff probably sees for building forces -over the coming decades.
8.	Although the ACSI coordinated the SBDP and designed its structure, all the
major Army intelligence production organizations provided the analysis. ITAC,
FSTG. MIA, and MIIA were the primary Army contributors. [ ЬЗ Р6Г DIA
ЬЗ per DIA
iv	This page is Unclassified
0349
DAMI-FIR	'	1 November Г9Й2
SUBJECT: Soviet Battlefield Development Plan (SBDP)
9.	Naturally, such a comprehensive undertaking inevitably has inadequacies and
contentious conclusions in its first variant. Work on the next version is
already under way, and it is directed toward refinements, filling .gaps, and
improving the analytical forecasts. You can help us in this effort by using
the SBDP in your daily work, then answering and mailing the questionnaire
which follows this letter.
10.	We are developing the 'SBDP as a tool to assist both intelligence producers
and consumers in accomplishing their tasks more efficiently and effectively.
We hope you find this and future editions of the SBDP to be of such assistance.
Major General, USA
ACofS for Intelligence
'Reverse side is blank
This Page is Unclassified
0350
CLASSIFICATION
SBDP evaluation questionnaire
1.	The information requested below will help the office of. the ACSI -develop
the SBDP in a way which is most useful to the consumer. If possible, do not
detach this questionnaire. We request you photocopy it, leaving the original
in the volume for other users. If the -spaces provided for answers are not
sufficient, please type your comments on additional sheets and attach tliem to
this questionnaire form. We request all classified responses be sent through
the proper channels.
2.	Please provide your name, rank or position, unit, and a short job descrip-
tion. This information will help us determine the specific way in which you
are using the SBDP.
a.	NAME 
b.	RANK (POSITION) ______________________________________________
c.	UNIT _________;_________________________________________________________
d.	JOB DESCRIPTION ________________________________________________________
e.	VOLUME YOU ARE EVALUATING _____________________________________________
3.	Total concept and structure: Do the eight volumes of the SBDP provide the
necessary framework for effective integration and interpretation of available
information? What improvements would you suggest to the overall organization
or concept of the SBDP?
a.	STRUCTURE: ___________________________________________________________
b.	CONCEPT: ________________________________________________________________
vii
4_______________)
•CLASSIFICATION
0351
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CLASSIFICATION
4.	Volume structure: Is this volume well organized? Does its method of
presentation facilitate comprehension? Is the subject matter -provided in the
right degree of detail for your use? What improvements would you suggest in
these areas?
a.	ORGANIZATION: _____________________________________.	_______________
b.	PRESENTATION: __________________________
c.	DETAIL: :, -
5.	Volume substance: Do you find the overall analysis and forecasts to be
sound? How would you correct or improve them?
6.	These questions are "wide-scope" by design. If you have -ether', more
specific comments you wish to make concerning the SBDP please include them in
your response. Eend all responses to: ' WQDA iDAMI-FIR)
ATTN: SBDP Project Officer
WASH DC 20310
7-f; ^ti^nks for your contribution in developing the “SBDP.
0352
viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS (U)	
Foreword	PAGE iii
Chapter 1. Warsaw Pact Missions in the Western Theater (0)	1-1
1. -General (U)	1-1
2. The Initial Campaign in the Western TVO {U)	1-1
3. The Initial Campaign in the Southwestern TVD (0)	1-2
4. The Initial Campaign in the Northwestern TVO (U)	1-3
Chapter 2. Soviet Requirements for Theater Warfare In Europe (U)	2-1
1. Background (U)	2-1
a. Constant Doctrinal Themes (U)	2-1
b. Principles of Military Art (U)	2-1
c. Revolutionary Period .in Military Affairs (0)	2-2
2, Strategic Overview of Theater Warfare Requirements in Europe (U)	2-3
a. Readiness (0)	2-3
b. Integration of Military Operations on a Broader Scale (U)	2-4
c. Requirements of the Integrated Theater Strategic Operation (-U)	2-5
3. Footnotes	2-17
Chapter 3. Soviet Capabilities to Meet Western Theater Requirements (Through 2000) (U)	3-1
1. Adequacy of Force Structure to Accomplish Required Operations in the Western Theater (U)	3-1
2. Readiness (U)	3-2
3. Integration of Military Operations on a Broader Scale (U)	3-2
a. Command and Control (U)	3-2
. b. Organizational Changes (U)	3-2
c. Operational Maneuver Group Concepts (U)	3-3
4. Summary Evaluation of Soviet Requirements versus Capabilities in the Western Theater (-U)	3-4
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont) (U)
PAGE
a.	Introduction (U)	3-4
b.	Force Structure (U)	3-4
c.	'Fielbed Technologies (U)	3-5
d.	Combat Capability (0)	3-5
Chapter 4,	Far	East Theater (U)	4-1
1.	Soviet Military Requirements	(u)	4-1
2.	Soviet Strategy and Capabilities	(LI)	4-1
a.	Conflict with China	4-1
b.	Operations Against OS Forces (U)	4-2
c.	Simultaneous Wars with NATO and	China (0)	4-3
d.	Other Contingencies (0)	4-3
3.	Future Prospects (0)	4-4
a.	Near Term (Through 1985) (0)	4-4
b.	Mid and Far Term (Through 2000)	(0)	4-4
4.	Summary Evaluation of Soviet	Requirements versus	4-4
Capabilities in the Far East Theater (U)
a.	Introduction (U)	4-4
b.	Force Structure (U)	4-5
c.	Fielded Technologies (U)	4-5
d.	Combat Capability (U)	4-5
Chapter 5.	Southwest Asia (U)	5-1
1.	Soviet Interests and Objectives (U)	5-1
2.	Circumstances That Could Prompt Soviet Military	5-1
Action (U).
3.	Illustrative Soviet Invasion Campaigns (U)	5-2
a.	Full-Scale Invasion of Iran (U)	5-2
b.	Invasion of the Persian Gulf Littoral (U)	5-5
c.	Seizure of Limited Iranian Territory (0)	5-7
4.	Future Prospects (4J)	5-10
a.	Near Term (Through 1985) (U)	5-10
b.	Mid and Far Term (Through 2000) (0)*	5-11
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Gont) (U)
5.	Summary Evaluation of Soviet Requirements versus	PAGE 5-11
	Capabilities in the Southwest Asian Theater (0)	
	a. Introduction (4J)	5-11
	b. Force Structure (U)	5t11
	c. Fielded Technologies (U)	5-12
-	d. Combat Capability (U)	5-12
Chapter 6.	Soviet Power Projection <-U)	6-1
1.	Goals, Objectives, and Policies (U)	6-1
2.	Instruments of Power Projection {U)	।	6-3
	a. Arms Sales (U)	6-3
	b. Military Advisors (U)	6-3
	c. Economic Aid (0)	6-4
	d. Proxies (U)	6-4
	e. Treaties (U)	6-4
	f. Subversion (U)	6-5
3.	Soviet Forces Available for Deployment to Distant	6-5
	Areas (U)	
4.	Other Soviet Resources for Distant Operations (U)	6-5
	a. Overseas Facilities (U)	6-5
	b. Merchant Marine (U)	6-6
	c. Fishing Fleets III)	6-6
5.	Command and Control of Distant Operations (U)	6-6
6.	Capabilities for Distant Operations (U)	6-6
	a. Military Airlifts (ll)	6-6
	b. Aeroflot <U)	6-7
	c. Intervention of Combat Forces in a Local Conflict (U)	6-7
	d. Airborne Assault Operations (U)	6-7
	e. Amphibious Assault Operations {U)	6-8
	f. Interdiction of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) (U)	6-9
7.	Future Force Capabilities for Distant Operations (U)	6-9
	a. Navy (U)	6-9
	b. Air Forces (U)	6-10
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TABIC OF CONTENTS (Cont) (<J)
PAGE
8.	Regional Outlook (XI)	6-11
a.	Southern Africa	(4J)	6-11
b.	Zaire (U)	6-13
c.	Caribbean (4J)	6-14
d.	Southeast Asia	(tl)	6-16
Chapter 7.	Summary Evaluation of	Soviet Hi 1 itary Requirements	7-1
versus Capabilities (U)
1.	Introduction (U)	7-1
2.	Western Theater (U)	7-2
a.	Introduction (0)	7-2
b.	Force Structure. (U) ..	7-2
c.	Fielded Technologies (ll)	7-3
d.	Combat Capability (U)	7-3
3.	Southwest Asian Theater	(U)	7-4
a.	Introduction (U)	7-4
b.	Force Structure (U)	7-4
c.	Fielded Technologies (U)	7-4
d.	Combat Capability (U)	7-5
4.	Far	East Theater (U)	7-5
a.	Introduction (ll)	7-5
b.	Force Structure (0)	7-5
c.	Fielded Technologies (U)	7-5
d.	Combat Capability (U)	7.-6
5.	Global Strategy (U)	7-5
a.	Introduction (U)	7-6
b.	Strategic Concept (U)	7-6
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S€€RET
CHAPTER 1
WARSAW PACT MISSi-ONS ID THE WESTERN THEATER (4J)
1.	(U) General
(S/N&FORN) The Soviets appear to have divided the Western Theater into
at least four theaters of military operations (TVDs). They believe that
Central Europe, which is the focus of the Western TVO, would be the decisive
arena, and this belief is demonstrated by the priority they give to this
region when assigning military manpower and equipment. It is also evident
from Soviet doctrine and writings that, if war comes in Europe, they plan to
overwhelm NATO in Germany with a massive combined air assault and ground
offensive. This principal effort notwithstanding, the Soviets know that the
Pact must also be prepared for operations in adjacent land and sea areas
identified as the Southwestern and Northwestern TVDs and one or more
maritime TVDs. The Soviet view of how these flank operations relate to the
main thrust in Central Europe is not well defined. In a Central European
scenario, one might expect the Soviets to strike at northern Norway in
order to facilitate the deployment of their Northern Fleet, to attack NATO
naval forces in the Mediterranean, and to move against the Turkish Straits.
Secondary offensives or holding operations probably would be conducted on
the flanks of these primary operations in order -both to weaken NATO forces
in these areas and to keep them from being shifted to Central Europe.
2.	(U) The Initial Campaign in the Western TVD
a.	(5/N^ORN) Warsaw Pact planning for the Western TVO envisions
offensives along three axes in Central Europe. To carry out these offen-
sives, the Pact probably would seek, at least initially, to organize its
forces into three corresponding fronts: the Soviet-East German front, the
Polish Front, and the Czechoslovak-Soviet Front. These fronts would be
made up of varying combinations of Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (-NSWP)
forces stationed in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. If time per-
mitted, these fronts would be reinforced by two additional fronts--
Belorussian and Carpathian Fronts—drawn from military districts in the
western USSR. Although a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact could evolve
in several ways, it probably would he preceded by an extended period of
rising tension during which both sides take steps to improve their force
posture. The Pact would require 2 to 3 weeks to prepare the. five fronts
discussed above and move them into assembly areas. The force -assembled
would consist of 80 to 90 ground divisions plus support and tactical air
units, and there would be time for most of the active Warsaw Pact naval
units to get ready to put to sea. To launch an offensive in Central Europe
with less preparation time but also with less than five fronts is, from a
Soviet standpoint, feasible but not desirable.
b.	(S/N^PoRN) The Soviet-East German front would attack NATO forces in
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central West -Germany, probably between Hannover and Mannheim. Major
elements of this front mi-ght swing north of Hannover across the North German
Plain, but this would demand extensive restructuring of its logistic base.
The Polish front would attempt to defeat NATO forces i-n northern West
Germany and seize Denmark and the Netherlands. The Czechoslovak-Soviet
Front would attack toward the Rhine in the area roughly between Mannheim
and the Swiss-German border. If the two additional.reinforcing fronts from
the USSR were available, the Belorussian Front would probably be committed
alongside the Soviet-East German Front, probably on its southern flank.
The Carpathian Front probably would be used to reinforce the Czechoslovak-
Soviet Front.
(«)
c.	fS/NOFORN) The success of a Warsaw Pact campaign in Central Europe
would depend to a considerable degree on the performance of the NSWP forces
involved. Recent events in Poland provide new reasons to question the
reliability of these forces, and the Soviets might therefore be planning to
accept a larger role in a Central European offensive, particularly in the
northern part of Germany. Poland continues to bear the principal responsi-
bility for operations on the northern axis of advance for facilitating the
movement of Soviet reinforcements toward West Germany. There is no evidence
that the Soviets have decided to relieve the Poles of these responsibilities,
but alternative plans must have been considered. One option would be to
bring forces forward from the USSR's Baltic Military District to operate
jointly with the Polish armed forces.
d.	(S/NOrORN) In the Baltic Sea, Warsaw Pact naval forces would
operate as part of the overall campaign in the Western TVD, particularly in
conjunction with the ground and air operations of the Polish Front. Their
broad objectives in this area would be to gain control of the Baltic Sea
and access to the North Sea. If initial sea control and air superiority
operations were successful, Pact forces in the Baltic would concentrate on
supporting the Polish Front's offensive across northern West Germany and
into Denmark.
3.	(U) The Initial Campaign in the Southwestern TVD
a.	(-S/NO^RN) The Southwestern TVD encompasses a broad area reaching
from Italy to the Persian Gulf. The principal focus of the Southwestern
TVD is on a war with NATO, in which it would conduct operations in conjunc-
tion with the Western and Northwestern TVDs. first among the Pact’s objec-
tives in this campaign would be the seizure of the Turkish Straits. The
Soviet forces for this operation would be drawn chiefly from the. Odessa
Military District, and most of them would have to cross Romania and Bulgaria
to reach Turkish territory. In Bulgaria, they would be augmented by some
Bulgarian forces to form an Odessa front whose objectives would be to
destroy Turkish forces in eastern Thrace, break through the fortifications
protecting the land approaches to the Turkish Straits, and seize the
Straits’.	.	-
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b.	(S/NGE6RN-) Probably concurrent with the effort to seize the Straits
would be a major ground operation through Austria. The attack would tie con-
ducted by a combined Soviet and Hungarian force, forming the Danube front,
which could also be used to protect the southern flank -of the Western TVD
in West Germany or could move south into Italy.
(u)
c.	(-5/N6F0RN) To attack Greece, the Pact would form a Balkan Front -on
the western flank of the Odessa Front. It would consist of the bulk of the
Bulgarian Army and could include some Romanian forces. -Because of the size
of the Balkan Front, the difficult terrain in Greece, and the jquesti-onable
commitment of Romanian forces, it seems likely that this front would be
used only to engage Greek forces in Thrace and to secure the western flank
of the Odessa Front.
d.	(S/N^ORN) The Warsaw Pact could conduct a limited offensive into
eastern Turkey, the primary objective of which would probably be to keep
Turkish forces in this area from aiding in the defense of the Straits. The
Soviet forces available for this offensive would be drawn from the
Transcaucasu.s Military District and, if required, from the North -Caucasus
Military District. Part of this combined force might also be used to move
into northwestern Iran and, conceivably, farther south. Although control
of this area would be attractive, the effort to seize it—either as a pre-
lude to or in conjunction .with a European war—could tie up considerable
second-echelon and . strategic reserve forces that otherwise would be
available for use against NATO.
e.	(5/NCirORN) Naval operations to support and extend the Warsaw
Pact's ground offensives in the Southwestern TVD would include efforts to
consolidate control of the Black Sea, support the movement of Pact forces
along its western shore and assist in seizing the Turkish Straits. From
the outset of hostilities, Pact air and naval units would attack NATO naval
forces in the Mediterranean, and possibly in the Arabian Sea, especially
carrier battle groups and ballistic missile submarines.
4.	(u) The Initial Campaign in the Northwestern TVD
(S/NO^nN) Initial Soviet objectives in this theater would be to
ensure the security of Northern Fleet ballistic missile submarines,
guarantee access to the North Atlantic for these and other Soviet ships and
aircraft, and protect the Kola Peninsula and the Leningrad гедтюп* To
achieve these objectives, the Soviets almost certainly would launch a
limited ground offensive into northern Norway early in the war. The
Soviets probably would be deterred from attempting a larger campaign into
central or southern Norway early in the war by the difficult terrain,
potentially strong NATO resistance beyond Finnmark, and extended lines of
communication from the Pact interior.
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CHAPTER 2
SOVIET REQUIREMENTS FOR THEATER WARFARE IN EUROPE (4J)
1.	(U) Background
(U) The Soviets' requirements for successful theater warfare in Europe
have evolved gradually, in parallel with the development of military capa-
bilities on both sides. These evolving requirements are also deeply rooted
in Soviet doctrine, principles of military art, and historical experience.
a.	(U) Constant Doctrinal Themes. As elaborated in Volume! of the
SBDP, Soviet military, doctrine has tended to be stable, and hence to lend
stability to force development. The main features of this doctrine include
the expected decisive nature of future war between socialism and
capitalism; the likelihood that this war will become nuclear; the probable
decisive role of nuclear weapons; the need for massive “multi-mi 11 ion man"
armies; the highly dynamic, unstable nature of the modern battlefield,
requiring extremely violent, fast-paced campaigns; the capability to wage
war successfully in either a nuclear or non-nuclear environment; and the
need to exert maximum simultaneous offensive pressure throughout the depths
of the enemy’s territory. It is reasonable to expect these constant
doctrinal themes to remain intact thru the year 2000. This assumption
clarifies to some extent uncertainities about the nature of the year-2000
battlefield. For example, the Soviets are not likely to discard their con-
cept of a massive conscript army in favor of a small, professional force,
or to cease to give priority to the demands of fighting on an "integrated"
battlefield. It also argues strongly that force developments will continue
to be keyed to a maneuver-oriented, fast-paced, offensive campaign.
b.	(U) Principles of Military Art. Besides general doctrinal pro-
nouncements about the nature of the future war they must prepare to fight,
Soviet requirements may be inferred from their principles of military art.
These principles are modified periodically to keep them compatible with the
latest perceptions of the modern battlefield, although in practice they
have considerable continuity. The most important of the principles are the
following:
(1)	(U) High combat preparedness (boyevaya • gotovnost') to
accomplish the task regardless of the circumstances under which the war is
initiated or prosecuted;
(2)	(U) surprise (vnezapnost’), decisiveness, and activeness of
combat actions;
{3) <U) constant effort to seize and retain the initiative;
(4)	(il) complete utilization of the various means and methods of
combat to achieve victory;
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(5)	(U)' -coordinated use and close coordination of formations
(large units) of all armed services and branches;
(6)	(U) decisive concentration of the main efforts at the right
moment, on the most important axes, to solve the main tasks;
(7)	(U) simultaneous destruction of the enemy to the full depth
of his formation, timely intensification of effort, bold maneuver of forces
and means for development of combat actions at high tempos, and defeat of
the enemy in a short time;
(8)	(li) calculation and full utilization of the moral-political
factor;
(8)	(d) firm and continuous control (upravleniye);
(10)	(U) determination and decisiveness in accomplishing the
mission;
(И) (II) thorough support of combat actions;
(12)	(U) timely restoration (vosstanovleniye) of reserves and
combat effectiveness of the forces.^
c.	(U) Revolutionary Period in Military Affairs, The above doctrinal
tenets and principles of military art themselves represent general require-
ments. Although they have had, and are expected to continue to have, con-
siderable continuity, they are not considered permanent. Marxist-Leninist
dialectics assert that military affairs (as are all other phenomena) are in
a state of constant evolution, with the future flowing from the present,
which in turn had its roots in the past. This natural state of continuous
change in military affairs results primarily from, changes in weapons and
military technology. The Soviet leadership believes that a revolutionary
transitional period in military affairs is now under way. This revolution
is the result of a combination of numerous breakthroughs in weaponry and
military technology that have occurred in recent years or are now on the
. verge of occurring. The pace of changes brought about by new technology is
seen as accelerating, and the leadership is vitally concerned with staying
abreast by making the necessary adaptations in a timely fashion. In this
context, overcoming natural bureaucratic tendencies toward preparing to
"fight the last war" is of concern. The importance of all these issues may
be seen in this quotation from MSU Ogarkov's 1982 booklet:
"A deep, in the full sense revolutionary, upheaval in military affairs
is occurring in pur time in connection with creation of thermonuclear
weapons, the vigourous development of electronics, development of weapons
based on new physical principles, and also in connection with broad quali-
tative perfecting of conventional means of armed conflict. This in turn
influences all other sides of military affairs, first of all on the deve-
lopment and perfecting of forms and methods of military actions, and
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consequently, -on .the organi-zatinnal structure -of troops (forces), of the
navy, on perfecting systems -of armament and control organs. .
"Realization -of this dialectic process is especially important in the
contemporary stage when on the basis of scientific-technical progress the
fundamental systems of armament are being renewed practically every 10-12
years. In these conditions untimely changing of views, stagnation in deve-
loping and putting into practice new issues of military development are
fraught with serious consequences."-2 The following section will present a
more detailed description of Soviet requirements as gleaned from writings,
exercises, and force development trends. These requirements represent
significant current issue areas to Soviet commanders and planners; they have
been the subject of considerable attention.
2. (U) Strategic Overview of Theater Warfare Requirements in Europe
a.	(S/NOTO^?/WNINTEL) Readiness. The Soviets are concerned about
reducing the time in which Warsaw Pact forces can convert from peacetime to
wartime readiness. This encompasses several tasks. Reduced strength and
cadre unit readiness requires improvement, including periodic exercises at
high levels of personnel strength. Alerting and mobilization of forces must
be accomplished more rapidly, and the resiliency and autonomy of the mobili-
zation system must be improved. Faster deployment into staging areas and
battle positions is required. The ability of missile units to fire while
moving to alert positions and during short halts requires improvement. The
system for providing replacement personnel, especially officers and critical
specialities, must be strengthened in light of more sober assessments of the
results of nuclear strikes. This is to include enlarging the reserve struc-
ture, with special attention to replacement command and control entities.
All of these efforts are designed to produce a force able’ to shift effi-
ciently and quickly to a wartime posture, regardless of how the war might
begin. Backing up the military organizaton, the entire national economy
must be made more responsive to the war-fighting requirements of the armed
forces. This requirement was expressed by MSU N. =Qgarkov, Chief of the
Soviet General Staff, who wrote in a recent Kommunist article:
"The question of the timely transfer of the Armed forces and the entire
national economy onto a war footing and of their mobilization in a short
time is considerably more acute. That is why the supply of trained person-
nel reserves and hardware to troops predetermines a need for measures
planned accurately in peacetime and for coordinated actions by party,
soviet and military organs on the spot."
"Coordination in the mobilization and deployment of the Armed forces
and the national economy as a whole, particularly in using manpower,
transportation, communications and energy and in ensuring the stability -and
survivability of the country's economic mechanism, is now needed more than
ever. In this connection a constant quest is needed in the sphere of
improving the system of production ties of enterprises producing the main
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types of weapons,' of enhancing, in the event of war, the autonomy of pro-
duction enterprises and associations in terms of energy and water supplies,
of completely providing them with the necessary stocks, and of creating a
reserve of equipment, and materials. The actual system of the national
economy's mobilization readiness also needs further improvement, proceeding
from the premise that the close interconnection between the mobilization
readiness of the Armed Forces, the national economy and civil defense is a
very important condition for maintaining the defense capability of the
country as a whole at the proper level."3
b.	(-U) Integration of Military Operations on a Broader Scale
(1)	(U) The focal point of Soviet efforts to modernize military
art in order to keep pace with scientific and technical progress is the
adoption of a broader, more encompassing viewpoint on integrated theater
operations. This endeavor also has received the attention of Marshal
Ogarkov:
"It is known that during the great patriotic war the basic form of
military operations was the frontal operation. Here, as a rule, the front
advanced over a zone of 200-300 km on average, to a depth of between 100
and 300-400 km. After the completion bf the front operation there was
usually a lull, and not infrequently a prolonged period of preparation for
the next frontal operation. At the time that was entirely necessary and
justified and was in accordance with the means of destruction then
available."
"Now the situation is different. The front's command has at its
disposal means of destruction (missiles, missile-carrying aircraft and so
forth) whose combat potential considerably transcends the bounds of front
operations."
"There has been a sharp increase in the maneuverability of troops; and
the methods of resolution of many strategic and operational tasks by
groupings and formations of branches of the Armed Forces have changed. As
a result earlier forms of use of formations and groupings have largely
ceased to correspond to the new conditions. In this connection it is evi-
dently necessary to regard as the basic operation in a possible future war
not the frontal form, but a larger-scale, form of military operations—the
theater strategic operation."^
(«)
(2)	(S/NOryRN/Wfi INTEL) The watchword of this requirement is
integration. {t is applicable across the full spectrum of combat tasks.
The Soviets have embarked on a long-range effort to more fully integrate
military operations into what they term the theater strategic operation.
Some of the principles of operational art, that is of the conduct of army
and front level operations, have been modified to correspond to the
changing perceptions of theater warfare requirements. Combat operations in
the Western TVD are to be integrated into a. single campaign. The operations
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of fronts are to be orchestrated at the level of the theater of military
operations (TVO) and are to be conducted without pause until the entire
campaign is concluded. Each front may be required to conduct two or more
operations in succession with little or no lull between operations. Ongoing
modifications to operational art are intended to upgrade the capability
to conduct such a campaign. in part, these modifications reflect a
concerted effort to bring operational art up to a level commensurate with
modern weapons and equipment: to more fully use their inherent capabili-
ties. It is also motivated by recognition of improved Western defensive
capabilities—actual and potential--which has prompted concern for finding
new methods to accomplish traditional functions more effectively and effi-
ciently. Finally, the elaboration of new elements of operational art is
intended to serve as a guide to force, training, and doctrine development.
c.	(U) Requirements of the integrated Theater Strategic Operation.
This section will sketch the Soviet perception of what is required to carry
out this integrated theater strategic operation, noting significant modifi-
cations in operational art. Subsequent sections will detail important
facets of the operations.
(u)
(1)	(S/NOFORN/WN1N-TEL) General. A successful integrated theater
strategic operation requires the ability to mass combat power on the criti-
cal axes, at the critical times, and the flexibility to change the locus of
effort quickly in order to take advantage of rapid changes in the battle-
field situation. The Soviets speak of the need to orchestrate the massive
theater campaign so effectively that the enemy is literally overwhelmed,
unable to react adequately to counter the pressure, and collapses under the
onslaught. Stress is placed on the need to conduct continuous operations,
and to do so simultaneously throughout the depths of the enemy's opera-
tional formations.
(2)	(U) Historical Precedents—The "Peep Operation." This concept
of simultaneous, deep operations is a fundamental tenet of Soviet opera-
tional art, dating back to the 1930s when the “deep operation" {glubokiy
boy) was first elaborated by Soviet theoreticians. At that time, the
Soviets concluded that the main task was to overcome the problem created
when forces had broken through enemy defenses and were spent by the effort,
and thus were unable to exploit their gains or even hold the ground they
had won. The deeper an army moved into the enemy's formations, the more
difficult it became for that army to continue its attack, and the more
readily could the enemy bring his reserves to bear on the attacking force.
Four prerequisites for the successful conduct of deep operations, were
recognized. These are, the capability to reliably suppress the enemy to
the depths of his operational formation, thus preventing him from adequately
focusing power on the sector under attack; to penetrate his -defending
forces; to rapidly exploit the penetration into his -operational rear area;
and to isolate that portion of the battlefield from outside reinforcement.
These requirements guided ’Soviet force development and operational art to
the end of World War II, and have remained conceptually unchanged to this
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day. They led in the 1930s to the creation of separate tank formations, or
"mobile groupings”, whose primary purpose was to "turn tactical into opera-
tional success" by exploiting breakthroughs attained by rifle troops.
Multiple echelons.of troops were created to overcome the problem of loss of
momentum, by providing the means to build up offensive pressure at that
critical period when the fighting was being done in the depth -of the
enemy's formations.
(3)	(0) Post-War Innovations. Following World War II, the
Soviets reaffirmed the concept of the deep operation and began the process
of motorizing their rifle troops to enable them to operate better with tank
formations. Soviet acknowledgement of the primacy of nuclear weapons pro-
duced the only major doctrinal change since the 1930s and led to the re-
making of the Soviet armed forces to fight on the nuclear battlefield. The
combination of nuclear weapons, missile delivery means, and guidance and
control systems was said to have produced a "qualitative jump," which they
called a "revolution in military affairs." The zenith of the Soviet fixa-
tion on the exclusively nuclear battlefield was reached in the 1960s.
Numerous writings, including all three editions of Sokolovskiy's Military
Strategy, issued in 1962, 1963, and 1968, affirmed the preeminent role of
nuclear weapons in modern warfare. Throughout.this revolution in doctrine,
however, the primacy of the deep operation was not challenged. The Soviets
saw the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield as a means to further
their ability to conduct deep operations since they would enable a military
force, for the first time, to simultaneously and decisively influence the
battlefield throughout its "operational and strategic depth". No longer
would it be necessary to penetrate enemy defenses in succession in a time-
consuming procedure. Nuclear weapons would accomplish the roles of
suppression, breaking through enemy positions, and deep interdiction stri-
kes, thus reducing the need for conventional artillery and air strikes and
facilitating rapid advance by tank-heavy ground force formations deep into
the enemy operational rear. The future battlefield was envisioned as dyna-
mic and highly mobile, without stable front lines and with a blurred
distinction between front and rear. Nuclear weapons provided greater
opportunities for delivering surprise strikes against both troops and deep
rear areas.
(4)	({J) Adaptation to the Integrated Battlefield. In the late
1960s, Soviet writings began to discuss the combination of battlefield
nuclear weapons with perfected conventional armaments. This led, by the
early 1970s, to a minor but important doctrinal modification that accepted
the "possibility" of conducting combat actions by units and sub-units
(regiments, battalions, and companies) with conventional weapons. The
doctrinal pronouncement noted that conventional weapons alone might be used
in the initial phases of a~ world war, and that it would be -necessary to
employ conventional weapons during and between nuclear exchanges. At this
time, Soviet forces were formally charged with the mission of fighting with
or without nuclear weapons. The basic concept of deep operations remained
essentially, unchanged, although the term had fallen into disuse. Soviet
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ground forces were steadily improved to permit them to better carry-out the
preferred rapid and deep mobile operations. The problem of achieving
simultaneous influence throughout the depths of the battlefield, which had
been overcome through the use of nuclear weapons, remained inadequately
solved in a conventional environment.
(u)
(5)	(S/N0F0IWWN INTEL) Recent Organizational Changes. By the
late 1970s, a comprehensive review of the. requirements of theater warfare
under modern conditions seems to have occurred. Changes in organization of
air, air defense, and ground forces, took place, all apparently designed to
permit better execution of the integrated theater strategic operation under
either nuclear or non-nuclear conditions. Bomber and longer range tactical
aircraft were operationally integrated to form the core of the strike force
for major theater strategic air operations. Previously separate and auto-
nomous air defense elements were unified into a single centralized struc-
ture within each military district or wartime front. This reorganization
permits better coordination of an integrated theater-wide air defense plan.
The rapid growth of attack helicopter forces under front control signifi-
cantly improves fire support to combined-arms and tank armies, while the
formation, since 1979, of air assau-lt brigades at front level demonstrates
the requirement for more air assault operations in support of advancing
ground forces. Reorganization of both tank and motorized rifle -divisions
reflects an across-the-board effort to more effectively conduct fast, con-
tinuous operations of great spatial scope in the face of anticipated NATO
air, air defense, anti-tank, and other improvements. They have been accom-
panied by increased requirements for all aspects of theater operations, as
discussed below..
(u)
(6)	{5/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Maneuver. Operations by fronts and armies
are to be focused on major theater axes. Greater agility in concentrating
efforts on first one and then another major theater axis is sought through
enhancing the ability to regroup major air and ground formations over
longer distances.
(u)
(a)	(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Breakthrough Operations. A more
modern breakthrough operation is required that employs more flexible and
more rapid methods and broader integration across the front. This opera-
tion must increasingly substitute rapidly deployable force for massing of
troops. A solution to this requirement is being approached gradually
through the integration of air power, air mobility, and fires from mobile,
dispersed artillery, with ground maneuver forces brought forward rapidly
from the depths to quickly concentrate on multiple axes and just as quickly
disperse.
(b)	(U) Exploitation. Improvement to exploitation operations
is also required. They must be made more rapid and continuous in order to
more quickly, carry the battle deep into the enemy operational rear.
Fulfilling this requirement involves careful coordination of maneuver, fire
support, air defense, and logistics elements.
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.	(5/NOrORN) With regard to maneuver,. the continuing
development of operational maneuver group {t)MG) concepts has been the cen-
terpiece of efforts to improve the effectiveness of exploitation operations.®
The OMG has historical antecedents in the operations of "mobile groups" in
World War II, although these earlier concepts were discarded in Soviet mili-
tary theory following the war, when mechanization of rifle units seemed to
eliminate the need for special mobile units. The current establishment of
OMG is part of the Soviet response to the requirement to enhance capabili-
ties for deep operations in the face of improvements in the NATO defense.
2. (-SfiiOFORMyWN'INTEL) OMGs of division to army size
are expected to move behind leading attack echelons. As early in the
offensive as possible, probably before second echelon divisions and armies
are introduced, OMGs would attempt to drive through gaps and weak sectors
in NATOs defense toward objectives deep in its operational rear. (i.e.,
the NATO corps rear area). OMGs would seek to rapidly destroy NATO nuclear-
weapons and reserves, prevent lateral reinforcement, and destroy supply
lines and C^I , through a series of large raiding operations. Helicopters
would be a primary source of air support to the OMGs, conducting route
reconnaissance, assisting in command and control, and providing fire sup-
port at the objective. Helicopters also would be useful in moving air
assault brigade elements forward of the FEBA to enable their close interac-
tion with the OMGs. The coincident creation of air assault brigades indi-
cates that their employment with OMGs is likely. 'OMG operations within the
NATO rear area would be relatively autonomous, although subordinate to the
overall front operations plan. All of this activity seems designed to
increase the tempo of the advance, disguise the axis of the main effort,
draw off enemy reserves, and in general disrupt enemy operational stabi-
lity. OMG employment could present NATO commanders with a difficult .deci-
sion as to whether to commit significant forces against the OMGs, thereby
diminishing the amount of force available for commitment against the main
body and risking collapse of the defense.
(u)
(c) (5/NOFORN/-WN INTCL) Improvements in Tactics. At lower
levels, there is a requirement t-o improve maneuver tactics to meet the
increased demands posed by enhancements to operational art. Some recurring
themes for tactical improvement include searching for better ways to combat
antitank defenses, improving coordination with aviation {especially
helicopter aviation) and artillery, developing better methods for over-
coming areas of mass destruction, obstacles, mountain passes and other
barriers, and improving specialized maneuver forms that are roughly analo-
gous^ at the regimental and divisional level, to t)MG operations.- The
latter include operations of forward, raiding, and enveloping detachments,
and the wide use of tactical air assault operations (parachute and
heliborne) in tandem with advancing ground forces. Night offensive, combat
operations, especially by forward and raiding detachments, are to receive
more emphasis. These measures are all intended to improve the overall
speed and agility® of maneuver divisions and regiments and thereby
contribute to maintaining the pace of advance.
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(7)	(U) Airborne, Air Assault, Airmobile Assault Forces
(a)	(JJ) The Soviets will retain a full spectrum -of specialized
units for. insertion by fixed-wing transport and/or helicopter into both the
enemy combat and rear areas. These specialized units will continue to be
supplemented by the airlanding of regular motorized rifle troops as the
specific operational situation warrants.
(u)
(b)	(S/NOrOilN) Air assault requirements will continue to be a
major area of focus.. The front organic air assault brigade's current pri-
mary role is to support the advance of an army-size front operational
maneuver group in the deep rear. The Soviets are likely to add to this
role by organizing, in many armies, separate air assault battalions whose
primary mission would be to support the advance of division-size army
operational maneuver groups. Air assault units might be incorporated into
the tank division to replace some motorized rifle units.,
(u)
(c)	(-5? Airborne divisions are likely to continue as centrally
controlled assets of the Supreme High Command to carry out deep strategic
missions in support of theater offensive goals. Some divisions will be
subordinated to individual fronts to carry out operational landings to
accomplish missions in support of the goals of individual front offensive
operations.	.
.	(u)
(d)	(S/NorORNj Airmobile assault brigades may continue io
exist in some fronts opposite the Near East and Far East regions, possibly
because of terrain. Shallow airmobile landings in the tactical zone of the
enemy defense will probably continue to be the responsibility of motorized
rifle companies and battalions drawn from regular combat divisions. This
function may be enhanced by making helicopter lift organic to the existing
division-or by replacing some motor rifle units with specialized air
assault units in a few divisions.
(u)
(8)	(S/NOTORN/WNi-NfEL) Artillery Fire Support. The Soviets are
seeking more flexible and more responsive fire.support capable of bringing
a high volume of fire to bear rapidly on multiple, often fleeting, targets.
Key considerations include the integration of artillery fires with all
other, means of destruction, integration of nuclear with non-nuclear fines,
automation of the fire control system, achieving a smooth transition from
one phase of support to another, improving ability to attrite enemy
nuclear-capable and . supporting systems, better antitank suppression, and
improved efficiency of ammunition consumption.
(u)
(a) (S/NGTOftN/WNiNTEt) Integration of All Non-nuclear Fires.
The integration of all available conventional means of destruction into a
single, flexible concept and plan remains a long-term Soviet requirement.
We believe that rocket troops and artillery, front and army aviation, air
defense assets (especially for anti-helicopter defense), tanks and ICVs,
and radioelectronic warfare assets are all to be included in such a unified
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plan. The wider incorporation -of necessary automation and other sophisti-
cated command and control capabilities will more fully resolve this
requirement. A basic goal, in keeping with the Soviet emphasis on deep
operations, is -a near-simultaneous destruction capability throughout the
entire enemy operational and tactical depth.
(u)
4b) (S/NOrORN/WNINTEL) Integration of Nuclear and Non-nuclear
Fires. Soviet rocket troop and artillery fire planning seeks to be respon-
sive in an integrated nuclear and non-nuclear battlefield. This requires
the ability to organize a system that is suitable for the heavier artillery
fire support responsibilities of the non-nuclear battlefield, while being
flexible and survivable enough to support troops advancing in the wake of
nuclear attacks. The problem of achieving a smoother and more rapid tran-
sition to the use of nuclear weapons by rocket troops is of continuing con-
cern. Solutions for effectively supporting breakthrough operations while
minimizing, risk from sudden nuclear attack emphasize better target acquisi-
tion and fire control procedures, improved reconnaissance, greater mobility
of artillery units, and more intense concentrations of shorter duration.
fc) /МПГПРИMIIП The Struggle Against Enemy Nuclear
Means.
Ы
The anticipated US fielding of enhanced radiation (ER) warheads, especially
for 155-mm systems, in view of their numbers, substantially magnifies the
problem of finding and destroying enemy nuclear means. The much improved
effectiveness of ER rounds over standard nuclear rounds for the 155-mm
system makes their effective targeting and destruction in the non-nuclear
phase a much more critical requirement. We expect the Soviets to attempt
to meet this requirement by focusing more reconnaissance assets on the
task, and by enhancing the quantity of nuclear and non-nuclear fire means
intended to destroy 155-mm systems. Conventional SS-21 and SS-23 missiles
are expected to he included in the assets to be targeted against Efl-capable
systems.
(d)	(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Fire Support Phases. Soviet offensive
procedures divide the destruction of enemy fire into at least three phases:
preparatory fire for the attack, fire support-of the attack, and close fire
support for troops advancing into the depth of the enemy positions.
Heightened emphasis on rapid movement forward from deep rear areas and
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commitment from the march suggest that specific fire support to that phase
of operations is also required. This seems particularly important with
respect to formations such as operational maneuver groups, which are
intended to move' rapidly through gaps formed in -enemy formations and
operate extensively in enemy rear areas. Whether or not the Soviets per-
ceive a requirement for a fourth phase of fire destruction, they are con-
cerned with transitioning rapidly and smoothly from one phase of support to
another. High priority is placed on improving automation of the fire
destruction system to permit automated fire commands and selection of the
optimum weapon mix.
(e)	{S/NOrORN/WNINTCL) Massive Fires. Because of improved
troop mobility, greater armor protection, and better artillery capabili-
ties, the role of massive artillery fire has increased in recent years.
Emphasis is being placed on measures to permit a higher volume of fire to
strike given targets rapidly. Procedural steps include attention to hasty
artillery preparation, using the overlapping fires of several artillery
groups on single targets. The need for a single powerful artillery strike
on a given target, as opposed to a longer-lasting but less intense attack,
has been stressed. Current high mobility offensive operations demand that
massive fire be sudden, accurate, fully coordinated with actions of
advancing troops and supporting air power, and preceded by minimal prepara-
tion time. Principal targets for massive fire would include tactical,
nuclear weapons, concentrations of tanks, antitank weapons, and mechanized
infantry, self-propelled artillery, centers of enemy resistance, counterat-
tacking enemy forces, fire support helicopters in basing areas, and.others.
Centralized command of reinforcing fires, more self-propelled artillery to
permit easier concentration and dispersal, and growth in the quantity of
both divisional and non-divisional artillery will help achieve the require-
ments for higher-intensity fires. Non-divisional artillery batteries are
expected to increase from 6 to 8 tubes, and the artillery battalion will
probably become the basic firing unit, as opposed to the battery.
(u)
(f)	(S/NQFORN/WNINTEL) Fire Support of Mobile Operations.
More responsive on^call fire support for troops advancing into the enemy
depths is also required. Supporting artillery is to be more mobile and
flexible, to permit maneuver units to use more fully their enhanced
maneuver capabilities. The concept is to preempt enemy artillery units, in
opening, up artillery fire, and to permit no lulls when fires are hieing
shifted. The increase in tube artillery within maneuver regiments and the
introduction of 82-mm mortars and 85-mm antitank guns will help to achieve
more-effective suppressive fires for maneuver units operating in the enemy
depths. Fuller integration with attack helicopters and more emphasis on
direct fire for these functions, to reduce anwunitlon expenditures, may
also be expected.
(u)
(g)	(-S/NOFQRN/WNINTEL) Other Key Requirements. The Soviets
pay great attention to the need to find better ways of suppressing enemy
antitank systems. This is a primary motivation that cuts across al Г facets
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of fire supportK and it is -being approached in an integrated manner. They
are also seeking more fire support efficiency through ammunition improve-
ments and better use of SR8M systems in the war's conventional phase,
possibly including infrared-seeking sub-bombiets and cratering rockets.
Special, attention is also to be given to fires under mountain and night con-
ditions. Artillery fire support is among the areas of greatest potential
near-term and mid-term improvement, due to the large numbers of new systems
and associated capabilities that have recently begun deployment or are
awaiting deployment in the near future.
(9)	Air and Air Defense. The Soviets are in the
process of integrating field force air defense and national air defense into
a single air defense structure that will improve theater capability,
increase operational flexibility, and enhance command and control. They
perceive a requirement for better theater-level integration of air defense
among Warsaw Pact countries. This is motivated by improvements in NATO
offensive aviation capabilities and by the expectation that the future
battlefield will be increased in spatial scope. Air defense integration is
part of a broader strategy that calls for rapid concentration of forces on
major theater axes through more responsive regrouping of major air and
ground formations over longer distances. Warsaw Pact forces will coordinate
both field force air defense operations and national air defense operations
along major theater axes in succession. They seek to achieve air supremacy
sufficient to maximally reduce NATO nuclear potential, |
Ы
________________________________________________________________| Further
advances can also be expected in Soviet SAM guidance systems and in missile
system containerization.
•(Ю) (U) Rear Services Support
(a)	During the past decade Soviet capabilities for
logistical support of their operational concepts have grown steadily.
Whereas in the 1960s it may have been accurate to describe Soviet transpor-
tation, maintenance, and supply structures as sparse, this is no longer the
case today. To some extent, this perception was based on focusing,
incorrectly, on the divisional structure and overlooking the fact that the
Soviet concept is to concentrate support at echelons above the division.
Today Soviet forces are' well supported logistically in terms of transpor-
tation, maintenance and supply organizations, and equipment.
(b)	(U) Nevertheless, Soviet leaders are very concerned about
the volume .of support required to sustain forces under modern combat con-
ditions. MSU Orgarkov has elaborated recently on the increasing materiel
requirements of modern warfare.7 He notes that current technical and rear
services requirements are in no way comparable with those of past wars.
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Materiel requirements have risen "tens of times." The volume- of repair
required has grown many times and the nature of repairs has -changed. This,
in turn, is said to require improved organization of technical support and
to increase the-importance of the work of the deep rear of the -country,
which must be able to more-rapidly replace losses of "an enormous quantity
of combat equipment and weapons."
fa)
(c)	(5/N8F0RN) Another chief concern of Soviet logistics plan-
ners is to Improve the rapidity with which the rear services structure, much
of which is in cadre status in peacetime, can be mobilized in a crisis.
Other important requirements are to improve standarization of equipment,
thereby simplifying maintenance and resupply; to increase the maneuver-abil-
ity of the operational (fr-ontal). rear; and to make use of the latest tech-
nology to plan and manage rear services activities.
(d)	(~S/PI^?ORN) The Soviets and NSWP have devoted considerable
effort toward developing an automated rear service support system. By the
late 1980s or early 1990s, a computer network will be established that will
tie together Soviet ground force logistics from regiment to MOD-controlled
fixed computer centers. This system-will permit Soviet logisticians to:
fa)
2 (R/hoFuRN) Monitor materiel inventories and expendi-
tures.
Z (S/NO^Jrm) Determine materiel requirements for -opera-
tional concepts and recommend which plans are most
feasible from a logistic point of view.
fa)
£ ("S/NOfeRhb) Plan an-d implement transportation movements
using the most efficient modes and routing.
fa)	'
£ (S/NQF6RH) Optimize the deployment of support units:
maintenance/ recovery, medical, engineer, and others,
based on projected requirements.
Full implementation of the rear service subsystem will significantly reduce
time requirements and enhance the effectiveness of ground forces support.
It is estimated that , time may be reduced from 48-72 hours to ^6-8 hours for
planning materiel support of a front offensive.
(11)	(U) Command and Control
(a)	The high speed, fluid battlefield envisioned by the
Soviets will place great demands on command and control. Increased mobility
and weapons effectiveness will result in frequent and radical changes in
battlefield situations, particularly when nuclear weapons are employed.
Vast amounts of combat intelligence will have to be collected, processed,
and disseminated responsive operational courses of action conceived,
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evaluated, and directed and weapons systems targeted—all in a minimum of
time if fleeting opportunities for tactical success are not to be lost. The
problem is particularly critical for the Soviets if they are to implement
successfully their doctrine of preempting a -NATO first-use of theater
nuclear weapons. Minimizing strike reaction time is essential if elusive
targets such as nuclear-capable artillery and missile units are to be
destroyed between the time the decision is made to use nuclear weapons and
their actual employment.
(uj
(b)	(4) The Soviets have long been concerned that the effi-
ciency of the decisionmaking and control processes has lagged behind the
growth of mobility in maneuver units. Control procedures are thought to
have become too slow from the identification of a requirement to the
issuance of unit orders. The most prominent means of compressing the
required time for planning and control procedures in the 1990s would -be an
integrated, real-time, automated command support (ACS) system. A fully
developed ACS could:
2 (U) Reduce significantly staff planning and
command decisionmaking time.
2 (U) Permit more-sophisticated consideration of
alternate operational and logistic problems.
2 (0) Improve and speed the collection, processing,
and dissemination of intelligence data and expand
access to it.
£ (U) Enhance the management of resources.
(c)	The Warsaw Pact has been engaged since the 1960s in a
multinational, effort to provide their forces with automated support of com-
mand, control, and communications. Parts of an ACS system are now opera-
tional, particularly in the area of air defense and artillery fire control.
A completely developed ACS system will probably be deployed to ground force
tactical commanders in the early 1990s.
(u)
(d)	(5) The structure of the Soviet ACS system is likely to be
along the lines of a conceptual plan developed by the Czechs, in response to
Soviet tasking, in the mid-1960s. This concept, called MODEL, integrated up
to 30 operational functions into six groupings supported by a centralized
ACS system. These systems are:
1_ (U) Strike activities—all means of striking enemy
ground forces.
2 (U) Troop maneuver—all ground troop movement activi-
ties not included in the strike category.
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3. (U) Reconnaissance—serveil lance -and reconnaissance
activities of individual services incliiding intelli-
gence activities.
£ (U) Supply—materiel support activities and facilities
of all branches of service, including logistic transpor-
tation. .
£ (U) Air defense-activities and facilities of the
entire air defense system.
£ (U) Political administration—activities of the
political and military service structure.
(u)
(e) The ACS system may feature control computers at each
operational headquarters from front to division designed to interface with
the decisionmaker and pass subtasks to specialized computers. Computers
would be at regimental level, but not necessarily for use in a control role.
Battalions would transmit and receive data through computer terminals.
(u)
(f) (S/NOrORN) In the area of strike activities, a completed
ACS system would enable commanders from regimental level on up, through
their respective Chiefs of Rocket Troops and Artillery (CRTA), to calculate
quickly total fire requirements based on the norms for various targets,
weigh the suitability of available strike means, and select the most econom-
ical means based on weapons capability. Likely programs would:
£ (U) Formulate and disseminate fire support plans.
£ (0) Furnish the number and readiness condition of
friendly strike means.
3 (JJ) Provide the categories and parameters of enemy
targets.
£ (U) Calculate the possibilities for various engage-
ment combinations.
5 (II) Pass logistic status reports and requests.
(g) Intelligence collection, collation, and dissemination
is an area particularly suitable for automation. A fundamental problem
inherent in the Soviet intention to preempt a nuclear strike is tracking
highly mobile delivery systems so they can -be attacked prior to employment.
By the 1990s, the Soviet ACS system will be much more capable of accepting
data directly from a wide variety of sensors, although information from some
may require manual input. Target location data will probably be passed
quickly and efficiently up and across echelons -digitally in the ACS
intel 1igence/reconnaissance (I-R) subsystems. Input and output will be made
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by subsystems used in other functional areas such as strike, air defense,
maneuver control, and aviation. Information collected from assets other than
those under control of the ground force chiefs of reconnaissance--!.e., from
from aviation, artillery units, and maneuver elements--wiH therefore be
readily available to ACS users. Tactical level units down to at least
regiment, and probably battalion, will be able to access the system for data.
(h) jjt&f Sensor systems available to the Soviet ground force
commander by the early M90s will include side-looking airborne radar with a
real-time downlink. These systems will provide data on moving vehicles and
other targets within the tactical commander's area of responsibility,
including location and direction of movement. Other sensor systems will
also put real-time data into the ground force I-R subsystem. Among these
will be TV target acquisition/identification sensors with a low-light-level
capability, mounted on a variety of airborne platforms— e.g., helicopters,
tactical aircraft, and drones. Г
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3.	(U) Footnotes
1.	"Printsipy Voennovoy Iskusstva" (Principles of Military Art)" -by A.A.
Sidorenko, Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya (Soviet Military Encyclopedia),
Volume 6 (Moskva: 1978)..
2.	Ogarkov,N.V., Always Prepared to Defend the Fatherland, p.31, Moscow,
1982.
3.	"For Our Socialist Motherland: Guarding Peaceful Labor," by MSU N.
Ogarkov, Kommunist, No. 10, July 1981.
4.	Ogarkov, Always Prepared to Defend the fatherland, p.25.
5.	The name "operational maneuver groups of the Army" is found in the
Polish open source journal, Review of Air and Air Defense Forces. June 1981.
During 1981, discussion of mobile groups, deep operations, operations of
groups of fronts, and other related concepts gained currency in Soviet open
source literature. See especially the December 1981 issue of
Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal (Military Historical Journal). This open
source discussion illuminates the historical roots from which DMG concepts
were developed.
6,	Agility is used in the sense meant by Beaufre: "....The combination of
mobility and the reaction capabilities: information, decision, transmission
of orders, execution." See Andre Beaufre, Strategy For Tomorrow, footnote,
p.29, Crane, Russak & Company, Inc. (New York: 1974).
7.	Ogarkov, N.V., Always Prepared to Defend the Fatherland, p.Z9.
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CHAPTER 3
SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO MEET WESTERN THEATER
RE-QUIREMENTS (THROUGH 2000) (U)
1.	(U) Adequacy of Force Structure to Accomplish Required -Operations in
the Western Theater.
a.	(5/N^ORN) The Soviets appear to be fairly satisfied with the total
quantity of the ground forces at their disposal for planned operations
against NATO. They are concerned with the readiness -of these forces to par-
ticipate early in offensive operations. This is particularly applicable to
the forces in the Western Military districts of the Soviet Union, which are
expected to form the initial reinforcing fronts used to extend quickly the
success of first echelon fronts that have penetrated deep into NATO rear
areas. The nature of Soviet operational concepts, with the -premiumplaced
on keeping NATO off balance and unable to react to offensive pressure,
demands that offensive momentum be maintained through campaign completion.
The Soviets, therefore, must be concerned with the readiness of Western ND
forces to conduct effective offensive combat operations early in the war.
This concern is heightened by fears about the reliability of their NSWP
partners, by the growing gap in capabilities between some NSWP forces and
the better Soviet divisions, and by the growing realization of the immense
attrition expected to occur.
b.	(S/l^OFORN) For these reasons, the Soviets probably wil T undertake a
long-term program to gradually heighten the mobilization readiness of their
forces opposite NATO. Taking into consideration manpower constraints and
the need for force increases in the Eastern Theater, a likely way to
increase readiness would be through a combination of measures:
(u)
(1)	(S/NOFOR-N-) Upgrade selected Category Ш divisions to Category
II status; , .
(u)
(2)	(S/N0F6RN) Mobilize as low strength Category III divisions
some existing inactive or mobilization base divisions;
(u)
(3)	(S/NOFORN-)' Upgrade the Vyborg Corps and presently under-
strength WTVD armies to full size, and establish an additional army in the
Baltic MD from available MD forces;
(u)
{4) (S/NOFORtt) Use equipment becoming available from inventory
turnover to establish mobilization bases to replace some or all of the newly
activated divisions.
(u)
c. (S/NOEORN) Conservatively, such a program might result in 6-TO
additional active divisions for combat in the Western TVD (all former mobi-
lization bases) by 2000. It could also result in 4-3 of the present Category
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III divisions being upgraded to Category II. These changes would occur in
the Leningrad, Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian MBs. Because current
force levels in the Northwest and Southwest TVDs are probably considered
adequate for planned missions, the force enhancements would be applied in
the Western TVO. Coupled with the non-divisional enhancements mentioned
above, this program would significantly enhance early-combat fighting capa-
bilities. It could be accomplished with modest resource expenditures if the
newly activated divisions were maintained at low peacetime manning and
current equipment (T64 tanks, for example) was provided to them as it was
replaced in the forward area by new production.
fu)
2.	Readiness. We consider the overall Soviet ground forces organiza-
tion to be well prepared to initiate combat operations promptly and to
marshall the required support. Soviet requirements to further improve their
readiness should be understood to reflect very high standards. In many
areas, for example in making the entire national economy more responsive to
military requirements, the scope of the issue is so large that only gradual
and incremental improvements should be expected. In other areas, such as
enlarging the reserve structure with attention to providing replacement com-
mand and control entities, significant progress should be attainable by
2000. The fruition of long-term projects such as the automatic command
support system and the Warsaw Pact area communications system will signifi-
cantly enhance overall readiness of Pact forces.
3.	(4J) Integration of Military Operations On a Broader Scale.
,(u)	  
a.	f-Sd Command and Control. Integration of military operations into
the "theater strategic operation" is an umbrella concept that depends
largely on achieving requisite command, control,, and communications capabi-
lities. Completion of the overall automatic command support (ACS) system,
projected to occur during the 1990s, will go a long way toward meeting this
requirement, providing the Soviets with a capability to plan more rapidly
the allocation and deployment of their forces for the changing operational
and tactical needs of the highly mobile battlefield envisioned in their
doctrine. An increase in their capability to engage fleeting targets would
significantly enhance the Soviet ability to preempt nuclear strikes. 'Senior
commanders would have a much greater ability to mass fires against critical
sectors and influence tactical situations at key points in the Hattie.
(u)
b.	(-5} Organizational Changes. Organizational changes in Soviet air,
air defense and ground forces already have improved significantly their
ability to execute the theater strategic operation.
(u)
(1) (S/NOFOfffl-) The new air and air defense organization provides
the Soviets with a peacetime structure that more -closely approximates their
anticipated wartime structure for the employment of air power. The new
structure will allow a more rapid transition to a wartime posture and should
enhance operational flexibility and coordination through centralized control
of air assets at front and theater levels. Continued introduction of new
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technology in command, control, and communications systems, and of 1-arge
numbers of new, modern weapons with longer ranges, will further enhance the
effectiveness of this structure in the coming years.
(2) _(5Д10₽0Я1ГГ Organizational changes within maneuver divisions
likewise will result in divisions more capable of mounting,effective offen-
sive operations against sophisticated NATO defenses, with less likelihood of
becoming stalled and being forced to fight an indecisive war of attrition.
The reorganized divisions have both greater firepower and improved maneuver
capabilities. The ability to overcome antitank defenses will be substan-
tially improved as divisions are equipped according to the new organiza-
tional norms.	The incorporation of attack and assault . helicopter
capabilities into the division structure will provide new flexibility for
the maneuver division commander. Infusion of greater numbers of cannon,
rockets, and mortar artillery into the maneuver regiments will give them
better capabilities to react quickly to abrupt changes in the tactical
situation with less need of fire support from higher echelons, and specific
cally to lay down a base of suppressive fire while on the move. |
Ы
On balance, by the year 2000, the addition of more weapons and equipment
into the tables of organization and equipment of Soviet maneuver divisions
will make these divisions substantially more capable of executing the wide
ranging, deep mobile operations required by Soviet doctrinal concepts.
(u)
c. (-SyNOTORN) Operational Maneuver -Group Concepts. The organizational
changes mentioned above support, in part, the employment of the operational
maneuver group (-OMG) as a large, high speed exploitation force designed to
move deep into an enemy's operational rear early In the initial period of
war. The restructured air forces and increases in firepower and mobility of
some new artillery and missile systems also support such rapid, deep
exploitation. The OMG concept has been incorporated into Soviet military
doctrine and will become, a standard feature in the organization and opera-
tions of some fronts and many* armies. The Soviets have acknowledged that
much more training and improved command and control systems will.-be required
to fully implement the concept. Despite probable difficulties in logistics
support and command and control, the Soviets would probably make use of OMGs
even if hostilities should occur in the near future. By the mid-1980s, the
necessary training and command and control to competently implement the OMG
concept should be in place. Thereafter, the significant contribution to
maneuver capabilities which it provides will be steadily enhanced as
improved weapons systems enter the force.
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4. (U) Summary Evaluation of Soviet Requirements versus -Capabi 1 ities in
the Western Theater.
(u) _
a.	(S/NOF-ORN) Introduction. The Soviets have a range of military
requirements in the Western Theater. At the minimum, they require the capa-
bility to keep the tPSU in power in the USSR. Next, they must maintain
Soviet hegemony over their Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact allies. Third, Soviet
forces require the capability to deter or successfully defend against any
form of NATO attack on the Pact. Finally, the Soviets require an offensive
capability to overwhelm NATO with a massive ground and air assault in
Central Europe, while simultaneously oonducting secondary offensives or
holding operations on the northwestern and southwestern flanks. The Soviets
must be capable of achieving all of these objectives in either an N&C or
non-NBC war.
(U) This section will contrast the above requirements with actual
Soviet capabilities in terms of three essential areas: force structure
(numbers, types, and locations of forces); fielded technologies (current
equipment); and operational capability (C^I and logistics). The purpose is
to determine areas where Soviet capabilities fall short of requirements in
an effort to identify critical factors driving Soviet force developments in
the Western theater.
(u)
b.	(-S/NOFORN) Force Structure. The current structure of Soviet
Western Theater forces is sufficient to accomplish the minimum mission of
securing GPSU power in the USSR and of ensuring continued Soviet dominance
over the Warsaw Pact. Beyond this, from a strictly structural viewpoint,
the Soviets seem satisfied that the size and disposition of their theater
forces generally meets their extensive offensive operational needs. As it
exists now, the Soviet force structure in the Western theater reflects a
long evolutionary process of deliberate, systematic improvement designed to
meet specific Soviet requirements for high speed mobile operations of great
depth. During the next twenty years, the Soviets are likely to continue
this process of gradual improvement as they strive to incorporate and maxi-
mize the positive impact of technological advances on their force structure
and operational concepts.
(u)
(S/NOFORN) However, while the Soviet approach to force structure
development to the year 2000 is more likely to be one of incremental rather
than radical alteration, we cannot rule out their willingness and capabil-
ity to rapidly and si-gnificahtly alter their force structure should they
perceive a requirement to do so. The key impetus for such a change is
technology. The Soviet approach to military technological development is
dialectical, emphasizing the evolutionary process by which a technology is
developed and introduced, has its impact, is followed by countermeasures
that negate or offset its impact, and is then improved or superseded by
new technology that negates the countermeasure. In the Soviet view, this
process is continuous and ensures the eventual obsolescence of every
weapons system. Attentiveness to the impact of military technological
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change, particularly Taser and directed-energy technology, and, increasing-
ly effective antitank weapons, will help shape "Soviet force structure
developments in the coming decades.
c.	(5/N0F0RN) Fielded Technologies. Technological inferiority has
been a traditional Russian concern. Since the 1920s, the need to import
technology has been a driving consideration in Soviet force development
decisions. This concern heightened during the early 1950s as the Soviets
realized that the pace and impact of military-technological change was
accelerating. While technically advanced equipment and operations are
needed throughout the Soviet military, the need is most acute in the Western
Theater, where the NATO bloc fields the most technologically sophisticated
potential adversary force.
In response to these concerns, the Soviets have develop-
ed a materiel research, development, and acquisition process that assures
the gradual improvement of old equipment and the continued fielding of new
technologies. The result is that Soviet Western Theater forces currently
possess the technological capability to accomplish all theater missions, in
a conventional war, and probably in'an NBC conflict as well. However, given
the highly dynamic nature of military technological evolution, the Soviets
are constantly striving to keep pace with the latest developements. 1	'
Ы
- further developing the standardization, interchange-
ability, and unification of Warsaw Pact equipment.
(u) ,
d.	(S/NOFORN) Combat Capability. Soviet operational capability in the
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Western Theater is currently sufficient to accomplish the more limited
theater missions -of maintaining the existing power structure in the USSR and
Eastern Europe and of deterring or defending against a NATO conventional or
NBC. attack on the Warsaw Pact countries. From an offensive perspective,
however, the Soviets are concerned about the overall capability of their C^I
and logistic support systems to meet anticipated requirements for an offen-
sive war of the size, speed, scope, and intensity they envision in Western
Europe. This is particularly true of their view of NBC warfare in Europe.
(1)	frS/N^TOtUlj From a C^I standpoint, the Soviets realize that the
extreme dynamism, rapidity, and spatial scope of modern combat has com-
pounded traditional problems by vastly increasing the volume of information
required, while simultaneously decreasing the amount of time available to
collect, process, evaluate, and disseminate it. This problem is especially
evident in Soviet efforts to integrate the command and control of combat
operations at the theater level. In their mi-nds, this is an essential step
toward ensuring the simultaneous prosecution of the offensive throughout the
enemy's operational depth, and toward maintaining the momentum of the offen-
sive, without pause, in a single theater campaign. Accomplishing these
objectives requires improvement in two basic areas: command organization, to
more efficiently integrate all theater combat and support functions and the
introduction of new C^I equipment, to enhance the collection, processing,
and evaluation of combat information and to facilitate the rapid implemen-
tation of command decisions. The Soviets realize that without these improve-
ments, combat capability will continue to lag behind combat potential.
From their view, this lag seriously threatens their capability to accomplish
Western Theater missions within the timeframe they perceive to be necessary.
(2)	£S/NOFORN} Many of the same problems also apply to the Soviet
logistical support structure. While Soviet forces are currently well sup-
ported logistically, Soviet leaders continue to be concerned with their abil-
ity to meet the tremendously expanded materiel requirements they forsee in
a European campaign. The enormous geographic distances involved, the
increased quantity and complexity of modern weapons and equipment, the heavy
losses of equipment and manpower they expect, the increased mobility of
maneuver units requiring logistic support, and the problems of converting
the rear services from peacetime to wartime readiness, all combine toplace
an enormous strain on the current logistics structure. In an effort to help
alleviate these problems, the Soviets and their NSWP allies have initiated
the development of an automated rear services support system to better orga-
nize, control, and implement rear service support. The bottom line is
however, that although the Soviets are concerned about their logistic capa-
bility and perceive a need for improvement, they also -believe that they
currently possess the capability to do the job.
(3)	fS/N^F^RN) Another factor affecting the overall operational
capability of Soviet Western Theater forces is the rapidity with which these
forces can convert from peacetime to wartime readiness. This is particularly
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true for the reduced-strength and cadre -units (particularly in the USSR's
Western MDs) that fill the critical wartime mission of reinforcing and
exploiting the success of first echel-оп units. Timely commitment of these
forces is necessary to maintain the momentum of the offensive, a key Soviet
requirement. This problem takes on added significance with the uncertain
reliability of some NSWP allies.
(u)
(4) (5/NOrORN) On a larger scale, the Soviets continue to empha-
size the importance of their entire national economic mobilization system.
However, while Soviet concerns over these and other mobil ization/readiness
issues is chronic, it should be remembered that these concerns reflect their
very high standards and that their current mobilization system is sufficient
to meet Soviet theater requirements. Still, they are seeking improvement in
the following specific areas; better integration of manpower, transpor-
tation, communications, and energy to insure the stability and survivability
of their economic mechanism; improving the wartime, autonomy of enterprises
producing the main combat weapons; improving their ability to mobilize
rapidly after hostilities have begun; and providing for better secrecy in
their mobilization process.
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CHAPTER 4
FAR EAST THEATER
].	(u) Soviet Military Requirements. The Far East is second only to the
European Theater in importance to Soviet military policy. The Soviets
have numerous requirements in the Far East Theater, including the following:
(u)
a. ftr) Ensuring Soviet territorial security by. deterring potential
Chinese aggression or containing a Sino-Soviet conflict.
(u)
b\ -(-§-) Developing further Soviet offensive military capabilities and
options in the region to improve their capability to inf 1 ict damage on
China's military-industrial capability and seize all or portions of
Manchuria.
с.	Countering US naval and air forces in the region.
d.	Preventing China from taking any advantage of Soviet involve-
ment in a war with NATO.
(u)
e.	Limiting American, Chinese, and Japanese influence in Asia.
f.	Frustrating and delaying the emergence of a “Washington-Seijing-
Tokyo axis" with links to NATO.
g.	Encouraging the evolution of a Soviet-sponsored Asian collect-
ive security system.
2.	(U) Soviet Strategy and Capabilities. Defense planners in Moscow must
consider several potential conflicts in the Far East, including, for
example, a direct confrontation with China; actions against US air and naval
forces only; and a simultaneous two-front war with NATO and China.
a.	(U) Conflict with China.
(1)	(S/NOpORN) Soviet options in a strictly Sino-Soviet-conf 1 ict—
which would be primarily a land and air campaign—could range from large-
scale raids with limited objectives to a full-scale invasion of western and
northeastern China supported by nuclear strikes. Military as well as polit-
ical considerations probably would discourage the Soviets from pursuing the
total defeat and surrender of China or attempting the long-term mil itary
occupation of the Chinese heartland.
(2)	(U) The Soviets have the following capabilities:
(a)	(S/N^FCRN) They could stop a Chinese general ground
offensive and could quickly mount a punishing counterattack.
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- (u)
(b)	.(-S-/NOFORN) They -could mount -ground incursions, supported
by tactical air forces, into northern China with a good chance of initial
success. They would have to consider, however, that anything beyond shallow
penetrations could lead to protracted guerrilla warfare.
(c)	(-S/NO^RN) They could overrun and hold Manchuria if pro-
vided substantial reinforcements from elsewhere in the -USSR or with the
extensive use of nuclear weapons. In most circumstances, however, because
of its preoccupation with NATO, it is unlikely that Moscow would draw down
its strategic reserves substantially to support a conflict with China.
Moreover, once deep into China, Soviet forces would have to fight a well-
entrenched enemy in inhospitable terrain at the end -of long and tenuous
supply lines.
(u)
(d)	(S/NOFORN) The Soviets have a substantial advantage over
China in chemical warfare capabilities, which, in the absence of a substan-
tial Chinese chemical or tactical nuclear retaliatory capability and because
of general Chinese vulnerabilities, provides the Soviets with a credible
option to initiate chemical warfare if'the situation requires it.
(u)
(e)	(S/NOTORN) The Soviets have a vast nuclear superiority and
could conduct nuclear strikes throughout China. Nonetheless, sufficient
Chinese ballistic missiles would survive a Soviet counterforce attack
{because of their concealed and dispersed deployment as well as mobility
and hardness) to deliver a small but destructive retaliatory strike. This
constitutes a constraint to an unprovoked Soviet nuclear attack.
b.	(U) Operations Against US Forces.
(1)	fS/N^PoRN) Moscow perceives a direct threat to its security
from US naval and air forces in the far East. The modernization of the
Pacific Ocean Fleet represents an attempt to counter this threat. In a
NATO-Warsaw Pact war, the most pressing tasks of the Pacific Ocean Fleet's
general purpose forces would be to establish sea control in waters con-
tinguous to the USSR and in Soviet ballistic missile submarine patrol areas
and to conduct sea-denial operations. Soviet air force elements would have
missions against US bases in the region.
(u)
(2)	(S/NOFORN) In a war with NATO, the Soviets probably would take
actions against US naval forces in the Pacific and probably would not con-
sider such attacks as directly risking wider hostilities with China or Japan.
Additionally, the Soviets probably would pressure the Japanese to deny the
United States the use of naval and air facilities. Failing this, however,
the Soviets probably would attack these facilities. Soviet forces would
have the following capabilities:
(u)
(a)	(S/NOroRft) The Soviets would pose a substantial threat to
any surface force that penetrated their sea-denial area.
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(u)
(b)	(’S'/NOrOR-N) The Soviets probably would ex-pect to make
limited use of 'bases in Vietnam, but we -do not anticipate large-scale
-operations because of Vietnam's distance from tbe -USSR.
(c)	(5/HUfORN) The Soviets would not mount large-scale ground
force attacks in the Aleutians or on the Alaskan mainland, but US facilities
in Alaska could be targets for air strikes or commando teams. Moscow might
anticipate that limited air strikes or nuisance raids on US territory cou Id
pin down US forces needed elsewhere.
c.	(U) Simultaneous Wars with MATO and -China,
(1)	(5/N(^F^IRN) Simultaneous wars with China and NATO would repre-
sent an extreme situation for the Soviets, and Soviet planners have been
increasingly occupied with this contingency in the last decade. In such a
contingency, the Soviet priority of effort would be against NATO, and Moscow
would avoid operations in the Far East that would prevent a quick victory in
Europe.	\ .
(u)
(2)	(5/NOTORN) The risk of precipitating simultaneous hostilities
with China would not preclude a decision by the Soviets to go to war with
NATO. Although they would prefer not to fight wars in Europe and Asia at
the same time, we believe they could sustain concurrent, large-scale combat
in both theaters for a number of months. If a war in both theaters were
prolonged, however, Soviet capabilities to support major offensive operations
in Asia would be severely strained by logistic, personnel, and material con-
straints. The Soviets also would consider that an attack on China could
develop into a long-term, large-scale commitment of manpower and materiel
that would compete with and weaken their European war effort.
d.	(U) -Other Contingencies.
. (1) (S/NOFORN-) A renewal of fighting between China and Vietnam
would lead to increased Soviet support of an important ally. The Soviet
reaction would probably be similar to that after the -Chinese attack in
1979: an initial propaganda campaign and a substantial increase in material
aid to Vietnam. If the conflict were prolonged or were -going badly for
Vietnam, limited Soviet military actions against China would be a possibil-
ity»	4
(u)
(2)	CS/NOFORft) The Soviet response to a renewal of conflict between
North and South Korea would depend heavily on the Chinese reaction and the
level of US involvement. The Soviets would -perceive a rapid cessation of
hostilities to be in their best interest. The Soviets -probably would provide
some materiel support to the North but probably would conclude that the risks
attending direct combat support would far outweigh the -possible benefits
unless the North were in danger, of total collapse.
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3.	(4J) Future Prospects.
a.	(5/N^)RH) Near Term (Through 1985). No development over the next
several years i5 likely to alter appreciably the current Soviet military
strategy in the Far-East or modify the USSR's effort to maintain and improve
the capabilities of its large standing forces in the region. The Soviets
will continue their program of gradual but steady force growth and moderniza-
tion in the Far East. The.number of Soviet ground force divisions in the Far
East will increase by some 5-43 active divisions through the mid-1980s. The
number of fixed-wing combat aircraft also will increase slightly. The
Pacific Ocean fleet will continue to be structured primarily to oppose US
naval forces, although the Navy also might have to devote more attention and
resources to offsetting the gradual growth of Japanese naval capabilities.
(u)
b.	(S/NOFORNj Mid and Far Term {Through 2000). The Soviets will
probably continue to gradually augment the force structure opposite China
during the late 1980s and 1990s. The extent of this buildup will depend on
such factors as improvement, in Chinese military capabilities, the status of
Sino-Japanese and Sino-US relations, Chinese success in obtaining Western
military assistance, and the ebb and flow of the Sino-Soviet dispute. A
conservative estimate, assuming no significant change in Sino-Soviet politi-
cal relations and steady but unspectacular Chinese military enhancements
that do not include marked improvement in their offensive potential, would
be that the number of Soviet active divisions in the far east TVO will grow
from the present count in the low 50s to 60-65 by the year 2000. This may
be accompanied by the upgrading of a corps headquarters in the Far East MO
to an army and constituting a corps headquarters in Mongolia. In the* face
of expected enhancements to PRC ground forces, the additional divisions fore-
cast would give the Soviets the strength to maintain a credible threat to
Northern China. It would provide Soviet planners with what we believe they
would perceive to be necessary to maintain a threat to rapidly cut off
Manchuria. Such a threat would impose a powerful constraint against the
PRC's becoming involved either in an escalation of the boarder dispute or in
extensive operations into southeast Asia.
4.	(U) Summary Evaluation of Soviet Requirements versus Capabilities in
the Far Cast Theater.
- A
a.	f5/N0r0RN) Introduction. Since the mid-1960s Soviet forces in the
Far East Theater have undergone gradual, steady growth and modernization.
During this period, Soviet military missions in the theater have evolved
from a strictly strategic defensive orientation toward a developing theater
offensive capability. Soviet «concern with the prospect of a multi-theater
war with both China and NATO has been a driving force behind this develop-
mental process, and remains a major Soviet fear today. As a result, Soviet
Far East Theater forces face a range of military requirements. These
include: securing Soviet-borders by deterring, containing, or defeating any
Chinese offensive against Soviet territory; further developing an offensive
capability to damage China's military-industrial capability and to seize all
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or parts of Manchuria; countering -US air and naval forces in the region; and
preparing for'a protracted multi-theater war with NAT-0 and China.
b.	(S/N^TORN^ Force Structure. The Soviet force structure in the Far
East Theater is currently sufficient to deter, contain, or defeat any form
of Chinese aggression against Soviet territory. It is also adequate to
mount a 1 imited. ground/air offensive against northern China. With regard to
Manchuria, the Soviets -could invade and damage this area in a conventional
ground/air offensive, but could probably not seize and hold Manuch-uria
without either substantial reinforcement from outside the theater or the use
of tactical nuclear weapons. Finally, given their tremendous superiority in
nuclear and chemical weapons, the Soviets could inflict serious damage over
the entire expanse of Chinese territory in an NBC war.
(u)
fStNOFORN) The Soviets currently have sufficient forces in the Far Fast
to seriously threaten any US surface force entering their sea-denial -zone
and to attack US bases in Japan. However, in a prolonged simultaneous war
with both China and NATO, logistic demands of the European theater would
probably preclude Soviet Far Eastern forces from maintaining offensive
operations of any depth against China without resorting to ’NSC warfare.
Thus, in a multi-theater war of extended duration, Soviet Far -East Theater
forces would probably be forced to revert to a strategic defensive posture.
(u) '
c.	-(5-/N0F0RNJ Fielded Technologies. Given the relative lack of
technical sophistication of the Chinese forces, and the Soviets1
overwhelming superiority in tactical nuclear and chemical warfare capabili-
ties, the Soviet Far Eastern forces are adequately equipped to accomplish
limited theater objectives. However, the prospect of a multi-theater war
with China and NATO is of grave concern to the Soviets, and they will
continue to upgrade Far East Theater equipment to meet this ultimate
contingency.
(u)
d.	(S/NOrORN) Combat Capability. Since World War II, the Soviets have
gradually upgraded their combat capability in the Far East Theater. In
1978, they reorganized their entire theater command structure along the
lines of their Western Theater organization. This reorganization reflected
the Soviet perception that the existing theater C^I structure was inadequate
to support expanding theater requirements, particularly to control theater
operations in a multi-theater war with both China and NATO. The new system
improved Soviet theater war-fighting capability by consolidating under -one
command all ground, air, air defense, and naval forces. The peacetime
implementation of communications links and command facilities facilitates
the transition from peacetime to wartime readiness, and provides tetter C^I
in the initial stages of a war. While the new organization may not yet be
fully developed, it is currently capable of handling Soviet theater defen-
sive missions, and it significantly upgrades their capability to meet the
expanded C^I requirements of a protracted multi-theater war.
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CHAPTER 5
SOUTHWEST ASIA
1.	(U) Soviet Interests and Objectives.
a.	Soviet interests in Southwest Asia are essentially twofold. At
the base is a need to maintain stability on their own borders and to prevent
spillover of Moslem extremism. Beyond this essentially defensive objective
is a broad offensive objective of promoting and extending Soviet influence
in the region. The key feature of this objective is to control Western
access to Persian Gulf oil, thereby gaining maximum political leverage-over
the West. The pertinent questions are: (1) How will the Soviets pursue
these objectives? (2) What kinds of circumstances might prompt them to
resort to military means in their pursuit?
fa)
b.	The Soviets will continue to pursue, in the future, varied
diplomatic, propaganda, and military means short of the use of Soviet troops
(arms deliveries, covert action, training of guerrillas, etc.) to secure
their interests. They will support local nongoverning Communist parties
when they perceive it as in their interests to do so arid will back certain
ethnic factions against others, guided by a broad perspective of Soviet
interests. They will use every opportunity to stir up anti-Western
feelings, and will attempt to foment instability within nonfriendly states
and use this Instability to influence the creation of more acceptable
governments. Expecting and engendering instability, the Soviets will be
alert to take advantage of any opportunities presented.
2.	(U) Circumstances that Could Prompt Soviet Military Action. Because
of the complexity of the geopolitical environment, it is not possible to
predict concrete actions the Soviets might undertake. Under most cir-
cumstances, the USSR would seek to avoid military involvement by its own
troops, preferring to rely on other tactics to achieve its ends.. There
are, of course, exceptions to this general rule. The following are events
that might prompt a Soviet resort to military force in Southwest Asia.
fa)
a.	(£) If a Communist or pro-Soviet regime were to come to power in
Iran, and were then in danger of being toppled, it would be characteristic
for the Soviets to introduce military force if needed to maintain that
government in power. This situation would be analogous to that of
Afghanistan. Such an operation would focus initially on Teheran, regional
political centers, and Soviet lines of communication. Securing Iranian oil
fields might not be of high’ initial priority in this scenario. It is less
likely that the Soviets would intervene merely to support a Communist fac-
tion that was competing for power.
(uj
b.	In the event that Iran were breaking up, i.e., that the central
regime was unable to maintain control over regional ethnic minorities, the
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Soviets might intervene militarily in support of a strong local Communist
faction. If, for example, Azarbayjani ethnic sentiments evolved, or could
be pushed by Moscow toward insurrection, the USSR could intervene on behalf
of a Moscow-oriented contender with the objective of making Tabriz the
capital of an allied or client state. De facto Soviet control of Azarbayjan
would give the USSR potential land access to both the Mediterranean Sea and
Persian "Gulf through the sometimes friendly states of Syria and Iraq. A
similar situation could arise in Iranian Baluchistan, possibly prompting the
Soviets to occupy southeastern Iran in support of Baluchi aspirations.
(u)
c.	The Soviet presence in Afghanistan provides a base of opera-
tions from which they could exploit future opportunities in this volatile
area. A possible Soviet intervention in Baluchi areas could extend beyond
Iranian Baluchistan into Pakistan. A Soviet-Indian squeeze on Pakistan in
which the Soviets trained and armed the Baluchis for activity against the
Pakistani and Iranian regimes could provide an opportunity for the USSR to
"sponsor" an independent and subservient Baluchistan.
fu)
d.	(Gf The Soviets could be expected to move into Iran if the US were
to attempt to occupy a portion of the country. Any US actions, taken in a
crisis, that might be perceived as leading toward possible intervention
could trigger Soviet military moves.
e.	(G-) Finally, the Soviets might intervene militarily in Southwest
Asia in the event of a general war. Such intervention could follow any of
the above scenarios and might also extend to the Persian Gulf littoral.
Under these circumstances, worldwide military considerations would dominate
Soviet planning. This might lead to limited ventures early in a world war,
with larger-scale follow-on efforts deferred, depending on the attainment
of objectives in more vital theaters. The Soviets could, for example,
intervene in northern Iran with the objectives of toppling the Teheran
government, securing a base of operations in the country, and inducing the
US to divert resources that otherwise would be available for use in furope.
Having occupied northern Iran, the Soviets could undertake- solely defensive
and consolidation operations pending the outcome of the war in the larger
arena.
3.	(G}- Illustrative Soviet invasion Campaigns. This section dis-cusses
several campaign scenarios to illustrate Soviet capabilities. They include
a full-scale invasion with the objectives of conquering all of Iran; seizure
of the Persian Gulf littoral and its oil-producing areas after occupying
Iran; and seizure of limited areas of Iran.
a. (U) Full-Scale Invasion of Iran.
(1)	(4^ This scenario envisions a full-scale Soviet invasion to
seize all of Iran. Total Soviet force requirements would be -decided more by
the vast territory to be covered and by the possibility of outside inter-
ference than by the threat from Iran’s armed forces. Iran is approximately
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be to seize sufficient territory to allow the maneuver room necessary тог
the employment of additional forces.
(u)
(7)	x^t 'The initial attack in northwestern Iran might be led by
the 4th and 7th Armies of the Transcaucasus Military District, with each
army consisting of four or five divisions. The -principal axis of advance
probably would be Jolfa-Tabriz-Zanjan. Secondary attacks -probably would be
launched on the coastal Astara-Rasht axis and on the more mountainous
Jolfa-Urumiyeh-Saqqez axis. These attacks would be supported by airborne
and airmobile operations aimed at seizing important airfields and strategic-
ally located mountain passes and surrounding Iranian defenses. Small-scale
amphibious landings might also be made along Iran’s Caspian Sea coast to
assist the drive on the Astara-Rasht axis.
(u)
(8)	Once initial operations in northwestern Iran had secured
sufficient maneuver room, larger numbers of divisions would be committed.
We believe that the Soviets would drive as far south as Kermanshah, hamadan,
and Qom during the first major phase of offensive operations to seize the
key road and nail lines leading south.. These would be essential for trans-
porting the supplies necessary to support follow-on operations.
(u)
(9)	гЯ In northeastern Iran, Soviet forces from the Turkestan MO
and from Afghanistan would probably form an army of four or five divisions.
This .army would eventually operate under the command of the Transcaucasus
Front but initially would be controlled from the Turkestan MO. It probably
would mount its initial attack to capture Mashhad and link up with advancing
forces from the Transcaucasus in the vicinity of Tehran and Qom.
Alternately, a separate Turkestan front, including all those forces com-
mitted to the operation from Afghanistan, might be formed to control opera-
tions throughout Eastern Iran.
(u)
(10)	During this initial phase of the offensive, one or two
divisions from the Soviet 40th Army in Afghanistan—supported by Soviet air-
borne forces—might launch a thrust toward the ports of Bandar-e-Abbas end
Chah Bahar to forestall the introduction of Western or Middle Eastern forces
into Iran. The Soviets would probably .assess such an operation by their
forces as carrying high risks, however, because adequate support for them
would be difficult against attacks by Western naval airpower. During the
first phase of the invasion, the forces from Turkestan and Afghanistan proba-
bly would attempt to seize airfields in eastern Iran—such as the ones at
Zahedan and Kerman—for providing air support to subsequent operations along
the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The actual seizure of Bandar-e-Abb as
and €hah Bahar might be delayed until later in the Soviet offensive.
(uj
(11)	Hn Following the seizure of northern {nan and limited areas
of eastern Iran, the Soviets would conduct a logistics and air buildup to
support subsequent operations to seize the rest of the country. An examina-
tion of the distances, terrain, and forces involved suggests that the
Soviets would require three to four weeks to seize northern and eastern Iran
and prepare for subsequent operations.
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one-third the -size of the -continental United States. If the Sovi-ets
believed that the situation and time allowed, they would prefer to take at
least a month—possibly six weeks or more—to prepare about 25 motorized
rifle, tank, and‘airborne divisions for this operation. The invasion could
be carried out by using divisions already in Soviet military districts near
Iran and in the strategic reserve, and possibly, some -divisions and support
units drawn fron^other military districts.
(2) ~(5) Preparations for such an operation would be extensive. The
command, control, and communication systems necessary to direct a force of
this size would have to be established and a logistics support system set
up. Forces would be mobilized and the reservists necessary to fully man
these units would be called up. Thousands of civilian trucks also would be
mobilized. Because several hundred thousand reservists would be required to
fully man the 25-division force, the Soviets probably would conduct at least
a week of refresher training and exercises prior to committing these units
to combat. The estimate of the time required to prepare the forces reflects
this perception.
, g)	'
(3) A full-scale invasion probably would be conducted in
several phases. The first phase would be an attack into northern Iran
having as its initial objective the capture of Iranian territory as far
south as Kermanshah, -Qom, and the salt desert of eastern Iran. It might
also include the capture of two key airfields in southeastern Iran—Zahedan
and Kerman.
(u)
(4) Small special-purpose units probably would attempt to
sabotage key facilities (such as airfields) some 12 to 24 hours before the
invasion and would conduct last-minute reconnaissance for ground and air
strikes against Iranian forces. The Soviets probably would conduct a large-
scale air operation to destroy Iranian aircraft and would conduct air strikes
against Iranian ground force units immediately before beginning the ground
attack. The Soviets could support the initial large-scale invasion with oyer
400 combat aircraft and up to 200 helicopters. Several hundred additional
aircraft could be made available for reinforcement if needed.
RO
C5) Forces assembled in the Transcaucasus and North Caucasus
MDs from these and more distant MBs would be organized into a front of up to
20 motorized rifle and tank divisions that would carry out the main ground
attack into northwestern Iran. Although the ultimate objective of this
front would be to seize the Khuzestan oilfields and key ports on the Persian
•Gulf, the distances involved make it likely that the Soviets would phase
their operations, with the first major phase extending on a line roughly
from Kermanshah to Qom.
W
(6) In northwestern Iran the initial ground attack by the
front would probably be made by less than half of its divisions. Attack
routes into northwestern Iran are few, and movement would be restricted to a
small number of highways. The purpose -of the initial ground attacks would
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(u) 
(12)	(•§•)• The final phase of -the invasion would be -directed toward
seizing the oil-producing regions of Khuzestan and all of the important
ports along the Iranian shore of the Persian Gulf and the -Gulf of Oman.
Some Soviet forces would probably be tasked to secure the Iran-Iraq bor-der
and guard against possible actions by Iraq. At this time, additional Soviet
troops would probably move into Iran to secure lines of communication and be
available for reinforcements if needed.
(u)
(13)	(-S4 After Soviet forces reached the Iranian shore of the
Persian Gulf and the Iran-Iraq border, they would probably again halt to
consolidate their positions and perhaps to prepare for further operations
against the states on the Persian Gulf's southern littoral. The Soviets
would probably plan to complete their conquest of Iran in six weeks. The
distances, terrain, and likely resistance involved tend to support four to
six weeks as a reasonable estimate for completing a compaign against Iranian
forces alone.
(«)
(14)	(6) A desire to capture the oilfields before possible sabo-
tage by the Iranians or seizure by-a third country might tempt the Soviets
to conduct an airborne assault in the Khuzestan area at the outset -of the
invasion. Several significant military factors, however, make such an
attempt unlikely. These include the distance of the oilfields from Soviet
territory, the inability of Soviet air forces to provide air cover for the
transports, and the presence in the area of major Iranian and Iraqi armored
forces.
,(ц)
(15)	Airborne troops might be used to help capture the oil-
fields after Soviet forces had captured airfields in the Kermanshah and
Hamadan area. Soviet ground forces would then have control of forward air-,
fields from which tactical aircraft could support an airborne assault. This
operation, however, would still carry a high risk because of the con-
centration of Iranian and Iraqi units in the region. In any case, even a
large-scale (up to a full division) and successful airborne operation -proba-
bly would be unable to prevent destruction of oil -pumping, storage, ..and
refining facilities before the arrival of Soviet main forces, should Iran
make a determined attempt to destroy them.
b. (U) Invasion of the Persian Gulf Littoral.
(1)	Following a period of consolidation along the Iranian
shore of the Persian Gulf, and a logistics buildup, the Soviets might decide
to launch another attack to seize the oil-producing areas in Kuwait, ’Saudi
Arabia, Baharain, Qatar, IIAE, and Oman. A key question in the minds of
Soviet military planners would be the likely reaction of Iraq. Iraqi mili-
tary forces are insufficient to prevent a determined Soviet effort to cross
their southeastern border to Kuwait, but concerted Iraqi resistance would
force the Soviets to employ a much larger combat force and would slow the
Soviet advance.
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(2)	ея The Soviets probably would attack using one army of about
five divisions, with air support provided by aircraft flying from captured
advanced bases in Iran. Ground forces involved in the attack on the Persian
-Gulf states would.probably have been brought into Iran during the final
phase of the -conquest of Iran. The line of advance probably would parallel
the Arab shore of the Gulf and not move inland into the desert except to
secure oil-related facilities. Soviet forces would probably begin their
attack near the Iraqi-Iranian border and advance along a line through Kuwait,
the ПАЕ, and up to the Strait of Hormuz and to Muscat.
(3)	Even with a promise of Iraqi cooperation, the Soviets
would want to maintain sufficient force in and near southeastern Iraq to
deal with any shift of Iraqi allegiance. Most of the remainder of the
original Soviet force used to invade Iran would be occupied in attempting to
pacify Iran and in guarding the Soviet lines of communication through Iran.
(4)	(У The Arabian Peninsula states alone would not be able to
mount significant resistance to a Soviet attack. These countries could,
however, destroy their oil facilities before they were overrun by the
Soviets.
(u)
(5)	ЕЯ Assuming that Iraq did not contest the passage of Soviet
forces through southern Iraq and that assistance from Western and other
Middle Eastern powers to the Arabian Peninsula countries was ineffective,
such a campaign probably would take an additional two weeks (a total of
perhaps eight to nine weeks). Long lines of communication would cause
resupply problems for a Soviet move along the southern Gulf shore. Water
scarcity would also be a serious problem if retreating Arab forces destroyed
a large portion of the region's -desalinization and pumping facilities. If
Iraq resisted the Soviet advance across southeastern Iraq toward Kuwait, the
Soviets’ problems would be significantly greater. They probably would buiId
up more forces before beginning their attack and would tak-e more time both
in preparing the attack and in accomplishing their objectives.
(u)
(5) (Я Assuming that the Soviets simply seized a blocking posi-
tion in southern Iraq, the actual campaign against the Arabian -Peninsula
-countries would be essentially the same as if Iraq had allowed the passage
of Soviet forces. Unless major forces from Western or other Middle Eastern
countries had been moved to the Arabian Peninsula by this time, the campaign
probably could -be completed within four weeks following the capture of Iran
(a total of perhaps 8 to 10 weeks).
(»)'.
(7) w If, however, major ground and tactical air forces from
Western and other Middle Eastern countries had moved to the Arabian
Peninsula earlier, had cooperated with Iraqi forces in resisting the
Soviets, and had-pursued an active interdiction campaign against Soviet lines
of communication in Iran, the Soviets would probably calculate the force
requirements for such a situation as being in excess of the forces they were
prepared to allocate to this theater.
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(u)
c. -(4) Seizure of Limited Iranian Territory. These examples include
two possible Soviet methods of preparing for and conducting a seizure of
Azarbayjan along with two campaigns aimed at seizing part of Eastern Iran.
(1)	(U) Seizure of Azarbayjan.
(a)	The Soviets . could seize Iranian Azarbayjan using
either a hastily prepared, initially small force or a larger, better pre-
pared force. Initially, a hastily or covertly prepared surprise attack
probably would be limited to the two motorized rifle divisions currently
stationed directly on the border, an airborne and airmobile force of
approximately division strength, and supporting tactical air forces.
(u)
(b)	fr) Such an attack could be prepared in less than a week,
and the Iranians {and Western intelligence) might get little or no warning —
perhaps only, the day or two needed to marshal the airlift and set up a com-
mand and communications structure. The Soviets might calculate that initial
combat operations could be concluded in 10 days or so, with an eventual
total of six Soviet divisions committed. Such a weak initial attack,
however, probably would be undertaken only if the Soviets were confident
that limited Iranian forces in the area would not be effectively reinforced,
that the Iranians would receive no outside assistance, and that the low-
strength Soviet units in this area could accomplish this demanding operation.
(u)
(c)	Hr) Probably, even if its objective were limited to seiz-
ing Azarbayjan, the Soviets would plan to use a more deliberately prepared
and somewhat larger initial invasion force including portions of two armies
(about five motorized rifle divisions, 135 aircraft, and two helicopter
regiments). An airborne and airmobile force of up to division strength
would probably also be used to secure key facilities in Tabriz as well as a
few key airfields and passes.
(d)	The total Soviet forces eventually committed to this
operation would probably not be significantly greater than those used in the
more hastily prepared attack previously discussed. With virtually all of
their invasion force fully prepared and immediately available from the
beginning of the operation, however, Soviet planners would be more confident
of their ability to rapidly overcome even relatively stiff Iranian resistance.
The Soviets probably would not make major increases in the size of their
invasion force or in the times projected for preparing and carrying out the
operation unless major increases were made in the strength of Iranian forces
stationed in Azarbayjan or unless significant outside assistance were expect-
ed. The Soviets probably could complete the most necessary arrangements
for such an invasion of Azarbayjan within two weeks. These would include
mobilizing reservists and preparing mobilized units for movement, assembling
the necessary transportation means (including requisitioned civilian
vehicles), moving the units to attack positions, and establishing a command
and control communications structure. In this case, the US could expect
about a week of warning.
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(2)	(U) Seizure of Iranian Baluchistan.
{а)	The Soviets might decide to use support of Baluchi
nationalism as a.cover for seizing a warm-water port near the Persian Gulf.
The objective of this campaign would be to quickly defeat the understrength
Iranian armored division stationed in Zahedan, seize control of the Iranian
Province of Baluchistan and the Baluchi ethnic areas of two adjoining prov-
inces, and guard the area against Iranian or outside efforts to dislodge
them.
(b)	The Soviets probably would calculate that one army of
approximately three maneuver divisions and one airborne division would be
sufficient to seize the area and defend it against the forces that Iran
would be able to deploy. In addition, they would want to maintain or
reestablish current force levels in Afghanistan and in the Turkestan MO.
Units in both areas would be readied to provide reinforcements if required.
An additional division or two might be deployed into southern Afghanistan to
provide a reserve force should it be needed.
(с)	Many of the military difficulties that the Soviets
would encounter if they undertook this campaign stem from the area's loca-
tion and primitive transportation network. The Baluchi areas of Iran share
only a very short border with a remote and undeveloped area of Afghanistan.
They are distant from and have no common border with the Soviet Union. Any
invasion would have to be launched from the Zaranj area of southwestern
Afghanistan and supplied by road through western Afghanistan from Kushka in
the Turkestan MD. This road is already extensively used to supply Soviet
forces conducting counter insurgency operations in Afghanistan and is subject
to attack by Afghan rebels. In addition, a bridge would have to be
constructed near Zaranj, and almost 300 kilometers of loose-surface road in
the same area would have to be improved to allow military operations and
resupply.
(u)
(d)	Because of the distances involved and the poor roads,
the Soviets probably would need at least three weeks to prepare for such an
attack. The development of facilities in southwestern Afghanistan would be
observable and should provide about two weeks warning.
(e)	The main axis	of advance for	such an attack would be
from Zaranj	through Zahedan toward-	Chah Bahar, a	distance of over 1,000
kilometers.	Smaller	forces would	seize positions to the east, on the
Pakistani border, and	to the west,	on the border	of Iranian Baluchistan.
Initial air support for the operation would be provided from Soviet bases in
Afghanistan—particularly Shindand and Kandahar.
(f)	-fc] Airborne operations might well be undertaken in the
Chah Bahar area, but probably not at the outset of the campaign. Soviet
tactical air forces could not support an airborne operation there from
currently existing bases in Afghanistan. The airborne troops would thus be
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open to attack by Iranian aircraft at -Bandar-e-Abbas -or potentially by us
naval air forces, {n addition, the long road distance from Afghanistan to
Chah Bahar would preclude a quick linkup with advancing ground forces.
Thus, the Soviets probably would wait until the airfield at Zahedan had been
seized before attempting to seize Chah 8ahar.
(u)
(g)	Because of the distance involved, this campaign proba-
bly would take at least 10 days to complete even if resistance were light.
If the Iranian forces were able to conduct an effective delaying action, the
campaign could be considerably longer. Western forces could alter the
situation by seizing Chah Bahar before Soviet airborne operations against it
became feasible.	«
(3)	(ll) Seizure of Eastern Iran.
(a)	The Soviets might decide to seize all of the four
easternmost provinces of Iran {Baluchistan, Khorasan, Kerman, and Hormozgan)
to control the Iranian side of the Strait of Hormuz and direct road links
between the USSR and potential warm-water naval facilities at
Bandar-e-Abbas and Chah Bahar. The Soviets probably would calculate that,
even though there are only limited Iranian forces currently stationed in the
area, the size of the area and the possibility of a strong Western reaction
to a Soviet seizure of the Iranian side of the Strait of Hormuz would
require the eventual commitment of at least two armies totaling about nine
divisions^ In.addition, they would want to maintain current force levels in
Afghanistan and in^the Turkestan MD.
(b)	(4У Most of the same problems of distance, poof roads,
and limited water sources described for the seizure of Iranian -Baluchistan
also apply to this campaign. The Soviets would have the advantage of being
able to use at least one additional route into the area—from the Soviet
border at Ashkabad south through Mashhad to Kerman and Bandar-e-Abbas, or to
Zahedan and Chah Bahar—that avoids Afghanistan. Major sections of the road
through the mountains just south of the Soviet border and through the desert
north of Kerman, however, have loose surfaces that would need substantial
improvement or continuous maintenance to handle heavy traffic.
(u)
(с)	ГЙ7 Preparation and warning times would -be at least as
long as for a Baluchistan campaign because almost all of the invasion force
units would have to be moved into the Turkestan MO and Afghanistan from
distant MDs. In southeastern Iran, the axis of advance would initi-ally
closely resemble that described for the seizure of Ir-anian Baluchistan;
however, the thrust from Zahedan to the-west would continue on to Kerman and
Bandar-e-Abbas.
(u)
(d) The "Soviets might conduct airborne operations against
Bandar-e-Abbas, but probably only after the seizure of the airfields at
Zahedan and Kerman, in northeastern Iran, elements of another Soviet army
probably would attack Mashhad both from the direction of Ashkabad in
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Turkestan and from Herat in Afghanistan. These forces would then seize
control of the remainder of northeastern Iran and link up with the Soviet
army operating to_the south. Tactical air could support the operations in
the northeast, flying from existing Soviet bases in the Turkestan ND. This
campaign probably would take at least fifteen days to complete even if
resistance were light. If the Iranians were able to redeploy major ground
forces to the area before the Soviet attack—for example, by returning to
its original garrisons the Iranian infantry division stationed in -the
Mashhad area before the Iran-Iraq war—the campaign could be much longer.
The Soviets probably would conclude that such a campaign would carry a high
risk of US intervention because of the threat it would represent to Western
oil supplies moving through the Strait of Hormuz. US seizure of
Bandar-e-Abbas and Chah -Bahar before the introduction of Soviet airborne
forces would jeopardize the main Soviet goal of the campaign.
4.	(U) Future Prospects.
a.	(U) Near Term (Through 1985).-
(1)	(-S/NOFOflN) All indications are that the war in Afghanistan
will be resolved slowly and that the Soviets will continue to maintain
substantial forces there throughout the near term. The Soviets seem
inclined to continue the moderate level of effort (around 100,000 men
in-country) observed to date, rather than to build up considerably larger
forces in an effort to achieve an early, decisive military victory. Long-
term Soviet presence in Afghanistan gives them a base of operation from
which to exploit future opportunities that may arise. Most Soviet forces
deployed to Afghanistan have been replaced in their home military districts
by newly activated forces. It is believed that an airborne division will de
reconstituted in the Turkestan M0 by 1985, while the combined deployment of
smaller, tailored air assault units to Afghanistan will eliminate the need
for an airborne division there.
(u)
(2)	(S/NOF'ORN) The Soviets are expected to continue to regard
Southwest Asia as a secondary area as far as peacetime forces are concerned.
Priority will be given to other theaters—particularly NATO areas and the
Far East—that represent greater threats to Soviet interests. One or two
mobilization bases might be activated in the North -Caucasus M0 as low
strength cadre divisions, and an attack helicopter regiment might -be added
to the inventory of the Turkestan ND. The area will continue to lag behind
other theaters in receipt of most new equipment items, although it may be
among the early recipients of certain new systems, such as new-mortars, that
are well suited for mountain warfare.
(u)
(3)	(£) The Soviets will continue their efforts to insinuate them-
selves into other states through such programs as technical assistance, base
building, weapons delivery programs, and other advisory activities. They
will seek to obtain Persian Gulf port and base rights in Iran at a location
such as Chah Bahar, at which they are now -building facilities for the
Iranian government.
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b.	(U) Mid -and Far Term (Through 2000).
(ii)
(1)	(5/NOFORN) The trend of peacetime force deployment described
above for the near term will probably continue into the far term. An addi-
tional one or two mobilization bases may be activated and another attack
helicopter regiment formed as part of an overall pattern of force growth.
Most, active divisions will continue to be held at Tow strength; but one or
two existing divisions may be upgraded to reduced-strength ready status in
order to enhance the present capability for quick reaction.
(u)
(2)	(-S/-NQFORN) Although the specific emphasis placed on this area
for peacetime force development may not be high, the wartime potential -of
these forces will be enhanced simply as a spinoff of-overall force develop-
ment activities. A significant increase in attack helicopter regiments the
growth in the quantities of modern fighter aircraft having greater range,
loiter time, and payloads and the introduction of SU-25 ground attack
fighters and MI-28 future attack helicopters all will markedly improve the
critical air element of Soviet military capabilities in this region. Growth
in the number of IL-76 transport aircraft will facilitate airborne opera-
tions at increased ranges. Finally, the projected development of sufficient
forces along the Sino-Sbviet border to carry out an offensive campaign
against the PRC, coupled with expected increases in the number of divisions
in strategic reserve MDs, will provide additional forces to support con-
tingencies that might arise in Southwest Asia.
5.	(II) Summary Evaluation of Soviet Requirements versus -Capabilities in
the Southwest Asian Theater.
a.	(5/n()?0RN) Introduction. The Soviets have a range of military
options in Southwest Asia (SWA). At the minimum, they require the capabil-
ity to stabilize and secure their southwestern borders and to deter or
successfully counter both an NBC or non-NBC attack against Soviet territory.
Beyond this, they have developed a number of offensive military requirements
in SWA, including the capability to seize portions of northern or eastern
Iran, to conduct a full-scale invasion of all of Iran, and to stage an
operation through Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia to Oman.
(u)
b.	(5/NOiORN). Force Structure. The existing Soviet force structure in
SWA (forces based in the Transcaucasus, North Caucasus,and Turkestan MDs and
those in Afghanistan) is sufficient -to accomplish the defensive mission of
securing Soviet borders against any currently expected form of attack. In
addition, it is large enough to seize northern and eastern Iran, and
possibly all of Iran, particularly if we assume -no -US opposition and no
simultaneous war with China and/or NATO. If they expected to encounter any
sizable US opposition, it is likely that the Soviets would seek to upgrade
their current force structure at least qualitatively (if not quantitatively)
before attacking. Moreover, we judge the current force structure insuf-
ficient to.achieve the more ambitious goal of seizing first Iran and then
the southern shore of the Persian Gulf without a major {army-sized) rein-
forcement from outside the theater.
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c.	fS/NOrORN) Fielded Technologies. Except for those forces currently
in Afghanistan, Soviet forces opposite . SWA are poorly equipped compared to
their Western and Far Eastern Theater counterparts. This reflects the
historical Soviet" perception that the SWA Theater is of secondary importance
both strategically and in terms of the threat they might expect to encounter
there. While there are some indications that this perception is changing,
significant improvements in the numbers and types of equipment available to
most Soviet SWA forces have not yet -been achieved. Thus, we believe that
current Soviet SWA theater equipment holdings provide Soviet forces in SWA
with a strong enough capability to accomplish the limited objectives of
securing their borders and of seizing parts or all of Iran without US oppo-
sition. However, the threat of US intervention would probably prevent the
Soviets from undertaking extensive operations in Iran without first carrying
out a major effort to fill out and modernize their current equipment
holdings. This type of major equipment upgrading is considered essential if
the Soviets intend to launch a major offensive against US forces through
Iran and down the southern littoral to Oman.
(u)
(S/NOrORN-} Another key concern of Soviet planners is the inability of their
limited-range aircraft based in the USSR and Afghanistan to ensure air.
superiority over the southern portions of Iran. While US airpower alone
could not prevent the Soviets from taking Iran, it would seriously delay the
pace of the Soviet advance and would take a substantial toll in equipment
and manpower. Early Soviet employment of nuclear or chemical strikes
against US airbases could offset this US advantage. Moreover, the Soviets
are currently upgrading their theater air assets by replacing older, shorter
range aircraft with newer, longer range models. Additional capability could
be attained by the introduction of AWACS-type aircraft into the theater.
(u)
d. (-S/NOFORN-) Combat Capability. In SWA, as in all other theaters,
the Soviets are constantly seeking to improve their combat capability.
However, given the proximity of this theater to the USSR, the structure and
sophistication of opposition forces, the type of. terrain involved, and the
size, speed, and scope of Soviet operations, the existing C^I system and the
logistical support structure are adequate to accomplish even the most elabo-
rate theater missions if we make the following assumptions: that the Soviets
are opposed only by indigenous SWA forces; thatj if opposed by the US, it
is only on the southern shore of the Persian Gulf; and that there is no
simultaneous war with China and/or NATO.
(-S/fiO^RN-) In our judgement, throughout the forecast period the Soviets
will seek to improve their combat capability in SWA in accordance with their
strategic military-political goals and priorities. If SWA is a priority
theater, and if the Soviets deem, it a military requirement to build the
capability to seize all of Iran, or even the southern shore of the Persian
Gulf, in the face of any opposition, then we can expect, in the next decade,
to see evidence of a substantial upgrading of theater force structure,
equipment,’C^I, and logistics support mechanisms. However, lacking this type
of strategic priority, we expect ’Soviet improvements to their SWA forces to
be incremental.
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CHAPTER 6
SOVIET POWER PROJECTION
1.	(u) Goals, Objectives, and Policies
(u)
a.	("Sj As self-designated leader of the communist world and as a
superpower with global ambitions, the Soviet Union practices an expansionist
policy abroad aimed at spreading and solidifying USSR political, economic,
and military influence, and drawing other nations into its orbit. Soviet
leaders continue to view the Third World as fertile ground for the expansion
of Soviet political, military, and, to a lesser degree, economic influence.
The United States and China are seen as the main opponents of this expan-
sion. The primary objectives in aligning the Soviet Union with states and
insurgent movements in Third World conflicts are to assert the USSR's legit-
imacy as the ideological vanguard of world "national liberation" movements,
to secure a major role in Third World affairs, to affect the outcome of
regional conflicts in favor of Soviet interests, and to neutralize Western
and Chinese political and military influence.
b.	Soviet leaders have no illusions about the immense difficulties
of attaining these objectives, but neither are they in any particular hurry,
for they remain convinced—or at least conditioned by Soviet ideology to
believe—that time and history are on their side. Although they see their
struggle with the United States as rooted in ideology, they view its
practical manifestations in terms of territory, in which the tide of battle
is measured in political control and influence. Their struggle is relent-
less, and is pursued aggressively where conditions permit but patiently
when resistance stiffens. Setbacks, which they view as the inevitable
accompaniment of a forward policy, do not deter them from pursuing long-term
objectives.
(uj
c.	Soviet policy constantly seeks, through exhortation, covert
action, and the coordinated application of diverse means, to exploit oppor-
tunities to expand Soviet power in the Third World, to secure new beachheads
of influence, and to continue to press the limits of Soviet -power projec-
tion. Soviet policy, therefore, is both assertive and opportunistic,
exploiting and manipulating events and situations that arise independently
of Moscow's control and vigorously pursuing competitive advantages where
circumstances permit.
(u)
d.	While broad political objectives are paramount, the Soviets
pursue specific military objectives as well. These include acquisition of
overflight- clearances and access to facilities abroad. The Soviet Navy
requires .overseas facilities in order to the ease logistics problems of
operating at great distances from Soviet waters. The Soviets deploy naval
and naval air forces in distant areas to promote and defend the USSR's
interests abroad. Soviet leaders believe that the presence of their naval
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forces can serve as a visible symbol of Soviet concern and military
capability, and can inhibit Western military initiatives in areas of the
Third World during periods of tension.
(«)
e.	Other objectives of Soviet Policy in distant Third World are-as
are to promote trade and secure access to certain raw materials. In addi-
tion, just as Moscow, through its military assistance, seeks to make nations
dependent on the USSR for their military security, so it also attempts
through a variety of means to foster economic dependence. Moscow also seeks
the ability to control, disrupt, or deny Western access to raw materials in
the Third World. This strategy of denial of oil and strategic minerals
encompasses various means, including physical disruption, market manipula-
tion, and attempted domination of producing or neighorbor ing states. By
undermining western ties with oil and raw materials producers and exacer-
bating differences in the Western alliance over policies toward these
regions, the Soviets seek to erode both the economic health’ and the
political cohesion of the West.
to
f.	НЧ Soviet leaders see military force, augmented by persistent
diplomatic and political efforts, as the main propellant of fundamental
changes in the Third World. Military strength is crucial not only in
exploiting future opportunities to extend Soviet influence, but also in pre-
serving past gains. It is the foundation of the USSR's status as a global.,
superpower and will remain the key to Soviet behavior in the world arena.
Military assistance and support have become demonstrably effective forms of
projecting Soviet influence abroad.
g.	The Soviets have gained from the expansion of their military
activity in the Third World. The policy has established a Soviet military
and economic presence in some Third World countries and has enabled the
Soviets to exercise some influence over the course of events there. Moscow
has expanded its political influence in some countries at the expense of the
West and, to a lesser extent, of the People's Republic of China. Soviet
interventions in Angola and Ethiopia enhanced the USSR's image as a great,
power capable of projecting military force far from its own shores and
demonstrated the feasibility of using Cuban forces to assist in such
actions. Military assistance to Africa and the Middle East has demonstrated
the value of Soviet support, especially under emergency conditions. Moscow
has also benefitted from the international perception that the military
balance has changed to the detriment of the West and from the seeming US
reluctance to use military force to counter the expansion of Soviet and
Cuban presence in the Third World.
fa)	.	’
h. ftr) Despite its successes, Soviet policy suffers from a number of
vulnerabilities that have contributed to setbacks in the USSR's relations
with the Third World. The Soviets have persistently underestimated national-
ism as a counter to the expansion of Soviet influence. Third World states
resent the heavy-handed behavior of Soviet representatives arid advisers,
whose prejudice against Third World peoples and cultures, especially black
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Africans, is sharply felt. The Soviets have al-so misjudged resentment a-nd
suspicion among Third World leaders against Soviet motives and have
overestimated military assistance as a mechanism of control -over Third World
political leaders? Moreover, the Soviet policy falters where economic con-
siderations become the priority interest of Third World nations. The
Soviets have tended to do well in countries that have been recently decolo-
nized or that need Soviet assistance to create a viable armed force. But
where security concerns become less paramount and emphasis shifts to econom-
ic progress, the Soviets have much less to offer. These factors often com-
bine to undermine the achievement of Soviet policy -goals and thus to make
the preservation of whatever influence they might have gained the most
pressing problem facing the Soviet leadership in its efforts to project
power and influence in the Third World through military means.
2.	(U) Instruments of Power Projections. The Soviets view the projection
of power in comprehensive terms. Their programs seek to integrate all
instruments at their disposal toward the pursuit of their goals. The
Soviets believe that military force is the major vehicle of change in inter-
national affairs. They see growing Soviet military strength as providing a
favorable backdrop for the conduct of a progressive foreign policy. A
general discussion of the instruments of Soviet power projecton is presented
below; a more detailed discussion is contained in Chapter 4, S8DP Volume VI.
a.	(U) Arms Sales. Soviet arms sales form the basis of Soviet
penetration of a number of Third World countries, providing Moscow access, to
nations over which it previously had little or no influence. The Soviet
Union's willingness to provide low-cost arms, to almost any customer has
been an important inducement to newly independent former colonies eager to
J improve their military capabilities. The favorable financial terms
(deferred payments at low interest) coupled with free training and. main-
tenance services and fast delivery schedules prove to be important entice-
ments in gaining early contracts.
b.	(U) Military Advisors.
(1)	(U) In 1980, approximately 20,0000 Soviet mil itary personnel
were stationed in 28 countires, where they have played a central role jn
organizing, training,, and penetrating client armed forces. Heavy con-
centrations of advisors are found in those countries that have acquired
large amounts of Soviet arms: Cuba, Algeria, Libya, Ethiopia, Iraq, Syria,
and South Yemen. Important missions are often headed by one or more Soviet
flag or general officers. Since 1955, some 52,000 military personnel from
the. less-developed countries have been trained in the USSR arid 'Eastern
Europe. Soviet advisors are able to cultivate pro-Soviet sentiments,
influence local military policies and pinpoint promising candidates for
recruitment training and indoctrination in the -USSR.
(2)	(U) Soviet advisory personnel are assigned to Third World
combat units, principally to assist in command and control functions but
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also in logistics and other activities. Since 1967, Soviet personnel have
seen combat in at least five Third World countries {North Yemen, Egypt,
Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan) and have played a direct combat advisory role
in two others (Angola and Ethiopia).
(3)	W Aside from their combat support role, military advisors
and technicians perform other functions. Because most Soviet equipment
guarantees are not valid unless the equipment is maintained by Soviet spe-
cialists, a substantial number of Soviet military personnel are involved in
delivery, assembly, and maintenance of military equipment. A large number
of Soviet specialists are involved under military ai-d agreements in
construction of military airfields, electronic installations, and military
training centers. The Soviets and East Germans are involved in support of
client military intelligence activities. The East Germans specialize in
training of police and security cadres and in intelligence operations,
penetrations of local governments, and devolopment of communist parties and
front organizations.
c.	(U) Economic Aid.	Selective	economic aid	often	follows arms
sales in Soviet efforts to	increase	its influence	in the	Third World.
However, total Soviet economic aid is	well below arms aid,	amounting to
only $18 billion given to 67	countries	in the last 25	years.	The USSR has
achieved a number of important benefits from its small economic assistance
program at a very small cost to the Soviet economy. By concentrating on a
number of highly visible showcase projects such as the Aswan Bam in Egypt,
the Bpkaro Steel Mill in India, and the Tigris-Euphrates Dam in Syria, the
Soviets have gained maximum political benefits. The economic aid program
has also resulted in an expansion in Soviet trade with the nations of the
Third World, and has enabled the Soviets to provide training for Third
World nationals in the Soviet Union.
d.	(U) Proxies. The use of proxy forces has significantly augmented
Soviet power projection capabilities. The Soviets have drawn on-the politi-
cal, military, and economic dependence of such allies as Cuba and East
Germany in order to promote anti-Western causes and extend the USSR's own
influence. The use of proxy military forces and advisers in areas of con-
tention minimizes the USSR's risks and defuzes charges of imperialism.
Since the. large-scale introduction of Cuban troops into the Angolan civil
war in 1975, Cuban units and military advisers have grown in numbers in
sub-Saharan Africa and have also appeared in the Middle "East. There are now
approximately 35,000 Cuban military personnel in nearly 20 countries--about
20 percent of Cuba's regular forces. In addition to Angola and Ethiopia,
substantial numbers of Cubans are in Mozambique and South Yemen. Among the
East Europeans, the East Germans are the most active proxies. To a lesser
extent, Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, and Bulgarian involvement has been noted
in Africa and the Middle East.
e.	(U) Treaties. As a major component of its efforts to consolidate
its ties with less-developed nations, the USSR has signed. 12 treaties of
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friendship and cooperation since 1971; ten are still in force. The-signing
of these treaties occurred at different stages of Soviet relations with the
countries in question. With Angola and Ethiopia, treaties were signed after
the principal objectives of military operations were achieved and the Soviet
presence was entrenched. Moscow signed pacts with few Delhi and Hanoi
shortly before they launched invasions of Pakistan and Kampuchea, respec-
tively. The ruling regimes in the Congo, Syria, and Afghanistan signed
partly because they needed a tangible indication of Soviet backing against
domestic opponents. All of these treaties contain a general provision
calling for military cooperation in the face of threats to peace and
security. The USSR has used this article as justification for military
intervention (Afghanistan) and support to a client at war (Vietnam).
f.	(U) Subversion. Overt Soviet foreign programs are paralleled by
covert action. The principal instrument for these activities is the KGB.
The foreign operations of KGB are of two types: destabilization and
penetration. The destabilization of target countries is accomplished by
such techniques as economic disruption, labor strikes, sabotage, assassina-
tion, clandestine aid, and training of local groups for terrorism, guerrilla
activity, and "national liberation" struggles. The KGB and GRU recruit
local nationals and place their own agents in vital areas of a nation's
social and political structure, such as the military, ruling and opposition
parties, the press, labor, key industries, local intelligence services, and
student groups.
3.	(U) Soviet Forces Available for Deployment to Distant Areas. The
Soviet Union has vast ground, air, and naval forces on which it can draw for
deployments to distant areas. The deployment of a large segment of these
forces to distant areas is, however, constrained by the practical dif-
ficulties of moving large forces over long distances and by the requirement
to retain the bulk of these forces in the USSR and Eastern Europe in readi-
ness for their primary mission—waging war with NATO or China. On the other
hand, these factors do not restrict the deployment of smaller units.
4.	(U) Other Soviet Resources for Distant Operations.
(u)
a.	fS/NOrBRN) Overseas Facilities. Access to naval and air facilities
abroad is .a. main objective of Soviet policy in the Third World. It has play-?
ed a key role in the projection of Soviet power and influence in the Third
World and is important for its potential to sustain higher levels of naval
and air activity. Access, however, is not to be confused with formal base
rights, which the Soviets have never held in any Third World nation. The
Soviets have been reluctant to become overly dependent in -distant areas on
shore support that might suddenly be denied them in time -of crisis or major
war. For this reason, naval auxiliaries for fuel, water, supplies, and
repairs are usually deployed with Soviet combatants even in areas where shore
support is available. Access to foreign ports greatly facilitates diesel _
submarine operations in the Mediterranean, but these operations are not
dependent on that access. The same level of deployment could -probably be
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maintained through the use of international anchorages and more frequent
deployments of shorter duration. Surface combatants are the least reliant
on overseas facilities, and such reliance is heaviest in the case of air
operations. These facilities enable long-range aircraft to conduct military
airlifts and reconnaissance over large parts of the world that could not
otherwise be reached from Soviet territory.
(u)
b.	-f-S/NOrORN) Merchant Marine. As the principal means -of transporting
Soviet arms and military equipment destined for friendly forces and insur-
gent movements, the merchant marine is vital to Moscow's effort to influence
developments in the Third World. Most of the USSR's general-purpose fleet
consists of ships with at least two decks that carry their own cargo-handling
gear (cranes or booms). -Roll-on/rol 1-off (ro/ro) ships, which the USSR is
currently stressing in modernizing its cargo fleet, were introduced in 1974
and reflect the latest technology for fast loading and offloading of wheeled
and tracked vehicles..
c.	Fishing Fleets. | Ь1
(u)	——
5. fS/NOrORN) Command and Control of •Distant Operations. Soviet command
and. control capabilties are diverse and well developed and can meet
stringent requirements for control of distant military operations. This
control is extended both over small military advisory groups and large
military contingents. All Soviet military activities abroad; including
military sales, military' assistance and training, military use of foreign
facilities, and direct involvement of Soviet military personnel in local
conflicts, are controlled—from planning, to implementation, to termination
—by the-General Staff.
6. (U) (-5/N^f))RN) Capabilities for Distant Operations.
(u)
a.	(G/НОГОЙМ) Military Airlifts. Soviet Military Transport Aviation
(VTA) has undertaken several major airlifts to Third World countries, pro-
viding critically needed equipment, ammunition, and medical supplies. They
also have helped overcome logistic bottlenecks in some smaller Third Irforld
ports and have resupplied isolated proxy forces. These operations represent
to both the recipients and to the rest of the world a -dramatic demonstration
of Soviet commitment. They also demonstrate that VTA can mount and sustain
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a major, unopposed, airlift io a short time. But they also have revealed
limitations. The profiency displayed has been uneven, and in some cases
even relatively low levels of effort have taxed VTA's capabilities. VTA
could have serioffs problems in intensive airlifts of long duration requiring
the transport of heavy payloads over distances greater than 2,-000 -nmi. The
VTA inventory of 593 transport, aircraft consists of 4-95 AM-12 Cubs, 57 AN-22
Cocks, and 141 IL-76 Candids. Airlift capabilities are increasing as
Candids steadily enter the force.
(u)
b.	(S/NOFOiW) Aeroflot. The Aeroflot civil fleet constitutes a
substantial reserve that enhances the capability of VTA to airlift-personnel
to areas of the Third World: Aeroflot IL-62s played a major role in both
the Angolan and Ethiopian airlifts. Aeroflot currently has some 1,300
medium- and long-range transports. Many of Aeroflot's crews and much of its
equipment are available to support VTA, and in fact are used whenever
needed. This capability is demonstrated each spring and fall when Aeroflot
makes over 1,000 flights transporting more than 100,000 Soviet troops to and
from bases in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. At pre-
sent, most VTA airlifts out-of-country use only a small percentage of the
Aeroflot fleet.
c.	(U) Intervention of-Combat forces in a Local Conflict. The Soviets
have significant forces capable of intervention in distant areas, have
introduced forces into combat situations in distant areas in the past, and
would be willing to use forces for this purpose in the future. Elements of
all Soviets conventional forces—ground, air, and naval—are potential
resources for use in intervention situations.
(u)
(1) (-S/NOFORN) The effectiveness of any intervention of Soviet
combat units in a local conflict would depend on scenario-related factors,
of which two are probably the most important—the level of -opposition and
the location. Naturally, the kind of opposition the Soviets would expect to
encounter would determine the feasibility of the operation and the com-
position of the intervention force.
(2) (S/NOfffifr) Interventions against substantial opposition, would
probably require conventional ground forces. If they could not be moved
overland into areas contiguous to the USSR, they would depend in large part
on movement by sea. The sealift to the Middle East of substantial interven-
tion forces—a combat-ready motorized rifle division, from the Odessa
Military District, for example—would take about two weeks. This includes
assembly, movement to Black Sea ports, loading, crossing the Mediterranean,
and offloading in a Middle East port. Oeploynent of larger forces—for
instance, the equivalent of two combined-arms armies totaling at least
120,000 men—would require two to three months.
d. (U) Airborne Assault Operations.
(u)
(1)	(5/NOfORN) In many areas of the Third World, a Soviet airborne
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division would -be more then a match for any indigenous military forces.
There ere more men with better equipment in a single Soviet airborne divi-
sion than in the „armies of most African nations. Thus, there are, poten-
tially, numerous situations in which an airborne division could be highly
effective.
(u)
(2)	(S/NOFOftN-} Situations in which airborne forces might be used
range from anti-guerrilla operations like those conducted by the French and
Belgians in Zaire in 1978 to more conventional -operations. The suitability
of an airborne force in each instance would vary. The Soviets might also
be tempted to deploy an airborne unit if they believed the likelihood of
combat were low and that the mere presence of an armed Soviet contingent
would be sufficient to compel the opponent to adopt a policy more favorable
to Moscow.
(3)	(5/WOrOWI) An important factor affecting the feasibility of
airborne operations is the extent to which the transport aircraft are
threatened by opposing air defense forces. Soviet fighter aircraft could
escort the transports to a distance of about 700 nautical miles from their
bases, either inside or outside the USSR. In the absence of fighter sup-
port, the slow-moving transports would be extremely vulnerable to attack
from both interceptors and surface-to-air missiles. Unless the Soviets
believed they could land and resupply an airborne force without serious
interference to their transports, the option to deploy the units would be
foreclosed.
(u)
(4)	(S/NOFORN) The speed with which the Soviets could deploy an
airborne force would depend on a number of factors: the distance to be
flown, the level and type of opposition expected at the destination, the
granting of overflight clearances, the logistic support available, and the
degree to which preparation had already been accomplished before the
•decision to deploy.
(5)	(S/Nf^Rtt) If the Soviets had.no time to make advance prepara-
tions, they would be hard put to airlift a division-size force to, say,
Syria in less than a week'. If, however, they chose to make preparations in
anticipation of, or during the development of, a crisis, they could
theoretically lift a slightly reduced airborne division there in one to two
days. This would require about 600 flights, full acquiescence of Turkey or
Iran for overflight clearances, and full use of three Syrian airfields.
e.	(•S-ZN^I^ORN) Amphibious Assault Operations. Soviet amphibious forces
were -developed to conduct assault landings on the maritime flanks of the
USSR in support of ground theater operations. With augmentation by naval
combatants and auxiliaries, these forces could undertake assault operations
against light opposition in many areas of the the Third World. Limited
seaborne, tactical air support could be made available using the -Forger
V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing) fighter-bombers deployed aboard
Kiev-class aircraft carriers. An amphibious task force might also receive
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tactical air support from neighboring countries, possibly -by Soviet
landbased aircraft -deployed -there. Even with substantial augmentation,
however, it is doubtful that a Soviet amphibious task force could carry out
a landing abroad against heavy opposition, due to the lack of adequate sea-
based tactical air support, the absence of sufficient naval gunfire support,
and the vulnerability of air and sea lines of communication.
(u) .
f.	(5/H0r0Rfty Interdiction of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC).
Soviet naval doctrine generally considers SLOC interdiction only within the
context of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. TJae Soviets do not anticipate fighting a
major naval war in other contexts, and they realize that military operations
against such vital Western interests as the-sea lines would probably lead to
war with NATO.
7. (U) Future Force Capabilities for Distant Operations.
a.	<4J) Navy.
(1)	(5/N^RN) The capability of the Soviet amphibious forces for
distant operations is expected to- improve through the continuation of
current building programs and the introduction of new designs. Of par-
ticular importance is the deployment of the modern Ivan Rogov-class amphi-
bious ship. This ship is a significant departure in amphibious ship design
for the Soviets. With its limited shore bombardment and air defense capa-
bilities, capacity for six Hormone naval helicopters, space for carrying
air cushion assault craft, and accommodations for a fully equipped 500-man
battalion landing team, the ship is well able to maintain a self contained
assault unit in forward deployments a capability the Soviets lacked pre-
viously.	, .
(u)
(2)	(S/NOFORN) A deficiency that limits Soviet capabilities for
distant intervention is tactical air support, a prerequisite for success-
ful assault operations. The production of the Navy's YAK-36 Forger V/ST-OL
fighter-bomber, carried aboard Kiev-class aircraft carriers, somewhat
improves Soviet capabilities in this area. This aircraft gives the Soviets
an initial, though limited, capability for sea-based ground attack as wel 1 as
some air defense. The aircraft would, however, perform poorly against high-
performance Western aircraft and against Soviet-built aircraft found in the
inventories of many Third World countries. The normal -complement of
aircraft on the Kiev-class carriers is about 2D to 30 helicopters and about
15 Forger fighter-bombers.
(u)
(4)	{-S/NOFORN) The Soviets will certainly undertake a program-oyer
the long term to replace the Forger with more advanced, probably supersonic
aircraft, which may be operational by the mid-1980s. The Kiev-cl ass
aircraft carriers probably will be followed in the late 1980s by a larger
class of ship capable of carrying more aircraft. The Soviets are expected
to have a total of five fixed-wing aircraft carriers by 1988, in addition to
their two- Mdskva-class helicopter cruisers. There is a good chance that by
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th el ate 1980s, the Soviets will have adapted existing helicopters, or
developed new ones, for a. number of amphibious warfare tasks, including
beach assault by vertical envelopment.
b.	(0) Air Forces.
(1)	(-^yNOiORN)' The transport arm (VTA).of the Soviet Airforce is
expected to undergo a significant modernization during the next 10 years.
VTA's capabilities will continue to be enhanced by the acquisition of IL-76
Candid jet aircraft—a total of 315 by 1990. The Candid can carry twice the
payload and has three times the range of the AN-12 Cub, which it is replacing.
(u)
(2)	(S/HOFuRN) The Soviets are reportedly developing a new wide -
body jet transport that will probably be roughly equivalent to the C-5A.
This program, if successful, will improve VTA's capability to transport out-
sized cargo such as medium tanks. This aircraft will become operational in
the mid-1980s.
(3)	(-5/N0l~0RN) The Soviets perceive a requirement to replace the
Cub transport in VTA in both numbers and mission. By the mid-to-1 ate 1980s
a new medium transport will become operational.
(b) (1) & (b) (3) per CIA
(5) VTA has a principal combat mission of providing air trans-
port support for VDV (airborne) operations. In order to perform this
mission, VTA must be capable of paradropping or air-landing personnel,
battle equipment, and materiel behind enemy lines. VTA aircraft—Cub, Cock,
and Candid—are rugged and reliable, and all have rear loading capability.
Overall, the force composed of a mix of. these aircraft gives VTA a good
capability to transport and airdrop the men and all_of the_equipment
assigned to airborne divisions^
(b)(1)& (b)(3) per CIA	____
_______________________________________________,_____________J Us i ng
both paradrop and air-landing methods, the Soviets can simultaneously 1 and
jsegret
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•soldiers, combat equipment, and materiel, thereby .enabling the VOV to carry
out combat operations immediately after the landing.
(6) At present, VTA is capable of lifting, simultaneously,
roughly one full airborne division or the assault elements of two divisions
{six airborne regiments). Over the next decade, several factors could
improve the ability of VTA to lift airborne forces. First, the increased
cargo capabilities of Candid, the projected wide-body transport, and of the
projected new medium transport would enable the Soviets to move any speci-
fied amount of men and materiel with fewer aircraft, thus providing an
increased capability for simultaneous lift of more than one VDV division.
Further, incorporating pressurized cargo cabins would enable VTA aircraft to
fly at their optimum cruising altitudes, thereby increasing their range.
I	(b)(1) & (b)(3) per CIA .	["while these factors wi 1 Г
improve the VTA lift capability, especially to longer distances, equipping
airborne divisions entirely with BMDs increases the lift requirement for
operations in which BMDs are transported, somewhat offsetting the increase
in lift capabi 1 ity.
(u)
8. Regional Outlook. The Soviet Union will probe for opportunities
to project power and influence wherever these opportunities may be found.
Certain states and geographical regions are especially susceptible to Soviet
penetration. This section focuses on three regions were significant Soviet
power projection is likely: southern Africa and Zaire; the Caribbean; and.
Southeast Asia. Southwest Asia is discussed at length in Chapter 5.
a. (U) Southern Africa.
(1)	(S/NQFnPM/wiftWTHftfr) Over the past five years, the Soviets,
Fast Europeans, and Cubans have considerably expanded their military
deliveries to southern Africa. Since 1975, Moscow has suppl ied|<B»1'tlb>p>^CT'
(b)(i)&(b)(3)perciA	[arms. But the political influence of the Soviets and
their allies is restricted to the states confronting’ South Africa--Angola
and Mozambique. Several factors constrain their influence in the other
-countries of the region.
(2)	frSyNOrORN/^CONTRACT) The suspicions of Soviet intentions har-
bored by Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and others are to a considerable extent the
result of fundamental differences between Soviet and African interests and
perspectives. Moscow tends to anatagonize southern African leaders by
dealing with their countries in the larger context of Fast-isfest and
Sino-Soviet competition. Moscow's basic aims in the region are to under-
mine Western and Chinese influence, to promote pro-Soviet regimes, and to
increase Soviet access to air and naval facilities.
(u)
(3) (S/NOFORN/NOCONTRAg-T) Soviet objectives in southern Africa al so
include the denial or complication of Western access to the strategic mineral
resources of the region. Under current political and economic conditions,
SECRET
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this Soviet objective is unlikely to be realized. Even if white rule -ended
in South Africa, the Soviet "denial strategy" would encounter serious
obstacles--particularly, Western reaction and resistence from the African
leaders who depend on the hard currency generated by the sale of mineral
resources.	, 4
W
(4)	f-SywrORN/NOCOHTRACT) The Soviets have an interest in continued
tension, and even military confrontation, in the region because their
influence and position are founded largely on military assistance. African
governments by and large want a negotiated settlement in Namibia, as they
did in Rhodesia, to hasten the end of minority rule and to ease the economic
and military burdens such issues create for them. And they know that only
the West is in a position to help them attain such a settlement with the
South Africans. , .
00
(5)	(-S/NOFORN/NOGONTRACT) In theory, the economic troubles that
prevail in most of black southern Africa—food shortages, inflation,
unemployment, stagnant growth, low,, export earnings, and massive debt
obligations—should enhance Moscow*s prospects in the region through their
aid to hard-pressed governments, as well as to dissident groups. In
practice, however, the Soviets have done little to meet African needs for
aid and capital. Only Western governments and private institutions; and
Western-sponsored multinational organizations such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, are in a position to address southern African
requirements. Even the Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique have
recognized the need to establish economic relations with the West and, in
the case of Mozambique, to maintain with South Africa economic ties that
were established during the Portuguese colonial period.
(6)	(5/NOTOR^/jiBCONTRACT) In all probability, Moscow's failure to
compete with the West in addressing the economic needs of various countries
in the region is largely due to the USSR's own economic constraints and its
recognition of African economic dependence on the West. Rather than
compete on Western terms, the Soviets have tried to turn the situation to
their advantage. This is readily apparent in Angola.	Despite the
extensive Soviet role there, only about 8 percent of Angola's trade is with
Communist countries. The only successful sector of the economy, oil
production, is operated by US and other Western firms and the oil .industry's
capital needs are met in Western financial markets. It is the hard
currency earned by its Western-run oil industry that enables Angola, to pay
for Soviet arms.and Cuban troops.
(u)
{7) (5/NOrORN/NOCONTRACT) In Mozamb i que, Western economic ass is t ance
dwarfs Communist aid -despite the country’s close ideological and military
ties with Moscow. In the rest of the region, as well, Western economic aid
far outstrips that of the Soviets and their allies. The West is also a
much more important trading partner. This is vividly illustrated in the
key area of minerals marketing: in addition to Angola’s dependence on oil
sales to the West, Zambia, Zaire, and Zimbabwe rely heavily on Western
purchases of copper, cobalt, and chrome to generate foreign exchange.
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• (u)
^8) (-S/NOrORN/NBCONTRACT) Southern Africa will remain an area of
conflict over the next several years. Collapse of the Namibia settlement
effort would be certain to sharpen tensions between Pretoria and its neigh-
bors. An internationally accepted settlement in Namibia would reduce ten-
sions but would not end the hostility between black Africa and South
Africa. The black Africans, prompted by opposition to apartheid, will con-
tinue their support of anti-South African insurgents, although they will
try to avoid direct armed conflict with Pretoria.
(9)	(-S/NOrORN/^G0NTRACT) South Africa has the resources and the
will to punish neighbors who appear to threaten it. Its weapons include
economic pressure, sponsorship of insurgencies, and military operations.
Whatever the outcome in Namibia, Pretoria will not relinquish its option to
use these weapons. Indeed, with terrorist incidents and domestic unrest
likely to increase inside South Africa, the government will probably step up
its actions against neighboring countries harboring South African insurgents.
(10)	(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Given these conditions, the Soviets
will find ample opportunity to increase their influence and presence. They
will continue to rely on the means of entry that they have found most effec-
tive in Africa—weapons sales, .military training, and associated technical
expertise. The level and character of Soviet military aid programs will
vary from country to country, but on the whole the USSR will probably
increase its efforts in the region.
(u)
(11)	(S/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT) Moscow has several further options. It
could facilitate a sizable increase in Cuban combat forces in Angola and
Mozambique, deploy additional Soviet naval units to southern African
waters, or provide advanced air defense equipment requiring Soviet manning.
(u)
'(12) (-5/NOrORN/NOCONTRACT) Final military victory in southern
Africa will elude both sides in the near future. South Africa can hold off
the Southwest Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO), the African National
Congress (ANC), and other domestic black dissident groups. But it cannot
crush all of them. An all-put effort to do so would precipitate enormous
domestic and international pressures. Similarly, while the black insurgents
and the black southern African countries seem committed to fight as long, as
necessary to bring about a settlement in Namibia and an end to apartheid,
they cannot defeat South Africa militarily without large-scale outside
assistance, including troops. There is no evidence at present that the USSR,
Cuba, or any other power is prepared to provide the necessary forces.
b.	(_S/NOEDRNT^eWTRACT~I Zaire. Economic problems, popular discontent,
a history of tribal and regional conflicts, and resistance to needed
reforms will keep mineral-rich Zaire on the verge of major violence and
disintegration. Mobutu's shaky rule will face the constant threat of a
military coup, a popular uprising, or armed attack from such exiled opposi-
tion groups as the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (fLNC).
Mobutu's departure, whenever and however it occurs, is likely to precipitate
6-13
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a bloody power struggle and perhaps attempts at secession in Shaba. The
instability and pro-Western orientation of Zaire make it a target for
Soviet-inspired machinations. I
(b) (1)&(b) (3) per CIA
c.	(U) Caribbean.
(1)	The key threat to the Caribbean results from the Soviet-
Cuban military relationship. This relationship impacts on US military capa-
bilities and requirements for general war, on regions such as Africa where
Soviet-Cuban forces have been used, and on the peace and stability of the
Caribbean basin itself. As a strategic base in the Western hemisphere,
Cuba will use its military capabilities to support Soviet interests. Cuba
affords the Soviets ports and repair facilities for Soviet ships and
submarines; airfields for Soviet air and reconnaissance forces.; a base for
Soviet intelligence collection; and' indirect support for insurgencies
throughout Latin America. In wartime, Cuban or Soviet forces operating
from Cuban bases could interdict movement of troops, supplies, and raw
materials. Over 50 percent of regional oil deliveries pass through sea
lanes that could be threatened by Cuba.
fa)
(2)	The growing fighter-bomber force in Cuba presents the US
with an air defense problem of increasing size. This threat is exacerbated
by a growing Cuban Naval Fleet, presenting the Americas with the first
Communist naval threat based in the Western Hemisphere. Finally, the
modernization of Cuban ground forces makes Cuba a significant threat in
the event of a general war.
(3)	bl Soviet and Cuban objectives and prioritiesin the Caribbean
for the near term are as follows:
fa)
(a)	Defend the communist government of Cuba.
(b)	bl Consolidate Marxist control over Nicaragua andGrenada.
fa)
fa)	w Support insurgent movements in £1 Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Colombia.
fa)
(d)	Foster state-to-state ties while promoting local
communist interests.
. faj
(e)	fad Exploit new opportunities as they become available.
(4)	The Sandinista victory in Nicargua in 1979 brought Cuba
back into the business of visibly exporting revolution. An elaborate
logistics system was established in Central America to transfer arms and
ammunition to the rebels. In the later stages, the bulk of this material
JEGRET"
0414
6-14
was furnished by Cuba, with smaller amount’s coming from other countries.
Cuba also provided the training for the guerrilla-cadres. Equally important,
however, was the role Cuba played in bringing about -cohesion among the
various insurgent groups. It championed cooperation among competing leftist
leaders, threatening to withhold further assistance from those that refu-sed
to cooperate. Vulnerable as they were, the insurgents had little choice but
to agree. Without Cuba's support, it is extremely unlikely that the
Sandinistas could have succeeded as quickly and completely as they did. .The
consolidation of Marxist gains in Nicaragua is now one of the highest
Soviet/Cuban priorities for the region. This consolidation process includes
supplying Nicaragua with T-55 tanks and with modern fighter aircraft to be
ПдипЛу Nicaraguan pilatsj фХ1)&(ь)(3) CIA
(5)	-4^T* The Cubans and Soviets are also involved in consolidating
Communist control in Grenada. Cuban technical assistants are involved at
all levels of government | (b) (1) & (b) (3) per CIA	|
|(b)(1)&(b)(3)percia	[ Grenada has shown its gratitude by firmly voting
with the USSR and Cuba at the United Nations and other international
organizations. It has also granted Cuba permission to install a powerful
radio and television transmitter designed to broadcast to the Eastern
Caribbean. Work on the Point Salines airport continues. When completed in
1983, the 10,000 foot runway will be able to accomodate Soviet’Bear bom-
bers. Cuba is also continuing to provide -Grenada with arms and training
for its 1,500-man army in order to ensure that domestic opponents do not
remove the present regime.
Й
(б)	Ш Concerning the third Soviet/Cuban objective in the region
—support of insurgent movements—current and near-term targets are
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Columbia. Cuban assistance to
insurgents in El Salvador includes providing insurgency training in Cuba
and Nicaragua; promoting mechanisms for domestic and international support;
furthering unity; and providing arms and ammunition. Central American
insurgents have stated that Guatemala and Honduras are next in line for
insurgency. In Honduras, the initial efforts of radical leftist groups
to mount terrorist attacks against soft targets have recently been noted.
In Columbia, Cuban support for the 19th of April movement has demonstrated
that countries outside of Central America are also targets for subversion.
(7)	The prospects for continued Cuban/Soviet initiatives . in
the Caribbean, and elsewhere in Latin America, are high. Their approach is
multipronged and flexible enough to appeal to a wide range of target groups
or states. The strategy is opportunistic, designed to take advantageOT the
most likely targets as they present themselves. There is no shortage , of
willing participants ready to interest them in new undertakings. -Dissidents
in several countries await greater Cuban assistance. However, the Cubans
and their Soviet patrons have opted for a selective, cautious, and more
gradual approach than their clients and prospective clients sometimes want.
Soviet interest in the Caribbean area has been whetted by the increase !n
6-15
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SECRET
the number of politically and «economically vulnerable mini-states. The
USSR will continue to exploit national assertiveness, political turbulence,
and growing economic frustrations in this area in the foreseeable future.
d.	(U) Southeast Asia.
(1)	(U) The Vietnamese Threat..
(u)
a. fa) The primary destabilizing influences in Southeast Asia today
are the Socialist Republic of Vietnam's alignment with the USSR, its
hostility toward China and Thailand, and its continued occupation of
Kampuchea. The enmity of China, a failed economy, and the financial drains
imposed by military operations in Kampuchea, will keep the SRV heavily
dependent on Soviet aid and vulnerable to Soviet influence. Moscow has
secured significant benefits from its relationship with Hanoi,, including
access to Vietnamese naval and air facilities, and these gains have enhanced
Soviet ability to project power into the region. Vietnamese dependence on
the USSR will continue so long as Sino-Vietnamese hostility remains high.
Soviet support will enable Vietnam to retain, and probably improve, its
existing military capabilities. In a crisis, Moscow would probably step up
its aid to Vietnam as necessary.
(и)
(b) (4) Vietnamese aggression in Kampuchea threatens the security
of Thailand and could lead to a conflict with wider international military
involvement. Due to the concentration of Vietnamese troops, Khmer refu-
gees, and resistance forces along the Thai-Kampuchean border, and Thai sup-
port for the resistance, there is high a potential for Vietnamese incursions
across the Thai border, either in pursuit of resistance forces or in puni-
tive actions against Thailand. The quantitative and qualitative military
superiority of the Vietnamese could enable them to quickly deal a crippling
blow to the Thais. A large-scale Vietnamese invasion would likely cause
Thailand to call for US support under the terms of the Manila Pact and,
provoke Chinese military retaliation against Vietnam. This, in turn, could
precipitate Soviet military involvement.
(u)
(c) The SRV possesses by far the largest and best-equipped
military force in Southeast Asia. Vietnam's military flexibility, however,
is limited by the deployment of its forces on several fronts. The extent of
Soviet support will be crucial to Vietnam's future military capability, as
will be its capacity to absorb Soviet assistance. In any event, the
prospects are for a prolonged period of instability in Southeast Asia, with
a high potential for military incidents that could expand into conflicts
involving the. major powers.
(2)	{U) The Soviet Threat.
(а)	Moscow has increased its influence and its presence
in Vietnam. The SRV depends on Soviet aid to help defend itself from China
and to prosecute the war in Kampuchea. The Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship
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Treaty of November 1978, the expansion of Soviet involvement in Vietnam, and
the continuing Soviet access to Vietnamese air and naval facilities
demonstrate the foothold Moscow has gained in Southeast Asia. A Soviet-
supported Vietnam furthers the Soviet policy of containing China, and
simplifies Soviet maritime surveillance and intelligence collection against
the US surface fleet and ballistic missile submarines.
(«)
(b)	(5) Materiel is the primary form of Soviet support to the
Vietnamese military forces. This aid increased tenfold from 1978 to Г979.
Currently, such aid is projected to be slightly above ISO percent of the
peak wartime aid, in 1966. These deliveries have resulted in significant
improvements in Vietnam's military capabilities, especially in the northern
military regions opposite China.
.________(c) -XS/NeFCftN) | Ь1
bl
(d) Soviet naval operations, especially transits to and
from the Indian Ocean, would be further facilitated if access to refueling,
repair, or support facilities beyond Vietnam could be acquired in
non-Communist Western Pacific countries. However, those countries have-deep
suspicions about Soviet intentions and will probably continue to rebuff
Soviet initiatives. Over the long term, the Soviets might seek the use of
air and naval facilities in Taiwan, but Taipei would probably not agree.
(u)
(e) Moscow's initiatives concerning Thailand will be
designed to complement those of Hanoi. Soviet influence in Thailand is not
likely to grow unless the Thais are convinced that the United States and
China lack sufficient commitment to Thailand's security and that a more
balanced policy toward Vietnam and the USSR is required. The USSR has
little influence with insurgent movements in Southeast Asia, most of which
reflect Chinese influence. The USSR is perceived as militarily powerful but
geographically remote, and lacking in ties of race and culture.
(3)	(U) Internal Threats. Prevailing economic, social, and
political conditions in many of the underdeveloped non-Communist countries
of the region have contributed to popular discontents that could be
exploited by subversive elements. The political and socio-economic
environment in many East Asian and western Pacific countries is characterized
by an imbalance in the distribution of wealth, a failure of industrialization
to keep pace with high rates of population growth, and the failure of some
governments to make significant headway in land reform and public works.
There is widespread poverty in the countryside and extensive unemployment
and underemployment in’ many urban areas. Corruption and favoritism abound
in governments that often are dominated by wealthy, conservative oligarchies
and military elements functioning behind democratic facades.
6-17
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S-ECREX
(u)-
(4)	fcS/NOfORN) Outlook for Soviet Involvement.
(a)	(-S/WO^RN) Since the US withdrawal from Vietnam, Hanoi
has become total Independent on Moscow for political, economic, and military
assistance, in return for this support, the Soviets have gained access to
Vietnamese naval and air facilities, concentrating their military activities
at Cam Ranh Bay. Although no formal basing agreement has been revealed, the
improvements made to these facilities indicate that the Soviets plan to
remain at Cam Ranh Bay and take full advantage of the stragetic value of this
fine natural harbor.
(u)
(b)	(S/NOFORN) The relationship between the two allies has
not been entirely smooth. Vietnam's need for protection from the Chinese
was the major reason for granting greater access to Soviet military forces,
and the Soviets will continue to exploit Hanoi's fears in order to keep
their influence intact. Their most notable differences have occurred over
economic issues. The Vietnamese have complained about the inadequate amount
of Soviet aid, while the Soviets have criticized Hanoi's inefficient use of
it. These differences may have resulted in a slight cutback in Soviet aid,
to demonstrate Moscow's tremendous economic leverage. Also, Vietnamese
xenophobia applies as much to the Soviets as to other foreigners and remains
a chronic irritant in relations between the two nations. Finally, the
Soviets have had to accept poor relations with the ASEAN states because of
Moscow’s support for Hanoi's occupation of Kampuchea. The Soviets are quite
aware of these problems, but Moscow thinks the benefits far outweigh the
costs.
(u)
(c)	The Soviets will not pressure the Vietnamese concern-
ing Kampuchea, but they will continue to support Vietnamese efforts to split
ASEAN unity and promote a regional solution that would result in a firmly
Communist Indochina. Finally, Moscow has used and will continue to use its
military power in the region to support its aims and those of its clients.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY EVALUATION OF SOVIET MILITARY REQUIREMENTS VERSUS CAPABILITIES
1, (U) Introduction.
(u)
a.	(5/MOFORN) As long as Soviet political thought is dominated by
Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the Soviet Union will continue to rely heavily
on military power in pursuit of its international interests. The -Marxist
view of history as a series of conflicts underscores the importance of mili-
tary power and compels the Soviet leadership to view war as a probable,
and in some cases desirable, occurrence for which it must be continually
prepared. Soviet belief in the irreconsilability of socialism and capital-
ism, and their conviction that the final solution to this conflict will
necessarily involve military force, are the foundations upon which Soviet
military theory rests. Moreover, the historical benefits derived from the
Soviet use of military power have practically reinforced these doctrinal
tenets.
(«)
b.	fST'NOrORN-} Essentially, Soviet military power serves two functions,
internal and external. In its internal function, the CPSU relies on military
force to maintain its power in the USSR and to ensure continued Soviet
hegemony over the Warsaw Pact nations. Its external function is threefold.
First, Soviet military power has the defensive mission of deterring or
defeating any form of attack on the Warsaw Pact nations and other Soviet
allies. Second, from an offensive perspective, Soviet forces must have the
capability to carry the destructiveness of war into the enemy's -heartland.
Third, and most important from a political viewpoint, Soviet mi 1 it-ary power
must be able to directly or indirectly advance the cause of socialism world-
wide. -Underscoring this last objective is the Soviet realization that
military power, or the threat of its use, has been an essential element in
every situation in which socialist revolutions have succeeded. Thus, we
should expect the continued growth of Soviet military power throughout the
forecast period, and its continued employment by Soviet leaders to meet these
internal and external requirements.
(u)
c.	(5/NOTttfWt Another constant in Soviet military planning t-o the year
2000 will.be the key adversary role played by the United States. In the
Soviet view, the US is and will remain to the turn of the century, the
principal obstacle to their achieving their worldwide ambitions. This fact
will continue to dominate the Soviet concept of the role and nature of future
war and their perception of their geopolitical and strategic position in
relation to the West, China, Japan, and the Third World. All other military
and political initiatives will directly or indirectly support the ultimate
Soviet objective of undermining and isolating US power.
(«) ,
d.	(S/NOrORNj From a military perspective, the key requ i rement of this
strategy is to minimize or eliminate the US ability to resist Soviet advances.
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by negating -US retaliatory capability. The essential components of this
policy are to keep US intercontinental and theater nuclear forces in check,
while expanding the Soviet advantage in conventional military power. if
this can be accomplished, US power will be largely negated and the Soviets
could continue their efforts to isolate the US from its allies, challenge US
interests by fomenting revolutionary war in the Third World, and still avoid
a potentially catastrophic East-West world war.
e.	(-SyMoRN) A key element in the Soviet capability to accomplish
these objectives is their ability to continue to offset Western tech-
nological superiority. Historically, they have done this by fielding
numerically superior military forces and by obtaining either overtly or
covertly whatever Western technology they required. If they are unable in
the future to continue to obtain the West's defense-related technology, it
will be much more difficult for them to meet their expanded global military
requirements.
 ' («) 4
f.	frSfNOFORN) Another key element in this strategic concept is Soviet
support of revolutionary warfare in’the Third World. Historically, the
Soviets have relied on military aid and the use of Soviet-equipped proxy
forces for this purpose. It is expected that they will continue to do so
where applicable in the future. At present, however, this proxy capability
is becoming too limited to accomplish expanded global requirements, and the
Soviets are expanding their own power projection capability, principally
through the addition of more and better naval and air assets. This trend
will continue throughout the forecast period. Another area, in which
improvement is expected is in Soviet penetration methods, particularly
their psychological and economic warfare capabilities.
2.	(U) Western Theater.
a.	(S/N^pQRN-} Introduction. -Current Soviet requirements in the Western
Theater are: to secure CPSU power in the USSR; to maintain Soviet hegemony
over the Warsaw Pact nations; to deter or defeat any attack on the Warsaw
Pact nations; and to field an undoubted capability to overwhelm NATO with a
conventional ground and . air offensive in Central Europe. These theater
requirements will remain essentially unchanged throughout the forecast
period, although the Soviets will continually strive to expand and improve
their offensive capability to go deeper, faster, and with more firepower.
The ultimate aim of Soviet Western Theater offensive capability is to con-
vince the Western -European nations of the futility of resisting the Soviets
in a European war. If this "Finlandization" -of Western Europe can be
accomplished, then Soviet military forces will have achieved their highest
possible level of effectiveness. As a result, the US will be isolated from
its major allies.
(«)
b.	f-S-/NOrORN-) Force Structure. The Soviets seem confident that their
current Western Theater force structure is sufficient to accomplish all of
their theater objectives. The existing numbers, types, and locations of
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Soviet forces in‘the Western Theater are the result of a well-planned force
development process that has gradually evolved over the years -to meet spe-
cific theater requirements. This gradual evolution is expected to continue,
over the next twenty years, a natural result of the Soviets' dialectic
approach to military affairs. During this period, we expect Soviet Western
Theater force structure alterations to be incremental rather than radical,
and to reflect the continual Soviet concern, for the speed of technological
advances and the potential impact of these on force structure and operation-
al concepts. Still, we must not rule out the Soviets' capability and
willingness to effect radical force structure changes should they perceive
these necessary.
(u)
c.	f5/KOrORN) Fielded Technologies. Soviet Western Theater forces are
currently sufficiently well equipped to accomplish all theater missions in
a conventional war, and possibly in an NBC war. We expect the Soviets to
continue throughout the forecast period to view the Western Theater as deci-
sive, and thus we expect that Soviet Western Theater forces will continue to
receive more of the best available Soviet military technology.- These forces
will continue to benefit from a weir developed materiel research, develop-
ment, and acquisition program that assures the steady improvement of old
equipment and the systematic introduction of new technology. Throughout the
remainder of the century, the Soviets will strive to maximize their use of
technological advances that improve their capability to project their
theater military power farther, faster, and with more firepower.
Technologically, the following areas have been identified by the Soviets as
requiring immediate improvement:
-	Fielding an automated command system.
-	Improving reconriaisance capability, particularly against NATO's
mobile nuclear delivery systems.
-	Defeating NATO’s significant and expanding antitank capability.
-	Improving antiair capability, particularly against low-flying
targets.
-	Improving their radioelectronic capability.
-	Improving the standardization, interoperability, and unification
of Warsaw Pact equipment.
(u)
d. (-5/N0T0RN) Combat Capability. The Soviets currently possess the
required operational capability”to accomplish their defensive requirements
in the Western Theater. However, from an . offensive perspective, they are
concerned about their ability to provide CU and logistic support structures
that will maximize their theater combat potential. The tremendous -geographic
distances involved in their theater plans, the size of the forces involved,
and the speed and intensity of the operations envisioned requires C^I and
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logistic support, mechanisms currently at the limit of Soviet capability.
While the Soviets have plans to improve these systems, particularly through
automation, until these improvements come on line, in the mid-1990s, Soviet
theater combat capability may lag behind their combat potential. Still, it
should be emphasized that Soviet concern for their 0^1 and logistic support
structures reflect very high standards, and that the Soviets currently
believe they have the capability to accomplish their theater offensive plans.
(u)
(•S/WrORN-) The Soviets have shown concern about the time required to
convert their Western Theater forces to a wartime footing. They require
the capability to mobilize large numbers of forces rapidly in order to
fulfill the critical time requirements of their offensive plans. The theater
strategic concept outlined by Ogarkov emphasizes the need to maintain the
momentum of the offensive thrust in a single, continuous theater campaign.
The Soviets stress that mobilisation capability must meet this demand.
Specific improvements are required in order to achieve better integration of
resources, to insure the survivability of the industrial mechanism, to
improve the autonomy of enterprises producing main combat weapons, to improve
the ability to mobilize under enemy attack, and to provide for greatdr
secrecy in the mobilization process.
3. (U) Southwest Asian Theater.
a. (S/NOf^IRN) Introduction. Soviet military requirements in SWA
include: stabilizing and securing their SW borders; deterring or defeating
any form of attack against Soviet territory; maintaining the offensive
capability to seize all or portions of Iran; and developing the capabiTity
to conduct offensive operations through Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia
to Oman, These requirements are likely to remain unchanged throughout the
forecast period.
(1) (S/N^ORtt) Force Structure. The existing Soviet force struc-
ture in SWA is sufficient to accomplish all theater defensive missions. In
addition, it is probably sufficient to accomplish the limited offensive
requirement of seizing all or parts of Iran. However, given the high proba-
bility of US or other Western intervention, the Soviet SWA force structure
is currently inadequate to achieve the ultimate theater aim of seizing the
southern.shore of the Persian -Gulf to Oman, particularly in the event of a
simultaneous war with China and/or NATO. It is estimated that to accomplish
this mission an additional army-sized force from outside the theater would
be needed.
c.	(S/NC^rm) Fielded Technologies. Except for those forces currently
in Afghanistan, Soviet SWA forces are relatively poor in both numbers arid
technological sophistication of their equipment holdings. Still, given the
inferior status of opposition forces, the Soviets SWA theater forces could
meet their minimum defensive theater missions and, if they did not encounter
US opposition, could probably seize all or portions of Iran. However, the
threat of US intervention is probably sufficient to deter the Soviets from
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launching an offensive to seize Iran without first undertaking a major
filling-out and modernization of their theater equipment stocks, fforeovjer,
this type of major equipment upgrading is considered absolutely necessary
before the Soviets would undertake the ultimate theater mission of
attempting to drive south to Oman.
(u)	,
d.	(S/N0F0RN-) Combat. Capability. In terms of C0I .and logistics sup-
port, Soviet SWA theater forces currently possess the capabil ity io maximize
their combat potential and to successfully accomplish all theater missions,
under the following circumstances: if they are opposed only by indigenous
SWA forces or by US forces only on the southern shore of the Persian Sulf;
and if there is no simultaneous war with China and/or NATO. If SWA becomes
a priority theater for the Soviets, we should expect to see conclusive
evidence of substantial upgrading of force structure, equipment, and overall
combat, capability during the forecast period. Otherwise, we can expect
incremental theater improvements.
4.	(U) Far East Theater.
a.	(5/nQoRN) Introduction. Since the mid-1960s, Soviet military
requirements in the Far Eastern Theater have been evolving from a strictly
defensive orientation to a limited offensive one. As a result, Soviet Far
East theater forces currently face a range of requirements, which include:
securing their borders by deterring, containing, or defeating any Chinese
offensive; further developing the offensive capability to damage China's
military-industrial base and to seize all or parts of Manchuria; countering
US air and naval forces in the region; and developing a theater capability
to. wage a protracted war against NATO forces in the West and the forces of a
Chinese, Japanese, US axis in the Cast.
(u) ,
b.	(G/HOrORNj Force Structure. The Soviet force structure in the Far
East Theater is currently sufficient to deter, contain, -or defeat any form
of Chinese aggression, and to mount a limited ground/air offensive against
northern China. In addition, Soviet superiority in nuclear and chemical
weapons gives them the capability to destroy or seriously damage China’s
military-industrial production base. However, without the use of NBC
weapons, it is unlikely that the Soviets could conduct extended operations
into^ Manchuria without major reinforcement from outside the theater. The
Soviets also possess the capability to seriously threaten any -US surface
force entering their sea-denial zone and to attack US bases in Japan.
However, in prolonged, simultaneous conventional war in both the "Western and
Eastern theaters, logistic demands of the European theater would probably
preclude Soviet Far Eastern forces from maintaining offensive operations of
any depth against China or the Western Pacific. Thus, in a multitheater war
of extended duration, Soviet Far Eastern, theater forces would probably be
forced into a strategic defensive posture.
(u)
c.	(S/NOFOWq Fielded Technologies. The Soviets are engaged in the
lengthy process of upgrading their Far East Theater equipment to meet the
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ultimate contingency of a theater war against both Chinese and NATO forces.
On the other hand, their theater forces now possess the requisite techno logy
to accomplish all of their more-limited objectives, particularly those
directed against*China, which lacks the nuclear, chemical, and conventional
sophistication of the Soviet forces.
(u)
d.	(S/NOrORN). Combat Capability. In 197-8, the Soviets reorganized
their Far East Theater command structure to meet expanding theater require-
ments. While the new organization may not yet be fully developed, it is
currently capable of handling Soviet theater defensive missions and it
significantly upgrades their capability to meet the expanded uh require-
ments of a protracted multitheater war. Moreover, their growing force
structure in the East suggests a developing strategic concept calling for
extending operations into the Western Pacific. Such strategic demands will
require further developments in command and operational capabilities.
5.	(II) Global Strategy.
a.	. (S/NO^RN) Introduction. The integrated theater-strategic opera-
tion introduced by MSI) Ogarkov can be viewed as a primary planning goal
driving Soviet force developments to the year 2000. In our judgement, the
Soviets will try, during the next twenty years, to acquire the force struc-
ture, equipment, and operational capability needed to conduct such opera-
tions simultaneously in each wartime theater. In general, they will strive
to improve their ability to conduct offensive operations at greater depth,
more quickly, and with more firepower, under all conditions and against any
enemy. We can therefore expect the Soviets to continue to introduce
weapons, equipment, organizational changes, and operational concepts empha-
sizing enhanced mobility, battlefield survivability, and autonomous opera-
tions on the fully integrated battlefield. Combined arms operations will
continue to be stressed.
(u)
b.	{57,'N0F0RN) Strategic Concept. While developing the force structure,
technology, and operational capability to conduct the theater-strategic
operation may be the immediate goal for the Soviet military, it must be
remembered that the Soviets view the world from a global-strategic perspec-
tive. In their eyes, the principal characteristic of the present inter-
national situation is the irreconcilable struggle between socialism and
capitalism, which, while it may not always take the form of military
conflict, is nevertheless continually being waged by political, economic,
psychological, ideological, and other means. From this perspective, it is
clear that the Soviet efforts to integrate inter-theater military operations
into a single theater-strategic concept are only part of a larger worldwide
effort to synthesize and coordinate various theater operations, and perhaps
even space operations, into an integrated global-strategic concept. The
goal of this strategy is to marshall all of the resources of the socialist
camp into an organized worldwide offensive against capitalism. The global
expanse of the military, economic, and political power of capitalism's
leader, the United States, requires the Soviets, as leaders of the socialist
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camp, to obtain similar power on a global scale. Thus, while our analytical
efforts for the remainder of the century may concentrate -on the Soviet
effort to meet their individual theater requirements, we must not lose sight
of the truly global nature of Soviet strategy.
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