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D. Reidel Publishing Company
Dordrecht / Boston / Lancaster

SEMANTIC MECHANISMS OF HUMOR

SYNTHESE LANGUAGE LIBRARY
TEXTS AND STUDIES IN
LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY
Managing Editors:
elisabet engdahl, University of Wisconsin
jaakko hintikka, Florida State University, Tallahassee
Stanley peters, The University of Texas at Austin
Editorial Board:
emmon bach, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
joan bresnan, Stanford University
john lyons, University of Sussex
julius m. e. moravcsik, Stanford University
Patrick suppes, Stanford University
dana scott, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh
VOLUME 24

VICTOR RASKIN
Purdue University
SEMANTIC
MECHANISMS
OF HUMOR
D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY
A MEMBER OF THE KLUWER IBfil ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS GROUP
DORDRECHT / BOSTON / LANCASTER

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Raskin, Victor, 1944.
Semantic mechanisms of humor.
HE
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Wit and humor-History and criticism. 2. Semantics. I.
Title.
PN6147.R33 1984 809.7 84-16093
ISBN 90-277-1821-0
ISBN 90-277-1891-1 (paperback)
Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company,
P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland.
Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada
by Kluwer Academic Publishers,
190 Old Derby Street, Hingham, MA 02043, U.S.A.
In all other countries, sold and distributed
by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group,
P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, Holland.
All Rights Reserved
© 1985 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner
Printed in the Netherlands

BHTaJiHK) h (noKOftHOMy) AJieKcaH^py PacKHHbiM,
OT KOTOptJX MHe flOCTaJlOCb MyBCTBO WMOpa
To Vitaly and Alexander (>nr) Raskin,
who gave me the sense of humor

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi
PREFACE xiii
Goal xiii
Structure xiii
Examples xv
Technicalities and Miscellanea xvi
Acknowledgments xviii
CHAPTER ONE: SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH J
Introduction I
1. What Is Humor? j
2. Is Humor Good or Bad? 9
3. Conditions for Humor 12
4. Physiology, Psychology, and Evolution of Humor 29
5. Classification of Humor 24
6. Theories of Humor 30
7. Structure of Humor 42
CHAPTER TWO: THEORY 45
Introduction 45
1. Verbal Humor 45
2. Linguistic Theory: Format 47
3. Linguistic Theory: Applications 5 2
4. Linguistic Applications to Humor:
Research Strategy 53
CHAPTER THREE: SEMANTIC THEORY 59
Introduction 59
1. Goals of Semantic Theory 59
2. Elements of Contextual Semantics 57
3. Format of Semantic Theory 75

Vlll
TABLE OF CONTENTS
4. Script-Based Lexicon 80
5. Combinatorial Rules 85
6. Justification and evaluation of semantic theory 92
CHAPTER FOUR! SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR 99
Introduction 99
1. Main Hypothesis 99
2. Joke Telling As Non-Bona-Fide-Commumcaiion 100
3. Script Overlap 104
4. Script Oppositeness 107
5. Semantic Script-Switch Triggers 114
6. Analysis of a Sample Joke 117
7. Theories of Humor: Script-Based Interpretation 127
8. Apparent Counterexamples 132
9. Joke Construction 139
CHAPTER FIVE: SEXUAL HUMOR i48
Introduction 148
1. Sexual/Non-Sexual Opposition: Overt, Unspecified 149
2. Sexual/Non-Sexual Opposition: Overt, Specified 154
3. Non-Sexual Opposition in Explicitly Sexual Humor 160
4. Specific Sexual Opposition in Explicitly Sexual Humor 165
5. Sexual Humor in the Russian Chastushka 170
6. Sexual Scripts, Oppositions and Triggers:
A Summary 177
CHAPTER SIX: ETHNIC HUMOR
Introduction
1. Script of Language Distortion
2. Script of Dumbness
3. Script of Stinginess
4. Script of Craftiness
5. Non-Standard Specific Scripts in Ethnic Jokes
6. Smaller Targeted Groups in Ethnic Humor
7. National Superiority Jokes
8. Pseudo-Ethnic Jokes
9. Jewish Humor
180
180
181
185
189
191
194
200
202
205
209

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER SEVEN: POLITICAL HUMOR
Introduction
1. Denigration of a Political Figure
2. Denigration of a Political Group or Institution
3. Denigration of a Political Idea or Slogan
4. Exposure of National Traits
5. Exposure of Political Repression
6. Exposure of Shortages
7. Exposure of Specific Political Situations
8. Soviet Political Humor
afterword
appendices: additional joke examples
Appendix 1: 50 Simple jokes
Appendix 2: 25 Complex jokes
references
subject index
NAME INDEX

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to acknowledge with gratitude the permissions to
quote passages and/or jokes from: Without Feathers by Woody Allen,
Warner Books, 1976, © 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 by Woody Allen, published
by arrangement with Random House, Inc., granted by Random House, Inc.;
"Laughter" by Henri Bergson from Comedy by Wylie Sypher (ed.), Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956, © 1911 by Macmillan Company, reprinted by
permission of Doubleday & Company, Inc.; "How do they tell Polish jokes
in Poland?" by Christie Davies, presentation at the April Fools' Day
(WHIM) Conference on Linguistic Humor, Tempe, AZ: Unpublished MS,
1982, granted by the author; Forbidden Laughter: Soviet Underground Jokes
by Emil Draitser, Los Angeles: Almanac Press, 1978, granted by Almanac
Press; The Humor of Humor by Evan Esar, © 1952, by permission of the
publisher, Horizon Press, New York; Jokes and Their Relation to the
Unconscious by Sigmund Freud, Penguin Books, 1976, used with kind
permission of Sigmund Freud Copyrights Ltd.; Sweet Madness: A Study of
Humorby William F. Fry, Jr., Palo Alto, CA: Pacific Book Publishers, 1963,
granted by Pacific Books Publishers; Nepodtsenzumaya russkaya chastushka
/The Uncensored Russian Chastushka/, compiled by Vladimir Kabronsky,
New York: Russica Books, 1978, granted by Russica Publishers; Pulling Our
Own Strings, edited by Gloria Kaufman and Mary Kay Blakeley,
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1980, granted by Indiana
University Press; Wit as a Weapon: The Political Joke in History by Egon
Larsen, London: Frederick Muller, 1980, granted by Frederick Muller
Limited; Rationale of the Dirty Joke by Gershon Legman, New York: Grove
Press & Basic Books, 1968, and No Laughing Matter: Rationale of the Dirty
Joke (2nd series) by Gershon Legman, New York: Breaking Point, 1975,
granted by the author's agent, Kryptadia, Inc.; Laughter and Liberation by
Harvey Mindess, Los Angeles: Nash, 1971, granted by the author; The Big
Book of Jewish Humor, edited by William Novak and Moshe Waldoks, New
York: Harper and Row, © 1981 by William Novak and Moshe Waldoks,
reprinted by permission of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.; 2000 New
Laughs for Speakers by Robert Orben, No.Hollywood, CA: Wilshire Book
Company, 1978, originally published as 2500 Jokes to Start 'em Laughing by
XI

Xll
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Robert Orben, © 1971,1972,1979 by Robert Orben, reprinted by permission
of Doubleday & Company, Inc.; The Origins of Wit and Humor by Albert
Rapp, New York: Dutton, 1951, granted by the author's widow, Mrs. Albert
(Helen) Rapp; the book Doctor Knock-Knock's Official Knock-Knock
Dictionary by Joseph Rosenbloom, © 1976 by Sterling Publishing Co., Inc.,
New York, N. Y. 10016; A Treasure-Trove of American Jewish Humor by
Henry D. Spalding, Middle Village, N.Y.: Jonathan David, 1976, granted
by Jonathan David Publishers, Inc.; The OfficialJewish/Irish Joke Book by
Larry Wilde, New York: Pinnacle, 1974, granted by the author.
The author is also grateful for the permissions to print: three jokes orally
delivered by Johnny Carson on the "Tonight Show," granted by Carson
Productions, Inc.; one joke orally delivered on TV by Rich Little, granted
by Mr. Rich Little; and a verbalization of the drawing and caption of a Stan
Hunt cartoon in the February 12, 1979, issue of The New Yorker, granted
by The New Yorker.
The author would also like to thank the publishers of his previous work
for permissions to use the material of: "Problems of justification in semantic
theory" by Victor Raskin, in: W. U. Dressier and W. Meid (eds.), Proceedings
of the 12th International Congress of Linguists, Innsbruck: Institut filr Sprach-
wissenschaft der Universitat Innsbruck, 1978, granted by Institut filr
Sprachwissenschaft der Universitat Innsbruck, A-6020, Innsbruck, Innrain
52, Austria; "Semantic mechanisms of humor" by Victor Raskin, in: C.
Chiarello et al. (eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley
Linguistics Society, Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1979, granted by
the Berkeley Linguistics Society; "Theory and practice of justification in
linguistics" by Victor Raskin, in: P. R. Clyne et al. (eds.), The Elements: A
Parasession on Linguistic Units and Levels, Chicago: Chicago Linguistic
Society, 1979, granted by the Chicago Linguistic Society; "Script-based
lexicon" by Victor Raskin, Quaderni di Semantica, Vol.11:1,1981, granted by
Professor Mario Alinei, Editor; "The semantics of abuse in the chastushka:
Women's bawdy" by Victor Raskin, Maledicta, Vol.V, 1981, granted by
Maledicta Press; and "A script-based semantic theory of humor," in: D. L.
F. Nilsen (with Alleen P. Nilsen) (ed.), The Language of Humor. The Humor
of Language, Tempe, AZ: Arizona State University, 1983, granted by the
editor.

PREFACE
GOAL
This is the funniest book I have ever written - and the ambiguity here is
deliberate. Much of this book is about deliberate ambiguity, described as
unambiguously as possible, so the previous sentence is probably the first,
last, and only deliberately ambiguous sentence in the book.
Deliberate ambiguity will be shown to underlie much, if not all, of verbal
humor. Some of its forms are simple enough to be perceived as deliberately
ambiguous on the surface; in others, the ambiguity results from a deep
semantic analysis.
Deep semantic analysis is the core of this approach to humor. The book
is the first ever application of modern linguistic theory to the study of humor
and it puts forward a formal semantic theory of verbal humor. The goal of
the theory is to formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions, in purely
semantic terms, for a text to be funny. In other words, if a formal semantic
analysis of a text yields a certain set of semantic properties which the text
possesses, then the text is recognized as a joke. As any modern linguistic
theory, this semantic theory of humor attempts to match a natural intuitive
ability which the native speaker has, in this particular case, the ability to
perceive a text as funny, i.e., to distinguish a joke from a non-joke.
The proposed set of necessary and sufficient conditions consists of the
following two semantic properties: first, in order to be a joke, any text should
be partially or fully compatible with two different scripts and secondly, a
special relation of script oppositeness should obtain between the two scripts.
STRUCTURE
The first part of the book, Chapters 1 - 4, attempts to make the last
paragraph comprehensible to the reader who is neither a linguist nor a humor
researcher.
The book proposes a semantic theory of humor, and both of the
components, semantic theory and humor, need an introduction.
xin

Xll
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Robert Orben, © 1971,1972,1979 by Robert Orben, reprinted by permission
of Doubleday & Company, Inc.; The Origins of Wit and Humor by Albert
Rapp, New York: Dutton, 1951, granted by the author's widow, Mrs. Albert
(Helen) Rapp; the book Doctor Knock-Knock's Official Knock-Knock
Dictionary by Joseph Rosenbloom, © 1976 by Sterling Publishing Co., Inc.,
New York, N. Y. 10016; A Treasure-Trove of American Jewish Humor by
Henry D. Spalding, Middle Village, N.Y.: Jonathan David, 1976, granted
by Jonathan David Publishers, Inc.; The Official Jewish/Irish Joke Book by
Larry Wilde, New York: Pinnacle, 1974, granted by the author.
The author is also grateful for the permissions to print: three jokes orally
delivered by Johnny Carson on the "Tonight Show," granted by Carson
Productions, Inc.; one joke orally delivered on TV by Rich Little, granted
by Mr. Rich Little; and a verbalization of the drawing and caption of a Stan
Hunt cartoon in the February 12, 1979, issue of The New Yorker, granted
by The New Yorker.
The author would also like to thank the publishers of his previous work
for permissions to use the material of: "Problems of justification in semantic
theory" by Victor Raskin, in: W. U. Dressier and W. Meid (eds.), Proceedings
of the 12th International Congress of Linguists, Innsbruck: Institut filr Sprach-
wissenschaft der Universitat Innsbruck, 1978, granted by Institut filr
Sprachwissenschaft der Universitat Innsbruck, A-6020, Innsbruck, Innrain
52, Austria; "Semantic mechanisms of humor" by Victor Raskin, in: C.
Chiarello et al (eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley
Linguistics Society, Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1979, granted by
the Berkeley Linguistics Society; "Theory and practice of justification in
linguistics" by Victor Raskin, in: P. R. Clyne et al. (eds.), The Elements: A
Parasession on Linguistic Units and Levels, Chicago: Chicago Linguistic
Society, 1979, granted by the Chicago Linguistic Society; "Script-based
lexicon" by Victor Raskin, Quadernidi Semantica, Vol.11:1,1981, granted by
Professor Mario Alinei, Editor; "The semantics of abuse in the chastushka:
Women's bawdy" by Victor Raskin, Maledicta, Vol.V, 1981, granted by
Maledicta Press; and "A script-based semantic theory of humor," in: D. L.
F. Nilsen (with Alleen P. Nilsen) (ed.), The Language of Humor. The Humor
of Language, Tempe, AZ: Arizona State University, 1983, granted by the
editor.

PREFACE
GOAL
This is the funniest book I have ever written - and the ambiguity here is
deliberate. Much of this book is about deliberate ambiguity, described as
unambiguously as possible, so the previous sentence is probably the first,
last, and only deliberately ambiguous sentence in the book.
Deliberate ambiguity will be shown to underlie much, if not all, of verbal
humor. Some of its forms are simple enough to be perceived as deliberately
ambiguous on the surface; in others, the ambiguity results from a deep
semantic analysis.
Deep semantic analysis is the core of this approach to humor. The book
is the first ever application of modern linguistic theory to the study of humor
and it puts forward a formal semantic theory of verbal humor. The goal of
the theory is to formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions, in purely
semantic terms, for a text to be funny. In other words, if a formal semantic
analysis of a text yields a certain set of semantic properties which the text
possesses, then the text is recognized as a joke. As any modern linguistic
theory, this semantic theory of humor attempts to match a natural intuitive
ability which the native speaker has, in this particular case, the ability to
perceive a text as funny, i.e., to distinguish a joke from a non-joke.
The proposed set of necessary and sufficient conditions consists of the
following two semantic properties: first, in order to be a joke, any text should
be partially or fully compatible with two different scripts and secondly, a
special relation of script oppositeness should obtain between the two scripts.
STRUCTURE
The first part of the book, Chapters 1 - 4, attempts to make the last
paragraph comprehensible to the reader who is neither a linguist nor a humor
researcher.
The book proposes a semantic theory of humor, and both of the
components, semantic theory and humor, need an introduction.
xin

XIV
PREFACE
An introduction to the general study of humor is provided by Chapter 1.
There is very little there on the linguistics of humor because nothing much
is available in the literature. Throughout the centuries, most of the thinkers
and, lately, researchers in the field of humor have been philosophers,
aestheticians, sociologists, psychologists, and practitioners, i.e., humorists
and comedians who have had some thoughts about their profession. The
latter three categories still dominate the international gatherings in the field,
such as the First (Cardiff, Wales, 1976), Second (Los Angeles, 1979) and
Third (Washington, D.C., 1982) International Conferences on humor. The
survey chapter introduces the basic ideas, problems, and concepts of humor
research by exposing the reader to a layer after layer of heterogeneous and
often mutually contradictory writings on the subject. The result, I hope, is
somewhat less frustrating to read than it was to write the chapter, for without
some familiarity with its content the rest of the book can hardly be
appreciated or even comprehended.
Chapter 2 is a transition from an introduction to humor to an introduction
to semantic theory. On the one hand, it limits and specifies the material of
the book to verbal humor. On the other, it sets up the framework of the
linguistic approach adopted in the book and the format of the application
of linguistics to humor. It even gives the reader a preview of a few semantic
concepts in order to make a point about their insufficiency for an analysis
of humor without a comprehensive formal theory.
Chapter 3 provides a proper introduction to the script-based semantic
theory on which the book is based. A background in formal semantic theory
is supplied in the first sections and then the basic concepts of the theory,
script and combinatorial rule, are introduced, analyzed and illustrated. It is
emphasized in the chapter that only a contextual semantic theory is useful
for the study of humor, and the script-based semantic theory is demonstrated
to accommodate the context much better than any of its predecessors.
Chapter 4 is the central and most important part of the book, and the
purpose of the previous three chapters is to build up enough common ground
for the central issues of the book to be dealt with in this chapter. Besides
applying the script-based semantic theory to the text of the joke, the chapter
explores the joke-telling mode of communication in a pioneering attempt to
extend the cooperative principle and maxims of communication beyond
Grice's bona-fide communication. It also introduces, classifies, and explores
the relation of script oppositeness on which the verbal jokes are based.
Chapters 5-7 constitute the second part of the book, in which the
script-based semantic theory of humor is applied to three specific categories

PREFACE
XV
of verbal humor, namely sexual, ethnic, and political humor, respectively.
Each of the chapters is, therefore, an application of an application of
semantic theory to humor, and it should be borne in mind that behind each
and every example used in the chapters there is a highly technical and purely
formal semantic analysis, along the lines of Chapter 4, which is introduced
in each of the three chapters very informally and non-technically for the sake
of easier legibility and comprehensibility.
There are different ways to read the book.'In its entirety, it is written
self-sufficiently for the general public. A humor researcher will probably
glance through Chapter 1 and some parts of Chapter 2 and will start reading
properly from Chapter 3. A semanticist will probably skip through a few
sections of Chapter 3 and will read its Sections 4-6 more closely though
Section 1 is also rather important. A rare person who is both a humor
researcher and a semanticist (I know two or three such people) will probably
start directly from Chapter 4 following some of the back references to the
first three chapters to clarify the use of terminology. The reader who is not
interested in the theory at all will perhaps, much to my displeasure, read
Chapter 4, Section 1, and then the second part of the book. All of these
categories of readers will, I hope, find some food for thought in the book.
It is only fair, however, to caution those who will take the book for a joke
book, with some redundant unfunny text in between jokes, that they are very
likely to be disappointed for reasons disclosed in the next section.
EXAMPLES
Rather few examples of jokes are used in the first part of the book because
of its theoretical nature. It is, however, somewhat reinforced by additional
examples in the Appendices. The second part introduces hundreds of
examples. Throughout the book, however, the joke examples have been
chosen, primarily, not for their quality but rather for their easy analyzability
and ability to illustrate a certain semantic point. Other things being equal,
a better and/Qr a later joke was preferred to a weaker and/or older one but,
in most cases, this was a very auxiliary consideration. I searched for
examples in various joke books which were available to me, in my own
memory and in the memories of my numerous friends, colleagues, associates,
and students. In some cases, I placed an order for a joke of a certain kind
and received it shortly thereafter. In other cases, I was disappointed because
no joke of a certain kind seemed to be available, and often for no clear
reason. Once, out of sheer desperation, I made up a joke of a certain kind

XVI
preface
myself. On another occasion, my wife authored a joke. The attentive reader
will not fail to discover those almost artificial products. It may turn out,
however, that they are not even the worst of the lot for reasons explained
above.
While the publishers and/or authors of most of the joke books, from which
I needed to use examples of certain semantic types, were quite cooperative
and understanding, two or three did not let me use their material - the result
is that some of the types and phenomena ended up being illustrated not by
the most trivial, obvious, and hackneyed examples, as my original intention
had been, but rather by somewhat more sophisticated jokes, usually of a
better quality. In many such cases I had to opt for Russian/Soviet examples,
which were obviously clear of any copyright restrictions, having never been
printed before. The predominance of Soviet humor in some of the chapters,
especially in Chapter 5, was not really intended, therefore, but it is not at
all unrepresentative of the world treasury of jokes as a whole because of the
enormous Russian productivity in this domain.
I would also like to emphasize, in very strong and unambiguous terms,
that the use of a joke in the text of the book does not constitute an
endorsement of its contents, values, and/or prejudices. Each joke illustrates
a certain semantic type and this constitutes its sole function of the book. I
fully realize that many of the used examples are 'dirty,' offensive, tasteless,
vulgar, etc., and sometimes I even comment on this in passing, but these are
not the qualities they were selected for, and I would like to urge the reader
to disinvolve himself (see the next section about the non-sexist use of the
masculine pronoun) from this irrelevant aspect of the jokes and concentrate
on the relevant ones, namely the involved scripts and their oppositeness. I
also realize that some of the jokes are, in fact, quite nice and good, besides
being useful for the semantic analysis, but this is equally irrelevant.
TECHNICALITIES AND MISCELLANEA
1. References. There is a great number of references in the book. Each
reference to an external source consists of the author's last name (or the
title), the year of original publication, and the page number of the edition
actually used. In the reference section of the book, each entry describes the
original edition. If there is no mention of another edition, translation, reprint,
etc., then this is the edition which is cited, and the page numbers, if any, refer
to it. If there is additional information of the described kind in the entry, the
page numbers usually refer to the edition, translation, reprint, etc., mentioned

prki acl:
XV11
last in the entry. In one case, however, the page numbers do correspond to
the original edition in spite of the fact that a later reprint is mentioned as
well, and this is quite obvious because no page numbers are listed for the
reprint.
In a number of cases, therefore, the page numbers in the text reference do
not correspond to the year, but the reference entry always contains all the
necessary and self-explanatory information to refer the reader to the exact
text used for quotation.
Each internal reference consists of a chapter number and a section number
for the chapters other than the one in which the internal reference occurs,
and just of a section number for the same chapter.
2. Non-sexist language. The entire language of the book is hereby declared
non-sexist in intention. After much internal debate, I decided to use the
masculine pronoun in its traditional non-gender, impersonal meaning rather
than to use he/she, he and/or she, or even worse, si he, and neutral pluralizing
was not always feasible. I never used man for 'person,' though, but some of
the cited authors did, and the fact of quotation does not constitute an act
of endorsement of the use even if it is known about the author that s/he was,
or is, a chauvinist pig. Those readers who like to generate accusative labels
for the authors will probably ignore this cautionary remark, along with those
of the previous section, and will come up with even worse labels for me on
the basis of the joke examples I used.
3. Transliterations. I used the European system of transliteration of the
Cyrillic whenever the choice was mine. For those words and names which
already exist in English I used their accepted British/American transliteration
which, unlike the European single-letter system with diacritical signs, uses
many two-letter combinations for one Cyrillic letter. I used the usual Israeli
system of transliteration for Hebrew. No confusion follows from this
customary practice, and there is extremely little transliteration in the book,
anyway.
4. Translations. If there is no mention of an English translation in the
reference entry, all the foreign quotations were translated by me. It may
sound like a great deal of work, but in fact, there are very few translations
of this kind in the book. With very few specific and self-explanatory
exceptions, all the originally foreign language jokes have been translated into
English as well, and if such a joke is given in English it is assumed that it
is comprehensible to the monolingual native speaker of English. The jokes
which lose their comprehensibility in translation were not used as regular
examples.

XV111
PREFACE
5. Miscellanea. There are no miscellanea at this time but I reserve the right
to think of some later.
6. Footnotes. There are no footnotes or end-of-chapter notes in the book,
and I am proud of it.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
There is a great number of people to whom I owe a debt of gratitude in
connection with this book.
I have greatly profited from discussions on humor with, and comments
on my contributions to its study by, Professors Wallace Chafe, Christie
Davies, Bruce Fraser, William Fry, Lawrence Mintz, Don Nilsen, and John
R. Ross. I also profited from various presentations and discussions at the
Second and Third International Conferences on Humor as well as at the
First WHIM Conference in Tempe, Arizona, in April 1982.
Professor Leonard Neufeldt and Mr. Scott Deerwester helped edit the
joke examples. Mr. Christie Davies's detailed comments on Chapter 6 are
partly incorporated in the text. Professors Bruce Fraser and Sergei
Nirenburg kindly offered to comment on the entire text of the book, and one
of them actually did. Mrs. Marina Raskin read the first two pages of the
manuscript with the same intention.
A few members of my 1983 NEH Summer Seminar on Contextual
Semantics caught many typos in the prefinal draft among them, especially
Professor Norman E. Jarrard.
The student participants in my courses and seminars on the semantics of
humor at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and at Purdue University,
as well as those who attended my presentations on humor at The University
of Michigan, Indiana University, The University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, and The University of California at Berkeley, contributed
seriously, even if often indirectly, to my thinking on the subject. A few
graduate students at Purdue also helped me with the fine tuning in the
wording of a few jokes, thus bringing me up to date with regard to certain
slangs and jargons.
Most importantly, perhaps, many people donated their jokes or lent their
ears and patiently listened to my jokes. The most active donors-cum-listeners
included Professors Virgil Lokke, Leonard Neufeldt, Sergei Nirenburg,
William Palmer, and Richard Thompson, Dr. Frank Oreovicz, Mr. and
Mrs. Val Mandel, Mr. Donald Seybold, Mr. Vladimir Paperny, and Rabbi
Victor Rashkovsky.

PREFACE
XIX
My former graduate students at Purdue University, Mrs. Maria Ingberg
and Mr. Guillermo Latorre contributed an example each in their native
languages at my request.
None of the above should be held responsible for the result of all of these
activities.
The work on the book was supported in very small part at an early stage
by a Summer 1979 XL grant from the Purdue Research Foundation, which
made it possible for me to speed up the research necessary for the writing
of the survey chapter.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge with gratitude the generous attitude
to this enterprise with regard to my use of their works or publications
(formally acknowledged on the credit page above) on the part of Mr. David
Daskal of Russica Publishers, Mr. Christie Davies, Mr. Gershon Legman,
Mr. Rich Little, Professor Harvey Mindess, Mrs. Albert (Helen) Rapp on
behalf of her deceased husband, Mr. Alexander Polovets of Almanac Press,
and Mr. Larry Wilde. I would also like to thank Mr. Legman, Mrs. Rapp,
Mr. Polovets, and Mr. Wilde for their kind letters of encouragement.

CHAPTER ONE
SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
This chapter contains a brief and rather selective survey of the literature
dealing with humor in its various aspects. While a special attention is paid
to the available theories of humor, it will soon become obvious to the reader
that no prior research is available on the linguistics of humor and no formal
theory of humor has ever been proposed. It will become equally clear that,
in spite of that, the reviewed literature provides the kind of informal
knowledge of, and feel for, humor which is indispensable for the present
study. The links between it and the bulk of the book will be apparent in a
number of places which are usually marked accordingly.
Section 1 is devoted to humor in general, and a formal definition of the
humor act is introduced there against the background of a survey of the
pertinent literature. Section 2 discusses whether humor is good or bad.
Section 3 introduces some (mostly external) conditions of humor. Section
4 reviews the physiology, psychology, and evolution of humor. Section 5
introduces a number of classifications of humor and some examples
illustrating them. Section 6, the central part of the chapter, discusses the
three large groups of theories of humor. And finally, Section 7 brings
together the various available insights into the structure of the joke.
1. WHAT IS HUMOR?
There is nothing unusual or rare about the phenomenon. Somebody hears
or sees something and laughs. In most cases, this means that the person
finds the audial or visual stimulus funny. Funny situations, funny stories,
even funny thoughts occur everyday to virtually everybody. Laughter can be
heard frequently in most societies though its exact meaning may differ from
occasion to occasion and from culture to culture. In any case, however,
laughter is more often than not the expression of the feeling of funniness.
Independently of their age, sex, social or economic status, culture, or epoch,
1

2
CHAPTER ONE
people are capable of finding things funny, and laughing at them. Different
people will not necessarily find the same things equally funny - many things
which will strike one group as funny may bore another group; some jokes
are private or individual, i.e., restricted in their funniness to just one or very
few individuals. However, the ability to appreciate and enjoy humor is
universal and shared by all people, even if the kinds of humor they favor
differ widely. This universality of humor is further reinforced by the fact that
surprisingly many jokes or situations will strike surprisingly many, if not all
people as funny.
It is obvious, therefore, that we are dealing with a universal human trait.
Responding to humor is part of human behavior, ability, or competence,
other parts of which comprise such important social and psychological
manifestations of homo sapiens as language, morality, logic, faith, etc. Just
as all of those, humor may be described as partly natural and partly acquired.
What do people laugh at? Hazlitt suggested a long though not exhaustive
list of funny things: "We laugh at absurdity; we laugh at deformity. We laugh
at a bottle nose in a caricature; at a stuffed figure of an alderman in a
pantomime, and the tale of Slaukenbergius. A dwarf standing by a giant
makes a contemptible figure enough. Rosinante and Dapple are laughable
from contrast, as their masters from the same principle make two for a pair.
We laugh at the dress of foreigners, and they at ours. Three chimneysweepers
meeting three Chinese at Lincoln's Inn Fields, they laughed at one another
till they were ready to drop down. Country people laugh at a person because
they never saw him before. Any one dressed in the height of the fashion, or
quite out of it, is equally an object of ridicule. One rich source of the ludicrous
is distress with which we cannot sympathize from its absurdity or
insignificance. It is hard to hinder children from laughing at a stammerer, at a
negro, at a drunken man, or even at a madman. We laugh at mischief. We
laugh at what we do not believe. We say that an argument or an assertion
that is very absurd, is quite ludicrous. We laugh to show our satisfaction with
ourselves, or our contempt for those about us, or to conceal our envy or our
ignorance. We laugh at fools, and at those who pretend to be wise - at
extreme simplicity, awkwardness, hypocrisy, and affectation" (1903, 8-9).
Obviously, individual humorous responses to the stimuli listed above will
vary widely, and it is not only that people tend to find different things funny
but they also exercise this ability in various degrees. Some people are
characterized as "having" the sense of humor while others "lack" it. This
seems to be a quantitative rather than a qualitative judgment. The former
group may respond to funny stimuli more often and more easily and eagerly;

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
3
they may seek those stimuli out; they may derive more pleasure from them;
they may try to generate such stimuli on their own and be successful in this
enterprise; as a result of all this, these people may be socially popular if their
society holds humor in high esteem. The latter, "humorless," group may be
virtually the opposite of the former: they will not respond to funny stimuli
readily or frequently; in fact, in many cases, they will not agree that there
is anything funny about those stimuli. However, it is plausible to suppose,
even about those "outcasts" in humor-ridden cultures, that the same
distinction between the funny and non-funny holds for them just as it does
for their opposites. They also think some things funny and laugh at them in
exactly the same way - it is just that other or fewer things strike them as
funny. However, they too have the humor competence. It is their humor
performance, the use of their humor competence, which is different from that
of the people who "have" the sense of humor. A similar relationship between
competence and performance can be observed in the cases of language (cf.
Chomsky, 1965, 4), logic, morality, religion, etc., and the corresponding
judgments (which, as it is claimed here, are quantitative rather than
qualitative) are reflected by such pairs of antonyms as articulate: inarticulate,
logical:illogical, moral:immoral, religious:atheist, etc., respectively.
For the sake of simplicity, we will call an individual occurrence of a funny
stimulus the humor act. (The term is analogous to the 'speech act,' without
the terminological restrictions imposed on it by any particular school of
thought - see Searle, 1969). What characterizes the humor act? In this
section, we will simply introduce the factors which contribute to the humor
act. They will be further explored in Section 3, along with some
accompanying and less important factors.
First of all, there should be human participants in the act. In cases of
verbal humor there is the speaker and one or more hearers. The speaker may,
of course, be replaced by the writer, radio, television or any other substitute
speaker. There may be substitute hearers as well - the readers, the radio or
television audiences, etc. In these and other cases, there may be only one
human participant who is physically present where something humorous
occurs. This sole participant may find something funny in the non-human
environment around, though some authors claim that it is impossible, that
only the human can be funny (see Section 3). In any case, the sole participant
is usually the hearer, the perceiver, the addressee of the humorous stimulus.
It is the perceiver's presence, of course, which makes a humor act a humor
act, simply because it is the perceiver who laughs. It is not at all accidental
that tapes with laughter are used when the only participant of a humor act

4
CHAPTER ONE
is the speaker - laughter should be physically there when a humor act takes
place. We will label the human participants of the humor act the speaker and
hearer - the terms will be used flexibly enough to be applicable to non-human
initiators and recipients of humor as well, if possible or absolutely necessary.
Secondly, something must happen in a humor act. An utterance has to
be made, a situation has to develop or to be perceived - in short, a new
stimulus should be presented and responded to humorously. The natural
term for this obligatory factor is the stimulus.
In a simple and "objective" world, the stimulus would constitute both the
necessary and sufficient condition for humor. In that world, every joke or
funny situation would be equally funny for everybody. In other words, in that
world "a situation, if it is laughable, must be so to everyone, whether he is
pleased to recognize it to be so or not" (Menon, 1931, 14).
Unfortunately, this world is different, and most researchers of humor have
been acutely aware of that. This circumstance has driven some of them to
conclusions which may have sounded more pessimistic than actually
intended: "We cannot find any characteristic for the laughable" (Monro,
1951, 15). This circumstance makes one reformulate the straightforward
question, "What is the common characteristic of the things we laugh at?"
more cautiously as "What is the common element in laughable situations?
That is granted that laughable objects may not have a common characteristic,
what is the common relation between us and the varied characteristics at
which we laugh?" (ibid, 19). In other words, it is the stimulus and the human
participant(s) which bring humor about.
What else is there? Monro continues to paraphrase his questions:
"... What is the relation between the objects at which an individual laughs and
his life history, temperament, etc.?
... What is the relation between the common element in laughable situations and
the physical concomitants of laughter?" (ibid, 19).
The life experience of an individual is an important factor. What made me
laugh 20 years ago may fail now. It is likely than 20 years from now I will
also laugh at some different things, if at all. We will see later (see Sections
3 and 6) that if an individual develops a strong feeling towards something,
it will not be perceived by him as humorous. We will also see later (see
Section 4) that children's sense of humor tends to be different from that of
adults and also that it undergoes a rapid evolution as the child becomes
older. We will use the term experience for this factor of the humor act.
Another important, though not necessarily independent factor is the
psychological type of the individual participating in the humor act. Together

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
5
with his experience it is likely to determine the degree of the individual's
predisposition to humor in a given situation. We will use the term psychology
for this factor.
Every humor act occurs in a certain physical environment which serves
as one of the most important contextual factors of the humor act. It may
determine the meaning of semantically recursive items in a verbal joke (see
Chapter 3, Section 2, and Chapter 4, Section 6); it may condition, direct and
modify the perception of a humorous situation. The loose term situation,
which is the short for 'situational context,' will denote this factor of the
humor act. We will investigate the relations between the situational context
and the linguistic (or discourse) context in Chapter 3.
Finally, every humor act occurs within a certain culture which belongs to
a certain society. Many researchers have commented on the fact that humor
is shared by individuals belonging to a certain social group - we claimed at
the very beginning of this section that "it ain't necessarily so" (cf. "universal"
jokes), and there is no reason to withdraw the claim, but there is much truth
to the statement that shared social values, norms, etc., make humor much
more effective. The term we will use is simply society (see also Section 3).
It is very tempting now to present the humor act as a function, with the
enumerated factors as its arguments and the values being either FUNNY
or UNFUNNY. This function will be very similar to any truth-value
function, for instance, to Lewis's intension of the sentence (1972,174ff.). (As
we will see very shortly, many circumstances seem to make the research of
humor very difficult, and a great many researchers have felt defeated by these
circumstances. Right now we have to come up with symbols for the
introduced terms, and inordinately many of them begin with an 's.' We could, of
course, rename the speaker as 'the initiator,' the stimulus as 'the material'
and the situation as 'the environment,' but instead of doing that, after having
proved the author's termogenic ability, we will use some two-character
symbols.) Let us denote the speaker S, the hearer H, the stimulus ST, the
experience E, the psychology P, the situation SI and the society SO. The
humor act can then be defined as the function HU in (1):
(1) HU(S,H,ST,E,P,SI,SO) = X, where X = ForX = U,
standing for FUNNY and
UNFUNNY, respectively
In a successful (or felicitous - cf. Austin, 1962) humor act, X = F; when
a joke falls flat and in similar unfortunate situations X = U. A continuous
version of the function, with X varying from 0 (U) to 1 (F) will, of course,

6
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be more flexible since it can estimate the degree of funniness, given all the
determining factors. However, (1) obviously needs more refinement even if
left discrete. Whose experience, psychology and society are involved in (1)?
Apparently, they belong to the hearer since he provides the laughter and,
therefore, is really indispensable for the humor act. It is better then to restate
(1) as (2) right away:
(2) HU(S,H,ST,Eh,Ph,SI,SOh) = X
However, the speaker's experience, psychology and society may also play
a role. Even more significantly, as will be shown in Chapter 3, Section 2, and
especially in Chapter 4, Section 7, the speaker and hearer's shared experience
plays an important role in humor. In verbal humor, the stimulus is always
a text (T). Since the book deals only with verbal humor (see also Chapter
2, Section 1) we can narrow the formal definition down to it. Thus, a
successful verbal joke (VJ) is likely to be formulated as (3):
(3) VJ(S,H,T,Es,Eh,Es,h,Ps,Ph,SI,SOs,h) = F
Intended verbal jokes constitute a subset of verbal jokes as well as of
intended jokes, and we would like to wait with any classification of humor
till Section 5; however, it is a good glimpse of one of the most serious
problems of humor research - the near-impossibility of making a
generalization without immediate reservations about the particular circumstances
captured by the arguments of the function in (3), or without caveats and
taxonomies. It is also clear that dealing with the arguments of the function,
especially the last five of them, is not easy (see Section 6).
This and many other difficulties have saddled humor research for
centuries, driving philosophers, psychologists, aestheticians, critics, writers,
sociologists, orators and comedians to apologetic and outright defeatist
positions about it. Thus, Croce (1903, 228) claimed that "humor is undefin-
able like all psychological states." "We shall not aim at imprisoning the
comic spirit within a definition," warned Bergson (1899, 61). "We regard it,
above all, a living thing." One of the implications of this was, of course, that
humor will defy any definition and escape from any prison. Bergson,
however, was one of those who did not give up hope altogether: "...The comic
spirit has a logic of its own, even in its wildest forms. It has a method in its
madness" (ibid, 62). "The funniest thing about comedy is that you never
know why people laugh," admitted W. C. Fields. "I know what makes them
laugh, but trying to get your hands on the why of it is like trying to pick an
eel out of a tub of water" (quoted from Levine, 1969, 1-2).

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
7
Other authors have found it necessary to apologize, somewhat curiously,
for the fact that their books or articles on humor are not funny (which, in
most cases, they are not, and this book is, and intended as, no exception -
no apology!) or, alternatively, castigate their predecessors, competitors and
(I am afraid) successors for having written unfunny stuff on humor. As
Leacock (1937, 15) put it, "people who sit down to write books on humor
are scientific people, philosophical analyzers who feel that they must make
something serious, something real out of it, and show us that humor can,
in proper hands, be made as dull and as respectable as philology or
epistemology." Even worse, Eastman (1921, viii) quotes Bernard Shaw as
saying (probably correctly) that "there is no more dangerous literary
symptom than a temptation to write about wit and humor. It indicates the
total loss of both." (A step down for "creative" writers, if Shaw says so, it
may be actually a step up the ladder for those who have never had any
ambitions to write funnily and have been actually rewarded for not doing so.)
It should be noted, however, that writing funnily on humor has always meant
giving a lot of examples, which may have been enjoyable, for the most part,
but have not rendered the stuff in between any funnier. Schopenhauer's
position with respect to examples, unpopular with some researchers as it is
(see Monro, 1951, 148), is nevertheless very tempting to adopt: "In the first
volume," he states correctly, "I regarded it as superfluous to illustrate [the
theory] by examples, for everyone can do this for himself by a little reflection
upon cases of the ludicrous which he remembers. Yet, in order to come to
the assistance of the mental inertness of those readers who prefer always to
remain in a passive condition, I will accommodate myself to them" (1819b,
271-2). In this book, examples are used for illustrative purposes only, which
(and not the quality) determine their choice, and they are concentrated
primarily in Section 5, Chapters 5-7, and the Appendices.
Humor has defeated researchers in still another, perhaps more subtle, less
conspicuous and ultimately more harmful way. It has generated a great
number of loose, incomplete, unrestricted or circular definitions of itself. A
book similar in intent to Ogden and Richards's (1923) on meaning, where
at least 16 types of definitions of meaning are reviewed and rejected, could
easily be written on humor, and this is something neither this book nor this
chapter have any intention of doing or being, though Section 6 will contain
a number of references of this sort. Humor was defined by Mindess (1971,
21) as "a frame of mind, a manner of perceiving and experiencing life. It is
a kind of outlook, a peculiar point of view, and one which has great
therapeutic power." "Humor is play," says Fry (1963, 138). "A joke may be

8
CHAPTER ONE
defined as an item of humor reduced to a single point or particle," writes
Leacock unfunnily (1937, 214). "It represents the breaking up of humorous
matter into its elements so that one can examine and appreciate one little
bit of it without any extraneous context. One might say that a joke is a
self-contained humorous thought."
Still another blow humor deals to its researchers is the terminological
chaos created by an abundance and competition of such similar and adjacent
terms as humor, laughter, the comic, the ludicrous, the funny, joke, wit.
While most authors, if they use more than one of these or similar terms, try
to distinguish between or among them, often offering a taxonomy of humor
based on those distinctions, there is no terminological agreement among
different researchers, and one man's 'humor' may be another man's
'laughter,' and so on and so forth. We will return to the problem of
terminological nomenclatures at least twice in this chapter - in Sections 5
and 6. It will suffice to note here that we will use the term 'humor' in the
least restricted sense, interchangeably with 'the funny.' The use of most of
the other terms will be very limited and, with luck, altogether avoided outside
this chapter. They will, however, be introduced and described in some of the
most frequent, popular or influential meanings in this chapter, and as a price
to pay for the wisdom received here, the terms will be used here as loosely
and often interchangeably as they have been in the literature quoted
throughout the chapter.
In general, this chapter addresses the title question of this section from
various angles and in various aspects. Many questions about humor are, in
fact, variations of this basic question. If we have a look, for instance, at the
four basic questions Fry (1963, 27) poses: "What is it that makes people
laugh?.. What is the nature of humor?.. Why is a joke (or anything else)
funny?.. Why is amusement pleasant?" - the first three are paraphrases of
the same question, which, of course, contains the main, if not the only
problem of humor research. The following chapters will attempt a partial
answer to an important part of the problem, namely a formal semantic theory
accounting for the linguistic nature of verbal humor will be outlined. Fry's
fourth question, important as it may be, is not in our province and will be
happily (and pleasantly) ignored in the original part of the book (see,
however, Section 6). In this survey, "get-acquainted" chapter we will proceed in
a centripetal way, from the more outlying and easily accessible aspects of
humor and the literature corresponding to them at the beginning, to the most
central notions and ideas and references to them, towards the end. One
external "circle" is therefore already behind us.

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
9
2. IS HUMOR GOOD OR BAD?
While many researchers of humor have admitted that the real nature of
humor escapes them, and those who have not done that, have been
denounced by others, firm opinions have been held and expressed as to
whether this unknown phenomenon is good or bad for you - a situation
which make strike one as slightly humorous itself but certainly not
unprecedented. Other examples of undefined phenomena which have been
evaluated in these terms include love, happiness, faith, success, detente, and
supply-side economy.
Most evaluators have argued (or even taken it for granted) that humor is
good. First of all, it has been noted that laughter, which accompanies humor,
gives pleasure (cf. Fry's fourth question quoted, and dismissed, in Section
1, which does assume this pleasure). Darwin provided an oft-quoted
physiological foundation for this assumption: "Joy, when intense, leads to
various purposeless movements - to dancing about, clapping the hands,
stamping, etc., and to loud laughter /the emphasis is mine (and everybody
else's but not Darwin's) - V.R./" (1872, 196). And also, somewhat
ambiguously: "Idiots and imbecile persons likewise afford good evidence
that laughter or smiling primarily expresses mere happiness or joy.... The
joyousness of most of these idiots cannot be possibly associated... with any
distinct ideas: they simply feel pleasure, and express it by laughter or smiles"
(ibid, 197). Grotjahn praised laughter for bringing freedom and a whole
package of goodies which he associates with freedom: "Laughter...can be
used to express an unending variety of emotions. It is based on guilt-free
release of aggression, and any release makes us perhaps a little better and
more capable of understanding one another, ourselves, and life. What is
learned with laughter is learned well. Laughter gives freedom, and freedom
gives laughter" (1957, VIII-IX). Mindess, another psychiatrist, concurs
heartily and adds non-conformism, iconoclasticity and playfulness to the list
of good things brought about by humor (1971,23,41,137,139). Rappiseven
more specific: "Laughter is relaxation.... [Radio comedians] are ministering
to mental health and physical fitness" (1951, 12). And also, even more
aphoristically: "Laughter is healthful" (ibid, 167). Sidis declares simply that
"laughter is the beginning of love" and that "we laugh when we cease to
hate" (1913, 145). Leacock (1937, 19) says that "humor... possesses the
element of human kindliness as its most essential ingredient..."
Eastman (1921, 1936) has been one of the most ardent proponents of
humor, and he was taken to task for his earlier book by one of the worst

10
CHAPTER ONE
enemies humor has ever had. "I am going to suggest that there is something
sinister about laughter," states this enemy simply (Ludovici, 1932, 17).
Resorting to the argument which has been used before in many fields,
including the study of humor, Ludovici claims, somewhat inaccurately
(Blokor, no date), that "...there is not a joke in the whole of the New
Testament,... even the laughter of the Bible is nearly always an expression
of scorn and not of mirth (exceptions: Psalms cxxvi, 2, and Job vii, 21)..."
(ibid, 10). Strongly believing that all laughter is based on despicable "superior
adaptation," on feeling superior toward the object of laughter (see the
discussion of, and references to, the
superiority/aggression/malice/disparagement theory in Section 6), Ludovici blames the popularity of humor in
society on the Anglo-Saxon race, for whom there is "...nothing worse than
to accuse [the German Kaiser] of having no sense of humour" (ibid, 7).
(Some 20 years later Rapp, unintentionally, I believe, accepted the accusation
on behalf of this country: "In America, generally, laughter is held in high
esteem. The desire to laugh and to be made to laugh is considerable, as
anyone knows who is not stone deaf and who owns a radio" (1951, 165).)
What may be pleasant relaxation for some is viewed by Ludovici as
cowardice in the speaker, indolence and forestalling (ibid, 12-13): "Humour
is, therefore, the lazier principle to adopt in approaching all questions, and
that is why muddle is visibly increasing everywhere." Shelley is often quoted
in this context as having said "I am convinced that there can be no entire
regeneration of mankind until laughter is put down" (cited from Rapp,
op.cit., 51). Lord Chesterfield, another misoghelus 'laughter-hater' and
aghelastos 'refrainer from laughter' (see Sully, 1902, 1), wrote to his son, "I
am neither of a melancholy, nor of a cynical disposition; and I am as willing,
and as apt, to be pleased as anybody; but I am sure that, since I have had
the full use of my reason, nobody has ever heard me laugh" (1748, 51).
However, many researchers who evaluated humor positively were not
blind to its "sinister" aspect and still praised it. Thus, Leacock, a devout
humorist, knew that "if humour in its essence stands for human kindness,
one has to admit that at times the forms of wit depart from it..." (1937, 59).
Chernyshevsky put it this way: "The impression which the comical makes
on one is a mixture of the pleasant and unpleasant sensation where the
pleasant, however, usually prevails; sometimes this prevalence is so strong
that the unpleasant is almost completely erased. This sensation is expressed
by laughter. The unpleasant in the comical strikes us as ugly; what is
pleasant is that we are so perceptive that we understand that the ugly is ugly.
Laughing at it we put ourselves above it" (1855, 193). "The true laughter,"

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
11
agreed Borev, "is not heartless, as Bergson claims, but rather sensitive,
compassionate, and intimate" (1957,83). Rapp was more specific: '...[Man]
has taken a gesture born out of hatred and aggressiveness and [produced
a potent medicine].
For laughter is born out of hatred and hostility...
Laughter was born out of hostility. If there had been no hostility in man,
there had been no laughter (and, incidentally, no need for laughter). All the
current types of wit and humor retain evidence of this hostile origin. Some
more clearly than others. But in all it is there to see, if you are willing and
able. Particularly, willing. Which a great many are not.
Ridicule, for example, still shows its teeth and its claws. And a great
majority of all jokes and gags which you will hear pour forth from your radio
contain an element of ridicule. Of course it is toned down. Of course it is
made acceptable to decent men in a kind-hearted society. But the savage still
lurks" (op.cit., 13). "This," marvels Rapp, "is one of the great paradoxes:
while there is demonstrably something hostile and degraded in laughter, at
the same time some types of laughter are full of charm and friendliness. A
good sense of humor is one of the most gracious qualities one can have. It
is friendly, warm, attractive. The ability to see fun in things, the ability to
make your fellows laugh, are traits that we greatly admire.
How does one explain this paradox? How can the same thing be both
noble and ignoble, friendly and hostile, a potential blessing and a potential
danger? For, all the important questions that people ask about wit and
humor and laughter are wrapped in this one" (ibid, 14).
The title question of this section is thus tied up with that of Section 1,
which only reconfirms, predictably so, the conclusion, already mentioned in
Section 1, that all questions about humor are, in fact, paraphrases of the
same question.
3. CONDITIONS FOR HUMOR
The next layer of information about humor, or somewhat more precisely,
even if more metaphorically, the next circle in our centripetal movement
toward the heart of the phenomenon in this chapter, deals with conditions
which various authors have associated with humor. We will leave the
discussion of the conditions which some of them have declared, in various
combinations, or assumed to constitute the necessary and/or sufficient
conditions of humor till Section 6 and will touch here instead on what can
be actually labeled 'the accompanying factors.' These factors are likely to

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CHAPTER ONE
be there when humor takes place but no claim is made (at least not here)
about their obligatoriness.
Freud (1905, 282-285 - cf. also 1928) comes up with an interesting list of
seven such accompanying factors, or predispositions - positive and negative
- for humor:
"(a) The most favorable condition for the production of comic pleasure is a
generally cheerful mood in which one is 'inclined to laugh...'
(b) A similarly favorable effect is produced by an expectation of the comic,
by being attuned to comic pleasure.
(c) Unfavorable conditions for the comic arise from the kind of mental
activity with which a particular person is occupied at the moment.
(d) The opportunity for the release of comic pleasure disappears, too, if the
attention is focused precisely on the comparison from which the comic may
emerge...
(e) The comic is greatly interfered with if the situation from which it ought
to develop gives rise at the same time to a release of strong affect...
(0 -the generating of comic pleasure can be encouraged by any other
pleasurable accompanying circumstance..."
The first condition has been mentioned by a great number of authors in
various contexts. Since being in a cheerful mood is generally considered to
be good, one has to believe that humor is also good in order to subscribe
to this condition. For those who dislike humor, an unhealthy compromise
relating humor to cheerfulness is still possible: they may, for instance, call
this cheerfulness foolish or childish and dismiss it as being beneath their
dignity, together with humor. Many authors who are interested primarily in
laughter rather than in humor per se have observed that, at least in most
cases, laughter expresses, and may be actually brought about by,
cheerfulness, joy, merriness, and the general sense of well-being (see Greig, 1923,
37ff.)
As far as Freud's second condition is concerned, many other researchers
have also indicated that special devices may be used by the speaker of
humor, especially by professional comedians, to put the hearer(s) in the
appropriate mood of expectation. Thus, Fry (1963, 55) observes that often
when a certain kind of humor takes place an "overt statement is made, "This
is a joke," "I want to tell you a funny story," or "Did you hear this one?"
etc." Other cues for forthcoming humor include such cliches as "A funny
thing happened to me on the way to..." and various conventional techniques
developed by individual stand-up comedians as their trademarks, e.g.,
Rodney Dangerfield's "no respect" or Johnny Carson's use of adjectives

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
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which almost always elicit a prompting response from the well-prepared
audience ("The weather is bad today." "How bad?" "So bad that...").
Freud's third condition, which formulates a negative predisposition,
interferes with this expectation of humor. Thus, a serious occupation will
contradict the playfulness which many researchers have associated with
humor (see Fry, 1963, 125ff; cf. Huizinga, 1938) and therefore will render
the hearer undisposed to the perception of humor. Again, we may be dealing
here with a quantitative rather than a qualitative distinction - what may
actually be involved is that a stronger stimulus or a more explicit cue of the
kind mentioned above is necessary here in order to engineer a shift from the
unfavorable circumstances for the perception of humor to the favorable
ones.
Grotjahn, among others, forcefully agrees with the fourth condition:
"Laughter has a tendency to disappear when we focus our intellect on it and
try to understand it" (1957, vii). It is also known, in corroboration of this
observation, that you either "get the joke" at once or not at all - this seems
to be one sphere of life where toil will not get one anywhere.
Bergson, for one, was very vocal about the issue raised by Freud's fifth
condition. Thus, he emphasized specifically "the absence of feeling which
usually accompanies laughter... Indifference is its natural environment, for
laughter has no greater foe than emotion" (1899, 63). "...the comic
demands," he believed, "something like a momentary anesthesia of the
heart. Its appeal is to intelligence, pure and simple" - though, as we have
noticed in connection with the previous condition, this "pure and simple"
intelligence should not concentrate on the subject of the joke or funny
situation too much.
A certain impersonality of the humorous situation has been mentioned
among other accompanying factors. As Leacock (1937, 111) put it, "in all
these cases of humour arising out of situation, the particular character of the
persons concerned does not enter, or only in a secondary degree. The man
without his trousers in the ballroom is just 'the man.'" Bergson would agree:
"The individuality of things or of beings escapes us in comic perception"
(1899,159). In fact, this condition is not unrelated to Freud's fifth condition
- we are unlikely to experience a strong feeling or "release a strong affect"
with respect to an impersonal, non-specific, "generic" person, object or
event.
This fifth condition, incidentally, makes a Marxist-Leninist theorist of
humor (Borev, 1957, 82) ideologically suspicious: "It is typical for the
idealistic aesthetics to treat humor as a phenomenon which does not involve

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CHAPTER ONE
our feelings, which does not appeal strongly to anything in human soul." He
would rather impose strict demands on the hearer of humor, who, Borev
claims, should possess certain aesthetic ideals along with a lively dialectical
mind which is able to perceive wholeness in contradictions and to generate
associations. These abilities should constitute an important condition for
humor - ideologically unsound comrades are thus denied the humor
competence, and their laughter is conveniently dismissed (cf. Chapter 7, especially
Section 8).
Laughter is, of course, an important accompanying factor of humor, one
cannot help agreeing with Leacock's statement which at the same time
relates the two phenomena and expresses a revealing caveat, underscoring
the really existing distinction between them: "...laughter, a physiological
phenomenon, appear[s] earlier in a definite and recognizable form and
laughter is at least closely connected with humour. It is true that many
humourous people seldom laugh and that many people with little sense of
humour laugh a great deal. Yet the two go together" (1937, 19-20). We will
further investigate the interesting relation between the two notions, laughter
and humor, in Section 4.
More obligatory conditions for humor are related to the components of
the humor act introduced in (1) in Section 1. First, there are the human
participants, the speaker and the hearer. Should they be necessarily human?
Or, alternatively, "do animals have a sense of humor?" (Rapp, 1951, 29).
Bergson believed that "the comic does not exist outside the pale of what is
strictly human" (1899, 62). Grotjahn is no less categorical: "Laughter is a
way of human communication which is essentially and exclusively human"
(1957, viii-ix; cf. also Paulos, 1980, 26: "Understanding a joke is a distinctly
human activity," - and also 102; Monro, 1951, 19). Laughter, however, has
been argued to exist with primates and other animals as well (see, for
instance, Darwin, 1872, 131, and Fry, 1977, 24), which, in view of the
contiguity between laughter and humor and also partly due perhaps to a
terminological mix-up, made some researchers more receptive to the idea of
non-human humor. Some animal behavior may strike one as funny and thus
similar to the unintended variety of human humor. On the other hand, it may
be argued that the funniness here would be due to a personification of animal
behavior, which will render animal humor a somewhat trivial and
unnecessary metaphorical extension of human humor. "Funny" natures mortes may
involve a personification of a similar though somewhat more indirect kind:
they may be argued to be perceived as if they were arranged by human
intellect.

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
15
Whichever way the case for the non-human humor goes, however, it is
clear that, in most, even if not all cases, the human participants are the
indispensable condition of humor. As we indicated in Section 1, two is the
most likely minimum number of participants, though sometimes, especially
in this electronic age, one of them may be substituted by a surrogate -
however, both the speaker and the hearer are to be present at least implicitly.
Many researchers have imposed certain conditions on the stimulus. Thus,
Plato, one of the earliest authors who wrote on humor, said that the necessary
condition for humor is the presence of "a failing, one that takes its name from
a state of character, and is that specific form of failing with the characteristic
quite opposed to what the oracle at Delphi recommends ['Know thyself.']"
(-4th, 47). One of the most all-encompassing and inexclusive conditions on
the stimulus was offered by Leacock (1937, 93-94): "The humour... arises,
therefore, out of any set of circumstances that involve discomfiture or
disaster of some odd incongruous kind, not connected with the ordinary run
of things and not involving sufficient pain or disaster to over-weigh the
pleasures of contemplating this incongruous distress: or it may arise without
any great amount of personal discomfiture when the circumstances
themselves are so incongruous as to involve a sort of paradox. One and the same
principle runs through it all, as it does through all humour, the idea of the
'thing smashed out of shape,' the comic broken umbrella." Another attempt
to impose conditions on what we term the stimulus was made by Sully (1902,
87-118) who postulated the presence of at least one of the following elements
in it: novelty, deformity or deviation, moral deformity or vice, breach of order
or rule, small misfortune, indecency or obscenity, pretence, want of
knowledge or skill (cf. Plato above), incongruity or absurdity, verbal play or
amusing witticism, fun-loving disposition, the sight of a winning person.
Since some theories of humor are completely determined by such
conditions, we will postpone a systematic discussion of some of them till Section
6. As we will see there, for a theory of humor to be valuable, the postulated
conditions should be necessary and sufficient for humor. In reality, they have
been usually offered as either the one or the other and have been neither.
The most respectable status some of them have ever gained is that of the
necessary and sufficient condition for a specific kind of humor, usually the
one particularly favored, or even exclusively recognized, by the proponent
of the theory.
An important factor in the experiences of the speaker and the hearer is
their familiarity with humor as a special mode of communication (see
Chapter 4, Section 2). The universality of humor discussed briefly in Section

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1 makes it difficult to predict what kind of behavior a person would display
at his first contact with humor or to stage an experiment of this sort. The
truth of the matter is that everybody "has it" to a degree, which is not to say
that this experience should be taken for granted. The computers which do
not have humor cannot communicate in this mode, though they can be
taught to model humor. Other aspects of the human experiences participating
in the humor act are accounted for by various scripts and their individual
variation (see Chapter 4).
We will not add much here to the discussion of the psychologies of the
participants in the humor act. The speaker and/or hearer's predispositions
to humor are important, and those were largely captured above in Freud's
conditions and the ensuing discussion. What is also important to understand
is that neither this book nor any other work on humor can account for the
psychology of every individual and determine his attitude to humor. While
most writings on humor fail to indicate their restrictions in this respect
explicitly or even implicitly, we are stating here, and are likely to restate it
elsewhere in the book, that unless specified otherwise, we will be dealing
here, to paraphrase Chomsky (1965, 3-4), with an idealized community of
speakers and hearers of humor. In other words, we will first try to establish
a general, "normative," individual-independent theory of humor and then
perhaps to attempt accounting for individual differences (see elements of
that in Chapter 4, Section 8). That others have practically always done it
may not be a very good defense for something which, on the face of it, is
an inherently inadequate and rather frustrating research strategy. The
argument that no science can proceed without such an idealization is likely to
be much more effective (cf. Chapter 3, Section 6).
The situation of the humor act will be captured in its relevant aspects in
the script analysis of verbal jokes (see Chapter 4, especially Section 6). An
interesting distinction can be made, which will be pursued somewhat in
Section 5, between those humor acts in which the situation virtually
coincides with the stimulus and those in which these two components of the
humor act are different though they still supplement each other (cf. the
intended and unintended humor, the canned and situation jokes, etc. - see
Section 5).
The sociology of the participants in the humor act is an extremely important
factor emphasized in various aspects by a number of researchers. It seems
to be generally recognized that the scope and degree of mutual understanding
in humor varies directly with the degree to which the participants share their
social backgrounds. Greig put it in rather absolute terms (1923, 71):

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
17
"Nothing is laughable in itself: the laughable borrows its special quality from
some persons or group of persons who happen to laugh at it, and, unless
you happen also to know a good deal about this person or group of persons
you cannot by any means guarantee the laugh beforehand. It is only people
with the same social heritage who laugh easily at the same kind of jokes. That
is why laughter so often balks at national frontier, and dies away with the
passage of time." Viktoroff concurs energetically (1953, 14): "...One never
laughs alone - laughter is always the laughter of a particular social group,
and it is impossible to associate oneself with it if one does not share the
group's norms, feelings and ideas - in short, if one is not part of it."
Another sociological aspect of humor was emphasized by Bergson. For
him (1899, 187), "laughter is, above all, a corrective. Being intended to
humiliate, it must take a painful impression on the person against whom it
is directed. By laughter, society avenges itself for the liberties taken with it.
It would fail in its object if it bore the stamp of sympathy or kindness." "In
this sense," he continues, "laughter cannot be absolutely just" (ibid, 188).
Viktoroff also speaks about "...the social function a/humor, that is the social
effect which laughter, to the extent that it can become itself a social factor,
is likely to produce" (1953, 145). He proposes, however, to "distinguish
between two different, even if correlative aspects of this action: on the one
hand, the society determines the circumstances under which laughter is
recommended, tolerated or forbidden, as well as its duration, intensity, etc.;
on the other hand, it distances itself from laughter in order to attribute some
sense to it" (ibid, 146). It is the latter aspect which evidently provides
Bergson's social corrective. The former aspect serves a different social
function, namely "...the socialization (/humor, that is the way in which the
social group elevates and transforms that emotion sui generis which is
laughter..." (ibid, 145). As virtually everything else in human society, humor
turns out to be a convention created and legitimized by society and imposed
by it on its members (so early in their lives, as we have mentioned above in
passing when talking about psychology and will return to briefly in Section
4, that no human who is totally unfamiliar with the phenomenon can actually
be found). In a similar context, Rapp speaks about "an invaluable social
factor, "contagion," which tends to spread this feeling [of relaxation brought
about by laughter] over a wide group" (1951, 52) (see also Section 4).
Fry puts the sociology of humor in an even broader perspective of
interpersonal relationship: "A field which has received attention and stimulated
conflicting ideas is that concerning the relationship between the persons
mutually involved in humor. What is the relationship between the persons

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CHAPTER ONE
smiling or laughing together? It has been suggested that humor embodies an
attack by one individual on another. Laughter is then variously explained as
resulting from feelings of superiority in attack or again as representing a
compensatory reaction to feelings of inferiority in battle. On the other hand,
some state that people can only smile and laugh together if they are feeling
a deep love or affection for each other. Humor then seems to become a
reaffirmation of "warm," "positive" emotions. It is also presented that
persons mutually involved in humor are covertly indulging in some illicit,
forbidden behavior. This behavior is usually represented as being of a sexual
nature. And there are other ideas about this interpersonal relatioship, none
of which have been demonstrated to be conclusive" (1963, 31).
The non-conformist, iconoclastic character of (some) humor mentioned
by Mindess (1971, cf. Section 2) actually provides another optional
condition for humor: often, if you want to "break loose from habitual behavior"
(op.cit., 139), it is easier to do it first humorously in order to test the ground
for a more serious act. Ironically, it is this condition for humor which
infuriated Ludovici who saw in it the speaker's defense against the risk of
saying something the audience would not like (1932, 14). He read this
strategy as cowardice; it is just as easy to interpret it as sociability, politeness
and any number of other good qualities.
When a joke is told by the speaker to the hearer(s), i.e., when we deal with
intended verbal humor, there are further conditions which ensure that the
joke be told exactly right. It should not be too long, and it should not be too
short. It should not be too trivial, and it should not be too hard to
understand. The punch line should not be given away too early. The amount of
detail should be adequate. Fry raises other "questions associated with
joke-presenting techniques... For the presenter to laugh occasionally and to
be mildly amused by his own joke increases the power of its humor. For the
presenter to laugh immoderately and to be obviously carried away by his
own joke spoils the joke for the recipient..." (1963,32). As we noticed before,
when discussing Freud's second condition, a special cue is appropriate to
put the audience in the right mood. Fry elaborates on that as well: "The joke
must be understood as being a joke for it to be funny. Many practical jokes
result in anger, fear, sadness - all sorts of inappropriate emotions - until the
joke angle is revealed. Then the possibility of laughter becomes available.
The implicit statement "This is a joke" is of vital importance..." (ibid, 32-33).
The paralinguistic behavior of the speaker of the joke is also important.
"Certain jestures, facial expressions, etc., enhance the humor of a joke.
Certain types of behavior decrease the humor" (ibid, 33). There are also

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
19
"mysterious" conditions: "it is legend among professional funnymen,"
observes Fry, that the utterance of the sound "k" "is itself enough to send
people into gales of laughter. And, oddly enough, there is evidence to support
the legend" (ibid, 33). There are other unanswered questions: "Why does a
joke seem less humorous when you hear it the second time, whereas you can
tell some jokes over and over without experiencing any decrease in the fun
of telling them?" (ibid, 32). The script analysis in the bulk of the book will
account for some of the problems raised in this paragraph (see especially
Chapter 4, Section 7). Eastman (1936, 290-326) devotes a whole chapter to
what he terms "the Ten Commandments of the Comic Arts: "1. Be
interesting. 2. Beunimpassioned. 3. Be effortless. 4. Remember the difference
between cracking practical jokes and conveying ludicrous impressions. 5. Be
plausible. 6. Be sudden. 7. Be neat. 8. Be right with your timing. 9. Give good
measure of serious satisfaction. 10. Redeem all serious disappointments"
(ibid, 290).
An important group of conditions for humor involve the internal structure
of a verbal joke. We will review those in Section 7 and come back again to
some of them in Chapter 4.
4. PHYSIOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND EVOLUTION OF HUMOR
As we have noted in the previous section, humor usually causes laughter.
Laughter is a physiological as well as a psychological phenomenon. From
the physiological point of view, "the sound of laughter is produced by a deep
inspiration followed by short, interrupted, spasmodic contraptions of the
chest, and especially of the diaphragm. Hence we hear of "laugher holding
both his sides." From the shaking of the body, the head nods to and fro. The
lower jaw often quivers up and down..." (Darwin, 1872, 200). Laughter is
believed to release an excess of mental or nervous energy accumulated in the
body as a result of some previous activity. Laughter is pleasurable. In
general, there is little that can be said of laughter physiologically which
cannot be said of orgasm - in fact, Ellis believed that "there is more than
an analogy between laughter and the phenomena of sexual tumescence and
detumescence" (1911, 14).
Psychologically, laughter is a versatile function. It can, indeed, accompany
humor but humor holds no monopoly for laughter. In fact, laughter may
accompany, and express, any pleasurable feeling. It is most often associated
with joy. According to Darwin (1872, 196-7; cf. Section 2), joy does lead
to "loud laughter," even with "idiots and imbecile persons." Play, make-

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CHAPTER ONE
believe and contests, listed by Monro (1951, 20-34) as "non-humorous
stimulants of laughter," can perhaps be also included among pleasurable
feelings. However, "laughter is frequently employed in a forced manner to
conceal or mask some other state of mind, even anger. We often see persons
laughing in order to conceal their shame or shyness" (Darwin, op.cit., 212).
"Laughter is often a defence mechanism," says Monro (op.cit., 27), when
it is resorted to cover up a discomfiture or nervousness. Laughter of relief
may occur after a strain. Laughing gas and tickling seem to cause laughter
of a purely reflectory character.
Fry considers laughter (and smiling) "physiologic accompaniments of
both humor and play, and little else" (1963, 9) and notices a number of
significant overlaps between those two modes of behavior. ViktorofT(1953,
1) insists that "contrary to what Darwin may have thought, the laughter
associated with the comic should not be mixed with the laughter of joy.
Dumas [1933, 248-9] expresses this idea very clearly: 'One can laugh
without experiencing the feeling of the comic but rather simply because one
is experiencing a pleasant sensation: for instance, one can laugh in the
middle of joy, and in this case, the laughter has the same meaning as crying,
speaking and all the other movements with the help of which the nervous
system discharges itself; in other cases, one laughs under the influence of
excitation resulting in the brain from the perception of one of those
unexpected relations which form the basis of the feeling of the comic, and
in this case, the laughter assumes a meaning which is quite distinct from the
previous case. Thus, there are at least two kinds of laughter, or rather a type
and a kind, which for lack of a more precise terminology, one can call the
laughter of joy and the laughter of the comic.'" In fact, Darwin seemed to
differentiate between the two kinds of laughter though he did see common
traits in them: "Yet laughter from a ludicrous idea, though involuntary,
cannot be called a strictly reflex action. In this case, and in that of laughter
from being tickled, the mind must be in a pleasurable condition; a young
child, if tickled by a strange man, would scream from fear. The touch must
be light, and an idea or event, to be ludicrous, must not be of grave import"
(1872, 199).
Researchers of children's humor (McGhee, 1979; Wolfenstein, 1954;
Chapman and Foot, 1977, 199-234, and references there) and of laughter
and humor in general have observed, that with babies, smiling and laughter
precedes any signs of humor per se by years. Infants have been noticed to
smile and laugh when looking at their mothers and experiencing other
pleasurable feelings, when being tickled, playing the game of peek-a-boo,

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
21
romping about, chasing and being chased, teasing (and not being teased) or
being rebellious (see Greig, 1923, 53-66). However, most researchers agree
that children do not develop humor until much later. Thus, verbal humor is
inaccessible to them till they begin to discern ambiguity in language, and
some available research in psychology seems to demonstrate that this does
not happen until six years of age (see, for instance, Shultz and Pilon, 1973;
McGhee, 1974b; Prentice and Fathman, 1975). Those researchers who
believe that different forms of humor are available to children earlier tend
to broaden the notion of humor to include pleasure and ultimately, I believe,
to mix up humor with laughter (see, McGhee, 1977a, b; Shultz, 1976; cf.
Piaget, 1962). What often happens in the psychological research of children's
humor is that psychological reactions of adults exposed to humor are found
in children as well and the erroneous conclusion is reached that what causes
those responses in children is also humor (see a revealing analysis of this
kind of error in McGhee, 1977a, 29).
Obviously, the older the child is the broader the scope of humor which
is available to him. It has also been observed that children graduate from
more primitive and more cruel or hostile forms of humor to more
complicated, more subtle and less aggressive ones. Since the idea of ontogeny
following the path of phylogeny has always been extremely appealing to
mankind, probably even before it was taken up by Darwin, the evolution of
individual humor of a given child has been often compared, more often
implicitly than explicitly (see, for instance, Rapp, 1951, 33-34), with the
evolution of humor of mankind.
The most popular theory of the evolution of humor regards humor as a
descendant of a certain form of archaic behavior. While many researchers
have believed that the human humor ability is an instinct which is important
for the sirvival of the species (see, for instance, Darwin, 1872; Spencer, 1860;
see also Section 6 and references there), not everybody has agreed on the
function the instinct performed (see Keith-Spiegel, 1972, 5-6, and references
there). A number of researchers including Ludovici (1932) and Rapp (1949,
1951) treated laughter and humor as a form of battle, complete with assaults,
conquests and defeats, a form which, in the process of civilization, has lost
its direct and physical character. Rapp's version of this evolution theory,
most recently reiterated by Gruner (1978), is quite clearly formulated.
The beginning, according to Rapp (1951, 21), was this: "...the single
source from which all modern forms of wit and humor developed is the roar
of triumph in an ancient jungle duel." The most likely outcome of such a duel
was one triumphing winner and one grieving (if alive) loser (see Gruner,

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CHAPTER ONE
op.cit., 39-48, for a vivid, if somewhat macabre, manual of primeval
battlefield manners). The winner's way to release the accumulated energy is
to laugh, the loser's to weep. The winner's party laughs with him; the loser's
party, if it has not changed sides yet, weeps with him.
What followed the roar-of-triumph stage was a transition from battle to
forms of humor: "first to ridicule and to its more civilized descendants; then
to wit down through many of its modern forms; and finally to what we have
termed "suppression laughter." For these are the three great families
indicated" (Rapp, op.cit., 27). Ridicule, Rapp believes, was the first and
most ancient form of humor available to man. The caveman laughed at the
physical misfortunes of others, possibly because those misfortunes might
have been physical manifestations of defeat in a fight (op.cit., 42-43). Next
came deliberate ridicule as a substitute for a physical fight and also perhaps
as a way for the loser (still on the assumption that he survived) to get back
at the winner. The subject of ridicule may have also developed from physical
misfortunes and deformities to minor misfortunes and deformities as a result
of "every kind of humanizing counter-pressure." However, argues Rapp, the
impulse to laugh at other people's even serious misfortunes "never gets
trained out of most people, even adults, even today," and children as well
as early literature and "primitive" civilizations provide many examples of
this (ibid, 33-34). Leacock agrees with this analysis: "[Primitive] humour
meant exultation, the sense of personal triumph over one's adversary, or the
sense of delight in seeing something - anything - demolished or knocked out
of shape. In such a form it was older than written language, and no doubt
older than language itself, belonging in the age of grunts and barks out of
which language arose. It expressed itself in action, not in words. We can find
still plenty of traces of this primitive humour existing to-day" (1937, 24). In
spite of this inherent hostility, "mankind did not discard laughter, even
derisive laughter. There are good reasons. For laughter has two qualities
which combine to make it very much worth while retaining, even at some
cost. It provides a pleasurable feeling of relaxation to the person who laughs;
and it contains an invaluable social factor, "contagion," which tends to
spread this feeling over a wide group" (Rapp, 1951, 52). Eventually, ridicule
became even more cultivated and civilized and developed into "genial
humor" which "is, actually, loving, affectionate ridicule" (ibid, 57). And the
"final remarkable achievement to conclude a remarkable line of succession
was: the ability to laugh humorously at oneself (ibid, 67; cf. Mindess, 1971,
49, where the Jewish "self-disparaging" humor is interpreted as "evidence
of the mental act of rising above one's deficiencies by frankly admitting and
enjoying them").

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
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In the meantime, a parallel development from battle to more civilized
forms of laughter was taking place: "the key lies in the phrase 'a duel of wits.'
Somewhere along the way, there seems to have developed a transfer from
the purely physical contest to a contest of cognitive skills; a contest of
intelligence and imagination and of figuring things out" (ibid, 70). The duel
took the form of riddles, conundrums, puns, repartees and other forms of
verbal humor (see Section 5 and references there). "Early riddle
competition," speculated Rapp, "must be pictured as serious. Its purpose was to
establish superiority. Mental superiority. The fact that laughter burst forth
was, in a sense, accidental. But it was a happy accident. For it meant that
there would be a demand for such contests on the part of the spectators. And
as soon as wit duels began to be staged more for the laughter which they
provoked than as a result of anger and personal rivalry, there would be great
changes" (ibid, 75). In riddles, "the formula was simply: deliberate
concealment. The protagonist took a subject, and by any and every possible verbal
device he described it in a hidden manner. The beauty of that was that, no
matter how brilliant or how stupid his antagonist was, the solution would burst
forth suddenly, if at all... The riddle formula also induced... great tension in
the antagonist" (ibid, 76). With conundrums (conundra?), which are
"punning riddles," and puns, which are "essentially abbreviated punning riddles"
(ibid, 81-87), later on, the duel of wits became "a contest in which you are
beaten without even knowing you were in a contest" (ibid, 90). Much of
contemporary verbal humor can be assigned to this line of development.
The third route was the humor of suppression or repression, which Rapp
also describes as "chafing at restraints" (ibid, 115). This is the loser's humor
par excellence, with the help of which he gets back at the winner. The winner
in this situation is usually somebody who is responsible for denying the loser
something he needs, alcohol (prohibition humor of the 1920's in America),
sex (dirty, or obscene, jokes of most countries at most times), political
freedoms (political jokes in Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, most recently,
Poland). In most cases, especially in our times, the forbidding adversary is
society which imposes its cultural, ethical and behavioral norms on the
individual. For the individual who suffers from the repressions resulting
from these impositions, the suppression humor is the best therapy, the best
way to get it out of his system. It is interesting to note that the humor of
suppression requires a modicum of freedom, a certain unhealthy combination
of repression and of some possibility to laugh at it and still get away with
it. Thus, there are few jokes on alcoholism in those Moslem countries where
the prohibition is very forcefully upheld and the perpetrator faces severe

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CHAPTER ONE
punishment. One can expect less humorous activity on the subject of sex in
a society where there are strict anti-adultery or anti-homosexual laws which
are effectively maintained and enforced. There were much fewer political
jokes generated and retold during Stalin's reign in the Soviet Union than
later on during Khrushchev's "thaw."
All these alternative routes of development have brought about a transition
from battle and primitive ridicule to modern humor. Obviously, various
cultures have favored different strategies or combinations of strategies to
form national or period humor. To a certain extent, however, Grotjahn's
observation is applicable to all of them: "To summarize, wit begins with an
intention to injure, which our culture requires us to repress.... The better the
disguise, the better the joke" (1957, 14).
We will consider some relevant examples in the next section.
5. CLASSIFICATION OF HUMOR
We will begin with a few simple and short examples of the types of humor
which we mentioned in the context of evolution of humor.
The first one is ridicule which, in most cases, cannot be verbalized. Rapp
(1951, 31-46) quotes a number of non-verbal examples, ranging from
hypothetical occurrences with primaeval cavemen " 150 centuries ago" to
contemporary children's humor to the humor of some "primitive" cultures. All the
examples are centered around a mishap which happens to another human
being and causes laughter to the observer. He quotes Chandler's experiment
(1902,959-60) with eight-year-old boys and girls who were asked to describe
the best joke they heard during vacation and who, "without exception,
described an action, and one in which they had personally participated,
either as joker or as observer. The jokes recorded were always on somebody
else. They all embodied an idea of discomfort to somebody or something.
A companion was tripped, or knocked into a water trough, or frightened by
a snake, or burned with a hot spoon, or shot with firecrackers, or pinched,
or beaten, or scared with a Jack-o'-lantern" (ibid, 34). Ludovici (1932, 92ff)
quotes two examples of laughter which the physical agony of prisoners being
punished brings about in the observers on the Fiji and in China. Rapp quotes
an example of crude ridicule from Homer's Iliad. It is the laughter of ridicule
which, Bergson believed, functions as a social corrective (cf. Sections 3 and
6). The examples of all the other kinds can be, conveniently, verbal.
Deliberate ridicule, this substitute, as we know already, of a physical

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
25
assault, always makes fun of somebody or something. First, an anti-pretense
example:
(4) An aristocratic Bostonian lady hired a new chauffeur. As they
started out on their first drive, she inquired:
"What is your name?"
"Thomas, ma'am," he answered.
"What is your last name?" she said. "I never call chauffeurs by
their first names."
"Darling, ma'am," he replied.
"Drive on - Thomas," she said. (Rapp, 1951,.49-50)
Next, an anti-politics example:
(5) "Who was that gentleman I saw you with last night?" "That was
no gentleman. That was a senator." (Esar, 1952, 177)
And, finally, an anti-clerical joke:
(6) The Archdeacon has got back from London, and confides to his
friend the doctor, "Like Saint Peter, I toiled all night. Let us hope
that like Saint Peter I caught nothing." (Legman, 1975, 308)
Rapp discovers many examples of affectionate ridicule in Mark Twain
(e.g., the Tom Sawyer jokes) and in Shakespeare (Falstaff, etc.). Here is an
example attributed to Joey Bishop:
(7) Back in 1942,1 said, "Mama, I'm going into the Army." And she
told me, "All right, but don't come home late." (Spalding, 1976,
24)
Freud cites a good example, in a different context, of humor at the
speaker's own expense:
(8) A rogue who was being led out to execution on a Monday
remarked: "Well, this week's beginning nicely." (1905, 294).
A typical example of Mindess's Jewish self-disparaging humor in (9) feeds
on one of the most ancient anti-Semitic myths:
(9) Nurse: That's a pretty bad cold you have, sir. What are you
taking for it?
Patient: Make me an offer! (Spalding, 1976, 225)

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CHAPTER ONE
Now, for a few examples in the duel-of-wits line. First, the riddle:
(10) Should a person stir his coffee with his right hand or his left
hand? Neither. He should use a spoon. (Esar, 1952, 21)
(11) When is a joke not a joke? Usually. (Esar, 1952, 21)
The conundrum, the punning riddle:
(12) Why is a drawn tooth like a thing forgot? Because it is out of
one's head. (Esar, 1952, 22)
(13) Why does a donkey eat thistles? Because he's an ass. (Esar,
1952, 23)
Next comes the pure pun which still reigns supreme in many cultures:
(14) The first thing which strikes a stranger in New York is a big car.
(Esar, 1952, 77)
(15) Common aspirin cures my headaches if I follow the directions
on the bottle - Keep Away from Children. (Kaufman and
Blakeley, 1980, 51)
Finally, the suppression/repression humor. First, sex:
(16) An elderly client in a whore-house insists on having a special girl,
who happens to be occupied. 'But what's she got that all my
other girls haven't got?' asks the madam. 'Patience,' says the old
man. (Legman, 1975, 200)
Next, politics:
(17) A contest for the best political joke was announced in Moscow.
First prize, 25 years of hard labor. Second prize, 15 years of
solitary confinement. Third prize, ten years of imprisonment and
confiscation of all belongings. (Soviet, 1950's - cf. Draitser,
1978, 29)
We will postpone the discussion of the mixed nature of this particular
classification until later in this section and address a few conceptual
taxonomies first.
The first dichotomy deals with what Viktoroff (1953,60-61) terms le risible
artificiel 'the artificial laughable' as opposed to le risible naturel 'the natural
laughable.' The latter simply occurs by itself and is then perceived as funny.
The former is specially created to produce the comic effect. Two other
oppositions proposed by Viktoroff cover essentially the same span: the

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
27
stereotypical laughable as opposed to the spontaneous laughable, and the
static laughable as opposed to the dynamic laughable. Aubouin (1948, 15)
distinguishes similarly between the comic, produced by intellectual
impression, and the ridiculous, produced by affective impression; in other words,
we simply perceive the latter while the former requires comprehension.
Bergson seems to observe an analogous opposition within the domain of
verbal humor: "...We should draw an important distinction between the witty
(spirituel) and the comic. A word is said to be comic when it makes us laugh
at the person who utters it, and witty when it makes us laugh either at a third
party or at ourselves" (1899,128). He also proposes to distinguish "between
the comic expressed and the comic created by language" (ibid, 127 - see also
Section 6). We evoked the distinction between natural, spontaneous,
perceived, occurring, etc., humor, on the one hand, and artificial, stereotypical,
intellectual, created humor, on the other, when we mentioned unintended
and intended humor, respectively. In somewhat simplistic terms, the former
kind occurs when somebody says something (or something happens) and the
observer perceives it as funny, usually unexpectedly for the speaker. The
latter occurs when the speaker intends to be funny and actually makes an
effort to be so (see Eastman's code of joke telling in Section 3). Freud seems
to make very much the same distinction when he says, "A joke is made, the
comic is found..." (1905,239). Fry introduces a somewhat similar dichotomy
between 'canned jokes' and 'situation jokes': "Canned jokes are defined as
those which are presented with little obvious relationship to the ongoing
human interaction. Situation jokes are indicated as those which are
spontaneous and have, to a major extent, their origin in the ongoing interpersonal
(or intrapersonal) process" (1963,43). Obviously, the canned jokes have to
be intended while some situation jokes may be unintended (see also Chapter
4, Section 2).
The second dichotomy involves a confusing pair of terms, 'humor' and
'wit'. Rapp (1951,154ff) attempts an orderly account of the relation between
the two but is not really happy with the result: "1) humorous laughter must
include a predominate measure of affection or love. ... 2) Wit is intellectual.
... 3)In humor it is nearly always clear who it is you are laughing at (and
with). In wit it is occasionally clear, but usually not.... 4)Wit is artificial and
deliberate. ... 5) The witty person... tends to be characterized by vanity,
[etc.]... The [humorous] person tends to be characterized by an affectionate
attitude toward his fellows, [etc.]..." Bergson's notion of wit, quoted above,
seems to be in disagreement with Rapp's third point.
For Freud, wit is "tendentious" and is opposed to innocent jokes (cf.

28
CHAPTER ONE
Beattie's dichotomy of the ludicrous and ridiculous - 1776, 587, as well as
Stendhal's opposition of'le ridicule' and 'le palisant' (1823, 31-35). "The
purposes of jokes can easily be reviewed. Where a joke is not an aim in itself
- that is, where it is not an innocent one - there are only two purposes that
it may serve, and these two can themselves be subsumed under a single
heading. It is either a hostile joke (serving the purpose of aggressiveness,
satire, or defence) or an obscene joke (serving the purpose of exposure)"
(Freud, 1905, 140). "To the classes of tendentious jokes that we have
considered so far - exposing or obscene jokes, aggressive (hostile) jokes,
cynical (critical, blasphemous) jokes" (ibid, 160-1) - he adds what he labels
the 'sceptical' joke and then states "the formula for the mode of operation
of tendentious jokes. They put themselves at the service of purposes in order
that, by means of using the pleasure from jokes as a fore-pleasure, they may
produce new pleasure by lifting suppressions and repressions" (ibid, 188).
Humor is something very different for Freud. It is "closer to the comic than
to the jokes" (ibid, 299), i.e., more "natural" than "artificial." Humor is used
"instead of getting angry" (ibid, 296). "Humor is the most easily satisfied
among the species of the comic. It completes its course within a single
person; another person's participation adds nothing new to it" (ibid, 294).
Leacock defines wit much more narrowly, as a subset of humor: "We can
define wit as being an expression of humour involving an unexpected play
upon words. Thus wit is far the lesser term of the two: it is all included under
humour. There could not be real wit without humour" (1937,57). Pirandello,
after a largely irrelevant though interesting dissertation on the etymology of
the word humor, becomes very specific: "the feeling of the oppositeness as
a result of analysis, of decomposition is humor... the perception of the
opposite is the comic" (1974, 113). There is no mention of wit in the
distinction, and it is actually closer to the first member of the dichotomy
above. We will not use wit or witty terminologically at all.
There are virtually dozens of terms which permeate and utterly confuse
classifications of humor (see, for instance, the table of contents in Esar,
1952). As we promised before (see Section 1), we will use the term 'humor'
most frequently and most generally throughout the book. It will, and actually
has already been, used synonymously with 'the funny,' 'the ludicrous,' 'the
comic,' 'the laughable.' Beginning with Chapter 2, however, this study will
concentrate entirely on verbal humor, and the term 'humor' will be used,
somewhat loosely, as a contraction of the longer term. The term 'joke' will
be used to denote a single humorous text. The term 'satire' and other generic
terms which denote various uses of humor for artistic purposes will be
completely ignored.

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
29
Terminology, however, is usually not the only cause for confusion in
classifications of humor. Most classifications, including the one we cited
earlier in the context of evolution, suffer from the absence of any principle
or principles of taxonomy. The subject matter, the intention, the technique
are all used indiscriminately. Thus, in the evolution-related classification, for
instance, 'ridicule' is intention while 'pun' is technique. For the purposes of
this study, traditional classifications are not particularly important and are
certainly not worth arguing about. We will, however, pursue a few more
examples of classification in order to acquaint ourselves more with the field
before plunging into the discussion of alternative theories of humor in the
next section.
Esar (1952, 13-33) proposes a seven-type classification into wisecracks,
epigrams, riddles, conundrums, gags, jokes and anecdotes.
A wisecrack is a "clever remark... which deals with a particular person
or thing" (ibid, 13), e.g., (18):
(18) He's a man of letters; he works in the Post Office. (Esar, 1952,
13)
An epigram is very much like a wisecrack, except that it "refers to a general
group of persons or things" (ibid, 16), e.g., (19):
(19) By the time the wise man is old enough to marry, the fool has
enough children to support him. (Esar, 1952, 18)
. We will skip the already familiar riddles and conundrums (see (10-13)) and
take up Esar's gags which are "limited to a definite form of comic dialogue"
and usually are "conversation rather than dialogue" (ibid, 25), e.g., (20):
(20) "He used such nautical terms." "Yes, sailors always talk dirty."
(Esar, 1952, 25)
Jokes and anecdotes are very similar: they are both very short funny stories.
The former involve a "situation comedy"; the latter illustrate "a moral point
or a celebrity's character."
The classification may seem logical to some (see, for instance, Gruner,
1978, 11) but, in fact, it is as mixed as the one mentioned and exemplified
earlier in this section. The wisecracks and epigrams are defined in terms of
the object of humor; riddles and gags in terms of the form; conundrums in
terms of the form and the technique; jokes and anecdotes in terms of the
form and subject matter. Besides that, the definitions are not precise enough
and the first two and last two types are rather easily confused.

30
CHAPTER ONE
Monro attempted a homogeneous, subject-matter-related classification
and produced "the following ten classes: (a) Any breach of the usual order
of events, (b) Any forbidden breach of the usual order of events, (c)
Indecency, (d) Importing into one situation what belongs to another, (e)
Anything masquerading as something it is not. (0 Word-play, (g) Nonsense,
(h) Small misfortunes, (i) Want of knowledge or skill, (j) Veiled insults"
(1951,40). In fact, the classification suffers both from imprecision and from
non-homogeneity, with at least (f) and (g) standing out as techniques.
Aubouin's (1948, Ch.2) eclectic classification includes seven types of
humor: the comic of words, which is basically techniques; the comic of ideas,
which is similar to Monro's (d); the comic of reasoning, which is parodying
scientific reasoning with a logical error and, therefore, basically a technique;
the comic of situation, which is rather general and vague; the visual and
audial comic, which is apparently unintended humor; the comic of gestures
and the wastepaper-basket category of the mixed comic to accommodate
all the rest.
We will take up additional taxonomies, which pertain to the structure of
humor, in Section 7.
6. THEORIES OF HUMOR
The previous sections have prepared us for dealing with this enormously
complex subject at a manageable and structurable general level. Detailed
chronological and ideolgical accounts of various theories, obviously
reflecting the authors' preferences and biases, can be found in Greig (1923),
Ludovici (1932), Piddington (1933), Eastman (1921), Monro (1951), Bergler
(1976). An informative blitz-survey can be found in Keith-Spiegel (1972).
Instead of repeating any of those reviews, we will attempt here a feature
analysis of central theories and groups of theories, with a strong emphasis
on the similarities exhibited by different approaches. It has been established
in the literature, both polemically and objectively, that most of the available
theories account for a certain type of humor and leave out all the others (see
also Section 3). In other words, we are dealing basically with partial theories
at best. Each of these theories usually puts forward a highly prominent
feature or two. It is reasonable to suppose then that a synthesis of those
features may serve as a better approximation of what humor is than any
partial theory taken separately.
It is apparently a fact that most of the researchers of humor nowadays
are psychologists (see Chapman, Foot, 1977; Mindess, Turek, 1980). They

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
31
certainly prevail among those who resort to the term 'theory' in humor
research. It may then be counted as a majority report that the theories of
humor should be grouped into three large classes: cognitive-perceptual,
social-behavioral and psychoanalytical (cf. Levine, 1969,2; Foss, 1977, xiii).
The first class is usually associated with incongruity; the second one with
disparagement; the third with suppression/repression. Darwin would
perhaps support this classification of theories of humor as well: "Many curious
discussions have been written on the causes of laughter with grown-up
persons. The subject is extremely complex. Something incongruous or
unaccountable, exciting surprise and some sense of superiority in the
laugher, who must be in a happy frame of mind, seems to be the commonest
cause. The circumstances must not be of a momentous nature: no poor man
would laugh or smile on suddenly hearing that a large fortune had been
bequeathed to him. If the mind is strongly excited by pleasurable feelings,
and any little unexpected event or thought occurs, then, as Mr. Herbert
Spencer remarks [1860,462], 'a large amount of nervous energy, instead of
being allowed to expend itself in producing an equivalent amount of the new
thoughts and emotion which were nascent, is suddenly checked in its flow...'
The excess must discharge itself in some other direction, and there results
an efflux through the motor nerves to various classes of the muscles,
producing the half-convulsive actions we term laughter" (1872, 198). This
is, in fact, a concise summary of all the three classes of theories. We will
begin a brief survey of them with theories of incongruity.
Commenting on his classification of humor quoted in Section 5, Monro
picks out his type (d), " Importing into one situation what belongs to
another" and comments, "It is usual to call this incongruity" (1951,45). The
idea that, as Mindess put it (1971, 21-22), "in jokes... we are led along one
line of thought and then booted out of it," has been very popular in humor
research. In his few passing remarks about humor which actually lay the
foundation of the incongruity theory, Kant emphasized that "laughter is an
affection arising from sudden transformation of a strained expectation into
nothing" (1790,177). Schopenhauer was among the very first thinkers to put
forward a more explicit incongruity-based theory of humor: "The cause of
laughter in every case," he wrote, "is simply the sudden perception of the
incongruity between a concept and the real objects which have been thought
through it in some relation, and the laugh itself is just the expression of this
incongruity" (1819a, 76). Inappropriateness, paradox, dissimilarity were all
introduced to characterize this approach by various researchers. What they
have also emphasized is the fact that the two incongruent components are

32
CHAPTER ONE
somehow brought together, synthesized, made similar. Thus, according to
Beattie (1776, 602), "laughter arises from the view of two or more
inconsistent, unsuitable, or incongruous parts or circumstances, considered as
united in complex object or assemblage, or as acquiring a sort of mutual
relation from the peculiar manner in which the mind takes notice of them."
(21) will serve as an unpretentious example:
(21) "Is the doctor at home?" the patient asked in his bronchial
whisper. "No," the doctor's young and pretty wife whispered in
reply. "Come right in." (American, 20th century)
The patient in this joke obviously wants to see the doctor. The invitation
to come in when the doctor himself is not in is incongruous. However, it is
highly congruous with respect to a different situation, that of adultery. The
fact that the doctor's wife is young and pretty is not at all essential to the
initial situation. The fact that the patient whispers is explained by his illness.
The fact that she whispers, while left unexplained, will not necessarily puzzle
the hearer too much. However, the incongruity of the invitation switches
things over instantaneously, and the situation of adultery is imposed on the
hearer who will fail to get the joke if he does not recognize that new situation.
The two situations are similar to the extent that they overlap. Their overlap
is related to the invitation to come in which would have come forth also if
the doctor had been at home (see Chapter 4, especially Section 6, for a script
analysis of the same joke).
As Freud put it, quoting from his favorite Jean-Paul, " 'joking is merely
playing with ideas.' [Richter, 1804, para.51]... A favorite definition of joking
has long been the ability to find similarity between dissimilar things - that
is hidden similarities" (1905,41). Hazlitt believes that wit "is founded on the
detection of unexpected likeness and distinction in things" (1903, 22); cf.
Locke, 1690, 156). Monro also emphasized "the linking of disparates" in
humor (1951, 248). "Humor is inappropriateness," he claimed (ibid, 244).
"But it must not be wholly inappropriate. There must be some hidden
propriety" (ibid, 241-2). Support to this idea comes from a contemporary
psychologist who, while practicing an entirely different approach, also
believes that there should be enough similarity between the events in order
to perceive incongruity (Nerhardt, 1977,48). According to Sully (1902, 300),
"the distinguishing intellectual element in humorous contemplation is a
larger development of that power of grasping things together, and in their
relation, which is at the root of all the higher perception of the laughable."
Incongruity-based theories of humor seem to be prevalent in contemporary

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
33
psychological research (see Suls, 1972; Shultz, 1972; McGhee, 1974b). A
popular current theory (Shultz, 1976) distinguishes two stages of incongruity,
perception and resolution, which correspond, of course, to the traditional
views of "the linking of disparates" quoted above. Rothbart and Pien (1977,
37) define four different possibilities resulting from the combination of "two
categories of incongruity and two categories of resolution:
1. Impossible Incongruity: elements that are unexpected and also
impossible given one's current knowledge of the world, for example, cookies
crying.
2. Possible incongruity: elements that are unexpected or improbable but
possible, for example, a dignified man slipping on a banana peel.
3. Complete resolution: the initial incongruity follows completely from
resolution information.
4. Incomplete resolution: the initial incongruity follows from resolution
information in some way, but is not made completely meaningful because
the situation remains impossible."
In this type of classification system, these authors claim, "cognitive
aspects of humour would be seen as a function of (a) the number of resolved
incongruous elements, (b) the number of incongruity elements remaining
unresolved, (c) the degree of incongruity of each element, (d) the difficulty
of resolution, and (e) the degree of resolution. Increases in the first three
factors should lead to increases in humour appreciation, while the difficulty
of resolution may be curvilinearly related to humour (McGhee, 1974a)"
(Rothbart and Pien, 1977, 38).
Many proponents of incongruity in humor as well as other theorists
emphasize the importance of the element of surprise in a joke. The word
sudden is crucial for Kant's famous formula quoted above. It is the absence
of surprise which kills the joke when one hears it for the second time (cf.
Fry's conditions of joke telling as well as Eastman's "sixth commandment,"
"Be sudden." in Section 3). The surprise element was also taken for granted
by Darwin (see above). In a joke, the surprise is usually delivered by what
is known as the punch line. According to Fry (1963, 19-20), the punch line
provides "a rather high-powered selection factor" which distinguishes
humor from non-humor. It provides a shift from one level of abstraction to
another, and the shift takes place "in a space of seconds." "The punch line
of a joke is a highly specialized article. It frequently presents a seemingly
irrelevant idea, or it may seem incongruous with respect to the main body
of the joke. Or it may seem to open up an entirely new trend of thought. Or
the punch line may be an unexpectedly rational statement.... What does the

34
CHAPTER ONE
punch line need to be funny? Why do some structures amuse and other fail?"
(ibid, 33-34; for the script-based answers to the last two questions see
Chapter 4, especially Section 5). "The twist or the punch line does the job"
in a joke, agrees Mindess (1971, 21-22). In (21), the punch line is, of course,
Come right in combined with the no before it.
Paulos comes up with an elegant mathematical metaphor for the
incongruity involved in humor, comparing the joke to an axiomatic system
which admits two different interpretations: "Axiom systems and their
interpretations or models," he writes, "provide a formal analogue for a certain
sort of incongruity, namely that resulting from a statement or story having
two different and incongruous interpretations. Moreover, since the two
incongruous interpretations both satisfy the same statement or story, there
is some point to the incongruity as well" (1980, 24). "...To get (i.e.,
understand) a joke, either situational or canned, one must ascend, so to speak,
to the metalevel at which both interpretations, the familiar and the
incongruous, can be imagined and compared (or, if there is only one interpretation,
at which its oddness can be appreciated)" (ibid, 26).
The oddness humor often introduces has also been often commented
upon in the literature. Thus, Monro speaks of "three types of humorous
nonsense: (a) Any fantastic departure from possibility... (b) The twisting of
familiar material, by means of argument, rhetoric, or exaggeration, so as to
obtain an absurd conclusion, (c) This twisting may be done, not for its own
sake, but as a means of parody or satire, to point the conclusion that
such-and-such is really nonsense, after all" (1951, 75). This humorous
nonsense has another aspect, creativity. Researchers have noted the
creation of new reality in jokes, which a modern semanticist would be willing
perhaps to term 'possible world' (see Chapter 3, Section 2, and references
there). Commenting on the "disruptive effects" that humor can have "on our
whole complex of thoughts and feelings," Monro adds, "We all of us practice
a mental compartmentalism: we sort out the facts of our environment into
different mental compartments, and decide that a particular attitude or
emotion is appropriate to each. The linking of disparates may mean the
shattering of this orderly system. We then have attitude-mixing or universe-
changing" (op.cit., 248-9). Similarly, Mindess remarks that the spirit of
humor "is iconoclastic" (1971, 41).
A very special kind of an incongruity-based theory of humor was proposed
by Bergson. The basic principle of this incongruity, which according to him,
permeates all humor, is "something mechanical encrusted on the living"
(1899, 84 - Bergson's overabundant emphasis in this and the subsequent

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
35
quotations in this paragraph has been removed for the sake of legibility). He
firmly believed that "some rigidity or other applied to the mobility of life, in
an awkward attempt to follow its lines and counterfeit its suppleness" is
funny, (ibid, 85). He consistently applied this principle to the seemingly
"automatic, inelastic" facial expressions that "make us laugh'' (ibid, 76), to
"the attitudes, gestures and movements of the human body" which "are
laughable in exact proportion as that body reminds us of a mere machine"
(ibid, 79), to any comic incident "that calls our attention to the physical in
a person, when it is the moral side that is concerned" (ibid, 93), to "every
time a person gives us the impression of being a thing" (ibid, 97), to any
comic "arrangement of acts and events which gives us, in a single
combination, the illusion of life and the distinct impression of a mechanical
arrangement" (ibid, 105), to "a comic meaning" which "is invariably obtained when
an absurd idea is fitted into a well established phrase-form" (ibid, 133), to
the "comic effect" which "is obtained whenever we pretend to take literally
an expression which was used figuratively" (ibid, 135) as well as to that
which "is always obtainable by transposing the natural expression of an idea
into another key" (ibid, 140). The incongruity, therefore, exists between the
living and the automaton imposed on it.
Another interesting kind of incongruity in humor is evoked by those
theories of humor which treat it as play. The motive of "fooling around" in
humor has been often observed even by those researchers who are not
necessarily committed to the idea of play (see, for instance, Mindess, 1971,
117). According to Fry's definition, "play...is behavior which depends on the
mutual recognition (through metacommunication - internal and external)
that that behavior (play) does not mean the same thing as does that behavior
(fighting, etc.) which play represents. Three distinct items are thus inyolved
in study of animal play. (1) There is the idea of a foundation behavior
(fighting, etc. - reality, primary process, mood statement, life or death). (2)
There is the idea of a metaphoric behavior (play - fantasy, secondary
process, representation, just for fun). (3) There is also the idea of
metacommunication" (1963, 125-6).
Just as in play, participants in humor "are able to determine that they are
playing (not fighting, etc.). They must be exchanging some
metacommunication... that indicates one to the other, 'Look, this slap - it's in fun, not
anger'" (ibid, 125). Play and humor are believed to be underlaid by the same
psychological principle which "involves the precipitation of a logical paradox
indicating humor, and play as different from certain other phenomena of life
- e.g., grief, business, conflict" (ibid, 8). However, there are differences as

36
CHAPTER ONE
well: "As contrasted to the repetitiousness of play, humor loses much of its
strength with repetition, either of the same joke or by the telling of a series
of jokes that are too similar in nature. Humor and play seem to have a
comparison similar to that between a fine work of art as contrasted with a
child's fingerpainting" (ibid, 20; see also Huizinga, 1938; Bateson, 1953 -
on humor as communication, and 1955; Berlyne, 1968; and Chapter 4,
Section 2).
The basic incongruity in this treatment of humor holds, of course, between
the "real" situation and its simulation in play, which leads to a certain
conceptual paradox (see Fry, op.cit., 126-7).
The second class of theories comprises approaches to humor based on
hostility, superiority, malice, aggression, derision, or disparagement. Many
researchers who have followed this line of analysis consider themselves
followers of Thomas Hobbes. "The passion of laughter," wrote Hobbes, "is
nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some
eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our
own formerly: for men laugh at the follies of themselves past, when they come
suddenly to remembrance, except they bring with them any present
dishonour" (1650, 46; see also Hobbes, 1651, 45). Long before Hobbes,
however, Plato maintained that malice or envy is at the root of comic
enjoyment and that we laugh at the misfortunes of others for joy that we do
not share them (-4th, 45-49). Aristotle talked of humor, or rather "Comedy,"
as being "an imitation of men worse than the average; worse, however, not
as regards any and every sort of fault, but only as regards one particular kind,
the Ridiculous, which is a species of the Ugly. The Ridiculous may be
defined as a mistake or deformity not productive of pain or harm to others"
(-4th, 229). Cicero also believed that humor "is restricted to that which may
be described as unseemly or ugly" (-55, 373). Statements to this effect can
be also found in Hegel, who believed that laughter is little more than "an
expression of self-satisfied shrewdness" (1835, 302); Hazlitt (see Section 1);
Schopenhauer (1819b, 281ff); Bain, who maintained that "not in physical
effects alone, but in everything where a man can achieve a stroke of
superiority, in surpassing or discomifiting a rival, is the disposition to
laughter apparent" (1859, 153) and that "the occasion of the ludicrous is the
degradation of some person or interest possessing dignity in circumstances
that excite no other strong emotion" (ibid, 248); Freud, who quoted Fischer
sympathetically as saying that "the comic is concerned with the ugly in one
of its manifestations" [Fischer, 1899, 45] and that "a joke is a playful
judgment" [ibid, 51] (Freud, 1905, 40); and Bergson, who admitted that "it

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
37
has often been said that it is the trifling faults of our fellow-men that make
us laugh" (1899, 149).
It was, of course, this approach to humor which gave the phenomenon
a bad name with some researchers (see Sections 2 and 3). Thus, Ludovici
made much, in a reference to Darwin, of the fact that "in laughing, we show
teeth" (1932, 69), claimed that "all laughter is the expression of superior
adaptation" (ibid, 74), and analyzed no less than 32 different examples of
humor to prove the point (ibid, 74ff). We have already seen that other
researchers who have recognized hostility as the basis of humor, have not
necessarily been driven to the negative conclusions about it. Thus, Rapp,
who proposed a whole theory of evolution of humor based on hostility (see
Section 4), grants not only "that we laugh at the mishap of others; but they
must be minor mishaps" (1951, 35) but also that there are still whole cultures
where non-minor mishaps become admissible objects of laughter (ibid, 36ff).
He postulates that "the joke is a complex form. Of the three "elements" of
laughter which we have isolated it nearly always uses two, sometimes three.
These three elements are (1) ridicule (2) sudden success in a contest of wit;
which in the joke usually means catching the point. And (3) sudden victory
over restraint or suppression" (ibid, 134). All the three elements introduced
here contain hostility and/or superiority in one way or another, but this does
not at all mean, to Rapp or many other researchers, that humor is necessarily
a hostile phenomenon: the civilizing and restraining influence of culture over
the centuries has been widely recognized as a significant factor (see Sections
2 and 4).
The hostility/superiority/malice/aggression/derision theory is also
represented in contemporary psychological research, where it may be labeled
differently: "By disparagement theories" writes Suls (1977, 41), "we mean
those theories of humour based on the observation that we laugh at other
people's infirmities, particularly those of our enemies. Variously known as
superiority theory, vicarious superiority theory (La Fave, 1972; La Fave,
Haddad and Maesen, 1976) and dispositional theory (Zillmann and Cantor,
1976), all focus on humor communications in which one party is disparaged
or aggressed against by another party. A recent statement of the theory
comes from Zillmann and Cantor (1976, [ 100-1 ]) who posit that '...humour
appreciation varies inversely with the favourableness of the disposition
toward the agent or entity being disparaged and varies directly with the
favourableness toward the agent or entity disparaging it. Appreciation
should be maximal when our friends humiliate our enemies, and minimal
when our enemies manage to get the upper hand over our friends.'" (all the

38
CHAPTER ONE
emphasis is mine - V.R.). Similar results have been obtained by La Fave
(1972, 198 - cf. 1977) who seems to have found some support for the claim
that the more effectively humor enhances a "positive reference group" and
disparages a 'negative reference group' the more effective it is.
The third kind of theories of humor, the release theory, has been advocated
in various forms by Spencer (1860), Penjon (1893), Kline (1907 - see also
Monro, 1951, 176-181), Gregory (1924), Eastman (1936) and other
researchers. The best known theory of this kind is apparently the one proposed
by Freud, though it goes well beyond a straightforward release theory. The
basic principle of all such theories is that laughter provides relief for mental,
nervous and/or psychic energy and thus ensures homeostasis after a
struggle, tension, strain, etc. This relief can be studied physiologically (see,
for instance, Darwin, 1872; Spencer, op.cit.), psychologically (Kline,
op.cit.), philosophically (Penjon, op.cit.), psychoanalytically (Freud, 1905)
or more or less generally (Monro, op.cit.; Eastman, op.cit.).
The advocates of the release theory have maintained that a human being
operates under a great number of constraints - to be logical, to think clearly,
to talk sense. According to Freud, "it cannot be doubted that it is easier and
more convenient to diverge from a line of thought we have embarked on than
to keep to it, to jumble up things that are different rather than to contrast
them - and, indeed, that is specially convenient to admit as valid methods
of inference that are rejected by logic and, lastly, to put words or thoughts
together without regard to the condition that they ought also to make sense"
(op.cit., 174). "In its early stages," agrees Mindess, "our sense of humor
frees us from the chains of our perceptual, conventional, logical, linguistic,
and moral systems" (1971, 28 - cf. also Armstrong, 1928, 45-46). Bergson
also commented on "a certain general relaxation of the rules of reasoning"
associated with humor. "The reasonings at which we laugh are those we
know to be false, but which we might accept as true were we to hear them
in a dream" (1899, 181). Just like another "release extremist" in humor
research, namely Gregory (1924), Freud not only maintained that release or
relief and the pleasure deriving from them characterized all humor but he
even classified humor in terms of kinds of relief which are associated with
a certain kind of humor: "The pleasure in jokes has seemed to us to arise
from an economy in expenditure upon inhibition, the pleasure in the comic from
an economy in expenditure upon ideation... and the pleasure of humor from
an economy in expenditure upon feeling" ( op.cit., 302; cf. Section 5).
Mindess, who regards humor as liberation, elaborates interestingly on
what it is we are trying to escape from. He is obviously not the only one to

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
39
think that it is the conventions and norms imposed on us by everyday life,
those "funny stereotypes whose social nature we have demonstrated"
(Viktoroff, 1953, 168). "We all feel a need to bank on something or
someone," writes Mindess, "be it reason, morality, science, the church,
democracy, family, friends, or own attractiveness, intelligence, strength, or
charm... Our sense of humor is stunted, individually, by our personal security
blankets; it is stunted, collectively, by the fact that we crave security at all"
(1971,31). "...Every aspect of our existence, from the most trivial to the most
profound, is molded by group expectations. It should come as no surprise,
then, that the sight of a comic ignoring conventions excites us... because it
provides us, vicariously, a moment of freedom from the prisons of our
adjustments" (ibid, 38). Very much in the same vein, Monro discusses the
role of "hack phrases" in humor, which, he believes, "crystallize these
conventional attitudes: often enough they are mere symbols which serve to
evoke them. ...Humour depends on a fixed background of conventional
beliefs, attitudes, behaviour. Humour upsets the pattern by abruptly
introducing something inappropriate" (1951,241 -2). Support for this comes from
a contemporary researcher as well: "However deep seated and universal the
psychology of humour may be, clearly most of its manifestations are culture-
bound - connected to realities of time and place. Humour as a cultural and
historical phenomenon is not merely a matter of content; such elements as
form, style, structure, and convention reveal values, beliefs, and concerns"
(Mintz, 1977a, 17; see also Chapter 6, Section 5). From a somewhat different
perspective, Paulos comments on "a modicum of mental orderliness, the
awareness of various complexes of ideas and their links to one another, and
the (at least partial) acceptance of certain values [which] is necessary to an
appreciation of humor" (1980, 26). It is the nonsensical jokes, of course,
which challenge conventions and stereotypes most forcefully. The
conventions, beliefs, assumptions, etc., which the quoted and other researchers
think necessary for the comprehension of humor, are immediately related to
scripts, as we will see in Chapters 4-7.
A special kind of relief takes place when a joke liberates us from an
inhibition. This kind of release of psychic energy seems to be a logical
companion of the suppression/repression laughter. In the literature,
however, it is usually associated with sex and, less frequently, with aggression.
As Mindess suggests, "since sex and viciousness comprise the two major
streams of impulse we normally try to control, it should come as no surprise
that they fuel our gustiest laughter... Ribald humor draws its sustenance
from two main sources: sexual behavior and elimination of body wastes"

40
CHAPTER ONE
(1971,59). "We have seen now how laughter at the obscene and the indecent
is aroused," remarks Greig. "Attention is suddenly directed to parts of the
body or to bodily functions which it is not usual to expose in public, the
exposure simultaneously excites sexual behavior and a resistance to it in the
form of modesty or disgust, and the overcoming of the resistance may set
free energy to escape in the laugh" (1923, 110). According to Freud, this
phenomenon is, of course, the essence of tendentious jokes: "...In both cases
of the use of tendentious jokes pleasure is obtained, it is therefore plausible
to suppose that this yield of pleasure corresponds to the physical expenditure
that is saved" (1905, 167).
Contemporary psychology accommodates the release/relief theory under
the guise of the arousal-safety theory: "Laughter occurs when a person has
experienced heightened arousal but at the same time (or soon after arousal)
evaluates the stimulus as safe or inconsequential. Emotional responses other
than laughter to arousing stimuli are likely to occur if arousal increases to
a very high level or if the stimulus is identified by the person as dangerous"
(Rothbart, 1973, quoted from McGhee, 1977a, 27). Interestingly but not
unexpectedly, this statement comprises Kant's "transformation of a strained
expectation into nothing."
In general, while the history of humor research has been marked by a great
deal of fighting, with loud claims and counterclaims, examples and
counterexamples, theories and antitheories, the three large groups of theories briefly
described above are not at all incompatible, and much feuding and animosity
in the field has often been based on the mutual misunderstanding of each
other's goals, premises and, of course, terminology. The three approaches
actually characterize the complex phenomenon of humor from very different
angles and do not at all contradict each other - rather they seem to
supplement each other quite nicely. In our terms, the incongruity-based theories
make a statement about the stimulus; the superiority theories characterize
the relations or attitudes between the speaker and the hearer; and the
release/relief theories comment on the feelings and psychology of the hearer
only. It should not be surprising then that there exists a large variety of
"smaller" theories of humor which pick out one or more of the other
components of the humor act, represented in (3), in various combinations
(for a representative list see, for instance, Aubouin, 1948, 11).
The script-based semantic theory of humor outlined in Chapter 4 is
designed as neutral with respect to all of those theories and is, in fact, easily
compatible with most, if not all of them, which is, of course, another way

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
41
of saying that its goals, premises and terms are rather dramatically different
from theirs.
7. STRUCTURE OF HUMOR
While theories of humor abound and various claims >about the nature of the
phenomenon are made, attempts to account systematically for the structure
of a humor act have been notoriously scarce. Many researchers have made
informal and largely anecdotal comments on the subject and most of them
have dealt, naturally, with verbal humor, where the structure is more
obvious. We will begin with observations on what might be termed the
'conceptual structure' or even 'logical structure' of the joke..
Leacock believed that "a typical joke proceeds from a hypothesis - let it
be granted that so and so: then in such and such circumstances an absurd
result follows.... In other words a joke is a sort of syllogism with a major
proposition as its hypothesis. The rest of it, in one fashion or the other, can
be reduced to a set of consequences running to an absurdity" (1937, 215).
According to Mindess, "punning at any level excites expanded ideation, a
creative escape from the inhibiting rigors of words" (1971, 87; see also
Section 6). He provides a more specific explanation: "A grammatically
correct phrase makes one point at a time; it does not say several unrelated
things simultaneously. But we experience unrelated things simultaneously"
(ibid, 86), and humor reflects this ability adequately by introducing two
different levels of perception at the same time. To Fry, the situation seems
even more complex: "...all humor has implicit unconscious aspects - ...each
joke has, in its essence, a host of unconscious chords sounding in the
audience mind no less loudly than does the explicit joke" (1963, 45). And,
he continues, "because of this playful nature, this metaphoric quality, humor
must necessarily be paradoxical. We are confronted by the shimmering,
endless oscillation of the paradoxes or "real-unreal." Humor becomes a vast
structure of intermeshed, revolving rings of reality-fantasy, finite-infinite,
presence-void" (ibid, 147). "It is important, however, that the content of the
joke be recognized as the "reality" of the moment" (ibid, 151) and "no matter
how fantastic the inexplicit content of a joke may seem, it is the reality of
the time it occupies" (ibid, 152). "Comparison is the very soul of humour,"
generalized Leacock (1937, 212).
This "simultaneity of perception of two contradictory things" amounts,
according to Aubouin, to the acceptance or justification of irreconcilable
things (1948, 102), and humor can be perceived as "an intellectual play

42
CHAPTER ONE
which consists of the unexpected reconciliation of irreconcilable objects or
of irreconcilable judgments or impressions of the same object. The comic
laughter is provoked by the funny reconciliation of two irreconcilables. It is
especially intense when it is perceived suddenly and for the first time" (ibid,
121). "How are the effects of oppositeness created?" asks Aubouin. The
answer he comes up with is: "errors of judgment, resemblance, disguise,
confusion of gestures, ignorance, creation of a false interpretation or an
expectation, distraction or concentration of attention to a strange point in
the middle of a question, false reasoning, errors following from language
automatism, automatism of perception and interpretation, word confusion,
the law of attraction, witticisms, reparties" (ibid, 129). What can be opposed
in a joke? Aubouin has an answer to that as well:
(22) "The concrete and the abstract, the literal and the figurative
The noble and the trivial, the decent and the indecent
The known and the unknown
The similar and the different
The relative and the absolute
The obscur-clair, unrailed allusion, emphasized omission
The uncovering of evidence, or the idea which is absurd to the
point of plausibility
The absurd and the logical
The end and the means
The intentions and the realization
The ease and the difficulty, or the realization of the impossible
The aggressiveness and the wellwishedness, or the innoccuous-
ness of an act" (ibid, 83).
We will see in Chapter 4 that these informal oppositions are interestingly
related to our formal analysis of the relation of oppositeness in the script
analysis of humor.
Many researchers have commented on the "newness, unexpectedness,
surprise" (Aubouin, op.cit., 103) associated with the joke (cf. Section 4) and
have identified the punch line as the structural device which effectuates the
surprise. "During the unfolding of humor," observes Fry, "one is suddenly
confronted by an explicit-implicit reversal when the punch line is delivered.
The reversal helps distinguish humor from play, dreams, etc. Sudden
reversals such as characterize the punch line moment in humor are disruptive
and foreign to play, etc" (1963, 153; cf. also Mindess, 1971, 54fn, and
Section 6).
Conceptually, in strict conformity to his version of the incongruity-based

SURVEY OF HUMOR RESEARCH
43
theory of humor, Bergson believed that "a mechanical element introduced
into nature and an automatic regulation of society... are the two types of
laughable effects at which we have arrived" (1899, 90). Technically, he
introduced "three processes which might be called repetition, inversion, and
reciprocal interference of series" (ibid, 118) and which made* jokes funny.
Repetition is, actually, the most important element, the other two being
variations of it, and Bergson comments on it evoking Pascal [1670, 123]:
" Two faces that are alike, although neither of them excites laughter by itself,
make us laugh when [they are] together, on account of their likeness...' The
truth is that a really living life never repeats itself. Wherever there is repetition
or complete similarity, we always suspect some mechanism at work behind
the living... This deflection of life towards the mechanical is here the real
cause of laughter" (Bergson, 1899, 82). Leacock also lists repetition, along
with rhythm and alliteration, among the techniques used in the "humor of
words" (1937, 32ff).
A most detailed inventory of verbal techniques used in American humor
can be found in Esar (1961). He analyzes and exemplifies 25 types of jokes
based on different language phenomena: alphabetics (jokes based on
individual letters), syllabics, abbrevese, parts of speech, prefixes and suffixes,
compounds, synonymies, antonymics, gender, idiomatics, lexicography,
ambiguity, spelling, misusage, punctuation, grammar, negative English
(jokes based on the use and misuse of negatives), speech, rhyming English,
nameplay, questionable English (jokes of questions), style, numerical
English, Advertese, and novelty English. There are numerous problems with
this classification, however. First, the rubrics are extremely heterogeneous.
Secondly, they are defined (actually, exemplified rather than defined or even
described) quite loosely. Thirdly, the rubrics are of very different sizes, from
such quite specific types as (relatively few) jokes based on the use of affixes
to such an enormous group as "speech" which can actually include any kind
of verbal humor. The problem of joke attribution to a certain class is not
simple either and reveals various complex dependencies among the rubrics
(cf. this criticism with those in Section 5). Much more importantly for the
purposes of this section, however, many of Esar's rubrics are not techniques
per se while those which are, are not treated systematically or consistently
from even the most liberal linguistic point of view.
A much more limited but accurate and consistent classification of verbal
techniques was proposed by Freud, and this is the closest that humor
research has ever come to the technical aspects of this book though Freud's
goals, premises, and methods were, of course, radically different. Freud's
three classes of techniques include ten different variations of what we might

44
CHAPTER ONE
term 'polysemy' or 'ambiguity,' with puns heavily represented across a
number of categories:
(23) "I. Condensation:
(a) with formation of composite word,
(b) with modification.
II. Multiple use of the same material:
(c) as a whole and in parts,
(d) in a different order,
(e) with slight modification,
(0 of the same words full and empty.
III. Double meaning:
(g) meaning as a name and as a thing,
(h) metaphorical and literal meanings,
(i) double meaning proper (play upon words),
(j) double entendre,
(k) double meaning with an allusion" (1905, 76-7).
This book will concentrate on the semantic properties of the joke-carrying
texts and, therefore, on the semantic techniques, which, of course, go far
beyond Freud's classes. The techniques distinguished by Freud, along with
the others, will be accounted for in terms of their formal semantic nature in
Chapter 4.

CHAPTER TWO
THEORY
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter must have clearly demonstrated that numerous
scholars have studied humor from different points of view, pursuing different
goals and using different assumptions. The very notion of humor as well as
the scope of the phenomenon varies considerably from writer to writer. In
fact, a psychoanalyst suggested half-jokingly that a scholar's theory of
humor is immediately related to his personality and provides psychoanalysis
with a revealing clue about his personal traits (Mindess, 1980). Most of the
writers on humor tend to perceive their own angle, assumptions, scope and
goal as the only "natural" and "commonsensical" approach to the
phenomenon and hardly ever bother to define them clearly and distinctively. This
chapter is this writer's attempt to avoid a similar accusation. The chapter
will define and explain the limitations on the material (Section 1), outline the
basic assumptions, principles, format and research paradigm of the proposed
linguistic theory of humor (Section 2), explore the goals and techniques of
linguistic applications in general and applications of linguistics to humor, in
particular (Section 3), and, finally, introduce the research strategy used in
the book (Section 4). It is one of the most important and, accordingly, boring
chapters. It is also the shortest.
1. VERBAL HUMOR
The material of this book is limited to verbal humor. The object of the
research is the joke-carrying text. While the proposed theory can, in
principle, handle longer texts, both with a single joke and multiple jokes, it will
be illustrated throughout the book predominantly by relatively short single-
joke texts such as (24) - cf. also (4-21):
(24) (i) "Does the accused have anything else to offer in his
defence?"
"No, your Honor, I've already given everything I own to
my lawyer and a couple of jurors, who are friends of his."
(ii) A doctor tells a woman, "Your husband must have
absolute rest. Here is a sleeping tablet." "When do I give
it to him," she asks. "You don't," explains the doctor.
45

46
CHAPTER TWO
"You take it yourself." (Esar, 1952, 228)
(iii) A five-year-old has lost his mother and is tearfully asking,
"Have you seen a woman without a small boy - looking
very much like me?" (Dolia-Popov, 1968, 581)
As the above examples suggest, what is meant by verbal humor is not at
all limited to word games, puns or any other form of language play such as
(25):
(25) (i) stalemate. The wife you are tired of. (Esar, 1961, 75)
(ii) The first thing that strikes a stranger in New York is a big
car (Esar, 1952, 77) (= 14)
(iii) People who used to wish for an ireless Ireland now wish
for a cowlike Moscow. (Esar, 1961, 30)
Any text which is capable of creating a humorous effect is, therefore, a
legitimate object of investigation here. What is excluded is the non-verbal
humor, i. e., a humorous situation which is not created, described and
expressed by a text. When two clowns slap and kick each other, when they
fall down or make funny faces, it may be humor and thus a legitimate object
of humor research, but linguistics cannot make a significant contribution to
such research. In other words, the fact that no such humor is analyzed here
is not supposed to cast any shadow on it - it simply means that a linguistic
theory of humor cannot account for non-linguistic phenomena. Even if a
non-verbal humorous situation is accompanied by a text but the text is just
a component of the joke rather than its creator, it is still non-verbal humor
and thus falls beyond the scope of this book.
Since it is easier to introduce a new theory by illustrating it with the help
of simple examples, an emphasis is placed in the book on the most
elementary kind of verbal humor. As will be shown in Chapter 4, most of the quoted
jokes are elementary in the sense that they are created by one overlap of just
two opposite scripts. The theory is applicable, in principle, to jokes created
by multiple overlaps of more than two scripts - however, it will run here into
the problem of the strong and weak capacity (see Section 2) and may turn
out to be not the most preferred theory for the more sophisticated kind of
humor. It can be expected, though, that if the proposed theory is correct, the
more sophisticated humor will be handled optimally by a derivative of the
basic theory. An example of the more sophisticated humor is a joke (e.g.,
(26i-iii)) which contains an allusion and is either incomprehensible or
unfunny to those who are not familiar with the material alluded to (27i-iii,
respectively).

THEORY
47
(26) (i) Paul Bunyan once chopped down a tree so tall that it took
two men and a boy to see to the top of it. (Esar, 1952, 162)
(ii) Two dogs meet on the Polish-Czechoslovakian border in
1956. The Czech dog asks, "What are you going to
Czechoslovakia for?" "To eat a little. And why are you
going to Poland?" "To bark a little." (Soviet, 1956)
(iii) "Davey, do you know that your assistant just left in a
Jaguar?" "So what? Left in Jaguar, returns in February."
(Israeli, 1970's)
(27) (i) Paul Bunyan is the imaginary hero of lumberjacks, known
for his logging marvels,
(ii) There was no political freedom in Czechoslovakia at the
time and no food in Poland,
(iii) The hero, an Israeli politician, is reputed to be ignorant,
especially with regard to foreign words.
On the other hand, if a potentially allusive joke explicitly contains the
information which could be alluded to, then it may be quite elementary, e.g.,
(28):
(28) Samson was so strong, he could lift himself by his hair three feet
ofT the ground. (Esar, 1952, 163)
The basic type of joke, therefore, used for illustrative purposes throughout
the book is the verbal, elementary, self-contained joke. Obviously, one's
favorite jokes do not always conform to these limitations, and the fun-
seeking reader, if still with me, should be firmly referred to joke collections
and treasuries, which this book is most definitely not.
2. LINGUISTIC THEORY: FORMAT
A linguistic theory of humor is supposed to account for the fact that some
texts are funny while some others are not and to do it in terms of certain
linguistic properties of the text. Ideally, a linguistic theory of humor should
determine and formulate the necessary and sufficient linguistic conditions
for the text to be funny.
The view of the function, goal and, to a certain extent, format of linguistic
theory maintained here is related to the one introduced by Chomsky (1965,
3-62) and long since neglected. However, it also differs from the Chomskyan
linguistic theory in a number of important aspects, and problems of
justification, adequacy, etc., have been further developed and/or streamlined.

48
CHAPTER TWO
Given a set of primary linguistic data, linguistic theory must be able to
perform the following tasks (29):
(29) (i) to provide complete and non-contradictory descriptions of
the data and thus to distinguish any such description from
a non-description;
(ii) to provide a procedure and an evaluation measure for
comparing two alternative descriptions of the data and for
preferring one of them over the other;
(iii) to provide a procedure for the corroboration of the
description by the native speaker.
(29ii) and (29iii) are closely connected with each other and with the crucial
question of the relation between a formal theory and the speaker's intuition.
Out of the two competing descriptions the theory is designed to prefer the
one whose treatment of the data is more intuitively appealing to the speaker.
The preferred description should assign a certain property to linguistic
entities to which the speaker is intuitively sensitive and about which he is
capable of passing judgments.
The cornerstone of Chomsky's linguistic theory was the property of gram-
maticality. His linguistic theory determined linguistic descriptions which
assigned to each sentence one of the two values of the binary feature
'grammaticality,' namely 'grammatical' or 'ungrammatical.'
In practice, it meant that if his transformational grammar could generate
a sentence by applying a certain sequence of rules to the initial symbol S,
the sentence was grammatical. If the grammar barred a string of words from
generation, that string was a non-sentence or an ungrammatical sentence.
Thus, in (30) only (i) can be generated by a transformational grammar while
(ii-v) cannot (the ungrammatical sentences are prefaced with an asterisk as
customary in transformational grammar:
(30) (i) I am reading a book
(ii) *I are reading a book
(iii) *A are book I readjjig
(iv) *I am read a book
(v) *I am reading book
Independently, the native speaker should be asked to rate the sentences
in (30) in terms of whether they are "good," "all right," "correct," etc.
(obviously, an unsophisticated speaker cannot be asked whether the
sentence is grammatical since the concept will be unfamiliar to him, and any

THEORY
49
explanation of the notion prior to his exposure to the sentences will pollute
his intuition). If the native speaker considers (30i) grammatical and (30ii-v)
ungrammatical, his responses will coincide exactly with the output of the
transformational grammar and, by virtue of this, will corroborate the
grammar. If the native speaker's responses never deviate from the output of
the transformational grammar, i.e., every sentence the grammar can generate
is considered grammatical by the native speaker, and vice versa, and every
sentence the grammar cannot generate is considered ungrammatical by the
native speaker, and vice versa, then the grammar is a fully corroborated
linguistic description. If we simplify and streamline Chomsky's own
terminology, such a grammar is then a descriptively and explanatorily adequate
linguistic description.
In other words, linguistic theory is designed to determine a formal object,
usually a set of rules, which is applied to certain linguistic entities purely
mechanically, according to a well-defined formal procedure. This formal
object, treated as the most preferred description of the linguistic entities,
assigns a certain feature to each of them. At the same time, the native
speaker is asked to assign the same feature to the same entities on the basis
of his linguistic intuition. If the same values of the feature are assigned by
the description and by the speaker to each individual entity, the description
can be said to simulate the speaker's intuition in one important respect, the
one related to the feature in question.
Thus, in the case of the examples in (30), linguistic theory prefers a certain
transformational grammar, which is a sequence of rules, as the linguistic
description of English sentences. The grammar assigns to each English
sentence the feature of grammaticality, in particular it will characterize (30i)
as grammatical and (30ii-v) as ungrammatical. Since the native speaker will
pass the same judgments with regard to (30i-v), the grammar is a good model
of the native speaker's linguistic competence with regard to grammaticality.
Thus, in (31), the theory should prefer Description 2 over Descriptions 1 and
3 since Description 2, as shown, is the only one which assigns to the data
a feature matching the one assigned to the same data intuitively by the native
speaker.
Good linguistic theory should be justified, it should be psychologically real
to the speaker and not arbitrary in this sense - in principle, a descriptively
adequate description of the primary data can be completely foreign and
intuitively unappealing to the speaker. Naturally, the theory which describes
the mental mechanisms underlying the native speaker's linguistic
competence more adequately is preferable. However, these mental mechanisms

50
CHAPTER TWO
(31)
Linguistic Theory
9
/
Primary Data
X
J Description 1
J Description 2
SJ Description 3
Assigned Feature
i
t
I Linguistic Competence
41 Primary Data
Speaker's Intuition
J Assigned Feature
are not accessible to direct observation and investigation, and our notion of
them is based only on indirect and remote consequences of their functioning.
The native speaker's ability to pass judgments as to the grammaticality or
ungrammaticality of a sentence is one such remote consequence of the work
of the mental mechanisms underlying language. In other words, the feature
which is assigned to the linguistic entities both by the native speaker
(intuitively) and by the grammar (formally) constitutes the only basis of
justification for the linguistic theory in question (cf. Raskin, 1979). Chomsky
postulated grammaticality as such a basis and ignored completely all the
other abilities provided by competence.
It is reasonable to suppose, however, that the ability to pass judgments
as to the grammaticality or ungrammaticality of a sentence is not the only
and perhaps not the most easily accessible component of linguistic
competence. Chomsky himself had to expand the notion of grammaticality by
including meaningfulness in it in his revised version of transformational
grammar (1965) which no longer treated (32i-iii) as grammatical:
(32) (i) *Colorless green ideas sleep furiously
(ii) *Caesar is a prime number
(iii) "The boy may frighten sincerity
(iv) Sincerity may frighten the boy
Lakoff( 197 lb) further complicated the matter by adding pragmatic
considerations to the notion of grammaticality. According to him, the
grammaticality of the sentences in (33) can only be determined on the basis of
individual beliefs, assumptions, prejudices, etc.; in other words, if you believe
that a frying pan is capable of believing then (33iv) is grammatical to you.
(Lakoff is, of course, a California-based, linguist.)

THEORY
51
(33) (i) My uncle believes that I am a fool
(ii) ?My cat believes that I am a fool
(iii) ?My pet amoeba believes that I am a fool
(iv) ?My frying pan believes that I am a fool
Grammatically as the cornerstone of linguistic theory has'been criticized
on various other grounds (see McCawley, 1976; Raskin, 1977, 1978). I have
suggested elsewhere (1978) that grammaticality-awareness is perhaps a
legitimate ability which the native speaker's competence includes but
certainly not the only ability on which a linguistic theory can be based, listing
truth-values awareness, presupposition-awareness, coherency-awareness,
context-awareness, and appropriateness-awareness as examples of other
abilities included in linguistic competence.
It was the existence of these other features about which the native speaker
can intuitively pass judgments which served as one of the main triggers for
this research. The ability of the native speaker to pass judgments as to the
funniness of a text is also part of his competence and, therefore, a formal
linguistic theory is possible which models the native speaker's competence
in this particular respect. The principles of application of linguistic theory
are discussed in the next section, and the format of a linguistic theory of
humor, justified on the basis of the feature of funniness as a native ability,
is outlined in Section 4.
3. LINGUISTIC THEORY: APPLICATIONS
The linguistic theory of humor proposed in the book is the result of
application of the script-based semantic theory, developed independently in
linguistic semantics (see Chapter 3), to verbal humor. Some principles of this and
other linguistic applications are briefly outlined below.
When one field of study (the source field) is applied to another (the target
field), a strict division of labor should be maintained. To simplify the
situation for the sake of the argument, each field can be described as
consisting of data, theories, methods and problems as shown in (34).
In a legitimate application of the source field to the target field the
problems should come from the latter while the methods are supplied by the
former. The data and the theories may actually overlap but it is the source
field which is primarily responsible for these as well. Any significant
deviation from this normative situation of application represented schemati-

52
CHAPTER TWO
(34)
Source Field
IfffffP
v Data /Vy/x//
Y/ Theories '/////
W////M//A
\/y Methods //////
mm,
■
Problems
Target Field
VA
Data
Theories
Methods
//// Problems
'///////////A
8
cally by the shaded area in (34) is likely to lead to largely irrelevant research.
Thus, some two decades ago when the so-called mathematical linguistics
came into fashion, various statistical methods were applied to linguistic
material. Statistics was then the source field and linguistics the target field.
Statistics turned out to be rather easily applicable to linguistics since in most
cases the linguistic entities constitute identifiable, discrete and countable
objects, especially at such lower levels of linguistic structure as phonetics
and morphology. The early applications led, for instance, to frequency tables
of high reliability, generality and validity, and there was nothing wrong with
that. The only problem with many such applications was that there was no
linguistic problem they were actually solving or, to put it differently, the
statistical results could not be interpreted in a way which would yield any
non-trivial conclusions about language. The fact that the tends to be the most
frequent word in the English language, for instance, did not seem to signify
much beyond itself, and in this and many similar cases, the statistical
methods as applied to linguistic material at best corroborated what was well
known in linguistics anyway and for which the heavy battery of statistics was
hardly necessary.
In this situation, the proud proprietor of a method was much more
interested in applying it to some new material than the proprietor of the
material was interested in having the method applied. On the other hand,
when a linguist came up with a real problem and statistics proved to be useful
in providing a (partial) answer to that problem, the result was valid research
and a valid application to linguistics, i.e., the problem of distance in semantic

THEORY
53
relations between words as researched statistically by SaikeviS (1963) or
Garvin et al. (1967).
Similarly, it would not really help poetics if the powerful apparatus of
phonological theory were imposed on it and a detailed analysis of the
phonemes making up a poem were made available, unless such an analysis
addressed a valid issue in poetics itself or could be interpreted poetically in
a non-trivial way. Thus, we do not perhaps want to know the distribution
of all the phonological distinctive features in the quatrain if it does not
contribute to our knowledge of rhyme or meter and does not help distinguish
between good and bad poetry. On the other hand, if we ask ourselves what
alliteration is and the answer comes phrased in terms of the recurrence of
identical distinctive features of the phonemes in the line, then, again, it is a
piece of useful research and an example of valid application in full
accordance with the shaded area in (34).
The legitimate applications are, therefore, problem-oriented - they strive
to solve a real problem of the target field using the available facts, techniques
and theories from the source field. The ill-advised applications are basically
method-oriented - the interest is usually in extending the use of one's favorite
method to some new material without much concern for the real need of the
field to which this new material belongs. The result of a method-oriented
application is not necessarily valueless - in fact, it can be quite interesting
and informative as far as the method in question is concerned. However, it
is highly unlikely to provide any fresh insights into the target field.
It follows then that if linguistics is to be applied to humor, i.e., linguistics
is the source field and the study of humor the target field, as it is indeed the
case in this book, then the problems, questions and needs should come from
humor, and the basic question coming out of there can be expected to be,
"What is funny?"
4. LINGUISTIC APPLICATIONS TO HUMOR:
RESEARCH STRATEGY
The principal research strategy adopted in the book is the application of a
newly-developed semantic theory, script-based semantics, to verbal jokes.
The purpose of the application is to provide a (partial) answer to the main
problem in the field of humor research, "What is humor?" or "What is
funny?" in terms of semantic concepts, features and categories.
A number of semantic notions made available by contemporary semantic
theory can be successfully used to explain numerous jokes.

54
CHAPTER TWO
Thus, if presupposition is thought of in terms of enablement, i.e., as one
of those statements which should be true (or one of those conditions which
should obtain, or one of those statements which should have taken place
before) in order for the sentence in question to be meaningful,
comprehensible, appropriate, etc., then many jokes can be demonstrated to be based on
the knowledge of a presupposition shared by the speaker and the hearer(s)
(see Raskin, 1978, Section 5 and references there for further discussion of
this notion of presupposition, which seems to include both the 'logical'
presupposition and most of the 'pragmatic' presupposition - cf. Keenan,
1971; Cooper, 1974). Thus, (35) would not be funny or even comprehensible
if the speaker and the hearer(s) did not share a certain presupposition which
may be tentatively presented as (36).
(35) This girl reminds me of Dreyfus, the army does not believe in her
innocence. (Freud, 1905, 75)
(36) Dreyfus was a French officer accused of treason. The army
considered him guilty while many others thought he was
innocent. He was tried, convicted and imprisoned.
It should be noted that while Dreyfus was later rehabilitated, it was not
known at the time the joke was made and used, and the presupposition is
clearly limited roughly to (36). Had it been known, the joke would have
probably lost most of its value because the same analogy would have then
led to the conclusion that the girl's innocence was also somehow restored.
Had the presupposition included all that became known of the case later,
the joke would have evoked information on injustice, prejudice, scapegoats,
etc., which is completely foreign to the simply frivolous joke of (35) and
which would effectively kill it.
It is the presuppositions in (27) which make the allusion-based jokes in
(26) accessible only to those who share it. Allusion, therefore, is the use of
presupposition. In (28), however, what might have been an allusion is
included in the text of the joke eliminating both the allusion and
consequently the need of a shared presupposition for the comprehension of the joke.
If implicature is construed as using a sentence not in its literal meaning
then many jokes can be explained in terms of implicature (for further
discussion of the notion of implicature and the semantic theory which
yielded it see Grice, 1975; Kempson, 1977; Raskin, 1977, 1979). Thus, (37)
seems to involve an implicature which has something like (38) as its literal
meaning:

THEORY
55
(37) "My wife used to play the violin a lot but after we had kids she
has not had much time for that." "Children are a comfort, aren't
they?" (Pocheptzov, 1974, 90)
(38) Your wife cannot possibly play the violin well so it is a comfort
to you that she does not any more, and you owe it to your
children.
If possible worlds are understood in the usual superficial way as minor
"impossible" deviations from the "real" world, many jokes can be treated
in terms of possible worlds, e.g., (39) (see, for instance, van Dijk, 1977, for
a good account and useful references on possible worlds).
(39) A man objects to the price a prostitute has charged him, and
attempts to have intercourse with her violently in and around her
navel, shouting, "At these prices, I am going to make my own
goddam hole!" (Legman, 1975, 295)
Speech acts, introduced by Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), can be
formulated as the sets of necessary and sufficient conditions for assertions,
questions, promises, etc. (cf. Raskin, 1977). It is not too difficult to propose
a definition of the speech act of making a joke (40) in exactly the same way
it was done for the other types of utterances, even though the "usual" speech
acts as defined by Searle (op.cit., 66-67) belong to the bona-fide communi-
cational mode, whatever that is (see Chapter 4, Section 2), and joking just
as lying, exist outside that mode no matter how it might be defined.
(40) Proposition Content: A proposition p or set of propositions P
Preparatory Condition:
1. S considers p or P appropriate to the situation
2. S is not committed to the literal truth ofporP
Sincerity Condition: S considers p or P funny
Essential Condition: Counts as an attempt to make H laugh
While basically correct, (40) is part trivial and part circular. It is a typical
example of what might be termed 'reductionist taxonomy,' an approach
generally characteristic of most of the philosophy of language in which the
speech-act theory originated. The approach comprises attempts, often quite
respectable, to reduce a large set of very diverse, complex and undefined
notions to a much more compact number of more basic, simpler, though still
undefined notions, and the latter are usually considered, somewhat indis-

56
CHAPTER TWO
criminately, to be "intuitively given." To become a part of formal linguistics
(or, for that matter, of its application), with its aspired even if perhaps
inachievable level of explicitness (cf. Raskin, 1979e), each of the key notions
in (40), 'proposition,' 'appropriateness,' 'situation,' 'commitment,' 'literal
truth,' 'funniness,' and 'counting,' needs a formal definition or an ontologi-
cally equivalent treatment. An attempt to provide those may turn out to be
unfeasible and/or lead to circularity or infinite regress. The most
conspicuous deficiency of (40) is the use of the notion 'funny' which signifies,
according to the speech-act theory, that funniness is conceptually simpler
than humor or making a joke, and, therefore, the latter can be defined in
terms of the former. In fact, humor and funniness are concepts of the same
order of complexity or intuitive givenness, and (40) turns out to be rather
unrevealing.
However, the essential problem with the previous four examples of
applications of contemporary semantic notions is not even that they are
basically method-oriented but rather that they are exclusively post hoc,
after-the-fact explanations of the joke. In logical terms, at best each of them
amounts to a (partial) necessary condition for the text to be funny as
schematically shown in (41): from the fact that the text is funny it may follow
that a presupposition and/or an implicature and/or a possible world and/or
a speech act is involved in the joke.
A presupposition is shared by S and H
and/or
An implicature is produced by S
and/or
A possible world is evoked by the text
and or
A speech act occurs
Unfortunately, no matter how attractive the notions or the techniques they
bring with them may be, none of them can constitute the sufficient condition
for the text to be funny. In other words, if any or even all of the conditions
in the right column of (41) obtain with a certain text, the text does not have
to, and usually is not, funny, as illustrated by (42i-iv), with the corresponding
conditions given in (43i-iv), respectively.
TEXT IS
FUNNY

THEORY
57
(42) (i) The present king of France is bald
(ii) Billy Carter was a man of real integrity
(iii) On the way from Mars to Venus John ran into a gigantic
three-legged squirrel
(iv) I think your nose looks like a lump of truffle p&te
(43) (i) Presupposition: There exists a unique man who is the
present king of France
(ii) Implicature: The speaker does not think that Billy Carter
was a man of real integrity
(iii) Possible world: A world with interplanetary shuttles and
three-legged giant squirrels is evoked
(iv) Speech act of joking: While all the conditions of (40)
obtain for the speaker, the hearer may not find the text
funny
The purpose of the proposed semantic theory of humor is to formulate a
set of conditions which are both necessary and sufficient conditions for the
text to be funny, as schematically shown in (44i): if a text is funny, all the
conditions in the set obtain; and conversely, if all the conditions in the set
obtain for a text, the text is funny.
The proposed conditions will be semantical in nature and provided by the
script-based semantic theory outlined in Chapter 3. The research is,
therefore, a legitimate application of an independently developed and motivated
semantic theory to verbal humor. The result of the application is a (partial)
(44)
(i)
TEXT IS
FUNNY
*
SET
OF CONDITIONS
(ii)
1"
JUDGMENT
E
=
ither both 'funny'
or both 'unfunny'
^
JUDGMENT

58
CHAPTER TWO
answer to the question, "What semantic properties of the text make it
funny?"
It will be useful to review here briefly the basic properties as well as some
of the limitations of, and reservations about, the proposed theory.
First, the problem of its ontological status. The semantic theory of humor
resulting from the application of the script-based semantic theory to humor
is a completely formal system: once formulated, it functions as a mechanical
symbol-manipulation device which does not depend on the user's knowledge
or intuition. Its output, the assignment of the feature of funniness to texts,
should coincide with the native speaker's judgment as to the funniness of
texts (as schematically shown in (44ii)). The semantic theory of humor is,
therefore, designed to model the native speaker's intuition with regard to
humor, or in other words, his humor competence. The theory models and
thus defines the concept of funniness. However, the theory itself depends on
a few crucial and formally undefined notions - the problem which this theory
shares with just about any theory within and without logic.
Secondly, the problem of idealization. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1,
the theory is formulated for an ideal speaker-hearer community, i.e., for
people whose senses of humor are exactly identical. This fiction is always
a useful first approximation of reality, and the other extreme, the description
of every individual competence, is unfeasible and conceptually uninteresting
since humor is a form of social communication. However, the proposed
theory provides a framework for an individual and customized treatment of
humor as well (see Chapter 4, Section 8).
Finally, as explained in Section 1, the material to which the theory is
applicable constitutes only a part of what should be, and is normally,
included in the notion of humor.

CHAPTER THREE
SEMANTIC THEORY
INTRODUCTION
An original script-based semantic theory developed and motivated by this
writer independently of humor research is briefly outlined in this chapter. It
is this theory, with its strong contextual emphasis, which has been found to
be applicable to the analysis of humor, unlike its predecessors in semantics
which were largely limited to the meaning of the sentence in isolation. After
providing some background information on the goals and format of the
proposed theory in Section 1, the chapter introduces and reintroduces the
necessary elements of contextual semantics (Section 2), describes the
accepted format of semantic theory (Section 3), and then focuses on the
notions of script and script-based lexicon (Section 4) which are essential for
the application of the theory to humor. Combinatorial rules which link the
scripts together to calculate the semantic interpretation of the sentence are
also described (Section 5), and the important issues of justification and
evaluation of the theory are dealt with in Section 6.
1. GOALS OF SEMANTIC THEORY
The primary goal of any semantic theory is to model the semantic competence
of the native speaker in its relevant manifestations -just as the goal of any
linguistic theory is to model linguistic competence as a whole (see Chapter
2, Section 2). Semantic theory is a formal object which provides semantic
entities with descriptions which are supposed to match the speaker's
intuitive judgments about the same entities. If the entities in question are
sentences, which is most often the case, semantic theory provides them with
semantic interpretations which should approximate the best they can the
meanings of the same sentences as perceived intuitively by the speaker.
Practically, however, the output of a formal linguistic theory can only match
the speaker's competence with respect to a particular pre-selected feature or
(more rarely) features (see (31)). The theory assigns the feature to some
entities and withholds them from others and the speaker is capable of
passing an intuitive judgment about the same entities characterizing them as
59

60
CHAPTER THREE
having the same feature in some cases and lacking it in others. If the set of
entities to which the feature was assigned by the theory coincides with the
set of entities which the speaker characterizes as having the feature, the
theory is corroborated by the speaker and can be said to model his
competence well.
Just as Chomsky based his linguistic theory on the feature of grammatical-
ity, Katz and Fodor (1963) based their semantic theory, the first formal
semantic theory in the defined sense of linguistic theory, on the features of
ambiguity, semantic normalcy and paraphrase relations between sentences.
According to them, semantic theory should model at least these semantic
abilities of the native speaker (45):
(45) (i) to determine the number of readings (meanings) of each
sentence
(ii) to determine the content of each reading
(iii) to detect semantic anomalies, i.e., to distinguish normal
sentences, i.e., sentences which are well-formed semanti-
cally, from semantically deviant sentences
(iv) to perceive paraphrase relations between sentences, i.e.,
given some two sentences, to determine whether they mean
the same or not as well as, given one sentence, to come up
with another sentence which means the same
Thus, their semantic theory was supposed to detect the (three-way)
ambiguity of (46i) and the (two-way) ambiguity of (46ii) and to determine
the content of all the involved readings (bird-related, money-related and
legal, for the former sentence, and tolerance-related and birth-related, for the
latter). It was also supposed to realize that the word paid disambiguated
(46iii). The theory was to detect the semantic deviance of (46iv-v) and to
perceive the paraphrase relation between (46vi) and (46vii).
(46) (i) The bill is large.
(ii) She cannot bear children,
(iii) The bill is large but need not be paid,
(iv) He painted the walls with silent paint.
(v) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously,
(vi) The dog bit the man.
(vii) The man was bitten by the dog.
While Katz and Fodor's interpretive semantics has been under attack
since shortly after its inception (see Weinreich, 1966; Katz, 1967,1970,1971,

SEMANTIC THEORY
61
1972; McCawley, 1971; Lakoff, 1971a) nobody has really expressed any
concern or doubt about (45), not even at the time of the heaviest onslaught
on Katz by the generative semanticists (see Maclay, 1971; Raskin, 1972,
1975, 1980; Bar-Hillel and Raskin, 1975; Fodor, 1977; Kempson, 1977;
Lyons, 1977, for further discussion of the interpretive-generative conflict of
the late 1960's - (very) early 1970's). It was the scope of the abilities in (45)
which the generative semantics saw differently, including in them, especially
in (45ii), more and more of what became known as pragmatics and what was
essentially contextual information both of a linguistic and extralinguistic
nature.
Interpretive semantics was unambiguously anti-contextual. In fact, Katz
and Fodor argued that no semantic theory could possibly account for the
meaning of every sentence in every possible setting. A hypothetical theory
that could achieve this could be thought of as a function taking as its
arguments the sentence itself, its grammatical description, its semantic
interpretation including, of course, the set of its possible readings, and an abstract
characteristic of the setting, i.e., the context, and having as its value one or
more or no readings out of the possible set of readings for the sentence,
depending on the situation in which the sentence is uttered. Thus, the setting
(47i) would disambiguate (48) as (49i) while the setting (47ii) would
disambiguate the same ambiguous sentence of (48) as (49ii):
(47) (i) The hunters did some shooting and nobody else did.
(ii) Somebody was shooting at the hunters.
(48) The shooting of the hunters was terrible.
(49) (i) The hunters were shooting very poorly.
(ii) Somebody shot the hunters and that was terrible.
The setting of (50) will render (51) odd and thus deprive it of all the
readings it might possibly have:
(50) It is daytime.
(51) This is the happiest night of my life.
The setting of (52) will not disambiguate (53) entirely but will reduce the
number of its possible readings from 3 to 2 eliminating (54i):
(52) An intellectual conversation is taking place.
(53) He follows Marx.
(54) (i) He dogs the footsteps of Karl,
(ii) He is a disciple of Karl's,
(iii) He postdates Karl.

62
CHAPTER THREE
According to Katz and Fodor, in order to construct such a semantic
theory a complete theory of settings would be necessary, and the latter would
require a structured and formalized description of all the knowledge the
speakers have about the world. The sentences of (55-59) are listed by them
to illustrate their claim that the knowledge which is internalized by the native
speaker and which they use to understand very similar sentences very
differently is of an extremely specific and varied nature - it can be listed
informally as (60).
(55) (i) Our store sells horse shoes,
(ii) Our store sells alligator shoes.
(56) (i) Should we take the junior back to the zoo?
(ii) Should we take the lion back to the zoo?
(iii) Should we take the bus back to the zoo?
(57) (i) Can I put the wallpaper on?
(ii) Can I put the coat on?
(58) (i) Joe jumped higher than the Empire State Building,
(ii) Joe jumped higher than you.
(59) (i) Black cats are unlucky.
(ii) People who break mirrors are unlucky.
(60) (i) Horses wear shoes.
(ii) Shoes are made of alligator skin.
(iii) Children are frequently taken to look at the animals in the
zoo.
(iv) Lions are kept in the zoo.
(v) Buses may include the zoo in their itinerary.
(vi) Wallpaper is glued onto the wall.
(vii) Coats are worn by people on their persons.
(viii) The Empire State Building is a building and cannot jump.
(ix) You can jump.
(x) Black cats are believed to bring ill luck.
(xi) Breaking mirrors is believed to bring ill luck.
It seems obvious to Katz and Fodor that such a theory of settings, no
matter how conceived, is unattainable, and therefore a semantic theory
which includes it, is inachievable. As a result, the scope of their semantic
theory is limited to the meaning of the sentence in isolation, beyond and
independently of any context.
It is firmly maintained here that such a semantic theory is devoid of any
interest since, quite simply, it fails to explain what a particular sentence

SEMANTIC THEORY
63
means. The most important reason why a theory like Katz and Fodor's is
vacuous is because there are no sentences in isolation. (I will also
demonstrate in Section 3 that a more powerful lexicon easily relates the polysemous
phrases in (55-59) which are responsible for the potentially different
readings, to the corresponding items in (60), thus minimizing the need in extralin-
guistic information of the kind Katz and Fodor considered unattainable.)
The native speaker or any user of a language cannot possibly be interested
in the meaning of a sentence in isolation because he never encounters a
sentence in isolation. In discourse, every sentence comes surrounded by
other sentences preceding and/or following the sentence in question.
Moreover, the speaker and hearer find themselves in a particular situation
and they are jointly aware of its many features. This linguistic and extra-
linguistic contextual information is taken into account when the sentence is
uttered and comprehended and it becomes part of the intended meaning.
Even when the speaker is exposed to a single sentence without any context,
e.g., in a linguistic experiment such as the grammaticality test, he
immediately visualizes a situation of which the sentence in question may be part and
his comprehension of the sentence depends heavily on this imaginary
context. Perhaps only a linguist is capable of abstracting a sentence from any
potential context and discussing the meaning it might have in this artificially
construed situation - because linguists are trained to do that. However, the
usefulness of the notion of isolated meaning is highly dubious since it is
completely divorced from the user's meaning of the same sentence. One
striking and important difference between these two conceptions of meaning
is that according to the meaning-in-isolation point of view, practically every
sentence is ambiguous while in real discourse it would be easily and unno-
ticeably disambiguated by the context - think, for instance, of (46i-ii), (48)
or (53).
In other words, every sentence is perceived by the hearer already in some
context. If the context is not given explicitly, by the adjacent discourse or
extralinguistic situation, the hearer supplies it from his previous experience.
If the hearer is unable to do that, he is very unlikely to comprehend the
sentence at all or at least fully.
When a potentially ambiguous sentence is uttered by the speaker, usually
only one meaning of it occurs to him and he intends the sentence in this one
meaning. The reason for that is, of course, that only one context in which
the sentence can be used is obvious to the speaker: it is either the real context
in which the sentence occurs or the imaginary context which comes to his
mind most easily. Usually only one meaning of a potentially ambiguous

64
CHAPTER THREE
sentence is perceived by the hearer - for exactly the same reasons. Normally
the speaker's obvious context coincides with the hearer's obvious context,
but this is not necessarily the case, and misunderstandings occur in the cases
of non-coincidence. The obvious context of a sentence can vary with the
same speaker and hearer from occasion to occasion and from situation to
situation.
It is the existence of the obvious context and its psychological validity for
the speaker and hearer which explains the well-known phenomenon which
many linguists and especially psycholinguists are seriously bothered by.
Exposed to sentences like (61), native speakers typically fail to perceive the
ambiguity. In the same experiment, some in the subject group will come up
with the meaning of (61) paraphrased as (62i) and others with (62ii). In other
words, native speakers are potentially aware of the ambiguity but are
typically unable to realize both of the meanings at the same time. What happens
is that one of the contexts presents itself to them as the obvious context and
squeezes the other one out. Which of the two becomes the obvious context
depends on a number of factors concerning the speakers' personal
background and experience, their idiolect, and their most recent encounters
with the objects or events referred to in the sentence. On a different occasion
the other context might easily prevail but the crucial thing is that it is only
one at any time and not both.
(61) Flying planes can be dangerous.
(62) (i) Flying planes are dangerous,
(ii) Flying planes is dangerous.
Grice's semantic theory places a heavy emphasis on a notion which is, in
fact, immediately adjacent to the obvious context (1975). His earlier analysis
of meaningNN (1957), which is dependent only on the speaker's intention
and the hearer's recognition of it, practically excludes the literal, or in his
terms, conventional (1975,44), meaning of the sentence from consideration.
While his account may be demonstrated to be largely self-contradictory for
this very reason (see Raskin, 1977 and 1979, for further discussion), what
is more important here is that his insightful and seminal notion of implicature
is heavily dependent on the notion of the obvious context, thus validating
it even further.
The issue of the obvious context as well as that of the setting theory which
Katz and Fodor considered impossible raise the important problem of the
boundary between the knowledge of language and the knowledge of the
world, or in other terms, between linguistic knowledge and encyclopedic

SEMANTIC THEORY
65
knowledge. Linguistics has always been held responsible for the former but
not for the latter. In semantic terms, it presumably means that any semantic
theory should account for what the speaker understands by virtue of his
knowing the language, while all kinds of inferences related to what he knows
about the world fall beyond the scope of the theory.
The existence and importance of this boundary was repeatedly brought
up by Bar-Hillel in the 1950's in the entirely different context of automatic
translation. Arguing that high quality translation by the computer was not
feasible, after years of his own pioneering research in the field, he named as
the main obstacle the impossibility to supply the translation machine not
only "with a dictionary but also with a universal encyclopedia" (1960, 176).
Without such an encyclopedia, however, Bar-Hillel pointed out, the
computer would be unable to assign the correct meaning to the word pen in
(63):
(63) Little John was looking for his toy box. Finally he found it. The
box was in the pen.
The problem which is involved here is indeed not "one that concerns
translation proper... but a preliminary stage of this process, viz., the
determination of the specific meaning in context of a word which, in isolation, is
semantically ambiguous" (op.cit., 175), and we might add, the impossibility
to supply the encyclopedia to the machine means simply that we are unable
to come up with a formal, i.e., explicit, description of the necessary semantic
information. In the case of (63) the necessary information includes, of
course, the relative measurements of box, pen x ("an implement for writing"),
and pen2 ("a small enclosure for animals and children"). In other cases,
naturally, the necessary information varies a great deal and can, in principle,
include virtually all there is in the world (and some of what there is not). This
additional information about the world, which one needs to possess in order
to calculate the correct meaning of a word in a context, is obviously just as
necessary to calculate the correct meaning of the sentence which contains
the word.
Most recently, the problem of the boundary between our knowledge of
language and our knowledge of the world has assumed still another guise.
The former kind of knowledge is assigned to the proper domain of semantics
while the latter is delegated to pragmatics. In a somewhat halfhearted
follow-up to Katz's struggle against the attacks by the generative semantics
- the struggle which gave way, after generative semantics disintegrated, to
the in-house fight between him as a rigorous interpretivist adhering to the

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Standard Theory of Chomsky (1965) and Katz and Postal (1964), on the
one hand, and Chomsky (1971, 1972, 1975, 1977) and JackendofT( 1981) as
revisionist interpretivists who have adopted first the Extended Standard
Theory and then the Revised Extended Standard Theory, on the other -
Katz is the proponent of 'autonomous semantics' and his adversaries of
'non-autonomous semantics.'
Autonomous semantics presupposes a clear-cut distinction between
semantic competence and semantic performance. Semantic competence
includes meaning proper and should be studied by semantics. Semantic
performance goes beyond semantics and actually belongs in pragmatics.
Semantic competence is the knowledge of linguistic meaning. Semantic
performance is the knowledge of extralinguistic meaning. For various
methodological reasons Katz wishes to exclude the latter from consideration
entirely (see, for instance, Katz, 1980), thus being perfectly consistent with
Katz and Fodor (1963) in his preference for a neat even if vacuous theory.
Non-autonomous semantics "claims that no clean point of separation
exists where logical or semantic inference leaves off and pragmatic or
knowledge-based inference begins; rather, the two kinds of inference are
interdependent, or based on the same principles, or both" (Jackendoff, 1981,
425). According to Chomsky, only a very small part of meaning, the one he
refers to somewhat misleadingly as 'logical form,' belongs to his sentence
grammar. The rest of it, 'meaning proper,' incorporates information from the
speakers' knowledge of the world.
The fight between the two sides reveals a surprising lack of difference with
regard to the feasibility of semantic research. Katz wants to discard most
of semantics and study the uninteresting remainder. Chomsky and
Jackendoff strive to broaden the scope of semantic phenomena by claiming that
more and more information should be included in semantics and that this
information is basically of a pragmatic nature. In doing this, they exclude
every single semantic phenomenon from Chomsky's sentence grammar and
therefore from linguistics in general, for Chomsky does not have any non-
sentence grammar to offer. (Support for their position came recently from
unexpected quarters - Nida declared recently that he no longer believed in
the existence of the boundary between the linguistic and the extralinguistic
(1979).)
If Katz's position is vacuous, Chomsky and JackendofFs is outright
defeatist and not really distinct from the spirit of Bloomfield's notorious
anti-semantical statement in which he claimed that "in order to give a
scientifically accurate definition of meaning for every form of a language, we

SEMANTIC THEORY
67
should have to have a scientifically accurate knowledge of everything in the
speakers' world. The actual extent of human knowledge is very small,
compared to that," concluding, accordingly, that we cannot know the
meaning of any word with the exception of technical and scientific terms
which are members of well-defined nomenclatures (Bloomfield, 1933, 139).
Similarly, Chomsky and JackendofT declare every semantic phenomenon
and issue to be dependent on pragmatic factors related to "the speakers'
belief systems" (JackendofT, op.cit., 425) and, therefore, also inaccessible,
even if they do not say so explicitly.
The goal of the semantic theory proposed here is to account for the
meaning of every sentence in every context it occurs. The theory does not
incorporate our entire knowledge of the world and does not claim that it is
possible to do so. It subscribes to the view shared by most if not all sciences
that the ultimate impossibility or infinity of the problem should not prevent
one from trying to get as far in one's knowledge as possible. The theory
recognizes the existence of the boundary between our knowledge of language
and our knowledge of the world and, being a linguistic theory, does not
account for what is on the other side of the boundary. However, it pushes
the boundary much further out than any other available formal semantic
theory. The feasibility and practicality of the approach are discussed in
Section 6.
Obviously, only a context-oriented theory of this kind could possibly
handle verbal humor. The sentence-oriented semantic theories were clearly
not sufficient. It is the recent developments in semantic theory which took
it beyond the individual sentence that made possible both the script-based
semantic theory and its subsequent application to humor. These
developments are discussed in the next session.
2. ELEMENTS OF CONTEXTUAL SEMANTICS
The format of Katz and Fodor's semantic theory includes the dictionary and
the projection rules. The function of the lexicon is to model the native
speaker's knowledge of the meanings of the words. The function of the
projection rules is to model the native speaker's ability to combine the
meanings of the words which make up the sentence into the meaning of the
whole sentence. No semantic theory proposed before or after interpretive
semantics has ever objected to this format in principle though there has been
a great deal of controversy about the semantic material which should go into
these two basic components. It is obvious, however, from the discussion in

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the previous section that in order to account for the meaning of a given
sentence in a given context the semantic theory should be able to go beyond
the meanings of separate words. Thus, in order to calculate the semantic
interpretation of (46iii) correctly the theory must be able to relate somehow
a certain meaning of bill and a certain meaning of paid and reject all the other
meanings of these two words as incompatible. In order to calculate correctly
the semantic interpretations of (47-59) the theory should be able to relate the
semantic material of each of these sentences, i.e., the meanings of the words
and of their combinations to some semantic material outside the sentence.
To be able to perform both of these and similar operations semantic theory
should resort to the kind of information which is distinct from the meanings
of separate words and from the rules which combine those meanings - at
least as they are presented in interpretive semantics and its rivals: the now
defunct generative semantics, Extended Standard Theory or Revised
Extended Standard Theory (see Section 1 and references there).
It appears that extralexical information, i.e., those semantic properties
evoked by the words which are not usually accommodated in lexicons of any
kind, is quite essential for the comprehension of numerous ordinary
sentences of natural language, e.g., (64):
(64) (i) John was a dime short and had to do without milk,
(ii) Mary saw a black cat and immediately turned home,
(iii) Mary came into the room and all the men were charmed
by her even before they sat down again.
(64i) can not be fully comprehended if the hearer does not possess the
knowledge of the basic commodity-money-commodity formula, and no
entry for milk in any dictionary or lexicon is likely to mention money. (64ii)
is based on the availability of the piece of information about black cats being
"unlucky" (cf. the discussion of mythological scripts in Chapter 5, Section
6, and Chapter 6, Introduction). (64iii) evokes the now obsolete rule of
etiquette according to which men stood up when a woman came into view,
and the sentence is utterly incomprehensible to those who are not familiar
with the rule. That extralexical knowledge is important can be further
demonstrated by a set of related examples (65) for which no such
information exists and which are therefore perceived as odd:
(65) (i) John was a dime short and had to do without family,
(ii) Mary saw a black cat and immediately bought a stamp,
(iii) Mary came into the room and all the men were charmed
by her even before they sneezed.

SEMANTIC THEORY
69
In the last decade and a half, there has emerged a number of works from
which it can also be deduced that some semantic information which is not
stored in the lexicon, is involved in the process of calculating the meaning
of such a compound linguistic entity as the sentence. I will continue to call
this kind of semantic information 'extralexicaT in spite of the fact that the
lexicon I will propose in Section 4 will, in fact, incorporate this information.
One of the early proposals introducing extralexical information into
semantic theory came from Staal (1967) and Bar-Hillel (1967) in their
responses to interpretive semantics. The former proposed to expand Katz
and Fodor's lexicon by accommodating in it such conversive semantic
relations as those between follow and precede or buy and sell. The latter also
saw the inability to accommodate relations like these as a major deficiency
of the theory but went further in his criticism claiming that the format of the
theory could not accommodate this kind of semantic information in
principle. According to Bar-Hillel, conversives and similar relations are, in fact,
meaning rules, distinct both from the lexicon and projection rules, and as
such, along with other meaning rules, e.g., Carnap's meaning postulates
(1955), cannot, and should not, be squeezed into a dictionary format of any
kind. Since the native speaker is clearly aware of these rules or relations, it
follows that an adequate semantic theory should store this information
beyond the lexicon whose format cannot accommodate it.
Next, presupposition came into the picture. As stated briefly and
somewhat loosely in Chapter 2, Section 4, the notion of presupposition was
introduced into linguistic theory to denote one of those statements which
should be true, or describe a state of affairs which should have taken place,
prior to the utterance of a certain sentence. Defined in logical terms by Frege
(1892) and Strawson (1950), the presupposition of a sentence should be true
in order for the sentence itself to be either true or false, e.g., for (42i) to be
either true or false (43i) must be true. Similarly, for (66i) or its negation,
(66ii), to be either true or false, their common presupposition, (67), must be
true. In general, as immediately follows from the logical definition of
presupposition, a sentence and its negation share the same presupposition(s).
(66) (i) I meant to insult him.
(ii) I did not mean to insult him.
(67) I insulted him.
Negation can, therefore, be used as a diagnostic test for (logical)
presupposition: take a sentence, negate it; if something remains from the content
in spite of the negation, it is a good candidate for presupposition.

CHAPTER THREE
This type of logical presupposition was used by the Kiparskys (1971),
somewhat redundantly, to further illustrate the difference between such
'factive' verbs as regret, comprehend, ignore, resent, etc., and such 'non-fac-
tive' verbs as assert, suppose, maintain, claim, etc. The factives, e.g., (68i),
presuppose their complement (68iii) while the non-factives do not, e.g.,
(68iii):
(68) (i) I regretted being late,
(ii) I claimed being late,
(iii) I was late.
A broader notion of presupposition was proposed by Lakoff (1971b). His
pragmatic presupposition includes various conditions which should be
satisfied in order for the sentence to be "appropriate," including such individual
factors as subjective assumptions and personal beliefs of the speakers. Thus,
according to him, the well-formedness (or, for that matter, the truth, the
appropriateness, or the aptness) of any sentence in (69) - cf. the discussion
of some of the same examples (33) in a different context in Chapter 2,
Section 2 - depends on whether the speaker believes that the corresponding
condition for each of them in (70) is satisfied:
(69)
believes that I am a fool
(70)
(i) My uncle
(ii) Mv cat
(iii) My goldfish
(iv) My pet amoeba
(v) My frying pan
(vi) My sincerity
(vii) My
(i) Uncles
(ii) Cats
(iii) Goldfish
(iv) Amoebae
(v) Pans
(vi) Sincerities
(vii) Births
are capable of believing
The notion of presupposition used in this book and elsewhere (see Raskin,
1978, for further discussion) differs both from logical and pragmatical
presupposition (see Keenan, 1971) and from Cooper's conceptual
presupposition (1974). It cannot pass the negation test just as pragmatical
presupposition but it is not as individual-dependent. In fact, it is as "objective" as

SEMANTIC THEORY
71
logical presupposition. It can be defined as a set of conditions which should
obtain in order for a sentence to be comprehended fully. The extralexical
nature of presupposition in any version must be obvious by now.
The notion of semantic recursion developed by this writer in the mid-1960's
provides a somewhat different perspective of the conditions which have to
be met for the sentence to be understood correctly. It relates these conditions
to certain elements of the sentence, presents a taxonomy of those elements
and constructs a near-algorithm for discovering those conditions (see
Raskin, 1968, 1978, for a more detailed account of semantic recursion).
According to this view, the meaning of each sentence is considered to be
a function of at least two factors (71), besides its own constituents and the
way they are combined together.
(71) (i) the degree of understanding of the previous discourse (if
any)
(ii) the quantity of pertinent information the hearer possesses
It is assumed that the greater (7 li-ii) are purely quantitatively the fuller the
sentence is comprehended. It is also assumed that there is a whole spectrum
of partial comprehension for most ordinary sentences. Most sentences
require one or more operations of semantic recursion to obtain the
additional semantic information which is necessary for its complete comprehension
and which is not contained in the sentence itself. The operations of semantic
recursion which may be performed, in various combinations, with respect
to a given sentence may be represented as (72):
(72) (i) distinguishing all the non-self-sufficient elements of the
sentence, viz., words which refer to something outside the
sentence
(ii) relating the sentence to the previous sentence in the
discourse, which has already been interpreted in the sense
of (72i-iii)
(iii) relating the sentence to the pertinent information not
contained in the previous discourse
The elements of the sentence mentioned in (72i) are called the semantic
recursion triggers of the sentence. (72ii) is, of course, the principle which
renders the approach recursive in the mathematical sense: first, the first
sentence of the discourse is interpreted in terms of outside information; then,
the next sentence is interpreted in the same way, but this time the complete
information obtained on the previous cycle, with regard to the first sentence,

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is taken into account as well, etc. The pertinent information mentioned in
(72iii) will include various elements of the hearer's experience and
knowledge of the world such as common sense, logical models, evaluative scales,
accepted patterns of humor, etc. (see Section 4).
In terms of semantic recursion, sentences form a continuous scale with
two poles. On the one pole of the scale, there are those sentences which
contain no recursion triggers whatsoever - their meaning follows
immediately from that of the lexical items consist of and of the ways in which they those
are combined. Such sentences are quite special and rare, and they are termed
'non-indexicaT (Bar-HiUel, 1954, 259), 'eternal' (Quine, 1960, 191fT.) or
'non-circumstantial' (see Raskin, 1979a). Most sentences require some
semantic recursion, but on the other pole of the scale there are sentences
which cannot be comprehended correctly at all by anybody who is not
familiar with the previous discourse and/or does not share the previous
experience with the speaker/writer. Those sentences are likely to contain
factual or literary allusions, non-universal associations and conventions,
"coded messages," taboos, etc. (cf. (26-27)). The examples of (73) illustrate
the two poles and a case in between. (73i) is a classical example of a
non-indexical, non-recursive sentence. (73iii) is a maximally recursive
sentence from a Russian novel. The sentence will not be comprehended by
those unfamiliar with the preceding part of the novel where the peculiar
expression was used in a context which determined its highly idiosyncratic,
euphemistic meaning, namely 'to make love.' The reader not in the know will
see that the heroes are spending a night in a house, not at all on a train, and
will therefore fail to interpret (73iii), perfectly meaningful to him otherwise,
in a context which rules out any meaning (cf. (50)-(51)). (73ii) is a typical
recursive sentence which can be understood partially without any semantic
recursion and fully with semantic recursion (see below).
(73) (i) Ice floats on water.
(ii) Watch your speed - we are.
(iii) That night they jumped off the train again.
Brushing aside the somewhat dubious grammatically of the popular
Indiana road sign in (73ii), we can analyze it from the point of view of
semantic recursion. At least four out of the five words are semantic recursion
triggers:
(74) (i) watch: watching here means making sure from time to
time that you are not exceeding a certain speed -
it does not mean looking at the speedometer all the
time

SEMANTIC THEORY
73
(ii) your: the message is addressed to automobile and
motorcycle drivers, but not to pedestrians, joggers,
cows, car passengers, helicopter pilots, UFO's,
etc.
(iii) speed: there is a Federal speed limit and any violation of
that law is, in theory, punishable
(iv) we: the law is enforced by the police, and we must
stand for some representatives of this body
detailed to a certain sector of the assigned area at a
certain time
It is clear that a representative of a different civilization who happens to
understand English but not to be familiar with (74), will grasp only the
semi-empty meaning of (73ii) loosely paraphrased here as (75):
(75) Somebody is urged to become engaged in visual inspection of a
certain feature of a motion though some other people are saying
that they are doing it already themselves.
Semantic recursion triggers may be of a simpler or more complex nature.
The most elementary recursion triggers are grammatical. The grammatical
triggers signify semantic recursion by virtue of their membership in a certain
grammatical category, and they do it whenever and wherever they occur, in
a simple and prescribed way. Pronouns and the definite article are the
simplest semantic recursion triggers in English - their typical use is
exemplified in (76), with the elicited semantic information from previous discourse
also italicized. The simplest type of semantic recursion includes deixis.
(76) (i) John came up to Mary. He was smiling.
(ii) I saw a Porsche on the street. The car was red.
Much more complex semantic recursion triggers are lexical. The lexical
triggers elicit additonal semantic information by virtue of their individual
lexical meaning, e.g., and so on, and so forth (how?), similarly (to what?),
abovementioned(what? where?) as well as good (by what standards?), proper,
adequate, bad, etc. (the questions in parentheses illustrate the kinds of
semantic information elicited by each example because, of course, every
question is exactly this - an elicitation of certain information). Depending
on the nature of a specific trigger, different rules of semantic recursion are
applied to the sentence. As a result, the notion of semantic recursion seems
to have an edge over that of presupposition both in terms of detalization and

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in terms of linguistic constructiveness - no rules have been proposed for
discovering the presupposition(s) of any given sentence. Semantic recursion
also makes the extralexical nature of the phenomenon truly explicit.
Another interesting extralexical concept was proposed in linguistics and
in the philosophy of language at approximately the same time though not
entirely independently. Gordon and Lakoffs conversational postulates
(1975), later interestingly reviewed by Morgan (1977), were essentially an
attempt to transpose Grice's implicature (1975) into formal linguistics, while
Searle's indirect speech acts (1975) have a great deal in common with both
conversational postulates and implicature (see Raskin, 1977, 1979, for
further discussion). All the three notions can be exemplified by (77):
(77) (i) Can you pass me the salt?
(ii) Pass me the salt.
(77i) is an example of Grice's implicature because it is not used in its
'conventional,' i.e., literal meaning - the latter is a question while, in fact,
the sentence is a request. Gordon and Lakoff postulated the existence of a
special kind of linguistic rules, conversational postulates, which are
internalized by the native speaker. One such conversational postulate, (78i) in their
simple predicate-calculus formalism, "translated" here into plain English as
(78ii), transforms (77i) into (77ii).
(78) (i) ASK(a,b,CAN(b,Q))* -> REQUEST(a,b,Q)
(ii) When a (the speaker) asks b (the hearer) whether b can do
Q (in this particular case, to pass the salt) and does not
happen to mean it literally (hence the asterisk), what he
actually means is that he requests the hearer to do it
An essentially similar analysis, though in an entirely different and less
formal framework, is proposed by Searle (1975,73-74) who can be
interpreted as treating (77i) as a direct but unintended speech act of question used
as an indirect but intended speech act of request (cf. Searle, 1969, 66).
Obviously, conversational postulates have to be postulated for all cases
of implicature, and whether it is feasible or not, they clearly constitute a
legitimate kind of extralexical information available to the native speaker
who will, indeed, interpret (77i) as (77ii) unless some very strong clues to
the contrary are present in the discourse.
The notion of possible world was borrowed by linguistics and the
philosophy of language from mathematical logic where a possible world functions
as a domain at which propositions are defined (see, for instance, Hughes and

SEMANTIC THEORY
75
Cresswell, 1968). Informally, it can be described as a set of all possible states
of affairs or, even more simply, a set of all possible situations. In this sense,
it is similar to Carnap's notion of state-description (1956, 9ff.). The
comprehension of a sentence and the judgment of its appropriateness clearly depend
on the world the sentence is perceived in. Human history can be perceived
discretely as a sequence of different worlds: thus, (79) would not evoke any
possible situation to an American colonial settler (though he would perhaps
understand all the words) but would to a modern New Yorker:
(79) I have only three subway tokens left.
On the other hand, (80) can only be comprehended fully and considered
appropriate in a world which is possible but distinct from the one we know:
(80) I have only three subway tokens, two gym tokens and one love
token left.
An interesting philosophical, logical and linguistical problem concerns
reference and similarity across possible worlds. Is, for instance,
Shakespeare of his own time identical to whom and what we mean by Shakespeare
now? Do such abstract words as good, love, truth, God, etc., or for that
matter, such specific words as car, missile, tank, etc. mean the same or
similar things in the worlds of different epochs and possible worlds -
obviously, a word like tank, for instance, did not mean 'an armored,
self-propelled combat vehicle, armed with cannon and machine guns and moving
on a caterpillar tread' until .the said thing was invented, but even after that,
do we mean the same when we use the word now as what people meant when
they used the word 70 years ago or as what a science-fiction writer may mean
(see Kripke, 1972; Lewis, 1973; van Dijk, 1977, for further discussion)?
Presupposition, semantic recursion, conversational postulates, implica-
tures and indirect speech acts are not the only repositories of extralexical
information which the speaker is aware of and has to internalize in order
to be successful in communication. Inference rules, entailments, conjectures,
cliches, allusions, etc., should perhaps be added to the list of what the
competent speaker should be able to operate with. Even engaged in a bitter
controversy and coming from very different backgrounds, an orthodox and
formal grammarian of the sentence and a typical philosopher of language
seem to express similar views on the importance of extralexical information:
while Chomsky emphasizes the importance of the speaker's "unspecified
assumptions, beliefs, attitudes, and conventions" for the comprehension of
a sentence (1975, 30), Searle puts forward the similar notion of "mutually

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shared background information of the speaker and the hearer, together with
an ability on the part of the hearer to make inferences" (1975, 61).
While these recently developed concepts dealing with various aspects of
extralexical information have been extremely useful for semantic theory in
general, none of them has been incorporated in any form into any existing
formal semantic theory. Nobody has proposed to incorporate any form of
extralexical information in the lexicon (thus rendering it lexical). On the other
hand, no attempt, with a possible exception of Weinreich's ill-defined
'semantic generator' (1966), has been made to define a separate format for
extralexical information within any formal (or, for that matter, informal)
semantic theory outside of its lexicon, either. In fact, as briefly indicated in
Section 1, the recognition of the existence and importance of extralexical
information on Chomsky's and some others' part seems to signify for them
the impossibility of a complete and formal semantic theory.
A format for a semantic theory which does incorporate extralexical
information is proposed in the next section.
3. FORMAT OF SEMANTIC THEORY
The proposed format for a semantic theory incorporating extralexical
information consists of two components which are similar in principle to the
dictionary component and projection-rule component of interpretive
semantics. The first component, the lexicon, contains lexical information which
approximates the speaker's knowledge of the meanings of the words. The
other component, the combinatorial rules, combines the meanings of the
words into the semantic interpretation of the whole sentence to which the
words belong. This second component approximates the ability of the
speaker to derive the meaning of the sentence out of the meanings of the
words which make up the sentence.
From the time the first semantic theories emerged in the context of modern
linguistic theory, it has been more or less taken for granted that one of the
components of any such theory is a set of characterizations of the individual
meanings of separate words, e.g., a lexicon with lexical entries for each word
of the language and each meaning of the word. Katz and Fodor made this
assumption rather obvious by saying, "What has always been unclear about
a semantic theory is what component(s) it contains besides a dictionary (the
emphasis is mine - V.R.)" (1963, 492). Their opponents have never really
doubted the necessity of the lexicon either (see, however, Bar-Hillel, 1967)
- even when the generative semanticists objected against the postulation by

SEMANTIC THEORY
77
Standard Theory of a lexicon in syntax and a dictionary in semantics (see
Raskin, 1980,64, and references there), they always considered one of them
necessary - it was the duplication of effort they objected to.
However, the inclusion of a dictionary in a semantic theory is based on
a strong assumption, namely that the individual word has a meaning. While
seemingly obvious, this assumption has been the center of a recurring
controversy for centuries. Does the word have an inherent meaning or does
it acquire it only when used in a sentence? In the former case, a dictionary
is required. In the latter case, no dictionary can accommodate all the shifting
meanings acquired by words in infinitely different situations of their use, and
the dictionary should be replaced by a system of rules assigning meaning to
words on the basis of conditions of use, probably along the lines of the
setting theory mentioned in Section 1.
Since the ancient Indian theory (in the fourth group, the "nirukta," of the
third canonical collection, the "vedanga," of Vedic documents - see Zvegin-
cev, 1964, 9) which claimed that the word cuckoo only means what is seems
to mean because it can be used in some sentence, various scholars have
maintained this view in different forms. Both traditional semantics (Breal,
1897; Darmesteter, 1887; Paul, 1886) and classical semantics (Ogden and
Richards, 1923; Stern, 1931; Ullmann, 1951) took it for granted that
meaning was an inherent property of the word - to the practical exclusion
of other meaningful linguistic entities (morphemes, phrases, sentences, texts)
from consideration. However, towards the middle of this century,
Wittgenstein founded an extremely influential school of thought in the philosophy
of language according to which language is use and no abstract entity called
'meaning' can be assigned to any word outside the use of this word: "...the
word 'meaning' is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that
'corresponds' to the word. That is to confound the meaning of a name with
the bearer of the name. For a large class of cases - though not for all - in
which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of
a word is its use in the language" (Wittgenstein, 1953, 20). In linguistic
semantics, this idea was most closely reflected in Firth's 'meaning by
collocation' (1957, 198): according to Firth, the meaning of dark contains the
ability of this word to be combined in a phrase with night, and conversely,
the meaning of night contains its ability to be combined with dark. Numerous
other linguists from various schools and trends also related the meaning of
the word to its use explicitly and implicitly (see, for instance, Buck, 1949,
V; Sorensen, 1966, 14; Harris, 1954, 42; Hill. 1958, 412; Benveniste, 1962,
127).

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Behaviorists and neo-behaviorists in semantics have defined meaning in
terms of the situation of use - both negatively, i.e., with the intent to take
meaning out of the domain of linguistic research, and positively, i.e., in an
earnest attempt to shed light on this elusive concept. The most notable
example of the former was, of course, Bloomfield who defined the meaning
of a linguistic form as "the situation in which the speaker utters it and the
response it calls forth in the hearer" (1933, 139). Realizing the extreme
crudity of this definition he added that "we must discriminate between the
non-distinctive features of the situation... and the distinctive, or linguistic,
meaning (the semantic features) which are common to all situations that call
forth the utterance of the linguistic form" (op.cit., 141). For Bloomfield, all
this meant that meaning was to be taken out of consideration (see also
Section 2). However, if this definition is to be taken seriously and positively,
as it was, and I believe still is, done by some followers of Bloomfield (see,
for instance, Fries, 1954 and 1961), then one should expect certain features
to be present in any situation in which a certain word is used, and those
features would then constitute the meaning of the word. Thus, a certain
cluster of features associated by the native speaker with the word shirt should
be present in all the situations evoked by (81):
(81) (i) Bring me my shirt,
(ii) This shirt is frayed,
(iii) I need a new shirt.
(iv) Shirts were rarely worn before the fourteenth century,
(v) What a lovely shirt!
(vi) Do you wear a size 15 shirt? (Alston, 1964, 26)
It is clear that the situations evoked by the examples hardly overlap on
any features though the same word is present in all of them. It is also clear
that any native speaker will recognize the word shirt in all of them as being
used in its ordinary and familiar meaning. If the meaning is clearly there and
the common features are not, the behaviorist account is counter-intuitive
and therefore deficient.
In general, the concept of the word and its inherent meaning is
psychologically real to the native speaker. People talk about the meaning of words, they
look them up in dictionaries, they learn the words from foreign language. It
can, of course, be argued that even a minimal amount of schooling will bias
the native speaker of virtually any language in favor of words because
education depends on the notion and freely uses the term. In spite of all these
reservations one cannot help agreeing with Benveniste (1962,123) who says,

SEMANTIC THEORY
79
"Please permit me, for the sake of convenience, to keep this decried - and
irreplaceable - term."
The question, "Does the word possess meaning in isolation or does it
acquire meaning only in the sentence?" also addressed by Gardiner (1932,
28ff.), is actually similar to the issue of the meaning of the sentence in
isolation as discussed in Section 1. The sentence means something concrete
and specific only in a certain setting but it does have an inherent meaning.
Similarly, the meaning of the word may vary considerably in actual use but
it does characterize the word inherently. An adequate linguistic theory must,
therefore, accommodate both of these non-contradictory properties of the
sentence and of the word, and its ability to do so is one of the tests of its
adequacy.
In fact, there is no contradiction between meaning as an inherent property
of the word and meaning as use. The meaning of every word can be
successfully and non-circularly defined as a set of elementary units of
meaning each of which is the ability of the word to be used in a different
phrase of the language. Developed by Zvegincev (1960; 1968, 41-42 and
116-123; see also Raskin, 1979), the theory of elementary units of meaning,
'monosemes,' was revised and formalized by this author and practically
applied to automatic natural-language processing (Raskin, 1971, 217-259
and 314-355). The proposed script-based semantic theory is a direct
descendant of that approach.
The script-based semantic theory recognizes the meaning of the word and
accounts for it in the lexicon. However, it is done in a way which is rather
different from the usual lexicons associated with formal semantic theories.
In fact, the treatment of the word meaning by the script-based theory is
especially compatible with the view that meaning is use (see Section 4).
The second component of the script-based semantic theory is the
combinatorial rules. Their basic function is to combine the meanings of the words
which make up the sentence and which are characterized in the lexicon into
the semantic interpretation, or simply meaning, of the whole sentence. As
described in Chapter 2, Section 2, and in Section 1 of the present chapter,
the meaning of the sentence calculated in this way should coincide with the
meaning assigned to it intuitively by the native speaker. This means that in
view of (45), the combinatorial rules should produce two or more different
interpretations for an ambiguous sentence, no interpretation for an
anomalous sentence, and identical interpretations for paraphrases. The script-
based semantic theory takes these requirements for an absolute minimum
and adds a few more to them (82):

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(82) (i) to detect and mark the source(s) of ambiguity, if any, much
more explicitly than in interpretive semantics or other
semantic theories
(ii) to disambiguate a potentially ambiguous sentence in a
non-ambiguous linguistic or extralinguistic context
(iii) to detect and mark the source(s) of anomaly, if any, much
more explicitly than in other semantic theories
(iv) to produce semantic interpretations of deviant sentences
approximating those perceived by native speakers (cf.
Katz, 1964; Ziff, 1964)
(v) to produce associations along the lines of those which are
evoked by the sentence in the speakers' minds
(vi) to ask questions soliciting more information if the sentence
raises them and to answer them if the information is
recursively available
(vii) to detect and interpret implicatures where present and
potential implicatures wherever possible
(viii) to discover the presuppositions of the sentence, if any
fix) to characterize the world in which the situation described
by the sentence takes place, in the aspects pertinent to the
sentence.
Naturally, the combinatorial rules depend heavily on what it is they are
combining, and it is the script-based lexical entries from the lexicon
associated with the theory that enable it to achieve (82). However, the combinatorial
rules should be both powerful and subtle in handling, shaping and rubricis-
ing the semantic information provided by the lexicon. The operations of (82)
will not, for the most part, be performed by the theory separately, one after
the other. Rather, the theory will aim to produce a formal account of the
context of the sentence in a broad but delimitable sense, and the result of
each operation from (82) must be easily identified as a certain part of this
context. It will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, if not obvious by now, that
no semantic theory short of achieving (82) can be adequately applied to the
analysis of humor.
The lexicon of the script-based semantic theory and the combinatorial
rules are described in the next two sections.
4. SCRIPT-BASED LEXICON
The lexicon of the proposed semantic theory is based on the notion of script

SEMANTIC THEORY
81
(see also Raskin, 1981 a). The script is a large chunk of semantic information
surrounding the word or evoked by it. The script is a cognitive structure
internalized by the native speaker and it represents the native speaker's
knowledge of a small part of the world. Every speaker has internalized rather
a large repertoire of scripts of "common sense" which represent his/her
knowledge of certain routines, standard procedures, basic situations, etc.,
for instance, the knowledge of what people do in certain situations, how they
do it, in what order, etc. Beyond the scripts of "common sense" every native
speaker may, and usually does, have individual scripts determined by his/her
individual background and subjective experience and restricted scripts
which the speaker shares with a certain group, e.g., family, neighbors,
colleagues, etc., but not with the whole speech community of native speakers
of the same language.
What is labeled here 'script' has been called 'schema,' 'frame,' 'daemon,'
etc. On the other hand, the term 'script' has been sometimes reserved for
a temporal sequence of frames. The notion has been used extensively in a
number of adjacent fields such as psychology, sociology, anthropology,
artificial intelligence, education (see, for instance, Bartlett, 1972; Bateson,
1972; Goffman, 1974; Charniak, 1972, 1975; Schank, 1975a,b; Schank and
Colby, 1973; Schank and Abelson, 1977; Minsky, 1975; Chafe, 1977;
Tannen, 1979; Freedle, 1977, 1979). I will not elaborate here on the
terminological differences between the use of the term 'script' here and the
use of the same or similar terms elsewhere. However, in Section 6, I will
discuss one important aspect in which the scripts as used here differ from
the ones used elsewhere in principle even if not in format or design.
Formally or technically, every script is a graph with lexical nodes and
semantic links between the nodes. In fact, all the scripts of the language
make up a single continuous graph, and the lexical entry of a word is a
domain within this graph around the word in question as the central node
of the domain. Somewhat tentatively and simplistically, (83) represents a
domain of the continuous graph which (partially) contains a few lexical
entries - for color, artifact, and the other italicized words.
[+Human] Make [-Animate] Shade

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CHAPTER THREE
As shown in (83), the links characterize the relations between the nodes,
often but not necessarily in terms ot the roles assigned to one node with
regard to the other. Two important features of the scripts not shown in (83)
are the distance and the emphasis. The first feature involves the relative
length of the links between the nodes - thus the link between color and
artifact is, in fact, much longer than those between artifact and the three
nodes under it, which reflects the fact that the idea of color is much less
related to the meaning of artifact than the situation of a human producing
something inanimate. The second feature emphasizes certain nodes with
respect to others - thus in the domain of the graph which is the lexical entry
for artifact, the node [-Animate] should be emphasized to reflect the fact that
it is this node which is actually the central part of the meaning in question.
The fact that the constituents of the sentence evoke pieces of semantic
information which go beyond the usual lexical entries for these constituents
in the existing ordinary dictionaries or in the lexicons of the existing formal
semantic theories has already been illustrated by the examples of (64),
especially when compared to (65). Similarly, the native speaker will
understand (84i) and (84ii) differently - the former will not raise any question as
to the reason for John's failure while the latter will (in other words, (84ii)
will be recursive where (84i) will not):
(84) (i) John tried to eat his hamburger with a spoon but did not
succeed,
(ii) John tried to eat his hamburger with a fork and knife but
did not succeed.
The semantic difference between the two sentences cannot be accounted
for in terms of an ordinary lexicon, whether formalized or not. Thus, a
typical dictionary such as Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1976) would
describe the appropriate meanings of the key words as (85):
(85) (i) EAT vt: 1. To take in through the mouth as
food: ingest, chew and swallow in
turn
(ii) HAMBURGER n: 2. A sandwich consisting of a patty
of hamburger [ground beef] in a
split bun
(iii) SPOON n: 1. An eating or cooking implement
consisting of a small shallow
bowl with a handle

SEMANTIC THEORY
83
Neither these lexical items nor the ones in terms of which they are
described, e.g., sandwich, beef, bun, contain any information about the fact
that hamburgers do not belong to the class of liquid or dry substances that
can be eaten with a spoon. However, it is exactly this piece of semantic
information which makes the speaker's perception of (84i) different from
that of (84ii). Since this semantic information is obviously available to the
native speaker, its source is a script which includes a small domain like (86i).
The full script for spoon will also include additional links and nodes such as
(86ii-iv):
(86) (i) ... eatK measure stirK
InstrumentN^^- InstrumentX------ Instruments
spoon J^~— Object Object ^-Object
^matter*
I
Object
I
pour
(ii) spoon :—► cutlery ► utensil ► ...
Hyponym Hyponym Hyponym
(iii) spoon
Equivalency
-► fork «-
Equivalency
-► Knife
(iv) spoon*
Material Material Material Material
wood metal plastic

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CHAPTER THREE
The names assigned to the links both in (83) and (86): 'object,' 'subject,'
'action,' 'instrument,' 'material,' 'hyponym,' 'equivalency' [membership in
the same category], 'value' can be treated simply as convenience terms for
the purposes of this book. Generally, the theory resorts to two alternative
ways to accommodate this type of information: 1) postulating a number of
standard semantic relations along these lines and trying to keep them at a
limited number and at roughly the same level of abstractness in order to
avoid the arbitrariness and unwieldiness of Mel'Cuk's "sense <-+ text" model
(1974, 1979 - see also Section 6), or 2) postulating abstract, non-lexical
nodes corresponding each to one type or subtype of link and having all the
pertinent lexical nodes connected with those non-lexical nodes by the same
unnamed link. According to the latter alternative, each verb, for instance,
will be connected by an unnamed link to one of the non-lexical nodes marked
'Subject' which will contain exactly the kind of subject the verb takes, e.g.,
[ + Animate] for sleep. Both alternatives are interestingly compatible with,
though clearly distinct from, Fillmore's early idea of deep cases (1968). Both
alternatives presuppose a multidimensional graph and, given the complexity
and heterogeneity of semantic information involved, it is naive to expect
anything simpler than that.
Every word of the sentence is characterized by a limited domain of the
continuous semantic graph. Every word evokes this domain, and obviously,
the most adjacent nodes, i.e., the nodes connected to the word-itself node
by the shortest links, are evoked more strongly than the less adjacent nodes.
In principle, since the graph is continuous and all-inclusive, every word
evokes everything which is there in the graph, and this seems to be a good
approximation of the native speaker's semantic performance. In practice,
however, the limits of the evocation process are determined by the purposes
of the semantic analysis, and the rest of the potentially evocable information
is disregarded. For the purposes of the analysis of humor here, the evoked
domain can be limited to the word-itself node and to one "circle" of
surrounding nodes connected with the word by a limited number of such
essential links as 'subject,' 'object,' 'activity,' etc. (87i-ii) are representative
examples of the greatly simplified, streamlined and discretized format of
script as used in this book.

SEMANTIC THEORY
85
(87) (i) DOCTOR
Subject: [ + Human] [ + Adult]
Activity: > Study medicine
= Receive patients: patient comes or doctor
visits
doctor listens to
complaints
doctor examines patient
= Cure disease: doctor diagnoses disease
doctor prescribes treatment
= (Take patient's money)
Place: > Medical School
= Hospital or doctor's office
Time: > Many years
= Every day
= Immediately
Condition: Physical contact
(ii) LOVER
Subject: [ + Human] [ + Adult] [ + Sex: x]
Activity: Make love
Object: [ + Human] [ + Adult] [ + Sex: x]
Place: Secluded
Time: > Once
= Regularly
Condition: If subject or object married, spouse(s) should
not know
('>' stands for 'past,' * =' for 'present')
The scripts of (87) are not very elementary in the sense that they
themselves utilize the material of other scripts, which is usually the case with
scripts. It is important to understand that in the full-fledged script-based
semantic theory, the scripts are constructed from the elementary level up in
order to avoid the typical lexicographic circularity.
5. COMBINATORIAL RULES
Every word of the sentence evokes a script or scripts with which it is
associated. Obviously, the node for an ambiguous word will be the center
of two or more domains of the continuous graph, and, in principle, each of

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CHAPTER THREE
these domains will be evoked when the word is uttered. The main function
of the combinatorial rules in the script-based semantic theory is to combine
the scripts evoked by the words of the sentence into one or more compatible
combinations. An unambiguous sentence will be associated with just one
compatible combination of evoked scripts, an /i-way ambiguous sentence
with n compatible combinations. The semantic interpretation of the sentence
does not coincide with the compatible combination(s) of evoked scripts but
is determined by it/them. (88i) below is a blend of two hackneyed examples
from semantic works of the last two decades, the word bachelor and the
sentence the man hit the colorful ball, first discussed by Katz and Fodor
(1963) and then by their friends and foes alike. With another potentially
ambiguous word, paralyzed, thrown in, (88i) is a representative example of
the ambiguous sentence treated in terms of the evoked scripts by the
combinatorial rules. In (88ii), the evoked scripts are assigned tentative and almost
arbitrary but self-explanatory labels for the sake of this discussion. (88iii)
lists all the potentially compatible combinations of the evoked scripts (with
the scripts for the, DEFINITE, UNIQUE, and GENERIC - cf. (92) -
omitted for the sake of simplicity):
(88)
(i) The paralyzed bachelor
(ii) 1. DISEASE 1. MARRIAGE
2. MORAL 2. ACADEME
3. KNIGHT
4. SEAL
(iii) 11111, 11112, 11212, 11222, 12111, 12112, 12212,
12222,
13111, 13112, 13212, 13222, 14111,
21111, 21112, 21212, 21222, 22111, 22112, 22212,
22222,
23111,23112,23212,23222
The 12 scripts listed in (88ii) can be theoretically combined in 64 ways.
The combinatorial rules will reduce this number to the 25 potentially
compatible combinations listed in the obvious way in (88iii). Thus, 11212, for
instance, is a combination of Script 1 for paralyzed, Script 1 for bachelor,
Script 2 for hit, Script 1 for colorful and Script 2 for ball, and it is paraphrased
below as (89i). 14111 and 23222 are paraphrased as (89ii) and (89iii),
hit the
1. COLLISION
2. DISCOVERY
colorful
1. COLOR
2.
EVALUATION
ball
1. ARTIFACT
2. ASSEMBLY

SEMANTIC THEORY
87
respectively:
A never-married man who couldn't move (some of) his
limbs discovered (found himself at) a large dancing party
abundant with bright colors.
A fur seal which couldn't move (some of) its limbs pushed
(with its nose?) a spheric object painted in bright colors.
A young knight who served under the standard of another
knight and who founds that he was unable to act (a
pacifist?) discovered (found himself at) a large and picturesque
dancing party.
While it does follow from (88) that (88i) is potentially 25-ways ambiguous,
for most native speakers it would be hard to discover all these ambiguities
without their being prompted by the appropriate obvious contexts (see
Section 1). Whenever (if ever) (88i) is actually used, the actual linguistic and
extralinguistic context will disambiguate it for any native speaker, and the
combinatorial rules should be able to do the same, otherwise the theory will
lose its adequacy. This requirement on the combinatorial rules is just one
of the many listed between (45) and (82), and (90) is an example on which
the functioning of the combinatorial rules will be non-technically illustrated:
(90) I got up in the morning, took a shower and made myself some
breakfast. Then I went out and started the car.
(91) Then I went out and started the car.
(90) is a short discourse, and the combinatorial rules will be applied to
its second sentence, repeated as (91) for a convenient reference, and
demonstrated to handle all the required items in (45) and especially (82).
First, let us list the scripts evoked by the words of (91) - for the sake of
simplicity again, they are not really given but rather alluded to in an informal
and self-explanatory way:
(92) (i) THEN adv: 1. At that time
2. Next in order of time
3. In that case
(ii) I pron: 1. Speaker or writer
(iii) GO OUT v: 1. Leave shelter
2. Entertain oneself outside one's home
(iv) AND conj: 1. [Connection or addition]
(89) (i)
(ii)
(iii)

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(v) START vt: 1. Cause to move
2. Bring into being
3. Begin the use
(vi) THE det: 1. [Definite]
2. [Unique]
3. [Generic]
(vii) CAR n: 1. Horse carriage
2. Automobile
3. Railway carriage
4. Cage of an elevator
At Stage Zero of the process of semantic interpretation of (91), the scripts
evoked by its words will include a few more scripts unlisted in (92), e.g., the
adjective script for then as in the then secretary of state or the intransitive
script(s) for start as in he started when he heard the shot. The combinatorial
rules filter out these syntactically inappropriate scripts on the basis of the
syntactic structure associated with (91):
Adv NP
Pron
then I
The part of the scripts which is most related to the syntactic information
of (93) is the set of named links or, alternatively, non-lexical nodes discussed
in connection with (86) in Section 4. Combining this information from the
scripts with (93), the combinatorial rules get rid of those scripts evoked by
the words in (91) which are syntactically incompatible with (93).
At Stage One, the combinatorial rules have to determine which mode of
communication (91) is uttered in. If there are no clues to the contrary or,
most often, no explicit clues at all, the combinatorial rules introduce the
bona-fide communication mode (cf. Grice, 1975; Searle, 1969; Raskin, 1979,
VP^
VP1 Conj ^VP2
/\
V NP
/\
Det N
I I
went out and started \ the car

SEMANTIC THEORY
89
328), viz. the "ordinary," information-conveying mode (no lying, acting,
joking, etc.). In this mode, unlike Katz and Fodor's projection rules, the
combinatorial rules are geared not to come up with all the potential*
ambiguities, as was done in (88), but on the contrary, to disambiguate a (-n
always) potentially ambiguous sentence to exactly one, most probable
meaning. For this purpose, all the scripts evoked by a word are divided into
two parts. The first part contains exactly one unmarked script (for instance,
the most frequent one); the second part contains all the other, marked,
scripts - the marking there can be hierarchical, from the least marked to the
most marked. Unless some clues to the contrary are present in the context,
the combinatorial rules will always push the unmarked script for the word
forward. If it turns out to be impossible (see below), the combinatorial rules
change the marking of the scripts for the word temporarily, for the purposes
of the processed discourse, and declare another script unmarked. It is
assumed here that the scripts with italicized numbers are treated as unmarked
in (92). The combinatorial rules can then be expected to come up with a
semantic interpretation for (91) which can be loosely paraphrased as (94):
(94) After having done something else, the speaker left a shelter and
caused (the engine of) some definite car to move.
After having used the unmarked scripts for the words of the sentence, the
combinatorial rules have to check whether those scripts involve any
conditions on their use and if so, whether these conditions are satisfied. Thus, in
the case of then there should be a mention of a previous action in the
discourse, and (90) satisfies this condition. However, in the case of the, the
script DEFINITE can only be used if the discourse contains a previous
reference to an object of the class denoted by the noun following the. This
condition is not satisfied, and the combinatorial rules switch to the other
script of the concluding that the car in question is unique for the speaker,
i.e., the only car the speaker has at his/her disposal.
The combinatorial rules will do some remarking of the scripts on their own
- if, for instance, the text is about railways, then at the beginning of its
processing some clue will indicate that the intended script for car is, in fact,
Script 3 of (92), and then the combinatorial rules will declare that script
unmarked for the current discourse. The marking of the scripts for a word
also changes in the course of history - thus, some two hundred years ago,
the unmarked script for car was apparently Script 1 of (92).
On the basis of other features of the involved scripts, the combinatorial

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rules will generate the statements of (95) as the presuppositions of (91) and
the statements of (96) as the probable presuppositions of (91).
(95) (i) The speaker is human.
(ii) The speaker is able-bodied,
(iii) The speaker is past infancy,
(iv) The speaker knows something about cars.
(96) (i) The shelter is the speaker's home,
(ii) The car is very near the shelter,
(iii) The speaker has started cars before.
The combinatorial rules will also generate the inferences of (97) as well
as the probable inferences of (98):
(97) (i) The speaker had the use of the car and the (ignition) key
to it.
(ii) The car was not inside the shelter.
(98) (i) The speaker intended to go somewhere by car.
(ii) The speaker probably did not come back in.
The combinatorial rules will also generate the question of (99). They will
fail to answer it on the basis of the previous discourse and will attempt to
answer it on the basis of the information about the world accumulated in
the process of semantic information of the previous discourse, if any, or
semantic information postulated in advance, if any (see below). If no answer
is available to (99), the combinatorial rules will record (99) as unanswered
and will attempt to answer it every time new information is obtained in or
around the discourse.
(99) Who is the speaker?
The combinatorial rules will list every lexical node which is contained
within the selected scripts for the sentence, collect the scripts for those words
and put them in a special storage marked ASSOCIATIONS. In the case
of (91), this will probably involve the scripts for such words as you, he, she,
etc., time, shelter, move, in, bring, vehicle, engine.
The combinatorial rules will also add the obtained semantic interpretation
for (91) to another special storage marked WORLD INFORMATION. The
latter operation involves comparison of the information contained in the
semantic information for (91) with the information already stored in
WORLD INFORMATION. The main goal of the comparison is to use the
information in this storage to disambiguate the sentence if the combinatorial

SEMANTIC THEORY
91
rules have failed to do it so far. This will not be necessary perhaps for (91)
in bona-fide communication but it will be necessary for a syntactically
ambiguous sentence such as (100 = 61) because the instruction to use the
unmarked scripts in the process of its semantic interpretation will still
preserve its potential ambiguity as either (lOli) or (lOlii).
(100) Flying planes can be dangerous
(101) (i) It happens that flying planes is dangerous,
(ii) It happens that flying planes are dangerous.
In the case of (100), if WORLD INFORMATION contains some
statement to the effect that planes are the subject of discourse, the combinatorial
rules will disambiguate (100) as (lOli). If, on the contrary, the discourse is
on flying as an activity, they will disambiguate the sentence as (lOlii).
On the other hand, WORLD INFORMATION may already contain any
one or more of the statements in (102), which, of course, will contradict (91).
Then the combinatorial rules will have to opt for one of the alternatives in
(103).
(102) (i) The speaker does not have a car at his/her disposal,
(ii) The speaker is outside.
(iii) The car is already started,
(iv) The car is a railway car.
(103) (i) Declare the sentence anomalous and list a conflict with
one of the statements in (102) as the reason
(ii) Change the mode of communication to 'non-bona-fide'
(iii) Determine the scripts shared by (91) and the conflicting
statement in (102) and check whether the conflict can be
resolved by switching to another script of the same word
The last two options in (103) would involve going back to Stage One
above and starting the process of semantic interpretation from there.
Option (ii) would mean considerable changes in the described procedure,
the most important of which is the different goal with regard to
disambiguation: the combinatorial rules would no longer be instructed to
disambiguate each sentence to just one meaning by using the unmarked scripts.
The marking may be kept, but the instruction will be to obtain all the
compatible combinations of scripts and thus all the potential meanings of
the sentence.
In various forms ofnon-bona-fide communication, the combinatorial rules
are instructed not to discard syntactically or semantically deviant sentences

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but rather to introduce minor changes in the scripts causing the deviance and
calculate the semantic interpretations conditional on these changes. This
will often lead to metaphors, implicatures and language innovations. In other
words, in the non-bona-fide modes, the combinatorial rules will slightly
modify their format with regard to the operations described above and also
assume some additional responsibilities. We will illustrate the work of the
combinatorial rules in a non-bona-fide mode in Chapter 4 on the example
of humor as one such mode. The functioning of the combinatorial rules will
be also demonstrated in somewhat more technical detail there as applied to
the semantic analysis of joke-carrying texts.
6. JUSTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF SEMANTIC THEORY
As shown in Chapter 2, Section 2, the ultimate goal of any linguistic theory
is to describe the mental mechanisms underlying language. Much more
realistically, linguistic theory tries to model the native speaker's competence
in some one significant aspect. In other words, when the output of the theory
(sentences, descriptions, semantic interpretations, etc.) is compared with
that of the native speaker, an ideal match should be obtained between certain
subclasses of objects within the two outputs, and the subclasses are
distinguished according to a certain important feature assigned to those objects
both by the theory and by the native speaker. Thus, if the assigned feature
is grammatically - as it almost invariably is within transformational
grammar - then what the theory characterizes as a grammatical sentence should
be also perceived intuitively as such by the native speaker. If a theory passes
this test, then according to Chomsky, it reaches the level of descriptive
adequacy (1965, 24-27).
It has been argued elsewhere that a good linguistic theory cannot be based
on any single feature, especially not on grammaticality (see Raskin, 1976;
cf. McCawley, 1976). A good semantic theory must, in fact, be based on a
number of semantic abilities of the speaker which manifest themselves in the
speaker's intuitive judgments of the sentence. Besides the feature of
grammaticality, revised to include meaningfulness and elements of
pragmatics (see Section 1) and manifested in the grammaticality-awareness of the
native speaker, other semantic abilities can be shown to include truth-value-
awareness, presupposition-awareness, coherency-awareness,
context-awareness, and appropriateness-awareness (see Raskin, 1978c and 1979e). The
output of such a theory should match that of the speaker in all of these
different though related aspects, and the level of descriptive adequacy is only

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achieved if all of the featured mentioned both in (45) and in (82) are the same
for every single sentence the theory interprets semantically. The script-based
semantic theory is certainly designed to meet this requirement. However, this
is not good enough.
A descriptively adequate theory may be too crude or too superficial, for
instance, if the assigned feature it is based upon is too crude, superficial or,
worse, irrelevant. A descriptively adequate theory can be none of the above
but still inferior to some other descriptively adequate theory. In this case,
the one that achieves the level of explanatory adequacy is preferred over the
other. Explanatory adequacy is only achieved when the theory is based on
entities and relations which are close to the ones which determine the
speaker's performance. If this happens, the theory actually matches the
speaker's intuition better than some other theory.
No other semantic theory is available for comparison with the script-
based semantic theory since the level of descriptive adequacy postulated for
the latter between (45) and (82) is significantly higher than that achieved by
its predecessors. However, the concern for explanatory adequacy is very
important for this research. It is firmly believed here that if an earnest
attempt is not made to demonstrate that the postulated theoretical concepts
get as close as possible to the linguistic reality the theory is trying to match,
the theory will fail in the long run, e.g., in attempts to extrapolate it to other
data, even if it seems "to do the job" on the data it is being applied to in
this particular case - in other words, a linguistic theory which is not justified
in this sense is going to be ad hoc and, therefore, not even a theory as this
term is used here.
The script-based semantic theory should be justified with regard to both
of its components, the scripts and the combinatorial rules. For the purposes
of this application of the theory to humor, it will certainly suffice to justify
the combinatorial rules in terms of their end product: if the obtained
semantic interpretation(s) matches (match) the meaning(s) of the sentence,
then the combinatorial rules are adequate. The justification of any
combinatorial rule consists mainly of the application of this criterion, anyway, but
it also includes the step-by-step matching of the intermediate applications
of the rules to the scripts with the speakers' intuitions about those
intermediate results, and we do not need to go into these complicated procedures
here.
The most important part of the justification procedure for the theory is,
however, the justification of the format and content of the scripts. The best
way to do this seems to be by using the most popular justification device used
by linguists both consciously and unconsciously, namely by showing that a

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deviant sentence results if something is not taken into account. Thus, given
a certain script presented in a certain format, for instance, (87i), one can
come up with any number of sentences such as (104), each of which violates
the script by contradicting a certain element of semantic information
contained there:
(104) (i) This kestrel is our village doctor,
(ii) This baby is our village doctor.
(iii) *Our village doctor has never treated a patient in his life,
(iv) *A deaf doctor is the best doctor,
(v) *Our doctor never examines his patients,
(vi) *Our doctor never knows what is wrong with you.
(vii) *I am not going to cure you - I am a doctor,
(viii) *After elementary school, I took a three-week crash course
and became a doctor,
(ix) *As your doctor, I would like very much to meet you finally
after 40 years of active correspondence.
According to Grice's cooperative principle (1975), the hearer of every
such sentence will make an effort to treat it as non-deviant if he/she
possibly can. However, if no clues are contained in the discourse to indicate
that the sentences in (104) are not meant literally - and in bona-fide
communication, clues to this effect are unlikely to be forthcoming - the hearer will
conclude that each of the sentences is odd, deviant, anomalous. To the
extent that this is the case, each of these sentences justifies the inclusion of
a certain semantic element in an appropriate rubric of the script.
(104i-ii) are the simplest because they violate a feature of the subject,
[ + Human] and [ + Adult], respectively. Such violations should even be
detected and filtered out by the strict subcategorization and selection
restriction rules, operating on the lexicon of the Standard Theory (Chomsky,
1965). The deviance of the other examples cannot be formally accounted for
by any non-script-based semantic theory.
(104iii) violates an important element listed under activity, which requires
of a doctor to see and treat patients - whoever does not, hardly qualifies for
the degree and/or position. Similarly, (104iv) renders another element of
activity difficult or impossible to carry out, namely, for the doctor to listen
to the patient's complains. (104v-vii) also involve various elements listed
under activity, and they are self-explanatory. (104viii) involves a time
restriction which refers to the past and requires that a few years be spent on

SEMANTIC THEORY
95
studying medicine. Finally, (104ix) violates the crucial condition of a face-to-
face contact for the interaction between a doctor and a patient to become
possible.
It is obvious that not all of the sentences in (104) are equally deviant.
Everyone of them can be interpreted as metaphorical, facetious and/or
involving an implicature. On their literal meaning, however, some of them
are quite difficult to interpret though an elaborate construction can save
them in marginal cases, e.g., a very competent doctor who lost his/her
hearing very recently, after many years of successful practice, can perhaps
continue his activities with the patients he knows so well that he can
diagnose their diseases without talking to them. However, the very need of
a special situation and an elaborate explanation underscores the (partial)
semantical abnormality of (104).
The inclusion of an element of semantic information in a script is
considered justified if there exists a sentence such that it contradicts this element of
the script and is deviant for this reason alone. Conversely, if a semantic ally
deviant sentence involving a script does not contradict any element of it, the
semantic information contained in the script is not complete and should be
supplemented with the element in question.
As was mentioned in Section 4, the concept of script has been widely used
recently in a variety of language-related fields. One important difference
between its use there and here is that, outside of the script-based semantic
theory, no systematic effort has been made to justify the format or content
of the postulated scripts. Scripts are postulated "to do a job," and if the job
seems to be done, if "the system works," the scripts are considered to be
the right ones. Not only does that mean that another "job," even of a similar
kind, may be impossible to do with the help of the conceptual equipment,
scripts, rules, etc., developed for the previous "job" because, of course, such
an approach is ad hoc in principle, but even more crucially, one can never
be certain that the job is indeed done or, more precisely, that the job which
is done is the job one wanted done.
On the surface of it, when the system is taught to behave like a restaurant
patron and the appropriate scripts have been introduced into it (see, for
instance, Schank, 1975a), it seems to be easy to check whether it does
behave as one or not. In fact, however, unless the degree to which the system
understands the situation is carefully controlled, it may successfully simulate
human linguistic performance in a limited number of situations by generating
the right sentences without really understanding them, and the researcher or,
more likely, the users of the system can be fooled. As a result, the system

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will be unable to handle an ever so slightly unusual situation which a
restaurant patron may also find himself/herself in.
One of the most dramatic examples of a clever ad hoc system was provided
by Weizenbaum (1966). His 'Eliza' simulated very successfully a dialogue
between a patient and a psychoanalyst of a particular ('non-contributive')
persuasion. Eliza, the system, was the shrink, and the human operator was
the patient. The patient could type in any kind of statement, e.g., (105i), and
Eliza was programmed to respond appropriately, e.g., (105ii):
(105) (i) I miss my mother so...
(ii) Tell me more about your family.
However, in processing (105i), Eliza did not, nor tried to, achieve any
degree of understanding. In fact, (105ii) was one of a few alternative
responses triggered by the word mother. Eliza cleverly created an illusion of
a reasonably intelligent dialogue but was not actually engaged in one - as
a result, it could be easily tricked. When a few years ago, playing with Eliza,
as many computer users have enjoyed doing for almost two decades, I typed
in (106i), knowing, of course, how Eliza would process it, Eliza promptly
generated the same response of (105ii).
(106) I don't miss my mother and I hate talking about my family.
Naturally, Eliza could not understand the inappropriateness of her
response. In most cases, however, with a few clever hedging, stalling and
repeating devices, it performed very well - in other words, "did the job."
When almost a decade later, the psychoanalysts started talking about Eliza
and its therapeutic value, Weizenbaum panicked and tried to explain, out
of intellectual honesty, that the system was not based on understanding. As
a result, he found himself in a peculiar position in which he attacked his own
system and others defended it against him (see Weizenbaum, 1977). That
was a clear case when many people, including experts in the field in which
Eliza pretended to perform, could not distinguish between her "doing the
job" and not "doing the job."
Controlling the degree of understanding of a computer system using
scripts is, in fact, hardly distinguishable from the problem of script
justification as it has been dealt with here. If, for the smooth functioning of the
system, it should approximate the degree of understanding exhibited by the
native speaker, the scripts should better approximate the cognitive structures
internalized by the native speaker. The serious problem which arises in this
connection is that of the feasibility of the approach.

SEMANTIC THEORY
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The problem of feasibility can be shown to have at least two distinct
facets: the resolution problem, i.e., the possibility to distinguish scripts from
non-scripts, and the finiteness problem, i.e., whether it is reasonable at all
to think of a semantic theory and its lexicon as associated with a finite but
more or less complete and consistent body of scripts. The former problem
has been largely taken care of in our discussion of script justification above.
We will conclude this section and the chapter with a brief discussion of the
finiteness problem.
It should be noted that linguistics in general has not so far been overly
concerned about either of the two facets or, for that matter, about feasibility
of any form. I know of no systematic attempts on the part of linguists to
justify the proposed conceptual apparata, either in their entirety or in terms
of their undefined primitives, otherwise than comparing them to other,
equally unjustified, concepts of apparata. The general tendency in linguistics
recently has been to postulate a certain conceptual apparatus and to
demonstrate that it helps solve a certain problem. This has been backed with
claims (see Chomsky, 1965, 19) that no rigorous procedure can be proposed
for what we might call "linguistic heuristics."
As far as scripts are concerned, however, a certain negative assumption
has prevailed for many years, hindering considerably the development of
linguistic theory in this direction, namely that it is impossible to structure and
use in linguistics our entire knowledge of the world, and, therefore, that no
script-based theory is possible (cf. Section 1). The first half of this
assumption may well be true; the second part, however, is, one would hope, false
and, in any case, not entailed by the first. It is obvious that our entire
civilization is a large number of scripts, that the more scripts one has
internalized the deeper one's comprehension, which could be amply
illustrated by jokes, literary allusions and other texts inaccessible to the
non-initiated. It is equally clear that to try and formulate a theory incorporating all the
existing scripts would not perhaps be practical. However, this is not at all
necessary for the construction of a successful script-based semantic theory.
A theory can be feasible without nfeeting this unreasonable demand of
universality which cannot be met by any recognized theory or technique in
linguistics.
Three aspects of feasibility can be briefly outlined with regard to the
proposed semantic theory.
First, as in the case of almost all of the current theories and approaches,
a number of scripts can be simply postulated and demonstrated to provide
a solution for a linguistic problem which cannot be solved (at all or at least

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as easily) without them. One example of such a problem is the treatment of
(63-65) or, for that matter, (84). Another example of a problem to which
scripts must be applied is the problem of the theoretical ambiguity of a
sentence in isolation and its disambiguation in discourse (see Sections 1 and
5).
Secondly, it is quite revealing to study a restricted sublanguage of a natural
language in its entirety, together with the world associated with this
sublanguage, in the framework of script-oriented semantics. Both the
inventory of scripts is more limited in a sublanguage and the problem of
Emeneau's patterning of reality seems to be much more manageable in the
limited world served by the sublanguage, e.g., football reports, weather
forecasts, or texts in a very limited field of science or technology (see
Emeneau, 1950; for a detailed discussion of sublanguages see Raskin, 1971).
In a sublanguage, it is possible to study all the scripts in their hierarchy -
from the most elementary "common sen sic al" ones to the most sophisticated
and complex scripts.
Thirdly, and more interestingly, a heuristic procedure of script discovery
can be outlined in terms of comparing the semantic interpretation of a
sentence obtainable on the basis of an "ordinary" lexicon and the
semantic/pragmatic meaning actually perceived by the speaker - the way it was
outlined with regard to (84). The discrepancy between the two
interpretations is to be filled with an appropriate script or set of scripts which is
discovered in this way.
The proof of the pudding is, of course, in the eating, and the justifiability
and feasibility of the script-based semantic theory will be demonstrated in
terms of its applicability to the analysis of verbal humor. This will be done
in the subsequent chapters primarily with regard to the first aspect of
feasibility mentioned above. However, Chapters 5-7 dealing with particular
kinds of humor will touch on the second aspect as well. The third aspect has
been, and will be further, illustrated throughout the book, with the exception
of Chapter 1.

CHAPTER FOUR
SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, the script-based semantic theory briefly outlined in Chapter
3 is applied to the analysis of verbal humor. After the Main Hypothesis is
formulated in Section 1 and the joke-telling mode of communication is
discussed in its relation to bona-fide communication in Section 2, the notion
of script overlap, the crucial relation of script oppositeness and the triggers
which produce the switch from the one script to the other are investigated
in Sections 3,4, and 5, respectively. In Section 6 a sample joke is analyzed
as completely as possible in terms of the theory. Section 7 demonstrates how
the script-based semantic theory of humor can accommodate the
observations made in the informal theories of humor which were reviewed in
Chapter 1. Some apparent counterexamples to the Main Hypothesis are
discussed in Section 8. Section 9 deals with the principles of joke
construction prompted by the theory.
l. Main hypothesis
The Main Hypothesis on which this approach is based can be formulated
as (107):
(107) A text can be characterized as a single-joke-carrying text if both
of the conditions in (108) are satisfied.
(108) (i) The text is compatible, fully or in part, with two different
scripts
(ii) The two scripts with which the text is compatible are
opposite in a special sense defined in Section 4
The two scripts with which some text is compatible are said to overlap fully
or in part on this text.
According to (107), therefore, the set of two conditions in (108) is proposed
as the necessary and sufficient conditions for a text to be funny.
Thus, the simple joke in (109 = 21) is at least partially compatible with
both of the scripts DOCTOR and LOVER (87), i.e., (87i) and (87ii) overlap
99

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on (109) in part. The first sentence of (109) evokes and corroborates (87i).
The second sentence loses some of the compatibility with (87i) and acquires
the strong compatibility with (87ii) instead:
(109) "Is the doctor at home?" the patient asked in his bronchial
whisper. "No," the doctor's young and pretty wife whispered in
reply. "Come right in."
The two overlapping scripts are perceived as opposite in a certain sense,
and it is this oppositeness which creates the joke. Obviously, an overlap is
not a sufficient condition for a text to be funny - in fact, any ambiguous text
is compatible with two or more scripts but certainly not every ambiguous text
is funny (cf. (46i-ii), (48), (53), (61)). According to the Main Hypothesis, a
script overlap is only a necessary condition for a text to be funny, and any
joke which can be demonstrated not to evoke two distinct scripts should be
considered a counterexample to this approach to the analysis of verbal
humor (see also Section 8).
The basic aspects of the Main Hypothesis are discussed in the subsequent
sessions. This discussion is interrupted in what is hoped to be a helpful way
by a detailed example of an application of the script-based semantic theory
to the analysis of verbal humor.
2. JOKE TELLING AS A NON-BONA-FIDE COMMUNICATION
Joke telling as a non-bona-fide communication occurs in four different
situations created by the combination of the two possibilities in (110) with
the two possibilities in (111):
(110) (i) The speaker makes the joke unintentionally
(ii) The speaker makes the joke intentionally
(111) (i) The hearer does not expect a joke
(ii) The hearer expects a joke
In the case of (HOi), the speaker is not aware of the full or partial
ambiguity which is created. He is engaged in bona-fide communication, i.e.,
in the earnest, serious, information-conveying mode of verbal
communication (cf. Chapter 3, Section 5, and references there). His intention is to make
an unambiguous statement, and the ambiguity which he does not control
defeats him in this purpose.
Bona-fide communication is governed by the 'co-operative principle'
introduced by Grice (1975). According to this principle, the speaker is

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
101
committed to the truth and relevance of his text, the hearer is aware of this
commitment and perceives the uttered text as true and relevant by virtue of
his recognition of the speaker's commitment to its truth and relevance.
Whenever the hearer experiences difficulties at the receiving end in
perceiving some text as true and relevant, in bona-fide communication he always
gives the speaker the benefit of the doubt first, groping for some less obvious
interpretations which will save the text by rendering it nevertheless true and
relevant. If the hearer succeeds in that, a felicitous speech act occurs. This
is how allusions and implicatures are made and successfully perceived in
bona-fide communication (see (26-27) and (37-38); cf. Kempson, 1977,
143-46).
In the case of (1 lOii), the speaker is fully aware of the overlap and the
resulting partial or full ambiguity and still proceeds with the text. This means
that he is engaged not in bona-fide communication but in one of the much
less explored and more interesting non-bona-fide modes of communication
such as lying, play acting, or joke telling. The purpose of the mode he is
engaged in, most likely joke telling, is not to convey any information
contained in the text he is uttering but rather to create a special effect with
the help of the text, namely to make the hearer laugh (cf. (40)).
In the case of (11 li), the hearer does not expect a joke and will initially
interpret the speaker's utterance as conforming to the requirements of
bona-fide communication. After his attempts to interpret the utterances
within this mode fail, he will have to look for an alternative way to interpret
it, and this will bring him into the joke-telling mode because, in our culture,
joke telling is a much more socially acceptable form of behavior than, for
instance, lying and a more frequent form of behavior than, for instance, play
acting.
In the case of (11 lii), the hearer is somehow "attuned" to the joke (see
Freud, 1905, 282-285; Fry, 1951, 55 - cf. Chapter 1, Section 3) and as a
result, does not even attempt to interpret the perceived text within the mode
of bona-fide communication. Instead, he either understands it as a joke
effortlessly or makes an effort to understand it as such.
In the case of (110i-l 1 li), there is still a possibility that an act of bona-fide
communication can take place if some non-humorous interpretation of the
speaker's utterance is possible. Since native speakers often fail to perceive
ambiguity, and for a very good reason, too (see Chapter 3, Section 1), it is
possible that both the speaker and the hearer fail to perceive the ambiguity
of (112 = 37) which may render it funny. In this case, the joke does not take
place and the unintended and unperceived ambiguity is suppressed. (It is

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interesting to note here that apparently, besides regular ambiguity, we are
dealing here with the unexplored phenomenon of mode ambiguity.)
(112) "My wife used to play the violin a lot but after we had kids she
has not had much time for that." "Children are a comfort, aren't
they?"
Usually, however, just as in the case of any ambiguity, some features of
the discourse or of the context tend to resolve the ambiguity. In (112) as well,
for bona-fide communication, the transition between the two sentences is
two sharp, and the non-bona-fide communication becomes preferable but
certainly not inevitable.
In the case of (110i-l 1 lii), the speaker may think that he is engaged in
bona-fide communication but he is perceived as making a joke. If some mode
ambiguity is indeed present, then the speaker intends the one serious reading
of his utterance and fails to perceive the other humorous one, while the
hearer perceives only the latter and fails to discern the other. This may
happen if, for some reason, the hearer has been attuned by the speaker
himself, deliberately or inadvertently, or by somebody else to the humorous
mode or if, for any number of other reasons, the obvious context of the
speaker's statement makes its non-serious reading more probable for the
hearer. This phenomenon can be observed, for instance, sometimes in
Johnny Carson's monologues when he tries to intersperse a serious note and
the audience refuses to accept it as such, often causing some frustration on
Carson's part. It is the perception of him as the funny man that creates the
misunderstanding and attunes the audience to the joke-telling mode. On the
other hand, this writer has been often misunderstood and believed to be
making a capital joke when saying (113) and intending it seriously, simply
because, according to the still prevailing stereotype, Mr. Nixon cannot be
commended for anything seriously:
(113) Richard Nixon was the best American president in this century
with regard to foreign policy.
In the case of (HOii-llli), the speaker throws a joke on the hearer
unexpectedly for the latter. "Leg pulling" as well as conundra (12-13) come
under this category, along with many other situations.
And finally, in the case of (110ii-l 1 lii), the speaker and the hearer are not
only both attuned to humor but also to each other. They are both actively
and consciously engaged in the joke-telling mode of communication. This
clearly involves a cooperative principle which is quite distinct from Grice's

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
103
cooperative principle for bona-fide communication. The latter is based on
four maxims (114):
(114) (i) Maxim of Quantity: Give exactly as much information as
required
(ii) Maxim of Quality: Say only what you believe to be true
(iii) Maxim of Relation: Be relevant
(iv) Maxim of Manner: Be succinct (cf. Grice, 1975, 45-47)
It is the hearer's belief that the speaker is conforming to these four maxims
that makes bona-fide communication possible in the case of (110i-l 1 li). The
maxims on which the cooperative principle for the
non-bona-fi^-communication mode of joke telling is based must be different (115):
(115) (i) Maxim of Quantity: Give exactly as much information as
is necessary for the joke
(ii) Maxim of Quality: Say only what is compatible wiih the
world of the joke
(iii) Maxim of Relation: Say only what is relevant to the joke
(iv) Maxim of Manner: Tell the joke efficiently (see the
discussion of conditions of humor in
Chapter 1, Section 3, and especially
references to Freud, 1905, and
Eastman, 1936, there)
In accordance with this new cooperative principle, the hearer does not
expect the speaker to tell the truth or to convey him any relevant information.
Rather, he perceives the intention of the speaker as an attempt to make him,
the hearer, laugh (again, cf. (40)). As a result, the hearer will look for the
necessary ingredients of the joke in the speaker's utterance, and according
to the Main Hypothesis, these ingredients include two overlapping and
opposite scripts.
Just as bona-fide communication can fail if the speaker does not have full
control of the maxims (114), humor fails if the maxims of (115) are not
abided by. Similarly, the hearer can fail the speaker in bona-fide
communication even if the speaker does everything right and the hearer of the joke can
fail to get it even if the speaker provides all the necessary ingredients and
follows all the maxims. The last important analogy between bona-fide
communication and joke telling is that Grice's maxims do not explain the
mechanisms which are involved in following them, and the maxims of (115),
while shedding some light on the semantics of humor, do not really provide

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an explicit account of the semantic mechanisms of humor. The latter are, of
course, based on the scripts and combinatorial rules of the script-based
semantic theory and on the relation of script oppositeness.
It is also interesting to note that if the hearer establishes beyond
reasonable doubt that the speaker violates the cooperative principle for
bona-fide communication, the hearer's next immediate hypothesis, in our
culture, is that the speaker is engaged in humor. This happens frequently in
such cases of (110i-l 1 lii) when the speaker's information strikes the hearer
as incredible. It seems easier and more natural for the hearer to check
whether the speaker is joking ("Are you kidding?") than either to incorporate
the information into the former's world or to assume that the latter is lying.
Humor seems to be the next most socially acceptable form of
communication in our society after bona-fide communication. In fact, it would be quite
reasonable to postulate an extended form of bona-fide communication which
would include humor since ordinary discourse abounds in facetiousness,
and failure to combine the two modes might lead to the necessity of two
separate kinds of analysis for various parts of the same text. The cooperative
principle for this extended bona-fide-cum-humox mode of communication
can be thought of in terms of a set of disjunctions of the maxims of (114)
and (115) or a more compact presentation of the two sets.
The easy shift from bona-fide communication to joke telling as the most
accessible and acceptable form of non-bona-fide communication may be
underlaid by the basic concept of play, which is readily assumed by people
as a natural form of behavior (see Huizinga, 1938; Bateson, 1955; Fry, 1963,
125-6 and 138; cf. Chapter 1, Section 5) and which conforms to a set of
mutually agreeable rules. In other words, joke telling is a cooperative
enterprise while lying is not and, as a result, the latter is considered by the
hearer only after the joke-telling option has been explored and rejected. (Play
acting is another cooperative activity but it is unlikely to compete with joke
telling in the hearer's perception because of the artificial setting it requires
- the hearer usually knows whether he is watching a play or not.)
3. SCRIPT OVERLAP
According to the Main Hypothesis (see Section 1), the text of a joke is
partially or fully compatible with some two different scripts. Thus, (109) was
described as involving an overlap of two scripts, DOCTOR and LOVER
(87i-ii).
(109) is a typical example of an overlap of two scripts on a joke. The joke

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
105
begins innocuously by describing a standard situation which immediately
evokes an easy and standard script DOCTOR from the native speaker's
common sense. The script is repeatedly evoked by three words in the first,
sentence, doctor, patient, and bronchial. The question asked by the patient is
the most natural question to ask in the situation (which is, of course, dated
back to the times at which doctors saw patients at home when the patients
needed them rather then according to an elaborate schedule made half a year
in advance). The negative answer he receives is unfortunate but also natural.
The fact that the doctor's wife turns out to be young and pretty does not seem
to be relevant to the situation and to the script it unambiguously evokes but
there is certainly no contradiction or incongruity between this fact and the
situation. Her invitation to come in, however, while the doctor is not at home
must strike the hearer as somewhat odd since she does not explain it by
adding the usual, "He will be back soon," or "You can wait if you like." It
will also be perceived as odd that she whispers back (cf. the preliminary
analysis of the same joke in Chapter 1, Section 5, and its formal script
analysis in Section 6). In Grice's terms, the woman's youth and good looks
would be a violation of the maxim of quantity - too much unnecessary
information, while her failure to explain why she is inviting the patient to
come in is a violation of the same maxim in the opposite direction - too little
information.
At this point, the hearer faces a dilemma: either he still accepts the text
of (109) at face value, i.e., as evoking only the script DOCTOR, or he begins
to look for another interpretation. He can hardly fail to notice that an entirely
different situation has been surreptitiously created - a young and pretty
woman invites a man other than her husband to come into her house while
the husband is away. As soon as the appropriate script, LOVER, is evoked,
all the previously odd pieces fall neatly into place: the "no" in response to
whether the doctor is in, in conjunction with an unexplained invitation to
come in; the woman's unexplained whisper (the patient does whisper as well
but his whisper is explained - for us, though, not for the doctor's wife); even
the woman's youth and good looks, which did not seem to be "working" with
the first evoked script, DOCTOR.
The case of (109) is typical with regard to the script overlap in the sense
that it is situated somewhere between the two extreme cases, that of a full
overlap and that of a truly partial overlap.
In the case of a. full overlap, the two involved scripts are both perfectly
compatible with the text of a joke, and there is nothing in the text which can
be perceived as odd, renundant or missing with regard to either script. Just

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as equiprobable ambiguity, jokes involving a full overlap are not frequent.
If not for the sharp transition between the two sentences, (112) above would
perhaps come close to a full overlap. Because of the negation in (5), it is
equally compatible with the SENATORS ARE GENTLEMEN and
SENATORS ARE NOT GENTLEMEN scripts. (16), SEX vs.
IMPOTENCE, and (26ii), BARKING vs. COMPLAINING, come very
close too.
In many more cases, however, one script is more easily compatible with
the entire text than the other. Thus, because of the scripts evoked by the
clerical titles and terms the sexual script is somewhat less compatible with
the text of (116) than the script CHURCH:
(116) An English bishop received the following note from the vicar of
a village in his diocese: "Milord, I regret to inform you of my
wife's death. Can you possibly send me a substitute for the
weekend?" (Pocheptzov, 1974, 41)
(6), involving the same two scripts, is perhaps somewhat more slanted
towards the script CHURCH than is (116). (7) is also, technically speaking,
compatible with two scripts, GOING OUT and GOING AWAY, but
clearly prefers the latter. (13), ANIMAL vs. ABUSE, and (14 = 25ii),
COLLISION vs. IMPRESSION, seem to be in the same category.
Many other jokes create a truly partial overlap in the sense that once both
scripts are evoked, there are some parts of the text which are incompatible
with one of them. Thus, in (117), the script COLOR is incompatible with
the second sentence and the ethical script evoked by the second sentence
is (almost entirely) incompatible with the first sentence.
(117) There's only one trouble with watching TV in glorious color. You
turn it off and the world's in black and white! (Orben, 1978, 50)
In (9) as well, the script DISEASE is incompatible with the patient's reply,
while the script TRANSACTION evoked by his reply is incompatible with
the nurse's inquiry. Jokes (4), EMPLOYEE vs. LOVER; (8), LIFE vs.
DEATH; (12), HEAD vs. MIND; (17), AWARD vs. PUNISHMENT;
(24i), JUSTICE vs. CORRUPTION; (26i), MATERIAL HEIGHT vs.
HUMAN HEIGHT; (35), SEX vs. JUSTICE; and (39), REAL HUMAN
ANATOMY vs. POSSIBLE WORLD HUMAN ANATOMY, are all in
this category as well.
A partial overlap actually means that one or both of the evoked scripts

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
107
are not acceptable as part of the semantic interpretation of the text. In
bona-fide communication that would mean that the text is characterized as
meaningless, which is indeed what some of them should be characterized as
within that mode. That such texts are not perceived as meaningless in the
joke-telling mode of communication emphasizes still another significant
difference between the two modes.
4. SCRIPT OPPOSITENESS
According to the Main Hypothesis, the two distinct scripts which overlap,
fully or in part, on the text of a joke, should be opposite in a specially defined
sense (108ii). Let us first consider the script oppositions in the 32 examples
of jokes we have had so far in the book. In (119) below, they are listed in
the following format (118):
(118) Script 1 vs. Script 2 (Example number)
The scripts are denoted somewhat loosely, exclusively for the purpose of
positive identification, and printed in lower case for the sake of easier
legibility.
(119) employee vs. lover (4)
senators are gentlemen vs. senators are not gentlemen (5)
church vs. sex (6)
going out vs. going away (7)
ordinary week (life) vs. death (8)
disease vs. money (transaction) (9)
hand with tool vs. bare hand (10)
good joke vs. bad joke (11)
head vs. mind (12)
animal vs. abuse (13)
collision vs. impression
drug prescription vs. children as pests (15)
sex vs. impotence (16)
award vs. punishment (17)
writer vs. postman (18)
wise vs. foolish (19)
dirty talk vs. nautical matters (20)
doctor vs. lover (21)
justice vs. corruption (24i)

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doctor vs. nagging wife (24ii)
presence vs. absence (24iii)
stalemate vs. wife (25i)
collision vs. impression (25ii)
Ireland, Moscow vs. ireless, cowless (25iii)
material height vs. human height (26i)
barking vs. complaining (26ii)
Jaguar vs. calendar (26iii)
real world strength vs. possible world strength (28)
justice vs. sex (35)
good performance vs. bad performance (37)
sex, real world human anatomy vs. buying a commodity, possible
world human anatomy (39)
church vs. sex (116)
literal color vs. figurative color (117)
Some of the scripts within the oppositions are opposed in the usual sense
of the one being the negation of the other (5) or an antonym of the other (8,
11, 17, 19, 24i, 24iii, 37). A few others reveal their antonymous nature if
slightly paraphrased: 10 (tool vs. no tool), 16 (sexual activity vs. impotence),
39 (real world vs. unreal world). All the others are treated here as perfect
examples of local antonyms, i.e., two linguistic entities whose meanings are
opposite only within a particular discourse and solely for the purposes of this
discourse (cf. Lyons, 1977, -271-279).
Each of the jokes describes a certain "real" situation and evokes another
"unreal" situation which does not take place and which is fully or partially
incompatible with the former. In certain cases, this situation oppositeness
is shadowed, as it were, by a complementary set of opposed situations (e.g.,
(6)). For the sake of clarity, we will take the trouble to list this once the real
and unreal situations for each of the joke examples used so far, in the format
of (120):
(120) Real situation vs. Unreal situation [Shadow opposition if any]
(Example number)
(121) The lady calls the driver by his family name vs. The lady calls
the driver "darling" [A lover calls her lover "darling" vs. A lover
calls her lover by his family name] (4)
Senators are gentlemen vs. Senators are not gentlemen (5)
The archdeacon was involved in debauchery vs. The archdeacon

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
109
was involved in honest toil [Saint Peter was involved in honest
toil vs. Saint Peter was involved in debauchery] (6)
The man was going to be absent from home for many days vs.
The man was going to come back home that night (and/or every
night) (7)
The man was not going to live during the entire week vs. The man
was going to live during the entire week (8)
The patient has an illness vs. The patient sells an illness (9)
The person stirs his coffee with a spoon vs. The person stirs his
coffee with his bare hand (10)
A joke is good vs. A joke is bad (11)
A tooth is drawn from one's head vs. A tooth is drawn from
one's mind [A thought is out of one's mind vs. A tooth is out of
one's mind] (12)
A donkey cannot be a fool vs. A donkey is a fool (13)
The first thing that strikes a stranger in New York is some kind
of sight or impression vs. The first thing that strikes a stranger
in New York is a big car (which hits him) [In a physical collision,
a car hits a person vs. In a physical collision, a car impresses a
person] (14)
The medicine within the bottle cures headaches vs. The
inscription on the bottle cures headaches (15)
In a whore-house, a client seeks a partner for sex vs. In a
whore-house, a client seeks a partner for (almost?) no sex (16)
A prize for an achievement is something one wants to have vs.
A prize for an achievement is something one does not want (hard
labor, etc.) (17)
He is a writer vs. He is not a writer (18)
The wise man is wise vs. The wise man is not wise [The fool is
foolish vs. The fool is not foolish] (19)
He did not talk dirty vs. He talked dirty (20)

CHAPTER FOUR
The patient comes to the doctor's house to see the doctor vs. The
patient comes to the doctor's house not to see the doctor [The
doctor's wife entertains a lover vs. The doctor's wife entertains
a patient] (21)
The judge wants more legal arguments vs. The judge wants more
money (24i)
A doctor prescribes some medicine to the sick person vs. The
doctor prescribes some medicine to the sick person's wife (24ii)
Identifying a child who is with his mother can help find her vs.
Identifying a child who is not with his mother can help find her
(24iii)
Stalemate is a lull, a pause vs. Stalemate is a wife (25i)
(See (14) above for the analysis of this joke) (25ii)
Ireless has nothing to do with Ireland. Cowless has nothing to
do with Moscow vs. Ireless has something to do with Ireland.
Cowless has something to do with Moscow (25iii)
Two or more people cannot see taller objects than one person
can vs. Two or more people can see taller objects than one
person can (26i)
A dog can bark vs. A dog can complain (26ii)
Davey can tell January from Jaguar vs. Davey cannot tell
January from Jaguar (26iii)
Samson could not lift himself by his hair, no matter how strong
he was vs. Samson could lilt himself by his hair (28)
Some people believe that this girl is chaste vs. Some people do
not believe that this girl is chaste (35)
It is good that the woman used to play the violin vs. It is not good
that the woman used to play the violin (37)
A client has intercourse with a prostitute in her vagina vs. A
client has intercourse with a prostitute in her navel (39)
The vicar wants a substitute for himself vs. The vicar wants a
substitute for his late wife (116)
The world is in color vs. The world is in black and white (117)

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
111
The analyzed examples exhibit three basic types of opposition between the
"real" and "unreal" situations they describe or evoke.
The first type clearly distinguishes between the actual situation in which
the hero of the joke finds himself or, somewhat more generally, in which the
joke is actually set, and a non-actual, non-existing situation which is not
compatible with the actual setting of the joke. Thus, in joke (6) the hero was
involved in debauchery in real life, which is his actual situation in a very
recent past, and he was not involved in honest toil as the comparison with
Saint Peter suggests. One can say then that it is the case that the archdeacon
was involved in debauchery and it is not the case that the archdeacon was
in volved in honest toil. The construction It is the case that and it is not
the case that is the diagnostic construction for this type of opposition if
the blanks can be filled in by two opposing propositions involving the
hero(es) and/or the actual setting of the joke. The other examples of the
actual/non-actual opposition include jokes (7), (8), (18), (20), (21), (24i),
(25i), (25iii), (35), (37), (116), and (117).
The second type introduces the normal, expected state of affairs and
opposes it to the abnormal, unexpected state of affairs. Thus, in joke (S),
the normal expectation is for a senator to be the best representative of the
public and, therefore, at least according to the ethical norms of a certain
period, a gentleman. The abnormal state of affairs introduced by the joke
is that senators are not, in fact, gentlemen. The other examples of the
normal/abnormal opposition include jokes (10), (11), (14), (16), (17), (19),
and (24ii).
The third type distinguishes between a possible, plausible situation and a
fully or partially impossible or much less plausible situation. Thus, in joke
(4), it is very plausible that the lady should want to call her chauffeur by his
last name and almost impossible for her to call him "darling" unless, of
course, they are lovers (which adds another dimension to the joke - see
below and Chapter 5). In joke (9), the opposed situation is outright
impossible - one cannot sell an illness. The other examples of the possible/impossible
opposition include jokes (12), (13), (15), (24iii), (26i-iii), (28), and (39).
In each of the jokes, however, there is an element which renders the unreal
situation less unreal than it looks. If, in joke (6) again, the archdeacon was
indeed involved in debauchery then he was not involved in honest toil.
However, the expression toiled all night can describe both situations. It is the
occurrence of this expression that triggers the switch from the one script to
the other and from the real situation to the unreal situation. In joke (5), the
normal situation is, of course, that a senator, an elected representative of the

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people, is the best kind of person available and therefore a gentleman. The
abnormal situation is that senators may be the opposite of that, and the
switch is triggered by the word gentleman which means both 'man' and 'man
of quality.' In joke (4), the impossible situation is triggered by the fact that
the chauffeur's last name turns out to be Darling. The function and typology
of these and other triggers will be discussed in the next section.
An additional list of 50 simple jokes in Appendix 1, numbered from A101
through A150, can be also easily reduced to the three types of the real-unreal
dichotomy distinguished above. (The jokes are referred to as 'simple' more
or less terminologically: they, as all the other jokes considered so far, can
be plausibly analyzed as the result of a single opposition of just two opposed
scripts. See Appendix 2 and Section 8 for examples and discussion of the
'sophisticated' jokes, where sophisticated is, of course, used as the local
antonym of simple.). Thus, jokes A102-05, A113, Al 15-17, A120-25,
A127-30, A136-37, A139, and A146-50 exhibit the actual/non-actual type of
script opposition; jokes A101, A106-10, A126, A131, A140, and A143 are
of the normal/abnormal type; and, finally, jokes All 1-12, A114, Al 18-19,
A132-35, A138, A141-42, and A144 belong to the possible/impossible type.
As can be expected, the boundaries between the three types are not
watertight, and there is a certain amount of mutual penetration and
diffusion. If, for instance, the non-actual script evoked by the joke is of a
somewhat implausible nature, e.g., A139, A146 or (39), but not altogether
impossible, the joke can be assigned either to the first or to the third type
depending on its position on the scale of plausibility (A139 and A146 were
assigned to the first type and (39) to the third). Similarly, to the extent that
the actual script of a joke from the first type constitutes a norm or an
expectation, the joke can tend to the second type as well, e.g., A126. In other
words, just as in the case of any meaningful classification, there are clear-cut
cases and marginal, or borderline, cases, and it is the clarity of the former
and of the distinctions among the clear-cut cases of various types that
determine the validity and feasibility of the taxonomy.
There are other marginal complications and deviations as well. The unreal
script evoked by the joke can be related to the real script in additional ways,
besides and beyond belonging to one of the three types of opposition. Thus,
for instance, it can exist externally, parallel to the real script. In joke (18),
the hero is a writer according to the one opposed script and is not a writer
according to the other script. Similarly, in joke A136, the doctor is talking
about the patient's anatomy according to the one script and about his place
according to the other. Alternatively, the unreal script can also exist
internally, i.e., to be brought about by the hero(es) of the joke as, for instance, in

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
113
jokes A124, A130 or (15). Transferred back to the mode of bona-fide
communication, the speaker of such jokes would be perceived there as lying
in the simplest sense of lying, viz., stating something which is not true (cf.
(13) or A142). In somewhat more complicated cases, almost verging on the
sophisticated kind of joke, one of the two opposed scripts can be not given
or evoked directly but rather be present by implication. One way of implying
a script is by allusion to a certain element of information which is available
to the speaker and is supposed by him to be available to the hearer as well.
Thus, joke A133 alludes to the familiarity with the genre of drama and its
conventions (cf (26-27) and discussion around them). Somewhat more
complicatedly, in joke A140 the allusion is to the non-actual script of polite
behavior while the hero of the joke actually finds himself, much to his
surprise and disdain, in the opposed situation of rude behavior. In joke
A121, the implied opposed script is that of a real, normally expected
meaningful explanation of the difference between a watchmaker and a jailer.
Another basis of comparison of the opposing scripts is the distance
between them. Some scripts are simple negations of each other and therefore
very closely related to each other, e.g., in joke (5) (see also above). Some
others have relatively little to do with each other (and are actually brought
together, in many cases, by an accidental polysemy, homonymy or phonetic
similarity - see Section 5 for further discussion), e.g., joke (9). Most jokes
can be found somewhere in between the two poles of this scale. Very close
to the pole of the least distance, one can find such jokes as A108 or Al 15:
in either case, the opposed pairs of scripts EVERYTHING IS GOOD vs.
NOT EVERYTHING GOOD and CIVIL FREEDOM vs. ETHICAL
LIBERTY, respectively, can, in fact, be easily treated as one, slightly more
complicated script instead of each pair or, more precisely, as an easily
compatible conjunction of simple scripts, namely EVERYTHING BUT
MANNERS IS GOOD & MANNERS ARE BAD and MUCH
FREEDOM IS GOOD & MUCH LIBERTY IS NOT GOOD,
respectively. To the extent that a text evokes a conjoined script rather that an
opposition of scripts it is not a joke, and, indeed, A108 and Al 15 verge much
more on the unfunny than the other simple jokes we are considering.
Still another, and significantly more important dimension of script
opposition is that many jokes evoke one of the relatively few binary
categories which are essential to human life. Thus, obviously, many if not all of
the examples involve the category of real vs. unreal, i.e., whether something
exists or does not exist, or in other words, whether something is true or false,
which is certainly important for human perception, catharsis, and ontology.

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Besides that, some examples may involve the judgmental dichotomy of good
vs. bad, e.g., jokes (5), (11), (37), A137, A143 and a few others. Still other
examples involve death vs. life, which is not totally unrelated to the previous
dichotomy, e.g., (14) or Al 18. Jokes related to age are of a similar kind, e.g.,
A102-03 or A113. The obscene/non-obscene dichotomy, very important and
almost standard for a certain type of humor, e.g., jokes (16), (20), (21), Al 14
or A139, is analyzed in more detail in Chapter 5. Money is another sensitive
matter, and the money/no money or much money/little money dichotomy
is present in a number of examples, e.g., A105, A107 or Alll.
To summarize this discussion of various aspects of script opposition,
besides belonging to the three basic types of the real/unreal dichotomy, the
opposed scripts can be introduced in various ways, can be more or less
closely related to each other, and usually involve some basic, quintessential
categories of human existence. Three groups of standard script oppositions
constituting sexual, ethnic, and political humor are analyzed in three
separate chapters (5, 6, and 7, respectively). A regular joke, involving a
different kind of opposition, non-standard in the sense of the previous
sentence, is analyzed in Section 6. The next section deals in more detail with
the linguistic means of script switching.
5. SEMANTIC SCRIPT-SWITCH TRIGGERS
As mentioned in the previous section, many jokes contain an element which
triggers the switch from the one script evoked by the text of the joke to the
opposed script, the switch which makes up the joke. This element, called
here the semantic script-switch trigger, or simply the trigger, usually belongs,
in simple jokes, to either of the two types: ambiguity or contradiction.
Thus, joke (5) /senator-gentleman/ has a typically ambiguous trigger
gentleman which, as also mentioned before, may mean both 'man' and 'man
of quality.' By virtue of this regular ambiguity the text switches from the
script SENATOR IS MAN to the script SENATOR IS NOT
GENTLEMAN. Retroactively, due to the ambiguity, the second script changes the
interpretation of the first part of the text of the joke, viz., the first sentence,
making believe - incorrectly - that the questioner was presupposing that the
man he was interested in was indeed a man of quality. The usual effect of
the trigger is exactly this: by introducing the second script it casts a shadow
on the first script and the part of the text which introduced it, and imposes
a different interpretation on it, which is different from the most obvious one.

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
115
The different interpretation, as was shown in the previous section, may
involve a non-actual, abnormal or even impossible state of affairs. The role
of the trigger, however, is, by its mere presence, to render this different
interpretation more plausible and less non-actual, abnormal, or impossible.
In fact, we are dealing here again with an important aspect of joke-telling
as a non-bona-fide mode of communication. In bona-fide communication as
well, ambiguity is quite frequent and it may also be created by the occurrence
of polysemous or homonymous words (see Chapter 3, Section 1). There,
however, the process of disambiguation should, and usually does, take place
immediately and, ideally, only one meaning of the utterance is intended by
the speaker and perceived by the hearer. In many if not most jokes, however,
ambiguity is deliberate and the intention of the speaker includes two
interpretations which he wants the hearer to perceive. If both the speaker and
the hearer are in the same mode of communication (see Section 2), the hearer
knows the "rules of the game" and is not only ready to perceive the second
interpretation along with the first obvious one but actually is willing to look
for it. This cooperation, which was not really captured, along with other
important features of the mode, by the maxims of (115), makes it possible
for a somewhat forced and often overextended second interpretation to pass
and thus to become less unreal. In joke (5), both the hearer and the speaker
know quite well that the questioner in the joke was not at all meaning
gentleman in the sense of 'man of quality,' but both are prepared to believe,
not for real but rather "for the fun of it," that he was. If it is even barely
possible, it goes.
The other cases of regular ambiguity in the corpus of quoted jokes include
joke (7): going as 'going out' and 'going away;' and joke (24): offer as 'say'
and 'give.' A very similar trigger innocence as 'justice' and 'chastity' creates
joke (35); this trigger is supported by an auxiliary trigger army, which, being
associated with debauchery, reinforces the sexual script. A few cases of
figurative ambiguity are also very similar, and in fact, border on regular
ambiguity - see, for instance, the triggers toil (with an auxiliary trigger all
night) as 'work hard' and 'have much sex' and catch as 'catch' and 'become
infected' in joke (6), ass as 'donkey' and 'fool' in joke (13), strikes as 'hit' and
'impress'in joke (14 = 25ii), and bark as 'bark' and 'complain' in joke (26ii).
Still another slight variety of regular ambiguity is exemplified by joke (12)
where the trigger out of one's head is of an idiomatic nature and incidentally,
in this form, is better compatible with the physical than with the non-physical
interpretation (out of one's mind is at least stylistically preferable for the
latter).

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Three different cases of what might be loosely referred to as syntactic
ambiguity are exemplified by jokes (10), (15), and (116). The latter is perhaps
the most obvious and closest to the syntactical surface: substitute may have
either vicar or vicar's wife as antecedent, and this triggers the script switch.
In (10), a case ambiguity is involved: with may introduce an agent or part
thereof (hand) or an instrument (spoon). In (15), the ambiguity is even more
of a deep-syntactical nature though not dissimilar to that in (116) - it is
therefore also the closest to regular ambiguity: directions may be for taking
the medicine or for keeping the medicine.
A somewhat more complicated case of situational ambiguity is
exemplified by joke (37), where the trigger comfort introduces the second, 'bad
performance,' script at the same time while the preceding text is almost
neutral with regard to either.
Ambiguous triggers create all puns and similar simple jokes.
Somewhat less interesting though still rather productive cases of quasi-
ambiguity based on purely phonetical and not semantical relations between
words (which are often intentionally misused or garbled in the text for this
purpose) is exemplified by jokes (20), (25i), (25iii), and (26iii) (cf. also
A120-21 as well as A149-50 and practically all the other known - and
potential - knock-knock jokes).
The other major type of trigger, the contradiction triggers, is of a slightly
more complicated nature. Joke (8), the Monday execution, is a typical
example: the trigger beginning, while perfectly compatible with Monday and
week, contradicts the fact that a beginning implies an ending which is distinct
from the beginning but, in the case of the man about to be executed, the
beginning is the ending and, therefore, beginning does not make sense. The
contradiction, while operating differently from ambiguity, creates exactly the
same effect, namely, a second interpretation retroactively imposed on the
whole text preceding the trigger as well as on the text following it, if any.
Sometimes the second interpretation has been surreptitiously prepared for,
and this makes the discovery of the second script easier (e.g., (21 = 109)).
In other cases, no preparation work has been done and then the switch
occurs to the script which is the exact opposite of the firstly evoked script
(e.g., (8)). Besides joke (8), the contradiction triggers can be found in joke
(11) (usually), (17) (prize - hard labor), (21 = 109) (no - come in), and (24ii)
(yourself). Some contradiction triggers include whole sentences rather than
individual words, and their relation to the ordinary contradiction triggers is
similar to that between situational ambiguous triggers and regular ambiguous
triggers mentioned above - see jokes (24iii), (26i), (28) and (39). An
alternative analysis of the trigger in (37) as contradiction is possible.

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
117
A slight variety of the contradiction trigger is the dichotomizing trigger
usually created by a pair of antonyms built into the joke - e.g., joke (19):
wise man -fool. In a bona-fide text involving a dichotomy of this kind, the
wise man will remain wise and the fool a fool. In a joke, the roles are usually
reversed, which, of course, creates the type of contradiction described above,
and the switch is actually triggered by a combination of the trigger and the
conventions of the mode of communication (see A101 and Al 11 for more
examples of the type).
The analysis of the additional corpus of jokes in Appendix 1 reveals
basically the same types of triggers with natural slight variations, and the
readers are invited to verify, or challenge, this assertion for themselves.
In principle, it should be observed that the jokes with overtly expressed
triggers are simpler than those with dissipated triggers or no triggers at all
(see Section 8 for some further discussion and Appendix 2).
6. ANALYSIS OF A SAMPLE JOKE
The sample joke chosen for a full though largely non-technical script analysis
is joke (21), repeated as (109) in Section 1.
First, let us summarize the results of an informal analysis of the joke
carried out in Sections 3-5 (and also in Chapter 1, Section 6).
The joke is created by a partial overlap of two opposed scripts tentatively
labeled DOCTOR and LOVER (see (87i-ii) for a simplified schematic
representation). The opposition between the real and unreal situations
evoked by the text belongs to the actual/non-actual type. The non-actual
situation exists externally as opposed to being conjectured by the hero(es)
of the joke. There is a certain distance between the opposed scripts - they
are neither the negations of each other nor compatible conjunctions of one
another. They involve the obscene/non-obscene dichotomy. The joke
contains a discontinuous contradiction trigger.
The choice of this particular joke for script analysis, while obviously not
random in the technical sense of the term, was based on considerations of
typicality and averageness. It is not an obvious pun nor an allusion and is,
therefore, of a medium degree of complexity within the set of simple jokes.
It is not terribly funny nor terribly unfunny. It is not too short nor too long.
None of its parameters, in other words, is extreme, atypical, or extraordinary
in any sense.
According to the research strategy outlined in Chapter 2, Section 4, the
goals and format of semantic theory postulated in Chapter 3, and the Main
Hypothesis formulated in Section 1, the purpose of the script analysis is to

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provide a semantic interpretation of the text of the joke, complete with two
scripts both of which are compatible with it and which are marked as
opposite. If such an interpretation is indeed available the text is recognized
as a joke.
The script analysis is therefore based on the following components (122):
(122) (i) A continuous lexical graph with domains corresponding to
the lexical entries (i.e., words) of the text
(ii) Combinatorial rules combining those domains (scripts)
into one or more larger scripts compatible with the text
(iii) A system for marking certain scripts as opposite
As stated in Chapter 3, Section 4, every word of the sentence evokes one
or more scripts. Each script is a limited domain of the single continuous
multidimensional graph which is the lexicon of the language. If a word is
polysemous, as is often the case, the surrounding domain will consist of a
number of subdomains, or areas of the graph, with close links inside each
area and few links with the other areas. Thus, bachelor will be surrounded
by a domain which can be presented, without any detalization or structuring
used in (83), as (123):
(123) man • marriage human • education
knight • other fur seal • breeding time
Assuming the availability of such a script-based lexicon (cf. Raskin,
1981a), (124-128) list the scripts evoked by the text of joke (109) clause by
clause using Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1976) as a source of
reference. As in (92), the numbers of the scripts considered unmarked are,
of course, marked, i.e., italicized.
(124) (i) IS = BE v 1. Equal or belong to a set
2. Exist
3. Spatial
4. Must

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
(ii) THE det 1. Definite
2. Unique
3. Generic
(iii) DOCTOR n 1. Academic
2. Medical
3. Material
4. Mechanical
5. Insect
(iv) AT prep 1. Spatial
2. Target
3. Occupation
4. State
5. Cause
6. Measure
(v) HOME n 1. Residence
2. Social
3. Habitat
4. Origin
5. Disabled
6. Objective
(125) (i) THE(see(124ii))
(ii) PATIENT n L Medical
2. Object
(iii) ASK v 1. Interrogative
2. Request
3. Selling
(iv) IN prep 1. Inclusion
2. Instrument
3. Circumstance
4. Purpose
5. Mathematical
(v) HIS pron 1. Belonging to he
(vi) BRONCHIAL adj 1. Bronchi or lungs
(vii) WHISPER n 1. Utter
2. Communication
(126) NO adv 1. Negation
2. Surprise
(127) (i) THE(see(124ii))
(ii) DOCTOR (see (124iii))

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CHAPTER FOUR
(iii) 'S pron 1. Belonging
(iv) YOUNG adj L Age
2. New
3. Experience
(v) AND conj 1. Connection
2. Logical
(vi) PRETTY adj 1. Beauty
2. Terrible
3. Considerable
(vii) WIFE n 1. Marriage
(viii) WHISPER v (see (125vii))
(xi) IN (see (125iv))
(x) REPLY n 1. Answer
2. Legal
(128) (i) COMEv 1. Move
2. Arrive
3. Sexual
4. Become
(ii) RIGHT adv 1. Propriety
2. Direct
3. Orientation
4. Immediate
5. Truth
(iii) IN(see(125iv)
Just as in (92), the items numbered by Arabic numerals are loose
shorthand for the scripts evoked by the words of the text. However, they are
assumed, for the limited purposes of this analysis, to represent accurately
the areas of the continuous graph potentially activated by the utterance of
each word. Even this loose notation reveals the interconnected nature of
various lexical items. Thus, items (124i-l), (125v), and (127iii) contain the
same node belong, and a detailed presentation of them (as in (83), (86) or
at least (87)) will also reveal this node within the domains evoked by (124v-1)
and (125iii-3); (124iii-2) and (125ii-l) coincide; (125iii-l), (125iii-2),
(125vii-l), and (127vii-l) share the same node utter. These and similar
connections are very important for the proper functioning of combinatorial
rules.
The combinatorial rules start out by calculating the meaning of the phrase
and of the sentence on the basis of the available syntactic structure and the

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
121
scripts in (124-128). Leaving the syntax aside, along with other more or less
obvious technicalities, let us follow the order of semantic operations
performed by the combinatorial rules.
Within each clause, they will look for the script or scripts which are
evoked by two or more words. (Actually, at the technical level, the rules will
be looking inside the scripts and go for the ones which contain the common
domains.) Thus, in the case of the first clause of the text, the combinatorial
rules will notice the common script denoted as SPATIAL in (124i-3) and
(124iv-l). They will consequently shift the feature of unmarkedness from
(124i-l) to (124i-3) and adopt SPATIAL as a working hypothesis.
Accordingly, they will reject (124v-2), (124v-3), (124v-4), and (124v-6) as not easily
compatible with the script SPATIAL. Some additional syntactical and
idiomatic information within the graph will select (124v-1) over (124v-5), i.e.,
at home will be correctly interpreted as 'in the residence' rather than as 'in
a home for the disabled.' This choice will then lead to the selection of the
two human scripts of doctor- (124iii-1,2) - over the other three possibilities.
The selected meaning of home, (124v-l), will have a semantic recursion
trigger within its script which will require information on the owner (see
Chapter 3, Section 2, especially (71) and (72), as well as references there for
further comments on semantic recursion). Both the medical and academic
scripts for doctor (124iii-1,2) will be recognized as appropriate fillings for the
node. Finally, in this clause, the unmarked script for the (124ii-l) will be
rejected in favor of (124ii-2) because of a semantic recursion trigger within
the script (124ii-l) requiring a filling from the previous discourse: since none
is available, the combinatorial rules will reject the script. In other words, the
combinatorial rules will thus accommodate the fact that the can only be
understood as 'definite' if there is a preceding reference to its head (doctor)
in the text - since there is no preceding text such an interpretation is
unacceptable. As a result of this procedure, the first clause of (109) will be
formally interpreted as two-way ambiguous. The two possible meanings can
be roughly paraphrased as (129):
(129) (i) Question: The unique proprietor of a family residence who
is a physician is physically present in the residence
(ii) Question: The unique proprietor of a family residence who
has the doctoral degree is physically present in the
residence
At this stage, since the first sentence is not complete, the combinatorial
rules will register the ambiguity and will go for the second clause of the

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sentence. Following a similar path, they will pick out the script MEDICAL
in patient (\25i\-\) as well as within bronchial (125vi-l). The duly registered
interrogative feature of the first clause (see (129)) will disambiguate ask as
(125iii-l), which will, in its turn, disambiguate whisper as (125vii-l). His will
be easily related to patient with the help of a semantic recursion trigger, and
the will be interpreted in its unmarked meaning of 'definite,' with the
semantic recursion trigger mentioned in the analysis of the first clause above
filled in this case, somewhat non-trivially though quite simply, with 'the
questioner of the previous question.' The doubly corroborated script
MEDICAL will disambiguate the first clause and reject (129ii).
The entire first sentence of (109) will then be interpreted roughly as the
paraphrase in (130):
(130) Somebody who was previously treated for an illness wants to
know whether the unique proprietor of a family residence is
physically present in the residence
At this point, the combinatorial rules are ready to come up with the
presuppositions, inferences and questions concerning the entire first
sentence of (109) (see Chapter 3, Section 5, especially (95-99)).
The non-trivial presuppositions of the first sentence are listed in (131) and
its probable presuppositions in (132):
(131) (i) The patient is human
(ii) The doctor is human
(iii) There is a hearer
(132) (i) The patient is at the door of the doctor's residence
(ii) The patient does not know the answer to the question
Some inferences from (130) are listed in (133) and probable inferences in
(134):
(133) (i) The patient is male
(ii) The patient whispers because of a problem with his
bronchi or lungs
(iii) The patient is temporarily unable to speak normally
(134) (i) The patient is adult
(ii) The patient has been treated by the doctor before
(iii) The patient wants to see the doctor
(iv) The patient wants to see the doctor about the problem with
his bronchi or lungs
(v) The patient wants the doctor to correct the problem

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
123
The question the combinatorial rules produce in relation to (130) is, of
course, (135):
(135) Who is the hearer?
(131-135) go to the special component closely associated with the
combinatorial rules and called WORLD INFORMATION (see Chapter 3,
Section 5). The component may already contain some elements of
information which the theory assumes at the outset of the analysis of any text. The
newly obtained information supplements the previously contained
information if it is compatible with it and signals a conflict if it is not. One important
element of information the combinatorial rules are interested in from the very
beginning is the mode of communication, and the usual path to take is to
assume that it is bona-fide as the first default value. Then the maxims of (114)
are contained in the WORLD INFORMATION component from the very
beginning and are considered valid unless contradicted and superseded (see
below).
The second sentence of (109) will be processed similarly, clause by clause,
the one significant difference being that the combinatorial rules will keep
relating the obtained results to the first sentence. Thus, the first clause will
be disambiguated as negation (126-1) in view of the preceding question and
will be interpreted accordingly as (136):
(136) The doctor is not at home
In the next clause, doctor will, of course, be disambiguated automatically
as 'medical' and the as 'definite.' Wife will be related to doctor by's. Wife will
also disambiguate young and pretty in their unmarked scripts,, i.e., as
(127iv-l) and (127vi-l), respectively. Whisper and reply will pick out the
compatible scripts within each other's domains, namely the ones which
share the node utter, i.e., (127viii-l) and (127x-l), respectively. Reply will
disambiguate in as 'instrumental' (127ix-2).
Finally, the third clause will be interpreted in the physical-motion sense
of the three constituent words on the basis of the overlapping scripts
(128i-l), (128ii-2) and (128iii-l).
The combinatorial rules will again come up with a (smaller) number of
usual presuppositions and probable presuppositions. More importantly,
they will make a few significant inferences (137), one of them (137i) being,
of course, the answer to the question (135) asked by the combinatorial rules
after having processed the first sentence.

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(137) (i) The doctor's wife is the hearer
(ii) The doctor is male
(iii) The reply refers to the patient's question
(iv) The patient and the doctor's wife are talking to each other
(v) The doctor's wife wants the patient to come into her home
(vi) The doctor's home is the doctor's wife's home
A significant probable inference will be (138):
(138) The patient and the doctor's wife are alone
At this stage, a very important set of derivative inferences (139) will be
produced by the combinatorial rules on the basis of all the inferences stored
so far in the WORLD INFORMATION component, i.e., (133-134) and
(137-138).
(139) (i) If the patient does come into the doctor's home he will not
see the doctor
(ii) If the patient comes into the doctor's home he will not
achieve his purpose
(iii) The patient does not need to come into the doctor's home
Technically, the crucial inferences in (139) are obtained as the result of
a process triggered by no and come in (cf. Section 5).
Next, the combinatorial rules will come up with the crucial question (140):
(140) Why does the doctor's wife want the patient to come in?
The only answer the combinatorial rules will be able to come up on the
basis of further inferencing is (141):
(141) The doctor's wife does not understand that (139iii)
Since one* of the basic assumptions stored in the WORLD
INFORMATION component will be that any human being, unless
otherwise specified, has the same inferencing ability as the combinatorial rules,
the only explanation which will be available to the theory is that the doctor's
wife's interpretation of the situation is different from the one obtained by the
combinatorial rules. In other words, the script analysis of the text obtained
so far will be recognized as the patient's interpretation, and the theory will
start the search for an alternative analysis.
An important decision will be made by the combinatorial rules at this
stage. Since there is no further explanation of the situation in the text and

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
125
the registered misunderstanding is never resolved, the text can no longer be
treated as a genuine sample of bona-fide communication. Therefore, the
combinatorial rules will have to reject the first default value of the mode of
communication adopted earlier and switch to the next default value, namely
that of joke telling, which is, of course, non-bona-fide. This switch will
reconfirm the command, already arrived at in the analysis by that time (see
the preceding paragraph), to the combinatorial rules to start looking for a
competing script analysis of the entire text or part thereof in view of the Main
Hypothesis (Section 1) and a subsequent discussion of script overlap in
Section 3. Another clue, following from the discussion of script oppositeness
in Section 4, will be to look for a special kind of a competing script, namely
a potentially opposed script.
The strategy of the search built into the combinatorial rules can be
presented schematically as (142):
(142) (i) Go back to the text and, beginning from the end, look for
another script or node evoked by more than one word; go
to (ii)
(ii) If such an additional common script is found go to (v); if
not found, go to (iii)
(iii) Go for the oppositeness instructions: if there are still
directions there which have not been applied, apply the
next direction; if there are no directions left, register defeat
and go to (iv)
(iv) Characterize the text as not belonging to the joke-telling
mode of communication and switch to the next default
value of non-bona-fide communication (probably lying)
(v) Check the compatibility of the discovered additional
common script with the text: if it is compatible with at least
a part of the text, go to (vi); if it is not, register defeat and
go to (iv)
(vi) Go to the oppositeness instructions and check the
suitability of one of them for the obtained pair of scripts, i.e., the
one compatible with the first interpretation of the text and
the script discovered in (ii): if a suitable type of
oppositeness is discovered, go to (vii); if not, register defeat and go
to (iv)
(vii) Recognize the analyzed text as a joke characterized by the
opposition of the type determined in (vi) between the two
obtained scripts

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In the case of joke (109), the first interpretation of the text established
above puts forward the script MEDICAL, or DOCTOR. In general, the
process of script analysis of a sentence leads to the recognition of such a
macroscript characterizing the entire situation. There are at least two
alternative ways of getting at the macroscript. The process of interpretation as
described above suggests one of the alternatives, namely adopting the most
frequently recurring script as the macroscript. This route implies a sequence
of rather complicated trial-and-error checks. The other way is almost
identical technically but more subtle conceptually. It is based on the
recognition of a difference between those scripts which are regular "static"
semantic descriptions of the kind which have been introduced and used so
far, on the one hand, and those which describe a process stage by stage, on
the other. The first kind of script can be referred to as atemporal, i.e., not
incorporating the notion of time or chronological sequence, while the other
will then be temporal. Basically the same distinction is captured by Schank's
(1976) usage of the terms 'frame' and 'script.' In script-based semantics, the
term 'scenario' is usually reserved for the temporal scripts. It is typical for
a temporal script to be a chronologically (and perhaps otherwise as well)
ordered sequence of atemporal scripts.
The script MEDICAL is then the scenario, or the temporal script, evoked
by the text of joke (109). As has been demonstrated on this example, in
script-based semantics, the semantic interpretation of the text is a function
of the scenario discovered in its script analysis, and an ambiguous sentence
will, of course, be associated with two or more scenarios. Beginning to look
for another scenario, the combinatorial rules will be instructed first to go
back to those words of the second sentence of the text which do not evoke
the script or node MEDICAL. Those include at least young, and,pretty, wife,
whisper, come, right, and in. The combinatorial rules will soon discover the
concealed script of SEX, evoked much less obviously perhaps but no less
persistently than the script MEDICAL is evoked by other words, by at least
the words pretty and wife as well as the inferences and probable inferences
of (133i) and (134i). Whisper in combination with the probable inference of
(138) will then match the temporal script LOVER, or ADULTERY.
Since the search for a competing scenario is successful in the case of joke
(109), the next step is to carry out (142v). The scenario will, in fact, turn out
to be perfectly compatible with the second sentence and not contradicted
by anything in the first sentence either.
The next step (142vi) requires a set of oppositeness instructions. On the
basis of Section 4, two lists can be obtained and easily formalized for use

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
127
by the combinatorial rules. The first list (143) captures the three basic types
of the real/unreal dichotomy; the second list contains a few essential features
frequently evoked in jokes and mentioned at the end of Section 4.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
0)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
If Script (Scenario) 1 is: then
actual
normal
possible
goodness-related
life-related
non-sex-related
non-money-related
high-stature-related
Script (Scenario) 2 is:
non-actual
possible
impossible
badness-related
death-related
sex-related
money-related
low-stature-related
The list in (144) is perhaps not exhaustive but representative and clearly
sufficient for most, if not all, simple jokes analyzed in the book.
The two scenarios of joke (109) will then be associated with (143i) and
(144iii), and the last step, (142vii), will then lead to the following result (145)
of the entire script analysis of the joke:
(145) Analysis of: Text (109)
Result: Joke
Script 1: MEDICAL (DOCTOR)
Script 2: ADULTERY (LOVER)
Type of oppositeness: Actual/Non-actual, Sex-related
There are some elements of joke (109) which the script analysis leaves out.
They are discussed in Sections 8 and 9, after the next section deals with the
relations between the semantic theory of humor proposed here and based
on script analysis, on the one hand, and the major theories and ideas about
humor surveyed in Chapter 1, on the other.
7. THEORIES OF HUMOR: SCRIPT-BASED INTERPRETATION
Hazlitt's long list of things "we laugh at" (1819, 8-9; see also Chapter 1,
Section 1) becomes surprisingly congruent and homogeneous when
interpreted in terms of the three basic types of the real/unreal script oppositeness
(see Section 4). Thus, the actual/non-actual type is represented by his

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"absurdity... a bottle nose in a caricature... a stuffed figure of an alderman."
The possible/impossible type is exemplified by "what we do not believe."
Practically all the other laughable things belong to the normal/abnormal type
of opposition: most of the things people do not expect to see can make them
laugh, and Hazlitt does seem to favor this type of opposition over the other
two.
The script interpretation of the varying sense of humor with different
people includes three basic factors (146):
(146) People "with a sense of People "without a sense of
humor": humor":
(i) switch easily and readily refuse to switch from the
from the bona-fide mode of bona-fide mode of commu-
communicationtothejoke- cication to the joke-telling
telling mode; mode
(ii) have more scripts available have fewer scripts available
for oppositeness interaction for oppositeness interaction
(iii) have more oppositeness have fewer oppositeness re-
relations between scripts lations between scripts
available available
(146i-iii) are also related to Freud's conditions for humor (1905, 282-285;
see also Chapter 1, Section 3). A "generally cheerful mood" which he
considers "the most favorable condition for the production of comic
pleasure" means also a certain degree of playfulness (cf. Fry, 1963; Huizin-
ga, 1938; see also Chapter 1, Section 6), and the latter can actually be
interpreted as the left part of (146i). Unless the switch can be made easily
and willingly the person cannot be "attuned to comic pleasure" either. The
"humorless" people are less prepared to make the switch also because they
tend to interpret the deliberate and often not entirely meaningful ambiguity
involved in humor (see Section 5) seriously, i.e., they tend to make an earnest
and usually futile attempt to disambiguate the text. In other words, they
behave according to the cooperative principle of bona-fide communication.
In Freud's terms, this kind of behavior is focusing "precisely on the
comparison from which the comic may arise," and apparently the effort can bona-fide
what is intended as a non-bona-fide mode of communication.

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
129
The unavailability of scripts for oppositeness interaction as well as of
oppositeness relationships with those people can be explained either by their
being preoccupied with the kinds of mental activity which are incompatible
with non-bona-fide communication or by their placing strong emotions on
various scripts and ways to oppose them in a joke. Obviously, a seriously
tabooed subject is hardly unlikely to amuse the person who maintains the
taboo. Religious, ethical, and other norms can preclude the availability of
the necessary second interpretation for the humorous text (see Section 4).
It is clearly the factors in the right part of (146) which made Ludovici
(1932) and other foes of humor so unreceptive and unsympathetic to it.
Scripts are involved in all the components of our definition of the verbal
joke (3) (see Chapter 1, Section 1). The speaker and hearer interact with
regard to modes of communication in the ways discussed in Section 2
according to the rules dictated to them in part by their psychologies and the
society to which they belong. Each of them has a certain number of scripts
and oppositeness relationships available to them. These are determined by
their individual experiences and especially their shared experience (cf.
Karttunen and Peters's "common ground," or "the common set of
presumptions" (1979, 13) and Stalnaker's (1974) "presupposition set") and
are selected from the larger set available again to their society. The text of
the joke, along with the situation in which the speaker and hearer find
themselves, evokes certain scripts from their repertoire(s).
The interaction of all of these components is schematically represented in
(147). The speaker and hearer's knowledge of their language makes a certain
set of scripts available to them in the form of the internalized lexicon of their
native language. Their experience, individual and especially shared, narrows
this set of scripts to a somewhat narrower subset of scripts which are
actually significant or relevant for the speaker and hearer. The text and the
situation reduce the subset to the minimum subsubset of scripts which are
actually used in interpreting the text. The society also contributes to the
process of selection of scripts by making some scripts much more readily
available to the speaker and hearer than some other scripts. Thus, in the
establishment culture of the United States of America, the script for starting
a car is much more readily available to the native speakers than the script
for cooking the human tenderloin. More importantly, the society and the
participants' psychologies affect their mode-switching mechanisms. The
switch leads to the adoption of a different cooperative principle and,
indirectly but importantly, influences the process of script selection again.

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(147)
Society
Psychology
Experience
Script interpretations are easily available for various premises, ideas and
hypotheses reviewed in Chapter 1. Thus, Bergson's insistence on the non-
individual, impersonal nature of humor (1899, 159; see also Chapter 1,
Section 3) is not only related to Freud's stipulation that there should be no
strong emotion about anything mentioned in the joke but also to the fact that
the individualization will necessarily lead to the evocation of more script
material than is necessary for the joke. Thus, for instance, the joke (9) is
impossible as a joke if you know the two people mentioned there personally
- it becomes a real-life anecdote with the following two possibilities: either
the story is true or it is false. In the latter case, the text is not funny. In the
former case, either the patient means what he says literally or he does not.
If he does, the text is not funny. If he does not, the text is a bona-fide report
of the patient's joke and not a joke itself. The availability of the individual
scripts, the knowledge of the people involved and the situation in which they
find themselves makes one follow all those paths and "kills" the joke.
All the lists of funny things mentioned in Chapter 1 after Hazlitt's
inventory (Sully, 1902, 87-118 - see also Chapter 1, Section 3; Monro, 1951, 40 -
see also Chapter 1, Section 5; Monro, op.cit., 75 - see also Chapter 1,
Section 6; Aubouin, 1948, 83-129 - see also Chapter 1, Sections 5 and 7)
are readily and meaningfully interpretable in terms of the basic types of script
oppositeness. This has the effect of invalidating the frequent complaints and
lamentations of humor theorists and practitioners about the elusive nature
of humor which escapes all generalization and definition (see, for instance,

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
131
Monro, 1951, 15-19 and Levine, 1969, 1-2 - see also Chapter 1, Section 1)
- it is, of course, difficult to enumerate all the scripts and oppositeness
relations which may create a joke but the principle of two scripts and an
oppositeness relation, the principle captured in the Main Hypothesis (see
Section 1), provides the desirable degree of unification .to the complex
phenomenon of humor.
It also makes it clear to what extent the various taxonomies of humor
mentioned in Chapter 1 are inherently heterogeneous. Some of them are
related to the nature of individual scripts evoked by the text of the joke,
others to the nature of the oppositeness relation, still others to the nature
of the trigger. One type of classification, the one pertaining to the method
of presenting the text, to its length, word and sentence order, etc., is actually
irrelevant from the point of view of the script-based semantic theory of
humor to the extent that all of these factors do not influence the script
analysis of the text of the joke. Does it mean that the theory is blind to the
timing of the joke, the position and format of the punch line and other
accompanying factors mentioned in Chapter 1, Section 3? This issue is
addressed at length in Section 9.
The three major classes of theories of humor outlined in Chapter 1,
Section 6, display the same heterogeneity of approach as the taxonomies of
humor.
The incongruity-based theories seem to address the issue of the deliberate
ambiguity of the text of the joke, the availability of two interpretations and,
to a certain extent with some theorists, the unreal nature of one of the
interpretations (see also Leacock, 1937,212 and 215; Mindess, 1971, 86-87;
Fry, 1963, 45, 147-152; and Chapter 1, Section 7). Bergson's special kind
of incongruity depends on the opposition of the natural and mechanical
scripts (1899, 84 - see also Chapter 1, Section 6).
The disparagement-based theories seem to attempt a reduction of all
humor to one particular kind of script oppositeness, namely (144i), with the
badness associated either with the hearer or with one of the heroes of the
joke. They also derive the oppositeness inherent in every joke from the direct
confrontation between two people in a battle.
The release-based theories concentrate on the switch from bona-fide
communication to the joke-telling mode: the freedom "from the chains of our
perceptual, conventional, logical, linguistic, and moral systems" (Mindess,
1971, 28 - see also Chapter 1, Section 6) means that the speaker and hearer
undertake to go beyond the regular cooperative principle of bona-fide
communication, which prohibits ambiguity, absurdity, etc., into a more

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"relaxed" though also rule-governed mode of humor. The suppression/
repression element which is often associated with this theory is easily
interpreted in script terms as a preference for those oppositeness relations
in which one of the scripts pertains to a tabooed area, e.g., sex, violence,
evacuation, etc.
It is clear from this brief "translation" of major theories and ideas about
humor into the language of scripts that script analysis provides a simple,
homogenious, and unifying basis for all of them. Everything that can be said
about humor without scripts can be expressed in their terms but not vice
versa. Being formally defined and based on an explicit semantic theory, the
scripts allow for important generalizations which are unavailable without
them. They also resolve the conflicts among the three reigning types of
theories of humor by demonstrating quite unequivocally the partial nature
of each of them and their emphasis on just one specific aspect of humor. The
script-based theory of humor provides a universal framework which is
completely neutral with regard to the major theories and non-committal as
to the truth or falsity of their claims. Some reservations about the theory are
discussed in the next two sections.
8. APPARENT COUNTEREXAMPLES
It was demonstrated in Sections 4-6 how the script-based semantic theory
is applied to the simple joke. According to the Main Hypothesis (see Section
1), each such joke is created by a (partial) overlap of two opposed scripts.
Obviously, the theory can be falsified in two ways: if at least one example
of a joke is produced which does not conform to the Main Hypothesis or
if at least one example of a text is produced which conforms to the Main
Hypothesis but is not funny. This section will deal with the former kind of
counterexample. The latter kind of counterexample will be discussed
somewhat indirectly in Section 9. It should be noted in passing that since
the script-based semantic theory of humor is falsifiable in principle,
according to Popper's (1972, 13ff.) philosophy of science, it is a valid theory.
Not every joke is a simple joke. Does it mean that every joke which is more
sophisticated may constitute a counterexample to the theory? (148) is an
example of a non-simple joke:
(148) Little Vova's elder brother, a high school junior, started getting
poor grades. He and his father had a little talk, and the father
said, "I remember myself at your age and I understand very well

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
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what is wrong with you. I wish my father had done what I am
going to do for you. Here - take five rubles and get yourself a girl.
She will take care of your problem."
The boy's sister overheard the conversation and stopped him on
the way out, "Listen, give the money to me - I will take care of
your problem, and the money will remain in the family." The boy
agrees, and they go to her room. In a little while the girl exclaims,
"Wow, your prick is much larger than Daddy's!" "Yes," he
answers, "Mommy told me so too." And little Vova, who hears
all that, says to himself, "What a whorish family I come from!"
(Soviet, 1960's)
The two opposing scripts will be identified by the script analysis easily
enough: FAMILY and SEX. They will also be assigned to the normal/
abnormal basic type of script oppositeness. Informally, what is involved here
is the opposition of the normal asexual relations between family members
and the intense incestual activity in little Vova's family. What complicates
the script analysis of (148), however, is the fact that the scripts are opposed
more than once. In fact, (148) is not an unusual concatenation of a number
of simple jokes. The first three sentences of the joke ending in "the money
will remain in the family" constitute the first joke, a rather feeble one perhaps
but with all the necessary components in place. The girl's mention of her
father realizes another opposition of basically the same two scripts, and the
boy's mention of his mother introduces a third opposition. It is all crowned
by little Vova's pronouncement, which while quite seriously intended,
constitutes a joke, very feeble again, on its own with a slight variation of the same
theme: it is not simply FAMILY vs. SEX but, more specifically, CHILD
vs. SEX; in other words, a young child is not expected to understand such
things or to use such language (see also Chapter 5, Sections 2 and 4).
Joke A221 in Appendix 2 is another example of a multiple-opposition
joke: the first joke consists of the first three sentences of the text, and the
second joke is created by the last two. Here the constituent jokes are not
equal - the first one can exist without the other; the second joke has to be
built on top of the first one, which introduces the necessary material for it.
This is the case in (148) as well: the first joke is independent, the next two
are perhaps somewhat less dependent on the first one and could, in principle,
constitute independent jokes but some rewording would be necessary,
probably along the lines of (149). However, they would be better together,
and, besides, a significant factor which adds greatly to joke (148) will be

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missing from the text. The factor, captured by a phrase like (150), would
spoil the joke(s) if simply added to the text. The first joke introduces this
element much more innocuously (see also Section 9).
(149) (i) "Wow," a girl told her brother, "your prick is much larger
than Daddy'V
(ii) "Mommy also told me that my prick is larger than
Daddy's," said the boy to her sister.
(150) when they were making love to each other for the first time
The last fragment of (148), involving little Vova, while containing a self-
sufficient script opposition, would be very weak without the preceding text
as well.
Jokes like (148) and A221 can be called compound jokes, and the only
difference between them and the simple jokes is that the script analysis has
to be applied to them more than once. An additional conceptually simple
and technically accessible device combining the multiple opposition into one
joke is necessary for their full analysis.
The compound jokes are the simplest type of apparent counterexamples
to the Main Hypothesis, and, with minor adjustments to be made, they turn
out to be not counterexamples.
The other type of apparent counterexamples involves non-elementary
scripts of various degrees of complexity and sophistication.
As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 1, and demonstrated in part in Section
6, the semantic interpretation of many ordinary sentences in natural
language requires the use of semantic information which is not contained in
the sentence explicitly but is rather presupposed, entailed or implied by it.
A significant part of this information is captured by the script-based lexicon
of a natural language (see Chapter 3, Section 4), and it is this part which can
be assumed to be immediately available to every proficient native speaker
of the language (obviously, some individual and dialectal variation takes
place here, just as in the case of slightly different vocabularies with different
native speakers, but this variation will be ignored here in conformance with
the principle of idealization of the material briefly mentioned in Chapter 1,
Section 1, and restated in Chapter 2, Section 4). However, besides these
linguistic scripts there are many other scripts which are part of the native
speaker's knowledge of the world, or encyclopedic knowledge. Some of it
is immediately adjacent to the linguistic knowledge, i.e., accessible to a large
number of speakers (cf. Chomsky, 1975, 30). Others are much more
restricted. Schematically and simplistically, the entire script baggage of the native

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR 135
speaker can be represented as a number of concentric circles, as shown in
(151):
(151)
Thus, the script relating the auto industry to the prime rate may be thought
of as belonging to General Knowledge for the native speakers of American
English in the 1980's. The script relating the comedian George Burns to the
Dean belongs in the Restricted Knowledge component for the faculty
members of the School of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Education at
Purdue University at the same time. The script relating magnetic tape to a
personal career disaster is an individual script for Richard Nixon (and,
possibly, for a few other similarly unfortunate individuals). Obviously, the
semantic elements making up the restricted scripts are all contained in the
continuous lexical graph of the language; what a restricted script does is to
connect those elements with each other with direct and/or shorter paths than
those which normally link them in the graph.

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A non-elementary script may be based on a number of elementary scripts
and still remain within the realm of linguistic scripts. The script analysis of
a joke involving one or more non-elementary script may require a little more
effort, for instance, in inferencing, but it will remain firmly within the sphere
of application of the proposed theory, and no apparent counterexamples are
created. In fact, quite a few of the jokes analysed in Sections 3-5 do involve
non-elementary scripts. Thus, in (8), the actual scripts involved in the
opposition are not immediately LIFE and DEATH but rather ORDINARY
WEEK and EXECUTION, which are derived from LIFE and DEATH,
respectively, and are less basic or elementary than LIFE and DEATH.
The difficulties for script analysis arise when a script evoked by the
joke is of a restricted nature. The simplest case of such humor is a joke
based on allusion. Some examples of allusion have, in fact, been included
in the corpus of examples and discussed briefly earlier (see (26-28)
and Chapter 2, Section 1). A typical straightforward allusion underlies
also (152):
(152) Nancy Reagan insisted on the free distribution of the
Government butter surplus to the truly needy. She said, 'Even these poor
people must have something to dip their lobster tails into.'
(Johnny Carson's monologue, NBC, February 1982)
In order to understand the joke the hearer must have internalized a
number of scripts corresponding to the knowledge informally described
in (153):
(153) (i) The Government is, indeed, distributing surplus butter to
the poor
(ii) The Reagans are frequently described as rich and friends
of the rich
(iii) Lobster tails are expensive, and the poor cannot afford
them
It is clear that if any one of the elements in (153) turned out to be
false, the joke would be seriously affected. It would lose much of its
effectiveness if (153i) were false, i.e., if Carson were simply fantasizing,
but it would collapse entirely if either of (153ii-iii) were falsified. (153iii)
seems to be of a more general nature than (153i-ii). In fact, many of
Carson's political, local and ad hominem jokes, almost all of which are
allusive, fall flat because his audience does not possess the necessary

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
137
knowledge to which the jokes allude (and/or is too "relaxed" to watch
the "Laugh" sign closely enough).
A few jokes in Appendix 2 are relatively simple allusions as well'.
Thus, A213 alludes to the fact that everybody in Russia knows that
Eugene Onegin was written by Pushkin; A214 to the widespread belief in
Israel that David Levy, now a Deputy Prime Minister, is so dumb and
ignorant that he mixes up even elementary foreign words and
expressions; A215 to the fact that many inhabitants of Boston are Pope-
loving Catholics; A223 to the fact that it is very far from Vancouver to
Japan and it is impossible for a human being to swim over (the particular
opposition of scripts here, involving DEATH, assigns the joke to the
rich class of humour noir - cf. Breton, 1966).
In many jokes the allusion is further complicated by the presence of
another phenomenon. Thus, in (154), the allusion is clearly to something
like (155); however, in addition to that, the opposed scripts are of rather
a sophisticated variety (156) and have themselves to be based on a
further allusion to something like (157) in order to convey the message
(158).
(154) A man sitting in his living room in front of a TV set turns to his
wife and says, "Funding for the 'Dick Cavett Show' has been
provided by this station and other public television stations, and
by a grant from the Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, with
additional funding from Allen Services Corporation."
(Verbalization of Stan Hunt's cartoon, The New Yorker, Vol.LIV, No.52,
February 12, 1979, 31)
(155) The content of the man's statement is displayed and voiced
verbatim before and after each installment of the program is
broadcast
(156) Informative communication vs. uninformative (redundant,
vacuous, trivial, self-obvious) communication
(157) (i) It is widely believed that watching TV adversely affects
people's mental capacities
(ii) Long, official-sounding, and grammatically complex
sentences are unlikely to occur in casual conversation
(iii) Husbands and wives usually have informal, casual
conversation
(158) In spite of the fact that the man watches an "intellectual"
program on PBS he has become as dumb and uninteresting as
any "Laverne and Shirley" fan

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("Laverne and Shirley" is not, of course, mentioned or alluded to in
(154) and is thrown in by this writer to vent malice and to emphasize
the point of (158) even further.)
In many sophisticated jokes, allusion takes the form of parody. Thus,
(159) presuposes the hearer's familiarity with the libretto of "The Swan
Lake" or some other "typical ballet" as well as with the genre of ballet
libretto, and makes fun of it. Besides that, some knowledge of mermaids,
frogs turned princes or princesses, etc., is necessary, along with a good
notion of human and bird anatomy as well as of sexual intercourse
among humans, to get the obscene nature of the joke:
(159) Sigmund is astounded to see that she is part swan and part
woman - unfortunately, divided lengthwise. (Allen, 1976, 21)
The most restricted script alluded to by the joke is, of course, the
specific ballet libretto, and this is exactly what the joke is designed to
parody. In this case, some primitive sexual joke remains even if the
parody element is unavailable to the hearer. In many other parodies,
nothing remains of the joke if the parodied script is not accessible. This
seems to be true, for instance, of A201 parodying a typical "last word"
story and also feeding on an ethnic stereotype of the "overlogical" Jew
(cf. Chapter 6). A few more jokes in Appendix 2 are typical parodies:
A202 (ritual of self-introduction); A203 (typical medical advice); A204
(race relations); A205 and A208 (psychoanalysis); A206 (religious ritual);
A207 (a racist cliche); A209 (dirty talk and official jargon); A210 and
A211 (heroic memoirs); A212 (Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment);
A217 (standing in line for commodities); A218 (thought about death and
complains about jobs); A219 (diary); A220 (thoughts about the essence
of life); A221 (gynecological examination); A222 (Dorothy Parker's
poem); A224 (philosophical discussion about the universe and (ethnic?)
fear of involvement); A225 (a cliche about meeting a particular person
about whom one heard before). Some of the parodies are further structured:
they may reverse the parodied situation, e.g., jokes A203, A206,
A208; double the parody, e.g., A209, A221, or A224; combine it with
non-elementary scripts, e.g., A218, and with allusions of a non-parodical
nature, e.g., A202, A204, A209-11, A217. The parodied material may be
a particular work of art, a genre, a ritual or a typical situation, a literary
or everyday cliche.
A special though not unusual type of joke is created by parodying
familiar jokes. In a recent example (160), a joke is made by refusing to

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
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make it and thus alluding to a primitive joke concerning something
obscene, e.g., masturbation, and assumed to be immediately available to
the hearer (it was, judging by their response):
(160) Suzanne Somers: In my childhood I was sort of "out of it." I
spent most of the time in the closet.
Johnny Carson: (Pause) Not I, folks. You supply the punch
line yourselves. (The "Tonight" Show, NBC,
February 19, 1982)
Every time an allusion of any kind is made, the involved script is a
metascript, i.e., a script evoking another script assumed to be available to
the hearer.
The successful application of the script analysis demonstrated in
Section 6 to the material of all the apparent counterexamples is contingent
on the availability of the involved scripts to the hearer, including, of
course, the metascript s. A strictly linguistical theory of humor would
have to rely only on the linguistic scripts and ignore all the other scripts
in (151). However, a conceptually obvious extension of such a theory is
created immediately by adding scripts from the external circles in (151)
to the available lexicon, and the straightforward extension of the Main
Hypothesis to this material will still hold true. The feasibility of such an
extension is an issue which does not have to be addressed here simply
because it belongs in linguistic theory, where, at least for some researchers
(see Chapter 3, Sections 1-2), the difference between semantics
and pragmatics and the feasibility of both and especially of the latter
hinges on the solution of this problem. A number of extensions of this
sort are carried out practically and briefly noted in Chapters 5-7.
A few less significant reservations about the Main Hypothesis are
dealt with in the next section.
9. JOKE CONSTRUCTION
The Main Hypothesis and the script analysis of verbal humor determine to
a great extent the general strategy involved in joke making, and this section
is devoted to some elements of this general strategy. In the course of the
discussion, some "accompanying factors" of verbal humor mentioned in
Chapter 1, Section 3, and ignored so far in this chapter will be discussed in
script-related terms, and the question whether the script-based semantic
theory of humor is blind to them, brought up in Section 7, will be addressed.

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Joke construction is interesting to discuss in application to what Fry
called the 'situation jokes' rather than the 'canned jokes.' To repeat in part
the quotation in Chapter 1, Section 5, the former "are spontaneous and have,
to a major extent, their origin in the ongoing interpersonal (or intrapersonal)
process" (Fry, 1963, 43). It is also more revealing to discuss the strategy
utilized by the speaker in the case of an intended rather than an unintended
joke (see Chapter 1, Section 5, for further discussion and references). Both
the canned and unintended jokes will, in fact, be also covered in the
following discussion, and brief comments to this effect will be made in the
appropriate places.
All intended humor begins with an impulse to make a joke. What creates
the impulse goes beyond the proposed theory though it was discussed in
detail in Chapter 1. The reasons for wanting to make a joke have to do with
the general acceptability or desirabiity of humor from the physiological,
psychological, or sociological point of view. Somewhat more specifically, the
speaker may be interested in establishing a bond with the hearer, to relieve
some tensions, anxieties or affects which are believed to interfere with
humor, or to make believe that the relief is achieved. It is known, for
instance, that especially in contemporary American custom, the public
speaker tends to begin his or her address to an unfamiliar audience with a
joke.
The speaker enters the domain for which the proposed theory is
responsible at the moment when the impulse to make a joke is there for whatever
reason. According to the proposed theory of humor, at this stage if the
speaker wants to make a joke he is responsible for the following five factors
(161):
(161) (i) A switch from the bona-fide mode of communication to the
non-bona- fide mode of joke telling
(ii) The text of an intended joke
(iii) Two (partially) overlapping scripts compatible with the
text
(iv) An oppositeness relation between the two scripts
(v) A trigger, obvious or implied, realizing the oppositeness
relation
Some of the factors in (161) may already be in place at this stage (in fact,
even prior to this stage, the impulse to make a joke may already be given
or imposed on the speaker - if, for instance, he is a professional comedian),
and then the speaker has to provide the remaining elements.

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(161i), a switch to the joke-telling mode of communication, may have
already taken place if a playful, mirthful, or humorous mood prevails
between the speaker and hearer(s). This can occur as a result of the
preceding humorous behavior which attuned the participants, especially the
hearer(s), to the joke-telling mode. If the hearer is not in the joke-telling
mode of communication, the speaker has the choice of putting the hearer in
that mode explicitly or implicitly. The former way includes various forms of
non-verbal behavior such as clowning, horseplay, grimacing, practical jokes,
etc., as well as some standard mode-switching clues of the kind discussed
in Chapter 1, Section 3 (e.g., "Did you hear this one?" or "A funny thing
happened to me on the way to..."). The latter includes various ways of
signalling to the hearer that a joke is being told, for instance, by building in
an obvious exaggeration, implausibility, etc.
The text of the joke should contain all the elements of (161) missing from
the situation the speaker is in, either overtly or through inferences, while the
elements which are in place already should be presupposed by the text. Thus,
if the joke-telling mode has already been achieved there is no need to include
an impicit or explicit mode-switching clue if, of course, it does not serve any
other purpose in the joke (e.g„ an obvious exaggeration such as "I made my
usual million and a half typos in the proposal" can both signal a joke and
introduce the unreal script for opposition).
The presence of an obvious trigger in the situation starts perhaps more
jokes than anything else. The popularity, accessibility and frequency of the
simple puns can be explained by this factor. For many speakers, the mere
exposure to a homonymous or polysemous word or phrase constitutes an
irresistible temptation to make a joke. If the hostess at a dinner party
mentions breasts or legs distributing the chicken, compulsive punners may
be a menace and an embarrassment, and the attempt to avoid this situation
by using such euphemisms as dark meat and light meat may provoke a
reference to the blondes and brunettes in the company or at least to the time
of day. It is the easy availability of puns which makes them a cheap and
somewhat despicable type of humor for many individuals and social groups.
However, the same factor prevents them from disappearing, and every new
generation goes through many cycles of discovering the puns, getting tired
of them, rejecting them and eventually rediscovering them again.
The fact of the matter is that the quality of the pun depends not so much
on the trigger itself as on the other four components of the joke from (161).
If the trigger is there but the scripts and the oppositeness relation are not,
the pun remains an artificial low-quality product. Thus, in the case of dark

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and light meat and the color of people's hair, the two scripts are not opposed
in any meaningful way, and the vaguely sex-related connotations of the
words blonde and brunette are unlikely to save the situation dramatically. In
the right frame, however, with all the necessary components in place, the pun
may trigger an excellent joke, and many hearers will not even realize that the
trigger of the joke is a trivial pun because their attention will be drawn to
the evoked scripts and their opposition.
Most frequently, the speaker is likely to discover a potential trigger and
one script already in position. The success of the joke depends on the
speaker's ability to construct a text evoking another script which will be
opposed to the given script in a humorously significant way. Often the other
script is prompted by the other meaning(s) of the homonymous or poly-
semous trigger. If the other script is not obvious to the hearer as well, the
mere evocation of it may make a joke. Thus, for instance, if at the
presentation by a visiting professor a colleague utters Visiting professors can be
boring, the sentence, similarly to (61), is syntactically ambiguous. This
ambiguity, illustrated by (62), turns out to be not immediately discernible by
all the native speakers exposed to it. It is possible to make the ambiguity into
a(n admittedly feeble) joke by making the concealed interpretation evoke a
script which would be opposed to the one the utterance evoked initially in
some standard way, for instance, by way of the sex-related opposition. Not
if the visiting professor is a gorgeous blonde and you visit her in her apartment
uttered in response to the first sentence will constitute a joke based on that
opposition. The realization of the presence of the other script requires an
effort, the trigger - the syntactic ambiguity - is not of the most obvious kind,
and therefore the second utterance has to be straightforward,
self-explanatory and not too snappy. A mere Not if she is a gorgeous blonde would not quite
do perhaps because for most speakers it will be too far removed from the
first interpretation and will, therefore, fail to evoke the second interpretation.
On the other hand, if the other script is obvious and easily accessible and
the trigger is simple, a more sophisticated textualization of the joke is
possible and even preferable. Thus, if somebody says She cannot bear
children in the sense of giving birth, She cannot bear me either may be too
cheap though it is a legitimate joke (letting aside its tastefulness: the issue
is sensitive for many people and therefore, according to Freud, their sense
of humor will not be activated by the first sentence while the second may
offend them - see Chapter 1, Section 3). She cannot stand me either is a little
better because it is a step away from the previous version and less obvious.
A slightly better joke can be made by evoking still another, less obvious

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
143
meaning of bear: if the lady in question is sly and catty and a disparaging
remark is permissible, the response might be No, but she could perhaps fox
them. Alternatively, if the lady is big, it could be No, but she could perhaps
elephant them. (None of the above are great jokes, but their obvious
homemade features help illustrate the construction principles better than any
seamless finished product.)
In other words, if the second script and the resulting opposition are too
obvious, more emphasis is placed on the speaker's joke-presenting
techniques (Fry, 1963, 32-33 - see also Chapter 1, Section 3), which will be
discussed in some more detail below.
Another possibility is for the speaker to observe two scripts in the
discourse-cum-situation but no trigger. In this case, the speaker must
provide the trigger himself. If he can think of an ambiguous word, phrase
or construction, it will do the job. If not, there are some standard and more
obvious triggers which he can use such as This reminds me of.... Thus, if a
lively conversation becomes a shouting match, the neutral observer can say
something like Bob, why don't you go for afield goal and leave Jill alone! or
say This reminds me of last night's game: they wouldn't score but wouldn't let
go of the ball, either.
There are situations when the speaker has options concerning the second
opposed scripts. While a list like (144) is always available to a proficient
joker, in some cases the most readily available oppositeness relation is not
permissible for ethical reasons - for instance, sex is ruled out because of a
mixed and not intimate company, life and death cannot be used for religious
or superstitious reasons, goodness and badness are ruled out because the
audience may vary widely in their values, etc. In this case, there are two safe
techniques which are widely used by public speakers and stand-up
comedians: direct negation (see Section 5) and self-disparagement (see
Chapter 1, Section 5).
The former provides a simple non-value-related oppositeness, usually of
the actual/non-actual kind and is mildly humorous without the risk of
offending anybody. Thus, entering a semi-empty lecture hall the scheduled
lecturer can say something like / knew the talk would be crowded or any
variation of it, stating explicitly or implying that there are too many people
there while, in fact, there are not. In a similar situation, the instructor
entering his classroom waits for a few moments for the students to stop
chattering, and when it does not happen, announces, "I am here!" The
announcement has a (proven) humorous effect because it implies something
which is directly contrary to what is actually taking place: it implies that the

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students cannot see the instructor while, in fact, they can and do. (Bergson
would remark that humor is used here as a "social corrective" - see (1899,
187) and Chapter 1, Section 3.)
The self-disparagement humor is based on (144i), i.e., the
goodness/badness opposition; it is inoffensive, however, at least technically because the
speaker is the purported target of it. The opposed scripts are variations of
I AM GOOD vs. I AM BAD theme, and, of course, many comedians use
this kind of humor for camouflaged messages about other people (some, like
Joan Rivers, combine self-disparagement directed, in fact, against other
people, e.g., the flat-chested, the Jews, etc., with a more than healthy dose
of straight disparagement jokes directed against other people, e.g., the
well-endowed, the Jews, etc.). Rodney Dangerfield's "no respect" jokes are
almost pure examples of self-disparagement though his hearers manage to
identify themselves even with the most implausible misfortunes which befall
him such as having his "Preparation H" replaced by glue - his jokes are also
very heavily allusive.
When no elements of (161) are in position but the impulse to make a joke
is there, the speaker will often resort to a canned joke. The canned jokes
work best when they are somehow associated with the situation. If, however,
the situation has not yet begun to unfold, i.e., the speaker and the hearer have
no common experience whatsoever, the speaker has the choice of telling a
canned joke on a general subject assuming the availability of the necessary
scripts to the hearer simply because they belong to either of the two inner
circles in (151) or simulating a common ground by using a standard clue
such as A funny thing happened to me..., commenting on the weather, the
room, etc. (e.g., Do you know what this room reminds me off). Another
technique used by professional and amateur comedians alike is repetition:
an innocuous and not humorous remark may become increasingly funny
when repeated many times in a row appropriately or inappropriately. The
opposed scripts of this kind are of a pretty non-elementary kind: the real
world, in which many repetitions of the same thing do not occur very often,
is opposed to the artificial world of mechanical repetitions (cf. Bergson,
1899, 118 - see also Chapter 1, Section 7).
In the opposite situation when, all the elements are there already and the
speaker does not have to provide any of them, what happens is basically an
unintended joke though the speaker may turn it into an intended joke by
noticing it first. If he fails to do it, a mode discrepancy of the kind discussed
in Section 2 can occur between him and the hearer (see (110-111) and the
following discussion).

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
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Besides (161), they are other elements which make jokes better or worse,
namely the joke-presenting techniques. The length of a joke, the degree of
its comprehensibility, the amount of detail, the timing and positioning of the
punch line are perhaps the most important of them (cf. Chapter 1, Section
3). However, to the degree that these techniques do not interfere with any
element in (161) they cannot make or break the joke on their own. Thus, a
somewhat lengthy version of a good joke will still remain a joke if the
redundant material does not interfere wih the process of script evocation and
does not make it impossible or difficult to capture the intended oppositeness
relation.
If the joke is too trivial, the oppositeness relation may be not perceived
by the hearer as a new element of information and may not be treated as
an oppositeness relation at all (cf. the discussion of the somewhat trivial
oppositeness relations involved in jokes A108 and A115 in Section 4). If the
joke is not easily comprehensible, the necessary scripts may not be evoked
and the oppositeness relation not obtained. The more effort is required for
script evocation, the more time the hearer should be given to work on it. For
this reason, many jokes are told as serials, with the same situation recurring
a couple of times before the punch line is delivered (see, for instance, A128
or A133). This helps establish the first script very firmly before it is
"disestablished." In any case, many jokes have a great deal of redundancy
corroborating both scripts built into them for the same purpose (see Section
6).
Too much or too little detail may affect the process of script evocation in
the same ways as the length and degree of comprehensibility.
The punch line can affect the joke very seriously largely because if it is
worded or positioned wrongly or omitted, the switch from the bona-fide
mode of communication to the joke-telling mode can be blocked and the
joke will be killed entirely. This is what happens, for instance, in (162), which
is, of course, a botched version of (109):
(162) A funny thing happened to a friend of mine. He had bronchitis
and went to see his doctor. The doctor's wife, who is young and
pretty, opened the door. He asked her whether the doctor was
in, and naturally, he had to whisper because he had lost his voice.
The woman misunderstood him entirely and decided that he was
whispering because he did not want to be overheard. She
thought therefore that he had amorous designs on her and
happily invited him to come in because, of course, her spouse
was conveniently away and the two of them were alone.

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While (162) may have still preserved some entertainment value for the
frivolously minded, it is not a joke simply because the entire discourse
remains within the domain of bona-fide communication and conforms
entirely to the cooperative principle governing that mode. Deliberate
ambiguity is excluded by that principle, and there is none whatsoever in
(162).
Less serious misuses of the punch line may lower the quality of the joke
significantly without killing it. In general, the less innocuous the punch line,
the better the joke. In script-based terms, the punch line contains, or at least
implies, the trigger, and the trigger is most effective when it effectuates the
switch after the first script is firmly established. This creates the element of
surprise valued by so many researchers of humor, and it explains why so
many punch lines come at the very end of the text.
It should be emphasized once again, however, that to the extent that the
joke-presenting techniques do not affect the elements of (161) and thus do
not interfere with the script processing of the joke by the hearer, they are
optional embellishments. In their optimum combination they lead to the best
possible and most effective version of the joke. In their worst combination,
they may spoil the joke considerably. But even a badly distorted joke
remains a joke if the right scripts are evoked and the oppositeness relation
is established.
The techniques, even if they do not interfere with the scripts, can be easily
explained in terms of script analysis, possibly with the exception of the
proverbial sound [k] (see Fry, 1963, 33). Thus, one of the most popular
techniques is skipping a logical link and making the hearer reconstruct it.
This is only effective if the procedure does not interfere with the degree of
comprehensibility of the joke. Joke A131 is a simple example: the missing
logical link is the image of a long, warm, and comfortable nightgown with
full sleeves, the opposite of the strapless evening dress, and it is never
mentioned explicitly. In this particular case, it could be mentioned by name
without killing the joke but spoiling it somewhat. In some other cases,
supplying the missing link renders the joke too trivial and thus kills it by
interfering with its script processing. Thus, in joke A134 adding a clause like
, who was so excited that he mixed his words, after the word driver would
trivialize the joke back to the bona-fide mode. A similar sophistication-
raising technique is used when instead of the regular riddle/conundrum
format (see, for instance, (10-13) as well as the discussion in Chapter 1,
Section 4), Carson reverses the procedure by giving the answer first and
asking to guess the question which leads to it.

SEMANTIC THEORY OF HUMOR
147
To summarize this section and the entire chapter, the script analysis of
verbal humor provides a unifying theoretical and formal basis for various
intuitions people share about humor as well as a conceptually simple and
an intuitively appealing explanation of the human ability to produce and
understand jokes. Even more importantly, the script-based semantic theory
of humor helps formulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for a text
to be funny, i.e., a joke. In fact, the script analysis as demonstrated in
Section 6 can be presented in terms of a construction algorithm which, given
a script and a dictionary of potential triggers (or any other combination of
given factors from (161)), will synthesize a joke automatically. Such an
algorithm can, of course, be computerized, and a research project in this
direction is underway. The point of the research is not so much to construct
jokes artificially as to verify the proposed theory with the help of the ultimately
formalized tool.
The next three chapters will be devoted to a script analysis of three specific
kinds of humor, sexual, ethnic, and political, each of which involves a
standard and easily accessible type of script oppositeness.

CHAPTER FIVE
SEXUAL HUMOR
INTRODUCTION
Sexual humor is defined here as including any verbal joke which contains
an explicit or implicit reference to sexual intercourse. This is not meant to
include references to phenomena immediately adjacent to sex if intercourse
is not mentioned directly nor directly alluded to. Thus, most of the usual
mother-in-law jokes (see, for instance, Alll) or marital jokes (see, for
instance, (24ii), (25i) or (37)) are not included in sexual humor because, while
it is customary for husbands and wife to engage in intercourse, sex is not
what these jokes are about. The practical intuitive criterion, easily and
uniformly available in our culture, is that these jokes are not considered
"dirty" and can be told in mixed company, sex- and age-wise. On the other
hand, jokes (4), (6), (16), (21), (35), (39), (116), (148), (159), and (160) are
definitely included in the category of sexual humor because all of them
contain explicit or implicit references to sex. Out of these jokes, (39) and
(148) will strike most people as the most explicitly sexual and, therefore,
"dirtiest," while (4) is perhaps the least explicit of them and, therefore, the
most socially acceptable. These two extremes determine the range of sexual
humor as intended here quite accurately. It will be recognized by most people
that joke (21 = 109) tends toward the mild pole of the scale.
Traditionally, sexual humor has been researched by the proponents of the
suppression/release-based theories (see Chapter 1, Section 6, and references
there), and the prevalent thesis has been that sex, along with other
physiological functions and direct violence, is normally suppressed and repressed, and
humor provides an outlet for its release in a way which may be more
appropriate and socially and ethically acceptable than the more direct and
natural way. In other words, according to this view, sexual language is
substituted for sexual behavior in sexual humor, and the pleasure from
sexual humor is of a sexual nature. In fact, some researchers claim that this
pleasure is a complicated mixture of sexual behavior, a resistance to it, and
the overcoming of the resistance (Greig, 1923, 110 - see also Chapter 1,
Section 6).
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, in general, and stated specifically in
148

SEXUAL HUMOR
149
Chapter 4, Section 7, the script-based semantic theory of humor is neutral
to, and perfectly compatible with, various theories of humor, including the
suppression/release theo^, and non-committal with regard to the claims
those theories make. From the point of view of the script-based semantic
theory of humor, sexual humor, just as any other kind of humor, conforms
to the Main Hypothesis and therefore is created by an opposition of two
partially overlapping scripts. Accordingly, sexual humor should be expected
to exhibit the same three basic types of the real/unreal dichotomy (see
Chapter 4, Section 4). It can be also expected to favor the sex-related/non-
sex-related type of script oppositeness (144iii) over the other types.
The purpose of this chapter is to take this general analysis further and to
investigate what semantic properties are shared by all the jokes of this
particular kind. These properties may include a number of specific scripts,
oppositeness relations and triggers, whose presence in a joke helps assign
it to the category of sexual humor.
Two basic classes of sexual humor are distinguished in this chapter on the
basis of script analysis: the jokes created by the overtly present opposition
between a non-sex-related and a sex-related script, on the one hand, and the
jokes which deal with an entirely sexual material and which only imply the
non-sexual reality and the sexual/non-sexual opposition, on the other. In
other words, the feature of explicit vs. implicit sexual/non-sexual opposition
underlies this basic categorization of sexual humor. This feature
cross-classifies with another essential feature, viz., the absence or presence in the joke
of a specific sexual script and a specific type of opposition usually associated
with it. The cross-classification of these two essential features results in four
types of sexual humor which are discussed one by one in the first four
sections of the chapter. Section 5 deals with one particular genre of sexual
humor which cuts across the four types.
1. SEXUAL/NON-SEXUAL OPPOSITION: OVERT, UNSPECIFIED
This first type of sexual humor is characterized by a standard opposition of
a non-sex-related script with a sex-related script and by the unavailability
of any specific sexual script for the joke. In other words, the humorous effect
is created by a mere evocation of sex in a general, non-specific manner and
its juxtaposition on the first, non-sexual interpretation of the text of the joke.
Out of the already quoted examples, joke (116) is a typical representative of
this category. The CHURCH script evoked repeatedly by the first part of
the text and, in fact, never completely rejected, is opposed to the generalized

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sexual script triggered by the word substitute and supported by the word wife
and the sexual implications of her death for the vicar. A139 is another
example, perhaps even of a simpler kind, because the sexual implications are
evoked by the misuse of a word: torso is substituted for trousseau, and the
non-sexual script is even less marked with regard to SEX than CHURCH,
which is perceived as diametrically opposite to SEX. Joke (4) about the
"darling" chauffeur is also of this kind though its sexual implications are
considerably weaker and it can be considered a borderline case in the sense
of its membership in the category of sexual humor.
Most of the do it bumper stickers are clear examples of this type (163):
(163) (i) Divers do it more deeply
(ii) Non-smokers do it without puffing (American, 1978)
(iii) Engineers do it with precision (American, 1978)
Since do it is a ready-made trigger evoking the generalized sexual script,
jokes like (163) are very easy to construct: all they need is a noun following
with(out) or an adverb compatible with the subject, which is the reference to
a professional or occupational group of people, and interpretable in sexual
terms, the latter being a very weak requirement since just about everything
is interpretable in sexual terms (cf. the discussion of Johnny Carson's
periodically unsuccessful attempts to break out of sexual humor in Chapter
4, Section 2). In terms of joke construction, the situation is even easier than
having a ready-made trigger and one script available because, in addition to
that, there is a ready-made oppositeness relation (144iii) and a given format
for the joke. One can easily improvise such jokes (164), and while some of
them may be funnier than others they are all legitimate jokes of a very basic
type.
(164) (i) Poets do it lyrically
(ii) Politicians do it conspicuously
(iii) Linguists do it lingually
(iv) Plumbers do it without leaks
(v) CPA's do it with records
(165) (i) Prostitutes do it professionally
(ii) Wives do it out of duty
(iii) Virgins do it blushingly
The joke would collapse, however, if the group of people referred to
evokes a sexual script already, as in (165), because no script oppositeness
is then available. Texts such as (165) may retain a minimum of humor for

SEXUAL HUMOR
151
some people who enjoy any reference to sex, and in this case, they can be
treated as the simplest jokes of the third type of sexual humor, discussed in
Section 3. On the other hand, people can be easily substituted for with
animals:
(166) (i) Snakes do it in cold blood
(ii) Dogs do it in dog fashion
(iii) Foxes do it furtively
(iv) Tigers do it ferociously
(v) Amoebae do it spinelessly, etc.
Jokes of this type are the real double entendre**, though the term is often
used broadly to include the next category as well. The triggers are either
homonymous words or phrases which combine a sexual meaning with a
non-sexual one as in the examples above or, more enjoyably for a certain
group of people, the triggers are obscenities or allusions to obscenities as in
(167) and (168), respectively:
(167) A girl who has been speeding, sasses the traffic policeman when
he gives her a ticket. "Say," he marvels, "You're a fresh egg."
"Well, I ought to be - I was just laid an hour ago." (Legman,
1968, 343)
(168) A male medical professor asks a young girl student at the exam,
"What organ has the capacity of increasing in size three times?"
The girl blushes and giggles, "Hee-hee!" "Don't be stupid!"
shouts the professor angrily. "It's the lungs. And the "hee-hee"
can only get twice the size." (Soviet, 1940's)
As any other kind of joke, this type of sexual humor can be based on
allusion (see Chapter 4, Section 7), always of a non-sexual kind (sexual
allusion is likely to take a basic double entendre from this type into the next
one). Thus, (169) alludes to the widespread phenomenon, at least prior to
the introduction and vigorous enforcement of the anti-sexual-harassment
laws and regulations, of male bosses sleeping with their female secretaries.
(169) What's the difference between a stenographer and a secretary?
- A stenographer watches her commas, and a secretary watches
her periods. (Legman, 1968, 423)
(It is cheerfully ignored in the joke, in an obvious deviation from reality
but in accordance with the world of sexual humor, that a stenographer has
to watch her punctuation periods along with her commas - see also
Section 6).

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Similarly, the comprehension of (170) depends on the hearer's familiarity
with the names of Russian noblemen, but otherwise, in terms of script
analysis, it is a simple joke of this type, with the standard oppositeness
relation and standard non-specific sexual script.
(170) Queen Elizabeth I is receiving messengers from Ivan the
Terrible. The majordomo announces: "Messieurs Long-enough,
Strong-enough and Put-it-in!" /Loginofif, Stroganofif (as
in beef), and Putyatin/ (Russian, no later than 18th century)
(159) is a joke of this type based on parody. In general, a joke of the first
type may become very complicated structurally while remaining quite simple
and basic as a sexual joke.
An important role in this basic type of sexual humor is played by sexually
obscene triggers which are not obligatory but typical of numerous jokes of
this kind. They evoke the sexual script simply by virtue of being obscene,
and the most primitive jokes of this type hardly need anything else to please
certain audiences. This is further supported by the fact that, for the same
kind of people, the mere utterance of a sexual obscenity in a non-sexual
context constitutes a joke. In this case, even if the text is unrefined the basic
elements of the jokes of this type, namely the basic sexual/non-sexual
opposition and the non-specific sexual script, are still in place (cf., for
instance, jokes A209 and A211).
The entertainment value of obscenities, present in various languages, is
especially characteristic of the Russian language which has many jokes
dependent solely and exclusively on the phonetic occurrence of an obscene
word, even if the text around it does not make much sense or there is no
text around it. Thus, one of the most popular and highly entertaining sayings
among the grade-schoolers of the 1950's was Ne psixujl Meaning literally
something like 'Don't get nervous!' it was used both appropriately and
inappropriately, but mostly the latter, because the last three letters of the
second word, xuj 'prick', make up one of the three dirtiest and absolutely
unprintable words of Russian. The same factor explains the everlasting
popularity of such largely meaningless poems as (171) (cf. the well-known
and much imitated epigram (172), which is attributed to Pushkin):
(171) Sebja ot xoloda strajcw/a,
Kupil doxujdi na mexwya...
/Protecting myself against cold
I bought myself a coat made of skins with fur inside.../

SEXUAL HUMOR
153
(172) Ax u £li, ajc u £li,
Cto za glazki, cto za lob!
Vse smotrel by, vse smotrel by,
Vse smotrel by na ne£ b\
/Ella has such [wonderful] eyes and forehead! I would love to
look, and look, and look at her!/
In addition to xuj\ (172) contains a sequence of sounds coresponding to
another such unprintable phrase since na ne& b in the last line can also be
understood as "but not to fuck [her]." Similar word games with obscenities
are available in other languages as well - cf. (173):
(173) (i) Hebrew: Question: Eizo ot baa akharey vav?
Answer: Zain.
/Which letter follows letter Vav' [in the
alphabet]?
Letter 'zain' [or prick]/ (Israeli, 1950's)
(ii) English: See Dick go. Oh, oh, oh! (From the Dick and
Jane Primer, North American, 1940's)
(iii) Swedish: ekollon 'acorn,' with ollon meaning 'glans'
(Swedish, 1950's)
(iv) Spanish: En que se parece un auto a una guagua? Los
dos hacen pipi.
/In what way is a car like a baby? Both make
pipi (the word is both the children's imitation of
the car horn and the children's word for
urination/ (Chilean, 1940's)
(v) English: DRAMATIS PERSONAE
Eric Shun, hero
Ora Fiss, heroine
Cunny Lingus, a tricksome Irish lass
Testy Cull, a cranky old discard
Anna L. Violation ]
Ona Nism > nymphs
Labia Minoris *
Auntie Climax, a rich and meaningful relation
ACT I
Eric (entering): !
Ora (entered): O! (Updike, 1970, 257)

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(173i) is a typical entrapment, and the unsuspecting hearer, usually a
young child, answering the question correctly, ends up uttering an obscenity,
much to the delight of the speaker, usually an older or more worldly
(wordly?) child. (173ii) is a perfect double entendre. (173iii) presents a
potential for a number of jokes. (173iv) is another typical example of
children's innocently obscene humor. (173v) is a much more sophisticated
and skillfully constructed collection of examples of the same kind: while the
general impression is that it is much more obscene, not a single obscenity
is used but the double entendre reigns supreme.
The opposite principle seems to underline a whole sublanguage of Russian
in which an elaborate, highly structured and semantically unique system of
morphological and syntactical derivatives of the three major unprintables,
xuj 'prick,' pizda 'cunt,' and ebaf 'fuck,' is used in entirely non-obscene
meanings (174):
(174) (i) On zaxfi/aril kost' za Skaf /He threw the bone behind the
cupboard/
(ii) On spizdil knigu iz biblioteki /He stole the book from the
library/
(iii) On sovsem zaebal auditoriju /He completely tired out his
audience/
The colorful nature of this dialect, analyzed in more detail elsewhere
(Raskin, 1978d), apparently depends on the implicit evocation of the sexual
script and its opposition to the non-sexual meaning of the intended message
in exactly the same way as in the least elaborate jokes of the analyzed type.
In general, the jokes of this type constitute the most basic layer of sexual
humor. The essential sexual/non-sexual opposition and the general sexual
script characterizing this type are either included, explicitly or implicitly, in
all sexual humor or superseded by some specification of the opposition, the
script(s), or both. In any case, the other three types can be reasonably
considered as developments, elaborations and refinements of this first type
of sexual humor.
2. SEXUAL/NON-SEXUAL OPPOSITION: OVERT, SPECIFIED
This second type of sexual humor includes jokes created by an overt
opposition of a non-sexual script with a specific sexual script instead of the
generalized script SEX evoked by the jokes of the previous type. The basic
sexual/non-sexual opposition on which the second type is also based is

SEXUAL HUMOR
155
supplemented, as it were, by a secondary opposition implied by the evoked
specific sexual script. The second type is thus interestingly related to the
fourth type, in which the specific opposition becomes overt and the general
sexual/non-sexual opposition is universally implied, as will be demonstrated
in Section 4. Obviously, since two oppositions are involved in the same joke
to a certain extent, the second type includes jokes which are more
complicated, in the sense of Chapter 4, Section 8 (see, in particular, (148-150) and the
discussion there), than the jokes of the first type.
(175) is a typical example of a joke from the second type:
(175) A girl comes back home from school half an hour earlier than
usual. When her mother asks her how she managed that, she
says, "John gave me a ride on his bike." "But John rides a girl's
bicycle!" says her brother. (Soviet, 1950's)
Besides a simple allusion to the fact that girl's bicycles do not have the
horizontal bar running from under the seat to the steering handle bars as well
as the fact that this bar is what the person who is given a ride has to sit on,
the joke evokes the specific sexual script of GENITAL SIZE and/or
strength. In other words, instead of referring to a sexual act in general, the
way it is done in jokes of the previous type, the sexual script deals with a
certain specific aspect of sexual intercourse. The idea of sitting on an erect
penis instead of the bar is obviously based on an exaggeration (besides
various practical obstacles in the way of realizing such a project, especially
surreptitiously, even if it were physically possible), which seems to assign this
joke to the possible/impossible basic type of opposition (see Chapter 4,
Section 4). From a slightly different perspective, it can be argued that the
opposition is of the normal/abnormal type. It is an interesting feature of
sexual humor that all the specific sexual jokes come equipped, as it were,
with a standard oppositeness relation of its own, which is in fact a specific
manifestation of the more general oppositeness relation. In the case of
GENITAL SIZE, it is, of course, the opposition between the normal, or
average, size of male or female genitalia and the gigantic, usually grossly
exaggerated dimensions. In general, such an opposition contrasts a normal
or expected state of affairs concerning sex to an exaggerated, abnormal, and
unexpected state of affairs. The exaggeration may range from very slight (if
any) as in (176) to rather implausible as in (175). In the latter case, the
normal/abnormal type of opposition is likely to be replaced by the
possible/impossible type.
In (176), the specific sexual script evoked by the text is another standard

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script characterizing many sexual jokes, viz., SEXUAL PROWESS:
(176) Men at a stag party are swapping stories about their wedding
nights. When his turn comes, a gorilla-like Georgian says, "On
the third day..." "No, on the first night, what happened on the
first night?" interrupt the others. "On the third day..." the
Georgian starts again. "Are you drunk? Don't you understand
Russian? We are talking about wedding nights, see?" "I'm telling
you, on the third day she said she had to take a pee."
(Soviet, 1960's)
(It is interesting to note here that for a Russian hearer, there is some
built-in redundancy in the text based on an ethnic stereotype of the Soviet
Georgians as the oversexed minority - see Chapter 6, Section 5.) To the
extent that a wedding night is perceived in a purely sexual light, (176)
gravitates towards the fourth type of sexual humor (see Section 4). However,
there is no explicit mention of sex in the text and, in principle, a wedding-
night story can be about other circumstances surrounding the sexual act.
Just as GENITAL SIZE, PROWESS is used as a binary feature, with
normal performance opposed to "sexual athletism" d la Hercules and
'average amount' vs. 'much' as its normal and abnormal values, respectively
(it is 'average' vs. 'gigantic' for GENITAL SIZE), rather than a multivalued
feature it is in reality, where the sexual activity can be measured by any
number of unions from zero per unit of time to whatever the world record
might be. In the case of GENITAL SIZE, the real values of the feature are
not even discrete and range anywhere in the continuum of plausible sizes.
The same binary nature characterizes all the specific sexual scripts, and this
is what equips them with a standard opposition. In a sense, each such script
is, in fact, an opposition, and an alternative analysis of the second type
would be as simple jokes in which the general sexual/non-sexual opposition
is replaced by a specific sexual opposition, This alternative analysis would
have trouble, however, explaining away the non-sexual script which is also
evoked by the jokes of this type.
(177) introduces the next binary sexual script, SEXUAL EXPOSURE,
which comes with two values, 'unexposed' as its normal, expected value, and
'exposed' as the abnormal, unexpected value. In other words, the clothed or
covered state is postulated as normal while the bare or naked state is
abnormal and evokes the specific sexual script.

SEXUAL HUMOR
157
(177) At a costumed party, the first prize for the most elegant outfit
went to the Six of Spade, a pretty brunette wearing a pair of
high-heeled black shoes. (Soviet, 1950's)
The joke also contains a simple allusion to human (female) anatomy
(normally haired and normally unhaired areas). Jokes A123, (282) and (326)
also belong to this kind.
Many sexual jokes about children, virgins, nuns, priests, etc., evoke the
binary script of SEXUAL IGNORANCE or INEXPERIENCE. Its two
values are 'presence' (of sexual ignorance or inexperience) for normal and
expected, for these groups of people, and 'absence' for abnormal and
unexpected. In other words, these groups of people are expected not to know
anything or much about sex, and if there is evidence to the contrary it is
considered abnormal, and the specific sexual script is evoked (178).
(178) Two very young siblings ask their grandmother, "Granny, where
do children come from?" "Well," she answers, "you, Sasha, for
instance, were found on the cabbage patch, and as to you,
Masha, you were simply brought over by a stork." The children
exchange a look, and Masha asks Sasha, "Should we tell her?"
"No," Sasha says, "Let her die in peace, an old fool that she is!"
(Soviet, 1950's)
Often the aura of presumed ignorance is dispelled and the evocation of
the sexual script is triggered by an obscenity - (179) is another typical
example:
(179) A man has been looking for an unspoilt, innocent girl to marry,
and after a long search he finds one and marries her. On the
wedding night he subjects her to the ultimate test - he lowers his
underpants, exposes his penis and asks her, "What is it?" "Oh,
it's your pee-pee," she answers, and he is very pleased by her
innocence. A few days later, he asks her the same question and
she answers, "It's your pee-pee." "Come on," he says, "You're
an experienced woman now. I have told you that it's a prick."
"Oh, no," she says. "This isn't a prick. It's a pee-pee. Now, Ivan
next door to where I used to live, he has a real prick!" (Soviet,
20th century)

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(The script of GENITAL SIZE plays a secondary role here, thus
rendering the joke more sophisticated - cf. Chapter 4, Section 8.)
Virginity is usually mentioned in explicitly sexual jokes of the fourth type
(see Section 4) rather than in the jokes which have to depend largely on the
opposition of non-sexual scripts with sexual scripts, but (180ii) comes close
enough to this type while (180i) combines children's ignorance with virginity:
(180) (i) One little girl asks the other her age. The second little girl
doesn't know. "Have you been with a boy?" "No." "Then
you must be eight, 'cause I'se nine." (Legman, 1968, 92)
(ii) An uneducated immigrant has been thrown over by the
bride for the rich young groom. He is standing
disconsolately in the corner after the ceremony, and the best man
attempts to cheer him up. "Don't take it so hard, old man
- there's just as good fish in the sea as were ever caught."
"Yah, sure," says the rejected suitor heavily, "but I hate to
lose fish after I have hook in, maybe saxteen-saventeen
times." (Legman, 1968, 457)
(35) is also a good example. (181) evokes the same script for nuns and
priests:
(181) The janitor in the convent was caught stealing some cash. He
confessed that he had taken it from the room shared by Sister
Agnes and Sister Dorothy. The Mother Superior summons
Sister Agnes to her office and asks her what the money was
doing in the room in the first place. "Oh, it's trick money," the
nun answers calmly. "Do you show card tricks for money? If you
raise funds for the convent this way, you can be easily absolved
from the sin of using playing cards. But then why didn't you
hand the money over?" "Oh no, Holy Mother," answers Sister
Agnes. "It's Sister Dorothy. She says she charges 10 dollars per
trick, but I can assure you she has never even touched playing
cards in her life."
The most numerous group of jokes in the second type involves the sexual
script of FORBIDDEN SEX, which sometimes borders on the previous
script. FORBIDDEN SEX can be further subspecified for various cases of
forbidden kinds of sexual activity, such as zoophily, adultery, prostitution,
incest, fellatio, and perversion (no gay rights in sexual humor, it seems).
Again, more examples of the use of this script can be found in the fourth type,

SEXUAL HUMOR
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but there are quite a few in the second type as well. Zoophily is exemplified
by (182); adultery by (183) as well as by (21 = 109), (250), and (269);
prostitution by (184) (with a strong element of SEXUAL IGNORANCE);
incest by (185); fellatio by (186) (with SEXUAL IGNORANCE as a
secondary script again); and homosexuality by (187) as well as by A221.
(182) Early morning in a Russian forest. The door of a small hut opens
and two men crawl out followed by a bear. The loud female voice
sounds from inside: "You two, get out! And you, in a fur coat,
you stay!" (Soviet, 1960's)
(183) A man comes home unexpectedly, and finds the doctor in bed
with his wife. "What do you think you are doing, Doc?" "I'm,
er, taking your wife's temperature." "O.K., Doc, But that thing
better have numbers on it when you take it out!" (Legman, 1968,
131)
(184) A little girl comes back home with a three-ruble bill in her hand.
"Where is the money from?" her mother asks. "Oh, I found it
on the street." "Well," says the mother, "first of all, brush the
dirt off the back of your coat, and second, when I was your age,
I never found less than five rubles on the street!" (Soviet, 1950's)
(185) A tenant vacating his Paris apartment offers his old bed to the
concierge. "Oh, this is very kind, m'sieur," she replies, "but I am
afraid I cannot afford it." "Afford it? It is free, I'm giving it to
you," says the tenant. "Oh, yes, I understand, m'sieur, but you
see, there are two reasons why I cannot take it. First of all, my
apartment is very small but perhaps I could somehow fit it in.
Secondly, if I get another bed, Roger, my son, who comes to visit
me on weekends, will start sleeping separately and spending his
entire salary on girls."
(186) The mother tells the little girl that the little boy's penis is a
whistle. "No, it ain't. I blew it all afternoon and I couldn't get
a sound out of it." (Legman, 1968, 55)
(187) Two young effeminate-looking men are standing on the street
talking. A pretty girl passes by. One of the men says, "Oh, what
a darling girl! So tender, so b-yoo-ti-ful! Isn't it a shame that I'm
not a nice little lesbian!" (Soviet, 1960's)
More examples of the same scripts will be found in Section 4 while the
next section is somewhat analogous to Section 1.

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3. NON-SEXUAL OPPOSITION IN EXPLICITLY SEXUAL HUMOR
The sexual/non-sexual opposition is always implied when the subject matter
of the joke is explicitly sexual. In many such jokes, no non-sexual situation
is mentioned. However, the very fact of describing an explicitly sexual
situation evokes the "normal," non-sexual world automatically by opposing
the content of the joke to it. Some audiences find explicitly sexual stories
amusing and funny even when they are not really jokes, i.e., there are no
opposite scripts evoked by their texts, which corroborates the fact that the
basic sexual/non-sexual opposition is always present and in these cases,
takes over, as it were, as the only script opposition available. The resulting
texts are extremely feeble as jokes; they are in fact borderline cases. The fact
that they still preserve some humorous value for certain people because of
the implied opposition is similar to the entertainment value of jokeless
obscenities mentioned in Section 1.
The more interesting case is that of jokes which contain a regular overt
opposition of scripts along with the implied opposition and different from
it. This other opposition cannot, of course, evoke the non-specific script
SEX used by the jokes of the first type because such a script is closely
associated with the basic sexual/non-sexual opposition which is already
present in the explicitly sexual jokes by implication.
As a result, there are two kinds of explicitly sexual jokes depending on
the nature of their overt opposition. The one kind evokes the specific sexual
scripts discussed in Section 2 and is based on the standard oppositions
associated with them - these jokes make up the fourth type of sexual humor
(see Section 4). The other kind of explicitly sexual jokes does not evoke any
specific sexual scripts, and the oppositions these jokes are based on are of
an essentially non-sexual nature which are applied to the sexual world. This
latter kind makes up the third type of sexual humor analyzed in this section.
The third type of sexual humor consists, therefore, of jokes based on the
implied sexual/non-sexual opposition and an overt non-sexual opposition.
(39) is an example of such a joke: its non-sexual opposition contrasts the
real-world human anatomy to a possible world human anatomy; the
opposition is applied to sex but it could be used equally well in any other
area.
Non-sexual oppositions in the jokes of this type can be diverse and range
from the very simple to more sophisticated ones. However, they all have the
same effect: they impose an element of the non-sexual world on the explicitly
sexual situation of the joke. In a sense, they involve a movement in the

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direction opposite to the first type. There, the hearer is taken from the
non-sexual world into the sexual world. Here, the hearer is reminded of the
non-sexual world while being still immersed in the sexual world.
(188) below is based on rather a simple actual/non-actual opposition.
(189), while touching on the same sexual theme of impotence, exploits the
more/less opposition with the money/no money script thrown in. (190) and
(191) are both based on a simple ambiguity in their respective punch lines
(use the old camel and use your head, and the ambiguities are not of a
specifically sexual nature, even if one of the involved meanings is indeed
sexual. (192) and (193) both involve a typical possible/impossible
opposition. What all these jokes share is that while they are sexually explicit and
as such, do involve various specific and non-specific sexual scripts, it is not
these scripts which make up the joke. The oppositions which do constitute
them are of a general kind and are frequently used outside sexual humor.
In general, the third type of sexual humor can utilize all the scripts, types
of opposition or triggers, along with allusion, parody, etc. available to verbal
humor. The only difference is that all of these are projected on the explicitly
sexual situation described by the text of the joke.
(188) The patient rushes into the doctor's office, visibly upset.
"Doctor, I cannot get an erection!" "So what," replies the doctor.
"You have not come here to fuck, have you?" (Soviet, 1950's)
(189) It is the 21 st century. Two friends flying their space vehicles meet
on an orbit. "Where are you headed?" asks one of them.
"Saturn," answers the other. "My wife and kids are visiting there
with my in-laws. And you?" "I am going to Mars," answers the
first man. "Mars? What didn't you see there?" "Oh, they have
a new regulation. Every man is paid a hundred rubles per
throw?" "So what will you do there on two hundred a month?"
(Soviet, 1960's)
(190) An officer is posted to a god-forsaken garrison. After a while,
he asks his batman who has spent a few years there, "What do
you do for sex? There isn't a single woman here." "Oh, Sir, we
all use the old camel over there?" "Really? Officers too?" "Yes,
Sir." After much hesitation, the officer decides to try it. That
night he comes back to his quarters disheveled, dirty, and
frustrated. "How do you all manage it? The camel does not seem
to be used to it at all. She threw me off each time I tried." "We
use the old camel to get to the village six miles from here, Sir."
(Russian, 19th century)

162 CHAPTER FIVE
(191) Tsarina Elizabeth the Second was looking for a man with a penis
large enough to satisfy her. Every night she would try a new man,
and every morning he would be sent away with his genitals cut
off. Finally, a little Jew shows up. "Are you crazy?" the courtiers
ask him. "Don't you understand Russian? She is looking for a
giant." "Just let me try," says the Jew. "What do you stand to
lose?" On the next morning the amazed courtiers see the Tsarina
kissing him goodbye at the door of her bedroom and asking him
to come back that night. "How on earth did you do it?" they ask
him. "Gentlemen," he says, "I never forget what my momma
keeps telling me. 'Moishe,' she always says to me, 'you must
always remember to use your head." (Russian, 1890's)
(192) A woman is sick and nobody can diagnose her illness. Finally,
a famous doctor whom she has sought out tells her, "I really
don't know what to think. Do you eat well?" "Yes, doctor." "Do
you exercise?" "I run three miles a day." "How is your sex life?"
"Very good, doctor. My husband is a man of most regular habits.
We make love every morning between 7:15 and 7:25, just before
he goes to work." "Well," says the doctor, "the only thing I can
think of is to try this new and very potent antibiotic. Take it for
a week and see me again." On hearing this, the three bacteria
which have been causing all this trouble panic. One of them says,
"I'll try to hide at the very top of her head. Probably, the drug
won't reach there." "And I," says another, "I will hide in her toe.
It will never get there either." "Oh no," says the third. "I am not
that stupid. Tomorrow, when the 7:25 pulls out, I'll be on it."
(American, 1970's)
(193) The captain of a Russian ship during the war spots a torpedo
fired at his ship from an enemy submarine. He calls the
boatswain and says, "A torpedo has been fired at us, and I don't
think we will manage to escape it. We have a few minutes.
Assemble the crew and entertain them. I don't want anybody to
see the torpedo and to panic." The boatswain assembles the
crew and says, "I'm going to show you a trick like you never saw
before." "Come on, boatswain," shout the sailors. "We know all
of your tricks." The boatswain lowers his pants and shows them
his enormous prick. "Wow," say the sailors. "I will now drop it
on this table here and split the ship in two, O.K.?" He drops his
prick on the table, and the ship explodes. The boatswain holds

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on to a piece of the table, and the captain swims up to him
holding on to a door. "You are an idiot, boatswain," he says.
"And your jokes stink! Do you know that the torpedo missed
us?!" (Soviet, 1950's)
A special group within this type is made up by jokes in which the sexual
situation is pretended to be mistaken for a non-sexual situation. This is
almost the direct reverse of the first type, and such jokes are based on the
same sexual/non-sexual opposition reduplicated in a special way: it is
implied in its direct form as for all the jokes in this type and used as the
primary opposition in its reverse form. Characteristically for this group, in
the three examples below the necessary switch to the non-sexual script is
triggered either by a perceptual (visual (194), audial (195)) or social (196))
similarity between the scripts.
(194) The wife of an extremely jealous husband started an affair with
the man from the apartment below. The only way they could get
together was through a hole in the floor of the lady's living room.
The lover drilled the hole in his ceiling and arranged an elaborate
structure which supported him right under his ceiling in a lying
position. When the husband was not at home the woman would
lie down on the floor, the lover would get up into position and
they would make love. One day when they were at it the husband
came back home unexpectedly in a foul mood. "What do you
think you are doing?" he shouted at his wife. "Lying around like
this in the middle of the day? Look around, the apartment is
filthy! Look where you were lying - the floor is so dirty, you have
a champignon growing there!" And he kicked it with his foot.
(Soviet, 1960's)
(195) The parents of the bride put up their daughter and her
bridegroom in their living room for their wedding night. After
midnight, dying of curiosity, they creep up to the door and stand
there listening. They hear tense, hoarse whispers: "Just a little
to the right! Now! No, it won't get in. To the left. No. Wait. Stop.
Could you raise the right leg just a little bit? Good. That's better.
Now that's a different matter..." Completely satisfied that
everything is going as it was supposed to, the parents retire to their
bedroom. In the morning, however, they discover the living
room window open and the piano missing. (Soviet, 1930's)

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(196) The husband comes back home unexpected and finds his wife
scared and undressed. He looks around and, sure enough, there
is a man in the closet. The husband looks at the man's short and
thin naked body and asks, "Who is this midget?" "Oh, this is
little Kolya," says the wife in a trembling voice. "Little Kolya?"
says the husband. "Off with you, little Kolya!" And he kicks him
down the stairs. Next week the husband discovers the little
Kolya in the closet again, and down the stairs he goes again. A
week later the husband finds his wife in a disarray again. He goes
straight to the closet, opens it - and there is an enormous
muscular fellow there. The husband steps back and says very
politely, "Hello there? Where is little Kolya?" (Soviet, 1960's)
The third type is the least sophisticated kind of explicitly sexual humor
because the sexual element in it is introduced by an implied
sexual/non-sexual opposition whose joke-forming ability is considerably weakened. Since
many of these jokes do not evoke any interesting scripts or well-structured
non-sexual oppositions either, the speakers of such jokes (and the authors
of joke books containing them) usually opt for the lengthiest possible
versions, with much sexual detail, aiming in fact at creating the pornographic
rather than purely humorous effect. If there is good humor in a joke of this
type it is of a non-sexual nature. The next type has a richer structural
potential for sexual humor proper.
A slightly more interesting variety of the third type is represented by the
jokes whose non-sexual opposition assigns them to another special category
of humor. Thus, jokes (231), (234), (248), (255-256), (258-266), (268-69),
(274), (277), (281), (282-83), (287), (296), (307), (312), and (314) are ethnic
jokes (see Chapter 6), which involve sexual scripts and therefore are sexual
jokes as well. However, the ethnic opposition is so prevalent in each of those
jokes that the sexual/non-sexual opposition takes the secondary role. In this
weak capacity, the involved sexual scripts may even become more specific
than is typical for the third type, but since they do not actually form the joke
there is no reason to assign them to either of the two types of sexual humor
which evoke specific sexual scripts, viz., the second and the fourth types.
Similarly, jokes (328-29), (339), (366), (368), (378), (380-81), and (396) are
political jokes (see Chapter 7), which are also sexual jokes of this type.

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4. SPECIFIC SEXUAL OPPOSITION IN EXPLICITLY SEXUAL
HUMOR
The fourth type of sexual humor includes jokes in which the implied
sexual/non-sexual opposition is powerfully reinforced by a specific sexual
opposition associated with one of the standard sexual scripts introduced in
Section 2. It is the latter opposition which actually forms the joke. The fourth
type easily dominates a typical collection of sexual jokes. Playboy's party
jokes, for instance, are a good example though the "glossary" items among
them are typical double entendre's and belong therefore to the first or second
types.
The script of GENITAL SIZE is represented in (197) in the female
variant. The joke is a version of the classical story about the enormous
vagina. It is a very feeble joke without a real punch line but it is a good
illustration of the use of this specific sexual script simply because it contains
absolutely nothing else.
(197) A man makes love to a woman for the first time and falls into
her cunt. Trying to get out, he wanders around and suddenly
runs into a group of sailors. "What are you doing here, guys?"
he asks. "Why, waiting for the bus to take us back to the base,"
they answer. (Soviet, 1940's)
(198) uses both the female and male applications of the script and avoids
an almost ethnic allusion of the kind discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6, by
making it explicit:
(198) A Texan brags about his state to his date: "Do you know,
ma'am, that the biggest cattle in the world is in Texas? We have
the tallest corn in the world. And we have more oil than anybody
else." He doesn't stop bragging when they find themselves in the
lady's bedroom later: "You're about to discover, ma'am, if you
allow me, that the Texan men are the best endowed in the
world!" A few moments later he asks in a somewhat disappointed
voice, "Ma'am, why didn't you tell me that you were from Texas
too?" (American, 20th century)
The script of GENITAL SIZE is often used in the reverse variant within
this type as well. In this case, the assumed normal size is opposed to the
abnormally small rather than to the abnormally large size. Both (199) and
(200) use the common knowledge of the relative measurements of various

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animals to allude to the abnormally large and abnormally small sizes of male
and female genitals. (201) is a slightly more sophisticated combination of the
same oppositions, which also falls under Jewish humor (see Chapter 6,
Section 9).
(199) The rabbit and the elephant decided to swap wives for one night.
On the next morning, The Forest News reported that a double
misfortune had befallen the rabbit family. The wife burst, and the
husband disappeared without a trace. (Soviet, 1960's)
(200) There is a ring on the door. The elephant opens it, and there is
nobody there. The bell rings again and again, and finally the
angry elephant notices a tiny mosquito on the knob. "Have you
been ringing the bell?" he asks. "What do you want?" "Oh, is
Mrs. Elephant in?" "No, she is out shopping. Why?" "Oh,
nothing. Could you simply tell her that Little Eddy from the
office dropped by. And I will give her a buzz." (Soviet, 1950's)
(201) A Jewish woman had been raped by a Cossack in the field. When
her husband tried to comfort her, she screamed, "Go away, you!
I had known you were circumcised but I never realized how
much they had cut off!" (Russian, 1900's)
The script of PROWESS is evoked by (202). (16), on the contrary, evokes
the same script with the opposite value: too little instead of too much.
(202) After a couple of beers in a pub, one of the boys says he must
get home early today. "It's my wife's birthday," he explains.
"What are you giving her?" his friends ask. "Oh, we have a
tradition. I always make love to her as many times as her age,
and I am not as fast about it as I used to be. Gosh, am I glad
she started lying about her age after 49!'
The EXPOSURE script can hardly be expected to be involved in a
primary opposition in this type because of the explicitly sexual nature of its
jokes: one can hardly expect a contrast based on nakedness/non-nakedness
in a sexual situation. It is likelier to expect something like that in the third
type, where the trigger would switch the sexual situation to the fully clothed
value of the opposition rather than from non-naked to naked as in the
second category.
Unlike EXPOSURE, SEXUAL IGNORANCE, or INEXPERIENCE,
provides fertile ground for this category of sexual humor. (203), another

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"little Vova" joke along with (148) from the same series, is a typical and
popular "children's" joke of this kind. (204) is another "children's" joke,
which also evokes the script of (presumed) virginity. (205) combines the
same script with an overlapping element of the GENITAL SIZE script in
its female version. (206) is based on the presumed sexual ignorance of
Catholic nuns. (207) contains a somewhat more sophisticated version of the
script of SEXUAL IGNORANCE, with a strong allusion to the asexuality
(see also the male correlate in (269)), frigidity and/or lack of sexual
sophistication in Russian women, which makes the joke ethnic in nature (see
Chapter 6, Section 5).
(203) Little Vova is put on trial for the alleged rape of the forty-two-
year-old Maria Ivanovna. After the prosecution and defense rest
their cases, the accused is given a chance to address the court.
Vova's mother stands him on the bench, lowers his pants, takes
out his little penis and shows it to the court. "Look," she appeals,
holding the little organ on her open palm. "Do you think it is
possible to assault a mature woman with this?!" "Do not shake
it, mum!" hisses little Vova. "Otherwise we will lose the case."
(Soviet, 1950's)
(204) A man is lustfully eyeing a very young girl who is jumping rope.
Finally, he says, "You know, at your age you could already make
money instead of wasting your time on this kiddy stuff!" "You
cannot expect me to be making money all the time, can you?"
replies the girl. (Soviet, (1950's)
(205) The girl doesn't want to go to bed with her boyfriend before the
wedding. During a heavy petting session the youth tries to talk
her into letting him touch her "there" with his finger. "All right,"
sighs the girl. "You may do it if you must. But be very careful.
I want to be married a virgin." A few moments later she says,
"Ouch! Who told you you could scratch me with your nail?"
"Sorry," says the boy. "It's my watch." (Soviet, 1930's)
(206) A nun is attacked and raped by twelve bandits in the desert.
When they are done with her and flee the nun stands up and says,
"That was nice. Enough and sinless." (Soviet, 1950's)
(207) A typical Soviet domestic scene: the husband is lying down on
the sofa after work and reading the evening paper; the wife is on
her knees scrubbing the floor. The neighbor looks in, notices the
woman's protruding behind, creeps up to her, lifts her dress, and

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shoves his penis in. The husband puts the paper down for a
moment to turn the page and sees this. "Manka," he shouts,
"Ivan is fucking you from behind!" The angry woman throws her
dirty rag at him, "You, son of a bitch, you are just lying over there
and won't even bother to let me know before it's too late!"
(Soviet, 1970's)
All the scripts of FORBIDDEN SEX are, of course, abundantly
represented in the fourth type. Zoophily is evoked in (208). Adultery forms both
(209) and (210) (see also (268)), but the latter evokes a reverse adultery -
the opposition forming this joke is based on an allusion to the standard
opposition associated with the script of adultery which is made to go in the
opposite direction. In the direct use of this or any other specific sexual script,
it is the abnormal value which is switched into in the joke, while here adultery
is made into non-adultery by the spouse's consent (see Section 6 for further
discussion of the reverse uses of sexual scripts). (211) evokes prostitution
and so, in a euphemistic way, does A132. (148) is a classical case of incest.
(212) is a version of a popular masturbation joke. (213) evokes fellatio while
(214) evokes homosexuality. (215) tops it by combining five forbidden
activities, zoophily, adultery, incest, masturbation and homosexuality, with
PROWESS.
(208) An oversexed man from Soviet Georgia catches a chicken and
shoves his enormous erect penis up its ass. When he is done, the
chicken shows no signs of life. The Georgian looks at it tenderly
and says, "Clever bird! It has fucked to its heart satisfaction and
now it is having a nap." (Soviet, 1960's)
(209) A man comes back home early and finds his wife in bed with
another man. "What are you doing, Nadya?" he shouts. "What?
Is it you, Nick, over there?" she replies, feigning surprise. "Then
who is it here, in bed with me?" (Soviet, 1940's)
(210) The neighbor's wife tells Mary, "Do you realize that your
husband is trying to lay me while you are pregnant?" "So what?"
asks Mary angrily. "Didn't I put out for your Nick when you
were expecting?" (Soviet, 1950's)
(211) After taking his new secretary to dinner the gentleman is dying
to get in bed with her but does not know how to ask her. Finally
at her place he asks her whether she would consider taking her
blouse off for 50 dollars. After the girl obliges, he tries the skirt
for $75, the stockings for $100 and, finally, her underwear for

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$200. Then he says stuttering, "How about... you know..." "Of
course," says the secretary, "but that will cost you another
twenty. I cannot charge you less than I would anybody else, can
I?" (American, 1920's)
(212) The exhausted-looking patient tells the shrink that he is driving
himself crazy by masturbation but he cannot stop - he simply
has to do it every hour on the hour. The psychiatrist asks him
a few routine questions and then begins a long speech about the
joys of normal sex, marital life, etc. All this time the patient keeps
furtively looking at his watch. It is five minutes to twelve, three,
two, one, and the doctor is still talking. At last, exactly on the
hour, the shrink goes to his bookshelf to quote from Freud and
the moment he turns his back to the patient, the man begins
jerking off. "Just think," the doctor is saying. "All that wasted
sperm! How many children you could have. How much joy they
could bring you. Why, they could become lawyers, doctors,
musicians..." At this moment, the patient sighs with relief and,
waving his index finger with some sperm hanging from it, says,
"Well, I think this one could have become an acrobat." (Soviet,
1960's)
(213) The mother asks her daughter why, after three husbands and a
long sequence of boyfriends and lovers, she has never become
pregnant. "Well, mother," the girl says, "to tell you the truth, I
have never been able to bring myself to swallow that filthy stuff."
(Soviet, 1950's)
(214) A man is approached by a homosexual in the small garden in
front of the Bolshoi in Moscow. He flees, spots a policeman, and
rushes to him. Having heard his complaint, the policeman asks,
"And why did you bring your cute little ass into our garden,
sweetie?" (Soviet, 1960's)
(215) Another oversexed Georgian comes to his physician and
complains about pains in his genitals. "Well, tell me about your
sex life," the doctor says. "You are happily married, aren't you?"
"Oh yes, doctor." "How often do you have intercourse with your
wife?" "Oh, nothing unusual, doctor, every morning and night,
just once. On weekends, maybe two-three times extra." "Any
other activities?" "Well, to be perfectly honest, doctor, I am very
close with my sister-in-law?" "How often?" "Three times a
week. Six when her husband is away." "Is that all?" "Not quite,

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doctor, we have this gorgeous new secretary in the office..."
"How often?" "Recently, twice a week at lunch-time, three-four
times per session." "That's an awful lot," says the doctor. "I
know," says the Georgian. "Perhaps I should have left that cute
messenger boy alone?" "Messenger boy?" "Oh, that's almost
nothing, doctor, we just became friends. It's been only three or
four times and never more than once per occasion." "Well, it is
quite clear, my friend," says the doctor, "that all your troubles
are caused by this excessive sexual activity. You should really
begin to reduce it." "I know, doctor," says the patient. "That's
why I left my wife's Pekingese alone almost a month ago, and
believe me, it was not easy - she is adorable. But I am relieved
to hear that these pains are caused by my relationships. I was
beginning to fear that I was causing them by masturbating so
often." (Soviet, 1950's)
While most of the jokes of this type evoke the specific scripts with their
standard oppositions in the way described in Section 2, some provide a peep
into the non-sexual world similarly to some jokes of the third type. The
explicitly sexual situation makes the fourth type different from the former
and the specific sexual scripts from the latter.
Different kinds of sexual humor, including some which have not yet been
exemplified here, are provided by the special class of Russian sexual humor
discussed in the next section.
5. SEXUAL HUMOR IN THE RUSSIAN CHASTUSHKA
This section deals with numerous instances of predominantly humorous
verbal abuse in a relatively recent genre of Russian and Soviet folklore, the
chastushka. It is sexual humor packaged in a special way, and its analysis
will corroborate, and shed some additional light on, the scripts and
oppositions discovered in the previous four sections.
As a genre, the chastushka has existed in Russia for about a century (see,
for instance, Gorelov, 1965, 5). Formally, the chastushka is a quatrain, i.e.,
"a stanza of 4 lines, rhymed or unrhymed" (Preminger, 1974, 684). While
both rhymed and unrhymed chastushkas may be encountered, the former
heavily prevail, and while they do allow for a certain degree of metrical
freedom, the chastushkas seem to be much more restricted in this respect
than other Russian poetical forms. Their even lines may occasionally blur

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into iamb but most chastushkas are typical trochaic four-footers with the
even lines often lacking the last unstressed syllable:
(216) Devki v ozere kupalis'
Xuj rezinovyj nasli.
Celyj den' oni ebalis' -
Daze v skolu ne poSli.
/The girls were bathing in the lake
And found a rubber prick [dildo].
They fucked [themselves with it] for the whole day
So that they even missed school./ (Kabronsky, 1978, 39)
As in (216), the rhymed chastushkas usually have the A-B-A-B rhyme.
Many chastushkas, just like their Anglo-Saxon counterpart, the limerick,
relate interesting events which take or took place. However, unlike the
limericks, such information-bulletin chastushkas only very rarely specify the
geographic location of the event, assuming that it coincides with the location
of the speaker either in the narrow sense (a village or a town - in (216), for
instance, it is clear to every native hearer that the lake is near the village
where the active girls live) or in the broad sense (Russia). The speaker is
always implicitly or explicitly present in the text, which may be explained by
the nature of the authorship and of the form of presentation of the
chastushkas.
Unlike the limericks, again, which are believed to be a part of the men's
world and authored by men, the chastushkas are usually sung by (drunken)
women at family and community events in Russian villages, small towns and
working-class suburbs of large cities. The singer dances while delivering the
chastushka and is accompanied by the same simple tune on a harmonica,
balalaika or a Russian variety of the accordion. The word chastushka is
derived from the verb chastif which, in its turn, is derived from the adverb
chasto 'fast.' The verb means 'to deliver speech very fast, to rattle things off
very quickly,' and the chastushkas are, in fact, delivered very fast. Most of
the original chastushkas are also believed to have been authored, not only
performed, by women.
Just as in the case of the limericks, there exists a powerful stream of
obscene or bawdy chastushkas which constitute a large part of all the
recorded units. It is hard to say whether the obscene chastushka emerged
at the same time as the non-obscene variety or later on, since for a long time
only the latter were recorded. Even the non-obscene chastushkas are also
usually frivolous, familiar, and/or presumptious.

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The obscene chastushka came into fashion among the Russian
intellectuals about two decades ago and became a form of dissent similar to the
political joke (see Chapter 7) - in this milieu it is never sung but rather recited
as a poem. Since that time, intellectuals have obviously, though
inconspicuously, contributed to the genre, and at the present stage, out of the
approximately 800 available chastushkas collected by Kabronsky and this
author with the help of numerous volunteer assistants and informants and
published in part by Kabronsky (1978 - a new enlarged edition is
forthcoming; see also Raskin, 1978d, in the first edition), nearly a half may be
suspected to be of a fake-folk origin.
The obscene chastushkas constitute a subset of all the existing Russian
chastushkas. This subset is usually characterized by the presence of one or
more obscene words, more rarely by an obscene situation described without
obscene words. Out of this subset, this section will be dealing with a much
narrower subsubset of those obscene chastushkas which contain sexual
humor. (Another narrow subsubset overlapping with this one and including
abusive or offensive obscene chastushkas is analyzed in Raskin, 1981b.)
The three major types of sexually humorous chastushkas include the
chastushkas with a direct reference to sexual intercourse (217-219),
chastushkas with a direct reference to the vagina (220-223), and chastushkas
with a direct reference to the penis (224-225). The examples below are taken
from Kabronsky (1978) and translated into English (non-poetically, with the
exception of the starred (*) translations rendered into British English by Dr.
Gerald S. Smith, formerly of the University of Birmingham, England,
currently at Indiana University); the number(s) at the end of each translation
refer(s) to the chastushka number(s) in that book, and this is where the
Russian originals can be found.
(217) (i) A cunt tells another cunt,
"Why the hell do they fuck us everywhere?
Down the ravine, and in the forest,
And in the ass, and in balance..." (44)
(ii) In our kolkhoz
They fuck girls in manure.
They fuck them, the girls fart,
And shit flies everywhere. (92)
(iii) Oi, kaput, kaput, kaput,
They are fucking now the new way:
The ass is up, the cunt is down,
And the result of that is that a communist is born. (211)

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173
(iv) The water is flowing from the bucket
And splashing from the tub.
My beloved at a party
Is quivering on [somebody else's] prick. (64)
(v) My beloved was wounded
In Germany right near the border.
Instead of a bullet they stuck a prick into her
But they said she was wounded. (125)
(vi) My beloved is in the coffin,
I'll go and fuck her remains.
Whether you like it or not -
Sleep well, my beauty. (127)
(vii) I will not fuck you,
Will not take thj trouble.
There is a bear in your cunt
Which is aiming its rifle at me. (364; see also 218, 365-67,
380-81)
(218) (i) Down the hill there is a garden,
By the garden there is a stream.
By the stream down there lives Manka,
She gets a cock between her teeth. (*) (25; see also 228)
(ii) A snow-white ship is sailing
Past the island.
On the island there lives
A heron, fucked in her mouth. (117)
(iii) Our own Piekha [a pop-star], just for fun,
Gave a blow job to the Secretary General [Brezhnev].
Oh, how sexy he is,
Our Secretary General. (194)
(iv) Hitler is sitting on the fence
And asking for milk.
And the milkmaid answers,
Go and suck a donkey['s prick]. (289)
(219) (i) Opa-opa-opa-pa,
A green fence.
The girls fucked a priest -
It serves him right. (217; see also 30)
(ii) At the Kiev railway station
They robbed a church,

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Fucked the priest in the ass
And shat into the bell. (77)
(iii) The pioneers stuck a candle
Into Ilyich's [Lenin's] ass,
So that the candle should burn
In Ilyich's red ass. (*) (230; see also 37, 69 and 82)
(iv) We are walking along the village,
The agronomist and the bookkeeper.
Come out to work,
You, people, fucked in your asses. (234)
(220) (i) See(217i)
(ii) The old woman tells her old man,
"I'm going to America."
"You, red-haired cunt,
There are no trains to America!" (45)
(iii) To our town, to our town,
To Orekhovo-Zuevo,
A cunt in a hat and a prick with glasses
Came by taxi. (89)
(221) (i) All the girls are like girls
But my beloved is like a bubble.
When she sits down to shit
Her cunt is hanging like the visor on a German's hat. (35)
(ii) My beloved drowned herself
In the pond this morning.
Her cunt got packed
Full with carps. (129)
(iii) I chased her and chased her,
I thought she was a virgin.
It turned out that her cunt
Was wider than my cap. (383)
(222) (i) See (221iii)
(ii) There is a whetstone on the hill
And on the whetstone there is a jar.
I am a Soviet man,
And you have a torn (deflowered) cunt. (171; see also 158,
188 and 191)
(iii) Tell me, darling,
Are you a v[irgin] or not a v?

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175
If a v, let's go to the barn,
If not a v, let's [do it] on the porch. (280)
(223) (i) You girls, bloody whores, I'm your uncle
And you're my nieces.
Get up to my bunk
And feel my balls. (46)
(ii) A hut is sitting on top of the hill,
The curtains are made of lace.
But in the hut all the little girls
Are bloody whores. (164)
(iii) Hair's curling, hair's curling,
The whores' hair is curling.
Why don't decent people
Have curls as well? (102)
(224) See (220iii)
(225) (i) The girls invited me to visit
But I didn't go.
My jacket is torn,
And my prick is small. (110)
(ii) I was drafted into the army.
I went to the recruitment center.
My chest is wide, my hands are white,
But my prick is shortish. (109)
The customary meter-and-rhyme format of all the chastushkas function
as the mode switcher (see Chapter 4, Section 2): the hearer understands
immediately that he is put in the joke-telling mode. Then he is ready to
perceive the text of the chastushka, which could otherwise strike him as
incomprehensible, as humorous. What it means in terms of the script-based
theory of humor is that he will respond to the evoked scripts and their
oppositions.
The chastushkas of (217) all involve the basic sexual/non-sexual
opposition and remain largely non-specific, thus belonging to the first type
((217iii) has a political connotation which will not be discussed here - see
Chapter 7, Section 1). (217vi) does contain an element of FORBIDDEN
SEX because of its necrophilic nature (cf. also (264)) and one could perhaps
build a case for the analysis of (217iv) as involving adultery within the same
specific sexual script if the text were not too ambiguous. One could also
argue that rape evoked in (217v) is another facet of the same script (cf. also

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(296)). However, the basic opposition remains overt and very strong here
so the membership of (217) in the first type is rather firm.
The chastushkas of (218), on the contrary, clearly evoke the specific
sexual script of FORBIDDEN SEX in its fellatio aspect. The difference
between all of the examples here, especially (218iv), on the one hand, and
(186) or (212), on the other, is that the former have an intended denigrating
effect, which reflects a typical Russian sexual attitude.
The chastushkas of (219) are all based on the sodomy facet of
FORBIDDEN SEX which, typically again, is never made quite explicit or
literal but rather is mentioned abstractly or metaphorically or even
committed by substitution, e.g., with a candle.
In (220), the references to the female genital organ denote women rather
than this part of their anatomy. It is sexually disparaging and offensive but
very few Russian hearers are offended, probably because the switch to the
joke-telling mode is so categorical that any serious attitude is in bad taste.
Besides, since the genre is perpetuated by women, it is actually
self-disparagement and thus much more acceptable.
The texts of (221) evoke the specific sexual script of GENITAL SIZE
(female application) in its more usual normal vs. gigantic variant. The
virginity facet of SEXUAL IGNORANCE evoked in (222) turns out to be
closely related to GENITAL SIZE, and, interestingly enough, this
connection is missing almost entirely from the similar examples of the previous
sections (cf. (180) and (204)). This is an ethnic trait reflecting a national
character and it is based on the availability, frequency and interdependency
of certain scripts for some groups but not for others, and the phenomenon
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6 (while the political note in (222ii) is,
of course, dealt with in Chapter 7, Section 8).
The examples of (223) appear to deal with the prostitution aspect of
FORBIDDEN SEX but, again, the direct references to whores are
sometimes simply meant disparagingly, of all women, and do not necessarily
involve monetary transactions. The connotation of promiscuity is always
there, nevertheless.
In (224), the direct reference to prick denotes, similarly and symmetrically
to (220), simply a man, and the examples of (225) evoke the specific sexual
script of GENITAL SIZE in its less usual normal vs. small variety: probably
because of the female authorship the more frequent normal vs. gigantic
variety of the script in its male application cannot be encountered in the
genre at all.
There are many chastushkas which evoke the basic sexual/non-sexual

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177
opposition with the help of an obscene trigger. When no other clearly
opposed scripts are involved the resulting texts can be assigned to the most
primitive types of sexual humor discussed within the first and third types.
The prescribed format of the genre, which attunes the hearer to the joke
automatically, lets the authors of the chastushkas get away with much less
carefully worded texts than in regular jokes.
6. SEXUAL SCRIPTS, OPPOSITIONS AND TRIGGERS: A SUMMARY
It has been demonstrated throughout the chapter that the basic sexual/non-
sexual opposition, in its non-specific variety (144iii), plays an important role
in sexual humor. It forms some jokes as their primary opposition and it is
implied in some other jokes in which it is assigned the secondary role while
the primary role is taken over by another opposition, usually a non-sexual
or a specific sexual one.
The basic opposition seems to involve scripts which are well within the
semantic competence of both the speaker and the hearer. Thus, the
generalized sexual script which participates in the basic opposition is very likely to
include the semantic information internalized by the native speaker in the
course of his/her life experience, and the appropriate semantic scripts are
evoked by words like sex, obscene and other related lexical items.
What makes sexual humor semantically interesting, however, is not these
regular scripts which are part of the semantic competence of the native
speaker and which may be evoked in a sexual joke, or for that matter in any
other kind of joke, just as any other semantic script. Sexual humor is
distinguished from other kinds of humor by a set of specific sexual scripts
which are neither necessarily available to every native speaker nor reflect
anything in his/her world accurately. If these specific scripts do not belong
in the native speaker's semantic competence, they are then part of his/her
encyclopedic knowledge, i.e., the native speaker's knowledge of the world
(see Chapter 3, Section 1). On the other hand, these scripts do not seem to
correspond to reality - instead they present it in a schematic, artificially
compressed and distorted way. The information they contain is, in fact, of
a mythological nature.
The specific sexual scripts seem to capture a limited number of stereotypic
conventions accepted by everybody involved in the activity of producing and
consuming sexual humor. As mentioned in Section 2, the binary or near-
binary discrete nature of the specific sexual scripts with the clear-cut
judgmental values assigned to them deviates from the continuous and diffuse

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nature of the involved phenomena as they are perceived by the native
speaker's semantic competence. Thus, for instance, outside of the field of
sexual humor, every native speaker has internalized semantic scripts which
do associate size with various organs, and according to this general
perception, any organ can be of any size within certain limits, and this is
virtually all there is to it. In sexual humor, this information, which is clearly
part of the native speaker's linguistic competence, is supplemented, or rather
superseded by a schematic binary mythological convention internalized as
a specific sexual script (226):
(226) r (Normal = Neutral)
GENITAL SIZE (Male) 1 Gigantic = Good
Small = Bad
r Gigantic = Bad
GENITAL SIZE (Female) \ Normal = Neutral
(Small = Good?)
(The lines in parentheses contain the third possible size of each type of
organ, which does not seem to be of any use in sexual humor though
elements of this part of the script can be easily encountered in sex manuals.)
This element of encyclopedic knowledge, distorted, mythologized, and
schematized, becomes an important convention which has to be shared by
the speaker and the hearer in order for a certain type of sexual jokes to get
across. As mentioned briefly in Section 2, all the other specific sexual scripts,
viz., PROWESS, EXPOSURE, SEXUAL IGNORANCE, and
FORBIDDEN SEX, in all of their relevant facets, can be easily reduced to
schemata similar to (226). All together, they constitute an important script
component which has to be internalized by all the users of sexual humor and
which is not part either of their semantic competence or their encyclopedic
knowledge. The special nature of this script component makes it clear that
acquiring sexual humor is similar to the acquisition of any skill since the
internalization of additional scripts is an important part of any learning.
What makes the specific script component of sexual humor different from
the component corresponding to a technical skill is the non-realistic,
distorted, conventional, mythological nature of the acquired scripts.
It was mentioned briefly before (see Section 2) that the specific sexual
scripts come equipped with the standard oppositions associated with them.
The reason for that is, of course, the binary or at least discrete nature of the
scripts based on a simple yes/no, good/bad, much/little or presence/absence
distribution of values within the script. This is actually shorthand for saying,

SEXUAL HUMOR
179
much more accurately, that every specific sexual script, as described above
and in Section 2, is in fact a pair (or a set of pairs, in the case of a near-binary
script) of scripts with an oppositeness relation between them, and the latter
is always of one of the basic types listed above and in (144).
The standard nature both of the specific scripts and the oppositions
associated with them makes this semantic information immediately
accessible to those who share them (and, of course, totally inaccessible to those who
do not), and as a result, it can be referred to in a cryptic, elliptic way (see,
for instance, do it in (163-164)), on the all-or-nothing principle - either you
get it all immediately or you cannot get it at all.
Sexual humor uses all the available types of triggers (see Chapter 4,
Section 5), and the only specifically sexual type includes sexual obscenities
used to trigger the non-specific sexual script. Such triggers usually
characterize the more primitive kinds of sexual humor of the first and third types (see
Sections 1 and 3). Many chastushkas, which come under one of these types,
use such triggers as well, e.g., (227):
(227) Down the village street we ramble,
We don't want no bother.
Each of us [is] a kolkhoz chairman,
So go and fuck your mother. (*) (236) (Kabronsky, 1978)
It will be demonstrated in the next two chapters that other special kinds
of humor are based on comparable specific script components.

CHAPTER SIX
ETHNIC HUMOR
INTRODUCTION
Ethnic humor is another special category of humor, and just as sexual
humor, it is based on a number of specific scripts and oppositions which
have to be internalized by the speakers and hearers of ethnic jokes. The
specific scripts are not part of the native speaker's semantic competence, nor
are they part of the native speaker's knowledge of the world. They have to
be acquired separately from linguistic competence and in this sense, they are
similar to encyclopedic knowledge. But on the other hand, they capture
stereotypes which are at best very crude approximations of reality. In other
words, just as the specific sexual scripts discussed in Chapter 5, Section 6,
the specific ethnic scripts are conventional, fictional, and mythological. They
are also simplistic and schematic, especially in the sense that they are binary
or near-binary and thus imply oppositions standardly associated with them.
In other words, just as the specific sexual scripts again, the specific ethnic
scripts are actually pairs of simply opposed scripts.
Unlike sexual humor, the basic type of script oppositeness used in ethnic
humor is predominantly possible/impossible (143iii) (and sometimes,
actual/non-actual (143i)) rather than normal/abnormal, and the essential
feature most frequently utilized in ethnic jokes is good/bad (144i) rather than
sexual/non-sexual (see also Davies, 1982a, 384). In other words, most of
ethnic humor is functionally deprecatory, or disparaging.
This chapter will deal with the semantic structure of ethnic humor in terms
of the evoked scripts and oppositions. Section 1 deals with the scripts of
language distortion. Section 2 analyzes jokes based on the script of
dumbness. Section 3 discusses the script of stinginess. Craftiness, or cunningness,
another popular script in ethnic humor, is the subject of Section 4. Section
5 emphasizes a special class of ethnic humor based on the scripts of national
superiority, antagonism, and hostility. Section 6 focuses on even more
specific and less standard ethnic scripts. Section 7 is devoted to smaller
groups as the targets of ethnic jokes. Section 8 exposes pseudo- and quasi-
ethnic jokes. Throughout the chapter, ethnic humor is analyzed and
classified regardless of its ethnic target, i.e., what ethnic group is made fun
180

ETHNIC HUMOR
181
of. However, in Section 9 the basic ideas of the chapters are further
illustrated on the example of one class of ethnic humor characterized by very
diverse semantic structures but by a single ethnic target, the Jews.
1. SCRIPT OF LANGUAGE DISORTION
The simplest script of LANGUAGE DISTORTION is evoked by a sound,
a word, or an utterance which is pronounced or used differently from the
way it is normally done in the language or dialect in which the joke is told.
Language distortion jokes are based on the simple opposition of language
identity vs. language difference, and nothing else. Some stand-up comedians
specialize in such jokes and, in many cases, the texts they use are mere
vehicles for phonetic and, more rarely, lexical confusion. Thus, if the French
accent in English is made fun of, the th sound would be replaced by s or z
and the word stress would be moved to the last syllable of the word, e.g.,
sank you or impression (most likely, with a double s instead of sh and the nasal
o - see, for instance, Poirot's English in Agatha Cristie's Poirot novels). If
it is the German accent, the same th sounds are likely to become / or d (tank
you), the final voiced consonants would be made voiceless, the soft g may
become the hard g, etc. (many examples of these could be encountered in
numerous comedians' numbers when Henry Kissinger was in power). The
Italian accent would be associated with adding vowels after the final
consonants, e.g., hadda for had. The Russian accent in French may be
parodied by substituting a's for a's, e.g., bati for bcauti. The Chinese,
Korean and Japanese accents in Russian are associated with using s and z
for s and z and with mixing up Ps and r*s (sizu for sizu 'I sit'; bryad for blyad
'whore'). The Arabic accent in Hebrew is usually expressed by substituting
a voiced consonant for its correct voiceless counterpart, e.g., bara fox para
'cow.' (Mr. Christie Davies reminded me of the comic use of language
distortion by Shakespeare: two of his Welsh characters confuse the English
[p] with [b]. Thus in Henry V Fluellyn says "Alexander the pig" instead of
"Alexander the Great," and in Merry Wives of Windsor the Welsh clergyman
Sir Hugh makes similar errors.)
Some of these distortions are based on linguistic fact and do take into
account the real phonological and phonetic differences between the two
languages in question. Many others, however, are fictitious and represent
mythical stereotypes which exist in the minds of the monolingual speakers
of one language about some other language. A typical example is the naive
but prevalent belief among native speakers of American English that the

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addition of -sky to any word, especially a name, makes it sound Russian,
while, in fact, many Russian names ending in -sky are of a Polish origin and
the only productive and frequent morpheme which sounds close to that in
Russian is used to form adjectives only.
Good speakers of such simple language-distortion jokes would also
imitate the typical intonation and body language. In many cases, they are
after dialectal rather than language differences or even idiolectal, individual,
idiosyncratic language mannerisms, in which case the jokes remain ethnic
only if the mannerisms assign the individual to a certain group about whom
certain stereotypes are available both to the speaker and the hearer(s) of the
joke. However, the purpose of all of these jokes, based both on language and
dialect difference, is more often not limited to just the simple script
introduced above. In most cases, the distorter of language is made fun of
at least by being characterized as an incompetent speaker unable to
enunciate or use words correctly. Thus, joke A139 is based on the speaker's
confusion of two complicated words - it thus assigns the speaker to the class
of poorly educated people but the joke is ethnic in the sense of Section 7.
Brezhnev was constantly denigrated on ethnic grounds in numerous Soviet
jokes (see also Chapter 7) in which his Russian was deliberately distorted
to sound as the least prestigious, uneducated and Ukrainian-based dialect,
especially in the case of long and complicated words: thus, for instance, his
pronunciation of the word sistematiceski 'systematically' and pessimisticeski
'pessimistically' was parodied as sis'kimasis'ki 'tits-ma-tits' and pis'kimisis'ki
'genitals-mi-tits,' respectively.
Many jokes of this type make fun of native speakers of one language who
are not familiar with some very well-known words of another, more
prestigious language. The latter language in most often French, and the words are
of an international nature. (228) is rather a typical example of this type of
ethnic humor, while a similar example in (229) is based on an authentic
historical anecdote. (230) makes fun both of the Jew and the Frenchman.
One problem with such jokes is that the context should always justify why
a person has to speak a foreign language and the situations are usually
limited, as a result, to international encounters, usually under some easily
recognized circumstances (e.g., wars, Olympic games, tourism, etc.), or to
elegant decors where French is necessary (e.g., expensive restaurants and,
in general, luxurious living). The set-ups for such jokes have to be rather
elaborate as a result, and they tend to be lengthy.
(228) An Englishman in Paris learns that his wife died in London. He
must leave France immediately in order to attend her funeral but

ETHNIC HUMOR
183
realizes that he needs a black hat and that he must purchase it
in Paris because he will have no time for that in England before
the funeral. His French is rather poor and he cannot think of the
word for hat. Neither does he know where he can buy a hat near
his hotel. He goes for help to the small drugstore next door and,
combining his public school Latin with English, comes up with
the word capote, which unbeknownst to him, means 'condom' in
French. He explains to the drugstore owner in a mixture of
French and English that he needs capote noire, meaning, of
course, 'black hat.' Very intrigued, the Frenchman asks him why
he needs a capote noire. "Oh, ma femme est morte," manages the
Englishman. "My wife is dead." "Oh, monsieur," exclaims the
pharmacist admiringly. "Quelle delicatesse!" (French, 20th
century)
(229) A French singing teacher, imported by the rich Russian landlord
who wanted to have his own opera theater, is auditioning the
landlord's serfs. A secretary is taking notes. If the candidate has
talent, the teacher says, "Chantra!" [will sing]. If not, the verdict
is, "Chantra pas!" [will not sing], and the unfortunate candidate
is promptly and discourteously dismissed by the landlord's
servants. One such unsuccessful singer comes home very angry.
"What happened!" "Oh, the damn Frenchie called me 'shantra-
pa,' but he is a shantrapa himself, that's what he is." (Russian,
19th Century - shantrapa did become a curse in Russian,
meaning ' 'disreputable,' 'good-for-nothing')
(230) An Israeli tourist is on a Mediterranean cruise. The first night
at dinner, the maitre d' brings a latecomer, a French tourist to
the Israeli's table. "Bon appetit!" says the Frenchman politely.
The Israeli jumps up and says, "Rabinowitz!" And they smile at
each other politely through the entire meal. After the meal, the
maitre d' takes the Israeli aside and says, "I could not help
overhearing what you said at the table. You see, bon appitit is not
the French gentleman's name. All it means is be teavon! in
Hebrew, that is 'I wish you a hearty appetite!" On the next night,
after the meal is served, the Israeli says, "Bon appetit!" and the
French replies, "Rabi novice!" (Israeli, 1950's)
The most numerous class of jokes based on the script of LANGUAGE
DISTORTION includes triggers which are created by the distortion. When
some two different words are brought together as a result of the distortion

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they start functioning as a simple pun involving a polysemous or
homonymous words. Thus, (231) is one of the many jokes based on the well-
known feature of the Hispanic (and for that matter, almost any Continental
European) accent in English, which is the confusion of the "long" and
"short" vowels, as, for instance, in sleep.slip. (232) is a similar example of
language distortion, this time in Hebrew when spoken with a strong
Hungarian accent, which regularly confuses the [x] sound with an [h] type
sound, as in akharon 'lasV.aharon 'Aaron.'
(231) A Hispanic driver pulls up at the service station. "Feel'er up!"
he tells the attendant. "What? With you here?" asks the boy,
looking in surprise at the driver's pretty wife in the passenger
seat. (American, 20th century)
(232) "Who is the last?" asks a Hungarian immigrant, joining a line
in the bank. "I don't know," answers the person right ahead of
him. "I have not met anybody here. My name is David!" (Israeli,
1950's)
Both (231) and (232) are also good examples of jokes which are much
better told than read, and, predictably, many other jokes based on
LANGUAGE DISTORTION share this feature.
Another group of language-distortion ethnic jokes is based on the
confusion of similarly-sounding words from different languages, which leads to
the creation of a new pseudo-trigger similarly to the phonetic confusion in
(231-232). Another example is a real-life anecdote witnessed by the author
in the professors' lounge of the Moscow State University:
(233) A professor of Romance languages came into the lounge with a
copy of the Pravda which announced the deposition of
Khrushchev. He came up to a professor of Russian and said in
his elegant French, "Coup d'etat!" The ignorant lady waved her
hand at him coquettishly but uncomprehendingly and replied
in her peasant Russian, "Kudy tam, kudy tam!" /Well, what can
one do, nothing!"/ (Soviet, 1964)
(234) is based on a lexical rather than phonetical distortion, and most of
such jokes use the differences between British and American English or
some other dialects of the same language because, of course, different
languages are rarely suitable for such a purpose (it is, however, possible to
use words of the same roots with different meanings in two different
languages, i.e., the so-called 'false friends,' e.g., Fr. dicevoir 'disappoint':
Engl, deceive).

ETHNIC HUMOR
185
(234) Do you know why an Englishman was arrested for corrupting
a minor in Arizona? He told a twelve-year old girl on a donkey
that he liked her ass. (American, 20th century)
The script of speech distortion is thus a binary script with 'undistorted'
as the 'good' value and the 'distorted' as 'bad.' The examples in this section
have been selected for their neutrality - the heroes in them are not
particularly denigrated for their language incompetence. Even in (228-230) their
ignorance is pardonable because it is foreign languages that they are not
proficient in ((230) comes the closest to disparagement). The purer the case
for LANGUAGE DISTORTION, i.e., the more exclusively the joke is
dependent on this binary opposition of no distortion/distortion, the more
people are amused just by the language difference itself. More often,
however, language distortion is a secondary opposition, subservient to the
more popular binary scripts used in ethnic jokes, and the script of
DUMBNESS is probably the most widely used specific ethnic script.
2. SCRIPT OF DUMBNESS
The dumb jokes constitute by far the largest class of ethnic jokes. The thrust
of such jokes is an accusation of another ethnic group of being stupid,
literal-minded, idiotic, inept, ignorant, uneducated, ineducable, etc., usually
some or all of these together. From the point of view of script analysis, the
natural, commonsensical and obvious way of seeing or doing things, which
is supposed to be internalized by all the people in the right ethnic group, i.e.,
"ours" - you and I and the other people who belong to our group and do
not belong to the targeted group, is opposed to a different, unnatural and
often impossible way of doing things. It is entailed from this purely semanti-
cally that what is obvious to "us" and therefore to everybody is not obvious
to "them," and the denigrating judgment follows from that immediately.
(235) is a joke which uses the script of LANGUAGE DISTORTION
between a Puerto-Rican grade school student and an Anglo teacher.
However, here there is a strong element of disparagement which is completely
absent from pure language-distortion jokes. The Puerto-Rican child is
perceived as dumb because he fails to understand the word European in the
obvious situation of a geography lesson. A similar combination of language
distortion with disparagement will be found in (272).
(235) "Pedro," asks the geography teacher. "Which continent has
England, Norway, Poland, and Spain on it?" Pedro keeps silent.
"Well, Pedro?" Dead silence. "Come on, Pedro," says the

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teacher, "European." "No," answers Pedro, "my pants are dry."
(American, 1940's)
The script of DUMBNESS opposes the ethnic group or groups to which
the speaker and hearer(s) belong as the non-dumb, reasonable, natural,
regular people to the targeted group which is depicted as dumb,
unreasonable, irrational, irregular, etc; it is a typical good/bad kind of oppositeness.
The targeted group is a variable which is a function of the speaker and
hearer's ethnic group. According to Davies (1980,51), each industrial society
has "an ethnic group labeled 'stupid' such as the Poles in the United States,
the Irish in Britain, the Belgians in Holland, the Norwegians in Sweden, the
Newfoundlanders in Eastern Canada or the Ukrainian in Western Canada."
In Davies (1982b, 2), the list is further extended to include "the Irish,
Tasmanians, Cornish in Australia; the Irish and Maories in New Zealand,
the Belgians in France, the Flemings in Belgium, the Norwegians in
Denmark, the Finns and Negroes in Sweden, the Gypsies and Karelians in
Finland." This statement can be easily extrapolated to virtually any kind of
society and any ethnic group - there is always a neighboring ethnic group
which is labeled 'stupid,' for instance, the Uzbeks in Tajikistan, the Kurds
in Iraq and, apparently by ethnic transference, the Kurdish Jews in Israel.
Some dumb jokes can be very straightforward. Others are more
sophisticated - they achieve the same effect by accusing the targeted minority of
dumbness via various inabilities, for instance, to tell a telephone from an iron
(243).
(236) is a well-known joke targeted at the stupid minority; what is
interesting about it, however, is that it has been serialized, as many jokes tend to
do, and the pattern with blanks (237) can be used to accommodate other
scripts as well (see also (308) and (315))
(236) How many Ukrainians does it take to change a light bulb? Five.
One to stand on the table and put the bulb in and four to turn
the table. (Soviet, 1960's - cf. also (244))
(237) How many does it take to change a light bulb?
[number].
One to and [number minus 1] to
A serialized joke is, of course, a joke with a built-in optional allusion to
its own pattern, and it is much better appreciated, therefore, by those who
are familiar with the pattern, though those who are introduced to the pattern
for the first time are not excluded from it either. Another popularly serialized
pattern, which is also often used outside this particular type of ethnic humor,

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is that of a hypothetical cross presented schematically as (238) and
exemplified by many primitive jokes.
(238) What is a cross between a [a member of the targeted
group] and a [an object]? [an object or
phenomenon which combines some real features of the object
mentioned in the question with dumbness attributed to the
targeted group by the specific ethnic script]
A somewhat more recent and less formalized series of dumb jokes deals
with brain transplants:
(239) A Jewish man in New York falls madly in love with a Polish
woman and wants to marry her. Both of their families are
vehemently against their union. The Jew manages, however, to
make his family accept the idea, but the Polish parents are
stubborn. Finally, seeing that their daughter is really suffering
they tell her boyfriend that he should talk to their priest. "The
only way you can marry the girl," says the priest, "is for you to
become Polish. And the only way for you to do that is to have
a lobotomy. You see, you Jews have too much brains, and a
piece should be taken out. I can recommend a good doctor."
After much hesitation, the Jew agrees to the operation but before
being put to sleep he makes the surgeon promise that the moment
he awakens, the surgeon will tell him whether the operation was
successful. When he does come to, the doctor tells him that
everything was fine but the patient detects some hesitation in his
voice. Finally, under pressure, the doctor says, "Well, everything
is fine as I said but we took off a little too much!" "Oh, mama
mia\" exclaims the patient. (American, 1970's)
(240) A patient in the hospital is offered a choice of two kinds of brains
for his brain transplant. "We have Jewish brains," he is told, "at
$5,000 and Polish brains at $10,000." "How come the Polish
brains are twice as much as the Jewish brains?" he asks in
amazement. "Well, sir, the Polish brains are brand-new. They
have never been used." (American, 1970's)
(239) has a popular variant which involves a gorilla used to emphasize the
dumbness of both the Poles and the Italians. What makes the joke more
sophisticated is not only its double-barrelness in terms of the targeted
minorities but also its structural duplication: all the semantic components

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of a joke are in position by the end of the last but one sentence in the priest's
statement; however, the joke does not stop there but rather goes on and
incorporates more scripts and a more forceful opposition. The complexity
of (240) is based on the fact that the patient is amazed that the Polish brains
cost more, which means that he is familiar with the Polish joke (and this may
be the reason why he needs a brain transplant) and has internalized the
script that the Poles arc dumb; in other words, it is another example of an
optional allusion.
In most dumb jokes the dumbness of the targeted minority is entailed with
the help of a few standard semantic operations involving regular semantic
rather than encyclopedic scripts. The operations follow a simple path which
can be schematically represented as (241):
(241) X [the targeted minority] are Y/do Y/... -► It is impossible/
unlikely for anybody to be Y/do Y/... -► Everybody but X is not
Y/does not do Y because they all know Z -► Z is very obvious
-► Only a very dumb person may not know Z -► X is very dumb
In some sophisticated dumb jokes the path can be taken not from the very
beginning or discovered in a more complicated way. An additional allusion
can be built in. A secondary opposition may be involved. However, in spite
of all of these possible complications, if a joke is primarily an ethnic joke
of this type, the script of DUMBNESS and the path of (241) will be quite
conspicuous. Thus, (242), which uses a more generalized version of (237),
alludes to the fact that Puerto-Ricans often walk with their transistors and
listen to the music, and it arrives at the DUMBNESS script via an
intermediate script according to which the kind of music they listen to, and
actually any transistor music, is inappropriate at a funeral. (243) alludes to
the fact that the Belgians are technologically unsophisticated, and arrives at
the same conclusion via an intermediate script according to which smart
people (the French) know their technology well. (244) involves a secondary
excrement-related opposition and arrives at the dumbness of the ethnic
character via an intermediate script according to which it is dumb to make
a supreme and unpleasant effort and gain nothing.
(242) How many Puerto-Ricans does it take to bury a Puerto-Rican?
Five. Four to carry the coffin and one to carry the transistor.
(American, 1980's)
(243) How can you burn a Belgian's ear? Call him on the phone when
he is ironing. (French, 1940's)

ETHNIC HUMOR
189
(244) Two Ukrainians are walking home from a beerhouse. One of
them says, "Hey, you have a new pair of galoshes on. I like
them." The other replies, "Can you see that pile of shit over
there? Eat it up, and the galoshes are yours." The first Ukrainian
eats the shit and gets the galoshes, and they are walking on. A
few minutes later, the former owner of the galoshes says, "I am
really sorry I gave you the galoshes. I shoudn't have done that."
"All right," says the other. "If you feel that way, I understand.
Now if you eat up that pile of shit over there, I'll return them to
you." After the galoshes are back where they were before, one
of the Ukrainians says, "Now everything is back as it was, right?
Except that both of us have eaten a lot of shit." (Soviet, 1950's)
The intermediate scripts may involve uncleanliness or any other
disparaging features assigned to the targeted minority but they are all secondary to
the prevalent script of DUMBNESS. It is important to note that the
intermediate scripts can be evoked in ethnic jokes with another prevalent
specific script, and then those jokes belong to a different type.
3. SCRIPT OF STINGINESS
According to Davies (1980), along with the minority labeled 'stupid' every
industrial society has another minority at which its ethnic jokes are targeted
and which is "labelled 'crafty' or 'stingy' such as the Jews and the Scots in
most countries, the Cardis in Wales, the Auvergnat in France, the Swabians
in Germany." (op.cit., 51). While it may well be true that the same minority
is usually labeled both 'stingy' and 'crafty,' the involved scripts are different,
and they will be dealt with separately here.
The script of STINGINESS is as schematic, fictional and binary as the
script of DUMBNESS. According to this script, the targeted group is stingy
while the group to which the speaker and hearer(s) belong is not. The stingy
group will do anything weird, irrational and even impossible in order not to
expend any money or other valuable commodity. (245) is a basic example
dealing with a situation in which an expenditure is very hard to avoid. (246)
introduces the script by evoking the situation of a negligible expenditure.
Both situations are typical for this kind of ethnic humor.
(245) How do you make a Scotsman mute and deaf? By asking him
to contribute to a charity. (English, 19th century)

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(246) An English schoolboy asked a Scottish schoolmate to lend him
an eraser. Noticing the Scot's reluctance, he adds, "Don't worry
-1 have only one character to erase." "I am not worried," says
the Scottish boy, "as long as you let me use your eraser, when
you get one, to erase one character also. (English, 19th century)
(247) is a slightly more sophisticated example in which the hero's
stinginess manages to turn a pure gain into a loss:
(247) A Scotsman finds a one-pound note on the street. He walks on
happily and, lo and behold, sees another bill, this time a ten-
pound one. At home, he discovers that he has lost the first bill.
"Oh no," he says to himself. "If I hadn't lost it, I would have had
11 pounds. Now, I have the 10 pounds but I lost 1, so actually,
what I have gained is just 9 pounds. Eleven minus nine is two,
so I am two pounds poorer than I could have been. I am really
sorry that I found that ten-pound bill. If I didn't, I would be one
pound richer instead of two pounds poorer." (Soviet, 1960's)
The STINGINESS is taken even further when it turns out that the
targeted group is less concerned about their own pleasure (248) or physical
damage to their loved ones (249) than about financial damage.
(248) A couple of Scottish newlyweds feel romantic and start making
love on the living-room floor of their brand-new house. In a little
while, the husband says, "Don't fret so, love?" "Fret?" his wife
asks in surprise. "Don't you like it when I do it?" "Oh yes, very
much so. In bed, it's a different matter. But here, you will wear
the shag off the carpet!"
(249) A Scot is flying a small private plane, with his family on board.
In the middle of the flight, he looks back, and his son is not there.
He asks his wife, "Where is Douglas?" "He fell off a minute
ago," she screams. "What, here?" shouts the husband. "We are
flying over a private park. The fine for trespassing is 100
pounds!"
The alleged stinginess of the targeted group is correctly presented as really
extreme when the commodity in question is, in fact, unexpendable:
(250) The stingiest Scotsman is the one who slept with his mother-in-

ETHNIC HUMOR
191
law, to save the "wear and tear" on his pretty wife. (Legman,
1968, 471)
Script analysis of the stinginess-based ethnic jokes proceeds along a
well-defined semantic path (251), parts of which are interestingly similar to
that for the dumbness-based jokes (241):
(251) X [a member of the targeted minority] behaves in an unlikely,
irrational, or impossible way -► All the non-X'es do not behave
this way in the same or similar situation -► The situation requires
an expenditure of a valuable commodity or a pseudo-commodity
-► The reason for X's behavior is X's desire to avoid the
expenditure at any cost -► The resulting economy is not worth the effort
-► X is stingy.
Any minority for which there exists a script of STINGINESS could, of
course, be substituted for the Scots in (246-250). The Jewish stingy jokes
are saved till Section 9, but joke (9) is often told about a Jewish patient and
perceived as a stingy joke. In fact, however, it is more crafty than stingy.
4. SCRIPT OF CRAFTINESS
The binary mythological script of CRAFTINESS, or CUNNINGNESS, is
evoked in the imaginary situations in which a member or members of the
targeted minority is (are) engaged in doing something highly unusual in order
to achieve their purpose. According to the script, the targeted minority is
cunning while the speaker and hearer's ethnic group(s) is (are) not. The
targeted minority labeled 'cunning' usually coincide with the ones labeled
'stingy.' However, the semantic nature of the script is different, it is evoked
by different words, and it has different inferences. One such difference is
that, unlike stinginess, CUNNINGNESS may command some reluctant
admiration. Another is that CUNNINGNESS is much more closely
associated with the script of deception. The standard semantic path for the script
of CUNNINGNESS can be presented schematically as (252):
(252) X [a member of the targeted minority] does something unusual
-► All the non-X'es do not behave in the same way in this or
similar situation -► The result of X's behavior is beneficial for

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X -► X succeeds in achieving this result (often against
considerable odds) -► X is cunning.
Some stingy jokes are also cunning. The reason for this overlap is that the
beneficial result in (252) can be of a financial nature. However, (253) is
cunning but not stingy, and though some financial gain is present in
(254-257) it is clearly not the focus of the jokes.
(253) A Scotsman committed a mortal sin. Immediately, he heard a
loud thunder and saw a lightning, and an authoritative voice told
him from the heavens that he was to be punished. "Choose your
death!" the voice ordered. "What do you prefer to die from?"
"Old age," said the Scotsman quickly. (British, 19th century)
(254) A Jew and a Gentile have an automobile accident: their cars
collided at an intersection. They call the police and wait for them
to arrive. Neither is injured but both are shaken. The Jew takes
out a flask with vodka and offers it to the other. The man gladly
accepts and takes a sip. Then he returns the flask to the Jew with
thanks and says, "Now help yourself." "Oh no," says the Jew,
"I'd better wait for the police to establish now who is the guilty
party." (Soviet, 1970's)
(255) A Jew calls on the wife of his colleague to tell her that her
husband will come home from work much later and that he
asked the Jew to stop by and inform the woman. The woman
thanks the Jew and asks him in for a drink. The Jew accepts.
They have a very pleasant chat at the end of which the Jew tells
her that he has always been very attracted to her and asks her
whether she would be willing to go to bed with him for 75 rubles.
The woman agrees, and in a little while they part in mutual
satisfaction. Later that night, when the husband comes home the
wife says, "Your friend stopped by. It was very considerate of
you to warn me that you would be late for dinner." "Never mind
that," grumbled the tired man. "Did he leave you my salary?"
(Soviet, 1950's)
(256) There wa,s a Jew in town whose favorite occupation was betting.
Once he insisted on an audience with the Governor because he
had some very important news to report. The Governor was
incredulous but decided to see him. "Your Excellency," said the
Jew. "I am afraid I have bad news for you. You are developing

ETHNIC HUMOR
193
a huge boil on your behind, and it has to be taken care of
immediately." "This is ridiculous," responded the Governor. "I
have nothing of the kind." "I will bet you 5 rubles that you do."
"Well," said the Governor, "just to punish you for your
imbecility." He lowered his trousers, and sure enough, there was no boil
on his behind. "Wait a second," said the Jew. "I don't
understand! I know that you do have a boil there. Maybe it is very
small. Come to the window - there's more light there. No, you
are right, there is no boil." And he paid the Governor the 5
rubles. "Now, what do you do these things for?" asked the
Governor indignantly. "Why do you waste money like that?"
"Oh no, Your Excellency," said the Jew. "I never waste money."
"But this stupid bet! You just threw away 5 rubles." "No, Your
Excellency, I just made 5 rubles." "What do you mean?" "Oh,
I bet somebody on the street 10 rubles that within 15 minutes he
would see the Governor's bare ass in this window." (Russian,
1910's)
(257) When promised a ruble by a rich man if he could tell a lie without
thinking, Hershele responded: "A ruble? But you just said two!"
(Novak and Waldoks, 1981, 30)
Because they often revolve around an elaborate scheme the cunning jokes
are also typically longer than the stingy jokes.
Obviously, there are sociological and psychological explanations for the
universality and prevalence of the three specific ethnic scripts discussed in
the last three sections (see, for instance, Davies, 1980, and Mintz, 1977b and
1980). To the extent that these explanations are available to the native
speaker, the scripts are conscious and then the paths of (241), (251) and
(252) can be presented much more elaborately. As they are, the paths
correspond to the fully unconscious use of the scripts, and there is reason
to believe that this is indeed the case in most situations.
An interesting question arises in this connection. Since the scripts are
simplistic and schematic they do not reflect the reality accurately. Is the
native speaker aware of that? If he is not, then his reality coincides with the
scripts and is of an entirely mythological nature. This is perhaps the case
with the uneducated, unsophisticated, and/or prejudiced speaker(s) and
hearer(s). It can be argued then that for these people, the scripts in question
are not of an encyclopedic but rather of a semantic nature. In most cases,
however, the purely conventional nature of the scripts is clear to the speaker,

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and then the scripts are used consciously and have to be acquired as a
special mythological kind of encyclopedic information (cf. Introduction and
Chapter 5, Section 6).
There is a number of less frequent but still popular scripts used in ethnic
jokes, and those are usually even more associated with a particular targeted
group and much less (if at all) interchangeable than the three dominating
scripts analyzed in Sections 2-4.
5. NON-STANDARD SPECIFIC SCRIPTS IN ETHNIC JOKES
The three most popular scripts in ethnic humor, DUMBNESS,
STINGINESS, and CUNNINGNESS, are largely language- and
nation-independent in the sense that they can be found virtually in any language and with
any ethnic group, and the pairs of originating and targeted ethnic groups are
highly variable, e.g., for DUMBNESS, the non-Polish Americans as the
originating group and the Polish Americans as the targeted group, or the
English as the former and the Irish as the latter group, or the Russians and
the Ukrainians, etc. Along with these scripts, ethnic humor utilizes a certain
number of even more specific scripts. Some of them can also be rather
universal while others are always associated with a certain originating group,
a certain targeted group, or both.
The script of OVERSEXED MINORITY is in the first category - it is
quite universal and holds for various pairs of ethnic groups. Thus, for the
Russians, the oversexed minority is the Soviet Georgians (see jokes (208)
and (215)). This script is a simple juxtaposition of the targeted minority with
the gigantic values of either or both of the specific sexual scripts of
GENITAL SIZE and PROWESS (see Chapter 5, Section 2). In the United States,
the Blacks and Hispanics are often targeted for this script: (258) is usually
told as a Hispanic joke (see, however, Section 8) - it is also a female correlate
of (176).
(258) Two young Hispanic newlyweds went to Las Vegas for their
honeymoon, but instead of going to the casinos, they did not
leave their room for a few days. Finally, they showed up in the
hotel restaurant late one morning. When the waiter approached
them, the bride looked at him brightly and said, "Do you know
what I would like?" The husband interrupted her abruptly, "He
doesn't but I do. Let's just eat, O.K.?" (American, 1970's)
The infamous joke which cost Earl Butz his cabinet post is also of this
variety:

ETHNIC HUMOR
195
(259) Three things the Black needs from life are a warm shit, a pair of
loose shoes and a tight cunt. (American, 1930's)
The oversexed script is often associated with the minority labeled stupid
as well. Sometimes it is the dumb minority, e.g., the Kurds in Iraq; in other
cases, it is an 'also-dumb' minority.
The less universal variation of the oversexed script is associated with just
one targeted ethnic group, the French, but the script is shared by many
originating ethnic groups; in other words, many ethnic groups maintain the
myth about the French fixation on sex, their frivolity and blast attitude to
sex (see, for instance, the French components of (268) and (269); cf. (185)).
(260) and (261) are typical examples - they also evoke two variations of the
specific sexual script of FORBIDDEN SEX, viz., homosexuality and
prostitution, respectively (the former also evokes another specific sexual
script, that of SEXUAL IGNORANCE, as well as a specific script of
Jewish humor, viz., ANTI-SEMITISM, and it is, therefore, a half-hearted
Jewish joke as well).
(260) A French mother comes home visibly upset and tells her
husband, "Your son is impossible. He is only 8, and do you
know what he just told me in front of the house? He said,
'Mother, I like Pierre very much. Can I marry him?'" "But that's
impossible," said the father. "Doesn't he know that Pierre is
Jewish?" (Soviet, 1970's)
(261) A Soviet trade union delegation is touring Paris by bus. A young
man in the delegation sees a very attractive girl on the street and
says, "Wow!" "Oh yes," says the guide, "this is at least 20
franks." On the next street, there is a girl who is even more
attractive. "40 franks," says the guide. The next girl is 50%the one
after her 80, and the one in front of the Louvre 100. "Aren't there
any decent women in Paris?" asks the young man. "Those who
aren't prostitutes?" "Of course, there are," says the guide. "But
they go for 500 franks and more." (Soviet, 1960's)
(262) is a typical illustration of the blast myth (see also (268)):
(262) The Frenchman and the American are arguing about the number
of positions they are familiar with. "I have read the Kama-
Sutra" insists the American, "and I have tried them all. There
are exactly 64 different positions." "No, monsieur," says the
Frenchman. "You must be mistaken. I know of only 63, and if

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I know only 63, that means that there are no more." "All right,"
says the American. "Let's enumerate them. First, she's lying on
her back and he is lying on top of her..." "Oh, monsieur, I am
devastated," says the Frenchman. "You're right. You win!"
(Soviet, 1960's)
However, the most clinging specific ethnic script about the French is that
they would do anything for love and exchange any other commodity in life
for it. (263) illustrates this from the angle of their savvy and matter-of-fact
attitude to sex (see also the French part of (268)), evoking the script of
SEXUAL IGNORANCE in the process.
(263) A French woman says to her husband, "Listen, our Andr6 is 13.
You should talk to him about facts of life." "Cannot you do
that?" asks the father. "I have no idea how to go about it." "No,"
says she, "it should be a man-to-man conversation. Why don't
you start with birds and bees, you know, and proceed from
there?" "Oh, all right," sighs the husband. After dinner, he says,
"Andre, let's go out to the porch for a minute. I need to talk to
you." On the porch, he asks the boy, "Andr6, are you sleeping
with the maid?" "Of course," answers the son. "Why?" "Oh,
nothing, it's just that your mother wants me to tell you that birds
and bees are doing it exactly the same way." (Soviet, 1960's)
A more powerful version of this "anything-for-love" script is illustrated
by (264), where it is combined with the opposite script about the Germans.
The French part of (350), where it is not even part of the main opposition,
is an eloquent proof of the productivity of the script.
(264) A Frenchman arrives at a German city and checks into his hotel
room. It is late and he retires immediately. On the next morning
he is met downstairs by the manager, who is visibly upset. "Sir,
I was not here when you arrived last night, and I am afraid my
staff made a terrible mistake concerning your accommodations.
I do beg your forgiveness for any shock or inconvenience that
we have caused you," he says in one breath. "You will not be
charged for this night, nor for the rest of your stay." "Oh, this
is very nice of you," answers the Frenchman, "but what
inconvenience are you talking about?" "Oh sir," exclaims the German.
"You could not fail to notice that there was a dead woman in
the bed?" "Dead?" says the surprised guest. "I didn't know that.
She was a little passive but I thought she was just a regular
German Frau." (Soviet, 1950's)

ETHNIC HUMOR
197
The script of ASEXUALITY associated with the Germans in (264) is
taken much further with the Russians, especially women, in Soviet Jewish
humor. The in sensitivity, often associated with the gigantic value of female
GENITAL SIZE, is exemplified by (182) and (207). (265) is one of the more
vulgar, tasteless and, therefore, clear and conspicuous examples of the script
of asexuality via GENITAL SIZE for Russian women.
(265) A young woman asks for an audition with the Head of the State
Concert Agency in Moscow. She walks into the office, takes a
big apple out of a box she has brought in, and puts the apple on
the floor in front of the Head's desk. Then she lifts her miniskirt,
squats on the floor and gets up, and the apple is gone. "This is
very impressive, comrade," says the visibly embarrassed Head.
"But don't you think what the State Circus is where you should
audition with this kind of thing?" "I know," says the woman,
"but that place is taken already. Mother works there with a
watermelon." (Soviet, 1950 's)
The Jews are also often accused of the vice of undersexedness as well as
of its exact opposite, oversexedness (see Section 9).
The French frivolity is interestingly combined in (265) with another
specific ethnic script, typically associated with the Germans, viz., their
EFFICIENCY, METHODICITY (see the German parts of (379) and
(384)) and BLIND OBEDIENCE to often arbitrary rules, which frequently
leads to absurdity as in (266).
(266) A German moves to Paris with his firm and settles down in his
new apartment with his wife. On one of the first nights he
discovers that his supply of condoms, which he replenishes every
year, is running low. He walks over to a nearby pharmacy and
asks for one hundred condoms. At home he opens the package,
counts the condoms, and there are only ninety-nine. The next
morning he returns to the pharmacy and complains about it. The
pharmacist is very upset, "I am desperately sorry, monsieur," he
says, "we must have spoilt a wonderful night for you." (Soviet,
1960's)
The non-universal specific ethnic scripts are quite numerous. Many of
them, as illustrated above, are targeted at one ethnic group but originated
with many different ethnic groups: these may include the alleged British
STUFFINESS ((267) and the English part of (268)), COLD POLITENESS
part of (269)), RESPECT FOR TRADITION (the English part of (379)),
or BEER-LOVING (the English part of (350)), often attributed to the

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Germans as well; Russian INEPTNESS IN ROMANCE (the Russian part
of (268)), SEXUAL INDIFFERENCE ((207) and the Russian part of
(269)), or BRAVADO (380); Irish LACK OF SAVOIR VIVRE (270);
American IRREVERENCE (347); etc.
(267) Do you know how a First Lieutenant of the Royal Navy
perished? When his ship was in port, a little girl fell overboard
from a small yacht docked nearby. The officer jumped into the
sea and saved her. After he had handed the girl over to her
mother, he jumped back into the sea and started swimming back
to his own ship. At that moment he was attacked by a shark.
Without a wink he took his dagger from its sheath and was going
to counterattack when the grateful mother from the yacht
exclaimed, "Lieutenant, where are your table manners? There is
a special knife for fish!" (Soviet, 1950's)
(268) Two Frenchman and one Frenchwoman find themselves on an
uninhabited island. A similar Russian group is on another such
island, and three Britons on a third. The French woman marries
one of the men, takes the other as a lover, and all the three are
very happy. The Russian woman falls in love with one of the
men, marries the other, and all the three are miserable. The three
Britons go each to a different corner of the island and never talk
to each other because there is nobody to introduce them. (Soviet,
1950's)
(269) How do different nationalities respond to adultery? The French
husband steps into his bedroom, sees his wife in bed with his best
friend, and says, "Oh, Marie, so you are here with Jean. That
means that Clotilde must be lonely. I think I will look her up."
The English husband says, "All right, my dear. My lawyer will
give your lawyer a ring." And the Russian husband yells, "So
you're here, having fun, right? Don't you know that they're
expecting some cottage cheese in the grocery store at long last,
and all the good women are standing in line already!" (Soviet,
1950's)
(270) What is the Irish seven-course dinner? A baked potato and a
six-pack of beer. (American, 20th century)
The least universal ethnic scripts are those which hold just between two
ethnic groups, the one originating and the other targeted. Thus, the
CONTEMPTUOUS script for the Roumaninan Jews is available only to the

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non-Romanian Jews in Israel; the alleged ZOOPHYLIC TENDENCIES
of the Armenians (378) or FINANCIAL ENTERPRISE of the Georgians
only to the Russians (271), etc.
With the exception of this last category of specific ethnic scripts, the
scripts involved in ethnic jokes targeted at different ethnic groups tend to
overlap very significantly as the comparison of various national sections of
joke books and/or of specialized joke books demonstrates immediately:
virtually the same jokes can be listed as Italian, Irish or Polish, as Scotch
and Jewish, etc.; and the involved scripts do not vary widely either. In fact,
if all the relevant scripts were enumerated for the abovementioned groups,
the lists would be almost identical. The overlap is especially heavy if the two
compared targeted groups have the same value on one or more of the three
standard ethnic scripts, in other words, if both targeted groups are dumb,
or stingy, and/or cunning.
As far as the non-interchangeable ethnic humor is concerned, it is
obviously the availability or unavailability of certain specific ethnic (and
other) scripts which gives humor its national character. If one does not
happen to possess the ethnic script according to which the Soviet Georgians
are fanatically mercenary as well as the political script according to which
every Soviet citizen is dying to get out of Russia (see also Chapter 7, Section
8), in conjunction with a few encyclopedic scripts, according to which
Georgia is in the South of the Soviet Union and grows fruit and flowers
which are in great demand in Moscow and are flown there daily by
enterprising private growers, (271) is not very likely to strike one as
particularly funny or even easily comprehensible. A particular combination
of an ethnic script of dumbness-cum-arrogance for the Eskimoes and of a
specific political script has to be in place in order for (272) to be understood
(see Section 7 and Chapter 7, Sections 1 and 4 for further explanation).
Similarly, only the Swedes are likely to appreciate (273) because they
possess the script of ARROGANCE for the Norwegians (along with the
standard dumb script as mentioned above).
(271) A hijacking is attempted on board a Soviet plane which is flying
from Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, to Moscow. The hijacker
tries to divert the plane to Paris but a muscular Georgian
overpowers him, and the plane lands in Moscow as scheduled.
The authorities treat the Georgian as a hero and a great Soviet
patriot. He is allowed to grant an interview to reporters. "Tell
us, comrade," he is asked, "what made you do this patriotic thing
at such a grave risk to yourself and other passengers?" "I had

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a ton of oranges on board," he replies. "What would I have done
with them in Paris?" (Soviet, 1970's)
(272) Different Soviet nationalities are arguing about Lenin's ethnic
heritage. "He was Russian," says the Russian. "His father was
half-Russian. His native tongue was Russian. His education and
culture were Russian." The Jew says, "He was Jewish - his
mother was Jewish, and this is all that counts." The Chuvash
says, "But his paternal grandfather was Chuvash, and this
makes Lenin Chuvash also." But the Eskimo says, "He was an
Eskimo." "How come?" ask the others in surprise. "He had no
Eskimo blood whatsoever." 'Because," replies the Eskimo, "he
was vely-vely clevel!" (Soviet, 1960's)
(273) The fishermen pull a load of shrimp to examine it. One fisherman
comments, "Good shrimp!" The one Norwegian shrimp in the
load hears that and says, "Oh, no, I'm a lobster." (American
Swedish, 1930's)
It was a complete in sensitivity to this factor and general semantic naiveti
which rendered Eysenck's (1944) investigation into national differences in
humor so ill-designed and hopelessly inconclusive: the main parameter, the
national availability of certain scripts, remained a mystery to the researchers.
6. SMALLER TARGETED GROUPS IN ETHNIC HUMOR
Along with whole nations targeted for humor in ethnic jokes, basically the
same scripts can be applied to smaller groups of an ethnic, religious, or
professional nature.
While, obviously, medical or lawyers'jokes do not belong to ethnic humor,
their semantic mechanism is exactly the same: as any other specific kind of
humor such jokes depend on the availability of a certain set of scripts which
capture a number of popular myths or stereotypes about the involved group
of people; the scripts in question do not have to correspond to reality and,
in this sense, are most frequently only partially true at best; nor are they
available to an ordinary native speaker of the language as part of his/her
semantic competence - rather, they have to be acquired specially for the
purpose.
There is even less difference between those jokes which are targeted at a
whole nation and those which are targeted at the whole population of a
region or province. As long as the involved scripts are individual-indepen-

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dent and provide "blanket coverage" for every single member of the targeted
group simply in virtue of his membership in it, we are dealing with a variety
of ethnic humor.
Thus, in Davies's (1982b, 2) list of stupid minorities, some are regional
rather than truly ethnic: the Ostfrieslanders for the other Germans, citizens
of Arhus for the other Norwegians, the Southern Italians for the rest of Italy,
and the Black Sea Greeks for Greece. The jokes told about each of these
groups would largely overlap with each other as well as with the list of
available jokes about any targeted group labeled as 'stupid.'
In the United States, there are ethnic jokes of any kind, from dumb, stingy,
and cunning to more specific, about the residents of certain states as
perceived by other states. Thus, the residents of Kentucky are perceived in
Indiana as dumb in the standard "literal-minded" sense of the script (274).
(274) A man from Kentucky comes into a Southern Indiana bar and
orders a dozen beers. He drinks them all and orders another
dozen. After the third dozen, he pays and leaves. In a minute,
however, he returns with a bucket of shit, a rifle and a leather
bag. He puts the bucket on the floor in front of the bar, aims his
rifle at the shit and shoots. After that, he opens a bag, takes out
a dead cat and starts eating it. Confronted by angry patrons, the
Kentuckian says, "Why are you so upset? I was just trying to be
friendly. They tell me that the Hoosiers drink a lot of beer, shoot
the shit and eat pussy!" (American, 20th century)
(It is interesting to note that the Indiana tellers of the joke do not seem
to be aware of the fact that the Kentuckian's explanation incorporates an
equally disparaging script of debauchery for themselves as the residents of
Indiana.)
Similarly, the Cantonese associate the script of dumbness and ineptness
with the residents of the Sansui region. The popular saying about an absurd
way of doing things is, "You are doing it exactly like the Sansui men eat their
noodles," and everybody knows that the Sansui men climb up the ladder
when they eat noodles because the noodles are so long.
The anti-Catholic sexual jokes (181, 206) are based on a specific script
(of celibacy) on whose availability to the hearer the jokes depend and thus
function similarly to the ethnic jokes. The feminist and anti-feminist jokes
are just as dependent on the availability of a certain set of scripts, usually
of the extreme variety, such as bra-burning, castration, and lesbianism (see,
for instance, A221).

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The relatively innocent ethnic joke (275) which almost got Candidate
Reagan into trouble early in 1980 is targeted at an occupational group, the
Mafia, along with two ethnic groups, and it is based on a certain script about
the Mafia, namely that they can make improbable things happen if it is in
their interest.
(275) A Pole would bring a duck to a cockfight. An Italian would bet
on the duck, and the Mafia would get the duck to win.
(American, 20th century)
These and many similar examples show that there exists a large class of
jokes targeted at collectives rather than at individuals or individual traits,
and the ethnic jokes proper constitute a subclass of that larger class.
7. NATIONAL SUPERIORITY JOKES
A special class of ethnic humor includes jokes which are anti-disparaging
and self-glorifying. They aim at asserting the national superiority of the
group, to which both the speaker and the hearer(s) belong, to all the others.
In some cases, the superiority can be established by using the standard or
non-standard disparaging scripts about the other nations, and such jokes
would basically fall under one of the previously discussed category, with one
ethnic group standing out as undisparaged. Thus, (276) is openly and
absurdly abusive of the other ethnic groups and makes a flattering though
incorrect claim about the originating group - the basic opposition being, of
course, of the good/bad kind.
(277), however, is a somewhat more interesting example: the Russian
national superiority is established on the basis of specific but
non-disparaging ethnic scripts, associated with each of the other groups, by claiming a
sexual superiority of sorts. Similarly, in (278), the French national
superiority is established without any real disparagement; it is notable that the aspect
of the superiority, viz., that the French women are the most chic in the world,
is itself dependent on a popular ethnic script about the French.
(276) The Chinese invented the atom bomb, and the Japanese
invented the rotten egg. (Hong-Kong Chinese, 1960's)
(277) An Iranian, a Frenchman, an American and a Russian are
drinking together. The Iranian says, "I propose a toast to
Persian rugs. They are the best in the world, and nobody can
make rugs like we do." They all drink to that. Then the

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203
Frenchman says, "I propose a toast to French women who are
the most beautiful and elegant in the world." They drink to that
as well. The American says, "I propose a toast to American
precision. We are the most technologically developed nation in
the world, and without our precision, we would not have gotten
where we are." After they drink to that, the Russian stands up
and says, "And I propose a toast to the Russian pilots who fuck
French women on Persian rugs with American precision."
(Soviet, 1950's)
(278) An American, a German and a Frenchman are arguing about
their wives - which is the thinnest. The American says, "My wife
is so thin that after I take her out to a restaurant for a full meal
she doubles her weight." "This is nothing," says the German.
"My wife is so thin that when she takes a bath, I have to hold
her by her hair so that she not disappear down the drain."
"Well," says the Frenchman, "my wife swallowed a cherry pit
recently, and everybody decided that she was pregnant." (Soviet,
1960's)
The multinational format is characteristic of this type of ethnic humor
though not every joke of this format belongs to the national-superiority class
- see, for instance, jokes (268) and (269), which are equally disparaging of
all the involved groups. However, the format is, naturally, most favorable
for comparison. The scripts associated with the other ethnic groups tend to
be of a more or less standard or universal variety; the script which
establishes the superiority of the originating ethnic group is quite often
limited in availability to this group itself. The largely self-assumed and often
factually incorrect nature of the self-referring script often makes it lose its
purported ethnic character and thus makes it into a political script (see also
below). (278), however, manages to use a pretty universal script about the
French as a basis of their national superiority in one respect. For this reason,
the joke can be told both by the French and by other ethnic groups. In the
latter case, it can be straight, i.e., corroborating the attributed claim of
national superiority, as is the case in (278) as a Soviet joke of the 1960's,
or otherwise it can be the reverse (see below).
National-superiority jokes obviously presuppose a considerable degree of
patriotism and self-admiration. Since these qualities are imposed on the
populace forcibly by fiercely nationalistic totalitarian regimes, the populace
responds to that with jokes which parody patriotic slogans and make fun

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of national superiority by reversing the script, as is often done in humor (see
also Chapter 7, Sections 3 and 8). In this case, the reverse ethnic script is
often combined with a non-ethnic political script.
Thus, in (279) the Russian political script according to which Russia has
the first claim to all things and phenomena (see also Chapter 7, Section 8),
is combined with regular ethnic scripts about the other ethnic groups.
(279) Students of different nationalities were asked to write an essay
about elephants. The Englishman wrote an essay entitled, "The
role of the elephant in the building of the British Empire." The
German wrote "The historical survey of the elephant as species
from its beginnings to the present." The French essay was called
"The elephant and the woman." The American student turned
in "On cost-efficient uses of the elephant." The Jewish student's
theme was "The elephant and anti-Semitism." And the Russian
author entitled his composition "The Soviet Union as the
Fatherland of the elephant" (Soviet, 1960's - a decade or two
earlier, the subject of the Russian essay was "Stalin on the
elephant")
It is typical for the reference to the originating ethnic group (the Soviet
Russians in (279)) to be based on a political script while all the other ethnic
groups are treated in terms of purely ethnic scripts, viz., the British are
(were?) empire-builders, the Germans are pedantic and methodical, the
French are womanizers, the Americans are profit-oriented businessmen.
The list of ethnic groups, besides the Russians, can be easily made longer
by using any other ethnic stereotypes available to the Russians, e.g., as in
(280):
(280) The Chinese essay was "The elephant and the rice." The
Japanese essay was "The erephant." The Georgian essay was
"The price of the elephant on the Moscow Farmers' Market."
Etc., etc.
Joke (272) presents a different combination of a political script with an
ethnic script used in a mock national-superiority joke about the Eskimoes.
The political script is based on the officially imposed cult of Lenin (see also
Chapter 7, Section 1) and the related patriotic-sentimental literature and
poetry to which the Soviet citizens and especially children have been forcibly
exposed and which try to demonstrate that each nationality would like to
claim Lenin as its own. The ethnic script is the reverse of the standard script

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205
of DUMBNES S reinforced by the fact, which would be immediately exposed
in straightforward script analysis of the text, that the Eskimo speaks out of
line and the strength of the others' claim is lost on him entirely.
One significant difference between the reverse national-superiority jokes
(272) and (279) is that the latter is a self-parody while the former originates
with a different ethnic group which makes fun of the targeted group's alleged
claim of national superiority.
The scripts on which the claims of national superiority are based in
straight jokes may coincide with the scripts, which the other ethnic groups
have about the originating group, or differ from them entirely. (278), as was
shown above, is an example of the former situation. (277) clearly belongs to
the latter because no ethnic group seems to possess any ethnic script about
the Russians (or for that matter, about the Russian pilots - if such a script
existed it would belong to the smaller kind discussed in Section 6), which
would be compatible with what is said about them in the joke. It follows
immediately that (277) could not possibly be told by any ethnic group other
than the Russians. In a sense, this makes (277) and similar jokes the purest
case of the national-superiority ethnic joke.
8. PSEUDO-ETHNIC JOKES
It was demonstrated in the preceding sections that ethnic jokes can also be
sexual or political. They can also overlap with other categories of humor. In
many cases, what is presented as ethnic humor, in fact, belongs solely to
these other categories of humor and is not all ethnic. Thus, (281) can be
presented as a Hispanic joke:
(281) "Angelo, did you take the school bus this morning?" "No,
teacher, I can't drive. And my big brother didn't do it either -
he is sick today."
It is obvious that there is nothing Hispanic or ethnic about the joke besides
the name. It is a simple joke with a regular pair of polysemous meanings of
one word take for a trigger, which makes it a typical (and very feeble) pun.
The name could be Ivan, Jacques, Chaim, or Ching, and the school bus
could be a trolley bus, tram, shuttle, or rickshaw, respectively or (almost)
irrespectively, and the joke would still be the same. The script of dumbness,
often associated with the Hispanics in the United States, is clearly
inapplicable here because the script of the incompetent student has nothing to do
with it and is very universal. Nor do any other scripts traditionally associated

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with the Hispanics apply here. In fact, the same joke can be listed almost
in any "national" section of a comprehensive ethnic joke book, and such
books do indeed abound in overlapping examples.
There is nothing wrong with such interchangeability in general: in fact, it
has been mentioned before that one targeted group can be easily substituted
for another if the same ethnic script holds for both of them, e.g., the Poles
and Italians are interchangeable as the dumb minorities. However, there is
no specific ethnic script which would hold, for instance, both for the
Hispanics and the British, and this is why this kind of interchangeability is
a give-away - a joke listed both in the Hispanic and British sections of a joke
book is not ethnic.
In spite of the abundance of ethnic clues (italicized by me) in (282), there
is nothing particularly Jewish about it, either, besides being included in a
(very good) Jewish joke book:
(282) Levy closed his shop Friday night and headed for temple services,
not realizing his fly was unzipped. At the entrance, he met Mrs.
Weiss, the president of the Ladies' Auxiliary. "I don't like to say
nothirt" she said shyly, "but your business is open." "You're
mistaken, lady!" said Levy. "Believe me," said Mrs. Weiss,
blushing, "your business is open." "You're crazy!" shouted
Levy, rushing inside. "I close the store every Friday to come
here!" Later at home, Levy saw that his fly was open and realized
that Mrs. Weiss had only been trying to tell him so in a delicate
way. He telephoned her immediately. "I v/anno apologize!" he
said, also trying to be tactful. "But tell me somethin'. When my
business was open, was my salesman in or out?" (Wilde, 1974,
44)
There may be two reasons for listing non-ethnic jokes as ethnic, and both
are wrong.
First, a joke may be listed as ethnic because the author of the joke book
or the joke teller heard it originally from a member of the ethnic group to
which the joke is assigned. In this case, naturally, the names would be
characteristic of the group, and so would be the place names, food or dress
paraphernalia, etc. Also, popular expressions in the language of the group
may creep in, such as French monsieur, merci, pardon, oh-la-la, etc., Italian
mama mia, prego, signorina, etc. Some joke tellers think that these ethnic
paraphernalia make the joke colorful and keep them in. Others may even
believe that the ethnicity is important for the joke. This usually is the case

ETHNIC HUMOR
207
of a relatively unsophisticated speaker of the pseudo-ethnic joke. Since most
jokes are language- and culture-independent, various ethnic groups tell
pretty much the same jokes.
Secondly, the speaker may be aware of the existence and importance of
ethnic stereotypes but may believe that they do contribute to the joke, at least
weakly and indirectly. Thus, in case of (281), the author of the joke book
may have decided that the script of dumbness (and perhaps of thievery),
frequently attributed to the Hispanics in ethnic humor, can make the joke
better. In (282), the speaker may be addressing the anti-Semitic hearer(s)
who would like to see the Jews ridiculed or, alternatively, the Jewish
hearer(s) who like to chuckle affectionately about the misfortune of a fellow
Jew. However, in both cases, the speaker is not likely to be assisted greatly
by either of these entirely extraneous factors, and they certainly do not affect
the semantic nature of the joke at all.
As mentioned briefly in Section 6, the joke is truly ethnic if and only if
its main opposition or one of its main oppositions involves at least one truly
ethnic script. The ethnic scripts are not part of the native speaker's semantic
competence but rather a separate set of pseudo-encyclopedic scripts which
have to be internalized prior to the production or consumption of ethnic
jokes. The main feature of the ethnic joke is this complete dependence on
an ethnic script. The dependence can be diagnosed on the basis of the
following criterion: if the joke is truly ethnic, the removal of the evoked ethnic
script renders it incomprehensible. There is an additional criterion, which
may be referred to as collective: if the joke is truly ethnic, it treats the
individuals involved in it solely and entirely as members of the targeted ethnic
group; in other words, any Scot, Pole, Jew, etc., would do and not necessarily
a particular Mr. McLean, Mr. Kozlowski, or Mr. Rabinowitz to whom this
or that may have happened - this is the 'blanket coverage' mentioned in
Section 6. Still another criterion involves interchangeability as discussed
above: if the joke is truly ethnic, the targeted ethnic group may be substituted
for only by another ethnic group which shares the evoked ethnic script with
it.
It is obvious that (281-82) are not at all truly ethnic: there are no ethnic
scripts involved at all; the jokes are about individuals in individual
situations; the ethnic paraphernalia in them are interchangeable for any other
ethnic set or no ethnic set at all.
In other words, what is claimed here is that the translation of a sexual,
non-ethnic joke, such as (283), into (284) does not render the latter ethnic,
and the script-based semantic theory of humor has a formal explanation for
this intuitive fact.

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(283) A man comes to his physician and complains about his
impotence. The doctor examines him carefully and says, "Well, I am
sorry to report that your problem is purely physical. There is
nothing psychological or psychosomatic about it. Your organ
cannot function, that's all." "Does it mean that nothing can be
done about it, doctor?" asks the dejected patient. "Yes, that's
correct - that is, for all practical purposes," says the doctor.
"What do you mean? Please tell me!" "Well," says the doctor,
"I'm not sure I should be even telling you about it. There is a
chance to improve your condition but it is so unfeasible that it
would probably have been better for you not to know about it."
"Please, doctor," pleads the patient. "All right. If we could
transplant the trunk of a two-month-old African elephant
instead of your organ, there would be a good chance of complete
recovery for you." "No problem," exclaims the patient. "My
brother-in-law serves in the embassy in Africa - he will get it for
me." In a few weeks, they get the trunk and make the transplant.
Several months later the doctor runs into the patient in a
restaurant. "How are you feeling?" he asks. "I understand that
things must be going well since I haven't seen you for a while.
But I'm curious, is everything absolutely all right?" "Terrific,
doctor," exclaims the patient. "You saved my life!" "No
problems, no side effects?" "No, nothing - that is, for all practical
purposes?" "How do you mean, for all practical purposes?"
"Well, doctor, it is so unimportant that it is not worth mentioning,
but sometimes when we go visiting and are sitting at the coffee
table having coffee it will grab a piece of sugar from the sugar
pot." (Soviet, 1960's)
(284) Shwartz goes to Dr. Cohen and complains about his impotence.
"How long ago did it begin, Abie," the doctor asks. "Since the
last rosh hashona, doctor," says Shwartz. "Sara is getting
restless. I have bought her a diamond ring to calm her down and
a new mink coat. Please do something before I'm ruined." The
doctor examines him carefully and says, "Well, Abie, I am sorry
to report that your problem is purely physical. There is nothing
psychological-shmychological about it. Your putz cannot
function, kaput\" "Does it mean that nothing can be done about
it, doctor?" asks Shwartz dejectedly. "Yes, that's correct - that
is, for all practical purposes," says the doctor. "What do you

ETHNIC HUMOR
209
mean? Please tell me!" "Well," says Dr. Cohen. "I'm not sure
I should be even telling you about it. There is a chance to improve
your condition but it is so unfeasible that probably it would have
been better for you not to know about it." "Since when doctors
have become rabbis?" shouts Shwartzt "Did they teach you the
Talmud in Medical School? Don't give me all this shmaltz! Just
tell me what to do!" "All right. If we could transplant the trunk
of a two-month-old African elephant instead of your putz, there
would be a good chance of complete recovery for you. But where
would a Yid like you get an elephant trunk?" "No problem,"
exclaims the patient. "My brother-in-law runs a concession in
our embassy in Kenia - he will get it for me." in a few weeks,
they get the trunk and make the transplant. A few months later
the doctor runs into the patient in the temple. "How are you
feeling, Abie?" he asks. "I understand that things must be going
well since I haven't seen you for a while, but I'm a curious
schmuck, is everything absolutely all right?" "Terrific, doctor,"
exclaims Shwartz. "You saved my life, and you gave my Sarele
her mensch back!" "No problems, no side effects?" "No, nothing
- that is, for all practical purposes." "How do you mean, for all
practical purposes?" "Well, doctor, it is so unimportant that it
is not worth mentioning, but sometimes when we go visiting
Sara's mother in Miami Beach and we are sitting at the coffee
table having coffee it would grab a piece of my mother-in-law's
strudel from the table."
The truly Jewish humor is discussed briefly in the next section.
9. JEWISH HUMOR
Jewish humor includes all the ethnic jokes which have the Jews for the
targeted ethnic group and which are based on a specific ethnic script. The
Jewish joke has to be truly ethnic in the sense of satisfying the criterion of
being based on an ethnic script as well as on the collectivity and interchan-
geability criteria, as specified in the previous section.
It follows immediately that, just as in the case of the parody in (284), it
does not suffice for a joke to mention Jews or things Jewish in order for it
to count as a truly Jewish joke. Thus, jokes (230), (282), (397-400), A202,
and A214, all of them having some Jewish reference points, do not satisfy

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any of the three membership criteria for ethnic humor. Many Jewish joke
books, however, do contain similar jokes and list them as Jewish for the
reasons mentioned in the previous section as well, perhaps, as out of the
collectors' pride in listing as many examples as possible.
Jewish humor is recognized as a very vast class of humor, and there are
numerous religious, social, political, historical, etc., reasons for that. What
it means from the point of view of the script-based theory of humor is that
there is a large number of productive specific ethnic scripts targeted at the
Jews. These scripts can be divided into two groups on the basis of their
availability to a certain originating group.
Some ethnic scripts about the Jews are available to other ethnic groups
and may form the basis of anti-Jewish, anti-Semitic humor. These scripts
are usually limited to the standard ethnic scripts of STINGINESS (285-86)
and CUNNINGNESS (doubled up, as it were, in (287)) (cf. (254-57)),
reinforced perhaps by the script of SMARTNESS, somewhat complicated
by COWARDICE in (288) (see also (239-40)).
(285) A Jewish tycoon disappointed the waiter who served him in a
luxurious restaurant by leaving him a more than moderate tip.
"If you forgive my saying so, sir," said the waiter, "your own
daughter is different. She comes here quite often, and we all love
to serve her because she tips very well." "She has a rich father,"
retorted the tycoon. "Mine was a street peddler." (International,
20th century)
(286) During the wartime shortages an acquaintance came up to
Rabinowitz, sniffed the air, and asked, "Listen, Rabinowitz, do
you ever change socks?" "What do you mean, change?" asked
the Jew. "I only trade socks for sugar." (Soviet, 1941)
(287) A Jew was stopped for jaywalking on a Moscow street. He ran,
and the policeman chased him. The Jew rushed into an
apartment block where friends of his lived and up the stairs. In the
apartment, he found the wife of his friend in bed, and the friend
was not at home. The Jew jumped into the bed, and the police
knocked on the door right after that. "I could not be jaywalking,"
he said when charged. "I have been in bed with my wife all the
time." "How do we know she's your wife?" "Look, I"m kissing
her," said the Jew. "Everybody can kiss," objected the
policeman. "All right," said the Jew and started making love to the
woman. When the police left, the woman exclaimed, "How
could you do it to your friend's wife?" "I'm truly sorry," said the

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Jew, "but you didn't want me to be caught lying to the
authorities, did you?" (Soviet, 1940's)
(288) Two Jews challenged each other to a duel and each asked a
non-Jewish friend to serve as their seconds. On the next
morning, only the seconds showed up in the selected spot. Both
had sealed notes from their Jewish friends. The first one said,
"Since my second is a much more respectable person, I have to
yield the honor of fighting you to him. Please accept my regrets."
The second note read, "May be late because of an emergency in
the store. Please start without me." (German, 19th century)
In some cases, these basic scripts are supplemented by the script of
physical UNCLEANLINESS (286), which is typical of all xenophobic
humor.
Jewish humor is often referred to and sometimes applauded as
"self-disparaging" (see Chapter 1, Section 4; cf. Leacock, 1937, 57, and Mindess,
1971,49). What it means in terms of script analysis is that virtually the same
ethnic scripts which are used in anti-Jewish jokes by other ethnic groups are
used by the Jews about themselves. This includes the standard scripts of
CUNNINGNESS and SMARTNESS but excludes DUMBNESS and, of
course, UNCLEANLINESS. Naturally, the tone of the jokes changes
considerably when they are no longer intended anti-Semitically, but the main
semantic property may remain identical. (289), (290), and (291) are typically
Jewish jokes based on the scripts of Jewish STINGINESS, CUNNING
and SMARTNESS, respectively:
(289) Schecter rented space at one of those outdoor California swap
meets. A woman customer picked up a broken fork and asked,
"How much?" "A penny," said Schecter. "A penny!" grumbled
the woman. "That's too much!" "So make me an offer." (Wilde,
1974, 49)
(290) Shapiro heard of a good private family physician and called to
make appointments for the entire family. He was told that the
doctor charged the lump sum of 20 rubles for the complete
physicals for the entire family but all the tests were 3 rubles each
for each person. On the next morning, he brought over one urine
sample and promised to deliver the other two separately. That
evening he came back from work in an excellent mood. "You
know, Manechka," he said, "you, and I, and Abrasha - we all
have perfect urine. And I only paid them 3 rubles." (Soviet,
1940's)

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(291) Scientists concluded that the icecap was going to melt and the
whole world would be flooded within six months. When the news
broke, religious leaders went into deep conference. The
Protestant hierarchy released a statement: "Because of the impending
disaster Protestants will go to church and pray for two hours
every day." Then the Catholics made an announcement:
"Because of the coming deluge, Catholics will make every other
day - all day - a day of prayer for the next six months!" Rabbis
from all over the land convened, then they too issued a message
to the world: "Because the whole world will be flooded in six
months, Jews will learn to live underwater!" (Wilde, 1974, 103)
One difference which is quite noticeable here is that the scripts are not
taken absolutely seriously. Semantically, it is expressed in that in each of the
jokes additional scripts are evoked by the text which somewhat contradict
the ethnic script supporting the main opposition. Thus, in (289) there can
be no cheaper price than one penny; in (290) the Jew got himself a dubious
bargain; and in (291) it will turn out that humans (even Jews) cannot live
underwater physically. In other words, when the Jews tell jokes about
themselves, STINGINESS becomes absurd and unreal, CUNNINGNESS
unsuccessful, and SMARTNESS exaggerated.
However, what makes Jewish humor originating with the Jews themselves
even more distinct from anti-Semitic humor is the existence of a large
number of additional ethnic scripts about the Jews which are simply not
available to other ethnic groups.
Probably the most important script of all is that of ANTI-SEMITISM
itself. According to the script, the Jews are discriminated against because
they are Jews; they are denied access to jobs and various privileges, facilities
and commodities. (292) and (293) are typical examples, with the latter being
slightly more allusive to the political situation than the former.
(292) A Soviet Jew comes to the Head of Personnel of a large plant
and applies for an engineering job. The official looks at his
credentials, sees that the Jew is qualified for the job but does not
want to hire him. "Well, Comrade Shapiro," he says, "you have
excellent qualifications for the job, but you see, we need
somebody who can also do some bookkeeping for us." "No problem,"
says the applicant. "Besides my engineering degree, I picked up
a CPA certificate." "Fine, fine," says the Personnel Head. "But
we also need somebody who can walk the tight rope. You see,

ETHNIC HUMOR
213
some parts of our old shops are not accessible in any other way."
"Will my five years of apprenticeship in the Moscow State
Circus help?" asks the Jew pleasantly. "Of course, this is very
good!" the bureaucrat says hastily and thinks hard. "But we
often have visitors from the Turkeman Republic..." "I speak
Turkeman fluently," interrupts the Jew, "and also Uzbek,
Kazakh and Kirgiz." "Get out of here, you dirty kike!" yells the
Personnel Head. (Soviet, 1950's)
(293) Two Jews are in a train compartment, and the one on the upper
berth hears a moan from the lower berth. "Are you not well,
Chaim?" he asks. "Who is well nowadays, though?" Chaim does
not answer but in a little while there is another moan. "Come on,
Chaim," says the other, "Don't take it to heart so. All of us are
suffering, aren't we?" The next morning he discovers that Chaim
is dead. "Ah," he says, "This is how you were unwell. I thought
you were unwell that way." (Soviet, 1950's)
On the other hand, the same script can be used ironically and self-depre-
catorily as in (293).
(294) Two Jews meet on the street. One of them looks very sad; the
other looks at him understanding^ and asks, "Still job hunting?"
A nod. "Just got another rejection?" Another nod.
"Anti-Semitism, as usual?" A very enthusiastic nod. "What kind of job was
it?" "R-r-rad-d-d-io an-n-nouncer." (Soviet, 1960's)
The extreme expression of ANTI-SEMITISM is, of course, the
POGROM, and there are jokes based on the script of POGROM (295), but
even it can be reversed and made fun of (296) - see also (201):
(295) A few months after the end of World War I, the premier of
Poland had a meeting with President Woodrow Wilson. "If you
don't meet our nation's demands at the peace conference,"
warned the premier, "I foresee great troubles ahead. The Polish
people will be very angry, and they"ll go out and massacre the
Jews." "And if your demands are met?" asked Wilson. "In that
case," responded the premier, "my people will be delighted.
They'll go out in the streets and get drunk - and then they'll
massacre the Jews." (Novak and Waldoks, 1981, 60)
(296) In a small town in Poland, the mob broke into the house of a Jew.
Living with him were his wife, three daughters, two sons, and his
aged mother. "We're gonna beat up all the men and rape all the

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women!" shouted the leader. "Wait," pleaded the Jew. "You can
wallop me and my sons, abuse my wife and daughters, but please
sir, I beg you... don't rape my mother! She's seventy-five years
old!" "Shut up!" yelled the old woman. "A pogrom is a pogrom!"
(Russian, 1900's - cf. Wilde, 1974, 80)
The standard cunning and smart ethnic scripts about the Jews are
extended and elaborated considerably in Jewish jokes about themselves.
The scripts develop into a sophisticated script of JEWISH LOGIC,
immediately related to the Talmud and talmudic scholarship and sophistry. Jokes
in which the script is evoked seriously and positively are rather rare - (297)
is one of the best known examples, but jokes in which this logic runs aground
and the rational approach to life is made fun of abound ((298-300) - cf. also
(349)).
(297) After months of negotiation, a Jewish scholar from Odessa was
granted permission to visit Moscow. He boarded the train and
found an empty seat. At the next stop a young man got on and
sat next to him. The scholar looked at the young man and
thought: This fellow doesn't look like a peasant, and if he isn't
a peasant, he probably comes from this district. If he comes from
this district, he must be Jewish because this is, after all, a Jewish
district. On the other hand, if he is a Jew, where could he be
going? I'm the only one in the district who has permission to
travel to Moscow. Wait -just outside Moscow ther^ is a village
called Samvet, and you don't need special permission to go
there. But why would he be going to Samvet? He's probably
going to visit somebody there, but how many Jewish families are
there in Samvet? Only two - the Bernsteins and the Steinbergs.
The Bernsteins are a terrible family, so he must be visiting the
Steinbergs. But why is he going? The Steinbergs have only girls,
so maybe he's their son-in-law. But if he is, which daughter did
he marry? Sarah married that nice lawyer from Budapest and
Esther married a businessman from Zhadomir, so it must be
Sarah's husband. Which means that his name is Alexander
Cohen, if I'm not mistaken. But if he comes from Budapest, with
all the anti-Semitism they have there, he must have changed his
name. What's the Hungarian equivalent of Cohen? Kovacs. But
if he changed his name, he must have some special status. What
could it be? A doctorate from the university. At this point the

ETHNIC HUMOR
215
scholar turned to the young man and said, "How do you do, Dr.
Kovacs?" "Very well, thank you, sir," answered the startled
passenger. "But how is it that you know my name?" "Oh,"
replied the scholar, "it was obvious." (Novak and Waldoks,
1981, 2)
(298) Two rival businessmen meet in the Warsaw train station.
"Where are you going?" says the first man. "To Minsk," says the
second. "To Minsk, eh? What a nerve you have! I know you're
telling me you're going to Minsk because you want me to think
that you're really going to Pinsk. But it so happens that I know
you really are going to Minsk. So why are you lying to meV
(Novak and Waldoks, 1981, 2 - a favorite joke of Freud's, with
Warsaw and Krakow for Minsk and Pinsk, it is analyzed
psychologically in (1905, 161))
(299) A woman on a train walked up to a distinguished-looking
gentleman across the aisle. "Excuse me," she said, "but are you
Jewish?" "No," replied the man. A few minutes later the woman
returned. "Excuse me," she said again, "but are you sure you're
not Jewish?" "I'm sure," replied the man. ...A few minutes later
she approached him a third time. "Are you absolutely sure you're
not Jewish?" she asked. "All right, all right," the man said. "You
win. I'm Jewish." "That's funny," said the woman. "You don't
look Jewish." (Novak and Waldoks, 1981, 7)
(300) Somebody once asked Motke Chabad, the legendary wit: "Tell
me, Motke, you're a smart fellow. Why is kugel called kugeV"
Motke lost no time in responding: "What kind of silly question
is that? It's sweet like kugel, isn't it? It's thick like kugel, isn't it?
And it tastes like kugel, doesn't it? So why shouldn't it be called
kugeVr (Novak and Waldoks, 1981, 7)
The self-deprecatory use of the script of Jewish logic is taken a step further
to become an even more specific script, that of the WISE FOOL. The
script occurs outside of Jewish humor as well (cf., for instance, (19)) but in
Jewish humor it is usually populated by a limited number of heroes, and the
legendary Hershele (301) and the wise men of Chelm (302) are the best
known of them. This variation of the script of JEWISH LOGIC tends to
demonstrate that there is some logic in every stupid thing and thought, rather
than showing that logic can lead to stupid things or thoughts as illustrated
by (298-300), but the opposition of logical vs. stupid, which is so prominent
in all Jewish humor, remains the same.

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(301) On the day after the fast of Tisha B'av, the rabbi sent for
Hershele. "My disciples have told me that you were seen eating
yesterday, the day of the fast. Is it true that you have committed
so grave a sin?" "Let me explain what happened," said Hershele.
"As I was leaving the synagogue after the morning prayers, I
walked along the river where the poor women do their laundry.
One of the women remarked that everybody in town was fasting
today. 'Is that so?' said her friend. 'Well, I wish I had a hundred
rubles for every Jew who will eat today!' And to make sure that
this poor woman would have at least a hundred rubles, I decided
that I should break the fast." (Novak and Waldoks, 1981, 27)
(302) One of the sages of Chelm was explaining to his friend that with
the miracle of the steam locomotive, a person could leave Chelm
at noon and be in Warsaw at midnight. His friend was
unimpressed: "What on earth would I do in Warsaw in the middle of
the night?" (Novak and Waldoks, 1981, 24)
Another step is sometimes made in the direction of further sophistication
and the simple logic of right vs. wrong or true vs. false is abandoned for what,
in logic, is called multi-valued, modal, or fuzzy logics. The script of
SOPHISTICATED LOGIC is best illustrated by this famous example
(303):
(303) ...Two litigants... come before the rabbi. After hearing the first
testimony, the rabbi says, "It seems that you are right." But
after the second man speaks, the rabbi says, "It seems that you
are right too." "How can this be?" says the rabbi's wife, who has
been listening to the arguments. "How can both of these men be
right?" "Hm," says the rabbi. "You're right too." (Novak and
Waldoks, 1981, 57)
Still|another expression of Jewish logic! is the NO-NONSENSE,
IRREVERENT ATTITUDE to anything, no matter how great or famous, if it
contradicts the Jewish common sense, no matter how pedestrian or trivial.
(304) is another famous joke illustrating this:
(304) Little Sammy tells his father about the great scientist and his
theory of relativity. "Oh, yes?" says the grandfather. "And what
does this theory have to say?"... "Relativity is like this: if a man
sits for an hour with a pretty girl, it feels like a minute. But if he
sits on a hot stove for a minute, it feels like an hour"... Grandpa
is silent, and slowly shakes his head. "Sammy," he says softly,

ETHNIC HUMOR
217
"from this your Einstein makes a living?" (Novak and Waldoks,
1981, 36)
An equally rich and complicated network of scripts used in Jewish
humor concerns the Jewish woman.
As a Yiddische MOMMA, she is also NO-NONSENSE and sees through
things simply and clearly (305); she is doting on her son (306) and expects
an equally all-devouring devotion on his part (307) while pretending to be
self-effacing (308); she is very ambitious for her children (or their children)
(309); she is fanatic about her children eating well (310); she is demanding
(7) and nagging (311):
(305) An elderly woman climbed three flights of stairs, opened a
carved mahogany door and walked into an exotically furnished
reception room. A gong sounded and out of a cloud of incense
appeared a beautiful Oriental brunette. "Do you," she said
softly, "wish to meet with His Omnipotence, the wise,
all-knowing, all-seeing guru, Maharishi Nam?" "Yeah," said the gray-
haired woman. "Tell Sheldon his mother is here from the
Bronx." (Wilde, 1974, 79)
(306) [After having] been gone more than a year, [Ira] telephoned
home. "Hello, Ma, how are you?" "Just fine, son. When're you
coming home? I'll fix you some chopped liver and chicken soup
and a beautiful pot roast!" "I'm still pretty far away!" "Oh, son,"
cried the desperate woman. "Just come home and I'll fix you
your favorite - oatmeal cookies!" "I don't like oatmeal cookies!"
said the boy. "You don't?" asked the woman. "Say," said Ira,
"is this Century 5-7682?" "No!" "Then I must have the wrong
number!" "Does that mean you're not coming?" asked the
woman. (Wilde, 1974, 37)
(307) The Jewish boy comes home from school and says, "Ma, our
psychologist says I have the Oedipus complex!" "Never mind,"
says the mother stroking the boy's head. "The important thing
is that you love your mother!" (Soviet, 1970's)
(308) How many Jewish mothers does it take to change a light bulb?
None. She won't change the light bulb. She will say, "Never
mind me. I will sit in the dark!" (American, 1970's - cf. (236))
(309) A proud Jewish grandmother is asked how old her two
grandsons were. "Well, the doctor is five," she replies, "and the
engineer will be two next month." (Soviet, 1930's)

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(310) ...A hit man for... a Jewish gang... was caught in a crossfire
during a gang war. Severely wounded, he managed to escape and
crawl the three blocks to his mother's house. Barely able to climb
the stairs, he used all his strength to bang on the door. "Mama,'
he cried," it's me, Sammy. I'm hurt bad!' "Sit down and eat,"
his mother said. "Later we'll talk." (Novak and Waldoks, 1981,
71)
(311) "What do we have for breakfast, Ma?" asked Sammy. "You can
have the kugel or you can have the tzimes." "Great!" said
Sammy. "I'll have some times." "And what do you have against
my kugel, may I ask?" said his mother indignantly. (Russian,
1910's)
As a JEWISH WIFE, she is unenthusiastic about sex (312) or as mercenary
(313) as her stingy husband is scripted to be, or both (314):
(312) While Mr. and Mrs. Blumstein were gaping at the gorilla in the
cage, the huge animal became sexually aroused, reached through
the bars, pulled Mrs. Blumstein into the cage and began ripping
off her clothes. "What should I do?" she screamed hysterically
to her husband. "Do what you do with me," replied Mr.
Blumstein. "Tell him you got a headache." (American, 1940's -
cf. Wilde, 1974, 22)
(313) "Whatsa matter, Harry?" "Ah, my wife is allergic to fur. Every
time she sees another woman wearing a mink coat - she gets
sick!" (Wilde, 1974,31)
(314) A middle-aged Jewish man became bored with his sex life. "You
know that I love you as I always have," he told his wife one night,
"but couldn't we think of something more exciting when we
make love? Could we have fantasies, for instance? Could you
pretend that you are a passionate flamenco dancer?" "Sure,"
said the wife, "do you want me to put my dentures back on and
bite you?" (Soviet, 1960's)
The Jewish girl is a JAP, JEWISH AMERICAN PRINCESS, always
spoilt by her father rather than her mother (315), and she is not wildly sexy,
either (316):
(315) How many Jewish American Princesses does it take to replace
the light bulb? Two - one to pour out the Tab, the other to call
daddy. (Novak and Waldoks, 1981, 126)
(316) What is the difference between a Jewish American Princess and
Russia? Russia sucks! (American, 1980's)

ETHNIC HUMOR
219
Even the very young Jewish girl is not left out - according to an available
script, she develops some of her mother's qualities very early (317):
(317) A nine-year-old Jewish girl comes back from school and says,
"I need a national costume. They told us to come to the ball on
Sunday in our national costumes." Her father says, "Just listen
to her! She's not yet ten, and she already demands a mink coat!"
(Soviet, 1960's)
Actually, (317) is, of course, based on a different script, that of the Jewish
PREOCCUPATION WITH MONEY. This "internal" version of the stingy
script is represented in a large variety of jokes about Jewish men or women,
without much discrimination, and (318) is one of the classic examples:
(318) An old Jew is dying. From his deathbed, he asks his wife, who
is holding his hand, "Is Abrasha here?" "Of course, he is." "And
Menashke?" "Yes." "And Estherke?" "Honey, we"re all here."
"And even the little Motele?" "Even the little Motele." "But
then, who's minding the store?" (Russian, 19th century)
It is interesting to note that the scripts involving the Jewish woman as the
butt of self-targeted Jewish jokes are more numerous and richer than those
involving the Jewish man. The latter scripts usually refer to the Jews as an
ethnic group, without any sex descrimination. One reason for that is, of
course, the usual sexism, which, in general, leads to the use of man for
human. Another reason is the somewhat less usual sexism: Jewish jokes are
if not much more popular among the Jewish men than among the Jewish
women, then at least told more frequently by men to other men, and under
these circumstances, the Jewish woman is a very convenient target. If there
are any specific ethnic scripts involving the Jewish men, marked for the male
sex as it were, rather than for being generally the Jews, they are much
narrower and less frequently used than the female scripts: hasty thinking,
long noses, and worrying too much should perhaps be listed among the male
scripts.
The last popular and productive set of ethnic scripts used in Jewish humor
by the Jews is the JEWISH VS. GOYISH script. On the face of it, the script
is rather xenophobic: according to it, all things Jewish are good and all things
non-Jewish are not good. As many other specific scripts it is actually an
opposed pair of scripts, and the opposition is of the good/bad type (144i).
In case of the rare serious applications of the script, the implied hostility is,
of course, of the defensive nature, and the script is related to, and in some
cases, can be thought of, as the exact reverse of the ANTI-SEMITISM

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script. In most cases, however, there is a great deal of self-deprecation
involved in the jokes based on that script, and the message, easily calculated
semantically, is something like "they are not so dumb and we are not so
great!" (319-322) illustrate the use of the JEWISH/GOYISH script in the
descending order of seriousness and hostility:
(319) "I told my son to marry a shiksa. If he marries a nice Jewish girl
and she becomes pregnant, he will worry like hell about her
health. And then she will develop weight problems, and liver
problems, and heart problems..." "Okay, but won't a non-Jewish
wife develop exactly the same kind of problems?" "Of course,
but who cares?" (Soviet, 1930's)
(320) Mendelson is dying. "Call the priest," he says to his wife, "and
tell him I want to convert." "But, Max, you've been an Orthodox
Jew all your life. What are you talking about, you want to
convert?" "Better one of them should die than one of us."
(Novak and Waldoks, 1981, 96)
(321) Why did God make goyiml Somebody has to buy retail. (Novak
and Waldoks, 1981, 92)
(322) An Orthodox Jew converts to Catholicism and is invited to
preach the Sunday sermon. He stands up proudly and begins:
"Fellow goyim..r (Novak and Waldoks, 1981, 94)
Many Jewish jokes told by the Jews themselves are immediately related
to the political situation, especially in the case of "confrontation" jokes, such
as the ones based on the anti-Semitic and anti-Gentile scripts. Their political
aspect is discussed in Chapter 7.
Jewish humor as a whole is an excellent illustration of the basic criterion
for the ethnic nature of a joke mentioned in Section 8: take away the specific
ethnic script/opposition on which the joke is based and the joke virtually
disappears. If it does not, it is not ethnic, or in this case, not Jewish, and
unfortunately, many examples of pseudo-Jewish jokes can be found in the
quoted and other joke books. Novak and Waldoks (1981) should be
commended for sinning much less in this respect than many others, and
Spalding (1978) is on the other pole of the scale, largely because he goes for
the quantity, and, as a result, the number of authentically Jewish jokes in
his collection is rather limited.

ETHNIC HUMOR
221
It should be noted in conclusion that the specific ethnic scripts, which
originally are not included in the original semantic competence of the native
speaker, become part of this competence after they have been acquired.
Thus, for instance, the acquisition of the Jewish script of the YIDDISCHE
MOMMA establishes a semantic link between the nodes for mother and
bossy which may be very weak or completely absent prior to the acquisition
of this particular script.

CHAPTER SEVEN
POLITICAL HUMOR
INTRODUCTION
Political humor is targeted at political leaders, professional politicians, or
elected representatives as well as at political institutions, groups, and parties.
In addition, political ideas and the life of entire societies under a political
regime can be aimed at in political jokes.
The structure of political humor is generally simpler than that of sexual
or ethnic humor. The typical message of a political joke is that a particular
leader or political figure, a political group, its ideas, or the entire way of life
are not what they are supposed or purported to be. The opposition between
the script for what they are supposed to be and the script for what they
actually are is the opposition which forms the joke. Usually, the former script
presents the target as 'good,' or proper, and the latter script sees it as 'bad,'
or improper, in a certain way.
The most frequent complication in a political joke is an allusion to a
particular event, slogan, mannerism, trait, etc. For this reason, some political
humor tends to be accessible only to the contemporaries living in a certain
country and often in a certain region or city - all the others are likely not
to have internalized the script(s) to which the allusion is made, and the joke
will be lost on them. Many jokes in this category, however, are freely
interchangeable from one country to another and from one epoch to another.
There are two basic classes of political jokes. The first class denigrates
a person, a group, an idea, or the whole society. The second class is usually
targeted at a political regime as a whole and contains a reference to an event
or series of events which are not widely publicised, and quite often actively
suppressed by the regime. The first class will be referred to here as the
denigration jokes and the second class as the exposure jokes - both are mere
convenience terms because, in fact, some exposure may actually occur in a
denigration joke, and the purpose of all exposure is usually denigration. The
exposure jokes are normally substantially more allusive than the denigration
jokes.
The first three sections of the chapter deal with three types of political
denigration humor, each depending on a different kind of target. The next
222

POLITICAL HUMOR
223
four sections introduce four different types of political exposure humor, each
depending on a different kind of exposed material. The last section uses the
Soviet political humor as a representative example of all the postulated types
of political humor.
1. DENIGRATION OF A POLITICAL FIGURE
Jokes DENIGRATING A POLITICAL FIGURE constitute the most
popular and universal type of political humor, which is based on a simple
opposition between a script and its direct negation (cf. Chapter 4, Section
4). The script is that a certain person occupying a political post is good,
suitable, proper for the job, and the negation is, of course, that it is not the
case. Basically, therefore, the involved opposition is of the good/bad type
(144i). However, there are various ways to illustrate the unsuitability of a
politician for the job and some of them may involve other types of script
oppositeness as well.
The ignorance or incompetence of a politician is a very popular ground
for considering him or her bad for the job, and the involved opposition is,
of course, between the script of a competent and knowledgeable leader and
its negation. (323) is another example in a long series of largely primitive
jokes targeted at an Israeli minister and based primarily on his alleged
unfamiliarity with either English or other foreign-based terms (cf. (26iii) and
A214):
(323) Dudu Levi comes back from an African safari. "How was it,
Dudu?" he is asked by his associates. "Fantastic," he says. "Did
you see a lot of different animals?" "We saw many animals," he
answers, "but they were all of one kind. They were all dangue-
ruses." "There are no such animals, Dudu. Why did you decide
that they were all that?" "Oh, it was written all over the place.
It was in English. It said: 'AH animals are dangerous
[pronounced "dunguerus" by an ignorant Hebrew speaker].'" (Israeli,
1970's)
(324) is a similarly organized joke about Ronald Reagan:
(324) President Reagan is asked about his opinion on foreign affairs.
He replies, "Personally, I do not like foreign affairs. I feel that
if you have to have an affair, you must have it right here, in
America." (Rich Little's routine, 1981)
(325) is another "ignorant" joke aimed at a different political figure. (152)

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combines the charge of ignorance with an allusion to a particular trait,
namely the Reagans' alleged luxirious lifestyle and their lack of
understanding of poverty. In joke (256), a governor is denigrated by being made a fool
of, and so is Lenin in joke (272): he is made fool of in a somewhat
roundabout way based on an ethnic slur - he is described as very clever by
an ethnic group depicted as primitive.
The leader is also supposed to be a person of good moral character and
personal integrity, a kind and compassionate person. Jokes (5) and (24i)
present political and public figures as corrupt. (326) contradicts the image
of Lenin as "the most humane of all human beings" imposed on the Soviet
society:
(325) The Austro-Hungarian Emperor Franz Joseph goes hunting. He
fires on an eagle and misses as usual. However, again as usual,
the faithful entourage produce the bird and congratulate His
Majesty on his marksmanship. "But this is not an eagle,"
exclaims the Emperor. "The real eagle has two heads." (Central
European, 1900's)
(326) The secretary calls Lenin: "Vladimir Ilyich, Comrade Bonch-
Bruyevich is on the phone. He says he is starving and needs
help." "What?" exclaims Lenin. "Comrade Bonch-Bruyevich, a
prominent revolutionary leader, is starving? How could it
happen? Who is responsible? How come Comrade
Bonch-Bruyevich did not face the firing squad long ago?" (Soviet, 1960's)
(327) What does the Adlai Stevenson Doll do? You wind it up, and
it promptly apologizes for our policies. (American, 1950's)
In a somewhat ironic contradiction to (326), joke (327) denigrates an
American political figure as being too humane, too soft, too liberal.
A popular way to denigrate a political figure is by using the sexual/non-
sexual opposition (144iii). The political figure is not supposed to be thought
of in sexual terms, and any attempt to present him or her as functioning in
the capacity of a (potential) sexual partner is viewed as degrading and
compromising (cf. Schutz, 1977, 67) and disqualifies the politician from the
job, as it were. (When, in modern times, some politicians manage to get away
with being viewed as a sexual human being, for instance by having notorious
and/or improper sex lives, e.g., Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau of Canada
after the failure of his marriage or former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
before his marriage, no sexual jokes about them exist.) Jokes (170) and (206)
degrade Queen Elizabeth and the Pope, respectively. Chastushkas (218iii-iv)

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225
and (219iii) degrade Brezhnev, Hitler, and Lenin, respectively. Joke (256)
degrades a governor, on top of his being made fool of as noted above, by
evoking the sexual script EXPOSURE. (328) gets at Franz Joseph again by
insinuating that his father was a cuckold and he himself a bastard. In (329),
Golda Meir is rather lovingly degraded on the basis of an allusion to her
manly qualities:
(328) Franz Joseph notices a man who resembles himself strikingly.
"Was your mother at some time in service at the palace?" the
emperor asks. "No, Sire," is the answer, "but my father was!"
(Central European, 1900's)
(329) Why does Golda never wear mini-skirts? For fear that
everybody will notice her balls. (Israeli, 1960's)
In many political jokes, politicians are denigrated by being wished dead.
The involved opposition is then between the script according to which the
leader is beloved, popular, and is wished a long and prosperous life for the
benefit of his or her people, and the negation of such a script. (330) and (331)
are typical examples targeted at Mussolini and a former Israeli minister of
finance, respectively:
(330) Two well-known Italians died in 1837: Marconi, the inventor of
wireless telegraphy, and Musco, a famous Sicilian actor. "Thank
God," said the Italians, "it's the turn of the 'MY at last."
(Larsen, 1980, 55)
(331) Pinkhas Sapir's chauffeur-driven limousine runs over a dog
which rushed under the wheels from the yard of a house. "Stop
the car," says the minister to his driver, "go inside, apologize to
the owners, and ask them what form of restitution they are
willing to accept." The driver goes in and does not come back
until an hour and a half later. "What happened?" fumes Sapir.
"Did you forget that I was waiting? Didn't you know that I had
an important appointment." "I am terribly sorry, sir," says the
driver. "There was nothing I could do. I went in and said, 'I am
Pinkhas Sapir's driver. I ran over the dog,' and they just
wouldn't listen to anything else. They started to congratulate me
and to embrace me and kiss me, they gave me wine and cookies,
asked for my autographs, took pictures with me, and they
wouldn't let me go." (Israeli, 1970's)
The death/life type of script oppositness (144ii) used in the examples

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above as well as in (332) is somewhat weakened in (333), which is one of
the best known political jokes aiming at different unpopular political figures
in various countries and at various (recent) times:
(332) Hitler talkes a walk in the woods and falls into a lake. A young
boy pulls him out. Hitler tells him to ask for anything he wants
in return for having saved his life. "Oh yes," says the boy. "May
I ask you not to breathe a word about this to anybody?" "But
why?" asks Hitler. "You would be made famous for this heroic
exploit." "This is what I am afraid of, sir," says the boy. "If I
become famous, my father will hear about it also, and he will
wring my neck right away!" (German, 1930's)
(333) A new Israeli stamp was issued with the face of Pinkhas Sapir
on it. In a short while, the Post Office received a large number
of complaints about the fact that the stamp wouldn't stick to the
envelope. An inspector was sent to investigate. Pretending to be
an ordinary customer, he bought one of the offending stamps,
spat on it and stuck it to the envelope without any difficulty.
"What's the matter with everybody?" he asked the clerk. "The
stamp seems to be perfectly normal." "Not really, sir," answered
the clerk. "You see, nobody spits on the back side." (Israeli,
1970's)
It is very important for a political figure to be well known, popular and
immediately recognized, so another popular way to denigrate him is to
present him as an unknown, a "John who?" as it were. A capital and
dangerous joke of this kind was originated by a German comedian at the
Nazi times (334). A very popular joke in (335) is targeted at the Pope in this
Soviet version.
(334) "Heil who? I keep forgetting the name." (German, 1930's)
(335) Rabinowitz went to Rome and got an audience with the Pope.
They had a pleasant chat, and then the Pope went out to the
balcony to greet the crowd on the square. Rabinowitz
accompanied him. "That's Rabinowitz over there," shouted the crowd.
"But who is it with him?" (Soviet, 1950's)
No matter what the attacked trait of the targeted political leader is, he or
she is never attacked as a private person but rather as a public figure who
is supposed not to have the alleged feature(s) and to have the exactly
opposite feature(s).

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227
2. DENIGRATION OF A POLITICAL BROUP OR INSTUTION
When a WHOLE POLITICAL GROUP OR INSTITUTION is
DENIGRATED in a political joke, the joke is usually about a member or members
of that group or institution. The people mentioned in such jokes are even
further stripped of their private identities than the leaders or prominent
politicians in the first type of political humor analyzed above. In fact, the
people mentioned in the second type of political humor discussed here are
devoid of their individualities. Thus, in (336)-(337), the hero of each joke is
an arbitrary, any, representative of the Gestapo, the Russian liberals or
populists, and American ecologists, not quite respectively:
(336) "I will let you go free," says the Gestapo man who is very proud
of his well-made glass eye, "if you can tell me which of my eyes
is artificial." The [prisoner] replies without hesitation, "The right
one!" "And how did you find out?" "Very easily. That eye seems
to show a trace of human feeling." (Larsen, 1980, 2)
(337) How do you recognize a Russian liberal? Very easily. He has a
Negro butler who takes your coat in the hall. (Russian, 1890's)
(338) How do you recognize a nature-loving ecologically-minded
person? Very easily. His fifth-generation digital computer is
energized by a wood stove.
(339) "Last night I went out," explains a Russian populist, "and saw
this very young prostitute on the corner. She was lightly and
poorly dressed - and it was cold. She was so young, so hungry.
She must have eaten nothing for days, you know; her arms were
so thin and so cold, and her legs were so thin and so very cold
that I really could not hold back my tears while I was fucking
her." (Russian, 1890's)
The semantic structure of this type of joke is typically more complex than
that of the previous type. There, the more or less standard message could
be conveyed in a limited number of ways. Even when a joke denigrating a
particular politician is allusive one can rather easily reconstruct the
information alluded to on the basis of one's understanding of what it is the joke is
trying to achieve. In this second type of political joke the message is also
quite often that the group or institution is not what it purports to be but the
notion of what it wants to pass for may be as diverse as the nature and
purpose of the group or institution itself.
Thus, to appreciate (336), the hearer must know that the Gestapo was the

228 CHAPTER SEVEN
Nazi secret police which, under the pretext of maintaining order and serving
the interests of the state and the people, victimized, tortured, and killed
thousands of people on the slightest suspicion, and was arbitrary and
uncontrolled. To appreciate (337), one has to know that most Russian
liberals of the time did not practice what they preached, and what they
preached was mostly equality. (338) is somewhat similar to (337) in that it
casts a suspicion on another group of people who are not always able to
practice what they preach, but one has to know that some of their extreme
teachings include the refusal to use electricity and other contemporary
facilities and the desire to go back to the "good old times." (339) ridicules
the Russian populists' widely publicized love for the simple, oppressed, and
underprivileged people.
Out of the four jokes, (337) conveys the standard message mentioned
above in the simplest way. Similarly, (214) depicts a Soviet policeman as a
homosexual and not as a straight, square, and solid citizen he is supposed
to be. In (340-41) and many other German jokes of the same period, the
Nazis are correctly depicted as largely turncoats from the Communist camp,
and thus both of the parties are denigrated at the same time: the Communists
as the deserters of their cause, and the Nazis as people who are not sincere
about their proclamations.
(340) A Berlin worker, applying for a job, was asked whether he
qualified as an "old fighter." "All I can say," was the reply, "is
that I already carried the red flag before they put a swastika in
it." (Larsen, 1980, 44)
(341) ...A tramp needs a roof over his head, even if it is only that of
a prison cell. So he goes up to a policeman, shouts "Rot Front!"
and raises his clenched fist. The policeman pretends not to have
heard or seen anything and continues on his beat. A column of
stormtroopers comes marching along, and the tramp repeats his
performance. One of the SA men breaks rank and tells him off:
"Are you nuts, mate? There, in the third row, we've got a Nazi!"
(Larsen, 1980, 44-45)
An analogous joke was created by Art Buchwald under much less perilous
circumstances when immediately after the Republican landslide victory in
1980 he addressed an audience in Washington, D.C., "Fellow
Republicans..."

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229
3. DENIGRATION OF A POLITICAL IDEA OR SLOGAN
If in the first type of denigration jokes the human target is treated as a
non-private person and in the second type he is completely deindividualized,
the third type makes a further step in the same direction and depersonifies
the target of the joke entirely. It is an abstract IDEA, CREDO, MOTTO,
OR SLOGAN which is DENIGRATED in this type of political joke.
Obviously, however, the jokes are still directed against people, namely those
whose idea or slogan is denigrated. If specific people are mentioned in such
a joke at all they do not matter in the least and quite often they are not even
responsible for, or directly related to, the denigrated material - they are just
a means to get at the idea or slogan.
Thus, in (342), the three Jews are variables for people rather than concrete
personalities, and in (343), man is exactly the same. No particular people are
involved in (344) at all.
(342) What is Zionism? It is when one Jew spends the money of a
second Jew to help a third Jew. (Jewish Palestinian, 1930's)
(343) Under capitalism, man exploits man. Under socialism, it is the
other way round. (Soviet, 1950's)
(344) The Yerevan Radio was asked whether it was possible to build
communism in one isolated country, for example, in Holland.
The answer was, "Yes, of course, it is possible, but what do you
have against Holland?" (Soviet, 1960's)
This type of joke combines the features of the previous two types of
denigration jokes. As the first type, it is pointedly and directly iconoclastic:
its message is that an idea or a slogan is actually the exact opposite of what
it purports to be. As the second type, these jokes are usually allusive, at least
to the content of the ridiculed idea. Thus, in (342), the hearer is supposed
to know that much of Zionist activity is indeed fund raising and fund
distribution; and the hearer of (343) must know that socialism claims
liberation from all forms of exploitation of which it accuses capitalism.
(345), besides being allusive to some particular circumstances (see Section
7), is one of many political jokes ridiculing patriotism. (346) is an Israeli
example while (347) is American - the latter also contains an allusion to an
alleged national trait (see Section 4):
(345) At the last stage of World War II, the German optimists said,
"We're going to lose the war." And the pessimists said, "Yes -
but when?" (German, 1940's)

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(346) An American tourist asks an Israeli cab driver to give him a
complete tour of the country. "All right," says the Israeli. "First,
some general information. My country is 400 kilometers long,
100 kilometers wide and 139 centimeters tall." "What do you
mean, tall?" asks the American. "Well," says the cabbie, "I am
169 centimeters tall, minus about 30 centimeters for my head -
and I have had this country up to here" [and he makes a short
horizontal line across his neck]. (Israeli, 1950's)
(347) An American and British pilot are crossing the Atlantic and
approaching the British Isles. "We have just crossed the British
coastline," reports the Briton with pride. "Fuck your Britain!"
responds the American gloomily. "We are flying over London,"
says the Briton a few minutes later. "Fuck your London," says
the American. "And this is Buckingham Palace. Our Queen lives
here." "Fuck your Queen," says the American. "In that case,"
explodes the Briton, "fuck your president!" "Fuck our
president," agrees the American. (Soviet, 1950's)
Joke (222ii) denigrates Soviet patriotism by putting it in a lowly sexual
context. Joke (271) combines the denigration of the same phenomenon with
an allusion to a specific situation (see Section 7). Denigration of national
patriotism is a step from the denigration of an idea to the denigration of the
entire society and its life. Thus, (348) denigrates life under Mussolini through
the denigration of the national currency:
(348) A shopper asked his greengrocer how much the figs were. "Three
figs fifty lire" said the greengrocer. "Good heavens," gasped the
shopper, "how's that possible?" "Well, sir, it isn't that the figs
are worth so many lire; it's the lira that isn't worth a fig." (Larsen,
1980, 55)
More examples of all types of denigration jokes will be given in
Section 8.
4. EXPOSURE OF NATIONAL TRAITS
This type of political humor is the closest it comes to ethnic humor. The
similarity is based on the use of the same scripts associating certain ethnic
groups with certain purported traits. The difference is that in a political joke
of this type the ethnic script is auxiliary while the main opposition remains
between the script for WHAT THE TARGETED NATIONAL GROUP
OR NATIONAL ENTITY IS SUPPOSED TO BE AND THE NE-

POLITICAL HUMOR
231
GATION of that script. The opposition is usually prompted by placing the
allusion to an ethnic script in a political context. Thus, (347) alludes to the
alleged American trait of IRREVERENCE and disrespect for authority.
(286) alludes to the standard ethnic script of Jewish CRAFTINESS
somewhat complicated by the anti-Semitic allegation of physical dirt, which is
also one of the most universal ethnic scripts of a xenophobic nature (see
Chapter 6, Sections 2 and 9). Joke (349) capitalizes on the ethnic script of
Jewish PRACTICALITY and RATIONALITY (see Chapter 6, Section 9),
along with the script of DUMBNESS for the Tartars (see Chapter 6, Section
1) and the script of BLIND AND HYPOCRITICAL OBEDIENCE for the
Russians. Joke (350) puts the ethnic script of Jewish survival instincts in the
context of the Israeli political situation as well as using two other popular
ethnic scripts.
(349) The Russian Csar inspects a military parade. Out of boredom,
he picks out the shortest soldier on the left flank and yells,
"Name?" "Mukhametdinov, your Majesty." "All right, Mukha-
metdinov, tell me, could you kill your Father Czar?" "Hurray!"
roars the poor Tartar who did not understand a single Russian
word. He is promptly taken away. Annoyed, the Czar moves
over to the right flank and addresses the tallest soldier in the
regiment, "Name?" "Ivanov, your Majesty." "Tell me, Ivanov,
could you possibly kill your Father Czar?" "Never, your
Majesty," reports the Russian soldier mechanically. "I would sooner
kill myself, my parents, and my children than endanger the life
of my Master for whom we are all ready to give our lives." "Very
good, Ivanov," says the Czar and gives the soldier a medal. Next,
he moves over to the band and asks the little drummer, "Name?"
"Rabinowitz, your Majesty." The Czar frowns but continues,
"Tell me, Rabinowitz, could you kill your Father Czar?" "With
what?" asks the Jew. "With this drum?" (Russian, 1900's)
(350) An Englishman, a Frenchman, and an Israeli are captured by a
tribe of African cannibals who are about to throw them into
boiling water. "What is your last wish?" asks the chief of the
Englishman. "I would like to drink as much beer as I can before
I die." "Give him the beer," says the chief. "And you," he asks
the Frenchman, "what would you like?" "I would like to spend
my last minutes with a young and pretty girl." "Bring my
youngest daughter to him," orders the chief. "And what is your
last wish," he asks the Israeli. "I want your strongest warrior to
punch me in the nose." "Is that what you really want?" asks the

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surprised chief. "This is the strangest last wish I have ever
heard." "Yes," replies the Israeli firmly. The chief brings over his
strongest warrior, who strikes the Israeli in the nose. The Israeli
reaches for his boots, pulls out a submachine gun from the one
and half a dozen hand grenades from the other. In a moment all
the cannibals are lying dead. "Why didn't you do that in the first
place?" ask the Englishman and the Frenchman. "I didn't want
to be labeled 'aggressor' again," replies the Israeli. (Soviet, 1967)
Joke (272) combines the ethnic script of DUMBNESS for the Eskimoes
with the LEADER-DENIGRATION script as well as with an allusion to
the cult of personality of Lenin (see also Chapter 6, Sections 5 and 7, and
Section 1), and it is typical for the jokes of this type to contain allusions to
other circumstances and situations beyond the ethnic scripts.
The three most standard types of allusions, universally used in exposure
jokes, are analyzed in the next three sections.
5. EXPOSURE OF POLITICAL EXPRESSION
Every repressive regime tries to pass itself as being based on the clearly
expressed preference of the people. It views itself as, and/or pretends to be,
the answer to what the oppressed population wants for government. As a
result, while crushing the smallest expressions of dissidence or resistance,
it usually also suppresses all information about arrests and other forms of
political terror which it imposes on the population. This type of political
humor EXPOSES THE REPRESSIEVE NATURE of the regime in
by alluding to the suppressed script of arrest and/or terror. The typical joke,
however, is not based primarily on this revealed script but rather on the
opposition of the widely publicized (and also alluded to) script of the regime
as free and popular and the negation of that script.
Thus, (351) exposes the repressive nature of the Italian fascism while (352)
deals with the Russian-supported Communist regime in East Germany.
Similarly, joke (353) exposes the oppresive regime of the Greek colonels less
than a decade ago while joke (354) takes on the Soviet repressive methods:
(351) This is our beautiful liberty under Fascism - everything that isn't
prohibited is compulsory. (Larsen, 1980, 54)
(352) A group of Young Communist League members are invited by
the Soviet soldiers stationed in the GDR to attend a military
parade. "Do you always have garlands on your tanks?" the boys

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233
ask. "Oh no, it is just for the demonstration," the soldiers reply.
"And the machine guns?" "Oh, they are against the
demonstration." (East German, 1953)
(353) [Colonel] Popadopoulos... visits Chairman Mao in Peking:
"How many dissidents do you reckon you have in your
country?" he asks him. "A very small number," replies Mao, "no
more than eight or nine million." "Hm, about the same as us,"
says the Greek ruler. (Larsen, 1980, 104-05)
(354) [The skeleton of one of the two famous saints, Cyril and
Methodius, was discovered by a Czech archeological expedition.
Unable to establish which of the two it was, they invited a team
of Russian experts. ] The Russians went to work on the problem.
Some time later they brought the remains to Prague in a bundle
tied with a string. The skull of the skeleton had been fractured,
the spine broken, the fingers shattered. "It's Cyril," the Russians
declared to their Czechoslovak colleagues. "But how do you
know?" the Russians were asked. "The saint confessed it
himself." "After having been buried for a thousand years?" "Ah
well, we have our ways of making people talk," explained the
Russians. (Larsen, 1980, 103)
A217 is another joke about Soviet political terror which also alludes to
constant shortages and the necessity to stand hours in queues for any
commodity. Joke (353) contains a simple additional allusion to a script of
an encyclopedic nature, namely the one containing information about the
relative populations of China and Greece.
Jokes (355) and (356) concentrate on another aspect of the same
phenomenon EXPOSING THE LACK OF POLITICAL FREEDOM
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES rather than the repressive measures into which
this is translated:
(355) The basis of the socialist democracy was created when God
made Eve and told Adam, "And now choose yourself a wife."
(East German, 1950's)
(356) ...A citizen [is] reading a motoring magazine in a Prague cafe!
Another man sits down next to him and notices that the reader
is studying the pictures of a Rolls-Royce and a Russian
Moskvitch car. "I wonder which of them you'd like to have,"
says the newcomer. The man looks up and replies, "The
Moskvitch, of course." "Come, come, you obviously know
nothing about cars!" "Oh yes," says the reader. "I know a lot
about cars. But I know nothing about you." (Larsen, 1980, 102)

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Joke (356) evokes the script of FREEDOM OF SPEECH opposed to its
own negation to form the joke, and the script is one of the most popular ones
in anti-repressive jokes (cf. (26ii)). Interestingly, this script typically
incorporates the standard opposition on which many political jokes are based:
one is supposed to say only good things about an oppressive regime in all
of its manifestations and not the truth about it (cf. joke (279), in which the
Soviet Union is alleged to claim priority, contrary to any evidence, general
knowledge, or verisimilitude, with regard to the origin of the elephant). Thus,
in (356), everybody knows that the Moskvitch is an awful car but no bad
thing can be uttered about anything Russian.
Just as in the case of ethnic jokes, the repressive political script is one of
a few standard scripts, and the jokes based on these standard scripts are
freely interchangeable wherever and whenever applicable. In other words,
just as the Poles can be targeted as the dumb minority in one country and
the Irish in another, a joke about prisons or suppression of civil liberties can
be told about any repressive regime.
6. EXPOSURE OF SHORTAGES
Every repressive political regime depicts itself as an excellent provider for
all the needs of its population, and the further it is from the truth the more
fervently its propaganda machine works on spreading the myth. The
SHORTAGE jokes are therefore based on the opposition of the script of
'plenty,' of no shortage, and its more realistic negation.
The script is evoked in (26ii) in conjunction with the repressive script
discussed in the preceding section. Jokes (357) and (358) are even more
typical examples of this type of political humor:
(357) ...A group of dead GDR citizens... discover that hell, too, is
divided into an eastern and western sector. Given the choice,
those who believe themselves to be ideologically sound opt for
the eastern hell. A fact-finding delegation arrives from the
western hell; they complain: "Conditions on our western side
are terrible; we've been boiled in oil three times already and
roasted half a dozen times. How are things with you, in the
eastern hell?" "Fine," is the answer. "They've run out of fuel."
(Larsen, 1980, 94-95)
(358) Some leading economists from East Germany have been invited
to Africa to modernize the Sahara area. Nothing changes in the

POLITICAL HUMOR
235
first year, nothing in the second. In the third year the Sahara runs
out of sand. (Larsen, 1980, 95)
Jokes (269) and (271) also allude to SHORTAGES. In general, this script
is of an even simpler semantic nature than the previous one: whenever a
commodity is mentioned, it can be safely assumed that it .is in short supply
and that the fact is not supposed to be mentioned officially.
Incredibly many variations of SHORTAGE jokes travel from one under-
supplied country to another, and more examples will be provided in Section
8.
7. EXPOSURE OF SPECIFIC POLITICAL SITUATIONS
This standard script evokes a particular political situation, usually of an
unflattering kind for the government, and the joke is based on the opposition
of the official or desirable script excluding the compromising situation and
the negation of this script recognizing the situation in question. The jokes
of this type are always allusive: the allusion is usually to a particular
encyclopedic script EVOKING THE COMPROMISING OR
UNDESIRABLE SITUATION.
Thus, the Jewish jokes (292) and (295) are based on the opposition of the
official position according to which anti-Semitism does not exist in Eastern
Europe and the real situation in which it does exist. Joke (152) alludes to
the encyclopedic script of the recent American economic policy and, more
specifically, to the Federal program of free distribution of some surplus dairy
products to the poor in 1981-82 - the script is, of course, combined with the
DENIGRATION OF A PUBLIC FIGURE. (359) is another such
combination: besides the obvious denigration of the president, the disreputable
behavior of his brother and his shady dealings with Lybia are exposed by
allusion:
(359) I don't have anything against Carter. He has important friends
who are ready to lean backwards for him. He has valuable
contacts abroad. He has a very clear-cut foreign policy which
yields tangible results. It's his brother in the White House that
I can't stand! (American, 1980)
Joke A216 alludes to the New Federalism program of the Reagan
administration and denigrates the government in the process. Joke (360)
exposed the Nazi last-ditch effort to reinforce their army by drafting
teenagers and old men.

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(360) Old men and young boys were mobilized for the Home Guard,
as a last-ditch defence of the [Nazi] Fatherland. "In the Home
Guard," said the Germans, "you get leave on two occasions: for
your confirmation and for your golden wedding." (Larsen, 1980,
53-54)
A somewhat more complicated group of political jokes within this type
exposes not a particular event but rather the whole way of life or an
important aspect of it and presents it as it really is and not as a regime would
like to see it. It is usually carried out by alluding to a whole array of standard
political scripts mentioned above but none of them is actually called upon
to form the joke directly. Thus, (361) EXPOSES THE WHOLE WAY OF
LIFE under Fascism in Italy by alluding to three scripts mentioned above
without directly evoking them: the script of LEADER-DENIGRATION,
the SHORTAGE script and the REPRESSIVE script. The result is an
allusive use of the LIFE IS GOOD vs. LIFE IS BAD opposition, which
characterizes a number of political jokes (see Section 3):
(361 A new maid... is being engaged by a well-to-do Roman lady. The
wage she is offered is not very generous. "All right," she says,
"but I want a bonus for keeping my mouth shut when you have
insulted the Duce." "That won't help you much," replies the
lady. "In this house the Duce is never insulted." "Well, then I
want a bonus for keeping quiet about your supplies from the
black market." "You're wrong again, we never buy on the black
market." "Then I want a bribe for not informing the... secret
police... that you are listening to the Italian program of the
BBC." "We never listen to it." "Then I am afraid this is no job
for me," says the girl. "You don't criticize the Duce, you don't
buy on the black market, you don't listen to the BBC - do you
think I want to live with complete idiots?" (Larsen, 1980, 56-57)
(362) is also a complex and rather sophisticated allusion which exposes
a certain aspect of Russian life by evoking the script of anti-Semitism in a
deliberately absurd way. What is also implicit in the joke is the typically
low-class Russian association of anything bizarre, extraordinary, and
esoteric with the Jews.
(362) A drunk comes up to the pianist in the bar, looks over his
shoulder, and whispers, "The keys... black... white... beautiful?
What are they made of?" "Ivory," answers the pianist. "What's

POLITICAL HUMOR
237
that?" "Elephant tusk." The drunk bursts into tears. "Dirty
kikes," he whines. "They tortured the poor elephant to death!"
(Soviet, 1960's)
Unlike the jokes exposing a very specific event and therefore containing
a very narrow allusion, the "combination" jokes are interchangeable from
country to country and from regime to regime as long as the same array of
undesirable traits characterizes the target.
8. SOVIET POLITICAL HUMOR
A very large number of political jokes which have emerged in this century
have been created in the Sovie* Union, and many jokes told about other
countries exist in Soviet variants as well, and in all likelihood, the latter are
the original ones. The reasons for this enormous humor productivity should
be, and sometimes are, seriously explored by sociology, mass psychology,
communication, and political science. Obviously, however, the abundance
and richness of Soviet political humor is derived from the fact that every
single standard script of political humor is easily and diversely applicable to,
and interpretable in terms of, Soviet reality. Also, in the situation where
freedom of speech is completely lacking, humor has become the only means
of political and social criticism as well as a very important and, along with
gossip and rumors, surprisingly reliable source of unofficial information.
The examples below will illustrate all the types and kinds of political
humor outlined in the preceding sections. Unlike in those sections, however,
where in some cases the supply was very scarce (thus, I have failed to
discover a single American anti-institution joke - FBI? IRS? - for Section
2 in spite of the abundance of willing and knowledgeable native informants),
here the researcher of humor faces an obvious case of embarras de richesse.
The selection is based, therefore, not so much on the availability as on the
clarity, purity of type, diversity and, other things being equal, newness of the
jokes.
The LEADER-DENIGRATION script is illustrated by jokes (363-366).
(363) is based on the straightforward good/bad opposition. (364-65) are
typical smart/dumb jokes; besides that, the former also contains an allussion
to the fact that Brezhnev seemed to be unable to deliver any message without
reading it from a prepared (by somebody else) text (cf. Chapter 6, Section
1); the latter is one joke from an infinite series of largely dumb jokes about
a Russian Civil War general of a peasant origin, whose figure was imposingly

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mythologized and fictionalized by a well-known Soviet novel of the 1920's,
a film of the 1930's and a children's radio program in the 1950's (cf. also
A210). (366) introduces the sexual/non-sexual kind of denigration. (367)
evokes the alive and beloved/abhorred and wished dead opposition:
(363) A foreign leader gave Khrushchev a piece of good cloth when
Khrushchev came to visit. Before the leader returns the visit,
Khrushchev wants to make himself a suit out of that cloth.
However, it turns out that there is not enough material there for
his ample figure, and none of the famous Moscow tailors can
help. At this desperate point, an aide recalls that somebody told
him about a great tailor from Odessa. The tailor is found, and
he agrees to undertake the task. A few days later Khrushchev
visits Odessa for a fitting and is presented with an elegantly-cut
three-piece suit. "How did you manage to make three pieces,"
asks he, "when my best tailors in Moscow could not make even
two?" "Well," says the tailor, "in Moscow you may be a big man.
Here in Odessa, you are nothing. Will you try on the cap as
well?" (Soviet, 1950's)
(364) Brezhnev is sitting alone in his office. There is a knock on the
door. He pulls out the central drawer of his desk, takes out his
glasses, and puts them on. Then he pulls out the right top drawer,
takes out a sheet of paper, and reads aloud from it, "Who is
there?" (Soviet, 1970's)
(365) General Chapayev's personal assistant rushes into the
headquarters with a happy smile on his face. "Vasily Ivanovich,"
he shouts, "victory is practically assured in tomorrow's big
offensive. They have just delivered ballistic missiles from the
General Headquarters!" The Civil War Hero looks at him
wearily and says, "I wouldn't be so sure, Peter. I checked the
damn whatchamcallit missiles, and you know what? They forgot
to send the saddles along!" (Soviet, 1960's - cf. also A516)
(366) A man sees a gorgeous blonde on the beach. He approaches her
and sees that she is wearing a bathing suit with the pictures of
Marx and Lenin on her chest. He asks her whether, out of pure
patriotism and ideological allegiance, he could pay his respects
to the great founders of communism by kissing their portraits.
Worded like this, the request cannot be denied. Emboldened by
his initial success (and assuming that the greatest leader of all
times must have his picture in an even more strategic place), he

POLITICAL HUMOR
239
asks the blonde whether he can proceed to kiss Stalin's picture.
"No," answers the beauty, "but you are welcome to kiss
Khrushchev on my ass." (Soviet, 1950's - cf. also A517)
(367) A man is standing at the Stalin Museum in front of a portrait of
Joseph Stalin's mother. He shakes his head in grief and sorrow
and heaves forth a sigh: "Ay, ay, ay! Such a lovely lady. It's such
a pity she didn't get that abortion in time!" (Draitser, 1978, 29)
The anti-institution and anti-group Soviet political jokes are usually
targeted at the Communist Party (368) and its institutions (369-70) and at
the representatives of the Government agencies, especially the police
(371-373), who often carry the butt of what, in the West, is the dumb ethnic
joke (see also, Davies, 1982a).
(368) At a business meeting of the Odessa Central Whorehouse, the
madam reports: "Girls and the auxiliary staff! I am happy to tell
you that the city committee of the Party is very happy with our
productivity, net profits, and the quality of service. We are
certainly one of the leading institutions of Socialist labor in the
city. They are surprised, however, that there are no members of
the Party in such a prosperous enterprise. They strongly
suggested that we recommend one of our best workers for the Party, and
I suggest that it be you, Manya. What do you say?" "Oh, you
must be kidding, Comrade Madam," says Manya blushing, "you
know very well that my mother barely allowed me to join even
your institution!" (Soviet, 1950's - cf. also A521)
(369) What is the Central Committee of the Communist Party? It is a
very important organ which consists of two groups of people,
those who are capable of nothing and those who are capable of
anything. (Soviet, I960')
(370) The Yerevan radio was asked, "What is the difference between
a disaster and a catastrophe?" The answer was as follows,
"Imagine a donkey crossing a creek. The small and old bridge
gives way, and the donkey falls into the creek. This is a disaster,
but not a catastrophe. Now, suppose the whole Soviet
Government is on board a plane, and the plane crashes. This is a
catastrophe, but certainly not a disaster." (Soviet, 1960's)
(371) How does a Soviet policeman open a can of sardines? He
knocks on it and shouts, "Open up! Police!" (Soviet, 1970's)
(372) How does a Soviet policeman check whether there are matches

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in the matchbox? He puts the box against his ear and vigorously
shakes his head. (Soviet, 1970's)
(373) One Soviet policeman asks another to check whether the turn
signals of his car are working. The other policeman reports, "The
right one is working. No, it isn't. Working again. Not working.
Working. Not working." (Soviet, 1980's)
(374) denigrates the idea of socialism and communism as a whole (cf.
(344)). (375) denigrates the Soviet regime by ridiculing its emblem. (376)
denigrates a popular slogan from Mayakovsky's poem about Lenin. (377)
denigrates Soviet life as a whole (cf. (293)).
(374) A Soviet specialist in Africa is captured by a tribe of cannibals.
They torture and kill the other prisoners in front of him, cut them
into pieces, and eat them. "Tell me," he asks the chief, "did you
have a revolution here?" "No," answers the chief. "Did you have
a civil war then?" "No." "Have you been building socialism here
at a great personal sacrifice to everybody?" "No." "You mean,
no collectivization, no industrialization, no dams, no canals to
turn all the North-bound rivers to the South and all the
Southbound rivers to the North?" "We have no rivers here." "But then
I don't understand! What made you all into wild animals then?"
(Soviet, 1960's)
(375) A Soviet hammer-thrower at the Olympic Games throws his
hammer five times farther than the world record. "How did you
manage to do that?" he is asked. "Oh, this is nothing," he
answers, "give me a sickle, and I will throw it so far you will
never find it!" (Soviet, 1960's)
(376) "We say 'Lenin' and we mean 'the Party.' We say 'the Party' and
we mean 'Lenin'" - for over 50 years already, we have been
saying one thing and meaning another. (Soviet, 1960's)
(377) A group of important officials is visiting a mental asylum. The
management organizes a show for them, and the inmates' choir
performs the popular song "Oh, Isn't It Great to Live in the
Soviet Land!" Suddenly, the chief inspector notices one man
who is not singing. "Why aren't you participating?" he asks.
"Oh, I am not crazy," answers the man. "I am a medic here."
(Soviet, 1960's - cf. also A522)
Soviet political jokes based on a national trait typically focus on other,
non-Soviet ethnic groups - see, for instance, (350). (378), however, deni-

POLITICAL HUMOR
241
grates a Soviet leader of Armenian origin by alluding to a widespread myth
among the Russians that the Armenians are sexual perverts (usually
zoophiliacs, though, rather than homosexuals). (272) presents the Soviet
Eskimoes as dumb and indirectly compromises Lenin in the process. There
are few jokes based on scripts for Soviet Russian national traits. One
popular script is the national-superiority script (cf. Chapter 6, Section 7)
according to which, in a fashion parallel to many Russian fairy tales, the
Russians get the upper hand not because they deserve it but rather by pulling
off a sly trick as in (379) - cf. also (277).
(378) A visitor from a remote village, dying to see the inside of the
Kremlin, is pleading with the guard, who will not let him in.
Suddenly, an attractive young woman comes up to the guard and
says, "GW," and he lets her through. Then another young
woman does the same, and a third. In desperation, the peasant
opens his mouth and also says, "GW." The guard looks at him
in amazement and then picks up the phone. "Comrade
Lieutenant," he says, "there is a man here at the gate, who says that
he is a government whore. What shall I do?" "Let him in," says
the lieutenant, "he must be for Mikoyan." (Soviet, 1950's)
(379) An Englishman, a German, and a Russian are arguing about
which nation invented the telegraph. The Briton says, "We dug
a well in a village, and we found some copper wire which was
at least 250 years old, which proves that we had the telegraph
earlier than anybody else." The German says, "Oh, no. We had
it much earlier. We found an old telegraph pole with some wire
around it, and according to the date, the engineer's signature, the
facsimile of the Emperor's seal, and the reference to the city log
it dates back to the 16th century." "Well," says the Russian, "we
also made some excavations, and you know what - we found no
wire at all. Which proves that even in those ancient times we, the
Russians, already had the wireless telegraph." (Soviet, 1950's)
The notorious Russian alcoholism could be expected to form the basis of
some political jokes but no examples seem to be available, though some
non-political jokes like (380) might be easily put in a political context:
(380) The scientists were testing the intoxicating strength of various
hard liquors. First, a mouse was given some Scotch. Two
minutes later it lost balance and dropped dead. Then another
mouse was given a dose of schnapps. It kept its balance for three

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and a half minutes but then dropped dead. The third mouse was
given some vodka. It started losing its balance immediately but
then regained it, smiled from ear to ear, and shouted, "And now
I'm going to rape your cat!" (Soviet, 1950's)
The REPRESSIVE script is abundantly and diversely represented in
Soviet political jokes. Jokes (381), (382), and (383) deal with arrests and
terror; jokes (384) and (385) with the lack of freedom; jokes (386) and (387)
introduce a new, purely Soviet, variety of the repressive script dealing with
the lies and deliberate disinformation the public is exposed to.
(381) Two rabbits meet on the road. "Why are you running?" one of
them asks the other. "Haven't you heard? They are going to
castrate all the camels!" "Well, that's very sad but why are you
concerned? You are not a camel, are you?" "First they catch you
and castrate you; afterwards you try to prove to them that you
are not a camel!" (Soviet, 1937)
(382) "Have you heard? Guadalquivir was taken last night!" "Alone
or with the entire family?" (Soviet, 1938)
(383) Under Lenin, it was like in a tunnel - it was cold and dark and
no food but there seemed to be some daylight at the far end.
Under Stalin, it was like in a streetcar - everybody was shaking
all the time. And now, it is like in a ship - long vistas and wide
horizons are almost visible, everybody is sick in the stomach but
nobody can get off. (Soviet, 1950's - cf. also A524)
(384) In Germany, what is allowed is allowed and what is not is not.
In France, what is allowed is allowed and what is not allowed
is also allowed. Now in the Soviet Union, what is not allowed
is not allowed and what is allowed is not allowed either. (Soviet,
1960's)
(385) An American and a Russian talk about freedom. "There is real
freedom in America," says the former. "I can stand in front of
the White House and shout that Eisenhower is a fool, and
nobody will do anything to me." "So what?" says the Russian.
"I can go to the Red Square and shout that Eisenhower is a fool
and nobody will touch me either!" (Soviet, 1960's - cf. also
A523)
(386) Nikita Krushchev visited Washington and President
Eisenhower suggested a jogging race around the White House. The
Washington Post reported: "President Eisenhower and the Soviet

POLITICAL HUMOR
243
leader Nikita Khrushchev had a jogging race yesterday
afternoon. The President came first." Pravda reported: "Our
beloved Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev and the American
president had a race yesterday. The Soviet leader was among the very
first while the American president was the last.but one." (Soviet,
1950's)
(387) A delegate to the Party Congress hears in a speech that an
enormous tractor plant has been erected in the town of Pochept-
sy, the Rostov region. "Wait a minute," he shouts, "this must be
a mistake. I live in Pocheptsy. There is no tractor plant there."
"There can be no mistake, Comrade," he is told. "It is very new.
It was not there before but it is there now." "No, it is not," the
delegate insists. "I left Pocheptsy yesterday, and no plant was
in sight." "Shame on you, comrade! Obviously the only reason
that you don't know that there is a new tractor plant in your
Pocheptsy is because you don't read the newspapers!" (Soviet,
1970's)
Another abundant class of Soviet political jokes is based on the
SHORTAGE script as in (388). Joke (389) may be the ultimate example while (390)
is one of the relatively new SHORTAGE jokes:
(388) In the year 2000, a small boy asks his grandfather: "Grandpa,
Grandpa, what does the word 'line' mean?" "You see, sonny, in
the year 1975 there wasn't enough meat to go around, so people
had to wait hours one behind the other, in order to buy a piece
of meat. This is the meaning of 'line.' Do you understand?" "I
do. But what does the word 'meat' mean?" (Draitser, 1978, 17)
(389) "Excuse me! Where did you get the toilet tissue?" "Oh, this is
used, my own - I'm simply taking it home from the cleaners."
(Soviet, 1960's)
(390) "Excuse me! Do you have any meat?" "Comrade, can't you
read? This is the fish department - we have nofishl Meat they
don't have in the meat department across the hall." (Soviet,
1978)
A large class of Soviet SHORTAGE jokes is based on the lack of choice,
poor variety of goods rather than on their physical absence - the appearance
of such jokes may be actually taken for a sign of growing affluence. Thus,
(391) alludes to the fact that all the long underwear available in Moscow was

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of the same color. Similarly, (392) refers to the situation when just one kind
of fish, imported from Cuba, was available in Moscow.
(391) The male locker room of a bathhouse in Moscow. It is cold
outside, and the men are all taking off or putting on their dark
blue long Johns. Suddenly one man reveals a purple pair.
Everybody rushes to him and asks, "How is life in Leningrad?"
(Soviet, 1930's)
(392) "Do you have any sole?" "No, there have been difficulties with
the transport, and we did not get any sole today. But we have
some excellent nototenia." "Noto-what?" "Nototenia. It's from
Cuba. Try it - it is almost like flounder." "Do you have any
flounder?" "No, no transport. But really, if you take the
nototenia you won't regret it." "How about carp?" "No carp, no,
problems with transportation again." "Okay, tell me, this one-
eyed whore of yours, the no-to-te-nia, how did it get here then
- did it just swim in, all by itself?" (Soviet, 1970's)
The most popular kind of Soviet political humor EXPOSES SPECIFIC
POLITICAL SITUATIONS. For many people, this humor is not only the
source of entertainment but also of information - quite frequently they learn
about a suppressed event from a joke exposing it. Out of the many specific
political situations two have been selected here as examples. Both lasted for
a few years and generated a large amount of jokes. In a sense, each
dominated a whole decade.
The first group of political jokes exposed and ridiculed the hullaboo about
the official celebration of the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth in 1970. The
newspapers, radio, and television talked about it for years. There were
lectures at places of work, schools, and kindergartens. Books were written
about it. Every factory produced its own gimmick to celebrate the occasion.
Jokes (393-396) allude heavily to these circumstances:
(393) The psychiatrists are examining a mentally retarded youth. "Tell
us, what is your name?" "Uugh." "All right. Where do you live?"
"Uugh." "Do you have brothers and sisters?" "Uugh." "What
day of the week is it today?" "Uugh." "What year?" "This is the
Jubilee Year - one hundredth anniversary of Lenin's birth."
(Soviet, 1960's)
(394) Two professors of history are examining an applicant at the
entrance exam to the University. "All right, young man," one of
them says, "your knowledge of ancient history is excellent. Now

POLITICAL HUMOR
245
let me ask you a simple question about modern history. What
marks the next year?" The applicant thinks hard and finally says,
"Sorry, I don't know." "Do you know what year it is?"
"Certainly, 1970." "Can you think of any anniversary or special occasion
in connection with this date?" "No." "Where do you come
from?" "From the village of Razyebalovka, near Tomsk." "You
see, my friend," says the first professor to the second, "that's
where we should have gone on vacation last summer if we really
wanted some rest." (Soviet, 1960's)
(395) The teacher shows a toy, a big white hare, to a group of three-
year-olds in the kindergarten. "Who is this, children?" Scared
silence. "Come on, children, you know the answer. It's very
simple - we talked about it yesterday and the day before
yesterday and last week. Weil, who knows the answer? Yes, Kolya?"
"Is it Grandpa Lenin again?" (Soviet, 1960's)
(396) The furniture factory has just manufactured a new model. It is
a triple bed, and it is called "Lenin is always with us." (Soviet,
1960's)
The second group exposes the Jewish emigration of the 1970's - the
subject almost never mentioned officially. Joke (397) is a simple example.
Joke (398) introduces the subject in a typical Soviet manner, by never
mentioning it directly. (399) alludes to the fact that many non-Jewish people
had to marry Jews fictitiously in order to be able to emigrate officially - the
joke parodies a popular slogan introduced by two Soviet humorists of the
1930's: "The car is not a luxury but a means of transportation!" (400) refers
to 'refuseniks' - people who have applied for an exit visa and have been
denied it. (401) puts the Soviet leaders themselves in the incongruent context
of emigration.
(397) Two Jews board a crowded Moscow bus. One gets in through
the back door, the other through the front door. The latter shouts
to his friend, who is standing right next to the money box, over
the entire crowd, "Chaim, have you paid the fare yet?" "You
must be crazy, Abram," the other shouts back angrily. "You
know perfectly well that it is too early for me to do that -1 have
not even received an affidavit from Israel yet, let alone the exit
visa. When I get that, then I will pay the airfare, not before?"
(Soviet, 1972)

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CHAPTER SEVEN
(398) "Hallo, may I speak to Abram Rabinowitz, please?" "No." "Is
he sick?" "No." "Is he on vacation then?" "No." "On a business
trip?" "No." "You don't mean to say that he is in big trouble?"
"No." "And he did not die either?" "No." "Did I then
understand you correctly?" "Yes, you did." (Soviet, 1971)
(399) The Jewish wife is not a luxury but simply a means of
transportation. (Soviet, 1971)
(400) A low-level Soviet official is invited to a conference with the
party committee. "Tell us, Comrade Ivanov, what is your
salary?" " 120 rubles a month." "Is it true that you own a cooperative
apartment which cost you 20,000 rubles?" "Yes." "And a car
which cost you 15,000 rubles?" "Yes." "And a dacha which cost
you 30,000 rubles?" "Yes." "And your wife owns a mink coat
and an astrakhan coat?" "Yes, it's correct." "Could you tell us
how you manage all that on your modest salary?" "I don't." "Do
you mean to tell us that you have an illegal source of income?"
"No, nothing illegal. You see, during the war I hid two Jews from
the Germans. They are now in Israel. They are both very wealthy,
and out of gratitude they send me clothes, money, jewelry,
everything, and this is how I am able to afford the apartment, the car,
the dacha, etc." "You are right, it is not illegal, Comrade Ivanov,
but is it appropriate for a loyal Soviet citizen to accept gifts from
the fascist Zionist state? Don't you think it is rather uncautious
of you? Have you thought of your future and the future of your
family?" "Indeed, I have. Right now I am hiding another two
Jews, who are refuseniks, from harassment and persecution!"
(Soviet, 1972)
(401) "Look what is happening with this emigration business," says
President Brezhnev to Prime Minister Kosygin. "Everybody
wants out! A few more years, and there will be just the two of
us left here." "You speak for yourself Leonid, okay?" answers
Kosygin. (Soviet, 1970)
New political situations introduce new scripts and create new jokes, but
both the basic types and, of course, the basic principles on which the jokes
are based remain constant.

AFTERWORD
It is customary, in an afterword, to summarize and reemphasize the
achievements of the book. Instead, I would like to list briefly a number of related
and deserving subjects which were left out completely or partially.
While the book does formulate the first ever formal semantic theory of
verbal humor and applies it to the analysis of three different categories of
jokes, it does not focus specifically on the distinction between good and bad
humor, though Chapter 4 provides all the necessary ingredients for such a
study. Nor does the book mention many other specific categories of humor
which the theory can handle just as easily and which can be presented just
as non-technically as sexual, ethnic, or political humor. These categories
include both such large and powerful groupings as dark humor, sick humor,
toilet humor, school and college humor, sports humor, etc., on the one hand,
and such smaller, more faddish and usually short-lived groupings as the
elephant jokes, dead-cat jokes, Little-Audrey jokes, Watergate jokes, Con-
gresspage jokes, etc.
It would be appropriate and customary, again, to promise in an afterword
to deal with these and other similar topics in a sequel to the book, but I am
not sure I would like to be the one to deliver that sequel because, of course,
this is the funniest book I have ever written.
247

APPENDICES: ADDITIONAL JOKE EXAMPLES
APPENDIX 1: 50 SIMPLE JOKES
A101. He is old enough to be her father and rich enough to be her
husband. (Esar, 1952, 13)
A102. She doesn't show her age but if you peek under the make-up -
there it is. (Esar, 1952, 13)
A103. I don't know how old you are but you don't look it. (Esar, 1952,
13)
A104. They were going to give the bride a shower, so he brought the
soap. (Esar, 1952, 13)
A105. My wife is asking for pin money, and the pin she wants has eight
diamonds in it. (Esar, 1952, 13)
A106. She's a fine talker - the best I've ever escaped from. (Esar, 1952,
13)
A107. He hid his money in the mattress so he could have something
to fall back on. (Esar, 1952, 13)
A108. She seems to have the best of everything, except manners. (Esar,
1952, 14)
A109. I married her because we have so many faults in common. (Esar,
1952, 14)
Al 10. I'm never troubled by improper thoughts because I enjoy them
(Esar, 1952, 14)
A111. My mother-in-law sits around all day grieving because she hasn't
a fortune with which to disinherit me. (Esar, 1952, 14)
A112. His teeth have so many cavities, he talks with an echo. (Esar,
1952, 15)
A113. Age gives people away; it tells on them. (Esar, 1952, 16)
A114. Training a young child is always a matter of pot luck. (Esar,
1952, 18)
A115. The United States is the land of the free, but some Americans
take too many liberties. (Esar, 1952, 18)
A116. Why did they bury Washington on a hill? Because he was dead.
(Esar, 1952, 21)

ADDITIONAL JOKE EXAMPLES
249
A117. Why is a looking-glass like a philosopher? Because it reflects.
(Esar, 1952, 22)
A118. What has four legs and flies? A dead horse. (Esar, 1952, 23)
A119. When is a cow not a cow? When she is turned into a field. (Esar,
1952, 23)
A120. Why did the little fly fly? Because the little spider spied 'er. (Esar,
1952, 23)
A121. What's the difference between a watchmaker and a jailer? One
sells watches and the other watches cells. (Esar, 1952, 24)
A122. Why do you drink liquor? What would you suggest I do with it?
(Esar, 1952, 25)
A123. A beautiful blonde had been prepared for the operation and left
on a stretcher just outside the operating room. While awaiting
the nurse's return, a young man in a white smock appeared, lifted
the sheet, peeked under, and left without saying a word. Another
did likewise. As a third man approached, the patient asked:
"What am I here for - an operation or observation?" "I don't
know," said the third young man. "You'll have to ask the doctor.
I'm one of the painters down the hall." (Esar, 1952, 28-29)
A124. A famous author was traveling in a train with two talkative
women. Having recognized him from his published portraits,
they started to bore him at once, telling him in elaborate detail
how much they enjoyed his novels, etc. He suffered their
comment and praise as best he could, and wondered how he could
silence them. Soon the train entered a tunnel, and in the darkness
the novelist raised the back of his hand to his lips and kissed it
with a loud smack. When light returned he found the two women
regarding one another in icy silence. Addressing them with great
suavity, he says: "Ladies, the one great regret of my life will be
that I shall never know which of you it was that kissed me."
(Esar, 1952, 29)
A125. Bernard Shaw was... the most famous of vegetarians... He is said
to have confessed once that the only time he had ever been taken
aback and at a loss for words was the occasion when a
messenger arrived at his home to take some Shavian copy to a
newspaper. The great man was at dinner. The lad came in,
looked at the plate of vegetables before Shaw, and said: "Have
you just finished or are you just starting?" (Esar, 1952, 32)
A126. When [Napoleon] escaped from Elba in 1815, a Paris news-

250
APPENDICES
paper reported the progress of the returning monarch through
France. Here is how it was headlined in successive editions:
"The Corsican monster has landed in the Gulf of Juan.
The cannibal is marching towards Grasse.
The usurper has entered Grenoble.
Bonaparte has entered Lyons.
Napoleon is marching towards Fontainebleau.
His Imperial Majesty is expected tomorrow in Paris."
(Esar, 1952, 36)
A127. "As I understand it," said the [American Indian], "you propose
to civilize me." "Exactly." "You want to get me out of the habit
of idleness and teach me to work." "That's the idea." "And then
lead me to simplify my methods and invent things to make my
work lighter." "Yes." "And after that I'll become ambitious to
get rich so that I won't have to work at all." "Naturally." "Well,
what's the use of taking such a roundabout way of getting just
where I started from. I don't have to work now." (Esar, 1952,
39)
A128. A man and his wife are talking. He says: "Did you read about
the man who fell out of a plane flying to Chicago?" She exclaims:
"How unfortunate!" "Yes, but a haystack was directly
underneath the plane." "How fortunate!" "Yes, but a pitchfork was
sticking right out of the haystack." "How unfortunate!" "But he
didn't hit the pitchfork." "How fortunate!" "Yes, but he didn't
hit the haystack either." (Esar, 1952, 41-42)
A129. When old man Jones' lawyer learned that his client had inherited
a million dollars, he remarked to his secretary: "I'll have to break
it gently or the old codger will drop dead from the shock. Watch
how I do it." At four o'clock the aged Mr. Jones was wheeled
into the lawyer's office. "Mr. Jones," began the lawyer softly,
"what would you say if I told you that you had inherited a million
dollars?" The old man chucked merrily. "What would I say?" he
repeated. "'Why, Bill, you damn fool,' I'd say, 'half of it goes to
you.'" Whereupon the lawyer dropped dead. (Esar, 1952, 45)
A130. A rich man was ordered to go to the country by his doctor to get
a much needed rest. While away, he was to receive no
communication from home. He returned from his vacation very much
better and very anxious for some news of home. At the station
he was met by his chauffeur, and the following conversation took

ADDITIONAL JOKE EXAMPLES
251
place:
"Well, John, how is everything about the place? Has anything
happened since I went away?"
"No, nothing happened. Everything is just about the same."
"Well, tell me any little thing, no matter how unimportant."
"Nothing really happened, except one little thing. Since you've
been away your dog died."
"My dog died! What killed him?"
"He died from eating burnt horseflesh."
"Burnt horseflesh! Where did he get that?"
"You see, your barn burnt down and the dog got in there and
ate some burnt horseflesh, and that's what killed him."
"My barn burnt down! How did that happen?"
"You see, the sparks from the house, they blew over, and fell on
the roof of the barn, and the barn caught fire, and some of the
horses were burnt. The dog got in there and ate the burnt
horseflesh, and that's what killed him."
"Sparks from the house! Did my house burn too?"
"Yes, that's all burnt down."
"How did the house get on fire?"
"You see, the candles were burning and the curtains caught on
fire and burnt down the house. The sparks flew over and--"
"Candles in my house! But we burn nothing but gas and
electricity. Where did the candles come from?"
"The candles were burning around the coffin."
"Coffin? Who's dead?"
"That's another little thing I forgot to tell you. Your mother-in-
law is dead."
"My mother-in-law dead! What killed her?"
"They're not quite sure, but around the neighborhood they say
that she died from the shock of your wife running away with her
chauffeur. But outside of that, there's no news."
(Esar, 1952, 44-45)
A131. After dinner [the movie star] changed into a strapless evening
gown to attend a party. "I'm so tired," she told her husband, "I
really don't feel like going." "Okay, darling," agreed her
husband. "Then put on something and let's go to bed." (Esar, 1952,
47-48)

252
APPENDICES
A132. [A folk poem from old Persia:] "I went upon the mountain top
to tend my flock. Seeing there a girl, I said: 'Lass, give me a kiss!'
She said: 'Lad, give me some money.' I said: 'My money is in
my purse, my purse is in my wallet, my wallet is on my camel,
and my camel is in Kerman.' She said: 'You want a kiss, but the
kiss lies behind my teeth, my teeth are locked up, the key is with
my mother, and my mother, like your camel, is in Kerman.'"
(Esar, 1952, 50)
A133. [The tale of a lion-hunting expedition:]
Part 1. A lion and two lion-hunters.
Part 2. A lion and one lion-hunter.
Part 3. A lion.
(Esar, 1952, 52)
A134. Traffic cops hailed a man who was speeding. "Please, officers,"
shouted the frustrated driver, "I'm in a great hurry. My baby is
about to have a wife." (Esar, 1952, 56)
A135. A little old lady [was] at the ticket window of a large bus
terminal. "How much is the fare to Bridgeton?" she asked. "It's
$1.85," said the ticket seller. The little old lady turned to her
elderly companion and explained: "We may as well buy the
tickets here. I've asked at all the windows and they all charge the
same." (Esar, 1952, 132)
A136. "Pretty swell joint you have here," as the doctor said when he
examined his patient's knee. (Esar, 1952, 80)
A137. She's a rarely beautiful girl - very rarely. (Esar, 1952, 93)
A138. Did you hear about the little moron who stayed up all night
studying for a blood test? (Esar, 1952, 111)
A139. As she was getting to be married in a few days, she was busy
getting her torso ready. (Esar, 1952, 118)
A140. [At] a party... one man turns to another and asks, "Who is that
awful-looking lady in the corner?" Why, that's my wife," says the
second man. "Oh, I don't mean her," is the quick evasion. "I
mean the lady next to her." "That," cries the second man
indignantly, "is my daughter." (Esar, 1952, 133)
A141. You can always spot the fella who gets eighty-two shaves from
a single blade. The blood bank follows him around with a bucket.
(Orben, 1978, 14)
A142. Personally, I never go economy class. Did you know if you fly
this way and there's an accident, you have to stand up in the life
raft? (Orben, 1978, 15)

ADDITIONAL JOKE EXAMPLES
253
A143. I am fascinated by the new cars. They're sort of a compromise.
Last year's styling with next year's prices. (Orben, 1978, 27)
A144. It's fascinating the new toys they've got for Christmas. One is
called a Neurotic Doll. It's wound up already. (Orben, 1978,44)
A145. I won't say how important my job was, but when they replaced
me with a computer - it was secondhand. (Orben, 1978, 51)
A146. The kids have a new craze. One of them stayed in a shower 33
hours, 33 minutes and 33 seconds. He would have stayed in
longer only - that would have been silly. (Orben, 1978, 77)
A147. You know what bothers me about operations? Why is everybody
wearing masks?... If something goes wrong, you don't even know
who to blame. (Orben, 1978, 112)
A148. It must be wonderful to be a cab driver. To go to work every day
in a taxi. (Orben, 1978, 133)
A149. "Who's there?" "Fatso." "Fatso who?" "Fatso matter with
you?" (Rosenbloom, 1976, 42)
A150. "Who's there?" "Lyndon." "Lyndon who?" "Lyndon ear and I'll
tell you." (Rosenbloom, 1976, 71)
APPENDIX 2: 25 COMPLEX JOKES
A201 A wise old rabbi lay dying, so his disciples lined up next to his
deathbed to catch his final words. They arranged themselves in
order from the most brilliant pupil to the most obtuse. The
brilliant one bent over the prostrate form and whispered, "Rabbi,
rabbi. What are your final words?"
"My final words," murmured the ancient, "are... life is a river."
The disciple passed it on to the fellow next to him and the phrase
traveled like wildlife down the line. "The rabbi says life is a
river."... "The rabbi says life is a river."... "The rabbi says life
is a river."
When it reached the oaf at the end, however, he scratched his
head in perplexity. "What does the rabbi mean, life is a river?"
he asked. That question, of course, traveled back up the line.
"What does the rabbi mean, life is a river?" "What does the rabbi
mean, life is a river?"
When the star pupil heard it, he leaned over again. "Rabbi," he
implored, for the old man was breathing his last, "What do you
mean, life is a river?"

254
APPENDICES
And the wise one, shrugging, croaked, "So it's not a river!"
(Mindess, 1971, 32-33)
A202 A little Jew in Hitler's Germany brushes by a Nazi officer,
knocking him off balance. "Schwein!" roars the Nazi, clicking
his heels imperiously. To which the Jew, undaunted, makes a low
bow and replies, "Cohen. Pleased to meet you." (Mindess, 1971,
45)
A203 The doctor's wife is unable to sleep because the toilet is dripping.
So she has her husband call the plumber in the middle of the
night. After listening to the problem on the phone, the plumber
grumpily declares, "But it's 2 a.m.!"
"So what?" replies the doctor. "If your child was sick, wouldn't
you call me?"
"Yes," mumbles the plumber. "You're right. So I'll tell you what
to do. Throw a couple of aspirins into the bowl and, if it doesn't
get better by morning, call me again." (Mindess, 1971, 46)
A204 A little Negro girl smears her face with white cold cream.
Running to her mother in the kitchen, she exclaims, "Mommy,
Mommy, look at me!" The mother replies with an angry "Get
that gunk off your face!" The child scurries to her father, but the
same interchange occurs. Downcast and pouting, she returns to
the bathroom, muttering, "I haven't been white for more than
five minutes and already I hate two niggers." (Mindess, 1971,47)
A205 "Are you a psychiatrist?"
"Why do you ask?"
"You are a psychiatrist." (Mindess, 1971, 107)
A206 A young priest, aflame with excitement, came running into the
study of an elder colleague. *'Come quick! Come quick!" he
exclaimed. "To the nave. Jesus Christ Himself is at the altar!"
The two priests hurried to the church and, sure enough, the Lord
Himself knelt there in prayer. "What shall we do?" the younger
man asked in perplexity. The elder, shielding his mouth with his
fingers, whispered simply, "Look busy." (Mindess, 1971, 133)
A207 "Women libbers are okay, I guess - but would you want your
sister to marry one?" (Mindess, 1979, 199)
A208 Postcard message from a patient to his analyst. "Dear doctor,
Having a wonderful time. Wish you were here to tell me why."
(Mindess, 1971, 227)
A209 The tenants' committee of an apartment block in Moscow

ADDITIONAL JOKE EXAMPLES
255
discusses various problems. Suddenly the janitor raises his
hand, "When fucking shit, then fucking shit, but when real
fucking shit, then not a prick!" "I agree entirely with what
Nikolai Ivanovich just said," says the chairman. "When we go
to a free picnic then everybody shows up, but when we need
volunteers to clean up the yard, nobody is there." (Soviet,
1960's)
A210 An old man is invited to meet with a group of young pioneers.
His claim to fame is that he was the last to see the great Red hero
of the Civil War, General Chapayev, alive. The children, very
excited, ask him to tell them everything he remembers about it.
"Well," he says, "it was over 50 years ago but I remember it very
well. I am on the river bank firing my machine gun. The enemy
is retreating in great haste. Suddenly I see Chapayev in the river
swimming across the fastest he can. And my sergent shouts to
me, 'Nick, this is the chance of your entire career. Don't miss it
- aim right at his head!" (Soviet, 1960's)
A211 Another Civil War hero, Marshall Budenny, is recalling a very
tough battle, "And here I am beginning to suspect that they are
surrounding us. I look out from the trench, look North - fuck
your mother! Look South - motherfuckers! Look West -
motherfucking pricks! Look East - a hundred pricks into your
mother's cunt!" An admiring voice from the audience, "What a
memory!" (Soviet, 1950's)
A212 A police car is cruising a neighborhood in downtown Moscow.
Suddenly, the policemen see a man with an axe in his hand, and
something red is dripping from it. One of the policemen shouts,
"Hey, you! Come here." When the man approaches, the
policeman asks him, "What is it in your hand?" "Can't you see? An
axe, what else?" "And what is this red stuff on it?" "Blood, what
else?" "And how did it get there?" "How could it get there? I just
killed an old woman?" "Where?" "Around the corner." "Why
did you do it?" "How do you mean, why? Are you stupid, or
what? For money, that's why." "And how much money did she
have?" "10 kopecks." "You mean, you killed a human being for
10 kopecks?!" "So what, ten old women, ten kopecks each - and
you've got yourself a whole ruble!" (Soviet, 1976)
A213 The teacher in a high school literature class asks one of the
students, "Who wrote Eugene OneginT "Not me," answers the

256
APPENDICES
boy. Enraged, the teacher invites the boy's father for a talk.
When he relates the episode to the father the latter says
hesitantly, "Sir, I do know that Alexander has been giving you trouble
lately. But as to that Onegin business, maybe he did not write
it after all, just like he says. Anyway, even if he did, I promise
to you he will never do it again!" (Russian, 1890's)
A214 The Israeli minister David Levy is at a party in a New York
apartment block. Suddenly he heads for the door long before the
party is over. An aide intercepts him and asks, "What's the
matter, Dudu? Where are you going?" "To the roof." "Why?"
"Oh, I just heard that there are sandwiches on the house."
(Israeli, 1979)
A215 At a party, the conversation turned to euthanasia. "I am all for
it," said an elderly lady. "When my late husband found out that
he was dying of leukemia, he had to commit suicide. It would
have been much nicer with euthanasia." "But how come you
collected his life insurance, Edith?" asked the hostess. "The
insurance companies don't usually pay up when it's a suicide."
"Oh, Bob was a very intelligent man. We lived in Boston at the
time. All he did was to go down the subway, and when he found
himself on a very crowded platform in between trains, he shouted
very loudly, "Does everyone know that the Pope is gay?"
(American, 20th century)
A216 The Federal Government is handing over many of its programs
to the states. One of the affected programs is "The Voice of
America." No more propaganda on the radio. But every farmer
in South Dakota will be obligated to get on top of his silo and
to shout with all his might, "Russia sucks!" (Johnny Carson's
monologue, NBC, January 1982)
A217 There is a long line in front of a building in Moscow. Suddenly
the door opens and an authoritative voice announces,
"Comrades, disperse! We won't have time to execute everybody today,
anyway." (Soviet, 1978)
A218 While taking my noon walk today, I had more morbid thoughts.
What is it about death that bothers me so much? Probably the
hours. (Allen, 1976, 10)
A219 Should I marry W.? Not if she won't tell me the other letters in
h<?r name. (Allen, 1976, 8)
A220 Today I saw a red-and-yellow sunset and thought, How insigni-

ADDITIONAL JOKE EXAMPLES
257
ficant I am. Of course, I thought that yesterday, too, and it
rained. (Allen, 1976, 9)
A221 Because of a minor medical emergency, a super-cool dyke finds.
herself seeking the services of a male gynecologist.
"I need to ask a few questions," he says. "What is your method
of birth control?"
"My present method is Norma."
"I haven't heard of that - is it an oral contraceptive?"
"Well, sometimes." (Kaufman and Blakeley, 1980, 33)
A222 "I wish men never made passes at girls who wear glasses." (Ellen
Levine's cartoon, Kaufman and Blakeley, 1980, 107)
A223 "Mummy, I don't want to go to Japan! I like it here, in
Vancouver."
"Don't talk so much - swim!" (Canadian, 1950's)
A224 Gina: Are you saying the universe is finite?
Kleinman: I'm not saying anything. I don't want to get involved.
(Allen, 1976, 78)
A225 Gina: Well, I'm a prostitute.
Kleinman: No kidding. Gee, I never met one before... I thought
you'd be taller. (Allen, 1976, 76)

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SUBJECT INDEX
The Index covers the Preface, Chapters 1 - 7 with the exception of the joke
examples there, and the Afterword.
Many entries in the Index contain indented subentries and doubly
indented subsubentries, which reflect accurately the involved conceptual
structures. As a result, however, certain terms are not listed directly and should
be looked for under a more general term. The entries for 'humor,' 'joke,' and
'script' have the largest numbers of sub- and subsubentries, and many
related terms can be found under one of those large entries. Thus, for
instance, 'humor act as a function' is listed under 'humor,' and within this
entry, under 'act.'
The page numbers may refer to the occurrences of each item both in the
listed form and in its various conceptually equivalent modifications. As a
rule, the page number for a more general term is not listed if the term occurs
within a more specific term on that page.
aesthetics xiv, 6, 13-4
allusion 42, 44, 46-7, 54, 72, 75, 97, 101, 113, 117, 136-9, 144, 148, 151, 157, 161, 165, 167,
188, 222, 227, 229, 231-3, 235-7, 243, 245.
ambiguity xiii, 44,60-1,63-5,79-80,85-7,91,98,100-2,114-6,121-3,126,128,131,142-3,175
deliberate xiii, 115, 131, 146
anecdote 29, 130, 184
anthropology 81
anti-Semitism, see also as specific script of Jewish humor 25, 207, 210-3, 220, 231, 235-6
appendix xv, 7, 112, 117, 133, 137-8.
artificial intelligence 81
automaton 35, 43, 65
chastushka 170-2, 175-7, 179, 224
obscene 171-2
Russian 170-2
cliche 75, 138
cognitive structure 81, 96
comic 6, 8, 10, 12-3, 15, 19-20, 26-30, 35-6, 38-9, 42, 128, 181
common sense 45, 72, 81, 98, 105, 185, 216
communication 14, 16, 35, 37, 58, 88, 94, 104, 115, 131, 137, 141, 145, 237
bona-fldey see mode of communication, bona-flde
mode of, see mode of communication
268

SUBJECT INDEX
269
competence, see also humor competence 2-3, 49-51, 58-9, 66, 92, 177-8, 180, 207, 221
conjecture 75
context xiv, 12, 25, 51, 61-5, 67, 72, 80, 87, 89, 92, 102, 152, 182, 231, 241, 245
discourse 5, 63, 71, 87, 90-1, 94, 104, 108, 146
linguistic 5
situational 5, 34
conundrum 23, 26, 29, 102, 146
conversational postulate 74
Cyrillic 7 xvii
default value 123, 125
education 81
enablement 54
entailment 75,97, 134, 185
epigram 29, 152
ethnic humor xv, 147, 164, 180-2, 184-5, 189, 191, 194, 199-203, 205-7, 209-10, 222, 230
criterion of 207, 209, 220
collectivity 207, 209
interchangeability 206-7, 209
ethnic script 198, 202, 204, 206-7, 209, 230
specific 180-1, 183-6, 188-9, 191, 193-9, 201-5, 209-2, 231-2
contemptuous 198-9
of arrogance 199
of asexuality 197-8
of beer loving 198
. of blind obedience 197, 231
of bravado 198
of cowardice 210
of craftiness 180, 191-2,231
of cunningness 180, 191, 194, 201, 210-2
of dumbness 180, 185-6, 188-9, 194-5, 201, 205, 211, 231-2, 234, 237, 239
of efficiency 197
of financial enterprise 199
of ineptness in romance 198
of irreverence 198, 231
of lack of savoir-vivre 198
of language distortion 180-5
of methodicity 197
of national superiority 180, 202-5, 241
of oversexed minority 156, 194-5
of respect for tradition 198
of stinginess 180, 189-91, 194, 201, 210-2
of stuffiness 197
of uncleanliness 211
of zoophylic tendencies 199
extralexical information 68-9, 71, 73-6

270
SUBJECT INDEX
extralinguistic situation 5, 34, 63, 66, 80, 87
frame 81, 126
funny xiii, 1-3, 5-8,12,14-5,18,26-8, 34-5, 39,42-3,46-7, 51, 53-8,99-102,113,117,130,132,
144-5, 147, 150, 199, 247
funny stimulus, see stimulus of humor act
gag 11,29
graph 81, 84-5, 118, 120, 135
domain of 81-6, 118, 120, 123
lexical node in 81-6, 88, 90, 120-3, 125, 221
semantic link in 81-4, 88, 118, 135, 221
subdomain of 118
homonymy 113, 115, 141-2, 151, 184
hostility 11,21-2,36-7
humor/humour xiii-xv, xviii, 1-43, 45-47, 51, 53-4, 56-9, 67, 72, 80, 84, 92, 98-9, 102-4, 114,
127-32, 137, 139-44, 147, 149, 164, 170, 175, 177, 179, 199-200, 211, 215, 237, 247
absurdity in 2, 15, 34, 41-2, 128, 131, 202, 212
acquired 2
act 1,3-6, 14-7,40
as a function 5
experience of 4-6, 15, 39, 64, 72, 81, 129-30
felicitous 5
formal definition of 1, 5-6
hearer of 3-6, 10, 12-6, 18, 25-6, 40, 54, 57-8, 100-4, 113, 115, 123, 129-31, 141-5, 154,
161, 171, 177, 180, 182, 186, 189, 193, 202, 207
psychology of 4-6, 16, 20-1, 129
shared experience of 6, 54, 56, 76, 129, 144
situation of 1-2, 4-6, 13-4, 16, 30-2, 129-30, 141, 143-5, 160, 244
society of 1, 3, 5-6, 10-1, 17, 23-4, 43, 129-30
speaker of 3-6, 10, 12, 14-6, 18, 25-7, 40, 54, 57-8, 100-4, 113, 115, 123, 129-31, 134-5,
140-4, 154, 164, 171, 177-8, 180-2, 186, 189, 193, 202, 206-7, 221
stimulus of 2-6, 13, 15-6,40
substitute hearer of 3
substitute speaker of 3
and freedom 9, 38-9
and iconoclasticity 9, 18, 34, 229
and mental health 9
and non-conformism 9, 18
and physical fitness 9
and playfulness 9, 13, 37, 128, 141
as liberation 38-9
as social corrective 17, 24, 144
bad 1,9,247
classification of, see taxonomy of humor
college 247
competence 2-3, 14, 51, 58

SUBJECT INDEX
condition 1, 11-5, 18-9, 128
dark 247
definition 1, 5-8
ethnic, see ethnic humor
evolution of 1, 19,21,24,29, 37
good 9, 164, 247
international conference on xiv, xviii
introduction to xiii-xiv
Jewish, see Jewish humor
linguistics of xiv, 1
national 24, 200
natural 2, 27-8
nature of 9, 41
non-verbal 26, 141
nonsense in, see absurdity in humor
object of 29
absurdity as, see absurdity in humor
breach of order as 15, 30
breach of rule as 15
deviation as 15
disaster as 15
discomfiture as 15, 20, 24, 36
distress as 15
failing as, see fault as object of humor
fault as 15, 36-7
incongruity as 15, 30-3
indecency as 15, 30, 40, 42
novelty as 15
obscenity as 15
pretense as 15, 24
small misfortune as 15, 22, 30, 36-7, 144, 207
verbal play as 15
vice as 15
want of knowledge as 15, 30
want of skill as 15, 30
performance 3
period 24
physiology of 1, 19-20, 37, 140
political, see political humor
popularity of 10
prohibition 23
psychology of 1, 19-21
repression 23, 26, 28, 31, 38-40, 132, 148
research xiv, 1, 4, 6-10, 31, 39-41, 43, 45, 53-4, 59, 237
basic idea of xiv
concept of xiv
linguistic approach to xiv

272
SUBJECT INDEX
main problem of xiv, 53-4
object of 46
problem of xiv, 54
school 247
self-disparaging 22, 25, 143-4, 176, 211, 213, 215, 220
semantic mechanisms of 104, 200
sense of 2-3, 10-1, 14, 38-9, 58, 105, 128, 142
children's 4, 20-1, 24
sexual, see sexual humor
sick 247
social function of, see humor as social corrective
sports 247
suppression, see repression
taxonomy of 1, 6, 8, 24, 26, 28-31, 33-4, 43-4, 112-3, 131
toilet 247
universality of 2, 5, 15, 194
verbal xiii-xix, 3, 6, 18, 21, 23-4, 27-8, 41, 43, 45-6, 51, 58, 67, 98-100, 129, 139, 147, 161,
247
ideal speaker-hearer community 16, 58, 134
idiolect 64, 182
implicature 54-7, 64, 74-5, 80, 92, 95, 101
inference 65-6, 75, 90, 122-4, 126, 136, 141, 253
probable 90, 122, 124, 126
inferiority 18
infinite regress 56
Jewish humor 22, 25, 166, 191, 195, 206, 209-15, 217, 219-20, 235
specific script of 195, 209-10, 219-21, 231
anti-Semitism 195, 207, 210-3, 219-20
Jewish American Princess 218
Jewish irreverence 216
Jewish logic 214-6
Jewish wife 218
Jews vs. Goyim 219-20
pogrom 213
smartness 210-2, 214
wise fool 215
Yiddische mamma 212, 221
joke xiii, xv-xviii, 2, 4-8, 10-4, 16-9, 23-9, 31-4, 36-9, 41-3, 46-7, 54-6, 89, 97, 99-108, 111-8,
125-7, 129-34, 136-8, 140-52, 154-8, 160-1, 163-8, 170, 177-8, 180-9, 191-5, 199-207,
209-14, 216, 219-20, 222-4, 226-37, 239-47
aggressive 20-1, 24, 28
blasphemous 28
book xv-xvi, 47, 164, 199, 206-7, 210, 220
canned 1£ 27, 34, 140, 144

SUBJECT INDEX
273
-carrying text 44-5, 92
semantic property of xiii, 44, 57
compound 134
condition for text to be funny 99-100, 103, 147
necessary xiii, 11, 15, 47, 56-7, 99-100, 147
sufficient xiii, 11, 15, 47, 56-7, 99-100, 147
Congress-page 247
construction of 99, 139-40, 143, 147, 150
critical 28
cynical 28
dead-cat 247
dirty xvi, 23, 148
double-entendre 44, 151, 165
dumb 185-8,201
elementary 46-7, 136
elephant 247
ethnic 164, 180-9, 191-4, 199-207, 209, 220, 234, 239
pseudo- 180, 205-7
reverse national superiority 205
example xv-xvii, 1,7,24-6,32,37,40,43,47,107-8,111-7,126,132,136,146,149-51,154-5,
157-60, 163, 170, 172, 176, 179, 181-2, 184-5, 187-90, 195, 197, 202-6. 210. 212. 214.
216, 219-21, 223, 225, 229-30, 234-5, 237, 241, 243-4
hostile, see aggressive
individual 2
innocent 28
knock-knock 116
lawyers 200
Little-Audrey 247
logical structure of 41
making 139-42, 144
marital 148
medical 200
mother-in-law 148
multiple 45, 133-4
non- xiii
obscene 28, 138
offensive xvi
political 23, 164, 222, 226-7, 229, 232, 256-7, 239-44
-presenting technique 18, 29-30, 43-4, 143-6,
primitive 21-2, 24, 152, 177, 179, 223
private 2
semantic type of xvi
sexual 138, 156-7, 164, 177, 201, 207, 224
simple 99, 112, 116-7, 151, 160, 182
single 45, 99, 112
situation 16, 27, 140
sophisticated 46, 112-3, 132, 137-8, 160, 164, 166, 186-7

274
SUBJECT INDEX
structure of 1, 19, 30,41
suddenness in 19, 23, 31, 33, 36-7, 42, 146
surprise in, see suddenness
tasteless xvi
tendentious 28, 40
verbal xiv, 5-6, 16, 19, 53, 148
intended 6, 16, 27, 100, 102-3, 115, 140, 144-5
unintended 14, 16, 27, 30, 100, 102, 140, 144
vulgar xvi
Watergate 247
knowledge 62, 66, 68, 72, 76, 134-7
encyclopedic 62-6, 68, 72, 81, 97, 134-6, 177-8, 180, 188, 193, 199, 233, 235
linguistic 64-6, 129
of language, see linguistic knowledge
of the world, see encyclopedic knowledge
language xvii, 2-3, 21-2, 27,42-3,46, 52, 63, 65-8, 76-8, 81, 92, 95, 98, 118, 129, 133-5, 152-3,
181-5, 194,200,207
non-sexist xvii
laughter 1-4, 6, 8-14, 17-24, 26-8, 31-3, 35-40, 42-3, 55, 101, 103, 127-8, 137
suppression 22, 39
lexical entry 76, 80-2, 118, 120-1, 135, 177
linguistic application xiii-xiv, 45, 51, 52-4, 56, 58, 67, 79-80, 98, 100, 136
goal of 45
method-oriented 53, 56
problem-oriented 53
source field in 51-3
target field in 51-3
technique of 45
linguistic heuristics 97-8
linguistic theory xiii, 47-51, 67, 69, 76, 79, 92-3, 97, 139
ad hoc 93, 95-6
adequacy of 48, 79, 87, 92-3
descriptive 49-50, 92-3
explanatory 49, 93
feasibility of 67, 96-8, 112, 139
idealization in 58
justification of 48, 50-1, 59, 92-8
linguistic theory of humor, see also semantic theory of humor 45-7, 51, 139
basic assumption of 45
format of 45, 51
principle of 45
research paradigm of 45
malice 36
mathematical linguistics 52

SUBJECT INDEX
275
meaning xii, 1,5,7-8,20,34,44,59,61-9,72-9, 82, 89,91-2,98,108,112,115,121, 130,142-3,
151-2, 161,71, 175, 184
by collocation 77
conventional 64, 74
intended 63-4, 115, 154
literal 54,64,74,94-5, 130, 152
of phrase 120
of sentence 59, 65-8, 71, 76-7, 79-80, 93, 120
of word 65, 67-8, 76-9, 142
meaning postulate 69
meaningfulness 50, 54, 72, 77, 92, 107, 112, 128, 130, 142
mechanical symbol-manipulation device (MSMD) 58
mental mechanism (underlying language) 50, 92
metaphor 92, 95
mode of communication 15,55,88,91-2,100-2,104,107,113,115,117, 123,125,128-30, 141,
144, 146, 175
ambuguity of 102
bona-fide xiv, 55, 88, 91, 94, 99-104, 107, 113, 115, 123, 125, 128-31, 140, 145-6
cooperative principle of xiv, 94, 103-4, 128-9, 131, 146
maxim in xiv, 102-5, 123
maxim of manner in 103
maxim of quality in 103
maxim of quantity in 103
maxim of relation in 101, 103
humorous 15, 102, 132
cooperative principle of 104
maxim in 102-5, 115
maxim of manner in 103
maxim of quality in 103
maxim of quantity in 103
maxim of relation in 103
non-bona-fide 91-2, 101-4, 125, 129, 140
joke telling as xiv, 27, 33, 99-104, 107, 115, 125, 128, 131, 140-1, 145, 175-6
lying as 55,89, 101, 104, 113, 125
play acting as 89, 101, 104
non-humorous 101
model 16, 49, 51, 58-60, 67, 72, 84, 92
native speaker xiii, xvii, 45-51, 57-60, 62-4, 67, 69, 74, 78-84, 87, 92, 96, 101, 105, 129, 134-5,
142, 177-8, 180-2, 193,200,221
intuition 48-50, 58-60
obvious context 64, 87, 102, 141
ontogeny 21
ontology 56, 58, 113-4

276
SUBJECT INDEX
paraphrase 60, 64, 73, 79, 86, 89, 108
parody 138, 152, 161, 181-2, 203, 205, 208, 245
performance, see also humor performance 3, 93, 95
philosophy xiv, 6, 38, 75, 132, 138
of language 74-5
phonetic similarity 113, 181-2
phylogeny 21
play 7, 19-20, 28, 35-6, 42, 46, 104
poetics 53
political humor xv, 114, 222-3, 227, 230, 232, 247
Soviet, see Soviet political humor
denigration 222-231, 237, 240
political exposure 222, 230-7, 244-5
political script 199, 204, 237
specific 223-7, 226-30, 232-5, 237, 240, 242-6
denigrating a political figure 223-6, 227, 232, 235, 237
denigrating a political idea or slogan 229-30, 240
denigrating a political group or institution 227-8, 235, 237
exposure of national trait 230-1
exposure of political repression 232-4, 242
exposure of shortage 234-5, 243-4
exposure of specific political situation 244-6
polysemy 44, 63, 113, 115, 118, 141-2, 184, 206
possible world 34, 55-7, 75, 80, 106, 160
pragmatics 61, 65-6, 92, 139
presupposition 51, 54, 56-7, 69-70, 73, 75, 80, 90, 92, 114, 122-3, 129, 134, 138, 141
conceptual 70
logical 54, 70-1
pragmatic 54, 70
probable 90, 122-3
shared 54, 56, 75-6, 129-30
previous discourse 71-3, 90, 121
psychology xiv, 5-6, 16, 19, 21, 31-3, 35, 37-40, 50, 64, 78, 81, 130, 140, 193, 237
pun 23, 26, 41, 44, 46, 116-7, 141-2, 184, 206
punch line 18, 33-4, 42, 131, 145-6
reference xvi-xvii, 7-8, 10, 21, 34, 54-5, 68, 75, 77, 87, 89, 100, 102, 118, 121, 140-1, 148
internal xvii
research strategy 16, 45, 53, 117
riddle 23, 26, 29, 32, 146
ridicule 11, 22, 24, 27, 29, 37, 207, 228-9, 240, 244
affectionate 22, 25
deliberate 22, 24
schema 81
script xiii, xvi, 16,40,46,59,80-2,84-9,100,104-8,112-3,117-8,120-1,125-47,160-4,175-180,
192, 200, 202, 207, 221

SUBJECT INDEX
277
analysis xiii, 16, 19, 32, 42, 117-8, 125-6, 130-4, 136, 139, 146-7, 149, 152, 191, 205, 211
atemporal 126
compatible with text 91, 99, 106, 115-6, 118, 120-1, 123, 125-6, 140
fully xiii, 99, 104
partially xiii, 99, 104
elementary 136
ethnic, see ethnic script
fictional, see mythological
Jewish, see Jewish humor
marked 89, 91, 118
meta- 139
mythological 68, 177-8, 180-1, 193, 195
non-elementary 134-6, 138
non-sexual 127, 149, 151, 154, 156, 160-4
oppositenessxiii-xiv,xvi,42,46,99-100,103,107-8,111-4,117-8,125-7,130-4,136-7,140-7,
149-50, 152, 154-8, 160-8, 170, 1,5-81, 185-6, 188, 207, 219-25, 229, 231-2, 235
abnormal state of affairs in 111-2, 127-8, 133, 155-7, 165, 168, 180
actual situation in 111-2, 117, 127, 143, 161, 180
auxiliary trigger of 115
binary category of 113-4, 156
contradiction trigger of 114, 116-7
diagnostic construction in 111
dichotomizing trigger of 117
essential category of 113-4, 127, 161, 180
figurative-ambiguity trigger of 115
impossible situation in 111-2, 115, 127, 155, 161, 180
instructions for 125-7
non-actual situation in 111-12, 115, 117, 127, 143, 155, 161, 180
normal state of affairs in 111-2, 127, 133, 155-7, 165, 176, 178, 180
obvious trigger of 141
possible situation in 34, 111-2, 127, 155, 161, 180
potential trigger of 142, 147
quintessential category of, see essential category of
real situation in 108, 111-4, 117, 127, 149
regular-ambiguity trigger of 114
semantic script-switch trigger of, see trigger of
sexually obscene trigger of 157, 177, 179
situational-ambiguity trigger of 116
syntactic-ambiguity trigger of 116, 142
trigger of 99, 111-2, 114-7, 124, 131, 140-3, 146, 149-51, 161, 163, 167, 179, 184
unreal situation in 108, 111-4, 127, 131, 141, 149, 212
overlap 32, 46, 99-101, 103, 105, 107, 123, 14>
full 99-100, 105, 107
partial 99-100, 105-7, 117, 132
political, see political script
scenario as 126-7
sexual, see sexual script

278
SUBJECT INDEX
specific 83, 86, 88-90, 105-6, 114, 120-1, 126, 133
of celibacy 201
of doctor 85, 99, 104-5, 117, 121, 126-7
of lover 85, 99, 104-5, 117, 126-7
temporal 126
unmarked 89-91, 118, 120-3
script-based semantic theory xiv, 58-9, 67, 79-80, 86, 93-5, 97-9, 104, 126, 132, 139, 147
combinatorial rule in xiv, 59, 76, 79-80, 85-93, 104, 118, 120-6
introduction to xiv
lexicon in 79-80, 82-3, 94, 97-9, 118, 129-30, 134, 139
world information in 90, 123-4
semantic analysis xiii, xvi, 84, 92
semantic anomaly 60, 80, 91, 94-5
semantic competence 66, 177-8, 180, 200, 221
semantic feature, see semantic property
semantic information 81-4, 90-1, 94-5, 177, 179
semantic interpretation 59-61, 68, 76, 79-80, 86, 88-93, 98, 107, 118, 126, 134
semantic normalcy 60
semantic performance 66, 84, 92-93, 95
semantic property xiii, 44, 58, 68, 78, 149, 180, 211
semanlic recursion 5, 71-4, 80, 82, 121-2
trigger in 71-4, 121-2
semantic theory xiii-xiv, 54-5, 58-62, 64, 69, 71-3, 76-7, 79-80, 82-6, 92-3, 97, 132
anti-contextual 61
contextual xiv, 59, 61, 67
dictionary in 65, 67-9, 76-8, 82-3
format of 59, 67, 69, 76, 95
formal xiii-xiv, 8, 60, 67, 76, 79-80, 82
goal of 59, 67, 117
introduction to xiv
projection rule in 67, 69, 76, 89
script-based, see script-based semantic theory
setting in 61-2, 64-5, 77, 79, 111-2
semantic theory of humor xiii, 57-8, 99, 127
counterexample to 99-100, 132, 134, 136, 139
main hypothesis of 99-100, 103|, 107, 117, 125, 131-2, 134, 139, 149
script-based xiv, 40, 99, 131-2, 147, 149, 207, 210
semantics xiii, xviii, 44, 51, 59-61, 65-6, 68, 77-8, 98, 121, 126, 139, 212, 221, 227, 235
autonomous 66
contextual xiv, 59, 61, 63, 67
generative 61, 65, 69, 77
interpretive 61, 65, 68-9, 76, 80
non-autonomous 66
sentence xiii, 5,48-51,54,60-4,66-72,74-7,79-80, 82, 84-95,98,100,102,105-6,114-5,116-8,
121-3, 126, 131, 133-5, 137, 142, 188
deviant 60, 79-80, 91,94-5
eternal 72

SUBJECT INDEX
279
grammatically of 48-51, 60, 63, 92
in isolation 59, 62-3, 98
meaningful, see meaningfulness
non-circumstantial 72
non-indexical 72
well-formedness of, see grammaticality of
sexual humor xv, 114, 148-52, 154-6, 158, 160-1, 164, 167, 170, 177-80, 247
explicitly 148-9, 158, 160-2, 164-5, 167, 170
range of 148
sexual intercourse 148, 156, 172, 198
sexual script 106, 115, 149-50, 152, 154, 157, 160-1, 164-5, 168, 177, 180
specific 149, 154-7, 161, 165, 170, 177-80, 195
of forbidden sex 158, 168, 176, 179, 195
of genital size 155-8, 165, 167, 176, 178, 194
of sexual exposure 156, 167, 178, 225
of sexual ignorance or inexperience 166-7, 176, 178, 195-6
of sexual prowess 156, 168, 178, 194
sexual/non-sexual opposition 149, 152, 154-6, 160, 163-5, 175-7, 180, 224, 238
explicit 149, 154, 175
implicit 149, 160, 163-4, 177
implied, see implicit
overt, see explicit
sociology xiv, 6, 16-7, 81, 140, 193, 237
Soviet political humor 223, 237, 239-40
speech act 3, 55-8, 74
felicitous 5, 101
indirect 74-5
joke-making 55
theory 56
stand-up comedian xiv, 6, 9, 12, 135, 140, 143-5, 181-2, 226
standard theory 66, 77, 94
extended (EST) 66, 68
revised extended (REST) 66, 68
statistics 52-3
stereotype, see also mythological script 27, 39, 102, 138, 156, 177, 180-1, 200, 204, 207
sublanguage 98
syntactic structure 88, 120
text 6, 28,44-8, 51, 56-8, 77, 84, 89,97-101, 104-7, 113-8, 120-1, 123-33, 140-2, 146-7, 149-50,
152, 156, 160-1, 171, 175-7, 181, 205, 212
theory xiii-xv, 15,30-1,36-8,40,43,45-6,48-9,51-4,57-8,67-8,98-9,123-4,127,130-2,139-40,
147, 149, 247
linguistic, see linguistic theory
of humor, see theory of humor
semantic, see semantic theory
theory of humor 1, 15, 29-31, 35, 37-8, 40-1, 45, 131-2, 139-40, 149, 175
arousal-safety 40

280
SUBJECT INDEX
disparagement-based 31, 37-8, 131, 202
dispositional 37
formal 1
goal of xiii, 41, 44-5, 59
incongruity-based 15, 31-6, 40, 43, 105, 131, 245
individual-independent 16, 200-1
informal 99
linguistic, see linguistic theory of humor
release-based 9, 12, 19-22, 31, 38-40, 131-2, 148-9
semantic, see semantic theory of humor
superiority 10, 18, 23, 31, 36-8, 40
vicarious superiority 37
translation xvi-xvii, 65, 172
automatic 65
English xvii
transliteration xvii
system of xvii
British/American xvii
European xvii
Israeli xvii
wisecrack 29
wit 7-8, 10-11, 21, 23-4, 26-8, 32, 37, 42

NAME INDEX
This Index covers the Preface, Chapters 1-7, the Afterword, and the
Appendices. The texts of the joke examples in the chapters are not indexed, and
a name from a joke appears below only if repeated in the main text.
The Index includes the names of people, real and fictitious, and of non-
political institutions. Generally, only the surnames are listed for people;
there are initials in parentheses if necessary for proper identification.
Abelson 81
Allen 138, 257
Almanac Press xix
Alston 78
Aristotle 36
Armstrong 38
Aubouin 27, 30, 40-42, 130
Austin 5, 55
Bain 36
Bar-Hillel 61, 65, 69, 72
Bartlett 81
Bateson 36, 81
Beattie 28, 32
Benveniste 77-8
Bergler 30
Bergson 6, 11, 13-4, 17, 24, 27, 34-5, 37-8,
43, 130-1, 144
Berlyne 36
Bishop 25
Blakeley 26, 257
Blokor 10
Bloomfield 66-7, 78
Borev 11, 13-4
Breal 77
Breton 137
Brezhnev 182,225,237
Buchwald 228
Buck 77
Burns 135
Butz 194
Cantor 37
Carnap 68, 75
Carson 12, 102, 136, 146, 150, 256
Chafe xviii, 81
Chandler 24
Chapman 20, 30
Charniak 81
Chernyshevsky 10
Chesterfield 10
Chomsky 3,16,47-50,60,66-7,45-6,92,94,
97, 134
Cicero 36
Christie 181
Colby 81
Cooper 54, 70
Cresswell 75
Croce 6
Dangerfield 12, 144
Darmesteter 77
Darwin 9, 14, 19-21,31,33,37-8
Daskal xix
Davies xviii-xix, 180-1, 186, 189, 193, 201,
239
Deerwester xviii
Dijk, van 75
Dolia-Popov 46
Dostoyevsky 138
Draitser 26, 239, 243
Dreyfus 54
Dumas 20
281

282
NAME INDEX
Eastman 7, 9, 19, 27, 30, 33, 39, 103
Eliza 96
Elizabeth, Queen 224
Ellis 19
Emeneau 98
Esar 25-6, 28-9, 44-7, 248-52
Eysenck 200
Haddad 37
Harris 77
Hazlitt 2, 32, 36, 127-8, 130
Hebrew University of Jerusalem xviii
Hegel 36
Hercules 156
Hill 77
Hitler 225
Hobbes 36
Homer 24
Hugh 181
Hughes 74
Huizinga 13, 36, 104, 128
Hunt 137
Indiana University xviii
Ingberg xviii
Jackendoflf 66-7
Jarrard xviii
Jean-Paul, see Richter
Kabronsky 171-2, 179
Kant 31, 33, 40
Karttunen 129
Katz 60-7, 69, 76, 80, 86, 89
Kaufman 26, 257
Keenan 54, 70
Keith-Spiegel 21, 30
Kempson 55,61, 101
Khrushchev 24
Kiparsky (C.) 70
Kiparsky (P.) 70
Kissinger 181,224
Kline 38
Kripke 75
La Fave 37
Lakoff50, 61,70, 74
Larsen 225, 227-8, 230, 232-6
Latorre xviii
Leacock 7-10,13-5,22,28,41,43, 131,211
Legman xix, 26, 55, 158-9, 191
Lenin 13, 204, 224-5, 232, 240, 244
Levine (E.) 257
Levine(J.)6, 31, 131
Levy 137
Lewis 75
Little xix, 223
Locke 32
Lokke xviii
Ludovici 9, 18, 21, 24, 30, 37, 129
Lyons 61, 108
Falstaff 25
Fathman 21
Fields 6
Fillmore 84
Firth 77
Fischer 36-7
Fluellyn 181
Fodor (J. A.) 60-4, 66-7, 69, 76, 86, 89
Fodor (J. D.) 61
Foot 20, 30
Foss 31
Franz Joseph 225
Fraser xviii
Freedle 81
Frege 69
Freud 12-3, 16, 18, 25, 27-8, 32, 36-8, 40,
43-4, 54, 101, 103, 128, 130, 142, 215
Fries 78
Fry xviii, 7-9,12-4,17-20,27,33,35-6,41-2,
101, 104, 128, 131, 140, 143, 146
Gardiner 79
Garvin 53
Goffman 81
Gordon 74
Gorelov 170
Gregory 38
Greig 12, 16,21,30,40, 148
Grice xiv, 55, 64, 74, 88, 94, 101, 103, 105
Grotjahn 9, 13-4, 24
Gruner21, 29

NAME INDEX
283
Maclay 61
Maesen 37
Mandel xviii
Marx 13
Mayakovsky 240
McCawley 51,61,92
McGhee 20-1, 33,40
Meir 225
Mel'cuk 84
Menon 4
Mindess xix, 7,9,18,22,25,30, 34-5, 38-9,
41-2,45, 131,211
Minsky 81
Mintz xviii, 39, 193
Monro 4, 7, 20, 30-2, 34, 38-9, 130-1
Morgan 74
Moscow State University 184
Mussolini 225, 230
National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC)
136, 139,256
National Endowment for the Humanities
(NEH) xviii
Nerhardt 32
Neufeldt xviii
New Yorker 137
Nida 66
Nilsen xviii
Nirenburg xviii
Nixon 102, 135
Novak 193,213,215-8,220
Ogden 7, 77
Onegin 137
Orben 106, 252-3
Oreovicz xviii
Palmer xviii
Paperny xviii
Parker 138
Pascal 43
Paul 77
Paulos 14, 34, 39
Penjon 38
Peter, Saint 111
Peters 129
Piaget 21
Piddington 30
Pien 33
Pilon 21
Pirandello 28
Plato 15
Playboy 165
Pocheptzov 55, 106
Poirot 181
Polovets xix
Popper 132
Postal 66
Preminger 170
Prentice 21
Public Broadcasting System (PBS) 137
Purdue Research Foundation xix
Purdue University xviii-xix, 135
Pushkin 152
Quine 72
Rapp (A.) 10-1, 14, 17,21-5,27,37
Rapp (H.) xix
Rashkovsky xviii
Raskin (M.) xviii
Raskin (V.) 50-1, 55-6, 61, 64, 70-2, 74, 76,
79,81,88,92,98, 118, 154, 172
Reagan (N.) 136, 224
Reagan (R.) 136, 202, 223-4
Richards 7, 77
Richter 32
Rivers 144
Rosenbloom 253
Ross xviii
Rothbart 33, 40
Russica Publishers xix
Saikevic 53
Sawyer 25
Schank 81, 95, 126
Schopenhauer 7, 31, 36
Schutz 224
Searle 3, 55, 74-5, 88
Seybold xviii
Shakespeare 25, 75, 181
Shaw 7
Shelley 10
Shultz21,33

284 NAM
Sidis 9
Smith 172
Sorensen 77
Spalding 25, 220
Spencer 21, 31, 38
Staal 69
Stalin 24
Stalnaker 129
Stendhal 28
Stern 77
Strawson 69
Sully 10, 15, 32, 130
Suls 33, 37
Tannen 81
Thompson xviii
Trudeau 224
Turek 30
Twain 25
Ullmann 77
INDEX
University of California xviii
University of Michigan xviii
University of North Carolina xviii
Updike 153
Viktoroffl7, 20, 26-7, 39
Waldoks 193,213,215-8,220
Webster 82, 118
Weinreich 60, 76
Weizenbaum 96
Western Humor and Irony Membership
(WHIM) xviii
Wilde xix, 206, 211-2, 214, 217-8
Wittgenstein 77
Wolfensteln 20
Ziff80
Zillmann 37
Zvegincev 77, 79

Synthese Language Library
SEMANTIC MECHANISMS OF HUMOR
VICTOR RASKIN
Purdue University
As the first book-length study of the linguistics of humor, this work
represents an attempt to apply formal methods of contemporary
semantics to verbal humor. The linguistic material exposed in the
first part of the book is an original semantic theory - script-based
semantics - and has thus far been available in short articles only.
In the second part of the book, the script-based semantic theory
is applied to three specific types of verbal humor: sexual humor,
ethnic humor, and political humor. The exposition is largely
nontechnical, making the book accessible to non-linguists and readers
unfamiliar with humor research. Besides linguists and humor
researchers therefore, the book will interest philosophers,
psychologists and sociologists who deal with humor as a phenomenon, as
well as those interested in application of formal methods in the
humanities and social sciences. While the book abounds in joke
examples, it is by no means a joke book and examples have been
selected for semantic analysis rather than quality or entertainment
value.
Audience
Linguists, semanticists, humor researchers, applied linguists,
psychologists, philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, experts
in natural-language AI.
D. Reidel Publishing Company
Dordrecht / Boston / Lancaster