POLISH BATTLES
AND CAMPAIGNS
IN 13TH–19TH CENTURIES

WOJSKOWE CENTRUM EDUKACJI OBYWATELSKIEJ
IM. PŁK. DYPL. MARIANA PORWITA
2016

POLISH BATTLES
AND CAMPAIGNS
IN 13TH–19TH CENTURIES

WOJSKOWE CENTRUM EDUKACJI OBYWATELSKIEJ
IM. PŁK. DYPL. MARIANA PORWITA
2016

Scientific editors:
Ph. D. Grzegorz Jasiński, Prof. Wojciech Włodarkiewicz
Reviewers:
Ph. D. hab. Marek Dutkiewicz, Ph. D. hab. Halina Łach
Scientific Council:
Prof. Piotr Matusak – chairman
Prof. Tadeusz Panecki – vice-chairman
Prof. Adam Dobroński
Ph. D. Janusz Gmitruk
Prof. Danuta Kisielewicz
Prof. Antoni Komorowski
Col. Prof. Dariusz S. Kozerawski
Prof. Mirosław Nagielski
Prof. Zbigniew Pilarczyk
Ph. D. hab. Dariusz Radziwiłłowicz
Prof. Waldemar Rezmer
Ph. D. hab. Aleksandra Skrabacz
Prof. Wojciech Włodarkiewicz
Prof. Lech Wyszczelski
Sketch maps:
Jan Rutkowski
Design and layout:
Janusz Świnarski
Front cover:
Battle against Theutonic Knights, XVI century drawing from Marcin Bielski’s Kronika Polski
Translation:
Summalinguæ
© Copyright by Wojskowe Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej im. płk. dypl. Mariana Porwita, 2016
© Copyright by Stowarzyszenie Historyków Wojskowości, 2016
ISBN 978-83-65409-12-6
Publisher:
Wojskowe Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej im. płk. dypl. Mariana Porwita
Stowarzyszenie Historyków Wojskowości

Contents
7

Introduction

9

Karol Olejnik
The Mongol Invasion of Poland in 1241 and the battle of Legnica

17

Karol Olejnik
‘The Great War’ of 1409–1410 and the Battle of Grunwald

29

Zbigniew Grabowski
The Battle of Ukmergė, the 1st of September 1435

41

Marek Plewczyński
The Battle of Orsha 8th September 1514

51

Henryk Lulewicz
Stephen Bathory’s Expeditions against Muscovy (1579–1581)

59

Witold Rawski
The Battle of Kircholm 1605

67

Przemysław Gawron
The Battle of Klushino

87

Paweł Przeździecki
The Polish-Turkish War of 1620–1621: the battles of Cecora and Chocim

103

Rafał Roguski
The Battle of Berestechko 28–30 June 1651

113

Mirosław Nagielski
The Chudniv Campaign of 1660

127

Marek Wagner
The Battle of Chocim, 10–11 November 1673

139

Mirosław Nagielski
Vienna Campaign 1683

147

Janusz Wojtasik
The Battle of Racławice, 4th April 1794

155

Tomasz Malarski
The Napoleon’s Polish Troop in 1815

167

Tomasz Strzeżek
Battle of Iganie, April 10, 1831

177

Zbigniew Moszumański
Battle in the Kobylanka Forest, 1–6 May 1863

– 5 –

Introduction

The thousand-year history of Poland and the Polish
nation reveals many battles which not only changed the
course of the history of Poland, but also other countries
in Central and Eastern Europe. A team of Polish military
historians from both civil and military circles wishes to
present you with a selection of campaigns and battles
fought by Polish armed forces, from the Battle of Legnica
against Tataro-Mongolians in 1241, through the Battle
of Grunwald against the Teutonic Knights in 1410, to the
January Uprising of 1863–1864. The battles were selected
according to their significance and results. Campaigns and
battles are presented chronologically and each study has
been appended with a drawing.
The book begins with texts on campaigns and battles of
the middle ages in Poland (Legnica, Grunwald, Ukmergė).
However, battles that are particularly interesting, especially from the point of view of general military history, are
those fought during the Polish-Lithuanian Union, as during that period Poles were very eager to learn from their
allies and enemies and incorporated new types of arms,
military organisation, tactics and strategy into the Polish
army. This led to the creation of the peculiar blend and
distinctiveness of the Polish art of war which flourished in
the 16th and 17th centuries. Descriptions of campaigns and

battles from that period, starting with the Battle of Orsha
(1514) and ending with the Vienna Campaign (1683), constitute the core of this work.
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which was the
name of the state created by Poland and Lithuania after
the Union of Lublin in 1569, was a military superpower
at the time. Victories achieved in the battles of Kircholm,
Klushino, Berestechko, Chocim and Vienna made Polish
cavalry famous throughout Europe. Above all, it was
the hussars, who, with their daredevil charges that decided the course of campaigns, earned people’s greatest
respect.
Other important battles from the point of view of the
history of the Polish army include battles fought in the
name of sovereignty at the end of the 18th century and
armed attempts to regain independence at the end of the
19th century. These problems are discussed in the last texts
of the book.
The authors and editors of this work are aware that this
is not a full record of the history of the Polish army. Nevertheless, they hope that the book will be warmly received
and plan to continue the subject in the form of studies
on selected campaigns and battles fought by the Polish
Armed Forces in the 20th century.

– 7 –

– Karol Olejnik –
Higher School of Humanities and Journalism in Poznan

The Mongol Invasion of Poland in 1241
and the battle of Legnica

The process of feudal fragmentation, although common in medieval European countries, was relatively short
in Poland. However, its effects were disastrous. The first
endeavours to recentralise the country, initiated in Silesia,
were made between the 12th and 13th centuries. At that time,
Henry I the Bearded, and later his son Henry II the Pious,
established the so-called ‘monarchy of the Silesian Henries’. Although their rule was consolidated only in Silesia
and Greater Poland, in many areas Henry’s authority being
purely nominal, and although the remaining regions of the
fragmented country were still feuding, Wrocław’s initiative
is considered the first stage of the unification process.1
It needs to be assumed that this state of affairs was also
noted by other countries, which perceived the Henries as
a major political factor in the territory between the Vistula,
Oder and Warta. In any case, in all their political endeavours, the external factors in distant territories had to allow
for the Silesian line of the Piast dynasty. And vice versa,
all political events that took place outside their dominion
triggered Wrocław’s reaction.
The above mentioned comments will gain significance
in the context of events which took place in the 1230’s in
territories to the east of the San, in connection with threats
from Tatars. News of the Mongolian army reached Poland
as early as the end of the 12th century and became particularly intensified ca. 1237, when the Mongol invasion of
Rus’ practically ended. These news, however, cannot be
assumed to have contained sufficiently detailed information on the character of the army, its equipment or fighting
methods. To some extent, the course of events which took
place on our lands in the first half of 1241 constitute a con1

firmation of how little we knew about the strangers from
the depths of the Asian steppes.
The Tatar army entered the territory of Poland between
December and January 1241. In its first stage, the invasion
covered lands on the east of the Vistula river, particularly
Lublin and Zawichost. Within several weeks the invaders
advance farther to the west and besiege Sandomierz,
Wiślica and Skarbimierz. After breaking down resistance of
local knights in Tursko Wielkie and besieging Zawichost,
the troops head towards Sieciechów, where they cross
the Vistula river and move to Rus’.2 At the beginning of
March 1241 Tatars attacked for the third time. This time
after crossing the Vistula river in Sandomierz, the Mongols
divided into two groups, one of which headed north and
the other, probably stronger, advanced towards Cracow.
On their way, the army won the battle of Chmielnik with
knights from Lesser Poland and reached Cracow. Upon
capturing the city (only st. Andrew’s church withstood
the attack) and after a short repose, they continued west.
Their route went on through Racibórz and Opole, and at
the beginning of April the hostile army stopped outside
Wrocław. At this point, however, we need to stop our narration in order to point out some details.
2

Cf. J. Baszkiewicz, Powstanie zjednoczonego państwa polskiego na przełomie XIII i XIV w., Warsaw 1954.

– 9 –

The most creadible and at the same time extensive source of
information is ‘Annals or Chronicles of the Famous Kingdom
of Poland’ by Jan Długosz (Roczniki czyli Kroniki sławnego
Królestwa Polskiego, Chapter VII, Warsaw 1974), which was
proved to have used (cf. G. Labuda, ‘Wojna z Tatarami w roku
1241’, in Przegląd Historyczny, vol. L, pp. 189–224), lost sources, unknown to us today. According to Długosz, in 1241 ‘Batu
[…] Khan of the Tatars […] arrives in Poland and with unusual
swiftness plunders and ravages two highly populated Polish
cities: Lublin and Zawichost together with adjoining powiats
and lands’ (author’s translation). J. Długosz, Roczniki czyli Kroniki…, Chapter VII, pp. 9–10.

– Karol Olejnik –

It follows from the above comments that before Tatars
reached the city walls of Wrocław, Polish knights had
tried to stop them. Their effort was realised in the battles
of Tursko, Racibórz and Chmielnik. It is assumed that the
first of the mentioned battles took place approximately in
the middle of February. The Mongol army fought against
armies from Sandomierz and Cracow, summoned by
Bolesław V the Chaste. Despite a promising beginning,
the battle resulted in a total defeat of the Polish army.3 It
turned out that even when forces of the two regions were
combined, the Polish knighthood could not be compared
to the aggressors. The historians are baffled by the second
battle, i.e. the battle of Racibórz, because of the lack of
written sources. According to the recent findings, Tatars
surrounded Racibórz twice.4 At first the town was defended, but when Mieszko II the Fat, encouraged by his initial
success, decided to lead the local forces against the aggressors, he was completely defeated and had to withdraw
to Silesia with the remaining troops, where he was taken
under Henry II the Pious’s wing. At that moment, Henry
was perceived as the last chance of successful resistance.
The third battle was fought in Lesser Poland, in Chmielnik. This time the Tatars, headed for Cracow, battled with
the knighthood of Sandomierz and Cracow, unfortunately
with the same result.5
It follows from the above mentioned assumptions that:
1. The sovereignty of Henry II the Pious over the attacked
areas could not have been well-established if the local
dukes tried to defend their lands single-handedly; 2. The
attempts at local concentration of forces (knighthoods
of Sandomierz and Cracow, followed by knighthoods of
Opole and Racibórz) did not produce great results because they were made too late (almost in the face of the
enemy); 3. wrong tactics were employed in the battles.
The Polish knighthood fought in accordance with the only
strategy they knew – close combat. In the first stage of
the battle, Tatars assumed this technique, but they subsequently feigned withdrawal in order to break the opponent’s ranks and perform a fast manoeuvre which would
result in heavy defeat; 4. this form of clash was greatly influenced by the fact that Polish heavy cavalry was unable
to defy the light cavalry of the Tatars; 5. During the fight,
the aggressors could perform a much wider array of man3
4
5

J. Długosz, Roczniki czyli Kroniki…, Chapter VII, p. 11.
G. Labuda, ‘Wojna z Tatarami…’, p. 204, footnote 63.
J. Długosz, Roczniki czyli Kroniki…, Chapter VII, p. 14.

oeuvres (arrow barrage, feigned retreat manoeuvre) than
the Polish knighthood, accustomed to close combat with
the use of pole-arms and melee weapons; 6. the Mongol
army mainly consisted of light cavalry, unburdened with
tabors and riding unusually sturdy horses. All this added to
the great swiftness of the Tatar army, as well as to its ability
to travel long distances and overcome natural obstacles.
Thus, the subsequent attempts to suppress the dangerous assailants from the east failed. Only then did the loose
sovereignty of the Silesian duke over the attacked regions
of Lesser Poland become significant, for it is known that
those who had been defeated in the mentioned battles
fled to Silesia.6 At this point, however, a question arises:
did Tatars assume the necessity to defeat Henry II the Pious upon their arrival in Poland, or was the battle of Legnica merely a result of their successful battles with the
knights of Sandomierz, Cracow, Opole and Racibórz? The
available sources do not explain this issue, which leaves
historians with a wide uncertainty margin.
Based on war campaigns led by the newcomers from
Asia, the historical and military literature assumes that
prior to commencing their expeditions, the Mongols carried out a thorough reconnaissance of the lands on which
they would perform their future manoeuvres. We can assume that this time their tactics did not differ. Thus, the
aggressors were aware of the balance of Polish political
forces and Henry II the Pious must have been perceived
as the most dangerous opponent who had to be defeated
in order to properly pacify the acquired lands to the north
of the Carpathians. At this point it is worth mentioning
that the main Tatar forces were headed towards the Pannonian Plain, Hungary, which constituted the dominant
political power in this part of Europe. The assault on Poland, therefore, was merely supplementary. The fact that
Henry’s army did not react to the January or February attacks could have led them to believe that it was a result of
both surprise at an unexpected time of the invasion and
the lack of awareness of its gravity. Nonetheless, the duke
of Silesia remained a potential threat to the aggressors,
which induced the Tatar command to launch an assault
on Wrocław.
The invasion began at the beginning of March 1241 and
its objective was to pillage as much of Henry’s lands as
possible, so that he would not be able to partake in the
events which were simultaneously taking place in Hun6

– 10 –

Ibid., Chapter VII, pp. 15–16.

– The Mongol Invasion of Poland in 1241 and the battle of Legnica –

gary. To this end, the Tatars divided their forces into two
parts. The southern part headed towards Cracow, and
later Racibórz, Opole and Wrocław. The aim of the second
troop was to support the former by deterring forces from
Łęczyce, Sieradz and Mazovia. The troop’s objective consisted in taking a detour to Łęczyce and change the direction to south-west, heading towards the capital of Henry
II the Pious.7 We should add that at one point part of the
northern group joined the first troop outside Cracow. It is
likely that the reinforcement of the mentioned group was
dictated by allowing for the possibility of a Silesian attack.
It is also worth noticing that the operations of both these
troops were aimed at rejoicing in Silesia. This proves that
the aggressors were perfectly aware of the balance of
political powers on our lands.
Around 5th–7th April the entire Tatar forces met near
Wrocław, but there was no sign of the Silesian army, which
at the time gathered in Legnica. The choice of this place
was dictated by several premises. First and foremost, it was
favourable in that it allowed the anticipation of help from
the west and south (Bohemia), where – as can be suspected – the news of the aggressive invaders had already circulated, spurring the ‘crusade’ impulses of its knighthood.
Furthermore, it was there that a large castle stood, which
the duke considered his residence rather than Wrocław.
Additionally, Henry could assume that in the case of
Wrocław’s siege, he could attack the besiegers, which was
not without significance. Regardless of the reasons, Legnica became the place of intentional concentration, the
point to which the survivors of previous battles fled as well
as the centre of force accumulation, from which the Polish
planned to attack the aggressors.
Before we discuss the issue connected with the course
of the battle of Legnica, it is worth noticing a series of
doubts arising from the actions the Silesian duke had
taken since the beginning of the Mongol invasion. The
first of the arising questions – why didn’t Henry face the
enemy – has already been answered when we mentioned
the high level of political autonomy of the attacked areas
as well as difficulties connected with the accumulation of
forces, adverse weather conditions and the element of surprise. There are also military reasons which made it neces7

Apart from Długosz (Roczniki czyli Kroniki…, Chapter VII, pp.
16–17), other sources also provide information on this subject. These are: ‘Rocznik kapituły poznańskiej’, in Monumenta
Poloniae Historica (hereinafter: MPH), vol. III, p. 9; also ‘Kronika
wielkopolska’, MPH, vol. II, p. 561.

sary for Henry II the Pious to await the opponent in Silesia.
Perhaps the news of the January siege of Sandomierz
reached the duke early, but did not contain information on
the enemy’s future intentions. The Tatars could have taken
a number of routes when heading to Wrocław. They could
have e.g. go via Cracow, Racibórz, Opole, as well as in the
centre of Poland via Sulejów and Sieradz.
The second route led through populated and fertile
lands, whereas the first one went through three well-fortified urban centres. The duke could assume that these
centres would detain the assailants, giving him sufficient
time to make further decisions. The enemy knew the
route which led from Wrocław via Sieradz and Sandomierz, which is proved by information contained in an annual called Rocznik świętokrzyski (the name deriving from
the Świętokrzyskie province – translator’s note), according to which the Tatars took the route when returning to
Rus’ after the victory in the battle of Legnica.8 The doubts
as to the direction from which the Mongols would attack
seemed to have been resolved by the beginning of March,
when the duke received information on the devastation of
areas around Iłża, Piotrków and Sieradz Land. At this point
Henry could only gather the forces and await the raid on
Silesia from both sides, for he already had received bad
news, first from Cracow and a little later from Racibórz and
Opole.
One of the further consequences of the decision to
await the enemy in Silesia was the assignment of the concentration point in Legnica instead of Wrocław. Legnica
was situated more to the west and there was a chance
that the enemy would want to siege the capital of Silesia,
which made it possible to ‘come to the rescue’. To this
end, the duke made feverish arrangements which would
allow the citizens of Wrocław to defend the city as persistently as possible.9 The possibility of siege seemed to have
been proved in the case of Cracow, Racibórz and even st.
Andrew’s church in Cracow, which was the only centre of
resistance that withheld the aggressors in the burning city.
It needs to be added that the lack of clarity in Długosz’s
writing makes it impossible to confirm whether the city
of Wrocław was in fact besieged or not, however it is of
8

9

– 11 –

‘Rocznik świętokrzyski’, in MPH, vol. III, p. 71. This message was
conveyed with the wrong date of 1239, and the place name
was pyszne pole (pyszne field). Also compare: G. Labuda, ‘Wojna z Tatarami…’, pp. 222–223.
Cf. Dzieje Wrocławia do roku 1807, Warsaw 1958, p. 72, footnote 188.

– Karol Olejnik –

little consequence here. But if well-fortified Legnica was
appointed as the place of concentration of forces led by
the Silesia duke, then what persuaded Henry to leave the
fortification and face the risk of confronting the enemy in
the open field?
There are differences among the authors on this matter. Some assume that the Polish army left the town in
order to meet Wenceslaus I, king of Bohemia, who was
approaching with help from the Kamienna Góra mountain
pass.10 Some researchers claim that by doing that the duke
wanted to stretch his forces, which on the one hand does
not agree with the chivalric code that had already been
employed in knighthood, but on the other – made sense
considering that there were many survivors of the previous clashes with the Tatars (battles of Sandomierz, Tursko,
Chmielnik). Their accounts must have awed Henry and
influenced his decision.11 It seems, nonetheless, that the
answer to the aforementioned questions could be found
when analysing the formation in which Henry II the Pious
arranged his army as well as the battle itself.
Jan Długosz writes that the duke spread his troops over
a vast plain, divided by a river. Studies have shown that
the place of the battle stretched between Koskowickie
lake and the village of Koskowice, situated on the edge
of a highland.12 Across this area ran a route from Legnica
to Wrocław, which the Tatars took. It is easy to note that
at the moment of the clash Henry’s army had two water
obstacles behind its back – the Kaczawa and Biała Struga
rivers, the former quite substantial. Considering the season
(early spring) this was a significant factor. The mentioned
highland narrowed the spot suitable for deploying the entire army. This means that Henry either made a striking
mistake by choosing such an inconvenient place, or was
surprised in the course of implementing some other plan
and had to take up arms.
At this point, account should be taken of the attributes
of the duke’s army in order to bow to one of the men10

11
12

Cf. W. Zatorski, ‘Pierwszy najazd Mongołów na Polskę w 1240–
1241’, in Przegląd Wojskowo-Historyczny, vol. IX, 1937, pp.
175–237; S. Krakowski, Polska w walce z najazdami tatarskimi
w XIII w., Warsaw 1956, pp. 148–149. A great amount of interesting information can also be found in sketches devoted to the
battle of Legnica, a volume entitled Bitwa legnicka. Historia
i tradycja, Wrocław–Warsaw 1994, however it does not involve
any new suggestions as to the interpretation of the battle.
G. Labuda, ‘Wojna z Tatarami…’, pp. 214–216.
Ibid.

tioned theories. The analysis of written sources concerning the rule of both Henries allows us to conclude that
armed forces played a major role in the implementation
of their unification plans. This was the case when Henry
I the Bearded strengthened his position in Greater Poland
as well as at the time when he kept strategic Lubusz from
the Margraviate of Brandenburg. It is hard to imagine that
his heir, Henry II the Pious, should not have been trained
in the art of war. Considering that his deeds were noted in
records as early as around 1210, he had plenty of time and
opportunities to gain not only political, but also military
experience. This can be proven by the fact that occasionally Henry I the Bearded trusted his heir with the entire
army during the mentioned (some indeed unsuccessful,
we should add) power struggles.13 All this allows us to
dismiss the incompetence theory, especially that Henry
was perfectly familiar with the area in which the fight took
place. What then? What may help us is literature, namely
an attempt at a different interpretation of Jan Długosz’s
account.
When describing the departure of the Polish army from
Legnica, W. Zatorski writes: ‘[…] knowing that the Mongols were immobilised by a blockade of Wrocław, Henry
remained ignorant of their plans. Had he carried out a reconnaissance, he would have acquired information about
their departure to Legnica’ (author’s translation).14 The
situation is judged differently by a contemporary historian, who concludes from the writing of Jan Długosz that
upon hearing that Henry was accumulating his forces in
Legnica, the Tatars immediately headed there from Racibórz, avoiding Wrocław. Moreover, the historian notices
an advantage in the Mongolian strategy, resulting from the
ability to move on roadless tract.15 Both the mentioned
historians came to the same conclusion, namely that the
approaching Mongols had taken Henry by surprise. It can
be assumed that even if the Silesian duke had counted on
the Tatars arriving at Legnica (according to Zatorski), he
13

14
15

– 12 –

Cf. S. Smolka, Henryk Brodaty, Lwów 1872, p. 101; and M. Łodyński, ‘Polityka Henryka Brodatego i jego syna w latach
1232–1241’, in Przegląd Historyczny, vol. XIV, p. 144. Also:
R. Grodecki, ‘Dzieje polityczne Śląska do roku 1290’, in Historia
Śląska, vol. I, Cracow 1933 and J. Baszkiewicz, Powstanie zjednoczonego państwa polskiego…, p. 77 et seq.
W. Zatorski, ‘Pierwszy najazd…’, p. 226.
Cf. T. Jasiński, ‘Strategia i taktyka wojsk polskich i mongolskich pod Legnicą w świetle nowo odczytanych zapisek Jana
Długosza’, in Bitwa legnicka. Historia i tradycja, pp. 110–111.

– The Mongol Invasion of Poland in 1241 and the battle of Legnica –

could not have ruled out the possibility of meeting them
on his way to the rescue. If, on the other hand, he had been
surprised by the Mongols (as Jasiński claims), it is without
much importance whether they actually avoided Wrocław
or not. In truth, the latter variant is confirmed by the formation of the Christian army during the battle itself.
The formation of the Polish army and its allies at the beginning of the battle is not accounted by Długosz in great
detail. But let him have his say: ‘Upon passing the outskirts
of Legnica, […] he arranges the army and divides it into four
divisions. The first division consisted in the Crusaders and
volunteers of different nationalities and speaking different
tongues. In order to tighten their ranks, they were complemented by gold miners from the town of Złota Góra. […]
The second division (constituted) knights from Cracow and
Greater Poland. […] The third were knights from Opole […]
The fourth […] Poppo von Osterna, the grand master of
Prussia, with brothers and his knights. The fifth was led by
duke Henry himself. It consisted of Silesian and Wrocław
squires, skilled and important knights from Greater Poland
and Silesia as well as a small number of others, hired for
pay’16 (author’s translation). Unfortunately, little can be
concluded from the above information, although it is possible to complement this description with the account of
the battle itself, also written by Długosz. Upon dismissing
information which is not relevant to our analysis, we are
left with the following:
– the first regiment, composed of foreigners, volunteers
and gold miners from Złota Góra (as a means of tightening
the ranks) fought the Tatars in the first stage of the battle.
Despite its initial success, it was soon surrounded and
broken;
– subsequently, other two regiments entered the battle
(the second and the third). Again, despite a promising beginning, both divisions were defeated as a result of a trick
performed by the enemy (the opposing army encouraged
to escape the battle by shouting ‘run, run!’, which confused
the Polish ranks). The other cause of the defeat was the
fact that the protective armour of the Polish army turned
out to be ineffective in the face of an all-out barrage of the
Tatar archers. On the other hand, they remained out of
reach of the Poles’ melee weapons.
– at that point, Henry used the reserve regiment. But let
us once again give the floor to Długosz, who claims that

the division was: ‘[…] composed of the best and bravest
warriors […] for some time the fight between the two
opponents was fierce. When a significant number of the
Tatars were killed, the Polish almost won, for the Tatars
started to think of retreat when their ranks thinned out.
Among many banners in the Tatar army there was a sizeable one […] At the top of its shaft there was an image of
a ghastly black head […] when the Tatars retreated by one
furlong and commenced to escape, the bearer of said banner began to […] shake the head […] Instantly, it belched
forth steam, smoke and fog which then spread over the
entire Polish army and due to its repugnant smell […] the
Polish, almost fainting and barely alive, could not fight any
more’ (author’s translation).
Before we move on to the bottom line, we need to add
that extensive research on the Tatar military service has
confirmed Długosz’s account of the use of stupefying gas
by the Mongols during battles. It may be that it had merely
a psychological effect on the medieval knighthood and
did not result in casualties, but its significance must have
been significant. For us, however, the above description
of the battle is of a different significance. It tells us how
Henry’s army was arranged immediately before the battle.
There is no uniform stand on the question of the Polish
military formation in literature. Some authors assume that
there were two wide lines (the first one consisting of the
regiments: one, two, three and four; the second one – of
duke Henry’s reserve regiment).17 Other suggest ‘steps’ or
‘horseshoe’ formations.18 However, it is easy to notice that
compared with Długosz’s accounts, these assumptions
must raise serious doubts.
– If the line was composed of four regiments, why did
only one attack the Tatars in the first stage of the battle?
– Why was the first regiment surrounded at the very beginning of the fight if it was supported on both sides by the
remaining divisions?
– Why didn’t these remaining divisions attack the enemy when it was engaged in fights with the first regiment?
– Why did regiments two and three enter the battle only
after the first regiment was destroyed?
Moreover, it is worth noticing that the arrangement
of Henry’s army as described in literature strikes as quite
17

18
16

J. Długosz, Roczniki czyli Kroniki…, pp. 21–27 description of
the battle of Legnica.

– 13 –

Cf. J. Sikorski, Materiały do historii sztuki wojennej, part I, Warsaw 1953, p. 91 etc.
Cf. W. Majewski., J. Teodorczyk, ‘Historia wojskowości polskiej
w XIII w.’, in Przegląd Historyczny, vol. XLVIII, no 1, p. 334; G. Labuda, ‘Wojna z Tatarami…’, p. 219.

– Karol Olejnik –

– 14 –

– The Mongol Invasion of Poland in 1241 and the battle of Legnica –

static. Everything happens in stages. Attacks are carried
out one after another until the final defeat. The literature
fails to answer the above questions, which encourages to
seek resolution elsewhere. It seems that the fact that Henry
II the Pious entered the warpath at that particular moment, place and array – which probably looked different
than described in historiography – should be considered
holistically and treated as his preconceived strategy.
For such an experienced leader as Henry II the Pious,
news of subsequent defeats faced by the Polish knighthood in the east contained certain hints as to the reasons for these failures. The choice of Legnica for the place
of the concentration in itself was dictated by the necessity to help besieged Wrocław (its siege being probable,
considering the seizure of Cracow or Sandomierz). The
choice of Legnica also resulted from the assumption that
the Tatars could approach from two sides (Sieradz and
Opole). The news from Tursko, Chmielnik and Racibórz
did not incline the duke to attempt fighting in the open
field without proper preparations, as it would result in
another failure, which had to be prevented. The subsequent stages of Henry’s actions ought to be perceived
in this context.
The duke led out his army from Legnica and at the same
time could not remain within the town, for his objective
was not to defend it, but to defeat the enemy before they
destroy the whole region. We also need to remember that
the knighthood which Henry amassed was not fit for defensive battles. If we assume that leading the Polish army
out of Legnica was a result of a particular strategy, the subsequent decisions made by the duke as well as the course
of events on the battlefield become reasonable. Henry intended to head to Wrocław, where he could conveniently
attack the Tatars when they were occupied with the siege.
Upon leaving Legnica, the Christian army is divided into
regiments and assumes a marching formation. The fourth
and first regiment (according to Długosz’s numbering)
form the head division – the vanguard followed by regiments two and three. Finally, in order to avoid mistakes
made in the previous battles with the Mongols (perhaps
resulting from the survivors’ accounts), the duke himself
takes place at the head of the reserve regiment. In this
marching arrangement, the Polish divisions are headed
towards Wrocław on a road that leads to the town. It is
easy to note that this type of formation constituted a tight
block which was secured, to a certain extent, in case of an
attack at all times and from all sides.

Although Henry probably assumed that he would commence attack only on the outskirts of Wrocław, the formation in which his army was arranged allowed him to take
on the battle much earlier. In that case the regiment at the
head of the march was to attack first. Upon engaging the
opponent, the next divisions would enter the battle ending with the reserves. However, this idea turned out to be
faulty, as the head of the Christian army was surrounded
and the Tatar archers prevented the other two regiments
from entering the battle. The duke’s regiment, however remains calm, for the role of the surrounded division was only
significant in terms of binding time. A longer resistance of
the regiment was impossible because of poor armament.
At this stage, the battle proceeded in line with the duke’s
expectations. Although the first division was surrounded,
regiments two and three entered the battle with great impact, and Henry’s own strong regiment, which was still in
control of the battle, was close behind them. The retreat
of part of the warriors from the battlefield, the result of the
Tatars’ deceptive shouts, constituted the pivotal moment
of the fight. In this situation the reserve group could not
achieve much. Although the duke’s division fought fiercely,
the preponderance of the Tatar regiment as well as the terror in the Polish ranks caused by the mysterious ‘smelly’
gas constituted the final straw. Henry, along with many
outstanding Polish and foreign knights, was defeated.
The significance of the battle of Legnica was great, and
multidimensional, constituting both a political and military failure. The political significance was the death of
Henry II the Pious, which broke the first attempt to centralised the divided Poland. Under the reign of Henry I the
Bearded and Henry II the Pious, Silesia underwent dynamic growth on all levels, which is why the plan of unification, propagated by the local dukes, had a solid working
base and chances of success. After the defeat at Legnica,
this process was disrupted for several decades and the
separatist tendencies gained the upper hand. Only at the
end of the 13th century would the dukes of Greater Poland
come forth with a similar idea, although it would happen
in much worse conditions and with an increased external
threat. Let us add that this second attempt at the unification of Poland would again be broken after the tragic
death of Przemysł II.
Secondly, the collapse of the Piast state of Silesia
would result in a gradual German and (to a lesser extent)
Czech colonisation of the district within the next decades,
which in turn would bring about its political and economic

– 15 –

– Karol Olejnik –

inclination towards Prague rather than Cracow. This process would also have its cultural dimension, for the knighthood, merchants as well as (to a certain extent) craftsmen
and monks would be ‘recruited’ from Germany. It is no
wonder, therefore, that when Cracow would make yet another, this time successful, attempt at unification at the
beginning of the 14th century, Silesia would remain outside
of the grasp of Władysław the Short, the unifier of Poland,
and would become part of the Crown of st. Wenceslas.
The military consequences of the Legnica defeat were
also significant. The 1241 invasion was the first encounter
of the Polish knighthood with different tactics. Insofar as
the contemporary Polish art of war was a typical product
of the European military tradition, the Tatar army was radically different. It’s difference was reflected in armament
and equipment as well as in strategy and tactics in all
stages of war preparation. This encounter was extremely
painful to the Polish party. Henry was defeated, as were
many distinguished knights from all regions, including
a large portion of those killed during the previous battles.
Several large urban and town centres were destroyed, not
only Cracow, at the time of fragmentation considered the

capital of Poland, but also individual ‘capitals’ of the regions, such as Sandomierz or Opole. A substantial surface
of the country was destroyed, as a result of the enemy’s
tactics, aimed at disorganising and weakening the Polish
lands in order to rule out possible assistance given to the
attacked lands at the Danube. There is no doubt, therefore, that such extensive consequences of these first several weeks of the year 1241 must have result in numerous
afterthoughts.
They would manifest themselves both instantaneously
and in the longer term. The latter would include the conviction of limited power when it comes to resisting the
hostile armies from the east – which is confirmed by subsequent Tatar invasions in the second half of the 13th century – and which would result in attempts to create a safeguard in the form of a stronghold at the time of Casimir III
the Great. These are the categories (apart from political,
dynasty and economic justifications) in which we can perceive the return of the policy of the Kingdom of Poland to
the Galician Rus’, so that such strongholds as: Jarosław,
Przemyśl, Lwów, Halicz, Tustań or Trembowla successfully
protected the Polish lands.

Bibliography
Primary Sources

S. Krakowski, Polska w walce z najazdami tatarskimi w XIII w.,

J. Długosz, Roczniki czyli Kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego,

Warsaw 1956

Lib. VII–VIII, Warsaw 1974 (J. Długosz, Annales seu Cronicae

S. Smolka, Henryk Brodaty, Lvov 1872

incliti Regni Poloniae, Lib. VII–VIII, Warsaw 1975)

J. Sikorski, Materiały do historii sztuki wojennej, vol. I, Warsaw

‘Rocznik kapituły poznańskiej’, in Monumenta Poloniae Historica,

1953

Articles

vol. III
‘Kronika wielkopolska’, in Monumenta Poloniae Historica, vol. II

G. Labuda, ‘Wojna z Tatarami w roku 1241’, in Przegląd Histo­­-

Books

rycz­ny, vol. L

Bitwa legnicka. Historia i tradycja, ed. Wacław Korta, Wrocław–

M. Łodyński, ‘Polityka Henryka Brodatego i jego syna w latach

Warsaw 1994

1232–1241’, in Przegląd Historyczny, vol. XIV

Dzieje Wrocławia do roku 1807, Warsaw 1958

W. Majewski., J. Teodorczyk, ‘Historia wojskowości polskiej w XIII w.’,

Historia Śląska od najdawniejszych czasów do roku 1400, vol. I,
Cracow 1933

in Przegląd Historyczny, vol. XLVIII, no. 1
W. Zatorski, ‘Pierwszy najazd Mongołów na Polskę w 1240–1241’,

J. Baszkiewicz, Powstanie zjednoczonego państwa polskiego na
przełomie XIII i XIV w., Warsaw 1954

– 16 –

in Przegląd Wojskowo-Historyczny, 1937, vol. IX

– Karol Olejnik –
Higher School of Humanities and Journalism in Poznan

‘The Great War’ of 1409–1410
and the Battle of Grunwald

One of the results of fragmentation of the Polish early
Piast state was loss of territory. Due to emerging decentralist tendencies, the authority of the central government
diminished along with the possibility to manage military
forces, which, in consequence, led to weakened defence
capabilities. It shouldn’t be surprising that the expansion
of neighbouring states (especially Bohemia and the Margraviate of Brandenburg) caused the loss of Silesia, Lubusz
Land and Western Pomerania. The latter, under the influence of Denmark’s and the Empire’s expansion, in the end
chose its own path and developed into an independent
duchy. A different fate awaited Pomerelia and the lands
on the right bank of Vistula’s mouth. The latter, originally
settled by Baltic Prussians, were conquered during the
second half of the 13th century by the Order of Brothers
of the German House of Saint Mary, commonly known
as the Teutonic Order. After impoverishing the Prussians,
the Teutonic Knights built a strong state with its capital in
Malbork and in the beginning of the 14th century reached
for the territories on Vistula’s left bank. They quickly
conquered not only Gdańsk but also lands bordering with
the Brandenburg dominion on the west and with Kujawy
on the south.
The cause of these astonishing victories was not only
the weakness of the Kingdom of Poland which was still
uniting at that time (early 14th century), but also the virtues
of an efficiently organised Teutonic state. The structure
of this organisation was ruled by religious discipline and
military needs. Material resources acquired from taxes collected mercilessly from villagers allowed to build strongholds and fortify cities, which made keeping citizens in
line easier and, in case of an attack, permitted unrelenting
defence. These castles also served as additional staging
areas for military activities aimed at further expansion. The

Order’s forces were also strengthened by guest crusaders
who, in search for glory, came to Malbork in order to wage
war against pagan Lithuania and thus fulfil the duty of
a ‘holy war’ against heathens. In addition, the Order’s army
was supremely equipped and armed which, in addition to
other of its values, such as an efficient chain of command
and resources gathered in strongholds, made it an enemy
to be feared.
This situation lasted throughout almost entire 14th century, when not only Poland but also the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania could see the power of the Order. Whereas the
Kingdom of Poland ruled by Casimir the Great (1333–1370)
and his successors (Louis I of Hungary and queen Hedwig) tried to avoid military confrontation with the Order,
Lithuania had no choice but to fight uncompromisingly
in defence of its territory. It was the Teutonic threat that
pushed both of the countries to sign a personal union in
the late 1380s (signing of the treaty took place in Krewo
in 1387)1.
From this moment the situation changed radically.
Although the Order’s power, multiplied even further by
the help of the aforementioned guest crusaders and the
support of the Empire on international arena, still posed
a threat, nobody in Malbork underestimated the joint Polish-Lithuanian forces. Moreover, the united countries had
1

– 17 –

Of the vast literature devoted to both the consequences of
fragmentation and the rising threat of the Order, the following
works are of fundamental value: J. Baszkiewicz, Powstanie
zjednoczonego państwa polskiego na przełomie XIII/XIV wieku,
Warsaw 1957; M. Biskup., G. Labuda, Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach, Gdańsk 1986; K. Górski, Zakon krzyżacki a powstanie państwa pruskiego, Wrocław – Warsaw – Cracow–
Gdańsk 1977, every aforementioned item contains a vast
literature on the subject.

– Karol Olejnik –

time on their side. Vilnius slowly adopted from Cracow not
only the basics of Christian faith (effectively knocking the
argument of ‘holy crusades’ out of the Teutons’ hands),
but also the achievements of western civilization, including the military field.
In Polish-Lithuatian relations with the Order, the turn of
the 14th and the 15th century characterised itself by rising
tensions which admittedly resulted in Teutonic ‘reysas’ on
Lithuanian territory, but never led to a larger-scale conflict. The factors inhibiting more decisive steps on the Polish side were both the actions of queen Hedwig and the
established realization, that a war with the Order, posing
as a symbol of Christian expansion on territories not subject to the rule of Rome, carries a risk of not only clashing in battle, but also of suffering various political consequences. It required multilateral preparations, which
could be observed not only in Cracow, but also in Vilnius
and Malbork.
The turn of the centuries also carried many démarches
on both sides, aiming at improving their strategic situation.
It is such categories through which we should perceive
the Order acquiring Dobrzyń Land, which met with Polish
response in the form of fortifying several castles in Wałcz
Land and an alliance with Western Pomerania. However,
when the Teutons reached for (partly by purchase, partly
by force) Neumark, the situation escalated quickly. The
first clash between Poland and the Order took place at the
turn of the years 1403 and 1404. The castle in Drezdenko
was seized by the Order’s army and thus became the bone
of contention. Strategic location of this stronghold (on
a road from deep within the Empire to Malbork) inclined
the Polish side to win it back, although without success.
Over the course of the coming years both sides fought
battles for Drawa, Gwda and middle Noteć Rivers with
varying luck, while at the same time maintaining diplomatic relations. However the spectre of an impending war
became more and more obvious2.
The year 1409 marked the beginning of the great
struggle between Poland, Lithuania and the Order. The
Polish-Lithuanian side reinforced their conviction that
actions on a limited scale not only do not improve the
situation, but worsen it even further. It was attested
by the fact that, despite Polish resistance, the Order
2

These matters are discussed in great detail based on vast sources and with international context in mind by: K. Olejnik,
Obrona polskiej granicy zachodniej od końca XIV do schyłku
XVIII wieku, Poznań 1985.

strengthened its cause by new conquests and thus posed
a threat to the whole of Greater Poland. It was especially
dangerous that Teutons reigned over Neumark, which
was separated from Pomerelia3 only by a thin stretch of
Polish territory with Wałcz, Czaplinek and Draheim. As it
soon turned out, the Teutons decided to take advantage
of this fact to finally dispose of Poland. They planned to
direct the main strike from Neumark against both Greater
Poland and the aforementioned narrow pass connecting
Poland with Western Pomerania. However this idea didn’t
become reality due to an unrelenting defence by the Polish military in the castles of Wałcz Land (i.a. in Tuczno,
Mirosławiec and Wałcz). The strike of the Order’s army on
Kujawy and the northern part of Greater Poland in August
had a similarly meagre effect, although the attackers did
succeed in seizing Bydgoszcz for a brief period of time.
Nonetheless, the counter attack of Polish forces in autumn allowed to regain this stronghold. The incoming
winter convinced both parties to sign a truce effective
until 24 June 1410. It was agreed, that all issues will be
resolved by Zygmunt Luksemburski, a person seemingly
neutral, but in truth favouring the Teutons. Both Malbork
and Cracow didn’t have any doubts, that the war will be
continued.
It seems that military activities of 1409 had a decisive
impact on both sides’ strategic objectives in the following
year. The Order found out, that their opponents possesses
military forces adequate not only to thwart the Teutons’
strategic plans (elimination of the narrow pass in Wałcz
Land), but also to regain lost points of fundamental value,
such as Bydgoszcz. An outright recapture of this stronghold from the Order’s forces could reinforce the Teutons’
conviction, that regaining control over Pomerelia will be of
utmost priority to Jagiełło. The Teutons deduced, that the
Polish strike will be carried out from Bydgoszcz and from
northern Greater Poland, along the left bank of the Vistula
River and into their dominion. From the start it was their
strategic objective to keep all of their lands. Accordingly,
they had to adapt a defensive tactic. This had crucial influence on the Order’s preparations and the first stage of the
incoming war.
The Polish side approached the matter with scope and
diligence unparalleled at that time. First of all, in December
1409 a war council was held in Brześć Litewski (Lithuanian
Brest) with the king, the grand duke Vytautas and a vast
3

– 18 –

Pomerelia, also referred as Gdańsk or Eastern Pomerania.

– ‘The Great War’ of 1409–1410 and the Battle of Grunwald –

circle of both military and civil advisers attending4. During
the meeting basic foundations pertaining to the summer
campaign next year were laid down. The main directions
of the assault were dominions of the Order’s state on the
right bank and their capital – Malbork. It was decided, that
all manoeuvres should be carried out on enemy territory,
in such a way as to bring about a decisive battle. The strategic objective was to inflict as much damage as possible
and afterwards regain at least some of territories lost to
the Order earlier. It especially applied to the recently lost
Dobrzyń Land. The bulk of the joint Polish-Lithuanian
forces were led by king Jagiełło, with the grand duke
Vytautas as his subordinate. Devising such and ambitious
plan required remarkably thorough material preparations
and caused a great deal of both tactical and organisational difficulties. During the aforementioned war council
many details were thought over, such as provisioning the
future army with food supplies (just for that in the winter
at the turn of 1409 and 1410 a great hunt was held in the
entire country with salted meat sent to Płock), gathering
horse carts, wagons and appropriate military equipment.
Sometimes in literature we can find implications, that the
Polish leadership used maps for planning future actions.
It doesn’t seem likely. However, it shouldn’t raise any suspicions that precise terrain reconnaissance carried out by
emissaries – spies played a pivotal role. One should add,
that identical means were used by the opposing side.
Because the war was supposed to be waged using Polish knights and Lithuanian army, the necessity to concentrate the army arose, whereas the chosen direction of the
strike determined, that it should happen on the right bank
of the Vistula River. Since it was planned to strengthen
the Teutons’ conviction, that the assault will target their
left‑bank dominions, a decision was made to cross the
Vistula River in the last phase of the manoeuvres, just before entering Dobrzyń Land, which wasn’t fortified by the
enemy heavily enough. Accordingly to those intents, it
was settled in Brest that Płock will serve as the place to
concentrate the military forces, whereas the Kingdom of
Poland’s army will cross the Vistula River in Czerwińsk.
4

Cf. a fundamental work by S. M. Kuczyński, Wielka wojna z zakonem krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411, Warsaw 1960. One can
find there a detailed overview of the vast literature pertaining
to the battle itself and the war campaign as a whole. A slightly
different standpoint towards many specific issues can be found in a study by A. Nadolski, Grunwald. Problemy wybrane,
Olsztyn 1990.

This choice served to conceal the strategic objectives
of the Polish leadership (Czerwińsk, located upstream of
the Vistula River from Płock, was 80 kilometres away from
the border of the Order’s state) and keep the enemy convinced, that the Polish army will march through Bydgoszcz
to Pomerelia.
The Teutons decided to act defensively and chose
Świecie on the left bank of the Vistula River as the waiting location. This tactic originated from the experiences of
previous campaigns, when strongly fortified territories of
the Order succeeded in resisting the Polish army, let alone
Lithuanian forces, which were hopeless against such an
obstacle. Thus, the Order could assume that the enemy
will withdraw after the first strike. The Teutons would
then gain the opportunity to reinforce their defences on
newly dominated land. The validity of such decision was
further strengthened by news coming to Malbork about
mercenaries hired by the Polish side and drawing (i.a.
from Bohemia) to Nakło, Bydgoszcz, Brześć Kujawski and
Inowrocław. Furthermore, since the early spring of 1410
the Polish side was building up troops in Wałcz Land with
small forces trying to attack Drezdenko which belong to
the Teutons. A deep foray by the troops from Bydgoszcz
in the first days of July reached the vicinity of Świecie,
which forced the Teutons to put units garrisoned in castles
in Pomerelia on high alert. At this point one can notice,
that the Polish side maintained tactical initiative since the
beginning of the war, forcing the enemy to a limited defence of fixed defence sites. At this moment the Kingdom
of Poland’s army began to fulfil the fundamental strategic
objectives, which meant shifting the manoeuvres to the
right bank of a big water obstacle. The first step towards
this was crossing the Vistula River. It undoubtedly was
a difficult task for medieval knighthood further burdened
with many carts and wagons and as a whole posed a great
organisational undertaking. Even this issue was discussed
during the aforementioned council in Lithuanian Brest,
where decisions were made about the construction of
a floating bridge in the upper reaches of the Vistula River
(in Kozienice). It was afterwards floated to the vicinity of
Czerwińsk at the turn of June and July. In its time it was
a very difficult operation. Such a skilful execution gives
a high mark to the Polish military technique5.
5

– 19 –

Cf. M. Nowak, ‘Uwagi o technice budowy mostów polowych
w Polsce w w. XV do XVIII’, in Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, vol. II, 1956.

– Karol Olejnik –

The crossing took place between 30 June and 2 July
and was carried out very efficiently. The basic source reporting these events, The Annals of Jan Długosz treat
it as an indisputable tactical achievement, long before
even encountering the enemy. Let’s add, that the plans
pertaining to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania’s army corresponded with the place of the crossing as well as with
the general plan of manoeuvres. In Brest, decisions were
made for Lithuanian forces and Ruthenian regiments to
gather up in the vicinity of the upper Narwia River at the
turn of June and July. The concentrated military was to
traverse northern Mazovia with the intention to close in
on the main royal force and then continue the intended
march into the Order’s state in the general direction of
Malbork. Until the last moment the Teutons were utterly
convinced, that Jagiełło will emerge from the vicinity of
Płock (along the left bank) and into the north. When they
received the message that the Polish army had crossed
the Vistula River and is most probably marching towards
Malbork, the Grand Master had to verify his earlier plans
in great haste.
The Teutons quickly moved from Świecie towards the
castle in Kurzętniki on the Drwęca River. Both the stronghold and the river itself seemed to constitute an effective
defence measure. Both armies (Kingdom of Poland’s and
Lithuania’s) conjoined even before reaching the Drwęca
River and had superiority in numbers over the Order’s
knighthood, which hastily drew more forces to Kurzętniki.
At that moment the defenders gained a chance of effectively standing their ground. Crossing the Drwęca River just
under the enemy front on the other side of the river (the
Teutons gathered not only all of their manpower but also
almost all of their artillery on the projected route) posed
a great risk and threatened with the campaign’s collapse,
when it was just in its early stages. With such a situation at
hand a decision was made in the allied camp to reroute
the march towards the Order’s capital and avoid the aforementioned water obstacle altogether. It was decided to
move away from the enemy blocking the crossing spot
and under the cover of the river go around Drwęca up to
its source. Probably for convenience reasons it was decided at that moment to leave the carts in that area. One
should add, that such a decision was dictated by terrain
conditions, because the area in which these manoeuvres
were carried out characterised itself with dense afforestation, numerous water obstacles in the form of lakes, which
forced the military to use the sparse roads available. The

Teutons reacted to the enemy movements by also setting
off towards the river’s source, in a parallel march along the
Drwęca River’s right bank. It was a significant convenience
for the Teutons, that the castles located in this region (Kurzętnik, Iława, Ostróda, and Olsztynek) could serve, if the
need arose, to assume defensive positions, take advantage of the terrain, block the enemy’s movement or – bring
about a decisive battle.
Meanwhile the town and castle of Dąbrówno found
themselves on the way of the Polish-Lithuanian army.
Despite adequate defence measures they were seized on
13 June. According to Długosz the castle was conquered
by peasant infantry and various camp servants. Maybe
this way the king wanted to save the main troops, but it’s
also possible, that he was acting conservatively in case
of larger enemy activity. Storming the Dąbrówna castle
gave the Order’s army time to relocate towards Ostróda.
Its castle guarded the roads crossing nearby. The Teutonic
army took positions nearby, in the vicinity of Stębark village, with the intent to await the further development of
events. Literature on the subject is dominated by a belief,
that the Order’s leadership choose this spot on purpose,
because of a vast plain located nearby and stretching
between the Stębark–Łodwigowo–Grunwald and the Łubień Lake. Such a space would serve as a way to cross the
path of the incoming Jagiełło and Vytautas’ army perfectly.
The opposing side probably also was in possession of this
information, and because a decisive battle was Jagiełło’s
plan from the beginning, and as opportunity presented itself, he decided to take advantage of it. That the Teutons
chose the location of the battle earlier is evidenced by the
fact that they managed to prepare positions for their artillery units and also dug a number of pitfalls (so called ‘wolf
pits’), which were to serve as an obstacle for the Polish cavalry attacking their positions. It would be impossible with
the enemy directly at hand, so one should assume, that it
was in the evening of June the 14th, when the royal army
was slowly approaching from the south-east. Jagiełło’s
army stopped in the woods on the western shore of the
Łubień Lake, between the villages of Stębark and Łodwigowo. The field of the incoming clash stretched to the
west from their position. Beyond it the Order’s knighthood
prepared itself for battle.
The size of both forces remains as one of the most controversial matters up until this day. From the beginning
sources indicated profound discrepancies in this matter,
which, in a way, was used by literature, which quoted this

– 20 –

– ‘The Great War’ of 1409–1410 and the Battle of Grunwald –

data with great liberty6. The Jan Długosz related, that
50.000 enemies were killed in the battle and 40.000 more
were taken prisoner, although he honestly admitted to not
knowing if these numbers were correct7. Historiographers
who came after him usually multiplied these figures, pertaining to both the participants and the casualties. Modern
researchers are much more cautious and usually take mobilisation capabilities of both fighting parties as a basis of
their calculation. Consequently, the Teutonic army preparing for a decisive battle on the fields of Grunwald totalled
21.000 cavalry and 6000 footsoldiers, to which circa 5000
camp servants can be added, whose duty was to guard
the war camp comprised of horse carts. In total it would
give the number of circa 33.000 people ready to fight the
Polish-Lithuanian army. It’s worth to add, that these numbers were mostly made up of mercenaries and the guest
crusaders and not the Order’s knighthood. The Teutons
not only possessed enough material means to hire mercenaries (mainly from Germanic countries) but also had
excellently organised diplomatic corpus, which was able
to convince travellers from Western Europe to take part in
a war with a fake-Christian Jagiełło and heathen Vytautas.
Armies of the latter were high in numbers also. They
were made up of: Polish knighthood and mercenaries
(circa 18.000 cavalry and 2.000 footsoldiers), Lithuanian-Ruthenian knighthood (circa 11.000 cavalry and 5.000
infantrymen) and a rather unknown number of Tatars (according to Długosz, there were three hundred of them)8.
The presence of the latter (let’s add, that their numbers
were multiplied up to dozens of thousands both in historical sources and in literature) caused the Teutons to use it
as an aggressively propagandistic argument, which served
as the main evidence of the pagan nature of Jagiełło and
his army. Going back to the quoted numbers, we can assume that between 31 and 32 thousand soldiers took part
in the fight against the Order. Similarly to the Teutonic
army, there was a rather large group of servants (circa
500 people) on the Polish-Lithuanian side. Although they
didn’t take part in the main battle itself, it can be stated
without a shadow of doubt, that in the last phase of the
fight, when the scales of victory tipped in Poland’s favour,

6

7

8

These matters are discussed in detail by S M. Kuczyński in his
polemical book Spór o Grunwald, Warsaw 1972.
J. Długosz Roczniki czyli Kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego,
Warsaw 1982, Chapter XI, p. 135.
Idem, p. 107.

they approached the battlefield to finish off the wounded,
take prisoners and loot.
From above comparison shows that both forces were
more or less even in numbers. The difference mainly pertained to equipment. Knights from the West, mainly volunteers (the guest crusaders) and mercenaries were the
elite of European knighthood. We can’t doubt that their
weaponry and equipment was cutting edge at that time.
The cavalry’s strike force was comprised of heavily armoured knights, fighting with lances, light spears, swords
and axes. They didn’t dominate in sheer numbers but,
along with much more numerous lancers equipped with
chain mails, determined the results of cavalry attacks. Let’s
add that the horses used by heavy cavalry were equipped
with barding, a sort of horse armour (it was usually made
of chain mail, in rare instances – plate). Sometimes horses
were protected by caparisons. The Teutons paid much
attention to the quality of mounts. Horse breeding was
a common practice in their dominion, so the Order’s cavalry presented itself excellently from this perspective. The
training regimen of the knighthood commanded by the
Grand Master was set on a very high level. These people
learnt basic military skills as early as during household
education, in accordance with a detailed code of conduct,
which a young member of this social class had to abide.
Regarding the practical side, altogether, monk-knights,
visiting volunteers and mercenaries had participated in
several war campaigns and also had experience from tournaments, which at that time were held on most European
courts.
The Order’s infantry was of ranged character (crossbows were the most common weapon) but in melee
combat swords, axes and spears were used. Protective
gear of the infantrymen comprised of shields, helmets
and chain mails. According to some researchers, the Order’s infantry didn’t play a significant role in the battle of
Grunwald. Such claim is further evidenced by the fact,
that both Długosz and the Teutonic sources remain silent
in this matter. Although it’s difficult to assume, that there
were none present within the ranks of the Grand Master’s
army. Teutons who rode into the field couldn’t rule out the
necessity of defending at least river crossings or, in case
of breaching the kingdom’s borders, the need to capture
enemy strongholds. Cavalry wasn’t fit for such tasks. Regarding the lack of sources, one could explain it by the
peasant nature of footsoldiers, who were overshadowed
by the achievements of proper knights.

– 21 –

– Karol Olejnik –

The presence of artillery in the Teutonic army deserves
separate attention. The basic Teutonic account of this
battle, the Chronicle of the Conflict, reports that artillery
was used in the first phase of the battle9. It could be attested by the fact that it was placed along with the footsoldiers in the front line of the Order’s forces and was
protected by terrain obstacles on the forefront. Because
during preparations the Grand Master’s army had to manoeuvre accordingly to the movement of the royal army,
one should rule out, that the Teutons brought with them
siege artillery (such as bombards). They were probably
light cannons, which shot rock projectiles. The dynamic
course of the battle forces us to assume, that the outcome
of using this type of weapon was meagre.
Knowing the excellent organisation of the Order’s state,
including the well developed town (i.a. in Gdańsk, Toruń,
Elbląg) and castle (above all in Malbork) craftsmanship, we
can’t doubt that the Teutonic army possessed standardised equipment and weaponry, Apart from their own production, the Teutons bought weaponry on a large scale,
especially in Germanic states, which were well known for
such trade. Large quantities of weapons were stockpiled in
individual castles of the Order, which was a consequence
of the precedence of aggressive politics employed in regard to neighbouring states.
Finally, let’s say a few words about the camps used by
both of the armies. Unfortunately we don’t possess precise
data pertaining to this matter. One should assume, however, that the Polish-Lithuanian camp was much bigger
than the Teutonic one. It was determined by the fact, that
the latter were acting on the territory of their own state
and could also use both human and material resources
found in numerous castles. Because of the aforementioned strategic plan which was to reach the Order’s capital, the opposing side, had to take care of food supplies,
additional weaponry and other equipment necessary for
such operations.
The matter of weaponry and equipment used by the
army commanded by Władysław Jagiełło was a bit different. It was caused both by the structure of its specific
units and with the place of origin of a particular part of the
army. Vast differences were present between the army of
the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, and even bigger
ones between the latter and the Tatars supporting them.
9

Cf. Cronica conflictus Wladislai regis Poloniae cum cruciferis.
Anno Christi 1410, Poznań 1911, p. 18.

Polish knighthood went to war with the Order due to the
so-called general call (expeditio generalis), which was regulated during the reign of Casimir the Great. According to
it, a land owner had to answer the call of the monarch and
show up in a designated location along with an armed
unit, equipped on his account. A rule was in force that
both the equipment of the knight himself and his lackeys should be ‘within best ability’. This lack of precision
turned out to be unfortunate at best, because it allowed
for arbitrariness in evaluating own capabilities pertaining
to purchasing equipment and weaponry used during the
expedition. On the other hand, the respect for own safety
(and the safety of the fellowship) and the rules defining the
position of the knight depending on his financial abilities
excluded excessive departure from actual needs, where
equipment and weaponry were concerned. The second
form of mobilization was the so-called ‘expedition from
demesnes and boroughs’. The landowner didn’t go to war
personally, rather than send a certain number of cavalry
and footsoldiers, whom he had to equip and arm by his
own means. In such a case the command had a much
bigger say in choosing certain weapons and equipment
possessed by the soldiers coming to the concentration. It’s
worth to note the third form of recruitment, which was the
so-called ‘defence of the district’. According to it, all men
were obligated to participate in the war. The scope and
form of participation were specified depending on the current needs. It affected peasants (conscripted mainly to infantry and auxiliary units) and townsfolk, who were mainly
required to man the city walls. In the reality of the year
1410 it involved mainly regions directly bordering with the
Order’s dominion, so it’s difficult to assess the role of this
form in the outcome of the campaign, much less the battle
of Grunwald itself.
The offensive equipment of a lancer knight wasn’t
much different from what was used in the ranks of the Order’s military. It comprised of a lance, a sword, a dagger
and sometimes an axe. The main difference lay in the protective gear. The chain mail was much more frequent than
plate armour10. The diversity was even bigger when choosing the specific elements of the equipment. Sometimes it
didn’t even form a complete set, which most probably was
the result of a less rigorous approach to the requirements
of the battlefield. It also involved helmets. They were com10

– 22 –

Polska technika wojskowa do roku 1500, ed. A. Nadolski, Warsaw 1994.

– ‘The Great War’ of 1409–1410 and the Battle of Grunwald –

monly used, but greatly diverse in shapes and sizes and
sometimes only decorated with elements associated with
the crest. The ranged weapon of a lancer was a crossbow.
Riding equipment of Polish knighthood was comprised
of all the necessary elements, although it wasn’t as rich
in shapes, as it was common in the West. It regarded caparisons in particular (less common and less exquisite).
In particular horse armours were a rarity. The quality of
mounts used by Polish knights wasn’t much different from
what the Teutons and their guest crusaders used. It can
be attributed to horse breeding which was well developed
on our lands. The last element which decided about
the combat value of Polish knights, namely the training
of individual units, was similar to the opponent’s regimen. Household education gave basic skills in this field,
whereas commonly held hunts for big game in a sense
served as a substitute to less frequent military operations,
when compared to the West. Participation in tournaments
and various games was only gaining on popularity at that
time, whereas foreign travels connected with these activities were the domain of only the most prominent persons.
Sources regarding Grunwald almost omit the participation of infantry in the royal army, but most definitely there
was a certain number present. Let’s add, that among its
ranks fought mainly townspeople and peasants armed
with bows, crossbows and slashing weapons (swords,
axes, spears). On the other hand the basic protective
equipment was a shield, with the chain mail covering only
the upper body and the head protected by a helmet. We
should add, that Jagiełło’s army also went to the war of
1410 with a certain amount of cannons. It is mentioned
both by Długosz, and the Chronicle of the Conflict as well,
not only in the context of crossing of the Vistula River near
Czerwińsk, but also the transportation of rock cannonballs
by wagons11. However the royal forces didn’t use artillery
during the battle, which can be explained not only by the
fact, that Jagiełło’s forces were the attacking party from
the start, but also because these were siege weapons, as
it was planned from the beginning to capture subsequent
points of resistance in the Order’s state.
The above thoughts give the conclusion, that the Kingdom of Poland’s army didn’t differ in terms of weaponry
and equipment from the knighthood commanded by the
Grand Master. The differences pertained to secondary
11

J. Długosz Roczniki…, Chapter XI, p. 75; Cronica conflictus…, p.
15–18.

matters (the variety of weapon and equipment types),
which didn’t have a decisive impact on the troops’ combat value. However, it was somewhat different with troops
brought by Vytautas. It is commonly agreed in literature on
the subject that only Lithuanian cavalry arrived at Grunwald. It was ethnically diversified. Apart from Lithuanians,
there were Ruthenians, Samogitians, Poles and finally
Tatars living in the southern reaches of the Grand Duchy.
Equipment of these warriors was a result of entirely different needs of the battlefield. Success was rarely decided
by a decisive battle of knights so frequent during wars
in Western Europe. More common, however, were short
clashes with speed, manoeuvrability (including the ability
to feign a retreat) and similar elements often bearing signs
of improvisation playing a crucial role. Such type of combat required lighter inventory, most of all. Offensive equipment was dominated by spears, bows and sabres (rarely
swords). Protective gear was comprised of characteristic
wedge helmets, scale armours (rarely – chain mails) and
shield. It doesn’t mean that pieces of equipment typical
for western knighthood didn’t occur, but they were in great
minority and could be found used only by the highest dignitaries. Even the quality of mounts varied greatly. The
west was dominated by more massive horses (it had to
carry a knight in full armour and its own equipment),
whereas because of the required speed and generally
lighter equipment of the rider, eastern cavalry used much
lighter and much more manoeuvrable horses.
It was with such equipment and weaponry that two
similarly numerous armies clashed on the morning of
15 June. Controlling such a big mass of people wasn’t an
easy matter, both in general and individual sense, considering that the soldiers didn’t look very different to one another. These matters had to be settled before the battle.
The latter was solved in such a way that on king’s order
all allied forces wore strawbands, as an optical recognition sign. The second one was a verbal sign in the form
of a password. At Grunwald these were: ‘Cracow’ and ‘Vilnius’, the names of both capitals12. Literature is dominated
by a conviction, that both parties commanded their units
directly. The Grand Master on one side and Jagiełło on the
other, with Vytautas accompanying him. Both sides used
mounted messengers or verbal commands when necessary. If the distance was bigger, banners and sound signals
made with trumpets and drums were used.
12

– 23 –

Cronica conflictus…, p. 22.

– Karol Olejnik –

The battle of Grunwald was but one of many clashes
of medieval knighthood fought on open field, but one
can easily find many elements, which definitely distinguish it from seemingly similar struggles. It especially
involved the preparations made by both fighting parties,
starting with the methodical arrangement of formations.
As we already mentioned, the Order’s armies reached
the future battlefield the day before. The coming of Jagiełło’s army was marked by fires lit by the Lithuanians
and Tatars along their march. Because the Grand Master ordered to lay battle at this spot, the army began the
necessary preparations. Terrain conditions determined
the place of the battle and, at the same time, allowed
to prepare obstacles such as the ditches, behind which
artillery was placed. Teutonic footsoldiers took position
between cannon emplacements, forming the forming
line of the Order’s army. Cavalry was placed behind the
infantry lines in such a way, that its right flank reached
Łodwigowo, whereas the left flank reached Stębark. Apart
from the main force, to the east of Grunwald Village, the
Teutons placed a camp surrounded by wagons with a few
banners of cavalry stationed nearby. The Grand Master’s
command post was located in the centre of the formation, a next to the cavalry lines13.
From the pattern of unit placement one can risk interpreting the intentions of the Order’s leadership. They
relied on waiting for the Polish-Lithuanian knighthood’s
first move, which would be met with cannon fire and then
break due to the aforementioned terrain obstacles. At this
moment the Order’s infantry would gain the chance to
shoot their crossbows at the breaking enemy formations,
which would then provide a perfect condition for a flanking attack carried out by the Order’s cavalry. It would be
even easier because of the chaos ensuing among the royal
army’s lines. Such a turn of events would give the Order’s
forces an almost certain victory. Literature on the subject
agrees, that one could point out a few flaws in these plans.
First of all, the Order’s army assumed battle formation
since the early morning hours of 15 June. Because the
day was sunny, with each moment the temperature rose
rapidly, which caused faster fatigue, especially amongst
heavily armoured knights. Secondly, the opponent wasn’t
eager for battle. Additionally, for a long time they were
barely even visible, which will make more sense as we take
13

Cf. annotation 3, also S. M. Kuczyński, Bitwa pod Grunwaldem,
Katowice 1985.

a look at the formation of the Polish-Lithuanian force and
Jagiełło’s intentions.
The royal army, as we remember, marched from the
south-east through the woods surrounding the Łubień
Lake and the village of Ulnowo. In the evening of 14 June
camps were set on both ends of the Łubień Lake. Poles
on the south end and Lithuanians on the north. Jagiełło
was informed about the Teutons, their preparations and
assumed positions by cavalry banners sent forward. Polish
leadership evidently decided to use the environment conditions to thwart the enemy’s plans. At first sunlight first
positions were started to be taken. Banners of Lithuanian
cavalry were prepared for battle on the right flank. The
front line was comprised of Lithuanian and Ruthenian
guard, whereas the next two lines of Lithuanian cavalry.
The whole right flank of Jagiełło’s army was located under
the cover of a forest. There were marshlands behind there
backs, also covered by trees. Duke Vytautas took his command post directly behind his troops. The centre of the
formation was comprised of Smolensk regiments supporting the Lithuanians, on the left flank Polish banners reaching as far as the Łodwigowo forest prepared for battle.
Deeper within the first strike group, on a hill near the west
shore of the Łubień Lake stood the royal tent. Polish banners left as a rear guard were positioned right next to it.
The royal army slowly prepared for battle and didn’t
show any signs of eagerness to strike. Although skirmishers
began to fight right in front of both armies, Jagiełło didn’t
want to commence the battle too early. The king had to
stop Vytautas, who, according to Długosz’s accounts, was
spoiling for a fight. Jagiełło was well aware of the fact,
that time was on his side. Apart from that, he wanted to
provoke the Teutons to relocate from their positions. After
hearing out the mass, the king knighted a dozen young
men and began preparing for the fight. It was at that time,
that he received news about the heralds who came from
the enemy’s camp and brought two swords (one for the
king and one from Vytautas), calling them out to battle.
The emissaries announced that their forces will move
back to allow the royal army to deploy formations. This
gesture was probably caused by the impatience of the Order’s knighthood, which expected their enemies to abide
the rules of medieval battlefields and who weren’t familiar with the tactics used by Jagiełło. Apart from that, the
Teutons began to grow weary from standing in direct sunlight on an open field. Jagiełło didn’t allow himself to get
provoked, especially since the enemy gave some space

– 24 –

– ‘The Great War’ of 1409–1410 and the Battle of Grunwald –

and at the same time uncovered their artillery positions.
The king was much too experienced not to understand the
enemy’s intentions, who could still have some surprises up
their sleeve. However, the clash was inevitable, so he gave
the order to start the battle.
‘When the reveilles began to sound, the whole Polish
army sang with loud voices the native song Bogurodzica
and then, lifting spears, they threw themselves into battle.
The first, however, who went to battle were the Lithuanian
army…’ is how Jan Długosz begins describing the battle14.
Sending Lithuanian and Tatar light cavalry in the first wave
was probably intentional move by the monarch, who
wanted to break the enemy’s tight formations. Because
the Lithuanians and Tatars carried out this attack, truly to
their eastern customs – in a loose formation, they easily
managed to reach enemy positions, attacking mainly the
infantry and artillery positions. The attack was most probably successful, as the sources don’t contain any mentions
about further usage of Teutonic cannons, just as they
don’t mention the effects brought by terrain obstacles prepared by the Order’s army. However, the Lithuanians and
Tatars provoked the opponent’s forces to unleash a frontal
attack on Jagiełło’s positions. The fight concentrated on
two flanks. On the right flank of Jagiełło’s army, closer to
Stębark, fought the Lithuanian and Tatar units supported
by Polish knighthood, the left flank (nearby the village of
Łodwigowo) was occupied by Polish cavalry and mercenaries. Let’s concentrate on the right wing of the allied army
for a moment.
The Lithuanians had to oppose not only the Order’s
knights but also a banner comprised of guest crusaders,
who were especially eager to prove their combat skills.
It wasn’t surprising that the fighting which took place
here was especially fierce, thus after some time the light
Lithuanian banners began to suffer heavy casualties and
crumble under the might of the opposing cavalry. Their retreat albeit slow at start soon turned into a panic escape.
Only the Smolensk banners – according to Długosz – managed to maintain formation and retreat in the direction
of the left flank of the royal army without getting broken.
Regarding the aforementioned events it’s worth to mention, that in literature one can find an opinion, according
to which the escape of Lithuanian and Tatar forces was
a manoeuvre commonly used in eastern combat (especially by the Tatars). It served as a tactical retreat before
14

J. Długosz Roczniki…, Chapter XI, p. 122–123.

the strike of a stronger enemy and a means to provoke him
into a chase, in order to choose the most advantageous
moment and resume the fight. In that moment, however,
that was a major turning point of the battle which could
end up with Jagiełło’s defeat. And yet the Lithuanians
while retreating in fear penetrated deeply forested areas
to the north and south-east of Stębark, managing to scatter the Order’s knights in pursuit. What’s more, there were
reserve units in these woods, which not only stopped the
escapees but also helped the scattered banners to regain
combat value. Meanwhile, after chasing away the Lithuanians, the Order’s knighthood, filled with success, didn’t
continue the pursuit, but rather began to return to the
main battle field. Here the situation was entirely different.
The situation was different on the left flank of the royal
army, where the Poles and mercenary banners comprised
of Bohemians and Moravians, later joined by Smolensk
knights. Soldiers of similar equipment and battle experience fought on both sides. It’s worth to mention, that
the greatest Polish knights were present, with Zawisza
Czarny among them. A great royal flag was waving over
their heads and the monarch was overlooking the course
of events, reacting accordingly to the changing situation
by sending more reserves. Let’s add, that the king commanded the battle while standing on a hill, surrounded by
a cavalry unit protecting him. The monarch, however, was
spoiling for a fight but his retinue didn’t allow it. Unrelenting resistance of the royal knighthood made the attacks
less effective and after some time the Teutons began to
give ground. The most critical moment of this battle took
place, when after the right wing retreated, the Lithuanians
uncovered the right flank of Polish banners. Intoxicated
with success over the Lithuanian-Ruthenian cavalry, the
heavily armoured guest knights of st. George could carry
out a critical strike. However, they were stopped by the
Lithuanians returning to the field, which averted the Polish
cavalry’s impending catastrophe.
In this situation the Grand Master ordered the last
rear guard into combat, which was comprised of 16 elite
cavalry banners, whom he chose to lead personally. This
strike could decide the fate of the battle, because the Polish knighthood fighting since the beginning of the battle
was growing wearier. However, this attack was noticed
by the combatants early enough, which enabled the king
to lead his remaining reserves to the endangered locations. The Grand Master along with his dignitaries and his
16 banners were immediately surrounded and the last

– 25 –

– Karol Olejnik –

– 26 –

– ‘The Great War’ of 1409–1410 and the Battle of Grunwald –

stage of the battle begun. The circle of the royal army was
tightening and just a few Teutons managed to escape.
Among those who died were the Grand Master Ulrich von
Jungingen, the Grand Commander, the Grand Marshal,
the Grand Treasurer, the rest of commanders and the majority of monk knights. Also, the majority of the visiting
knights were victims of the battle. The victors took the
possession of the Teutonic flags, and a few thousands of
prisoners of war were captured. Also those, who managed
to escape from the battle field, were killed by unrelenting
Lithuanians. The last act of the battle was the conquest of
the Teutonic military camp by the Polish infantry accompanied by camp servants. This stage of the battle caused
many deaths among the enemies. Those who were fleeing
could not be let alive and were still within the grasp of the
vengeful hand of the king. As Długosz wrote: ‘The road was
covered with corpses for many miles’.
Despite the fact that, in the literary sources, the Battle
of Grunwald is called the last, typical battle of the Middle
Ages, one can notice numerous departures from the norm
as established by other such battles. The difference could
be seen in reference to the Polish-Lithuanian Army, and
the discrepancy is apparent throughout the whole military campaign of the years 1409–1410. We assume that the
characteristic feature of the medieval military strategy was
to settle the outcome of a war with the help of one crucial
battle. Although it was apparent in the deeds/actions of
the Command of the Teutonic Order, such attitude was absent among the opposing troops. From the very beginning,
the tactical aim of the Polish-Lithuanian army was to move
hostilities to the enemy’s territory, whereas their strategic
objective was to reach to the capital of the Order, which
was to be conquered later. It was assumed that the success
of such plan would result in the domination over at least
a part of the enemy’s territory, which would deprive it of its
meaningful defensive potential, namely highly developed
castles. The scope of tactical and strategic was really wide.

The battle was conceived to be just one step forward in
the execution of those far-reaching intentions. The signs of
a modern approach to combat on the allied side were visible already at the point of preparing the campaign itself.
An event unprecedented on European scale was the war
council in the Lithuanian Brest. Similarly, quite unusual
was the fact that the place of the main strike was not revealed to the enemies. Several early spring strikes/attacks
directed from the line of Noteć River towards the interior
of the Order’s state served the purpose. Another achievement with regard to a technical aspect was undoubtedly
getting such a huge army across of the marshes of the Vistula River. The concentration of the Lithuanian and Polish
forces in the exact place and time was the proof of another
tactic test passed, along with the rapid march (after having
escaped from the enemy forces) from Kurzętniki towards
the area of the forthcoming battle.
The battle itself also delivers numerous examples
to prove our hypothesis. Jagiełło would not be misled
neither by the Vytautas’ insistence to proceed with an attack immediately once he had stood in front of enemies’
troops, nor by the Grand Master’s provocations. He made
a maximum use of terrain conditions, keeping his own
forces in a forest, while the enemy suffered from a heat
of a July’s sun, whereas the reserves he kept till the last
moment helped to annihilate the desperate attacks of the
Grand Master in the last stage of the battle. Speaking of
differences which make us perceive the battle in categories quite different from typical medieval armed battles, we
could mention high level of priority awareness within the
Polish army. Despite the fact that the outcome of the campaign was not so successful (Malbork was not conquered;
soon after the defeat the Order again stood on its feet,
and, after the painful experience in Grunwald, it changed
its attitude towards Poland), due to all of the reasons mentioned above, the victory in the battle of Grunwald has
went down in the history of Poland.

Bibliography
Primary sources

Cronica conflictus Wladislai regis Poloniae cum cruciferis. Anno

J. Długosz, Roczniki czyli Kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego,

Christi 1410, Poznań 1911

Books

Lib. X–XI, Warsaw 1982
(J. Długosz, Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae, Lib. X–XI,

Polska technika wojskowa do roku 1500, ed. A. Nadolski, Warsaw
1994

Warsaw 1997)

– 27 –

Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, vol. II, Warsaw 1956
J. Baszkiewicz, Powstanie zjednoczonego państwa polskiego na
przełomie XIII/XIV wieku, Warsaw 1957
M. Biskup, G. Labuda, Dzieje zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach,
Gdańsk 1986
K. Górski, Zakon krzyżacki a powstanie państwa pruskiego, Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow–Gdańsk 1977

K. Olejnik, Obrona polskiej granicy zachodniej od końca XIV do
schyłku XVIII wieku, Poznań 1985
A. Nadolski, Grunwald. Problemy wybrane, Olsztyn 1990
S. M. Kuczyński, Bitwa pod Grunwaldem, Katowice 1985
S. M. Kuczyńsk, Spór o Grunwald, Warsaw 1972
S. M. Kuczyński, Wielka wojna z zakonem krzyżackim w latach
1409–1411, Warsaw 1960

– Zbigniew Grabowski –
Military Bureau for Historical Research in Military Centre for Civic Education

The Battle of Ukmergė,
the 1 st of September 1435

During the civil war in Lithuania (1431–1435) a battle
between the Polish-Lithuanian and Teutonic-Ruthenian
armies took place on the 1st of September 1435 near
the village of Ukmergė and between the Šventoji and
Zyrnowka Rivers. This battle has ended a long series of
wars between Poland and the Teutonic Order in the first
half of the 15th century, which began with the great war
of 1409–1411 and the victory over the Prussian branch of
the Order at Grunwald on the 15th of July 1410. The Battle
of Ukmergė did not have the significance of the Battle of
Grunwald, although some did put it on par with the victory from 25 years earlier. However, very serious losses
among the Teutons, including the death of the Teutonic
commander and other far-reaching effects (weakening of
the Livonian branch of the Order), nevertheless raise some
kind of analogy and the notion of a ‘Livonian’ Grunwald.

Background
The Lithuanian Grand Duke Vytautas died on the 27th of
October 1430 in the castle in Trakai. Under the provisions
of the Union of Vilnius and Radom from 1401, the Lithuanian state was to be returned to the Polish king and the
‘supreme Duke of Lithuania’ Władysław Jagiełło. This ruler,
in accordance with the Union of Horodło of 1413, was to
appoint the new ruler of Lithuania, with the consent of
the Polish and Lithuanian nobility1. At that time the king
1

At the beginning of October 1413, Władysław Jagiełło, Alexander Vytautas and the Polish and Lithuanian nobles met in
Horodlo at the Bug River. The new provisions on the union of
both countries were drawn up there. It had been determined,
that Lithuania will be ruled by Vytautas as the Grand Duke and
his successor will be appointed by the Polish king, with the
advice and knowledge of the Lithuanian boyars and the Pol-

was struggling with the Polish gentry about securing the
throne for his oldest son, Prince Władysław. Therefore,
Jagiełło decided not to incorporate Lithuania into Poland,
contrary to what the Polish nobles suggested, but keep it
for his sons. The throne in Vilnius was, in fact, hereditary2.
The king was convinced that the Poles will not allow
the union to break off and therefore will have to choose
the one who will become the Grand Duke of Lithuania as
their ruler. The Polish monarch could not immediately
transmit the rule over Lithuania to his son, because he
was still a minor. Therefore he took into account the aspirations of his youngest brother Švitrigaila, ‘a man of an
equally violent temper and insatiable ambition’3. Jagiełło
hoped, however, that his childless brother would become
loyal after receiving the long coveted power and recognize
his nephews (Władysław and the younger Casimir) as his
successors. The actions of the king, primarily oriented towards fulfilling dynastic interests, resulted in many disapproving voices throughout the Crown, including that of the
royal council.
Meanwhile Švitrigaila did not live up to the king’s expectations and laid the groundwork towards complete
self-empowerment and to break the union with Poland. In
order to strengthen his position, on the 19th of June 1431 in
Skirsnemunė, he formed an alliance against the Kingdom
of Poland with the Teutonic Order. Upon learning of the
Lithuanian-Teutonic alliance, Polish troops marched out
towards the east as early as in late June, in order to capture

2

3

– 29 –

ish nobles. The union was to be respected even if the Jagiellonian dynasty expired.
T. Stolarczyk, ‘Świdrygiełło przeciwko Jagielle – tzw. wojna łucka w 1431 r.’, in Mars, vol. X, 2001, p. 4.
H. Łowmiański, Polityka Jagiellonów, 2nd ed., Poznań 2006, pp.
136–137.

– Zbigniew Grabowski –

the territories disputed between Poland and Lithuania4. In
early July 1431, the border castles of Zbarazh, Włodzimierz
and Horodło were taken from the Lithuanians, who had
captured them earlier. On the 31st of July 1431 Švitrigaila′s
units clashed with the Polish army at Kobiałki near Lutsk.
The grand duke declined to wage a decisive battle.
The subsequent military manoeuvres focused on
Volyn. The Polish troops tried to capture Lutsk using siege
engines brought from Krakow and cannons called ‘falconets’ (taraśnice). The castle, however, was well fortified
and the garrison defended it valiantly, fending of attacks
and organizing outings against the royal troops5. In addition, internal conflicts, caused by the lack of success,
began to arise among the besiegers, who – according to
Długosz – blamed Jagiełło himself. The king was said to
be reluctant towards a strike against Lithuania and his beloved brother, and agreed to military action under heavy
pressure from his advisers. As a result, a truce was signed
on the 1st of September 1431, near the walls of the Lutsk
castle, which was besieged unsuccessfully throughout
August. The document was to be in force until the 24th of
June 1433.
Meanwhile, in the vicinity of the 20th of August 1431, the
Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, Paul von Rusdorf, implemented the provisions of the alliance with Švitrigaila by
ordering the Teutonic Knights to invade Poland at several
locations. War was declared as soon as they crossed the
border. One of the Teutonic groups, under the command
of Heinrich Rabenstein, the Vogt of Neumark, stormed
out of Neumark into the north-western regions of Greater
Poland and destroyed, among others, the town of Międzychód. The second one, led by the komtur of Torun, Jan
von Pommersheim, attacked the Dobrzyń province from
Chelmno on the 29th of August, pillaging Rypin, Lipno,
Nowa Nieszawa (Dybów) and other towns. The third and
largest group of the Teutonic Knights, several thousand
soldiers strong, commanded by marshal Jost von Strupper, rushed in from Bydgoszcz into Kujawy and burned
Radziejów and Włocławek, and captured Inowroclaw. The
fourth group, composed of Marshal Werner von Nesselrode and Tuchola’s komtur Jost von Hohenkirchen’s Livonian units was directed from Tuchola to Krajna. In total, 24
towns and more than 1000 villages fell victim to the Teu4

5

P. Bunar, S. A. Sroka, Słownik wojen, bitew i potyczek w średniowiecznej Polsce, Cracow 2004, p. 84.
H. Łowmiański, op. cit., p. 140.

tonic aggression6. The Teutons, however, failed to capture
Bydgoszcz, Brest Kujawski and Naklo.
Their task was all the easier, as the Polish troops were
already engaged in fighting with Švitrigaila. Only in Krajna,
the local knights Jan Jarogniewski, Bartosz of Wezenborg
and Dobrogost Koliński formed armed units from the local
peasantry within the legal boundaries of the ‘defence of
the land’ (defensio terrae) and commanded these forces of,
approximately, up to 5000 people. On the 13th of September they defeated the fourth Teutonic group at Dąbki, near
Nakło, capturing several banners and taking many prisoners. Following the conclusion of the aforementioned truce
with Švitrigaila, the Grand Master ordered a retreat, fearing
retaliation from the Poles7. That is why in mid-September,
the Teutonic Knights fell back to the territory of the monastic state.
The year 1432 brought a political upheaval in Lithuania. Švitrigaila was overthrown and Sigismund Kęstutaitis,
the brother of the Grand Duke Vytautas, was ascended to
the throne. Švitrigaila, although a Catholic himself, mainly
had the support of Orthodox, predominantly Ruthenian,
gentry, as it was consistently devoid of equal treatment
by Władysław Jagiełło, who supported Catholics, represented by the Lithuanian boyars8. Sigismund Kęstutaitis
was the Ruthenian representative. Despite old age, he has
not distinguished himself yet. As a result, the Grand Duchy
of Lithuania broke down into two hostile camps and found
itself in a state of civil war. Russian Orthodox boyars led by
Švitrigaila, supported by the Teutonic Order and the Tatars, along with the Lithuanian, mainly Catholic, gentry led
by Sigismund Kęstutaitis and supported by Poland faced
each other9.
Fights still continued after Švitrigaila was overthrown
and Sigismund Kęstutaitis took reign over Lithuania. In
autumn of 1432 Polish troops led by the Ruthenian starost
Wincenty of Szamotuly, struck Podole and forced out
Švitrigaila′s forces. On the 30th of November 1432 at the
battle of Kopystyryn over the Murachwa River, the royal
troops defeated Švitrigaila’s soldiers led by the former
6

7

8
9

– 30 –

T. M. Nowak, J. Wimmer, Historia oręża polskiego 963–1795,
Warsaw 1981, p. 212.
T. Korzon, Dzieje wojen i wojskowości w Polsce, vol. 1, 2nd ed.,
Lvov–Warsaw–Cracow 1923, pp. 143–144; P. Bunar, S. A. Sroka, op. cit., p. 85.
H. Łowmiański, op. cit., pp. 136–137.
W. Mikołajczak, Wojny polsko-krzyżackie, Zakrzewo 2009, p.
165.

– The Battle of Ukmergė, the 1st of September 1435 –

governor of Podolia, knyaz Fedko Nieświcki. During this
battle the Moldovans and Tatars aided Švitrigaila. The recently overthrown Grand Duke soon lost a significant part
of Volyn to the Crown. However, the situation in Lithuania
has stabilised in such a way that Sigismund Kęstutaitis
gained advantage in ethnically Lithuanian lands, whereas
Švitrigaila has kept his influence in Ruthenian territories.10
Meanwhile, in early 1433, the Livonian master Cisse von
dem Rutenberg joined the military operation. The Livonian branch of the Order so far participated in the actions
against Poland and Lithuania only to a small extent. The
Livonian knights were absent, among others, at Grunwald.
However, the power of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, reinforced by the union with Poland and Lithuanian influences
in Pskov and Veliky Novgorod, and the resulting sense of
vulnerability made the Livonian Teutons change their position and express their support for the actions taken by
the Grand Master in order to break down the Jagiellonian
Union. Their participation in the battle of Dąbki already
showed a shift in this matter. On the 11th of January, von
dem Rutenberg’s troops gathered by the Daugava River,
marching up river in order to join Švitrigaila. His troops and
the Livonian Teutons’ forces intended to jointly attack the
Lithuanian army, which was supported by Polish units11.
On the 28th of January the Livonian Master declared war on
Sigismund Kęstutaitis. Two days later he invaded northern
Lithuania, burning and pillaging.
This action, however, was not synchronized with
Švitrigaila′s troops, which were at that time in the vicinity of Minsk and Dzisna. In this situation both Švitrigaila,
who blamed the Livonian Master von dem Rutenberg for
the lack of coordination, and the Teutons themselves gave
up the joint action. The latter, on their way back, burned
and robbed yet again, ravaging the lands of western and
northern Lithuania and capturing numerous prisoners
(3000 people).
Meanwhile, Švitrigaila, consistently supported by the
Ruthenians, managed to reclaim the castle in Lutsk, along
with the Lutsk province in Volyn in April 1433.12 In the
meantime, in Krakow, it was considered that the matter
of great damages caused by the Teutons on Polish lands
could not escape with impunity. A great retaliatory expedi10
11

12

P. Bunar, S. A. Sroka, op. cit., p. 84.
Liv-, Est- Und Curländisches Urkundenbuch, Bd. 8, 1429 Mai –
1435, Riga–Moskau 1884, pp. XIII–XIV.
M. Biskup, Wojny Polski z Zakonem Krzyżackim (1308–1521),
Gdańsk 1993, p. 160.

tion was organised in 1433 in order to avenge the Teutonic
aggression. In this matter the Polish command negotiated
with the Czech Hussites, who offered Poland armed support against the Teutons.
Two battle groups were formed: the first one composed
of units from Greater Poland aided by the Czech Hussites, numbering between 5,000 and 7,000 infantry, and
120 armed cars – it was to hit Neumark. During a council in Poznań, the king Władysław Jagiełło, the Voivode
of Poznań Sędziwój of Ostroróg, and Jan Čapek of Sany
and other Hussite commanders decided on concentrating
these troops in Miedzyrzecz. The second group, composed
of a levy en masse from Lesser Poland and mercenary
troops was to invade Pomerelia13.
The Hussite troops passed Odra at Głogów and reached
the place of concentration through Świebodzin at the end
of May. The Polish side had to give them material aid,
because most of the Hussites had destroyed shoes and
clothing. A strong Hussite unit led by Jan Čapek and the
troops from Greater Poland commanded by Sedziwój of
Ostroróg entered Neumark in June and ravaged its lands.
Meanwhile, on the 25th of June, the second group of
Polish troops set off from Kolo, where its concentration
place was located and entered the Teutonic territories
after crossing Brda at Bydgoszcz. Due to the King’s old age
(he was about 80 years old at the time), the Castellan of
Krakow, Mikołaj of Michałów, commanded all of the troops
(including the levy) as exercituum Regni Poloniae capitaneus generalis. In the meantime, the troops from Greater
Poland and the Hussites entered the Pomerelia after pillaging Neumark and began the siege of Chojnice14. Units
from Lesser Poland soon joined them.
However, the Poles and Czechs failed to capture
Chojnice, which was boldly defended by the Teutonic garrison. A month-long siege was abandoned on the 15th of
August and the army marched through the Tuchola Forest towards Świecie. Afterwards they went along the left
bank of the Vistula River towards Gdańsk. Along the way,
the monastery in Pelplin was destroyed and Tczew was
captured and burned15. On the 1st of September, the Polish and Hussite troops reached Gdańsk, pillaged the suburbs, fired at the city and destroyed a Cistercian abbey in
Oliwa. On the 4th of September the army reached the Gulf
13
14
15

– 31 –

Pomerelia, also referred as Eastern or Gdańsk Pomerania.
H. Łowmiański, op. cit., pp. 149–150.
Ibid., T. Korzon, op. cit., p. 147.

– Zbigniew Grabowski –

of Gdańsk. The Hussite troops were especially impressed
by the view of the sea. Many Czechs poured seawater into
bottles, taking them home as souvenirs16.
Their return led through Starogard and Tuchola. The
raid was not easy on the Teutons, however they did not
dare stand against the Poles and Czechs in an open field.
When the news from Lithuania did not come and the Pomeranian and Chełmno gentry demanded the end of the
war, the Teutons sent their representatives, who signed
a ceasefire at the castle in Jasienica on the 13th of September 1433. It was supposed to last until Christmas17. During
this time both sides were to prepare the conditions for
a lasting peace. However, negotiations advanced slowly, as
the Teutons did not agree to Polish terms, which included,
among others: the Order renunciating any connection to
the Empire, abandoning the matter of Švitrigaila, exempting their subjects from the obligation of obedience in case
the truce broke off. The last term was to affect both sides.
The Polish determination, and therefore the threat of
war and the attitude of the Prussian estates (the Mayor of
Torun said to the Grand Master, that if ‘Your Grace […] will
not bring us peace and tranquillity, then let it be known
to Your Grace that we will think about it ourselves and
will look for such a master, who will give us peace’)18. In
this situation, the Grand Master, on the 15th of December,
agreed to sign a truce agreement for a period of 12 years in
Łęczyca. Under this agreement, the order pledged to withdraw from forming an alliance with Švitrigaila. The Livonian branch of the Order did not acknowledge this agreement, despite the fact that it was also signed on its behalf.
During the war in Pomerlia, the struggle between
Švitrigaila and Sigismund Kęstutaitis flared up with new
force. Švitrigaila, taking advantage of the truce with the
Polish nobility in Ruthenia, had complete freedom of
movement and planned aggressive manoeuvres19. Vilnius
was to be the target of his attack. He planned to strike it
from two sides.
The military action initially planned for June was delayed, because Švitrigaila′s ally, the Livonian Master von
dem Rutenberg left Wenden as late as on the 8th of July,
leading most of his troops toward Lithuania in order to
16
17
18

19

P. Bunar, S. A. Sroka, op. cit., pp. 86–87.
Ibid., T. Korzon, op. cit., p. 147.
A. Lewicki, Powstanie Świdrygiełły. Ustęp z dziejów unii Litwy
z Koroną, Cracow 1892, p. 210; H. Łowmiański, op. cit., pp.
149–150.
W. Mikołajczak, op. cit., p. 180.

join forces with Švitrigaila. Troops belonging to the latter
set out from Polatsk in mid-July and merged with the Livonian Teuton’s army at Braslaw. Afterwards the allies tried
to conquer Troki, but to no avail20. Švitrigaila and von dem
Rutenberg opted out of the attack on Vilnius and moved
south in order to join the troops under Ruthenian dukes
marching from Lutsk. Their aim was to lay a decisive battle
with the retreating Sigismund Kęstutaitis.
However, Kęstutaitis’s troops managed to stop the advance of the Ruthenian dukes at Kletsk, and even push
them back, not allowing them to merge with the enemy
troops. This resulted in the retreat of Švitrigaila and Livonian Master’s forces towards Minsk, but heavy rainfall and
diseases have significantly weakened their army. The ailing Livonian master turned back north. On the 18th of September he arrived to Riga with the rest of his troops and
died there in October 1433. Before his death he wrote to
the Grand Master that ‘many knights and servants have
died, he himself is sick and «there are not even two of us
still healthy»’21. Meanwhile, Švitrigaila seized a large portion of Ruthenian lands in the eastern part of the Grand
Duchy of Lithuania, overrun Kiev and still reiterated his aspirations to the Grand Duchy.
Due to the fact that the Grand Master of the Order had to
reckon with retaliation from the Poles, and with the Prussian estates and their anti-war resolutions, the successor
to von dem Rutenberg, Franke von Kerskorff decided to
support Švitrigaila′s cause on his own.22 In the summer of
1434 the latter prepared another great military expedition
against the Grand Duke Sigismund, which was to include –
in violation of the Łęczyca truce – Teutonic reinforcements
from Livonia, with the silent acceptance and support of the
Grand Master Rusdorf. This foray began in August, when
Švitrigaila gathered his armies. The core of Švitrigaila and
the Livonian Master Kerskorff’s army, which marched from
Brasław to Ukmergė in order to cut off Samogitia from the
capital, Vilnius, had to retreat in September 1434, due to
Grand Duke Sigismund Kęstutaitis concentrating his vast
forces, including auxiliary Polish troops.
The Livonian Teutons supporting Švitrigaila (counting
800 riders and infantrymen) suffered heavy losses. The
20
21
22

– 32 –

M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 178.
T. Korzon, op. cit., pp. 147–148.
Such spelling was used in the list of the national Livonian masters by Klaus Militzer (Dostojnicy i urzędnicy Zakonu Kawalerów Mieczowych i Zakonu Krzyżackiego w Inflantach, in: Zakon
Krzyżacki w Prusach i Inflantach, Toruń 2013).

– The Battle of Ukmergė, the 1st of September 1435 –

Grand Master quickly sent a promise saying that the assault was made without his ‘will, knowledge and order’
to the Grand Duke and the Polish gentry23. Sigismund responded derisively: ’How did the land master dare to do
so? After all, is he not your subordinate?’24. However, in
view of important state affairs in Poland and Lithuania after the death of king Władysław Jagiełło, it stopped at exchanging letters, without any armed response. At the same
time Švitrigaila lost his seat on the southern Ruthenian
lands, where some of the dukes – acquired by extending
the Polish law unto Red Ruthenia and Podole – crossed
over to Sigismund Kęstutaitis’s side. He did not intend to
lose his aspirations to the throne of the Grand Duchy and
planned to resume operations in 1435, with the help of the
Teutons from Livonia.

Opponents
In light of Švitrigaila and the Master of the Order in Livonia Frank Kerskorff’s, military preparations for a new campaign against the Grand Duke Sigismund Kęstutaitis, at
the beginning of 1435, the Crown Council decided to call
a 12,000 strong levy en masse and send it to Lithuania25.
The Order’s Grand Master, Rusdorf, assumed this mobilisation as directed against Prussia and decided to take similar action in order to stop the Polish troops still within the
Crown’s territory. The Prussian estates strongly opposed
this, citing the truce in Łęczyca as being still in force. The
mayor of Chełmno, Johann Sterz, even resorted to threats
against the Order’s officials. He said that, if the Grand Master does not listen to the estates’ council, then ‘an evil wind
could start blowing, and it will not die down easily’26. Sterz
was imprisoned by Rusdorf, who at the same time assured
the opposing estates that he will comply with the provisions of the Łęczyca truce. Nevertheless, after learning the
news from Livonia and with Švitrigaila preparing an attack
on Lithuania in the summer of 1435, in early August Rusdorf began to simulate an army concentration on the Polish border. This made a strong impression on the Crown

23

24
25

26

J. Caro, Dzieje Polski, vol. 4, 1430–1455, Warsaw 1897, pp. 132–
133.
Ibid.
M. Plewczyński, Wojny Jagiellonów z wschodnimi i południowymi sąsiadami Królestwa Polskiego w XV wieku, Siedlce 2002,
pp. 39–40.
M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 191.

Council, which has changed its decision, ordering most of
the nobility to defend the northern borders.
In mid-July Švitrigaila concentrated his troops in
Vitebsk27. They were about 6,000 light Ruthenian cavalry
and 500 Tatars strong. After the 20th of July they moved in
the direction of Braslaw, which was located near the Livonian border. Approximately on the 20th of August, Livonian
troops under the personal command of the Livonian Master Kerskorff and the former Marshal Werner von Nesselrode, a veteran of the battle of Dąbki in 1431, arrived there
too. They had 3,000 cavalrymen28, 1,500 mercenary infantry, armed with long wooden pikes and iron flails, trained
in waging war the Hussite way, using cannons and muskets
placed on wagons29. These infantrymen also knew how to
locate wagons. Undoubtedly, they made a very formidable opponent30. They were commanded by Duke Sigismund Korybutowicz, a participant of the Hussite wars in
Bohemia. Presumably, this stock counted 300 cars. Among
the soldiers from Livonia, there were perhaps some Teutonic Knights from Prussia, who were banned from taking
part in any hostilities by the twelve-year truce between the
Crown and Sigismund.
Overall, the Teutonic army counted circa 4,500 soldiers,
predominantly cavalrymen. The whole Ruthenian-Livonian army could be as many as 11,000 soldiers strong.
The infantry comprised between 15 and 20 percent. The
Teutonic Knights, including the very best among the Order’s officials, and the Teutonic guest crusaders were typical medieval heavy cavalry, in terms of their weaponry31.
The whole of the Order’s forces from Livonia was made up
from soldiers. In the previous year, the Teutons from Livonia asked the Grand Master to send 400 infantrymen from
Prussia, who were to guard Livonian strongholds during
the offensive.
27

28

29
30
31

– 33 –

J. Skrzypek, ‘Bitwa nad rzeką Świętą’, in Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy, vol. X, 1938, p. 44; M. Plewczyński, op. cit., p. 40; M.
Biskup, op. cit. p. 192.
As during the time of Teutonic plundering raids (‘rejzy’) in the
14th and the first years of the 15th century, soldiers from western Europe hurried to take part in the Livonian war of 1435.
Over 100 foreign guest crusaders, along with their retines, participated in the excursion. Many of them came from Bohemia,
Silesia and Austria. Švitrigaila and his cause, because of his
connection with the Order, has became very popular in Germany.
J. Skrzypek, op. cit., p. 46–47; M. Plewczyński, op. cit., p. 40.
J. Skrzypek, op. cit., p. 46–47.
Ibid.; M. Plewczyński, op. cit., p. 40.

– Zbigniew Grabowski –

In the middle of August Sigismund Kęstutaitis received
help in the form of gentry from Lesser Poland, mainly
from the Lublin province, against the concentration of
Teutonic forces at the Polish border. They mostly came
from a levy en masse and were commanded by Jakub of
Kobylany (Kobylański)32, consisting of 800 lances-fournies,
which equalled 3,000–4,000 cavalrymen, mainly medium
cavalry33. They were accompanied by circa 500 horsemen
from Polish garrisons in Lithuania, thus the auxiliary corps
from the Crown could – at most – count about 4,500 riders
in total. Jakub of Kobylany went to Vilnius, which was designated as a concentration spot for all the troops that were
to march against Švitrigaila.
Sigismund’s troops, which concentrated in Vilnius,
came from the north-western part of Lithuania, including Samogitia. They consisted of light cavalry (less armed
than Polish knights), mercenary troops and Tatars, however it is difficult to determine the size of the Lithuanian
army, because of the lack of historical sources. Taking into
account the calculations of Otto Laskowski concerning the
Lithuanian army during the Battle of Grunwald, as well as
the data supplied by Tadeusz Korzon, especially his calculations covering the first half of the 16th century, one can
hypothetically assume that the mobilization conducted
by the Grand Duke of Lithuania covered about 5,000–6,000
people, including the mercenaries, but counting out Polish troops. Thus, in total the Lithuanian-Polish force can
be estimated at about 9,500–10,500 soldiers, including
a small group of infantry34. Therefore, in terms of numbers,
there was a relative balance between the opponents, with
a possible, but slight advantage of the Ruthenian-Teutonian forces.
There was no single commander in chief appointed
on Švitrigaila′s side – Švitrigaila, Kerskorff and Sigismund
Korybutowicz commanded only their own soldiers35. The
Tatars, who also were in Švitrigaila′s army, had their own
32

33
34
35

Jakub Kobylański, Kobyleński of Kobylany, of the Grzymała
crest, courtier of Queen Anna 1407, Starost of Łuków 1440,
Court Marshal of Lithuania 1425–1430, Castellan of Biecz
1440, died 1444 On the contrary to common belief, Jakub
Kobylański did not participate in the battle of Grunwald. His
uncle fought there, he also bore the name Jakub. During the
excursion to Lithuania in 1435 he wore the title capitaneus exercitus regis.
M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 191; M. Plewczyński, op. cit., pp. 39–40.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 40.

commander36. This lack of a unified command was unfavourable. Regarding the Polish-Lithuanian side, Sigismund Kęstutaitis did not exhibit any leadership capabilities and certainly did not command any troops in the
field. According to Długosz, Jakub of Kobylany became
the commander in chief of the combined allied force37. It
seems possible, as he was known in Lithuania and – to
some extent – could pass for a man associated with the
local affairs after staying in Grand Duke Vytautas’s service
for a few years38. In other sources, the son of Duke Sigismund, Michal, is mentioned as the supreme commander,
but according to Długosz, at that time he was in Trakai39.
Therefore, as long as historical science fails to clearly resolve this matter, one can accept the notion that Jakub of
Kobylany commanded the Lithuanian-Polish forces during the battle.
As mentioned above, the Livonian group led by master
Frank Kerskorff reached Braslav around the 20th of August,
where he joined Švitrigaila′s forces. The plan established
by the commanders of the Teutons and the Ruthenians
assumed conquering Trakai and Vilnius40. The battle with
Sigismund Kęstutaitis’s forces was anticipated to happen
in the vicinity of these major political centres of Lithuania.41 Švitrigaila and Kerskorff’s troops moved southwest,
towards Ukmergė after the 20th of August. Most probably
they intended to cut off Samogitia from Lithuania and
approach Vilnius and Trakai from the west. It is also possible, that they counted on Prussian reinforcements from
the Grand Master coming from Kaunas in order to quickly
merge with them.
The Lithuanian-Polish army also moved out to meet the
Teutonian-Ruthenian military. It seems that due to a unified command structure they had better military organisation than their enemies. The marching system utilized by
Jakub of Kobylany is difficult to determine, but due to the
fact that the Lithuanian-Polish army was mainly mounted,
it can be assumed that it moved, more or less, in a com36

37

38
39
40
41

– 34 –

S. Zakrzewski, ‘W pięćsetną rocznicę: Bitwa nad Świętą, inaczej pod Wiłkomierzem, dnia 1 września 1435 r.’, in Pamiętnik
VI Powszechnego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich, vol. I, Lvov 1935,
pp. 555–556.
J. Długosz, Roczniki czyli kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego,
Chapters XI and XII, 1431–1444, Warsaw 2009, p. 176.
J. Skrzypek, op. cit., pp. 47–48.
J. Długosz, op. cit., p. 176.
W. Mikołajczak, op. cit., pp. 182–183.
M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 192.

– The Battle of Ukmergė, the 1st of September 1435 –

pact column, with wagons in the back. Jakub of Kobylany
ordered the whole army to march through Širvintos in the
direction of Ukmergė42. At the end of August he reached
an area north of Širvintos, the forested and marshy area
of lake Żyrnowo. The lake was the source of the Żyrnówka
stream, which flowed into the Šventoji River.

Course of the battle
A forested plain stretched to the east of Lake Żyrnowo,
reaching the city of Ukmergė, from which a road ran to
the south. Near the village of Pasila it branched in the directions of Širvintos-Vilnius and Gielwanty-Alytus, which
crossed the Żyrnówka stream. With news of the enemy
rushing from Ukmergė, Jakub of Kobylany decided to
cross his way and lay battle43.
After leaving Ukmergė (on the 29th or 30th of August),
Švitrigaila′s corps headed south in Pasile, along the trail to
Alytus. Two groups of the Teutonic-Ruthenian troops, including a part of the Livonian army and the guest crusaders commanded by Kerskorff himself and Ruthenian units
led by Švitrigaila, as well as Sigismund Korybutowicz’s
infantry crossed to the left bank of the Żyrnówka stream,
north of Lake Żyrnowo, by a dam or a wooden bridge,
possibly a piled one. In contrast, the third group moved
slower. It was mostly made up of Livonian knights, guest
crusaders and their supply wagons. It lagged a few kilometres behind both other groups and probably still had the
village of Pasile, to the south of Ukmergė, ahead of it44.
Jacob of Kobylany initially did not think that the enemy
would move along the Alytus road. It was only when the
first unit moved past Pasile and entered the second high
road, did he recognize their intentions. Seeing that the
enemy stretched his forces and did not expect battle, he
based his actions on surprise. The terrain was mostly forested and very marshy, the roads were narrow, forest tracts
in very bad condition, especially because of heavy rainfall
in the days preceding the clash. It favoured the lightly armoured Polish-Lithuanian troops, but proved very difficult
to heavily armoured Germans, especially their infantry,
hindering not only their ability to march, but also to fight.
Jakub of Kobylany sent one reconnaissance unit
to Pasile and a second one to the south shore of Lake

Żyrnowo. After scouting the positions of the enemy
groups, he decided to attack the first two that crossed
Żyrnówka. Due to the fact that the lake covered his left
flank, he moved his troops past its northern shore and cut
off the third enemy group from the first two (29th or 30th of
August). Such positioning gave him an advantage at the
very beginning of the battle. Due to the marshy land on
the left bank of Żyrnówka, the Polish commander could
not strike first. The wetland at the southern shore of Lake
Żyrnowo also did not allow to bypass it and attack from
the south-west45. Striking the Livonian troops at Ukmergė
proved too risky, as in such a case the Lithuanian-Polish
army would have the majority of the Livonian-Ruthenian
army behind its back. The commander of the Lithuanian
and Polish troops did not have a choice, but to keep his
soldiers at bay despite heavy rainfall and patiently wait for
Švitrigaila and Kerskorff’s move.46
The Teutonic-Ruthenian army commanders could not
unanimously decide on how to proceed. They did not realize that they have the whole Lithuanian-Polish army in
front of them. Only a failed attempt to force enemy troops
to withdraw using marksmen sent to the right shore of
Lake Żyrnowo showed the difficulty and complexity of the
situation: the burdensome repeated crossing to the right
shore of Żyrnówka and assuming battle formations in
front of Jakub of Kobylany’s army. It is not known whether
there was any communication with the Livonian troops
at Ukmergė. For two days the army stood idly, although
in full combat readiness, only shooting bows, crossbows,
muskets and harquebuses at the Poles and Lithuanians.
Soon they began to run out of food and fodder for horses,
whereas the rain soaked gunpowder stock on the wagons47. Švitrigaila and Marshal Werner von Nesselrode
wanted to attack the Lithuanian-Polish forces in front of
them, but Kerskorff opposed and Sigismund Korybutowicz advised negotiating with the enemy.
Finally, it was decided to carry out offensive action.
They decided to cross the Zyrnowka again. They planned
to march further to Ukmergė, join the third Livonian group
and only then lay a decisive battle. They realized that the
enemy would not stay passive, so they decided to act by
surprise48.
45
46

42
43
44

W. Mikołajczak, op. cit., pp. 182–183.
J. Skrzypek, op. cit., p. 52.
M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 193.

47
48

– 35 –

M. Plewczyński, op. cit., p. 41; M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 193.
J. Długosz, op. cit., p. 176; J. Skrzypek, op. cit., p. 54; M. Plewczyński, op. cit., p. 41.
M. Plewczyński, op. cit., p. 41; M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 194.
M. Plewczyński, op. cit., p. 41.

– Zbigniew Grabowski –

– 36 –

– The Battle of Ukmergė, the 1st of September 1435 –

Just before dawn on the 1st of September, they advanced to cross Żyrnówka. The Tatars fought with the
Lithuanian-Polish guard, trying to protect the march of the
main force. They most probably moved in the following order: first Sigismund Korybutowicz’s wagons with firearms,
paving the way for the Ruthenian cavalry and the Livonian
knights and guest crusaders in the back. At the same time,
Jakub of Kobylany, immediately after receiving news of
the enemy crossing the river, positioned his troops along
the road from Pasile and sidelong to the marching enemy.
Lithuanian light cavalry was located on the left and right
flanks and the centre was comprised of Polish heavy soldiers. Some were left near Ukmergė, just in case. They still
could have been of use as rear guard. It was decided to
take advantage of enemy separation and strike in wedge
formation and afterwards, in full strength, split their formations even further and push them away into the marshy
banks of the Rivers Żyrnówka and Šventoji49.
This manoeuvre decided the fate of the battle, bringing glory to the Lithuanian-Polish commander. The
Lithuanian-Polish army crossed the same stream in a different place and in the opposite direction, and by striking in wedge formation split the enemy troops into two.
They managed to sing just the beginning of ‘Bogurodzica’
(‘Mother of God’) before it came to melee combat. Firstly,
the main body of the army, which closed the marching
column, was attacked. The banner of St. George and its
protector Werner von Nesselrode was the first to fall; afterwards they crushed Master Kerskorff’s units and then
every subsequent unit that appeared on the battlefield. It
is possible, that the left Lithuanian flank struck too soon,
allowing some Teutonic troops to retreat to the left bank
of Żyrnówka.
The main attacks were directed from the right, Lithuanian flank onto Švitrigaila’s units, which already crossed
the river, and from the middle group, that is, the Polish cavalry clashing with the central enemy formation. Lithuanian
and Polish lighter cavalry units moved smoothly through
the marshy ground, on the contrary to heavier armed
units, which began to trudge. It was especially true for
Livonian and ‘guest’ troops. Infantry fire from Sigismund
Korybutowicz’s wagons turned out to be impossible, due
to wet gunpowder50.

49
50

M. Plewczyński, op. cit., pp. 41–43.
M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 194.

Frank von Kerskorff, the former Marshall Werner von
Nesselrode and six other dignitaries of the Order were
killed during the battle. Świdrygiełło managed to escape along with 30 people to Vitebsk (or Polatsk)51. This
clash caused huge losses among the Teutons, many of
whom were prominent knights – ‘good men’. Many of the
Švitrigaila′s Ruthenian supporters were also killed, including 13 dukes. Forty-two were taken prisoner.
However, the Teutons were treated especially mercilessly – just like at Grunwald, a quarter of a century earlier.
The Lithuanians and Poles suspected that the Grand Master sent some of the Teutonic knights from Prussia (it could
be true only about a few persons). Some of them got into
Lithuanian and Polish captivity (in such cases, they were
brought to the Crown, in order to obtain ransom). As a result, the Livonian branch began lacking Order personnel
for maintaining and defending the country. Upon learning
about the defeat, the Livonian Marshall Heinrich von Buckenvorde immediately asked the Grand Master to quickly
send 400 armed men in order to save the branch of the
Order from destruction.
As a result, the Polish (and Lithuanian, from the right
flank) cavalry strike shredded the wagons and pushed
them away from the road to Pasile. The Lithuanian light
cavalry quickly ousted the weakened enemy, who sought
rescue in escaping towards the Šventoji River and Ukmergė. Some of the Ruthenians tried to secure the bridge
over Żyrnówka, but suffered defeat. Similar fate awaited
a Teutonic unit, which tried to hold the bridge on the
Šventoji River52.
The real tragedy happened 2–3 kilometres further north.
Ruthenians and the Teutons stumbled upon a column of
Livonian knights and their wagons, while fleeing in panic.
These units, in accordance with the battle plan, moved out
on the morning of the 1st of September to meet the main
force. The weak Polish-Lithuanian guard was not able
to stop their march, however slow it was due to difficult
terrain conditions – soggy ground caused the wagons to
move with difficulty and regularly get stuck. The Lithuanian-Polish pursuit clashed into the column of soldiers
marching away from the battlefield. As a result, the third
51

52

– 37 –

The Livonian master received two mortal wounds, one in the
face, the other in the abdomen (T. Narbutt, Dzieje narodu litewskiego, vol. VII, Wilno 1840, p. 175, footnote 1); ‘Pskovskaya
pervaya letopis’, in Polnoye sobraniye russkikh letopisey, vol. IV,
St. Petersburg 1848, pp. 209–210.
Liv-, Est- Und Curländisches…, p. XVIII.

– Zbigniew Grabowski –

group of Teutonic-Ruthenian troops panicked and began
to flee along with other units53.
The battle lasted for just an hour and ended with an
utter defeat of Švitrigaila and Kerskorff’s army54. This part
of their troops, which had taken refuge on the other side
of Żyrnówka was taken prisoner by Lithuanian soldiers.
Most of the Lithuanian and Polish lightly armoured soldiers chased the escapees, most of whom lost their lives
in the Šventoji River and in the wetlands. The defeated
Teutons and Ruthenian sought refuge in the forest and in
the bushes along the shore of the lake, where they were
either killed off or taken captive by the Lithuanians during
the following 15 days.
The same happened with the infantry maintaining the
wagons. Those soldiers, taking advantage of a break in
Polish attacks, decided to escape, dying in the depths of
the Šventoji River or during the subsequent chase55. Those
who remained alive surrendered along with their commander, Sigismund Korybutowicz, who received wounds
to the head and neck.56

Consequences
The news of Švitrigaila and the Livonian army’s defeat
on the 1st of September 1435 made a great impression
both in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, especially in the
Ruthenian lands, as well as in the Polish Crown. The banners captured in the battle at the Šventoji River, especially
Livonian ones, were displayed in the Vilnius Cathedral by
order of King Wladyslaw III57. The Grand Duke Sigismund
funded a parish church near the Żyrnowo Lake, in a town
henceforth bearing the symbolic name of ‘Pobojsk’ (derived from the Polish word for ‘battlefield after the battle’).
Švitrigaila and the Livonian army’s defeat on the 1st of
September 1435 could result in the Lithuanian and Polish army’s invasion on almost defenceless Livonia, which
could put an end to the power of the Order in the lands
surrounding the Daugava River. However, neither was the
Grand Duke Sigismund Kęstutaitis interested in its eradication, fearing the overwhelming domination of the Poles
in Lithuania, nor the Crown Council strived to completely
53
54
55
56

57

M. Plewczyński, op. cit., p. 43.
J. Długosz, op. cit., p. 177.
A. Michałek, Wyprawy krzyżowe. Husyci, Warsaw 2004, p. 95.
Sigismund Korybutowicz soon died under mysterious circumstances.
J. Długosz, op. cit., p. 178.

dispose of Švitrigaila, in order not to strengthen Kęstutaitis’s position in Lithuania. As a result, the march of the
Lithuanian and Kobylański’s troops after the 1st of September 1435 has been suspended, and most of the Polish
troops returned to the Crown with their Livonian prisoners58.
A Ruthenian chronicler wrote ‘there wasn’t such a battle in the Lithuanian lands since long ago’59. The Poles also
maintained that ‘there is no similar battle in human memory’, and that it could be compared only to the one which
took place 25 years ago at Grunwald. Some considered it
even bigger than that60. The consequences were extremely
momentous, but not quite visible yet: the battle has decided the fate of both the Order and Švitrigaila. Livonia lost
its influence on the position of the whole Teutonic Order
on the matters of Poland and Lithuania.
The battle of Ukmergė settled the war for the throne
of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but it did not break
Švitrigaila. Although Smolensk, Starodub and Mcensk
fell into the hands of Sigismund Kęstutaitis in September 1435, other great north-Ruthenian centres (Vitebsk
and Polotsk) still recognized Švitrigaila′s authority and
reign61. With the help of the Tatars he succeeded in recovering Volyn and Bracław Land in November. A total failure
of Švitrigaila did not lie in the interest of the Polish lords.
Experience has already taught that Sigismund Kęstutaitis
will seek to secure independence from Poland. While gaining more and more support among the Lithuanian elites,
he could return to Vytautas’s political programme, which
was popular in Lithuania. Švitrigaila, deprived of Teutonic
support after the Brest armistice, did not seem dangerous
for the Polish interests in Lithuania and maintaining his
reign could prove a good protection against the ambitions
of Sigismund Kęstutaitis62.
However, the effects of the Ukmergė disaster proved
dire for Master Rusdorf: in the coming negotiations with
Poland he could no longer use evasive tactics, as the Poles
clearly intended to strike Teutonic Prussia before the
winter of 1435 and force a peace treaty by using repressions. The Grand Master’s cries to Emperor Sigismund did
not bring any reaction, as he was busy settling relations
with Bohemia and securing full royal reign over them.
58
59
60
61
62

– 38 –

M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 196.
‘Pskovskaya pervaya letopis’, p. 210.
A. Lewicki, op. cit., pp. 257–258.
M. Biskup, op. cit., p. 196.
S. Szczur, Historia Polski. Średniowiecze, Cracow 2006, p. 509.

– The Battle of Ukmergė, the 1st of September 1435 –

Further hostilities broke the peace negotiations undertaken in relation to the Polish-Teutonic treaty in Brest
Kujawski. Under the peace treaty concluded on the 31st of
December 1435 (its main part reiterated the provisions of
the Treaty of Melno), the Order yet again promised to sever
its ties with Švitrigaila, and the Teutons had to pay 9,500
Hungarian gold coins for violating the Treaty of Melno. The
Treaty of Brest Kujawski ultimately forced the Teutons to
abandon their plans of forcefully breaking the Polish-Lithuanian union, by abandoning Švitrigaila, precluding any
Papal or Imperial intervention in the affairs of the Order.
The possibility of the Order winning against Poland has
been removed, just as the Luxembourgs have been doing
for years. Thus, the monastic state began to lose its international importance. The last day of 1435 was also the last
day the Teutonic Order could think of itself as an independent, international actor.
Poland regained the economically and strategically important district of Nieszawa, but reiterated the abandoning of Gdańsk Pomerania and Chełmno Land. A number of
provisions of the treaty regulated the freedom of economic
trade with the Baltic Sea, particularly along of the Vistula
River, and free trade of Prussian merchants on Polish soil
and Polish ones in Prussia. The right of the knights and
citizens of both states to relocate freely has been secured
along with a peaceful elimination of border disputes63. The
whole treaty sought to develop free contacts between the
two sides, with the exception of peasantry. Fugitives of this
estate were to be given up. The Prussian estates became
the warrantors of the Treaty on the Order’s side, because if
the Teutons breached it, the estates were to be exempted
from the obligation of obedience.
The peace in Brest Kujawski ended the most important stage of the Polish-Teutonic wars started in 1409, including a great victory of the allied forces at Grunwald,
and a second, equally important, victory at Ukmergė,
however it did not cover the most important Polish interest – Pomerelia, which still remained in the hands of
the Teutons64.Nevertheless, the Polish-Teutonic wars of
1409–1435 have significantly weakened the Order both on
economic and political ground, have undermined the authority of the Order among its own subjects and paved the

63

64

M. Biskup, G. Labuda, Dzieje Zakonu Krzyżackiego w Prusach,
Gdańsk 1986, p. 377.
T. M. Nowak, J. Wimmer, op. cit., p. 213–214.

way for their massive uprising against the Teutons 20 years
later, at the beginning of the Thirteen Years’ War.
After the war ended in 1435, the Order needed the
money and began to seize the cities’ income from minting
and exporting grain and at the same time tried to deprive
the Chełmno gentry of the privilege granting them tax freedom. As a result, the Union of Prussia, an anti-Teutonic organisation was founded in 1440, grouping the knights and
cities under the Order’s rule. Despite the Teutons trying to
counter its development, the Union grew in strength, seeking support in the nearest state, Poland.
Initial negotiations with Švitrigaila began in early 1436.
The following year he signed an agreement in Lvov. However, Polish diplomacy failed to strike an agreement between Jagiełło’s brother and Sigismund Kęstutaitis, who
was irreconcilable and did not intend to accept Švitrigaila′s
rule over even the smallest part of the Grand Duchy65. The
Polish lords could do nothing else, but stop supporting
Švitrigaila and recognize Sigismund’s authority. The price
of the compromise was the recognition of Polish rights
to the lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Under an
agreement with Kęstutaitis in Grodno in 1437, after his
death Lithuania was to fall into the hands of Władysław
Jagiełło’s son.
In March 1440, as a result of a conspiracy, Sigismund
Kęstutaitis was assassinated. The envoys from Lithuania
proposed King Władysław to take the throne of the Grand
Duchy. It was decided that the king’s thirteen-year-old
brother, Prince Casimir, would be sent to Vilnius as a governor. In the second half of May 1440, Casimir went to Lithuania with an armed guard commanded by Jan of Czyżowo
and the accompanying Polish nobles were to keep watch
over him. When he arrived, the Lithuanian boyars, without
their consent and violating the resolutions of the Grodno
union, elected him as the Grand Duke and Casimir began his independent reign in Lithuania. Švitrigaila, on the
other hand, has never returned to the throne of the Grand
Duchy.

65

– 39 –

S. Szczur, op. cit., p. 509.

Bibliography
Primary sources
Liv-, Est- Und Curlandisches Urkundenbuch, Bd. 8, 1429 Mai – 1435,
Riga–Moskau 1884
‘Pskovskaya pervaya letopis’, in Polnoye sobraniye russkikh leto­
pisey, vol. IV, St. Petersburg 1848
J. Długosz, Roczniki czyli Kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego,
Lib. XI–XII, Warsaw 2009
(J. Długosz, Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae, Lib. XI–XII,
Warsaw 2001)

Books
Pamiętnik VI Powszechnego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich w Wilnie,
17–20 września 1935 r., vol. I, Lvov 1935
Zakon Krzyżacki w Prusach i Inflantach. Podziały administracyjne
i kościelne w XIII-XVI wieku, ed. R. Czaja, A. Radzimiński, Toruń
2013
M. Biskup, Wojny Polski z Zakonem Krzyżackim (1308–1521),
Gdańsk 1993
M. Biskup, G. Labuda, Dzieje Zakonu Krzyżackiego w Prusach,
Gdańsk 1986
P. Bunar, S. A. Sroka, Słownik wojen, bitew i potyczek w średniowiecznej Polsce, Cracow 2004

J. Caro, Dzieje Polski, transl. S. Mieczyński, vol. 4 1430–1455,
Warsaw 1897
T. Korzon, Dzieje wojen i wojskowości w Polsce, vol. 1, 2nd ed.,
Lvov–Warsaw–Cracow 1923
A. Lewicki, Powstanie Świdrygiełły. Ustęp z dziejów unii Litwy
z Koro­­ną, Cracow 1892
H. Łowmiański, Polityka Jagiellonów, Poznań 2006
W. Mikołajczak, Wojny polsko-krzyżackie, Zakrzewo 2009
T. Narbutt, Dzieje narodu litewskiego, vol. VII, Wilno 1840
T. M. Nowak, J. Wimmer, Historia oręża polskiego 963–1795, Warsaw 1981
M. Plewczyński, Wojny Jagiellonów z wschodnimi i południo­
wymi sąsiadami Królestwa Polskiego w XV wieku, Siedlce
2002
S. Szczur, Historia Polski. Średniowiecze, Cracow 2006

Articles
J. Skrzypek, ‘Bitwa nad rzeką Świętą’, in Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy, 1938, vol. X
T. Stolarczyk, ‘Świdrygiełło przeciwko Jagielle – tzw. wojna łucka
w 1431 r.’, in Mars, 2001, vol. X

– Marek Plewczyński –
Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities

The Battle of Orsha 8 th September 1514

Smolensk – we tend to associate this city with the great
tragedy that afflicted the Polish nation on 10th April this
year. However, it should be remembered that the soil of
the Smolensk district soaked up the blood of Polish soldiers throughout ages. As early as 1514 thousands of
Poles, Lithuanians and Ruthenians gave their lives here
while defending the Jagiellonian borders against the Muscovite onslaught. What is meant here is, above all, the
battle fought on 8th September, near the town of Orsha,
110 km away from Smolensk. Nearly 100 thousand people
may have taken part in it, which is twice as much as in the
battle of Grunwald in 1410. Though the battle is one of the
biggest in the early modern period and its significance,
both political and military cannot be overestimated, it has
not become the subject of any greater monograph and the
western historiography hardly notices it. Six years ago, its
490th anniversary passed completely unnoticed in Poland,
and the present authorities in Minsk abandoned the idea
of celebrating a Belarussian national holiday in honour of
the victory of Orsha. Therefore, it befits to recall the battle
of Orsha, which stopped the Muscovite expansion to the
west, just as the victory at Grunwald crushed the power
of the Teutonic Order threatening the Polish-Lithuanian
union from the north.
A crew consisting of Polish, Lithuanian and Ruthenian
soldiers defended Smolensk for 40 days with great fierceness. It was only the strong fire of Muscovite guns operated
by German gunners that forced the boyars and residents
of the city to capitulate on 30th July 1514. After 110 years
of Lithuanian rule and six previous sieges, the fortress of
Smolensk was captured by Russians. This fact strongly impressed the whole Europe. Grand Prince Vasili III had all
the gold and silver from churches and the castle brought
to Moscow. He took Lithuanian soldiers captive and gar-

risoned Smolensk with his own troops1. It was only after
four months, in the latter half of August, that King Sigismund the Old led the Polish-Lithuanian army from Vilnius
in order to regain the lost fortress. A census of gathered
troops was conducted in Minsk. The army consisted of
15 thousand Lithuaninan landed service, 14 thousand
regular cavalry and 3 thousand regular infantry as well
as 2500 household cavalry and voluntary detachments
from Polish magnates. The artillery was quite numerous,
but the number of cannons remains unknown. The Polish-Lithuanian army had ca. 35 thousand soldiers in total,
57% of whom were Poles. The Crown of the Kingdom of
Poland had never before deployed such a numerous regular army in the field. The Lithuanian landed service was
commanded by the hetmans – Grand Hetman Konstanty
Ostrogski and Field Hetman Jerzy Radziwiłł. The regular
Polish army was under the command of Janusz Świerczowski, the castellan of Biecz, the household troops and
private detachments were led by Wojciech Sempoliński.
To face the royal troops, Vasili sent a much bigger force.
Apart from the strong crews in Smolensk and the nearby
1

– 41 –

Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, Lithuanian
Metrica vol. CXCIII, No. 238, p. 348, 361; Akty otnosyashchiyesya k istorii Yuzhnoy i Zapadnoy Rossii, sobrannyye i izdannyye Arkheograficheskoyu Komissiyeyu, vol. II, S. Petersburg
1863, p.115; J. L. Decjusz, Księga o czasach króla Zygmunta,
pp. 76–77; M. Bielski, Kronika polska, ed. K.J. Turowski, Sanok 1856, pp. 970–971; T. Korzon, Dzieje wojen i wojskowości
w Polsce, vol. I, Lvov – Warsaw – Cracow 1923, pp. 257–258;
L. Kolankowski, Polska Jagiellonów. Dzieje polityczne, Olsztyn
1991, pp. 144–145; idem, Dzieje Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego za Jagiellonów, vol. II, Warsaw 1930, p. 123; W. Pociecha,
Daszkiewicz Eustachy, Polski Słownik Biograficzny, vol. IV, p.
445; E. Razin, Historia sztuki wojennej, vol. II, Warsaw 1958, pp.
333–337.

– Marek Plewczyński –

castles, it consisted in, according to exaggerated data, 80
thousand soldiers, including auxiliary staff. The high command lay with Kniaz Ivan Chelyadnin. The main burden
of warfare was carried by the cavalry of feudal pospolite
ruszenie (levée en masse). Chelyadnin’s mounted nobility
militia was reinforced by sparse mercenary and infantry
Tartar squadrons.2
Sigismundus decided to take military action, but did
not intend to direct it himself. He stayed in an encampment near Borisov with 4 thousand soldiers, and sent the
remaining troops beyond the Berezina River, handing the
high command to Hetman Ostrogski. Chelyadnin was surprised by the size of the Polish-Lithuanian force. After all,
spies had reported on the small size of the royal army and
the grand prince himself told him to ‘drive them to Moscow
with whips like cattle’. Ostrogski’s march induced him to
gather his scattered troops. During his stay in Drutsk, by
the Drut River, Chelyadnin ordered his forces to retreat to
Orsha, by the Dnieper River, and only there did he decide
to face his enemy in a decisive battle. Orsha, situated on
the right bank of the Dnieper, constituted the last line of
defence before Smolensk. However, the crew in the castle
were Polish. Chelyadnin did not want to risk a battle with
enemy in the rear, and ordered a retreat to the other bank
of Dnieper. Having crossed the river, his army took position at the edge of a forest on a gentle slope of a wide
hill at the distance of 2.5–3 km from the river bank, near
the road leading from Orsha to Dubrovna. The Muscovite
leader planned to attack the royal army while they were
crossing the river, or to make them march on the left bank,
surround and then crush.

Slowly and carefully (10 km a day), the Polish-Lithuanian army reached Orsha on 6th September.
The men were ordered to stop for two days and carry out
a reconnaissance to see if there was a possibility of crossing the Dnieper. While Lithuanian mounted archers rode
along the bank making an impression that the entire royal
army stayed by the ford, the main force moved up the
river searching for another suitable place to cross it. After
marching for 5 km, the second ford, opposite the village
of Pashino, was found. There, Ostrogski erected a military
camp surrounded by carts and ordered the army to prepare for crossing the river.3
On the night of 7th to 8th September 1514 two pontoon
bridges were built of floating, tightly closed barrels tied
together and beam rafts. Some of the light cavalry swam
across the river. A few infantry companies and some cannons were transported to the left bank on rafts. Just after
the infantrymen garrisoned the beachhead secured by
the cavalry, the pontoon bridges were deployed. At about
6 a.m. the remaining troops started to march over them.
First, the infantry were carried, followed by the cannons
and military equipment, and then the heavy cavalry set
off. Yet, there were dramatic moments. One of the bridges
collapsed under the heavy lancers, so the riders in 30 kg
armour had to swim to the other bank. During this operation, the army showed unusual skill, losing only one soldier. One can doubt whether the heavy lancers crossing
the Dnieper were wearing full armour. The written sources,
however, state explicitly that expecting a Muscovite attack,
‘all the cavalry in formation, as if for the battle, jumped into
the swift river without scattering’. Also the painting ’Battle
3

2

B. Wapowski, ‘Kroniki’, in Scriptores rerum Polonicarum, vol. II,
ed. J. Szujski, Cracow 1874, p. 115; T. Korzon, Dzieje wojen…,
p. 258; S. Herbst, M. Walicki, ‘Obraz bitwy pod Orszą 1514’, in
Rozprawy Komisji Historii Sztuki, vol. I, Warsaw 1949, pp. 33–68;
Z. Spieralski, ‘Wojskowość polska’, in Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej do roku 1864, vol. I, ed. J. Sikorski, Warsaw 1965, p.
331; J. Teodorczyk, ‘Bitwy polskie. Orsza’, in Tygodnik Kulturalny, no. 16, 1984, vol.27, p. 11; J. Wimmer, Historia piechoty polskiej do roku 1864, Warsaw 1978, p. 102; K. Górski, ‘O rozwoju
sztuki wojennej w Polsce w wieku XV’, in Biblioteka Warszawska, vol. III, 1890, pp. 85–95; M. Plewczyński, ‘Polska technika
wojskowa w XVI wieku’, in Studia z dziejów polskiej techniki
wojskowej od XVI do XX wieku, ed. J. Wojtasik, Warsaw 2001,
p. 100; idem, ‘Wkład Serbów w rozwój staropolskiej wojskowości’, in Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, vol. XXXVI,
1994, pp. 14, 17–18.

– 42 –

K. Górski, Acta Tomiciana, vol. III, ed. T. Działyński, Poznań
1853, pp. 3–6; J. L. Decjusz, Księga o czasach króla Zygmunta…, pp. 78–79; M. Bielski, Kronika polska…, pp. 973–974; S.
Sarnicki, ‘Księgi hetmańskie’, in Jagiellonian Library, no 171,
p. 237, printed in Z. Spieralski, Wypisy źródłowe do historii polskiej sztuki wojennej, vol. IV, Warsaw 1958, p. 140; T. Korzon,
Dzieje wojen…, p. 258; Z. Spieralski, ‘Wojskowość polska’, in
Zarys dziejów wojskowości…, pp. 333–336; N.S. Golicyn, Russkaya voyennaya istoriya, vol. II, Petersburg 1878, pp. 309–327;
O. Laskowski, ‘Orsza’, in Encyklopedia wojskowa, vol. VI, ed.
O. Laskowski, Warsaw 1938, pp. 161–163; E.J. Kashprovskiy,
‘Borba Vasiliya Ivanovicha s Sigizmundom I izh – za obladaniya Smoleńskom (1507–1522)’, in Sbornik Istorichesko–filologicheskovo obshchestwa pri Institute kn. Bezborodko v Nezine,
II, 1899, pp. 112–118; L. Podhorodecki, Sławne bitwy Polaków,
Warsaw 1997, p. 105; P. Dróżdż, Orsza 1514, Warsaw 2000, pp.
193–194.

– The Battle of Orsha 8th September 1514 –

of Orsha’ from ca. 1520, a leading piece of military art of
Renaissance currently in the National Museum in Warsaw,
shows the heavy lancers swimming across the river and
then drying themselves on the left bank. Some of them
are even pouring water out of iron boots. In three hours
an army of over 30 thousand men was on the left bank of
the Dnieper. At about 9 a.m. the passage was finished. The
surprised enemy did nothing to stop them. The Muscovite
command had already known about crossing the river by
the royal army in the morning, but Chelyadnin refused the
suggestion to attack the Polish-Lithuanian troops divided
by the river. He hoped that, due to the advantage in numbers, he would turn his army, surround the enemy corps
and push all of them to the Dnieper.
The Polish-Lithuanian force took the position on a flat
hill, four kilometre wide, situated to the left of the Dnieper,
which turned from the east to south. The hill was divided in the middle by a wide gully leading to the village
of Pugaylovo. Closer to the river, at the entry to the gully,
there lay the village of Pashino. The area was covered by
numerous groves, bushes and holes, which significantly
limited the possibility to observe the area and to use cannons and heavy lancers. At his right flank, Ostrogski deployed most of his infantry and cavalry under the cover
of the forest. On the left, the cavalry stood in a formation
known as ‘the old Polish device’. The forward regiment
constituted the first attack group, then the main regiment
was to enter the battle. Beside them there were three reinforcement regiments consisting of light cavalry. The forward and main regiments were divided by the Pugaylovo
gully splitting both of them into two parts. The left side was
occupied by the Lithuanian horsemen, and the right by
the Polish cavalry. The Polish forward regiment was commanded by Sampoliński. He led the troop of 2500 household and volunteer cavalrymen, mostly heavy lancers,
probably divided into two attack groups in 7–9 columns.
The main regiment, comprised of ca. 9 thousand regular
cavalry, was under Świerczowski’s command. Almost 70
companies were crowded into a small, half a kilometre
wide, space between two gullies (the Pugaylovo gully and
a second, smaller one) and the bank of the Dnieper. The
area was only wide enough for lines of 5 companies. They
were probably deployed in 13 attack groups in a chequerboard formation – first the heavy lancer companies, then
Polish hussars and crossbowmen at the back. The three
auxiliary regiments of the Crown consisted of ca. 3.5 thousand horsemen in total. They were deployed between

the smaller gully and the forest. The hussar regiment was
probably at the front, with the archers following. Companies in each of the regiments were divided into 3–4 attack groups. The Lithuanian forward regiment was commanded by Ostrogski himself. It probably consisted of ca.
3 thousand cavalrymen deployed between the Pugaylovo
and the Pashino ravine. It consisted mostly of horsemen
wielding only bear spears, less often bows and sabres. The
main regiment of the Lithuanian army was under Radziwiłł’s command. About 6 thousand cavalry were packed
on a plateau only a couple of hundred metres wide at
the bend of the Pashino gully. The heavy lancers stood
at the front, followed by the hussars, crossbowmen and
horsemen wielding sabres and swords. Lastly, the three
Lithuanian reinforcement regiments deployed in a wide
space between the Pashino gully and the Dnieper. They
consisted of about 3 thousand archers.
The only road from the village of Pashino led south‑east
to Pugaylovo situated over a kilometre away from a bend
of Dnieper. By this road, over the entrance to the Pugaylovo
ravine, between the Polish and the Lithuanian armies,
a few Crown infantry companies were deployed slightly in
front of the remaining troops. This sector, 200–300 metres
wide, could not hold more than 3–4 companies, i.e. up
to 1000 infantrymen. Ostrogski wanted to fight a defensive-offensive battle. In the initial phase, he wanted to pin
the Muscovite cavalry in the centre and weaken them with
infantry fire. Subsequently, the Lithuanian commander
intended to weaken the enemy horsemen with hand cannons and artillery fire at the right flank (thus the 2 thousand
infantry and artillery in the forest between the village of
Ruklino and the Dnieper) and crush with cavalry charges.
The decisive role was to be played by Świerczowski’s main
regiment.
The Muscovite army, consisting exclusively of cavalry
(cannons had been left in the captured castles), deployed
in its traditional formation. The vanguard regiment stood
at the front. 7 thousand horsemen that comprised it hid in
the gully leading north-west from Pugaylovo to Dnieper,
whose slopes were overgrown with bushes. In front of the
entrance to the gully, on the right flank, the right hand
regiment (12 thousand cavalry in three attack groups) under the command of Mikhail Golitsa was deployed. The
left hand regiment (ca. 10 thousand horsemen) took position opposite the Polish army, on the left flank near the
Muscovite encampment east of Ruklino. In the centre, on
a hillside by a road connecting Ruklino with the Dubrovno

– 43 –

– Marek Plewczyński –

route, there stood the grand regiment (ca. 20 thousand
cavalry) consisting of ‘the bravest and the best equipped
men’. On the top of the hill, in the reserve, stood the rearguard regiment (ca. 10 thousand horsemen), accompanied by Chelyadnin himself. The Muscovite leader intended
to use the opacity of terrain obstacles (groves, gullies)
and flank the Polish-Lithuanian forces from both sides.
Then, having separated them from the bridge and the
ford, he planned to push them to the Dnieper and crush
them.
Deploying forces lasted a few hours. During that time
there was only some skirmishing. About 2 p.m. in the
Muscovite army ‘the trumpets hit and the signs of attack
were raised’. The right hand regiment (12 thousand men
under Golitsa) marched forward, crossed the gully east
of Pugaylovo and started to move around the Lithuanian
formation in a wide arch from the left. The vanguard regiment followed it to the Dnieper valley through the ravine.
Concealed by the elevated terrain, covered by riverbank
bushes, it deployed right from Golitsa’s regiment, intending to face the rear of the Lithuanian regiments. The manoeuvres were not unnoticed by the Lithuanian auxiliary
regiments. An exchange of arrows took place there, The
Muscovite archers were four times more numerous than
the Lithuanians, thus the hail of enemy arrows was more
intense. Both parties used short eastern weapons, known
as reflexive bows.
Ostrogski realised that the Muscovite flanking manoeuvre from the left is the biggest threat to his forces, as
it was directed towards the Polish bridge. He knew that
the enemies first ‘harm horses and men with arrows, and
only then enter close combat’. Hence the Lithuanian hetman ordered the Polish forward regiment to attack. Due
to its close position, the attack should have been made
by the Lithuanian forward regiment. However, it would
have to turn on the spot. Moreover, the lightly armoured
Lithuanian horsemen could have been threatened by the
hail of enemy arrows to a greater degree, especially while
crossing the Pashino gully. The threat of being flanked
was too serious to enter a fight whose result would be uncertain. It had to be a crushing and decisive attack. Thus
Sampoliński’s heavy armed lancers were chosen. They
changed their direction, descending to the Pugaylovo
gully, then they went round in an arch onto a rather flat
plateau and running quite a long way downhill (ca. 1 km)
they gathered even greater momentum for the charge.
The attack of the household and volunteer companies

was conducted in front of some of the Muscovite vanguard
troops. The speed of the lancers passing through the range
of enemy archers was so great that the Polish casualties
were insignificant. Golitsa’s horsemen had few lances and
swords, and they were attacked from the side. Before they
were able to release their arrows, they were reached by
the violent Polish charge. They must have been shaken
and petrified by the sight of protruding lances and the
approaching mass of the armoured cavalry crushing and
trampling everything on their path.
The sword from the early 16th century could be used
not only for hacking, but also for thrusting by placing a finger over the crossguard with extended cantles protecting
one’s hand. The Muscovite horsemen could counter this
weapon only with axes, bear spears, javelins and shorter
sabres, less useful in mounted combat. Thus it is not
surprising that Sampoliński ‘having slaughtered them in
great numbers, forced them to retreat’. The impetus of
his charge and the help of reinforcement regiments only
disturbed the right hand regiment, but did not crush it.
It could not balance the great advantage in numbers,
as Golitsa was quickly reinforced by the vanguard regiment. Its horsemen, implementing Chelyadnin’s plan, left
the Dnieper valley, crossed the bushes and attacked the
Lithuanian auxiliary regiments from the rear and the side
with ‘trumpets and war-cries’. Their advantage in numbers
was overwhelming – 5.5 thousand Polish-Lithuanian cavalry could not stop the mass of 19 thousand Muscovites. Is
some places ‘there were not two against one, as the Kniaz
[Ostrogski] had predicted, but six against one’. The companies of the Polish forward regiment and the Lithuanian
auxiliary regiment started to yield.
At the moment, Ostrogski rushed to help Sempoliński
with his forward regiment consisting of landed service.
He commanded the attack personally – as it can be seen
in the painting, with a long wind-blown beard, ferezja on
his head, splinted mail, sabre at his side and mace in his
hand. 3 thousand of fresh Lithuanian horsemen wielding
bear spears, bows and sabres crossed the Pashino gully
and struck the Muscovite cavalry. Over twenty thousand
mounted men clashed in a deadly fight over an area about
a kilometre wide and long, on a gentle slope limited by the
gullies and the bank of the Dnieper. This monstrous battling crowd did not allow anyone to use a bow. Soldiers
hacked one another with sabres, swords and picks. However, the Lithuanian bear spear proved most useful. It was
lighter and shorter (2 m) than the lance. It was also thrust

– 44 –

– The Battle of Orsha 8th September 1514 –

to the sides and the back, used to parry various blows and
even thrown like a javelin. It was due to the Lithuanian
bear spear and the Polish sword that Ostrogski succeeded
at his left flank. Having better training and equipment, the
royal soldiers started to push the enemy to the gully and
against the bank of the Dnieper. Eventually – in spite of being twice as numerous – the right hand and the vanguard
regiments were crushed and fell back towards the main
forces.
Meanwhile, at the centre and the right flank of the
Polish-Lithuanian army, fierce fighting took place. After
Golitsa’s manoeuvre, Chelyadnin immediately ordered his
left hand regiment to attack. According to his plan, he intended to flank the sides and the back of the Polish formation as well. Yet he was worried about the Polish infantry
deployed at the front. The infantry companies stood about
a kilometre away from the place at the left flank, where
Sempoliński’s forward regiment and the Lithuanian auxiliary regiments fought Golitsa’s troops. Neither firearms nor
missile weapons could be used at such a distance. What is
more, there was a hill, and further off Ostrogski’s forward
regiment, in the line of fire. The grand hetman of Lithuania
probably abandoned his plans after the fight at the flanks
started, and ordered the infantry companies to move away
from the centre and join the remaining ones hidden in the
forest near his right flank.
The charge of the Muscovite left hand regiment was
not as impetuous and well concealed as in the case of the
right hand regiment and the vanguard. Polish auxiliary regiments at the right flank, comprising archers and hussars
resisted attacks of three times more numerous enemy (3.5
thousand against ca. 10 thousand) for a long time. The
fighting probably consisted in quick charges and immediate retreats by the hussar companies. The slowly withdrawing archer companies marched in a chequerboard
formation. The hussars repeatedly moved though the
gaps between the attack groups just to turn their horses
after the attack and to fall back. Such a tactic, based on
Tartar manoeuvres, proved to be very effective. Thus the
auxiliary regiments allowed Sampoliński to attack Golitsa.
Despite this, Chelyadnin did not bring the grand regiment
into battle at either of the flanks. He waited passively for
the enemy formation to stretch and for the main regiments to enter the battle. Besides, the rough terrain partially covered with groves, limited by the Dnieper river,
forced him to manoeuvre limited masses of cavalry on
both flanks.

Meanwhile in the forest neighbouring the Dnieper,
‘in suitable places’, the gathering of 3 thousand infantryment (about 15 companies) was completed. They were
mostly gunners ‘who carried long arquebuses’ and hand
cannons. The gaps between the companies were used
to deploy cannons known as kartouwes. Several hundred metres from these positions hidden ‘in the ambush
among thickets’, fierce combat took place. The left hand
regiment, having advantage in numbers, started to push
the Polish auxiliary forces on the right flank. They resisted
until the infantry companies showed at the edge of the
forest and stood in tens, ‘in formation similar to protruding lances with gun facing those regiments’. In the front –
as a charge of enemy cavalry was expected – there were
pikemen in plate armour. Then the pavisiers with large
rectangular wooden shields fixed to the ground. The third
line consisted of crossbowmen, if a particular company included them. The last 7–8 lines comprised gunners with
hand cannons. It is probable that groups of arquebusiers
with loaded guns were placed in front of the pikemen in
a loose formation. The line of the Polish infantry and artillery possibly stretched for about half a kilometre, almost
perpendicularly to the bank of the Dnieper.
When the Polish infantry was ready, the light cavalry
feigned retreat towards the Dnieper. Chelyadnin thought
that Poles were crushed. He wanted to capture the bridge
across the Dnieper as fast as possible and ordered the
grand regiment forwards. When the disorderly masses of
the Muscovite left hand regiment stretched while chasing
the Poles along the forest and a part of them entered the
ravine in the vicinity, the infantry and cannons revealed
by the Polish cavalry fired. Of course the basic guidelines
of combat had been discussed by the grand hetman of
Lithuania beforehand, but at the decisive moment, the
Polish commanders decided on their own. The ‘senior
commander’ of the infantry was one Polobsza, but ‘this
foot hetman had not been signalled by Konstanty to engage in combat, but he did it himself, yet successfully…’
Anyway, Ostrogski was personally involved in the fights at
his left flank.
Unexpected strong artillery, arquebus and hand cannon fire from the side caused great disturbance among the
attackers. A salvo of almost 2 thousand infantrymen firing
upwards (‘clout shooting’) from the distance of almost
a hundred metres caused ‘such a great cry and thunder of
men, horses and guns that the earth quaked’. Due to the
necessity of standing behind the pikemen and pavisiers

– 45 –

– Marek Plewczyński –

– 46 –

– The Battle of Orsha 8th September 1514 –

protecting against the enemy cavalry, firing forwards at
such distance was virtually impossible. Thus the method
of ‘clout shooting’ over the heads of friendly troops was
adopted from crossbowmen. Only the arquebusiers at
the head ran towards the back of the company after firing
a salvo. The bullet spread of firearms at that time was still
quite significant, thus the rate of fire was more important
than precision. No one even attempted at aiming the guns,
it sufficed to direct the barrel towards the target or upwards, at a desired angle. Loading and firing was very slow
– it lasted a dozen or so minutes. In the painting depicting
the battle one can see all the stages of a shot: loading the
gun with a ramrod, aiming with the stock by a cheek and
firing. Hence it is probable that all the lines managed to
fire their guns and some of the soldiers did it again.
Due to the noise, flashes and smoke the horses bolted,
and the Muscovite boyars were frightened of death decimating their lines. Voivod Ivan Temka Rostovskiy fell hit by artillery fire. The horsemen ‘fell off their horses like sheaves,
became confused’, ‘crowded and at the same time struck
by the infantry with their machines (guns)’. High casualties
caused by gunfire should be attributed to weak armour of
the Muscovite soldiers. Probably only a small portion was
equipped with splinted mail and iron helmets. Most of
them wore quilted broadcloth or linen kaftans with occasional metal plates stitched to them. Leather helmets and
misiurkas did not provide protection against bullet hits.
Panic broke out. Some sought shelter in trees, not understanding where the invisible death came from.
The artillery and infantry fire could break the charge of
the enemy cavalry provided two basic conditions were fulfilled. First, the gunners had to surprise the enemy; second
– they had to cooperate with the friendly light cavalry. And
in fact, the auxiliary regiments suddenly turned back, and
charged at the enemy violently, supported by a portion
of Świerczowski’s main regiment. Another unexpected
event intensified the panic in the Muscovite army. From
the left, the men of the left hand regiment were struck
by gunfire and assaults by infantrymen attacking with
melee weapons. From the front, a hail of arrows hit them,
followed by a charge of the Polish hussars (1000 horses)
and mounted archers (2500), who tightened their formation and attacked in line with sabres in their hands. The
strongest hit struck the Muscovite horsemen from the right.
Świerczowski’s main regiment, 300–400 m away, probably
split in half. A portion of its soldiers turned right on the run
and, having passed the nearby gully in an arch, attacked

the stretched left hand regiment from the side. This charge
of over thirty companies (ca. 4.5 thousand cavalry) was led
probably by such experienced captains as Jan Boratyński
(2300 hussars), Jakub Secygniowski (1600 crossbowmen)
or Mikołaj Iskrzycki (600 lancers). Heavy lancer companies
were the first to attack, crossbowmen shot clouds of bolts
from behind, but the lead role at this stage of the battle of
Orsha was played by the Polish hussars.
This new type of cavalry, present in Poland for only
14 years, was based on Serbian light mercenary cavalry,
known as racowie, and Hungarian hussars. The charging
riders wearing felted hats, żupicas, stitched and padded
kaftans, depicted in the painting, were probably an exception. The vast majority consisted of hussars wearing
leather kaftans under mid-thigh-long mails with sleeves
reaching elbows. This kind of armour, made of interwoven
metal rings, was prone to tearing resulting from a sabre
or spear thrust or from piercing with an arrowhead with
a beak-like bulge. A hussar, however, was additionally
protected by a Hungarian shield. During mounted combat, while passing an enemy, hussars usually used strong
cutting swing moves from the shoulder with a relaxed
arm. Yet the sabre was not the main weapon of the hussars that made them so successful. It was the Hungarian
lance, based on the Turkish one. It burst on hit, but pierced
through Muscovite armour. It was discarded afterwards –
as it was a disposable weapon. Only then did the hussars
draw their sabres. The companions who were riding in the
first line of a troop often just parried enemy blows with
their sabres without striking opponents. They rode forward, while their pocztowi (retainers), who followed them,
‘finished’ the enemies.
The left flank of the Muscovite army, caught in the ambush set by the more numerous Polish forces, was crushed
and pushed towards the grand regiment (ca. 20 thousand
well armed cavalry) that fell to battle just at that moment.
Crowded Muscovite horsemen, pushed from the front and
the sides by the Poles and from the rear by the friendly
troops, started to flee to the left, towards Pugaylovo. At
that very moment, Ostrogski’s forward regiment charged
at them. The hetman, having left finishing Golitsa’s troops
to Sampoliński, galloped through the Pugaylovo gully and
reinforced the Poles. In the ‘crowded throng’ of the Muscovite regiments, Lithuanian riders wielding bear spears
proved to be very effective. As a result, the grant regiment
in the centre was disordered, and the crushed left and
right flank of the Muscovite army fled towards Dubrovno.

– 47 –

– Marek Plewczyński –

Then the Muscovite commander ordered his reserve –
the rear guard regiment – to attack and save the situation.
It attacked the Polish-Lithuanian cavalry from the right
flank in an attempt to assist the grand regiment. Thus the
Muscovite army gained advantage in the centre, as their
men (ca. 30 thousand) were three times more numerous
than the Polish-Lithuanian forces (11 thousand). The result
of the battle could still be changed. Ostrogski ordered his
forward regiment to withdraw from the chase, regrouped
the companies and personally led the decisive charge at
the Muscovite grand regiment and rear guard. Lithuanian
main regiment under Radziwiłł, which had not taken part
in the battle by that time, together with a portion of the
Polish main regiment under Świerczowski, accompanied
the grand hetman. This greatest clash in the battle of Orsha took place near Pugaylovo, within a space of two kilometres limited by gullies from the north, east and west. It
was a hillside, gently sloping towards the north with village buildings in the middle, probably already existing at
that time, and the road connecting Ruklino and Pashino
with the Dubrovno route in the middle. The royal forces
that took part in the fight consisted of about 21.5 thousand horsemen – 12.5 thousand Polish cavalry (including
5.5 thousand hussars and 3.5 thousand crossbowmen)
under Świerczowski, attacking from the direction of the
Pugaylovo gully, and 9 thousand Lithuanian cavalry (including 3.5 thousand hussars and 2.5 riders wielding bear
spears) coming from the direction of the Pashino gully.
Once again the Polish-Lithuanian hussars proved their
superiority over the boyar cavalry. Despite the enemy’s
advantage in numbers and the necessity to charge uphill,
the Muscovite troops were flanked from both sides, pinned
with arrows and crushed with lances. 50 thousand cavalry
faced one another in a clash unprecedented in our history.
The main regiment and the rear guard were forced to
retreat, and Chelyadnin himself was taken prisoner. The
defeated enemy army was chased by Polish-Lithuanian
companies to the Kropivna river (5 km away from Orsha). Its marshy banks made fleeing more difficult, thus
4 thousand Muscovite soldiers supposedly fell there. ‘Such
a great number of men and horses lay there that it polluted the water and obstructed its course, and our men,
out of thirst, drank the bloodstained water from their helmets’ – wrote Marcin Bielski, speaking of the massacre on
the banks of Kropivna. The chase continued even after
the dusk (the sun set before 6 p.m.). It stopped past midnight, about 50 km away from the site of the battle. Only

an insignificant number of Muscovites managed to reach
Smolensk through the woods.
Bielski probably exaggerated when he wrote that
40 thousand enemy troops died at the battle of Orsha.
However, the massacre of the Grand Prince’s army is certain. ‘One could see a vast area with open fields with the
bloodstained corpses lying on the ground without heads,
arms or legs’. The victors captured 5 thousand men, including 8 voivods (Chelyadnin, Princes Bulgakov, Ivan
Lugvitsa, Ivan Pronski, Dimitri Kitayev, Ivan Kolychev and
Mikulinski) and 37 lesser commanders. Supposedly, only
500 soldiers of the Polish-Lithuanian force died, including
captain Słubicki and Jan Zborowski. The victorious army
seized the enemy encampment with all its equipment,
banners, precious standards and valuables. 20 thousand
horses were captured as spoils of war. All the loot was distributed among the soldiers. The prisoners of war were
sent to Borysov, to the king, but ‘a day after the battle [Ostrogski] received them as his guests and lifted their spirit
in misfortune with knightly consolation, induced a hope of
the king’s grace in them’.4
This battle, the greatest since Grunwald, lasted for six
hours. Its result was mainly decided by the manoeuvre of
the Polish auxiliary cavalry (hussars and mounted archers)
that made the Muscovite cavalry fall into the ambush, under the fire of firearms and cannons. Ostrogski’s leadership
skills should be emphasised. He destroyed Chelyadnin’s
army in stages, in accordance with the economy of forces
and managed to control large masses of cavalry on the battlefield. Each of the components of the Polish-Lithuanian
force and various types of troops excellently cooperated
4

– 48 –

K. Górski, Acta Tomiciana…, p. 6; M. Bielski, Kronika polska…,
p. 976; M. Stryjkowski, Kronika polska, litewska, żmudzka
i wszystkiej Rusi, ed. M. Malinowski, vol. I, Warsaw 1846, pp.
380–384; J. L. Decjusz, Księga o czasach króla Zygmunta…,
pp. 80–83; S. Herberstein, Zapiski o moskovitskikh delakh, ed.
A. Malezna, S. Petersburg, 1908, p. 18; S. Sarnicki, Księgi hetmańskie…, p. 140; T. Korzon, Dzieje wojen…, p. 259; Z. Spieralski, ‘Wojskowość polska’, in Zarys dziejów wojskowości…, p.
336; S.M. Sołovev, Istorija Rossii s drevnejsich vremen, vol. V,
Moskwa 1960, pp. 334–352, 369; H. Lulewicz, ‘Konstanty Ostrogski’, in Hetmani Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów, ed. M.
Nagielski, Warsaw 1995, pp. 387–388; P. Dróżdż, Orsza 1514, p.
195–204. E. Razin, Historia sztuki wojennej, pp. 340–344; J. Białostocki, Zagadka ‘Bitwy pod Orszą’, in Biuletyn Historii Sztuki,
no. 1, 1955, vol. 17, p. 80–98; M. Plewczyński, Wkład Serbów…,
pp. 14, 17–18; Z. Żygulski jun., Sławne bitwy w sztuce, Warsaw
1996, pp. 76–85.

– The Battle of Orsha 8th September 1514 –

with one another. This element was missing in the Muscovite tactics. Their troops attacked separately, while the
main force passively waited until the regiments at the
flanks were totally defeated. Better equipment and leadership, as well as the bravery of Lithuanian levée en masse
and military experience of the regular Polish troops resulted in great successes in the two biggest cavalry clashes
– at the left flank and then in the centre. The battle of Orsha not only showed increased significance of cooperation between field artillery, firearm wielding infantry and
light cavalry. It also proved the superiority of the hussars
equipped with lances, sabres, shields and mail. The effectiveness of this new type of cavalry could especially be seen
in the flanking attacks to the sides of the enemy formation.
The glorious victory at Orsha, just like the one at Grunwald over a hundred years earlier, was not sufficiently
taken advantage of. The army spent over a dozen days
doing nothing and marched toward Smolensk only after
almost three weeks. Only three towns were regained:
Dubrovno, Krichev and Mstislavl. Their crews surrendered
at the news of incoming royal army. In Smolensk, bishop
Varsonofi arranged a plot to the benefit of the king. Ostrogski reached the fortress at the end of September. He was
too late. The plans of surrendering the city prepared by
the supporters of Lithuania had been revealed and their
proponents executed. The army, fatigued and weakened
in numbers, lacked the force to take the city. The Grand
Prince of Muscovy provided the castle with large supplies
and numerous crew. The mighty stronghold would require
months of siege. Ostrogski did not have siege artillery. Acquiring food came with difficulty. After a number of futile
assaults, when the cold October weather took its toll on
the soldiers, the hetman ordered his troops to retreat. The

victory of Orsha had some positive results in the field of
politics – it ended the alliance between the Empire, the
Teutonic Order and Muscovy.
Since that war, the Muscovites tried to avoid battles in
the open field. The Polish-Lithuanian force refrained from
sieges, and the only attempt at capturing Opochka (1517)
ended in defeat. Though the balance of necessary castle
defence was positive (8 resisted assaults – mostly Polotsk,
4 capitulations), the most significant fortress in Smolensk
was taken by the Muscovites. They intended to seize the
territory by capturing subsequent points of resistance
and destroying the enemy with cavalry raids. The loss of
Smolensk was even more severe for Lithuania due to the
fact that it lost the most powerful stronghold of the line
comprising Polotsk, Vitebsk, Smolensk, Mstislavl, Krichev,
Prupoy and Chechersk. It was like giving a picket of the
north-eastern bastion consisting of those castles, and
directed towards Moscow. Smolensk guarded the whole
upper Dnieper area, constituted a hub of trade routes and
a political and military centre on the road from Lithuania
to Moscow. Its possession gave the Grand Prince of Muscovy a political and military advantage, and infringed the
defences of Lithuanian border on the Daugava River and
the Dnieper. Smolensk became a gateway to Lithuania for
Muscovy, as it had been a gateway to Muscovite lands for
Lithuanians. The first stage of the plan aiming at making
the Grand Prince the ruler of ‘the whole Rus’’ was complete. The second included Kiev, and the third – Vilnius.
As early as in the initial stages of defensive struggle that
lasted almost a century, this long-term Muscovite strategy
convinced Lithuanian nobles that Polish political, military
and financial support was necessary.

Bibliography
Primary sources
Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, Lithuanian

M. Stryjkowski, Kronika polska, litewska, żmudzka i wszystkiej

Metrica vol. CXCIII, No. 238

Rusi, ed. M. Malinowski, vol. I, Warsaw 1846

Akty otnosyashchiyesya k istorii Yuzhnoy i Zapadnoy Rossii,

B. Wapowski, ‘Kroniki’, in Scriptores rerum Polonicarum, vol. II,
ed. J. Szujski, Cracow 1874

sobrannyye i izdannyye Arkheograficheskoyu Komissiyeyu,

Books

vol. II, S. Petersburg 1863
M. Bielski, Kronika polska, ed. K.J. Turowski, Sanok 1856

Encyklopedia wojskowa, vol. VI, ed. O. Laskowski, Warsaw 1938

J. L. Decjusz, Księga o czasach króla Zygmunta, Warsaw 1960

Hetmani Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów, ed. M. Nagielski,
Warsaw 1995

K. Górski, Acta Tomiciana, vol. III, ed. T. Działyński, Poznań

Polski Słownik Biograficzny, vol. IV, ed. W. Konopczyński, Cracow

1853

1938

Z. Spieralski, Wypisy źródłowe do historii polskiej sztuki wojennej,
vol. IV, Warsaw 1958

Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, vol. XXXVI, Warsaw 1994

– 49 –

Studia z dziejów polskiej techniki wojskowej od XVI do XX wieku,
ed. J. Wojtasik, Warsaw 2001
Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej do roku 1864, vol. I, ed. J. Sikorski, Warsaw 1965

S. M. Solovev, Istorija Rossii s drevnejsich vremen, vol. V, Moscow
1960
J. Wimmer, Historia piechoty polskiej do roku 1864, Warsaw 1978
Z. Żygulski jun., Sławne bitwy w sztuce, Warsaw 1996

P. Drożdż, Orsza 1514, Warsaw 2000

Articles

N. S. Golicyn, Russkaya voyennaya istoriya, vol. II, Petersburg

J. Białostocki, ‘Zagadka „Bitwy pod Orszą”’, in Biuletyn Historii

1878
S. Herberstein, Zapiski o moskovitskikh delakh, ed. A. Malezna,
St. Petersburg, 1908
L. Kolankowski, Polska Jagiellonów. Dzieje polityczne, Olsztyn
1991
L. Kolankowski, Dzieje Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego za Jagiellonow, vol. II, Warsaw 1930
T. Korzon, Dzieje wojen i wojskowości w Polsce, vol. I, Lvov–
–Warsaw–Cracow 1923
L. Podhorodecki, Sławne bitwy Polaków, Warsaw 1997
E. Razin, Historia sztuki wojennej, vol. II, Warsaw 1958

Sztuki, 1955, no. 1, vol. 17
K. Górski, ‘O rozwoju sztuki wojennej w Polsce w wieku XV’, in Biblioteka Warszawska, 1890, vol. III
S. Herbst, M. Walicki, ‘Obraz bitwy pod Orszą 1514’, in Rozprawy
Komisji Historii Sztuki, 1949, vol. I
E. J. Kashprovskiy, ‘Borba Vasiliya Ivanovicha s Sigizmundom
I izh – za obladaniya Smoleńskom (1507–1522)’, in Sbornik
Istorichesko–filologicheskovo

obshchestwa

pri

Institute

kn. Bezborodko v Nezine, II, 1899
J. Teodorczyk, ‘Bitwy polskie. Orsza’, in Tygodnik Kulturalny, 1984,
no. 16, vol.27

– Henryk Lulewicz –
Polish Academy Of Sciences Institute of History
Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities

Stephen Bathory’s Expeditions against Muscovy
(1579–1581)
The relatively short reign of Stephen Bathory, lasting
only ten years (1576–1586), had an indelible influence on
the military history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The victorious campaigns against Muscovy from
1579 to 1581 were a special study subject for many military historians, starting with the second quarter of the 19th
century, when the first editions of source texts relevant to
the times of Bathory’s wars were published. Those were
mostly memoirs or chronicle accounts. Editions of sources
that were most essential for historians were published
in 1880s, largely as a result of editorial activity of Adolf
Pawiński,1 a renowned historian of the Warsaw school.
The first serious dissertations based on in-depth study of
sources, including archives, appeared slightly later, and
the historian I would like to start with is Konstanty Górski,
author of treatises on Bathory’s three military campaigns
in the east, published in 1892 in the Biblioteka Warszawska
journal.2 His works on the history of infantry, cavalry and
artillery published at the turn of the 20th century are also
worth mentioning.3 Other authors whose publications
1

2

3

Źródła dziejowe, ed. A. Pawiński, vol. IV: ‘Początki panowania w Polsce Stefana Batorego 1575–1577, listy, uniwersały’,
Warsaw 1877, vol. IX, Warsaw 1881; also, cf. ‘Sprawy wojenne króla Stefana Batorego. Diariusze, relacje, listy i akta z lat
1576–1586’, ed. I. Polkowski, in Acta historica res gestas Poloniae illustrantia ab anno 1507 ad annum 1795, vol. XI, Cracow
1887.
K. Górski, Pierwsza wojna Rzeczypospolitej z Wielkim Księstwem Moskiewskim za Batorego, vol. CCVI (1892), pt. 2; idem,
Druga wojna Batorego z Wielkim Księstwem Moskiewskim, vol.
CCVIII (1892), pt. 3; idem, Trzecia wojna Batorego z Wielkim
Księstwem Moskiewskim, vol. CCVIII (1892), pt. 4;
K. Górski, Historia piechoty polskiej, Cracow 1893; idem, Historia jazdy polskiej, Cracow 1894; idem, Historia artylerii polskiej,
Warsaw 1903.

should be referred to here are Witold Nowodworski4 and
Tadeusz Korzon.5 The issue of the military organisation
from the times of Bathory attracted particularly wide interest in the interwar period, due to round anniversaries
related to that king, first the quadricentennial of his birth,
and then the 350th anniversary of his death, which was celebrated by a joint publication in French,6 and a collection
of documents under the title of Księga Batoriańska edited
by Ryszard Mielnicki.7 Names of other historians distinguished in the field should also be mentioned. Those include Marian Kukiel8 and Jan Natanson-Leski, due to his
work on diplomatic bargaining over the eastern border,9
or Otton Laskowski, the author of the analytical article devoted to the battle of Toropets, published in the Przegląd
Historyczno-Wojskowy journal.10 After over thirty years,
Laskowski’s work was continued by Henryk Kotarski,
who comprehensively discussed the issue of Polish and
Lithuanian military organisation in the second stage of
the Livonian war of 1576–1582 in five parts, which were
published in a post-war journal devoted to the subject
of military history, namely in Studia i Materiały do Historii
4

5
6

7

8
9

10

– 51 –

V. Novodvorskiy, Borba za Livoniyu mezhdu Moskvoy i Rech’yu
Pospolitoy 1570–1582 gg, Sankt Petersburg 1904.
T. Korzon, Dzieje wojen i wojskowości w Polsce, Cracow 1912.
Etienne Batory, roi de Pologne, prince de Transylvanie, Cracow
1935.
Księga Batoriańska. Zbiór dokumentów ku uczczeniu 350-letniej rocznicy zgonu króla Stefana Batorego, ed.. R. Mienicki,
Wilno 1939.
M. Kukiel, Zarys dziejów wojskowości w Polsce, Cracow 1929.
J. Natanson-Leski, Epoka Stefana Batorego w dziejach granicy
wschodniej Rzeczypospolitej, Warsaw 1930.
O. Laskowski, ‘Wyprawa na Toropiec. Ze studiów nad wojnami moskiewskimi Stefana Batorego’, in Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy, vol. IX, Warsaw 1936.

– Henryk Lulewicz –

Wojskowości.11 Thus, the expeditions against Muscovy
of 1579–1581 are discussed in a relatively rich collection
of historical documents, both in the form of editions of
source texts and monographs concerning their course.
Much less attention was paid to Bathory’s other campaigns. Nonetheless, the conflict with Gdansk of 1576–
1577, which preceded expeditions against Muscovy, also
became a subject of interesting publications. The works
worth noticing include the edition of source texts prepared
by the abovementioned historian A. Pawiński, entitled Stefan Batory pod Gdańskiem 1576–1577.12 To avoid making
too long lists of historians and their treatises, though many
names deserve this honour, I will mention two newer publications, more of the popularising type, that present the
person of the monarch to the wider audience. I mean biographical monographs: Stefan Batory 1533–1586 by Karol
Olejnik,13 and one by Jerzy Besala, under the same title14.
What is also worth noticing is another conclusion of
the research on the military of the epoch. Due to studies
done by Karol Buczek15 and Stanisław Alexandrowicz16 we
learned about the significant influence that the campaigns
of that time had on the development of contemporary Polish cartography.
So what made the decade of Stephen Bathory’s reign
such a significant period in the history of the Polish military? I shall start with a trivial statement that in many respects Bathory’s reign was a continuation of many aspects
of the Jagiellonian military, especially from the reign of the
last rulers of the dynasty. This can be concluded particularly clearly from the basic facts. First of all, the direction
of Stephen Bathory’s military operations resulted from
conflicts inherited from Sigismund Augustus (1548–1572),
11

12

13
14
15

16

H. Kotarski, ‘Wojsko polsko-litewskie podczas wojny inflanckiej1576—1582. Sprawy organizacyjne’, in Studia i Materiały
do Historii Wojskowości, pt. 1: vol. XVI/2 (1970), pt. 2: vol. XVII/1
(1971), pt. 3: vol. XVII/2 (1971), pt. 4: vol. XVIII/1 (1972), pt. 5:
vol. XVIII/2 (1972).
Źródła dziejowe, vol. III: ‘Stefan Batory pod Gdańskiem 1576–
1577’, ed. A. Pawiński, Warsaw 1877.
K. Olejnik, Stefan Batory 1533–1586, Warsaw 1988.
J. Besala, Stefan Batory, Warsaw 1992.
K. Buczek, Dzieje kartografii polskiej od XV do XVIII w. Zarys
analityczno-syntetyczny, Wrocław 1963.
S. Alexandrowicz, Rozwój kartografii Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego od XV do połowy XVIII w., 2nd ed., Poznań 1989; idem,
‘Źródła kartograficzne do wyprawy płockiej Stefana Batorego
roku 1579’, in: Od armii kompotowej do narodowej (XVI–XX w.),
Toruń 1998, pp. 17–43.

which could neither be ended during his reign nor during
the two periods of prolonged interregnum (1572–1576).
Let us start with a brief reminder of the basic events. The
military activity of 1577–1581 at the eastern frontier of the
Grand Duchy of Lithuania (the Commonwealth) and in
Livonia were, in fact, another stage of the northern war,
which started with Sigismund Augustus’ expedition to Pozvol and, as a result, the inclusion of the declining Livonian
state of the Teutonic Order in the Lithuanian sphere of influence, and then in the Commonwealth. During Bathory’s
reign the war was waged with varying luck. The result of
the first stage was unfavourable for the Polish-Lithuanian
side, when, during the summer campaign of 1577, Ivan
the Terrible’s armies conquered the part of Livonia beyond the Daugava River (except Riga), which had not been
occupied by Muscovy before. However, by the end of the
year, Jan Hieronimowicz Chodkiewicz, the governor and
hetman of that land and the starosta of Samogitia, started the laborious process of regaining the lost Livonian
castles. This stage of military action in Livonia can be said
to have ended with a successful battle fought on 21st October 1578 at Kieś (Wenden), in the area of modern Latvia,
but under a new commander, Andrzej Sapieha, a lieutenant appointed by the contemporary voivod of Vilnius and
grand hetman of Lithuania, Mikołaj ‘the Red’ Radziwiłł,
with the participation of allied (if temporary cooperation
could be called so) Swedish troops. A sabotage raid by the
court (field) hetman of Lithuania, Krzysztof Radziwiłł, later
known as ‘the Thunderbolt’ deep into the territory of Livonia, which ended in seizing the castle of Kierepeć (modern Kirempee, at the border between Latvia and Estonia)
and pillaging the area of Dorpat (Tartu) started a new,
offensive phase of the Livonian war. It was crowned by
three campaigns that followed: the expedition to Polotsk
in 1579, which resulted in capturing the city and regaining
the whole district, including castles built by Muscovy; the
expedition to Velikiye Luki in 1580, ending in a successful
siege of that stronghold. The last expedition, to Pskov,
undertaken in 1581 did not lead to victory on such a scale
as the two previous ones, but instead it ended in a diplomatic success, as Ivan IV the Terrible was forced to enter
peace talks concluded in the truce of Yam-Zapolsky, sworn
on 15th January 1582. On the whole, the prolonged war
ended in a Polish-Lithuanian success, Livonia was granted
to the Commonwealth, and the eastern border of the Polish-Lithuanian state was returned to an approximate status quo ante, i.e. the state from before the conflict of 1560s.

– 52 –

– Stephen Bathory’s Expeditions against Muscovy (1579–1581) –

It is also worth mentioning that in the political and military
dimension the success of Bathory’s expeditions was a result of shared Polish and Lithuanian military effort, and in
the financial aspect, it was, to some extent, the price that
Poland paid Lithuania for the union of Lublin. I shall not
continue with this train of thought, but focus on the main
subject matter instead.
Another theatre of military confrontation during
Bathory’s reign was the war with Gdansk. Chronologically, this conflict had been resolved earlier than the
main struggle against Muscovy mentioned above, as it
had already started in late 1576 and ended in late 1577.
The conflict with the burghers of the wealthy port city of
Gdansk was also a Jagiellonian legacy. In the final years
of Sigismund Augustus’ reign the matter of the conflict
was the subjection of the economic interests of the city to
contradictory interests of the monarch and raison d’état.
The Jagiellonian king aimed at strengthening his control
over the port, situated on the Vistula estuary, a position
strategic for the kingdom, bringing the city substantial
income. In the early period of Bathory’s reign, apart from
the economic conflict, a political one arose due to the
city’s political stand opposing the will of the Nobles’ Commonwealth after the double election at the end of 1575.
Gdansk firmly backed Maximilian II Habsburg against the
majority of the nobles, who supported the election of
Anna Jagiellon, giving her Stephen Bathory for husband.
As a consequence, both parties took military action. During the struggle, Court Hetman Jan Zborowski, commanding the royal army, gained victory on 17th April 1577, in
a battle fought on the open field near Lubieszów. However, the siege laid by the king to the strongly defended
city and its fortifications controlling the entry to the port,
i.e. the fort known as Latarnia (Wisłoujście) in the summer
and autumn of that year, did not bring any success. The
war ended in a compromise: the city accepted Bathory’s
sovereignty and paid a huge contribution of 200 thousand
contemporary Polish zloty. That sum enabled the king to
enact his plans of war against Muscovy, as he received the
funds necessary to wage it. Yet, this compromise meant
resignation from stronger subjection of Gdansk and its finances to the royal control.
War with Gdansk, which, in fact, was an internal conflict, has been included here in order to provide comparison with main campaigns conducted by the Commonwealth at its north-eastern border. The nature of military
operations, both during the war with Gdansk and the ex-

peditions against Muscovy, was similar and boiled down
to the necessity to perform siege works in the main directions. In the period in question, there was also another
front of military operations, but of secondary importance.
What is meant here is, of course, the defence of the southeastern border (Podolia and Ukraine) against the Tatar
hordes. Military operations in that area, opposing the raids
of the nomads, were conducted in the sping (March–April)
of 1577 and in February 1578, and had the nature of manoeuver warfare. Due to this fact it is difficult to treat them
the same way as other conflicts, but they led to the necessity of leaving a portion of the forces in Podolia, and drew
the king’s attention away from the main direction of operations.
Stephen Bathory, who arrived in the Commonwealth in
the spring of 1576 to take the throne, found the military of
the realm in a complete disorder after years of prolonged
interregnum and Henry de Valois’, the first elected king’s,
escape. One of the earliest decisions taken by Bathory in
this field was to dissolve wojsko kwarciane (quarter army)
stationing in Podolia in the summer of 1576, as it was demoralised and unable to take military action. This army
refused to follow the king’s order anyway. At the beginning
of his reign Bathory trusted only his Hungarians, whom he
brought to Poland in a group of about 1000 horsemen and
550 footmen (hajduks). Soon after the coronation sejm in
June and July 1576, he started to restore the army paid
from the public treasury. He started with enlisting over
a dozen cavalry companies, mainly Polish hussars, numbering over a thousand horses, which constituted the
so-called court army, whose primary task was to protect
the monarch and his court. A separate court hetman was
appointed to command this force, and it was the abovementioned Jan Zborowski. Since January 1577 the restored wojsko kwarciane was formed, and it stationed in
Podolia in the number of well-nigh 3 thousand soldiers
(slightly over 2 thousand cavalry, almost exclusively
armed lightly, in the Cossack manner, and 850 infantry
with artillery). Over the years and with the settlement of
the state matters, as well as due to the monarch’s efforts,
the military potential of the Commonwealth was restored
relatively quickly. The mobilisation capability of the common Polish-Lithuanian state was shown in the full extent
during subsequent military campaigns, namely at Gdansk
in 1577, with only the forces of the Crown, and during the
three expeditions against Muscovy – to Polotsk, Velikiye
Luki and Pskov in 1579–1581. The contemporary army of

– 53 –

– Henryk Lulewicz –

the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland consisted mainly of
regular troops. Only in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was
the whole of the nobility levied, under the so-called landed
service (a counterpart of levée en masse), apart from the
regular troops. The duration of essential sieges, as well as
the manpower of armies gathered for the main campaigns
of Stephen Bathory, is shown in the table below:

Grand Duchy of Lithuania due to the war. The enormous
financial liability to Lithuania’s soldiers was resolved by
spreading the payment out over many years following
the war. A portion of the Lithuanian army consisted of
the nobles of the landed service, hardly useful at sieges,
who did not take part in the last of the Pskov campaigns.
This explains the smaller manpower of the Lithuanian

The Crown
Gdansk (Apr–Dec 1577) – 8 months
Polotsk (late Apr – 30th Aug 1579) – ca. 5 weeks
[campaign – 2.5 months]
Velikiye Luki (26th Aug – 5th Sep 1580) – 11 days
[campaign – 3 months]
Pskov (Aug 1581 – I 1582) – ca. 6 months
Source: H. Kotarski, ‘Wojsko polsko-litewskie podczas wojny inflanckiej 1576–1582 r. Sprawy organizacyjne’, in Studia i Materiały
do Historii Wojskowości, vol. XVI/2 (1970), p. 122; vol. XVII/1 (1971),
pp. 103–105; vol. XVII/2 (1971), pp. 107–108; vol. XVIII/1 (1972), pp.
78–87; cf. also: H. Lulewicz, Gniewów o unię ciąg dalszy. Stosunki
polsko-litewskie w latach 1569–1588, Warsaw 2002, pp. 334–336.

The above table requires author’s comments on the
data concerning the manpower of the combined Polish-Lithuanian armies, which took part in the greatest war
of Bathory’s era, i.e. the three victorious campaigns against
Muscovy in 1579–1581. First of all, it should be remarked
that most of the data presented here is approximate, due
to the lack of precise information. Based on the revised
calculations by Henryk Kotarski, the manpower of the
armies of the Commonwealth participating in particular
campaigns can be estimated at 38 thousand (at Pskov) to
even over 48 thousand during the Velikiye Luki campaign.
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of that time could
afford to keep relatively numerous armies for a few years.
The overall cost of military actions during the Livonian
war incurred by the Commonwealth in 1578–1582 is estimated at 3–3.5 million Polish zloty. Most of the cost was
borne by the Polish part of the Commonwealth, as it was
more affluent and less exhausted from the conflict with
a powerful neighbour, which was the share of Lithuania.
The Lithuanian participation in the cost of the Polotsk expedition, the first of those campaigns, reached ¼ of the
total expense, but it undoubtedly decreased throughout
the years because of a worsened situation of local taxpayers and additional tax burden borne by the people of the

Lithuania

TOTAL:

ca. 12 000

–

ca. 12 000

18,839

22,975

41,814

22,719

ca. 25 680

ca. 48 400

ca. 24 000

ca. 14 500

ca. 38 500

army during the blockade of that city. What was the effect of such great expenditure of forces and funds for the
Livonian war then? Well, the successful conclusion of the
conflict indubitably resulted in strengthening the bonds
between Poland and Lithuania within the newly created
federal state, which the Commonwealth constituted after
the union of Lublin in 1569. After the victorious war, this
Commonwealth became a regional power. Despite the
fact that none of the Lithuanians voted for Bathory during the autumn election of 1575, it was the Hungarian,
who wielded the royal power over the Commonwealth,
who contributed significantly to its integration. His energy
and willingness to launch offensive military operations
led to meet the basic condition the fulfilment of which the
Lithuanians expected from their Polish partners after the
union of Lublin. It should be admitted that the Poles of the
time, some of them unwillingly, managed to provide not
only financial support, but often themselves joined the
armies that headed towards the eastern frontier. Such military commitment was enough to ensure a decisive victory
over Muscovy and secure peace at the eastern border of
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which at the same time constituted the border of the whole Commonwealth.
Due to the limited size of this paper I should not go
into details on the tactics or strategy of the military operations in question. After all, their nature is not to provide
the reader with a precise description, as those operations
consisted mainly in gathering large masses of soldiers, coordinating their march to a chosen target and laboriously
besieging a particular stronghold. Siege operations usually lasted extremely long, rarely for weeks, more often for

– 54 –

– Stephen Bathory’s Expeditions against Muscovy (1579–1581) –

months, and, in some cases, even for years. It is not a situation suitable for the media, unlike spectacular victories in
the battles fought by field armies. I shall confine myself to
mentioning just a few elements characterising the times of
Bathory’s wars. The basic stipulation of the strategy employed in the greatest of the wars waged at that time was
to lead the offensive away from Livonia in order to seize it
as unharmed by prolonged siege operations as possible.
Another characteristic feature of the operations was the
precise determination of the objective, which was an unquestionable merit of the king. The size and type of the
forces as well as the planned amount of necessary funds
were adjusted to the intended goal. Moreover, there was an
additional element, which could especially be seen in the
operations of great armies with complex national structure and military formations participating in them, notably
in the Muscovite territory (the campaigns of Velikiye Luki
and Pskov). It complemented the usual cover of the right
flank, i.e. the potentially endangered one, with activities
aimed at diverting the enemy’s attention. This was done
by chosen detachments, who conducted sabotage actions
deep within the enemy territory. A classic example of such
action is a raid against the rear of the Muscovite defence
conducted by a force under Krzysztof Radziwiłł, the field
hetman of Lithuania, in the autumn of 1581, during the
Pskov campaign.
The time has come to summarise the achievements of
the Polish military during the reign of Stephen Bathory,
and to list the merits of the king himself. Bathory should,
above all, be attributed with the shift from the passive defence to daring military offences. Due to his personal energy and willingess, as well as the skill to organise offensive operations, the tradition of ineffectiveness, especially
on the front of the struggle against the eastern neighbour
of Lithuania, was broken. The defensive nature of military
activity was visible especially during the wars against the
eastern neighbour waged by the Jagiellons in the former
half of the 16th century, but also during the Livonian War.
The only exception was the war of Starodub of 1533–1537,
which nonetheless ended with rather unfavourable results for Lithuania. The spectacular case in point is the socalled Radashkovichy expedition of 1567–1568 organised
by Sigismundus Augustus at a huge cost, which concluded
with a complete failure, inter alia because of the king’s
lack of initiative to take decisions. Bathory’s campaigns of
1579–1581 can serve as a contrary example. Their cost was
also huge, but they brought the prolonged conflict with

Muscovy to conclusion, which was favourable for the Commonwealth. One should not only emphasise the king’s
courage to undertake plans of military operations, but
also the accuracy of his decisions regarding the choice of
hetmans, as well as lower level commanders. Bathory was
not afraid to change commanders at decisive moments,
e.g. to appoint Mikołaj ‘the Red’ Radziwiłł as the grand hetman of Lithuania in early 1578, and then Jan Zamoyski as
the grand hetman of the Crown. He could also choose the
right advisers and associates.
There were also other achievements in the field of politics that made an impact on the history of the military, and
through affecting its condition, the history of the Commonwealth as well. They usually include the following:
a) The conclusion of the development of the Polish hussars as an old Polish cavalry formation. Fashioned, especially in regard to equipment and organisation, as it was
described, more hungarico (according to Hungarian custom), it constituted the basic type of cavalry in the Polish
and Lithuanian army during the last decades of the 16th
and throughout the 17th century.
b) The establishment of the chosen infantry, consisting
of peasants from royal estates, who would constitute the
beginning of the national infantry formation, most often
known as the Polish infantry, in 1578.
c) The age of Bathory was characterised by careful planning and preparation for military operations with respect
to gathering forces and funds, but also carrying out reconnaissance of the enemy army and the theatre where prospective operations were to take place.
d) Another element is the use of large detachments –
namely regiments of the infantry of the ‘foreign contingent’ (this name, more typical for the 17th century, can
already be used), i.e. mercenary Hungarian and German
(Landsknecht) infantry, necessary for siege works, without
which capturing strongholds would be impossible.
e) Bathory can also be attributed with creating a military formation resembling a royal guard. In the final years
of his reign he kept 400 household ‘Hungarians’, half of
whom constantly guarded him, mostly during the king’s
stay in the castle in Grodno. The other half stationed in
the so-called blockhouse, i.e. the keep guarding and controlling the access to the port in Riga from the sea.
f) Another element is also worth emphasising, i.e. raising the generations of later hetmans and middle-level
commanders and providing them with experience during
the triumphs of the age of Bathory. I shall confine myself

– 55 –

– Henryk Lulewicz –

– 56 –

– Stephen Bathory’s Expeditions against Muscovy (1579–1581) –

to naming the hetmans, such as Jan Zamoyski, Stanisław
Żółkiewski or, in Lithuania, Krzysztof ‘the Thunderbolt’
Radziwiłł.
In the field of politics, the greatest of Stephen Bathory’s
triumphs was stopping the expansion of the Grand Duchy
of Muscovy (the Russian state) towards the Baltic Sea for
over a century. It hindered Russia from contacting the

Western Europe, and thus probably to some extent, its
modernisation and development. On the other hand,
after its failure Russia directed its expansion to the east,
into the almost completely uninhabited areas beyond the
Ural Mountains. Within another century, Russians reached
the seas at the eastern end of Asia, gradually incorporating
those territories into their state.

Bibliography
Primary sources

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Księga Batoriańska. Zbiór dokumentow ku uczczeniu 350-letniej

skiego od XV do połowy XVIII w., 2nd ed., Poznań 1989

rocznicy zgonu króla Stefana Batorego, ed., R. Mienicki, Wilno

J. Besala, Stefan Batory, Warsaw 1992

1939

K. Buczek, Dzieje kartografii polskiej od XV do XVIII w. Zarys anali-

Źrodła dziejowe, ed. A. Pawiński, vol. III: ‘Stefan Batory pod
Gdańskiem 1576–1577’, Warsaw 1877

tyczno-syntetyczny, Wrocław 1963
K. Górski, Historia artylerii polskiej, Warsaw 1903

Źrodła dziejowe, ed. A. Pawiński, vol. IV: ‘Początki panowania

K. Górski, Historia jazdy polskiej, Cracow 1894

w Polsce Stefana Batorego 1575–1577, listy, uniwersały’,

K. Górski, Historia piechoty polskiej, Cracow 1893

Warsaw 1877, vol. IX, Warsaw 1881

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‘Sprawy wojenne krola Stefana Batorego. Diariusze, relacje, listy

Moskiewskim za Batorego, vol. CCVI (1892), pt. 2, Warsaw

i akta z lat 1576–1586’, ed. I. Polkowski, in Acta historica res
gestas Poloniae illustrantia ab anno 1507 ad annum 1795,

1892
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vol. XI, Cracow 1887

skim, vol. CCVIII (1892), pt. 3, Warsaw 1892

Books

K. Górski, Trzecia wojna Batorego z Wielkim Księstwem Moskiew-

Etienne Batory, roi de Pologne, prince de Transylvanie, Cracow
1935

skim, vol. CCVIII (1892), pt. 4, Warsaw 1892
H. Lulewicz, Gniewów o unię ciąg dalszy. Stosunki polsko-litew-

Od armii komputowej do narodowej (XVI–XX w.), ed. Z. Karpus,
W. Rezmer, Toruń 1998

skie w latach 1569–1588, Warsaw 2002
J. Natanson-Leski, Epoka Stefana Batorego w dziejach granicy

Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, pt. 1: vol. XVI/2, Warsaw
1970

wschodniej Rzeczypospolitej, Warsaw 1930
V. Novodvorskiy, Borba za Livoniyu mezhdu Moskvoy i Rech’yu

Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, pt. 2: vol. XVII/1, Warsaw 1971

Pospolitoy 1570–1582 gg, Sankt Petersburg 1904
T. Korzon, Dzieje wojen i wojskowości w Polsce, Cracow 1912

Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, pt. 3: vol. XVII/2, Warsaw 1971

M. Kukiel, Zarys dziejów wojskowości w Polsce, Cracow 1929
K. Olejnik, Stefan Batory 1533–1586, Warsaw 1988

Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, pt. 4: vol. XVIII/1, War-

Articles
O. Laskowski, ‘Wyprawa na Toropiec. Ze studiów nad wojnami

saw 1972
Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, pt. 5: vol. XVIII/2, War-

moskiewskimi Stefana Batorego’, in Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy, 1936, vol. IX

saw 1972

– 57 –

– Witold Rawski –
Military Bureau for Historical Research in Military Centre for Civic Education

The Battle of Kircholm 1605

In 1587 the son of the Swedish King, Sigismund Vasa,
became the ruler of Poland. After his father’s death, he left
Poland and went to Sweden with a desire to take over the
throne. Unfortunately, the opposition led by Charles of
Södermanland rejected his candidacy. As a result, in 1594
he handed over the reign over Sweden to the Regency
Council led by his uncle and returned to Poland. In 1598
he launched an attack on Sweden. The lack of a strong
fleet made it impossible to transport reinforcements. The
absence of support in Sweden and the surrender of the
army at Linköping compromised Vasa’s dreams about the
Swedish throne. In addition, in 1600, the Swedish parliament dethroned him and his descendants were deprived
of hereditary rights to the throne1. Sigismund did not give
up. He needed the power of the Republic of Poland to fulfil
his plans. The nobility did not intend to agree to war, but
the magnates authorised Sigismund’s plans. After long discussions held on the 12th of March 1600, the Sejm passed
the incorporation of Estonia to the Republic of Poland.
At that time, in the summer of 1599, Charles of Södermanland pacified Finland, as the country had been in
favour of Sigismund. In the autumn of the same year he
redeployed his troops to Estonia. In March of 1600, the
troops ousted the Polish army. In August, 10,000 soldiers
of Charles came to Estonia and received reinforcements
consisting of the local nobles and peasant infantry.
In such circumstances, in 1601, the Sejm passed the
taxes for the war with Sweden. Meanwhile, the poorly organized Swedish army began to suffer one defeat after another2. Krzysztof ‘Thunder’ Radziwiłł has begun a series of
1

2

military victories with crushing the Swedish forces at Kokenhausen, followed by the victories of Jan Zamoyski and
Stanislaw Żółkiewski3.
When in October, l602, the seriously ill Jan Zamoyski
left the army, Hetman Żółkiewski left the command to the
Great Hetman of Lithuania Jan Karol Chodkiewicz4. Five
thousand men went under his command, most of whom
constituted the crew in Livonia fortresses. Unfortunately,
the number of soldiers has been constantly decreasing.
Two months later, due to a harsh winter, famine, epidemics and desertions of troops, there were only just over 2,000
servicemen. Impatient by the lack of pay, the soldiers often
initiated revolts. The commanders of the army had to pay
out wages from their own pocket5.
Chodkiewicz did not cease to fight with the Swedes.
At the end of the year, he marched at the head of 1,200
troops to Dorpat (currently Tartu) and tried to conquer it.
Two thousand soldiers defended the city. At the beginning
of 1603 the Swedes tried to launch an offensive and force
Chodkiewicz to withdraw from the siege. In February, the
Swedes set off to the north of Estonia, to Rakibor (Wesenberg, Rekvere) and tried to conquer it. However, on the
5th of March, Chodkiewicz crossed their way with 1,000 soldiers and won the battle. Having heard the grave news, the
Dorpat garrison surrendered on the 15th of April.
3

4

5

M. Roberts, The Early Vasas. A History of Sweden, 1523–1611,
Cambridge 1968.
Cf. M. Paradowski, Studia i materiały do historii wojen ze Szwecją 1600–1635, Oświęcim 2013, pp. 15–29.

– 59 –

For the description of the first part of the campaign cf. S.
Herbst, Wojna inflancka 1600–1602, Zabrze 2006.
L. Podhorodecki, Jan Karol Chodkiewicz 1560–1621, Warsaw
1882.
The financial problems of the Finnish Campaign are described by A. Filipczak-Kocur, Skarb litewski za pierwszych dwu
Wazów 1587–1648, Wrocław 1994. (pp. 51–62); Cf. J. Wimmer,
‘Z zagadnień ekonomiki wojskowej XV–XVIII w.’, in Materiały
i Studia, no. 32, 1974.

– Witold Rawski –

Unfortunately, further Polish military action was suspended due to the fact that the unpaid soldiers refused
to fight. In this situation, Chodkiewicz was forced to set
up camp south of Rakvere. Hence, during the summer he
roiled the enemy and blocked all Swedish operations in
the direction of Dorpat and Biały Kamień (Paide). To facilitate the task he stood at Dorpat in July.
In August 1604, the Swedish commander Arvid Eriksson Stalarm, using the distance from Chodkiewicz, took
offensive measures towards Fellin and Ibarpol. However,
along the way he had to conquer Biały Kamień. The first
offensive was unsuccessful. Eriksson, hearing the news
that the Hetman is coming, chose not to fight. He withdrew, but a month later with 5,000 men and 6 cannons at
his side, he tried to besiege the city again. After 10 days,
on the 25th of September, Chodkiewicz came to the rescue
of the besieged city with 2,500 men, mainly cavaliers. This
time the Swedes decided to fight. They grouped north of
the city. Their left flank was leaned on the embankment
on the marshy Paide (Pärnu) River valley and on the side
road to Reval (Tallin). In order to hinder the breakdown of
their own cavalry, the Swedes decided to mix it with infantry regiments.
Knowing this, Chodkiewicz reinforced his right flank
with the Hussars. They were to carry out the critical strike.
He deployed infantry, light cavalry and artillery in the
centre, and on the left flank he deployed the rest of the
cavalry. The two groups were to engage the enemy formations and therefore, deliberately withdrawn, they attacked
later. The right flank of Chodkiewicz’s army encircled the
Swedish light cavalry and broke their left flank, cutting off
their retreat. Swedish losses amounted to approximately
5,000 men and 6 cannons. They also lost their wagons.
Chodkiewicz’s army lost around 200 men. The victory was
not used well. The unpaid Lithuanian army rebelled and
refused further service.
The Swedes have not abandoned the attempts to crush
Chodkiewicz’s forces operating in Livonia. After over six
months, in the summer of 1605, they managed to concentrate an army of 12,000 soldiers. It consisted mainly of
foreign mercenaries. At that time the Republic of Poland
lacked the money to pay the army wages. The Sejm that
gathered in the beginning of 1605 has dissolved without
passing the taxes necessary to cover the army’s wages.
However, Chodkiewicz, using his own resources, managed to gather about 5,000 soldiers. Unfortunately he
could use only 3,500 in the battlefield, because the rest

had to defend the most important fortresses in Estonia.
They were to constitute the basis of offensive actions
aimed at conquering the rest of Estonia, Biały Kamień,
Fellin, Dorpat (where Chodkiewicz’s army had quartered)
and Rakvere. The troops were garrisoned at Cesis, Wenden, Cests and Dyjament (Daugagriva) at the river mouth
of the Daugava (150 infantry and 100 peasants).
Riga could provide hundreds of mercenaries (including
200 Poles) and a few thousand soldiers. The trail along the
coast from Pärnu to Riga was not protected due to the lack
of men. It needs to be emphasized that the sea was almost
entirely ruled by the Swedes.
Charles of Södermanland made the decision to venture
for Riga. The siege of the city would create a basis for further action along the Daugava River. As a consequence, it
would cut off of Livonia from Poland. The Swedes failed to
transport all of their forces by sea to Riga. The lack of transport ships caused the Swedish forces to dispersed and
land in several different places. Joachim Mansfeld with
5,000 men, mostly Germans and siege artillery, had landed
at Dyjament on the 12th of August and blocked Riga. Between the 15th and 20th of August the troops of Anders Lennartsson, circa 4,000 men, mainly from Finland and the
Netherlands, have been landing at Revel. Finally, on the
30th of August, Charles IX, the King of Sweden, landed at
Pärnu with around 4,000 men, mainly Swedes and Scots.
Chodkiewicz set off to retaliate, as he was urged to help
by the citizens of Riga. In order not to delay the march,
he left most of the camp at Dorpat. He reached Wolmar,
150 km away from Dorpat, in four days, on the 21st of
August. It was here that he received reassuring information
about the situation in Riga. The Swedish attempt to besiege the city did not cause the crew to surrender. On the
contrary, Riga decided to launch an offensive of its own. On
the 14th and 15th of August the soldiers of Riga succeeded
in battling the Swedes outside of the city. Therefore the
citizens of Riga informed the Hetman that temporarily the
rescue was unnecessary6.
In Wolmar, Chodkiewicz acquired information about
Lennartson landing in Reval (Talin) and about his march
to the south. Knowing that Riga was safe, Chodkiewicz
set off against Lennartson on the 25th of August. He secured himself from the south by sending a few cavalry
6

– 60 –

A. Ziemlewska, ‘Postawa Rygi wobec państwa polsko-litewskiego na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku’, in Wojny północne w XVI–
–XVIII wieku, Toruń 2007, pp. 75–76.

– The Battle of Kircholm 1605 –

regiments towards Riga. Possessing this information, Lennartsson decided to take Fellin. But after the information
that Chodkiewicz moved to the north, the Swedes directed their troops to Fickel (Vigala) and garrisoned there in
order to avoid battle. The Swedes took position among
marshes and forests and it fortified it well – fences were
built all around. Chodkiewicz arrived there on the 29th of
August (210 km from Wolmar). The attempts to induce the
Swedes into an open battle have failed.
Additionally, the situation became further complicated by the news that Charles IX landed at Parnu. Bearing
in mind that Charles IX is a threat to Fellin, the Hetman
moved towards him (100 km from Fickel). He arrived on
the 5th of September. It allowed Lennartsson’s forces to
move away from Parnu. Here the Swedish forces have concentrated. While Chodkiewicz was approaching the city,
Charles IX travelled by sea with all of his forces (8,000 men)
in the direction of Riga. He was convoyed along the coast
by the fleet. In addition, his forces were protected from
the east by a line of marshes and forests. It made it more
difficult for Chodkiewicz to predict enemy movement. He
was unsure as to the direction of the march of the main
Swedish force. He assumed that the Swedes would turn
to the east, towards Fellin. Hence, he moved in that direction. Around the 14th of September he was informed
that the Swedes were marching south. Immediately, he
marched to Wolmar (100 km) and arrived there on the
16th of September. However he has still not considered the
possibility of the Swedes heading towards Riga. On the
other hand, the forces that he had under his command
were too small to engage in a battle. He awaited reinforcements from Lithuania. When he received the information
that ‘the Swedes are going to attack him’, he crossed the
Gavia River near Kiesi and fortified there, planning to attack the Swedes while they were crossing the river. The
supply from Dorpat also arrived at Kiesi. Unexpectedly, on
the 24th of September, Chodkiewicz received information
that Charles IX had arrived at Riga7.
In those circumstances, despite how meager his forces
were, the Hetman had to make decisions quickly. He set off
for Riga immediately. On the 26th of September, after an exhausting two-day march (110 km) he reached the Daugava
River at Kircholm (Salaspils), 15 km away from Riga.
Mansfeld had been stationing near Riga, but having
small forces, he did not attack the city. As soon as Charles
7

IX arrived at Riga, he summoned the citizens and the garrison to surrender. The city has rejected the proposition
and in consequence the Swedes began preparations for
the siege.
Upon receiving the news that Chodkiewicz is approaching the city, the Swedes decided to relocate all of their
forces grouped at Riga to Kircholm on the 26th of September. Only a few hundreds soldiers were left to protect the
camp. In accordance with the previous plan, on the evening of September 26, all of the Swedish forces, counting
10,700 soldiers left the camp (8,200 infantry, 2,500 cavalry,
11 canons).
The road to Kircholm was difficult. The night and the
pouring rain were delaying the Swedish march.
At dawn of September 27 the Swedes spread along the
hill east of the village of Kircholm. They were separated
from the Hetman’s army by an oxbow, only from the north
were they protected by a marsh. The Swedes had the
Daugava River8 on their right side.
King Charles’s troops were dispatched in the following way: three batteries, each consisting of three canons,
were placed in the first line, the pikemen were covering the
musketeers and the infantry was divided into three groups.
The light cavalry regiments stood behind the infantry and
had the possibility to enter the gaps between the infantry
regiments of the first group. As such, they would be able
to form a strong defense capable of a counter strike. The
last two lines could form a similar defense line to the flank
(Gustave II Adolph has used this idea a refined form). The
chosen formation allowed to carry out cavalry attacks
from beyond of the infantry flanks: the infantry regiment
of the third group would fill the gaps of the first group9.
The Swedish right flank was stronger than the centre
and the left flank. Charles tried to train his soldiers according to Dutch tactics. Both sides ‘not wanting to lose the
opportune position towering over the oxbow valley waited
for the opponent to attack’10. Willing to encourage the
other side to attack, Chodkiewicz formed his forces into
several groups, so that the opponent might think that the
Poles were in smaller numbers than they in fact had been.
8

9

10

H. Wisner, Kircholm 1605, Warsaw 1987.

– 61 –

H. Wizner, ‘Polska sztuka wojenna XVII w. Wątpliwości i hipotezy’, in Kwartalnik Historyczny, 1977, p. 408.
G. Petri, ‘Bitwa pod Kircholmem 27 września 1605’, in Wypisy
do ćwiczeń z historii wojskowej, part 1, Warsaw 1961.
S. Herbst, ‘Wojskowość polska i wojny w okresie 1576–1648’,
in Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej do roku 1864, vol. 2, Warsaw, pp. 352–433.

– Witold Rawski –

Yet, it has not worked out as planned. Charles IX, being
an experienced commander, was afraid of going down the
valley and being trapped by the raging Hussars.
At noon, the impatient Chodkiewicz ordered that the
skirmishers ‘suddenly and in panic withdraw from the
front towards the army’, faking the withdrawal of the whole
army.
Charles IX, fearing the escape of a weak opponent,
commanded his army to attack. He rejected caution and
renounced a formation focused on both defensive and offensive actions in favor of placing the cavalry in the front
flanks in order to add more impact to the offensive.
He moved the greater part of his cavalry to the left flank,
intending to push the Poles towards the Daugava River.
The columns of the Polish troops formed a battle formation. Chodkiewicz commanded 3,700–4,000 soldiers, including 2,700–3,000 horsemen (before the battle, the army
was reinforced with 500 light cavalrymen of Courland origin and under the command of their prince Frederic), and
circa 1,000 infantrymen.
The Hetman was, all in all, much weaker than Charles
but he managed to achieve domination on the left flank
led by Tomasz Dąbrowa: 1,200–1,500 horsemen (100–400
Hussars, 200 light cavalry, 700–900 Cossacks), that was arrayed in four groups.
The far left flank, based on the fortified camp placed on
a high bank of the Daugava River, constituted of infantry
with two cannons and four Tatar regiments (350 mounts).
Mansfeld had 1,000 of light cavalry11 there.
Wincenty Woyna stood in the middle and had 1,000
infantry, 500 Hussars, 500 Courland light cavalry and five
cannons at his command. He was being faced by 8,200
Swedish infantry and 11 Lennartsson’s cannons.
On the left flank, 700 cavalry (The Hussars and Cossacks) were grouped in four units. In the front, there were
1,500 light cavalrymen under Henryk Brandt. Chodkiewicz
kept 200–400 Hussars under Teodor Lacki in reserve.
Seeking the definite conclusion of the battle at his left
flank, therefore ‘moving the Swedes towards the Daugava
River, but not pushing them to it’, as it might have been
expected in theory, was a consequence of the fact that
11

A. Hniłko, ‘Plan bitwy pod Kircholmem Józefa Naronowicza-Narońskiego z r. 1659’, in Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy,
1935, vol. 7. Further reading cf. M. Balcerek, ‘Ordre de Bataille
armii walczących pod Kircholmem dnia 27 września 1605 r.’,
in Do szarży marsz, marsz… Studia z dziejów kawalerii, vol. 4,
Toruń 2013, pp. 27–62.

Chodkiewicz was at a dry land enabling the Polish cavalry
to profit from their main value – the vehemence of the impact – a charge in full gallop.
The wet meadows of the oxbow in the north ‘limited
the possibility to perform a charge’ at full speed, ‘made
it impossible to perform a properly forceful flanking
manoeuvre and forced to engage in almost stationary
combat’. At the same time, these meadows ‘did not pose
a serious obstacle for the Swedish cavalry, which was
not familiar with a galloping charge’. ‘The Polish [cavalry] could not show its disastrous advantages over the
Swedes and had to fight on almost equal conditions’.
However, the Polish right flank was quite strong, proportionally stronger than the engaging flank at Kokenhausen (1601). Most probably it was supposed to be the
active flank. Without the advantage of momentum or
sheer numbers, it had the advantage of looser formation allowing to take more lances into the fray. As the
centre and the right flank almost exclusively consisted
of heavy hussar cavalry and reiters, best suited for
breaking enemy formations in a frontal charge, the left
flank was dominated by Cossack regiments, perfectly
suited for encircling the enemy flank. When the Swedish
infantry ‘began climbing the opposite slope’ after descending into the valley, ‘Polish artillery [opened fire] as
the enemy infantry approached’. Afterwards, ‘hussars
emerged’ galloping from within its intervals, followed
by reiters. There was a fierce battle. It soon reinforced
the Polish infantry.
Allowing the first line of the infantry to strike without the
reiters was Charles IX’s mistake. The reiters were directed
at the flanks, in order to allow the second wave of infantry
and – at the same time – strike Polish flanks. There was
a gap between the first and the second wave of the infantry. Chodkiewicz sensed the moment perfectly when the
Swedish army became ‘torn apart’12. The centre of the battlefield was empty. After the Polish artillery volley, Chodkiewicz’s infantry charged at the enemy formations. It was
only supposed to engage the enemy forces. Knowing how
the enemy manoeuvred, Chodkiewicz could disregard the
Swedish infantry. He knew that it was not able to change
the front. It could only begin to withdraw. The Hetman was
interested in breaking the first line and preventing subsequent Swedish waves to merge. Dąbrowa and Sapieha’s
12

– 62 –

W. Rawski, ‘Kircholm 1605. Refleksje w 400-lecie bitwy’, in
Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy, 2005, no. 3, p. 168.

– The Battle of Kircholm 1605 –

– 63 –

– Witold Rawski –

flanks were to divert the attention from the strike tearing
apart the centre.
When the Swedish formations were approximately 370
metres away from the Hetman’s troops, Chodkiewicz gave
the order to attack. Two best regiments under Woyna’s
command went first.
The total distance of the charge equalled to not more
than 375 metres, that is, about two minutes. A musket’s
maximal range of fire equals 250–300 metres, however, in
practice, shots were fired from a distance of 100 metres,
which is less than 30 seconds before direct engagement. In
such a situation only one or two volleys can be fired. In theory, infantry trying to stop the hussar charge was doomed
to fail. Breaking down the pikemen’s defence usually led to
the whole formation getting scattered.
This time the Swedes did not allow to be broken apart
so easily. The hussar squadrons were stopped (the losses
amounted to circa 150 horses – 50% of the total number,
25 killed and 17 wounded – 14% of the total number). The
regiments marching after them could barely walk through
the heaps of horse corpses. The attack had to be repeated. Woyna used the rest of his hussars and attacked
again, reinforced by two Courland companies13. This time
the companies struck between two Swedish regiments.
The first Swedish line, threatened with being surrounded
by the Polish cavalry, began to retreat in battle order, leaving behind its artillery, which in no way could be pulled to
the rear.
The skirmishers’ retreat on the right wing lured the
Swedish cavalry directly under Polish fire. The enemy
cavalry was shocked. It was attacked from the front by
Dąbrowa’s main force and flanked by the Tatar companies
and immediately torn apart. Dąbrowa’s cavalry struck the
rear and the sides of the right-flanking infantry engaged by
the Polish centre. The fight at Sapieha’s flank lasted longer. Brandt’s reiters moved out a little later than the rest
of the formation. Sapieha waited until they pass the wet
meadows, where his hussars would lose their momentum.
When the Swedish cavalry entered dry land, Sapieha attacked it with his first line, which broke the enemy formation and pushed him away into the meadows, however the
second Swedish wave resisted the hussars, which failed to
13

The problem of the Courlanders’ arrival at Kircholm is described by M. Balcerek, cf. ‘Wkład księstwa Kurlandii i Semigalii oraz powiatu piltyńskiego w bitwie pod Kircholmem
w 1605 roku’, in Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy, 2009, No. 2,
pp. 9–14.

re-form after the clash and the subsequent chase. When
the Swedes stepped on dry land, they were broken down
by Sapieha’s second line, pushed away in the meadows by
the recently re-formed first line commanded by Brandt.
Due to Dąbrowa’s success and the engagement of the
Swedish centre, Chodkiewicz noticed that the enemy has
spent all of his troops and decided to use his rear-guard
in order to resolve the situation of Sapieha’s flank. Lacki
struck the side of Brandt’s reiters and broke their formation14.
The fleeing Swedes stumbled upon the left flank of
their – already retreating – infantry. When the centre commander Lennartsson was killed, some of the retreating
units were crushed. Polish cavalry trapped a part of the
infantry. The rest got caught during a pursuit, which made
the defeat complete. The Swedes lost about 6,000 people,
including several hundred prisoners. The infantry suffered
heavy losses; well over half of them were killed. A hundred
Poles were killed; several hundred were wounded, mostly
while fighting the infantry. The remnants of the Swedish
infantry were loaded onto ships at Dyjamant a few days
later, whereas the remnants of Mansfeld’s reiters went to
Pärnu15.
One of the reasons of the Swedish defeat was poor training of the musketeers (they were a far cry from the Dutch
veterans, masters in handling this type of weapon). That is
why they could not create an effective firewall against the
hussars. Shots from their muskets, requiring long reloading, were fired too rarely.
The Swedes could not possibly win the battle using
just infantry muskets (who fought with counter-march)
and the reiter pistols (who used caracole). One and a half
thousand reiters meant 150 pistols used at the same time.
The first line of Swedish infantry consisted of 175 pikemen
and musketeers able to engage in direct combat. A mobile, melee-fighting enemy obtained advantage even over
a much more numerous opponent.
Kircholm is not a victory achieved by massive hussar
charge, like Lubieszów, Kokenhausen or Biały Kamień.
What we have here is the concept of not only beating, but
utterly destroying the enemy’s main force. Chodkiewicz
was aware of the significant tactical advantage of the Polish cavalry and went even further than Radziwiłł at Koken14
15

– 64 –

F. Kudelka, Bitwa pod Kircholmem, Warsaw 1921.
J. Teodorczyk, ‘Tajemnice zwycięstwa czyli bitwa pod Kircholmem w ikonografii z XVIII w.’, in Muzealnictwo Wojskowe, 2005,
vol. 8, p. 377.

– The Battle of Kircholm 1605 –

hausen. He created not one, but two offensive groups in
order to not only break, but also trap the Swedish centre
after breaking both flanks, except that one of these groups
(the left flank) was twice stronger than the other and it
had its opponent vastly outnumbered; Obtaining this advantage is one of the classic examples of force economy,
applied despite the fact that the opponent had of almost
three times more soldiers16.
16

Kircholm is one of the few examples in international
history, unique because of the balance of power decidedly
unfavourable for the winner. The new Swedish formation
used at Kircholm, not tested in practice, included relevant
concepts that could have neutralized the Polish cavalry’s
advantage to some extent: deep grouping and mixing cavalry with infantry, later used by Gustav Adolph in a slightly
different manner.

W. Majewski, Kampania 1603–1605. Kircholm 1605, typescript
in the author’s collection.

Bibliography
Books

M. 	Balcerek, cf. ‘Wkład księstwa Kurlandii i Semigalii oraz
powiatu piltyńskiego w bitwie pod Kircholmem w 1605 roku’,

Wojny północne w XVI–XVIII wieku. W czterechsetlecie bitwy pod
Kircholmem, ed. B. Dybaś, Toruń 2007

in Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy, 2009, no. 2

Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej do roku 1864, vol. 2, Warsaw

A. Hniłko, ‘Plan bitwy pod Kircholmem Jozefa Naronowicza-

1965

-Narońskiego z r. 1659’, in Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy,

A. Filipczak-Kocur, Skarb litewski za pierwszych dwu Wazów 1587–
–1648, Wrocław 1994

1935, no. 7
G. Petri, ‘Bitwa pod Kircholmem 27 września 1605’, in Wypisy

S. Herbst, Wojna inflancka 1600–1602, Zabrze 2006

do ćwiczeń z historii wojskowej, 1961, vol. 1

F. Kudelka, Bitwa pod Kircholmem, Warsaw 1921

W. Rawski, ‘Kircholm 1605. Refleksje w 400-lecie bitwy’, in Prze-

W. Majewski, Kampania 1603–1605. Kircholm 1605 (typescript)
M. Paradowski, Studia i materiały do historii wojen ze Szwecją

gląd Historyczno-Wojskowy, 2005, no. 3
J. Teodorczyk, ‘Tajemnice zwycięstwa czyli bitwa pod Kirchol-

1600–1635, Oświęcim 2013

mem w ikonografii z XVIII w.’, in Muzealnictwo Wojskowe, 2005,

L. Podhorodecki, Jan Karol Chodkiewicz 1560–1621, Warsaw 1882
M. Roberts, The Early Vasas. A History of Sweden, 1523–1611,

vol. 8
J. Wimmer, ‘Z zagadnień ekonomiki wojskowej XV–XVIII w.’, in

Cambridge 1968

Materiały i Studia, 1974, no. 32

H. Wisner, Kircholm 1605, Warsaw 1987

H. Wisner, ‘Polska sztuka wojenna pierwszej połowy XVII wieku.

Articles

Wątpliwości i hipotezy’, in Kwartalnik Historyczny, 1977, nr 2

M. 	Balcerek, ‘Ordre de Bataille armii walczących pod Kircholmem dnia 27 września 1605 r.’, in Do szarży marsz, marsz...
Studia z dziejów kawalerii, vol. 4, Toruń 2013

– 65 –

– Przemysław Gawron –
Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw

The Battle of Klushino

On 4 July 1610 Polish-Lithuanian units commanded by
the voivode of Kiev and Field Hetman of the Crown Stanisław Żółkiewski defeated a much larger Muscovite army in
the battle of Klushino. Without a shadow of doubt, it was
one of the biggest victories of old Polish warfare, despite
the fact that it didn’t bring expected results. The battle
itself became an object of attention for many, especially
Polish, historians. One should mention the works of Konstanty Górski, Franiczek Kudelka, Franciszek Kusiak and,
a few years ago, Robert Szcześniak.1. It was also covered by
the Hetman’s biographers, mainly Antoni Prochaska, Jerzy
Besala and Leszek Podhorodecki2. It wouldn’t be correct
to state that the course of the battle had been determined decisively. One can learn about this just by reading
the newest monography written by Radosław Sikora, who
attempted to revise existing descriptions, basing on previously unused sources – mainly iconography – and a different interpretation of already known accounts3. Wacław
Sobieski and Wojciech Polak were concerned about political and diplomatic aspects of the Hetman’s expedition,
whereas to Jarema Maciszewski we owe an excellent study
devoted to the attitude of the nobility’s public opinion towards the war with Moscow4. The output of Russian histor1

2

3
4

K. Górski, ‘Oblężenie Smoleńska w latach 1609–1611 i bitwa
pod Kłuszynem’, in Przewodnik Naukowy i Literacki, vol. 23,
1895; F. Kudelka, ‘Bitwa pod Kłuszynem’, in Bellona, nr 6, 1920;
F. Kusiak, Bitwa pod Kłuszynem 1610 roku, Wrocław 1992; R.
Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610, Warsaw 2008.
J. Besala, Stanisław Żółkiewski, Warsaw 1988; L. Podhorodecki, Stanisław Żółkiewski, Warsaw 1988; A. Prohaska, Hetman
Stanisław Żółkiewski, Warsaw 1927.
R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610, Warsaw 2010.
W. Sobieski, Żółkiewski na Kremlu, Warsaw 1920; W. Polak,
O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę. Polityka Rzeczypospolitej wobec
Moskwy w latach 1607 – 1612, Gdańsk 2008; J. Maciszewski,

ians is much more modest in this matter. One can partly
explain it by the reluctance to cover a spectacular defeat
of one’s own army and partly by a relative lack of Muscovite sources, as indicated by Boris Nikolaevich Floria in his
monography devoted to the Commonwealth’s intervention in Moscow during the Time of Troubles5.
A reconstruction of the course of events of 4 July 1610 is
possible thanks to relatively rich and diversified, for the 17th
century, source base, which includes not only numerous
written sources, but also iconographic material. A review
of accounts describing the Battle of Klushino should begin
with the report by Stanisław Żółkiewski. A historian possesses at least three relations, which were written by the
Hetman. The day after the victorious battle, the Hetman
informed the monarch and the most prominent dignitaries staying in the camp at Smoleńsk about the victory. Letters to Sigismund III and Lew Sapieha containing numerous interesting information are well-known6. Next, three

5

6

– 67 –

Polska a Moskwa 1603 – 1618. Opinie i stanowiska szlachty polskiej, Warsaw 1968.
B. N. Floria, Polsko–litovskaya intervenciya w Rossii i russkoye
obstshestvo, Moscow 2005, p. 165; also cf.: M. Karamzin, Historia państwa rosyjskiego, translated by G. Buczyński, vol.
XII, Warsaw 1830; S. M. Sołowiew, Istoriya Rossii drevneyshikh
vremen, vol. VIII, Moscow 1866; M. Kostomarow, Smutnoye vremya Moskovskogo gosudarstva w nachale XVII v. (1604–1614),
Sankt Petersburg 1868; S. F. Płatonow, Ocherki po istorii smuty
w Moskowskom Gosudarstwie XVI – XVII v., Moscow 1995.
Letter from S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche (Carowe Zajmiszcze) 5 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library 33, p. 154 v; different copy BJ 3596/II, p. 13 et seq.; printed
in Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego, kanclerza koronnego i hetmana, publ. A. Bielowski, Lvov 1861; p. 198 et seq.; J. U. Niemcewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III, króla polskiego etc.,
vol. II, Warsaw 1819, p. 598 nn.; S. Żółkiewski to L. Sapieha,

– Przemysław Gawron –

years after the described events, the Hetman wrote a short
description, and as well a justification, of his Muscovian
actions, called Początek i progres wojny moskiewskiej (‘The
Beginning and Course of the Muscovian War’; hereinafter
Początek i progres), in which he also covered the Klushino
campaign in detail. This work, although printed as late
as the 19th century, was published eight times and translated to Russian and English7. Thanks to its literary values
and truthfulness attributed to the Hetman, it was treated
as a basic source of research on the Battle of Klushino,
though historians passed over the differences between the
descriptions in the letters and in Początek i progres. Meanwhile, as W. Polak proved, the latter text does not always
contain accurate information8. Moreover, while writing,
the Hetman used Russian sources, especially the account
of the commander-in-chief Dmitry Ivanovich Shuisky, who,
along with his brother, tsar Vasili IV, were taken prisoner by
the Poles. It very well could influence their description of
the battle of Klushino.
The goal motivating Żółkiewski while writing Początek
i progres could be of some importance to the described
matter. The Hetman, faced with unfavourable public opinion pertaining to the authors of the Muscovian war, clearly
aimed to justify his actions and underline the weight of the
achievements which, in his opinion, could have ended the
Smoleńsk expedition with great success. It didn’t happen,
although not of his fault.
Interesting information can be found in the letters
of Stanisław Domaradzki, Lvov’s deputy master of the
pantry, addressed to Zygmunt Kazanowski, the starosta
of Kokenhausen and a Jesuit, priest Piotr Kulesza to an
unknown addressee. Both authors participated in the
battle and described its course at length, with the letters
written shortly afterwards. Kulesza’s letter clearly states,
that he made contact with tsar Vasili Shuisky’s soldiers,

7

8

camp at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche 6 VII 1610, fragments printed
in A. Prohaska, ‘Wyprawa pod Smoleńsk (z listów litewskiego
kanclerza r. 1609–1611)’, in Kwartalnik Litewski, vol. V, Sankt
Petersburg 1911, p. 68.
As to the date of the uprising, L. Podhorodecki, Stanisław Żółkiewski…, p. 196 et seq.; as to editions and translations, cf.:
S. Żółkiewski, Początek i progres wojny moskiewskiej, ed. A.
Borowski, Cracow 2009, p. 36 et seq. (hereinafter: Początek
i progres); I have used this edition while writing this text.
W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 238 et seq., pertaining to the autonomy of the Hetman’s actions during the
negotiations in Moscow, as the account in Początek i progres
deviates from the truth.

who mostly switched sides in favour of royal service and
were located in the Polish-Lithuanian army camp.9. While
analysing the letter one should have in mind that the author wasn’t a professional military man, however he was
no stranger to the matters of war. Although he didn’t personally participate in the fight, he was present in the commander-in-chief’s surroundings, which improves the value
of his report.
Two other participants of the battle, Mikołaj Ścibor
Marchocki and Samuel Maskiewicz, left behind journals
in which they mentioned Klushino. Especially the latter,
a companion from duke Janusz Porycki’s hussar company
(‘rota’ – also called ‘chorągiew’, a unit of 100–150 cavalrymen), which was a part of the Field Hetman’s regiment, described in great detail his and his brothers in arms’ struggle
with much more numerous enemy cavalry. Thanks to its
literary value, this description often served as a basis for
reconstructing the course of the fight, although the main
part of the journal was probably created between 1625–
1631, so almost fifteen years after the described events.10.
Similarly, Marchocki’s journal was written after 1625. In the
battle of Klushino he served in the rank of a Hussar company rotmistrz (a commander of a cavalry company).11. In
both cases one should carry in mind the fact, that both authors actively took part in the battle and therefore could
not know of the course of the fight in other places. Apart
from that, because the respective accounts were written
after a certain period of time, their memory couldn’t serve
them accurately, in consequence causing the journals to
be mistaken when it comes to details. There is also the risk
that the authors relied not only on their own memories but
also on relations of other people, including those, who did

9

10

11

– 68 –

Letter from S. Domaracki to Z. Kazanowski, camp at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche 10 VII 1610, AGAD, AR II, 556 (hereinafter: S. Domaracki); P. Kulesza SJ to N.N., from the camp at Tsaryovo 5 VII
1610, The Princes Czartoryski Library (hereinafter: B. Czart.),
342, p. 759, publ. W. Sobieski, in Kwartalnik Historyczny, vol.
XXXV, vol. 14, Lvov 1921, p. 154 (hereinafter: P. Kulesza).
A. Sajkowski, Introduction in Pamiętniki Samuela i Bogusława
Kazimierza Maskiewiczów, publ. A. Sajkowski, Wrocław 1961,
p. 55 et seq.; ‘Dyjaryjusz Samuela Maskiewicza’, in ibid, p. 93
et seq. (hereinafter: S. Maskiewicz).
‘Historia moskiewskiej wojny prawdziwa przez mię Mikołaja
Ścibora z Marchocic Marchockiego pisana’, in Moskwa w rękach Polaków. Pamiętniki dowódców i oficerów garnizonu
polskiego w Moskwie w latach 1610 – 1612, ed. M. Kubala, T.
Ściężor, Cracow 2005, p. 21 et seq. (hereinafter: M. Marchocki).

– The Battle of Klushino –

not participate in the battle, which should urge a historian
to be cautious.
We also possess two accounts written by English mercenaries who participated in the battle of Klushino on
the Russian side. Henry Brereton published his relation in
London in 1614. As a soldier in Swedish service since 1609
he was sent to help Vasili Shuisky as a part of a mercenary unit, under the Vyborg treaty signed between the tsar
and the Swedish king Charles IX, and probably took part
in the aforementioned battle, after which he returned to
his homeland. An anonymous Narrative of an Englishman
serving against Poland was, without a shadow of doubt,
written by a participant, a soldier of English cavalry from
Captain Crale’s company, who also decided not to stay in
Moscow and, through Gdańsk, returned to England after
the events in Klushino. Both texts show the battle from
the perspective of foreigners in Russian service and thus
are a valuable addition to Polish accounts. One should
remember, however, that because of Russian accusations
stating that the battle was lost because of mercenaries’
treason, their relations can arise from the need to counter
the allegations and should be meticulously confronted
with other descriptions12.
It’s difficult to indubitably settle, if the authors of anonymous Polish accounts of the events in Klushino took
part in the battle or if their relations were based on information taken from the participants. Precisely, I have in mind:
Progres potrzeby z Moskwą pod Kłuszynem in anno 1610 4
Julii za szczęśliwego panowania Zygmunta III szczęsliwie
odprawiona13, Spod Możajska d. 23 July 161014, Wiadomość
o porażce Dymitrowego15 and an untitled relation attached
to the Diariusz drogi Króla Jmci Zygmunta III…16, contain12

13

14
15

16

H. Brereton, ‘News of the Present Miseries of Russia’, in: The
False Dmitri. A Russian Romance and Tragedy, described by
British Eye – Witness, 1604–1612, ed. S. E. Howe, London 1916,
p 69 et seq. (hereinafter: H. Brereton); Narrative of an Englishman serving against Poland, in ibid., p. 151 et seq. (hereinafter:
Narrative).
BJ 102, p. 411 et seq.; printed in Wypisy źródłowe do historii
polskiej sztuki wojennej, vol. 5, Polska sztuka wojenna w latach
1563–1647, ed. Z. Spieralski, J. Wimmer, Warsaw 1961, p. 187
et seq.; (hereinafter: Anonimowa relacja).
AGAD, AR II 557 (hereinafter: Relacja spod Możajska).
B. Czart. 105, p. 177; other copy titled ‘Die 3 July’, B. Czart. 342,
p. 755; The Raczyńscy Library 139, p. 376 v. (hereinafter: Wiadomość).
Diariusz drogi Króla Jmci Zygmunta III od szczęśliwego wyjazdu
z Wilna pod Smoleńsk w roku 1609 a die 18 Augusta i fortunne-

ing numerous very interesting details, especially pertaining to fights against mercenaries. The last of the aforementioned texts was, probably, written by the Hetman himself,
because this account is in many points very similar to the
letter addressed to Sigismund III.
One must also mention the information contained in
the accounts of people who didn’t fight in the battle itself,
but relied on information supplied by actual participants.
Some of these relations come from that time, mainly letters
written by Jakub Zadzik, Jan Zawadzki, Samuel Targowski,
Andrzej Bobola and Giovanni Luna addressed to persons
concerned with the course of military actions, especially
Szymon Rudnicki, the bishop of Warmia, and Wawrzyniec
Gembicki, Chancellor of the Crown, and the memoirs of
Józef Budziłło, a soldier serving False Dmitry II, or Konrad
Bussow and Pierre de la Ville, who served the Russians17.
We also possess works of historians, Paweł Piasecki, Stanisław Kobierzycki and Johan Widekindi18, written at a later
time, who created descriptions of the battle many years
later, basing on documents and witness accounts, especially of Hetman Żółkiewski. Of special character are documents registering losses suffered by the Hetman’s subordinates. They allow to not only estimate losses but also
provide information about the causes of death, types of
wounds or the equipment used by both sides19.

17

18

19

– 69 –

go powodzenia przez lat dwie do wzięcia zamku Smoleńska
w roku 1611, ed. J. Byliński, Wrocław 1999, p. 157 et seq. (hereinafter: Relacja z diariusza); in a large part is identical with the
Żółkiewski’s letter to the king, dated 5 VII 1610.
J. Budziło, Wojna moskiewska wzniecona i prowadzona z okazji fałszywych Dymitrów od 1603 do 1612 r., pub. J. Byliński, J.
Długosz, Wrocław 1995 (hereinafter: J. Budziło); K. Bussow,
Moskovskaya kronika, 1584 – 1613, pub. I. Smirnow, Moscow
– Leningrad 1961 (hereinafter: K. Bussow); ‘Krótka powieść
o tem, co się zdarzyło na Moskwie od panowania Iwana III do
Szujskiego r. 1611. Przez Piotra de la Ville sieur de Dombasle’,
in Skarbiec historii polskiej, vol. I, publ. K. Sienkiewicz, Paryż
1839 (hereinafter: P. de la Ville).
S. Kobierzycki, Historia Władysława, Królewicza Polskiego
i Szwedzkiego, trans. M. Krajewski, publ. J. Byliński, W. Kaczorowski, Wrocław 2005; P. Piasecki, Kronika, trans. A. Chrząszczewski, publ. J. Bartoszewicz, Cracow 1870; J. Widekindi,
Istoriya desyatiletney shvedsko-moskovitskoy voyny, trans. S.
A. Annenskiy, A.M. Alexandrov, A.F. Kostina, Moscow 2000.
I used an electronic version published on the website www.
vostlit. info.
‘Regestr pobicia Towarzystwa w potrzebie pod Kłuszynem za
Carowym Zamieściem mil 2 dnia 4 lipca’, in R. Sikora, Kłuszyn
1610…, p. 129 et seq. (hereinafter: Regestr pobicia); a different,

– Przemysław Gawron –

Annalistic quality can be attributed to certain passages
contained in Razryadnyye zapisy20 and Russian historic
works, such as: Nowyj letopisiec, Rukopis Filareta, patriarcha Moskowskogo i wseja Rossii or Letopisnaja kniga21.
The main attribute of these writings is their briefness (perhaps with the exclusion of Filaret’s manuscript), lack of details pertaining to the course of the battle and the strength
of the Russian side.
Two iconographic representations were devoted to the
battle of Klushino. Based on Teofil Szemberg’s drawing,
who was present near Smoleńsk during the battle, Jakub
Filip, probably a student of Tomasz Makowski, the court
engraver of Mikołaj Krzysztof ‘the Orphan’ Radziwiłł, made
an etching, which depicts the formations assumed during the battle by both armies in great detail. It is located
in the University of Warsaw Library collection22. In Olesko
one can find a painting of the battle made by Szymon
Boguszewicz, the court painter of Hetman Żółkiewski. It is
said, that the commander himself made remarks pertaining to the contents of the painting, which would greatly
increase its worth as a historic source23..
To sum up, the battle of Klushino was represented in
many diverse sources, which in itself can be a cause of
joy. On the other hand it can induce discrepancies, which
make it difficult to reconstruct the course of events and
forces caution in interpreting each account, including
iconography. One cannot overly trust only one source,
which was known to happen among researchers in reference to the work of Hetman Żółkiewski.

20

21

22

23

later register published in Diariusz drogi…, p. 162 et seq. (hereinafter: Regestr z diariusza).
‘Razryadnyye zapisy za smutnoye vremya (7113–7121 g.)’,
publ. S.A. Belokurov, in Chteniya v Imperatorskom Obstchestve
Istorii i Drevnostey Rossiyskikh, vol. II–III, Moscow 1907 (hereinafter: S.A. Belokurov).
Rukopis Filareta, patriarkha Moskovskogo i vseya Rossii, ed. P.
Muchanow, Moscow 1837; ‘Novyy letopisets’, in Polnoye Sobranyye russkikh letopisey, vol. XIV, Sankt Petersburg 1910; S.I.
Szachowski, Letopisnaya kniga, www.old-ru.ru.
University of Warsaw Library (BUW), Gabinet Rycin, GR 5444,
review S. Alexandrowicz, ‘Wykorzystanie źródeł kartograficznych w badaniach nad historią Polski XVI i XVII wieku’, in
Z dziejów kartografii, vol. XIV, ed. S. Alexandrowicz, R. Skrycki,
Szczecin 2008, p. 57; I used a copy published on the website
www.hussar.com. pl
R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 20, I used pictures published on
the website www.hussar.com.pl

With the above caveat in mind we can now move on to
describe the origin of the Klushino campaign. There is no
need to analyse the cause and course of the crisis in which
the Grand Duchy of Moscow found itself after the death of
Ivan IV the Terrible and later on after the termination of the
Rurik dynasty in 1598. It has been done already by Danuta
Czerska, Andrzej Andrusiewicz and Rusłan Skrynnikow24.
Boris Godunov, who took the throne after the mentally
ill Feodor I, faced strong boyar opposition. They put up
against him a pretender to the Tsar’s throne, Dmitry. He
claimed to be the younger brother of Feodor, who died
in 1591 in Uglich. The False Dmitry found support among
the Crown’s magnates, especially the Wiśniowieckis and
the voivode of Sandomierz Jerzy Mniszech. In exchange
for support he promised Mniszech, who was in great debt,
many bestowals and the status of the Tsar’s father-in-law,
as he was to marry Mniszech’s daughter – Maryna. Informally he also received support from Sigismund III Vase and
the papal nuncio Claudio Rangoni, who expected political
benefits from putting False Dmitry II on the throne. In 1604
the pretender began his expedition for the Monomach’s
Cap while commanding Cossacks and Polish mercenary
forces. It brought him many victories, mainly thanks to the
betrayal of some tsarist dignitaries, who switched sides.
However, in January of the following year he suffered defeat at Dobrynicze and, in consequence, found himself
in a difficult position, only to be saved by an unexpected
death of Tsar Boris and the following May revolt in Moscow,
which overturned his son and successor Feodor Godunov.
The pretender succeed to the throne, albeit it wasn’t
to last for long. Little more than a year later, when Maryna
Mniszchówna came to the city with her father and a large
Polish retinue, including royal envoys, another revolt ensued. Among the victims were the Tsar himself and numerous newcomers, who already managed to get under
the locals’ skin. Those who survived were imprisoned. This
group included the Tsar’s wife Maryna and her father. Vasili Shuisky succeed to the throne. He strived to consolidate his power and had no intention, at least for the time
being, to start a war with the Commonwealth. Sigismund
III, who had problems with his own people in the form of
the Sandomierz Rebellion (TN: rokosz sandomierski), also
was not eager for a conflict. Thus, in July 1608 both lead24

– 70 –

D. Czerska, Borys Godunow, Wrocław 1988; idem, Dymitr Samozwaniec, Wrocław 2004, A. Andrusiewicz, Dzieje wielkiej
smuty, Katowice 1999; R. Skrynnikow, Borys Godunow, trans.
J. Dancygier, M. Migalska, Warsaw 1982.

– The Battle of Klushino –

ers after long negotiations signed a truce effective until 30
June 161225.
Shuisky didn’t feel too confident on the throne, especially because he had to deal with a peasant insurgency
in Severia led by Ivan Isayevich Bolotnikov. When his commanders dealt with it, in July 1607 a new threat emerged
– another False Dmitry ‘miraculously’ saved from the
slaughter in Moscow. As was the case with the first pretender, this time the main military force was also composed by Poles and Lithuanians. They were commanded
by duke Roman Rożyński and since July 1608 also by Jan
Piotr Sapieha, the starost of Usvyaty (TN: Uświat). When,
pursuant to the truce, Shuisky released Maryna and her
father in September 1608, False Dmitry sent military units,
who kidnapped her and brought her to the camp. Her
father negotiated a favourable agreement with Dmitry’s
army commanders, whereas Maryna ‘recognized’ False
Dmitry as her late husband26.
Nevertheless, despite Vasili Shuisky’s weakness, Dimitri didn’t conquer Moscow, although he set a camp in
Tushino, then a nearby town, nowadays one of the capital’s
districts. Jan Piotr Sapieha, on Dimitri’s order, besieged, as
it would later turn out – in vain – The Trinity Lavra of St.
Sergius, but more and more towns and provinces accepted False Dimitri’s reign. However, negotiation attempts
between Moscow and Tushino didn’t succeed27. With time
the situation started to turn for the worse. The pretender’s
arrears with the mercenaries rose, which threatened with
revolt in the camp, whereas attempts to exploit conquered
Muscovian lands led some of them to rebel, which complicated the situation in Tushino camp even more28.
In such a situation Sigismund III, who in June 1608 finally reconciled with the rebel leader, voivode of Cracow,
Mikołaj Zebrzydowski, once more started to think about
launching military action against Moscow. This plans
didn’t take a specific form before the parliament session
of 1609 which, in accordance with King Henry’s Articles
(TN: Artykuły Henrykowskie), was competent to permit
waging a war. The matter wasn’t discussed during sejm,
although it was mentioned during senatorial votes, but
the course of events inclined the king to execute his Muscovian plans. In February 1609 Shuisky signed a treaty
25
26

27
28

W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 42 et seq.
A.G. Przepiórka, od Staroduba do Moskwy. Działania wojsk Dymitra II Samozwańca w latach 1607–1608, Zabrze 2007.
W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 65 et seq.
Ibid., p. 87 et seq.

with Charles IX whereby he would obtain help against his
enemies. Intervention of Sweden, with whom Sigismund
III and the Commonwealth were at war for Livonia, into the
Muscovian matters and the alliance of both leaders had to
be interpreted in Warsaw as a threat to vital affairs of the
king and the state, because after defeating False Dmitry,
Moscow and Stockholm would most probably designate
the Crown and Lithuania as next targets. On the contrary,
Dmitry’s victory could turn into an alliance against Charles
IX of Sweden29.
In the meantime, the Swedish-Muscovian agreement
began to bear its first fruit. Between April and July 1609,
using Swedish reinforcements commanded by Jacob Pontusson de la Gardie, Mikhail Skopin-Shuisky, the tsar’s relative, managed to unblock Veliky Novgorod and conquer,
after an indecisive battle, Tver, although the castle stayed
in the hands of Polish units. Afterwards he started consolidating his forces in the Transvolga Region. In the vicinity
of Moscow, clashes between tsarist soldiers and False
Dmitry’s mercenaries at the Chodynka river ended in a defeat of the latter. Everything pointed towards a steadily
weakening position of the villain of Tushino and his men30.
In such a situation Sigismund III could not wait any
longer. He decided to begin preparations for war and commence propaganda activities in order to justify it. Without
the permission of the parliament, he strived for senator’s
support. In order to receive financial backing he called
on September’s deputational sejmiks to enact taxes for
the war, which ended in a partial success, although at the
beginning of military manoeuvres the king didn’t possess
enough resources to carry them out for long. Moreover, the
king’s entourage was conflicted as to the strategy of future
actions. The king in his universals addressed to gentry recognized recapturing Smoleńsk and the Severia Region as
goals of the war, but also expressed hope that the course
of the war will allow to conquer all of Russia. Thus, the
Field Hetman of the Crown Stanisław Żółkiewski proposed
to march through Severia straight to Moscow, whereas the
Lithuanian advisers of the king, especially Lew Sapieha,
suggested, more conservatively, to besiege Smoleńsk.
Sigismund III acquiesced to the latter opinion and – despite the lack of proper siege equipment, especially heavy
cannons and infantry – decided on a siege, probably because of information presented to him by Sapieha and
29
30

– 71 –

Ibid., p. 67 et seq, about the treaty in Vyborg, p. 93 et seq.
Ibid., p. 94 et seq.

– Przemysław Gawron –

– 72 –

– The Battle of Klushino –

Aleksander Korwin Gosiewski, the starost of Wieliż, as if
the local voivode, Michał Borysowicz Szein, wanted to surrender the castle without a fight31.
When the vanguard of Polish-Lithuanian forces reached
Smoleńsk at the end of September 1609, it turned out that
Szein doesn’t exhibit any will to surrender and the stronghold was well prepared for a siege. The assault carried out
on 4 October didn’t succeed and thus began an unsuccessful blockade of the city and the wait for either the heavy
cannons to arrive or Dmitry’s soldiers to switch sides. The
mood in the camp wasn’t good. Conflicts arose between
the Hetman and the voivode of Braclav, Jan Potocki, and
his brothers. Crown soldiers frowned upon the Lithuatians
and vice versa, volunteers didn’t listen to Żółkiewski’s orders and the winter began to take its toll on everybody.
Despite all that no one decided to march on Moscow, as
Żółkiewski proposed32.
The camp at Smoleńsk was only one of the vertexes of
a pentagram, which was to decide about the fate of Russia
in the coming months. The second one was the camp in
Tushino, where Sigismund III sent his envoys in order to
drag Dmitry’s soldiers to his cause. This plan didn’t succeed because of overly greedy financial requests of the
mercenaries, which the king wasn’t able to fulfil33. However, in February 1610, the monarch reached an agreement with the Muscovian boyars supporting False Dmitry,
who recognised prince Władysław Zygmunt Vase as the
Muscovian tsar, while at the same time accepting the
king’s rule until the situation in the country settled down
and without deciding about the nationality of Smoleńsk
and Severia. Swedes, Crimean Tatars and, of course, tsar
Vasili were the remaining vertexes and had an important
role to play in the coming events34.
In January 1610 False Dmitry’s camp divided itself because of negotiations conducted by soldiers and their
commanders with Sigismund III. Dmitry escaped to
31

32

33

34

W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 97 et seq.; W. Sobieski, Żółkiewski na Kremlu…, p. 13 et seq.; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 24 et seq.
W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 136 et seq.; W. Sobieski, Żółkiewski na Kremlu…, p. 44 et seq; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn
1610…, p. 28 et seq.; L. Podhorodecki, Stanisław Żółkiewski…,
p. 158 et seq.
W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 139 et seq.; W. Sobieski, Żółkiewski na Kremlu…, p. 60 et seq.
W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 157 et seq.; W. Sobieski, Żółkiewski na Kremlu…, p. 77 et seq.

Kaluga along with some of his allies. Conflicts in Tushino
played into the hands of Skopin Shuisky, who launched
a counter-offensive and freed up The Trinity Lavra of St.
Sergius using Swedish reinforcements, which had tremendous propaganda value to the Russians. Sapieha
retreated to Dymitrów and because of constant harassment by Skopin’s forces – afterwards, in March, to Osipów.
The camp in Tushino found itself in a terrible spot, especially because Mozhaysk was overrun by Shuisky’s supporters and Dmitry cut off food shipments in Kaluga. In
such a situation Różyński’s subordinates left Tushino in
March and went to Volok and afterwards to Osipowo. On
22 March Skopin Shuisky triumphantly marched into the
unblocked capital. Although he died only a month later,
military manoeuvres carried out by two Russian armies,
commanded by Grigory Valuev and Jakub Boratyński, and
aided by foreign mercenaries in May managed to break
Dmitry’s former forces in the battle of Osipów and began
prepare military action against Bely stronghold overrun
by royal forces35.
In the royal camp at least since February a plan to send
a strong unit tasked to crush Skopin Shuisky’s forces in
cooperation with the military from Tushino. Originally Jan
Potocki, the voivode of Braclav, was supposed to become
its leader, with 2 thousand men under his command. This
idea wasn’t realised because the candidate’s illness supposedly stood in the way36. When Potocki regained his
health, tall snow became a new problem. Afterwards the
voivode began to haggle with the king about the strength
of cavalry companies under his command and their payment, although Żółkiewski, rather unfriendly towards him,
thought that Potocki, in reality, tried to avoid the expedition because he didn’t expect to gain any laurels and considered it very dangerous. Instead, he hoped to capture
Smoleńsk swiftly37.
The dissolution of the camp in Tushino and Shuisky’s
counter-offensive aided by Swedish reinforcements forced
the need for decisive actions, especially because the tsar
rejected negotiations with the King, as proposed by the

35

36

37

– 73 –

W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 175 et seq; W. Sobieski, Żółkiewski na Kremlu…, p. 69 et seq; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn
1610…, p.35 et seq.
S. Targowski (?) to S. Rudnicki, camp at Smoleńsk 28 II 1610,
6 III 1610; B.Czart. 1630, pp. 973, 979
J. Zawadzki to S. Rudnicki, camp at Smoleńsk 20 III 1610,
B.Czart. 105, p. 79; Początek i progres, p. 68.

– Przemysław Gawron –

Polish-Lithuanian side38. Therefore, during the war council
on 1 June the king entrusted Żółkiewski with commanding troops, which left False Dmitry’s service, enforcing order among them and lastly, striking tsarist forces preparing to relieve Smoleńsk39. The Hetman had to carry out
this task with forces weaker than those proposed to Potocki, because he was ordered to rally only two regiments
from Smoleńsk; his own and Mikołaj Struś’s, the starost
of Chmielnice. He gave out an order that commanders
who were located farther to the east, that means Marcin
Kazanowski and Samuel Dunikowski who was replacing
Ludwik Weiher, concentrate their units and issued a deadline of four days to rally camp servants sent away from the
camp for provisions40.
However, before Żółkiewski left the trenches of Smoleńsk, on 6 June came alarming news of Bely fortress
threatened by Boratyński’s and Horn’s units, which forced
the king to summon another council. In consequence, the
objective of the expedition was changed. Żółkiewski was
to relieve the castle and his troops were strengthened by
several additional cavalry companies41. In the end, the
Hetman left the camp in the evening of 7 June. Some
troops moved out earlier in the direction of Shuyskoye
and the rest on the following day. It caused problems to
the authors of sources, which differ in the amount of cavalry companies and soldiers, with the difference amounting to circa a thousand horses (2–3 thousand). Similarly
to R. Szcześniak and R. Sikora, I propose to assume as
a foundation the list included in the manuscript located
in The Raczyński Library in Poznań 33. According to it, on
8 June the Hetman had 3280 portions (TN: units of soldiers’ salary) at his disposal. It coincides with Samuel Targowski’s account, mentioning that the troops leaving the
camp at Smoleńsk were three thousand people strong42.
The Hetman marched hastily to Bely. On 9 June he travelled 8 miles (between 51 and 62 kilometres) and started
to receive news that the direct threat to the fortress had
38

39
40
41
42

Początek i progres, p. 66; Diariusz drogi, p. 139 et seq. (a mission of His Royal Majesty’s courtier Śliźń); W. Polak, O Kreml
i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 181.
Diariusz drogi, p. 145; Początek i progres, p. 68.
Początek i progres, s. 68 i n.; S. Maskiewicz, s. 123 et seq.
Diariusz drogi, p. 146.
S. Maskiewicz, p. 124; Diariusz drogi, p. 147; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn
1610…, p. 22 et seq.; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 48,
especially annotation no. 48; cf. S. Targowski to S. Rudnicki,
camp at Smoleńsk 7 VI 1610, B. Czart. 1630, p. 1119.

passed. On 12 June he was no doubt of it anymore, because the camp was reached by Gosiewski’s envoys, including 12 foreign soldiers – 11 Englishmen and 1 Scot,
who joined the king’s cause by informing that the tsarist army relocated to Rzhev. He decided to continue the
march, because the mercenaries’ account stated that the
Russians are preparing to besiege the castle once more43.
He reached Bely two days later, where he rested for two
more days, reinforced the stronghold’s garrison and sent
four cavalry companies back to the royal camp. Afterwards
he moved towards Shuyskoye, where on 22 June he joined
some of the companies sent from Smoleńsk and the regiments of Kazanowski and Ludwik Weiher, commanded, as
I have mentioned, by Samuel Dunikowski44.
Since the end of April Russians rallied their forces at
Mozhaysk. Their objective was to unblock Smoleńsk and
decisively crush the Polish-Lithuanian mercenaries, who
served False Dmitry II in the past. Regiments from Moscow
commanded by Andriej Golicyn and Danilo Ivanovich
Mezecki reached it first, followed by Ivan Andreyevich
Khovansky’s regiment from Rzhev and Vasily Ivanovich
Buturlin and Grigori Sulevich Pushkin’s from Pogorełowe
Gorodiszcze45. Additionally, units from Wolok, Osipowo
and Zubtsof reached the place of concentration, whereas
in the middle of May came 15 thousand soldiers led by the
supreme commander, Dmitry Shuisky. After long hesitation, with initial disapproval of the tsar, who finally gave
in to his brother’s demands, foreign mercenaries led by
Jacob Pontusson de la Gardie and Evert Horn appeared
at the end of July. They demanded the Muscovian side
paid the overdue salaries, with some arrears reaching as
much as half a year in case of some units. In the foreigner’s
camp there were even some revolts provoked by colonels
Nicolas Pinarte and Colville with Englishmen supposedly
taking part in them. The rebellion was thwarted and the

43

44

45

– 74 –

Letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at the Tsaritsa
River 9 VI 1610; 10 VI 1610; Raczyńscy Library 33, p. 151 v; 152.
Początek i progres, p. 69; pertaining to sending off the companies: Diariusz drogi, p. 149; (four companies); J. Zadzik to
S. Rudnicki, camp at Smoleńsk 19 VI 1610, B. Czart. 342, p. 746;
a copy in B.Czart. 105, p. 145; (5 companies and a hundred infantrymen) as to the reinforcement of the Bely garrison, N.N.
to N.N., camp at Smoleński 11 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library
139, p. 376; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 26 et seq.; differently:
R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 48.
S. A. Belokurov, vol. II, p. 18, 54 n.; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn
1610…, p. 42.

– The Battle of Klushino –

provokers punished46. The tsar sent the foreigners 10 thousand roubles, which were paid to de la Gardia by diak
Razriadnego prikazu Jakow Demidow, but the Swedish
commander didn’t pay them out to soldiers before the
battle. Another twenty thousand roubles in the form of
furs and cloth, which the Russians kept in their camp also
weren’t paid out47.
Shuisky ordered Grigory Valuev and Fedor Jelecki to
take front-end position at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche, where
both leaders, choosing a naturally defended location,
made camp. The Polish-Lithuanian side estimated these
forces to be 6–8 thousand soldiers strong, although after
the battle of Klushino Valuev quoted a number of 10 thousand48. Tsaryovo-Zaymishche was located 2–4 miles from
Shuyskoye (between 12,5–17 and circa 25–31 kilometres)
which forced Żółkiewski to take action49. Valuev’s forces
were also a threat to False Dmitry’s units, commanded
by Aleksander Zborowski, which stationed in a separate camp and didn’t want to serve under the voivode of
Kiev. Therefore the Hetman wanted to attend the general’s council to personally convince his companions but
Zborowski convinced him otherwise. Żółkiewski only
sent his envoy, in the person of a Hussarian rotmistrz and
starost of Tłumacze – Mikołaj Herburt. Other members of
the council faced him with conditions of paying a donative of 100 thousand zlotych and overdue salaries for time
served under Dmitry, threatening to form a confederation otherwise. They promised, however, that in case of
danger they won’t hesitate to join forces with the Hetman.
Żółkiewski couldn’t pay because he lacked the necessary
resources, although he didn’t stop influencing Zborowski
and his subordinates informally by using his most trusted men50. One should remember, that this matter had
46

47

48

49

50

J. Widekindi, op. cit, vol. VIII; P. de la Ville, p. 299; Narrative, p.
176; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 43 et seq.
J. Widekindi, op. cit., vol. VIII; B.N. Floria, op. cit., p. 168, somewhat differently: R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 44.
Początek i progres, p. 70; Letter of N.N. to N.N., camp at
Smoleńsk 30 VI 1610, Raczyńscy Library, 139, p. 239 v.
(8–10 000); letter of J. Hrydzicz to L. Sapieha, Tsaryovo-Zaymishche 25 VI 1610; Sztokholm, Riksarkivet Skokloster Samlingen, E 8604 (6000)
2 miles: letter of J. Hrydzicz to L. Sapieha, Tsaryovo-Zaymishche 25 VI 1610; Stockholm, Riksarkivet Skokloster Samlingen, E 8604; 4 miles: S. Maskiewicz, p. 125.
Letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, half a mile from Tsaryovo-Zaymishche 22 VI 1610, Raczyńscy Library, 33, p. 152 v.;
R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 50.

a personal side to it, because Aleksander Zborowski was
Samuel’s son, whose death on a scaffold in 1584 was generally caused by Żółkiewski, then a loyal assistant of Chancellor and Hetman of the Crown, Jan Zamoyski.
Despite the weakness of his forces, the Hetman didn’t
delay any longer and as soon as on 23 June made a personal reconnaissance of Muscovian positions, without
engaging the enemy. On the following day he achieved
two significant successes. In the result of heavy fighting,
in which cossack (the name of light cavalry formation,
not ethnic description) rotmistrz Spodwiłowski and Marcin Weiher were killed, Polish-Lithuanian forces managed
to surround the enemy in the camp, although fire from
harquebuses and improvised firearms drove the Poles
and Lithuanians away from the embankments. Moreover,
Zborowski’s soldiers decided to go under the Hetman’s
command which strengthened his position greatly, however, without relinquishing their demands. The Muscovian
camp in which, according to prisoners’ accounts, circa 5
thousand soldiers were trapped, was well prepared to
defend itself for Żółkiewski, lacking any heavy artillery, to
decide about an assault, thus a siege began. After fending
off two Russian forays on 25 June, the Hetman’s soldiers,
commanded by Paweł Rudzki (also called Szysz) built
a few wooden forts (‘ostrógi’, also: ‘ostrożki’) manned by
Zaporozhian Cossacks. They managed to cut off Valuev
and Jelecki’s supply lines and any contact with Shuisky.
The besiegers captured some, although probably not all,
messengers sent by Muscovian leaders to the supreme
commander. What’s more, Polish infantry was supposed
to reverse the river flow in order to cut off water supplies
to the beleaguered51. Żółkiewski’s camp was in high spirits,
as it was assumed that no one should fear the relief forces
coming from Mozhaysk, because Jan Piotr Sapieha’s soldiers wouldn’t let any of them through. Fortunately, the
Hetman didn’t succumb to such optimism and constantly
51

– 75 –

Letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche 25 VI 1610, Raczyńscy Library, 33, p. 153; printed in
J. U. Niemcewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III…, vol. II, p.
594; letter of J. Hrydzicz to L. Sapieha, Tsaryovo-Zaymishche
25 VI 1610; Sztokholm, Riksarkivet Skokloster Samlingen,
E 8604; Relacja spod Możajska, p. 1; letter of N.N. to N.N., camp
at Smoleńsk 30 VI 1610, Raczyńscy Library, 139, b. 239 v.; Nowiny spod Smoleńska de data 28 Juny, ibid., p. 240; Początek
i progres, p. 70 et seq.; S. Maskiewicz, p. 126 et seq.; Diariusz
drogi, p. 152 et seq.; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 51 et seq;
R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 47 et seq.

– Przemysław Gawron –

sent forays in order to identify Shuisky’s intentions. However, if Żółkiewski is to be trusted, after some time defeatism spread among the ranks, probably under the influence
of the news describing the size of the army at Mozhaysk.
The Hetman, in turn, was accused of planning a spectacular suicide52.
One can assume that news of tragic position in which
the beleaguered troops in Tsaryovo-Zaymishche found
themselves reached Mozhaysk. A war council was held
there on 1 July. It was probably then, that the decision
to move out to Tsaryovo-Zaymishche was made and put
into effect the day after. The Russians marched fast along
a high road parallel to the main road connecting Mozhaysk
and Smoleńsk. Hot weather in July led to many losses during the march and extreme exhaustion among some of
the soldiers and mounts. In the village of Masłowoj Jakow
Boriatyński and Evert Horn’s units joined the main force.
The ill commander of the Frenchmen stayed behind in
Pohorełe Gorodiszcze along with two of his companies.
On 3 July they stopped a few kilometres from the village
of Klushino, Russians separately from the foreigners. They
intended to march further on and didn’t build any fortifications except for a makeshift embankment made of horse
carts and wagons. It also seems as if they didn’t carry out
any intensive reconnaissance activities53. The premises on
which Russian strategy was built remain unknown, but it
is possible, as R. Szcześniak has already done, to attempt
to reconstruct it. It seems that Shuisky didn’t intend to
fight a decisive battle, although it cannot be ruled out
unambiguously. On the other hand, it’s very likely that he
wanted to use a method which brought exceptional successes to his younger brother, Mikhail Skopin. It relied on
building a whole chain of fortified positions, which were
used to cut off the enemy’s supply base along with food
and animal feed deliveries, which led caused weakening
of their forces54.
In the morning of 3 July rotmistrz Niewiadorowski vel
Niewiadomski brought several boyar sons, who stated
that Dmitry Shuisky intends to crush the camp at Klushino.
Almost at the same time deserters from foreign units arrived at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche. They informed the Hetman

about the unwillingness of their comrades to fight arm in
arm with the Russians and the possibility to aid the royal
cause which, nota bene, was nothing new, as the Hetman
had to consider such offers in the past. This time he decided to use the help and sent one of the mercenaries,
a Frenchmen of unknown name, with a letter written in
Latin urging to leave the enemy’s army. The messenger
was captured by Horn, who ordered to have him hanged,
but the content of the letter became publicly known and
definitely didn’t improve relations between the mercenaries and the Russians55.
The Hetman summoned his colonels and rotmistrzs
to a war council. According to his words, the participants
proposed different solutions. Some of them feared that
dividing forces and leaving the barricade at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche weak in manpower can only help the defenders’ cause. Others, maybe from Zborowski’s regiment,
which had bad experience in this matter, feared that the
Russians will use the aforementioned ostrógi strategy,
which could lead to a quick and easy extermination of
the military force. That’s why they proposed to move out
against Shuisky in full force while using weaker forces to
block Valuyev and Jelecki. The Hetman didn’t make any
decision during the council, however he advised his subordinates to be ready to march out at a moment’s notice.
The underlying intention was, most of all, to keep the plan
to leave the camp a secret from the Russians. Thus, he
gave the order to move out two hours before sunset. According to R. Szcześniak it was at around 6 p.m. He sent
officers round without using drums or trumpets, whereas
the arrangement of the march was written down on paper. Cavalry companies moved out about an hour later,
if Maskiewicz’s account is to be trusted56.
The Polish-Lithuanian camp was to be left under the
command of rotmistrz Jakub Bobowski and manned by
55

56
52

53

54

Letter of J. Hrydzicz to L. Sapieha, Tsaryovo-Zaymishche 25 VI
1610; Stockholm, Riksarkivet Skokloster Samlingen, E 8604;
Początek i progres, p. 74
P. de la Ville, p. 300; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 55 et seq.;
B.N. Floria, op. cit., p. 166.
R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 55 et seq.

– 76 –

Początek i progres, p. 74 et seq.; S. Maskiewicz, p. 127, where
it is mentioned about four captured Germans as a source of
information; M. Marchocki, p. 71, mentions two Germans; the
number of Germans is not included in Anonimowa relacja,
p. 188; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 54 et seq.; R. Sikora,
Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 49.
Letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche, 5 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library 33, p. 154 v; different
copy BJ 3596/II, p. 13 et seq.; printed in Pisma Stanisława
Żółkiewskiego…, p. 198 et seq.; J. U. Niemcewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III…, vol. II, p. 598 et seq.; Początek i progres,
p. 75; S. Maskiewicz, p. 127; M. Marchocki, p. 72; R. Szcześniak,
Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 58 et seq.; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 56.

– The Battle of Klushino –

one cossack and eight hussar companies, totalling circa
700 horses, 200 infantrymen, 4 thousand Zaporozhian Cossacks, all wagons and probably most of the camp servants.
It was aimed at convincing the Russians that a whole army
is still residing inside and at the same time at speeding up
the movement of the Hetman’s cavalry companies, which
had a night march along a muddy and narrow forest road
ahead of them. The Poles and Lithuanians took with them
only the most necessary equipment, food supplies for two
days and two falconets57.
In the meantime Shuisky and his subordinates felt so
confident that, as I have mentioned before, they didn’t
fortify they camp and didn’t send out any reconnaissance
units. The foreigners explained themselves by saying that
they trusted the Russians, who knew the vicinity better, to
take care of this duty. What’s more, they were supposed
to be so full of confidence that when Jacob Pontusson de
la Gardie in the evening of 3 July met with Shuisky, who
gave him an equivalent of 350 thousand zlotych by way
of overdue payment for the soldiers, boasted that he will
repay the Hetman for the lynx fur cloak, which he received
in exchange for sable fur when Żółkiewski took him prisoner in 1602 after the fall of Valmiera58. There’s nothing
out of the ordinary to the fact that when Polish-Lithuanian
forces showed up early in the morning at the outskirts of
Shuisky’s camp panic ensued, essentially crippling any
battle preparations. As Maskiewicz put it, using his unique
sense of humour, the enemies shouted ‘saddle trousers
and bring me the horse’, which clearly indicated the confusion among them59.
Żółkiewski’s army had to traverse circa 3 miles, that is
between 19 and 23 kilometres. It took them all night, circa
9 hours. Maskiewicz praised the local guides and mentioned that the rear regiments fell behind too much. It
was caused by the falconets, which got stuck in the mud
and blocked the road. Partly, it was also the fault of the
Hetman’s reconnaissance, because the commanders were
57

58

59

Początek i progres, p. 75 n.; S. Maskiewicz, p. 127; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 60, mentions 700 cavalrymen, 800 infantrymen and 3 thousand Zaporozhian Cossacks; R. Sikora
Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 57 n. mentions the same numbers as present in the main text.
Początek i progres, p. 76; H. Brereton, p. 142; R. Szcześniak,
Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 58; L. Podhorodecki, Stanisław Żółkiewski…, p. 168
S. Maskiewicz, p.128, see also: H. Brereton, p. 142; P. de la Ville,
p. 300.

utterly convinced that the enemy is located circa 8 kilometres farther to the east. They almost missed them on
their road towards Klushino. Fortunately the sound of
alarm trumpets from de la Gardie and Horn’s camp made
them stop and prepare for battle60.
In the light of Jakub Filip’s etching, Boguszewicz’s painting, written sources and 18th century Russian maps of the
terrain, R. Sikora convincingly established that the battlefield was a flatland narrowing to the east, in the direction
of Shuisky’s camp, which was located near the village of
Łoszczinka. Swamps and a forest in the west and two villages with common fences, Cziernawka and Preczistoje, in
the east made a corridor leading from the Poles from their
positions to the enemy. Cziernawka’s location caused the
Polish-Lithuanian forces to divide into two groups, which
even R. Szcześniak identified as flanks fighting the Russians and the foreigners separately. A cautious analysis
of the etching indicates that it was true only for Marcin
Kazanowski’s regiment on the right flank. The village was
set on fire on the Hetman’s order61. It looks somewhat differently in the light of Boguszewicz’s painting, in which
the buildings of a burning village clearly divide the Polish-Lithuanian formation into two flanks. The aforementioned fences turned out to be a significant obstacle. The
Hetman ordered his subordinates to destroy them, however it didn’t succeed everywhere, which is excellently
visible on Boguszewicz’s painting. It led to a situation in
which Żółkiewski’s units on the left flank could attack using only narrow corridors between the fences or tried to
destroy them with their lances or mounts which, including
concentrated enemy fire, hampered the attack and led to
substantial losses62.
The issue of the fighting sides’ numbers raises controversy and historians probably won’t ever be able to determine an accurate number of soldiers participating in
battle. As an example, we possess two newest estimates of
60

61

62

– 77 –

S. Domaracki, p. 1; Początek i progres, p. 76; S. Maskiewicz,
p. 127 et seq.; M. Marchocki, p. 72 et seq.; Anonimowa relacja,
p. 188; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 72 et seq.; R. Sikora,
Kłuszyn 1610…, p.81 et seq.
R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 82 et seq.; a traditional, different
from Sikora’s, description of the battlefield, see R Szcześniak,
Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 83, who, however, didn’t take into account
neither the etching nor Boguszewicz’s paining.
S. Domaracki, p. 2; Początek i progres, p. 76; S. Maskiewicz,
p. 128.; M. Marchocki, p. 73.; Anonimowa relacja, p. 189;
R. Szcze­śniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 74.; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…,
p. 83.

– Przemysław Gawron –

the Polish-Lithuanian forces. R. Szcześniak relied on, similarly to most historians, on a financial register, Komput zasłużonego wojsku moskiewskiemu stołecznemu, estimating
the number of people entitled to a donative given by virtue of the Klushino victory at 5556 hussars, 290 petyhorcy
(TN: medium-armoured cavalry), 679 Cossack cavalry and
200 footsoldiers, and later adding 400 Zaporozhian Cossacks which amounted to a total of 7 thousand soldiers63.
R. Sikora contested the above method of calculation by
pointing out that the aforementioned document lists only
financial entries, without including blind portions and
losses suffered before the battle. Additionally he assumed,
alluded by the title, that the calculation didn’t regard the
Klushino army but the military stationed in Moscow 1612.
An analysis of the data provided by the participants of the
battle implicates that Żółkiewski had between 2700 and
4000 soldiers at his disposal. Basing on that information,
the first number is much more probable, as it was told by
Samuel Maskiewicz, especially since Jakub Filip’s etching
shows similar numbers64.
However, this line of reasoning contains significant
errors. First of all, the term ‘the capital’s army’ was used
in the second decade of the 17th century was used to describe the crew at Kremlin, which entered it along with
Żółkiewski and later served under Aleksander Gosiewski
up until the forming of the confederation on 27 January
1612 and leaving Moscow. Therefore, these would be the
units from Klushino and Tsaryovo-Zaymishche65. One can
have understandable doubts pertaining to the credibility of the calculation, because the confederates overestimated the numerical strength of the units by including
people who found themselves among their ranks after
6 July 1610. It also includes units, which didn’t fight at
Klushino. Nevertheless, it mustn’t be rejected as a whole.
Secondly, not all accounts from the Hetman’s camp
indicate numbers as low as the authors quoted by Sikora
do. On 25 June Jan Hrydzicz estimated them at circa 10
thousand. Excluding forces left at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche
the Hetman would have circa 5000 soldiers at his disposal66. Also, there’s no reason to reject en bloc relations
concerning the strength of Żółkiewski’s forces at Tsary63

64
65
66

Jagiellonian Library 160/51, p. 92; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn
1610…, p. 60.
R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 58 et seq.
T. Bohun, Moskwa 1612, Warsaw 2005, p. 168 et seq.
Letter of J. Hrydzicz to L. Sapieha, Tsaryovo-Zaymishche 25 VI
1610; Stockholm, Riksarkivet Skokloster Samlingen, E 8604;

ovo-Zaymishche which came from the Smoleńsk camp
and were omitted by Sikora. After all their authors could
have access to the reports send by the Hetman to the
king and the Crown’s dignitaries. An anonymous author
of a letter dated 30 June estimated that the Hetman has,
excluding Moscow and the foreigners, 12 thousand men,
including 5000 hussars at his disposal. After subtracting
units at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche it would amount to 7000
men at Klushino67. Another anonymous letter states that
after the battle the victorious camp had 5000 hussars. Jan
Zawadzki wrote about 5500 hussars who left the camp at
Smoleńsk with Żółkiewski. On 3 July he also estimated
his force at over a dozen thousand men. To be fair, a correspondent of Stefan Zadorny in Vilnius mentioned 3000
hussars, 7000 Cossacks and 1000 infantrymen. It would
near the number of heavy cavalry to the level proposed
by Sikora, whereas Giovanni Luna said about 4000 hussars
and 500 infantrymen68.
The question arises, whether the authors who participated in the battle gave in to the temptation to blow up
the size of the victory by diminishing the size of their own
forces and increasing the enemy numbers. For example,
Samuel Maskiewicz said that 2700 Poles and Lithuanians
fought against 50 thousand enemy soldiers and additional
20 thousand Russian peasants gathered for building
fortifications69. Moreover, it’s difficult to completely believe a later note written by king John Sobieski who was
supposed to refer to a family tradition, which also could
have fallen victim to the aforementioned phenomena.
To conclude, determining the number of soldiers serving
under the Hetman requires additional research, although
Sikora’s remarks, concerning the differences between the
financial calculation and the real size of the unit, must be
taken into account.
The organisation of the Polish-Lithuanian army, recon­
structed by Sikora, based on the etching seems much
67

68

69

– 78 –

Letter of N.N. to N.N., camp at Smoleńsk 30 VI 1610, Raczyńscy
Library, 139, p. 239 v.
Letter of N.N. to N.N., camp at Smoleńsk 11 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library. 139, p. 376; letter of J. Zawadzki to S. Rudnicki,
camp at Smoleńsk 3 VII 1610, B.Czart. 342, p. 753, copy in
B. Czart. 105, p. 179; letter of N.N. to S. Zadorski, Vilnius 7 VII
1610, ibid, 342, p. 757; letter of G. Luna do N.N., camp at Smoleńsk 17 VII 1610, and in A. Sajkowski, W stronę Wiednia. Dole
i niedole wojenne w świetle listów i pamiętników, Poznań 1984,
p. 355 (hereinafter: G. Luna).
S. Maskiewicz, p. 127.

– The Battle of Klushino –

more plausible. It was supposed to be composed of 5 regiments: Stanisław Żółkiewski’s (5 hussar companies, 1 petyhorcy, 1 Ccossack, 1 infantry – nominally 1180 mounts);
the starost of Chmielnice, Mikołaj Struś’s (3 hussar companies, 1 cossack, 1 infantry – nominally 600 people); Marcin Kazanowski’s (3 hussar companies, 2 cossack – nominally 550); Ludwik Weiher’s, led by Samuel Dunikowski
(3 hussar companies, nominally 300 mounts); Aleksander
Zborowski’s (9 hussar companies, nominally 1400 mounts)
and Wysokiński’s cossack company belonging to an unknown regiment70.
Sikora, basing on Jakub Filip’s etching, the English
accounts of the battle, Widekind’s chronicle and historian’s research – Daniel Staberg from Sweden and Michał
Paradowski from Poland – determined in a believable way
the numbers and formation of foreign forces serving under the Russians. Seven Reiter regiments (led by Samual
Colbrone, Pierre de la Ville, Evert Horn, Johann Jost von
Quarnhemb, Posse and Glazeraby) and three infantry regiments (nominally led by Samuel Colbrone, Reinhold
Taube and Johann Conrad Linck von Thurnburg) would
total 1830 cavalry, 1500 infantry and 4 cannons. It differs
from the numbers given by Żółkiewski both in the letter
to the king from 5 July and Początek i progres, which contained respectively 5 and 8 thousand soldiers. It indicates
the tendency to increase the enemy numbers by the Hetman. Priest Kulesza wrote about 4 thousand ‘excellent
men’71.
In regard to the Russian army, the problem lies in the
fact, that there are no known Russian sources which
contain information pertaining to its numerical strength,
whereas the numbers given by their allies and enemies
are highly unbelievable. There are several phenomena
at play here. The first one consisted in underestimating
Shuisky’s forces, maybe because of the victorious fight at
Tsaryovo-Zaymishche and involved mainly the Smoleńsk
camp. They were estimated to consist of between 8 and 10
thousand Russian soldiers, although one should remember that some part of the army reached Shuisky just before
the battle, so these early estimations should be related to
the situation during the last ten days of June72. Secondly,
70
71

72

R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 59 et seq.
Ibid, p. 65 et seq.; P. Kulesza, p. 155; differently: R. Szcześniak,
Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 43, who deemed the number of 8.000 foreigners believable.
Letter of S. Targowski to S. Rudnicki, camp at Smoleńsk 26 VI
1610, B. Czart. 1630, p. 1229 (10 000); camp at Smoleńsk 3 VII

Hetman Żółkiewski mentions two numbers: 30 thousand
in a letter to the king dated 5 July and 10 thousand more in
Początek i progres R. Sikora explains this by the fact he received information from Shuisky several months after the
battle. It would be equally probable that the Hetman blew
up the number of enemies in order to increase the size of
his success. One should have in mind what was the aim
of his memoirs73. Thirdly, as the aforementioned historian
has noticed, the farther an author of a source was located
from the battle, the lower were the numbers he provided.
For example, Budziło wrote about 16 thousand, whereas
Luna about 15 thousand. Maskiewicz quoted data similar
to those of the Hetman74.
R. Szcześniak assumed that 30 thousand Muscovian soldiers and circa 10 thousand peasants fought at Klushino,
so he stood by the numbers provided by the Hetman and
tried to reconcile them. R. Sikora, on the other hand, assumed that the camp was most probably manned by 15
thousand soldiers and the same number of camp servants.
He mostly relied on clues left by Luna and Bereton. In the
light of Targowski’s data, this number seems to be a little
more probable, but it’s difficult to solve this problem definitely without researching the sources more extensively75.
Apart from the accepted set of numbers, one can easily
notice that the Russian side had a large numerical advantage, although its exact size is a matter of dispute. However,
there were several factors which acted in favour of the Polish-Lithuanian side. Primo, as the Hetman briefly put it in
his speech given to the troops, referring to ancient times:
‘neccesitas in loco, spes in virtute, salus in victoria.’76 The
Polish-Lithuanian army, having the Russians Valuev and
Jelecki behind them, couldn’t, in fact, fight in a different
place. A defeat would condemn them to a fate similar to
the one, which the False Dmitry’s soldiers experienced
when retreating from Volok. Of 1500 men only 1/5 sur-

73

74

75

76

– 79 –

1610, ibid, p. 1233 (8 thousand)
Letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche 5 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library. 33, p. 154 v; different
copy in Jagiellonian Library 3596/II, p. 13 et seq., printed in
Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego…, p. 198 et seq.; J. U. Niemcewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III, króla…, vol. II, p. 598
et seq.; Początek i progres, p. 77; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…,
p. 75.
J. Budziło, p. 100; G. Luna, p. 356; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…,
p. 74.
R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 43; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn
1610…, p. 74 et seq.
Początek i progres, p. 77.

– Przemysław Gawron –

vived77. Only bravery could achieve this victory, thus the
soldier’s determination rose to a widely seen level. The
Russians didn’t really intend to die for an unpopular tsar,
whereas the mercenaries fought as long as it made sense
from a purely rational, military standpoint.
Secundo, only the foreigners could stand up to the Hetman’s subordinates when it comes to military training and
experience. In the past most of the soldiers served either
in the ‘quarter army’ (‘wojsko kwarciane’) or in Livonia, or
in False Dmitry’s army. One can’t exclude that they lived
through all of these experiences. The Russian army was
composed of noble host and half-professional marksmen
used to overly common defeats throughout the last decade. That’s why the ‘ostrógi’ strategy was implemented
and brought success, but it couldn’t be used this time78.
Tertio, Shuisky’s units were troubled with the lack of
trust and communication issues between the mercenaries and the Russians themselves, The assumed formation
implies that both armies were to fight almost separately.
Unpaid foreigners who deserted and switched to the Polish side resulted in rising distrust among the Russians,
whereas the low level of training among the Moskals filled
their allies with concern, especially since neglecting their
duties, as was the case with the aforementioned reconnaissance, led to serious danger. It also concerned the
foreigners. Englishmen looked wryly on the Flanders and
Frenchmen and all of them feared the Swedes and Fins.
Last but not least, the Poles and Lithuanians could trust
the experience and responsibility of their officers, starting from the Hetman, who lived through over thirty years
of exceptional service and several meaningful victories,
although – as we tend to forget – Klushino was the first
big battle which Żółkiewski commanded. The colonels,
rotmistrzs and lieutenants also had significant battle experience. At the same time Shuisky didn’t display a great
military talent. His previous achievements, including the
battle of Bolchowo (10–11 May 1608) didn’t exactly imbue with optimism. The question remained whether the
active list, chosen according to the rules of mestnichestvo
(Russian system of seniority derived from feudal hierarchy)
instead of military skill, could stand up to the enemy. It
didn’t, however, concern the mercenaries who had experienced officers in abundance, although it’s difficult to call
77
78

M. Marchocki, p. 70.
About Russian army cf. R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 66 et
seq.

de la Gardie or Horn great leaders. Additionally, they didn’t
have any influence over the Russians79.
The Hetman surprised his enemy, but because of terrain conditions, especially the aforementioned fences (or
rather – a fence) and village buildings and the late-coming reinforcements, he wasn’t able to fully take advantage of his success. Just as the etching shows, he placed
Kazanowski’s regiment on the right flank. It was to attack
in the corridor between Cziernawka and a small forest,
however the fence was located also in front of his positions. Zborowski’s regiment stood farther to the left and
had Cziernawka on its right side. The location of the village
isn’t as obvious as R. Sikora would want it to be, because
on Boguszewicz’s paining, the village had been located exactly in the middle of the Crown’s forces, dividing it into
two parts, which is more consistent with the description
from Początek i progres. The Hetman’s regiment, commanded by Janusz Porycki, took the middle and in the
back, between Zborowski and Porycki was Wejher’s regiment. The left flank was occupied by Struś’s regiment. Its
left edge was taken by a unit of Cossacks from Pohrebyshche, a domain of the Zbaraski princely family, thus the
Hetman called those soldiers ‘Pohrebyshchans’. This flank
was covered by swamp and forest80. The Hetman gave
a short speech. It limited itself to the aforementioned
quote, which gave the signal to begin the battle.
The matter of who was it exactly that the hussar companies had struck remains controversial to this day. Determining this aspect is vital to the correct reconstruction of the events of the battle, especially the problem
of ‘treason’ committed by the mercenaries, or rather the
Russians, Traditional descriptions, which can be found,
for example, in R. Szcześniak’s work were mainly based
on Początek i progres and Marchocki’s journal. It assumes
that Russians took the left flank of the formation, whereas
the foreigners took the right and both sides clashed with,
respectively, Zborowski’s and Struś’s regiments81. How79

80

81

– 80 –

See also: R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 60 et seq.; A.G. Przepiórka, od Staroduba do Moskwy…, p. 113 et seq.
Letter S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche, 5 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library. 33, p. 154 v; different
copy in Jagiellonian Library 3596/II, p. 13 et seq., printed in
Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego…, p. 198 et seq.; J. U. Niemcewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III…, vol. II, p. 598 et seq.;
Początek i progres, p. 76 et seq.; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 83
et seq.
Początek i progres, p. 77; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 75.

– The Battle of Klushino –

ever, this theory is incompatible on many different levels
with iconographic depictions. Let’s begin with Filip’s etching, the basis of R. Sikora’s reconstruction. According to
it, Shuisky’s army formation took the shape not of a line,
but rather a ‘stairstep’. Foreigners were located in the front
lines on both flanks. They were spread from Cziernawka
as far as the forest and swamplands, totalling, as Sikora
thinks, 5 infantry companies from Taube’s regiment and 10
cavalry units. However, the main bulk of Muscovian forces
formed two lines and stayed somewhat in the back. In this
light Zborowski’s main assault marched to clash with the
foreign cavalry, rather than the Muscovian one. The latter
could only be targeted by the most far-right units of this
regiment and a much weaker formation commanded by
Kazanowski. Similarly, the heroic assault by the hussars,
as depicted by Maskiewicz, would have been fought with
the Reiters and not boyar cavalry (‘jazda pomiestna’)82.
It is not, however, entirely consistent with Boguszewicz’s
painting, which, as I have mentioned, locates Cziernawka
in the middle of the Polish-Lithuanian forces’ position. Additionally it places foreign infantry in front of Żółkiewski’s
far-right flank, and although it’s nowhere to be seen in
Filip’s etching, it would be consistent with Anonimowa
relacja. What’s more, in the front line opposite the infantry
were not the hussars but the cossack cavalry, which would
mean that in this section the cavalry also had to break
through infantry in order to fight the enemy cavalry, Russian in this case. On the other hand, what’s really important is that the painting clearly indicates, similarly to the
etching, that Zborowski’s hussars attacked the Reiters and
not the boyar cavalry.
Let’s try to reconstruct the course of events. A sturdy,
oaken fence, partly destroyed by Żółkiewski’s units, maybe
also by the Russians on the previous day, makes it significantly harder for the attackers to carry out the assault. The
gaps had, at most, 10–15 metres, usually less. It made it
possible for a formation less than 10 horses wide to attack.
Charging directly at the fence threatened the hussars with
loosing speed, weapons (lances), mounts or even their
own health or lives. On the other hand, attacking through
the breaches helped the enemy infantry and cavalry concentrate fire and increase accuracy. The Hetman and his
people, however, didn’t have a choice83.
82

83

.Anonimowa relacja, p. 189; see also: R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…,
p. 85 et seq. and p. 93.
M. Marchocki, p. 73; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 94 et seq.

On the far-right flank the Cossack company (or companies), previously commanded by either Spodwiłowski
or Zylicki, both killed at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche, struck
a foreign infantry unit, probably English and Dutch, led
by Samuel Colbrone, because Taube was positioned on
the left flank and Linck didn’t take part in the battle84. It
means that at this section a clash with Russian forces was
possible only after breaking through the infantry, about
which the sources remain silent. Whereas Marchocki’s account indicates that some companies from Zborowski’s
regiment stumbled upon companies of boyar children and
forced them into retreat swiftly. It is possible, however, that
Teofil Szemberg was right and the front line was taken by
Kazanowski’s units, as depicted on the etching based on
his drawing85.
The sight of Russian army retreating unexpectedly
quickly from the battlefield dominates English and
Swedish accounts. Brereton stated that the whole Russian army uncovered the allied flank when they suddenly
started escaping despite being ‘out of danger’. In a similar
fashion, the author of Narrative said that the Russian retreat began even before they experienced any attacks and
described it as an ‘outward cowardice’. Also Widekind accused the Russians of not helping the mercenaries under
attack86. These accounts are coherent with Budziła’s relation, who clearly stated that the Muscovians stood in the
second line and ran away from the battlefield instead of
helping the foreigners. Other Polish-Lithuanian sources indicate that the Russian resistance was, at most, weak and
concentrated on fighting ‘the Germans’87. In these light the
accusations made by the Russian side, as if treason committed by some, especially Evert Horn’s regiment, or all
mercenary soldiers contributed to the defeat, unless we
relate them only to the last part of the battle, which will
be discussed in a moment88. However Shuisky and some
of his subordinates found shelter in the camp, where they
still had some role to play out89.
84
85

86

87

88

89

– 81 –

R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 93.
M. Marchocki, p. 73; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 101; B.N. Floria, op. cit. p. 167.
H. Brereton, p. 143; Narrative, p. 178; J. Widekindi, op.cit., vol.
9.
J. Budziło, p. 100; Początek i progres, p. 78; Relacja spod Możajska, p. 2
Novyz letopisets, p. 97 et seq.; Rukopis Filareta, p. 29;
S. A Belokurov, vol. 2, pp. 18, 55; B.N. Floria, op. cit., p. 167
Ibid., p. 167; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 103 et seq.

– Przemysław Gawron –

On the Polish left flank the companies from Struś’s regiment struck Taube’s infantry regiment, which had 400 men
and an unspecified number of companies from Colbrone’s
regiment. The hussars charged through gaps in the fence
under musketeer fire, who were so close that they ‘almost
stabbed their muskets our [hussars’] bodies’, and suffering heavy losses in men and mounts. Struś’s company
had 2 men killed and 9 wounded and 22 horses killed, 9
wounded and one missing in action. It took about three
hours but finally the infantry arrived with two falconets.
They managed to widen the breaches and inflict some
damage to enemy footsoldiers, which allowed Polish infantry to rout Taube’s soldiers, who escaped to the forest,
whereas the hussars stumbled upon Reiter companies
fighting in the centre90.
In the middle of the battlefield most companies from
Zborowski’s regiment struck Horn’s regiment composed
of his, Posse’s and Quarnhemb’s units. Right next to it
the Hetman’s regiment attack de la Ville’s Frenchmen,
Glazerabi’s Flamands and later on six English companies. However, the etching is partly in conflict with Narrative and Brereton’s account. Most of all, the Englishmen
were located in the third line, behind the Flamands and
four French regiments, close to de la Gardie’s position.
Thus, it’s difficult to imagine them going into battle right
after the Fins, which is clearly stated in both accounts. Although Luna accused them of passiveness, it should be
emphasized that they fought bravely. They charged three
times, repulsing Polish attacks. It was probably this section that witnessed the events so masterfully described
by Maskiewicz, when hussar companies couldn’t break
through the enemy and thus attacked 8–10 times. The
Hetman himself was impressed by their bravery. Not until
Zborowski’s companies attacked, was it possible to break
through the enemy and force de la Gardie and Horn to retreat91.
90

91

Początek i progres, p. 78; Relacja z diariusza, p. 158; see: Anonimowa relacja, p. 189; Wiadomość, p. 177 one could deduce
from it, that it was the hussars, who broke through infantry
lines; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p.94 et seq.
Wiadomości z Moskwy [17 VII 1610], B.Czart. 105, p. 215; S. Maskiewicz, p. 128 et seq.; M. Marchocki, p. 73; G. Luna, p. 356;
Anonimowa relacja, p. 190; H. Brereton, p. 143; Narrative,
p. 178; Rukopis Filareta, p. 29, mentions that on the Russian
side Horn’s regiment was first to enter battle with de la
Gardie’s and Andriej Golicyn’s regiments following soon after;
R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p.88 et seq.

A situation described in an entirely different way by
the Lithuanian and the Englishman also happened here.
Samuel Maskiewicz saw the reasons of this unexpected
success in a failed attack of two Reiter units (‘kornety’),
which tried the caracole after the first line’s volley. The hussars used this in their advantage, attacking in full speed
and meddling the enemy’s formation. It was probably
this situation, which the author of Narrative described as
a treason of six hundred Frenchmen, who switched sides
and attacked their former brothers in arms. It supposedly
happened after de la Gardie and Horn escaped the battlefield. Interestingly, no Polish source confirms such situation. On the contrary, some emphasize French bravery,
whereas accusations of treason hurt also the Englishmen
and Scots, as it was mentioned before92.
Either way, the resistance continued. According to Narrative the Englishmen charged four more times. There were
only 1200–1400 Scots, Englishmen, Germans, Swedes and
Fins left on the battlefield, who were ultimately attacked
by the hussars from Struś’s regiment and pushed back into
the camp. The whole clash took circa 3–4 hours and took
a heavy toll on the Englishmen. According to Narrative, out
of 80 men only 12 survived and out of six company commanders one was killed in battle, two died from wounds,
one wounded in the head survived and only one, Captain
Crale, managed to escape unscathed, although his unit
didn’t have the same fortune93.
Some Polish-Lithuanian cavalry companies rode
through both camps in pursuit of the escapees, namely:
the Hetman’s, Jan Daniłowicz’s, Bałaban’s and Herburt’s
and from the left flank Struś’s Firlej Dunikowski’s and Kopyciński’s94. At the same time the Hetman declared that the
battle was won and left to attend mass said by a Jesuit,
priest Piotr Kulesza95. In the meantime armed units began
92

93

94

95

– 82 –

S. Maskiewicz, p. 129 et seq.; Narrative, p. 178; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 103 et seq. thinks that Maskiewicz described
the final, seventh attack of the Englishmen; praise of the
Frenchmen: letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at
Tsaryovo-Zaymishche 5 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library, 33, p. 154
v; different copy Jagiellonian Library 3596/II, p. 13 et seq.,
printed in Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego…, p. 198 et seq.;
J. U. Niemcewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III…, vol. II,
p. 598 et seq.
Narrative, p. 179; Wiadomość, p. 177; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…,
p. 118.
Anonimowa relacja, p. 190; S. Domaracki, p. 2; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 106.
P. Kulesza, p. 155; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 106.

– The Battle of Klushino –

to gather once more in the foreign camp. Shuisky tried to
make contact with them by sending Gavrilo Grigorievich
Pushkin, a falconer and proud esquire, along with Mikhail
Fyodorovich Babarykin. Żółkiewski noticed the imminent
danger in time to gather some of the companies and prepare for further struggle. In one section Andrzej Firlej’s hussar company broke through German formation protected
by kobylice (TN: a kind of wooden palisade), which convinced the latter of Żółkiewski’s determination96.
During their commanders’ absence they sent a negotiation proposal to the Hetman. Żółkiewski eagerly took
their offer by sending his nephew Adam Żółkiewski and
Piotr Borkowski. In exchange for surrendering the camp he
proposed the possibility to join the royal side while retaining their current pay and those who didn’t want to serve
under Polish-Lithuanian banners were offered free passage to their homeland. The mercenaries, exhausted by
more than a dozen hour long battle, lacking the support
of not only the Moscals but also their own units, such as
Finck’s regiment, didn’t see much sense in spilling blood
for the tsar anymore. The efforts of Shuisky’s envoys and
de la Gardie and Horne, who by that time returned to the
camp, were all for nothing. The foreigners surrendered to
Żółkiewski, pledging either loyal service or never to fight
against the king, especially in Moscow. When he got word
of it, Shuisky and his men escaped from the camp. On their
way they threw around valuable trinkets in order to slow
down the chase. Despite that the Russian commander arrived at Mozhaysk on a worn-out nag and without shoes.
From there he quickly escaped to Moscow. Pushkin managed to elude the foreigners through the swamplands and
forests and reached Mozhaysk, whereas Babarykin was
captured and handed over to Żółkiewski. The decision to
surrender the camp and join the royal side let the Russians
shape the accusation of treason because, in their perception, they still had a chance to achieve victory. It’s hard to
blame the mercenaries for not wanting to die for an unreliable ‘employer’, whose units left the battlefield first97.

Afterwards the royal army, despite its losses and general
fatigue, moved out to Tsaryovo-Zaymishche, fearing that
during their non-presence Valuev and Jelecki could take
offensive measures and break away from the siege, taking
advantage of the absence of the bigger part of Żółkiewski’s
forces. It turned out that these concerns were unsound.
The Russians didn’t take any action because they weren’t
even aware of the Hetman’s expedition to Klushino. During the return march the Hetman ordered to place some
of the wounded in his carriage and the rest on stretchers
between two horses98.
The commanders of foreign troops found themselves in
great trouble. It was especially the case with de la Gardie
who was almost killed by English soldiers accusing him
of seizing money reserved for them. He managed to escape alive and, along with Horn and Swedish and Finnish
mercenaries, went to Pohorołe Gorodiszcze, where sick
de la Ville could be found. The mercenaries’ commander
promised the Hetman that he won’t fight in Moscow and
at the same time stated that he doesn’t want to return to
Sweden, rather than travel to the Netherlands. He kept his
word only halfway. He didn’t fight against the royal army
in Moscow anymore but participated in the campaigns
against the Moscals side by side with Gustav II Adolf’s
Swedes and in 1616 was one of the negotiators of the
Swedish-Russian truce99.
The Polish side paid a high price for their victory.
Sources differ in regard to the size of their losses. The Hetman himself estimated them to be circa 100 companions.
Different registers of killed and wounded gave numbers
ranging from 180 to 300 people killed and wounded out of
all types of soldiers, and over a thousand horses. R. Sikora
assessed, also based on registers of killed and wounded,
that it would be circa 80 killed and 100 wounded. As to the
horses – respectively 200 killed and as much wounded100.

98
96

97

S. A. Belokurov, kniga 2, p. 55; M. Marchocki, p. 73, annotation
1; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 106 et seq.
Letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche 5 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library, 33, p. 154 v; different
copy Jagiellonian Library 3596/II, p. 13 et seq.; printed in
Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego…, p. 198 et seq.; J. U. Niemcewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III…, vol. II, p. 598 et seq.;
S. Domaracki, p. 2; Początek i progres, p. 78 et seq.; S. Maskiewicz, p.130 et seq.; Anonimowa relacja, p. 190 et seq.; H. Brere-

99

100

– 83 –

ton, p. 144; Narrative, p. 180; J. Widekindi, op. cit., vol. 10;
S. A. Belokurov, vol. 2, p. 55; K. Bussow, p. 301; B.N. Floria, op.
cit., p. 168.
Początek i progres, p. 80; S. Maskiewicz, p. 131; R. Szcześniak,
Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 116 et seq.
Letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche, 5 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library, 33, p. 154 v; different
copy Jagiellonian Library 3596/II, p. 13 et seq., printed in Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego…, p. 198 et seq.; J. U. Niemcewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III…, vol. II, p. 598 et seq.;
Anonimowa relacja, p. 192; B.N. Floria, op. cit., p. 167.
Początek i progres, p. 79; R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 109
et seq.; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 117.

– Przemysław Gawron –

When it comes to estimating Russian losses the differences
were even larger, because numbers provided ranged from
2 to 15 thousand soldiers, mainly killed during the chase,
because, as we remember, Russian participation in the
battle was rather insignificant. Among the killed was, inter
alia, Jakov Boriatyński, wheras Vasili Buturlin and Jakov
Diemidov were taken prisoner. The losses among foreigners are estimated to be between 100 and 2 thousand men.
Both of these numbers aren’t really believable, especially if
we take into account the aforementioned English losses101.
The Polish-Lithuanian side captured several dozens banners, including the ones belonging to Shuisky and Buturlin, 11 cannons, the sabre, helmet and buława (TN: ceremonial mace) of the Russian supreme commander and
goods intended as payment for the mercenaries, valued at
20 thousand roubles102.
While analysing the operation and battle of Klushino,
one should, first of all, take notice of the speed at which the
Polish-Lithuanian side acted, beginning with the march
towards Bely, through the assault at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche
up until the night march towards Klushino. Thanks to both
the speed and a tendency for risky but well-thought manoeuvres, such as dividing the troops, the secret march
from Tsaryovo-Zaymishche and the night march along
a muddy road through the forest, Żółkiewski managed to
surprise the enemy, forcing him into changing the established strategy and accepting battle in the field. It didn’t
let the Russians use their existing strategy of exterminating
enemy forces by means of a long-term blockade, which allowed them to defeat the False Dmitry’s army earlier. Additionally, as one can presume, Shuisky’s battle order was
caused by confusion and surprise, because, probably, the
foreigners took positions earlier and were ordered to protect the Russians while they assumed formation. Thanks
to it, and the surprising behaviour of the Russians, outnumbered Poles and Lithuanians indeed engaged more
soldiers than the enemy and achieved higher ground because mainly mercenaries took part in the battle.
101

102

R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 109; R. Sikora, Kłuszyn
1610…, p.117 et seq.
Letter of S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, camp at Tsaryovo-Zaymishche, 5 VII 1610, Raczyńscy Library. 33, p. 154 v; different
copy Jagiellonian Library 3596/II, p. 13 et seq., printed in
Pisma Stanisława Żółkiewskiego…, p. 198 et seq.; J. U. Niemcewicz, Dzieje panowania Zygmunta III…, vol. II, p. 598 et seq.;
R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610…, p. 110 writes about as much as
18 cannons.

The second factor, which in my opinion decided about
the victory, was the training and determination of the
Hetman’s subordinates. It was even more striking when
compared with both the passive behaviour, or even cowardice, of the bigger part of Russian units, and the cold
calculation of the mercenaries who surrendered after
coming to the conclusion that further struggle is futile.
Żółkiewski played a large role in it. He convinced his soldiers to fight in circumstances when defeat would doom
them. Surprising the enemy, the bravery and battle skills
of the Polish-Lithuanian cavalry and the enemy’s attitude
minimized the negative effects of insufficient reconnaissance, which didn’t take notice of the Russians’ different
position and led to laying battle in a largely unfavourable
spot (fences, farm buildings).
The success wouldn’t be possible if not for the over-confidence of the opposing side, which neglected proper camp
fortifications and didn’t send forays. It led to a situation in
which de la Gardie was almost captured in his own tent103,
whereas battle preparations were conducted in chaos and
general confusion. One can also assume that the shock
lowered the morale and contributed to a bad attitude, especially among the Russians. It should be also noted that
the defeated side accused each other of treason: the Russians blamed everyone or only Evert Horn’s Swedes and
Fins, Frenchmen blamed the English and Scots, and they
repaid with the same.
The victory at Klushino didn’t, however, end the war.
Valuev and Jelecki surrendered not long after the battle.
With Żółkiewski’s approval, they sent envoys to Klushino
in order to confirm news they received, as if the relief was
truly defeated. One of the conditions of the truce was an
oath to Władysław IV Vasa and the obligation that when
Smoleńsk surrenders to the prince, Sigismund III will
withdraw from besieging it104. On 12 July a group of 300
Spaniards, Englishmen, Scots, Germans and Frenchmen,
who surrendered to the king, reached the camp. It was
a living testimony of the victory105. Five days later, a ceremony was held in the royal camp. The Hetman’s and
the army’s envoys – Adam Żółkiewski and Mikołaj Struś
– presented both Shuisky’s banner and buława and the
postulates of the victorious army: the request for quarterly
pay, payment of overdue salaries, compensations for the
103
104
105

– 84 –

P. de la Ville, p. 300.
W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 199 et seq.
Letter of A. Bobola to S. Rudnicki, camp at Smoleńsk 12 VII
1610, B. Czart. 1631, p. 539.

– The Battle of Klushino –

injured and wounded and the bestowment of office positions. The Russians, headed by Jelecki, presented themselves to the king, and were answered by the Chancellor
of Lithuania Lew Sapieha, along with the foreign soldiers.
The Vice-Chancellor of the Crown Szczęsny Kryski spoke
for the king. Nevertheless, the senate council on 24 July
proved that fulfilling the army’s requests will be very difficult because of an empty treasury106.
In the meantime events occurred with great speed. The
Hetman planned to cooperate with Jan Piotr Sapieha’s
army which, after Klushino, began an offensive against Moscow but were stopped by the Crimean Tatars in mid-July.
They were commanded by Bata Gerej and Khan Temir,
who – on Shuisky’s request – struck the False Dmitry’s
forces and set camp (‘kosz’) at Serpukhov107. It turned out,
however, that Vasili Shuisky doesn’t possess significant
armies anymore. He was abolished on 27 July. No one was
appointed in his place and the boyars took power. They
began negotiations with Żółkiewski, fearing him less than
False Dmitry. A treaty was signed on 27 August. The Hetman secured the right to appoint the prince as the tsar
106

107

Letter of J. Zadzik to W. Gembicki, camp at Smoleńsk 17 VII
1610, 24 VII 1610, Stockholm, Riksarkivet, Extranea IX Polen,
105; letter of S. Targowski to S. Rudnicki, camp at Smoleńsk
17 VII 1610, B.Czart. 1630, p. 1287; Diariusz drogi, p. 165; the
army’s financial demands were known a few days earlier, cf.
letter of A. Bobola to S. Rudnicki, camp at Smoleńsk12 VII
1610, B. Czart. 1631, p. 539.
S. Żółkiewski to Sigismund III, the same month, after 16 VII
1610, Raczyńscy Library 33, p. 157 v; Wiadomości spod Możajska, p. 3; S. A. Belokurov, vol. 2, p. 55; W. Polak, O Kreml i Smoleńszczyznę…, p. 200 et seq.

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Books

R. Szcześniak, Kłuszyn 1610, Warsaw 2008

The False Dmitri. A Russian Romance and Tragedy, described

Articles

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T. Bohun, Moskwa 1612, Warsaw 2005

www.hussar.com. pl

D. Czerska, Borys Godunow, Wrocław 1988

www.old-ru.ru.

D. Czerska, Dymitr Samozwaniec,Wrocław 2004

www. vostlit.info

– Paweł Przeździecki –
Military Bureau for Historical Research in Military Centre for Civic Education

The Polish-Turkish War of 1620–1621:
the battles of Cecora and Chocim

In the autumn of 1620, near Mogilev, the army of the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth suffered its first catastrophic defeat. During the tragic finale of the unsuccessful Moldavian excursion, the troops retreating from
Cecora (today – Țuțora in Romania) under the command
of the Grand Hetman of the Crown Stanisław Żółkiewski
were decimated by the Tatars and the commander himself
killed. The destruction of the Crown’s armies resulted in
opening the southeastern lands of the Republic of Poland
to the attacks and provoked the Turkish Sultan to invade.
Less than a year after the Cecora disaster, there was the
month-long battle of Chocim (today – Khotyn in Ukraine).
Mobilised with great difficulty, the Commonwealth’s forces
faced the powerful army of the Ottoman Empire, and came
out of this battle victorious.
The battle of Cecora (and the tragic retreat from Moldova) and Chocim entered Polish military history as examples of the extraordinary bravery of Polish soldiers.
These clashes, however, also deserve some attention due
to the tactical solutions used by the Commonwealth’s
commanders and their relentless fighting.

Background of the conflict
The history of Turkish-Polish conflict dates back to the
first half of the 15th century. It was then that the spheres
of influence of the up-and-coming Jagiellonian monarchy
and the quickly expanding Ottoman Empire intersected. In
1444, during the battle of Varna, the young king of Poland
and Hungary Ladislaus III was killed at the hands of Turks.
Earlier, in the battles against the Turks on the side of the
King of Bohemia and Hungary, Sigismund of Luxembourg,
the most famous Polish Knights, Zawisza Czarny coat of
arms Sulima was killed.

A new confrontation arose at the end of the 15th century
due to the Ottoman expansion to the west coast of the
Black Sea. Turkey subjected the Crimean Khanate reigned
by Giray dynasty, and afterwards conquered Kilię and Bilhorod – gaining control over the mouth of the Danube
and the Dniester. In the last decade of the 15th century the
Empire strengthened its dominance in Moldova. The attempt to restore the influence of the Kingdom of Poland
over the Black Sea by Jan Olbracht ended in a disaster in
the Bukovina forest in Moldova in the year 1497. The unsuccessful expedition provoked retaliatory Turkish-Tatar
raids. Because neither party was interested in continuing
an open war, a truce was signed at the beginning of the
16th century. The Empire and The Kingdom (since 1569, the
Commonwealth of Both Nations) were in neutral relations
throughout the century. However, the plundering Tatar attacks on the southern Polish provinces did not stop. Constant threat of the ‘hordes’ (i.e. the Tatars belonging to the
Horde) forced major changes in the organization of Polish
armed forces, which became the basis of the so-called
old-Polish warfare1.
At the beginning of the 17th century the Republic remained in proper relations with Turkey. The Polish-Lithuanian State became involved in the internal crisis
in the Russian Tsarism, whereas the Ottoman dynasty
fought a war with the Habsburgs and Persia. Both parties
wanted to maintain peace. Under the agreements of 1607
and 1617, the Republic had to give up its influence in Moldavia and Wallachia, but the Hospodars interred there by
the Sultan were to stay in friendly relations with Poland.
The aim was also to regulate the two most contentious
1

– 87 –

Z. Grabowski, Dzieje oręża polskiego. Odrodzenie, Warsaw
2012, pp. 104–111, 157–159.

– Paweł Przeździecki –

issues in their relations: Tatar attacks on the southern
and southeastern Polish lands and – pillaging raids of Zaporozhian Cossacks (so-called ‘chadzki’) in the domain of
the Empire and its vassals2.
The Cossacks were determined to be the population
residing mostly in the areas of the lower reaches of the
Dnieper, the so-called Zaporozhia. They were a rampant
element, eager to revolt and fiercely defending their
freedom against the nobility. Registered Cossacks, employed by the Commonwealth, were relatively few. The
vast majority were Sich Cossacks, staying in fortified
camps – Sichs – who were not subject to any control by
the Polish-Lithuanian State. The existence of the Cossacks became an important and unsolvable problem for
the Commonwealth. On the one hand, critics praised the
combat valour of the Cossacks, there were numerous
warriors, eager to fight, and relatively cheap, and their
help was used over the course of the operations against
the Russians and especially against Tatars. On the other
hand, the lack of discipline and Cossack raids could constitute a casus belli with Turkey in the future3. To impose
the yoke on the Cossacks exceed the possibility of the
Republic of Poland. The Polish forces were able to choke
down the occasional Cossack revolts; however, they
could not keep the rebellious population in check and
prevent sub­sequent ‘chadzkis’4.
In 1617 a new Sultan, Osman II rose to the throne in
Istanbul. Initially, the young lord has been friendly for the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; assurances that the
Polish side had taken the steps to halt the Cossack raids
were helping. However, ‘chadzki’ did not stop. Early in the
spring of 1620, there have been several attacks directly on
the territories of the Empire. During one of the pillaging
raids Cossacks ransacked the suburbs of Istanbul, which at
that time was visited by an envoy from Poland, Hieronim
Otwinowski. In these circumstances, the diplomat met
with a cold reception. Under the influence of the atmosphere prevailing in the capital of the Empire, Otwinowski
sent cautionary letters back to the country, notifying about
the war with the Republic the Turks are preparing5.

Another reason, in addition to the Cossack raids, for the
conflict was the explicit support of King Sigismund III Vasa
to the Habsburgs in the thirty years ‘ war. Although the
forces of the Republic did not participate in the struggle,
however, the monarch gave the Allies help by sending irregular troops of the so-called lisowczycy against the army
of Transylvania, a Turkish vassal. In 1619, the lisowczycy
decimated the army of the Transylvanian Prince Bethen
Gabor at Humienno, leading to breaking the siege of Vienna. This event has passed into history as the first relief
of Vienna6.
The situation in the Turkish fiefdom in Moldova became
a pretext for the future war. Early in 1619, Gaspar (Casper)
Grazziani ascended the the Hospodarski throne. The new
ruler favoured the Republic and during the first period of
his reign mediated between Poland and Turkey, seeking
to improve relations between the two countries7. However, at the turn of 1619 and 1620 in Istanbul, there were
changes among the most important and closest nobles
to the Sultan. Grazziani felt threatened, and besides,
it was not without grounds, and in the summer of 1620 he
declared compliance of the Moldovan hospodarstwo to
the Republic.8
From the perspective of Poland, the acceptance of the
offer of the Turkish vassal could mean open conflict with
the Ottoman Empire. Most probably, however, it was believed that Turkey is committed to waging a war that will
break out sooner or later. Signals from the envoys sent to
Istanbul and the Crimea testified to this. Decisive action
in Moldova was supposed to be a demonstration of the
Commonwealth’s force and serve to strengthen the Polish
influence in the region. For King Sigismund III Vasa the intervention in the South would serve to ease his opposition
and conciliate the nobility. Similar reasons have probably
also influenced the Grand Chancellor of the Crown Hetman Stanislaw Żółkiewski, who on the 2nd of September
1620 stepped in with his army to Moldova, which became
a direct cause of the outbreak of the Polish-Turkish war.9
6
7
8

2

3

4
5

L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, Wojna chocimska 1621 roku, Cracow 1979, pp. 6–9.
Z. Budzyński, L. Fac, Wojny polsko-tureckie w XVII w., Przemyśl
2000, pp. 4–5.
R. Majewski, Cecora 1620, Warsaw 1970, pp. 24–25.
L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op.cit., pp. 18–22.

9

– 88 –

Ibid., pp. 23–25.
R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 29–33.
Ibid., pp. 41–44, 69–70.
Ibid., pp. 69–72, 76–83, 149–152; L. Podhorodecki, Hetman
Stanisław Żółkiewski, Warsaw 2011. Stanislaw Żółkiewski military and political career started alongside Jan Zamoyski. He
participated in numerous battles and campaigns, during, inter
alia, the War of Danzig (1576–1577), with Russia (1577–1582),
and Sweden (1600–1611), he participated in military attacks

– The Polish-Turkish War of 1620–1621: the battles of Cecora and Chocim –

Intervention in Moldova
After crossing the border of Moldova on the Dniester,
the Polish forces have taken an unhurried march towards
the hospodarstwo’s capital in Iaşi. The delay was to allow
Grazziani, who has officially broke relations with Turkey,
to strengthen his position and gather auxiliary Moldovan
troops. Probably at this stage of the expedition Żółkiewski
decided to post the so-called Cecora position10.
Cecora (currently Romanian Ţuţora) was a small village on the right bank of the Prut, located to the East of
Iaşi. On the other side of the river, along its course, led
an important route from the southeast, leading by a ford
on the River Prut to the capital of Moldova, and further to
Chocim and Kamieniec Podolski (Kamyanets Podilsky).
Conquering this vast terrain, located in a bend of the river
and lined on three sides of her waters, allowed strategic
control of the crossing and blocked the road of the Turkish
forces. The Cecora position may have been a convenient
base for possible strikes against the important Ottoman
forts of Galați and Tehinia. This place was the scene of
the first battle of Cecora from 1595, when the army of the
Commonwealth, under the command of Crown Hetman
Jan Zamoyski stopped the Tatar-Turkish forces under the
leadership of the Crimean Khan Gazi Giray II. The success,
thanks to the strengthened Cecora field position11, has enabled placing a ruler favouring Poland on the hospodarski
throne. Żółkiewski, the Field Hetman of the Crown at that
time, participated in Zamoyski’s excursion. Remembering
the past course of events, he sought to repeat the former

10
11

to Moldova (1595 and 1600), suppressed the Nalewajko’s Cossack uprising (1596). During the so-called ‘dmitriads’ – armed
interventions in Russia during the Time of Troubles – he has
achieved a magnificent victory at Klushino (1610). In 1606 he
defeated the Tatars under Kalnik. He was the Field Hetman of
the Crown in the years 1588–1618. It was only in 1618, at the
age of 70, when he received the baton of the Grand Hetman
of the Crown. His political opponents accused Żółkiewski of
incompetence in defending the southern borders of the Commonwealth from the Tatar raids (especially after the battle of
Orynin in 1618), he saw the intervention as a chance of regaining reputation and silencing his opponents.
R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 152–163.
Ibid., p. 173. At the command of the Hetman, the area in the
bend of the Prut was sealed off from the east by a field fortifications. The wall was made of earth and it was over 2 metres
high and reinforced with 14 earthen bastions. There were four
gates made in it, they were used during forays between the
18th and the 20th of October 1595.

scenario. Hetman counted that the mere presence of the
Polish army would force the Turks to open negotiations
and step down before the power of the Republic12. The
success of the plan depended on an effective stop of the
Tatar-Turkish units moving towards Iaşi, to impose an
agreement, and the activity of Grazziani, who would have
been able to mobilize strong, Moldovan reinforcements.
On the 12th of September, during the evening, Żół­kie­
wski’s troops stood at the Cecora line. The Hetman’s army
consisted of more than 10,000 people, including 2,500
Hussars, 2,600 Cossack cavalry, 200 reiters, between 1,200
to 1,800 lisowczycy, 100 Tatars and 3,000 infantrymen.
The support was composed of 16 guns and several arquebusses. In addition to Polish troops, they were joined
by Grazziani’s Moldovans – in the number of only around
1,000 people.13 The hospodar himself, despite the Hetman’s insistence, was not eager to return to Iaşi, which put
into question the meaning of the whole expedition, after
all, aimed at strengthening the ruler’s position.
On the 17th of September, the army of the beylerbey
of Sylistria (province governor) Iskender Pasha reached
the vicinity of the Polish camp. Not intruded by the passive Żółkiewski, the Sultan’s official managed to mobilize
between 10,000 and 13,000 people out of a total of five
sandžaks (county equivalents). The core of the force was
comprised of 2,000 Turks, including Janissaries infantry,
reinforced by sparse artillery. Iskender’s call was answered
by numerous Budziak Tatars14 led by Cantymir Murza
and Crimean Tatars, commanded by Kalga Sultan Devlet
Giray15.
Due to negligence in identifying the position of enemy
forces, the arrival of Iskender Pasha’s troops surprised the
Poles. The Tatars took prisoner a large number of camp
workers, who tended to the horses outside the camp or
were busy searching for food in the surrounding area (the
so-called picownicy). They forced a last-minute Polish raid
to retreat, while still taking prisoners. In the face of such
a strong enemy, it became clear that a confrontation is
imminent. The work to rebuild the old Zamoyski’s fortifications was sped up – so far, they have been conducted slowly and rather carelessly.16 The next day, on the
12
13
14

15
16

– 89 –

Ibid., pp. 163–164.
Ibid., pp. 169–171.
The so-called Nogais, residents of Budjak, a part of Bessarabia, currently the vicinity of Odessa in the Ukraine.
R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 178–180.
K. Śledziński, Cecora 1620, Warsaw 2007, p. 155.

– Paweł Przeździecki –

18th of October, there was a cavalry battle, which began
with the Tatar attack on the lisowczycy’s camp outside of
the Cecora position. The enemy was repulsed, a prisoner
has been taken captive, but his testimony did not prove
to be very useful for estimating of the number of IskenderPasha’s units17. The lisowczycy, in turn, moved their camp
behind the fortifications18.

The Battle of Cecora
Information gained during skirmishes and the generally
optimistic result of the first clash prompted Żółkiewski
to lay a decisive battle on the 19th of October. The plan
of the armed confrontation developed by the Hetman is
considered as a glimmer of the old genius of the winner
from Klushino.19 The main idea of it was based on the
assumption that the most dangerous part of the army of
Iskendera-Pasha, in view of the numbers and strength,
are the Tatars. The main strength of the mounted warriors
was their extraordinary mobility, allowing them to avoid
an attack and carry out their own strike from the flank.
The weapon of the Tatars, which most of them was associated with, was a short bow, which they were able to
accurately and quickly shoot while riding. They also used
djerids – javelins. In direct combat they also used sabres,
spears and lassos. Most of the Tatars – the so-called ‘black’
were, however, very badly armed20. They set off to fight
in a loose, flexible formation, showering their opponent
with a barrage of missiles and constantly striving to flank.
In view of the almost total lack of military protection, the
Tatars tried to avoid frontal clashes as much as they could.
They often faked retreats and then attacked the relaxed
formation of the enemy. The nomads were very sensitive
to gunpowder weapons, which they did not have and were
clearly respecting.
Perfectly knowing the possibility of Tatars, Żółkiewski
decided to neutralize their threat to the maximum extent.
To this end, the Polish formation was based on the fortific17
18
19

20

Ibid., p. 158.
R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 180–182.
J. Besala, Stanisław Żółkiewski, Warsaw 1988, p. 357; R. Majewski, op. cit., p. 183.
The maslak is a blunt weapon consisting of a wooden handle
with a bovine or equine jaw strapped to it. Arkan was a rigit
rope with a loop, used mainly to capture animals, but also
useful in battle, for example – to pull an opponent down from
a mount.

ations of the Cecora position, manned with a part of the infantry, protecting the soldiers’ backs at the foreground. On
both flanks the Hetman has placed wagon trains, 4 rows
of 50–60 cars in each one. The wagon trains were guarded
by several hundred infantrymen, and cannons and harquebuses loaded unto them. To defend the fragile joint
of rows of carts and camp fortifications on the right flank,
Żółkiewski has directed the lisowczycy and the Moldovans
under Walenty Rogowski (Commander of the lisowczycy).
Stefan Chmielecki protected the rear of the wagon train
on the left. In accordance with the idea of the Hetman,
the wagon trains, staffed by densely shooting infantry and
artillerymen, were to stop and bleed out the Tatars. The
fate of the battle would be decided by a decisive blow of
the Polish central formation in which Żółkiewski set 5 regiments, composed of hussars and Cossacks supporting
them. They were, counting from the left, the units of: Duke
Samuel Korecki, governor of Kamieniec, Walenty Kalinowski, the Grand Hetman of the Crown himself, the Field
Hetman of the Crown Stanisław Koniecpolski, governor of
Halicz Mikołaj Struś. Due to limited space, the units formed
the so-called ‘granite huf’, in columns21.
The weakness of this unique setting was the lack of
a strong rear-guard, characteristic for Polish military. The
formation was rigid and fairly compact, making it difficult
for any modifications during the fight. In addition, proper
implementation of the plan required excellent coordination of the wagons march, cavalry strikes and shielding.
The Turkish-Tatar army stood in front of the Commonwealth’s camp. On the right flank, under the command of
Yussuf-Pasha, the beylerbey of Rumelia, lined up the Nogais of Cantymir Murza. Iskendera-Pasha entrusted the
left flank to Devlet Giray. The governor of Sylistria himself
commanded the centre, occupied by Turkish troops, i.e.
the janissaries and the artillery.
The battle took place on 19 September. It began with
a powerful attack of the Polish regiments to the middle of
the Turkish-Tatar formation. In a bloody battle the hussars
and the Cossacks supporting them, despite losses, gained
an advantage over the opponent. The mercilessly repelled
centre of Iskender-Pasha’s forces could be broken.
At this critical moment of the battle an unexpected
breakthrough appeared in the thus-tight Polish formation.
The regiments of Struś and Koniecpolski, and the right
21

– 90 –

R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 183–184; L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba,
op. cit., pp. 34–35.

– The Polish-Turkish War of 1620–1621: the battles of Cecora and Chocim –

wagon train, positioned on the right side of the centre
group, slid ahead of the front line. At the same time the
column of cars stood somewhat obliquely in relation to
the formation of the opponent. Most probably, the reason
for this phenomenon was the encounter with a previously
unrecognized off-road obstacle – a shallow ravine, which
was manned by Turkish infantry22. Attempts to circumvent
the trench led to the asymmetry of formations and the creation of gaps between the right wagon train and the line
of fortifications of the Cecora position and their own cavalry. Devlet-Giray’s Tatars immediately attacked the first
breach.
The attack of the Crimean fighters was so hard, that
neither strong infantry fire nor the lisowczycy and Moldovan cavalry protecting the rear of the wagon train
managed to stop it. What’s worse, some of the hospodars
switched sides. The lisowczycy were dispersed, fleeing in
the direction of the camp and the interior of Polish formation, increasing the confusion and hindering effective prevention. While encircling them, the Tatars fought with the
rear of Struś’s regiment and the Hetman’s units. The unexpected attack faltered the density of the regiments, which
retreated to the camp. The right wagon train was isolated
from its own forces, surrounded by the enemy, and after
a few hours of fierce battle, decimated. A few dozens of
people (including Szemberg) managed to survive the extermination on the right flank. They broke through the
Tatar circle and reached the mounds of the Cecora position. The left wagon train, covered by the brave Korecki
and Chmielecki’s units managed to withdraw to the camp,
still in formation.23
It is estimated that as a result of losing the battle, the
Hetman’s forces lost approximately 2,500–3,000 people,
and more or less a third of the cannons and harquebuses
22

23

J. Besala, op. cit., p. 360; R. Majewski, op. cit., p. 187; L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op. cit., p. 36. A participant of the battle,
commanding over the right wagon group, Teofil Szemberg
mentioned that erroneous formation of the left column of the
carts was the reason for the confusion. The carts led by Duke
Korecki was supposed to stand to close to the camp, thus
the Hetman’s central cavalry did not have enough space to
gain speed and began to push against the right column. Cf.
T. Szemberg, Relacja prawdziwa o wejściu wojska polskiego
do Wołoch, fragment in: O. Laskowski, B. Pawłowski, Polska
Historja Wojskowa (w wypisach źródłowych), Warsaw 1928, pp.
90–91.
R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 187–193; L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba,
op. cit., p. 36.

and more than 2,000 cars. The losses of the opposing party
were, probably, considerably lower24. However, Żółkiewski
still had a strong amry and the Cecora position remained
practically impregnable for Iskender-Pasha. The worst
consequence of this failure, however, was the collapse
of the morale of the Commonwealth’s soldiers. It would
take its toll a day later, in the evening of the 20th of October. The Hetman’s decision to prepare for the retreat and
move towards the country under the cover of the rescued
carts, reached the general public in a distorted form. The
soldiers felt that the commanders intended to save their
own hides, leaving the army to its fate. Grazziani’s actions
were also destructive to the morale. He has witnessed his
own doom in Żółkiewski’s withdrawal. The Hospodar has
convinced, Kalinowski, among others, to try and force
their way to Prut and escape by horse. Many soldiers
followed the starost of Kamieniec. Some commanders,
including Duke Korecki also rushed towards Prut. At the
same time an uproar broke out within the camp, numerous tents were looted by the demoralized servants and
the lisowczycy. The Hetmans were unable to control the
chaos, only the awareness of the terrible fate that befell
some refugees drowning in the rushing stream of Prut or
were murdered by marauding Tatars on the other side25,
dampened the mood of the soldiers. The rest has been
done by Żółkiewski’s attitude, whose personal presence
blew away all the rumours about the plans to abandon the
army26. The allegation made by the soaking Duke Korecki,
who was not able to cross the river, that it was the Hetman
who caused panic by getting ready to flee, was met with
Żółkiewski’s proud response: ‘Here I stand, and water does
not drip from me’27.
The disaster on the night of 20 to 21 September cost the
Polish forces another 2,000 soldiers. The following days the
Hetman devoted to rebuilding morale of the army reduced
24
25

26
27

– 91 –

R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 194–195.
Walenty Kanilewski drowned in the Prut. Grazziani tried to
cross the river and escape his pursuers, but he was soon murdered by his own bodyguards. Stefan Chmielecki also managed to escape – he was initially send by the Hetman to stop
the escapees – he arrived safely in Poland bringing news of
the defeat at Cecora.
R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 196–198.
Entry devoted to Samuel Korecki in: Polski słownik biograficzny, ed. Władysław Konopczyński, vol. XIV, p. 61. Various
versions of Żółkiewski’s response cf. Cecora i Chocim, prelekcja prof. Józefa Szujskiego z dnia 5 grudnia 1870 roku, Cracow
1871, p. 8; J. Besala, op. cit., p. 363.

– Paweł Przeździecki –

– 92 –

– The Polish-Turkish War of 1620–1621: the battles of Cecora and Chocim –

to half the size of the enemy. Negotiations with IskenderPasha became one of the tools for this purpose. The conversations allowed to gain a few days, during which the
soldiers in the camp were being convinced that the only
chance of saving is to yield to the discipline and the carry
on with the Hetman’s plan, that assumed retreat under
the cover of the wagons. In addition, Żółkiewski tried to
convince the army, that the negotiations with the Turkish
side are merely a ruse. As soon as the captain found that
his forces are ready to march, he broke talks with IskenderPasha. He temporarily abandoned carrying out justice to
the participants of the night raids28.

The retreat and defeat at Mogilev
On 29 September, the Polish troops dug northern section of the mound of the Cecora position and left the camp.
The task of forming the pattern marching Żółkiewski entrusted to Duke Korecki. All saddle horses were positioned
at the head of the group. In this way, the Hetman wanted
to step up discipline by thwarting all attempts to rush
ahead to Poland on mounts. In addition, the herd served
as front cover of the wagons. Behind the herd there was
one wagon train, consisted of 6 or 7 rows of up to 100 cars
each. Apart from the wounded and sick, transported on
vehicles, the military has been dismounted. Soldiers from
cavalry companies, hussars and Cossacks marched in
rows on both sides of the wagon train, with weapons on
their shoulders. The vanguard consisted of two hundred
Polish and on hundred German infantry under the command of Wolmar Farensbach. They were supported by 5
cannons and several harquebuses. The same artillery support was granted to the rear-guard, counting 550 infantry
soldiers and all of the surviving lisowczycy29.
The route led along the shortest possible road to the
Commonwealth’s border, but it was chosen carefully nonetheless. Żółkiewski’s army had to travel about 175 km.
Along the way, they had to cross three rivers – the Deli,
Reut and Kubołta. All major narrows, ravines and forests,
which could introduce confusion in the column and disorganized defence, were avoided. They marched during the
night and rested during the day30.

28
29
30

R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 200–202.
Ibid., pp. 202–208.
Ibid., pp. 209, 212, 214; L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op.cit.,
p. 41.

The Tatars took chase on the morning of the 30th of
September, quickly catching up the army resting after
a night march, but were repulsed infantry fire. They were
not able to threaten the Poles during the next stage of the
journey; their attacks on the 1st of October have failed.
During the next day, Turkish infantry reached the camping
site, reinforcing Devlet-Giray’s forces. A successful German
infantry counterattack induced severe losses among the
enemy ranks and the capturing of two guns, both of which
were identified as those lost on the 19th of September,
along with the broken right-flank wagon train. The retreat
that followed was held in worse conditions, as IskenderPasha, avoiding open confrontation, ordered the Tatars
to ravage the lands on the expected withdrawal route. Extreme conditions during the march through the scorched
desert took their toll especially on the horses, which fell in
scores31.
On the 4th of October the leader of the Turkish-Tatar
forces decided to carry out a decisive assault on the army
resting after the next stage of its journey. The enemy, however, was bloodily repulsed again, thanks to the personnel
operating the Polish guns. After this lesson the Turks discontinued the pursuit, the Tatars temporarily confined to
observing and occasionally harassing the Poles32.
On the morning of the 6th of October, after a total of 6
night marches, the column stopped near Serwirni village,
prior set on fire by the Tatars, about 10 km from the city
of Mogilev. Around noon the Hetmans ordered to move
out, due to the proximity of the border and the gunpowder
stock running dry, opposing the majority’s insistence to
wait until the night. At the request of some soldiers, victims of the robberies of the night of the 20th of September,
Żółkiewski promised direct searches and that he will begin
to administer justice without delay after crossing the border. It seemed as if the Tatar threat ceased. In this situation
the servants, the lisowczycy and all of the soldiers who
had something on their conscience, decided to leave the
camp. Another uproar broke out, this time it could not be
thwarted. The column was torn, most of the horses stolen
by the escapees, which were soon joined by the rest of the
scattered army. At this point the Tatars came again, this
time no one could stop them. Only a dozen people stayed
with the Hetmans. Żółkiewski refused to save himself,
demonstratively killing his horse, but soon enough the
31
32

– 93 –

R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 210–211.
Ibid., p. 211.

– Paweł Przeździecki –

hussar Abraham Złotopolski convinced the commander
and put him on a mount almost forcefully. However, the
Grand Hetman of the Crown did not reach the border. He
was killed in battle on the night of the 6th of October. On
the following day, about 5 kilometres from Mogilev, the
Turks found Żółkiewski’s body, wounded in the head and
with a severed right hand33.
About three thousand soldiers survived the Cecora campaign, including the escapees from the 20th of
September. Most of the veterans returned to the country
without weapons, in a state of shock due to the devastating experience of the retreat and the disaster in Mogilev.
The casualties were particularly severe, as they concerned
professional military personnel on the basis of which the
Republic exhibited an army in case of danger. The Grand
Hetman of the Crown and many other officers fell. The
Field Hetman of the Crown Stanisław Koniecpolski, Duke
Samuel Korecki, Wolmar Farensbach, Mikołaj Struś and
the son and two nephews of Hetman Żółkiewski were all
taken prisoner by the Turks34.

Mobilisation of the country
The news of the defeat of the excursion to Moldova and
death of Żółkiewski, and the loss of the army quickly went
around the Commonwealth. The terror intensified due to
Tatar actions, who in the autumn of 1620, almost with impunity, ravaged the lands of the Ruthenian, Volyn and Belz
provinces. King Sigismund III was advised that, for his own
safety, he should leave Warsaw – the monarch rejected the
idea. Also a mound was hastily piled around the capital35.
33

34

35

At Iskender-Pasha’s order, the Hetman’s head was cut off
and sent to the Sultan. After some time the widow, Regina
Żółkiewska, bought it off and buried along with the rest of the
body in the seat of the family in Żółkiew. Cf. J. Besala, op. cit.,
pp. 365–367; R. Majewski, op. cit., pp. 211–218.
Ibid., pp. 218–219, 239–240. Most of the wealthy prisoners
managed to buy their freedom or were bought out with the
help of the country. In this way Hetman Koniecpolski, who
was soon to crush the Tatars at Martynov (1624) and Ochmatowo (1644), regained his freedom. The only exception was
Duke Korecki. He was murdered in Istanbul in 1623, shortly
before the start of the negotiations for his release. Most of the
common soldiers never returned to Poland. About 2,000 died
soon after being captured, because of exhaustion, cold, malnutrition and ill-treatment. The others awaited a bitter fate on
Turkish galleys and slave work in the estates of feudal lords.
Ibid., pp. 232–235.

A general sejm (session of parliement) was called to
meet on the 3rd of November in Warsaw. The proceedings
took place with knowledge that after the destruction of
the royal army, an attack is inevitable and the deputies almost unanimously agreed to adopt emergency measures
to counter the threat. Altogether it was intended to spend
almost 7,000,000 zlotys for the defence purposes. According to the agreements, the Commonwealth was to issue
a 60-thousand army, including 15,000 hussars, 10,000 reiters, 20,000 Cossack cavalry, 10,000 German infantry and
5,000 Polish infantry against the Ottoman Empire. The
combined armies of the Crown and Lithuania were to be
strengthened by a contingent of Zaporozhian Cossacks. In
addition, considerable sums were spent on strengthening
the fortresses and on purchasing artillery cannons and
ammunition. In order to raise such funds the parliament
passed very high taxes, including doubled quarter tax and
charges on the production and sales of honey, wine and
beer. A bill against excess was passed, setting uniform
prices of luxury goods and banning the sale of jewellery
under the penalty of confiscation. They also banned the
export of horses and nitrate, which is the basic raw material used in the production of gunpowder. Lessons have
been learned from the terrible accidents that led to the
tumult and the collapse of morale during the Cecora campaign. The Sejm (the parliament) has passed a special bill
on military discipline, confirming the judicial powers of
commanders and Hetmans36.
In cities located on lands directly threatened by the
invasion, works were underway to restore and construct
additional fortifications. The Sejm decided to form the
‘chosen infantry’ (‘piechota wybraniecka’) and call a mass
mobilization37.
Command of the armed forces of the Republic in the upcoming campaign was entrusted to the Lithuanian Grand
Hetman Jan Karol Chodkiewicz38. The command over
36
37
38

– 94 –

L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op. cit., pp. 77–79.
Ibid., p. 81.
Jan Karol Chodkiewicz began his military career by suppressing Semen Nalewajko’s Cossack uprising in 1596. Since 1600
the Polish-Lithuanian Hetman took part in the second expedition of Jan Zamoyski to Wallachia, afterwards he fought at
the side of the Grand Hetman of Lithuania Krzysztof ‘Thunder’
Radziwiłł against the Swedes in Livonia. In 1601 he displayed
commanding talent in the battle of Kokenhausen. The overwhelming defeat of the much more numerous Swedish army
at Kircholm in 1605 brought him fame. In the same year he
received the baton of the Grand Hetman of Lithuania. He took

– The Polish-Turkish War of 1620–1621: the battles of Cecora and Chocim –

the partially rebuilt Crown troops was given to the Crown
cupbearer Stanisław Lubomirski, appointed ‘regimentarz’
for the duration of the campaign. The sejm has also created a War Council, an supporting body for the Hetman.
Although the presence of the council limited power of the
Hetman – the commissioners had the prerogative to give
consent to lay a battle against the enemy or to start negotiations – but also made invaluable contribution in the
process of organizing the army, taking over some issues
from the over-worked Hetman39.
Despite the great financial effort, the State failed to
collect the planned funds. The attempts to raise money
from abroad met with partial failure – the gained sums
were transferred to Poland only after the war. In June
1621, it was estimated that the funds would suffice for
the maintenance of 36,000 people for 3 quarters. Full success in recruiting the soldiers also was not achieved. The
concentration of troops proceeded slowly and it quickly
became apparent that the target numbers would not be
reached40. It is estimated that the Republic issued a little
more than 33,000 cavalrymen and infantry against the Ottoman Empire. Taking into account the differences in the
payrolls and the actual size, the Polish-Lithuanian army
was smaller by approximately 10%. In addition, part of the
resources were allocated on the strengthening of border
fortresses and major cities, including the ‘chosen infantry’
and mercenaries41.
Knowing his own numbers and having information
about the might of the enemy, Chodkiewicz developed
a careful plan of action. According to it, the army of the Republic was to actively defend based on the fortified stronghold, lying on the route of the march of the Turks and their
allies. The location of the position would prevent the continued march of the forces of the Ottoman Empire, barring
the way to the lands of the Commonwealth. The Hetman’s
choice fell on the old Moldavian fortress of Chocim, which
guarded the crossing through the Dniester, and was acquired at the beginning of the ill-fated Żółkiewski’s excursion. Taking position on the right bank of the river was also
associated with the morale-raising method adopted by
a Chodkiewicza. In the event of defeat, the army would be

39
40
41

part in the Polish-Russian war in the years 1609–1618, commanding, inter alia, the attempts to relief the crew of the
Kremlin.
L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op. cit., pp. 81–86.
Ibid., pp. 97–108.
Ibid., pp. 174–175.

cut off from their lands by the waters of the Dniester and
have little chance for rescue, and that is why, according to
the Hetman, the soldiers should fight well. Crossing the
river also gave a clear signal to the Zaporozhian Cossacks
that the Polish-Lithuanian army wants to resist the enemy
in combat, and not seek concord at the expense of the
Sich’s population42.
The combined army went over to the Dniester at the
end of July. The crossing of the main forces across the river
at Chocim, wide for over 250 meters, was held between 1
and 19 August. They made a fortified camp on the plateau, rising slightly to the south of the Chocim castle. He
was connected with the fortress by drawbridge, slung over
a steep ravine. From the east, access was blocked by the
rocky slopes of the Dniester. Plateau sloped gently toward
the south, toward a deep ravine. Convenient approach to
the Chocim position was possible only through the plains
extending to the west43.
In order to increase the defensive qualities, work was
organized at the beginning of August on strengthening
the Chocim position. The operations were led by an experienced engineer from Belgium, William Appelman,
well-versed in the Dutch art of fortification. Under his leadership, the camp was surrounded by with a high embankment and a ditch. Every couple of hundred steps brought
bastions built of wood and earth. The main rampart was
covered in the most vulnerable spots by additional ones,
sometimes hidden among the unevenness of the ground.
Access to the interior of the camp was possible only by two
heavily fortified gates, which were facing west: the crown
gate, which was located in the north of the fortifications,
and the Lithuanian one in the southern part. In order to
further the field of view and prevent the enemy from moving unseen in the immediate vicinity of the position, some
vegetation in the foreland was cut down. Also the wooden
buildings of the Chocim village, lying northeast of the
castle, were burned. Only the remains of a stone church
survived. The Communication with Polish banks of the
Dniester was provided by a bridge built by the engineers
(and repaired a number of times during the campaign)
near the ruins of the village of Braha. The bridge approach
was defended by a small infantry garrison44. Engineering
work continued during the battle itself, expanding the line
42
43
44

– 95 –

Ibid., pp. 100–101.
Ibid., p. 156.
Ibid., pp. 181–184, 188.

– Paweł Przeździecki –

of the fortifications with forward cannons, based on uneven terrain and sometimes cleverly disguised.
The names of the gates were directly linked to the tactical division the personnel of the Chocim position, as
decided by Chodkiewicz. The Crown’s army under Lubomirski’s command stood in the north of the camp. Hetman personally led the Lithuanians in the south. The central part of the west-facing fortifications was taken by soldiers from Prince Ladislaus’s corps45. These forces, numbering about 10,000 people reached Chocim at the very
end of August and crossed through the Dniester already in
the presence of the enemy46.
A little earlier, in the last week of August, Chodkiewicz’s
army was joined by the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who set
camp on the southern slope, outside of the Chocim position. The Cossack forces crossed to the right bank of the
Dniester quite early and throughout August ravaged the
lands lying on the planned route of the Turkish march. The
Cossacks fought fierce battles with the Tatar patrols, but
also got in the way of the Sultan’s troops, delaying their
march. On the 19th of August there was a violent skirmish
on the Prut crossing, during which the unit of a couple of
hundred Zaporozhians induced heavy losses to the rushing janissaries, before it was almost entirely cut down. The
contemporaries have compared the brave Cossacks to
Leonidas’s Spartans, defending the Thermopylae gorge47.
Osman II was so furious with the valiant Zaporozhians that
he killed some of the few prisoners himself with a bow48.
In total, the number of Polish-Lithuanian forces which
were at the Chocim position at the beginning of September is estimated to total 25,000 people. Of that number,
there were approximately 8,000 hussars, as many Cossacks and lisowczycy, nearly 2000 cavalry and about 6,000
German infantry and 7,000 Polish infantry. One must also
add several thousand camp servants to this number.
Chodkiewicz’s army possessed 28 guns but their usefulness was limited due to the poor condition ofl doges and
poor gunpowder quality. The Crown’s military, barely rebuilt after Cecora was clearly behind the Lithuanians in
45

46

47
48

The son of Sigismund III Vasa, the future of the Commonwealth, King Ladislaus IV.
L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op. cit., pp. 162, 188. Recent
subdivisions have crossed the river on September 4, cf. ibid.,
p. 197.
Ibid., pp. 122–137.
J. Sobieski, Jakóba Sobieskiego, pamiętnik wojny chocimskiej,
xiąg troje, Petersburg 1854, pp. 18–19.

terms of weapons and equipment, as well as, in the case
of cavalry, mounts. The mercenary troops under the command of Prince Ladislau presented themselves much
better. The number of Cossacks led by the Cossack Hetman Piotr Konaszewicz-Sahajdaczny, can be estimated
at around 30–35 thousand. The Zaporozhian army had 23
cannons, usually of small dimensions and with limited fire
capabilities49.
The Turkish army was nearly twice as large as the defender. At the Sultan’s order the mass mobilization appeared – the mounted spahis – from remote provinces
of the Empire, i.e. from the territory of Syria and Anatolia.
Some of the troops had to travel more than 2000 km. Taking into account the marching losses, fights during the
travels and the number of desertions, the Turkish levy en
masse at Chocim totalled about 55,000 riders. Osman II
was accompanied by about 12,000 janissaries, 8000 spahis
and a few thousand Tatars of the Sultan’s guard during his
march towards the Dniester. The imperial artillery was relatively strong, numbering 62 guns, including 15 siege engines. Its weaker side was the poor level of training among
the gunsmiths.
Auxiliary units took part in the excursion along with
the Turkish army. The Tatars were the most numerous at
about 10,000 soldiers from the Crimea under the leadership of Dżanibek Gerej and 5000 Cantymir’s Nogais. The
Tatar troops made the vanguard of the Sultan’s troops,
they were also responsible for reconnaissance and performing raids on the left bank of the Dniester. In addition,
the Moldovans and Vlachs issued reinforcements circa
12-thousand strong. In total, Osman II’s army consisted of
about 100,000 soldiers accompanied by tens of thousands
of servants.50

The Battle of Chocim
At the end of August the Tatar troops forming the vanguard of the Sultan’s army approached the Chocim position. The Tatar presence turned out to be particularly
worrisome for the defenders on the Polish bank. They constituted an immediate threat to the safety of the shipment
trail from Kamenets Podolski. The warriors also harassed
Prince Ladislau’s corps at the last stage of the march.
Shortly thereafter, on 2 September, first Turkish troops
49
50

– 96 –

L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op. cit., pp. 174–177.
Ibid., pp. 167–172.

– The Polish-Turkish War of 1620–1621: the battles of Cecora and Chocim –

– 97 –

– Paweł Przeździecki –

closed on Chocim51. The siege of the defensive positions
began. It was to take more than a month – until the 9th of
October.
The initial tactical plan envisaged to use the Sultan’s
troops to quickly resolve the battle by outnumbering the
enemy. The main objective of the first attack was the Cossack camp, as their numbers were larger than soldiers of
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, although their
camp was unguarded by massive earthen fortifications
already present at the Chocim position. In fact, the Zaporozhians only began to form a double wall from two rows
of carts filled with ballast. They dug ditches for the defenders under the carts.
The first assault was carried out just by the guard
troops of Osman II’s forces. The attack of the dismounted spahis and the Sultan’s janissaries, more than 11,000
people in total, was repelled by the Cossack infantry, the
lisowczycy and cavalry reinforcements sent by the alert
Hetman as support for the Zaporozhians. This first success of Chodkiewicz’s troops had utter psychological significance, as in the public awareness the Turkish army was
almost invincible.52 Defenders also enjoyed the rich spoils
taken away from defeated opponents, including saddles,
swords, hides and mounts themselves53.
The two consecutive strikes ended similarly, but this
time carried out by a much larger force of the slowly approaching Turkish army. On the 3rd of September the assault was preceded by a dummy attack on the Lubomirski’s
royal army positions, the next day the Tatars invaded the
ruins of Chocim, briefly occupying the church. The main
attack, however, was still directed against the Cossacks.
Again, Sahajdaczny’s troops were aided by the Commonwealth’s infantry and scarce artillery, making breaches in
Turkish lines with heavy gunfire. They were then repelled
by Cossack counter-attacks with the lisowczycy’s companies and Lithuanian cavalry’s jabs. On the 3rd of September the Cossacks succeeded capturing 4 cannons during
a counter-attack. On the 4th of September they managed
to break into the Turkish camp, looting tents and damaging several guns54.

51
52

53
54

Ibid., pp. 185–191.
Sobieski mentioned that ‘on that day, the army accepted
[success] as the best omen of the on-going war’, cf. J. Sobieski,
op. cit., p. 27.
L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op. cit., pp. 185–191.
Ibid., pp. 194–200.

With a strong and constantly upgraded defensive
position, and good observation conditions Hetman
Chodkiewicz was able to see the enemy moves and successfully oppose the assaults by manoeuvring on internal
lines. The Turks bled in the strikes on the Cossack camp
and afterwards were decimated by the counter-attacks
of the Polish-Lithuanian cavalry. That is why the Sultan’s
camp decided to abandon the existing tactics and move
on to a regular siege of the Chocim position. At the same
time the Sultan finally gave consent to the conveyance to
the bulk of the Tatar hordes to the Polish coast55. Throughout the following weeks the Tatars ravaged the lands of the
Republic, paralyzing any attempts to organize the relief of
defenders in Chocim and capturing most of the shipments
of food and ammunition.
All of the Turkish troops reached the battlefield on
the 7th of September. From early morning the Sultan’s
army carried out several assaults on different parts of
the Chocim position, aiming to engage the defenders.
The Cossacks found themselves in a particularly difficult
position. Their camp was first shelled by Turkish artillery, and then attacked four times by the janissaries and
spahis. Despite the lack of success, at noon Osman II again
sent his troops to fight, this time hitting the contact point
between the Lithuanian and the Prince’s forces. The sudden attack surprised the mercenary infantry. Two companies were decimated to the last man. The Turks trying
to storm the ramparts were scared away by a counter-attack of the already prepared rear-guard of the Cossack and
hussar cavalry56.
Despite the temporary settlement of the threat,
Chodkiewicz realized that the last attack made a breach in
the position of defenders. Expecting another strike in the
same place, he commanded 3 hussar companies and one
reiter company (in fact, hussars without lances), 605 riders
in total, to leave the camp through the Lithuanian gate and
take a hide in the shadow of the German infantry’s rampart
in front of the gate. Indeed, just before dusk around 10,000
Turks began advancing towards the empty positions. The
first spahis’ line was followed by janissaries57.
When the enemy approached the fortifications,
Chodkiewicz gave the order to attack. A strike of four companies of scarce, but elite cavalry hit the Turkish flank. At
55
56
57

– 98 –

Ibid., p. 201.
Ibid., pp. 203–204.
R. Sikora, Niezwykłe bitwy i szarże husarii, Warsaw 2011, pp.
54–55.

– The Polish-Turkish War of 1620–1621: the battles of Cecora and Chocim –

the same time the attackers were welcomed with infantry
fire from the mounds. The attacked flank has collapsed and
the crowd of escapees confused the Janissary lines. The
assault of Osman II’s military was stopped and the separated forces partially routed. Turkish losses could amount
to several hundred killed. Dozens of Polish-Lithuanian
riders were killed from the janissaries’ dense fire, many
were wounded58.
The battle of the 7th of September became the culminating point of the battle of Chocim. Repelling the assaulting
troops raised the spirits of the defenders, who henceforth
acted courageously, organizing forays into the forefront
and skirmishing with the enemy. Morale in the Turkish
army greatly deteriorated, the army of the Sultan avoided
melee combat and dug their own trenches. Osman II himself, witnessing the defeat of his subjects, among whom
were ‘many veterans, many men basked in the glory of
their knighthood and the very best […] warriors’, was supposed to complain and weep59.
Severe defeat in the field forced the Turks to change
tactics in a battle of attrition. The Turks intensified their
attacks on food shipments, the Osman army began the
construction of a crossing through the Dniester, in order to
be able to shoot at Chodkiewicz’s camp from the Polish
bank. At the same time the Sultan’s forces evaded a decisive battle, and did not take the challenge thrown by the
Hetman, who has moved his army to the forefront twice,
on 8 and 9 September60.
In the following days skirmishes took place, the shelling
of the Commonwealth’s camp intensified. It was not until the 15th of September, when a massive assault on the
centre of the defensive formation took place. The newly
arrived Karakasz-Pasha led about 27,000 people, some of
which even managed to penetrate the Polish-Lithuanian
ramparts. The attack was repelled, however, mainly by
dense infantry fire, and the Sultan’s commander found
death in battle. Another defeat heavily damaged the morale of the Turkish army; desertions became widespread, including to the Polish side. Since the 15th of September, the
Sultan’s army virtually ceased any offensive operations,
confining to the siege and artillery bombardment.61 The
defenders responded with cannon fire from the mound
58

59
60
61

and with organized from time to time armed raids. The
Cossacks and lisowczycy stood out in these excursions.
On several times have they broke into the Turkish camp,
raided the Turkish crossing over the Dniester River, causing
severe losses among the enemy and causing a permanent
sense of threat among the besiegers62.
Until the 23rd of September, the defenders have modified their positions. First of all, all defences beyond the
main line of fortifications were destroyed, and the main
line itself expanded. The Cossacks moved their camp a bit
further north63. These changes were necessary due to the
losses, both caused by combat and by diseases and the
increasing hunger, all of which limited the numbers of the
defenders guarding the Chocim position.
The three last strikes on the Sultan’s military camp were
conducted on the 19th, 25th and 28th of September. The first
attack was provoked by a successful night excursion of the
Cossacks, who plundered the Turkish tents. The assault
was repelled with strong rifle fire. On the 24th of September the heavily ill Hetman Chodkiewicz died. Despite the
attempts to preserve this fact in secrecy, the news of the
death of the Commonwealth’s commander reached Osman II. A powerful attack directed at the southwestern
section of the fortification was preceded by an artillery
barrage, which caused some casualties among the defenders. This attack failed as well. During the attack many
Polish and Lithuanian soldiers learned of Chodkiewicz’s
death from the Turks cursing them64.
The last assault took place on the 28th of September.
During the night before the attack the Turks set up four
batteries which began shelling the camp come dawn. After
the artillery preparation, it came to the main attack. It included most of the Sultan’s troops. The Turks sent most of
their forces against the Cossacks and lisowczycy, engaging
the defenders at both gates and near the church in Chocim
with smaller units. The enemy’s rush was so strong that
62

63
64

L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op. cit., pp. 205–206; R. Sikora, op.
cit., pp. 55–61.
J. Sobieski, op. cit., pp. 36–37.
L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, op. cit., pp. 206–208.
Ibid., pp. 211–215.

– 99 –

M. Franz, Wojskowość Kozaczyzny Zaporoskiej w XVI–XVII wieku.
Geneza i charakter, Torun 2002, p. 199–201; L. Podhorodecki,
N. Raszba, op. cit., pp. 224–229.
Ibid., pp. 223–224.
Ibid., pp. 225–226, 229–232. The death of the commander
brought a short-lived crisis in the Commonwealth’s command structures. Although Chodkiewicz clearly designated
his succesor by giving the baton to Lubomirski, but not only
the Cossacks but also the Lithuanians did not want to yield
before the new commander. In the end, the Lithuanian army
was persuaded by Prince Ladislaus to obey the new leader.

– Paweł Przeździecki –

signs of panic began to appear in the Polish-Lithuanian
camp. The defenders were down to their last men in order to defend the enemy rushing to the ramparts, including Prince Ladislaus, who sent a small unit of his adjutant
Scottish infantrymen into the fray. At the same time, the
battle raged on in the Cossack camp and in the foreground
of the Crown’s position. The attack on the northern section was repulsed, among others, due to the intense gunfire laid unto the rushing enemy from a masked, advanced
position prepared by Szemberg. After the whole-day fighting, the Turks retreated to their camp, losing nearly 1,000
killed65. The attackers have used up all of their gunpowder
stock. Bullets for rifles and artillery cannons were also
scarce. At some point of the battle the lisowczycy loaded
their bandoliers with buckshots from scrap metal and
broken glass, whereas Szemberg’s gunsmiths rammed the
cannons even with dirt and grass66.
The unsuccessful assault and an earlier, equally unsuccessful, excursion to Kamenets Podolski ultimately
discouraged Osman II to continue the campaign. Morale
in the Turkish camp was very low; the Sultan’s army was
decimated by disease and desertions. Particularly high
losses concerned the contingents from Minor Asia, they
were not suitable for the climatic conditions and inappropriately dressed. The situation defenders became increasingly desperate, also. Food and feed were at their limits,
after the attack of 28 September, reportedly, there was
only one barrel of gunpowder left and most horses fell.
There were cases of desertion, the escapees mostly fell
prey to marauders on the left bank of the Tatar’s River67.
The recent success has allowed the defenders to resume
negotiations (preliminary agreements were initiated during the life Chodkiewicz) with a strong position. After several days of talks, during which virtually every hostilities
ceased, it was agreed to jointly honour the content of the
agreement. Under the so-called Chocim agreement, the
Commonwealth had to stop the Cossacks from raiding the
lands of the Empire, whereas the Turks were to effectively
prohibit Tatar expedition against the Polish-Lithuanian
state. Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania remained under the Turkish sphere of influence, the first of these hos65
66

67

Ibid., pp. 234–238.
In combat over short distances the use of such an original
projectiles turned to be extremely efficient, the Turks – fired
at with ‘something green’ – thought the defenders were using
magic. Ibid., s. 237–238.
Ibid., pp. 216–218.

podarstwo also regained Chocim. On the 10th of October
the Sultan’s army began their retreat from the Commonwealth’s borders68. The Horde did not obey the imperial
order. The Tatars continued to ravage the lands of the
southern provinces of the Crown even in the second half
of October, bringing thousands of people into captivity69.
It is estimated that during the month-long siege of the
Chocim position the Polish-Lithuanian army lost almost
7,500 soldiers. Of this number, about 2,000 of them were
killed, and 3,000 died of wounds, from disease or starvation. On the list of deserters, there were approximately
500 comrades, which were covered in common infamy.
The hussars suffered particularly heavy losses, almost
one third of them did not return from Chocim. Similarly to
many German infantrymen. The fighting in the siege killed
about 6,500 Cossacks. The total losses of the Zaporozhians, taking into account the fallen during the march
through Moldavia, during the struggle at sea, and the sick
and wounded, amounted to several thousand people. The
failed Turkish assaults cost the lives of about 9,000 soldiers
and another 4,000–5,000 were killed during night raids and
skirmishes. To the several thousands killed in the fights at
Chocim, one should add a similar number of those killed
by hunger and diseases (caused mainly by the lack of adaptability to the colder climate and malnutrition). In total,
the war with the Commonwealth will cost the Sultan’s
army even about 40,000 people. The Tatars have suffered
relatively low losses, at the level of a few hundred fighters. Irreversible losses among the mass deserters of Wallachian and Moldavian reinforcements are estimated at
3,000 soldiers70.

Consequences
The unfortunate expedition to Moldavia became the
direct cause of the Polish-Turkish war. Thanks to the extraordinary efforts of the Commonwealth, the State managed to put together an army, whose long-standing and
fierce defence of the Chocim position enabled to end the
conflict. The mortal threat from the powerful and fear-inciting all over Europe Sultan’s army was pushed back from
the borders of the country. The Chocim treaty became
a starting point for the subsequent peace negotiations.
68
69
70

Ibid., pp. 240–257.
Ibid., pp. 263–268, 278–279.
Ibid., pp. 260–263.

– 100 –

– The Polish-Turkish War of 1620–1621: the battles of Cecora and Chocim –

They were on-going with varying success until October
1623, but it was crowned with the treaty, the provisions of
which were formally to survive half a century71.
The Commonwealth emerged very weak from the war.
Huge losses were suffered, including – an experienced
army – the southern reaches of the country were devastated and the treasury largely empty. Following the
agreement, the Polish-Lithuanian State renounced its
efforts to build a sphere of influence to the south of the
Dniester. Despite peace with the Turks, Tatar attacks did
not cease. The threat from the Horde was to last until the
end of the seventeenth century. The weakness of the Polish-Lithuanian state and emptying Lithuania of its troops
was used by the Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus, who
attacked Livonia in August 1621. The war with Sweden led
to the separation of major areas of Lithuania, which the
Commonwealth has never recovered.
The conflict with Turkey brought extraordinarily rich
military experience. The operations in 1620 brought serious use of carts and wagons for the first time since the
battle of Obertyn in 1531. Although the Cecora formation
failed, three years later, the Hetman of the Crown Stanislaw Koniecpolski reached for a similar solution (released
in 1623 after the conclusion of the peace with Turkey). In
June 1624, the royal army, the harnessing the firepower
and the cover of the manoeuvring rolling stock crushed
Kantymir’s Tatars at Martynov. The retreat from Cecora has
shown, in turn, the possibility of effectively using wagons
while marching, even in contact with the enemy. Disaster
in Mogilev caused that experience was lost along with
those who died or were taken prisoner.
The operations in 1621 proved that the Commonwealth
still has the ability to stand up to a power considered
almost unstoppable in Europe. Position operations in
71

Chocim enriched the Polish military tactics. For the first
time field fortifications, often masked and skilfully combined with natural obstacles were used on such a scale.
Battles have proven the superiority of the Western-type
infantry’s firepower, provided with muskets, over less wellarmed infantry. The numerous cavalry at Chocim was
served mainly a secondary role, as a moving rear-guard relocated to an endangered position in the critical moment
of the enemy attack. The presence of one’s own cavalry,
especially the hussars, however, was also important for the
morale of the troops remaining in the lap. During a joint
struggle valuable experience was gained while observing
the Cossacks. The courage and tenacity of the Zaporozhians, counter-attacking after almost every Turkish assault,
and the ability to harass the enemy by sudden raids and
night excursions, made a great impression on the Polish
and Lithuanian soldiers. The short camaraderie with the
Cossacks, however, did not survive the test of time and
after the war with the Tatars, the issue of non-yielding and
rebellious Sich remained one of the biggest internal problems of the Commonwealth.
The unfavourable outcome of the war shook the Turkish Empire. The smouldering conflict between the Sultan and the janissaries rekindled after he returned from
his journey. In the spring of 1622, in Istanbul there was
a palace coup, which resulted in Osman II being killed.
Fortunately for the Commonwealth, the next leader of
the weakened Empire agreed to conclude the peace both
countries needed.
The Chocim position played its role in the next great
Polish-Turkish war of 1672–1676. In November 1673, the
trenches occupied by the Turks were captured in a spectacular assault of the Polish army led by the Grand Hetman of the Crown Jan Sobieski.

The next Polish-Turkish war broke out as late as in 1672. Earlier, in the years 1633–1635 there was the so-called war with
Abazy-Pasha, the rebellious Silistran Sanjak-bey. This conflict
ended with routing the Turkish-Tatar forces in the battle of
Kamenets Podolski, whereas Abazy-Pasha was killed at the
order of the Sultan.

– 101 –

Bibliography
Primary sources
J. Sobieski, Jakóba Sobieskiego, pamiętnik wojny chocimskiej,
xiąg troje, Petersburg 1854
T. Szemberg, Relacja prawdziwa o wejściu wojska polskiego do

Z. Budzyński, L. Fac, Wojny polsko-tureckie w XVII w., Przemyśl
2000
M. Franz, Wojskowość Kozaczyzny Zaporoskiej w XVI–XVII wieku.
Geneza i charakter, Torun 2002

Wołoch, fragment in: O. Laskowski, B. Pawłowski, Polska His-

Z. Grabowski, Dzieje oręża polskiego. Odrodzenie, Warsaw 2012

torja Wojskowa (w wypisach źródłowych), Warsaw 1928

R. Majewski, Cecora 1620, Warsaw 1970

Books

L. Podhorodecki, Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski, Warsaw 2011

Cecora i Chocim, prelekcja prof. Jozefa Szujskiego z dnia 5 grudnia

L. Podhorodecki, N. Raszba, Wojna chocimska 1621 roku, Cracow

1870 roku, Cracow 1871

1979

Polski słownik biograficzny, ed. W. Konopczyński, vol. XIV, Cracow 1938

R. Sikora, Niezwykłe bitwy i szarże husarii, Warsaw 2011

J. Besala, Stanisław Żółkiewski, Warsaw 1988

K. Śledziński, Cecora 1620, Warsaw 2007

– Rafał Roguski –
Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities

The Battle of Berestechko 28–30 June 1651

In the first half of the 17th century the most serious threat
to the security of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth
were the Cossacks, who constituted a specific group of fugitives gathered at the Lower Dnieper. They were hostile
towards the borderland Polish nobility, and considered
the Polish politics to be a strike against vital Cossack interests. An unfriendly attitude of Polish government towards the Orthodox faith, constant restrictions on Cossack
register, cruel repressions of participants in the several
peasant uprisings, breaking the promises of amnesty, and
finally the intent to turn the Cossacks into peasants were
the sources of universal hatred1. At the beginning of 1648
the Cossacks took action aimed at starting a new uprising.
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth then started organising a defence, despite the scale of the real threat was not
yet known. The first battle took place at Żółte Wody (the
Yellow Waters) and lasted from the 29th of April to the 16th
of May 1648. The Polish army was defeated. Another battle
took place at Korsuń, where the Cossacks captured two
Polish hetmans – Mikołaj Potocki and Marcin Kalinowski
(and handed over to the Tatars). The Korsuń battle turned
out to be catastrophic for the Polish side. On the 20th of
May, six days before the fight at Korsuń, King Władysław
IV Vasa died. The next battle lost by the Poles happened
on 23–24 September 1648 at Pyliava (Piławce), where the
Polish troops – with a few exceptions – fled the battlefield.
Joint Cossack forces under the command of Bohdan Kh-

melnytsky and the Tatar forces led by Krym Girej moved
deep into Poland, reaching as far as Lvov2.
During the royal election, a new ruler was chosen
between the two brothers of the deceased King
Władysław IV Vasa – John Casimir and Charles Ferdinand.
The first one received support of the chancellor Jerzy
Ossoliński and Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Bearing in mind
the defeat at Pyliava, the people chose John Casimir and
the policy of compromise for further dealings with the
Cossacks. At that time, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who failed
to seize Zamość, returned to Kiev and at the beginning
of 1649 rode in triumph as a victorious chieftain. After
a short armistice, the hostilities began anew in Spring
1649. After fighting was renewed in Ukraine a number
of new military commanders – the Regimentarz officers
– retreated to Zbarazh, which was afterwards surrounded by the Cossack-Tatar army. John Casimir came to
the rescue of the besieged. At the crossing of the river
Strypa at Zboriv he fought the Cossack troops and the
Tatars led by hetman Khmelnytsky and Islam-Giray. The
King used Islam-Giray’s inclination for negotiations and
communicated with him behind Khmelnytsky’s back.
The Treaty of Zboriv was a sign of the Commonwealth’s
weakness, but it also was a blow against the Cossacks
and their attempt at gaining independence3. Although
2

3
1

Register – a list of the Cossacks on soldier’s pay in the Polish
army. The registered Cossacks were most commonly the
members of the starshyna (Polish starszyzna), the most prominent, as well as the best armed and thus the richest Cossacks and their sons. Based on: L. Podhorodecki, Kozacy zaporoscy. Czy Polska stworzyła Ukrainę?, Warsaw 2011, p. 59.

W. A. Serczyk, Historia Ukrainy, Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow
1990, pp. 117–120.
W. A. Serczyk, Historia Ukrainy…, pp. 122–126; Islam III Giray,
born 1604 – died 1654 – a khan of the Crimean Khanate in
1644–1654, the son of khan Selamet I Giray. In 1644 Sultan
Ibrahim I appointed him the Crimean Khan. In 1648 Islam established an alliance directed against the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth with the Cossack hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. He participated in the siege of Zbarazh and in the battle

– 103 –

– Rafał Roguski –

the agreement ended the 1649 war campaign, it did not
calm the unrest in the Ukraine, because two most crucial points were not accomplished: the return of nobility banished from their land in Ukraine in 1648 and the
completion of a 40-thousand register including only the
part of the people integrated with the Cossack culture
obliged to give themselves under the authority of their
old lords. In February 1650 there was a Cossack outbreak
against the elders (starshyna) suppressed by Khmelnytsky. Hetman wanted to centralise power and the Cossacks – accustomed to war democracy – were against it.
The chancellor Jerzy Ossoliński tried to peacefully settle
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s relationships
with the Cossacks. A possibility emerged to seal an anti-Turkish coalition consisting of the Republic of Venice,
the Cossacks, and even the Tatars wanting to shake off
the dependency on Porte. However, one factor important in that part of the world was not considered – Russia.
At the beginning of 1650 there was a Russian message
with a demand for the return of Smoleńsk and the payment of a compensation. If it wasn’t for an outbreak that
started in Moscow, Poland would face yet another war,
this time with Russia. Khmelnytsky turned to the Russian
Tsar with a request for taking the Cossack nation under
his care4.
In August 1650 Bohdan Khmelnytsky received the sultan’s protection, and a group of supporters of war with
the Cossacks gained political advantage at the court of
the Polish king John Casimir. Khmelnytsky’s agreement
with Turkey destroyed the chances for an internal solution to the Cossack problem, and Khmelnytsky designs
on Moldavia threatened to burden the Polish borders. In
response to the political and military situation, in December 1650the Polish parliament passed an increasing of
the number of troops in the Crown to 33 thousand, and in
Lithuania to 18 thousand, as well as called a levy in mass5.
Bohdan Khmelnytsky increased the register of Cossacks

4
5

at Zboriv. In 1649 he made a treaty with the Polish side and
retreated, plundering Ukraine. In the battles of Berestechko
and Żwaniec in 1653 he supported Khmelnytsky. In 1654, after
the Cossack-Russian treaty in Pereieslav he crossed to the
Polish side. Islam III Giray died in 1654. Based on a military
encyclopaedia: Encyklopedia Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie.
Historia wojen i bitew. Technika wojskowa. A–M, managing ed.
A. Krupa, Warsaw 2007, p. 365.
W. A. Serczyk, Historia Ukrainy…, pp. 127–128.
Ibid., p. 128.

and intended to incite a peasant rebellion throughout
Poland6.
This caused preparations to a military solution. Military operations that ended with the Battle of Berestechko
were ongoing already in February 1651. They were centred
in Bila Tserkva and run by the Cossack soldiers, 30 thousand of whom entered Podolia under the command of
Danylo Nechay and Ivan Bohun7. They took over Krasne
6

7

Encyklopedia wojskowa (A Military Encyclopaedia), ed. O. Laskowski, vol. 1, Warsaw 1931, p. 261.
Nechay (Niechay) Danylo, born ? – died 1651; a colonel of the
Bratslav Regiment in 1648–1651; took part in the Khmelnytsky
Uprising. A participant of the opposition against the realisation of the Treaty of Zboriv. He took part in battles at Zbarazh
and Zboriv, and in the campaign to Moldavia in 1650. Taken
prisoner by hetman S. Lanckoroński’s troops at Krasne and
killed during a quarrel over a captive. Based on: Encyklopedia
Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie. Historia wojen i bitew. Technika wojskowa. N–Ż…, p. 18.
Ivan Bohun, born ? – died 1664. In 1649–1658 – a colonel of
the Kalnik Regiment, one of the main leaders in Khmelnytsky
Uprising. A sotnik of the Chyhyryn Regiment. In 1651 he conquered and burned down Vinnytsia. At Berestechko he managed lead out what remained of the Cossack camp, which
got encircled by the enemy. He was against the subjugation
of the Cossacks to both Moscow (Treaty of Pereyaslav), and
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Treaty of Hadiach
1658). In 1657–1664 colonel of Połock. During the John II
Casimir against Russia (1663–1664) he was the Acting Hetman. During the John II Casimir against Russia (1663–1664)
he was the Acting Hetman. During the Swedish Deluge Bohun
encouraged the hetman to support the Commonwealth, and
then supported his stand against Poland (Treaty of Radnot).
After his death, Bohun was a supporter of the pro-Polish Ivan
Vyhovsky, then of Yurii Khmelnytsky, until he decided to associate with Moscow. Bohun did not swore his allegiance to the
Tsar again. He fought the Russians on the Polish side, but was
removed from his post and imprisoned in Malbork. Released
in 1663, he took part as the Acting Hetman in the struggle with
the pro-Moscow Ivan Briukhovetsky and Ivan Vyhovsky. He
then contacted Briukhovetsky and Vyhovsky, for which he was
executed by firing squad on the 27th of February 1664. Based
on the Polish Biographical Dictionary: Polski Słownik Biograficzny, ed. W. Konopczyński, vol. II, Cracow 1936, pp. 227–229,
entry: Ivan Bohun.
Yurii Khmelnytsky (Jerzy Chmielnicki, Juraszko), born 1640
– died probably 1685, a Cossack hetman, son of Bohdan
Khmelnytsky. During Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s life Yurii was
chosen his successor in 1657. He received his bulawa in 1659;
participant of the Cudnowo campaign run against Poland in
1660. After the defeat of the Cossacks and the Russians he
assumed sovereignty of Poland. In 1633 he renounced het-

– 104 –

– The Battle of Berestechko 28–30 June 1651 –

and started their march towards Bar, threatening the
communication lines of the Crown Field Hetman Marcin
Kalinowski8. Hetman Kalinowski concentrated his forces
at Stanyslaviv (Stanisławczyk) along the Bar-Krasne line.
The night between the 19th and the 20th of February he
struck the main Cossack forces at Krasne and defeated
them after a few-days battle (21–23 February). After the
battle colonel Danylo Nechay was captured and then
died. After the victory at Krasne, Kalinowski wanted to
take over the area between rivers Dniester and Boh to
stop or delay the march of the main Cossack army. Operating very slowly, he managed to move to Jampol and
reach Vinnytsia, beset by the Iwan Bohun’s regiment. The
city and the castle were conquered, however the siege
of the monastery in which Bohun took refuge along with
his men, was not successful. When Khmelnytsky himself
came to Bohun’s rescue, hetman Kalinowski quickly retreated to Kamieniec, leaving behind the wounded, as
well as wagons and cannons. He manned the fortress
with soldiers and on the 23th of April 1651 headed for
the main camp near Sokal (via Pobożno – Janowo –
Kupczyńce – Pomorzany route), losing – due to a Cossack-Tatar pursuit – all his wagons, cannons and many of
his men. It wasn’t until the 22 May that he reached Sokal
with less than six thousand soldiers. After his attempt at
conquering Kamieniec, Khmelnytsky concentrated his

8

manship and entered a monastery. He was held prisoner in
Marlbork in 1664–1667. In 1667, after hetman Petro Doroszenko gave himself under the protection of Turkey, Yrii took leadership of a part of the disgruntled Cossacks. Held in Turkish
captivity since 1669. Later appointed the Prince of Sarmatia
by the sultan, and nominated for the Cossack bulawa. His
rule over Ukraine, which was subject to Turkey, were those
of tyranny. In 1681 he was called off to Stamboul. Based on:
Encyklopedia Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie. Historia wojen
i bitew. Technika wojskowa. A–M…, p. 145.
Kalinowski Marcin, born 1605 – died 13 June 1652, crown field
hetman, 1632 chamberlain of Podolia, 1635 voivode of Chernihiv, 1646 crown field hetman. Participated in the war with
the Swedes in Prussia; in 1633 he fought Russia at Smoleńsk,
in 1644 the Tatars at Ochmatów; the opponent of the Polish-Ottoman war planned by Władysław IV. After Khmelnytsky
Uprising he was defeated at Korsuń and until 1650 held captive by the Cossacks. In 1651 at Krasne he destroyed the army
led by Danylo Nechay. In the Battle of Berestechko Kalinowski
commanded the army’s left wing. He died in combat at Batoh.
Based on: Encyklopedia Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie. Historia wojen i bitew. Technika wojskowa. A–M…, p. 401.

troops on the Ternopil – Zbarazh front and awaited the
arrival of the Tatars9.
In May and June 1651 the main Polish forces were gathering, under the command of the Crown Grand Hetman
Mikołaj Potocki, in a fortified camp near Sokal, blocking
Khmelnytsky the way into Poland10. The Polish King John
Casimir set off on a war campaign from Warsaw on the 13th
of April 1651, and reached Sokal on May 16th the same year.
He gathered an army of 28–30 thousand regular troops
and 30–40 thousand nobility from the levy in mass. Before
the Battle of Berestechko the Polish army amounted to ca.
70–80 thousand men. All the most prominent Polish commanders were present. The role of the King’s right hand
was played by the Crown General of Artillery Zygmunt
Przyjemski, general Krzysztof Houwaldt and the military
judge, the Grand Hetman’s lieutenant Stefan Czarniecki11.
9

10

11

Encyklopedia wojskowa (The Military Encyclopaedia), ed. O. La­
s­kowski, vol. 1…, p. 261, entry: Berestechko.
Potocki Mikołaj, born ca. 1593 – died 20 11 1651, castellan in
Cracow and Crown Grand Hetman, alumnus of the Academy
in Zamość. Captain, then colonel of crown troops. Participator in the siege of Smoleńsk in 1609–1611. Was taken captive by the Ottoman army in the battle of Cecora. A fellow of
hetman S. Koniecpolski. A participant in the Polish-Swedish
war of 1626–1629. A commander in 1633 in the battle with
Abazy, the pasha of the Ottoman province, at Kamieniec.
Since 1633 a general (general starost) of Podolia. 1636 – voivode of Bratslav, 1637 Crown Field Hetman. Quelled Cossack
uprisings led by Pawluk and Huni. Opponent of plans for the
Commonwealth’s war with the Ottoman Empire. 1646 castellan of Cracow and Crown Grand Hetman in 1648. In 1648 defeated at Korsuń and taken captive by the Tatars, from which he
returned in 1650. Fought at Berestechko, and then took part in
establishing a truce with the Cossacks in Bila Tserkva. Based
on: Encyklopedia Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie. Historia wojen i bitew. Technika wojskowa. N–Ż…, p. 178.
R. Romański, Beresteczko 1651, Warsaw 1994, p. 106–107; Houwaldt Krzysztof, German, born 1602 – died 1663, general-major of infantry, military engineer. Participated in the Emperor’s
war with Venice and the Thirty Years War in Germany. Later
he served in the Gustaw Adolf’s army during the war against Poland in Livonia and Royal Prussia; a Swedish general,
Saxon field marshal (went over to the Saxon side due to an
unpaid soldier’s pay), a commander for the Gdańsk armed
forces for 12 years. In 1647 due to Polish-Ottoman war planned by Władysław IV entered the Polish service. When the war
did not break out, he joined the Brandenburg army, and then
on 10 April 1649 entered Polish service. He fought at Zboriv.
Participated in the Berestechko campaign (developer tactical
plans for the Battle of Berestechko). In 1652 he received a Polish indygenat. Participant of the Żwaniec campaign. In 1654

– 105 –

– Rafał Roguski –

In order to secure and protect the Polish forces in Sokal, at
the beginning of 1651 the Crown Field Hetman stood with
12 thousand of his experienced men at Morachwa on the
border of Podolia and the Bratslav voivodeship. Whereas
the Cossack side placed about 30 thousand armed Cossacks near the Bila Tserkva, which were then joined by
about 20–25 thousand Tatars12.
A false message about a retreat of the Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s army made the Polish command send the
troops on Dubno. The march stopped when the message
arrived that the joint forces of the Cossacks and the Tatars
were closing in (about 20–30 thousand strong). The Polish army retreated to Berestechko. The battle started on
Wednesday, on June 28 1651 and was supposed to resolve
the Polish-Cossack conflict for both sides. Individual Tatar
troops, the czambuls, appeared near the Polish camp
already on the night before the battle. The Polish king received a message that a great number of horses were captured, along with the servants who went against the kings
orders and grazed the animals on nearby grasslands 13.
The Polish side did not realise the size and strength of
the incoming Cossack-Tatar forces14. After pushing through
the Plaszówka river crossing the Tatar czambuls spread out
across the area. They divided themselves into smaller divisions and took over the surrounding hills. Villages, manors

12

13

14

he left the Polish army and entered the Brandenburg service.
After the Swedish attaca on Poland he defended the Duchy of
Prussia. Died on the 29th of November 1663. Based on the Polish Biographical Dictionary: Polski Słownik Biograficzny, ed.
K. Lepszy, vol. X, Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow 1962–1964, pp.
35–36, entry: Houwaldt Krzysztof;
Zygmunt Przyjemski, born ? – died 1652, Polish artillery general, crown field writer. Served in the French army under the
command of Louis de Bourbon, Prince of Conde and in the
Swedish under Bernard of Saxe-Weimar. In 1650 he became a crown field writer and in 1650 became a general of the
crown artillery. He led the artillery at Berestechko. It was most
likely he who authored the battle plan. He died in combat at
Batoh. Based on: Encyklopedia Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie. Historia wojen i bitew. Technika wojskowa. N–Ż…, p. 209.
L. Podhorodecki, Kozacy Zaporoscy. Czy Polska stworzyła
Ukrainę?(Zaporozhian Cossacks. Did Poland create the Ukraine?), Warsaw 2011, p. 131.
M. Kukiel, Zarys historii wojskowości w Polsce, Cracow 1929,
Reprint Poznań 2006, p. 105; Berestechko – a city in the Ukraine, in the Volyn Oblast, on the Styr River, based on: Encyklopedia PWN w trzech tomach, vol. 1 a–h, ed. A. Krupa, Warsaw
2006, p. 177.
R. Romański, Beresteczko 1651…, p. 153.

and the city of Leśniów were burned. The Polish troops
started to take positions outside the camp ramparts. The
spreading of formations and the military operation on that
day was conducted by John Casimir himself. The right wing
was led by the Crown Grand Hetman Mikołaj Potocki, the
left wing by the Crown Field Hetman Marcin Kalinowski.
In the first day of battle nearly 18 thousand riders of the
mercenary cavalry and nearly 40 thousand men of the levy
in mass stepped outside the Polish camp. The individual
soldiers or small groups of soldiers from the Tatar side approached the Polish group and challenged Polish soldiers
to duels but to no effect, as the Poles were forbidden to
leave the ranks. John Casimir allowed the Polish cavalry to
participate in duels only when it turned out that the enemy
does not intend to send forth his main forces and only sent
reconnaissance to gather information before the fight15.
While the duals were under way, a number of Tatar czambuls attacked the Polish posts, provoking the expected
confrontation. The Polish command turned the attack
towards the greatest Tatar forces, breaking their ranks,
turning and striking three more times. However, the Polish
attack was too weak to succeed16.
On Thursday, on the 29th of June 1651, ca. 8:00 a.m.
shots were heard form Korytno and the Plaszówka crossing, which meant that the enemy was trying to push past
the river crossing guarded by a group of Polish dragoons.
Separate units of Polish cavalry – the banners were led out
of the camp. Only the cavalry entered the battlefield. The
infantry and a part of the dragoons were left to beset the
camp sconces and ramparts17.
On the 29th of June the fight was joined by the whole
Tatar horde strengthened by all sotnias of the mounted
Cossacks. It was a cavalry gathering of about 35–45 thou15

16
17

Ibid., p. 155; Duels during the preparations for the final battle
were called harce – from the Hungarian word harc – fight. The
duelling men were the mounted soldiers outside of the main
formation; they fought with the enemy riders or raided their
divisions. Such raids were called harce. In the 16th and 17th
centuries such a form of aggressive fighting was common
practice throughout Europe. In the Polish military soldiers
designated to these particular duels constituted the formation cover. They often feigned retreat to draw the enemy out
of his advantageous position, provoke an attack or a chase,
thus creating better fighting situation. Based on: Encyklopedia
Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie. Historia wojen i bitew. Technika wojskowa. A–M…, pp. 331–332.
R. Romański, Beresteczko 1651…, p. 158.
Ibid., p. 164.

– 106 –

– The Battle of Berestechko 28–30 June 1651 –

sand soldiers, perhaps the biggest such battle in the history of the 17th-century Europe, and the engagement itself
could well be the biggest cavalry battle in the world history
of that era18.
The front of the Cossack-Tatar group crossing the
Plaszówka reached the vicinity of the Polish camp at 8:00
a.m., and the last troops arrived a little past noon. Similarly to the previous day the Tatars spread out, taking over
the surrounding hills and setting fire to all the buildings.
Next they approached the posts of the Polish crown soldiers, challenging them to duels. At 11:00 a.m. the Voivode
of Podolia Stanisław Rewera Potocki and Stanisław Lanckoroński led the attack of the Polish right wing banner. It
threw off the Tatar duelling soldiers who shielded the
grouping of czambuls located on the hills opposite the
camp. Around noon the enemy finished crossing the river
and the main corps of the Cossack-Tatar army reached the
battlefield. Under the cover of the ongoing duels a powerful division of 20–25 thousand soldiers managed to regroup near the camp.
He struck the left wing of the Polish army, but was
driven back by the attack of the Jeremy Wiśniowiecki’s regiment19.
A critical situation on the left wing of the Polish army
was saved by the charge of the regiment of Stanislaw
Rewera Potocki – the Voivode of the Bratslav Voivodeship. Repulsed from the left wing, the Tatars attacked the
centrally located regiment of Szymon Szczawiński, who
18
19

Ibid., p. 165.
Ibid., p. 167; Jeremi Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki (also sometimes spelled as Jarema), was born on 17.08.1612 in Łubnie,
died on 20.08.1651 in a camp near Pawołocza; he was Prince
of Wiśniowiec, Łubnie and Chorol, commander of the royal
army, the Voivod of the Ruthenian Voivodeship since 1646,
Staroste of Przemyśl, Przasnysz, Nowy Targ, Hadziacz, Kaniów
region. He was the father of the Polish king Michał Korybut
Wiśniowiecki. He participated in the war with Moscow in
1633–1634 and in the demonstration manoeuvres against the
Swedes in Pomerania, he fought against the Cossack Ostrzanin Uprising. He fought battles with the Tatars, among others
in the Battle of Ochmatów. He was a bitter opponent of the
Khmelnytsky Uprising. During the elections in 1648, he initially supported Jerzy Rakoczy, later Charles Ferdinand Vasa. He
commanded the defence of Zbarazh; he was an opponent of
the Treaty of Zboriv signed with the Cossacks in 1649. He died
suddenly during an expedition against the Cossacks, which
caused rumours that he was poisoned. Quoted from: Encyklopedia Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie. Historia wojen i bitew.
Technika wojskowa. N–Ż…, p. 445.

was assisted by Stanislaw Lanckoroński. The Tatars, however, encircled both regiments and forced them to defend
themselves. This was the critical moment of this stage of
the battle. The Tatars reached the bulwarks of the Polish
camp, where they were fired on by the infantry and regiment cannons. However, the Tatars fell short of reserves
and reduced the pressure against the left wing by getting
involved on the right wing and in the centre. This made it
possible for the Wiśniowiecki’s forces to provide effective
assistance to the left wing of the Polish army. The threat
was averted by a counterattack of the right wing, i.e. the
regiments of Hetman Mikołaj Potocki under the command of Stefan Czarnecki, and the forces of Jerzy Lubomirski and Kazimierz Sapieha, followed by the reiters of
Boguslaw Radziwiłł under his personal command. Polish
forces repulsed the Tatars and pursued them forgetting
that escape is a favourite Tatar manoeuvre, and hence
they got surrounded by a superior Tatar and Cossack force
(perhaps by reinforcements deliberately hidden behind
a hill)20. They escaped the encirclement owing to the help
of Jeremy Wiśniowiecki regiment and mass levy units. The
Tatars and Cossacks attacked the gap between the right
wing and the centre of the Stanisław Lanckoroński regiment backed by mass levy units. The threat was averted
only after the counter attack of the Stanislaw Rewera Potocki’s regiment and the right and left wing units, which
were sent to the endangered sections by John Casimir21.
The intensity of fighting weakened gradually to cease entirely about 4 PM. Royal squadrons went back to the camp.
The Polish army found themselves in a dangerous position. They were pushed into a desperate defence. The
incompetence of the combat leadership of the Polish
command was revealed. Every senior commander acted
on his own and he commanded his troops only. There was
no co-ordination between various forces, which resulted
in the recurring uncertainty. The Poles suffered significant
losses – about 300 soldiers while the Tatars lost about one
thousand fighters, including leaders such as Tugay Bey
and Mehmed Gerey and the captured treasurer, Muffrach.
Khan was dissatisfied with the course of the battle, but
achieved his objective – the controlled the river crossing
and the area around the camp22. The Poles debated their
strategy for the future actions. The plan was to fight the
20
21
22

R. Romański, Beresteczko 1651…, pp. 168–169.
Ibid., p. 171.
Ibid., p. 171.

– 107 –

– Rafał Roguski –

battle in a wagon fort (tabor) array. John Casimir, however, decided to use the offensive option: to field all the
forces and force the opponent to fight a decisive battle.
At that time, at night, under the cover of Tatar armoured
spearheads, the Cossack infantry and artillery crossed the
Plaszówka river and occupied the positions on the hills
between the marshes of Plaszówka and the Szczurowiecki
forest23.
On 30 June 1651, the Polish forces were arranged in
a Western European army manner, which consisted in positioning the army in a chess board deployment with the
fields formed alternately by cavalry and infantry squadrons that were able at any time to support each other in
the fight. John Casimir commanded the forces of 35,000–
40,000 mercenaries (both the supplemental army enlisted
soldiers and the private military) and 40,000 of mass levy
units. The cavalry squadrons were grouped mainly in the
wings whereas in the centre there was the army and foreign-style forces composed of dragoons, reiters with arquebuses and infantry. There were reinforcements made
up of reserve reiter cavalry of the Elector of Brandenburg
and other mass levy forces24. The troop deployment took
place under the personal supervision of the King. The enemy was grouped relatively far away from the front of the
Royal army. The Cossack troops lined up on the right wing,
the Tatars under the command of Amurat, the brother of
Islam-Gerey were deployed on the left and partially in the
centre. The Tatars were also placed in the centre, which
was composed of Tatar, Walachian and Turkish forces under the command of Nurredin Sultan and Sultan Kalga. The
Khan took a position behind the left wing by the forest25.
The battle was started by Jeremi Wiśniowiecki, who
asked for permission to attack as late as at 3 PM. The clash
began with the charge of the regular army cavalry squadrons, which consisted of about 2,000 cavalry. At the spearhead there was Jeremi Wiśniowiecki without armour. The
attack was led towards the Cossacks wing in the direction
of a wagon fort and the troops who were digging trenches
23
24
25

Ibid., pp. 172–173.
Ibid., pp. 175–176.
Ibid., p. 178; Sultan Kalga was the Khan’s steward and administrator of the right (east) region of the Khanate and the
commander of the Tatar right wing of the army. Nureddin Sultan was the second steward of the Khan, the administrator of
the left (western) region of the Khanate and the commander
of the left wing of the army. Quoted from: M. Wagner, Wojna
polsko-turecka w latach 1672–1676, vol. 1, Zabrze 2009, p. 145.

and the one-hundred-men cavalry units guarding them.
The Polish cavalry wedge smashed through the enemy
lines, breaking the Cossack masses and attacking wagon
fort. The critical situation of the Cossack wing was saved
by a counterattack of Tatar forces of Nurredin Sultan. The
Nurredin Sultan’s cavalry posed a threat to the Polish regiments that were facing the wagon fort and fighting the
Cossacks who defended it. The units that were trying to
assist Wiśniowiecki rushed into the crowd of Tatars and
were surrounded by them, but this event made it possible
for Wiśniowiecki to change the front of the squadrons. The
Polish artillery placed in the centre began firing. After driving out the Tatar cavalry, Wiśniowiecki broke through the
Cossack one-hundred-men cavalry units, forcing them to
flee in the direction of the wagon forts. At the same time
as the charge of the squadrons of the left wing, the centre
moved to attack26.
The fight continued on the Cossack wing, where a group
of Wiśniowiecki and Kalinowski attacked Zaporozhye infantry intending to break and capture the Cossack wagon
fort. Tatar troops tried to stop the Polish forces twice, but
their charges were interrupted by the fire of artillery, dragoons and infantry. Polish infantry units were slow, but
consistently moved towards the top of the hill in the centre
of the enemy ranks, attempting to breach them and cut
the communication between the Tatar and the Cossack
wing. During the battle, both John Casimir and the Tatar
Khan were exposed o danger. The Polish King was fired on
from Tatar field cannons and slightly wounded in the leg.
The Polish artillery commanded by Zygmunt Przyjemski
fired at the position of the Khan and killed an unidentified
dignitary standing next to the ruler27.
From the centre, the Tatars were struck by the left wing
forces of Jeremi Wiśniowiecki. The Tatars’ situation became critical. Islam-Gerey was terrified by the prospect of
clash with all the power of the Polish army. Khan’s rearguard was obliterated by the Polish cavalry riding from
the right wing. The Tatar forces were pursued by the right
wing squadrons, mainly by the regiment of Koniecpolski.
The Tatars fled in panic, leaving the dead and wounded.
The escape of the Khan and his troops from the battle
decided the outcome of the Battle of Berestechko, all
the more that Bohdan Khmelnytsky was gone along with
26

27

Ibid., p. 181–182; M. Kukiel, Zarys historii wojskowości w Polsce…, p. 108.
R. Romański, Beresteczko 1651…, pp. 181–189.

– 108 –

– The Battle of Berestechko 28–30 June 1651 –

– 109 –

– Rafał Roguski –

the Khan. The Horde’s main forces retreated through
the road towards Kozin-Krzemieniec and further to
Wiśniowiec, and its rearguard fled to Leśniów. This group
of Tatars was chased and captured by light squadrons
of Aleksander Koniecpolski when crossing the Ikva river.
They were saved from extermination by the king’s order to
give up the pursuit for fear of ambushes.
The Polish assault was interrupted by a heavy rain.
Throughout the night, the Poles were waiting in readiness
in the pouring rain. During that time, the Cossacks managed to dig up their wagon fort28. The casualties suffered
by the Polish forces during the three-day battle included
only 700 soldiers and nobles from the mass levy. Cossack
casualties are not known, but were certainly many times
higher than the Polish.
The decisive battle at Berestechko was intended to be
fought in defensive-offensive way. The decision to attack
was taken only after it was noticed that the Cossack wagon
fort crew started to build trenches. The infantry and artillery, guarded by the cavalry in the centre, was ordered to
fire at the Tatar cavalry, which was vulnerable to firearms.
The Cossacks were attacked by cavalry, which knew how
to engage the enemy infantry that operated using the protection of the wagon fort. The cavalry could even quite effectively attempt to break wagon fort29.
When the battle came to the end, the remains of the
Cossack army found shelter in the fortified wagon fort.
The encircled group of Cossacks showed signs of defeat. There was no leader with any authority. Previously,
this role was played Bohdan Khmelnytsky; afterwards,
the Cossack peasant infantry (a type of mass levy) did
not want to listen to the colonels. The commanders of
the Polish army, hearing the buzz of voices in the Cossack camp, ordered an emergency, convinced that they
are preparing to counter-attack. The turmoil resulted in
fact from the resignation of Filon Dzhalalii from the Hetman title and appointment of Ivan Bohun to fulfil this
function. The new Hetman accelerated the work on the
construction of crossings over the Plaszówka river, where
he intended to escape with the Cossack forces from
the encirclement, and then to strike the Lanckoroński’s
forces and provide an opportunity for the rest of the insurgents to get out as well. However, the insurgents did
28
29

M. Kukiel, Zarys historii wojskowości w Polsce…, pp. 108–109.
W. Majewski, ‘Polska sztuka wojenna w drugiej połowie XVII
wieku’, in Historia wojskowości polskiej. Wybrane zagadnienia,
ed. W. Biegański, P. Stawecki, J. Wojtasik, Warsaw 1972, p. 201.

not know the Hetman’s plans and thought that he was
running away with the elders, leaving them at the mercy
of the enemy. Panic ensued in the camp. The Hetman
and mounted Cossacks who started leaving the camp in
order to organise a crossing were followed by everyone.
Convinced that Cossacks launched a massive assault on
his regiment, Lanckoroński ordered his forces to withdraw towards Korytno and Kozin. However, when they
realised what was happening in reality on the battlefield,
the Royal troops marched into the enemy camp and started a slaughter. “[…] Our army entered the camp and
massacred every Cossack they found while others chased
them a few miles. Over 10,000 of them were killed this
day. The Cossacks were deprived of their banners and the
banners given formerly to Cossacks by our kings […] The
King and the whole army sang Te Deum Laudamus celebrating the victory […] Meanwhile, the servants and nobles
plundered the enemy camp. They seized large quantities
of food, clothing, animals, bells, vessels, various types of
rifles, money. The cannons were given the King“30.
The evening’s council decided to order Marcin Kalinowski, Jeremi Wiśniowiecki and Aleksander Koniecpolski
to pursue the insurgents. During the fighting, they killed
anyone who fell under the sword. No women, children
and priests found with the Cossack army were spared.
They captured the Seal of the Zaporozhye Army, the original document of the Treaty of Zboriv, the mail between
Khmelnytsky and the Sultan, Khan and György Rákóczi II,
a considerable sum of money and other valuables. The
number of Cossack casualties could not be established.
Today it is estimated at 3,000–30,000. Most likely, over
10,000 people were killed in the pursuit31.
However, the victory of Berestechko was not properly
exploited since mass levy nobility, concerned about the
anti-feudal incidents in Podhale and Wielkopolska (Greater
Poland), refused to participate in the rest of the campaign.
The mercenary army reduced to 18,000 soldiers as a result
of combat losses, marches and plagues marched into the
Ukraine and merged with the Lithuanians at Bila Tserkva.
Meanwhile, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, freed from the Tatar
bondage, managed to organise new military forces, which
put up stiff resistance. The Polish army was too weak to
force a favourable outcome of the campaign. After several
30

31

W. A. Serczyk, Na płonącej Ukrainie. Dzieje Kozaczyzny 1648–
1651, Warsaw 1998, p. 346.
Ibid., p. 347.

– 110 –

– The Battle of Berestechko 28–30 June 1651 –

days of fights at Bila Tserkva (23–28 September), Hetman
Potocki signed a new treaty. It limited Cossack conscription census to 20,000, setting Kyiv Voivodeship as their
headquarters. The others “are to remain under serfdom
and works for the castles of His Majesty’. This treaty was in
fact not put into effect and represented only a short‑term
ceasefire32.
Cossacks routed in one place, gathered in another. Released by the Tatars, Khmelnytsky managed to concentrate 50,000 people at Bila Tserkva, while noble mass levy
began to disperse to their homes.
In military terms, the Battle of Berestechko was a significant step forward in the development of tactics of the
Polish infantry and artillery. They worked not only with the
use of fire, but also by means of the movement of artillery,
the movement of light three-pound regiment cannons.
Synchronising the fire and movement, both the infantry
and artillery acted offensively against the Tatar cavalry,
with unguarded right wing. Infantry easily manoeuvred on
the battlefield (changing the direction towards the Cossack
wagon fort). On the third day of the Battle of Berestechko,
there were endeavours to co-ordinate the activities of individual weapons. “The Przyjemski’s artillery supported
the attack of Wiśniowiecki’s cavalry with diagonal fire’ and
“a whole bunch of infantry under the command of the King
manoeuvred during the assault in order to co-operate with
the struggling left wing cavalry’. The infantry alone would
not be able to counteract the return of the defeated Tatar
cavalry to the battlefield, which was achieved only by the
pursuit of the right wing cavalry33. Despite this, during the
Khmelnytsky Uprising, the infantry played a major role,
not only in the defence of the besieged fortresses and fortified camps, but also in some of the battles in the open
field. Its fire frequently was the decisive factor in the battle
against the Tatars allied with the Cossacks. In particular,
it was in the battle of Berestechko. Deployed in the WestEuropean style, the infantry skilfully combined musket fire
with manoeuvre34.
The nobility refused to participate in further campaigns
against the Cossacks in the Ukraine. This forced the Polish monarch to withdraw from the military operations and
to pass the leadership to the Grand Hetman of the Crown
Mikołaj Potocki. A. Miaskowski in correspondence with
32
33
34

Ibid., p. 348.
W. Majewski, Polska sztuka wojenna…, p. 201.
Historia wojskowości polskiej. Wybrane zagadnienia, Warsaw
1972, p. 172.

Prince Charles Ferdinand wrote about mass levy fleeing
from the King. He concluded his dilatation with the words:
“We have learned well what it means to wage wars with
mass levies. God forbid this ever happens’35. It was not
enough that the Polish King as a personal example went
into the Ukraine and reached as far as Krzemieniec. The
Vice-Chancellor Radziejowski accused the monarch of deliberate releases of Cossacks from encirclement. Only the
Hetmans with the army followed the King. Seeing the futility of his endeavours, the King returned to Warsaw36.
Abandoning of the Royal Army by the King and part
of the leadership commanders after the Battle of Berestechko had a negative impact on the discipline and morale of the troops that continued the campaign against the
Cossacks under the command of Hetmans Mikołaj Potocki
and Marcin Kalinowski. The army ranks were left by Prince
Bogusław Radziwiłł and Krzysztof Houwaldt. “All the captains were ordered by the King to stay with their squadrons, but many of them escaped’37.
On the Cossack side, Khmelnytsky conducted a very
clever political game in the period in question. He managed to isolate the Polish-Lithuanian State, which could
not count on the support from Russia or Transylvania,
and all the more from Tatars. He secured his back and
managed to win the support of some allies. As a military
commander, however, Khmelnytsky made mistakes by
losing the initiative to the Polish side. He let the King John
Casimir decide the direction of the conducted military operations, and later to choose the location of the decisive
battle, the Battle of Berestechko. He also failed to protect
Kiev against the Lithuanian army of Janusz Radziwiłł. In
the campaign of 1651, Khmelnytsky showed a lot of conservatism, which was one of the causes of the Cossack and
Tatar defeat at Berestechko38.
Contacts of Hetman Khmelnitsky with Russia were
more important for the Cossacks than further war plans.
The Battle of Berestechko and the subsequent skirmishes
and battles have shown that it is hard to defeat the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth even with the assistance
of Tatars. Therefore, Khmelnytsky reached an agreement
with the Russian Tsar Alexei, the Treaty of Pereyaslav
35

36
37
38

M. Nagielski, ‘Armia koronna w latach 1651–1653’, in Studia
i materiały do Historii Wojskowości, vol. XL, p. 25.
W. A. Serczyk, Na płonącej Ukrainie…, p. 347.
M. Nagielski, Armia koronna w latach 1651–1653…, p. 31.
M. Franz, Idea państwa kozackiego na ziemiach ukrainnych
w XVI–XVII wieku, Toruń 2006, p. 303.

– 111 –

– Rafał Roguski –

signed in 1654, under which Ukraine accepted the Russia’s
authority. In the year 1667, the Truce of Andrusovo was
signed resulting in the division of the Ukraine between
Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It was
confirmed by the Eternal Peace Treaty signed in Moscow
in 1686 by Grzymułtowski39.
The Battle of Berestechko did not bring the results proportional to the achieved victory, neither in military nor in
political terms. The routed Cossack army managed to rebuild its fighting capacity, and the victorious forces of the

39

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth revealed its weakness.
Well-organised and able to use the latest achievements in
military thought, the Polish army lacked discipline after
the end of the battle. The mass levy was a particularly
serious weakness as it refused to continue fighting and
dispersed to their homes. After the victory at the Battle
of Berestechko, the war continued. At the later stage, the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was defeated at the
Battle of Batoh, which ended with the massacre of Polish
prisoners.

W. A. Serczyk, Na płonącej Ukrainie…, pp. 348–349.

Bibliography
Books

Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, vol. XL, Warsaw 2003

Encyklopedia PWN w trzech tomach, vol. 1 a–h, ed. A. Krupa,

M. Franz, Idea państwa kozackiego na ziemiach ukrainnych w XVI–

Warsaw 2006

–XVII wieku, Toruń 2006

Encyklopedia wojskowa , ed. O. Laskowski, vol. 1, Warsaw 1931

M. Kukiel, Zarys historii wojskowości w Polsce, Cracow 1929

Encyklopedia Wojskowa. Dowódcy i ich armie. Historia wojen

L. Podhorodecki, Kozacy zaporoscy. Czy Polska stworzyła Ukrainę?,

i bitew. Technika wojskowa. A–M, ed. A. Krupa, Warsaw 2007
Historia wojskowości polskiej. Wybrane zagadnienia, ed. W. Biegański, P. Stawecki, J. Wojtasik, Warsaw 1972

R. Romański, Beresteczko 1651, Warsaw 1994
W. A. Serczyk, Historia Ukrainy, Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow 1990

Polski Słownik Biograficzny, ed. W. Konopczyński, vol. II, Cracow
1936

W. A. Serczyk, Na płonącej Ukrainie. Dzieje Kozaczyzny 1648–1651,
Warsaw 1998

Polski Słownik Biograficzny, ed. K. Lepszy, vol. X, Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow 1962–1964

Warsaw 2011

M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka w latach 1672–1676, vol. 1,
Zabrze 2009

– 112 –

– Mirosław Nagielski –
University of Warsaw

The Chudniv Campaign of 1660

There is rich literature on the campaign of Chudniv conducted in Ukraine by both hetmans – Stanisław Rewera Potocki and Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski. The subject was discussed by W. Czermak,1 F.R. Gawroński in his work on Yurii
Khmelnytsky,2 A. Hniłko,3 and, in recent times, P. Kroll,4 Ł.
Ossoliński,5 R. Romański,6 or, from the point of view of Polish-Tartar rivalry, Z. Wójcik.7 The issue of the manpower of
the Polish forces participating in this campaign has been
addressed by J. Wimmer.8 In order to present the course of
the Chudniv campaign it is necessary to discuss the military actions in White Ruthenia, where the Polish-Lithuanian
forces took offensive action against the Tsar’s army under
I. Khovansky; the battles have been discussed in detail by
K. Kossarzecki.9 The operations at Chudniv, Liubar and
Slobodyshche were an object of interest of Ukrainian and
1

2
3

4

5
6
7

8

9

W. Czermak, ‘Szczęśliwy rok. Dzieje wojny moskiewsko-polskiej z r.1660’, in Przegląd Polski, vol. 82, 83 and 107 from
1886–1893.
F.R. Gawroński, Ostatni Chmielniczenko, Poznań 1919
A. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku, Warsaw 1931;
idem, ‘Bitwa pod Słobodyszczem’, in Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy, vol. 1–2, Warsaw 1929.
P. Kroll, Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudnowa. Kozaczyzna między
Rzecząpospolitą a Moskwą w latach 1658–1660, Warsaw 2008,
pp. 331–394
Ł. Ossoliński, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze 1660, Zabrze 2006.
R. Romański, Cudnów 1660, Warsaw 1996.
Z. Wójcik, ‘Rywalizacja polsko-tatarska o Ukrainę na przełomie lat 1660–1661’, in Przegląd Historyczny, vol. XLV/4, Warsaw
1960, p.
J. Wimmer, Wojsko polskie w drugiej połowie XVII wieku, Warsaw 1965, pp. 125–131; cf.: idem, ‘Materiały do zagadnienia
liczebności i organizacji armii koronnej w latach 1660–1667’,
in Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, vol. VI, Warsaw
1960, page numbers missing.
K. Kossarzecki, Kampania roku 1660 na Litwie, Zabrze 2005.

Russian historians; essential publications that ought to
be mentioned here include works by V. Gerasimchuk,10 M.
Kostomarov11 or A.V. Malov.12
The end of the war with Sweden (the treaty of Oliva of
rd
3 May 1660) gave the Polish-Lithuanian side the opportunity to take action in the eastern theatre of war, where,
following Ivan Khovansky’s offensive in Lithuania and the
defeat of Ivan Vyhovsky in Ukraine, the Muscovite forces
of Aleksey Mikhailovich once again took the initiative. The
downfall of Hetman I. Vyhovsky and Yurii Khmelnytsky’s
ascension to power were particularly severe. The new
hetman was forced to sign the Pereyaslav Artices with
Moscow on 27th October 1659, which ceded much of his
power to Tsar’s voivods.13 The Commonwealth could not
assist I. Vyhovsky in defending the union of Hadiach due
to difficult operations against the Swedes in Royal Prussia
and a confederation formed by a portion of the army of the
Crown under Military Prefect Mariusz Stanisław Jaskólski.14
Though the confederation was dissolved in early September, due to the change of the Zaporozhian hetman and the
new relations between Cossacks and Moscow, sending
any major force to Ukraine could hardly be imagined.
10

11

12

13
14

V. Gerasimczuk, Cudnivskaja kampania 1660 r., Lvov 1913;
idem, ‘Pered cudnivskoyu kampaneyu’, in Naukovyy Zbirnyk
prysvyacheny profesorovy Mykhaylovy Hrushevskomu, Lvov
1906.
M. Kostomarov, ‘Getmanstvo Yuriya Khmelnytskogo’, in Istoricheskiye monografii i issledovaniya Nikolaya Kostomarova,
vol.XII, St Petersburg 1872.
A.W. Małow, Moskovskiye vybornyye polki soldatskogo stroya v
nachal’nyy period svoyey istorii 1656–1671, Moscow 2006.
P. Kroll, Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudnowa…, pp. 318–326
More on the confederation: E. Janas, Konfederacja wojska
koronnego w latach 1661–1663. Dzieje i ideologia, Lublin 1998,
pp. 26–32.

– 113 –

– Mirosław Nagielski –

In the spring of 1660, due to the initiation of peace
talks with Sweden, the royal court began preparation for
an offensive in the eastern theatre of war, which aimed
at regaining Ukraine and White Ruthenia. Russians occupied key cities and strongholds of the Grand Duchy of
Lithuania, including Vilnius, and after Y. Khmelnytsky’s
forces had surrendered to the Tsar, they controlled not
only Left-bank Ukraine, but also the right-bank Ukraine
voivodeships of the Commonwealth. The king and the
senate were aware of the fact that unpaid soldiers, whose
number amounted to 54 thousand, could not be kept for
a long time because it exceeded financial capability of the
state. In total, according to J. Wimmer’s calculations, on
the eve of the Chudniv campaign the army of the Crown
had 224 units with 38,976 horses and portions in total.
This, after deducting so called ‘blind’ portions15 for both
cavalry and infantry officers, meant about 35 thousand
men. The most significant task of the commanders was to
regroup forces from the territory of the Crown to the eastern theatre of war. Thus, Stefan Czarniecki’s troops returning from Denmark marched to Podlasie in order to support
weak Lithuanian forces under Paweł Sapieha, as the main
armies, led by Aleksander Połubiński and Michał Kazimierz
Pac, stayed in Courland.
The armies of the Crown, which besieged Malbork and
Elbląg, including the HRM’s guard regiment under F. von
Lüdinghausen Wolff or detachments under Jan Sapieha,
the field scribe of the Crown.16
The council of war held in Warsaw in May 1660, and
participated by the king, was a decisive action against
the Russian offensive under Khovansky, who had seized
Brest-Litovsk. The council decided to relocate the army
by splitting it into two parts. S. Czarniecki and his division were to reinforce the Lithuanians in order to oppose
the Russians under Khovansky, and S.R. Potocki, the
grand hetman of the Crown, together with Tatar forces,
was sent to Ukraine; J.S. Lubomirski’s division remained
in reserve, but it was also sent to Ukraine after signing
peace terms with the Swedes. The Polish-Lithuanian victory over I. Khovansky at Polonka, on 27th June 1660, and
the initiation of the offensive operation directed towards
15

16

Portion was general unit of account of soldiers’ pay. About
10% portions (called ‘blind’ portions) was allocated for officers’ salary, thus number of portions was not equal to the actual size of the army.
J. Wimmer, Wojsko polskie w drugiej połowie XVII wieku…, p.
126.

the Berezina and the Dnieper Rivers created new opportunities for the forces of the Crown heading towards the
Ukrainian theater of war.17 The concentration of both divisions lasted long, as the cavalry from the division under
the grand marshal of the Crown reached Horodło in late
July, and the infantry gathered near Kryłów around 19th
August. At the same time, troops were being concentrated
under S.R. Potocki, the grand hetman of the Crown. His
forces gathered near Ternopil. The two divisions and Tatar
reinforcements under Nuradyn-Soltan Safer joined as late
as 9th September.18
What were the forces of the Crown and the Tatar reinforcements on the eve of the Chudniv campaign like?
Within J. Lubomirski’s division we see: 9 infantry regiments with 7761 portions, including the hetman’s own
Hungarian foot company under Kalinowski (100 portions),
3 regiments and 2 squadrons of dragoons, 2107 portions in total, 2 regiments and a squadron of reiters with
1453 horses and 4 cavalry regiments (Jerzy Lubomirski’s,
Aleksander Lubomirski’s, Stanisław Lubomirski’s and Jan
Sobieski’s). S.R. Potocki’s division consisted of the following units of all types of weapons: 4 foreign foot regiments
and 4 Polish infantry regiments with 3020 portions, 5 regiments and 3 squadrons of dragoons with 2986 portions in
total, J. Zamoyski’s reiter regiment with 586 horses and the
remaining cavalry of the national contingent divided into
13 regiments. The army was led by Hetman S. Potocki himself, Anrzej – the voivod of Bratslav, Andrzej – the starosta
of Halych, Jakub – son of the castellan of Cracow, members of the Potocki family, Stanisław Jabłonowski, Samuel
Leszczyński, Mariusz Jaskólski, Jerzy Bałaban and Jan
Wyhowski. In total, both hetmans’ armies, which stationed
in a camp near Starokostiantyniv, consisted of:
– infantry, 10861 portions, i.e. about 9800 men
– dragoons, 5093 portions, i.e. about 4600 men
– reiters, 2039 horses, i.e. about 1800 men
– cavalry of the national contingent, 13,804 horses, i.e.
about 12,400 men.
In total, there were 31,797 portions and horses, i.e.
28,800 soldiers, which, including the Tartar reinforcements estimated at 15 thousand men,19 amounts to
17

18
19

The campaign in White Ruthenia is thoroughly discussed by K.
Kossarzecki, Kampania roku 1660 na Litwie…, pp. 201–300.
A. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku…, pp. 37–38.
Some authors estimate that the Tatar forces were smaller and
did not exceed 12, due to the absence of the khan, see: Ł. Ossoliński, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze 1660…, p. 102.

– 114 –

– The Chudniv Campaign of 1660 –

about 43 thousand men fit for fighting.20 These forces
were hardened in battle after the campaigns against the
Swedes, Brandenburgians and Transilvanians of ‘the Deluge’, and many a soldier remembered the war in Ukraine
preceding the outbreak of the conflict with Charles Gustav.
The Polish-Tatar forces faced the Russo-Cossack
armies. The manpower of the latter cannot be easily estimated. Vasili Borisevich Sheremetev’s army consisted of
three divisions: his own, Osip Shcherbatov’s and Grigori
Kozlovski’s. They were accompanied by Cossack forces under Tymofiy Tsetsura, the colonel of Pereyaslav. Their respective manpower amounted to: Sheremetev’s division –
about 10 thousand men, O. Shcherbatov’s division – 3900
men, G. Kozlovski’s division – 5400 men; in total – about
19 thousand regular soldiers, not including over a dozen
thousand ‘loose men’ accompanying the Muscovite corps.
As far as the unit types are concerned, Sheremetev’s forces
included:
– cavalry of the national contingent, i.e. mounted boyars, with 5100 horses
– foreign reiters, estimated at about 6 thousand horses
– dragoons, with 4000 portions
– infantry, with about 4000 portions, consisting of both
foreign regiments, as well as a Russian marksmen regiment under Levontovich.
In total, the Muscovite army is estimated at 30–34 thousand men.21 It is worth noticing that the Russian army included a few foreign units, consisting of Germans, Swedes,
Englishmen, Dutchmen and people of other nationalities.
For example, selected infantry regiments were led by von
Staden and Craffort, while one of the dragoon regiments
was led by von Howen.22
The Muscovite forces were accompanied by six regiments of Cossacks under acting hetman Tymofiy Tsetsura,
the colonel of Pereyaslav. Apart from the hetman, they
were led by Pavel Apostol (Myrhorod), Vasili Dvoretsky
(Kiev), Fedir Zhuchenko (Poltava), Anikiy Silich (Chernihov)
and Yakov Zasadka (Lubny). These regiments originated
from the Left-bank Ukraine and supported the Russian op20

21

22

J. Wimmer, Wojsko polskie w drugiej połowie XVII wieku…, pp.
129–130.
R. Romański, Cudnów 1660…, pp. 18–19. Ł. Ossoliński estimates the regular Russian army at 19,200 men, not including the
servants at the encampment and the acting hetman Tymofi
Tsetsura’s corps, which accompanied Sheremetev’s troops.
Ł. Ossoliński, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze 1660…, pp. 102–103.
R. Romański, Cudnów 1660…, pp. 18–19

tion. Their manpower did not exceed a dozen or so thousand men, due to serious problems with recruiting troops
in Ukraine because of the military operations carried out
from 1648 onwards. The Cossack corps certainly did not
amount to 20 thousand men, as A. Hniłko stated, considering the fact that the main Cossack army had not yet finished gathering near Bila Tserkva, and is believed to have
had 30–35 thousand men divided into 8 regiments.23 The
Polish side overestimated the Cossack forces both in the
Muscovite encampment and in the division led by the new
Zaporozhian hetman, Y. Khmelnytsky. In his Climacteres,
W. Kochowski explicitly stated that Tsetsura had been accompanied by 30 thousand, and young Yurii by 40 thousand Cossacks, which proved to have been exaggerated by
almost a half.24
Such a superficial calculation leads to the clear conclusion that it was necessary for the Poles to crush the Muscovite forces under Sheremetev before they joined Yurii
Khmelnytsky’s army. For the enemies had at their disposal
an army of well-nigh 80 thousand men in two large divisions.25 The Polish-Tatar side could deploy about 40 thousand soldiers, not including servants and loose men, who
always accompanied regular forces. Unlike the Muscovite
force, well prepared for the campaign in terms of logistics and food supply, the Polish army was hungry and underpaid, and provisions had to be transported by foragers
from areas increasingly distant from the encampment.
Who held the chief command of both armies that were
to fight at Liubar and Slobodyshche? The Polish army was
led by both hetmans of the Crown; Grand Hetman StanA. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku…, pp. 50–51.
Historya panowania Jana Kazimierza przez nieznajomego
autora, ed. E. Raczyński, vol. II, Poznań 1840, pp. 84–85. The
low evaluation of the Cossack forces is confirmed by Samuel
Leszczyński’s poem of 1660, describing the battle of Chudniv,
where we read:
‘Tsetsura counted his Cossacks, under him there served
Thirty thousand, to those who observed
They resembled not men, but rather cattle
As they hideously crowded in the field of battle’
S. Leszczyński, Potrzeba z Szeremetem, hetmanem moskiewskim
i z Kozakami w roku pańskim 1660 od Polaków wygrana, ed.
P.Borek, Cracow 2006, p.56.
25
A. Hniłko overestimates Sheremetev’s forces stating that they
consisted of 11,200 cavalry, 4000 dragoons, 24 thousand regular infantry, about 10 thousand levée en masse infantry and
50 cannons. A. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku…,
p. 52.
23
24

– 115 –

– Mirosław Nagielski –

isław Rewera Potocki, was the nominal commander of
this force. He had served under Żółkiewski and Koniecpolski and tried to regain king John II Casimir’s trust as
atonement for the events of 1655. The actual command
was held by the younger Field Hetman Jerzy Lubomirski,
whom A. Hniłko rightly described as ‘the heart and the
brain of this expedition’, as he was HRM’s trusted official.
Unlike his senior colleague, he was not only successful in
operations based solely on cavalry, but he could also use
other types of units: infantry, dragoons and artillery, which
he proved when he commanded the siege of Toruń in the
autumn of 1658. The Tatar reinforcements sent by Khan
Mehmed IV Giray were led by Nuradyn-Soltan Safer Giray,
known to Poles for his earlier operations in Ukraine. Their
manpower was estimated at between 12 and 15 thousand
sabres, though contemporary sources provide us with
numbers reaching even 40 thousand.26
The command over the Muscovite forces was held by
Vasili Borisevich Sheremetev, the voivod of Kiev, firmly
keeping the Cossacks of the Left-bank Ukraine under the
Tsar’s power. He was known to the Polish commanders
from the battle of Ochmatów, fought in January 1655. He
enjoyed Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich’s support, granted for
his successes in inducing Y. Khmelnytsky to accept the
articles of Pereyaslav and in repelling the Cossack attack
on Kiev led by Daniel Vyhovsky in 1659. Sheremetev was
an outstanding Muscovite commander of his time; he was
consistent in action and enjoyed great authority among
his men.
During the council of war in Starokostiantyniv, two
concepts of conducting the military action against Sheremetev’s forces were confronted. One of them was to wait for
the Russian army, which was heading for Liubar; the other
was to surprise them on their way, which would require
leaving the camp immediately. The Poles decided to depart from Starokostiantyniv, and following the Sluch River
via Ostropol, head towards Liubar, to confront the Russian
forces under Sheremetev directly.27 The first skirmishes
26

27

‘Soltan came [to Starokostiantyniv] with hordes that numbered 40 thousand sabres, not including servants in the encampment’; see: ‘Diariusz wojny z Szeremetem i Cieciurą
półkownikiem perejasławskim, która się odprawowała w mcu
wrześniu, październiku i listopadzie roku 1660’, in Ojczyste
spominki w pismach do dziejów dawnej Polski, ed. A. Grabowski, vol. I, Cracow 1845, p. 144.
Cf. map of the Chudniv campain of 1660, by M. Krwawicz and
T. Nowak, in Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej do roku 1864,

took place as early as on 14th September, when the cavalry
reconnaissance troops brought the news of approaching
Russo-Cossack army. The enemy’s vanguard, consisting
of T. Tsetsura’s men, was crushed. 600 Cossacks were reportedly killed, and the Polish-Tatar troops captured many
wagons. On the next day, both armies prepared for a decisive battle. The Poles were waiting for their infantry and
artillery, Sherevemtev entrenched his camp before combat. The Russo-Cossack force occupied the place known
as Kutishche, and the camp was headed towards the area
known as Pola Hanczaryskie, where the Poles were expected to come from. The Verbka River, swamps and forests
covered the sides and the rear of Sheremetev’s camp.
Though the Russians held a defensive position, they run
into difficulties with finding fresh water and forage for their
horses. The Polish camp had been set up near Liubar, and
the Tatars settled by the lower course of the Verbka River,
north of that town. On 16th September the battle over the
hill overseeing the area began. The hill was occupied by
the dragoons of the royal guard under Col. Jan Henryk
von Alten-Bockum. The troops were pushed back by the
Muscovite cavalry, and their retreat was stopped by Maj.
Jan Magnus von Ochab’s infantry company from the field
hetman’s foot regiment, whose actual commander was Lt
Col. Mikołaj Ghissa. The Russian infantry tried to surround
Polish infantry, but it suffered great casualties inflicted by
cavalry led by Dymitr Wiśniowiecki and Jakub Potocki.
After chasing away the enemy infantry, the horsemen
approached the Muscovite wagon fort, from which they
were fired at by the artillery. The grand hetman’s troops
did not manage to break the positions held by the Russian
infantry.
The forces on the right flank, led by J. Lubomirski, fought
with varying luck. The Cossacks in front of the wagon fort
were struck by cavalry under Jan Sobieski, Jan Sapieha
and Ivan Vyhovsky, followed by Stefan Niemirycz’s and
Krzyszof Korycki’s foot regiments. Cossacks were forced
to flee to the wagon fort. Meanwhile, Safer Giray’s horde,
having noticed the Polish success and desirous of loot, attacked the Muscovite wagon fort and the Russian gunners
had no difficulty in repelling them with fire from muskets
and cannons. When one of the Tatars was shot and pinned
to the ground by his horse, the Cossacks ran at him from
behind the walls, hoping to take him captive. The horde,
known for their cunning, charged at the Cossacks once
ed. J. Sikorski, vol. II, Warsaw 1966, p. 104.

– 116 –

– The Chudniv Campaign of 1660 –

again and, chasing them, entered the part of the Muscovite encampment garrisoned by Tsetsura’s men. The Tatars
were followed by light Polish horsemen, and even some
infantry companies under Gen. Maj. Grotthauz. Lubomirski
himself did not give permission for general assault of that
part of the camp, because Sheremetev managed to recreate the defensive front within the encampment, and the
fights could have ended in heavy casualties among the
cavalry, for the Cossacks fired their guns at their horses.
Both sides suffered major losses, but the outcome of this
struggle led Sheremetev to realise that the Polish-Tatar
side had an advantage, and that he ought to assume defensive tactics while he was waiting for incoming Cossack
regiments.
The rumours about disagreements between Tsetsura’s
Cossack’s and the Muscovite commanders began to
spread among the men in the Polish camp; thus J. Lubomirski sent Cossacks a letter promising the king’s mercy
should they swear allegiance to HRM and the Commonwealth. It persuaded some Cossacks to desert their force
and join the Polish side. Sheremetev did not waste his
time as well. He intended to end the Polish-Tatar alliance
and to this end, he sent a messenger to Safer Giray, promising more gifts for leaving the Poles.28
The position of the Muscovite forces worsened when
the general of the artillery of the Crown, Formhold von
Lüdinghausen Wolff, arrived at the Polish camp with
heavy cannons, mortars and a supply of gunpowder on
23rd September. The Poles built new entrenchments and
began to fire at the enemy, who soon started to suffer
from the shortage of supplies, especially drinking water
and forage for horses. Thus, on 26th Semptember, after
the earthworks facing Chudniv were disassembled, the
Muscovite leader ordered a retreat in a defensive formation. The Muscovite troops were at the front, Cossacks at
the rear and two outer rows of wagons were garrisoned
by dragoons and arquebusiers. At the corners of the
convoy there were cannons, which were supposed to
provide the retreating army with artillery support. The
rear of the formation, occupied by Cossacks, was attacked by J. Lubomirski, while S. Potocki tried to stop the
enemy from the front. The Tatars appeared on the field
of battle, and the Muscovite formation, which was a kilometre long, was attacked from each side. Jan Zamoyski’s
hussar company under Lt Silnicki distinguished itself by
28

A. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku…, p. 77.

piercing deeply into the enemy’s left flank. In the evening, the Muscovite formation, having marched for 2 miles,
reached a muddy rivulet known as Ibr, that hindered the
wagons from moving further. The Poles did not manage
to stop the enemy at the crossing, because the infantry
and artillery were far behind the cavalry that blocked the
moving convoy. They managed to crush only the portion
of Muscovite infantry and Cossack force that was stuck
at the crossing. The night allowed Sheremetev to move
further away from the ford and recreate the wagon fort
formation. Diarists estimated the Muscovite casualties
at 2 thousand; Polish casualties were significantly lower,
but many officers leading the reiters and the infantry
died, including Bartłomiej Gaszyński, Lt Col. of the reiters, or Maj. Wierzchowski from Franciszek de Buy’s foot
regiment. Stefan Niemirycz, commander of the foot regiment, was shot in the arm, and so was his deputy, Lt
Col. Jan Stachurski. In this regiment only, over a hundred
men suffered from bullet wounds.
Meanwhile, the Russo-Cossack forces marched towards Chudniv, on the Teterev River, initially harassed
only by Tatar skirmishers. As late as at the dawn of 27th
September, the Polish cavalry set off to chase the enemy
who had already managed to cross the river with their
wagons. The Russians, however, made a serious mistake:
they had not garrisoned their crew at the Chudniv keep,
which was immediately taken by J.H. Bockum’s dragoons
following J. Lubomirski’s order. Neither Cossack nor Muscovite infantry managed to seize that stronghold – they
confined themselves to setting the town on fire. That
gave both divisions the time necessary for surrounding
Sheremetev’s wagon fort, which was forced, by the Polish artillery, to entrench its position and encircle it with
wagons. As late as on 28th September, the Polish wagons
crossed the river and the Poles started to set artillery positions. The exchange of cannon fire began. At the same
time, a troop of Tatars supported by S. Niemirycz’s foot
regiment repelled the enemy from the Chudniv orchards
after a hard struggle. The battle with the Cossacks began
with a general clash that included several regiments of
the Polish cavalry, along with J. Sobieski’s unit, which
distinguished itself in confronting Muscovite footmen
and horsemen sent to support the Cossacks. Though the
Russians managed to defend their position, they suffered
great casualties.
The joy of the success on 27th September was overshadowed by the message of approaching Cossack corps

– 117 –

– Mirosław Nagielski –

under Yurii Khmelnytsky. Capt. Teodor Szandarowski,
sent on a reconnaissance mission, brought the news
that the Zaporozhian hetman, leading an army of almost
40 thousand men and 30 guns, had set off towards the
Muscovite forces and, marching towards Chudniv, had
already reached Pryluky. In fact, young Yurii had at his
disposal 8 Cossack regiments of the Right-bank Ukraine:
Bila Tserkva regiment under Ivan Kravchenko, Bratslav
regiment under Mikhail Zelinsky (Zelensky), Chyhyryn
regiment under Petr Doroshenko, Uman regiment led
by Mikhail Khanenko, Podolia regiment under Eustakhy
Hohol, Pavoloch regiment under Ivan Bohun, Korsun
regiment led by Yakov Ulezko, and Kalnik regiment under Ivan Verteletsky.29 In total, Khmelnytsky’s forces
numbered 20–25 thousand Cossacks supported by 12
companies from Constantin Serban, the former prince of
Wallachia.
In spite of Sheremetev’s pressure, the Cossacks remained at Pryluky, east of Vinnytsia, awaiting further
reinforcements. In fact, the news of Polish-Lithuanian
military successes in Lithuania and the difficult situation
of Muscovite forces in Ukraine gave rise to a party within
the Cossack army that drew conclusions from the military
advantage of the Commonwealth in the eastern theatre
of war. The Cossacks might have been waiting for the
Kaniv and Cherkasy regiments, which had been sent to
Zaporozhia beforehand. Khmelnytsky eventually decided
to leave Pryluky on 30th September and marched towards
Berdychiv (in straight line, his position was only 87 km
from Chudniv, which the Zaporozhian army could traverse
in 4–5 days in the tabor formation). After three days, the
Cossack regiments reached Berdychiv, where they were
joined by a messenger from the hetmans of the Crown –
Piotr Stepczyński, who brought the offer to enter peace
talks and a the promise of pardon from the king and the
Commonwealth. After a stormy debate among the colonels the offers were refused, and on 5th October the Cossack
formation left Berdychiv and headed towards Chudniv.
On the next day, the Cossacks reached Slobodyshche, at
the mere 27 km distance from the site of battle between
the Poles and Sheremetev. The Cossacks would need 1–2
days of march to join the Russians. Meanwhile, the Cossack wagon fort was approached by Polish troops under
field hetman J. Lubomirski.
29

See the list of Cossack colonels given by P. Kroll, in P. Kroll, Od
ugody hadziackiej do Cudnowa…, pp. 411–412.

The Poles constantly sent forayers whose task was to
observe the movement of Khmelnytsky’s corps. They
confirmed that the Zaporozhian hetman was approaching Chudniv and that he reached Slobodyshche with the
regiments of Right-bank Ukraine on 6th October. Hence,
in the night from October 6th to October 7th, the Poles prepared forces who were supposed to march against the
Cossacks in order to prevent them from joining besieged
Sheremetev. The division assigned to this task consisted
of 14 companies under I. Vyhovsky, which constituted
the vanguard together with 6 thousand horde riders
(‘Soltanik’ – nuradyn-soltan’s son remained with 5 thousand Tatars near Chudniv, in order to block the Muscovite
convoy) and 6 cavalry regiments: hetman’s own unit under Andrzej Sokolnicki, Aleksander Lubomirski’s regiment
under Władysław Wilczkowski, Stanisław Lubomirski’s
regiment under Stanisław Wyżycki, Dymitr Wiśniowiecki’s
regiment, Jan Zamoyski’s regiment and Jan Sobieski’s regiment. Their manpower is estimated at 5–5.5 thousand
men. Other types of units led by J. Lubomirski included:
2 regiments under Stefan Franciszek de Oedt’s and Jan
Zamoyski’s reiters with about 1500 horses;30 3 regiments of
dragoons under J. H. de Alten Bockum (royal guard), Józef
Łączyński’s dragoons and dragoons of the hetman’s bodyguard company under Aleksander Pniewski (about 800
portions in total31). The infantry consisted of 1000–1200
men chosen from Paweł Cellari’s, Stefan Niemirycz’s and
the hetman’s own regiment under M. Ghissa. The majority
of infantry and dragoons remained at Chudniv because
the Polish commanders feared that Sheremetev might
try to leave his positions and fight his way through to Khmelnytsky’s Cossacks. Thus, assuming a lowered estimate
of the manpower of particular units, the field hetman’s
30

31

According to the data from the third quarter of 1660, their
respective strength was: J. Lubomirski’s reiters under baron
de Oedt – 919 horses, and J. Zamoyski’s reiters under Gordon
– 586 horses. In total, 1505 horses, not including casualties
incurred in combat or during the march; cf.: J. Wimmer, Materiały do zagadnienia liczebności i organizacji armii koronnej…,
pp. 242–243.
Probably only a part of dragoons from those regiments was
taken, as according to the data from the third quarter of 1660
their strength was: the royal regiment under J.H. Bockum –
636 portions, J. Łączyński’s regiment – 200 portions; hence in
total – 1372 dragoons; ibid., pp. 248–249. Ł. Ossoliński estimates the number of dragoons marching towards Slobodyshche
against the Cossacks at 500; idem, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze
1660…, p. 59.

– 118 –

– The Chudniv Campaign of 1660 –

– 119 –

– Mirosław Nagielski –

corps did not exceed 15 thousand, including the forces under I. Vyhovsky and the Tatar horde.32
In the camp near Slobodyshche, inexperienced Yurii
Khmelnytsky had 20–25 thousand Cossacks reinforced by
Wallachian cavalry with 1200 horses. The Cossack corps
did not expect the Polish-Tatar attack, and, what seems
strange, did not conduct any reconnaissance. The Tatar
vanguard captured many Cossack horses grazing in the
nearby fields as early as on 7th October. J. Lubomirski’s
forces reached the Cossack wagon fort in the late afternoon,33 and, having noticed confusion among the surprised Cossacks, started preparing an assault on their
encampment. Though the men were eager to fight, the
hetman was aware of the difficulty in breaking the Cossack wagon fort, which seemed to be impressive. In front
of the army of the Crown there was a marsh formed by the
Hnilopiat River, and the Cossack camp could be seen on
a hill beyond the town. As Cossacks started to build earthworks and entrench the wagon fort in a hurry, the hetman
took the only possible decision – to attack the Cossack
fortifications immediately. A well entrenched wagon fort
with field artillery positions was impossible for the Poles
to capture, which they learnt from the very beginning of
the war with Khmelnytsky.
After crossing the Hnilopiat River, the Tatars attacked
the wagon fort and lost many horses, which fell into holes
dug by the Cossacks in front of their wagons. The horde
was followed by two reiter regiments, four hussar companies and 200 dragoons. Yet only after the attack of Gen.
Cellari’s dragoons and infantry the Poles managed to fight
their way into the Cossack wagon fort. Sobieski’s and
Zamoyski’s cavalry regiments distinguished themselves by
reaching deep into the Cossack camp, and Wilczkowski’s
hussar company endangered Khmelnytsky’s tents. The
Poles and German reiters in Polish service caused their
own demise by their lust for loot, as both infantry and
dragoons rushed towards the enemy wagons to take the
32

33

A. Hniłko estimates J. Lubomirski’s corps at 16,000 men, just
like R. Romański, while Ł. Ossoliński lowers its manpower to
13,800–14,200 men; A. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660
roku…, p. 102; R. Romański, Cudnów 1660…, p. 127; Ł. Ossoliński, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze 1660…, p. 59.
A reiter in the Polish service who took part in those events
– Hieronim Chrystian Holsten – wrote in his diary that J.
Lubomirski’s corps reached the wagon fort at noon (sic!); cf.:
H.Ch. Holsten, Przygody wojenne 1655–1666; ed. T. Wasilewski,
Warsaw 1980, p. 58.

spoils of war, which gave Cossacks time necessary to organise a counterattack and push the enemy outside the
wagon fort. This situation was described by Joachim Jerlicz, a diary writer, who explicitly stated that ‘some fought,
some, namely dragoons and infantry, rushed for the loot.
Cossacks, having noticed it, regrouped, repelled our men
and killed quite a lot of noble captains, German commanders and lieutenants’34. The reiters also managed to
enter the camp after the horde had been repelled and fled
the field. The reiter troops succeeded, yet not without difficulty, in retreating from the wagon fort, but they suffered
huge casualties. Let us quote Hieronim Chrystian Holsten,
a reiter in the Polish service: ‘Eventually, they chased
us away from the camp with guns, pikes, bows, scythes,
staves and even wagon posts, to a place which happened
to be a marsh. There, a battle started for good and lasted
until sunset’35. Reinforcements sent by J. Lubomirski did
not manage to provide any help. The Cossacks seized two
reiter standards and killed many high ranked officers who
led their men to battle. Baron de Oedt, the actual commander of Grand Marshal of the Crown’s reiters, fell, Lt
Col. E. Łącki suffered a bullet wound, ‘Maj. Łaszowski was
wounded, and Captain Mautner was killed with an axe,
having slain about twenty men himself’36. Cavalry companies, mainly the hussars, suffered great casualties as
well; Holsten wrote that ‘a few hussar companies were totaliter crushed.’ Dusk falling on earth stopped the struggle,
and the next day the belligerents saw piles of corpses in
the field of battle. Holsten counted ‘3000 Cossacks, not
including the wounded and injured,’ though he seems to
exaggerate greatly. The Polish casualties were significant
as well, they ought to be estimated at a few hundred killed
and wounded. The battle of Slobodyshche was inconclusive, but it made the Cossacks aware that the Polish-Tatar
forces were dangerous, as they not only managed to
stop the Cossack convoy, but also surrounded their ally
– Sheremetev. On 8th October, after inspecting the Cossack encampment, J. Lubomirski abandoned the idea of
a frontal assault, at the same time initiating peace talks,
34

35
36

J. Jerlicz, Latopisiec albo kroniczka różnych spraw i dziejów
(1648–1673), vol. II, Warsaw 1853, p. 54.
H.Ch. Holsten, Przygody wojenne 1655–1666…, p. 59.
Ibid., p. 59. As the diarist adds: ‘Captain Makowski had his
head split open with a scythe, my lieutenant captain was shot
too, and four lieutenants fell in the field, as well as three cornets. Two horses were shot under me, and there were some
cuts and bullet holes in my banner’; ibid.

– 120 –

– The Chudniv Campaign of 1660 –

whose aim was to persuade Cossacks to break the alliance
with Russia. Due to the news of the Muscovite attempt
at fighting their way through the surrounding forces, and
having received alarming letters from S. Potocki, the field
hetman set off to return to Chudniv on the same day. He
left Murat Giray’s Tatars and several Polish companies to
keep Khmelnytsky in check. At the same time he appointed Pavel Tetera and Ivan Hrusha to conduct negotiations
with the Zaporozhian hetman. The promises of HRM’s and
the Commonwealth’s pardon worked. From 7th to 14th October the Cossack elders debated the situation stormily.
They even sent messengers to the Tatars, trying to bribe
them to join the Cossacks. Murat Giray, however, handed
the letters to Lubomirski.
Meanwhile at Chudniv, most probably due to an agreement with Y. Khmelnytsky, the Muscovite forces tried to
move towards Pyatka, but they were stopped by the horde
and Polish cavalry regiments. In the evening, the grand
marshal’s forces, returning from Slobodyshche, entered
the camp. On the next day, there arrived a group of Cossack emissaries, led by Ivan Kravchenko, the colonel of
Bila Tserkva, demonstrating their conciliatory attitude and
willingness to enter into peace talks. Between 9th and 13th
October, the pro-Russian option once again triumphed in
young Yurii’s circle, and the date of joining Sheremetev’s
troops was set to 14th October. On that day both armies
were to meet near Pyatka, which Poles learned from the
Cossacks who opted for re-establishing the relationship
with the Polish monarch. Indeed, on 14th October, after disassembling the earthworks in the early morning, the Muscovite forces started marching along the road to Pyatka,
capturing entrenchments that blocked their path. As late
as at about 1 p.m., the Russians were once again chased
back to their wagon fort, which situated the enemy in an
unfavourable position, at the edge of the forest. Muscovy
reportedly lost many wagons, a portion of supplies and
cannons, and suffered large casualties. A. Hniłko estimates
them at 1500 deceased Russians and Tsetsura’s Cossacks.
Sheremetev’s situation was becoming hopeless, especially
due to the fact that the Poles drew Murat Giray’s horde
from Slobodyshche. The Muscovite leader himself counted on Khmelnytsky’s Cossacks, who started preparing for
the march from their camp towards Pyatka on 14th October. However, upon hearing the sounds of battle between
the Muscovites and the Poles, the Cossacks slowly formed
their wagons into a marching column. According to one
of the witnesses ‘The hetman did not dare fight his way

through the enemy regiments with some Cossacks, especially because there was confusion among them’37. Only
12 thousand Cossacks left the wagon fort, but they moved
so slowly that they reached Pyatka when the battle with
Sheremetev was about to conclude, and the Muscovite
wagon fort was encircled by both hetmans’ division again.
Most of the Cossack forces remained at Slobodyshche
waiting for the further course of action. An unknown author of a report on the events rightly observed that if the
Cossacks had wanted it, they would have reached Sheremetev’s camp, as most of the Polish-Tatar forces were
called back to stop the Muscovite formation that headed
towards Pyatka. He wrote: ‘The resonation of that noise
percutit Khmelnystky, because he was convinced that
there was shooting at Pyatki, which induced him to agree.
He was estimated to have had 20000 Cossacks and 30 cannons by him; he could have reached Sheremet had he
wanted to, for after that battle our companies were decimated, the artillery summo defektu laborabat, and there
were no horses to pull the cannons’38.
The news of Sheremetev’s failed evacuation attempt
reached the Cossack encampment quickly. Khmelnytsky
himself assumed that the Muscovite struggle was lost,
sending the Chyhyryn colonel, Petr Doroshenko, to the
Polish camp with the information that the Cossacks are
willing to enter negotiations with Poles. To allow the talks
to begin, the Poles sent hostages to the Cossack wagon
fort (Capt. Tomasz Karczewski, the cup-bearer of Chełm,
Lt Władysław Wilczowski and Mehmed Mirza), and over
a dozen colonels and sotnia leaders, headed by Hrehory
Lesnitski, Mikhail Hanenko and Ivan Kravchenko. The Polish delegation was presided by Michał Jerzy Czartoryski,
the voivod of Bratslav, Aleksander Cetner, the castellan of
Halych, Jan Sobieski, the standard bearer of the Crown,
Jan Szumowski, the pantler of Sandomierz, and Andrzej
Sokolnicki, the standard bearer of Lvov.39 Initially, the talks
were conducted in a good atmosphere, due to the Polish guarantee that all the privileges and liberties given to
them by the Polish kings would be preserved. However,
when the Cossacks demanded restoration of the pact of
Hadiach, the talks came to a standstill.
It was decided that the Poles should seek agreement
with the Cossacks to separate them from Muscovy, but
37
38
39

Cf. P. Kroll, Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudnowa…, p. 382.
Diariusz wojny z Szeremetem i Cieciurą…, vol. I, pp. 159–160.
Diariusz wojny z Szeremetem i Cieciurą…, vol. I, p. 160; P. Kroll,
Od ugody hadziackiej do Cudnowa…, p. 384.

– 121 –

– Mirosław Nagielski –

the final compromise should be renegotiated after the
end of the conflict. The Polish party eventually consented to the restoration of the treaty of Hadiach, excluding
the point which established the Duchy of Ruthenia. On
17th October 1660, an agreement, known as the treaty
of Chudniv, was signed, and the most important points
concerned the return of Ukraine and the Cossack lands
under the reign of the Polish monarch. In exchange, the
Cossacks not only renounced Tsar Aleksey Mikhalovich’s
protection, accepting John Casimir Vasa as their king but
they also took on the duty to capture the strongholds and
cities which still remained in Muscovite hands. T. Tsetsura
and the Cossacks in Sheremetev’s camp received pardon
on the condition that they left the Muscovite wagon fort
immediately. The regiments of Nizhyn and Chernihiv
were to abandon the Muscovite service and support Polish-Lithuanian forces that fought in White Ruthenia. In
the evening of 17th October, Zaporozhian Hetman Y. Khmelnytsky came to the Polish camp in person to swear
the treaty. The solemn oath was taken in Grand Hetman
Stanisław Potocki’s tent on the next day. The Cossack
Hetman himself was to send public letters with information about the treaty to cities of Ukraine in order to persuade both Cossacks and the municipal authorities to
resume their loyalty towards HRM.
The first mutual Polish-Cossack initiative was to lead
Tsetsura’s regiments out of the Muscovite wagon fort.
Fearing the reaction of the Russian commander and
with Cossacks opting for alliance with the Tsar, T. Tstetsura
kept the plans secret, which resulted in the failure of the
attempt to leave Sheremetev’s camp on 21st October. The
colonel of Pereyaslav rallied his Cossacks prematurely,
without waiting for the Poles to take positions opposite the
earthworks occupied by his men. The plan was not known
to the Tatars, who attacked the Cossacks who were leaving the encampment. Some of them were slain; some had
been taken captive before the hetman reacted by sending cavalry companies towards the Muscovite entrenchments. As little as 2 thousand Cossacks under T. Tsetsura
and Pavel Apostol, the colonel of Myrhorod, reached the
Polish camp; the remaining men, seeing the fate of their
companions, went back to the Muscovite wagon fort.40 An
anonymous witness to the events described the failed
40

A. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku…, pp. 139–140.
Tsetsura was arrested for leading the passage without success.

attempt of the Pereyaslav colonel’s passage to the Polish
camp: ‘Tsetsura, not having gathered all the Cossacks and
not having told everyone about the agreement, took his
company, as upon seeing Khmelnytsky’s troop, as he had
been ordered, and left the camp followed by only 2000
Cossacks. They were struck by the Tatars who caused
a great tumult among our men, because they took Cossacks, and our men, who intended to attract both parties,
tried to hinder them from doing so. In this confusion,
about 200 Cossacks were killed by the horde, others were
led to our camp, and some were taken by the horde’41. The
Polish commanders were surprised by the attitude of the
horde, which insisted on striking Khmelnytsky’s Cossacks,
slaughtering them as rebels against the king and the Commonwealth and taking the survivors captive. This incident
served as a pretext for Khmelnytsky to ignore the terms of
the Chudniv agreement, as he neither sent 2 regiments to
continue the fight with Muscovy, nor intended to continue
military operations in Ukraine or to besiege Kiev, garrisoned with a mighty crew under Kniaz Yurii Bariatynsky.
With the hetmans’ consent, Khmelnytsky was allowed to
march deep into Ukraine, but his forces weakened due to
mass desertions of men fleeing to their homes. The burden of concluding the campaign against Sheremetev lay
only on the hetmans and their corps.
The battle between the Polish infantry and the Muscovite arquebusiers near the encampments started on
22nd October. It was accompanied by constant exchange
of artillery fire. Sheremetev’s situation became increasingly desperate due to the location of his wagon fort on
marshy terrain, insufficient supplies and lack of forage for
horses, drinking water and fuel, necessary as the nights
became colder. The Russian leader counted on reinforcements from Kniaz Y. Boriatynsky, who indeed had
left Kiev with 4 thousand soldiers, but having heard of
the Cossack’s betrayal, stopped at Rozhevo, i.e. about 60
km southeast of Kiev and waited for more troops.42 From
23rd October on, due to pressure from his soldiers, Shere41
42

Diariusz wojny z Szeremetem i Cieciurą…, p. 161.
Bariatynsky left Rozhevo with a corps of 5 thousand men as
late as on 28th October. He led many horses and supplies for
besieged Sheremetev. He reached Brusyliv, about 90 km from
the Muscovite camp, but due to the change of the Cossack
and the local sentiments, he marched back to Kiev. The news
of his approach induced J. Lubomirski to order J. Sobieski’s
regiment to cooperate with Khmelnytsky’s Cossacks; cf.: A.
Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku…, p. 147.

– 122 –

– The Chudniv Campaign of 1660 –

metev decided to start negotiating his capitulation with
Poles. The talks were conducted by a commission led by
Stanisław Bieniewski, voivod of Chernihiv, representing
the Poles, Kniaz Grigori Kozlovsky representing the Russians and Omer-Agha and Kammekhmet-Mirza representing Tatars. The talks were stormy and difficult as the
Russians rejected numerous terms proposed by the hetmans, including war reparations of 4 million and handing
the documentation concerning the recognition of the authority of Moscow by Ukraine. They only agreed to turn in
the Cossack traitors who remained in the Russian camp.
Eventually, the tragic situation induced Sheremetev to
accept the terms offered by the Poles. The conditions
in the camp were described by Holsten, who had been
taken prisoner by the Muscovites. Let him have his say:
‘There was such great famine that I cannot even begin
to describe it. Our Poles and Tatars blocked them so effectively that they could only take 20 steps from their encampment. A horse ate another horse out of hunger, and
one could find neither leaves, nor wood, nor tree roots.
To us, their prisoners, they handed a piece of raw horse
meat from time to time. Out of bones we immediately
made fire and coal that we used in order to cook meat,
until it was burnt’43. The talks concluded on 1st November, and the Cossack leader confirmed the agreement on
the following day. Let us list some of the most important
conditions of the Russian capitulation:
– Muscovite were to leave Kiev, Pereyaslav, Nizhyn,
Chernihiv and other cities, handing cannons and military
supplies to Polish commissars.
– Kniaz Bariatynsky was to accept the conditions and
arrive in the Polish camp as a hostage, guaranteeing Muscovite departure from Ukraine
– The Russians were to hand over weapons, cannons
and ammunition to Poles.
– V. Sheremetev, eight boyars and 300 noblemen were
to remain hostage in the Polish camp until the Muscovite
garrisons abandoned cities in Ukraine.
– The Muscovite forces were to leave the wagon fort
after 3 days, and march to Kodnya, Kotelnya and Pavoloch
until the conditions were met.
– The captives were to be freed from the Muscovite
camp.44
43
44

H.Ch. Holsten, Przygody wojenne…, p. 62.
Ł. Ossoliński, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze 1660…, pp. 92–93; cf.: R.
Romański, Cudnów 1660…, pp. 180–182.

Tatars were promised not only the payment of 300,000
talars, but also 24 hostages as security.45 The Tatars opposed accepting Sheremetev’s and Tsetsura’s Cossacks’
capitulation from the beginning. The Poles, forced by
their ally, had to pay Safer Giray with Cossack and Russian prisoners including the Muscovite leader himself. On
3rd November Cossacks from Tsetsura’s regiments were
handed to the horde, and on the next day the Muscovite
regiments leaving the encampment were captured by the
Tatars. Though Sheremetev, the boyars and the nobles
remained in the Polish camp, most of the Muscovite soldiers stayed in their wagon fort. In the night from 4th to
5th November, the horde attacked the encampment, and,
having crushed the Polish guards and slaughtered those
who opposed, took all the Muscovite captives. The Tatars
did not confine themselves to this, but also demanded
the head of Sheremetev, who was in the hetmans’ camp,
under their protection. J. Lubomirski had to comply, as
it might have resulted in the fall of the alliance with the
Tatars, who were more numerous than Poles, who suffered
great casualties during the battles and part of whom (J.
Sobieski’s and Jakub Potocki’s regiments) had been sent
towards Y. Bariatynsky’s corps. Sheremetev was handed
to the Tatars, proclaiming rightly that the conditions of
the capitulation had been violated by the Poles, and that
Russian garrisons could not be expected to leave Ukraine.
Only the reiters in the Polish service sheltered their fellows
– the prisoners from Muscovite regiments – which was described by Hosten in his war diary: ‘However, we saved all
the Germans and divided them between our German regiments.’ He noted with satisfaction that he gained quite
a lot from the Muscovites who were handed to Tatars, and
whose wagons were left at the soldiers’ disposal: ‘I halted
Muscovite carts and took many costly items, I gained over
a few thousand (talars)’46.
Muscovites suffered the greatest deal of casualties; in
fact, Sheremetiev’s army ceased to exist; part of the soldiers were killed, others died of wounds and hunger, and
the remainder, including their leader, became Tatar captives. T. Tsetsura’s Cossacks lost about a thousand men
killed in combat, 3 thousand wounded or dead of injuries and exhaustion, and about 2 thousand taken cap45

46

Patryk Gordon writes that Tatars were promised 60 thousand
reichstalar and 20 hostages from Russian courtiers; see: P.
Gordon, Pniewnik 1659–1667, ed. D.G. Fedosow, Moskwa 2002,
p. 74.
H. Ch. Holsten. Przygody wojenne…, pp. 64–65.

– 123 –

– Mirosław Nagielski –

tive by the Tatars. Actual Cossack casualties were much
higher because they ought to include men killed and injured in battle at Slobodyshche, whose number is estimated by historians at between 1500 and 4000. What were
the victors’ casualties? The Tatars lost the fewest men,
amounting to a few hundred dead and wounded; the
total number did not exceed a thousand horde warriors.47
A. Hniłko estimates the Polish casualties from the whole
Chudniv-Slobodyshche campaign at 3500–4000 men, i.e.
about 15% of the total manpower of the army that entered
Ukraine in the summer. J. Wimmer adds about 1500–2000
dead from starvation, disease and exhaustion.48 The casualties were most probably higher, as many soldiers deserted after the conclusion of the campaign, while others died
of hunger and exhaustion. The great casualties of the army
of the Crown were described by diarists who participated
in the events in Ukraine. Joachim Jerlicz noted in his diary that the number of the killed amounted to 14 thousand, which sounds improbable. News of the great losses
among the nobles who served in cavalry companies that
took part in the campaign spread in the Commonwealth.
Under date of 9th November 1660, Antoni Chrapowicki from
Podlasie wrote in his diary that: ‘Sheremetev himself was
taken prisoner and his army was crushed on 29 octobris.
God forbid that it should change. True, but many of our
men are said to have died’49. In the anonymous account
of the fight with Sheremetev we read that though the
campaign was victorious, the army was in a lamentable
state: ‘Old soldiers, remembering the Russian, Livonian
and Prussian wars cannot remember such a beautiful and
tough war; because for seven Sundays, men could fight
each day and the guards had to be kept the whole day and
night, hay had to be sought 8 or 10 miles away, grass 3 or 4
miles away, and grain over 20 miles away, and horses died
before it was brought’50. Did such high casualties balance
out the victories of that campaign? How should the hetmans’ actions and the results of the Russo-Polish struggle
of the autumn of 1660 be judged?
47

48

49

50

Ł. Ossoliński, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze 1660…, p. 95; A. Hniłko,
Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku…, p. 162.
A. Hniłko, Wyprawa cudnowska w 1660 roku…, p. 161; J. Wimmer, Wojsko polskie w drugiej połowie XVII wieku…, p 130. Ł.
Ossoliński estimates the Polish casualties at 5300 killed. Ł.
Ossoliński, Cudnów-Słobodyszcze 1660…, p. 95.
J.A. Chrapowicki, Diariusz, pt. (1656–1664), ed. T. Wasilewski,
Warsaw 1978, p. 267.
Diariusz wojny z Szeremetem i Cieciurą…, p. 163.

The victories of S. Czarniecki’s division and the Lithuanian
army at Polonka and Lyakhavichy in White Ruthenia, and
the success of the Crown forces in Ukraine began a new
chapter of the conflict between Muscovy and the Commonwealth after the conclusion of the war with the Swedes. The
triumphs of 1660 foreshadowed the regaining of the operational initiative by the Commonwealth and reclaiming the
provinces that had been lost since the outbreak of the war
with Muscovy (1654). Despite the casualties suffered during
the campaign, the results were impressive; V. Sheremetev’s
army ceased to exist, and the Polish command were faced
with a prospect of renewing the military operations in the
following year. The unfortunate military confederations of
1661–1663 wasted the opportunities that had arisen after
the Polish-Lithuanian victories of 1660. The Cossack issue
is an important aspect of the Chudniv campaign. The Russo-Polish struggle for Ukraine started with B. Khmelnytsky’s
Pereyaslav articles of 1654. The union of Hadiach created
a short-lived bond between the Cossacks and the Commonwealth, but due to both parties I Vyhovsky could not
retain his power in 1659. The young Zaporozhian hetman,
Yurii Khmelnytsky, and his colonels faced the dilemma of
choosing between Muscovy and the Commonwealth. The
campaign of 1660 showed the might of the Commonwealth
and induced the Cossack elders to support the idea of surrendering to John Casimir Vasa.
The violation of the conditions of Sheremetev’s capitulation by the Polish-Tatar side and their rejection by
Aleksey Mikhailovich led to the necessity of fighting for
both Right-bank and Left-bank Ukraine. The lands beyond
the Dnieper, including Kiev, which had a strong garrison,
remained in Russian hands. The success at Chudniv only
brought the Commonwealth closer to repelling the Muscovites from Ukraine, but the Polish side was aware of
the difficulty resulting from cooperation with Tatars, who
pursued their own political and military goals, and of the
lamentable state of the military, who had not been paid
since 1655. The agreement of Chudniv initiated a lasting
division among the Cossacks, who were deprived of able
commanders, and the army of the Crown took their winter
lodgings in Right-bank Ukraine, to some degree manifesting the end of the Cossack autonomy. The struggle
for Ukraine continued in the years that followed (John
Casimir’s invasion of Left-bank Ukraine of 1663/1664), thus
leading to the lasting division of the country into the Polish
(right bank of the Dnieper) and Muscovite part (left bank),
confirmed by the Treaty of Andrusovo in January 1667.

– 124 –

Bibliography
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– 125 –

– Marek Wagner –
Siedlce University of Natural Sciences and Humanities

The Battle of Chocim, 10–11 November 1673

In October 1673 Grand Hetman of the Crown – Jan i m pact on his further plans, on the presence of three Turkish
corps on the Moldavian and Podolia operational area: in
Kamieniec, near Chocim and near Cecora. As early as at
the end of the month there was a new concept of how to
attack and destroy the Hüseyin Pasha corps before Kaplan Pasha reaches Cecora with his troops. Sobieski was
convinced of its accuracy. His only justified concern was
whether there will be an alliance between the Lithuanians,
Moldavians, and the inhabitants of the Crown territory
(Polish: Koroniarze), otherwise the Poles will have to fight
the overwhelming Turkish forces1.
Thus the army immediately marched from the Lvov
region towards Sniatyn to join with the Moldavian troops
of Stefan Petriceicu on 31 October. Hospodar camped
near Barbesti, but tired of waiting for the reinforcements,
he marched off towards Suceava, where he arrived on 3
November. While in Suceava he exchanged letters with
Sobieski informing him on the positions and intensions of
the Turkish commanders2.
Hetman Sobieski had to chose one of two roads leading to Chocim – one from Nieźwiska, through Horodenka,
Wasilów and Hruszowce of approx. 100 km, and the other
one through Sniatyn, Linkowce and Zuczka covering approx. 135 km. Although the first one was slightly shorter,
but it ran through areas difficult in terms of terrain and
climate conditions, while the longer route guaranteed
comforts on the way and lead straight to the camp of Petriceicu. Thus, taking the longer march through the areas
1

2

M.Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka w latach 1672–1676, vol. 1,
Zabrze 2009, pp. 354–368.
S. Petryczejko do J. Sobieski, Suczawa 1–3 November 1673,
The Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine (hereinafter: NBU
Kiev), Chreptowicz archive, no 5985, pp. 119v–120.

situated between Dniester and Prut, the army of Hetman
Sobieski reached Sniatyn on 31 October, then it crossed
the Moldavian border and on 4 November it arrived at
Zuczka; the next day the army was near Bojan, where it
met in the Hetman’s camp with the Lithuanian army “coming through Horodenka’3.
Meanwhile, the joined armies covered small distances,
mainly, due to unfavourable terrain conditions for marching troops (valleys, gorges, brooks, forests) and the need to
construct numerous bridges over various Prut tributaries.
At the beginning, reconnaissance parties failed to bring
reliable information on the enemy’s positions, and only
on the night of 4 to 5 November, several Turkish prisoners and Moldavian boyars were captured, who confirmed
previous reports – on 5 November Hetman Sobieski was
also informed of the presence of the Kaplan Pasha corps
near Cecora. In early November Sobieski and Petriceicu
carried on intensive correspondence. Hospodar reported on Turkish-Tatar corps of Yusuf Pasha numbering
2.5 thousand men, stationed at Budžak, and proposed
a joint Polish-Moldavian expedition to destroy the groups
of enemy’s troops providing supplies to Kamieniec and
Chocim. Petriceicu suggested also to install the Crown’s
infantry troops in Suceava. He was concerned with the attitude of Kaplan Pasha, who ordered to murder many of
his subjects, was responsible for plundering villages and
towns and collected a levy for provisions in the area of Iași
and Cecora. Hospodar also sent to Sobieski the letters of
the Grand Vizier, which called both Hospodars to undertake peace mediations. He wrote about the poor state of
3

A. Przyborowski do A. Trzebickiego, Bojan 5 November 1673,
Scientific Library of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences
and of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Cracow (hereinafter:
B.PAU-PAN), no 1070, p. 652.

– 127 –

– Marek Wagner –

the Ottoman army near Chocim, urging Poles to step up
offensive operations4.
On 5 November Hetman Sobieski was stationed in the
camp near Bojan, where from he reported on the difficult
position of the Crown army. A paid quarter of their military service was lapsing, so the soldiers started ‘to stir up
trouble’, and only the payments from the Hetman’s treasury could prevent further incidents. There were also cases
of desertion mainly because of high food prices in the
camp. However, the firm stand of Hetman Sobieski, who
even order an execution of two officers, restored order
and discipline. On 15 November, the Lithuanian soldiers
also would reach a quarter of their military service. Their
situation was similar to that of the Crown army, and thus
Hetman Sobieski feared that they might go back home.
Everything spoke in favour of stepping up the offensive operations. The disastrous financial situation was evidenced
by the fact that Sobieski decided to borrow 100 thousand
zloty from Moldavian Hospodar, if it proved necessary to
pay the salaries to the Lithuanian army5.
Surely, these were also the reasons for considering another variant of the Polish operation plan. The contemporary reports reveal a plan of dividing the army into two
groupings – one (‘the right wing’), led by Sobieski was to
march towards Cecora to destroy the corps of the Kaplan
Pasha, and the second one (‘the left wing’) with Prince
Dymitr Wiśniowiecki was to besiege the Chocim corps of
Hüseyin Pasha until its surrender. The project was, undoubtedly, developed by Hetman Sobieski since it was
his grouping that got the most difficult task. Moreover,
the concept of dividing the Lithuanian army between two
groupings in order to eliminate any possible opposition
only attests to our assumptions6.
Finally, the October operations plan of Jan Sobieski
has been approved for execution. This resulted from two
events that took place at that time – firstly, the reconnaissance parties confirmed the enemy’s presence near
Chocim and Cecora, and secondly – on the same day the
envoys of the Moldavian Hospodar brought a letter to the
camp in which Petriceicu gives himself up to the protection of Sobieski. The dramatic situation in the camp as

regards logistics also contributed significantly to the decision on marching off towards Chocim7.
In preparation to the offensive operations Sobieski sent
many reconnaissance parties and on 4 November he sent
in the direction of Chocim a group of 20 squadrons (Polish: chorągiew) of Gabriel Silnicki, and on another day – 12
squadrons of Krzysztof Łaska that returned with confirmed
information that the Turks ‘have hid carefully, now even
very behind their defenses’. Moreover, a group of 12–15
squadrons of Jan Rzeczycki were sent to the Cecora region and these brought back several Moldavian boyars,
runaways from Chocim, who confirmed that Turkish soldiers and commanders are very much concerned with the
swiftly approaching Hetman’s army8.
Under such circumstances on 8 November Hetman’s
army left the general camp heading northeast across the
Bukovina region. The march was difficult in terms of terrain
(through “grand and thick crossings’, i.e. wooded hills and
valleys) and climate conditions (gusty winds and heavy
rains), which greatly influenced the mobility of individual
units. Despite these impediments the cavalry squadrons
pushed on quite efficiently, and only the infantry and dragoon regiments with canons “advanced more slowly’. On
the very same day the Silnicki vanguard (20 cavalry and
dragoon squadrons), after crossing the wooded hills,
reached the area of the Turkish camp on the early morning
of 9 November9.
The camp of the Hüseyin Pasha was situated at the
place of the former Polish camp of 1621, hence on the right
bank of Dniester. It stretched on a plateau from the brick
Orthodox church, the Chocim castle and a deep gorge
in the north, through the western edge of the plateau, to
a small ravine in the south. Whereas a steep bank of Dniester closed the camp to the east. There was a quite large
forest to the west of fortifications, and smaller to the south
of the Ottoman camp. A road running from Żwaniec to the
bridge over Dniester descended to the Braha village situated on the left bank of the river.
Turkish army camp was located to the west of the
river and south of the castle, at a vast plateau located
7

4

5

6

S. Petryczejko do J. Sobieskiego, Suczawa 5–7 November
1673, NBU Kiev, Chreptowicz archive, no. 5985, p. 120.
J.Sobieski do NN, bm. 5 November 1673, B.PAU-PAN, no. 1070,
p. 652.
M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka…, vol. 1, p. 370.

8

9

A. Przyborowski do NN, Chocim 11 November 1672, NBU Kiev,
Chreptowicz archive, no. 5983, p. 2.
‘Victoria pod Chocimiem…’, Chocim 12 November 1673, ibid.,
p. 1.
‘Z pod Chocimia z obozu’, 11 November 1673, The National
Archives in Krakow (hereinafter: ANK), archive of Pinocci family, no. 372, p. 419.

– 128 –

– The Battle of Chocim, 10–11 November 1673 –

approximately 2 km from the Dniester river. From the
north, a natural obstacle was a deep ravine, where once
a stream run which flowed into the Dniester below the
Chocim castle. At the height of the brick church, there
was a narrow bridge, which was the passage connecting
the edges of the ‘northern’ gorge, a second bridge linked
the plateau and the castle. The north-eastern edge of the
hill was a steep bank of the Dniester, so the camp embankment was not too high here, and in some places
even rudimentary. Its regular redan outline began with
the ‘northern’ bridge and continued along the banks of
the gorge, which then separated into two small ravines,
closing the northern section of the Turkish fortifications.
Because of no natural barriers on the west side, it was
necessary to raise a relatively high embankment in this
section that extended from the fork of the ‘north’ gorge
to the fork of the ‘southern’ gorge. In the western section
there were two ‘gates’ – Bukovina, situated closer to the
northern corner, and Jaska (also called Cecorska) – in
the southern corner of embankments, which F. Gratty
presented in the form of narrow passages in the embankment. In turn, on the south side, the obstacle was the
local ‘south’ gorge with not very steep slopes and also
forked in the western corner of the plateau. The edges of
the elevation gently sloped here towards the edge of the
gorge, also between them and the embankment there
was a considerable distance, so the Turkish fortifications
had considerable height and width. However, they did
not reach the very edges of the Dniester, creating a convenient side entrance into the camp on the south side.
Between the edge of the escarpment and the bank of the
river, there were small buildings, and further a narrow
passage leading down to the foot of the Chocim castle.
In 1673 the Ottomans took the position at the main
plateau. All natural obstacles were taken advantage of
by raising an embankment with a redan outline on the
perimeter of about 5 km. On the south side, its defensive qualities were reinforced with a camp for Moldavian
and Wallachian contingents, although they were placed
outside the main line of the Turkish fortifications. Experienced Ottoman engineers reinforced profiles of earthen
embankments, deepened the moats to the depth of eight
cubits (about 4–5 m deep) and provided with in the socalled ‘excursions’ (passageways in embankment) and
artillery batteries. They also performed enormous earthworks, adapting it to the needs of the military. The ‘old’
Chocim castle was strengthened, a floating bridge was

built on the Dniester, connecting the other side with the
Chocim camp and the rampart before the bridge with the
‘wooden castle’ (blockhouse) located on the left bank
of the Dniester completed the fortification. Therefore,
the Turks used the defensive qualities of the terrain and
modernized the field fortifications, forming a real fortified camp on the Dniester.
Turkish camp was surrounded by a zigzag embankment, behind which was a number of canons and groups
of Janissaries. Embankments did not have a deep moat or
palisades, but the undulating camp foreground was well
visible, especially the gorges and ravines. The interior of
the Turkish camp was ‘filled with’ groups of soldiers, located at the western side of the main embankment (I phase
of the battle) or already fighting with Poles (second phase
of the battle). The iconography shows us the interior of the
camp as an ordered arrangement of lines and tents (large
and small), alongside images of horses and camels, with
the main street running to the bridge over the Dniester
and two secondary roads – one to the bridge on the north
gorge and one to the Moldovan camp. Despite minor differences, both accounts and the iconography show very
similar, in general terms of course, image of the Ottoman
army camp at Chocim10.
In the history and military literature, it was adopted that
about 25–30 thousand Turkish, Moldavian and Wallachian
soldiers were present at Chocim. These included 8 thousand Janissary corps, about 10–12 thousand cavalry, and
about 6–8 thousand Moldovan and Vlach troops. Here
is a list of Ottoman groups participating in the Battle of
Chocim (and their approximate numbers):
– Spahi troops of Hüseyin Pasha beylerbey of Silistra –
3000 people
– Spahi troops of Mehmed Pasha beylerbey of Rumelia
– 3000 people
– Spahi troops of Soliman Pasha beylerbey of Bosnia –
2000 people
– Spahi troops of Jahay beylerbey of Siwasu – 2000
people
– Troops of Murtaza Pasha bey of Ohrid – unknown
– Troops of Suleiman Pasha bey of Thessaloniki – 1000
people
– Troops of Ahmed Seidoglu Pasha bey of Sofia – unknown
10

M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka…, v. 1, pp. 371–374.

– 129 –

– Marek Wagner –

– Janissary corps – 8000 people (including some 2000
mercenaries)
– Corps of artillery and engineering – number unknown11.
Considering the preparation of individual groups –
2 thousand mercenary Janissary troops were deployed to
the main embankment (‘western’), a further 5–6 thousand
of infantry were sent to the flanks, with selected corps of
cavalry – on the right flank of Soliman Pasha beylerbey of
Bosnia and Jahay bey beylerbey of Siwasu and on the left
flank – of Mehmed Pasha beylerbey of Rumelia with other
troops. The reserve of sultan cavalry was commanded by
Hüseyin Pasha himself. Cavalry corps consisted of about
3–4 thousand soldiers, their rearguard was stronger, and
the infantry defended embankment.12.
Command post was located in the middle of the camp,
probably at the intersection of the two main ‘streets’. Quite
significant space of the camp was occupied by tents, cars,
stables for horses, mules and camels, which created a general feeling of chaos, although the F. Gratty placed tents
only in five locations right next to the embankment line,
the quarters of Hüseyin Pasha was at the centre of the
camp. However, during the fighting this ‘mess’ was a major obstacle to advancing troops due to the lack of space
inside the camp.
Tactical action plan of Hüseyin Pasha assumed internal
and external defence positions until the arrival of the corps
of the Kaplan Pasha from Cecora. It is possible that Turks
considered abandoning and burning Chocim camp and
retreat towards Kamieniec in the case of serious threat
from the advancing Hetman troops. On the other hand,
it does not seem possible, because the commanders of
Kamieniec traditionally forbid the entrance to the fortress
of the larger masses due to purely pragmatic reasons (lack
of food, diseases, etc.)13. The Turkish commander predicted that for similar reasons Khalil Pasha would be careful in helping his corps, and in fact he could only count on
the support of the Cecora corps, located within 150–160
km from Chocim. He calculated that Kaplan Pasha would
arrive in the area of the Chocim camp within 7 or 8 days –
11

12

13

W. Majewski, Wojny polsko-tureckie 1672–1699, [in:] Polskie tradycje wojskowe, v. 1, ed. by J. Sikorski, Warsaw 1990, p. 378.
‘Data 11 Novembris z obozu…’, Chocim 11 November 1673,
B.PAU-PAN, No. 1070, p.653.
‘Opisanie potrzeby z Turkami…’, after 11 November 1673, The
Princes Czartoryski Library (hereinafter: B.Czart), No. 171, pp.
569–570.

so the soldiers of Hussein Pasha had to endure in trenches
for that time.
Another issue was related to the choice of the place of
battle. This begs the question, why Hüseyin Pasha did not
decide to battle on the outskirts of the camp? The answer
is not simple, probably the Turkish commander was afraid
to face the Poles and Lithuanians in the open field, not believing in the tactical superiority of his subordinates and
hoping that the massive fortifications and firepower will
help to stop the Hetman forces until the arrival of ‘Cecora
corps’.
On the morning of 9 November, the banners of the
vanguard reached a distance of 500–600 meters from the
Turkish embankments, taking ‘the road from Jass’ through
flat hills and beech forests to the west side of the camp. Initially, the Turks did not take up the challenge. It was only
when they realized that only the vanguard appeared at the
foreground that real clashes of skirmishers began. Armed
groups leaving the Ottoman camp consisted of dozens of
riders but ‘they could not be pulled away from embankment’, despite the day-long efforts of Polish skirmishers.
Meanwhile, the cavalry regiments regularly arrived in
the foreground of the camp. In the evening, however, they
retreated to their camps, ‘leaving the vanguard’. By the
time the dusk fell, the regiments of infantry and dragoons
with canons and caravans arrived. Hetman army camps
created in the evening were located approximately 2 km
west of the Turkish embankments, beyond the hills and
forests.
The number of Polish-Lithuanian forces at the Battle
of Chocim according to Polish literature is about 29–30
thousand soldiers, among them there were about 22 thousand Crown troops and about eight thousand Lithuanian
troops. Among the latter, about 3500 cavalry and 4800
infantry, with 15 guns, participated in the battle; on the
Polish side about 12 thousand cavalry and about 11 thousand infantry with 50 canons participated. 13 regiments of
Crown cavalry participated, including a total of 12 hussar
regiments (about 1.5 thousand people), 109 armoured
squadrons (about 10 thousand) and 19 light squadrons
(about 1.5 thousand) and 23 infantry regiments (about 7
thousand) and 19 regiments of dragoons (about five thousand people) with artillery corps14.
Polish-Lithuanian forces were divided into five major
groups, which have traditionally formed, in two echelons,
14

W. Majewski, Wojny polsko-tureckie…, p. 379.

– 130 –

– The Battle of Chocim, 10–11 November 1673 –

the centre of the two wings, formed in semicircle around
the Turkish embankment, with overall circumference of
about 6.5–7.0 km. Right wing based at the southern gorge,
the left reached the north gorge, while the centre covered
the area beyond the beech forest, opposite the two gates
– Bukovina and Jaska15.
The right wing (Crown) consisted of two powerful groupings – the leading corps of 15 regiments of infantry and
dragoons (5400 people) with 30 canons and the reserve
corps of six cavalry regiments. Two cavalry groups stood
here – of Bidziński and Sobieski. The first involved three regiments (commanders, M. Zbrożek and W. Skoraszewski),
protected by light squadrons, and the group of Sobieski
consisted of three regiments (Hetman, S. Jabłonowski and
W. Leszczyński), protected by light cavalry.
The first line consisted of three groups of infantry, dragoons and artillery – on 10 November Poles lead three regiments of dragoons with four canons, which created the
utmost group located closer to the Dniester, to the Moldovan camp. The group of Crown infantry of M. Kątski with
battery of 20–24 canons stood before the regiments of
Jabłonowski. To the left of the infantry there were infantry
regiments of K. Korycki with eight canons, including ‘two
big’ ones (maybe 60-pound). All of these groups covered
the area from the Dniester to the Jaska gate, in a hilly terrain, declining towards Turkish embankment and convenient for offensive action of cavalry.
The centre of Polish formation consisted of a frontal infantry group – nine regiments of E. Denhoff and S.S. Czarnecki (2800 soldiers) with a battery of eight canons – and
two or three groups of cavalry, set in the second echelon.
J. Woliński suggested the setting of three cavalry corps –
of Wiśniowiecki and two Potockis (Andrzej and Szczęsny),
on the other hand, W. Majewski distinguished positions
of the two cavalry corps – of Wiśniowiecki and A. Potocki.
This concept seems more likely, which in turn gave only
two groups of cavalry – of Wiśniowiecki (two regiments – of
the king and Hetman) and of A. Potocki (three regiments
of Andrzej, Szczęsny and Jan Potocki). The centre covered
the area between the gates – Jaska and Bukovina, in some
hilly terrain, also convenient for an offensive action by cavalry and infantry.
The left ‘Lithuanian’ wing, under the leadership of Hetman Pac, was arranged in two shootouts involving two

groupings – the front one with Lithuanian infantry (4800
men) and the pterygoid one – with the right Pac’s column
and left Radziwił’s column. In front of the infantry, a dozen
of Lithuania canons were placed. The Lithuanian wing
covered the area from Bucovina gate to the shore of the
Dniester, outside the bed of the northern gorge, and the
area – because of the many hills – was less convenient for
offensive operations here.
The majority of Polish relations puts five Chocim military groups in such a way: the ‘guardian party’ was located ‘a little higher than the Dniester’, then the Sobieski
group ‘in the middle’, followed by the group of Hetman
Wiśniowiecki, next to Andrzej Potocki and ‘near Dniester
from the side of Żwaniec’ Lithuanian troops were stationed16.
W. Majewski assumes that the right wing had 7,000 infantry and dragoon, and in the centre and on the left wing
about 4 thousand people respectively, which meant that,
according to the concept of Hetman Sobieski, almost ‘half
of the Polish forces were concentrated on the right wing’.
The other groups were only to hold back the enemy troop
movements, when the right wing was attacking fortified
Ottoman camp17.
Sobieski’s tactical plan was therefore based on using
infantry and dragoon regiments on the south-western
corner of the embankments with a gateway, with supporting attack on the northwest corner of Bucovian gate. An
important part of the Hetman’s plan were also attacks directed from both wings towards the bridges over the gorge
and the river. If successful, infantry was followed by squadrons, ready to occupy the enemy’s camp and destroy the
Hüseyin Pasha’s corps. Sobieski realized that success in
armed fighting depends primarily on effective and instant
decisions, but also on the effective cooperation ‘in time
and in space’ of individual groups during the execution of
defined tactical tasks18.
On the morning of 10 November, the Polish group went
close to camps embankments, and when noticing no reaction from Turkish commanders, Sobieski decided to get
the Crown troops closer to the embankments. This was
around 10 a.m. After that, the Lithuanian grouping took
positions under the embankments. After 11 a.m. rapid
shooting started from the canons and mortars from the
16
17

15

‘Data 11 Novembris z obozu…’, Chocim 11 November 1673,
B.PAU-PAN, No. 1070, p. 653.

18

M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka…, vol. 1, pp. 376–378.
W. Majewski, Wojny polsko-tureckie…, pp. 380–381.
[J. Woliński] Chocim, Encyklopedia Wojskowa, vol. 1–2, Warsaw 1931, pp. 674–676.

– 131 –

– Marek Wagner –

enemy’s camp, as well as the Moldovian camp. At that
time, Petryczejko demanded help from the Ottoman Empire, but it was only an excuse for the official transfer of
Moldovans onto the Polish side. Three regiments of infantry with several canons were directed to their camp, all
of which were used to shoot at the left flank of the Turkish embankments. Sobieski and Kątski intended to break
down the enemy on this section of fortifications, to allow
the crown infantry to attack and enter the Turkish camp.
Despite much distance from the line of embankments
(over 500 m) and a fairly deep gorge, this plan was not
abandoned19.
About 12 p.m. Sobieski ordered to start preparations to
make an assault on the embankments on the left wing, assigning to this task the infantry of general J.W. Dennemark
and seimens of colonel J. Motowidło. The fight started
after 1300, but infantrymen and seimens were stopped
by a strong fire of handguns of the janissaries, and having lost many injured and killed on the same shaft, they
retreated to entry positions. The incident depicted in the
literature of the subject as a stand-alone Dennemark and
Motowidło action seems to be a rather non-agreed element in the implementation of the tactical plans of John
III Sobieski, rather than a daring attack by these officers,
who were killed in the clash along with a few non-commissioned officers and privates. A definite lack of combat
support was decisive for the defeat of a group of two colonels, but helped the Hetman to reconnoitre the Turkish
positions on this section20.
This enabled Sobieski to prepare Polish soldiers more
effectively to the final attack. It turned out that the defenders were properly prepared in this section for defence and
had considerable firepower. Therefore, for Poles, who were
at a distance of 500–600 m from the ramparts, the position
of the enemy was very important – if Sobieski planned to
take decisive assault on the right wing, then fighting reconnaissance was a logical consequence of his tactical plans.
As the dusk came, before 4 p.m., servants and infantry
begun the construction of several (?) artillery batteries
located within approx. 200 m from the Turkish positions,
placing on them several dozens of cannons and mortars.
W. Majewski claims that because of the preparations for
the general attack, the cannons were removed from the
19

20

‘Victoria pod Chocimiem…, Chocim 12 November 1673’, NBU
Kiev, Chreptowicz archive, no. 6283, p. 1–1v.
BU Wrocław, no. 535992 adl. p. 1–1v.

right wing of the Crown and evenly placed before the
Turkish defences, despite the fact that such a claim is not
confirmed by the tactical battle plan adopted by Sobieski,
which assumed that the attack will come from the right
wing21. Meanwhile, some of the iconographic reproductions show two, three and four artillery batteries, while the
most reliable of the records is definitely the one by J. Bensheimer. The author placed two mighty cannon batteries
on the Crown wing, firing at the south corner of the Turkish posts, the third battery, also powerful, placed on the
Lithuanian wing, and the fourth, significantly smaller in
size, in the Moldavian camp. It seems that his drawing decides on the location of the cannon batteries in the area,
prepared to carry out a strong artillery fire22.
In the night of 10 to 11 November, the last war council
was held before the battle, during which Hetman M.K. Pac
criticised Sobieski’s plans, stressing numerous difficulties
in their performance pointing to the number of Turkish
cannons, the exhaustion of the soldiers and the lack of
food provisions in the camp23. This was met with a firm
resistance from the Crown Hetman, who presented a new
tactical plan, approved by the officers present on the council. Sobieski proposed to conduct the main attack from the
right wing on the southern corner of the defences, with the
supporting attack on the northern corner, planning also to
flank and cut off the Ottomans from Dniester crossing24.
The same night, around 3 a.m., all Polish and Lithuanian
units took the designated positions in the battle ranks –
in order to secure bulwarks and batteries, as well as to
‘weaken the battle ability’ of the Turkish soldiers in difficult
for them climate conditions. Moreover, various accounts
informed about the “night drills’ carried out by the infantry
companies under the guidance of Sobieski, however, it
seems that the author confused them with the soldiers’
march ‘through difficult gorges’ to the designated battle
posts25.
The military assessment of the first day is definitely
favourable for the Polish-Lithuanian side which used traditional tactical elements, namely skirmishes, reconnaissance through fighting, regrouping of the units and the
21
22
23

24

25

W. Majewski, Wojny polsko-tureckie…, p. 380.
M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka…, vol. 1, pp. 380–381.
K. Bobiatyński, Michał Kazimierz Pac, wojewoda wileński, hetman wielki litweski, Warsaw 2008, pp. 290–291.
“Victoria pod Choimiem…’, Chocim 12 November 1673, NBU
Kiev, Chreptowicz archive, no. 6283, p. 1v.
M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka…, vol.1, pp. 381–382.

– 132 –

– The Battle of Chocim, 10–11 November 1673 –

construction of the artillery batteries. Hetman Sobieski recognised enemy’s fortifications, locations and resistance
of the defenders, and more importantly acquiring a Moldavian and Wallachian ally, which aided in “closing’ the
circle around the Turkish camp, allowing for a successful
preparation of Hetman’s groups for the deciding attack the
next day.
Before 7 a.m., on the 11 November, right after dusk,
Hetman Sobieski with a group of higher commanders observed the positions of Turkish troops, and confirmed that
only scant guards were present on the embankments, and
that the majority of the Turkish soldiers were resting in the
camp. Because of that Sobieski decided to immediately
attack, before the units of Janissaries appear again on
the embankments, ready to repulse further attacks. After 7
a.m., the commanders of the groups were ordered to prepare a common attack for 8 a.m. On 7.30 a.m. the artillery
began a 15-minute preparation, firing intensely from the
cannons and mortars at selected defences26.
On 8 a.m., the Crown and Lithuanian regiments of infantry and dragoons begun the attack on the selected sections of the defences, and despite the serious loss in men
during 10–15 minutes, the soldiers managed to climb the
embankments, pushing away the troops of Janissaries.
The unquestionable tactical victory was owed to the surprise and swiftness of action, as well as courage demonstrated by Hetman Sobieski and many of his officers27.
The infantry of the right wing quickly reached the line
of the defences, since the gorge there was flat, just like the
edges of the plateau. On the left wing, the attack of the
Lithuanian regiments was delayed because of the deep
gorge and the narrow bridge over it and the steep slope
of the plateau. It seems that at least on certain sections
of the attack, the regiments of infantry and dragoons had
to overcome significant difficulties – frozen water in the
moat, as well as the significant height of the defences and
palisades there had to hinder the effective access to the
fortifications for the Poles and Lithuanians. The drawings
show the infantry forming regiments, however, it is believed that during the attack it had to initially attack in
companies (platoons), and during the seizing of the defences it attacked in a lose order.

26

27

“Spod Chocimia’ [November 1673], NBU Kiev, Chreptowicz
archive, no. 5985, p. 116.
A. Przyborowski to NN, Chocim 15 November 1673, B.PAU-PAN, no. 1070, pp. 654–655.

However, such description of the battle does not, include the defensive operations of the Ottoman troops – it
seems that the simple absence of the Janissary companies,
which were surprised by the swift pace of the attack of the
Polish infantry played a certain role during the onslaught.
The accounts also mention the fierce hand‑to‑hand combat, which erupted at certain sections. What is characteristic is that those Janissaries later disappear from the
preserved descriptions of further stages of the battle. It
seems then that their troops were partially destroyed and
partially “assimilated’ into the camp, later taking limited
part in further fighing. The accounts also informed about
the counter-attack of the Turkish cavalry on the left wing,
warded off by the advance of cavalry regiments of S. Bidziński and W. Soraszewski28.
Around 8.30 a.m. the infantrymen and dragoons begun coming down from the embankments to the camp;
some of them were already ordered to dig up the earth
and backfill the moat with it, as well as to arrange bridges
from the wooden stockade, and prepare the area for the
deciding attack of the Hetman’s cavalry. The operations
lasted until 10 a.m., preventing the Turkish commanders
from regrouping and preparing their own cavalry troops to
counter-attack the Hetman’s infantry and dragoon groups
invading the camp.
Around 10.30 a.m., Hetman Sobieski’s group of cavalry
attempted to enter the camp from the right wing, in order
to support and defend the infantrymen, but also to attempt a reconnaissance. Jabłonowski, who commanded
on this stage, with 7–8 hussar squadrons even attempted
to cross the dug up passage in the defences, but he immediately found himself in a difficult situation. Because
of the too narrow passages, the cavalry had to march in
columns, which come across a strong group of Rumelia
Sipahi (numbering approx 4,000 men) prepared for battle,
and the cavalry suffered significant losses. From the same
reasons Jabłonowski ordered a retreat to the current positions, because he was unable to receive support from
other squadrons29.
This moment was captured by J. Bensheimer in his
drawing, proving the thesis about the column formation
of the cavalry. W. Kochowski wrote also about the strong
resistance of an unknown group of Janissaries, defend28
29

M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka…, vol. 1, pp. 383–384.
Iden, Stanisław Jabłonowski (1634–1702). Polityk i dowdówdca, vol. 1, Siedlce 1997, p. 111.

– 133 –

– Marek Wagner –

– 134 –

– The Battle of Chocim, 10–11 November 1673 –

ing the entrance to the camp with janczarki (light Turkish
firearm). All those factors preconditioned the failure of the
Polish hussars, and only the help of the squadrons from
neighbouring troops stopped the movements of Rumelia
Sipahi emerging on the outskirts of the defences. Those
were the squadrons of pancerni (medium-cavalary) Hetman Sobieski, supported on Dniester by Bidziński’s troops
and the Moldavian divisions, which forced the Ottomans
to retreat to the entrance of the camp. The course of the
fight in the accounts clearly points to the deliberate actions of Sobieski, for it was his order to support the retreat
of the Russian Voivode’s squadron, the mentioned groups
of cavalry flanked the enemy, forcing him to retreat inside
the camp30.
The Crown’s cavalry did not cross the line of the defences anymore, instead on the Lithuanian wing three hussar squadrons of J.K. Chodkiewicz and the Sapieha clan,
admittedly crossed the defences, but they were quickly
forced out to the outskirts by the counter-attack of the
Turkish cavalry – those were the Bosnian Sipahi, which until now did not participated directly in the battle31.
Hüseyin Pasha saw at that moment some chances for
victory and decided to lead the cavalry groups outside the
defences and make an attempt to break Polish troops located on the right wing.
The train of thought of the Turkish Pasha was logical,
because the foregoing tactical successes were optimistic.
He could also expect that the squadrons of Jabłonowski
and Sobieski were tired and exhausted by the fighting.
Moreover, he took into account the threat for his own
units – which was the possibility of flanking them on the
defences of Dniester by the Polish and Moldavian squadrons, or the necessity of escape “to Cecora’ with his own
cavalry group. Arguably, all those conditions caused the
Ottomans to undertake offensive action32.
Around 12 p.m., the enemy’s cavalry begun its attack
on two sections of the outskirts of the camp – the southern (Rumelia Sipahi) and western (Bosnian Sipahi). Along
the first section they were stopped by the counter-attack
of the Bidziński’s cavalry regiment and at the second by
the Wiśniowiecki and Potocki’s regiments, whereupon the
30

31

32

W. Kochowski, Roczników Polskich Klimakter IV, ed. J.N. Bobrowicz, Lipsk 1853, p. 341.
Relacja gdańska, Gdańsk po 3 grudnia 1673, The Gdańsk Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences, N.1 5 adl. 99.
“De data 11 Novembris z obozu…, Chocim 11 November
1673, B.PAU-PAN, no. 1070, p. 656.

Sipahi corps was thrown back outside the line of the line
of defences. Hetman Sobieski saw a chance for victory and
decided to charge the enemy lines in order to brake them,
seize the Jaska gate and enter the camp thereby definitely
crushing the Turkish forces.
After 12 p.m. Jabłonowski, with 15 hussar squadrons
(around 1,200 men) charged violently Turks crowded near
the Jaska gate and by penetrating through the groups
of Sipahi, entered the camp. The hussars of the Russian
Voivode, crossed the gorge, the dug up defences and the
gate, and despite the strong resistance of the Turks, managed to successfully break through to the lodging area
of Hüseyin Pasha’s tents33. The hussar squadrons were
accompanied by the pancerni units of the Sobieski and
Wiśniowiecki cavalry groups34.
After the battle, Hetman Sobieski praised Voivode
Jabłonowski’s courage and his commanding virtues,
because Polish cavaliers fought in an almost two hour
vicious combat with the Sipahi troops, who by the use of
“fire and movement’ inflicted significant casualties in both
men and horses. The success of the hussar charge had
a crucial meaning for the course of the further fights. The
Poles reached the tents of Hüseyin Pasha, which caused
panic among his people and a swift retreat towards the
bridge, but it also allowed the Hetman’s infantry a secure
entrance to the Turkish camp35.
In the course of these struggle, the Polish infantrymen
showed their insubordination, as instead of fighting, they
were preoccupied with plundering and robbing the Turkish camp. The intervention of the Russian Voivide in the
form of firm orders directed at their commanders restored
discipline among the infantry, which is mentioned in every
account36.
Meanwhile, on the Lithuanian section the attack was
delayed. Since at that same time, the leading regiments
of infantry were only reaching the Bukovina gate, passed
it and allowed the cavalry squadrons of the Lithuanian
Hetman to slowly advance into the Turkish camp. Hetman Pac, not waiting for all of the units to enter, organised
a group of hussars and petyhorcy and carried out a violent
charge at “the flank of the enemy fighting with the Crown

33
34

35
36

“Opisane potrzeby z Turkami…’, B.Czart. no. 171, pp. 570–571.
From Gdańsk 22 November 1673, B.PAU-PAN, no. 8189,
p. 29v.
W. Kochowski, Roczników Polskich klimakter IV…, p. 347.
M. Wagner, Stanisław Jabłonowski…, vol. 1, p. 111.

– 135 –

– Marek Wagner –

squadrons’. This caused panic in the ranks of Bosnian cavalry and forced it to retreat further into the camp37.
At that time, the overall tactical situation was as follows:
inside the Turkish camp, just outside the line of defences,
there were groups of Polish and Lithuanian cavalry and
infantry, while the Ottoman cavalry gathered in the area
bordering on Dniester and partially moving towards the
crossing. A unitary command was already lacking in the
enemy’s army, since Hüseyin Pasha, after the attack of the
Russian Voivode’ cavalry, retreated in the direction of the
Dniester crossing.
Around 2 p.m., the battle entered in its final stage, but
there are only partial accounts about its exact course. It
is known that the groups of cavalry aimed to seize the
Chocim bridge going from the outskirts to the centre,
which is why they moved closer to the river. The rest of the
camp was occupied by loose groups of Polish cavalry and
infantry. Probably around 2 p.m., Bosnian Suleiman Pasha
gathered a group of 2–3 thousand Turkish cavalrymen and
for the last time attempted to break through to the south,
reaching without difficulty near the Jaska gate (the Bukovina gate was already seized by the Lithuanians). However,
after crossing it, already on the outskirts the Pasha was
stopped by the cavalry of Wiśniowiecki and Potocki, which
forced the Turks back into the camp. At that time, another
encounter with the Polish cavalry took place, which ended
with the charge of several hussar and pancerni squadrons,
as well as with breaking the group of Suleiman Pasha into
few smaller groups of cavalry38.
Arguably, also around 2 p.m. the flanking groups of
Bidziński and Radziwiłł entered the camp, moving along
the bank of Dniester towards the bridge with the intent of
cutting off the retreat of the escaping Turks. Many minor
clashes and encounters happened there, e.g. the Crown
infantry sized the battery of Turkish cannons which were
fired against those escaping from the battlefield, and
a large group of Ottoman cavalry run into a part of the
Bidziński’s corps, causing many Poles and Turks to fall
from a high Dniester slope. Defensive operations of the
scattered groups of Sipahi were possible thanks to the
maze of tents and smaller buildings, causing significant
troubles for the attacking Poles and Lithuanians.

Meanwhile, also the Lithuanian cavalry of Radziwiłł was
pushed away towards the bridge. During the attack they
were pushed away from the crossing by the Bosnian cavalry, who with a strong attack forced the Lithuanian’s out
past the northern gorge. Soon, a subsequent counter-attack of Radziwiłł’s cavalry troops broke the Bosnian Sipahi
group, forcing them into the camp39. Ultimately, only 2–3
thousand of the fleeing managed to escape on to the
other river bank, and the bridge collapsed preventing the
Turks from further escape40.
The cavalry squadrons and companies of infantry remaining in the Turkish camp, while still plundering and
robbing, were moving systematically towards Dniester
forcing the crowded Ottomans onto the bank of the river,
taking them into captivity or killing them in the vicinity of
the bridge, which sealed the defeat of the corps of Hüseyin
Pasha41.
The final stage of the battle of Chocim was the chase
after escaping Turks by the light squadrons of Atanazy
Miączyński and Jerzy Ruszczy, because their several-thousand group managed to cross the bridge, while heading
towards Kamieniec. The remaining Hetman units returned
to the military camp. On the 12 November, in the morning, a very formal thanksgiving service was performed with
a speech from Sobieski directed at the soldiers42.
In the morning offensive actions were continued. Kątski’s artillery began firing at the Chocim castle, and the
Janissaries’ garrison send a trumpeter with conditions
of capitulation – possibility of an exit with weapons and
equipment, lending them a convoy and proceeding to Iași
or to Cecora, and swearing by the Sobieski on the gospel. However, the offensive operations were continued.
In the morning of 13 November, the infantry regiment of
Jan Tedtwin sized the bulwark before the bridge on the
left bank of Dniester, and later also the fortifications in
Żwaniec, which caused the capitulation of the janissaries
in the Chocim castle43.
The losses on the Turkish side were tremendous –
20 thou­sand dead and wounded soldiers, including 8 thou­
39
40

41
37

38

“De data 11 Novembris z obozu…’, Chocim 11 November
1673, B.PAU-PAN, no. 1070, p. 656.
“Spod Chocimia’ [November 1673], NBU Kiev, Chreptowicz
archive, no. 5985, p. 116v.

42
43

K. Bobiatyński, Michał Kazimierz Pac…, pp. 291–292.
“Victoria pod Chocimiem…’ Chocim 12 November 1673, ibid.,
no. 6283, pp. 1v–2.
[Relacja włoska, Warszawa po 11 listopada 1673], ANK Cracow, Pinocchi archive, no. 372, pp. 434–435.
M. Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka…, vol. 1, pp. 391–392.
J. Sobieski, do NN, Chocim after 11 November 1673, NBU Kiev,
Chreptowicz archive, no. 5985, pp. 120–120v.

– 136 –

– The Battle of Chocim, 10–11 November 1673 –

sand dead janissaries, further 5 thousand drowned in
Dniester, many of the Ottoman higher commanders died.
The Poles took several dozen cannons, supply of ammunition and gunpowder, many banners and bunchuks, horses
and camels, among the rich military equipment, which was
given to the “infantry and rabble’ already on the battlefield.
On the Polish side, the loses were amounting to 2 thousand
dead and wounded, especially among the soldiers and
officers of infantry and dragoon regiments44.
Sobieski owed the tactical success in the second day
of the battle, as well as during the whole encounter, to numerous factors which were discussed many times in Polish and foreign literature of the subject. Firstly – the march
of the Hetman army towards Chocim from the southwest
were described in historiography as ̒ inside actions’ to­
wards the position of the Kaplan Basha’s corps. Secondly
44

M. Wagner, Wojona polsko-turecka…, vol. 1, p. 392.

Bibliography
Primary sources

– because of the numerous military and logistic difficulties, as well as the real possibility of rescue, Sobieski
abandoned the long term camp blockage and conducted
successful offensive operations against the Chocim corps,
finished with their complete defeat. Thirdly – Sobieski skilfully used the climate conditions, the rules of economy of
force and cooperation of different types of military, the
effectiveness of infantry and artillery, swiftness of the
cavalry attack, and when he obtained the initiative and
tactical advantage over the Ottomans, he lead to a spectacular failure of the Turkish force45.
45

K. von Clausewitz, Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von
Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegführung, vol. X ‘Strategische
Beleuchtung mehrerer Feldzüge von Sobieski, Münnich, Friedrich dem Grossen und dem Herzog Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand
von Braunschweig und andere historische Materialien zur
Strategie. Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Karl von Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegführung’, Berlin 1837, pp. 11–14.

K. von Clausewitz, Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von

Scientific Library of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences and

Clausewitz über Krieg und Kriegführung, vol. X ‘Strategische

of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Cracow (B. PAU-PAN)

Beleuchtung mehrerer Feldzuge von Sobieski, Münnich, Frie-

The Gdańsk Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences

drich dem Grossen und dem Herzog Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand

The National Archives in Krakow (ANK Cracow)

von Braunschweig und andere historische Materialien zur

The Princes Czartoryski Library (B. Czart)

Strategie. Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Karl von Clause-

The Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine in Kiev (NBU Kiev)

witz über Krieg und Kriegführung’, Berlin 1837

W. Kochowski, Roczników Polskich Klimakter IV, ed. J.N. Bobrowicz, Lipsk 1853

wojskowe, vol. 1, ed. by J. Sikorski, Warsaw 1990

Books

M. Wagner, Stanisław Jabłonowski (1634–1702). Polityk i do­wódca,

Chocim, Encyklopedia Wojskowa, vol. 1–2, Warsaw 1931

vol. 1, Siedlce 1997

K. Bobiatyński, Michał Kazimierz Pac, wojewoda wileński, hetman
wielki litewski, Warsaw 2008

W. Majewski, Wojny polsko-tureckie 1672–1699, in Polskie tradycje

M.  Wagner, Wojna polsko-turecka w latach 1672–1676, vol. 1,
Zabrze 2009

– 137 –

– Mirosław Nagielski –
University of Warsaw

Vienna Campaign 1683

The threat to Europe from Turkey ruled by the viziers
from the Köprülü family increased since Sultan Ibrahim
I had started a war for Crete with Venice in 1645. Right
when Crete had been conquered in 1669, Turkey regained
freedom of manoeuvre in other theatres of war. Between
the years 1672–1676 it waged war against the Commonwealth of Both Nations and afterwards with Russia until
1681. A treaty signed with the tsar on 23 January 1681 in
Bakhchysarai gave sultan Mehmed IV the liberty to choose
a new direction of strike in south-eastern Europe. It would
be either the Empire or the Commonwealth. The latter
deemed the peace negotiated in 1678 by Jan Gniński,
the voivode of Chełmno (Culm), as greatly unfavourable.
It left Kamyanets-Podilsky (Kamieniec Podolski) along
with a fragment of Ukraine within Turkish borders. The
situation was getting even more complicated because of
battles fought in Hungary since 1672 by Imre Thököly’s
insurgents, who rebelled against the rule of emperor Leopold I. In May 1681, when Thököly was assured of Turkish help, he decided to broaden the scope of his uprising
against the Habsburgs. John III Sobieski, faced with the
demise of ‘Baltic’ plans and Gniński’s unsuccessful mission, decided to commence talks with Vienna because of
the rising threat of Turkey and its new vizier Kara Mustafa
(since 1676). It was under his reign, that Turkey began to
threaten Habsburg countries.
A long time passed before the Viennese royal court
became interested in an alliance with Sobieski against
the Ottoman Porte, because after signing the Nijmegen
treaty, the Habsburgs could relocate their troops from
the western theatre to Hungary, which strengthened
their position in the negotiations with the sultan. Since
April 1682 imperial diplomats in Istanbul (messages from
count Alberto Caprara) were convinced, that the Sultan’s

strike will be directed at the Empire. From this moment
the Austrian side began to consider an offensive-defensive alliance with John III against Turkey more seriously.
Still, efforts were made, so that the attack is directed
at the Commonwealth. In a message from 6 June 1682
Caprara supposedly reported that ‘it would be possible
to redirect the war from us onto Poland for a substantial
amount of money. But even such a turn of events would
greatly harm Your Majesty’s lands’1. It seems reasonable,
then, that Sobieski hesitated for so long before making
a final decision about an alliance with Austria. In September 1682 a draft of a Polish-Austrian treaty was accepted
in Vienna along with instructions for deputy Karol Ferdynand Waldstein authorizing him to make minor corrections
during the Sejm (Parliament) in Warsaw in 1683. Finally,
on 31 March an agreement with the emperor was accepted by the parliament and the treaty between Leopold
I and Sobieski was signed on 1 April (it was antedated to
31 March, because the date was feared to be wrongly interpreted – April’s Fools!) 2.
The signed treaty described an offensive-defensive alliance directed against Turkey alone. The emperor had to
put out an army of 60 thousand men, including about 20
thousand reinforcements from the Reich and Sobieski an
army 40 thousand strong. At the same time Leopold I took
1

2

After: K. Konaski, Polska przed odsieczą wiedeńską, Warsaw
1914, pp. 112–113.
The following authors wrote about Polish-Austrian relations in
great detail: J. Wimmer, Wiedeń 1683. Dzieje kampanii i bitwy,
Warsaw 1983, pp. 15–61; Z. Wójcik, Traktaty polsko-austriackie
z drugiej połowy XVII wieku, Warsaw 1985; C. Reichl-Ham,
Österreichisch-polnische Militärbündnisse in der 2. Hälfte des
17.Jahrhunderts, [w:] Polnisch-österreichische Kontakte sowie
Militärbündnisse 1618 –1918, Wien 2009, pp. 77–120.

– 139 –

– Mirosław Nagielski –

on the obligation to pay 1.200.000 zlotych in Polish coin
for the recruitment of Polish-Lithuanian forces. According
to the calculations by J. Wimmer, the financial strain on
the Crown went beyond 8 million zlotych, excluding donations from abroad, whereas the Lithuanian’s – 3 million
zlotych. The Commonwealth, in total, paid about 11 million zlotych for the Vienna campaign, which constituted
78% of its total war expenditures3. The royal army, led by
John III to relief Vienna, outnumbered the imperial forces
under the command of Prince Charles V of Lorraine, which
didn’t exceed 18 thousand soldiers during the direct operation of unblocking the Empire’s capital. So how did the
allied forces achieve victory under the walls of Vienna?
In June 1683 an enormous Turkish army headed by vizier Kara Mustafa reached the walls of Vienna and began
the siege. Since May the fights with Turkish forces were led
by the imperial army under prince Charles V of Lorraine.
During war councils preceding field manoeuvres in Hungary, the prince had been an advocate of offence, which
was not only supposed to surprise Turkish units heading
toward Vienna, but also raise the morale among Austrian
soldiers. Thus, the Lorrainer introduced a few modifications to the imperial defence plans, which had been originally conceived by Johann Georg Rimpler and the head
of the Court Council of War – Herman von Baden. Near
Kittsee, where the imperial forces were concentrating,
prince Charles had 32 thousand infantry and cavalrymen
and 72 cannons at his disposal. On 11 May he commenced
manoeuvres along the right bank of the Danube, reaching
the stronghold of Győr and Komárno afterwards. After
performing reconnaissance near Esztergom and reaching the heavy artillery camp, the prince began the siege
of Nové Zámky on 3 June. Slow advance of the imperial
army wasn’t the effect of prince Charles’s negligence,
rather than the resistance among lower ranked commanders and members of the Court Council of War, who
were against offensive manoeuvres towards the incoming
Turkish forces. They feared that prince Charles will waste
the best imperial units even before the confrontation with
the main Kara Mustafa’s forces. This insistence caused
that prince had to break the successfully developing siege
of Nové Zámky on 9 June and once again set camp near
Komárno, waiting for enemy movement. After reaching
Győr and strengthening the stronghold’s garrison, on 30
June the first fights with the Turkish vanguard began on
3

J. Wimmer, Wiedeń 1683…, p. 232.

the Rába river. In order to avoid being cut off from Vienna,
the prince retreated along with his cavalry in the direction
of Magyaróvár, to defend the centre of the country from
destructive Tatar raids which arrived under the command
of khan Murad Giray. Up until 7 July the imperial cavalry
withdrew in the direction of Vienna and only the information about the Turks reaching the Leitha river crossing
accelerated the decision to withdraw the wagons and
infantry to the endangered capital. On 9 July near Petronell the prince fought a bloody battle with the Turkish
vanguard while retreating and suffered defeat. The Tatars
especially took their toll on the imperial forces spreading fear among the soldiers unfamiliar with fighting with
such an enemy. The Tatar czambuls plundered the direct
hinterland of Vienna and intimidated the populace unaccustomed to such fast moving units. After strengthening
the garrison in Vienna, the prince traversed to the right
bank of the Danube river, burning the bridges behind him.
It was the last moment to relocate the cavalry, because
since 14 July Vienna was surrounded by Turkish-Tatar
forces on all sides.
We have to negatively judge the actions delaying the
Lorrainer due to the reluctance of his commanders to
more active operations against Kara Mustafa’s army. Although, the fact that he didn’t get surprised and managed
to lead a large amount of infantrymen into besieged Vienna was a positive. Already during the siege the prince
managed to organize an effective resistance throughout
Austria against roaming Tatar czambuls, which lowered
losses and protected the supply base for active imperial
forces. Until the allied forces arrived the Lorrainer could
boast with great achievements:
– protecting the high roads leading the relief army
towards Vienna; including the defence of an important
bridge on the Danuve river, near the city of Krems, through
which reinforcements from the Reich were to arrive.
– protection the regions of Lower Austria and Moravia
from Tatar czambuls and Imre Thököly’s Hungarian forces
(the leader of a Hungarian uprising directed against the
emperor);
– a successful relief of Bratislava near the end of July
1683, along with a Polish corps led by prince Hieronim
Lubomirski;
– securing bridge crossings near Tulln for Sobieski’s
army marching to relieve Vienna;
– building bridges near Tulln, in close vicinity to active
enemy forces;

– 140 –

– Vienna Campaign 1683 –

– victory against beylerbey of Eger Abaza Kör Hussein’s
corps near Bisamberg.
The prince managed to stop the Turkish offensive on
the left bank of the Danube river twice, which allowed the
reinforcements both from the Commonwealth and from
the Reich to arrive at Tulln peacefully. If we include imperial soldiers burning the bridge under construction by the
Vlachs and Moldovans and securing the approaches to
Vienna for allies from the Reich and Poland, we have give
him a high grade as a commander-in-chief.
Prince Charles V was born in 1643, so he was 14 years
younger than Sobieski. He was the son of Nicholas Francis, the younger brother of Charles IV, prince of Lorraine
and Bar. At first he was raised in the French court of Louis
XIV, who strived for the restitution of the Duchy since 1658
without success. Estranged from France, he abandoned
his duty at Louis XIV’s court. Since 1663 he served the
Austrian Habsburgs and as a lieutenant colonel of cavalry
distinguished himself in a fight against the Turks in the
battle of Saint Gottard. In 1669 and 1674 he was a candidate to the Polish throne and Sobieski’s competitor,
at the same time. However, it didn’t affect the relations
between the two commanders during the Vienna campaign. Beginning in 1674, he fought under the command
of general de Souches against the army of duke Condé in
the battle of Seneffe. In 1675 he was promoted to lieutenant of marshal Raimondo Monecuccoli in the fight against
the French forces led by Turenne. In 1676, as an independent commander, he conquered Philippsburg on the River
Rhine while leading an army of 30 thousand soldiers. In
the following year he failed to deliver reinforcements to
Freiburg on time, causing the opposition to criticize him.
In 1678 he operated without much success in the upper
Rhein region against the Frenchmen led by marshal de
Créquy, and afterwards was appointed governor of Upper
Austria, based in Innsbruck. The prince of Lorraine was
an apprentice of Montecuccoli and called an advocate of
manoeuvre warfare by his contemporaries; he was a brave
man, man of consequence, a good tactician adored by
his soldiers, with whom he often spent time in the camp,
similarly to his future ally – John III Sobieski. In meetings
with Sobieski and his entourage it turned out, that he had
a big sense of humour and wasn’t able to hold his liquor,
when old Polish hospitality treated him with Polish drinks
in the camp.
The Polish relief forces were led by John III Sobieski,
king of the Commonwealth since 1674, who certainly beat

his ally with experience. Born in 1629, was 54 years old during the relief of Vienna.
Since 1649, that is since the Zboriv campaign against
the Cossacks, he served in the royal army starting as
a rittmeister (‘rotmistrz’) of armoured cavalrymen, then
a commander of big cavalry raids and finally – Field Hetman in 1666 and Great Hetman in 1668. He gained experience under the service of such seasoned masters as
Stefan Czarniecki or Jerzy Sebastian Lubomirski on several
theatres of war against the Cossacks, Tatars, Transylvanians, Moscow, Sweden and Turkey. As an independent
leader Sobieski brilliantly used the speed of cavalry attacks, which he demonstrated in campaigns against the
Tatar Horde in 1667 during the Podhajce campaign and
also between the years 1671 and 1672 during the fights in
Ukraine. Since 1672 he fought against Turkish-Tatar forces
stopping Tatars in strongholds in the battles of Podhajce
(1667), Lvov, (1675) or Zhuravno (Żurawno) (1676). In 1673
he took Turkish fortifications of Hussain Pasha by storm in
the battle of Khotyn (Chocim), which resulted in the utter
destruction of the Turkish army. Sobieski was a master of
using cavalry not only on strategic and tactical scale, but
also could lead various types of units, including marksmen
and artillery. Sobieski’s pursuit to not only defeat but destroy the enemy’s personnel is apparent not only in the
Khotyn campaign, but also in the Vienna campaign, in
which he tried to flank Kara Mustafa’s army. Among the
allied leaders marching towards Vienna, Sobieski had the
biggest experience in fighting Turkish forces. Nobody knew
Turkish and Tatar tactics better than him. In 1683, against
many of his advisers, he was determined to help the imperial forces and, while leading the allied army, crush the
Turks before Kara Mustafa ends the siege of Vienna. He utterly convinced the doubtful to participate in the Vienna
campaign in a famous letter to the Crown’s Field Hetman
Mikołaj Sieniawski in which, on 28 July 1683, he wrote:
‘it’s better to fight on foreign soil, eating foreign bread, in
assistance of all of the Empire’s forces, not only the Emperor himself, than to defend ourselves, while eating our
own bread when all our friends and neighbours have left
us if we don’t give them a hasty succour’4. Sobieski managed to compel his army to a strenuous march, as the left
column (led by Hetman M. Sieniawski) traversed 320 kilo4

John III to M. Sieniawski, Field Hetman of the Crown, from
Częstochowa on 25 July 1683; B. Czart., manuscript 2757,
p. 87.

– 141 –

– Mirosław Nagielski –

metres in 12 days, whereas the right (Sobieski’s main force)
over 400 kilometres in 15 days, which was a good result for
that time, especially considering that infantry, artillery and
supply wagons travelled along with the cavalry.
For the last three hundred years the matter of who, in
fact, commanded the allied army in the battle of Vienna
had been raising controversy. Formally it shouldn’t pique
any interest, because when Leopold I got ahold of the news
of Sobieski approaching the walls of Vienna, he sent Herman von Baden and Count Rabatta to carry the marshal’s
baton as a symbol of supreme command to Sobieski. He
also appointed Sobieski as the commander-in-chief of the
allied army in an instruction to Schaffgotsch on 3 September. We will show how the matter of command during the
battle presented itself below. The authorship of the accepted plan of Vienna’s relief is another case entirely. Both
Austrian and Polish historians attribute it to either Charles
V or Sobieski. A detailed analysis of sources pertaining to
this campaign indicate that the plan of directing the attack
from the west through the Vienna Woods was developed
by both commanders at the same time and independently
from each other. A council in Stettelsdorf on 3 September
acknowledged this scenario. The plans to march towards
Wiener Neustadt or to strike the Turkish Forces through
Bratislava were rejected, instead the operation including
Vienna Woods was chosen. Both commanders of the allied Christian forces accepted this plan unanimously. It
was also settled, that supreme command will be given to
the Polish monarch whereas each of the contingent commanders will order his units. Polish and imperial forces will
cross at Tulln and Saxon at Krems in order to concentrate
on the right bank of the Danube River and begin marching
towards Vienna. The differences emerged from the interpretation of the order of battle assumed by both commanders.
Charles intended to free Vienna as soon as possible.
With Turks preparing for a general assault, its situation
was getting worse by the minute. That’s why the imperials
took position on the left flank of the forces which were to
attack from the north, along the Danube. At the same time
Sobieski wanted to cut off the Turkish retreat and lay a decisive battle, so to destroy enemy personnel. Polish units
along with German reinforcements took the right flank,
which was to operate along the Vienna River in order to
block Turkish withdrawal to the south.
Forces used in the Vienna operation exceeded 65 thousand men, of which almost 1/3 were Poles. What’s import-

ant, they had as much as 14 thousand cavalrymen at their
disposal, which Charles was severely lacking during his
fight with Kara Mustafa before the siege of Vienna. In accordance with the previous arrangements, the allied forces
began their march from Tulln through the Vienna Woods
on 9 September. It was Charles’s merit to provide reconnaissance of the roads leading from the northern part of
the Vienna Woods towards the Danube River; moreover,
the Austrian forces had to travel the longest way the line
of departure near Weidling and Klosterneuburg whereas
the remaining units made their way towards Kirchbach
and Rosskopf. First victories in fighting the Turks were also
the work imperial units led by prince Charles. In the early
morning of 11 September the hills of Leopoldsberg and
Kahlenberg were overrun by imperial infantry. Both commanders attended the mass said by Marco d’Aviano and
afterwards went to Leopoldsberg, where further decisions
were made concerning the actions of the prince of Waldeck in the centre and the Polish forces continuing their
march through the Vienna Woods.
In Kahlenberg at 3 a.m. in the morning on 12 September JohnIII wrote a letter to Marie Casimire (Queen
Marysieńka) in which he emphasized his satisfaction
about good cooperation with prince Charles V of Lorraine,
the electors and the commanders of Reich’s contingents,
who complied with his orders. Of special importance is
the opinion of the Polish monarch about the Lorrainer,
expressed three days earlier in a letter to Marie Casimire
just after crossing the Danube near Tulln. ‘With the prince
of Lorraine I’m contended inexpressibly, he acts exemplarily towards me, he’s a just and noble man, and knows the
craft of war better than others’5. At 6 a.m. in the morning
prince Charles gave his soldiers the order to move out
from camp to the line of departure. Both leaders met at
Kahlenberg with commanders of the allied forces accompanying them. It was here, where the prince of Waldeck,
who led the Reich’s contingents in the centre, received
his orders. The commanders proceeded to their units.
The battle of Vienna was beginning. The imperials commenced assault on Nussberg, the Saxons on Heiligenstadt
and Waldeck’s units moved towards Grinzing. Sobieski, on
the other hand, after hearing out the holy mass on Kahlenberg said by father d’Aviano began to slowly move to5

John III to Queen Marie Casimire at he bridge on the Danube
near Tulln on 9 September 1683, in Sobieski. Listy do Marysieńki, ed. L. Kukulski, Warsaw 1970, p. 515.

– 142 –

– Vienna Campaign 1683 –

– 143 –

– Mirosław Nagielski –

wards Schafberg, where first companies (‘chorągiew’, literally a ‘banner’, Polish cavalry unit comprised of 100–150
mounted soldiers) of Polish cavalry were to emerge from
Vienna Woods.
Many historian’s works, including Thomas Barker,
emphasize the main role of prince Charles in the battle
of Vienna, without negating the nominal leadership of
Sobieski6. After all it was the Lorrainer who, since 6 in
the morning, led his infantry and pushed the Turks away
from the fortifications of Vienna, conquering respectively
Nussberg, Nussdorf, Heiligenstadt and finally Döbling.
Waldeck himself emphasized that the generals of specific
allied armies acted depending on the course of events and
Sobieski, because of the size of the front (8–10km) and terrain conditions, simply wasn’t able to perform the duty of
the supreme commander. Prince Charles determined the
outcome of the battle of Vienna on the left flank by keeping
most of the Turkish forces led by Ibrahim Pasha on himself
almost until 4 p.m. Reading the combat itinerary of the
prince, who was constantly accompanying his troops, it’s
worth to mention that Nussberg had been seized at circa
10 a.m. and afterwards a strong enemy attack between
the Nesselbach and Schreiberbach creeks was countered.
Bloody fights between the dwellings of Nussdorf lasted for
almost two hours and not before 1 p.m. the Prince suspended operations in order to organise the left flank, when the
imperials were taking position in front of Döbling. Until 6
p.m. the imperial forces were pushing the Turks towards
the walls of Vienna and entered the city at dusk. At this
time Sobieski along with his accompanying companies
was already in the conquered Kara Mustafa’s camp. How
did it come to that?
A difficult terrain, cut by numerous ravines, made it impossible for the supreme commander to directly interfere
with the actions of individual groups of allied forces. It
also wasn’t possible for Sobieski who was present at Leopoldsberg and later on at Michaelerberg and Schafberg,
even though he used a field glass. A constantly changing
situation caused that the commanders of big concentrations of coalition forces had to make decisions individually, taking into consideration the directives settled down
on war councils preceding the battle of Vienna. It doesn’t
mean that John III didn’t act as a supreme commander.
6

T.M. Barker, Double Eagle and Crescent. Vienna’s second Turkish siege and its historical setting, New York 1967, pp. 322–
324.

The events of 12 September confirm this fully. The commanders of respective German and imperial army units
like clockwork executed the assumptions of the order of
battle prepared in the early days of September, correcting
them during the march of the allied forces towards Vienna.
Sobieski carried out reconnaissance on his flank by
sending prince Alexander’s hussars commanded by lieutenant Zygmunt Zbierzchowski and from Hetman Sieniawski’s group two further Potocki companies: Szczęsny’s
hussars and Stanisław’s armoured cavalry. Despite
heavy losses, the attack of these companies which returned to the line of departure showed that an assault
on Türkenschanz is, in fact, possible. The losses of prince
Alexander’s company totalled 19 knights (‘towarzysz’) and
35 subordinates (‘pocztowy’), which was circa 35% of the
whole company’s manpower); a senator accompanying this company – Court Treasurer of the Crown Andrzej
Modrzewski died. The Potocki companies sent for reconnaissance suffered similar losses, but their return showed
that a cavalry charge en masse could succeed. It was in
that moment, that Sobieski, acting as the supreme leader,
made a decision of dire consequences. Considering that
only about 1,5 hour left till dusk and the onrush of prince
Charles’s imperial forces’ left flank would inevitably push
the Turks beyond the Vienna River, he ordered an immediate attack with the whole right flank and centre. We’re
doubtful that the dispatched couriers reached all of the
allied groups but Sobieski, fearing that the Turks will retreat from Vienna, tried to flank Kara Mustafa’s forces by
using a cavalry attack along the Vienna River. 20 thousand
Polish, imperial and Bavarian cavalry rushed at Abaza Sari
Hussein’s positions. It was the biggest cavalry charge of the
17th century. This onslaught couldn’t be stopped by Turkish units reinforced by Ibrahim Pasha’s troops from the
back and from the right flank. Right before 6 p.m. Sobieski
marched into abandoned tents of Kara Mustafa. The battle
of Vienna was a victory.
As the supreme commander Sobieski bore full responsibility for the outcome of the battle of Vienna. The victory
on 12 September was ascribed to the Polish monarch, as
state congratulatory letters from many European rulers
and the Pope. Polish historian Jan Wimmer rightly deemed
Brandenburgian and German, not Polish, accounts of the
relief of Vienna and the matter of supreme command reliable. According to Johann Georg von Anhalt, who reported the battle of Vienna to an elector (13 September) ‘Der
König von Pohlen commandirte en cheff und war überall

– 144 –

– Vienna Campaign 1683 –

wo das grösste Feüer wahr’. In turn, baron Schlick-Görtz,
a resident of Frederic William wrote: ‘der König von Pohlen hirinnen alles ordinirte’7. Even prince Charles himself
confirmed in his letters, that throughout the campaign he
acted in accordance with John III’s directives. Three days
after the battle of Vienna he wrote in one of his letters:
‘The Polish king gained eternal fame during this fight, as
he came from his kingdom and acted as a great king and
a great leader. I have only given orders, which were accepted and executed’8. In this matter the Turkish accounts of
the battle of Vienna are most important. They saw Sobieski
as the obiggest contributor to their defeat at the Habsburg capital’s walls. Hussain Hezarfenn wrote in his war
journal: ‘The great vizier barely stepped into his tent when
the Poles came after his trail, overran the military camp
and surrounded the tents of the great vizier. When they
captured the royal treasury, the great vizier took the holy
banner and left the encampment’9. Defterdar Sari Mehmed
Pasha noted: ‘the Polish king became the head of all the
giaours because of his dignity’ He had with him both the
Great and Field Hetmans and twenty four thousand Polish cavalry and infantrymen’10. These accounts attest, that
the Turkish side was utterly convinced that the reinforcements acquired by the emperor from the Polish monarch
decided about their defeat in the campaign of 1683.
How to judge the effort of the commanders and the
forces accompanying them during the battle of Vienna?
The Viennese success was the work of all allied soldiers
and their commanders, among whom John III and Charles
V indeed played a superior role. A combined effort of the
whole coalition army was needed to beat the Turks; none of
the participants would achieve success alone. Indeed, the
left flank, comprised of imperial and Saxon forces, carried
the weight of fighting Ibrahim Pasha’s units, which allowed
the remaining allied forces, including the Polish cavalry, to
cross the Vienna Woods and position themselves on the
line of departure. In turn, the appearance of Polish cav7
8

9

10

After: J. Wimmer, Wiedeń 1683…, p. 350.
O. Forst de Battaglia, Jan Sobieski król Polski, Warsaw 1983, p.
217.
Husajn Hezarfenn, ‘Historia wyprawy wiedeńskiej’, in Kara Mustafa pod Wiedniem. Źródła muzułmańskie do dziejów wyprawy wiedeńskiej 1683 roku, ed. Z. Abrahamowicz, Cracow 1973,
p. 256.
Defterdar Sary Mehmed Pasza, ‘Wyprawa wiedeńska i związane z nią wydarzenia w państwie osmańskim od lutego 1681 r.
do lutego 1684 r.’, in Kara Mustafa pod Wiedniem…, p. 294.

alry on the slopes of Schafberg made Kara Mustafa realize
from where the Christians will carry out the decisive strike.
That’s why he began to relocate reinforcements from the
right flank to Abaza Sari Husseins’s position, thus weakening forces blocking prince Charles’s march. This gave
the Lorrainer an incentive to resume operations along
the Danube River after regrouping his own forces. German
troops from the centre, in turn, helped Sieniawski’s cavalry
unit, when it was having a hard time fighting the Turks.
Keeping the Turkish forces busy by these units made it
possible for Sobieski to commence a decisive strike with
all might of his right wing and some units from the centre,
which allowed to break through Abaza Sari Husseins’s positions and cause Kara Mustafa’s army to flee the battlefield.
The basic objective laid by the allied command during
the council in Stettelsdorf was fulfilled – Vienna was set free
and rescued from inevitable doom. However, the second
objective, primary in the eyes of the supreme commander,
wasn’t completed. Kara Mustafa’s army was defeated,
but not destroyed, and was retreating through the crossing at Vienna River in the direction of Győr. Almost 60.000
soldiers, not including about 15.000 Tatars, Vlachs and
Moldovans who didn’t participate in the battle, fled the
battlefield in panic. Turkish losses, mainly among infantry,
didn’t exceed 15.000 people, including many taken prisoner. The biggest death toll and prisoner count was among
infantry, which stayed in the approaches among Vienna
and received the order to retreat from its walls too late.
Because soldiers began to pillage the Turkish camp, the
pursuit after escaping Turks wasn’t organised well. Would
the Poles chase Kara Mustafa’s entourage, Turkish losses
would be much bigger. Turkish sources confirm it, as Silahdar Mehmed Aga writes: ‘[The allied forces] didn’t care
much for chasing the Muslim army. If it weren’t for this, our
situation would be much more dire!’11. The allies looted
great treasures, rich robes, items belonging to the vizier
and Turkish dignitaries, horses and camp equipment. Apart
from that, almost whole Turkish artillery, large amounts of
gunpowder, cannonballs, siege equipment and lots of food
brought for the Turkish army from Hungary were taken.
Most of the cannons were given to Viennese arsenal, despite the fact that it were Polish soldier who captured them.
Sobieski complained to the Lorrainer about it five days after
11

Silahdar Mehmed Aga from Findiklili, ‘Diariusz wyprawy wiedeńskiej i kronika związanych z nią wydarzeń w państwie
osmańskim od 21 stycznia 1681 r. do 28 lutego 1684 r.’, in Kara
Mustafa pod Wiedniem…, p. 164.

– 145 –

– Mirosław Nagielski –

the battle of Vienna without much success: cannons ‘which
we promised ourselves to collect and evenly split, I have
grabbed almost in entirety beforehand’ 12. Many incidents
happened between the Poles and German and imperial
soldiers when it came to divide the loot. The fact, that the
part of the camp in which the vizier’s tent and the tents of
his dignitaries were located along with many valuables
fell to the Poles caused envy and animosity both among
commanders and soldiers of the allied armies. Sobieski
himself tried to relieve the tension by giving numerous gifts
to emperor Leopold I (a couple of Turkish horses with rich
saddles), prince Charles V of Lorraine and his commanders, electors present in the camp and other officers. For
example, he gave a horse ‘with full equipment’ to Johann
Georg von Anhalt and to Saxon elector Jan Jerzy III a twohorse retinue, two Turkish banners, 4 prisoners and a rich
curtain for the wife. It didn’t repair the relations between
the allies and hostile incidents began to multiply since the
meeting with Leopold I on 15 September in Schwechat.
Relations between Sobieski and the Lorrainer began to
degrade as supply problems plaguing both armies caused
constant disagreements with Poles, who complained to
Charles about being stripped of their trophies. Mentions of
even more frequent conflicts between the soldiers of both
nations began to show up in John III’s letters. It’s telling,
that after successfully relieving of Vienna Austrian commanders treated Sobieski and his soldiers with much less
esteem, even hostility in some cases.
Until the end of the campaign both leaders held each
other in high regard, praising cooperation in Upper Hungary until the troops separated on 4 November 1683.
12

Letter of John III to Marie Casimire in a camp near Szenau village on the road to Proszowice near the Danube River, three
miles from Vienna on 17 September 1683, in Sobieski. Listy do
Marysieńki…, p. 530.

Sobieski didn’t neglect to emphasize in one of his letters
that victory at Vienna didn’t change the Lorrainer, as was
the case with many commanders of the allied force. He
wrote in a camp over the Danube River in front of Bratislava: ‘The prince of Lorraine does not know sorrow nor
pride, nor the Emperor’s grace’13. Sobieski was able to appreciate his ally’s skills, military experience and esteem,
which he had among imperial troops. Nonetheless, it
doesn’t change the fact that the victory at Vienna had two
fathers; these were John III Sobieski and prince Charles
V of Lorraine, who on separate fronts executed the order
of battle developed a few days earlier. Glory also covered
numerous nameless Polish, German and Austrian soldiers,
among whom many stayed on the imperial soil eternally. The losses of the whole army of the Commonwealth
marching to rescue Vienna are hard to estimate. Out of 25
thousand crown soldiers accompanying Sobieski, about
3 thousand didn’t return to the country, some died of
wounds and exhaustion later. For example, while crossing
the borders of the Commonwealth a freshly appointed
Court Treasurer of the Crown Dominik Potocki died, and
15 December in the same year Field Hetman of the Crown
Mikołaj Sieniawski died in Lubowla. Aside from that, circa
1000 volunteers accompanying the army died or were
killed, including a few hundred camp servants. All in all,
excluding Lithuanian soldiers who were operating in Slovakia, the losses totalled circa 5 thousand people. The goal
which motivated the allies was achieved and both monarchs, Sobieski and Leopold I could continue their great
plan of recapturing Hungary, Transylvania and Podolia
from Turkish hands.

13

Letter of John III to Marie Casimire at the Danube River near
Bratislava on 24 September 1683; in Sobieski. Listy do Marysieńki…, p. 542.

Bibliography
Primary sources

-1918: Symposium und Abendvortrag 11. und 12. September

The Princes Czartoryski Library (B. Czart)

2008 , Wien 2009

Traktaty polsko-austriackie z drugiej połowy XVII wieku, ed.
Z. Wojcik, Warsaw 1985

Sobieski. Listy do Marysieńki, ed. L. Kukulski, Warsaw 1970
T. M. Barker, Double Eagle and Crescent. Vienna’s second Turkish

Books

siege and its historical setting, New York 1967

Kara Mustafa pod Wiedniem. Źrodła muzułmańskie do dziejów

O. Forst de Battaglia, Jan Sobieski król Polski, Warsaw 1983

wyprawy wiedeńskiej 1683 roku, ed. Z. Abrahamowicz,

K. Konaski, Polska przed odsieczą wiedeńską, Warsaw 1914

Cracow 1973

J. Wimmer, Wiedeń 1683. Dzieje kampanii i bitwy, Warsaw

Polnisch-österreichische Kontakte sowie Militärbündnisse 1618–

1983

– 146 –

– Janusz Wojtasik –
University of Finance and Management in Warsaw

The Battle of Racławice, 4 th April 1794

Decisions made by the parties
before the uprising.
Plans, forces and means
The 1793 Second Partition of Poland effectuated by
Russia and Prussia on the pretext of annihilation of the
spreading plague of Jacobins was a direct threat to the
Polish Commonwealth. Under the St. Petersburg Convention of 1793 Russia obtained lands to the east of the
Zbruch River and Druya, the majority of Belarussia together with Kamyanets-Podilsky, Bratslav, Zhytomyr and
Minsk – 250 thousand km2 altogether. Prussia seized Trouń
and Gdańsk, all of Greater Poland together with Poznań,
Gniezno and Kalisz, Kuyavia with Inowrocław and Brześć
Kujawski, part of Mazovia with Płock, Sieradz and Łęczyce
lands – altogether comprising 58 thousand km2. The partitions changed the formerly vast country into the rump
Polish Commonwealth, virtually occupied by the Russian
army and comprising less than 200 thousand km2 with approx. 4 million citizens.
Polish patriots were fully aware that the treacherous
powers would have no qualms about partitioning the
Commonwealth for the third and last time in the future.
However, they did not want to give in to the perspective of
wiping their country off the political map of Europe. The
feeling of active resistance was heightened by the news
from revolution-ridden France. As early as in May 1793,
this atmosphere of tension brought forward a conspiracy
to organise an armed uprising. There were several centres
which spurred uprising plans within the country and
a gathering of exiled leading activists of the Four-Year Sejm
in Dresden attempted to act as their controlling centre.
General Tadeusz Kościuszko, the Polish national hero who
fought in the American Revolutionary War and against

Russia in 1792, was chosen to be the leader of the uprising.
The scheme of the uprising was brought forth during a war
council which took place in September 1793 in Podgórze
with the participation of Gen. Tadeusz Kościuszko and
Gen. Józef Zajączek, who had come from Dresden. The
plan was to commence the operation in Greater Poland
while simultaneously attacking the occupying armies stationed in Warsaw and Cracow Voivodeship with part of the
forces. After liberating the capital, offensive actions were
to commence on the right bank of the Vistula River. In the
territory of Lithuania, the Lithuanian army (12 000 men)
would fight on its own. The ‘Podgórze’ scheme was not
realised because Kościuszko considered the preparations
made to be unsatisfactory. According to the second plan,
developed in far worse conditions, in the face of army reduction and imprisonments which posed a major threat to
the conspiracy, the uprising was to commence in Cracow
and ‘attract’ Russian forces from Warsaw, which would facilitate the liberation of the capital. However, the date of
the uprising was yet to be established.

The uprising and first steps
of the opponents
Meanwhile, unforeseen circumstances quickened uprising actions. This was due to the 1st Greater Poland National Cavalry Brigade commanded by brigadier Antoni
Madaliński who, as a member of the uprising conspiracy
as well as a commander of a brigade which was to be
demobilised (approx. 1200 men), decided to disobey the
orders and advanced his troops south from Ostrołęka to
Cracow Voivodeship via Mława and Wyszogród. This lawless act prematurely raised alarm among Russians, who
commenced to strengthen their military forces by the

– 147 –

– Janusz Wojtasik –

Vistula, as well as Prussians, who began to mobilise their
troops in order to thwart the uprising. A Russian ambassador, Gen. Osip Igelström, ordered a regrouping in the occupying Russian army, theretofore calculated to maintain
control over the main routes in Poland, in aid of reinforcing
Warsaw’s defence and blocking Sandomierz Voivodeship.
To this end, those Russian troops which were stationed
outside Warsaw were drawn to the capital, together with
several divisions of the Słonimska and Brzeska groups,
led by Gen. Alesei Khrushchyov. Those divisions who were
instructed to defeat Madaliński’s brigade were also drawn
to Warsaw via Northern Mazovia. In total, Gen. Igelström
gathered over 16 000 men in the capital.
Sandomierz Voivodeship was blocked by troops of Gen.
Nikolai Rakhmanov from Lublin and Gen. Fiodor Denisov
from Łuck. They were supposed to cross the Vistula River
near Kazimierz and later join forces from Cracow and
Opatów. In order to join Rakhmanov and Denisov who
were blocking Sandomierz Voivodeship, a battalion of
Streltsy commanded by Lieut. Col. Łykoszyn left Cracow.
Taking advantage of these circumstances, on the night
of 22th to 23rd March, Gen. Tadeusz Kościuszko arrived in
Wiatowice near Cracow, and on the evening of 23rd March
he held the final council in the Wodzicki Palace in Cracow.
As a consequence, on 24th March 1794, at the Main Square
in the presence of the citizens of Cracow and few military
forces, the Polish leader announced the general uprising
by reading a proclamation in which he stated the objective of the struggle: ‘The liberation of Poland from the foreign soldier, recuperation and protection of the entirety of
its borders, withdrawal of all forms of usurpation, foreign
as well as domestic, consolidation of national freedom
and Nation’s sovereignty’1. At the same time, he was proclaimed ‘the highest and only Commander-in-Chief of the
whole uprising’2.
Upon commencing the dramatic uprising as a means of
struggle for freedom, integrity and sovereignty of the Polish Commonwealth, Commander-in-Chief of the National
Armed Force Tadeusz Kościuszko had only one battalion of
2nd (Wodzicki’s) regiment and one battalion of 3rd (Czapski’s)
regiment, i.e. 800 men in total. This number was supple1

2

Tadeusz Kościuszko, jego odezwy i raporta uzupełnione celniejszymi aktami odnoszącymi się do powstania narodowego
1794, ed. L. Nabielak, Cracow 1918, pp. 32–33; Powstanie kościuszkowskie 1794 Dzieje militarne, ed. T. Rawski, vol. 1,Warsaw
1994, p. 78.
Ibid.

mented by 8 squadrons of 2nd Lesser Poland National
Cavalry Brigade of Gen. Ludwik Manget. With these forces,
on 1st April 1794 the Commander-in-Chief left Cracow for
Warsaw via Mogiła – Pleszów – Wadów – Kocmyszów to
Luborzyca, where he joined 1st Greater Poland National
Cavalry Brigade of Maj. Gen. Antoni Madaliński, which had
been reduced to approx. 1000 horses.
On 3rd April 1794 the forces reached Koniusza, situated
by the river Szreniawa, where they were joined by Maj.
Gen. Jan Ślaski, leading 2000 peasants-recruits armed
with scythes. At that moment the number of Kościuszko’s
troops reached 3500 regular soldiers and 2000 scythemen.
Kościuszko also had the artillery composed of 12 cannons
(4 six pounders and 8 three pounders) at his disposal.
On 3rd April in Skalbmierz the Polish forces under Kościuszko’s command encountered Russian corps led by
Gens. Tormasov, Rakhmanov and Denisov, numbering
approx. 5000 men. On the morning of 4th April, upon arri­
ving at Skalbmierz, Kościuszko assessed that the route
leading to Warsaw had already been blocked by the Russians. Therefore, he decided to bypass the Russian forces
by leading his troops on a route to Działoszyce. It turned
out, however, that the route had also been successfully
blocked by the Russians. This could attest to the complete determination of the Russian command to defeat
the opponent in a general battle, which would decide the
fate of the Polish uprising. Upon learning that the Polish
army gathered in Koniusza, on the night of 3rd to 4th April
Denisov, the chief commander of the Russian camp, had
ordered Gen. Tormasov’s group to go to Koniusza, and he
himself had marched towards Płaszowie, intending to attack the Polish camp from south east.

Kościuszko’s march towards Racławice.
The battle
When Kościuszko approached Racławice, ‘his vanguard
met the vanguard of the Russians […]. The Poles, moving farther towards the hills near Racławice discerned the
Moskals, stationed in a very strong position, for indeed, they
took up quite an impassable mountain’3. In the clash of the
vanguards both sides took captives, which made the Commander-in-Chief realise that what he saw was only a part of
3

‘Józefa Zajączka Pamiętniki albo Historia rewolucji czyli Powstanie roku 1792, przekład Hugona Kołłataja’, in Pamiętniki
z ośmnastego wieku, Poznań 1862, p. 25; Powstanie kościuszkowskie 1794… p. 178.

– 148 –

– The Battle of Racławice, 4th April 1794 –

– 149 –

– Janusz Wojtasik –

Russian forces under the command of Gen. Tormasov. He
immediately decided to attack the slightly weaker opponent by ordering his troops forward toward the formation.
But Tormasov did not intend to commence the fight in an
unfavourable position, so he withdrew to the Kościejowskie
hills, past the Janowiczki–Racławice route, where he took
his defensive position. The Polish troops followed the Russian withdrawal until they reached the aforementioned
hills. However, after a reconnaissance of the hostile positions, the Commander-in-Chief decided that the perspective of a frontal attack on the Russians was not promising,
as it meant that the Polish soldiers would have to climb
a steep slope without artillery support. On the other hand,
bypassing the hostile army from the north through the
Klonów–Racławice route would mean dividing Kościuszko’s
forces, not to mention that the amount of time needed for
completing the operation would easily draw the opponent’s
attention. Tomosov could not be bypassed from the south
either, as that was the direction from which the rest of Gen.
Denisov’s troops would be coming.
In this situation the Commander-in-Chief made a decision to take a defensive position on the top of a hill on
the Dziemierzyce–Janowiczki route, which created favourable conditions for both offensive and defensive battle,
as the hostile army had to climb a steep hill. On the other
hand, any potential attempts made by the opponent to
bypass the Polish positions from the north or south would
allow the Commander-in-Chief to rearrange his forces.
The area in which the battle was to take place was a part
of the Cracow–Częstochowa Upland, a mountainous terrain
furrowed with valleys. A stream, from the 19th century onward known as Ścieklec, encompasses the whole area with
its branches, creating a U-shape. In spring these branches,
also known as Ścieklecs, fill with water and flow in deep
valleys which divide ranges of hills. Between them, there
is a hilly terrain reminiscent of a long tongue stuck out to
south-east, 11 km long and raised 40 m above ground level.
A number of ravines which plough into the hillside divide its
wavy ridge into distinctively outlined sections. On the crest
of this hilly terrain with an average height of 300 m above
sea level, there was a route that went from Wrocimowice
through a 300.3 m hill and then turned north-west to Marchocice. In the middle of the hilly crest, the Wrocimowice–
Marchocice route crossed Dziemierzyce–Janowiczki track
that partly went through a several-metre long gully. There
was a forest north of the road, and to the east of the eastern
Ścieklec, behind the Janowiczki–Racławice route, lied Koś-

ciejowskie hills, 300 m high and with a steep hillside on the
side of the spring.
On these hills, east of Racławice, Gen. Tormasov positioned his army. The main forces, made up of battalions
of riflemen and artillery, were arranged in the centre of the
track on the ridge. Their flanks were comprised of the cavalry, whereas Maj. Adrian Denisov’s Cossacks stood on the
hillside. The Russian forces numbered 3 infantry battalions,
6 cavalry squadrons and one regiment of Cossacks, which in
total amounted to 3000 men and 12 guns. As was previously
mentioned, this was a highly defensive position, for both
a frontal assault as well as an attempt to bypass the enemy
from the north or south would end in failure.
The Poles were deployed opposite, i.e. on the crest of
Dziemierzyce hills, approx. 2000m from the Russians. The
positions of both hostile armies were divided by a valley
and the eastern Ścieklec. Polish positions were as defensive as Russian. ‘The Polish infantry under Gen. Józef
Zajączek was arranged in one line of 450–500 m’, on the
right flank the infantry formation was based on a 306.2 m
hill and on the left flank it went beyond the Dziemierzyce–
Janowiczki route. Two artillery batteries, 6 cannons each,
were positioned in the following manner: first next to the
306.2m hill, second by the ravine of the road. The cavalry
commanded by Gen. Antoni Madaliński, composed of two
brigades – 1st Greater Poland National Cavalry Brigade and
2nd Lesser Polish National Cavalry Brigade, took position
on the right flank between the 306.2 m and 300.3 m hills. In
the forest, on the extension of the left flank on the hillside
facing Janowiczki there were 100 riflemen and half of battalion of infantry. Because they were untrained for battle,
the scythemen were arranged on the opposite hillside facing Dziemierzyce, shielded from artillery fire; the Polish
supply train was situated on the same slope. Overall, the
width of the Polish line could have amounted to 800 m.4
From 11 a.m. both sides were fully prepared, but reluctant to start the battle, as though they did not want to
leave their positions prematurely. However, that was only
pretence. Gen. Tormasov was awaiting Gen. Denisov’s order in response to his report about the presence of Poles
on Dziemierzyce hills. Upon receiving the order to attack
his opponent, supported by reinforcement in the form
of a battalion of grenadiers and 4 additional cannons,
he promptly proceeded to commence the battle. After
a council held in the afternoon of 4th April 1794, at 5 p.m.
4

Powstanie kościuszkowskie 1794…, vol. 1, p. 180.

– 150 –

– The Battle of Racławice, 4th April 1794 –

the Russian side decided to attack the Polish positions
with two groups. The first one was to attack from the
front and bind the Polish forces while the second would
bypass the Polish positions and the forest from the north
and emerge through the base of the Dziemierzyce crest towards the left Polish flank which was bent and based in
the valley of the Marchocice brook. The group which was
charging from the front, composed of a battalion of grenadiers, half a battalion of riflemen and 5 mounted squadrons under the command of Col. Muromcev, supported by
field artillery fire, descended from Kościejowskie hills into
the valley of eastern Ścieklec near Zakościele, from where,
sheltered by the forest in which it had left a part of riflemen, it advanced towards the Dziemierzyce–Janowiczki–
Wrocimowice crossroads. The left Polish battery (6 cannons) was situated on the bank of the road ravine through
which the Russians were descending and delayed their
march successfully with fire, which resulted in a great deal
of losses on the Russian side. The Polish cavalry (2nd brigade) also descended from the Dziemierzyce hill, attacking, with varying degrees of success, Muromcev’s squadrons north of the crossroads. The Polish side experienced
some commotion and signs of panic due to the hostile
fire. Two squadrons fled the battlefield and those which
remained withdrew to the Dziemierzyce hill.
When the Polish cavalry found itself within the range
of the Russian artillery, the latter successfully fired at the
centre of the Polish formation. In this tense situation,
when the Russian side was beginning to gain the upper
hand, the Polish battery fired, which helped balance the
battle. Eventually, the Polish managed to maintain their
position on the Dziemierzyce crest. Even Tormasov himself praised the Polish artillery after the battle: ‘The actions
of the hostile artillery,’ he wrote, ‘held back our charge. It
was simply ruthless’5.
Having faced the determined resistance of the Polish
centre and having realised that repeating his attack uphill
and in the fire of Polish artillery did not constitute a promising perspective, Gen. Tormasov decided to seek the settlement in the north. He had high hopes for the bypassing
group led by Lieut. Col. Pustovalov. During the persistent
struggle in the centre of the Polish formation, the Russian flanking group, composed of 3rd battalion of riflemen
and one regiment of Cossacks under the command of
Lieut. Col. Dmitriy Pustovalov, was quite successful. Hav5

Quote: Powstanie kościuszkowskie 1794…, vol. 1, p. 182.

ing marched through Racławice, the group bypassed the
forest from the north and ascended the Dziemierzyce hill.
Tormasov wanted to use Pustovalov’s success to win the
fight, so he ordered another part of his half battalion of
riflemen to the forest in order to take over that area and
establish tactical connection with Pustovalov’s group.
He also ordered Muromcev’s mounted squadrons in that
direction. Upon receiving reinforcements, Lieut. Col.
Pustovalov developed the front of his division to the left
with greater eagerness, ordering it south and attacking
the left Polish flank under the command of Gen. Józef Zajączek. The struggle between the troops of Gen. Zajączek
and the Russian column of Lieut. Col. Pustovalov was
fierce.
The Polish side was rather tardy in discerning serious
threat coming from the north in the form of Pustovalov’s
group. In great haste the Greater Poland Cavalry Brigade
was transferred in that direction in the attempt to block the
exit from the forest. The move turned to be unsuccessful
due to the cooperation between the Russian cavalry and
riflemen. Surely, after the initial failure Gen. Madaliński’s
cavalry managed to repel the Cossack attack, but eventually it was broken by a decisive charge of the Russian cavalry and partly fled the battlefield. The attempts of Lieut.
Col. Pustovalov’s flanking group turned out to be ineffective notwithstanding, as Gen. Zajączek’s left flank was too
strong to be broken. Thus, the battle temporarily transformed into a mutual shoot-out.
Meanwhile, the battle was settled at a different part of
the front and it was not the Russians who settled it. It was
the Polish Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Tadeusz Kościuszko,
who, having noticed substantial attenuation of the Russian centre, decided to take advantage of his opponent’s
mistake. He arranged an assault group in order to attack
the Russian artillery positions in the centre of the opponent’s formation. The assault group consisted of 320 peasants armed with scythes, having 2 companies of 3rd and 6th
regiments on both flanks. ‘One company of 6th regiment
remained in the initial position and constituted support in
case of failure. One company of 2nd regiment and the cavalry were to stand on the left in order to allow the enemy
to join Pustovalov’s group beyond the forest and to cover
the withdrawal in case of failure’6.
The attack of the assault column was preceded by artillery fire to overpower the opponent. After the barrage
6

Ibid.

– 151 –

– Janusz Wojtasik –

Gen. Kościuszko advanced a group of scythemen from behind the 306.2 m hill through a gully, flanked with infantry
from 3rd and 6th regiments, towards the Russian cannons.
The enemy managed to fire once or twice with canister
shots, but the power and momentum of the assault was
unbreakable. First the peasants and then the infantry
crushed with gunners and after a fierce hand-to-hand
combat they broke the Russian grenadiers arrayed behind
the battery; at the same time they seized all Russian cannons (12) together with carriages, horses and artillery ammunition. Gen. Tormasov tried to avoid the disaster by ordering back 3 squadrons of Muromcev’s cavalry, but they
seemed to have been unable to come, held back by Gen.
Zajączkowski’s cavalry on the left wing. During the battle
Col. Muromcev was injured and taken captive.
Thanks to his decisive assault, not only did Kościuszko
destroy the Russian centre by capturing all the enemy
cannons, but he also gained the opportunity to cut off
Pustovalov’s column on his left flank and to raise fear in
the advancing column led by Gen. Denisov. After a roaring success in the centre, the Commander-in-Chief returned to the crest of the Dziemierzyce hill to the aid of
Gen. Zajączkowski, whose troops were still fighting with
Pustovalov’s column on the left flank. Kościuszko ordered
all the infantry and scythemen that had not yet taken active part in the battle to the left wing to fight Pustovalov’s
column. In a fierce hand-to-hand combat, 3rd battalion of
riflemen under Lieut. Col. Pustovalov was almost completely destroyed, together with the commander himself.
The remaining part of the column, including Maj. Ardian
Denisov’s Cossacks, fled towards Racławice. The fight with
separated enemy groups lasted the longest in the forest,
but again the peasants’ full commitment led to a complete
defeat of the hostile army.
The battle of Racławice had not yet ended when Gen.
Fiodor Denisov’s group approached the battlefield, composed of 3 infantry battalions, 6 mounted squadrons, one
regiment of Cossacks and 6 cannons, altogether 3000 men.
The Russian leader even ascended the Dziemierzyce hill
from the south and approached the Polish stations. It is
said that only a gully divided the Russian troops from the
Polish, but Gen. Denisov did not attempt to cross it. Only
sub-divisions of the Russian cavalry tried to come closer
to the Polish positions. Ultimately, having decided not to
resume the battle, the Russian leader descended from
the hill in quadrilaterals and ascended Kościejowskie hills
between Podmłyn and Wrocimowice, where he joined the

rest of Gen. Tormasov’s forces and whence the two Russian groups set off for Skalbmierz.
Thus, on 4th April 1794, after 5 hours of struggle the
battle of Racławice resulted in a decisive victory of the
Polish army. The Poles remained on the battlefield. On
the Polish side, the battle took 100 lives, with the same
number of injured. It is said that the Russians lost as
many as 600 soldiers and 12 cannons. However, after
midnight on 5th April Kościuszko ordered retreat to Słomniki and on 6th April he retreated even farther to Bosutów
by the river Dłubnica and took to deploying defence on
the riverbank.

Assessment of the battle of Racławice
Although the battle of Racławice was a rather tactical
meeting engagement between two minor forces, it played
a pivotal role in the history of the Kościuszko Uprising of
1794. It was the first victorious battle that substantially
raised the Polish morale. The news of the victorious battle
of Racławice sparked off an uprising in Cracow, which
spread to other parts of the Crown to flare up on the
Lithuanian lands of the former Commonwealth. On the
fields of Racławice, a new army had appeared. The Polish
soldier was joined by a peasant armed with nothing but
melee weapon (scythe or pike) as part of a newly formed
militia. It was those untrained peasants who constituted
the majority of the striking force that overpowered the opponent in the centre and on the Polish left flank.
From ‘the tactical point of view, due to the combination
of regular and irregular (scythe) formations, Racławice was
a novelty on the European war scene’. In this respect, Kościuszko splendidly implemented the previous theoretical
stipulations (of Jean Charles Folard) on the effectiveness
of charges made by columns armed with melee weapons,
surrounded by regular formations. Here, the historians
emphasise the experience gained by Kościuszko in the
American war for independence. The commander had the
opportunity to observe manoeuvres made by the regular
American units with the use of untrained and diffident
militia. The regular units, trained after the fashion of the
English, fought in a linear formation, leading organised
assault. The untrained and somewhat timid militia, also
armed with firearms and most often positioned in the forefront, fired one or two shots, after which it withdrew in an
organised way, with the use of camouflage. The practical
lesson learnt in the southern states of America allowed

– 152 –

Kościuszko to notice possibilities of a diversified army.
Thanks to his bravery and experience combined with this
new type of army, upon considering its specifications and
possibilities, the commander was able to win battles.
Such a diversified army was led by Kościuszko near
Racławice. The untrained scythemen armed with melee
weapons were arranged into column on the Dziemierzyce
hillside, shielded against the enemy’s artillery fire. Only
after the Polish artillery had managed to partly overpower the Russian artillery did the Commander-in-Chief
order the scythemen forward. The column of scythe-bearers, framed with regular infantry, approach the enemy
until they reach an attacking distance, after which ‘the
scythemen scatter and begin assault in a wide front line,
whereas the flanked line infantry accelerates’. Such an impetuous attack brought about the decisive effect.
Kościuszko used scythemen in a similar manner on the
left flank in the last stage of the battle. When the Polish
line infantry was in a fire fight and could not break the
opponent’s ranks, the Commander-in-Chief decided to
use scythe-bearers. He ordered them to the centre, creating a column core, surrounded with regular infantry. The
column was then instructed to charge, and it broke the
opponent.
Apart from the scythe-bearers, the well-trained and
disciplined artillery also stood out with its marksmanship. The infantry showed good attacking skills. The
cavalry was the weakest link in the Polish armed forces.
Both 2nd Lesser Polish National Cavalry Brigade under
Gen. Ludwik Manget and 1st Greater Polish National Cavalry Brigade of Gen. Antoni Madaliński turned out to be
a disappointment. Cavalry was successful only when in
preponderance and did not ‘manifest its former superiority over the corresponding foreign weapon’7. The hostile
army demonstrated its traditional advantages: the well7

M. Kukiel, Zarys historii wojskowości w Polsce, 5th ed., London
1949, p. 140.

trained infantry was resilient to fatigue and discomfort;
the cavalry overshadowed the Polish one in hand-tohand combat and carried out effective reconnaissance
and hit-and-run tactics.
As the Commander-in-Chief of the 1974 uprising, Gen.
Tadeusz Kościuszko deserves a separate overview. In the
battle of Racławice the Polish leader showed great initiative in his use of the infantry for charging. He demonstrated his skill of redeploying the forces during the battle,
his great orientation and quick thinking. But most importantly, he proved to be extremely confident in his actions
and skilful in the economical use of his troops. Apart
from the mentioned assets, Kościuszko showed personal
bravery. He single-handedly, and before the eyes of his
soldiers (both regular and peasant), led columns to attack
the Russian cannons in the centre and on the left flank,
which raised the morale of the whole army. ‘The legend
that had surrounded this person after 1792 was confirmed in the eyes of his soldiers. It became an essential
factor that shaped the morale of the Polish army during
the uprising’8. Such characteristics could not be found in
Russian leaders.

8

Quote: Powstanie kościuszkowskie…, p. 186. Further reading
on Battle of Racławice: K. Bauer, Wojsko koronne powstania
kościuszkowskiego, Warsaw 1981; S. Herbst, Z dziejów wojskowych powstania kościuszkowskiego 1794, Warsaw 1983;
M. Kukiel, Zarys historii wojskowości w Polsce, 5th ed. London
1949; J. Lubicz–Pachoński, Kościuszko na ziemi krakowskiej,
Warsaw 1984; idem, Wojciech Bartosz Głowacki, Warsaw–
Cracow 1987; J. Nadzieja, Generał Józef Zajączek 1752–1826,
Warsaw 1975; Powstanie kościuszkowskie 1794 Dzieje militarne, vol. 1, ed. T. Rawski, Warsaw 1994; T. Rawski, ‘Bitwa
Racławicka’, in W kręgu panoramy Racławickiej, Wrocław–
Warsaw–Cracow–Gdańsk 1984; W. Tokarz, Marsz Madalińskiego, Warsaw 1926; Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej do
roku 1864, vol. 2 1648–1864, Warsaw 1966; W. Zienkiewicz,
‘Manewr i bitwa pod Racławicami’, in Nauka i Sztuka, vol. 3,
1946, no. 4.

Bibliography
Primary sources

K. Bauer, Wojsko koronne powstania kościuszkowskiego, Warsaw 1981

Pamiętniki z ośmnastego wieku, ed. Hugo Kołłataj, Poznań 1862

S. Herbst, Z dziejów wojskowych powstania kościuszkowskiego

Tadeusz Kościuszko, jego odezwy i raporta uzupełnione celniejszy-

1794, Warsaw 1983

mi aktami odnoszącymi się do powstania narodowego 1794,

M. Kukiel, Zarys historii wojskowości w Polsce, London 1949

ed. L. Nabielak, Cracow 1918

J. Lubicz-Pachoński, Kościuszko na ziemi krakowskiej, Warsaw 1984

Books
Powstanie kościuszkowskie 1794. Dzieje militarne, ed. T. Rawski,
vol. 1, Warsaw 1994
W kręgu panoramy Racławickiej, Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow–
–Gdańsk 1984
Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej do roku 1864, vol. 2 1648–1864,
Warsaw 1966

J. Lubicz-Pachoński, Wojciech Bartosz Głowacki, Warsaw–Cracow
1987
J. Nadzieja, Generał Józef Zajączek 1752–1826, Warsaw 1975
W. Tokarz, Marsz Madalińskiego, Warsaw 1926

Articles
W. Zienkiewicz, ‘Manewr i bitwa pod Racławicami’, in Nauka
i Sztuka, 1946, vol. 3, no. 4

– Tomasz Malarski –
Military Bureau for Historical Research in Military Centre for Civic Education

The Napoleon’s Polish Troop in 1815

The participation of Polish formations in the last campaign of Napoleon in June 1815 is not widely known and
only a few Polish historians took up this topic. These were:
Adam Skałkowski, Stanisław Kirkor and Robert Bielecki.
Adam Skałkowski’s study ‘Oficerowie polscy stu dni’, which
was published in 1915 in Warsaw and Lvov was dedicated to the history of Polish formations, which were being organised during the Empire’s restoration. Skałkowski
presented only selected biographies of Polish officers
standing by the Emperor’s side until the last days of his
reign and the history of Polish troops. A substantial part
of Skałkowski’s study is devoted to Polish chevau-légers
and their participation in the Belgian campaign. The author also mentions Napoleon’s plans to conscript two battalions of Polish infantry, which were at that time in Soissons, personally visited by the Emperor1. The Emperor’s
plan, as mentioned by Skałkowski, to restore the famous
7th Lancer Regiment did not follow through due to the lack
of a sufficient number of cavalry mounts2. Only a handful
of these cavalrymen took part in the battles in the Sévres
and Saint-Cloud region.
The issue of Poles participating in the 1815 campaign
was taken up by Stanisław Kirkor, a Polish emigrant historian, who died in London in 1983. He devoted a lot of space
to the Elba Squadron and its officers in a study published in
London in 1974. It was dedicated to Napoleon’s donations
to Polish officers and soldiers. This valuable work contains
a large number of facts about the very interesting Poles
1

2

A.Skałkowski, Oficerowie polscy stu dni, Warsaw, Lvov 1915, p.
31.
The 7th Lancers Regiment originated in a straight line from
the legionary cavalry regiment and a regiment of the legion of
the Vistula. It was formed on July 18, 1811, and was on French
payroll.

from Napoleon’s circles, such as Jerzy Despot-Zenowicz3
and Fryderyk Piątkowski4. Robert Bielecki’s study called
‘Szwoleżerowie Gwardii’ and published in 1996, was intended by its author to be a collection of chevau-légers’ biographies, based on documents located in the collection of
the former archive of the French Ministry of War, currently
called Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre and located in
the Parisian suburb of Vincennes.
By including a list of chevau-légers in his study, Robert
Bielecki complements a valuable two-volume study written by Aleksander Rembowski and published in 1899 under
the title ‘Źródła do historii polskiego pułku lekkokonnego
gwardii Napoleona I’5. That the tomes of the 1st Chevau-légers and Lancers Regiment of the Guard survived
the wartime destruction can only be due to the fact that
this regiment was a unit of the French army throughout its
existence, it was on French payroll6 and under French mil3

4

5

6

Jerzy Despot-Zenowicz on 18 June 1815, around 11.00 A.M.
was sent by the Emperor (before the battle of waterloo) with
orders to Marshal Grouchy, so that he aids the right flank of
the French Army in the afternoon of the same day. For unknown reasons, Zenowicz arrived at Grouchy’s position at late
afternoon crossing out the chance to support Napoleon at
Waterloo.
Fryderyk Piątkowski was the only Pole in the entourage of the
Emperor during his exile on the island of St. Helena. His stay
at Longwood ended in October 1816 at the express request of
the British. S. Kirkor, Polscy Donatariusze Napoleona, London
1974, p. 287.
Rembowski’s work was translated and published in 2012,
more than a hundred years later by the publishing company:
Napoleon V from Oświęcim.
The aforementioned archives have in their collections also
registers of the Vistula Lancers while being the Polish unit in
the French army.

– 155 –

– Tomasz Malarski –

– 156 –

– The Napoleon’s Polish Troop in 1815 –

itary administration. The documentation of the regiment
remained intact in French archives.
The regimental registers of the Polish army from the
years 1806–1831, which included the periods of the Duchy
of Warsaw, the Kingdom of Poland and the November
Uprising were all burned by German soldiers after the Old
Town fell in September 19447. All the invaluable documentation has thus been irretrievably lost.

The road to Elba
The abdication treaty signed on the 11th of April 1814 in
Paris granted Napoleon the right to take four hundred volunteers serving as bodyguards and honour assist to Elba.
The Emperor has decided that, apart from a battalion of
infantry guard grenadiers, a Polish troop of chevau‑légers
lancers commanded by thirty-five year old Major Baron
Jan Paweł Jerzmanowski will be incorporated into his subordinate formation. The volunteers were to be recruited
from the soldiers of the 1st Chevau-légers Lancer Regiment of the Guard and the 3rd Éclaireurs Regiment.
The selection of volunteers formally started even earlier in Fontainebleau, in accordance with the daily orders
signed on the 8th of April 1814. The order notified both regiments of the Guard about the plans to create a light cavalry
volunteer troop, with respect to chevau-léger tradition, including chevau-léger colours and uniforms. The existing,
tricolour regiment flag from 1812 was replaced by a white
pennant with a diagonal, crimson inset with three golden,
imperial bees embroidered within. The main side of the
pennant was complemented by the embroidered words:
Chevau-Légeres Polones Escadron Napoleon (Light Cavalry Polish Troop of Napoleon). The reverse had a golden
‘N’ letter under a golden imperial crown. The heading of
the pennant was similar to a gold-plated spearhead. The
referred pennant is present in the collection of the Musée
de l’Armée in Les Invalides in Paris8.
The commander of the troop, Baron Jan Paweł Jerzmanowski of Dołęga coat of arms was a brilliant cavalry
7

8

Regimental registers were a major source of information
about the history of individual units, including the service of
the officers and soldiers. Relying on this type of sources Bronisław Gembarzewski wrote his two most important works on
the history of the Polish Army in the years 1806–1830.
The image of the pennant was included in the book of A.
Jouineau, Officers and Soldiers of The French Imperial Guards,
Paris 2005, p. 38.

commander with considerable experience. He was born
on the 25th of June 1779 in Mniewo, current Koło County, in
a family of impoverished nobility. Franciszek Dołęga-Jerzmanowski, an envoy from Łęczyca, was his father and Franciszka Jerzmanowska of the Dobrscy family, his mother.
He left his family home at the age of twenty, snuck
into the west, where General Karol Kniaziewicz created
the Danube Legion. During that time, many young Poles
glared at revolutionary France with interest and hope.
Many of them decided to take the long journey west, to
join the army and either fight in the Polish legions or in the
French army, believing in the imminent rebirth of Poland.
Jerzmanowski joined the Legion in the rank of second
lieutenant. He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant
after the battle of Hohenlinden9, where Kniaziewicz’s
Danube Legion earned well-deserved fame. He received
the nomination to lieutenant on the 21st of January 1801.
The young officer began his career on the battlefield, as
many soldiers similar to him. Unfortunately, the signing of
the peace treaty between Austria and France on the 9th of
February 1801 in Lunéville negatively affected the mood
of the Poles. Years of fighting and huge losses suffered by
Polish formations proved futile. The Italian and Danube
Legions became unnecessary and were disbanded. Three
half-brigades were formed in their place, they had French
organization and remained on French payroll. This situation was followed by numerous resignations requested
by many Polish officers, including Jerzmanowski. Initially,
he decided to return to the country, but the way turned out
to be barred form him, just as it was for the many similar
to him.
For some time Jerzmanowski has stayed an officer
without allocation, although attempts were made to find
him a suitable post. He was assigned to the regiment of
mounted grenadiers of the Guard as late as on the 14th of
November 1804, where he became aide-de-camp to the
Commander. This was not a prestigious job, but the sole
fact of serving in such an elite unit put him among the
elite. The regiment of mounted grenadiers of the Guard,
along with the mounted riflemen gave rise to the cavalry
of the Guard, originating from the times of the Consulate.
At that time Jean-Baptiste Bessiéres was the commander of the Guard Cavalry. He was promoted to the
9

At the battle of Hohenlinden in Bavaria, the French General
Jean Moreau on the 3rd of December 1800 defeated the Austrian army of the Archduke John. Karol Kniaziewicz’s Danube
Legions distinguished themselves during the battle.

– 157 –

– Tomasz Malarski –

rank of Marshal after the imperial coronation of Napoleon.
Bessiéres enjoyed the well-deserved fame of a brilliant
cavalry commander, as has been demonstrated during the
battle of Marengo on the 14th of June 1800.
On the 23rd of September 1806 Jerzmanowski became
aide-de-camp of Duroc, the Marshal of the Imperial Court,
thus becoming a member of the imperial entourage.
In the following years he took part in the campaign of
1805 and 1806 and on the 7th of April 1807 he entered the
officer team of the 1st Regiment of Chevau-légers of the
Guard in the rank of captain.
Since then, his career was associated with the elite light
cavalry regiment. Jerzmanowski became the commander
of the 2nd Company, of the 2nd Squadron, with Jan Hipolit
Kozietulski as its head.
He spent 1808 in Spain, participating in the fights on its
territory. On the 10th of March 1809, Paweł Jerzmanowski
received the Legion of Honour in recognition for his military services.
In 1809 the chevau-légers took part in the campaign
against Austria, concluded by a bloody two-day battle of
Wagram, in which Jerzmanowski was injured. After the
campaign of 1809 Polish chevau-légers received lances
as part of their equipment, thus becoming a light lancer
regiment. After Wagram the chevau-légers returned to
the Iberian Peninsula where the situation was becoming increasingly difficult, and the French military slowly
lost control over transport routes and felt most secure in
locked garrisons. In 1810 Jerzmanowski received the Virtuti Military Cross, and on the 15th of March of the same
year he was made a Knight of the Empire. On the 17th of
February 1811, Captain Jerzmanowski took over as head
of a squadron10.
Jerzmanowski left Spain with his regiment, when Napoleon began preparing to march on Moscow. During the
Moscow campaign of 1812, the chevau-légers lancers of
the Guard became the direct bodyguards of the Emperor,
clashing with numerous units of Cossack cavalry.
During the excursion to Moscow, and especially during
the tragic retreat, Paweł Jerzmanowski established himself
as an excellent, determined and brave commander, capable of keeping discipline among the ranks of his troop.
Jerzmanowski’s subordinate, Lieutenant Józef Załuski, in
his memoirs, issues Jerzmanowski a high grade, emphas10

M. Karpowicz, M. Filipiak, Elita jazdy polskiej, Warsaw 1995, p.
176.

izing his severity, but also care for the soldiers and the
ability to maintain the unit in full combat readiness. Due to
such an attitude of the commander, the Polish guardsmen
were admired not only by their brothers in arms, but also
by their enemies. As the memoirists emphasize, they tried
to avoid clashing with the Poles, seeing as they never falter
from combat11. The Emperor Napoleon appreciated the
merits of his squadron’s commander. In the spring of 1813,
he became an officer of the League of Honor and received
the title of Baron of the Empire. In 1813, Jerzmanowski,
along with his regiment, took part in the battles of Lützen
(May 2nd), Budziszyn (May 21st), Dresden (August 26th) and
Leipzig (October 16th – 19th). In 1814 Jerzmanowski participated in the battles in French, when the coalition forces
were advancing towards Paris.
Many recruits answered the call after the announcement of the recruitment to the ‘Elba Squadron’, a number
far exceeding the expected capacity of the unit. Many chevau-légers and eclaireurs went through the office of Major
Jerzmanowski in Fontainebleau on the 9th and 10th of April.
All of them wanted the honour of accompanying the Emperor in his exile. The recruitment concluded on the 10th of
April, and the results were announced immediately during
the morning assembly. The list of qualified personnel was
opened by officers: Major Jan Paweł Jerzmanowski, Captain Kajetan Baliński, Lieutenants Marcin Fiutowski, Kazimierz Koch and Second Lieutenants Tomasz Skowroński
and Józef Piotrowski.12Stanisław Kirkor notes that in accordance to the abdication treaty, Napoleon had guaranteed funds in the amount of 2,000,000 francs in exchange
for imperial funds seized by the French treasury. On the
13th of April 1814, Napoleon allocated 170,000 francs out
of this sum for the officers staffing the squadron. However,
the list lacks the name of Lieutenant Kazimierz Koch, who
was at that time replaced by Captain Jan Szulc. Captain
Jan Szulc has not served in the Guard up to that point. He
was an officer in the Polish, albeit remaining on the French
payroll, 7th Regiment of Chevau-légers Lancers. This regiment, as a line unit of the French army, became famous by
participating in the fights in Spain, where it wreaked havoc
on the battlefield under the command of Colonel Jan
Konopka. The lancers of the 7th Regiment used uniforms
11
12

J. Załuski, Wspomnienia, Cracow 1976, p. 260.
The list of officers is cited in the studies by: A. Rembowski,
Źródła do historii Pułku Polskiego Lekkokonnego Gwardii
Napoleona I, vol. II Oświęcim 2013, pp. 276–277 and S. Kirkor,
Polscy donatariusze Napoleona London 1974, p. 250.

– 158 –

– The Napoleon’s Polish Troop in 1815 –

of Polish cut and a lance was their main weapon. The
fame of this unit and its valour matched the chevau-légers
of the Guard, and the enemy called it ‘The Hell Lancers’.
On the 24th of March 1809, in the unfortunate battle of
Yevenes, the Poles had lost some of their banners; Szulc
was heavily wounded and taken prisoner. The Spanish
handed over the wounded officer to the Englishmen, who
transported him to England. After almost 4 years of English captivity, Captain Szulc was released on the 10th of
October 1813 due to permanent disability, as the military
medics assessed, and was allowed to return to France.
The British stated that despite treatment and long recovery, the clearly limping Pole is not suitable for active frontline service. A month later, on the 10th of November 1813,
Jan Szulc reported in his old 7th chevau-légers lanciers
regiment in Sedan. His superiors decided that he would
take command of the squadron. During the French campaign of 1814, Captain Szulc and his squadron participated in the fights, until Marshal Marmont’s betrayal. During the night of the 4th of April, his squadron covered the
march of the VI Corps, commanded by Marshal Marmont,
which was to surrender the corps to the Austrians. Lancier patrols sent by Szulc discovered enemy units hidden
in the darkness and managed to warn their commander
just in time to move out his lancers out of the trap. The
Poles broke through the tightening enemy ring and, led by
Szulc, reached the Emperor in Fontainebleau with news
about the fate of the VI Corps. We can assume that Szulc’s
merits earned him the inclusion to the officer corps of the
newly established Elba Squadron.13 The aforementioned
Lieutenant Franciszek Koch, already in the squadron,
travelled to Elba on the 14th of April 1814 but, as Robert
Bielecki states, left he squadron and returned to Poland
after having an argument with Szulc.14
On the 28th of May 1814 the Guard landed in Portoferraio,
on Elba. However, a part of the Polish squadron stayed on
the peninsula, in Parma, where Captain Kajetan Baliński,
the unit’s commander, was responsible for escorting the
Empress Maria Louise and the young son of the Emperor
on their way to Elba. When it turned out that the Empress
will not come, Captain Baliński joined the rest of the chevau-légers already on the island on the 3rd of October 1814,
along with his unit of 55 soldiers. Since October 1814 until
the end of February the following year, 109 chevau-légers

served at the Empeor’s side on Elba15. After Napoleon’s return to France in March 1815, this number quickly grew to
226, as highlighted by Robert Bielecki in his study dedicated to the chevau-légers16. During the preparations to the
Belgian campaign, those who did not return to Poland in
1814 and stayed in France joined the soldiers who arrived
from Elba. The squadron soldiers names list was published by Robert Bielecki, it was based on records present
in French archives17. After arriving to Elba, the Emperor appointed Jerzmanowski as commander of Porto Longone,
and Captain Jan Szulc, in effect of his attitude during the
aforementioned Marmont’s treason, received the nomination to squadron commander on the 5th of June 1814. The
rank, which Szulc had (captain) corresponded to the rank
of lieutenant in the Guard. That is why Baliński, Captain of
the Guard since the 2nd of September 1813, albeit younger
than Szulc, had priority to this nomination.18 The Emperor,
however, has decided to grant Szulc the command. The
officer corps was very stable during the entire stay on the
island. Similarly, in the case of non-commissioned officers
and common soldiers. There were also two Frenchmen
in the squadron. They worked as trumpeters19. Both apparently spoke Polish well and became familiar with their
Polish colleagues. The officers and soldiers of the squadron distinguished themselves with discipline, presence
and good manners during their entire service. This won
the kindness and respect among not only the Emperor’s
entourage, but also the residents of Elba. Cases of low discipline or even maraudership occured in many European
armies, especially in times of war. Jerzmanowski, however, was known from his high requirements in relation
to his subordinates, that is why his soldiers distinguished
themselves with their attitude.
Throughout the whole stay on Elba, the Emperor and
his miniature state were under constant surveillance by
spies from countries of the, until recently, firm anti-Napoleonic coalition. Meanwhile, the Emperor reigned over an
island of 223,5km², inhabited by about 12,000 people. He
tried to get to know the new environment and reorganize
15
16
17

18
13
14

S. Kirkor, op. cit., p. 251.
R. Bielecki, Szwoleżerowie Gwardii, Warsaw 1996, p. 88 pos.69.

19

A. Skałkowski, op. cit., p. 3.
R. Bielecki, op. cit., p. 73.
Ibid.; SHAT 20 YC 166. Ex-Garde Imperiale, Cavalerie. Régistre-Matricule du Régiment des Chévau-Légers Lanciers, Volume du No 1 au No 2400, pp. 354–368.
S. Kirkor, op. cit., p. 252.
It was Plaut Duvelte and Augusta Ramones, cf. S. Kirkor, op.
cit., p.266.

– 159 –

– Tomasz Malarski –

his state with characteristic energy. Intelligence reports
arriving in capitals of the recent enemies of the Emperor
did not cause anxiety and strengthened rulers in the conviction that the emperor is no longer a threat. Initially,
Napoleon intended to make a number of investments
on the island. It quickly became clear that his financial
resources are too thin, given that the new French government did not live up to their obligations under the abdication treaty. The costs of maintaining the manor house
and a miniature army outgrew the income from fishing,
mining and agriculture collected from these activities
on the island. The emperor gave the impression of being
completely occupied by the affairs of Elba. His attention
was divided, however, and despite appearances, he was
interested in the information coming from Vienna, and
above all, from France. Conflicts growing in Vienna filled
him with hope that the, thus far, firm anti-Napoleonic coalition may disintegrate at any moment leading to a new
war in Europe.

The return to France
The tensions in France slowly increased. The aristocracy
and gentry, with the acceptance and passivity of Louis
XVIII, introduced their own reign, striving to return to the
pre-revolutionary order. The growing reluctance towards
the Bourbons, especially among former soldiers, the intelligence and all those for whom the rule of Napoleon was
a time of prosperity caused an increase in pro-Napoleonic
moods. Many cruel wars of the previous years were forgotten. They have caused the French much suffering, but
they were also the beginning of many brilliant careers. His
former soldiers and officers, who were expelled from army
ranks by the Bourbon regime, remembered Napoleon
fondly.
Information about the growing discontent in France
reached Napoleon in the early weeks of 1815, accelerating the preparations for his return. The Emperor no longer
felt bound by any obligations. Louis XVIII did not pay the
promised two million francs, and Emperor Francis I deprived him of his wife (not without her participation) and
his beloved son. In mid-February, Fleury de Chaboulon,
envoy of Hugues Bernard Maret, Duke of Bessano, reached
the island. He presented the situation in France accurately
and objectively20. One can suspect, that the information

received from Maret ultimately convinced the Emperor to
return. Napoleon believed Maret and valued his opinions,
and the received information only confirmed what the Emperor already knew. The Emperor has made his decision
and gave the necessary orders.
Preparations have been made very discreetly, so that
no outsiders could get a hold of the information about the
date and location of the planned landing on the French
coast.
The pompous carnival celebrations on the island were
of utter importance, as they lulled the vigilance of spies
and observers of the imperial entourage.
The presence of Princess Pauline, the Emperor’s beautiful sister and his mother Letitia was supposed to evidence Napoleon’s plans to create a friendly environment
based on the members of his family, with whom he was
very close, on one hand, and on the group of civilian and
military personnel, whom he granted special trust, on the
other. It was common knowledge that Napoleon loved his
mother Letitia, who was truly supportive for him, similarly
to his sister Pauline, well known for her unconventional
ideas and controversial manners, but always loyal to her
brother and the whole Bonaparte family. It was decided
that the preparations, carried out in total secrecy, would
be completed on the 25th of February 1815.
On the following day, around 5 P.M., Napoleon and the
infantry guardsmen boarded a brig moored in the harbour.
The rest, including the Polish chevau-légers lancers squadron lugged their equipment onto other ships. Poles did not
take their horses, as the limited travel resources were not
able to provide sufficient space for almost 120 animals. It
was planned that after landing on the French coast, horses
will be purchased at first opportunity. The whole preparations and the loading itself were led by General Antoine
Drouot, who was the governor of Elba at that time. General
Antoine Drouot will soon become the head of the Imperial Guard in Belgium. The miniature flotilla reached the
French coast on 1 March and entered the Jouan Bay, a few
kilometres from the Antibes Cape. Horses were bought
in the nearby Cannes and soon the Polish squadron operated in accordance with its intended purpose21. During
Napoleon’s march to Paris Polish officers performed their
duty at the Emperor’s side at all times, directly protecting
him22. Only a small garrison of 12 chevau-légers stayed at
21

20

E. Tarle, Napoleon, Warsaw 1950, p. 427.

22

A. Skałkowski, op. cit., p. 10.
S. Kirkor, op. cit., p. 258.

– 160 –

– The Napoleon’s Polish Troop in 1815 –

Elba, commanded by Lieutenant Marcin Fiutowski. They
were all to join the rest of the squadron soon23.
A manifesto to the army and the French nation was
printed in Grasse and distributed over a large area, and
met with an enthusiastic reception wherever the residents
had the opportunity to get acquainted with its contents.
Its impact on the military and the civilians was so significant that the imperial forces got bigger the closer they
got to the capital. On 20 March Emperor Napoleon entered
Fontainebleau, where he noticed a guard post consisting
of Polish chevau-légers24. A few months earlier, a touching
farewell between the Emperor and his Guard took place in
the courtyard of the palace.
In the late evening of the 20th of March, the Emperor
rode into Paris under Polish escort and went into Tuileries.

Preparation to war
By a decree of the 11th of April 1815 the Emperor gave
Jerzmanowski the Commander’s Cross of the Legion of
Honour. On the 30th of April, after his return from Elba, Lieutenant Fiutowski received the Officer’s Cross25. Ever since
the Emperor took over his reign over France, he began to
energetically reorganize the army and prepare the country
for war. The reorganization also included the Polish chevau-léger squadron, which was included in to the (Dutch)
2nd Chevau-légers Lancier Regiment of the Guard (2e régiment de chevau-légers lanciers de la Garde Impériale), as its
first squadron. The Dutch Chevau-léger Lancer Regiment
of the Guard was formed by the imperial decree of the 13th
of September 1810, and was based on the Dutch Royal
Hussar Regiment of the Royal Guard. Its structure, training
system and equipment was modelled after the – already
existing Polish Chevau-légers Regiment of the Guard. The
uniforms and equipment of the Dutch were identical to
Polish in terms of their cut. The only differences concerned
the colours of the uniforms, as the Polish uniform was dark
blue with crimson lapels and stripes, whereas the Dutch
ones were red with dark blue lapels and stripes. The Dutch
regiment was colloquially called Red Lancers (Lanciers
rouges) among the Guard. It initially consisted mostly of
Dutchmen, who were replaced with French soldiers, in
time. After the first Bourbon restoration, the regiment was

renamed to Corps Royal des Chevau‑Légeres de France. It
returned to its original name in 1815. Since 1812, the regiment was commanded by an excellent cavalryman, Baron
Édouard de Colbert-Chabanais26. Józef Załuski also gives
Colbert a high grade, comparing him with many other
French commanders and praises him for the foresight
and energy, which he showed in 1812.27 During the preparations to strike Belgium, Colbert’s Chevau-légers Lancers Regiment became part of the light cavalry division of
the guard, commanded by Count Charles Lefebvre-Desnoëttes. In addition to Colbert’s regiment, the excellent
Mounted Rifles of the Guard Regiment, commanded at
that time by General François Antoine ‘Charles’ Lallemand
was included into the division. This regiment was the elite
of the imperial guard and was one of the oldest and best
cavalry units in the whole of the French army28.
In the evening of the 14th of June 1815, the French army
under the command of Napoleon was a few hours’ walk
from the strategic bridge on the Sambre River in Charleroi.
The main force was to cross it and march towards Brussels,
as per the Emperor’s order. The Emperor hoped that during the march the enemy will cross his way and start the
battle before the English and Prussian armies fully concentrate. On the night between the 14th and 15th of June, the
French cavalry patrols effectively covered the concentration, which thus was not noticed by the opposite party.

The belgian campaign;
the 15th–18th of June 1815
The strike, which came in the morning through Charleroi
was a big surprise for both Wellington and Blücher’s staffs.
Their forces were scattered over a large area and their concentration would require time. Napoleon used the dislocation of the coalition troops to his advantage, inserting his
forces between them. He tried to engage in two battles by
manoeuvring from a middle position and then defeat both
coalition partners.
During the campaign of 1815, Colbert’s chevau-légers
regiment and the Mounted Riflemen of the Guard lost their
earlier role of honourable escort of the Emperor and became a combat unit. In the early phase of the operation
its tasks included conducting reconnaissance, covering
26

23
24
25

Ibid., p. 258.
Ibid., p. 258.
Ibid., p. 258.

27
28

C. Summerville, Who was Who at Waterloo A Biography Of The
Battle, Edinburgh 2007, p. 86.
J. Załuski, op.cit., p. 224.
F. Masson, Kawalerzyści Napoleona, Oświęcim 2012, p. 156.

– 161 –

– Tomasz Malarski –

activities and fighting enemy patrols. The chevau-légers
and chasseurs were a right fit to this tasks and had considerable experience in this area from the years 1812–1814.
On the 16th of June, which was the second day of the campaign, the Light Cavalry Division of the Imperial Guard
had a total of 106 officers and 1971 soldiers, including 47
officers and 833 soldiers, who belonged to Colbert’s 2nd
Regiment of Chevau-légers Lancers.29 The list of Polish officers and soldiers who formed the 1st squadron includes
a total of 226 names30. It has been published by Robert
Bielecki and based on French documents. One can assume that the Polish Jerzmanowski’s squadron went to
fight in Belgium in the strength of not less than 200 people.
After forcing through the Sambre River and passing
Charleroi, Napoleon immediately began to implement the
proposed plan. To this end, he gave forth the left flank of
the army to Marshal Ney and he himself advanced towards
Blücher’s Prussians along the road to Fleurus and Sombreffe. Ney took under his command the II Corps of Gen.
Count of Honoré Joseph Reille and the I Corps of General
Count Jean Baptiste Drouet d’Erlon, which at that time
was located north of Charleroi in the Gosselies region.
In addition, Ney had at his disposal Count Charles Lefebvre-Desnouettes’s division of light cavalry of the Guard,
which was sent to the vicinity of the Bossu Forest and the
crossroads in Quatre-Bras by the Emperor as early as on
the 15th of June. The guardsmen came to the designated
area and during reconnaissance saw only a weak presence
of British forces of Prince William of Orange’s I Corps31. As
soon as on the morning of the 16th of June, Ney’s formation
would have disposed of them easily. The Marshal, however, wanted to achieve success in one hit and decided
to wait for the arrival of d’Erlon’s corps. It soon became
clear that this decision was entirely incorrect. Wellington’s
forces at Quatre-Bras increased over time and allowed
him to maintain their positions until the next morning32.
D’Erlon, so much awaited by Ney, did not come, because
at that time he was marching towards Ligna, at the Emperor’s request. Ney took offensive action at 1.40 P.M., but
it was too late to achieve success, as the fortified enemy
29

30
31
32

P. Haythornthwaite, The Waterloo Armies, Men, Organization &
Tactics, Barnsley 2007, p. 220.
R. Bielecki op.cit., pp. 369–384.
A. Skałkowski, op. cit., p.32.
Wellington, when planning future actions, took into account
the possibility of a decisive battle at Quatre-Bras, counting on
the general concentration of coalition troops in the area.

firmly defended the approaches to the intersection. Duke
Wellington arrived at Quatre-Bras already around 11.00
A.M. and noted the absence of any activity on the part of
the Frenchmen. It took Ney over three hours to prepare an
attack, and when it happened, he encountered a strong
defence of the perfectly prepared General Thomas Picton’s 5th Division. Ultimately, the English maintained their
positions thereby negating Ney’s plans to march towards
Brussels on that day.
D’Erlon’s corps did not participate in any of the battles
on the 16th of June, which made it impossible for Napoleon to achieve final conclusion at Ligny, although the
Prussians suffered defeat there. The division of the cavalry
of the Guard and the Poles serving in it did not participate
in this phase of the fighting, and remained in the area of
Frasnes.
There were two battles on Friday, June the 16th, 1815:
one at Ligny, which ended up with Blücher’s Prussians defeat, who – defeated, but not crushed – began their night
retreat in the direction of Wavre, the second one at QuatreBras, where Wellington managed to stop Ney’s attacks and
gain time needed to concentrate his forces.
On the morning of the following day, the 17th of June,
the left flank of the French Army, commanded by Ney, still
held their existing position after Quatre-Bras. Ney’s unit
still had a division of light cavalry of the guard, serving as
reinforcement to Kellermann’s III Corps, consisting solely
of heavy cavalry.
Duke Wellington waited for the information about the
result of the battle of Ligny throughout the night. The Prussians did not notify their coalition partners about their
loss, and most importantly, did not specify their retreat
route, placing the Englishmen in a very difficult spot with
Ney at their front and Napoleon in a position to the east of
their own left flank, but difficult to pinpoint.
In the morning, when the British patrols have brought
reliable information about the result of the battle of Ligny,
Duke Wellington gave the order to retreat to a position at
Mont Saint Jean, which began after 11 A.M. The retreat and
subsequent chase happened in pouring rain and looked
more like a slow march, with the highroad to Brussels as
its axis. In the evening, the Englishmen reached Mont Saint
Jean, whereas the French set camp to the north of Rossomme. The whole night was filled with heavy rain and
strong wind that tore away tents and blew out campfires.
The Guard, including the regiment Colbert’s chevau‑légers lancers spent the night near the Le Caillou tavern,

– 162 –

– The Napoleon’s Polish Troop in 1815 –

where the Emperor slept along with some of his staff members. In the garden of the inn, behind the stone wall and
just under the Emperor’s window, there were rain-soaked
tents belonging to riflemen and grenadiers of the Guard.
In the morning of the 18th of June, after the overnight
downpour, the future battlefield turned into a quagmire33.
Both sides rolled their camps and took designated positions. To the east of the highroad, the French formation
consisting of units from d’Erlon’s I Corps descended in
a gentle curve in the direction of the town of Frichermont,
having the Papelotte and La Haye farms in front of it, both
taken by the Dutch infantry of Prince Bernard from General
Perponcher’s division. General Edouard Jean Baptiste Milhaud’s IV Corps cavalry was located in the second wave of
the right flank. In total eight cuirassier regiments typically
used for decisive strikes on enemy formations. A division
of light cavalry of the Guard, which included the 1st squadron of the Polish chevau-légers lancers of the 2nd regiment,
was located just behind the cuirassiers. Polish soldiers
were in their dress uniforms and all officers in dress, white
uniform jackets34.
The battle of Waterloo started around 11.30 A.M. when
the fields on both sides of the highroad to Brussels began
to dry up and became passable for artillery teams. The
first French attack was directed at the fortified farm of
Hougomount, located at the end of Wellington’s right
flank. The infantry strike was supported by heavy artillery
fire, but the farm itself was not captured, despite heavy
losses. Seeing the futility of fighting in the region, Napoleon decided to seek conclusion on the right flank, using
the force of d’Erlon’s I Corps. The attack, supported by artillery fire, advanced on a wide front, stretching from the
La Haye Sainte farm up until Papelotte. It was 1:30 P.M.
when the French forces reached the region defended by
a light battalion commanded by Major Baring35. It seemed
as if the strong attack will break the British infantry’s form33

34
35

After even slight rain the field to the south of the La Haye Saint
Farm on both sides of the highroad to Brussels is difficult to
traverse up to this day.
S. Kirkor, op.cit., p., 262.
Major Baring commanded the defence of La Haye Sainte with
the force of two battalions of the King German Legion, consisting mostly of citizens of Hanover in British service. The
farm was manned by 365 people. The Hanover light infantry
battalions were equipped with excellent Baker rifles, the same
that were used by the 95th Riflement Regiment and the light
companies of the royal guard.

ation at once and will lead to the utter defeat of Wellington’s army.
Witnessing the progress of d’Erlon’s division, Ney called
General Wathier’s 13th heavy cavalry division36 in order to
finish off the shocked Englishmen at the right moment.
Duke Wellington saw the hesitation of his left wing and
decided to use two brigades of heavy cavalry in order to
restore its tightness. These were: Lord Edward Somerset’s guard brigade (Life Guards), consisting of three Dragoon Guard regiments and two brigades (Union Brigade)
of General William Ponsonby37. Somerset’s brigade struck
along the highroad to Brussels, leaving behind the farm
buildings of La Haye Sainte on their left, and marching towards the French cuirassiers. Ponsonby’s regiments struck
directly at the expanded divisions of d’Erlon and their artillery support. Both brigades achieved success, but the
costs of their attacks were very high. The charging brigades
lost their formation and did not react to the retreat signal,
engaging in individual skirmishes and trying to break the
line of French squares. Some troops went into gallop,
loosening their formation and losing the ability to perform
any manoeuvre. This was not the end of the tragedy, as
the line of the stretched-out Colbert’s chevau-légers lancers regiment and Lallemand’s mounted rifles regiment
appeared on the flank of attacking British brigades. The
lancers bowed their lances and rushed at the scattered
Englishmen, quickly defeating them in a direct clash. The
advantage lances had over heavy cavalry broadswords
was incontestable. Seeing as Somerset and Ponsonby’s
heavy brigades were routed, light cavalry brigades staying
in the north of Papelotte joined the battle. Richard Hussey Vivan’s 6th brigade clashed with the lancers first, but
they quickly broke its formation38. The French artillery also
went into action, raining the English cavalry with gunfire.
36

37

38

The division consisted of two brigades: the first of Gen. Charles Dubois (1 and 4 regiment of cuirassiers), the second of
Gen. Jacques Traverse (7th and 12th regiment of cuirassiers).
Both brigades were the best cavalry formation of the Napoleonic days. Somerset’s brigade consisted of two regiments
(1st and 2nd) of the guard (Life Guards) and the 1st regiment of
dragoons of the guard (King’s Dragoon Guards Blues). The 2nd
Ponsonby’s brigade consisted of dragoon regiments: the 1st
(British), the 2nd (Scottish, commonly named the Scots Greys)
and the 6th Dragoon regiment (Irish). P. Haythornthwaite,
op.cit., pp. 66–69
Vivian’s brigade consisted of three hussar regiments, two of
them (the 10th and the 18th) were English, one was German. In
total about 1400 men, P. Haythornthwaite, op. cit., p.71.

– 163 –

– Tomasz Malarski –

The attempt to repel the victorious Frenchmen and
Poles by the English 4th light brigade under the command
of General John Ormsby Vandeleur, which clashed with
the French lancers of General Martin Charles Gobrecht,
ended with a similar result. The French attacked the Englishmen the moment they were changing the front, which
resulted in collapsing their formation and scattering the
entire light dragoon brigade39. The cavalry battle, in which
the Polish lancer squadron under Jerzmanowski’s command participated, brought heavy losses to the English
cavalry, both in men and horses. Duke Wellington moved
the decimated brigades to the second line (the vicinity of
the Mont-Saint-Jean farm) in order to restore some of their
combat readiness.
The Polish chevau-légers, along with their regiment,
participated in massive cavalry attacks, which were led by
Ney unto the formation of English infantry squares in the
later part of the battle. Despite heavy losses they did not
bring conclusion. These attacks were conducted at approximately 16.00 with the participation of the IV cavalry
corps led by Gen. Milhaud and almost worn out a significant part of the French Cavalry, especially the regiments of
cuirassiers. This will have a significant impact on the final
outcome of the battle. Persistent defence line of Wellington and the arrival of the Prussians, whose first troops went
after the right flank of Napoleon’s army at about 4 P.M. put
the French in a very difficult tactical position. The VI Corps
of Blücher’s army, led by General Count Wilhelm Bülow
von Dennewitz had a total of approximately 30,000 bayonets and was supported by 80 guns. Its appearance at the
rear and on the right flank of the French troops caused an
immediate reaction of the Emperor, who initially sent two
divisions of Gen. Baron Jean Simon Domon’s light cavalry
and a division of Gen. Baron Jacques Garvais Subervie’s
line lancers and mounted riflemen against the Prussians.
They were supposed to delay Bülow’s march. During this
time the Prussians continued their march towards Plancenoit in order to capture this town and attack the rear
of Napoleon’s army. The Emperor directed a part of Gen.
Count. Mouton de Lobau’s VI Corps against the marching
Prussians, and then a division of Gen. Count Charles Alexis
Morand’s guard40. Thus began the bloody battle of Plan39

40

Vandeleur had three light dragoon regiments (the 11th, the 12th
and the 16th), together around 1300 people. P. Haythornthwait, op. cit., p. 216.
It was a division of the ‘Middle guard’, consisting of two regiments of Fusiliers Division.

cenoit, which lasted until the very end and involved substantial forces on both sides.
At the same time, the 2nd regiment of chevau-légers lancers of the guard participated in the desperate attacks on
the left flank, which were supposed to ultimately break the
British resistance and scatter their squares. It was most
probably at this time that Jerzmanowski and Baliński were
wounded or injured41.
The arrival of Bülow has changed little in Wellington’s
army position. However, it had a significant impact on Napoleon, who involved bigger forces at Plancenoit. Only the
arrival of the Prussian I Corps’ vanguard under the command of Gen. Hans Ernst Karl von Zieten strengthened the
British left flank and made the French defeat unavoidable.
Undoubtedly, the last attack of the imperial guard was
the turning point of the battle. It was utterly repulsed by
the royal guardsmen of Gen. Peregrine Maitland’s brigade
and the soldiers of Colonel Colborn’s 1st battalion of the
52nd regiment who supported them42. The retreat of the
imperial guardsmen ultimately led to the retreat of the
French army, which turned into a panicked escape in the
darkness. The Polish chevau-légers along with the rest of
the regiment began to retreat after the French army collapsed. During their retreat, the English and Prussian cavalry did not dare to attack them, seeing the units retreating
in battle order43. It was also important that the coalition
troops were exhausted and that the march took place in
complete darkness. The Polish chevau-légers after the fall
of Paris and the abdication of the Emperor, signed by him
on the 22nd of June 1815, crossed the Loire along with the
retreating army of Marshal Nicholas Davout, who was still
Minister of War. On the 1st of October the Napoleon’s squadron was crossed of from the French army checklists and
went under the commands of Tsar Alexander I. The head
of the squadron, Kajetan Baliński, led the chevau-légers
back to the homeland. They did not receive warm reception from Duke Constantine. Ultimately, Baliński himself
left the army ranks on the 24th of February 1816.

41
42

43

R. Bielecki, op. cit., p. 87, 373.
Colonel John Colborne commanded a brigade of infantry at
the Battle of Albuera on the 16th of May 1811, the year that it
was shattered by the 7th regiment of Polish lancers. At Waterloo he was the commander of the 52nd light infantry regiment
(Oxfordshire Light Infantry), which belonged to the elite of the
English army.
S. Kirkor, op. cit., p.263.

– 164 –

– The Napoleon’s Polish Troop in 1815 –

The reluctance of the Grand Duke to the veterans of the
Napoleonic wars was associated on one side with their
considerable combat experience and, often manifested,
loose attitude towards the forms of military discipline,
which were favoured by Constantine. Jerzmanowski met
a similar fate, as he returned to the Kingdom of Poland,
counting on being drafted to the newly established Polish
Army.
Colonel Paweł Jerzmanowski joined the ranks of the
army of the Kingdom of Poland at the end of February 1816,
but similarly to other participants, did not receive neither
assignment nor command, despite common opinions
about his merits and experience. In the annual ‘Roczniki
Woyskowe Królestwa Polskiego’ (‘Military Annals of the
Kingdom of Poland’) from the years 1817, 1818, 1819, 1820
and 1821 he is listed as an ‘inactive’ colonel44. Eventually,
he left the army in 1812 and travelled to France45. He raised
a family there and died on the 15th of April 1862 in Paris. His
grave is located in the Parisian cemetery of Montmartre46.
Jerzmanowski’s funeral was held on the 17th of April and
included a celebration. Apart from numerous representatives of the Polish diaspora, the funeral ceremony was attended by many Frenchmen, as the general was a known
and respected person in France. Because the deceased
was a senior officer of the French army, he was accompanied during his final journey to the Montmartre cemetery by
ceremonial guard from a Parisian garrison.

associated with numerous nominations for the cross of
the Legion of Honour and financial donations. The return
of the Emperor from Elba and reorganization of the army
preparing it for war in Belgium was associated with numerous nominations for the cross of the Legion of Honour and financial donations. This group included a large
number of Poles, mostly officers and soldiers serving in
the ‘Elbe Squadron’.
On the 27th of February 1815, that is, already on his
way to France, Napoleon signed a certain number of
nominations for the cross of the Legion of Honour, thirty
of which went to Poles. On the 1st of March he signed
another 6 nominations, and on the 13th of March the
chevau-léger Andrzej Swarocki received his cross of the
Legion of Honour47. On the 6th of April another 13 Poles
received the Legion of Honour, all of them are present on
the list published in R. Bielecki and Z. Dunin-Wilczyński’s
studies. On the 11th of April the Emperor signed the nomination of Colonel Jerzmanowski48. On the 8th of May 1815
only one nomination was signed. It went to Colonel Józef
Ksawery Giedroyc49 (Colonel Józef Giedroyc served in
the headquarters of the French army during the Belgian
campaign50). Most likely, this was the last nomination to
the Legion of Honour before the arrival of the imperial
army in Belgium.

Polish knights of the Legion of Honour
in 1815

Apart from the distinctions given to the Poles during
the 100 days, the Emperor gave financial donations to
all officers and soldiers who were with him on Elba, and
signed the donation decrees on the 10th and the 27th of
April 1815. The donations which the emperor granted
since 1806 were a form of financial rewards associated
initially with the income from goods specified in the
donation decree51. Donations granted by the Emperor
in decrees from the 10th and the 27th of April 1815 did

The return of the Emperor from Elba and reorganization of the army preparing it for war in Belgium was
44

45

46

Cf. Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego 1817, p. 23; Rocznik
Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego 1818, p. 22; Rocznik Woyskowy
Królestwa Polskiego 1819, p. 25; Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa
Polskiego 1820, p. 27; Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego
1821, p. 26.
Information about Jerzmanowski’s resignation was found in
the Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego 1822 p. 29.
Montmartre cemetery: quarter 7, 4 line from the wall, third
tomb grave (Avenue des Carriéres) no. 444cc1861 (the grave
is located close to the first resting place of Juliusz Słowacki,
famous Polish Romantic poet; since 1927 the artist`s remains
rest in Wawel Cathedral in Cracow, Poland). Collective work
ed. by A. Biernat i S. Górzyński, Polacy pochowani na cmentarzu Montmart oraz Saint-Vincent i Batignoles w Paryżu, Warsaw
1999 p. 57.

Napoleon’s donations during the 100 days

47
48

49
50

51

R. Bielecki, op.cit., p. 361 position 4535.
Jerzmanowski was awarded with Commander cross of the Legion of Honour, nomination no. 23033, cf. Z. Dunin-Wilczyński,
A. Chojnacki, op. cit., pp. 44–46.
J. Załuski, op. cit., p. 226.
Z. Dunin-Wilczyński, A. Chojnacki, Legia Honorowa od I Restauracji do II cesarstwa, Historia Orderu, Słownik biograficzny uhonorowanych Polaków (typescript) Warsaw 2013, pp.
42–43.
S. Kirkor, op. cit., pp. 14–26.

– 165 –

not specify what goods and estates had to generate the
income on which the donation was based. Thus, such
donation had the form of an annual pension and, in accordance with the will of the Emperor, could be inherited. The value of donations attributable to each of the
beneficiaries was 200 francs in the case of the decree of
the 27th of April 1815. Paweł Jerzmanowski, mentioned
in the earlier donation decree dated the 10th of April, was
to receive a donation of 1000 francs, whereas the value
of the remaining four donations granted to four squadron officers was specified in the decree of the 15th of May
181552 at 500 francs per person.
After the second abdication, only those donations were
kept, which the Emperor gave before his first abdication
and those, which were based on estates located within the
borders of France. All others were forfeit, including those
granted in 181553.

52

53

Donations in the amount of 500 francs annualy received:
Head of the squadron K. Balinski, Captain J. Szulc, lieutenant
M. Fiutowski lieutenant and second lieutenant T. Skowroński,
cf. Ibid., s. 30.
Ibid., 30–31.

Conclusion
Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo and his abdication on the
22 of June 1815 was an end of an epic for Poles, and the
end of the dreams about the restoration of the Kingdom of
Poland in alliance with France. The end of the dream was
also the birth of the Napoleonic legend, which helped the
Poles survive during the next hundred years of servitude.
Out of 226 officers and soldiers of the 1st Polish squadron
of the 2nd regiment of chevau-légers lanciers of the imperial guard, most returned to the Kingdom of Poland immediately after the unit was disbanded in October 181554.
The rest were killed during the fight or ‘remained behind’,
which could mean they separated from the squadron during the retreat or were taken prisoner55. A handful of Polish
chevau-légers accompanying the Emperor in his last battle
gave evidence not only to courage, but also the fidelity, loyalty and the defence of honour until the very end.
nd

54

55

R. Bielecki states, that basing on official French sources, after the regiment was disbanded, 206 soldiers and officers
returned to the Kingdom of Poland. R. Bielecki, op. cit., pp.
354–366.
R. Bielecki, basing of French sources, states that the wachtmeister from 2nd company Michał Szultz (Szulc) poz. 4507
(S. Kirkor gives the name Schultz Michel in his study, p. 265)
was taken prisoner at Waterloo. R. Bielecki, op. cit., p. 358.

Bibliography
Primary sources

Books

The Archives of the French Army Historical Service (SHAT)

Polacy pochowani na cmentarzu Montmart oraz Saint-Vincent

Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego, na rok 1817, Warszawa
1817
Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego, na rok 1818, Warszawa
1818
Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego, na rok 1819, Warszawa
1819
Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego, na rok 1820, Warszawa
1820
Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego, na rok 1821, Warszawa
1821
Rocznik Woyskowy Królestwa Polskiego, na rok 1822, Warszawa
1822
A. Rembowski, Źrodła do historii polskiego pułku lekkokonnego gwardii Napoleona, transl. A. Heberko, vol. II, Oświęcim
2013
J. Załuski, Wspomnienia, ed. A. A. Polarczykowa, Cracow 1976

i Batignoles w Paryżu, ed. A. Biernat i S. Górzyński, Warsaw 1999
R. Bielecki, Szwoleżerowie Gwardii, Warsaw 1996
Z. Dunin-Wilczyński, A. Chojnacki, Legia Honorowa od I Restauracji do II cesarstwa, Historia Orderu, Słownik biograficzny
uhonorowanych Polakow (typescript), Warsaw 2013
P. Haythornthwaite, The Waterloo Armies, Men, Organization &
Tactics, Barnsley 2007
A. Jouineau, Officers and Soldiers of The French Imperial Guards,
Paris 2005
M. Karpowicz, M. Filipiak, Elita jazdy polskiej, Warsaw 1995
S. Kirkor, Polscy Donatariusze Napoleona, London 1974
F. Masson, Kawalerzyści Napoleona, Oświęcim 2012
A. Skałkowski, Oficerowie polscy stu dni, Warsaw, Lvov 1915
C. Summerville, Who was Who at Waterloo. A Biography of the
Battle, Edinburgh 2007
E. Tarle, Napoleon, Warsaw 1950

– Tomasz Strzeżek –
University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn

Battle of Iganie, April 10, 1831

Nothing is more exciting for historians and history
enthusiasts than the fight between the weak and the
strong, especially when the weaker defends himself
persistently and skilfully, striking the strong severely.
Such a situation occurred in 1831, when the Polish
Kingdom, a small country in Eastern Europe fought for
its survival against Russia, a military power at this time.
The struggle lasted nine months, which is admirable1.
Poles, raising against Russia, prevented it from performing a military intervention in the Western Europe,
where, as a result of revolutionary events of 1830 (the
revolution in France and Belgium) a new political order
was forming.
From the point of view of a military historian, the Polish-Russian war of 1831 is interesting, because it was
waged by senior officers who participated in the Napoleonic Wars, standing on both sides of the barricade2.
They acquired skills and experience there. The War resembled the struggles of the years 1803–1815 due to
the current tactics and types of equipment, which, from
the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
changed very little. It is even safe to say that this was the
last Napoleonic war in Europe. From the beginning it was
not a confrontation of equal opponents.

1

2

Russia occupied the area of 343 thousand square miles, had
52 million inhabitants, and its army amounted to about 744
thousand soldiers. The Kingdom, respectively: 2.2 thousand
square miles, 4.2 million people and about 42 thousand soldiers.
The Army of Duchy of Warsaw, where the Polish officers
served, supported Napoleon in his battles against successive
coalitions.

In February of 1831, the outnumbered Polish army3,
commanded by General Józef Chłopicki4 managed to stop
the offensive of the Field-Marshal Ivan Dibich5 at the line
of the Vistula River. Although the Russians occupied large
areas of the Polish Kingdom between the Bug and Vistula
Rivers, they neither could subdue Warsaw, the primary
military objective of both warring parties, nor break the
Polish army. The Russian army suffered significant losses6
and in March stopped at the right bank of the Vistula River,
at the winter quarters to the east of Warsaw. Dibich was
preparing to cross the Vistula River. He planned the beginning of the operations for March 29, 18317. However, he
3

4

5

6

7

On February 8, 1831, that is more than two months after the
outbreak of the November Uprising, it had about 65 thousand
soldiers and 144 cannons.
Józef Chłopicki commanded an army as an advisor to the
commander in chief, Gen. Michał Radziwill.
On February 5–6, 1831, the borders of the Polish Kingdom
were crossed by 112 thousand Russian soldiers and 326 cannons. The entire active army which was to suppress the Polish
uprising consisted of at least 180 thousand soldiers and 664
cannons (without Cossacs, i.e., irregular cavalry).
For several days, until February 28, in bloody battles such as
at Stoczek (February 14), at Dobre (15 February) and of Warsaw (February 19–25 Battle of Wawer, Bialołęka and Grochów)
the ranks of the army were reduced by more than 20 thousand soldiers, including 2.5 thousand killed, 11.4 thousand
wounded. At the time the Polish Army lost about 11 thousand
soldiers. A. Puzyrewski, Wojna polsko-ruska 1831, Warsaw
1899, p. 131.
The main army (about 50 thousand soldiers and 220 cannons)
after concentrating at the mouth of the Wieprz and Vistula Rivers, was to cross it on 4–5 April, and then, in the second half
of April, attack Warsaw, gradually reinforcing itself with the
troops brought from the right bank. The entire active forces
involved were estimated at 80 thousand soldiers and 294

– 167 –

– Tomasz Strzeżek –

did not foresee that the Poles would not passively watch
the actions of the Russian army. His self-confidence and
the belief in the insurgents’ inability to act was beyond all
reason. The operation began before the end of concentration of the forces. A considerable gap in the formation
of the Russian army in the Polish Kingdom developed
between the right wing stationed between the Narew
and Bug Rivers (30 thousand soldiers and 86 cannons)8
and the main army and the left wing distributed on both
sides of the Wieprz River (about 81 thousand soldiers and
298 cannons). The space separating these two formations amounted to about 120 km. It was guarded by the
VI Corps of General Georg von Rosen (about 18 thousand
soldiers and 49 cannons). The troops that were to support
him were either approaching the borders of the Kingdom
of Poland (23 thousand soldiers and 100 cannons), or just
crossed it (10.4 thousand soldiers and 33 cannons). Only
the VI Corp was guarding the route crucial to the Russians – the road connecting Warsaw and Brest-Litovsk on
the Bug. This road served as the main line of operations
of the Russian army. Warehouses and hospitals were established along it. It united the operational basis of the
Active Army (warehouses in the border areas of the contemporary Lithuania and Belarus) with an intermediate
operational basis created by Dibich in the Polish Kingdom.
The key role in this system was played by Siedlce, lying
on the Brest road approximately halfway between Brest
and Warsaw. The city acted as a communication junction
connecting three operational areas of the Russian army
separated by Bug and Wieprz. The Brest road with Siedlce
was the key to controlling large areas of the Polish Kingdom situated on the right bank of the Vistula River9.
The Polish high command was aware of the intentions
of Dibich. The Supreme Commander Gen. Jan Skrzynecki
was unable to carry out activities in a Napoleonic style.
Not only because of mediocre abilities that did not predispose him to command an army, but also due to the
lack of faith in the success of a military uprising. Skrzynecki, just as the majority of the representatives of the
Polish ruling elite, was convinced that only a diplomatic

8

9

cannons. T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku.
Zaprzepaszczona szansa powstania listopadowego, wydawnictwo Napoleon V, Oświęcim 2010, pp. 59, 63–64.
The Guards Corps and the division designated from the main
army.
T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku…, pp. 50–
–51, 88.

intervention of France, England and Austria would be able
to persuade Russia to a compromise and restoration of
the political status of the Polish Kingdom, in accordance
with the provisions of the Congress of Vienna. To survive
until an intervention Skrzynecki was not going to undertake risky ventures. He wanted keep a strong army and
Warsaw as long as possible. For him, the army and the
capital were the assets in the negotiations with Russia10.
The war strategy he adopted, reminded a risk strategy
characteristic of the eighteenth century. He was not going
to meet Dibich in a general battle, but rather harass him
by attacking smaller, isolated corps or begin uprisings in
the western Russian provinces (the former territory of the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth).
In the month that passed since the battle of Grochów,
the Polish side increased the army to 95 thousand soldiers,
including 69 thousand and 152 cannon which could be
used in the field activities. It should be added that in terms
of training the insurgent army prevailed over the Russian
army11. The morale of soldiers was excellent. They were
ready for the greatest sacrifices. Nevertheless, Skrzynecki
was not able to exploit this potential.
Faced with the threat that was caused by the preparation of the Russian offensive, Skrzynecki was determined
to defend the line of the Vistula River. He was opposed
by the Chief of Staff, Colonel Wojciech Chrzanowski and
Quartermaster General, Colonel Ignacy Prądzyński. Both
were the supporters of the Napoleonic art of war. They
preferred the manoeuvre and the active defence over the
static and passive positional defence. For Chrzanowski the
objective of the offensive operations was to beat the corps
of the Russian Guards, and for Prądzyński, the Rosen’s
VI Corps.
At the end of March, Skrzynecki agreed to pursue the
plan of the Quartermaster General, which assumed attacking the vanguard of the IV corps (6 thousand soldiers and
10

11

Tsar Nicholas I (up to January 25, 1831, King of Poland) was
not willing to negotiate with the ‘rebel’ Poles. The political
elite of Russia also had no supporters of a compromise. For
the Russia, the war of 1831 was the war for preservation of
the status of Russia, which she gained in the second half of
the eighteenth century, participating in the partitions of the
Republic of Poland and defeating Napoleon. According to the
Russians, the war of 1831 was even compared to the struggles
of 1812.
T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku…, pp. 43–
–47.

– 168 –

– Battle of Iganie, April 10, 1831 –

10 cannons)12 in Wawer, near Warsaw, and threatening the
Russian operational lines13. Commander in chief was not
thinking about challenging the main Russian army. The
purpose of the operations was actually reduced only to
a demonstration, aimed at forcing Dibich to abandon the
offensive against Warsaw. The limited nature of the operation resulted in the fact that Skrzynecki used only 39 thousand soldiers with 92 cannons (he assigned 30 thousand
soldiers and 39 cannons for protective actions).
The Polish offensive begun on March 31 in the area of​​
the Brest road surprised with its results, both, the Polish,
and Russian side. On the first day, in two battles of Wawer
and Dębe Wielkie, the insurgents defeated the VI corps,
causing it serious losses14. It was increased the next day in
the battles of Stojadła, Jędrzejów, and Minsk, and many
minor engagements, by at least 3–4 thousand. That evening, Rosen had only about five thousand soldiers available. Those who did not die or fall into the hands of the
Poles, were scattered and did not return to the ranks for
a long time.
The great victory did not stimulate Skrzynecki to continue the operation. He could continue to pursue Rosen
and get Siedlce or concentrate all the forces he had, and
hit the main army of Dibich. The general battle, which
would obliterate the memory of Tadeusz Kosciuszko’s failure in Maciejowice in 1794, undoubtedly would determine
the fate of the uprising in 1831. It could happen in the region of Ryki and Żelechów on 3 or 5–6 April. The result was
not certain, but surely it would be a very bloody and fierce
battle, because both sides would be aware of its importance15. To continue the offensive activities in Siedlce was
much safer for the Polish side. Capturing the city with its
warehouses would force Dibich to retreat, if not behind
Bug, then to border areas near the operation basis.
However, on 2 April Skrzynecki did not opt for this variant of activities. For Wacław Tokarz, a prominent Polish
military historian of this war, the events of that day were

a turning point in the war of 183116. From the occupied
positions by the Kostrzyń river, the Polish army was located less than 20 km from Siedlce, the area defended by
the survivors of the Rosen’s army and about 11 thousand
fresh Russian soldiers with 55 cannons, who have not yet
experienced failure. Skrzynecki feared that Dibich could
strike the Polish army engaged in a struggle for the Siedlce
from the south (from Wieprz). In his calculations he did not
take into account the fact that, in order to accomplish this
move, the main Russian army would have to concentrate
and then travel the 40 km separating it from the Brest road
in terrible conditions (there was a thaw), in an area without
convenient roads. Still, the corps of the Russian Guards deployed in the quarters between the Narew and Bug rivers
would have a longer way to travel from the North17.
In the face of the exaggerated threats Skrzynecki settled
only for the control of the liberated area, delimited to the
north by the Bug river, to the east by the Kostrzyń and Liwiec rivers, and to the south by the Świder river. He dispersed the Army. Then turned its core part towards south
from the Brest road, its front to Dibich, and threatened the
communication lines connecting the main Russian army
with Siedlce. The disengaged Polish troops (of generals K.
Skarżyński and W. Chrzanowski), crossing the Świder line,
simulated the willingness of Skrzynecki to deliver a battle.
With these demonstrations Skrzynecki wanted to dissuade Dibich from crossing of the Vistula and the offensive
against Warsaw. When it turned out that it did not produce
the desired effect, he decided to do what he should have
done a few days earlier – defeat Rosen and seize Siedlce.
On 5 April gen. Ignacy Prądzyński presented the first
plan of operations. He planned to flank and defeat Rosen’s
VI corps18 at the confluence of Kostrzyń and Muchawka
rivers, and seize Siedlce. The plan referred to the Napoleonic legacy of the art of war. He planned the division of
the army into three groups – engaging, supporting and
16

12
13

14

15

It was commanded by Gen. Fiodor Geismar.
Źródła do dziejów wojny polsko-rosyjskiej 1830–1831, vol. 2,
Warsaw 1931, pp. 56, 169.
On March 31, the VI corps lost 5–6 thousand killed, wounded
and prisoners, that is 30% of its numbers, at least 10 cannons,
and several thousand pieces of arms. The Poles have paid for
the success with 200–300 soldiers.
F. Smit, Istoriya polskogo vozstaniya i voyny 1830–1831 godov,
vol. 2, S. Peterburg 1863, p. 48; T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa
wiosenna w 1831 roku…, pp. 303–307.

17

18

W. Tokarz, Wojna polsko-rosyjska 1830–1831, Warsaw 1993,
pp. 253–254.
The Polish high command did not know that in the spring of
1831 Dibich was not be able to make use of this Corps in the
military action. The Guards Corps was a symbol of the military
power of Russia. Its officers corps consisted mostly of children
of the ruling elite and aristocracy. Tsar wanted to keep it for an
intervention in the Western Europe.
On April 5, after six days of the Polish offensive operations, his
loss were estimated at 2 thousand killed, 9 thousand prisoners, 5 banners, 12 cannons and 6 thousand pieces of arms.

– 169 –

– Tomasz Strzeżek –

flanking19. The flanking group, under the command of the
Commander in Chief, would amount to about 20 thousand
soldiers with 18–20 cannons. The most important task
was assigned to it by Prądzyński. It was to circumvent the
southern position of the first wave of the Rosen’s troops
(6.4 thousand soldiers and 14 cannons) over the Kostrzyń
river, and seize Siedlce, going along the Muchawka river on
the left or right bank. A second wave of the Rosen’s troops,
deployed by Muchawka and in Siedlce (about 10 thousand
soldiers and 47 cannons), would be its adversary. The engaging group of Gen. Tomasz Łubieński (about 8 thousand
soldiers and 10 cannons) should attack the first Rosen’s
wave by Kostrzyń, engage it in a battle and block (with
the cavalry) its way of retreat due north. The third group
(about 4 thousand soldiers and 8 cannons) would weaken
the entire operation from the south. It could be supported
by additional 4 thousand soldiers and 20 cannons20.
Skrzynecki suspended execution of the operation. He
felt that it was too risky because of the presence of the
Russian Guard and the main army on the wings of the Polish forces. The latter in particular caused his concern, due
to the battle fought by Skarżyński and Chrzanowski with
the Russians in Żelechów. In addition, the activity of the
Russian cavalry was reported.
Dibich, surprised by the offensive actions of the Poles
and Rosen’s defeat, from April 4 begun to abandon various
elements of the operation plan. He postponed his crossing
of the Vistula River, and proceeded with concentration of
the main army 10 km to the south of Żelechow (in Wylezin).
He expected the Polish army to attack him first, so he even
considered a formation that his army was to assume in
battle21. Meanwhile, Skrzynecki did not even think about
such a radical action. On April 7, he even expect that it was
Dibich, who intended to deliver a general battle.
The Polish side wasted several days to identify the exact
location of the main Russian army and the Guard corps.
The corps of Gen. Jan Nepomucen Umiński (about 6 thousand soldiers and 8 cannons), who assumed position to
19

20

21

W. Majewski, ‘Sztuka wojenna powstania listopadowego na tle
sztuki wojennej przełomu XVIII i XIX wieku’, in Powstanie listopadowe 1830–1831. Geneza – uwarunkowania – bilans – porównania, Warsaw 1983, p. 65.
Źródła do dziejów wojny polsko-rosyjskiej…, vol. 2, pp. 105,
112, 115; I. Prądzyński, Pamiętniki, vol. 2, Cracow 1909, p. 90–
–91; T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku…, pp.
197–198.
National Library of Poland, manuscript 1812, p. 127.

the north of the Brest road in Stanisławów and prepared to
march on Liw, was summoned from Narew. It was to protect the main Polish army against the alleged attack. On
the other hand, the southern wing of the insurgent army
troops was secured by an extensive cordon of troops along
the Świder river.
On April 9, in the afternoon, Skrzynecki decided to resume the offensive operations in accordance with the
plan of Prądzyński of April 5. He was persuaded to do it
by the information that Dibich did not yet resign from the
crossing of the Vistula River. The pressure exerted by the
President of the National Government, Prince Adam Czartoryski and staff officers also contributed to the change of
the commander in chief’s attitude. Inactivity and a growing awareness of the missed opportunities of the previous
days was a heavy burden on everybody.
Dibich, who with great difficulty concentrated the main
army, on April 8 decided to move with it through Żelechów
and Garwolin, to the rear of the Polish army. If he realized this intention, the main forces of the warring parties
would perform actions in divergent directions – Polish to
the southeast and east, and the Russian to the northwest.
Nevertheless, Dibich resigned from the offensive towards
the Brest road. The lack of food and feed was its main
cause. The Russians had to rebuild stocks to even think
about continuing the fight. In the war-ravaged country and
with the uprisings breaking out in Lithuania and Volyn,
paralyzing supplies for the army in the Polish Kingdom,
this was not easy. Dibich ordered the main army retreat
between Łuków and Kock for April 9. At the same time, the
Poles gained some time to defeat Rosen.
To some extent the plan of operations coincided with
Prądzyński’s initial assumptions. Nevertheless, Skrzynecki
reduced the forces assigned for basic tasks and limited the
purpose of the offensive.
Skrzynecki reduced the flanking group to 10 thousand
soldiers with 16 cannons. He entrusted the command over
it to General Ignacy Prądzyński, and ordered him to flank
the first wave of the Rosen’s troops from the south through
Skórzec (during the operation, the group went through Trzciniec and Domanice). Prądzyński was to come out on the
Brest road near Iganie (a village located 4 km to the west of
Siedlce, over the Muchawka river). The engaging group of
Gen. T. Łubieński (6.5 thousand soldiers and 12 cannons)
deployed in Bojmie over the Kostrzyń kept original tasks.
It’s command was taken by Skrzynecki. In accordance to
the plan, after hearing the cannon shots of the Prądzyński

– 170 –

– Battle of Iganie, April 10, 1831 –

group or after the first sign of the Russians’ preparations
to retreat from Kostrzyń, it was to begin the march east,
towards Siedlce, along the Brest road. Some of the tasks of
the group, associated with cutting off the survivors’ escape
routes due north, was taken over by the corps of General
Umiński, which was to seize Liw and cross the Liwiec22. At
the expense of the first two major groups, Skrzynecki reinforced the support – the group of General Chrzanowski (4.9
thousand soldiers and 8 cannons), which was to secure
the rear of Prądzyński, and a cordon of troops over Swider
(15 thousand soldiers)23.
As a consequence of the performed transfers of forces,
the objectives of the operation have changed. Defeating
the first-line of the Rosen’s troops commanded by General
Gustav Igelström (6.4 thousand soldiers and 14 cannons)
became the primary objective. Taking into consideration
that near Siedlce the Russians could gather 12 thousand
soldiers (without the forces of gen Igelström) under the
command of General Geismar and General Rosen, the
group of Prądzyński, without the support of the Skrzynecki’s group, could neither defeat the Russian army under Iganie, nor attempt to seize Siedlce. The success of the
plan depended on the close coordination between the
two groups, and the efficiency and capacity of their commanders. Only Prądzyński demonstrated those characteristics. He started the day of 10 April as a theorist of warfare,
and ended as a field commander, combining theory with
practice.
The march of Prądzyński and his troops to Iganie was
not safe. There were no signs of success. On the right wing
and in the rear, the main Russian army moved, which
under the new dispositions of Dibich headed through
Łuków to Siedlce, where it was to appear on April 1124.
Between the Poles and the Russians a race to Siedlce be22

23
24

Already on April 9, the ​​division of General W. Andrychiewicz (2.8 thousand soldiers and 2 cannons), subordinate to
Umiński, fought for bridges under Liw against the division of
General Pinabel (1.8 thousand soldiers, 4 cannons), and on
April 10, in the morning, with a division of General Nasaken
(3.1 thousand soldiers and 6 cannons). T. Strzeżek, ‘Zapomniane bitwy powstania listopadowego. Zmagania o przeprawę pod Liwem w lutym i pierwszej dekadzie kwietnia 1831
roku’, Echa Przeszłości, no. 11, 2010, pp. 181–192 (http://www.
uwm.edu.pl/historia/echa/echa11.pdf, access 2011-02-03).
Idem, Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku…, pp. 228–231.
In the evening of April 9, Dibich guessed the Skrzynecki’s intentions. He resigned from the crossing of the Vistula and
started for the rescue of Rosen and Siedlce.

gun. It did not even occur to Dibich that Skrzynecki had
no intention to seize the city. The Polish commander in
chief, the commander of the engaging group, slowed
down the march of the units that were subordinate to
him so much that he reached Iganie in the evening on
April 10, when Prądzyński defeated the opponent alone.
It was not easy to achieve.
Even during the march to Iganie the group of Prądzyński
engaged in small battles with the enemy. At Domanice, the
Polish cavalry (2nd Cavalry Regiment25) supported by the
artillery and infantry defeated the squad of the Russian
cavalry of almost 2.8 thousand hussars and lancers. This
magnificent victory only confirmed the qualitative advantage of the Polish cavalry over the Russian. The talent and
abilities of General Ludwik Kicki26, called by his contemporaries ‘Polish Ajax’ or ‘second Bayard’27, shined in this
fight. Prądzyński was fortunate in the selection of his commanders. Among others, colonels Hieronim Ramorino,
Emilian Węgierski and the commander of the horse artillery battery, Maj. Józef Bem, were his subordinates.
Prądzyński appeared at Iganie with a group weakened
in numbers (6.8 thousand soldiers and 14 cannons)28. The
forces, which Geismar and Rosen managed to gather to
defend the crossing of the Muchawka, totalled 12 thousand soldiers and 52 cannons. In addition, the first wave of
troops from the VI Corps of Gen. Igelstrom (6.4 thousand
soldiers and 14 cannons) from Kostrzyń was approaching,
as General Skrzynecki failed to stop them with his sluggish
and protective actions. The distribution of Russian forces
was beneficial for Prądzyński. The majority of Rosen’s division (7.8 thousand Infantry, 1.1 thousand Cavalry and
46 cannons) was on the right bank of the Muchawka. The
artillery stationed along the river (28 heavy and light guns)
covered the foreground of the village of Iganie with their
fire, which Prądzyński had to take to get to the Brest road
and cut off the face of the troops of General Igelstrom from
25
26

27

28

‘White uhlans’, by the Russians were called ‘white devils’.
T. Strzeżek, ‘Bitwa pod Domanicami 10 kwietnia 1831 – epizod
z dziejów kawalerii polskiej w powstaniu listopadowym’, in
Czyn zbrojny w dziejach narodu polskiego. Studia ofiarowane
Profesorowi Januszowi Wojtasikowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin, ed. P. Matusak, M. Plewczyński, M. Wagner, Siedlce 2004, pp. 157–164; T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa wiosenna
w 1831 roku…, pp. 242–247.
Pierre du Terri de Bayard, the French commander of the sixteenth century, nicknamed ‘the knight without fear and flaws.’
He separated about 3 thousand soldiers with two cannons as
covering force.

– 171 –

– Tomasz Strzeżek –

the safety of Siedlce. On the left bank of Muchawka Russians initially did not have many forces (a total of about 2.7
thousand Soldiers and six cannons). An infantry battalion
(about 800 soldiers) with four cannons was occupying Iganie away to the south of the Brest road by approximately
300–500 m. Before the buildings of the mansion and farm
(lying west of the village) the host of numerous Russian
cavalry of General J. Sievers has developed (about two
thousand hussars and lancers with two cannons). During the battle the position of cavalry was occupied by the
infantry of General Igelstrom, as they were coming from
Kostrzyń. Thus, the Russian forces on the left bank were increasing. Rosen was able to further strengthen them with
the troops from the right bank. In this situation, it seemed
that Prądzyński would not be able to do anything. The enemy was stronger, and besides in order to even approach
Iganie and the court, he had to lead his troops onto the
plain, and cross a few hundred meters (about 800–900)
under the fire of the Russian artillery from the right bank
of Muchawka29. It is no wonder, therefore, that Prądzyński
hesitated whether or not to attack. He had less forces at
his disposal than the Russians. In the headquarters there
were voices (General Kicks) calling for a retreat. However,
Prądzyński could not allow such a solution. Most of the officers, especially Major Bem, called for a fight.
For two hours (1 to 3 p.m.) Prądzyński waited for signs
of activity of Skrzynecki. When he saw the Russian supply
train going along the Brest road from Kostrzyń to Siedlce,
he gave the signal to start the battle. Polish troops emerged
from the forest onto the plain. The battery of horse artillery
of Major Bem opened fire on the Russian cavalry of General Sievers and the artillery. Under his cover Poles formed
attack formation. Four foot artillery cannons placed on the
left wing (hill 78.7) joined in the shelling of Russian positions.
In the centre six battalions of the 1st and 5th Infantry
Regiment stood in square formations (about 4.5 thousand
soldiers), and before them, Bem’s battery (10 cannons)
supported by the second Uhlan Regiment (600 soldiers).
Right wing was formed by two battalions of the 8th Infantry Regiment (about 1.2 thousand soldiers).
The assault was launched by the first line led by General
Kicki. Bem’s battery, Uhlan Regiment and the battalions of
the 8th Infantry Regiment moved towards Iganie under fire
of the Russian guns from behind Muchawka. Six battalions

of the 1st and 5th infantry regiment formed a compact
block of squares, shielding the back of the front line.
Russian artillery (at least 30 guns) fired bullets and grenades at the Polish troops. Kicki quickened their march, and
with the support of Bem’s battery, which cleared his path
with grape shots, at approx. 5 p.m. approached Iganie.
Soldiers of the 8th regiment, singing ‘Poland has not yet
perished’, captured a part of the village and captured four
Russian cannons. Russian Cavalry of General Sievers tried
to attack Kicki’s troops from the rear, but the Uhlan Regiment and ‘fire-breathing’ squares of the 1st infantry Regiment managed to counter the attack.
At this point Polish troops formed a diagonal formation
– from Iganie to the hill 78.7. Bem’s battery began to strike
the Brest road and the Russian supply train, advancing towards the bridge with projectiles more effectively.
Rosen had to regain control of Iganie, as the units of
General Igelstrom have not yet arrived from Kostrzyń.
For the counterattack he threw three battalions (about
2.4 thousand soldiers) of the 13th and 14th regiment of
jagers commanded by Gen. Dobrowolski. These regiments were called ‘lions of Varna’ as they distinguished
themselves in the battles for Varna in 1829 during the Russo-Turkish War. It seemed that they will uphold their fame
in the fight against the Poles. Backed by the cavalry regiments they recovered Iganie and the cannons, and then in
a long column moved after the retreating Polish battalions
of the 8th Infantry Regiment. The march of the jagers was
slowed by the grapeshots fired by the Major Bem’s artillery
battery. One of the participants of the events mentioned
that it was no longer a battle, but ‘… a slaughter. The Russians fell to the ground like apples from an apple tree’30.
However, the Polish artillery did not manage to eliminate
the column of jagers completely, because the ammunition
was running out. The battery had to limit its activities. The
Polish division was now faced the risk of annihilation31.
General Geismar, seeing the progress of the jagers, encouraged by their success, wanted to transfer a brigade of
grenadiers to the left bank (3.6 thousand soldiers). At the
same time the Russian infantry troops (about two thousand Soldiers) from the right bank approached the fords
on Muchawka to the south of the bridge, getting ready for
the crossing. On the left bank, near the Iganie first infantry
30

31
29

In addition, the right bank dominated over the left bank.

S. Jabłonowski, Wspomnienia o baterii artylerii konnej gwardii
Królestwa Polskiego, Cracow 1860, pp. 26–27.
T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku…, pp. 256–
–261.

– 172 –

– Battle of Iganie, April 10, 1831 –

– 173 –

– Tomasz Strzeżek –

troops of General Igelstrom, retreating from Kostrzyń,
began to emerge from the woods (about one thousand
Soldiers). Everything pointed to the fact that the Russians
were preparing for the general attack on the Polish regiment.
In fact, Rosen had other plans. He stopped the crossing of the grenadiers brigade, because as his main objective was the defence of Siedlce and the crossing over the
Muchawka. He feared that the Polish troops who attacked
him, were only the avant-garde of the main body of the
Polish army. In this situation, engaging in battle would
be unwise. General Sievers used the same reasoning and
began to withdraw his cavalry over the bridge to the right
bank of Muchawka as soon as the troops of General Igelstrom appeared32.
Prądzyński and his officers did not know Rosen’s intentions. Seeing the movements of the Russian infantry and
cavalry, they were expecting a strong enemy attack. In the
Polish headquarters once again there appeared voices
calling for a retreat (General Kicki). Prądzyński could not
condone such a course of action because he was convinced that also at his rear there was a strong concentration of Russian troops from the main army of Dibich. Retreat in this situation could lead to the disintegration of the
regiment entrusted to him and expose other groups to the
risk of defeat.
State of emergency, paradoxically served Prądzyński.
In this difficult situation, he devised a plan to complete
the battle. Only unconventional behaviour could give
him victory and he decided to do so. He decided to attack alone to save the situation through a ‘brave deed’33.
He noticed two errors committed by the Russians. Paralyzing the traffic on the bridge and the causeway, through
which ran the Brest road, by the retreating Sievers cavalry
and supply train and the and the remoteness from Iganie
of the column of jagers of General Dobrowolski. The gap
between the latter and the Brest road was increasing. The
retreating 8th Regiment dragged gen. Dobrowolski further
south. Even the Russian artillery went silent on the right
bank of Muchawka, not wanting to hurt their own soldiers.
The road to Iganie was open. Prądzyński took personal
command of the six battalions of the 1st and 5th Infantry
Regiment (about 4.5 thousand soldiers). He formed them
32

33

F. Smit, Istorija pol’skogo vozstanija i vojny…, vol. 2, pp. 79– 80;
A. Puzyrewski, Wojna polsko-ruska…, p. 170.
I. Prądzyński, Pamiętniki…, vol. 2, p. 123.

into battalion columns and led this mass ‘to the sound of
drums and regimental music’ towards the Russian positions34. The 1st Infantry Regiment under the command of
General Ramorino struck the right wing, took the manor35
and began fighting with the regiments of General Igelstrom. At the same time Prądzyński at the head of three
battalions of the 5th Infantry Regiment took Iganie and the
attacked the causeway and the bridge on Muchawka. Polish infantry raced towards the designated goals so quickly
that Prądzyński, to keep up, had to ride on horseback in
a decent trot. Gen. Dobrowolski – commander of the ‘lions
of Varna’ saw the movement of the insurgent infantry and
turned back his jagers. Polish and Russian infantry without
firing a shot raced for the causeway and the bridge. Jagers
got there first, but Polish soldiers drove into the centre of
the column. A fierce battle broke out with bayonets and
butt-ends. One of the Polish participants in the struggle,
wrote that ‘… the fifth regiment fought the same way as
once the Romans and the Greeks fought, when there were
no firearm weapons in the world’. In the battle the commander of one of the jager regiments was killed, and the
commander of the second, along with General Dobrowolski were injured. Their regiments lost about 50% of the
state from before the battle. Poles took the causeway and
even drove to the right bank of Muchawka. Ramorino, at
that time, overtook the manor in Iganie and pushed north
the troops of gen. Igelstrom, which have failed to reach the
bridge. Their escape route should have been cut off by the
cavalry from the column of General Skrzynecki, but they
failed to do so as a result of mistakes made by the commander General Zygmunt Stryjeński36.
Prądzyński became the master of the Iganie battlefield.
Skrzynecki and his troops arrived at Iganie, after the battle.
Rosen, on his part did not take any steps (except artillery fire) to regain control of the bridge. Poles thus gained
an excellent foothold to fight for Siedlce on April 11. Skrzynecki, however, decided not to take such a risky step37.
34
35

36

37

Ibid., p. 124.
Tomasz Potocki, a witness to the Polish infantry attack on the
manor, wrote that the palisade surrounding the buildings ‘[…]
collapsed as a result of the efforts of the column that marched
as one man […] the battalion crossed the yard in such order,
as though they were on parade’. Cf. University Library of the
Catholic University of Lublin, manuscript 58, p. 327.
T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku…, pp. 266–
–267.
Ibid., pp. 271–273.

– 174 –

– Battle of Iganie, April 10, 1831 –

All three groups of Polish forces participating in the operation quietly withdrew to their initial positions across the
river Kostrzyń38. The Battle of Iganie, became just a small
episode, in consequence of which the Russians lost about
3.5–5 thousand soldiers, but kept something more substantial – Siedlce, and the control over the Polish Kingdom.
38

General Umiński, who seized Liw on April 10, the next day
crossed the Liwiec and seized Sokołów Podlaski. He was
sure that Siedlce were already in the hands of Skrzynecki. On
April 12 he retreated behind Liwiec. T. Strzeżek, Zapomniane
bitwy…, pp. 188–191.

Dibich paid for that by abandoning the crossing of the Vistula and the retreat of the army to the line Siedlce–Kock.
This was exactly Skrzynecki’s intention and, therefore, he
considered himself to be the winner. He pushed Russians
away from the Vistula River and ensured the safety of the
capital. General Ignacy Prądzyński, the hero of the battle of
Iganie won fame and experience, but Skrzynecki, did not
entrust the command in the field to him ever again, seeing him as an opponent to the position of commander in
chief. Success does not always pay, especially in the eyes
of an ambitious superior.

Bibliography
National Library of Poland

W. Majewski, ‘Sztuka wojenna powstania listopadowego na tle

University Library of the Catholic University of Lublin

sztuki wojennej przełomu XVIII i XIX wieku’, in Powstanie listo-

Primary sources

padowe 1830–1831. Geneza – uwarunkowania – bilans – po-

I. Prądzyński, Pamiętniki, vol. 2, Cracow 1909

równania, Warsaw 1983

F. Smit, Istoriya polskogo vozstaniya i voyny 1830–1831 godov,
vol. 2, S. Peterburg 1863

A. Puzyrewski, Wojna polsko-ruska 1831, Warsaw 1899
T. Strzeżek, Polska ofensywa wiosenna w 1831 roku. Zaprzepasz-

Źródła do dziejów wojny polsko-rosyjskiej 1830–1831, vol. 2, Warsaw 1931

czona szansa powstania listopadowego, wydawnictwo Napoleon V, Oświęcim 2010

Books

W. Tokarz, Wojna polsko-rosyjska 1830–1831, Warsaw 1993

Czyn zbrojny w dziejach narodu polskiego. Studia ofiarowane Profe-

Articles

sorowi Januszowi Wojtasikowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin, ed. P. Matusak, M. Plewczyński, M. Wagner, Siedlce 2004
S. Jabłonowski, Wspomnienia o baterii artylerii konnej gwardii
Królestwa Polskiego, Cracow 1860

T. Strzeżek, ‘Zapomniane bitwy powstania listopadowego.
Zmagania o przeprawę pod Liwem w lutym i pierwszej
dekadzie kwietnia 1831 roku’, in Echa Przeszłości, 2010,
no. 11

– 175 –

– Zbigniew Moszumański –
Military Bureau for Historical Research in Military Centre for Civic Education

Battle in the Kobylanka Forest, 1–6 May 1863

Due to the outbreak of the January Uprising, Grand
Duke Constantine announced martial law in the whole
Kingdom of Poland on 24th of January 18631. The commander of the Russian troops in the Kingdom of Poland,
General Anders Edvard Ramsay2 ordered the troops to
concentrate in larger towns, reducing the number of garrisons, in which the Russians were stationed, from 180 to
42. For example, in the Lublin province, where Aleksandr P.
Khrushchëv was the head of the Military Division and the
commander of the 5th Infantry Division stationed there3,
Russian forces were dislocated at the end of January 1864,
except for Ivanogrod and Zamosc fortresses, only in eight
other garrisons (Garwolin, Janow, Krasnystaw, Kurów,
Lublin, Radzyń, Siedlce i Węgrów)4. When the Russian
military closed a garrison, they also took the disabled, recruits, money and some officials with them5. It was bene1
2

3

4

5

Dziennik Powszechny, 1863, 24 January, No. 19, p. 1.
Anders Edvard Ramsay (1808–1877) – Russian general, baron.
He was born in a Scottish family, took part in the campaign of
1831 and the Crimean War. From July 1862 to March 1863, he
commanded the armies of the Warsaw Military District. Dismissed because of he did not suppress the uprising vigorously
enough. In 1867 he was appointed deputy commander of that
district. Cf. Russkiy biograficheskiy slovar, vol. 15, Pritvits – Rejs,
Petersburg 1910, pp. 489–490.
Aleksandr P. Khrushchëv (1806–1875) – Russian general,
a participant of the Crimean War. In years 1861–1863 he
commanded the 5 Infantry Division and was the head of the
Military Division in the province of Lublin. After the January
Uprising he became the acting commander of the Military
District of Vilnius, in the years 1866–1874 – Governor-General
of Western Siberia, and a member of the Council of State. Cf.
ibid., vol. 21, Faber–Tsavlovskiy, Petersburg 1901, pp. 442–444.
Sergej D. Gesket, Voyennyye deystviya v Tsarstve Polskom
v 1863 godu, Warsaw 1894, pp. 160–161.
Stefan Kieniewicz, Powstanie styczniowe, Warsaw 1983, p. 374.

ficial for the insurgents, who had gained greater freedom
of action and easy access to the borders of the Kingdom of
Poland. However, since the advantage of both Russian soldiers and weaponry was very clear, the Poles adopted the
tactics of guerrilla warfare, performing raids, harassing the
enemy with surprise attacks, usually not in open battle.
In the province of Lublin, the main insurgent forces
were concentrated in the region of Lublin and Lubartow. In
the border region most of the battles and skirmishes were
fought by troops formed in Eastern Galicia and forcing
their way through towards Lublin. This was influenced by
two factors: firstly – vast forests were a convenient area to
carry out activities by the insurgents; secondly – the proximity of the border of the Kingdom of Poland and not very
difficult conditions for illegal crossing facilitated the smuggling of people, arms and supplies6.
The role of Galicia was limited mainly to delivering
troops, weapons, ammunition and material resources for
the fighters in the Russian partition. Thanks to the zeal of
the organizers and the dedication of the Galician citizens
in the border counties, they managed to successfully break
through the border.

Plans
The failure of the first insurgent troops sent from Eastern Galicia into the Lublin province led to the decision that
the next unit had to be better armed and equipped.7 On
6

7

Zbigniew Moszumański, Jeszcze o powstaniu styczniowym
w Leżajskiem, ‘Almanach Leżajski’ 2013, No. 9, p. 89.
Cf.: Krzysztof Klikicki, Oddziały galicyjskie w walkach na Zamojszczyźnie w 1863 r., in: Galicja a powstanie styczniowe,
edited by Mariola Hoszowska, Agnieszka Kawalec, Leonid
Zaszkilniak, Warsaw, Rzeszów 2013, pp. 89–99.

– 177 –

– Zbigniew Moszumański –

March 24th, 1863, the Director of the Department of War of
the Interim National Government, General Józef Wysocki8
appointed Gen. Antoni Jeziorański9 the commander in
chief of the armed forces of the province of Lublin10, replacing Colonel Leon Czechowski11 on this position.
8

9

10

11

Józef Wysocki (1809–1873) – an officer of the November
Uprising of 1831, an emigrant in France and activist of the
Polish Democratic Society. In years 1848–1849, the organizer
and commander of the Polish Legion in Hungary, and the
Hungarian army corps commander. Appointed General in
1849. During the Crimean War he tried to form the Polish Legion in Turkey. Since March 1862, the commander of the Polish Military School in Italy. Since February 1863, he was firstly
the director of the War Department of the Interim National
Government, then the commander in chief of the armed
forces of the province of Lublin and the Russian lands. He
commanded the attack on Radziwillow (2 July), among others. After the uprising he emigrated back to France, where
he died in Paris. See. Henryk Piotr Kosk, Generalicja polska.
Popularny słownik biograficzny, vol. 2, M – Ż, Pruszków 2001,
pp. 265–266.
Antoni Jeziorański aka. Antoni Jovanovic (1827–1882) – Polish General of the January Uprising, a participant of the
Hungarian uprising 1848–1849, conservator and restorer
of the fortress in Belgrade, he fought against Russia in the
Crimean War 1854–1855. In 1861 he returned to Warsaw,
where he joined the independence conspiracy. After the outbreak of the January Uprising, he was the chief commander
of the armed forces – firstly in the Rawa province, then in
the Lublin province. He fought at Pieskowa Skala and Rawa,
achieved victory in the battle of the Kobylanka Forest and
was defeated in battle of Huta Krzeszowska. Imprisoned by
the Austrian authorities in Kufstein and Merani. Released
in 1865, he moved to Paris, then settled in Lvov, where he
died. Cf. Henryk Piotr Kosk, Generalicja polska…, vol. 1, A – Ł,
Pruszków 1998, p. 207.
January Uprising. Materiały i dokumenty, vol. 8, Dokumenty
Wydziału Wojny Rządu Narodowego 1863–1864, Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow–Gdańsk 1973, doc. 42 and 43, p. 137; Pamiętniki
jenerała Jeziorańskiego. Powstanie r. 1863, part 2, Lvov 1913,
pp. 15–16.
Leon Czechowski (1797–1887) – an officer of the November
Uprising. After the uprising fell, he settled in Galicia; where
in 1846 he commanded the uprising in the Tarnow province. Released from prison after the revolution of 1848, he
fought in Hungary under the command of General Józef
Bem and was promoted to the rank of colonel. Since 1853
he lived in Paris. In March 1863, he was appointed commander in chief of the armed forces of the province of Lublin, at the same time taking command of the excursion
from Galicia to Lublin Land. Despite initial success, after
the last clash in Huta Krzeszowska (21 March) had to re-

The intention of the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces of the Lublin province was to gather a few units on
the territory of Galicia and penetrate Lublin Land at several points simultaneously. These units, however, were not
expected to be combined into one, but kept at […] a continuous contact between each other and used against the
enemy12.
Therefore, Gen. Antoni Jeziorański appointed Major
Jan Żalplachta13 as the leader of a squad to be formed
of the soldiers of the former unit of Colonel Leon
Czechowski, who retreated to Galicia. In turn, Capt. Edmund Ślaski was entrusted with the task of collecting
volunteers in the vicinity of Sanok.14 In addition, he sent
a few officers nominated as squad leaders into the Lublin
area, ordering them to form units from the local popula-

12

13

14

treat to Galicia. Brought before a court-martial, he was
acquitted of all charges by General Antoni Jeziorański.
After the uprising he settled in Jaroslaw, where he died.
Cf. Józef Białynia Chołodecki, Pamiętnik powstania styczniowego. W pięćdziesiątą rocznicę wypadków, Lvov 1913,
pp. 192–193.
Tomasz Winnicki, Wspomnienia z powstania 1863 roku. Na
marginesie pamiętników generała Antoniego Jeziorańskiego,
in: Zapomniane wspomnienia, ed. Eligiusz Kozłowski, Warsaw
1981, p. 348.
Jan Żalplachta, aka. Zapałowicz (1834–1894) – since 1852 in
the Austrian army, where he served as an artillery lieutenant.
In 1863 he left the army and joined Colonel Leon Czechowski’s unit, where he commanded a battalion in the rank of Major. After the withdrawal of the unit to Galicia, he formed his
own unit (May 1863), which was disbanded during the fights
at Tyszowce and Tuczapy (15–19 May). Subsequently, he participated in an excursion to Volyn (July 2) as a subordinate of
Colonel Franciszek Horodyński. After the uprising he was imprisoned by the Austrians. He died in Bucharest. Cf. further:
Józef Białynia Chołodecki, Dąb-Dąbczańscy i Jan Żalplachta-Zapałowicz. Przyczynek do dziejów powstania styczniowego,
Lvov 1913, pp. 14–37.
Edmund Slaski (1831–1863) – a participant of the Hungarian
uprising of 1848, and later an officer in the Austrian army, and
after his release from the army – a high school teacher in Lvov.
After the outbreak of the January Uprising of 1863, he fought
as a captain in the unit of Colonel Leon Czechowski in Lublin Land, among others in the battles of Huta Krzeszowska
(March 21), then in the rank of Major as commander of his own
unit. He died in Chwałowice as a result of injuries sustained
in the battle at Łążek, he was buried in a parish cemetery in
Zaleszany. Cf. Dora Kacnelson, István Kovács, Pamiętniki Edmunda Ślaskiego a legion polski w Siedmiogrodzie, ‘Akcent’
1992, No. 2/3, pp. 331–334.

– 178 –

– Battle in the Kobylanka Forest, 1–6 May 1863 –

tion15. Major Józef Rucki16 had to form a unit in the region
of Krasnystaw and Chełm17. Major Zygmunt Koskowski18
was directed near Lubartow, where he was to form a unit
in the Luków area19.
The Lublin province was to be simultaneously entered by
the units of: Major Jan Żalplachta and Capt. Edmund Ślaski.
In Lublin, in addition to the operating units of Marcin Borelowski (aka ‘Lelewel’)20, Kajetan Cieszkowski (aka ‘Ćwiek’)21,
15

16

17

18

19

20

21

According to information received from Lublin, there has been
sufficient equipment for 1,000–1,500 people, with volunteers
only waiting for their commanders. Cf. Tomasz Winnicki,
Wspomnienia…, p. 349.
Wladyslaw Jozef Rucki (1815 – after 1866) – an officer in the
Austrian army, in 1849 he was an adjutant of General Józef
Bem in Transylvania. In the January Uprising he commanded
units in Podlasie and Lublin land, he was the chief of the military district Krasnystaw, the acting commander in chief of
the armed forces of the province of Lublin for a few months,
he fought, among others, in the battles of Urszulin (7 July)
and Chelm (July 9). After the uprising he escaped to Munich.
Cf. Józef Białynia Chołodecki, Pamiętnik powstania…, pp.
347–348.
The National Library of Poland, mf 11995/III, Papers of col.
Józef W. Rucki, commander of III Department in Lublin voivodeship in 1863/64.
Zygmunt Koskowski (1820–?) – Captain of the Russian army,
under the orders of Marian Langiewicz, he commanded
a battalion in the rank of Major, among others: in the battles of Chrobrze (17 March) and Grochowiska (March 18). He
fought under the command of Colonel Marcin Borelowski
and afterwards General Józef Hauke, among others, in the
battles of Sobolewo (May 24) and Róża (23 June). Cf. Zapomniane wspomnienia…, p. 462.
January Uprising. Materiały…, vol. 8a, Dokumenty terenowych
władz wojskowych powstania styczniowego 1863–1864, Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow–Gdańsk 1976, doc. 130, p. 136.
Maciej Marcin Borelowski, aka. Lelewel (1829–1863), a Polish
social and patriotic activist, a tinsmith by profession, a well
foreman. Participant of revolutionary speeches in Cracow in
1846 and 1848, co-organizer of patriotic demonstrations in
Warsaw in 1862 Appointed by the National Government to
the rank of Colonel and commander in chief of the armed
forces in the Podlasie and Lublin regions. A good organizer,
he formed new insurgent troops, he fought, among others, at
Krasnobród, Borowe Młyny, Chruslina, Panasówka and Batorz, where he was mortally wounded on September 6, 1863.
Cf. further: K. Dunin-Wąsowicz, Marcin Borelowski-Lelewel,
Warsaw 1964, passim.
Kajetan Cieszkowski aka. Ćwiek (1826–1877) – a Colonel in
the January Uprising of 1863, commander of a unit in the
Sandomierz and Lublin regions. He fought, e.g., at Depułtycze (5 August), Ilza (20 August) and Irena (29 August). Due

Jan Czerwinski22 and Tytus O’Byrne (aka ‘Grzymała’)23,
forces were already being organized under the command of
Major Józef Rucki and Major Zygmunt Koskowski. It should
be mentioned that while the unit of General Jeziorański entered Lubelskie, the cavalry of ataman Józef Leniecki24 was
to conceal the true movements of these forces25.
The formed insurgent troops, in addition to their own
cavalry units, were to have about 200 scythe bearers,
which if needed, could be equipped with firearms. As a result of these plans the insurgent forces in Lublin could be
reinforced with 5 units, which would also enter the Lublin
area under the command of Gen. Jeziorański.
Units were to be divided into operating on the right
and the left flank and in the centre. They were to be led
by Gen. Aleksander Waligórski26 (the right flank), Gen. Józef

22

23

24

25
26

to a sickness, he left the unit after the Battle of Panasowka
(3 September), he then left for France. Chief of Staff Walery
Kozlowski took over his unit. In 1873, he came to Galicia and
died in Cracow. Cf. Zapomniane wspomnienia…, p. 447.
John Czerwinski (? – after 1890) – the commander of the insurgent unit in the Lublin region. For a time he worked with
a unit of Major Jan Żalplachta, but he left it before the battle
of Tuczapy. He refused to cooperate with the division of Gen.
Antoni Jeziorański during his excursion in the May into the
Lublin region (Kobylanka May 1–6, 1863), explaining it by the
lack of weapons. After the uprising, he worked in the judiciary
in Monasterzyska. Cf. ibid., p. 448.
Tytus Jan O’Byrn de Lassy, aka. Grzymała (1837–1897) – a Russian army officer, a member of the Sierakowski’s Circle of Officers. During the January Uprising he first commanded the
Zouaves of Death, then in the rank of colonel and became
a squad leader and the commander in chief of the armed
forces of the Podlaskie province. After the uprising, he emigrated to France. After 1871 he returned to Galicia and died in
Nowy Targ. Cf. Józef Białynia Chołodecki, Pamiętnik powstania…, p. 316.
Józef Leniecki (1839–1909) – an officer of the Russian army.
During the uprising he fought in the unit of General Antoni
Jeziorański, and then Marian Langiewicz, in April and May,
again under the command of Gen. Jeziorański (Kobylanka).
Until March 1864 he fought in Podlasie and in Lublin province.
After escaping from Olomuniec, he emigrated to France and
afterwards to Turkey. After 1880, he settled in Galicia and took
up oil prospecting. He died in Tustanowice. Cf. ibid., p. 280–
–281.
Tomasz Winnicki, Wspomnienia…, p. 350.
Aleksander Waligórski (1802–1873) – an officer of the November Uprising. He emigrated to Norway and France, where he
worked as an engineer and cartographer. A participant of
the Crimean War and in the years 1861–1862 a lecturer at the
Polish Military School in Italy. In 1863 he organized troops for

– 179 –

– Zbigniew Moszumański –

Śmiechowski27 and Colonel Marcin Borelowski (on the left
flank) and Gen. Antoni Jeziorański (in the centre). This explains the real reason why as many as three generals participated in the battles in the Kobylanka Forest on 1 and 6
May 1863. All of these units were to operate according to
a uniform plan. For this purpose it was intended to maintain a permanent contact with the commander in chief,
General Antoni Jeziorański and, according to the orders
and instructions received from him, to act on the designated operation line28.
The action plans of the insurgent troops in Lublin remained on paper only. The main reason for the failure was
the lack of coordination, weapons and ammunition, as
well as the lack of cavalry equipment.

Preparations
After receiving the appointment for the position of commander in chief of the armed forces of the province of Lublin on March 24, 1863, Gen. Antoni Jeziorański along with
Gen. Aleksander Waligórski and Colonel Tomasz Winnicki29

27

28
29

Marian Langiewicz, by whom he was promoted to the rank
of general. He took part in the excursion of Gen. Antoni Jeziorański into Lublin province and fought in battles of the
Kobylanka Forest (1–6 May). In June 1863 he became commander in chief of the armed forces of the province of Lublin.
On 16 October, 1863 his squad entered Lublin area. His unit
was disbanded at the battle of Łążek (22 October). He emigrated after the uprising. He took part in the French-Prussian war (1870–1871) He died. Died in Paris. Cf. further: Jacek
Juniszewski, Generał Waligórski, inżynier i żołnierz, Brzezia
Łąka 2013, passim.
Józef Śmiechowski (1798–1875) – an officer of the November
Uprising. In 1863, he fought under the command of Gen. Antoni Jeziorański and Marian Langiewicz, by whom he was promoted to the rank of general. After the meeting in Welcz, he
took command over Langiewicz’s squad and with its remains
crossed the border of Galicia. Afterwards he participated
in General Jezioranski’s excursion into Lublin province. He
fought in the battles of the Kobylanka Forest (1–6 May). From
11 May he commanded Jeziorański’s troops, he was defeated
in the battle of Huta Krzeszowska and retreated to Galicia.
After the uprising he lived in Lvov, where he died. Cf. Henryk
Piotr Kosk, Generalicja polska…, vol. 2, p. 213.
Tomasz Winnicki, Wspomnienia…, p. 350.
Tomasz Winnicki (1828–1883) – from 1860, in a secret organization, imprisoned in the X Pavilion of the Warsaw Citadel (1861–1862), exiled to the province of Tambov. After the
outbreak of the January Uprising he became chief of staff
in the unit of General Antoni Jeziorański in the Sandomierz

came to Radymno, where in the nearby Wysocko he spoke
with Stefan Zamoyski30 – civil governor of the circuit of
Przemysl about the recruitment of volunteers to the newly
formed insurgent unit and the capabilities of the recruitment base in Przemysl Land31. The headquarters of the
formed unit was in Wojtkowski’s manor in Żurawiczki, converted into a recruitment office for insurgent volunteers.32
On 6 April General Jeziorański gave the order to begin
the concentration of volunteers in the main assembly point
in the Zerwankowskie Woods near Żołynia in the Rzeszów
County33. Captain Ignacy Kucz became its commander.
Somewhat earlier, on 25 March 1863, he appointed Major
Bronislaw Ryx to an accredited deputy for finance and requisition34. He then strived for financial assistance, as well
as weapons and equipment, including necessary surgical
instruments, for the unit.
Unfortunately, equipment and ammunition shortages
remained a major problem for the unit. Although the commander was able to buy some ammunition, it was still
not enough. The help promised by General Wysocki was
nowhere to be seen35.
From 20 April the insurgent unit began forming in Zerwankowskie Woods in Rzeszów County. Battalion, company and platoon commanders were appointed. The unit
consisted of 8 companies (‘rot’) of infantry, a squadron of
cavalrymen (‘Krakusi’), one hundred Cossacks and two

30

31
32

33

34
35

and Lublin provinces. After merging with Marian Langiewicz’s
units, he received stewardship and temporarily became chief
of staff of the joint insurgent forces. He fought, i.a. at Chrobrze,
Grochowiska and in the Kobylanka Forest. Promoted to the
rank of colonel, severely wounded twice. He settled in Galicia.
He died in Berehy and was buried in Jasien. Cf. Józef Białynia
Chołodecki, Pamiętnik powstania…, p. 398.
Stefan Zamoyski, Count of the Jelita crest (1837–1899) – Civil
Head of the Przemysl district during the January Uprising in
1863 and an Austrian prisoner, after the uprising he became
a member of parliament in Galicia, a lifetime member of the
House of Lords, economic activist. Cf. Teresa Zielińska, Poczet
polskich rodów arystokratycznych, Warsaw 1997, passim.
Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 32.
Eligiusz Kozłowski, Od Węgrowa do Opatowa 3 II 1863 – 21 II
1864. Wybrane bitwy z powstania styczniowego, Warsaw 1962,
p. 102–103.
January Uprising. Materiały…, vol. 12, Dokumenty terenowych
władz cywilnych powstania styczniowego 1862–1864, Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow–Gdańsk–Łódź 1986, doc. 53, pp. 34–35.
Ibid., vol. 8a, doc. 118, p. 130.
January Uprising. Materiały…, vol. 8a, doc. 131, p. 137; Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 42.

– 180 –

– Battle in the Kobylanka Forest, 1–6 May 1863 –

companies of sappers36 – a total of about 740 soldiers37.
The well-armed and sufficiently-equipped unit included,
i.a.: General Aleksander Waligórski and General Józef
Śmiechowski, chief of staff Colonel Tomasz Winnicki, battaltion commanders – Major Kazimierz Grudziński38 and
Major Leszek Dąbczański39, sapper commander – Major Adam Bobowski, Cossack atamans – Józef Leniecki
and Adam Wyleżyński, cavalry squadron commander
– Maliszewski, doctor Adam Stanisławski and chaplain
Father Berard Bulsiewicz40. The company Commanders
were: 1 – Cpt. Kazimierz Wyszomirski, 2 – Ignacy Zawadzki,
3 – Cpt. Leonard Komodziński, 4 – Cpt. Emil Lampe, 7 –
Cpt. Mieczyslaw Czechowicz, and Zygmunt Horn, Wladyslaw Kazanecki, Kurek, Leonard Łepkowicz (Lepkowski)
and Wiktor Wisniewski.
Gen. Anthony Jeziorański, came to the camp in the
Woods Zerwankowskich on 25 April in order to review the
troops. Earlier a cavalry subdivision under the command
of ataman Józef Leniecki was sent to mask the movement
of the unit’s main column.

36

37

38

39

40

Col. Tomasz Winnicki claimed that there was only one
company of sappers. Cf. idem, Wspomnienia…, p. 356, foot­note. g1.
Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 42. Cpt. Wiktor Wiśniewski mentioned that the unit had about 600 soldiers
(idem, Wspomnienia kapitana wojsk polskich z roku 1863,
Leipzig 1866, p. 58). This is also confirmed by Colonel Tomasz
Winnicki (idem, Wspomnienia…, p. 321).
Kazimierz Grudzinski (1835–?) – Russian army officer in the
rank of major in command of battalions in Marian Langiewicz and Gen. Antoni Jeziorański’s units, promoted to the rank
of colonel. Afterwards in the Mazovia Corps of Gen. Józef
Karol Miniewski. He participated in all battles fought by these
troops. After the uprising he stayed in Galicia, and later took
advantage of the amnesty and returned to the Kingdom of
Poland. Cf. Józef Białynia Chołodecki, Pamiętnik powstania…,
pp. 225–226.
Leszek Dabczanski (1836–1909) – graduated from the military academy in Weisskirchen, an Austrian artillery officer.
In 1863, in the rank of major, he commanded a battalion in
Colonel Leon Czechowski’s unit, and later had the same position in General Antoni Jeziorański’s unit. He fought at Huta
Krzeszowska and at the Kobylanka Forest, where he was
wounded. After the uprising he settled in Czortkowo county,
then in Lvov, where he died.Cf. further: Józef Białynia Chołodecki, Dąb-Dąbczańscy and Jan Żalplachta-Zapałowicz…, pp.
38–46.
Józef Stanisław Pietrzak, Księża powstańcy 1863, Cracow
1916, p. 64.

The next day, the main column of the unit moved out
towards the border of the Kingdom of Poland. After some
trials and tribulations the unit crossed the San River and
after two days of marching reached the area of Ruda
Różaniecka. After resting, the column moved towards
the Kutnie farm, which belonged to baron Piotr Brunicki
(about 2 km from Ruda Różaniecka), where they intended to stock up on ammunition. Each soldier had only
8 rounds and the stock totalled 800 for the entire unit. Unfortunately, there was no ammunition, however they did
acquire some tools for the sappers. Therefore, they sent
messengers to the chief of the civil and military organisation in Galicia, with the request to provide ammunition as
soon as possible. On 28 April the unit crossed the border
of the Kingdom of Poland and Lubliniec41 and stopped in
a well-hidden position at Borowe Młyny.
At this time, the cavalry subdivision of Ataman Józef Leniecki, accompanied by Major Bronislaw Ryx, acquired in
Krzeszow some Russian money, which amounted to about
1000 rubles.42 They spent the night in Dabrowka near Potok43. In the night of 27 and 28 April, the unit lost a cash box
containing almost 50 thousand Polish zlotys, including almost 33 thousand taken from the salt warehouse in Brzesk
on 18 March 1863.44
Upon learning about the insurgent unit crossing the
Austrian border near Borowe Młyny, the military chief of
the Janowski county, Colonel Georgy Miednikov45, not
41

42
43
44

45

Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 42. Gen. Antoni Jezioranski’s unit reportedly crossed the Russian border a day
earlier, as stated in Czas, 1863, 2 May, No. 100, p. 2, as well as
Stanisław Zieliński (Bitwy i potyczki 1863–1864, Rapperswil
1913, p. 88).
January Uprising. Materiały…, vol. 8a, doc. 131, p. 137.
Czas, 1863, 3 May, No. 101, p. 3.
January Uprising. Materiały…, vol. 8a, doc. 127, p. 135 and
doc. 134, p. 139.
In accordance with the order of 14 May 1863, Colonel Georgy
Miednikov was appointed commander of the Arkhangelogorodski Infantry Regiment in place of Colonel Yegor Biedriagi, who commanded this regiment since 1856 and at the
same time was the military chief of the Zamość district since
January 1863. Cf. Nikolaj G. Nikolaev, Istoriya 17-go Pekh.
Arkhangelogorodskogo yego imperatorskogo vysochestva
velikogo knyazya Vladimira Aleksandrovicha polka, 1700 – 25
iûna 1900, Petersburg 1900, pp. 382, 387; A. B. Sirokorad, Davniy spor slavan. Rossia. Polsha. Litva, Moscow 2006, http://
www.e-reading-lib.com/chapter.php/144943/35/Shirokorad_-_Davniii_spor_slavyan._Rossiya._Pol%27sha._Litva_%28ill%29.html [access 21-07-2013]. Cracow’s Czas (1863,

– 181 –

– Zbigniew Moszumański –

knowing its strength, sent there a unit commanded by Major Ivan Sternberg46 composed of: an infantry battalion of
the Archangelogorod Infantry Regiment, reinforced by two
cannons, the uhlan platoon of the Kharkov Uhlan Cavalry
Regiment of Captain Antulayev, a platoon of Cossacks and
half a hundred of border guards – about a 1000 soldiers in
total. The march towards Borowe Młyny began on 26 April,
at approximately 8 P.M. However, they reached their destination after three days. Muddy road, heavy continuous
rains and low temperatures strained the marching soldiers
and horses so much, that Major Sternberg had to stop for
two days and rest in the area of Borowe Młyny.47 During
this time, no new credible information about the insurgents reached him48.
Meanwhile, on 30 April, in a camp in Łysa Góra, General
Jeziorański received information that a column of Russian soldiers moved out of Janow to meet the insurgents.
Therefore he chose to position his troops in an advantageous position in the Kobylanka Forest, between Borowe
Młyny and Tepiły. On one side it reached the Austro-Russian border and was surrounded by swamps on the other.
Such a position allowed the enemy to attack only from
two sides: a broad road from Łysa Góra and a narrow forest road from Janow. Therefore, at some distance from the
camp on both these roads defensive positions were taken
by the half-company strong front guards, and in front of
them put forward guards consisting of several horsemen49.
They also started sorting and processing possessed ammunition, including casting bullets for rifles. Major Feliks
Obniski, former captain of the Russian army, oversaw this

46

47

48

49

28 March, No. 71, p. 1 and 2 April, No. 75, p. 1) reported erroneously that it was Colonel Mielnikov.
Major Ivan Sternberg – since 1860 the commander of the
II Battalion 17 Arkhangelogorodski Infantry Regiment, military chief of the following counties: Zamość (1864–1867),
Lubartów (1867–1872) and Biłgoraj (1872–1879). Cf. Nikolaj
G. Nikolaev, Istoriya 17-go…, appendix XIV, p. 42; Krzysztof
Latawiec, Naczelnicy powiatów guberni lubelskiej w latach
1867–1915. ‘Próba charakterystyki grupy’, in Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, 2003, vol. LVIII, p. 79, 91. Polish
historiography also knows different spelling of this name ‘Szternberg’ and ‘Sztiernbierg’.
It rained for several days, sometimes even with snow, the
air temperature dropped even below 5 degrees. Cf. Gazeta
Lwowska, 1863, 29 April – 2 May, No. 98–100; Czas, 1863, 29
April – 2 May, No. 97–100.
Evgenij A. Albovskij, Kharkovskiye kazaki. Istoriya Kharkovskogo Polka, part 5, Minsk 1897, p. 387.
Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, pp. 43–44.

work. Two companies of riflemen working in shifts managed to adapt during the night about 1,800 rifle rounds
and cast about 2000 bullets50.

Battle
On 1st of May the weather had improved somewhat.
Major Sternberg decided to send the subunits to search
for the insurgents in the Gluchowski Forest. In a short time
the Cossacks signalled that at the nearby border, which
goes along a 10-meter-wide forest clearing, one could see
a group of insurgents. Soon it became clear that it was the
commander of the 14 Hussar Regiment, Colonel Olivier
Wallis51 together with an escort, and his soldiers acted at
the time as the border guard.
After a short rest, the Russians began to search through
the Kobylanka Forest. Shortly after 9 A.M. the first shots
were fired. The Russian forces, scattered in battle order
throughout the marshy woods, attacked the defensive
positions of the vanguard. After a short fight Capt. Ignacy
Zawadzki’s company stopped their march. The Russians,
due to the difficult terrain, used only one cannon52, while
the other remained at the wagons53. Soon, the enemy’s
the right wing was attacked by two companies under the
command of Major Ignacy Grudzinski, forcing the Russians to retreat in the direction of Borowe Młyny. A strike to
the side of the retreating enemy column, led to mixing the
formation and a subsequent strike of the insurgent cavalry caused complete panic. After a two-hour battle the
Russians fled and left one cannon with a broken tow and
lost 90 wounded and killed men, 23 of whom54 were left
on the battlefield. Polish losses totalled only 5 killed and
18 wounded55.
50
51

52

53
54

55

Tomasz Winnicki, Wspomnienia…, pp. 352–353.
Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 48. Cf. Militär-Schematismus des Österreichischen Kaiserthumes, 1863, Wien
1863, pp. 104, 416. Evgenij A. Albovskij (Kharkovskiye kazaki…,
p. 387) suggests that he was a general.
In order to stop artillery fire, Captain Leonard Łepkowicz, with
a group of volunteers, organized a successful foray to the firing position of Russian cannon. Cf. Tomasz Winnicki, Wspomnienia…, p. 357.
Evgenij A. Albovskij, Kharkovskiye kazaki…, p. 388.
Cracow’s Czas from 3 May (1863, No. 101, p. 3) reported that 26
Russians were buried, and on 5 May (1863, No. 102, p. 3) and 7
May (1863, No. 104, p. 2) – that there was 27 of them.
Stanisław Zieliński, Bitwy i potyczki…, p. 88. Evgenij A. Albovskij (Kharkovskiye kazaki…, p. 388) reports that Russians had

– 182 –

– Battle in the Kobylanka Forest, 1–6 May 1863 –

– 183 –

– Zbigniew Moszumański –

After the withdrawal of Russian forces to Borowe
Młyny, Major Sternberg immediately sent a report to
Lublin about the outcome of the battle, at the same time
asking for help. The Head of the Military Department of
the Lublin Province, General Aleksandr P. Khrushchev,
ordered to reinforce Major Sternberg with troops stationed in Janow and Tomaszow. Colonel Georgy Miednikov, the military head of the Janowski County, took
command of all Russian forces. Their ranks included:
Archangelogorod Infantry Regiment, the independent
5th Riflemen Battalion, 6 cannons, half a squadron of
Uhlans of Kharkiv Uhlan Regiment, half a hundred of
Cossacks and half hundred of border guardsmen56. They
counted a total of more than 2000 people. For five days,
however, the Russians did not dare to attack the insurgent unit.
In turn, General Jeziorański ordered the sapper commander, Maj. Adam Bobowski, to strengthen the fortification of the camp and barricade all roads leading to the
camp with logs. The depleted ammunition supply had
been partially supplemented by a transport from Lviv (several thousand rounds). Injured insurgents were provided
care on site, and the more heavily injured were transported
to hospitals in Galicia. On 3rd of May the camp was visited
by Duke Adam Sapieha, who took part in the ceremony of
burial of the fallen insurgents, and ordered an increase in
the supply of food and ammunition. On this day they were
also joined by two cavalry units of captain Albert Potocki
and Karol Liniewicz (in total 85 cavalrymen), as well as insurgents from a broken unit of Marcin Borelowski, among
which was, inter alia, Kalikst Ujejski57. On the 5th of May
about 50 thousand rounds were transported to the camp,
which were distributed until late evening58.

56
57

58

only 20 people killed and 40 injured. In turn, Gen. Antoni Jeziorański (Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p.47) argues
that the losses of the insurgents amounted to 5 killed and 28
wounded. In contrast, Cracow’s Czas on 3 May (1863, No 101,
p. 3) and 7 May (1863, No 104, p. 2) reported that 3 insurgents
were killed and 20 wounded were transported to the hospital
in Cieszanów, and on 5 May (1863, No 102, p. 3) – that there
were only 11 wounded. Gazeta Lwowska from 4 May (1863, No.
101, p. 411) contains even more different information.
Evgenij A. Albovskij, Kharkovskiye kazaki…, p. 389.
He later took command over the company after Captain
Wiktor Wisniewski. Cf. Stanisław Zieliński, Bitwy i potyczki…,
p. 89.
Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, pp. 47–50.

In the morning of 6th of May, the Russian forces commanded by Colonel Georgiy Miednikov, began surrounding the insurgent camp. About 8.30 A.M. they first attacked vanguard positions put forward on the left flank,
which, after a slight resistance retreated to the main
position. This section of the defence was led by General
Józef Śmiechowski. On the adjacent section, the Russian
skirmishers were stopped in wetland forest, followed by
an exchange of fire, but with little effect, because the
trees protected the riflemen from both warring parties
against larger losses. About 10.30 A.M. the Russian forces
attacked the centre of the defensive position, but good
spacing and masked companies caused them significant
losses, forcing them to withdraw.
There was an hour-long break, after which the insurgents were attacked from the side of Galicia. The
defenders of this section, Major Adam Bobowski’s sappers, hidden behind a barricade, initially successfully
repelled the attack the Russians. During the second
attack of the Russians surrounded the entrenched
engineers. Seeing the ineffectiveness of the sappers’s
resistance, General Jeziorański came to their rescue by
sending the 4 Company of Captain Wiktor Wisniewski,
located in reserve. The rapid counterattack at the enemy’s side has caused some confusion in their ranks.
Witnessing this, major Leszek Dąbczański led the insurgents to attack with bayonets, causing a chaotic withdrawal of the Russians.
For nearly an hour the Russians gathered to attack
the camp again. At the same time, Colonel Miednikov regrouped some of his forces from the left wing, strengthening the attack in the centre. Major Leonard Łepkowicz
received an order from General Jeziorański compelling
him to repel the two companies of the Russian assault.
The skirmishers of Captain Wiktor Wisniewski stopped the
enemy, and Captain Władysław Kazanecki’s 7 Company
sent to help Major Łepkowicz, at the same time the last
rear guard59 of General Jeziorański, forced the Russians to
retreat in a fierce bayonet battle.60

59

60

Fourty two uhlans under the command of rittmeister Ludwik
Czerminski came from Galicia during the battle. They were
used to distribute rounds to infantry positions and later to
escort transports with the wounded. Cf.: ibid., p. 56; Halina
Matławska, Lasy – nasze fortece, Zwierzyniec 1993, p. 61.
Stanislaw Zielinski (Bitwy i potyczki…, p. 89) states that after
a three-hour fight, at noon, General Jezioranski, after having

– 184 –

– Battle in the Kobylanka Forest, 1–6 May 1863 –

After 3 P.M. the Russians, pushed away on the whole
line, retreated without a fight. Only Colonel Wyleżyński
and Leniecki’s Cossacks chased the retreating enemy61. It
was one of the most spectacular forest battles in the January Uprising. Austrian officers who stood at the border,
witnessing the fight, could not praise the courage of the insurgents enough and began applauding them. The aforementioned commander of the 14th Hussar Regiment, Colonel Olivier Wallis, said that he was not able to resist the
[…] desire to see the soldiers fighting so valiantly62.
This victory, however, was at the big cost. It is estimated that the Russian side would have a total of up to
400 injured and killed in this battle63. Warrant officer Teofil Bilewicz died from suffered wounds and Major Ivan
Sternberg was injured64. Forty eight insurgents were killed
on the field of battle, including Captain Emil Lampe and
the son of General Waligorski – Wladyslaw, quartermaster Stanislaw Urbanowski. They were buried on the same
day. Sixty injured insurgents and several wounded Russian Cossacks were transported to a makeshift hospital in
Cieszanów65, not counting those sent to Narol, Lubaczow
and Oleszyce66. Until 10 May Lt. Kazimierz Tyszkiewicz, Cpt.

61

62

63

64
65

66

given command over the unit to General Aleksander Waligórski, personally led a bold charge with a bayonet in his hand.
Description of the fight according to Gen. Antoni Jeziorański.
Cf. Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 52–56. Cf. Zygmunt Kubrak, Powstanie styczniowe. Pogranicze cieszanowsko-lubaczowskie, Lubaczów 2003, p. 22–25. The battle of the
Kobylanka Forest was also described in a popular ‘spirit-raising’ fashion by Józef K. Zajączkowski: W rocznicę styczniową
(Bitwa pod Kobylanką w roku 1863), Lvov 1911.
Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 48; Jan Stella-Sawicki, [Col. Struś], Galicya w powstaniu styczniowem, Lvov 1913,
p. 60; Czas, 1863, 8 May, No. 105, p. 3.
Cracow’s Czas (1863, 12 May, No. 107, p. 2); Stanisław Zieliński, Bitwy i potyczki…, p. 89. Evgenij A. Albovskij (Kharkovskie
kazaki…, p. 389) reports that the Russians lost 100 killed and
wounded. According to Gen. Antoni Jezioranski, the Russian
losses amounted to 273 killed and 432 wounded. Cf. Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 57.
Nikolaj G. Nikolaev, Istoriya 17-go…, p. 385.
Gen. Antoni Jeziorański states that the losses among the insurgents amounted to 59 killed and 47 wounded. Cf. Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 57. On 10 May 1863, there
were 24 lightly wounded, 11 heavily wounded and 8 mortally
wounded insurgents at the hospital in Cieszanow. However, there were 20 lightly wounded in Oleszyce and 12 in
Lubaczów. A total of 75. Cf. Czas, 1863, 14 May, No. 109, p. 1.
More information about the medical care provided to the insurgents participating in the battles of the Kobylanka Forest,

Wladyslaw Kazanecki, Lt. Franciszek Szubartowski and
Józef Łucki died of wounds. Col. Tomasz Winnicki, Colonel
Adam Wylezynski, Major Leszek Dabczanski, Major Emilian
Sokolnicki, Captains: Kurek, Wladyslaw Litwicki, Wictor
Wisniewski, Kazimierz Wyszomirski and Ignacy Zawadzki
and chaplain Father Berard Bulsiewicz, as well as doctor
Adam Stanislawski were injured67.

Further steps
The enemy did not give up. After forming their ranks,
they began preparations to attack the insurgent camp. In
anticipation of the Russians resuming their actions, General Jeziorański shifted the defensive positions to the very
border with Austria, to be provided with a way to retreat,
if necessary68. Reconnaissance confirmed the Russian intention to attack the camp. Therefore, General Jeziorański
ordered, keeping silence and caution, to leave the camp.
Only intensely burning campfires were left. After the insurgent unit withdrew, the Russians, believing that Poles
are still in the camp, fired at it at dawn with artillery fire
from two sides. Only when called to attack, the Russians
learned that the camp was abandoned69.
Meanwhile, Gen. Jeziorański, fleeing with a unit numbering less than 600 people and almost without any ammunition, through Tepily and Ułazów70, moved to the
Galician side about 20 miles west and on 9 May at approx.
2 P.M., allowing the soldiers to rest and handing out provisions, crossed back into Lublin Landprovince at Mielniki.71
Having passed a few kilometres into the province, General
Jeziorański, under the guise of terrain reconnaissance,
left the squad, handing over the command to Gen. Józef
Śmiechowski, and went to Galicia, motivating his trip by
a makeshift-illness72. He spent the night in Naklik, and

67

68
69
70

71

72

cf.: Zygmunt Kubrak, Powstanie styczniowe…, pp. 45–51.
Cracow`s Czas (1863, 12 May, No. 107, p. 2) and Stanisław
Zieliński (Bitwy i potyczki…, p. 89) both claim that Gen. Antoni Jezioranski was also wounded in the battle, however the
author of the memoirs does not confirm this. Cf. Pamiętniki
jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, passim.
Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 56.
Czas, 1863, 13 May, No. 108, p. 3 and 14 May, No. 109, p. 1.
‘From Warsaw secret archives’, in Czas, 1923, 15 September,
No. 206, p. 2.
Stefan Kieniewicz, Powstanie…, p. 485; Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, p. 62.
Jan Stella-Sawicki, Galicya…, pp. 60–61. Cf. Pamiętniki jenerała Jeziorańskiego…, pp. 63–65.

– 185 –

– Zbigniew Moszumański –

then in the morning went north73 to Lipiny and Harasiuki
and stopped in the evening to rest at Huta Krzeszowska74.
Gen. Śmiechowski had horses unsaddled and ordered
the supper to be prepared. The vanguard of the Russian
forces, commanded by Major Yakov Ogolina, surprised
the unprepared insurgents. Gen. Śmiechowski placed the
riflemen in the bushes, the attack was blocked with difficulty. Afterwards Captain Ludwik Czerminski led the Polish cavalry charge, which allowed the infantry to escape
into the woods, along with the wagons75. After 9 P.M. the
insurgents crossed the Austrian border in small groups at
Kurzyna Wielka and Golce76. Gen. Śmiechowski also withdrew to Austrian territory. General Jeziorański was found
in the nearby Galician Wymyslow77. Out of the units commanded by him, counting less than 300 people at the end
of the action, the Austrian patrols arrested 208 insurgents,
49 horses, 220 guns (rifles) and 300 kg of gunpowder. It is

73
74
75
76
77

Gazeta Lwowska, 1863, 11 May, No. 107, pp. 435–436.
Stefan Kieniewicz, Powstanie…, p. 485.
Halina Matławska, Lasy…, p. 64.
Gazeta Lwowska, 1863, 12 May, p. 108, p. 440.
January Uprising. Materiały…, vol. 8a, doc. 136, p. 140.

estimated that 30–40 people managed to evade arrest78.
Some weapons were buried by insurgents (and retrieved
later by Colonel Marcin Borelowski while forming a new
insurgent unit).
To conclude, one has to state that General Antoni Jezioranski’s unit remained at the borderland strip for almost
two weeks, longer than any Galician unit and he caused
significant losses to the Russians, defeating them in both
battles of the Kobylanka Forest. General Jezioranski could
expect support from both Jan Czerwinski’s unit, stationed
less than a mile from Borowe Młyny, and a second unit,
formed in Galicia, commanded by Major Jan Żalplachta’s.
Lack of coordination resulted in Major Żalplachta’s unit not
being armed and dispatched in time, so it did not reach
Gen Jezioranski in time. It was a common mistake of the
organizers of the Galician excursions, who could not coordinate the activities of individual departments. They were
formed near the border and observed by Russian spies
from the very beginning, thus were quickly disbanded before even starting any tasks deeper in the country engulfed
by the uprising.
78

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W pięćdziesiątą rocznicę wypadków, Lvov 1913

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– 187 –

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