Russia at the barricades eyewitness accounts of the August 1991 coup - Sharpe M.E.

Author: Sharpe M.E.

Tags: politics history of the ussr history of russia revolution memories of events

ISBN: 1-56324-272-9

Year: 2015

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RUSSIA
AT THE

BARRICADES

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RUSSIA
AT THE

BARRICADES
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS
OF THE AUGUST 1 991 COUP

EDITED BY
VICTORIA E. BONNELL,
ANN COOPER, AND GREGORY FREIDIN

Routledge

Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published1994by M.E. Sharpe
Published2015 by Routledge
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Milton Park,Abingdon,Oxon OX14 4RN
711 Third Avenue,New York, NY 10017,USA
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Copyright© 1994 Taylor & Francis.All rights reserved.
No partof this book may be reprintedor reproducedor utilised in any form or by
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Notices
No responsibilityis assumedby the publisherfor any injury and/ordamageto
personsor propertyasa matterof productsliability, negligenceor otherwise,
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containedin the materialherein.
mustalwaysrely on their own experienceand
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Library of CongressCataloging-in-PubJication
Data

Russiaat the barricades:eyewitnessaccountsof the August 1991 coup/
editedby Victoria E. Bonnell, Ann Cooper,andGregoryFreidin.
p.cm.
Includesindex.
ISBN 1-56324-272-9(pbk.)
ISBN 1-56324-271-0(cloth)
I. SovietUnion-History-Attemptedcoup. 1991-Personainarratives.
2. SovietUnion-History-Attemptedcoup. 1991-Sources.
l. Bonnell, Victoria, E.
II. Cooper,Ann.
Ill. Freidin, Gregory.
DK292.R86 1991
947.085'4'0922--iic2093-27944
CIP
ISBN 13: 9781563242724(Pbk)
ISBN 13: 9781563242717(hbk)

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Contents

Map of CentralMoscow

List of Photographs

Preface

xiii

Acknowledgments

Note on TransliterationandInterpolations

xvii

Guideto the Print Media

xix

Introduction Victoria E. Bonnelland GregoryFreidin

I: Savingthe Old Country

1. ProclamationsandDecreesof the StateCommittee
for the Stateof Emergency,August 19, 1991

DocumentJ Decreeofthe Vice Presidentof the USSR

Document2 Appealto the SovietPeople

Document3 ResolutionNo. 1 ofthe USSRStateCommittee
for the Stateof Emergency

Document4 Resolutionofthe Chairmanof the Supreme
Sovietof the USSRon the Conveningof an Extraordinary
Sessionof the SupremeSovietof the USSR

2. The PressConferenceofthe StateCommitteefor the State
of Emergency,August 19, 1991

42
vii

3. StatementsandExplanationsby the PutschistsAfter the Coup
Document1 Interrogationof DefenseMinister Dmitrii Yazov
on August22, 1991
Document2 Interrogationof SovietPrimeMinister

ValentinPavlov,August30,1991

Document3 Interrogationof the Headof the USSRKGB,

55
55
63

Vladimir Kriuchkov

II: The Public Reacts

1. GregoryFreidin To the Barricades

2. Letter from Moscow

3. Victoria E. Bonnell August 19 and20 in Moscow

4. Lauren G. Leighton Moscow: The Morning of August21

100

5. nadimir Petrik Moscow'sM.V. Khrunichev

Machine-BuildingFactoryReactsto the AugustCoup
6. SergeP. Petroff The Congressof Compatriots:

Witnessto a DemocraticCounter-Revolution

111
120

7. DonaldJ. Raleigh A View from Saratov

131

8. Valerii Zavorotnyi Letter from St. Petersburg

147

III: In High Places

159

1. Mikhail S. Gorbachev What Happenedin Foros

161

2. Boris Yeltsin Proclamations,Decrees,andAppeals

in Responseto the Coup,August19,1991

170

Document1 Appealto the Citizensof Russia

170

Document2 DecreeNo. 59 ofthe Presidentof the RSFSR

172

Document3 DecreeNo. 61 of the Presidentof the RSFSR

172

Document4 Appealby Boris Yeltsin, Presidentof the

RSFSR,to the SoldiersandOfficers ofthe USSRArmed
Forces,the USSRCommitteefor StateSecurity[KGB],
andthe USSRMinistry oflnternalAffairs [MVO]

173

3. Boris Yeltsin Speechto the RussianParliament,
August21, 1991

176

4. Interview with Nikolai Vorontsov BetweenRussia
andthe SovietUnion-With Noteson the USSR
Council of MinistersMeetingof August 19, 1991

181

5. Vladimir ShcherbakovRecountsHis Role in the Coup

195

6. Interview with YevgeniiShaposhnikovThe Coup
andthe Armed Forces

201

7. Interview with Davlat Khudonazarov From Dushanbe
to Moscow

209

8. Interview with Anatolii Sobchak Breakthrough:
The Coupin St. Petersburg

218

9. Interview with AleksandrN. Yakovlev Our ChildrenWere
on the Barricades

226

IV: Defendingthe White House

233

1. TheresaSabonis-ChafeeReflectionsfrom the Barricades

235

2. Interview with AleksandrProkhanov Concerning
the Defendersof the White House

249

3. Michael Hetzer Deathon the Streets

253

4. A Man in the Crowd

256

5. E-Mailfrom AlekseiKozhevnikov On the Barricades

263

6. Conversationwith Viktor SheinisandAlla Nazimova
In andAround the White House

267

V: Gettingthe NewsIn andOut

287

1. lain Elliot ThreeDaysin August: On-the-SpotImpressions

289

2. Interview with SergeiMedvedev Gettingthe News
on "Vremia"

301

3. Ann Cooper The ForeignPressandthe Coup

308

4. Interviewwith TatianaMalkina The August 19
PressConference

318

S. Interviewwith Valerii Kucher A RussianReporter
Remembersthe Coup

322

Chronologyof Eventsof August 19,20,21,1991

337

Indexof PersonalNames

367

List of Photographs

Erectinga barricadenearthe White House

Civilians rushto fonn a humanchainagainstapproachingtanks
on K.alinin Prospect

A civilian appealsto a soldiernearthe White House

Tankslined up on Kutuzov Prospect

Womenhaulingdebristo build a barricadeastanks approachthe
White House

A barricadedstreetnearthe White House,mid-afternoonon
August 19

Demonstratorsmarchingfrom ManezhSquareto the White
House

A civilian confrontsan officer in ManezhSquare

"Yeltsin HasCalledfor a GeneralStrike"

"Outlaw the CPSU!"and"Put the BolshevikPutschistson Trial!"

Peoplegatheredfor a rally by the Hotel Moskvain Manezh
Square

Protestleafletsat a metrostationon Kalinin Prospect

Peoplecarryingan enormoustricolor flag to the middayrally at
the White House

The Tuesdayrally, with the tricolor flag drapedoverthe White
Housebalcony

96
xi

xii

liST OF PHOTOGRAPHS

The crowd listeningto speechesat the Tuesdayrally

Childrenon a pro-Y eltsin tank nearthe White House

Defendersof the White Housesetup camp

Men guardingthe White HouseearlyTuesdayevening

A makeshiftmemorialon the spotwherea youngmanwas
killed in the early morningof August21

102

Threeyoungmenwho perishedat the barricades

103

A trolleybusdamagedby an armoredvehiclein the early
morningof August21

105

RevolutionSquare,Saratov:"Hangmanof Russia"

140

At the Mariinskii Palace,St. Petersburg:''No to RedFascism!"
"Join the Indefinite Political Strike!" "No to the CPSU
Dictatorship!"

150

Rally in PalaceSquare,August 19

152

Rally in PalaceSquare,August20

156

A soldierreadsYeltsin's appealto the armedforces

174

Defendersof the White House,Tuesdaynight

250

Preface

On August 19, 1991, eight high-rankingSoviet officials took over the
governmentof the USSR by force and proclaimed themselvesthe
country'snew rulets. Lessthan seventy-twohours later, their attempt
to seizepower had collapsed.Though short-lived,the coup produced
consequences
few could have foreseen.Soonafterward,the Communist Partythat had ruled Russiasince 1917was suspendedanddispossessed.Five monthsafter the coup,the SovietUnion itself had ceased
to exist.
The editorsof this volume had the good fortune to witnessat close
rangethe monumentaleventsthat shookRussiaand the world in August 1991. Ann Cooper, the National Public Radio bureauchief in
Moscow since 1986,was coveringa story in Vilnius, Lithuania, when
the coup began. By the end of the day she was back in Moscow.
Victoria E. Bonnell, a sociologist at the University of California,
Berkeley,and GregoryFreidin, a former Muscovitewho teachesRussianliteratureat StanfordUniversity, arrivedin Moscowon August 15
to do researchandvisit friends andfamily.
Experiencedthough we all were in observing and writing about
Sovietaffairs, we found ourselvesoverwhelmedandastonishedby the
tremendouspower of the events.With millions of othersin Moscow,
St. Petersburg,and throughoutthe Soviet Union and the world, we
watchedwith horror and fascinationas the junta soughtto turn back
the clock to a time--a mere six years earlier!-whena corrupt and
brutal Communistparty-statehadruledRussia.
Severalmonthsafter the event,the threeeditors reunitedin Berkeley, California. Despitethe time that had passed,we still felt the magnetismof the Augustdays, whendemocraticreformswere suddenlyin
xiii

xiv

PREFACE

jeopardy,andthe whole countryteeteredprecariouslyon the brink ofa
civil war.
To do honor to the eventsand their participantsand to preservethe
vibrancy of the moment,we decidedto put togetherthis collection of
eyewitnessaccountsof the three fateful daysin August. We wantedto
showthe eventsfrom a variety of pointsofview~ose foreignof the plotters,
the leadersof the democraticresistance,foreign and Russianjournalists, visiting emigresand scholars,military officers and ordinary citizens of diverse occupations.Our accountsconcentrateon Moscow,
wheremostof the key eventswereplayedout. St.Petersburg(then still
called Leningrad),the provincial city of Saratov,and the Tajik capital
of Dushanbeare representedas well. We have included some documents,suchas the major declarationsanddecreesissuedby the Emergency Committeeand by RussianPresidentBoris Yeltsin, to provide
the contextfor the Augustevents.
Above all, we have tried to give a senseof what it was like to be
there and to see with one's own eyes how the people of Russia,as
George Kennan put it, ''turned their back on the manner in which
they've beenruled-notjust in the Soviet period but in the centuries
before.... Even 1917 had nothing quite like this" (New York Times,
August24, 1991).

Acknowledgments

The editors would like to thank GeorgeBreslauer,who gave us the
idea for this volume. Gail Lapidusprovidedvaluableand timely support for the projectthroughthe Berkeley-StanfordProgramon Soviet
and Post-SovietStudies. Without researchassistance,the volume
would havebeenfar longerin the making.
When we beganwork on the volume, we placed a notice in the
newsletterof the AmericanAssociationfor the Advancementof Slavic
Studies inviting contributions. We received quite a number of responses,andsomeof themhavebeenincludedhere.We regretthat we
could not publish all of them, and we thank thosecontributorswhose
work did not fit the final format of the book. Dorothy Atkinson was
especiallyhelpful in alerting us to material and potential authorsfor
the volume.
The project benefitedgreatly from the assistanceof severalBerkeley graduatestudents.Specialthanksto Howard Allen, Jeffrey Rossman, and especially Veljko Vujacic. George Breslauer, Victor
Zaslavsky,and Veljko Vujacic gave us valuable commentsand suggestionson the introduction.We also appreciatethe help we received
from Donald J. Raleigh, David Hartsough,and Irina Mikhaleva and
MariannaFreidinain Moscow.
Most of the translationsfrom Russianthat appearin this volumeare
by GregoryFreidin. We havefound it necessary,in manyinstances,to
retranslatewell-known documentsand speechesbecauseof inadequacies in wire-serviceandnewspapertranslations.HowardAllen, Jeffrey
Rossman,andVeljko Vujacic alsocontributedto the translations.
At M.E. Sharpe,PatriciaKolb's enthusiasmfor the project gaveus
the burst of energy we neededto finish it. She provided excellent
xv

xvi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

assistance,and we thank her and her colleaguesfor bringing out the
book so expeditiously.Leona Schecteralso provided valuableadvice
alongthe way.
Some of the selectionsin this volume originally appearedelsewhere,mostly in Russiannewspapersandjournals.The editorswould
like to thankthesepublicationsfor permissionto reprint the following
articles:
Gregory Freidin, "To the Barricades:A Street-LevelView of Moscow, August
19," TheNewRepublic,September30,1991.
Vladimir Petrik, "Moscow'sM.V. KhrunichevMachine-BuildingFactoryReacts
to the AugustCoup,"Literatumaiagazeta,January1, 1992.
Nikolai Vorontsov, "Minutes of the Council of Ministers Meeting, August 19,
1991,"Komsomolskaiapravda,August24, 1991.
Interview with Yevgenii Shaposhnikov,"The Coup and the Armed Forces,"
Nezavisimaiagazeta,September12, 1991.
Interview with Anatolii Sobchak,"The Breakthrough:The Coup in St. Petersburg," MoscowNews,August26, 1991.
Interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, "Our Children Were on the Barricades,"
Ogonek,no. 36 (August31-September
7,1991).
Interview with Aleksandr Prokhanov, "Defenders of the White House,"
Komsomolskaiapravda,September3,1991.
Michael Hetzer,"Deathon the Streets,"Guardian,August23, 1991.
"A Man in the Crowd," Ogonek,no. 41 (October5-12, 1991).
lain Elliot, "Three Days in August: On-the-SpotImpressions,"RFEIRL Research
Institute,Reporton the USSR,vol. 3, no. 36 (September6, 1991).
Interview with TatianaMalkina, "The August 19 PressConference,"Ogonek,no.
41 (October5-12,1991).

Photo Credits
Cover illustration and photographson pages80, 87, 89,96,97,103, 174,and
250 courtesyof the PhotoGroupof the White House Defenders(PhotoArt,
Moscow).
Photographson pages73, 75, 76,82, 94, 99,102,and 105 by Gregory Freidin.
Photographs.on pages90, 91, 92, and 98 by Victoria E. Bonnell and Sandor
Szabo.
Photographon page140by DonaldJ. Raleigh.
Photographson pages150, 152, and 156 courtesyof Vladimir Zavorotnyi.

Note on Transliteration and
Interpolations

We follow the Library of Congresssystemfor transliteratingRussian
words into English, but have madesomeexceptionsin the interestof
readability. Throughout,we haveomittedsoft signs,andwe usea "Y"
to begin suchnamesas Yakovlev, Yevtushenko,and Yurii. More generally, we have adoptedthe New York Times usagefor well-known
names,titles, andplaces.
The readerwill also note that we have usedtwo different conventions for interpolationsinto the text. If the interpolationis by the author
or interviewee,it appearsin parentheses.
If it was madeby the editors
for the purposeof clarification or identification, it appearsin square
brackets.
The explanatoryfootnotesthat appearin the volume were supplied
by the editors.

xvii

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Guide to the Print Media

The following Russianmedia are mentionedin the book undertheir
Russiannames.Englishtranslationsof thesetitles areasfollows:
Periodicals

Argumentyifakty (ArgumentsandFacts)
Den (Day)
Izvestiia(Information)
Kommersant(Man of Commerce)
Kommunist(Communist)
Komsomolskaia
pravda(KomsomolTruth)
Kuranty(Chimes)
Literaturnaiagazeta(Literary Gazette)
LiteraturnaiaRossiia(Literary Russia)
Magnitogorskiirabochii (MagnitogorskWorker)
Moskovskiikomsomolets
(MoscowKomsomolMember)
Moskovskienovosti(MoscowNews)
Moskovskaiapravda(MoscowTruth)
Nevskoevremia(NevaTimes)
Nezavisimaiagazeta(IndependentGazette)
Obshchaiagazeta(JointGazette)
Ogonek(Flicker)
Pravda(Truth)
Rossiia(Russia)
Rossiiskaiagazeta(RussianGazette)
Rossiiskievesti(RussianNews)
Smena(New Generation)
Stolitsa(The Capital)
VechemiaiaMoskva(EveningMoscow)
xix

GUIDE TO THE PRINT MEDIA

NewsAgencies
TASS (TelegrafnoeagenstvoSovetskogoSoiuza): the official news
agencyof the SovietUnion
ITAR-TASS (InformatsionnoetelegrafnoeagenstvoRossii-TASS):
the Russianwire service-TASS
RIA (Rossisskoeinformatsionnoeagenstvo,or RussianInformation
Agency): the official newsagencyof the RSFSR
Novosti: semi-official newsagencyof the USSR
Interfax: an independentnewsagency
Postfactum:an independentnewsagency

RUSSIA
AT THE

BARRICADES

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VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN

Introduction

The eventsof August 1991 canbestbe understoodasa consequence
of
the reform programput into motion by Mikhail Gorbachevand his
closestallies, AleksandrYakovlev and EduardShevardnadze,
following Gorbachev'sappointmentas GeneralSecretaryof the Communist
Partyof the SovietUnion in March 1985.Recognizingthat the country
faced severeand intractableeconomicand social problemsthat had
long been neglected,Gorbachevand his team embarkedon a series
of fundamentalreforms of the Soviet system.In a December1988
meetingwith U.S. PresidentGeorgeBush, Gorbachevdescribedhis
intentions:
You'll see soon enoughthat I'm not doing this for show and I'm not
doing this to undermineyou or to surpriseyou or to take advantageof
you. I'm playing real politics. I'm doing this becauseI need to. I'm
doing this becausethere'sa revolution taking place in my country. I
startedit. And they all applaudedme when I startedit in 1986 andnow
they don't like it so much,but it's goingto be a revolution,nonetheless.
I

Expertsdisagreeas to how muchof Gorbachev'srevolutionaryprogramshouldbe attributedto his team'soriginal plansandhow muchto
the unanticipatedconsequences
of the initial reforms.2 But few would
denythatthe changesthat took placeweresignificantandfar-reaching.
The introduction of glasnosl--apolicy of increasingopennessin the
massmedi~irrevocably
November transformedthe political cultureof the country. Beginning in November1987, Gorbachevrelinquishedthe CommunistParty'smonopolyon truth. Encouragedfrom above,intellectuals
and political activists saw to it that a pluralism of ideas quickly re3

VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN

placed the Leninist idea of a single truth defined by a single party,
disseminatedby propagandists,
andbackedup by censorship.By 1990,
with the revision of Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which had
guaranteedthe CommunistParty's"leadingrole" in political andsocial
life, there was virtually no subjectthat could not be discussedopenly
in the mediaor otherpublic forums. Societywas now ableto challenge
the Party'spreeminenceon all fronts, and the Party, as was becoming
increasinglyclear,was notup to the challenge.
In the political sphere,the Gorbachevreformsled to a restructuring
-perestroika--ofthe systemof government,which since 1917 had
beenfirmly controlledby the CommunistParty.Representative
bodies,
from local sovietsto the SupremeSoviet of the USSR,were staffedin
single-candidateelectionsand functionedas rubberstampsfor decisions taken at the higher echelonsof the CommunistParty apparatus. Gorbachevrevampedthesepseudo-democratic
institutions.His
first major innovation was the creation of the USSR Congressof
People'sDeputiesas a national assemblythat would selectthe standing legislature----theSupremeSoviet-fromamongits members.Twothirds of the deputiesto the new Congresswere chosenin electionsin
the springof 1989,and-ina radicalbreakwith the Communistpastmany of these were free elections with competing candidates.The
remainderof the deputieswere selectedby so-called"public organizations," including suchstalwartsof the old regimeasthe "official" trade
unionsand,of course,the CommunistParty.(Gorbachevhimselfchose
to becomea deputynot by election,which he could easily havewon,
but throughthe CommunistParty quota-adecisionthat deprivedhim
of any popular mandate,with fateful consequences
for his future in
politics.) Similar legislativeinstitutionswerethencreatedat the republic level (electionsfor Russia'sCongressof People'sDeputies took
placein 1990), and, for the first time, genuineelectionsfor local sovietswereheld in cities throughoutthe country.
Though often dominatedby old-guard elements(including Party
bureaucrats,industrial managers,and military officers), the new
legislaturesprovideda powerful forum for discussionof a wide range
of political opinion. Most important,they madeit possiblefor democratic politicians, like Andrei Sakharovand Boris Yeltsin, to speak
directly to the Soviet public. Incessanttelevision coverageof parliamentarydebatesandpolitical commentarypracticallytook over the air
waves and the print media. The secretiveor largely ceremonialpoli-

INTRODUCTION 5

ticking of the Soviet era gaveway to full-blown political theater,open
to all. For a while it seemedthat the whole country was glued to
television sets,watchingthe thrust and parry betweenGorbachevand
Sakharovand clashesbetweenthe liberal deputiesof the Interregional
Group and the conservativesof the "Soiuz" (Union) faction. In the
process,the political horizons of the attentive public expandedso
much that what seemedonly yesterdaya daring political move appearedtoday as an exercisein timid half-measures--and
would be
seentomorrowasa betrayalof democracy.
The headyatmosphereof thosedayswas propitiousfor the creation
of voluntary associations,and they quickly proliferated during the
Gorbachevera,evolving into a multitudeof political partiesandmovementswith diverseaims. Theseopportunitiesfor openexpressionand
political involvementhelpedto draw peopleinto new forms of activism in the public sphere.At first encouraged,protected,indeednurturedby glasnostandperestroika,the new political activistseventually
beganto chafeunderthe restrictionsimplicit in thesepolicies.Little by
little, they distancedthemselvesfrom Gorbachev,whoseposition (or,
somewould say, convictions)did not allow him to stray too far from
the centerof the Sovietpolitical spectrum.
Nowherewas this processmore evidentthan in the Baltic republics,
wherethe first advocatesof glasnostand perestroikasoonemergedas
championsof national independence.In a matter of monthsafter the
first free elections, this phenomenonspreadthroughout the Soviet
Union, not excluding its heartland,the largestrepublic of them allthe RussianFederation.
At the republic level, the·new legislative bodies, in which former
dissidentssat side by side with old-style Soviet bosses,did not take
long to develop their own political dynamic. The "democrats,"who
were gaining in authority at the expenseof the Partybut still had little
power, andParty apparatchiks,who held on to the leversof powerbut
were losing their mantleof authority, found commongroundon issues
of nationalism-theideological heir of communismin the modem
world. Across the Soviet Union they formed powerful coalitions to
challengethe authorityof ''the center,"namely,the top Sovietpolitical
elite presidedover by Gorbachev.By the summerof 1991, many republics, acting through the newly electedlegislatures,had declared
their sovereignty.Among them was the RussianSoviet FederatedSocialist Republic,led by its newly electedPresident,Boris Yeltsin.

VICTORIA E. BONNEll AND GREGORYFREIDIN

For the first time sincethe revolution of 1917,the integrity of the
empirewas threatenedfrom within. Whetherthey soughtdisintegration or opposedit, most responsibleand foresighted politicians,
amongthem Gorbachevand Yeltsin, understoodthat the old Union
structurehadto be replacedby a new arrangementthat would transfer much of the center'spower to the republics.This becameespecially clear after Moscow's attempt to overthrow the nationalist
governmentin Lithuania in January1991 endedin bloodshedand
failure. In an effort to institutionalizethe new statusquo in relations
with the center, Gorbachevand the heads of nine republics (the
Baltic states,Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia did not participate)
drafted a new Union Treaty, initialed the final version of it, and
agreedto have it signedon August 20, 1991. It was to preventthis
from coming to passthat opponentsof changeattemptedtheir coup
d'etaton August 18.3
Another important aspectof perestroikawas the programof economic restructuring. Although the Gorbachevgovernmentfailed to
move decisively in the direction of a market economy,it did create
opportunities for certain types of private enterprise,known by the
catch-allterm kooperativy,or cooperatives.This easingof centralcontrols over economicactivity madeit possiblefor peopleto leave employment in the statesectorfor the first time sincethe 1920s,and by
August 1991, new groups of private entrepreneurshad proliferated
throughoutthe country.

***
It should not be surprising that the policies of glasnostand perestroika found someof their most ardentsupportersamong'urban,educated,"middle-class"citizens who appreciated-and
took advantage
of--the new opportunitiesfor individual and collective activity in the
economyand in politics. This group emergedas a critically important
new force in the countryduring the Gorbachevera.
At the sametime, three pillars of the old systemstill clung to the
resourcesand power, if not the authority, that they had enjoyed
throughoutthe Soviet era: the military-industrial complex, which included a large part of the heavy industrial sector of the command
economy;the all-pervasiveCommitteefor State Security, the KGB;
and above it all, the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union, or more

INTRODUCTION 7

preciselyits central apparatus,which controlledvirtually all top governmentappointmentsfrom the revolution of 1917 until August 1991.
Whetherfor lack of will or lack of power,out of tacticalconsiderations
or out of conviction, and most likely for all of thesereasonsat once,
Gorbachevdid not break with the CommunistParty. Yet his policies
continuouslyunderminedthe position and authority of the Party apparatusand fosteredthe emergenceof reform groupswithin the Party at
all levelsaswell asrival political movementsoutsidethe Party.
Until its suspensionon August 24, 1991,the CommunistParty was
the sole political organizationspanningthe entire SovietUnion. Using
the art of political maneuverof which he was a consummatepractitioner, Gorbachevtried to enlist the Partyin the causeof reform andto use
its organizationalresourcesasa counterweightto the centrifugalforces
that were pulling the country apart. This paradoxlies at the heart of
Gorbachev'sachievement,but it wasthe causeof his failure aswell. In
the yearprecedingthe coup, grassrootspolitical forcesthat Gorbachev
himselfhad helpedto unleashwere becomingincreasinglyradicalized
in frustration over the seeminglyslow pace of change.At the same
time, conservativeelementswithin the Party were stiffening their
resistanceto reform. To placatethem, Gorbachevretainedkey conservativefigures in his governmenteven as he was preparingto sign
the new Union Treaty that would have dealt a fatal blow to their
power.
As political forces polarized,Gorbachevmoved first in one direction and then the other. The result was that Gorbachevappearedtimid
and indecisive as he repeatedlydrew back from the bold strategies
proposedby someof his more radicaleconomicadvisers.At the top,
therewas a gradualattrition amongliberal politicians, including those
most intimately associatedwith the post-1985 reforms-Aleksandr
Yakovlev, EduardShevardnadze,
and Vadim Bakatin. ForeignMinister Shevardnadze's
resignationfrom his postdrew worldattention;yet
his dramatic warning of an impending coup d'etat-"Dictatorshipis
coming!"--spokenfrom the high rostrumof the Congressof People's
Deputiesin December1990, seemedto fall on deafears.Gorbachev's
apparentacquiescence
in the useof brute force to suppressthe nationalist movementsin the Baltic republics, and, especially,.the bloody
attack on Lithuania'sparliamentbuilding in January1991, cost him
support among the democratswhile not winning him many friends
amongthe conservatives,who hadgrown to mistrusthim personallyas

VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN

muchasthey mistrustedhis policy of reform.
In the monthsprecedingthe coup there were many signs that conservativeforces---acoalition of leading officials in the RSFSRCommunist Party and key membersof the KGB, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MVD), and the armed forces, along with some well-known
ultra-nationalistRussianwritersc-werecoalescingin oppositionto reformist policies.4
In mid-June,critics of perestroikain the governmentleadershipincluding future putschistsValentin Pavlov, Dmitrii Yazov, Boris
Pugo, and Vladimir Kriuchkov-attemptedto carry out a "constitutional coup d'etat"by expandingthe powersof PrimeMinister Pavlov,
an outspokenopponentof the new Union Treatywhich was thenbeing
negotiated.Their efforts failed.
On July 23, 1991, twelve Soviet leaders,including high-ranking
army officers, publisheda dramaticappealin the conservativenewspaper SovetskaiaRossiiawhich called on "citizens of the Soviet Union"
to resist the breakup of the country, allegedly being engineeredby
greedy capitalists, foreign-directedelements,and cunning apostates.
Hitherto suchchargespredictablyhad issuedfrom the lunatic fringe of
the conservativeopposition.Not so this time: the signatoriesincluded
suchpowerful figures as Colonel GeneralBoris Gromov, the Deputy
Minister oflnternalAffairs anda heroof the Afghan War. This appeal,
publishedunderthe title "A Word to the People,"prefiguredmany of
the argumentsput forward by the putschistsless than a month later.
With its specialreferenceto the role of the armedforces in preserving
"Holy Russia,"this statementbroughtinto the openthe possibility of a
military seizureof power.
Both former Foreign Minister Shevardnadzeand Aleksandr Yakovlev felt sufficiently alarmedby the courseof eventsto issue repeatedwarnings of an impending coup.sIn June 1991, Secretaryof
StateJamesBakerconveyedto Gorbachev,throughsecurechannels,a
reportthat Pavlov,Yazov, andKriuchkov were plotting his overthrow.
But Gorbachevrefusedto follow up theseand other alarm bells with
decisiveaction.6 In an interview conductedin August 1991, only a few
days after the attemptedcoup, Shevardnadze
was askedwhy Gorbachev
had failed to take action to preventa seizureof power by high-ranking
officials, mostof whomhe hadappointed.Shevardnadze
replied:
Most likely, he did not understand;probablyhe did not want to under-

INTRODUCTION 9

stand.Thereinlies the whole tragedy, thewhole trouble. This featureis
characteristicof many leaders.There are numerousexamplesthroughout history where a persondoesnot want to believethat terrible things
are going on. In my opinion, this is what happenedwith Mikhail
Sergeevich.And this grievesme tremendously.It has cost the country
dearly?

The immediatecircumstancethatprecipitatedthe coupwasthe signing ceremonyfor the new Union Treaty, scheduledfor August 20.
The treaty would have grantedsupremacyto the laws of the republics in many areasand permanentlycurtailedthe power of the central
government-andwith it, Communist Party rule. Conservatives,
among others, were especially indignant when Gorbachevdid not
make public the text of the new Union Treaty. Even cabinetministers had no accessto the text until a draft versionfell into the hands
of the editors of MoscowNews,who publishedit a few days before
the coup.8 There was also suspicion that Gorbachevmay have
struck a secretdeal with the G7 leaderswith whom he had met in
London in July, leaving Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov out of the
negotiations.9
Although the impendingUnion Treaty was the galvanizing event,
there were other factors that arousedthe plotters to action.lO
Gorbachev'sskill at maneuveringbetweenthe oppositeends of the
political spectrumhadbeenmakingconservativesseasickfor a number
of years.From their point of view, the worst turn had come in April
1991. From September1990 to April 1991 it had seemedthat
Gorbachevhad thrown in his lot with the old guard. How outraged
they musthavebeenwhen Gorbachevsuddenlystruckan alliancewith
Boris Yeltsin (who had publicly resignedfrom the CommunistParty
the previousJuly) andembraceda numberof importanteconomicand
political reforms in the monthsprecedingthe coup. One item high on
the conservatives'bill of particularswas Yeltsin's ban on the workplaceactivities of political partiesin the RussianFederation,issuedon
July 20, not long after his election as Presidentof Russia. Clearly
directed againstthe CommunistParty, since it spelledan end to the
Party'sgrassrootsystemof control, the bancausedgreatconsternation
amongconservatives.Worse yet, their failure to force Yeltsin to rescind this decreedemonstratedunmistakablythat the Party, the erstwhile colossus,hadlost its iron grip.

VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFRElDIN

All of thesedevelopments,moreover,took place againstthe background of a deterioratingeconomicsituation. By mid-summer,there
were strongindicationsof impendingshortagesof fuel andfood, asthe
commandsystemcollapsedand republics and even localities set up
protectionistbarriersto guardlocal supplies.
Feelingincreasinglyirrelevant,afraidthat Gorbachev'snext maneuver would throw them overboard,the plotters resolvedto take action.
The decisivemeetingof the conspiratorstook placeon August 16 at a
KGB resorton the outskirtsof Moscow.1 1

***
When the coup beganon Sunday,August 18, 1991,Gorbachevwas
vacationingwith his family in Foros, on the Crimeanpeninsula.The
plotters' first act was to send a delegationto Foros--ledby Valerii
Boldin, the President'sChief of Staff, along with Yurii Plekhanov,
Chief of the Security Directorateof the KGB---to seek Gorbachev's
own sanctionfor the takeover. Some of the plotters, it appears,believed that, although he might offer resistanceat first, Gorbachev
would in the end cooperatewith them by declaring a state of emergencyin the country. After all, he hadyieldedto pressurefrom conservativesin the past.Gorbachev,however,refusedto play any part in the
scheme,calling the instigators"adventurists"and using (in the words
of one of the plotters) other "non-parliamentaryexpressions."Held
under house arrest and with no means of communicationwith the
outside world, Gorbachevand his family would remain in complete
isolation, unsure of their fate, until the afternoon of Wednesday,
August21.
Gorbachev'srefusal to play along with their plans disorientedthe
conspirators,but they decidedto proceedwith the takeover,in the hope
that the countrywould welcometheir move asheraldinga respitefrom
disruptivechangeandmountingdisorder.

***
In the early morning of Monday, August 19, troopswere mobilized
in the vicinity of Moscow and large numbersof tanks and armored
personnelcarriers(APCs) beganmoving towardthe city. Beginningat
6:00 A.M. Moscow time, the country awoke to television and radio
broadcastsannouncingthe formation of the State Committeefor the

INTRODUCTION J J

Stateof Emergency.12Thejunta consistedof eight men, sevenof them
high-ranking membersof the governmentand all of them identified
with the top echelon of the party-state: Vice PresidentGennadii
Yanaev; KGB chief Vladimir Kriuchkov; DefenseMinister Dmitrii
Yazov; Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo; Prime Minister
Valentin Pavlov; Oleg Baklanov, First Deputy Chairmanof the National DefenseCouncil and leaderof the military-industrial complex;
Vasilii Starodubtsev,Chairmanof the Peasants'Union; andAleksandr
Tiziakov, Presidentof the Associationof StateEnterprisesand Industrial Groupsin Production,Construction,Transportation,andCommunicationsandmemberof the Council of Ministers.
The Committee'sfirst public statementsannouncedthe imposition
of a state of emergencyin the country to rescue"our great Motherland" from the "mortal danger"that loomedover it. The form as much
as the contentof thesestatementsindicatedclearly that theEmergency
Committeewished to turn back the clock to an earlier era, to restore
the law and order once commandedby an all-powerful Communist
Party,andto preservethe SovietUnion as a unitary state.
Yet it wasalsoobviousthat the conspiratorswantedto give a constitutional gloss to their actions,for the benefit of the Soviet population
asmuchasthe restof the world. Although in clearviolation of the Law
on the Stateof Emergency,13they claimedto be acting in accordance
with certain articles of the USSR Constitution(adoptedin 1977, but
much amendedsince 1988). Article 127(7) of the Constitution provided for a transferof power to the Vice Presidentof the USSRif the
Presidentwas for any reason''unableto continue to executehis duties." (Throughoutthe coup,the Committeewould maintainthe pretext
that Gorbachevwas incapacitatedby healthproblems.)Ironically, this
effort to formulate a constitutional justification for the seizure of
power suggeststhat, as one commentatorobserved,''the reform process begun by Gorbachevha[d] been effective in introducing some
semblanceof the rule oflaw in the USSR."14
By mid-morningon Monday,large numbersof tanksandAPCs and
truckloadsof soldiers had begunto enter the city of Moscow. Later
that day, both Moscow and Leningrad (now St. Petersburg)were
placedundermartial law. Although martial law was not formally imposedin the Baltic republics,troopsbeganmoving there,too, and the
commanderof the Baltic Military District declaredthat he was assuming control of the region.IS

VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDlN

Popularresistanceto the takeoverdid not appearimmediately.The
galvanizingforce was Boris Yeltsin, the newly electedPresidentof the
RussianFederation.On Mondaymorning Yeltsin issuedan "Appeal to
the Citizensof Russia,"denouncingthe takeoveras illegal and calling
for popular resistance,including a generalstrike. At midday Yeltsin
mounted a tank near the building known as the White House (the
Houseof Soviets,which housedthe Russiangovernment)andmadean
appealto soldiersand officers, exhortingthem to give their allegiance
to the governmentof the RussianFederation.
In the late afternoon,at around5:00 P.M. the EmergencyCommittee
held a televised pressconference,open to Soviet and foreign press.
Speakingin a booming,authoritativevoice, but with his handsvisibly
trembling, Vice PresidentYanaev,ostensiblythe leaderof the coup,
offered the junta's casefor the takeover.Without producinganyevidence for his assertion,Yanaev repeatedlydeclaredthat Gorbachev
wasill andwould eventually,Yanaevhoped,resumehis duties.
That sameevening,in one of thoseodd twists that aboundedduring
the coup, the image of Yeltsin on a tank, capturedby a CNN camera,
was beamedto millions of Soviet viewerson the newsprogram"Vremia." This icon of defiancewas part of a remarkablefive-minute segment on "Vremia" aboutthe appearanceof a democraticresistanceto
the coup in the country'scapital. Put togetherby televisionjournalist
SergeiMedvedev,the short segmentconveyeda vast amountof information: the tanks rolling down the streetsof Moscow, Yeltsin's "Appeal to the Citizens of Russia," the building of barricades,and the
massingof peopledeterminedto defendthe White Housefrom attack.
Medvedev'sreporton the eveningnews,following a tapedrebroadcast
of the EmergencyCommittee'spressconference,helped to turn the
tide againstthe coupd'etat.16
November
As motorizedarmor convergedon the streetsof Moscow~ver
six
hundredpieces,not countingthe trucks carrying soldiersin full battle
gear--peoplebeganerecting barricades,some in Manezh Square(a
largeplazanearRed Squarewherebig rallies areheld) andmanymore
outsidethe White House.In somecases,peoplestoppedthe movement
of tanksandAPCsby forming a humanchain.
Many amongthe first barricade-buildersunderstoodthat the putschists were using a tried-and-trueSoviet technique,one that had been
usedsuccessfullyall over EasternEuropein the yearsafter World War
II: while tanks surroundthe governmentheadquarters,a junta offers

INTRODUCTION J3

the alternative of "national salvation" through Party-imposedorder.
Most recentlythe scenariohadbeenemployedin Vilnius, Lithuania,in
January1991. This time, however--unlikeHungaryin 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Polandin 1981, where coups d'etat had been
carried out under the cover of the Cold War and with totalitarian
controls--Lithuaniastoodfirm. Indeed,the Lithuaniansenjoyedbroad
andvocal public supportamongRussia'sintelligentsiaand democratic
politicians, and the "Committeefor National Salvation" failed to take
power.
Thanksto the Vilnius example,and to SergeiMedvedev'sbrief but
incisive "Vremia" report about the barricade-buildingin Moscow,
Russiancitizens knew what they had to do: defendthe White House,
the seat of their freely elected government.That the putschistsexpectedto succeedin Moscow (where closeto 80 percenthad voted to
elect Yeltsin President)17with a plan that had not worked in Vilnius
speaksvolumes about the plotters' generalcompetence,political imagination,andhorizons.
A major changein the alignment of forces occurred as early as
10:00 P.M. on Monday night, when several tanks from the Taman
Division, stationedin the vicinity of the White House,declaredtheir
loyalty to Russiaand moved to defendthe building, cheeredon by a
large crowd that hadbeengatheringsincethe early afternoon.An hour
later, eight armoredscoutvehiclesflying the Russiantricolor arrivedto
protectthe White House;they were led by Major GeneralAleksandr
Lebed, under orders from the commanderof the airborne paratroop
forces, Colonel GeneralPavel Grachev.18 Thesewere the first indications of divided loyaltieswithin the military.
Meanwhile, in Leningrad,Mayor Anatolii Sobchakhad hastily returnedfrom Moscow to take chargeof the democraticresistance.One
of his first acts was to reachan agreementwith local military officers
to keep tanks and"APCs out of the city. In the eveninghe delivereda
rousing televisedspeech,calling for resistanceand urging people to
attenda protestrally the following day. From that time on, the Leningradtelevisionstationtransmittedinformation in supportof the democratic resistance.
On August 20, the secondday of the coup, large rallies were held in
LeningradandMoscow.The Leningradrally, attendedby an estimated
130,000to 300,000people,took placein PalaceSquare.The Moscow
rally, variously estimatedat 70,000 to 150,000 people, was held at

VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN

noon in front of the White House.19 Yeltsin and other major political
figures from the democraticresistanceaddressed
the Moscowrally and
appealedto citizens to defendthe White Houseagainstan imminent
military attack.2oAs many as 70,000 people-amongthem students
andyoungpeople,middle-classMuscovitesin their thirties andforties,
and a large contingent of veteransof the war in Afghanistan--respondedto Yeltsin's call. They streamedto the White House and,
despitethe curfew declaredby the Military Commandantof Moscow,
they stayedtherethroughthe night, forming self-defenseunits.
An attack on the White House was expectedin the early hours of
Wednesdaymorning. Shortly after midnight, shotsrang out abouthalf
a mile away: a column of APCs had found itself trappedby the barricadesblocking an underpassa couple of blocks from the U.S. Embassy.As the APCs tried to ram througha row of trolleycars,a melee
ensuedin which three young men died defendingthe barricade.This
incident notwithstanding,evidenceindicates that there was no concertedattackmountedon the seatof Russia'sgovernment,althoughan
attack-abrutal one----hadbeenplannedand ordered.Soonafterward,
tanks and APCs beganto departfrom the city. At 9:25 A.M., Marshal
Yazov, one of the plotters,resignedhis post, and the coup leadership,
or what remainedof it, rapidly collapsed.
On Wednesdaymorning an emergencysessionof the SupremeSoviet of Russiaconvenedat the White House.A high-level delegation
from the Russiangovernmentwas dispatchedto the Crimeato rescue
Gorbachevand his family, who would return to Moscow shortly after
midnight. Meanwhile,mostof the plotterswerearrested.
The following day, Thursday,August 22, was officially proclaimed
the Day of Freedom.Bannednewspapersbeganto publish again, and
televisionandradio programsresumedtheir regularschedules.Yeltsin
madean appearancebefore the Russianparliamentwhere he thanked
Muscovitesfor havingdefendedthe White Houseso courageously.
At noon, tens of thousandsof Muscovites gatheredat the White
Housefor a victory rally and a marchto Red Square.The speechesby
Yeltsin, Ivan Silaevof the RussianCouncil of Ministers,RussianVice
PresidentAleksandr Rutskoi, AleksandrYakovlev, Eduard Shevardnadze,andotherleadingfigures in the democraticmovementattributed
the victory over the junta to the "peopleof Moscow," who heroically
mobilized to defendfreedomagainst''totalitarianism.''The potentadmixture of local patriotismandRussiannationalismbroughtthe crowd

INTRODUCTION J5

to a frenzy of delight, with much flag waving and cheering. The
speechescontinuedwhen the crowds reachedRed Square,but Gorbachevwas conspicuously
absent.
The symbols of victory were everywhere.Many people carried
small tricolor flags which hadbecomethe symbol of democraticRussia. Later that day, the tricolor was madethe official flag of the Russian Republic. The squareadjoining the White House was renamed
FreedomSquare.
On Thursdayeveninga massivedisplay of fireworks had beenarrangedto mark the culminationof the day's events.Perhapsthe organizers of the festivities conceivedof victory day as a Russianversion
of the Fourth of July or Bastille Day. But these were not the only
fIreworks. In Dzerzhinskii Square----namedfor the head of the infamous revolutionary-eraCheka, precursor of the KGB--an angry
crowd had gatheredin the late afternoon.Somecalled for an attackon
the KGB building, the Lubianka. It was the fIrst time in four daysthat
popularindignationappearedreadyto spill over into spontaneousviolence. Soon a delegationcame from the White House to calm the
crowd and dissuadethem from rashactions.Somehourslater, a mammoth yellow crane,bearingthe logo "Krupp," arrivedin the squareand
begandismantlingthe imposing statueof "Iron Feliks" Dzerzhinskii
which stoodon a tall pedestalin the centerof the square.
Gorbachevconducteda pressconferenceon Thursdayevening,his
first extendedappearancesincethe conspiracyhad begun.Many were
surprisedthat the Presidenthad chosenas his fIrst audiencethe press
corpsandnot the Sovietpublic at large or thepeopleof Moscow, who
had risked their lives to, among other things, securehis freedom. At
the pressconference,Gorbachevappearedshakenby the events,even
contrite, yet still unable to grasp (as his critics put it) that he had
returnedto a different country. In responseto a question about the
possible complicity of the CPSU leadershipin the attemptedcoup
d'etat, Gorbachevequivocated.The impressionwas further amplifIed
when, in responseto anotherquestion,Gorbachevlaunchedinto his
all-too-familiar defenseof the "socialist idea." Still the GeneralSecretary of the CPSU,he failed to takeadvantageof what was,perhaps,the
last opportunityto dissociatehimselfpublicly from a party whoseleadershiphadbetrayedhim andthe countryby remainingsilent during the
coup.
The action on Friday, August 23, took place in the sphereof high

VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFRElDIN

politics and on television rather than on the streets.For the first time
sinceMonday, Muscovitesbecamespectatorsratherthan actorsas the
drama of retribution went forward in the chambersof the Russian
parliament.GorbachevandYeltsin playedthe leadingroles that day as
they camefaceto face for the first time sincethe crisis began.
Standinglike a deposedleaderbefore an angry crowd, Gorbachev
was heckled, criticized, interrogated,and disgracedby Yeltsin and
otherdeputies.After Gorbachevfinished his address,expressinggratitude to the "Russians" for their role in defeating the plot, Yeltsin
walked up to him and insisted that Gorbachevnow read aloud the
minutes of a meetingof the USSR Council of Ministers held on the
first day of the coup, in which Gorbachev'sown cabinetbetrayedhim.
Gorbachevhesitatedbecausethe authenticityand accuracyof the minutes had not beenestablished,but Yeltsin went on bUllying him, and
Gorbachevsubmitted, reading what turned out to be an inaccurate
transcript.ThenGorbachevtook questionsfrom the deputies.
From time to time, Yeltsin interruptedthe proceedings,declaring
with a broad grin that "in order to relieve accumulatedtension" he
would now sign a decreewith far-reachingimplications for the future
of the country. In this way he madepublic decreesorderingthe Communist Party to ceaseactivities in the armed forces serving on the
territory of the RSFSR;suspendingpublicationof newspapersthat had
~th
the junta; confiscatingCommunistParty publishing
cooperated
November
houses and printing plants and placing them under the Russian
government'scontrol; and sealing the headquartersof the Central
Committeeandsuspendingthe activitiesof the CommunistPartyin the
RussianRepublic, pendingan investigationinto its role in the coup.
This last movehadmomentousconsequences,
for it signaledthe endof
the Party'slegal existencein Russia.
On Saturdaymorning,a massivefuneral was held for the threemen
who had died at the barricadesearly Wednesdaymorning. A crowd of
tens of thousandsof people gatheredin Manezh Square to hear
speechesmadeby major political figures, including Gorbachev.Somber and emotional, Gorbachevpaid tribute to the three men and announcedthat he had signeda decreeposthumouslyawardingthemthe
title of Hero of the SovietUnion. The crowd thenproceededto Kalinin
Prospectand on to the White House,pausingto hearYeltsin's funeral
oration,perhapsthe mostpowerful speechof his public career.Marching in the funeral processionwere Afghan War veterans,RussianOr-

INTRODUCTION 17

thodox priests,rabbis, colorfully bedeckedCossacks,and, of course,
defendersof the White Housecarrying a large tricolor flag. Later that
day, Gorbachevresignedas GeneralSecretaryof the CommunistParty
of the Soviet Union and suspendedthe Party'sactivities, extendingto
the entirecountryY eltsin's decreebanningthe Partyon the territory of
the RussianRepublic.

***
How can we accountfor the rapid and ignominious defeat of the
"gang of eight"? Among the important factors were the ineptitudeof
the plotters,the generaldecrepitudeof the centralizedsystemof control, and, perhapsmost critical at that moment, the Emergency
Committee'sinability to commandauthority among the top brassin
the military and the KGB. Their ordersto arrestYeltsin and other key
political figures were disobeyed(in fact, only four people were arrestedduring the coup, all of them People'sDeputies).The conspirators then failed to cut off communicationswith the White Houseeven
21
after it becamethe headquarters
of the resistance.
The spokesmenof the EmergencyCommitteedid not make a convincing case for themselvesat their one and only press conference,
wherethey were openly ridiculed by membersof the Sovietpress---all
of this broadcastlive for the benefit of the entire country. More surprising is the fact that they could not even control the contentof the
one and only television news program,"Vremia," or the government
newspaperIzvestiia.22
When rumors of a coup had circulatedsome months earlier, Gorbachevreportedlydismissedthe possibility on the groundsthat people
like Yanaev were incapable of mastermindinga takeover. He was
wrong about that, but the plot did in fact unfold like a comedy of
errors. By the time it was over, two of the conspiratorshad landedin
the hospital(pavlov andYazov); one had committed suicide(PugO);23
andanotherlay unconsciousin an alcoholicstupor(Yanaev).
But ineptnessdoesnot precludebrutality and may evenfacilitate it.
A few daysbeforethe coup began,the plottershadplacedan orderfor
250,000handcuffs,and the Moscow police commandanthad 300,000
arrest forms printed in advance.The plotters prepareda list of sixtynine people, most of them public figures, who were to be arrested.
Someof the men involved in the coupgaveordersto arrestYeltsin and

VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFRElDIN

shootcivilians at the White House.Theseorderswere not obeyed,as
we know now, becausecommanderssuchas Colonel GeneralGrachev
(subsequentlyappointedRussia'sMinister of Defense),Major General
Lebed (subsequentlythe Commanderof the FourteenthArmy), and
Major General Viktor Karpukhin (at the time, Commanderof the
KGB's anti-terrorist "Alpha" brigade, and under pressurefrom his
subordinates)refusedto shedthe blood of their compatriots.
The internal securityforcesprovidea particularlytelling exampleof
the plotters' failure to mobilize key segmentsof the military behind
their effort. Moscowpolicemenprovidedthe nucleusofYeltsin'ssecurity forces during the coup. The staff and cadetsat the RiazanHigher
Police Academyand a Moscow platoonof the elite SpecializedDesignation Police Detachment~own November
by the RussianacronymOMONthrewtheir supportbehindYeltsin.
Even more critical for the defeatof the putschwas the equivocation and noncooperationwithin the KGB. An interview with Major
General Karpukhin later disclosedthe extent of insubordination.According to Karpukhin, he fIrst disobeyedorders on the morning of
August 19 when he was instructedto arrestYeltsin at his countly house.
Although he was in a position to make the arrest ("My vehicles were
stakedout aroundthe entire settlement.All roads were blocked . . ."),
KarpukhinnonethelessallowedYeltsin to depart.
On the evening of August 19, Karpukhin participatedin a secret
meetingof commandingofficers at the USSRMinistry of Defense.At
that point, Karpukhin hadoperationalcommandover elite forcesnumberingabout 15,000men.He describedthe plan of attackas follows:
At 3:00 A.M. the OMON divisions would clear the square[aroundthe
White House] and dispersethe crowd with gasand watercannons.Our
divisions were to follow them. On the ground and from the air, using
helicopterswith grenadelaunchersand other special equipment,we
would takethe building.
My boys were practically invulnerable.All this would have lasted
fifteen minutes. Everything dependedon me in this situation. Thank
God, I did not lift a hand. Had there beena battle, there would have
beena bloody mess.I refused.24

Karpukhin was not aloneamongtop KGB officers who resistedthe
plan for attack. Other Alpha commanderssharedKarpukhin's view
that the White House could easily be seized,but only at the cost of

INTRODUCTION 19

many casualtiesamongthe defenders.To be sure, someKGB officers
were initially attractedby the putschists'appeal.But by Monday evening, following the press conferenceof the EmergencyCommittee,
they concluded(in the words of a KGB major general)that "this was a
simple adventure,and the perplexing questions[about Gorbachev's
health] multiplied."2s A numberof themviewedthe coup as "unlawful
andunconstitutional."26
Insubordinationin the police,the army, andthe KGB, andespeciallyin
the elite units, preventedthe putschistsfrom canyingout their plans,21
The numberof Muscoviteswho participatedpublicly in some aspect of the popular resistanceduring the three days of the coup has
beenestimatedat as many as 500,000(many more joinedthe victory
rally on Thursdayand the funeral on Saturday).Even this high figure
representsonly a small proportionof the city's total popUlationof eight
or nine million.
Yet, within hoursof the coup d'etat, thejunta'sctuim to governhad
beenreducedto one issue:who would control the White House?In this
context, a relatively small number of people---butenough to fill to
overflowing the vast spacearoundthe structure----madea tremendous
difference. They stoppedthe movementof tanks with barricadesand
with their own bodies. They fraternized with soldiers and officers.
They protestedin the Tuesdaymassrally. They organizedself-defense
units aroundthe White Houseon MondayandTuesdaynights.
By these acts, ordinary people helped to demoralizesoldiers and
their officers andto dissuadethemfrom carryingout thejunta'sorders.
The attackon the White Houseorderedby the EmergencyCommittee
nevertook place.Justas in the FebruaryRevolutionof 1917,whenthe
defectionof the Cossackssealedthe fate of the "old regime," so in this
casedefectionsamongarmy, police, and KGB officers preventedthe
junta----ilie last holdover of the Communistold regime-fromimposing its will on the country.
Although evidenceon the situation in the provinces during these
events is incomplete, we know that local governmentssupported
Yeltsin in a number of key cities in the RussianRepublic including
Sverdlovsk, Voronezh, Khabarovsk, Tula, Novosibirsk, Rostov on
Don, Arkhangelsk,and Yaroslavl. The fact is that oppositionwas considerable--enough
to preventthe tanks from evenenteringLeningrad
andto sendsignalsto the plottersthat compliancethroughoutthe country could not easilybe achieved.

VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN

The precedingyears of glasnost and perestroika,with unprecedentedopportunitiesfor public activism, had preparedthe ground for
resistanceto the coup. First, there was no longer only one centerof
power and authority in the country. Apart from the central statestructure -the governmentof the USSR-therewas now an electedgovernment of the Russian Federation,and other republic-level
governmentsaswell. The governmentof Russiahadbecomeidentified
with the new social forces in the country struggling to liberate themselvesfrom the Communistsystem.It stoodfor constitutionalismand
democracy,headedas it was by a Presidentchosenin an open and
competitive election (the only Soviet leader on Russianterritory to
governby a truly popularmandate).Thejunta, by contrast,was identified with the old regimeseekingto perpetuatethe hegemony,if not of
communism,then of its self-selectingpolitical elite, the Communist
Partynomenklatura.
The August Revolutionprovideda major test of popularallegiance
in Russia:would the people,including the officers and soldiersof the
armed forces, side with Russiaagainstthe central authoritiesof the
Sovietparty-state?A potentmixture of democraticsentiments,Russian
nationalism,and hatredfor the CommunistParty drove thousandsof
peopleinto the resistancemovementagainstthe junta. In the words of
a Leningradprotester,people "knew what could happen,they knew
what this might leadto. They felt that they werepeople,humanbeings.
They hadstoppedbeingafraid."28

***
It is surely one of history'S great paradoxesthat the August 1991
coup producedresultsdiametricallyopposedto the aims of the putschists. The coup was intendedto prevent the signing of a new Union
Treaty and decentralizationof the Soviet Union. But in the aftermath
of the coup, negotiationsover the treaty faltered and, barely four
monthslater,the USSRhadceasedto exist.
The plotters, all of them high-ranking Communist officials, also
soughtto preservethe Party'suniquepositionin the country'spolitical
and economiclife. Their ill-conceived and poorly executedplan had
precisely the oppositeeffect. The most immediateconsequencewas
the dissolution of the Communist Party, whose activities were sus-

INTRODUCTION 21

pendedin the RussianRepublic on August 23 and in the entire Soviet
Union on August 24. Though Party officials and organizationsremainedimportant actorsin the monthsand years following the coup,
the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union-thecountry'sruling party
for morethan sevendecades---ceased
to exit.
The coup was led by peoplewho had come to opposemany of the
political, economic,and cultural reforms inauguratedby Gorbachev.
Again paradoxically,whenthe coup failed, it elevatedoneofthe boldest and most outspokenof the reformers,Boris Yeltsin, to an unprecedentedposition of powerand authority. He emergedas the hero of the
August crisis-the David who smote the Communist Party Goliath
once and for all. In the months following the coup, Y dtsin carried
forward with renewedvigor many of the reformsthat hadbeenstalled
under Gorbachev'sequivocatingleadership.The progressof these
reforms has been far from easy, and Yeltsin's own popularity has
sometimesplungedvery low. Nevertheless,when a legitimation crisis
was precipitatedin the spring of 1993 by the conservativeopposition
in Russia'sCongressof People'sDeputies, Yeltsin and his reform
strategy once again won substantialpopular support in a national
referendum.
The seven surviving membersof the EmergencyCommittee, togetherwith five other high-ranking officials consideredcomplicit in
the Committee'sactions,were arrestedand imprisonedfollowing the
abortivecoup.29They were chargedwith "betrayingthe Motherland,"
a crime punishableby death. After remaining in jail for eighteen
months,they werereleasedon bail. Sincethat time, manyof themhave
given interviews,addressedpublic gatherings,andparticipatedin public rallies, including a May Day demonstrationin 1993 that endedin a
bloody confrontationwith police. Meanwhile,the prosecutionprepared
a caseagainstthem.
After somedelays,the trial finally beganon April 14, 1993,but was
suspendedalmostimmediatelywhen one of the defendants(Tiziakov)
suddenlybecameill. The defenseteam raiseda numberof objections
to continuation of the trial and sought dismissal of the charges.It
argued that the court had no jurisdiction to try the defendantson
chargesof betrayinga country(the SovietUnion) that no longerexists.
The court rejectedthesearguments.
On May 18, 1993, the three military judges hearing the case accepteda defensemotion to suspendthe proceedingsindefinitely. The

VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN

court hadbeenpersuadedby defenseargumentsaboutthe allegedbias
of the prosecutionteam,citing the fact that Russia'sChiefProsecutor,
Valentin Stepankov,and his deputy, Yevgenii Lisov, had used the
materials from the pretrial investigation in their book The Kremlin
Conspiracy,publishedin late 1992.30 Since the authorsof the book
were unequivocalin their indictmentof the allegedconspirators(went
the argumentof the defense),and the prosecutionteam was subordinate to the country'sChief Prosecutor,its memberscould not be impartial in presentingto the court the resultsof their investigation.The
judgesreferredthe caseto the SupremeSovietto determinehow "real
31 The
independence"of the prosecutionteam could be guaranteed.
SupremeSoviet subsequentlyrejectedthe appealas unfoundedand
the trial resumedyet again on July 7, 1993, only to be postponed
32 In September1993,
due to the illness of one of the codefendants.
the court ruled againsta motion for postponementby the prosecution and therebyremovedthe last proceduralhurdle to the resumption of the trial.
Popularattitudestoward the caseare deeplydivided, mirroring different retrospectiveevaluationsof the coup itself. For some,the three
daysin Augustremaininscribedas a courageousvictory for the forces
of democracyandreform. For others,the takeoverwasa well-meaning
but bungledeffort to rescuethe Soviet Union from chaosand disintegration. Still othersview the eventsof August 1991 as signifying little
more than a shift in power from one segmentof the nomenklaturato
another.A public opinion poll conductedin August 1993 showedthe
generalpublic to be deeplydivided aboutthe coup andthe criminality
of the plotters. A survey of 1,600 peopleconductedby the "Mnenie"
opinion researchservice disclosedthat 48 percentthought the coup
plotters should get "no punishment"or be formally pardoned(in the
fall of 1991, only 30 percent hadfelt that way). The proportion of
those who believedtheir lives would have beenbetter had the coup
succeededrose from 4 percent in the fall of 1991 to 14 percent in
August 1993.33
Given suchambivalentpopularattitudesaboutthe eventsof August
1991,it is hardly surprisingthat the first two anniversariesof the coup
were commemoratedin a low key. The celebrationhas been deeply
compromisedby an inversion of some of the symbols of the democratic resistanceto the August coup. The White Houseand the plaza
behind it, renamedFreedomSquare,were once symbolically associ-

INTRODUCTION 23

atedwith Yeltsin, the Russianparliament'sresistanceto the putschists,
and the crowds of Muscovites who turned out to defend freedom
against resurgenttotalitarianism. BetweenAugust 1991 and August
1993,thosesymbols----theWhite House,FreedomSquare,andthe Russian parliament itself--becametransformedinto their opposites
through associationwith the anti-Yeltsin opposition in the Supreme
Soviet and its motley collection of supporters,including ultranationalists, pro-Communists,neo-Stalinists,neo-Nazis,anti-Semites,and others. The dismal economic conditions and political disarray at the
highestlevels of the Russiangovernmentput a further damperon the
celebrationof a victory that promisedfar more than it hasdeliveredto
ordinarypeople.
On the first anniversaryof the putsch, Yeltsin delivered a major
addressto the nation praising those who, a year earlier, had been
"motivatedby a noble patriotic impulsefrom the heartand by a sense
of civic duty to defendfreedomand democracy."He castigatedthose
who wantedto "erase[this heroic deed]from the people'smemory."34
Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popovmarkedthe first anniversarywith an
extensiveand highly reflective statementaboutthe coup and its aftermath. Popovarguedthat the democrats'"main mistake[was] that they
imagined they had taken power in Russia after the coup. Unfortunately, the people believed this, too." Instead, argued Popov, the
democrats'victory "finally forcedthe reformistPartyapparatchiksand
nomenklaturato do what they had not done [under Gorbachev}-tl:.
organizethemselves,unite, cleansethemselvesof ideologicalgarbage,
remove the conservativesand start making reforms." Reforms were
under way, but there was still much work to be done to strengthen
democraticprinciples.3s
By August 1993, nearly all vestigesof the celebratoryaspectof the
anniversaryhad beenextinguished.An angry confrontationof groups
demonstratingfor and againstthe putschiststook placenearthe White
House, with strong overtonesof latent violence. The once hallowed
ground near the White House,stainedby the blood of three victims,
had becomeidentified with a coalition of forces calling for the ouster
of Yeltsin andthe refonD.ersandadvocatingsomeof the very measures
that the plotters had tried to imposeon the country. The anniversary
had been transformedinto another contestedsymbolic terrain for
Russia'spolitical leadersandthe public.
In early October1993,the contestescalatedinto an armedconflict,

VICTORIA E. BONNEll AND GREGORYFREIDIN

with the White Houseonceagainbecomingthe focal point of Russia's
post-communistpolitics. In reactionto Yeltsin's September21 decree
disbandingthe parliamentand calling a new election for December,
Ruslan Khasbulatov and other parliamentaryleaders, the renegade
Vice PresidentAleksandrRutskoi, and severalthousandsof their supporters mountedan armed uprising, including lethal assaultson the
nearbyMoscow Mayor's office and the Gosteleradiobuilding at Ostankino. This bloody outburstforced Yeltsin to declarea stateof emergencyin Moscowandto call in the army underDefenseMinister Pavel
Grachev, who two years earlier had refused to carry out a similar
order. Stormedby paratrooperson Yeltsin's orders,the White House
burnedthroughthe night of October4-5, 1993.
Ironically, by the spring of 1994, the causeof the August 1991
putschistshadbecomeconflatedwith that of the leadersof the October
1993 uprising-Yeltsin's erstwhile allies. In late February 1994
Russia'snewly elected StateDuma passedan amnestycovering those
chargedwith crimesin connectionwith both events.The trial of the coup
plotterswasterminated,andRutskoi andKhasbulatovwerereleasedfrom
prison.Then,in mid-March,the casetook anotherstrangetwist. Ruling in
favor of the prosecutor'sappeal,to the effect that amnestycould not be
grantedto anyonewho had not been tried and convicted,the Supreme
Court ordereda resumptionof the trial of the August 1991 putschists.
Matterswereat this impasseasthis bookwasbeingsentto press.

***
The accountsthat follow havebeendivided into five sections,each
focusingon a particulargroup or aspectof the eventsof August 19-21,
1991. In selecting from a wide range of letters, reports, interviews,
transcripts,and documents,the editorshaveattemptedto include in the
volume accountsby men andwomen,Russiansandnon-Russians,who
personallytook part in the August days. Sincewe wantedto show the
eventsfrom many different angles,dependingon the location and orientationof the individual, we havetried to incorporatematerialfrom a
wide spectrumof peoplefrom many walks of life, but there are some
gaps. We were unableto find an accountby a veteranof the Afghan
War who helpedto defendthe White House or from a businessman
who provided suppliesfor the democraticresistance.The actions of
thesegroupsarerecountedby others.
Part I, "Saving the Old Country," is devotedto the putschists.This

INTRODUCTION 25

section includesthe major decrees,proclamations,and pronouncements
of the StateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergencyas well as the full
transcriptof the pressconferenceconductedby membersof the Committee on August 19. Soonafter the coup, the putschistswere interrogated by governmentinvestigatorspreparing the legal case against
them. We haveincludedexcerptsfrom the transcriptsof interrogations
ofYazov, Pavlov, and Kriuchkov. Theseselectionsshow the motivations andoutlook of the menwho directedthe putsch.
In Part II, "The Public Reacts,"eight Russiansand Americansof diverse backgroundsgive their personalimpressionsof the coup. Their
accountsarebasedon observationsof andparticipationin eventsthattook
placein Moscow,Leningrad,andthe provincial city of Saratov.Threeof
the selectionsare by Russiancitizens(the anonymousauthorof the ''Letter from Moscow," Vladimir Petrik, and Valerii Zavorotnyi); one author
is an emigre (GregoryFreidin) and anotherthe son of emigres(SergeP.
Petroff); andthreemore accountsare by Americanscholars(Victoria E.
Bonnell,LaurenG. Leighton,andDonaldJ. Raleigh).
Part III, "In High Places,"shifts to the centersof power and influenceamongthe opponentsof the coup. Here we seehow someof the
most powerful men in the country respondedto the putsch.This part
beginswith Gorbachev'slengthy personalstatementabout what happened to him betweenthe afternoon of Sunday, August 18, and
Wednesday,August 21, when the putschistsheld him incommunicado
at his summerresidencein Foros.Gorbachev'saccountis followed by the
appeal ''To the Citizens of Russia" issued by Yeltsin, Silaev, and
KhasbuIatov,and other appealsand decreesissuedby Yeltsin during the
first day of the coup. We have also included Yeltsin's speechto the
Russianparliamenton Wednesday,August 21, when victory over the
plottersseemedassured.HereYeltsin giveshis own versionof the events.
Part III also containsreportsand interviews from six other leading
political figures in Moscow, Leningrad,and Dushanbe.Theseauthors
are generallyquite well known and influential figures in Russianpoliticallife. Among themareNikolai Vorontsov,Minister of the Environment under Gorbachev;Yevgenii Shaposhnikov,head of the Soviet
Air Force at the time of the August coup; Vladimir Shcherbakov,a
Deputy Prime Minister in the Gorbachevgovernment;Davlat Khudonazarov,a filmmaker from Tajikistanwho roseto political prominence
under Gorbachev,serving as People'sDeputy in the USSR Supreme
Soviet and a memberof the Central Committee of the Communist

VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN

Party; Anatolii Sobchak, the Mayor of Leningrad; and Aleksandr
Yakovlev, a fonnerCPSUPolitburomemberanda leadingarchitectof
perestroika.
Part IV focuses on an event--the defenseof the White House
againstmilitary assaultby the putschists.In this sectionwe have included accountsof the activities both inside and outside the White
House,with particular attentionto the night of August 20-21, when
threeyoung men died defendingthe barricades.Here we hopeto show
the characterandcompositionof the public oppositionthat gatheredat
the White Houseand the extraordinaryatmosphereamongthosewho
riskedtheir lives on the barricades.The reports,letters,and interviews
are from an Americanstudent,TheresaSabonis-Chafee;
a well-known
Russian ultranationalistwriter, Aleksandr Prokhanov; an American
journalist, Michael Hetzer; an anonymousRussianman; a Russian
scholar,Aleksei Kozhevnikov; a People'sDeputy to the Russianparliament and democraticpolitical activist, Viktor Sheinis,and his wife,
the sociologistAlIa Nazimova.
PartV of the volume, "Getting the News In andOut," is devotedto
the role playedby the media.The massmedia-bothSoviet and foreign
-were critically important during the putsch. Despite heavy censorship, the shutdownof most newspapersand radio stations, and the
suspensionof regulartelevisionprogramming,the mediacontinuedto
function outsideofficial control during the three days of the coup. As
these accountsshow, adverseconditions did not prevent television,
radio, and newspaperjournalistsfrom transmittingcritical information
to the Sovietpeopleandabroad.The foreign pressis representedhere
by lain Elliot of Radio Liberty and Ann Cooper of National Public
Radio. The televisionjournalist SergeiMedvedevrecountshis experiencesreporting for "Vremia"; Valerii Kucher describesthe efforts of
journaliststo publisha collectiveundergroundnewspaper;andTatiana
Malkina reportson herparticipationin the August 19 pressconference.

***
A Chronologyof Eventshasbeenprovidedat the conclusionof the
volume with a timetableof developmentsduring the coup, day by day,
hour by hour, sometimesminute by minute.This will help to guidethe
readerwho is interestedin sequentialcoverageof the eventsof the
threedaysandwill serveasa point of readyreference.36

INTRODUCTION 27

Notes
1. Quotedin Michael R. Beschloss'sreview of The Turnfrom the Cold War to
a New Era: The United Statesand the SovietUnion, 1983-1990by Don Oberdorfer, in The New York TimesBookReview,October27,1991,p. 11.
2. For analysesof Gorbachev'srefonns,seethe essaysin AlexanderDallin
and Gail Lapidus, eds., The Soviet Systemin Crisis: A Readerof Westernand
Soviet Views(Boulder, SanFrancisco,Oxford, 1991); and GeorgeBreslauer,ed.,
Will Gorbachev'sReformsSucceed?(Berkeley,1990).
3. Valentin Stepankovand Yevgenii Lisov reportthat it was Gorbachevwho
insisted on August 20 as the signing date for the Treaty; other cosignershad
wantedto wait until the end of the vacation season.See Stepankovand Lisov,
Kremlevskiizagovor:versiia sledstviia(Moscow, 1992),p. 83.
4. A closeobserverof the Sovietscenenotedthat in JuneandJuly 1991,"the
anny-KGB-MVD troika undertook a well-orchestratedeffort to weaken Gorbachevdomesticallyand to humiliate him internationally.... [It] seemsevident
that the coup leaders were laying groundwork for a move against Gorbachev
[and] the anti-Gorbachevalliance was gaining experiencein working together."
See Scott R. McMichael, "Moscow Prelude: Warning Signs Ignored," RFEIRL
ResearchInstitute, Report on the USSR,vol. 3, no. 36 (1991), pp. 10-11. The
accountthat follows drawsuponMcMichael'sarticle.
5. Yakovlev'slast warning camein an "open letter," datedAugust 16, 1991,
that was publishedin Nezavisimaiagazeta on August 18. Among other things,
Yakovlev wrote that "shadowstructures"had alreadybeenestablishedand were
"waiting for the right momentto carry out a takeover."
6. Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykhand the U.S. Ambassadorin
Moscow,JackMatlock, servedas intennediaries(David Remnick,Lenin's Tomb:
The Last Daysofthe SovietEmpire [New York, 1993],pp. 436-37).Accordingto
Bessmertnykh'stestimony, when he conveyedBaker's warning to Gorbachev
(after AmbassadorMatlock haddonethe same),Gorbachevrespondedthat he had
already had a ''talk with thesestatesmen,a tough talk" (Stepankovand Lisov,
Kremlevskiizagovor,p. 79).
7. The interview, publishedunderthe title "Nachinaetsiarevoliutsiia snizu,"
appearedin Literaturnaia gazeta, August 28, 1991. The text may be found in
English translationin RussianPolitics and Law: A Journal of Translations,vol.
31, no. 1 (Summer1992),pp. 21-26.
8. The official text of the Treaty was madepublic on August 15. Under the
provisionsof the Treatythe office of USSRVice Presidentwasto be abolished,a
fact that throws somelight on GennadiiYanaev'sparticipationin the plot.
9. GorbachevchoseVladimir Shcherbakov,Pavlov'sdeputy,to accompany
him to the G7 meetingofleadersof the top industrialnations.
10. A comprehensivediscussionof thesefactors canbe found in Dawn Mann,
"The CircumstancesSurroundingthe ConservativePutsch,"in RFEIRL Research
Institute,Reporton the USSR,vol. 3, no. 36 (1991), pp.1-5.
11. StepankovandLisov, Kremlevskiizagovor,p. 85.
12. The Committee'snamewas officially abbreviatedas GKChP (pronounced
Geh-Keh-Cheh-Peh),
which not only soundsawkwardbut is suspiciouslyreminis-

VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN

cent of the well-known andmuch disliked acronymsfor the secretpolice---KGB,
GPU, andCheka.
13. The law stipulatedthat a stateof emergencycould be declaredonly in the
eventof "natural and man-madedisasters,epidemics,and large-scalepublic disorders,"eitherby the SupremeSovietof a constituentrepublic of the USSRor by
the USSR President,"following the petition or consentof the Presidiumof the
SupremeSovietof the USSRor constituentrepublic, or the supremeorganof the
constituentrepublic." If the Presidentdecidedto declarea stateof emergencyon
his own, he hadto "immediatelyseekthe approvalof the SupremeSoviet."
14. Carla Thorson,"ConstitutionalIssuesSurroundingthe Coup," in RFURL
ResearchInstitute,Reporton the USSR,vol. 3, no. 36 (1991),p. 22.
15. Ibid, p. 21.
16. See Victoria E. Bonnell and Gregory Freidin, "Televorot: The Role of
TelevisionCoveragein Russia'sAugust 1991 Coup," SlavicReview,vol. 52, no.
4 (Winter 1993),pp. 810-38.
17. In theRussianFederationas a whole,Yeltsin received58 percentof thevote.
18. According to GeneralLebed'srecently releasedmemoirs(publishedin the
TransnistrianRepublic), the paratrooperdivision under his commandhad been orderedby GeneralGrachevto be battle ready on August 17. NeitherGrachevnor his
staff disclosedto Lebedthe natureof his mission. The order for Lebedto move his
division into Moscow cameat around4:00 AM. on August 19. Still in the dark about
his mission,Lebed(who hadnot listenedto stateradio while on the march)reached
the outskirts of Moscow at 10:30 A.M. He was soon contactedby Grachev'sstaff
officer, who conveyedto him anotherorderfrom Grachev:Lebedwas "personally,"
and without using any communicationsequipment,to lead the 2nd Batallion to the
White Houseandthere,after contactingthe headof White Housesecurity,to assume
the defenseof the building. Still unawareof the coup d'etat, Lebed arrived at the
White Houseat 1:30 P.M. He tried to follow Grachev'sorderbut waschasedout of the
building by an irate crowd of about200 defenderswho assumedthat he was on the
side of the EmergencyCommittee(at one point in the ensuingfracas,Lebedpractically had to run for his life). As a result of the confusion,Lebedwas ableto carry out
his order to defend the White House only late in the evening of the 19th. See
AleksandrLebed,Spe/aakJnazyvalsiaputch (Tiraspol, 1993); also excerptedin the
right-wing nationalistnewspaperLiteratumaiaRossiia,September24, 1993.
19. The crowd estimatescome from the RussianInformation Agency. See
Khronika putcha: chasza chasom.Sobytiia 19--22avgustaJ99J v svodkakhRossiiskagoin!ormatsionnogoagenstva(Leningrad,1991),p. 43.
20. ThroughoutTuesday,speciallyorganizedgroupsof People'sDeputiesof
Russiawere dispatchedto the city's military garrisons;using their parliamentary
immunity to gain access,they endeavoredto explain to army officers the unconstitutional natureof the Declarationof the Stateof Emergency.Seethe interview
with Viktor SheinisandAlIa Nazimovain part IV, below.
21. In the confrontationof September-October
1993, Yeltsin did not hesitate
to cut off all White Housecommunications,aswell aswaterandelectricity.
22. On "Vremia," seethe accountof SergeiMedvedev'sfilm report, above,and
the interview with Medvedevin part V. For an analysisof television'srole in defeating the coup, see Bonnell and Freidin, "Televorot." The governmentnewspaper
/zvestiiaalsoeludedcontrol by the putschists.Dueto internalconflictson the paper's

INTRODUCTION 29

staff, no issueof Izvestiiaappearedon August19. The issuepublishedon the morning
of August 20 carried statementsfrom the EmergencyCommitteeon pageone and
Yeltsin's "Appeal to the Citizensof Russia"on pagetwo. The afternoonedition on
August 20 had two photographswhich showeda vast crowd canying the Russian
tricolor flag at the Moscow mlly and civilians fraternizing with soldiers in tanks.
Again, Yeltsin leamedhis lessonwell. After issuinghis decreedisbandingthe Russian parliamentin September1993, he took finn control of news programmingon
Russiantelevision and briefly invoked presscensorshipin the wake of the October
military confrontation.
23. Two other notable figures associatedwith the plotters (Marshal of the
Soviet Union SergeiAkhromeev,and Nikolai Kruchina, Chief of the CPSUCentml Committee'sAdministmtiveOffice) committedsuicidesoonafterward.
24. The interview with Karpukhin appearedin Literaturnaia gazetaunderthe
title "Oni otkazalis shtunnovatBelyi dom," August 28, 1991, p. 5. An English
tmnslationmay be found in RussianPolitics andLaw: A Journal of Translations,
vol. 31, no. 1 (Summer1992),pp. 8-11.
25. Seethe interview with Major GenemlAleksandrKorsak, "Nam byl otdan
prikaz arestovatPopova,"in Literaturnaia gazeta,September11, 1991. An English tmnslationappearsin RussianPolitics andLaw: A Journal of Translations,
vol. 31, no. 1 (Summer1992),pp. 16-20.
26. LieutenantcolonelsMikhail Golovatov and SergeiGoncharovof the Alpha
unit madethesestatementsin the interviewwith Literaturnaiagazetacitedin note24.
27. According to the accountby the headof the investigativeteam,the Russian
Federation'sProsecutorGeneralValentin Stepankovandhis deputy,Yevgenii Lisov,
the plansfor the attackon the White Houseandthe decisionto proceedweremadein
themiddle of thedayon August20. The attackitselfwasto commenceat 3:00AM. on
the 21st andwas to be carriedout by a combinedforce of the Airborne Pamtroopers,
the SpecialForcesof the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and three specialunits of the
KGB--"Alpha," "Group B," and the "Wave." However,commandersof the operation soonbeganto developdoubtsaboutits wisdom,partly underthe pressureof the
lower ranks; partly for fear of losing up to half of their force (accordingto one
estimate)in storming what had alreadybecomea well-fortified and well-defended
building; and partly from the conviction that it would be wrong to spill their
compatriots'blood. According to the plan, code-named"Opemtion Thunder," the
pamtrooperswere to be the first to take up their position. Their commander,Pavel
Gmchev, refused to order them to advance.After talking to Gmchev, Viktor
Karpukhin,the commanderof the "Alpha" unit andthe man in chargeof "Operation
Thunder,"followed Gmchev'sexample,as did mostothercommanders.When in the
early hoursof the morningYazov wasinfonnedaboutthe first instanceof bloodshed
and the possibility of thousandsof victims if an attackwere to take place,his order
wasto "halt" the entireoperation.SeeStepankovandLisov, Kremlevskiizagovor.
28. Felicity Barringer,"Chronicleof the Resistance:48 TenseHours in Leningrad," New York Times,September10,1991,p. A4.
29. The otherswere: Anatolii Lukianov, Chainnanof the USSRSupremeSoviet;
Oleg Shenin, Secretaryof the CPSU Central Committee; Valentin Varennikov,
Commander-in-Chiefof Ground Forces and Deputy Minister of Defense; Yurii
Plekhanov, Director of the Security Directomte of the KGB; and Viacheslav
Administration.
Genemlov,Directorof the KGB's SpecializedOperational-Technical

VICTORIA E. BONNELL AND GREGORYFREIDIN

30. We have cited the book several times in this account(Stepankovand
Lisov, Kremlevskiizagovor).To date,it is availableonly in Russian.
31. See Steven Erlanger,"Russia SuspendsCoup Trial, Citing Bias by the
Prosecutor,"New York Times,May 19,1993,p. A6.
32. Seethe issuesof Radio Free Europe/RadioLiberty Daily Reportfor January 27, April 15-16,May 18-19,May 27, andJuly 7, 1993.
33. "Growing Minority in RussiaWish '91 Coup Hadn't Failed" (Associated
Press),SanFranciscoChronicle, August 19, 1993,p. Al3.
34. Foreign BroadcastInformation Service,Daily Report: Central Eurasia,
FBIS-SOV-92-162,August20, 1992,p. 17.
35. Popov'sremarksappearedin Izvestiia on August21,24,25,26,1992.
For
an English translationseeCurrent Digestofthe Post-SovietPress,vol. 44, no. 34
1~.
(September23, 1992),pp.1992,
36. Accounts of the coup and its aftermath may be found in the following
English-languagesources:JamesH. Billington, Russia Transformed: Breakthrough to Hope, Moscow, August1991 (New York, 1992); Victoria E. Bonnell
and Gregory Freidin, "Televorot: The Role of Television Coveragein Russia's
August 1991 Coup," Slavic Review,vol. 52, no. 4 (Winter 1993); GeorgeW.
Breslauer,"Bursting the Dams: Politics and Society in the USSR Since the
Coup," Problemsof Communism,NovemberlDecember1991; John B. Dunlop,
The RiseofRussiaand the Fall of the SovietEmpire (princeton, 1993); Mikhail
Gorbachev,The August Coup: The Truth and the Lessons(New York, 1991);
Amy Knight, "The Coup That Never Was: Gorbachevand the Forcesof Reaction," Problems of Communism,NovemberlDecember1991; Michael Mandelbaum,"Coup de Grace: The End of the Soviet Union," Foreign Affairs, vol. 71,
no. 1 (1991/2); William E. Odom, "Alternative Perspectiveson the August
Coup," Problemsof Communism,NovemberlDecember1991; Lilia Shevtsova,
"The August Coup and the Soviet Collapse,"Survival, vol. 34, no. 1 (Spring
1992); Anatole Shub,"The Fourth RussianRevolution: Historical Perspectives,"
Problemsof Communism,NovemberlDecember1991; Hedrick Smith, The New
Russians,Part Seven:The SecondRussianRevolution (New York, 1991); Melor
Sturua,"The Real Coup," Foreign Policy, no. 85 (Winter 1991-2); and David
Remnick,Lenin'sTomb: TheLast Daysofthe SovietEmpire(New York, 1993).
Russian-language
sourceson the coup are as follows: Avgust-91(Moscow,
1991); . . . Deviatnadtsatoe,dvadtsatoe,dvadtsatpervoe. . . : svobodnoeradio
dlia svobodnykhliudei (Moscow, 1991);Leonid Ivashov,Marshal Iazov: Rokovoi
avgust19-9o (Moscow: Muzhestvo,1992); Krasnoeili beloe?Drama Avgusta·91: Fakty, gipotezy, stolknoveniemnenii (Moscow, 1991); Korichnevyi putch
krasnykh avgust '91: Khronika, svidetelstvapressy, fotodokumenty(Moscow,
1991); Iu. Kazarin andBoris Iakovlev, eds.,Smertzagovora:Belaia kniga (Moscow, 1992); Khronika putcha: chas za chasom.Sobytiia 19-22 avgusta1991 v
svodkakhRossiiskogoinformatsionnogoagentstva(Leningrad, n.d.); Valentin
Pavlov, Gorbachev-Putch:Avgust iznutri (Moscow, 1993); Putch: Khronika
trevozhnykhdnei (Moscow, 1991); Iu.S. Sidorenko,Tri dnia, kotoryeoprokinuli
bolshevizm: Ispoved svidetelia, pokazaniia ochevodsta(Rostov-on-Don,
1991); V. Stepankovand E. Lisov, Kremlevskii zagovor: versiia sledstviia
(Moscow, 1992).

Saving the Old Country

In the early morning of August 19, 1991, eight high-ranking Soviet
officials made an announcementthat stunnedthe country and the
world: PresidentMikhail Gorbachevhad resigneddue to illness, and
his governmenthadbeentakenover by a StateCommitteefor the State
of Emergency(GKChP). The committee included Vice President
GennadiiYanaev(who was namedActing President);KGB headVladimir Kriuchkov; DefenseMinister Dmitrii Yazov; Minister of Internal
Affairs Boris Pugo; Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov; 01eg Baklanov,
First Deputy Chairmanof the National DefenseCouncil and leaderof
the military-industrial complex; Vasilii Starodubtsev,chairmanof the
Peasants'Union; and AleksandrTiziakov, Presidentof the USSRAssociation of State Enterprisesand Industrial Groups in Production,
Construction,Transportation,andCommunications.
Throughtheir proclamationsand appeals,their one and only press
conference,andtheir subsequentintetviewswith interrogators,the members of the EmergencyCommittee articulated their version of the
eventsleadingup to andduring the Augustcrisis.

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Proclamations and Decreesof the
State Committee for the State of
Emergency,August 19, 1991

On thefirst day ofthe coup, the membersofthe StateCommitteefor
the StateofEmergencyissuedseveraldocuments
justifyingtheir
actionsandexplainingtheir policies. ThefolloWing textswere
transmittedby the TASSnewsagencyandreadrepeatedlyoverthe
SovietUnion's centralbroadcastfacilities beginningthe morningof
August19.
Document1: Decreeof the Vice Presidentofthe USSR
In connection with Mikhail SergeevichGorbachev'sinability, for
healthreasons,to carry out the responsibilitiesof the Presidentof the
USSR, and in accordancewith Article 127(7) of the USSR Constitution, responsibilitiesof the USSR Presidenthave beentransferredto
the USSR Vice President,Gennadii Yanaev, beginning August 19,
1991.
Vice Presidentof the USSR,GennadiiYanaev
August 18, 1991

Document2: Appealto the SovietPeople
Compatriots,
Citizensof the SovietUnion,
We are addressingyou at a grave,critical hour for the destiniesof
our Fatherlandand our peoples.A mortal dangerlooms large over our
greatMotherland.
33

THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE

The policy ofrefonns,launchedat Mikhail S. Gorbachev'sinitiative
and designedto ensurethe country's dynamic developmentand the
democratizationof social life, has, for a numberof reasons,run into a
deadend. Lack of faith, apathy,and despairhavereplacedthe original
enthusiasmand hopes.Authorities at all levels have lost the population's trust. In public life, political gameshave replacedconcernfor
the fate of the Fatherlandand the citizen. An attitude of malicious
contempttoward all state institutions is being imposed.The country
hasin effect becomeungovernable.
Taking advantageof the liberties that havebeengranted,and trampling on the first shootsof democracy,extremistforceshaveemerged,
embarkingon a coursetowardliquidating the SovietUnion, ruining the
state,and seizing power at any cost. They trampledon the results of
the nationwidereferendumon the unity of the Fatherland.*The cynical
exploitationof nationalfeelingsservesmerelyasa coverfor satisfying
personal ambition. Political adventurersare worried neither by the
misfortunesthat their peoplesare experiencingtoday nor by thosein
the future. Creating an atmosphereof moral and political terror, and
seekingto hide behindthe shield of the people'strust, they forget that
the ties being condemnedand severedby them were establishedon
the basisof far broaderpopularsupport,which, furthennore,hasstood
the test of many centuriesof history. Today, those who are working
towardthe overt::-:;.w "fthe constitutionalsystemshouldbe broughtto
accountbefore mothersand fathers for the deathsof the hundredsof
victims of interethnicconflicts. The brokendestiniesof more than half
a million refugeesare on their conscience.They are to blame for the
loss of tranquility and joy of tens of millions of Soviet people, who
only yesterdaylived in a united family, but today find themselves
living asoutcastsin their own home.
People must decide what kind of social system should be established,but attemptsarebeingmadeto deprivethe peopleof this choice.
Insteadof showingconcernfor the securityand well-being of every
citizen and all society,personswho have come to positionsof power
frequently use it for interestsalien to the people,as a meansfor unscrupulousself-assertion.Torrentsof words and piles of declarations
and promisesonly underline the scanty and meagernature of their
*On March 17, 1991, a nationwidereferendumwas held on the future of the
Union. The majority of citizensvotedfor the preservationof the USSR.

APPEAL TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE 35

practicaldeeds.The inflation of authority, which is the most terrifying
type of inflation, is destroyingour stateand society. Every citizen is
feeling increasinguncertaintyabouttomorrow and deepconcernabout
the future of his or her children.
The crisis of power has had a catastrophiceffect on the economy.
The chaotic,elementaldescentalong the slippery slopetoward a market economyhasled to an explosionof egotismat allievels--regional,
institutional,collective,andpersonal.The war oflaws· andthe promotion of centrifugal forces have causedthe disintegrationof a unified
economic systemthat it has taken decadesto create.The result is a
sharp decline in the standardof living for the majority of the Soviet
peopleandthe spreadof speculationandblack marketeering.It is high
time peopleweretold the truth: if urgentanddecisivemeasuresare not
adoptedto stabilize the economy,hunger and another spiral of impoverishmentare imminentin the nearfuture, and from thereit is but a
single stepto massmanifestationsof elementaldiscontent,with devastating consequences.
Only irresponsiblepeoplecan put their hopesin
some kind of aid from abroad.No handoutscan solve our problems.
Our rescueis in our own hands.The time has come to measurethe
influenceof eachindividual or organizationby its real contributionto
the developmentof our economy.
For many years,we have beenhearing incantationsfrom all sides
about this or that politician's commitmentto the interestsof the individual, his rights, and his social protection.In fact, what hashappened
is that the individual hasbeenhumiliated,his actualrights and opportunities have been constrained,and he has been driven to despair.
Right before our eyes,all the democraticinstitutions, createdon the
basisof the will of the people,are losing their authority. All of this is
the result of the systematicactivity of thosewho, in grossviolation of
the FundamentalLaw of [the Constitution] the USSR, are, in fact,
carryingout an unconstitutionalcoupd' etat,pursuingthe goal of unrestrainedpersonaldictatorship.The prefectures, mayoralties,
and other
unlawful structureshave beenincreasinglyusurpingthe power of the
popularlyelectedsoviets.
·"War of laws" is the phraseusedto characterizethe jurisdictional disputes
that followed upon unilateral declarationsby some republics and even lower
political units that in the eventof a conflict betweenUnion legislation and local
law, the latter shouldprevail.

THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE

An offensive is under way againstthe rights of working people.
The rights to work, education,health, housing, and leisure are in
jeopardy.
Even the elementarypersonal security of people is increasingly
underthreat. Crime is rising fast, becomingorganizedand politicized.
The country is sinking into an abyss of violence and lawlessness.
Never before in the nation's history has the propagandaof sex and
violence assumedsuch a scale, threateningthe health and lives of
future generations.Millions of peoplearedemandingmeasuresagainst
the octopusof crime andflagrant immorality.
The increasingdestabilizationof the political and economicsituation in the Soviet Union is undercuttingour position in the world.
Revanchistnotes are to be heard in some places,and demandsare
being made for a review of our borders.Voices can even be heard
speakingof dismemberingthe Soviet Union and of the possibility of
establishingan internationalprotectorateover certainfacilities and regions of the country. Suchis the bitter reality. Only yesterdaya Soviet
personfinding himselfabroadfelt himselfa worthy citizen of an influential and respectedstate. Now he is often a second-classforeigner,
whosetreatmentbearsthe imprint of disdainor pity.
The pride and honor of Soviet people must be restoredin full
measure.
The State Committeefor the Stateof Emergencyin the USSR is
fully awareof the depth of the crisis that has afflicted the country. It
takesresponsibilityfor the fate of the country and is fully determined
to take the most seriousmeasuresto pull the stateand societyout of
the crisis as soonaspossible.
We promiseto hold a nationwidediscussionof the new draft Union
treaty.Eachindividual will havethe right andopportunityto think over
this importantact anddeterminehis attitudetowardit, becausethe fate
of the numerouspeoplesof our greatMotherlandwill dependon what
the SovietUnion will be like.
We intend, without delay, to restorelaw and order, end bloodshed,
declarea mercilesswar againstthe criminal world, and eradicatethe
shamefulphenomenathat discreditour societyanddegradeSovietcitizens.We shall cleanour cities' streetsof criminal elementsandput an
endto the tyrannyof thosewho pillage the people'swealth.
We standfor truly democraticprocessesand for a consistentpolicy
of reforms,which shouldleadto a renewalin our Motherlandandto an

APPEAL TO THE SOVIET PEOPLE 37

economic and social efflorescencethat will enable her to take her
rightful placein the world communityof nations.
A nation'sdevelopmentmust not be basedon a drop in the living
standardsof its citizens.In a healthysociety,constantimprovementof
the living standardsshall becomethe norm.
Without slackeningin our devotionto the strengtheningandprotection of the rights of individuals, we shall concentrateour attentionon
protectingthe rights of the populationat large, thosewho have been
hurt the mostby inflation, disorganizationof production,corruption,
andcrime.
Developingthe multitiered characterof the national economy,we
shall supportprivate enterprise,grantingit the necessaryopportunities
for developingproductionandservices.
Our prime concernshall be solving the food and housingproblems.
All availableforces will be mobilizedto meetthese,the most essential
needsofthe people.
We are calling on workers,peasants,the working intelligentsia,and
all Soviet people,within the shortestperiod of time, to restorelabor
discipline and order and to raise the level of production, in order to
march forward resolutely.Our life and the future of our children and
grandchildren,aswell asthe fate of the Fatherland,dependon this.
We are a peace-lovingcountry, and we shall steadfastlyhonor all
our commitments.We makeno claimsagainstanyone.We wish to live
with all in peaceand friendship.But we firmly declarethat no one will
ever be allowed to encroachupon our sovereignty,independence,or
territorial integrity. All attemptsto speakthe languageof diktat to our
country,no matterwherethey originate,will be resolutelyrepelled.
Our multinational people has lived for centuriesin pride of their
Motherland. We have never been ashamedof our patriotic feelings,
and we hold it to be natural and right to raise the presentand future
generationsof citizensof this greatpowerin this spirit.
To remaininactive at this hour of crisis for the fate of the Motherland meansto take upon oneselfheavy responsibility for tragic, truly
unpredictableconsequences.
Each individual who holds our Motherland dear, who wants to live and work in peaceand confidence,who
doesnot acquiescein the continuationof bloody interethnicconflicts,
who seeshis Fatherlandindependentandprosperingin the future, must
makethe only correctchoice.We call on all true patriotsandpeopleof
goodwill to put an endto the presenttime of troubles.

THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE

We appealto all citizensof the SovietUnion to recognizetheir duty
before the Motherland and extend all possible support to the State
Committeefor the Stateof Emergencyand its efforts to leadthe country out of the crisis.
Constructiveproposalsof public and political organizations,work
collectives,and individuals will be gratefully acceptedas an expression of their patriotic readinessto take an active part in the restoration
of the age-oldfriendship in the unified family of fraternal peoplesand
the revival ofthe Fatherland.
The StateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergency
August 18, 1991
Document3: ResolutionNo.1 ofthe USSR
StateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergency
In order to securethe vital interestof the peoplesand citizens of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,the independenceand territorial
integrity of the country,the restorationof law and order,the stabilization of the situation, to overcomethe most acute crisis and prevent
chaos,anarchy,and fratricidal civil war, the StateCommitteefor the
Stateof Emergencyhasresolvedas follows:
1. All political and administrative organsof the Union of Soviet
SocialistRepublicsandof union andautonomousrepublics,territories,
regions,cities, districts,towns,andvillagesmustfollow without deviation the regimeof the stateof emergencyin accordancewith the USSR
Law "On the Legal Regimeof the Stateof Emergency"andresolutions
of the USSR State Committee for the State of Emergency.In those
caseswhere the specifiedorgansprove unable to conform to this regime, their powers are suspendedand the implementationof their
function is entrustedto personsspeciallyappointedby the USSRState
Committeefor the Stateof Emergency.
2. To disbandwithout delay thosepower and administrativestructures and paramilitaryunits acting contraryto the USSR Constitution
andthe laws ofthe USSR.
3. Immediatelyto renderinvalid all laws and decisionsadoptedby
organsof powerthat contradictthe USSRConstitutionandthe laws of
the USSR.
4. To suspendthe activities of political parties, public organiza-

RESOLUTIONNO. 1 39

tions, andmassmovementsthat interferewith the nonnalizationof the
situation.
5. Due to the temporaryassumptionby the USSRStateCommittee
for the State of Emergencyof the functions of the USSR Security
Council, the activity of the latter is suspended.
6. Citizens,institutions, and organizationsmust without delay give
up all illegally held firearms of all types,ammunition,explosivematerials, military equipmentand materiel. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB, andthe USSRMinistry of Defenseareto provide strict
enforcementof this requirement.In caseof resistance,the aboveitems
mustbe confiscatedby force andthe violators prosecutedby the criminal andadministrativejusticesystems.
7. The Prosecutor'sOffice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the
KGB, and the USSR Ministry of Defenseare to organize efficient
coordinationof the organsof law and orderwith the Armed Forcesin
their effort to establishpublic order and maintain the security of the
state,society, and citizens in accordancewith the USSRlaw "On the
Legal Regimeof the State of Emergency" andthe resolutionsof the
USSRStateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergency.
Public rallies, marches,and demonstrationsas well as strikes are
prohibited.
When necessary,a curfew is to be introducedas well as patrols,
inspections,and a strengtheningof measuresto enforcethe borderand
customsregime.
To assumecontrol of, and when necessaryto defend,the most important state and economic organizationsas well as essentiallifesupportingfacilities.
To curb decisively the spreadof all destabilizingrumors, actions
provoking the violation of law and order and contributingto interethnic strife, and insubordinationin dealing with the official personsresponsiblefor the maintenanceof the stateof emergencyregime.
8. To establishoontrol over the massmedia,this control function to
be assumedby a special arm of the USSR State Committeefor the
Stateof Emergencywhich is being setup for this purpose.
9. Organsof powerand administrationandthe headsof institutions
and enterprisesmust undertakemeasuresto increasecoordination,
order, and discipline in all spheresof our society. They must secure
conditionsfor the normal functioning of enterprisesin all branchesof
the economy;strict observanceof the measuresdirectedat strengthen-

THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE

ing horizontal andvertical links amongall economicsubjectsthroughout the entire territory of the USSR; and unflagging fulfillment of
designatedquotasin productionand deliveriesof raw materials,products,andspareparts.
To establisha regime of strict economyof technical,material, and
hard currency resources,to design and carry out concretemeasures
againstsquanderingof people'swealth.
To struggle decisively with the shadoweconomy,to prosecuteassiduouslyinstancesof corruption,theft, speCUlation,hoarding,squandering,andotherviolationsin the economicsphere.
To createfavorableconditionsfor the expansionof the contribution
to the country'seconomyandthe vital needsof its citizensmadeby all
typesof privateenterpriseoperatingwithin the laws of the USSR.
10. To makeholding a full-time governmentpost incompatiblewith
privateenterpriseactivity.
11. The USSR Council of Ministers is to carry out in a period of
sevendays a completeinventory of all availablefoodstuffs and basic
consumergoods; report to the peoplewhat the country has at its disposal;and assumethe strictestcontrol over the storageanddistribution
of theseresources.
To removeall obstaclesto the movementthroughoutthe territory of
the USSR of foodstuffs, consumergoods,and material necessaryfor
their manufacture;to assumestrict control overthis sphere.
Special attentionmust be paid and first priority assignedto supplying preschool children's establishments,orphanages,schools,
intermediary-,specialized-intermediary,
and higher-educationalinstitutions,andhospitalsaswell aspensionersandthe disabled.
In the periodof one weekto prepareproposalsfor stabilizing, freezing, and lowering prices for certaintypes of industrial and food products, first and foremost those that are meant for children, consumer
services,and public food services,and for increasingsalaries,pensions,subsidies,andcompensations
for variouscategoriesof citizens.
Within two weeks to design measuresfor streamliningthe salary
structure for the top-managementpersonnelat all levels of state,
public, cooperative,andotherestablishments,
organizations,andenterprises.
12. Taking into accountthe critical situation with the harvestand
the threatof hunger,to takeextraordinarymeasuresto organizesupply,
storage,andprocessingof agriculturalproducts.To help the rural toil-

RESOLUTIONOF THE SUPREMESOVIET CHAIRMAN 41

ers asmuch aspossibleby providing themwith equipment,spareparts,
lubricating materials, fuels, etc. To organize without delay the dispatching,in requisitenumbers,of blue- and white-collar workers, students,and servicemento rural areas[to help with the harvest].
13. Within one week, the Council of Ministers is to preparea resolution making it possibleto provide in the courseof 1991-1992all
willing city dwellerswith gardeningplots of 0.15 hectare.
14. Within two weeks,the USSR Council of Ministers is to complete plans for solving the crisis in the country'senergyindustry and
preparingfor the winter.
15. Within one month, it is to prepareconcretemeasuresfor radically improving the housingsituation in the country and report to the
peopleaboutthem.
In the course of six months, to develop a concreteprogram for
accelerateddevelopmentof state,cooperative,and individual housing
constructionfor a five-yearperiod.
16. To make it a duty of the organsof power in the centerand in
localities to give first priority to the basic needsof the population.To
locate additional resourcesfor improving free medical care and free
education.
[Pravda, August20,1991]

Document4: Resolutionof the Chairman
ofthe SupremeSovietof the USSRon
the Conveningof an ExtraordinarySession
of the SupremeSovietofthe USSR
In connectionwith the petition directedto the USSR SupremeSoviet
to confirm the decision to introduce a state of emergencyin certain
localities in the USSR, it is resolvedto convenean extraordinarysession of the SupremeSoviet of the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics
in the city of Moscowon August26,1991.
Chairmanof the SupremeSovietof the USSRA. Lukianov
Moscow,the Kremlin, August 19, 1991

The PressConferenceof the State
Committee for the State of
Emergency,August 19, 1991

On the eveningofMonday, August19,five ofthe eightplotters
(Yanaev,Baklanov,Pugo, Starodubtsev,and Tiziakov) heldtheirfirst
andonlypressconferenceat the Foreign Ministry's presscenterin
centralMoscow.Millions ofpeoplegatheredby their televisionsand
radios to learn moreaboutthefate oftheir country. With visibly
tremblinghandsandevidentconfusion,GennadiiYanaevcame
forward as spokesman
for the EmergencyStateCommitteeandActing
President.Belowis a slightly abridgedtranslation ofthe transcript of
thepressconference.
Yanaev: Ladies and gentlemen,friends and comrades:As you already know from media reports, becauseMikhail Sergeevich
Gorbachevis unable,owing to the stateof his health,to dischargethe
dutiesof Presidentof the USSR,the USSRVice Presidenthastemporarily takenover the performanceof the duties of the Presidenton the
basisof Article 127(7)of the USSRConstitution.
I addressyou today, ladies and gentlemen,at a moment that is
crucial for the destiniesof the SovietUnion andthe internationalsituation throughoutthe world.
Having embarkedon the path of profoundreformsand having gone
a considerableway in this direction, the SovietUnion hasnow reached
a point at which it finds itself faced with a deep crisis, the further
developmentof which could both place in questionthe courseof reforms itself andleadto seriouscataclysmsin internationallife.
42

PRESSCONFERENCE 43

It is of courseno secretto you that a sharp drop in the country's
output, which has so far not beencompensatedfor by the activity of
the alternativeindustrial and agricultural structures,is creatinga real
threat to the further existenceand developmentof the peoplesof the
SovietUnion. A situationof ungovernabilityandmultiple authorityhas
arisenin the country. All of this cannotfail to arouseextensive dissatisfaction amongthe people.A real threatto the country'sintegrity has
also arisen,with a consequentcollapseof the unified economic space,
the unified spacefor civil rights, a unified defense,and a unified foreignpolicy.
Undersuchconditionsnormal life is impossible.In many regionsof
the USSR,as a result of interethnicclashes,blood is being spilled, and
the collapseof the USSRwould have the most seriousconsequences,
not only internally, but also internationally.In suchconditionswe have
no alternativebut to takedecisivestepsto stopthe countryfrom sliding
into disaster.
As you know, in order to govern the country and to realize most
effectively the regime of the stateof emergency,a decisionhas been
madeto set up the StateCommittee.for the Stateof Emergencyin the
USSR,consistingof the following members:ComradeBaklanov,First
DeputyChairmanof the USSRDefenseCouncil; ComradeKriuchkov,
Chairmanofthe USSRKGB; ComradePavlov,the USSRPrime Minister; ComradePugo, Ministerof Internal Affairs of the USSR; Comrade Starodubtsev,Chairmanof the USSRPeasants'Union; Comrade
Tiziakov, Presidentof the USSRAssociationof StateEnterprisesand
Industrial Groups in Production, Construction,Transportation,and
Communications;Comrade Yazov, the USSR Minister of Defense;
andActing Presidentof the USSRYanaev.
I would like to makea statementtodaythat the EmergencyCommittee is fully awareof the depthof the crisis that has struckour country.
It assumesresponsibilityfor the fate of the Motherlandand is full of
resolve to undertakethe strongestmeasuresin order to enable the
countryandthe stateto overcomethe crisis in the shortesttime possible.
We promise to conduct a broad-basedpopular discussionof the
draft of the new Union Treaty. Eachcitizen of the USSRwill havethe
right and the opportunityto analyzethis most important documentin
circumstancesof tranquillity andto define his own position,for it is on
the future shapeof the Union that the fate of the multitude of peoples
of our greatMotherlandshall depend.

THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE

[Yanaevthen repeatsverbatim many of the points containedin the
EmergencyCommittee'sAppealto the SovietPeople.]

NewsweekcorrespondentCarroll Bogert: Whereis Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev?What is he sick with? Specifically and concretely,
what diseasedoes he have?And againstwhom are the tanks that we
see on the streetsof Moscow directed?What is the purposeof those
tanks?Thankyou.
Yanaev:I haveto say that Mikhail SergeevichGorbachevpresently
is on vacationandundergoingtreatmentin the Crimea.He has,indeed,
grown very tired over thesepastyears,and he will needsometime to
put his healthin order.I would like to saythat we hopethat when he is
recovered,Mikhail Sergeevichwill return to carrying out his duties.
And at any rate, we will continue to follow the course begun by
Mikhail SergeevichGorbachevin 1985.
As for the stateof emergency,it goeswithout sayingthat the stateof
emergencyis being introduced,as I have alreadysaid, at a very difficult time, and to avoid excessesof any kind, we have been forced to
take somemeasuresfor the safetyof our citizens.
Correspondentfrom Pravda: I have two questions.Perestroikahas
not producedtangible results for many reasons,primarily becauseit
possessedno precisetactical and strategicplan for its realization. Do
you have at presenta concreteplan for reviving the country's economy? More specifically, will the previously adoptedlaws continueto
function?Will the movementto a marketeconomycontinue?
My secondquestion: The RussianInformation Agency has broadcasttoday an appealto the peopleof Russiafrom Yeltsin, Silaev, and
Khasbulatov.In it, the eventsof the past night are defined asa rightwing, reactionary,anticonstitutionalcoup d'etat.What is your reaction
to this statement?
And the secondpart of that samequestion:This appealcontaineda
call for a generalstrike. In my opinion, suchstatementscan leadto the
mosttragic consequences.
Are you planningto take any concretemeasuresin this regard?
Yanaev:I'll answerthe secondquestion,andComradeTiziakov will
answerthe first.
Tiziakov: Indeed,the policy of perestroika,announcedin 1985, has
not, as you know, yielded the results we had expected.Our economy

PRESSCONFERENCE 45

today is in a most difficult state.The decline in productionis continuing becauseof a whole seriesof factors.Of course,we havegot to take
into accountthe fact that restructuringon such a scalewas being carried out by us for the first time.
Of course,we are and have been seekingthe right way, and any
searchinvolves somemistakesor omissions.This situationwhich has
come aboutis what constitutesthe main reasonfor the introductionof
the stateof emergency.
You know that the horizontal links among enterpriseshave been
badly damaged.Many of those who are presenthere probably know
that at the end of 1990,there was a conferenceof enterprisedirectors
which focusedpreciselyon the issue of creating a network covering
enterprisesof all the regions. We have managedto move this matter
forward in a seriousway. By the beginningof January,we alreadyhad
85 percent[of the enterprises]sign agreements,and those are agreementsthat actuallyyield products.It would seemthis shouldcreatethe
properconditions.
But as time went on, becauseof a whole slew of measuresthat had
been carried out with regard to the so-called sovereigntymatter, a
numberof bordersbetweenrepublicswere closed.In particular, such
republicsas Ukraine, Belorussia,and the Baltic republicsblockedthe
cross-borderflow of productsfrom their enterprises.
This hascreatedan extremelydifficult situationfor our enterprises.
Our enterprisesstartedspinningtheir wheelsin their work. This led to
production stoppages,creatingan atmosphereof uncertaintyin work
collectives.
What are our actions? First of all, we will direct our efforts at
stabilizing the economy,and, naturally, we are not rejecting our reforms, which are to effect our transition to a market economy. We
believethat this is the right way, but we must study it in greaterdetail
andorganizeit at a higherlevel, taking into accountall our activities.
Yanaev:I will now answerthe secondquestion.Indeed,today,when
the Soviet peoplewerebeing informedabout thecreationof the Emergency Committee,I, along with someof the other members,had contact with the leadersof all nine republics that had expressedtheir
readinessto becomemembersof the new Union Federation.We have
had contactwith the leadershipof many regionsand territories of the
Soviet Union. And I can state that, on the whole, they support the
creationofthe EmergencyCommitteeandthe Committee'sattemptsto

THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE

enablethe countryto overcomethe crisis we find ourselvesin.
I havetalked today to Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin. I am awareof the
statementmade by Boris Nikolaevich, Comrade Khasbulatov, and
ComradeSilaev, and I would like to emphasizetoday that the Emergency Committeeis ready to cooperatewith the leadershipof the republics, regions, and territories in accordancewith our desire to find
such adequateforms of developmentof our democracy,our economic
growth, developmentof culture, and guaranteesof humanrights that
could makeit possiblefor us to solve most effectively thoseproblems
we are now confronting. I believe that if the leadershipof Russiais
ready to cooperatewith us on such a basis, we will be able to find
ways of effecting suchcooperation.I considerthe call for an indefinite
generalstrike an irresponsiblestatement,and we probably cannotafford sucha luxury now that the country is in chaos,the luxury of some
kind of political games.Ultimately, thesepolitical gameshurt our longsuffering people.If we are not indifferent to the fate of the Fatherland,
the fate of Russia,we mustseekout real forms of cooperation.
Correspondentfrom the Italian newspaperLa Stampa: Two questions for Mr. Yanaev.The first question:Can you tell us, what is the
stateof your health?·The secondquestion:According to the Constitution, a state of emergencycan be introducedby the Presidentof the
country, or by the USSR SupremeSoviet Presidium,with mandatory
agreementfrom the republics.Which of thesethreepartiesparticipated
in this decision?And are thereplansto set up somenational salvation
committee?tDo you intend to convenea meeting of the USSR SupremeSovietimmediately?
Yanaev:As for my health,I think it is all right, it allows me to work
16-17 hours a day, and as you can see,I am alive, sitting here before
you. I do not look too bad, despitethe fact that we really did have a
sleeplessnight last night.
*This was a doubleentendrequestion,referring not only to the allegedillness
of Gorbachev,but also to the answerYanaevgave when he was askedabouthis
health at the USSR SupremeSoviet at the time he was being consideredfor the
post of Vice President."My health is all right," he responded,"My wife ain't
complaining."
tThe National SalvationCommitteeof Lithuania was a shadoworganization
in whosenamedie-hardCommunists,aidedby the SovietArmy, wereplanningto
takeover Lithuaniain January1991.

PRESSCONFERENCE 47

As for the introduction of the state of emergency,we took as our
premiseand do proceedfrom this fact, that therecan be critical situations requiring immediate actions, and we intend to ask the USSR
SupremeSoviet,which will be convenedon August 27, to confirm our
mandateto introducethe stateof emergency.
SovietTelevision:I havea questionfor GennadiiIvanovichYanaev.
In its addressto the people,the EmergencyCommitteehas statedthat
it would, first of all, takecareof the interestsof the public at large and
would seekto solvethe food and housingproblems.Could you please
tell us what concretemeasuresyou are planning to undertakein this
regard, and what are the resourcesat the disposalof the Emergency
Committee?
Yanaev:You know, this is really a very interesting,very important
question.The first step we are planning to undertakeis to do everything possibleto savethe harvest.Probablytomorrow,we will issuean
appropriatedocument, which will be oriented toward undertaking
emergencymeasuresto savethe harvest.Further, we intend to utilize
all the resourcesof the state in order, first, to carry out a special
inventory of everythingthat we have in the country and, as you recall
from our statement,after we have completedthis inventory, we will
tell the people what we have at our disposal. This will include the
materialresourceswhich we will be able to mobilize in orderto solve
the housingproblem.
In the lastthreeyears,we have not done a goodjob building housing, and many citizens who expectedthat we would carry out the
programthat we hadannouncedat the outsetof perestroika[havebeen
disappointed].Unfortunately,as it turned out, we were not up to the
job, which is why I think we are now confrontedwith three major
tasks.The first is food; the secondis housing;andthe third is transportation andenergy,becausewe are moving towardwinter. The situation
in the energy industry is now very tense, and there, too, we need
extraordinarymeasuresif we are to avoid plunging the country into a
difficult situationbecauseof the winter.
Argumentyi fakty: Apart from his post as President,M.S. Gorbachevalso holdsthe postof GeneralSecretaryof the Central Committee
of the CPSU.Who will be dischargingthe dutiesof the GeneralSecretary of the CentralCommittee?And my secondquestion:As we have

THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE

learnedtoday, a seriesof newspapers,including Argumentyi fakty,
Moskovskienovosti, Kuranty, Stolitsa, and a few others have been
declaredclosed.For how long arethey to remainclosed,andwhenwill
they be opened?Thankyou.
Yanaev:I think that sincewe areintroducingthe regimeof a stateof
emergency,we will have to re-registersome of our mass-circulation
publications.Re-register.We are not talking aboutclosingdown newspapers;we are talking aboutre-registration,becausethis chaosthat has
overtakenthe country is due, in part, to someof the mass-circulation
organs. As to the post of the General Secretary,I would not like to
commenton that. We have a Deputy General Secretary.He is fully
capableof functioning, he is working, and I think that the plenary
sessionof the CentralCommitteeor a PartyCongresscan resolvethis
issue.I am now dischargingthe duties of the Acting Presidentof the
country, and I would not like to use my authority, or lack thereof, in
orderto influencethe decisionmakingof party organs.
Question:Mr. Yanaev, sir, what responsedid you get to your appeals to the headsof state and the SecretaryGeneralof the United
Nations?
Yanaev:I must statethat we are analyzingvery carefully the statementsof foreign statesmenand politicians, and I must statethat their
reaction is rather restrained,because,apparently,there are very few
facts availableat this point to takea definitive stand.I am familiar with
the last statementby PresidentBush, wherehe expresseshis hopethat
those foreign policy commitmentsthat the Soviet Union had made
would be adheredto in the future, which is what I have confirmed
today, speakingbeforethis audience,which is what we affirmed in our
statementright afterthe EmergencyCommitteehadbeensetup.
Novosti InformationAgency: I have two questionsto Boris Karlovich Pugo and to ComradeStarodubtsev.A lot has beenwritten and
said lately about the war on crime. Boris Karlovich, what new measuresare you planning to undertakein this regard?And the question
for ComradeStarodubtsev:Do you havethe supportof the massof the
peasantry,anddo you think that the massof the peasantrywill support
the EmergencyCommittee?
Pugo: In answerto your question,I would saythat it is unlikely that
we will be able to find any new, entirely new ways for combating

PRESSCONFERENCE 49

crime that have not beenused before. I believe that first of all, the
organsof law and order, all of them, must improve their work. We
must be more demandingwith law-and-orderpersonnel.They must
improve their work to a considerabledegree.We must createthe conditions so that professionalscan be more effective. I especiallystress
professionalism--thisis my credo.Working in the Ministry ofIntemal
Affairs, I believe that we can do a lot following this precept. As to
concretemeasures,I think that suchmethodsasjoint [ militia-military]
patrolsof city streetshavebroughtsubstantialresults,as evidencedby
the experienceof over fifty cities. You may recall that at first, this
measurewas met with somesort of suspicion,but it hasdemonstrated
its effectiveness.Indeed,recently eventhe Mayor of Leningrad,Sobchak,hasresortedto this methodof policing.
We must restoreour ties to the community, but, above all, in my
opinion, we must work with the leadershipof law-and-orderorgansin
sucha way that all the potentialof our personnelcanbe realized.
Starodubtsev:The greatestlossesduring the period of perestroika
have, of course,beensustainedby the peasantry;especiallythis year,
the blow has beenmost crushing. The majority of the collective and
statefarms, along with the nascentindividual farms, are today on the
brink of disaster.The price equilibrium betweenthe city andthe countryside has beenundermined.Lack of fuel and sparepartsand a sharp
reductionin othertechnicalsupplieshavecreateda very difficult situation for the peasantry.
I think that the peasants,driven to despair,hope that, at long last,
order will be restored,and that our society will turn its gaze to the
peasantryand will help peasantsto find a firm footing, to experience
revival.

Nezavisimaiagazeta correspondentTatiana Malkina: Could you
pleasesaywhetheror not you understandthat last night you carriedout
a coup d'etat?Which comparisonseemsmoreapt to you---thecomparison with 1917or with 1964?*This is the first question.
The secondquestion concernsnewspapers.First, how long will it
taketo re-registernewspapers,
andwhat criteria will decidewhetheror
not a particular publication should be re-registered?Who will deal
*Referenceis to the abruptremoval of Soviet leaderNikita Khrushchevfrom
powerin 1964.

THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE

with this? Will political censorshipbe introducedin the re-registered
publications?Thankyou.
Yanaev: With regardto the re-registrationof newspapers,we will
try not to drag out this process.I would not like to commentnow on
the criteriathat will be usedasthe basisfor this re-registration.
As for your allegation that a coup d'etat was stagedlast night, I
would beg to disagreewith you, inasmuchas we are following constitutional nonns.And I assumethat confinnationby the USSRSupreme
Soviet of the decisions we have made will enable us to state that
absolutelyall the juridical and, so to speak,constitutionalnorms have
beenobserved.
It does not seemto me correct to draw a comparisonwith either
1917or 1964.I believeany analogyhereis simply dangerous.
Correspondentfrom the Italian newspaperCorriere della Sera: A
questionabout Mikhail SergeevichGorbachev.Did you discusswith
the Presidentyour takeoverof power?Did he agreewith you? Why.is
there no medical reporton the stateof his health?And a secondquestion: Bearing in mind the wording of your communique,did you ask
for advicefrom GeneralPinochet?*Thankyou.
[Laughterin the audience.]
[Yurii Gremitskikh, an official of the PressCenter: "Pleaserefrain
from displayingemotion.This is a pressconference."]
Yanaev: I imagine that at some time we will publish the medical
findings on Mikhail SergeevichGorbachev'sstate of health. As concernsyour assertionthat we took power from PresidentGorbachev,I
would like to express disagreement
with that, too, becausewhat we are
talking about is a temporaryinability on the part of the Presidentto
fulfill his dutiesby virtue of the stateof his health.And in accordance
with the Constitution,the duties of the Presidentpasstemporarily to
the Vice Presidentor the Chainnanofthe SupremeSoviet.
ADN [GennanNews Agency]: Will the introduction of the stateof
emergencyaffect the agreementswith Gennany;specifically,the timetable for the withdrawalof Soviettroopsfrom Germany?HasChancellor Kohl reactedin any way?
• A military junta led by GeneralAugusto PinochetoverthrewChilean President SalvadorAllende in 1973.

PRESSCONFERENCE 51

Yanaev:I havealreadystatedthis in my openingstatement,andthe
EmergencyCommitteehas madeits statementon this matter: We afftrm all the commitmentswhich the Soviet Union has assumedin the
sphereof foreign policy, including our obligationswith respectto Germany.
[ ...]
Soviet Television:GennadiiIvanovich [Yanaev], could you please
elaborateon the statementthat "in certainareas,a stateof emergency
hasbeenintroduced"?What does"in certainareas"mean,and what is
the geographicallocation?And the secondquestion:Whenwill reportersbe ableto meetwith Mikhail SergeevichGorbachev?
Yanaev: You know, as soon as Mikhail Sergeevich'shealth improves,I am sure hewill be happyto meetwith reportersandrepresentatives of the massmedia. As to the stateof emergency,I believe we
have no needto introduce it throughoutthe entire country. There are
regions which have such problemsthat cannotbe solved without the
introduction of the state of emergency.At the, sametime, I see that
neitherKazakhstannor Uzbekistanrequiresa stateof emergency,becausethe situationthereis stableenough.
So far, I cannot put a number on all such places. I believe that
Moscow is one, and beginning today a state of emergencywill be
introducedin Moscow.
[ ...]
Question:HonorableComradeYanaev [...], I have thefollowing
question:Are you preparedto undertakesomeform of legal, constitutional measuresagainstYeltsin's decreeaimed at removingthe Party
not only from societybut alsofrom the tradeunion structures?*
Yanaev:I believethat all the decreesand ordersthat are issuedwill
be screenedfrom the point of view of the stateof emergencythat we
are introducingin the country.But taking advantageof this questionof
yours, I would like to emphasize:what theRussianFederationleadership is doing now-buildingbarricades,calling forFederation
disobedienc~is
Federation a
very dangerouspolicy.
*Earlier in the summerof 1991, RussianPresidentBoris Yeltsin had issueda
decree prohibiting all political parties,including the CommunistParty,from locating
their chaptersat workplacesanywhereon theterritoty of theRussianFederation.

THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE

This policy may lead to someform of military provocationso that
later the blame for this tension,for this excesswhich may take place,
can be put on the EmergencyCommittee. Soviet citizens should be
forewarned,especiallythe inhabitantsof Moscow, where a state of
emergencyhasbeenintroduced.We hopethat peaceand orderwill be
guaranteed.
[ ...]
Correspondentfrom Al-Ittihad, United Arab Emirates:Mr. Yanaev,
this is now the first newsconferencegiven by the interim Presidentof
the USSR,and your obligationsinclude many things. At this time can
you give us a guarantee-oryour word, an oath to the public---that
everything will be all right with the health of Mikhail Sergeevich
Gorbachev?
Yanaev:I must tell you that Mikhail SergeevichGorbachevis completely safe.Thereis no dangerto him. The only thing is that a certain
amountof time is neededfor him simply to recoverhis strength.Ladies and gentlemen,working in a regime like the one that President
Gorbachevhas been working in these past six years, the organism
naturally ... gets somewhatworn out. I hopethat my friend President
Gorbachevwill return to the ranks and that we will work together
again.
Interfax [news agency]: You have mentionedthat every citizen of
the USSRwill havean opportunityto think over the new Union Treaty
in peaceand determinehis position. In what way do you plan to find
out what this position really is? Do you meanthat you are planningto
hold a referendum?And one more: What is the position of the Emergency Committee with regard to the Baltic republics and Georgia,
Armenia, and Moldova, which do not intend to sign the new Union
Treaty? And did Mikhail Sergeevich[Gorbachev] know that today a
stateof emergencyis being introducedandthe EmergencyCommittee
hasbeenformed?Thankyou.
Yanaev:As to the formation of this Committee,as one of my colleagueshasalreadynoted,the Committeewas setup today in the early
hours of the morning. I believethat PresidentGorbachevunderstands
and will understandthat, indeed,at a momentwhen the countryis in a
critical situation, we will have to find some effective measuresthat
would allow us to overcomethis crisis.

PRESSCONFERENCE 53

With regardto the Baltic republics,Moldova, Georgia,andArmenia
--that is, thoserepublicsthat have statedthey were not ready to sign
the Union Treaty~urNovember
position is unaltered.PresidentGorbachevhas
statedit repeatedly.We will respectthe will of the people.You know,
I think we will find a way of finding out what the mood of the people
is with regardto the Union Treaty. I do not know what form this will
eventually tak~whether
Novembera referendumor somethingelse-butwe
will do our bestto havethe Union Treaty,on which the future developmentof our country depends,be discussedand acceptedby our people
in its entirety.
[ ...]

Novosti correspondentVladimir Riabinnikov: My question is to
Boris Karlovich Pugo. So, today, from approximately 15:00 in the
afternoon, residentsof Moscow are looking at the tanks standing
aroundthe PressCenter.How do you technicallyseethe organization
of this emergencyregime----asI understoodfrom the reply given by
GennadiiIvanovich-inMoscow,given the situationthat existstoday?
Hundreds,maybethousandsof peoplewill start for the airports today
and for placesfar away from the capital. How is this regime going to
be put into effect?
Pugo: The introductionof military hardware,evenincluding troops,
onto the territory of Moscow-well, it is already completelyevident
that this is a measurewholly forced on us by the circumstances.It has
been takenonly to prevent any disturbanceof order in Moscow, to
preventany casualties.That is our chief purpose.As for how things
will be controlled, I see the developmentof eventsin the following
way: Provided nobody forces us to extend it or to make it too longterm an arrangement,we would favor withdrawing all military units
andhardwarefrom Moscowas soonaspossible.
Yanaev:We do not envisagea curfew.
Pugo: But that is somethingthat comeswithin thejurisdiction of the
Moscow commandant.If it should suddenlycome about that this is
necessary,well, that is within his jurisdiction. But we did not plan for
this. We did not considerit necessaryto do that today.
Postfactum[news agency]: Gennadii Ivanovich, your Committee
consists of eight people. It's an even number, which makes voting
difficult. How are you going to deal with this issue?Perhapsit would

THE EMERGENCYCOMMI1TEE

be a good idea to bring in another person, say Anatolii Ivanovich
Lukianov [Chairmanofthe USSRSupremeSoviet]?
And the secondquestion. Is it possible that the role of Mikhail
SergeevichGorbachevin, say, the Tenghiz oil fields deal, will be
investigated?
Yanaev:I believe we will be making our decisionsin a consensus
fashion. Your recommendationwith regard to ComradeLukianov is
takenunderadvisement,but we believethat theremustbe a separation
of functions,andthe Chairmanof the SupremeSovietshouldbe Chairmanofthe SupremeSoviet.
I can't tell you anything about the oil deal. I believe that Mikhail
Sergeevichhas made an immeasurablecontribution to launchingthe
democraticprocessesthat were launchedin 1985. This is a man who
deservesall possibleforms of respect,not an investigation.
You know I can'tsayanythingaboutthis oil. ...
Question:But is an investigationof this type possibleat all?
Yanaev:I believe that Mikhail Sergeevichhas madean immeasurable contributionto the developmentof the democraticprocesseson a
large scalethroughoutthe countrybeginningin 1985.He is a man who
deservesall respect,and not, pardonme, an investigation.He is not a
statecriminal. He is a man who has doneeverythingso that we could
embarkon this democraticpath.Onelast question?

AssociatedPress:Canyou pleasetell us whetheryour committeeis
preparedto order the use of force againstcivilians? And under what
conditionswould force be usedagainstcivilians?
Yanaev:First, I would like to do everythingto ensurethat the useof
force againstcivilians is not required.We must do everythingto prevent any excesses.And what we are envisagingnow--someextraordinary measures-theyare not at all linked with any attack on human
rights. On the contrary, we want to protect humanrights as much as
possible. And I would like to hope very much that we will not be
compelled,we will not be provoked, into using some kind of force
againstthe civilian population.

Statementsand Explanations by
the PutschistsAfter the Coup

Document1: Interrogationof DefenseMinister
Dmitrii Yazov on August22, 1991

In a post-coupinterrogationheldon August22 by stateinvestigators
LeganovandSychev,former DefenseMinister Dmitrii Yazov
confirmedthat the coupattemptbeganwhenit did becausethe
plotterswantedto preventthesigningofa new Union Treaty, a
documentthat Yazovandhis co-conspiratorsbelievedwouldbring the
political deathoftheSovietUnion. Perhapsbetterthan any other
document,the interrogationshowsthe mentalityofthepeoplewho
broughtthe countryto the brink ofcatastrophe.This transcriptofthe
interrogationfirst appearedin Der Spiegelandwassubsequently
reprintedin Izvestiia(October10, 1991).It is reproducedherein
English translationwith only minor omissions.
[ ...]

Investigator: You must understandthat you are being interrogated
in connectionwith your role in a crime that is defined as treason,
conspiracywith the aim of seizing power, abuse of office. Now I
would like to know how you respondto this accusation.
Yazov: I have a somewhatdifferent view of what constitutestreason,
and I don't want to hide this. Betrayalof the President,perhaps,but I did
not betraymy peopleor my country. I haveknown Gorbachevfor a long
time. We haveworkedtogether,solvedmanyproblemstogether.
Personally, I like Gorbachevvery much. There must have been
compelling reasonsfor me to go againstthe Commander-in-Chiefof
55

THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE

our Armed Forces.Many, including myself,begandevelopinga negative emotional attitude to Gorbachev.The reasonfor this was the
decline in the standardof living of our people, the collapseof our
economy, and the intensification of ethnic conflict and conflicts
among the republics. In certain Party leadershipcircles, people
begandiscussing[Gorbachev].Gradually,the opinion emergedthat
Gorbachevhad run his courseas an active statesman.Somefelt that
he had either run out of steamor lost direction. His economicpolicy
consistedof begging for foreign credits, running up foreign debt,
but he did very little inside the country to repair the economy.We
talked about this with Mikhail Sergeevichin the [CPSU] Central
Committee andat [USSR] SupremeSoviet sessions.But he kept to
the samecourse:solving economicproblemsthrough foreign policy.
He and his governmentpractically ignored economicproblemsinside the country. Our economicmechanismhas grown threadbare,
and the country is on the vergeof disintegration.On August 20, the
Union Treaty was supposedto be signed.... It becameapparentto
me and many other comradeswith whom I discussedthis matterthat
we were facing the disintegrationof the country. Everybody had
beensupportingthe Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics,and all of a
suddenwe get the draft of a treaty of sovereignstates!
We were convincedthat this was not just a mistakebut purposeful
activity aimed at doing away with the Union, substituting for it a
confederationof republics,eachwith its own president.
Investigator: [ ...] But why did you decideto removethe President
by unconstitutionalmeans?
Yazov:I neverthoughtthat it was necessaryto removethe President
from power. I am guilty of this crime to the extentthat my participation in all of this madeit possible.I could havepreventedit all; I ought
to have informed the Presidentaboutall of this. On Sunday,August
18, we decidedthat five peoplewould fly to seehim and to talk to
him about a voluntary resignation,with the proviso that Vice President Yanaev would assumethe function of the President.Unfortunately, I did not know Yanaev. I just supportedeverything without
going into details.I regretall of this very much. This was, I believe,a
very gravemistake.
Investigator: This soundspretty naive,coming from an experienced
statesmanlike you, the Minister of Defense.

INTERROGATIONOF DMITRII YAZOV 57

Yazov:Discussionsof this sort hadtakenplacebefore,underdifferent circumstances.More often than not, ComradesKriuchkov, Baklanov, and Boldin were presentat thesediscussions.We would talk
aboutthe situationin the country,aboutthe disintegrationof the Party,
the economy, growing foreign debt, impoverishmentof the people.
Shouldn'tsomeonebe responsiblefor all that? Gradually, wecameto
the conclusionthat the blame for all this lay with the Presidentof the
country because,as some said, he had put distancebetweenhimself
andthe Party,or asotherssaid,he hadbetrayedthe army....
Investigator:Canyou be specificaboutwho wassayingthosethings?
Yazov: Not really. Thesewere just discussions.Of late, conversations tendedto dwell on the fact that Gorbachevhad been going on
foreign tours too much in recentyears,andthat we often did not know
what important mattershe was discussingthere. For example, what
kind of speechdid Gorbachevmakein London at the G7 meeting[July
1991]?We did not have a good idea about what he was saying there.
Until that time at least,we usedto discusstheseissuesin the [CPSU]
Politburoor in the PresidentialCouncil or the SecurityCouncil.

Investigator:It was betterwhen all thesedecisionswere madein an
openforum?
Yazov: Well, perhapssuch an approachis not constructive,but all
the decisionswere madecollectively.... Of coursewe were not ready
to becomeevenmore dependenton the United Statespolitically, economically, andmilitarily.

Investigator:So what decisiondid you cometo?
Yazov:We hadneithera plan nor a conspiracy.We just got together
on Saturday....

Investigator:Who calledthe meeting?
Yazov:Kriuchkov.
Investigator:Where?
Yazov:At one of the military installationsin Moscow, at the end of
Leninskii Prospect, closeto the traffic police post, on a side street.
Kriuchkov called at the end of the day and said: ''There is something
we must discuss." And I went there. After me, came Shenin and
Baklanov.... That's when it all began. They were saying, "Well,
maybewe should goand seeGorbachev,talk to him...."

THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE

Investigator:Why wereyou in sucha hurry? Is it becausethe Union
Treaty wasaboutto be signed?
Yazov: Of course,we were doing this becausewe were unhappy
aboutthe draft treaty, we did not want the stateto fall apart.I saidthat
I was readyto provide them with an airplane.The five peoplewere to
take off from Chkalovskoe [military airfield]: Shenin, V arennikov,
Boldin, Plekhanov,and Baklanov.Plekhanovwas the man who knew
the entire security systemthere. I alreadyunderstoodthat Kriuchkov
hadorderedPlekhanovto replaceall the guards.
Investigator:What for?
Yazov: In order to persuadeGorbachev.... And if he refused,then
we would haveto take decisivemeasures.
Investigator: So whoseideawas it-to fly there,to try andpersuade
Gorbachev,to breakall communications,to switch the guards?
Yazov: I believe this was a collective decision. For my part, I had
always been skeptical. I doubtedwhether we should undertakeanything at all. I had my own doubts. When they came back, we were
sitting in the Kremlin, in Pavlov'soffice. [ ...] Yanaevcameat about
8:00 P.M. The five cameat about nine.... The Committeewas set up
after the emissariesreturned in a pretty gloomy mood from seeing
Gorbachev.He hadpracticallykicked themout. He saidto them: "You
must decide by yourself what you are going to do." So when they
reportedthis to us, when they told us that they had shottheir wad, that
the original ideawas unrealizable,then it becameclear: Yanaevwould
haveto sign the paper.SinceGorbachevwasnot sick, we were,first, to
declarehim sick. That's when we realizedthat our original plan had
collapsed.
Investigator:How wasthe EmergencyCommitteeformed?
Yazov:We were sitting in Pavlov'soffice. Yanaevarrived at around
nine. Then came Lukianov. He arrived by plane, recalled from his
vacation.Lukianov said that he could not becomea memberof some
committeeor other. He was the Chairmanof the SupremeSoviet, the
legislativeorganthat ruled supremeover everything."The only thing I
could do," he said, "is to makea statementaboutthe unconstitutionality of the new Union Treaty." By that time Yanaevwas quite drunkthat is, he hadby that time hadquite a bit of fun.

INTERROGATIONOF DMITRII YAZOV 59

Investigator:WasKriuchkov drunk,too?
Yazov:Pugo,myself, andKriuchkov. We told Pugothat we hadsent
peopleto Gorbachev,but that Gorbachevwould not receivethem for a
whole hour. He was,at the time, seeingsomedoctorwho hadwith him
somevaccineor other. And if Gorbachevagreed[to our terms], then
Yanaevwould for sometime carry out his duties.

Investigator:And what ifhe did not agree?
Yazov:If you aretalking aboutthe completeremoval,liquidation, or
somethinglike that ... I assureyou that was neverdiscussed.Around
eleven o'clock, we were joined by the Foreign Minister, Bessmertnykh. He said: "If you put my nameon this Committee,that will
be the end of all foreign affairs." I was home at Bakovka about half
pastmidnight. I got up at 5:30 andwentto my office.

Investigator:Had you issuedany ordersbeforethat?
Yazov:No, I did not give any ordersin the eveninguntil the documentswere signed.The TV Centerstoppedfunctioning beginningat
6:00 A.M. We sentour own troopsthere.

[ ...]

Investigator: From a psychologicalpoint of view, the introduction
of troops into the city was precisely what made people suspicious
aboutthe President'sallegedillness.
Yazov: Our President--heis invincible, and the introduction of the
troops,too, wasprobablya mistake.Falserumorshadbeencirculating:
Gorbachevis abusinghis office, thereis someonebehindhim manipulating him. Possiblytheserumors pushedus to undertakethis action,
this risky business.
[ ...]
Investigator:Thenyou sawthat you had gottentoo entangledin this
caper,that it wastime to get out.
Yazov:Yes, of course.I begantaking certainstepsearly on. Things
were going downhill, and fast. Those people at first agreedthat the
Committeewould meettwice a day. But on the secondday, it met only
once.And the following day, I did not evenattendthe meeting.

Investigator:You meanthe 21st of August?
Yazov:Yes, yesterday.I beganwithdrawingthe troops.

THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE

Investigator: If you realizedafter the pressconferencethat you had
gonetoo far, that you had committeda crime, why did you go on with
it? I have in mind the decisionto bring the tanksin on the night of the
20th and early morning of the 21st,the introductionof the curfew, the
appointmentof the city's military commandant.
Yazov: It just happenedthat way. I'll speakfrankly, and I always
speakfrankly. When the state of emergencywas introduced,rumors
begin to circulate that there would be a curfew, too. This Vice President, this Yanaev,introducedthe stateof emergencyonly on the second
day.· And when the state of emergencywas fmally introduced,and I
appointedGeneralKalinin to be the Moscow Military Commandant,he
required verydifferent meansand forces, becausea stateof emergency
anda curfew aretwo differentthings. And that'sexactlyhow it happened.
It was only on the eveningof the 20th that he was able to issuehis order
introducinga curfew. That requiredadditionalforces-----adifficult situation
given the pouringrain andthe politicizationof the people.
Investigator: Who could have proposedto Yanaev to introduce a
curfew in Moscow?After all, he could not havecomeup with the idea
himself, he is not a military man.
Yazov: [ ...] Yanaevintroducedthe stateof emergencyin Moscow,
andCommandantKalinin orderedthe curfew.
Investigator:Who suggestedit?
Yazov:I did.
Investigator: Was it your recommendationto dispersethe forces
defendingthe White House? Youwould havehad a formal excuse:by
11:00 P.M. everybodyoughtto havebeenat home.
Yazov:Therewere 70,000peoplethere.
Investigator:But thereweretankspatrollingthe city.
Yazov: Yes, they were, but I prohibited the use of fire power. All
they were supposedto do wasto block streets.

[...]
Investigator: Did you rotatethe troops,for examplethosethat were
stationednear the White House?And was it becausethe men were
*According to Yanaev'sstatementat the pressconference,the stateof emergencywasto be introducedin Moscowon August 19.

INTERROGATIONOF DMITRII YAZOY 61

entering into contact with the people and were becomingpolitically
unreliable?
Yazov:Therewas a battalionfrom the Tula Division there.Its commander was formerly the commanderof the division, and he was
Yeltsin's personalfriend. Well, he withdrew his battalion-;iustto relieve the tension. [ ...] Then we sent in anotherunit, from the same
division. After all, the mencould not staythereall the time, they hadto
eat, sleep.That's why we had plannedto rotate them. And when the
secondday began,I saw a whole busloadof vodka being brought to
them. That's how they tried to encouragethe soldiersto betray their
duty. Justimagine drunks in the armoredpersonnelcarriers! That'sa
whole different sort of danger.

Investigator:Whendid you realize thatthis putsch,this coupd'etat...
Yazov: How can you call this a coup d'etat?We said to Yanaev:
"This is a joke, isn't it?" At the end of the pressconferencehe presentedeverything as some kind of a joke. Didn't he say, "Mikhail
Sergeevichis a friend of mine, and when he recovers,he will resume
carryingout his duties"?That wasdoneto calm people.

Investigator: It was then that you decidedto withdraw the troops
and,practically,embarkon the roadto repentance.
Yazov:For God'ssake,very early in the morning·I issuedthe order
to withdraw the troops and, along with that, to help with the dismantling of the barricades,so that we could put an end to this shameful
business.It was in accordancewith my own will, my own decision,
that the troopsbeganto withdraw. I knew that one must not play such
jokeswith the people.

Investigator: Now tell me honestly,when you plannedthis whole
thing, you thoughtthatpeoplewould swallow it without a peep?
Yazov:I think suchan outcomewould not havebeenpossible.I am
speakingfrankly.
Investigator: Supposepeople had swallowed it, what would you
havedonewith Gorbachevthen?
Yazov:I think we would haverestoredthe communicationsthenand
would have returnedGorbachevto his duties, becausethose people
who took over from him wereincapableof governing.
*The orderto withdraw wasissuedby Yazov on the morningof August21.

THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE

Investigator: But a man whose honor had been violated, who had
beenarrestedtogetherwith his whole family, how would he havebeen
ableto continueafterthat?
Yazov:.This is a legitimate question. I am now torturing myself
becauseof this.
Investigator: But you had to think things through, considerthe options for the future.
Yazov:We thoughtaboutnothing,eitherin the shortor the long run.

Investigator:But in caseof your success,you hadto havean ideaof
what todo with Gorbachev.
Yazov:Nobodythoughtaboutthat. My positionwasthat Gorbachev
mustbe allowedto return.
Investigator:So that you could persuadehim [to changehis mind]?
Yazov:I did not plan for this, but I did counton it.
Investigator: How, then, were you planningto win over the people
to your side?
Yazov: We counted on some goods, some reserves,some stocks
hiddenaway somewhere.For this reason,we called in [Deputy Prime
Minister] Shcherbakov.He said: "What you want doesnot exist. There
may be somein the republics,but we have none of it. We don't have
.... Our requestsfor creditswill be rejected,and in five
such-and-such
days,we'll be bayinglike wolves from hunger."
Investigator:What wasthe causeof Pavlov'sillness?
Yazov: I think it was alcohol abuse. I think he was doing this
purposefully,to get out of the game. I saw him two or three times,
and eachtime he was deaddrunk. When he called me [for the first
time], I realizedthis just from his voice. He said: "Arrest them all."
This was after the meeting of the Cabinet on the evening of the
19th.

[...]

Investigator:What role do you now envisionfor yourself?
Yazov:The bestthing for me now ... I wish the earthcould part and
swallow me up. I am suffering terribly. I would like to beg Mikhail
Sergeevichfor forgiveness.I realizemy guilt beforethe people.

[ ...]

INTERROGATIONOF VALENTIN PAVLOV 63

Investigator: You have the opportunity now to senda messageto
PresidentGorbachev.
Yazov: In November,it will be fifty yearssince I joined the armed
forces, and I, an old fool, took part in this ... caper. Now I realize
what a nightmareI causedyou. I regretit very much.But it is probably
too late after all I have done, bringing troops into the streetsof Moscow. I know you as a man with a kind heart who shows so much
understanding.I fought in the war, I was woundedtwice. I would like
to pleadwith you not to court-martialme, but insteadsimply to send
me into retirement.I denouncethis plot, and I will keep denouncingit
until the end of my days, along with my complicity in doing harm to
you, to our countryandour people.

Document2: Interrogationof SovietPrimeMinister
Valentin Pavlov,August30,1991
In an August30 interrogation,formerSovietPrime Minister Valentin
Pavlovtold an investigator"No, " whenaskedwhetherhe
acknowledged
his guilt in the coup. Pavlovinsistedtherehadbeenno
advanceplotting. He soughtto portray himselfas an innocentdupe
taken in by otherscloserto Gorbachev,who deceivedhim with tales
ofGorbachev'sillnessandinability to rule the country. Pavlov
insistedthat he himselfgrew ill at an August18 meeting,whenthe
coup leadersagreedto form theEmergencyCommittee.The
transcript wasfirst publishedin Der Spiegel;it wasreprintedin
Izvestiia(October10,1991).

[ ...]
Pavlov: Yanaevalso statedthat he was assumingthe functions of
the Presidentonly until the meeting of the SupremeSoviet or the
return of the President.On Sundaynight [August 18], we were saying
that we ought to call the SupremeSoviet into sessionon Tuesday.
We-myself,Yanaev,and others--;>roposed
this to Lukianov. He replied that it was not possiblefor purely technicalreasonsand that the
sessionwould probablyconveneon September16, andtheneverything
would be finalized. We responded:If it is not possibleto convenethe
SupremeSoviet on Tuesday,then it shouldbe doneon Wednesdayat
the latest.What this meansis that, as we were creatingthe Emergency

THE EMERGENCYCOMMI7TEE

Committee,we thoughtwe would needtwo or three daysto convene
the SupremeSoviet. Then, either power would then be vestedin the
EmergencyCommittee,or the SupremeSovietwould orderothersteps
to betaken.
During the meetingat which the Committeewas formed, I developed a powerful headache,my blood pressureshot up, and I had to
take my pills. They are called "Valimeton" or something.I always
carry themwith me.
During thosevery sharpdebates,they broughtus more coffee, and
some alcohol to go with it. After some time, I apparentlylost consciousness.My guardstold me that they carriedme from the restroom,
where I was lying on the sofa. So, to put it mildly, I couldn't move
independently.They hadto carry me to my car. I was simply incapable
of taking part in discussionsor debates.My only activity was on Monday night, when I was able, with the help of my doctors,to go to the
Council of Ministers meeting. There, people were supposedto say
what they wanted, butmy condition wasno better. This is the truth.
And I would like to draw attention to the fact that I heard nothing
aboutbringing in troops,aboutstormingthe White Houseor anything
of the kind, or about depriving the Russianleadershipof power. If
therewassucha discussion,I was in no conditionto graspit.
Investigator: When one listensto you, one comesto the conclusion
thatyou fully denyyour guilt.
Pavlov: It's possiblethat I alreadycarry this guilt.
Investigator:Couldyou explain?
Pavlov: At the time of the meeting of the Council of Ministers, I
said, "No confrontationshould be allowed, no stoppageof an enterprise, no bloodshed,no thievery or looting on the streetsand in the
stores."I could and shouldhavetaken a more active position. I could
haveunitedwith the otherside,which was defendingthe White House.
Investigator: You meanyou could have beenamongthe defenders
oftheWhite House?
Pavlov: Probably.But I was very sick, and as my doctor told me,
my blood pressurewas 200 over 100. I am repeatingonce again: for
me the only justification is the stateof my health.
Investigator: Your earlier testimony suggeststhat you were aware
that the Presidentrefusedto yield to the pressureexertedon him.

INTERROGATIONOF VALENTIN PAVLOV 65

Pavlov: The group that had come back from the Crimea reported:
"The Presidentis incapableof doing anything in the state he is in
today. He refusedto sign anything.He is incapacitated,andonecannot
even have a conversationwith him." That's what they said. Besides,
they saidthat they had hadto wait over an hour to be receivedby him,
and that they saw his family, who were in a state of shock as if
someonewere gravely ill. He had doctors there. And only after the
doctorshad left.... He was in no shape.He threw out Plekhanov,the
headof the PresidentialSecurityForce.He would not evenspeakwith
him. He ragedandraged,andPlekhanovwas forcedto leavethe premises.It wassimply impossibleto havea conversationwith him. He was
out of shape,he wasn't a normal humanbeing. Which is why he did
not sign anything.
Investigator: How am I to interpret your testimony of last Friday
when you said: "I was informed that the Presidenthad categorically
refusedto sign any papersthat had anything to do with the state of
emergency.
"
Pavlov: The peoplefrom that group said that it was not possibleto
havea conversationwith him at all.
[ ...]

Investigator: One of the participantssaid: "So, we have completely
exposedourselvesby that visit [to Gorbachev].Everybody who is
presentherenow is implicatedin it. Now we mustmakea decision."In
otherwords, you thoughtthat sinceyou had gonethat far already,you
would haveto take the next step: to take over completelyand transfer
to Yanaevall the functionsof the President.
Pavlov: Underthosecircumstances[ ...] I could not help believing
Boldin that it wasimpossibleto explainanythingto the President.

[...]
Investigator:You didn't try to phonethe President,did you?
Pavlov: I wasn't in any condition to do so, since in the middle of
this meeting, I was already lying down and not participating. Physically, I simply couldnot havecalled.
Investigator:Did you haveany alcohol or coffeein the afternoon?
Pavlov: No, no.

THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE

Investigator:Your bodyguardsaretestifying otherwise.
Pavlov: I meanwe hadcoffee and a little alcohol. Now I know that
it was whisky, becausea bottle of whisky stood on the table. And I
probablytook a gulp.
[ ...]

Investigator:Wasthis all an attemptto seizepower?
Pavlov: I am firmly convincedthat no one intendedto deprive the
Presidentof power. That was not the point. There was an attempt to
convince the Presidentthat decisive steps ought to be taken. Nobody
believedthatYanaevwastrying to takepowerawayfrom the President.

Document3: Interrogationof the Headof the USSRKGB,
Vladimir Kriuchkov
Arrestedon Wednesday,August21, Vladimir Kriuchkov was
interrogatedthefollowing day. Belowis an excerptfrom the
transcript ofhis interrogation. It appearedfirstin Der Spiegel,and
wassubsequentlyreprintedin Izvestiia(October10, 1991).
Investigator: Describe,please,the circumstancesunder which you
decidedto fly to the Crimeato seethe President.
Kriuchkov: We were planning to say it straight to Gorbachevthat
after his departurefor a vacation we had come to a conclusion: the
country is paralyzed.For example,take sugarbeets.It was complete
irresponsibility. All deliveries were off. And if we did not take immediatemeasuresto stabilizeour state,then we would havean imminent collapseofthe state.We wantedto inform him aboutthis. Besides,
we were interestedin hearinghis position, and after that, in our opinion, we had to undertakestabilization measures.We were going to
proposestemmeasures,but we saw no other way out. We wantedto
do everythingto havefull employment,to reducethe numberof factories that neededto be closed.The situation appearedto be so critical
that it was not possibleto drag things out until Septemberor October.
And we were planningto tell Gorbachevthat it might be a goodidea if
he, for some period of time, would relieve himself of his duties and
then,later, would assumethemagain.

INTERROGATIONOF VLADIMIR KRIUCHKOV 67

Investigator:You wantedhim to announcehis own resignation?
Kriuchkov: We wantedhim to delegatehis dutiesto Vice President
Yanaev, temporarily. But we knew that Gorbachevwould soon....
According to Article 127, Paragraph1, of the Constitution,he could
havetransferredhis dutiesto somebodyelse.
Investigator: So it had nothing to do with someillness or other,but
Gorbachevsimply refusedto delegatehis authority to someone.Is that
true?
Kriuchkov: He said: "You may try, but nothingwill comeof it." He
also saidthat he wasnot feeling well. But today,of course,nobodycan
say that he is feeling well. We switchedoff the communicationschannelsto maintainorder,in our terms,andreinforcedthe security.
[ ...]

Investigator:Did you instructPlekhanovto do this?
Kriuchkov: Yes, I did, personally.

[ ...]
Investigator: [ ...] You testified that at first the discussion[with
Gorbachev]wasvery heated.
Kriuchkov: We proposedthat he declarea stateof emergencyand
transferpower to Yanaev,temporarily, so that he could return to his
dutiesat somelater date.His reactionto this proposalwasvery stormy.
After a while, though, he calmed down, but he did not changehis
position: he would nevergive consentto this. So it had nothing to do
with depriving the Presidentof his powers.This is an importantpoint:
we did not breathea word aboutit in any ofthe discussions.
Investigator:You meanphysicalliquidation?
Kriuchkov: What areyou talking about?!We did not evendiscussor
think aboutwhat you are implying. Never. Gorbachevwas to continue
living. Whenwe discussedYanaev,we all understoodvery well that he
could serveonly for a very shortperiod.We knew in advancethat if it
came to [armed] confrontationand the like, then we would have to
resignright away,or takea completelydifferenttack.
Investigator: Were there any written or verbal ordersto storm the
White House?Did you enterinto negotiationwith Yeltsin's people?
Kriuchkov: Our EmergencyCommitteedid not undertakeanyac-

THE EMERGENCYCOMMITTEE

tions that would in any way be directed againstRussiaor Russia's
leadership.We wereawarethat no force would be sufficient [for that].
Investigator:Were thereany attemptsmadeto preventYeltsin from
leavinghis dachafor Moscow?
Kriuchkov: Nothing of the sort. We knew that he had left his dacha
and was on his way. We were not watching him, though, we were
simply awareof it.
Investigator:Did you activateyour armedforces?
Kriuchkov: In Moscow,we strengthened
the Kremlin securityforce.
We did it on the 19th. We weren'tprepared.And we issuedno orders
on the morning of the 19th. Everythingwas postponedtill manana.Of
the things we planned for the 19th, nothing was realized. We took
thosemeasureslater. You are sayingnow that the peoplewere against
us, etc. But the peoplereactedambiguously.The first reactionresembled an expressionof trust, emerginghopes.Peopledid not respondto
the calls to go on strike. Somewhere,four mineswent on strike: one in
the Komi Republic,the othersin the Sverdlovskregion. But the country as a whole reactedfar more calmly than one could haveexpected.
However,the next day, the situationchangedconsiderably.And yet, in
industry, things did not go as far as strikes, just public rallies. The
biggestrally was held in Leningrad,andthereare reasonsfor that. But
Moscowwasmuchweaker;it hadonly 160,000demonstrators.[ ...]

The Public Reacts

All over the SovietUnion, newsof the coup caughtpeopleby surprise
on Monday morning, August 19, 1991.Thoughmanypeopleremained
watchfully on the sidelinesduring the crisis, othersthrust themselves
into the fray. The accountsin this sectiontell the storiesof peoplewho
felt passionatelyaboutthe coup and gravitatedto the centersof action
wherethey witnessed,and to someextentparticipatedin, the momentous events.

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GREGORYFREIDIN

To the Barricades

WhentheAugustcouptookplace, GregoryFreidin, a professorof
Russianliterature at StanfordUniversity, wasmakinghisfourth visit
to Moscowsinceemigratingto the United Statesin 1971.He has
written extensivelyaboutSovietliterature andculture as well as
contemporaryaffairs. He producedthis pieceoriginally for The New
Republic.
As she stuck her hand through a police barrier, a heavy-setmiddleagedwoman whisperedto a pimply young sentry guardinga bevy of
mean-lookingarmoredpersonnelcarriers (APCs) lined up near Red
Square: "Sonny, hey sonny, here's a candy bar, go ahead,take it,
please."
"Against regulations," he muttered, shaking his head, his hands
gripping a Kalashnikov,and then addedalmostinaudibly, "Stick it in
my pocket,fast."
The hand lunged forward-and a tiny chocolate bardisappeared
into the pantspocketof the soldier'sfatigues.Furtheron, more of the
same:chocolates,cigarettes,sandwichessliding into the pocketsof the
young soldiers standing guard before their APCs, as their officers
by the soldiers' mendicancy
looked the other way, both embarrassed
and moved by the crowd's considerationand warmth. An occasional
latecomerto the revolution, anxious to show his militant resolve,elbows his way to the barrierandbeginsto beratethe soldiers,exhorting
themto comeover to the people'sside,to join Yeltsin andRussia.The
soldiers, mostly Slavic-looking, wink and smile at him indulgently
from undertheir rain hoods.
possiblydisposedot:On Monday morning, having deposed-and
the country'sPresident,the self-appointedEmergencyCommitteede71

GREGORYFRElDlN

elaredan all-out war on the opposition.It was hard to imagineat 8:30
A.M. that there was anotherpower in the Soviet Union that could accept the challengeof thosewho had takenover the omnipotentcentral
state.Yet the recentlyinstalledmechanismof the separationof powers
was alreadyworking. By late morning,Yeltsin was climbing
a tank~
November
big tank dispatchedto bring this big man to his knees--tothunder
away at the junta and to pronounceits actionsillegal. A lone member
of the Union Cabinet,Minister of the EnvironmentNikolai Vorontsov,
a People'sDeputy from Russia, joined Yeltsin on the tank to the
cheers,as he told me later that day, of a hundredor so people.For a
spacethe sizeof the Capitol steps,this was a sparsecrowd.
No more than an hour earlier, on my way to the writers' enclavein
Peredelkino,I askedmy taxi driver to circle once aroundthe White
House,the seatof Russia'sparliament.All was calm and ordinary as
befits a governmentbuilding on a sleepyMonday morning in August
(inside, Yeltsin, Khasbulatov,and Silaev were denouncingthe Committee as unconstitutionalto the Moscow presscorps). As we drove
west through the outskirts of the city, a column of tanks, APCs, and
trucks full of armed soldiers was rumbling in the oppositedirection.
By the time we turnedoff the main highway half an hour later, I had
counted150tanksandAPes.
"This is my fourth coup d'etat," confided the ninety-two-year-old
writer I had goneto Peredelkinoto visit. I inscribedfor her a copy of
my Russiantranslation of The Federalist Papers, published a few
monthsearlierin the United States:"To TamaraIvanova,on the day of
her fourth coup d'etat."Starvedfor news,we turnedon the TV only to
be treatedto a splendiferousBolshoi production of Swan Lake. The
sole channelthat was broadcastingover most of the country was teasing the viewers---atthe brink of a civil waF-with a well-preserved
vestigeof Russia'simperial adornment.The high-brow newsblackout
lasted pretty much throughout the coup, but on the secondday an
inventive soul in programmingran a concerthall productionof Boris
Godunov-anoperaticblastat regicides,silent majorities,andpretenders. "Now, cometo think of it, I have lived through six coupsd'etat,"
Ivanova correctedherselfas we were parting. I amendedmy inscription accordingly.The book now seemedno more than a cruel reminder
of yet anotherchancethat Russiahadmissed.
Part of the tank column I had run into earlier was alreadyparkedin
the centerlane on the Kalinin Bridgejust oppositethe White House.A

TO THE BARRICADES 73

Erectinga barricadenearthe WhiteHouse

cop was blocking the traffic, but in sucha dazedand half-heartedway
that my taxi driver jumpedthe curb under his very noseand spedon
without looking back to the other end of the bridge. There,something
strangewas going on. The column of tanks had stoppedshort of a
flimsy barrier madeof sectionsof wire-meshfencing, behindwhich a
dozen or so people were silently pushing an empty trolleybus. "It
must'vestalled,"I said to myself, and wonderedwhy they were pushing it at a right angle to the line of traffic. Next to the trolleybus, a
womenand several
small crowd, consistingof two respectable-looking
men in businesssuits carrying attachecases,was pursuinga weaving
milk truck. One of the menmanagedto jump onto the stepof the cabin
but was immediatelypushedoff by the irate and foulmoutheddriver:
"You fuckers,I'm the one who'll be paying for it, not you...." They
weretrying to commandeerthe truck.·Only thendid it dawnon me that
what I was witnessingwasthe constructionof a barricade.
Further up, where the bridge formed a thoroughfarewith the road
leading to the embankmentand the White House,half a dozentanks
had already taken up positions, their gun barrels trained quizzically
onto an empty patch of overcastsky betweenRussia'sWhite House

GREGORYFREIDIN

andthe ghosttower of the new AmericanEmbassybuilding. The leading tank peakedout dinosaur-likefrom behinda barricadeconsisting
solely of a ten-foot-Iong gardenbench. Up close you could see the
insignia of one of Moscow's two elite tank divisions. A helmeted
soldier sitting on top of the gun turret displayedthat intenselysullen
and distantlook that one readily associateswith the actual Soviet man
engagedin actual socialist construction.Before long, neighborhood
kids were crawling all over the armor, their presencetransformingthe
tank, if not into ploughshares,then into a heavy-dutytenementjungle
gym. Taking in this scene,my eye pausedto registera few inch-thick
metal bars,usedfor reinforcing concrete,sticking out of the wheelsof
the tank treads.The barsdisabledthe vehicle,but the soldierswere in
no hurry to takethemout.
A young man in his twentieswas now climbing on top of the tank.
Leaningagainstthe gun barrel and without any regardfor the soldier,
he beganwaving Russia'snon-Communisttricolor flag. "Folks in the
White Housesay you ought to stick anotherflag into the gun barrel,"
an unassumingelderly woman whisperedloudly to the flag-waver.
"Tell 'em I can't do it: the gun is sheathed,"he hissedback, his face
showing that he was at the limit of his pluck, and with addedfervor
went on making figure eights with his giant tricolor. Did the people
holed up in the White House, for whose benefit the flag was being
waved,find in this sightthe neededencouragement?
The news spreadthat more tanks werecoming along Kalinin Prospect from the direction of the city center. By 3:00 P.M. the crowd,
which hadswelledto a few hundred,rushedto the end of the avenue,
which openedonto the White House.Men and women, mostly welldressedtypes in their thirties and forties, scurriedaroundin searchof
barricade-buildingdebris. As barricade building goes, Moscow is
Europe'smost efficient city. You don't needto overturncarsor newspaperbooths,or tear up roads for the sakeof the archetypalcobblestones, becausethe city's construction bosseshave unwittingly
positionedstoresof debris within everybody'seasyreach.Unfinished
buildings, tom-up roads,and moundsof fragmentsof reinforcedconcrete are as plentiful in Moscow as outdoor cafes in Paris. Past me
marcheda teamof severalmen shoulderinga heavypipe, their shopping bagsandattachecasesswayingin unison.
A column of light tanks and heavy APCs was rumbling along
Kalinin Prospect.The fortification, intendedto block their passage,

TO THE BARRlCADES 75

Civilians rush to form a humanchain againstapproachingtanks on Kalinin
Prospect
consistedof wire mesh screensstrung acrossthe street,held erect by
some sort of telepathyor magic. To shield this contraptionfrom the
catexpillartreads,men and womenjoined handsto form a chain across
the breadthof the avenue.The approachingcolumn, headedby a tanklike thing without a turret, slowedto a crawl. It halteda few feet before
the human chain, filling the air with the noise and stench of idling
diesel engines.Peoplerushedaroundthe leading vehicle, someshouting heart-rendingpleasnot to shoot, othershurling insults at the helmetedheadof the convoycommanderwhich was sticking forlornly out
of the vehicle'stop hatch. "Shame!" "Don't shoot at your own people!" "Yeltsin is your President!""Lackeys of the junta!" "Murderers!" "Be with the people!"
The commanderclimbed halfway out of the hatch. This exhausted
wiry man of aboutforty was wearinga paratrooper'suniform with the
two starsof a lieutenantcolonel. Crouchingbehindhim was a junior
officer, a beefy young man with an anxious smile, cradling in his
enormousarms a handy little automaticrifle. Red-eyed,his face the
color of dust-coveredasphalt,the commanderhad the tormentedlook
of a rudely awakenedman who was orderedto choosebetweenhis

GREGORYFREIDIN

A civilian appealsto a soldiernear the White House

duty as an annyofficer andkilling his own mother.The worst was still
to come.Waving his half-empty string bag at the commander,a grizzled diminutive man---a lifetime of labor stampedindelibly into his
demeanor-elbowed
his way to the side of the tank. He was shaking
with rage. Almost bursting to make himself heard over the engine
noise, he shouted:"I've worked all my life, you see,all my life I've
paid for this anny,andnow you'veturnedagainstme, you're shooting
at me!" "Shame,shame!"the crowd was egginghim on. Severalpeople were pressinginto the officer's handsphotocopiesof the Russian
government'sfIrst appeal,issuedat 9:00 A.M., calling the Emergency
Committee''unconstitutional,''its members"putschists,"anddeclaring
an "indefInite generalstrike." Many were yelling: "You did vote for
Yeltsin, didn't you? You yourselfvoted for Yeltsin, and now you've
got your gunspointing at him." The officer would not takethe bait, but

TO THE BARRICADES 77

his gold-toothedsmile madeit clearthat he did not mind beingcounted
amongYeltsin'ssupporters.
A young man in bluejeansclimbed on top of the tank, helpingonto
the armortwo very good-looking,stylish young women.Like many in
the crowdsaroundthe White House,all threehadaboutthemthe air of
peoplewho "ownedthe place."Nonchalantly,they took surveysof the
tank's top, locateda comfortablespot, and without much ado settled
down, park-benchstyle, for a chatanda smoke.But beforetheir charm
could beginto melt the armor,a corpulentmatron,her grayinghair in a
tight bun, wrestledher way to the front of the tank andbeganto bellow
at the officers. Gesticulatingforcefully, as if unawarethat her hands
were ensnaredby a braceof string bags,shepointedto her breastand
roared:"I've nurturedyou, bastards,andnow you will be shootingme
in this breast!" A vein on the commander'stemple, which had been
pulsating visibly throughoutthe encounter,swelled enormously;his
dust-coveredface grew ruddy,jawsclenched,but the eyeswereclearly
pleading to sparehim this unbearableordeal. His aide let go of the
rifle, and it disappeareddown the hatch. "Cut off the engine, commander,saveyour fuel for the crops!" The enginewas stopped,and
minutes latereveryvehiclein the convoyfollowed suit. No, he will not
obey if orderedto shootat the people,he said to a Frenchreporterin
reply to the questionon everybody'smind.
The family reunion was now in full swing. The paratroopershad
not eaten for twenty-four hours and had been on the march since
leaving their basein Riazantwo days ago. The contentsof the barricadebuilders' shoppingbags-thoseunprepossessing
horns-of-plenty
stuffedwith sausage,bread,candy,cartonsof milk-flowed freely into
the openhatchesof the paratroopers'tanks and APCs. An hour or so
later, an order came for the convoy to leave. The streetgrew empty,
exposingto all the vicissitudesof a revolutionthe still flimsy barricade
and the wearied,vulnerablemen and womenwho had the determination to build it. Therewere the people,therewas their electedgovernment, which the people had gatheredto defend, and there was the
enemy,epitomizedby the old Communiststate.Therewas a nation in
the making.

Letter from Moscow

At the time ofthe coup, the author ofthis letter was in Moscowwith
her daughter,Masha.Her sonArtemwas in Czechoslovakia,andher
husband,Volodia, was ona concerttrip in Nizhnii Tagil. Shewrote
this letter to a friend in Berkeley,California, andprefersto remain
anonymous.

On the 19th, when our neighborwoke me up at 8:00 A.M. andsaidvery
rudely, "We have a military coup, and you're just lying around," it
becameclear that I had to act independently.On televisionthey were
broadcastingonly Beethoven.Radio Russiaand Moscow Echo were
already silent, and the ''voices'' [Western radio broadcasts]were already jammed. I was frightened becauseit had happenedso quickly
and so easily. I telephonedArtem andtold him not to comehome,as I
was afraid thesebastardswould announcea military draft. It turnedout
that the Europeancountrieshad alreadyclosedthe borders,and Artem
askedme not to losemy head,that he would try to fly back.
I was surprisedthe entire time that the telephonekept working. I
beganto telephonearound,and I learnedthat the tanks were already
moving on Lenin and Kutuzov Prospects,and that they had long since
surroundedour White House. I finally reachedthe people at
Nezavisimaiagazeta,and there I heardthe first consoling news: that
Yeltsin had alreadywritten an appealand that peoplewere askedto
gatheron ManezhSquare.I tried to phoneanyoneI could, just to tell
them the news. I found a place for Mashato stay, and then, with the
only (!) person who agreed to go with me, I headedfor Manezh
Square. It was 12:00 noon. Trolleybuseswere still running along
Tverskaia Street, and they were selling television sets and washing
machinesin the storesWITHOUT SPECIAL COUPONS(I). People
78

LEITER FROM MOSCOW 79

were standingin huge lines for gasolineand food, and the rest of the
city looked as though nothing were going on. There were peopleeverywhere,and it seemedto me there was no alarm on their faces.We
took a trolley to ManezhSquare....
There were not a lot of peopleon the square--morethan the 150
that "Vremia" [the newsprogram] mentioned,but no more than 500.
Everyonefelt lost, and some man was shouting into a loudspeaker
that Yeltsin had not askedpeopleto come to the square,and that it
wasjust a provocation.I told him: "Don't get hysterical.Peoplewill
come here anyway. Tell us what to do." No one knew anything.No
one understoodanything. Deputies of the Moscow City Council
appeared,but although they were wearing their deputy pins, they
somehowlooked small in their beardsand jeans.They didn't look
serious.But they brought the text of Yeltsin's appealand beganto
call us to go to the White House. Someonesaid that THIS was a
provocation.I askedwhetherthey couldn't find someonemore serious to explain everything to us. At that moment we all heard a
terrible noiseand saw that on two sides--ManezhSquareand Revolution Square----tankswere coming and trying to surroundthe square
and us. It was terrible (one of the most terrible moments).I stood
with my eyes closedand kept saying, "I'm frightened, I'm afraid!"
An elderly Georgian who was holding me by the shoulder said,
"Everything is okay."
Thenthe tankscomingfrom the sideof RevolutionSquarestopped,
and thosefrom the side of ManezhSquarecontinuedto move and we
ran there.When we ran up to them, the tanksthat were surroundedby
people had already stopped, and the people immediately began to
climb on them. What the hell (I was wearing a skirt). One of the
officers emergedfrom a tank and said that he gave his word as a
Russianofficer that theydid not haveweaponsandtheir gunswere not
loaded. This was met with terrible shouts and whistles. He said the
magazinesof their guns were empty. I said, we already know about
empty stores [Russian: magaziny]! In a word, there was a terrible
ruckus,with everyonespeakingat once.
Then a Deputy appearedagainwith a loudspeaker.We all followed
him to the White House.Everyonewas sayingthat the stormingof the
White Housewould begin at 16:00,and we shouldbuild barricades.It
was really pouringrain. Whenwe cameto the embankmenttherewere
somepeoplealreadythere(very few!) and we learnedthat Yeltsin had

LEITER FROM MOSCOW

Tankslined up on KutuzovProspect

already spoken,that he had read his appeal.We were all standingin
the rain andtherewas a rumor that Yeltsin was alreadyarrested.Later,
he appearedon the balcony. Everyoneshoutedfor him to leave becausetheremight be snipersaround.
Tanks appearedfrom the side of the bridge that connectsKutuzov
and Kalinin Prospects.Everyonebeganto screamhorribly and many,
including myself, beganto weep.Then we saw how peoplewho were
on the other side were weeping and sitting down on the bridge,
blocking the path of the tanks. The tanks stoppedand I heard some
man in civilian clothesyelling hystericallyinto a radio transmitterthat
they couldn't move forward becausepeoplewere lying down in front
of the tanks, and that if the tanks all stayedon the bridge, it would
collapse.
Then I saw somethingthat mademy hair standon end. A Japanese
man(!), carryinghis child abovehis head,beganto approachthe tanks.
I rushedto him and screamedlike mad, in English: "You must come
out!" I don't rememberhow many times I repeatedthis, seizing his
elbow, before I heardhim say, "Why?" I screamedagain, pointing at
the tanks: "This is our things!" At this moment, everyonescreamed

LEITER FROM MOSCOW 81

that the OMON [specialpolice] hadarrived,andeveryoneran to them.
The crowd carriedme to the othersideof the White House,the sideby
the Krasnopresnenskaia
embankment.
I describeto you the most horrible, scary moments,though now I
understandthat the incident with the Japaneseman was really funny.
God only knows what he thought of me (I mean,what he thought of
my English). In a calmersituationI probablywould have said''This is
our problem," not ''This is our things." I'm afraid he probablythought
that we didn't wantto give him our tanks....
There were indeed two cars full of OMON at the entrance.We
surroundedthemandbeganto rock them. They shoutedbackthat they
were RussianOMON, but no one believedthem, and peoplesaidthat
decentpeoplewould neverjoin OMON. Then Rutskoi cameout and
said that they did belong to the RussianOMON. Everyoneshouted
"Hurrah" andapplauded,andsaid "Letthe carsgo."
Thenwe beganto build barricades.Guesswho wascarryingthe first
logs and boxes?That'sright, our women.Then the menjoined us and
began to carry logs from the park. Then we uprooted a telephone
booth-andwe were sorry that night, becausewe had to go to the
metro stationto makecalls. It was five o'clock. After six, we all began
to disperse.We all went home to put on somethingwarmer for the
night and to get food. I also went home to changeclothes, to feed
Masha,to find a placefor her to spendthe night, andto write a note to
Volodia. My mood was terrible. I didn't want to listen to the radio,
becauseat that time they were broadcastingthe pressconferenceof
this new committee. Lenka called me from somewherearound the
White Houseandsaidthat everythingwasquiet so far. Shecameto see
me, to leaveher bagsand to dry off. We cried togethera little bit, got
everything in order, and then went to the White House for the night
with my sisterandanotherman.
The crowd grew. To my surpriseI saw many young people.They
were setting up tents and making campfires.Tanks were standingat
the White Houseunderthe Russianflag, andeveryonewas discussing
the new heroes--theofficers who took the side of Yeltsin. Threecars
of soldiers arrived, and everyonehurried to give them food, tea, or
coffee. The radio of the White House was working. There weren't
really that many people,but we had a feeling of organization.There
were persistentrumors that at four o'clock in the morning the
storming would begin. So we began to strengthenthe barricades.

LEITER FROM MOSCOW

Women hauling debris to build a barricade as tanks approach the White
House

A barricadedstreetnearthe White House,mid-afternoonon August19

LEITER FROM MOSCOW 83

Then an announcementwas madeon the radio that really scaredme.
They reportedthat in hospitalsandclinics, toxicological and intensive
careunits were being freed up, and it was explainedwhat one should
do during a gasattack. And I didn't evenhave a handkerchief.People
who had some suppliesdistributed bandagesand rags. I said that I
would not soakthoseragsin a rain puddle-itwasn'tclean.The experiencedpeoplesaid that we should not soak the rags in water, but in
urine! I should tell you that I was peeing in the bushesall the time,
becauseI was really scared,and when you're scared,you have to.
Everyonetried to get me to savethis valuableliquid, or at leastput it
all in onebottle.
We were all waiting for four 0'clock. The tensionwas so greatthat
we could actually hear the hum of arriving tanks, though in reality,
they weren'tthere....
When it got lighter, everyoneunderstoodtherewould be no storming. I felt cold and bored. We were waiting for the metro to open,
hoping that replacementswould arrive to give us a rest. And I only
went homewhen I sawthat a thin streamand then a currentof people
wasarriving.
As I was climbing over the barricadeI lookedback andsawpeople
running to and fro. SuddenlyI thought:"I love themall!" And I'm not
afraidto sayit; it wasa momentof truth.
What cameafter that, I really don't have the strengthto write. It
was the end of the most terrible, nerve-rackingday. The unknown
was terrible. The night was sleepless. Iwas worried about Volodia.
(He arrived on the morning of the 20th and went to the White
House.)Desperation,hope, inhumanhatred.But there were already
many of us.
Now I understandthat we had many amusingmoments.For example, on the 20th, the day of the storming, an army of taxis and
gypsy cabscameto the barricades.The ownersof the new carswere
using them to form part of the barricades.Co-operators[private
businessmen]in Volvos and Mercedesbrought boxes of imported
beer and American cigarettes.I can't describeit all. In short, life
went on. As Berezhkovsaid, the last two days of communismwere
terribly rainy....
We didn't go to the celebrationmeeting. We just turned off the
telephoneand finally had a good sleep. We didn't have a crumb of
food in the house.We had eatenit all up or takenit to the barricades.

84 LETTER FROM MOSCOW

The shopswere empty. My apartmentwas a mess.Thank God it's all
over. Howeverstrangeit may seemto you, I don't feel anyjoy. Things
are very confusedand unclear.I will never forget the fear and terror.
Volodia went to Lubiankaand cut a pieceof graniteoff of Feliks.* We
shouldhavehada drink; thenwe would havefelt better.Mashacries at
night, andit makesme feel terribly guilty.
But all the same,God is with us.

*This is a referenceto the toppling of the statue of Feliks Dzerzhinskii,
founderofthe secretpolice,on Thursdayevening.

VICTORIA E. BONNELL

August 19 and 20 in Moscow

Victoria E. Bonnell, a sociologistat the UniversityofCalifornia,
Berkeley,madeherfirst visit to the SovietUnion in J970. Shehas
written extensivelyaboutthe Russianlabor movementon the eveof
the J9J 7 revolution, but neverimaginedshewouldwitnesspersonally
a major upheavalin Russia.At the time ofthe coup, shewas in
Moscowcompletingthe researchfor a studyofSovietpolitical art.
DAY ONE

"Wake up, there's been a coup," were the fIrst words I heard that
Monday. I was blissfully asleepwhen my husbandrushed into the
bedroomto announcethe news.
"So what?"I said,still half asleep,"What do you mean,a coup?"
He was visibly agitated. "Gorbachevhas been declaredill, and
power is now in the handsof someemergencycommittee.Don't you
understand,it's civil war now!"
The seriousnessof the situation was beginning to sink in. Still,
somehowthe newsdid not quite fIt with what I knew aboutthe country. "Don't be so sure," I said, summoningwhat little remainedof my
Americancool. "The SovietUnion is no bananarepublic."
He was notconvinced.
My husbandand I had met in Moscow in 1970, two years after
Soviet tanks put an end to the PragueSpring. For the Russiansof his
generationand outlook (he was involved in the dissidentmovement),
that was the harshestblow, and now, it seemed,he was destinedto
witnessa replayof it all with a twenty-yeardelay.
We were visiting our in-laws in Moscow, andhadbroughtour fiveyear-olddaughterwith us. Now the whole family gatheredaroundthe
85

VICTORIA E. BONNELL

small white plasticradio with a single station.A Sovietannouncerwas
readingthe proclamationsof the newly createdEmergencyCommittee.
His word-of-God style of delivery, seldom heard since the onset of
glasnost,arousedunpleasantmemories.Gorbachev,while on vacation
at his dachain the Crimea,had beentakenill, and was being replaced
by Vice President Gennadii
Yanaev.Yanaevand sevenothertop governmentofficials had formed a StateCommitteefor the StateofEmergencyto rescuethe "greatMotherland"from chaos.
My in-Iaws----Gita Samuilovna,a retired doctor, and Monos Grigorievich, a retired engineer, both in their mid-seventies-Iooked
stricken by the news. Shaking their heads,they mutteredagain and
again that it was uzhasno (frightful), really uzhasno,and shuffled
around the apartmentwith bewilderedexpressions.And truly, the
news was hard to assimilate.No one in our family believed for a
moment that Gorbachevhad steppeddown becauseof illness. But
what did it all mean?Our fears that first morning were almost too
terrible to contemplate.Yet one thing seemedclear: the long expectedright-wing coup, predictedby Shevardnadzeand others,had
finally takenplace.
Soon the immensity of the eventsbore down on us. Gita Samuilovna turned on the television and found a test patterninsteadof the
usual morning programs.The mute television had a profoundly disturbing effect on my in-laws, who dependon it for a steadystreamof
informationandentertainmentthroughoutthe day. Somewhatlater, the
blank screenyieldedto films of operaand ballet, andthat evening,the
televisioncarriedthe eveningnewsand a broadcastof the junta'sfirst
and only press conference.Inexplicably, even children's programs
were suspendedon Monday and for the duration of the crisis. For
seventy-twohours,the regular routine of televisionbroadcastson the
four availablestationsalmostentirelydisappeared.
Monos Grigorievich quickly dressedand went to visit the local newspaperkiosk. He returnedsoonafterwardwith his lips tightly pursedanda
frightenedlook in his eyes:the kiosks were closedand rumors had it
that the non-CommunistParty presshad beenshut down. As we later
discovered,only Party-controlledpaperssuchas Pravda continuedto
publish during the threedaysof the coup. The country'sastonishingly
successfulindependentnewspapers--Argumenty
i fakty, Nezavisimaia
gazeta,Kommersant,and Komsomolskaiapravda--vanishedfor the
durationof the crisis. The junta'sappropriationof the medianot only

AUGUST 19 AND 20 IN MOSCOW 87

Demonstratorsmarching/romManezhSquareto the White House

disruptedthe senseof normalcybut also arousedtremendousindignation among educatedmiddle-classpeople, such as my in-laws, who
havecometo cherishfreedomof informationandcommunication.
At about2:00 P.M., I arrived in downtownMoscow. As I cameout
of the Lenin Library metro station, I saw a crowd of peoplemoving
throughManezhSquareandup Kalinin Prospectin the directionof the
White House,headquartersfor Yeltsin and the SupremeSoviet of the
RussianFederation.ManezhSquareis an immenseareaextendingthe
length of severalcity blocks, adjacentto Red Squareand the Kremlin,
and flanked by the Manezh(a large exhibition hall that had oncebeen
a tsarist stable) on one end and the Hotel Moskva on the other. The
militia had closed off the entire squareand nearby streetsto traffic.
The demonstrators-numbering
from one to two thousandpeople--marchedwithout interference.They were a somberand well-dressed
crowd; many of the men wore suits and carried briefcases.As subse-

VICTORIA E. BONNELL

quent events conftmled, the protest movementagainst the coup in
Moscowwas overwhelminglya middle-classaffair.
I stoppeda tall manwith a bushybeard--thekind of personI might
encounterin my hometownof Berkeley, California---andaskedwhat
was going on. He told me that Yeltsin had called for a generalstrike
againstthejunta. What did he think this was all about,I asked.He said
with great conviction that Gorbachevhad orchestratedthe coup and
was now pretendingto be under arrest while watching to see if it
succeeded.When I expressedsome skepticismover this scenario,he
insistedthat Gorbachevwas not a victim but a perpetratorof the plot
againstYeltsin and the country'sdemocraticforces. This conspiracy
theory circulatedrather widely until Thursdaymorning, when a haggard Gorbachevreappearedin Moscow,togetherwith detailedreports
of his incarcerationandthe illnessof his wife.
Turning away from the demonstration,I crossedthe street into
Manezh Square,savoring the marvelous,almost illicit sensationof
crossingabovegroundon streetsusually reservedfor Ladasand Volthroughwhich Muscogas,insteadof in the undergroundpassageways
vites are obliged to shuffle like moles. On this Monday afternoon,
amid intermittentrain showers,the squarewas filled with demonstrators, strollers, curious bystanders,people fraternizing with soldiers,
young couplesholding hands,and peopleeatingice cream.The line at
the popularjoint-venturePenguinice cream store, next to the Hotel
Moskva, never slackenedthat afternoon.The atmospheremight have
seemedalmost festive had it not been for the presenceof the tanks,
armoredpersonnelcarriers(APCs),andmilitary trucksthat hadmoved
in so suddenlythat morning.
The sight of all the hardwarewas awesome.A long line of APCs
extendedfrom the Moscow Riverinto ManezhSquare.Besidesthe armed
soldiers, equippedwith Kalashnikovmachineguns, severalbusloadsof
OMON special forces ("black berets") blocked the entranceto Red
Square.APCs,ratherthantanks,dominatedthe scenearoundthe Manezh.
I later learnedthat many tankshadbeenmovedinto Red Square.Similar
concentrationsof APCs and tanks--severalhundred in all-could be
found aroundthe Central Telephoneand Telegraphoffice on Tverskaia
Street,in SovetskaiaSquare,andin the vicinity of the White House.
The spectacleof so many military vehicles and soldiersreminded
me of the monumentalvictory paradesheld in Red Squaretwice each
yearsince 1918 on the occasionsof May Day andNovember7. Yet the

AUGUST 19 AND 20 IN MOSCOW 89

A civilian confrontsan officer in ManezhSquare

sceneon this overcastafternoonof August 19 was dramaticallydifferent. The vehicleswere going nowhere;the young soldierswho occupied them, though fully armed, appeareddazedand confused.As it
turned out, they were also hungry and had no bathrooms.The APCs
seemedoddly unprotectedandevenvulnerable.
Even more astonishing---almostsurreal-wasthe lively fraternization betweencivilians and soldiers.By the time I arrived in Manezh
Square,fraternizationwasalreadywell underway, leavenedby cigarettes,
chocolates,and other goodies. Civilians, even some children, were
perchedon APCs or circled around them. Most of the soldiers-very
young men with Central Asian or Ukrainian namesimprinted on their
ammunitionpouches-stoodmute but not hostile. Since they had been
told that their presencein Moscow was neededto preventa left-wing
coupagainstthe government,they wereunderstandablyperplexed.

VICTORIA E. BONNELL

"Yeltsin Has Calledfor a GeneralStrike"

"Outlaw the CPSU!" and "Put the BolshevikPutschistson Trial!"

AUGUST 19 AND 20 IN MOSCOW 91

Peoplegatheredfora rally by the Hotel Moskvain ManezhSquare

That day, neitherthe officers, nor soldiers,nor Moscow militiamen
(generally sparseand aloof) interferedwith the protestersor tried to
protectthe APCs from civilian intrusion. People tookadvantageof the
situationand scrawledchalk sloganson APCs, suchas "Shameon the
CPSU" and "Yazov on Trial." Two young men stood on one APC
holding placardswith the messagethat Yeltsin hadcalledfor a general
strike. Not far from them, someonehad paintedsloganson the pavementin largewhite letters:"Outlaw the CPSU"and"Put the Bolshevik
Putschistson Trial." Officers must havehadsecondthoughtsaboutthe
fraternizationbecausethe next day the areaaroundthe APCs hadbeen
cordonedoff. But on Monday civilians had easyaccessto the APCs,
which werebedeckedwith flowers, protestsigns,andofferingsof food
and cigarettes.The mighty defendersof the old regimeof communism
hadalreadylost someof their auraof invincibility.
As I moved toward the far end of Manezh Squarein front of the
Hotel Moskva-ahotel reservedfor membersof the SupremeSoviet
and other governmentdignitaries---arally was in progress.An earlier
rally organizedhere around 11:00 A.M. had alreadymoved on to the
White House, and new people,perhapsfive hundredor more, were

VICTORIA E. BONNELL

Protestleafletsat a metrostationon Kalinin Prospect

gatheredaround the platform. We strainedto hear speechesby four
men, including severalmembersof the Moscow City Soviet, who exhorted people to support Yeltsin and defy the junta with a general
strike. From time to time the crowd erupted into rhythmic chants:
"Yeltsin, Russia,GeneralStrike."
Behind the speakersstood a small but visible flag of the Russian
Republic,a tricolor with horizontalbandsof white, blue, and red. The
flag has a long history in Russia,dating back to 1799, when it was
introducedas the country'smerchantflag. In 1883 it becamean alternative civil flag, and in 1914 Tsar Nicholas II addedto it a doubleheadedeagle, symbol of the monarchy. The flag, minus the eagle,
servedthe ProvisionalGovernmentbut was abandonedafter the Bolsheviks seized
power. During Russia'sAugustRevolution,the tricolor
flag becamea potentsymbolof Russiandemocraticresistance.
A scruffy manappearedandbeganto hawk photocopiesofYeltsin's
appeal, ''To the Citizens of Russia," for fifty kopecks each. Some
peoplegrumbledand complainedabout paying for the proclamation,
but therewas no shortageof buyers.I later noticedidentical photocopies of the proclamationpostedon the walls of metro stationsin central

AUGUST 19 AND 20 IN MOSCOW 93

Moscow, providing many people with their first information about
Yeltsin's opposition to the coup. Only the most determinedcitizens
could take advantageof this form of communication,since the typescript was extremelysmall andpoorly spaced.During the next critical
forty-eight hours,communicationsdid not flow easilyin this sprawling
city of nearly nine million people.Word of mouth-atplacesof work
and residence,in the streets,and over the telephone-probablytransmitted more informationthanany otherchannelsof communication.
As I returnedhome late that afternoon,I looked at Muscovite faces
-weary,stolid, care-linedfaces,eyesaverted-andwondered:Will these
people mobilize to resist the attack on their freedomand their fledgling
democraticinstitutions?How will they overcometheir dispersionin this
enormouscity, their poor communications,the apparentabsenceof networks for organization?That first day, I did not see a single instanceof
leafletingor proselytizingin public places,exceptat the White Houseand
around Manezh Square.My fears intensified when I got back to my
in-laws' district of Sokol, abouthalf an hour from the centerof the city.
There,peoplewere going abouttheir businessasusual.The White House
andthe barricadessuddenlyseemedvery remote.
When I put my daughterto bed, she asked about ''the war" and
whetherwe would be takento prison. Unthinkingly, I assuredher that
foreignerswould not be arrested,which sheinterpreted,quite logically,
to meanthat Muscovitesmight be. "Will they comeandtake babushka
and dedushkaaway?" she asked with a grave look. No, I told her,
_certainlynot your grandparents,for they are old andhavedonenothing
but sit at home. "We're all safe," I said in my most reassuringvoice,
stifling my own alarm.
Later my husbandandI talked aboutevacuationif things continued
to deteriorate.We were relievedto learn earlier that air travel had not
been interrupted. But we were not ready to leave yet. The situation
seemedtoo ambiguousand our emotions--amixture of caution and
daring, hope and despair,exhilarationat being there and fear for our
personalsafetyandthat of our family-weretoo contradictoryto guide
us towarddecisiveaction.
DAY

Two

On Tuesdaymorning the situation seemedunchangedexceptthat a
major public rally was scheduledto take placeat the White Houseat
noon. The announcementcameover the Moscow Echo radio station

VICTORIA E. BONNELL

Peoplecarrying an enormoustricolor flag to the midday rally at the White
House

andshortwavebroadcasts.I sawnoticesof the meetingon the walls in
somemetro stationswith instructionsaboutwhich stationto exit from.
Since the junta had taken almost complete control over the mass
media, communicationnetworks remainedextremely restricted and
manyMuscovitesneverfound out aboutthe rally.
Tuesdaywas sunny. Enormouscrowds of peoplestreamedtoward
the White House,coveringthe entire areaof the parking lot behindit.
They spreadout on the lawn beyondthe parking lot and into nearby
streets.Somepeopleperchedon the pedestalof a huge sculptureof a
womanwaving a Soviet flag, flanked by a soldier with a rifle. Others
stoodon ledgesof nearbybuildings. Peoplecrowdedonto the tanks that
had goneover to Yeltsin the eveningbefore,now deckedwith flowers
andheapedwith milk cartons,bread,potatoes,andcannedfood.
The sight of so many people--perhapsas many as one hundred
thousand--gaveme hope,for the first time sincethe coup began,that
Muscoviteswould mount significant resistanceto the junta. The size
and determinationof the crowd andthe tone of the rally remindedme
of civil rights and antiwar demonstrationsI had participatedin during
the late 1960sand the1970s.This was no randomcollectionof ordinary

AUGUST 19 AND 20 IN MOSCOW 95

Muscovites.Judgingby their faces,clothes,and deportment,the vast
majority werepeoplewith highereducation,solidly middle classintellectuals and white-collar workers. Apart from the Afghan vets who came to
defend the White House, few of the demonstratorslooked like factory
workers. Although there were someyoung people,especiallystudents,the
vast majority of the participantsin the demonstrationwere in their thirties
andforties. Photographswe took at the time confinnthis impression.
There were women in the crowd, but noticeably fewer than men.
''They're probably standing in line somewhere,"I thought to myself.
Political figures andpublic speakersduring the coupwerenearlyall male.
At the Tuesdaydemonstration,only one woman spokepublicly: Yelena
Bonner,the widow of Andrei Sakharov,a featuredspeakerat the rally.
Peopledid not come in organizedpolitical groups,and there were
few placards.The crowd consistedof individuals, brought there by a
commonoppositionto the junta, their allegianceto Yeltsin, and Russian nationalism. Three chants that periodically rang out over the
square conveyedthe mood of the crowd: "Put the junta on trial,"
"Yeltsin, we supportyou," "Russiais alive" (the latter proclaimedat
the rally by the poetY evtushenko).
For threehours,speakerafter speakertook the microphoneto exhort
peopleto resistance.They remindedthe crowd of the long history of
submissionto unjust authority (mention was madeof Czechoslovakia
in 1968,the millions who hadbeenarrestedandsentto camps,andso on)
and urged each citizen to take a stand againstthe coup. Others spoke
aboutthe illegality of the junta, its violation of Article 62 of the Constitution of the USSR and the criminal code, its unlawful introduction of
martial law, and the necessityfor proper legal proceedingsagainstits
members.Onephrasewasrepeatedoverandover: ''Putthejuntaon trial."
Speakerafter speakerpraisedthe peopleof Moscow and Russians
more generally, giving the rally a strong nationalist tone. This was
most vividly symbolizedby the arrival of a gigantic tricolor flag, carried by several hundred people and hung along the balcony of the
White Housethat servedasthe speakers'platform. A few smallerflags
werealso sprinkledthroughoutthe crowd.
Eloquentand moving speeches,such as the one deliveredby Bonner, arousedstrongfeelings of allegianceto Moscow andRussia.Bonner
beganwith an anecdotefrom her daysof exile in Gorky. Shehadaskeda
KGB officer: ''Why do you write lies aboutmy husband'sactivities?" "It
is written not for 'us,' " he replied, but for 'the rabble' [bydlo-literally,

VICTORIA E. BONNELL

The Tuesdayrally, with the tricolor flag drapedover the WhiteHousebalcony

cattle]." The junta is the same,Bonner continued. Everything they
have said and written is for the "rabble." "They think we are rabble."
All putschesandrevolutionsaredecidedin the capital,andMuscovites
must demonstrate
that they are not rabbleandcannotbe boughtwith a
salami paid for with a Pavlov ruble-areferenceto the terrible inflation that devaluedthe ruble following the appointmentof Valentin
Pavlov as Prime Minister in January 1991. This statementelicited
tremendousapplause.
Relentlessly,Bonnerexhortedthe crowd, calling on themto defend
the Russianparliament,the RussianPresident,andthe Presidentof the
USSR.For althoughhe wassometimesmistaken,Gorbachevwas,after
all, "our President"(applause).We must not give over our countryto a
"gang of crooks"; we must resist as we did in 1941. She concluded
with a paeanto Moscow, so dearto Russianhearts,whereshechoseto
live even though she could have moved anywhere (prolonged applause).Shespokewith greatauthorityandelegance.
Some speakersmentionedthe general strike, but this was not a
major themeat the rally. The timetablefor the beginningof the general
strike, vague on Monday, becomeeven more uncertainon Tuesday.
The tactical issue on Tuesdaywas not the generalstrike but the de-

AUGUST 19 AND 20 IN MOSCOW 97

The crowdlisteningto speeches
at the Tuesdayrally

fenseof the White Houseagainstwhat manybelievedto be an imminent military attack. An extraordinarysessionof the RSFSRSupreme
Soviethadbeenscheduledto beginthereon the following day.
The mood of the departingcrowd was tense,determined,and somber as it movedaway from the White Housein a disciplinedmanner.I
was struck by the fact that therehadbeenno disturbancesor incidents,
no hint of violence during the entire afternoon,despitethe fact that
policemen were conspicuously absentand no informal networks of
civilians hadbeencreatedto guideandregulatethe crowd.
The junta had declareda curfew in effect from 11:00 P.M. to 5:00
A.M .. This, it seemed,wasthe preludeto an attackon the White House.
Speakershadurgedpeopleto remainand defendthe White House,and
some five or ten thousandpeople heededtheir call. Around five
0'clock they beganto form self-defense
units. A groupof somefifty or
sixty Ukrainian men gatheredin front of the White Houseto discuss
procedures.Some political groups had units, such as the anarchists,
andthe supportersof Memorial, an organizationdevotedto the preservation of information about Stalin'sterror. Other units consistedsimply of volunteers without any common allegiance except their
oppositionto the junta. As night fell, small groupsset up camp in the

VICTORIA E. BONNELL

Children on a pro-Yeltsin tank near the White House (Anna Freidin, the
author'sdaughter,is at center)

area,makingfires, eatingfood, listeningto radios;sometook naps.
Having collectedmy daughterat the AmericanEmbassy,whereshe
was in daycare,and photographingher standingon a friendly tank, I
departedfor home.Everyonein my family was glued to the radio that
evening.Therewas a feeling of intenseapprehensionand foreboding.
We all expecteda confrontationlater thatnight. Around nine o'clock
I put a call throughto my father in California, my first sincethe coup
began.He wept on the phone as he told me how frightened he had
been for our safety. We were not in physical danger,I told him, but
tonight would probablyleadto violence.It was hardexplainingto him
that so far most of the city remained unaffected
by the coup. Despite
the high probability of violence aroundthe White House,our neighborhoodpresentedno dangerswhatsoever.
My father's alarm gave me a senseof how ominous the situation
must appearto the outside world. With memoriesstill vivid of the
governmentattacksin Lithuania and Latvia as well as the Tiananmen
massacre,a major loss of life and even a civil war seemedlikely. I
went to sleepthat night with a heavyheart.

AUGUST 19 AND 20 IN MOSCOW 99

Defendersofthe WhiteHousesetup camp

Men guardingthe WhiteHouseearly Tuesdayevening

LAUREN G. LEIGHTON

Moscow: The Morning of
August 21

Lauren G. Leighton,who teachesRussianliterature at the University
ofIllinois at Chicago,is the authorofmanyscholarlyworks, essays,
andtranslations.He lived in Russia duringmostofthe two years
precedingthe coupandin 1991-92wasa Fulbright Exchange
Teacherat the MoscowPedagogicalUniversity.
I was in the orchardtaking a lukewarm showerin a cold rain at the
dacha near Kharkov, in Ukraine, when the EmergencyCommittee
madeits now well-known statementthat it hadtakenpower. The voice
over the radio soundedlike it is supposedto soundat such a moment:
spooky, without human quality,distanced,ominous. It had the Party
Old Guardring of a lie to it-not the words themselves,but the presumptiveeasewith which the Old Guard lies for its view of history.
My wife, her father, and I immediatelydecidedto return to Moscow,
not out of any senseof apprehension,but becausewe knew that the
future would be decidedthereandwe wantedto seeit.
When we arrived in Moscow we got a glimpse of tanks near the
Kremlin and passeda standingcolumn of armoredtroop carriers on
our way home,but the city seemedcalm and our taxi driver reported
that most of the city had not reacted.Life also continuedas usual in
our neighborhood,and I saw no signs of military control when I
walked downto look at the Ostankinotelevision center. Radio Free
Europe reportedresistance,but the impressionwe receivedwas that
peoplehad not reacted.So far as we could tell throughoutthe remainto be in control; we hadplenty
der of August20, the putschists seemed
of time to decidewhat, if anything,we could do.
100

AUGUST21 IN MOSCOW 101

In this we erred,of course,and it was only in the evening,with rain
pouring down and public transportationhalted, that we learnedfrom
friends that we had lost anotherday. We tried to makeour way across
the city on foot, but finally turned back, wet and feeling foolish. We
spentthe rest of the night listening to the reportsof the confrontation
on the Garden Ring Road near the American Embassy.I had spent
most of the previoustwo yearsin Russiabecause,as a colleagueonce
remarked,"History is happeningthere and it would be shamefulto
miss it." Now we weremissingit.
The rain was still alternatelydrizzling and pouring on the morning
of August 21. We were able to make our way by trolleybus to the
Garden Ring Road at the junction with Tverskaia Street and then
walked about a mile to the American Embassy.We had to make our
way throughtwo columnsof light tanks,enginesrunning, the air thick
with dieselfumes.Peoplesurroundedthe tanks,beggingthe soldiersto
return to their barracks.("Pleasego home, children," is the way one
womanput it.) The streetin front of the embassywas littered with the
remnantsof the confrontation.Further along the Ring stood the first
outer barricade:smashedtrucks and trolleybuses,huge blocks of cement, iron rods, boards,glass.We climbed with difficulty throughthe
massof junk, and were helpedby irregularly dressedRSFSRsoldiers,
Afghanistanvetsin their distinctivecombatfatigues,andyoungmen in
pseudo-militarydressof every description. Russiansof all ageswelcomedus. Peoplestoppedeachotherto exchangeinformation. Further
along,wherethe lane alongthe centerof the Ring descendsbeneathan
overpassat the junction with Kalinin Prospect,we cameupon the now
well-known site of the "Three Fallen," massesof flowers and candles,
andpeoplecrossingthemselvesandkneelingin prayer.
A graduatestudentreportedthe first of manycontradictoryexplanations of the clash: the tanks had been orderedto pull back, took the
wrong direction, and descendedinto the underpass.When the soldiers
realizedthey weretrappedby the high walls, they panickedandtried to
smashtheir way throughthe row of trolleybuses.The "barrikadniki,"
assumingthat this was the long-awaitedattack,panickedin turn. Further along, anotheryoung Russiantold us that eageryoung tankers,or
their commanders,had acted on their own. Later that day we were
assuredthat theincidentwasa last-minuteprovocation.Onereportwas
that it was a diversion to draw attention from an assaultby a KGB
teamthroughthe heatingtunnelsinto the White House.

102

LA UREN G. LEIGHTON

A makeshiftmemorialon the spotwherea youngman was killed in the early
morningofAugust21

AUGUST 21 IN MOSCOW 103

The threeyoungmen who perishedat the barricades(photofrom thefuneral
procession,Saturday,August24)

/04

LAUREN G. LEIGHTON

The moodwithin the perimeterwasa mixture of defianceand anticipation, but not fear. The expectationwasthat the real attemptto storm
the White Housewould occur after dark. Until then a lull. There was
hopethat a tank columnapproachingalongthe LeningradHighway the
night before had stoppednot under orders of juntists experiencing
secondthoughts,but in outright refusal to confront the troops of the
RussianRepublicand crowdsof unarmedcitizensstandingin the way.
That hope becamewhat I considera litany of the three days: Russian
soldiersmustnot fire on Russianpeople,Russiansoldiersmustnot kill
Russiansoldiers.I am impressedby what we saw only later on television: Peoplesurroundedthe tankson Red Squareand elsewherein the
city centerfor the whole threedays,beggedthe soldiersnot to obeythe
ordersof the putschists,paintedsloganson the tanksandcoveredthem
with flowers, and fed the soldiers when they realized they were not
being supplied. For their part the soldiers-inmost casesnaive and
provincial-wereinitially hostile,thensullen,thenconfused.Most had
no idea why they had beencalled into the city. Only one soldier declaredhe was preparedto obeyordersto shoot.Many showedas much
interestin their legendarysurroundingsas any othertourist in Moscow
for the first time. All clearly enjoyed the unexpectedabundanceof
food, candy,cigarettes,andsouvenirsgiven by oneandall.
Among the first things we noticed as we approachedthe White
House were the pun-sloganscovering windows and barricadejunk.
"We are not afraid ofPugo-Pugach"(a pun on the surnameof Minister
of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo and the Russianword for a toy gun).
"Put the putschiststo a people'strial!" "Let's put the putschistsa
putschin the tush." More than a few sloganswere plays on the word
khunta Gunta) and khui (prick). Many sloganswere straightforward:
"Yazov is a piece of shit!" All were defiant: "Defend Russia!" "Russia! Lithuania is with you!" "They tried to drive us back into the barn,
but we won't go!" "Traitors, out of Russia!"In severalplacesgarbage
cans were markedwith signs "Party cards here." During those three
daysandafter, hundredsof Partymembershipcardswerethrown at the
front door of Partyheadquarters
on Staraia(Old) Square.Interestingly,
there were no anti-Gorbachevslogans,but as soon as the Presidentwas
safe,a numberof extremelybitter signsappeared,including one reminding Yeltsin that ''theonly curefor a hunchback[gorbatyll is the grave."
We had to make our way through three barricadesbefore reaching
the huge marble White House standing back from the long curved

AUGUST21 1N MOSCOW 105

A trolleybusdamagedby an annoredvehiclein the early morningofAugust21

embankmentof the MoscowRiver abouttwo miles to the northwestof
the Kremlin. It can be approachedfrom the Kremlin along Kalinin
Prospectpast the GardenRing Road. Adjacent on a rise at its southwest comer standsthe American Embassy,which obviously figured
prominently in the defense.The juntist troops would have to forgo
approachesalongtwo streetsfrom that direction, for fear of causingan
international incident. Both streetswere left open, as if daring the
juntists to risk that approach.The bridge acrossthe river was barricadedby largevehiclesandheavyconstructionmachineryof all kinds.
The river itself was blockedby bargesand ships.All other approaches
on all sideswere similarly barricadedthreetimes: trucks, trolleybuses,
constructionmachinery,beamsand pipes, boardsand beams,glass,
blocks of cement,piles of bricks and cobblestones,anything and everything that could be piled up to halt and delay tanks. Many people
rememberthe double and triple rows of public transportationvehicles that formed the strongest barriers;
I rememberthe long concrete-

/06

LA UREN G. LEIGHTON

reinforcementrods that stuck out in all directionslike straws.Around
the Soviet-stylemonumentto the workerswho barricadedthis areain
1917, the straws had been arrangedwith pleasinggrace, as if with
artistic forethought.
Units of armedcitizens,MVD militiamen and MVD specialpolice
troops (OMON), young men andwomen, and curious onlookerssurroundedevery area control post, each markedby a campfire for hot
tea, tents, and sleepingquartersjerry-rigged in vehicles. Within the
center stood ten tanks arrangedat strategicpoints aroundthe White
House.Regulararmy soldiers,Afghanistanersandother veterans,studentsand young workersof both sexes--Muscovites
of all ages--had
cometo defendthis last and only andbestdefenseof Russia'sdemocracy. Many were obviouslytired. They slept in groupsunderwhatever
shelterthey could find or build, or noddedaroundthe fires. The seats
of some vehicles were filled with people sleepingin every possible
uncomfortableposition. One young couple had a trolleybus all to
themselves.While he sleptwith his headon her shoulder,shesmoked
andfrowned at the rain. Later, whenmy wife complimenteda groupof
Afghanistanerssurroundinga tank, they protestedthat they were only
standingin for exhaustedregular soldierssleepingsomewhereinside
the White House.
Even as we arrived, so also did hundredsof others,and soonthousandsbeganarriving. Everybodytried to bring along anotherpieceof
junk to throw on the barricades. Theflow was down on the Ring Road
and Kalinin Prospect,throughthe barricades,and directly through the
centerofthe squarebehindthe White House.Peoplelookedwith wonder at the splendidchaosof the barricades,and turnedto anyonewho
looked like an experiencedbarricaderfor inside news of what was
happeningor might happen. Sometimearound ten 0'clock, others
beganto arrive too. Loudspeakerswelcomedthem and peoplerushed
to hug them: busloadsof heavily armedmilitia units from other cities
--Orel, Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Rostov, Novgorod, Smolensk. People
clappedthem on the shouldersand helped carry their equipment.
Togetherwith them throughoutthe rest of the day, groups of soldiers of the regular army strode self-consciously,embarrassedby
shouts of praise, "to the side of Russia," against"the junta," "the
putschists,""the Communists,""the traitors," as they were calledby
one and all. We shouldhave known then that the outcomehad been
decided.By the end of the day over a half a million people were

AUGUST21 IN MOSCOW 107

there,andin the city as a whole severalmillion peoplehadtakento the
streets.Peoplewere also taking to the streetsin other cities; the demonstrationon St. Petersburg'sWinter PalaceSquarewas anotherimpressiveevent.
But the generalview at that momentwas that severaltank divisions
were in Moscow, and eventhoughmost of the troopsmight refuseto
fIre on their own people, theplain damnsizeofthe confrontationcould
leadto bloodshed.No onethoughtthat ten tankscould stop a division.
No one could be surethat the juntists would not musterthe courageto
solve their dilemma "Lenin-style." That did not seem likelyYanaev'sshaking hands at the press conferencethe day before revealedthe true characterof the putschists-butit did seempossible
that they would issuefatal ordersout of desperation.Therewas every
expectationthat when the time came,the army would come crashing
through, with no regardfor the civilians determinedto standin their
way. If the tanksdid come,there could be no way out of that massof
peopleandmetal.
Rain, fog, the smoke of campfIres.Women, children, old people,
students,and streettoughs.Earnestyoung men in suits and ties----the
"new businessmen."Tents, ambulances,medical stations, tables of
food free for all. Many peoplehadbroughttheir children, and fortifIed
sheltershad been built for them. The organizationwas impressive:
peoplehad beendivided into sectorswith commandposts,complete
with colored arm bands to mark position, function, and authority.
Weaponshad beengiven only to civilians who clearly knew how to
carry them. Vodka was conspicuousonly by its absence.And the rain
camedown.
The long, high balconyon the side of the White Housefacing away
from the river was lined with people.Someonewas speakingover the
loudspeakers,but we could see no one speakingfrom the balcony.
Resolutionswere being proposedand voted on, and the crowd on the
squarevoted eagerlyandunanimously.It took us sometime to realize
we were listening to the proceedingsof the SupremeSoviet of the
RSFSRinside, and peopleon the squarewere voting along with their
deputies!Thereis no denyingthat this was the world centerof democracy at that momentin our time.
We walked around,and I took lots of pictures.As an obvious foreigner I was recognizedwhereverwe went, even given the special
favor of climbing up on a tank to posefor a photo. I was gladly shown

J08

LAUREN G. LEIGHTON

the interior, and the annamentwas explainedto me. Newsweeklater
reportedthat a few tanks nearthe White Househad turnedtheir guns
symbolically in the other direction, and that they were not anned.In
fact, the tanks had gone early on to the side of Russia,and now they
were inside, not outside,the barricades.Peoplewantedto know who
I was and how an American came to be there. But no one was
particularly talkative: there was too much tension,and though people knew the world sympathizedwith them, they also understood
that they were alone. It cannotbe said that spirits were high. Even
as peoplejeeredand cheered,arguedand orated,they were solemn
and serious.
I tried an experiment.WhenI smiledat someone,thatpersonsmiled
back. If I held out my hand,someoneshookit. WhenI madea V sign,
the sign was immediatelyreturnedwith a smile. WhereverI pointed
my camera,peopleassumedwhateverposethey thought seemedappropriate to the day. Peoplereadily answeredquestions,and took a
momentto tell us who they were and why they were there.Most of us
were spectatorsthat day--therewasclearly a differencebetweenexperiencedbarricadersandthosewho hadarrivedtoo late to be given a job
to do-but solidarity is still the bestword in any languageto describe
the morale that day. The barricadersat one post immediately made
room for me to sit with them while I changedfilm. The young men in
chargeof areashelpedme reacha bettervantagepoint, and showedby
their polite mannerthat they wantedRussiaandRussiansto be seenin
their bestlight by foreigners.
So, on the morning of August 21 the tanks in the centerof Moscow would have to passthrough massivecrowds of people before
reachingthe White House.Troops had moved away from the Moscow City Soviet, where Mayor Gavriil Popov and his government
had also barricadedthemselves.Tank columns had halted on the
roadsinto Moscow, and thoseon Red Squareshowedno indications
of leaving or acting. The army had refused orders to advanceon
Leningrad. Several cities remained under the control of the still
strongParty rule, but crowds had takento the streetsin many cities.
By this time anyone who was anyone had arrived to support the
Yeltsin government: Gorbachev'sformer political adviser AIeksandrYakovlev, Vadim Bakatin (one of Yeltsin's opponentsin
the spring election campaign), Eduard Shevardnadze,Andrei
Sakharov'swidow YelenaBonner,and poet Yevgenii Yevtushtenko.

AUGUST21 IN MOSCOW 109

Mstislav Rostropovichflew in from Paris the moment he received
word of the coup. Later that day he walkedthroughcrowdsof adoring
Russians.
Somethings never change.Russiansonly half joke when they say
that the worst scourgeof the Soviet period was not Stalin, but the
little old ladies who appointedthemselvesguardiansof Socialist
Morality in every neighborhood.Nowadaysthey are called keepers
of social or civil propriety. While we watcheda tank maneuverits
way through a barricade,it knockedover a tree. The usual band of
little old ladiescamerunning forth to scoldthe soldiers,who madea
hastyretreat.
As in any country, where the action is, there the little boys are.
Somehad fashionedfor themselvesthe mostimpressivemilitary wear.
All were everywhereandinto everything.Their appointedduty wasto
hand out sandwichesfrom trays, and perhapsa sign of the patriotism
of those days was that they seemednot to have found a way to sell
what they were supposedto give. Thosewho were there on their own
were of course envied by those who had to endure accompanying
parents.
Old people were there too, many of them wearing the medalsof
their World War II generation.They helpedmaketeaaroundthe campfIres, carried signs, stoppedbarricadersto offer words of encouragement. Onewell-known TV clip showsan elderly womandeterminedly
carryingcobblestones
to the constructionof a barricade.
The end cameso swiftly and in suchunlikely fashion that no one
really believedit, neitherthen nor later. RuslanKhasbulatov,acting
presiding officer of the SupremeSoviet of the RSFSR,simply announcedthat the putschistshad made a run for V nukovo Airport.
There were loud cheers,and then the SupremeSoviet beganissuing
orders: The MVD and KGB were to arrestthe putschists.The army
was to submit immediately to the governmentof the RSFSR, and
troops were to return to their barracks.A delegationformed under
the leadershipof RSFSRVice PresidentAleksandrRutskoi was to
go to the Crimea and free Gorbachev.Another delegationwas sent
to take control of the Kremlin. All local sovietsthat supportedthe
junta were to be dismissedimmediately. The headquartersof the
CentralCommitteeof the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union was
seized.All press,radio, and television personnelwere immediately
to resumecontrol of their reporting facilities. A delegationwas sent

110 LAUREN G. LEIGHTON

to KGB headquarters
on Lubiankato take control. The Black Beretsin
Lithuaniaweretold to ceaseand desist.
When we left the White Housethat evening,the sun was shining. I
do not rememberwhenthe rain stopped.On Novyi Arbat, peoplestood
as if frozen to the sidewalks,listening to the proceedingsof the SupremeSoviet of the RSFSRbeing broadcastfrom loudspeakersevery
hundredfeet or so along the promenade.Every face showedthe same
expression.I have tried ever since to find a word to describethat
expression.Thoughtfulis the onethat fits the best.

VLADIMIR PETRIK

Moscow's M.V. Khrunichev
Machine-BuDding Factory Reacts
to the August Coup

At the time ofthe coup, Vladimir Petrik waschiefofthe assembly
division at the M V. KhrunichevMachine-BuildingFactory. Petrik's
division ofthefactory built the Mir spacestationandassembledthe
Proton rocketlauncher. Whatfollows is his story ofthe coupas it was
recordedby a staffwriter at Literatumaiagazeta.It waspublishedon
January1, 1992.

"I beganmy careerthirty yearsago in this factory," saysPetrik. "Back
then, the factory was devotedto aviation and was simply called 'P.O.
Box 222.'· A little later, after the introductionof an 'open,'consumer
goodssection,they gaveit a second,parallelname[...]. And so it was
also known as the M.V. KhrunichevMoscow Machine-BuildingFactory."
THE MORNING OF THE TWENTIETH

August 20, 9:00 A.M. The secondday of the coup. An executivemeeting of the factory administration.Seventypeoplein attendance.All are
from uppermanagement.
The bosses.The elite. Kiselev,the directorof
the factory, rises.He hasa copy of Pravdain his hands.
[Here is Petrik'saccountof whatoccurredat the meeting:]
"Have you hada chanceyet to familiarize yourselveswith Resolution No.1 of the GKChP?"[askedKiselev]. Silencein the hall.

*As a rule, military enterpriseswerereferredto by postoffice addresses.
111

112

VLADIMIR PETRIK

"Now then. Some eventshave transpired.Our job is not to get
involved in politics. On the 26th, the SupremeSoviet will convene and reacha decisionon the legality of everythingthat has
occurred.Until then, we must not give way to panic! Everything
is functioning normally. Our task is to makesurethat the factory
continuesto operate."
Everythinghe said was correct. The factory must continueto
operate.But there seemedto be somesort of misunderstanding.
The President-whoafter all is the headof the entire stateapparatus
-wasjust dischargedfrom his duties in a very peculiarmanner,
and the director of the factory-who is the highest-rankingstate
authority in this small sliver of our country'sterrito~a1mly
highest-ranking
declaresthat nothingspecialhashappened.
The instructionscontinue on how we are to behave.Special
dutiesare assigned.Deputy chiefs of eachdivision are to remain
at their posts until eight in the evening; division headsstay on
until midnight. Security is to be doubledacrossthe factory. The
chemicaldepotsareto be speciallyprotected.
Similar measureswere taken in all factories at this time. One
got the feeling that not even a tiny group of officials were angeredby events,but ratherthat all of them were expectingsome
sort of major military attack by international imperialism or
world Zionism--orperhapsby Arab terrorism.
Finally, at threeo'clock camethe director'sspeech-ageneral
discussionand lamentabouthow difficult the times are now and
how unfortunatethe factory's lot. All aroundus there is nothing
but anarchy,everythingis a mess.There'sno programfor conversion.Thereare no supplies.Eachrepublic is trying to pull the
blanket to its own side. All contractsare violated. Supplies of
metal are stalled.
"All of you here---chiefsof the divisions and departmentsthink about how you can get your divisions out of this mess.
Create small-scale[private] enterprises.Perhapsit would be
worthwhile to setup a concern...."
The speechended. Any questions?The director's mouth was already open and about to utter the concludingphrase:"That's all, the
executivemeetingis over."
Petrik raisedhis hand."I haveonequestion."

THE M.V. KHRUNICHEV FACTORY Il3
SUICIDE

"I don't rememberexactly what 1 said," recalls Petrik, "but it was
somethinglike this: 'Of course,we have supply problems,staff turnover, and we needto think aboutthe creationof small enterprisesand
concems-theseare all very important questions.But the most important question today is, what will the factory do now that anticonstitutionalactionshavebeencarriedout--essentiallya coupd'etat?'"
What???What is this???
"I understand,Anatolii Ivanovich," continuedPetrik, ''that you are
expressingyour personalopinion. . . ." Kiselev was known to have
been one of the signatoriesto the unforgettableLetter of 53, which
calleduponGorbachevto tightenthe screwson democracy.
At this point Kiselev interrupted:"This is not my personalposition.
I am a servantof the state.My responsibilityis the factory. We must
not allow any panichere."
"Sure, but didn't we vote for Yeltsin in June?Didn't we elect him
President?I introducea concreteproposal:Let's continueour meeting
for anotherfifteen minutes and work out the position of the factory
leadership.And there is only one standwe can take: supportYeltsin,
the legally electedPresident,and declarea symbolic two-hour strike
without interrupting any of the operationsthat require a continuous
cycle of production.In short,makeit clearwhosesidewe're on. After
all, we are widely viewedas oneof the pillars of the military-industrial
complex."
The director leanedback in his armchair. The initial shock had
passed.He was eveninterestedin finding out what the reactionof the
audiencewould be. Oneof the division chiefsrose.
"This is demagoguery!He's for Yeltsin.... And what are we to do?
We are on military duty. What doesit meanto declarea strike?Leave
the countrywithout missiles,without the nuclearshield?"
Anotherpersonstoodup, from the consumergoodsdivision. He had
otherarguments.They employ"guestworkers" there.If they declarea
strike for just two hours, those guys won't get back to work for two
weeks.
Two morespokeout. No support.
The director, calm by now, brought the meeting to a close. "Has
everyonehad a chanceto speak?Everythingis understood.The situation is clear.Everyoneto his post."

114

VLADIMIR PETRIK

After executivemeetingspeopleusually swarmaroundPetrik. The
chief of the assemblydivision is an important person. In a sense,
everyoneworks for him. If in a conferencehe asks someonean unpleasantquestion or tells a person to hastena delivery-it's like a
reprimandor a signal that the factory might be facing an emergency.
Suchmattersarealwaysbetterdiscussedandsettledbeforehand.
This time as he left ... therewas a vacuumaroundhim. A complete
void. Peopleavertedtheir gaze. They turned away. He was now an
outcast.A death-rowinmate.A goner. It was then that fear beganto
set in.
"I was standingthere, smoking. Do people really have this much
fear?It's beensix yearsnow. Wasit all for nothing?"
True, one persondid approachand congratulatehim. "Well, you're
quite a fellow!" They stood for a moment and chatted.Then, once
more,Petrik wasalone.
Now the director was leaving. As he did so, he mockingly slapped
Petrik on the back: "For today'sspeechandthe call for a strike,you've
alreadyearnedfive yearsin prison. The materialjust hasto be turned
over to the prosecutor'soffice."
Petrik wantedto respond:"Better five yearsin prison than seventyfour consecutiveyears of slavery." But the director had already descendedthe stairs.He wasoff to a meetingwith someAmericans.
"AN INDIVIDUAL STRIKE OF PROTEST"

Petrik returnedto his division and sat in his office. To hell with work!
He had received no support, none. What would he do now? He
grabbeda sheetof thick draftsman'spaperand with a magic marker
wrote in largeprint: "As a sign of protestagainstthe anti-constitutional
coup d'etat carried out on 19.08.91 by the so-called GKChP (CC
CPSU) ..." ("I understoodintuitively even then that the Central
Committeeof the CPSUstoodbehindthe GKChP," saysPetrik), " ... 1
declarean individual strike on 20 August beginningat 11:30 A.M." He
underlinedthe word "individual" twice. He signedhis name,and then
he glued the announcement
to his door, firmly, so that it could not be
removed.
He thensatdown andaddressed
a statementto the director:
"I bring it to your attentionthat on accountof the anti-constitutional,
anti-statecoup d'etatcarriedout by the GKChP (CC CPSU),an indi-

THE MV. KHRUNICHEV FACTORY 115

vidual strike is herebydeclaredby myself beginningon 20 August at
11 :30 A.M. My demands:(1) the membersof the so-calledand self-appointed GKChP must be brought to justice; (2) the legally elected
Presidentof the USSR,M.S. Gorbachev,mustbe restoredto power."
1 summonedmy secretary.She was thoroughly frightened; the
rumors had alreadyreachedher. According to procedure,1 listed
the declarationin her registry to make everythingofficial. 1 did
not want to wait for interoffice mail and so 1 senther off at a trot
to the administrationheadquarters.
After a while chief engineerGorodnichevplaceda call to me
by direct line, via the factory line: "I haveyour declarationin my
hand.Haveyou lost your mind?"
"Yurii Petrovich,how did you get hold of it? It was addressed
to the director.How arbitrary,how out of bounds!"
''Well, the secretarybroughtit to me
He was a little embarrassed.
... beforeputting it on the director'sdesk."A "friendly" admonition ensued:"I have my doubts, too, you understand.This ...
well, this Yanaev.Let's just say, his handswere shakingas ifhe
hadjust madeoff with a neighbor'shen...."
"So, this meansthatyou ... What exactlyis your position?"
He didn't answerthat. "All the same,you would be betteroff
taking backthis declaration."
"Excuseme, but what do you take me for, a little boy? This is
my clear and consciouschoice, and 1 will not back down from
it."
Fifteen minutes later, 1 receiveda more ominous call---from
the local KGB officer, the deputy director for security procedures. ''They gave me an order, here ... ," he said. "To take
measureswith regardto you."
"Well, if they gaveyou orders,you'dbettercarry themout."
"None of this seemsvery seriousnow," saysPetrik, "but at the time
1 was certain they were going to arrestme. After all, it is a military
enterprise.A 'P.O. Box' factory. 1 thoughtto myself: They will carry
out the order immediately. They will call for a black Maria [KGB
car] and shove me in--only 1 don't know whetherthey'll be using
handcuffs.To the 'Sailors' Peace'[detentioncenter],or somewhere
closer."

116

VLADIMIR PETRIK

The [deputy director's] voice dropped a half-tone. "Is your
division bringing operationsto a halt?"
Well, how could a work stoppagebe permittedin our division?
That would be tantamountto closing down the entire factory!
Holes would immediately appearin our nuclear shield. There
would be gapsin our programof spaceexploration.
''No, the division hasnot broughtoperationsto a halt," Petrik reassuredthe KGB officer. "The division is at work. The strike I declared
is an individual one."
LET THE CIRCUS SHOW BEGIN

Thenthe streamof visitors began.Lengthy excursionsto the office of
the chiefofthe twenty-seconddivision.
At least factory efficiency was dented somewhat:people were
distracted from their work. They read the declaration. Some
laughed,somecried.... That'show it was. Two women looked
into my office in tears: "What have you done?They will crush
anddestroyyou!"
"Well, listen," respondedPetrik, "sometimesyou haveto get up off
your knees!Or are we supposedto remainthis way forever?"But most
of the time, of course,they just laughed.One could hear everything
throughthe door. How odd! Never beforehad they seenanythinglike
this in the factory.
At that point, someinterestingthings were taking place in the factory headquarters.Once the declarationwas read, orderswent out to
the legal departmentto preparea casefor Petrik'sdismissal.The documentswere to be conveyedimmediatelyto the prosecutor'soffice. At
this stage,however, a small problem arose: the legal departmentrefusedto go alongandwould not budge.
I had known this young woman,Olia Pobedinskaia--she
was the
entire legal department-forabouta year.I alwaysthought... how
factory lawshouldI put it? ... that shewas your standard-issue
yer: they tell her to do something,she does it. The bow-andscrapetype. But now, if you can imagine,shedisplayedher true
character.

THE M.v. KHRUNICHEV FACTORY 117

"There are no grounds for dismissal," she told them. "And
evenlessfor contactingthe prosecutor'soffice."
Undoubtedly,the administrationwas shockedby her response:
well, well, what in the world arewe to do?!
It is well known, however,that there are no obstaclesthat Bolsheviks cannotovercome.So they turned the task over to the personnel
department.And this time there was no problem. The order was
greetedwith a salute. The paperswere drawn up. Later, the director
showedthemto Petrik.
. . . Working hourswere drawing to a close.Vitalii Lukich Tverskoi, the chairmanof the factory trade union committeeand a
respectedmanin the factory, cameto my office.
"The director telephonedme. Go, he said, and explain everything to him. I cannot speakwith him myself. This was with
regardto you, Petrik."
Oh, God, how well I know this overbearing,paternalistic,excessivelyfamiliar, lord-of-the-manorintonationof Sovietbosses.
The embodimentof higherwisdom,inaccessibleto meremortals.
We talked for a while. "Well now, you're in favor ofYeltsin?
Or is it Gorbachev?"
"It's not the namesthat are importantto me now," I said,"but
the process--theprocessof achievingfreedom as such. I mean
completeemancipation,not one that hides behind some sort of
socialism-whetherwith a humanface, without a face, or with a
behind.... This is a unique chance,and we have only to make
surethat it doesn'tslip throughour fingers."
We discussedeverything and understoodone another very
clearly. The trade union man then went to seethe director--to
persuadehim not to issue the order. As they say, trade union
officials mustdefendthe workers.
. . . Vladimir spentthe night of 20-21 August in the vicinity of the
White House,wherehe workedalongsideoneof the groupsof students.
THE PLODDING GAIT OF THE DINOSAURS

Vladimir Petrik is no politician. He's not on the left or the right, and
he'sneithera democratnor a conservative.He reachedhis decisionby

lIB

VLADIMIR PETRIK

using commonsense.As he himself puts it, commonsenseand pragmatismarehis mostsalienttraits.
"My evolutiontook placebeginningin 1986 with the publicationof
information on what hastakenplacein our country, our history. I had
not yet lost my analytical abilities. I was never a dogmaticthinker. I
neveridolizedthis sacredcow--theCPSU."
Shortly beforethe eventsof August,Petrik visited France.It was his
fIrst trip abroad.In the old days, of course,this was unheardof; only
the top bossescould travel beyondthe border. But now the door was
open. A full-scale model of the Mir spacerocket was being put on
displayat La BourgerExhibition.
"We had a good time" [Petrik recalls]. "At fIrst, of course,you feel
like a completeass,but then ... you feel as though you'd beenborn
prematurely.Of course,I had alwaysassumedthat life would be completely different there. That much was clear from the newspapersand
television. But to seeit with your own eyes--that'sa different matter
altogether.Whenyou look into one of thoseAlgerian shopsandseean
array of goods that you would never dream of seeing in GUM or
TsUM [Moscow'smain departmentstores].... Obviously,this had an
impact.I felt thenthat I would no longerbe ableto live asbefore."
It is more or lessclearwhy Petrik spokeout at the executivemeeting. But what madehim leave the factory after August?After all, no
one drove him out. (The order to sack him was quickly withdrawn.)
Wasthe directorto blame?
"It wasn'tjust the director. It was the feeling of being in a 'dead
zone,' a vacuum,when I left the executive meetingafter my speech,
and the belatedapproval,when everythingwas over: 'Well now, that
was really great! .. .' Worst of all, however,was when someoneset
out to make a hero out of me for the sole purposeof using me as a
batteringram in the battleof oneclique againstanother.All of this was
disgustingto me."
I don't know whetherthe 1:70 ratio-remember,there were about
seventypeopleat the executivemeeting-accurately
reflectsthe actual
level of supportfor the GKChP within the military-industrialcomplex.
I have no doubt, however, that the balancewas entirely in favor of
YanaevandCompany-ormore precisely,in favor of the "ideals" that
inspired them to act (nobody gives a damn about Yanaev). What is
especiallydisturbing is that this level of support continuesto grow
with each and every passingweek. This was certainly evident from

THE MY. KHRUNICHEV FACTORY 119

Rutskoi's recent trip to Siberia and the Altai region. (Incidentally,
noticethe paradox:the erstwhileopponentof the GKChP, it seems,has
virtually beentransformedinto a vehicle for a new confrontatioIl--Qr
somethinglike that. We certainlyhaveour luck with vice presidents!)
I fear that the numberof peoplepossessingPetrik'sframe of mind is
not much greaterin the organizationsof the military-industrial complex than it is in the Army. Some, like Petrik, leave of their own
accord;othersare askedto leave,oneway or another.
Vladimir hasnow setup his own small business.
"My goal is not to run one of those 'Russianbusinesses'that buys
goodsat oneprice andsellsthemat another.I want to makethings."

SERGEP. PETROFF

The Congressof Compatriots:
Witness to a Democratic
Counter-Revolution

SergeP. PetrofJwasborn in Harbin, China, into afamily ofRussian
emigreswhofled Russiain 1922.He grew up in Japanandthe United
Statesandhashada careeras a businessexecutiveandhistorian. The
authorofa bookaboutthe late CommunistParty ideologistMikhail
Suslov,he is currentlycompletingresearchon theRussianCivil War.
PetrofJhasvisitedRussiamanytimesandis promotingU.S.-Russian
businesscontacts.
I

By bizarrecoincidence,the August 1991 coup in Moscow occurredon
the sameday as the openingof the First Congressof Compatriot!rMonday, August 19. Convenedwith PresidentYeltsin's blessing,the
Congressof Compatriotswas organizedby the SupremeSoviet of the
RussianFederationto servetwo objectives:to establisha communication channel for overseasRussians,and to create for the Russian
governmenta supporting network of foreign businessmenand professionalsof Russianorigin.
Eight hundredmen and women came from twenty-sevendifferent
countries, representingall three waves of Russianemigration since
1917. By far the largest number came from the United Statesand
France, and more than half were descendantsof the first wave of
emigreswho fled communismin the wake of the OctoberRevolution
andthe ensuingcivil war. "Heavenfrom all creatureshidesthe book of
fate," Shakespeare
wrote, and so it seemedto many of the congress
120

THE CONGRESSOF COMPATRIOTS 121

delegates----especially
to thosewhosefamily backgroundsembraceda
history of fierce anticommunism.They cameto Moscowto reestablish
long-severedcontacts,but found themselvesinsteadin the midst of a
coupthat triggeredthe endof Communistrule in Russia.
From the very beginning, the organizationof the congresswas
steepedin controversy.The advancepublicity andthe programagenda
had a decidedlynationalist-patriotictenor. Someemigresencouraged
this; othersfelt that the organizingcommitteewas placing too much
emphasison national rebirth. A number of prominent emigreswere
convincedthat it was mostly a public relationsgesture,and therefore
chosenot to attendat all. I, too, had seriousreservations.As a liberal
democratnot unmindful of Russiannationalism,I was not sure that I
would be comfortablein the companyof flag-wavingemigresandtheir
ultrapatriotic Russianhosts.But as a Russian-Americanvitally interestedin the future of Russia,I felt a powerful pull to attendthe congress.I had traveledto the Soviet Union regularly since 1983, and I
was trying to make senseout of perestroika'stortuous course.I had
watchedBoris Yeltsin's gradualrise to powerand was anxiousto find
out for myselfwho Yeltsin actually was. Was he a democrat,a populist, a Westemizer,or a Russiannationalist?In August 1991 therewere
still no reliable answersto this question,and the Congressof Compatriots seemeda perfectpoint of reference,particularly since many of
Yeltsin'ssupporterswerescheduledto participatein the program.
The Congressof Compatriotswas plannedas an importantand gala
political milestone.The Russiangovernmentallocatedeighteenmillion
rublesfor it. Anothertwelve million rubleswereraisedby variousnew
Russianbusinessorganizations,the Russianbranch of the Union of
USSRLeaseholdersand Entrepreneurscoming throughwith the largest contribution. Giant bannerswith the inscription "Welcome, Compatriots" were hung along many of Moscow'smain thoroughfares.To
mark the eventand maximizepublicity, PresidentYeltsin was to open
the congress,and it was rumoredthat he would use the occasionto
acknowledgeCommunistoppressionandoffer a public apologyfor all
the indignities thrust upon the Russiannation during nearly seventyfive yearsof Communistrule.
II

The official openingof the Congressof Compatriotswas scheduledfor
7:00 P.M. at TchaikovskyConcertHall. But the day'seventscasta dark

122 SERGEP. PETROFF

shadowover the plannedfestivities. Due to heavy traffic and crowds
alongTverskaiaStreet,the congressdid not openuntil 8:30 P.M. President Yeltsin, who had escapedarrestand was now directing the opposition from the White House,obviously could not attend.In his place,
USSR SupremeSoviet Deputy Mikhail Tolstoi, grandnephewof the
Russianwriter Aleksei Tolstoi, openedthe meetingwith a readingof
PresidentYeltsin's bold proclamationaboutthe unlawful andunconstitutional seizureof powerby the self-appointedEmergencyCommittee
and a brief commenton the eventsof the day. The organizingcommittee had put togetheran ambitious cultural programof music, dance,
and theatrical performancesfeaturing a variety of artists from the
multiethnic RussianFederation.The hall was packedwith officials,
delegates,guests,membersof the Leaseholdersand Entrepreneurs
Union, and representativesof the Russianpress,many of whom had
come to Moscow from such faraway placesas Perm, Yekaterinburg,
and Novosibirsk to find out what their overseascompatriotslooked
like andwhat they hadto sayaboutthe changingface of Russia.
Without Yeltsin'spresence,the openingceremonywould havebeen
of little consequence,despitethe quality and richnessof the cultural
program.But an incidentthat took placeearly in the programmadean
enormousdifference.A Russian-Americandelegate-Ifound out later
that he wasthe New York avant-gardeartist Smorchevskii-Butterbr~
November
November
arrivedat the concerthall from the barricadesoutsidethe White House
and askedto be recognized.His moving remarkselectrified the audience:"Democracyhasbeenslain, and Gorbachev,too, may be dead-killed in the Crimea," he announced,alleging that he had heard the
newsaboutGorbachevfrom a reputablesourceonly an hour before.
Throughoutthe day rumorsaboutGorbachevwere flying, but nothing as drastic as this had been suggested.There were also informal
discussionson how the congressshould officially react to the coup.
Should it go on record with a declarationin support of Yeltsin or
should it and its delegates--most
of whom were not Soviet citizens-refrain from participationin Soviet internal affairs? Despitea general
feeling of supportfor Yeltsin, genuineconsensuswashardto comeby.
Congressofficials were on the whole pro-Y eltsin, but did not want
to take a firm positionwithout further deliberation.Five yearsof glasnostandembryonicdemocracyhadnot yet erasedcompletelythe longnurtured habit of caution and equivocation.Delegatesalso found it
difficult to reach a conclusion.Although their sympathieswere with

THE CONGRESSOF COMPATRIOTS 123

Yeltsin, they hesitatedto takea decisiveposition,fearingthat the Party
and the KGB could easily defeat the opposition. The most resolute
responsecame from the unofficial hosts of the congress----thenew
Russianbusinessmen.As former technocratsand Party apparatchiks
who only recentlyhadexchangedtheir Partyprivilegesfor the promise
of unrestrictedwealth and personalindependence,they knew how far
the centralSovietapparatushadalreadydisintegrated.They hadstrong
doubtsthat the gray menof the EmergencyCommitteewerecapableof
accomplishinganything, let alone governing a tired and raucousnation. They also had a greatdeal to lose if the old "command-administrative system"were put in force again. Many of them had spokenin
the early hours of the coup to their home bases,and had satisfied
themselvesthat their employeeswere also supportingYeltsin. It was
not surprisingthereforethat they favoreda strongstatementof support
for Yeltsin. Somewere certainthat the "putschwould ultimately misfIre," but the best forecastcamefrom a constructioncompanyowner
from Tver who gave the junta "a maximum of one week before they
would destroythemselves."
The stagingof the congressin the midst of a coup presentedformidable problems. In many ways, the congresswas a "pir vo vremia
chumy" (a feast during a pestilence),as one of the Russianbusinessmencalledit, usingthe title of a shortplay by Pushkin.On the first day
of the coupit was still very difficult to be unequivocal,andno sensible
responseto the artist'sstatement~xplicit Novemberor implicit--seemedappropriate. Trying to relievethe built-up tension,Mikhail Tolstoi askedthe
audienceto standup and observea momentof silence.Most did, but a
numberof prominent Soviet leadersand intellectualsin the audience
declinedto follow his call. If thereeverwas a momentof truth during
the entirecongress,this wasit.
I don't know what promptedme to speakout andbreakthe silence.
It may have been a suddenflash of emotion in protestagainstthose
who refusedto standup. It may have had somethingto do with the
distressingdefeatismof the artist's commentsand Mikhail Tolstoi's
indecisivereaction.Or it may have beeninfluencedby more rational
thinking aboutwhat I hadwitnessedandassimilatedduringthe day.
I had spent most of the day walking the streets and squaresof
Moscow trying to ascertainfor myself the extent of support for
Yeltsin, and I cameto the conclusionthat the oddswere in his favor.
The attitudeof the troops,the vitality of the crowdssupportingYeltsin,

124 SERGEP. PETROFF

the rapidity and thoroughnesswith which Moscow had mobilized its
anti-putschforces, the continuing transmissionof clandestineradio
stations,the disseminationof anti-putschliterature, and the favorable
reportsfrom the provincesall pointedto the conclusionthat therewas
in Russiaa large enoughcritical massto sustainpressureagainstthe
junta. In the words of one "sidewalk philosopher"who knew his Lermontov, "Yeltsin as still 'the hero of his time,' despitethe yelping of
the drunksfor the goodold days."
Whateverit was,the momentof silencedid not satisfyme. I felt that
a more affirmative statementwas called for, and I stoodup to demand
one."There is no sanereasonfor a requiem,"I cried out. "It's too early
to bury Gorbachevand write off Yeltsin. What is neededis a declaration of solidarity with them." The hall explodedin a suddenrumble of
voices. Some felt that my statementwas too confrontational,others
agreedwith me, and still othersdid not hear what I had said. In the
end,no positive actionwastakenthat evening,althoughat an 8:00 P.M.
meetingon August 20, after a heateddiscussionof who shouldreceive
the letter of protest,the congressdid sendone to the USSR Supreme
Sovietwith a copy to the UnitedNations.
My demonstrativeresponseto the incident did not pass without
consequences.
On the positive side, I had suddenlybecomea celebrity
for whom doors were now open where they had beenclosedbefore,
giving me an opportunityin the aftermathof the failed coupto comein
contactwith peoplewhoseviews and opinionsgaveme a much better
understandingof what hadactuallyhappenedduring the threedays.On
the negative side, I found that I was being houndedby the Russian
pressand a profusion of new Russiansocial organizationsand charities. But there was also a more encompassingelementto the experience. I suddenlyrealized that, despitethe resolution of the coup in
favor of democracy,there were still deep divisions in Russia,especially amongthe elite.
III

The morningof August20 arrivedwithout any climactic developments
during the night. At the morning news briefing at the Hotel Rossiia,
where the congressstaff had its headquarters,I found out that
Gorbachevwas under housearrest athis dachain the Crimea. I also
overheardsomeonesay that the "Soiuz" group of rightist parliamen-

THE CONGRESSOF COMPATRIOTS 125

tary deputieshadbackedthe EmergencyCommittee,as did the rightist
nationalist organization"Edinstvo." The defenseof the White House
was almost completedand pro-Y eltsin units of the Taman Division
were now guarding it. There was also confirmation that the Social
Democratic Party, the RepublicanParty of Russia, the Democratic
Partyof Russia,andthe ConstitutionalDemocratshadall issuedstrong
statementsof protestagainstthe usurpationof constitutionalpowersby
thejunta.
I had agreedto participate in the Economic Round Table of the
Union of Leaseholdersand Entrepreneursthat morning. Organizedin
February 1990 under the leadershipof economistPavel G. Bunich,
First Deputy Chairmanof the Economic Reform Commissionof the
USSR SupremeSoviet, the Union of USSR Leaseholdersand Entrepreneurs(since renamedthe Union of Managersand Entrepreneurs)
was establishedto protectand promotethe interestsof individual Soviet businessmen.According to GeneralDirector I.M. Baskin, in August 1991 it represented14,000 membersand 6,500,000employees.
The membershipfigure was probablyaccurate,but the numberof employeeswas greatlyexaggerated.Encompassing
the whole spectrumof
businessactivity from small mom-and-popcontractorsto large enterprises,suchasDr. Fedorov'sEye MicrosurgeryClinic in Moscow,and
including trade,construction,agriculture,transportation,and services,
the Union of Leaseholdersand Entrepreneurswas at the time of the
coup the undisputeddomainof the new Russiancapitalist elite. Some
members,straight out of the pagesof Soviet satirists Ilf and Petrov,
had been hawking wares and repairing flats for many years. But a
larger and more urbanecontingentcamedirectly out of the nomenklatura, arousedto businessactivity by the new Law on Individual Enterprises. Conservative,hard-working, zealouslypatriotic, and strongly
anti-Communist,they were representativesof the newly emerging
bourgeoisiein Russia.Carefully groomedand projecting paramount
confidence,they could easilyhavebeenmistakenfor positive-thinking
Americansalesmenattendingtheir first Dale Carnegieconvention.
The round table was to begin at 10:00 A.M. at SEV: one of Moscow's new modem buildings only a stone'sthrow from the White
*This building, the Moscowheadquarters
of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance(RussianacronymSEV), would later housethe Moscow mayoralty
offices.

126 SERGEP. PETROFF

House.Becauseof overturnedtram cars,barricades,and hugecrowds,
it took our specially dispatchedbus more than one hour to travel the
two-mile distancefrom the Hotel Rossiiato SEV. The conversationon
the bus centeredon the coup, but I did not senseany undueanxiety or
vacillation aboutYeltsin andhis ability to resistthe coup. Exceptfor a
SanFranciscobusinessman,
a Swedishagriculturalspecialistwho was
the grandnephewof Leo Tolstoi, and me, everyoneon the bus was a
nativeRussian.
The round table had an extensiveagenda.There were a numberof
formal presentations,including Dr. Tolstoi's and mine. There were
also reportsfrom committeechairmen,but the mostamazingaspectof
the entire meeting was the confidenceand unruffled composureof
nearly four hundredLeaseholdersand Entrepreneurs.It wasas if nothing of consequence
was happeningoutside.Most of the membershad
apparentlyalready concludedthat the putsch would undoubtedlybe
derailed and that PresidentYeltsin would emergeas the undisputed
new leader. The auditorium came alive only during the vote on the
declarationin supportofYeltsin. A strongstatementhadbeenprepared
in advance,and it carriedunanimouslyand boisterously.The Union of
Leaseholdersand Entrepreneurswas the first businessorganizationto
comeout with sucha statement;other businessassociationsfollowed.
By late evening,the Union of Co-operators,the Associationof Small
Entrepreneurs,
the Associationof CommercialBanksof the USSR,the
All-RussianCommodityExchange,and most of the Moscow business
clubs, including the All-Russian Club of Young Millionaires, joined
the Leaseholdersand Entrepreneursin declaringtheir solidarity with
the Yeltsin government.
IV
From the sixteenthfloor ofthe SEV building we could look diagonally
at the White House.No otherplacein Moscowofferedthe sameunobstructedview, exceptperhapsthe roof of the unoccupiednew American Embassybuilding. A giant Russiantricolor wrappedaroundthe
front and sides of the White House would have made even Christo
proudof the handiwork,while a medium-sizedblimp flying abovethe
building with an inscription in Russian-"Welcome,Compatriots"madethe vista look almost surrealistic.Below, on the ground,a large
mosaicmadeup of people,rubble,overturnedtrolleys, stalledcars,and

THE CONGRESSOF COMPATRIOTS 127

lines of barricadesand military equipmentrenderedan unforgettable
tableauof a rebellionin progress.
I left SEV a few minutesbefore3:00 P.M., maneuveringtoward the
White Housethrough clustersof excitedly talking peopleand the unsightly debrisof the barricades.The barricadeshad beensubstantially
improvedsinceI sawthem last, but gangsof four or five young men,
carrying railroad ties, twisted rails, large cement blocks, and other
objectsof obstructioncontinuedto reinforce them. The tanks and armored personnelcarriers were still deployedon the left flank of the
White House, but they had turned their gun barrels away from the
building. With flowers stuck in their barrelsandteenagersclambering
overthem,they no longerlookedmenacing.
The noon meeting in front of the White House that I had been
watching from the SEV building was coming to an end. At three
o'clock, PresidentYeltsin cameout to say a few words, followed by
EduardShevardnadze,who receivedan equally warm ovation. More
peoplewere still arriving, eventhoughthe squarein front of the White
Housewasalreadypackedto its limits.
The arrayof peopleandpolitical groupingswasbeyonddescription.
There were young and old, men and women, Cossacksand bearded
Caucasians,GreatRussians,Ukrainians,andBelorussians,Muscovites
and people from the provinces,businessmen,professionals,and academics,RussianOrthodox priests and SeventhDay Adventist ministers, students,Afghan veteransin soiled fatigues,and militaryofficers
in uniform, monarchistsandanarcho-syndicalists,
groupsfrom the new
democraticpolitical parties,andMoscowpunksanddrifters who came
to seethe spectacle.Many of thesepeoplehadvoted for Yeltsin in the
Juneelection and now cameout to show their continuedsupportfor
him. By no stretchof the imaginationwere all of them democratically
thinking liberals. They were ordinary patriotic citizens who were fed
up with communismand, like their EastEuropeanneighbors,wanted
to free themselvesfrom its abuse.Nor were they backersor benefactors of a "SecondRussianRevolution," as some commentatorslater
classified the events of August 19-21. Like the declarationof the
LeaseholdersandEntrepreneurs,
their presenceon the barricadeswasa
counter-revolutionarystatement.They cameto bearwitnessnot only to
the abandonmentof Stalinism, asGorbachevhad beenchampioning,
but to a completebreak with the revolutionary tradition of October
1917.

128 SERGEP. PETROFF

There was both good news and bad news that afternoon.A great
cheer went up from the crowd when it was announcedthat USSR
Prime Minister and junta memberValentin Pavlov was resigning on
groundsof disability. It was a suresign that the leadershipof the coup
wasbeginningto falter. News wasalso receivedthat the USSRConstitutional OversightCommitteehad issueda cautiouscondemnationof
the coup,· and that the All-Union Confederationof TradeUnions had
alsodenouncedthe actionof the EmergencyCommittee.But reportsof
a possiblestorming of the White House by the special Alpha forces
were also spreading,as was the news that an 11:00 P.M. curfew had
beenannounced.At about6:00 P.M., thesereportswere officially confirmed by the White House. At around 7:00 P.M., the White House
commandissuednew instructionsto the crowd. To providemoreroom
for maneuvering,the crowd was askedto move farther away from the
front of the building. Severalmonthslater, a participantin the defense
of the White Housetold me that the credit for the successfuldefenseof
the White Houseshouldgo to RussianVice PresidentAleksandrRutskoi. According to my friend, it was Rutskoi who establisheda military
headquarters
that coordinatedthe work of the volunteerswith the proYeltsin elementsof the Army and the KGB. Yeltsin generatedthe
meaningand spirit of the rebellion while Rutskoi organizedthe defenseof it. If this was indeedthe case,then, ironically, it was a symbiotic relationshipnot unlike that of Lenin andTrotskii in 1917.
A light rain had beenfalling throughoutthe day, but at 6:00 P.M. it
beganraining harder.Peoplewere getting thoroughly soaked,and the
largecrowd was slowly dwindling. It was alsotime for me to go home.
At 8:30 P.M. I arrived at the hotel, tired and hungry, only to find that I
hadmissedthe regulardinnerhour and now hadto scroungefor something to eat.
V

The atmospherein the hotel pressroom on Wednesdaymorning was
tense.Word had gotten outthat therewere casualtiesduring the night.
Mikhail Tolstoi, who had taken chargeof the morning briefing, confirmed that there had been three fatalities near Smolensk Square,
*According to S. Alekseev, the head of the committee,the version of the
reportas it appearedin /zvestiiahadbeenheavily amendedby the censor.

THE CONGRESSOF COMPATRIOTS 129

where a confrontationhad taken place betweenpicketsdefendingthe
outer barricadesof the White Houseand the armoredpersonnelcarriers of the 27th Brigade.The White Houseitself had not beenstormed,
however,and the Tamanand Kantemir Tank Divisions were moving
out of Moscow. The night's official khronika (chronicle of events),a
copy of which I was ableto obtain,testifiedto the defenders'courage,
but its salient messagewas more poignant. During that night, one
Soviet organizationafter another--government,
civilian, and religious
-badfallen in line in supportofYeltsin. Even if the dull-witted "gang
of eight" had given the orderto storm the White House,it is doubtful
that it would have beenfollowed. By midnight of August 20-21, the
rank and file of the KGB and the military had declaredfor Yeltsin,
refusingto supportthe EmergencyCommittee.
The final resolutionofthe couptook placefive or six hourslater. At
the barricades--aseveryoneby now referred to the area around the
White House--ahuge crowd had gatheredin the afternoon.It was so
large and so compactthat it was physically impossibleto move from
one side of the squareto the other. Along the embankment,a whole
city of tents and makeshift sheltershad sprungup during the night; a
soup kitchen, organizedby the SeventhDay Adventists,was dispensing food to a line of tired "defenders,"while a first-aid station was
administeringto the old and the frail. Along the barrier facing the
White House,young men and women--somewith guitars and some
singing-addedcolor andgaietyto the excitedcrowd. The atmosphere
wasdistinctly festive.
The climax cameat around3:00 P.M. Until then it was still hearsay,
but a few minutesafter three, PresidentYeltsin, surroundedby Gennadii Burbulis, RuslanKhasbulatov,AleksandrRutskoi, andotherloyalists, cameout to announcethat it wasall over. Exceptfor Boris Pugo
(who, I discoveredlater, had committed suicide), the men who had
tried to turn the clock back were all under arrest. A thunderousyell
went up from the anxiously awaiting crowd. Some people laughed,
others cried. I must admit that I had a difficult time controlling my
emotions.My parentshadbeenimplacablefoes of Bolshevism.In June
1918, my father, a careerofficer, had taken part in a similar demonstration of anti-Communistsentimentby backing the democratic
anti-Bolshevikgovernmentorganizedby Socialist Revolutionariesin
Samara.My mother, an army nurse,joined the anti-Bolshevikmovement in the Urals six months later. Together,they spentnearly four

130 SERGEP. PETROFF

yearsin the ranksof the White Army. They neverregrettedtheir decisions, even in times of great despairand privation. Nor did they ever
give up hopethat someday communismwould be discredited.Standing transfixed in front of the RussianWhite House with the tricolor
waving in the wind, I could not but think of them,wonderinghow they
would havefelt hadthey lived to seewhat I witnessed--theundeniable
groundswellof a democraticcounter-revolution.

DONALD 1. RALEIGH

A View from Saratov

Donald1. Raleighis professorofRussianhistoryat the Universityof
North Carolina at ChapelHill. He haswritten a historyofthe 1917
revolution in Saratovandwasworkingon a sequelto that studyat the
time ofthe coup. Afterafifteen-yearbattle to gain admissionto that
closedcity, he visitedSaratovfor thefirst time in 1990as a
participantin an official academicexchangeprogram.Raleigh
returnedto Saratovon the eveofthe coupto edit a Russian
translationofhis book,Revolutionon the Volga: 1917in Saratov,and
to conductresearchin local archivesfor his currentproject.
The announcer'svoice was cheerless,calm, soothing.Gorbachevwas
in "ill health." The measures''would be in force for only six months."
Not meantas a rejection of reform, they were "necessaryto savethe
economyfrom completecollapse.""Apathy, despair,andlack of faith"
had seized hold of the population. "The country," in essence,"had
becomeungovernable."Peopledemanded"law and order." Responding to popularpressures,the ''temporary''leadershipwould assigntop
priority to assuringadequatefood suppliesandhousing.
It was 9:00 A.M., Saratovtime, Monday, August 19, 1991. Viktor
Ivanovich, my host, aboutwhom more will be said later, hadjust left
with my passportand visato registerme with the police, a necessary
ritual that could not be attendedto the day before when I arrived in
Saratov,a "closed"city, albeitone inthe processof opening.
Viktor Ivanovich phonedtwice from the police station, but both
times my line went dead.I listenednervouslyto ResolutionNo. 1 of
the cumbersomelynamedStateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergency.
I harboredno doubts about what I had just heard. Recalling Eduard
Shevardnadze's
resignationas Gorbachev'sforeign affairs ministerthe
131

132

DONALD J. RALEIGH

previous Decemberand his warning that "dictatorship is coming," I
sawnew meaningin the abruptrejectionofStanislavShatalin'splan to
move to a market economyin five hundreddays, in the violence in
Lithuaniaback in January,and in reformerAleksandrYakovlev'ssinister forecasta few days before that a conspiracywas in the air. But
how could this gambit by (as would soonbecomeevident) a group of
blunderingPartyapparatchikipossiblywork in a countrywhoseentire
belief systemhadbeenshatteredby yearsof fermentandendlessrevelations aboutthe tragedyof Soviethistory?Although vulnerable,civil
societyhad emergedupon the sceneand had to be reckonedwith. My
thoughtsthen focusedon my own predicament:I was a lone foreigner
in Saratov;I was living in what I suspectedwas a KGB flat; I had no
documents.Would I be forced to leave for Moscow?The broadcasts
ended.Funeralmusic followed. Then the announcements
and proclamationswererepeated.
National radio broadcastfour documentsthat morning: a decreeof
Vice PresidentGennadiiI. Yanaevthat he had assumedthe duties of
Acting Presidentbecauseof Mikhail SergeevichGorbachev'sincapacity; a statementby the eight-personcommitteeexplaining why it had
decidedto introducea six-monthstateof emergency;ResolutionNo. 1
of the committee,spelling out what specific measuresit was taking
to "normalize" the country; and a messagefrom Yanaev to foreign
leaders,emphasizingthe temporarynatureof the emergencymeasures,
which would not affect the USSR's international commitments.I
switchedon the TV: ballet. The Saratovstationwasoff the air.
The long-awaitedring at the door came.The police had registered
me. "For now," Viktor Ivanovich cautioned.I then rushedto the nearby kiosks in the squareadjacentto the large coveredmarket,but there
were no Saratovpapersto be had.Proceedingto the centralpostoffice,
accompaniedby Viktor Ivanovich, I cabledmy family that I had arrived safely and askedmy wife to phoneme from ChapelHill, North
Carolina. I wonderedwhetherthe ill-manneredand surly postal clerk
had taken a dislike to me or whether theday's news had ruined her
morning.Peopleseemedtenseandirritable.
At first glancenothing seemedto distinguishthe outwardappearance of the city from the previous, "normal day." But when I observed things more closely, I realized that people had clustered
togetherin the parks and on streetcomers,absorbedin serious,and
quiet, conversation.It was as if the volume control for streetsounds

VIEW FROM SARATOV /33

andnoiseshadbeenturneddown. I took notice of the police, but had
no way of knowing whether there were more of them than usual;
what was different about today was that I was merely awareof their
presence.
Feeling vulnerable,I did what most peopledid that day: I went to
work. I droppedin at the publishinghousethat is putting out a Russianlanguageedition of my book Revolution on the Volga. There, staff
membersdescribedtheir feeling as one of shock, dismay, sadness,
numbness.No one seemedfearful. No one caredto work. An editor
friend took me to meeta visiting Pole, not only in the hopesof getting
servedsome exotic tea, but also becauseGdansk-bornHenryk knew
aboutmartial law firsthand.The waterin Henryk's apartmenthadbeen
turnedoff altogether,so insteadof herbata,we drank in his prophetic
words that the introductionof martial law would not last. But this was
hard to believe, no matterhow much we wantedto, as the only news
came from national broadcastswhich gave no hint of the opposition
that had taken to the streetsin Moscow. The SaratovParty organizations, at both the city andregionallevels, failed to respondpublicly to
the events.
Lack of any news from the outside, other than the official broadcastsaired that morning, not only createdan anxiousatmospherebut
also guaranteedthe spreadof rumorsandrelentlessspeculation.Where
was Gorbachev?Had the very people he had selectedto govern betrayed him? Or had he hatchedthe plot himself? Why were thereonly
eight membersof the State Committee insteadof a ninth neededto
break any tie votes if the Committeereachedan impasse?Who had
mastermindedthe plot? Anatolii Lukianov, Gorbachev'schoice for
Chairmanof the SupremeSoviet? Or had he beeninvited to join the
group but declined?Was Yeltsin dead?Gorbachev?Why hadn't the
CentralCommitteeof the CommunistPartyissueda statement?Whose
side was the army on? Had the leadersof Saratov's democraticmovement been arrested?Why were local leaderssilent? Had the events
takenthemby surprisetoo?
Those with whom I sharedmy fears on August 19 expressedtheir
outragenot only at the attemptby a group of mediocrepersonalitiesto
derail Russia'sunsteadynew order, but also at the return to the old
paradigms,the old language,the old lies. Although conversations,
overheardin lines or on crowdedbuses,urged law and order, no one
with whom I spokethat day-andI spentthe entire day in conversation

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DONALD J. RALEIGH

--supportedthe action of the State Committee.But for Saratov,the
reactionto the official decreesfor now belongedto the private sphere,
somethingsharedwith family and friends. Peopledid not rush into the
streets,as in Moscow, to defend any concretesymbol of Russia's
shakydemocracy,becausethat which neededtheir protection,for then,
remainedan abstraction.
I later learnedthat at 4:15 P.M. the local committeefor radio and
televisionhadreceiveda copy of PresidentYeltsin'sdecree,calling the
activities of the StateCommitteeunconstitutional,but apparentlyhad
little enthusiasmfor publicizing it. When a small group of deputies
from the city and regional soviets sought out the head of the local
committee,A.P. Zotov, they found him deepin conversationwith his
assistantand with a representativeof the KGB, who made a tasteful
exit when the deputiesannouncedthemselves.In postponinghis reaction to Yeltsin's decree,the unpopularZotov further discreditedhimselfin the eyesof Saratov's progressiveelements,who during the local
power struggle in the year precedingthe coup had come to resent
Zotov's conservatismand outright hostility toward glasnostand its
consequences.
Saratov newspapersafterward revealedthat at roughly the same
time PresidentYeltsin's decreereachedSaratov,the local department
of health receiveda messagefrom the Ministry of Health ordering
officials to put two additional emergencymedical crews on duty that
night.
Although I learnedlittle about the coup until that evening,I updated my knowledgeof the course of perestroikain Saratovsince
my first visit the year before, in May-June 1990. Back then, my
stay helped broadenmy overall perspectiveon the reform movement by adding a sorely needed"provincial" correctiveto the views
articulated in Moscow. I had left Moscow for Saratovpuzzled by
the nonstopreferenceto imminent civil war. A month later I left
Saratovfor Moscow, cautiouslyoptimistic about the country'sfuture. Although Saratovlacked the frenetic political atmosphereof
the capital cities, I realized how wrong it was to dismiss this as a
fact of life in provincial Russia. Still in control of local politics,
reactionaryParty apparatchikihad repressedpublic demonstrations
in Februaryand May 1990, and they still ran the major newspaper,
which was as dull as they come. Yet I could not help but wonder
whethertheir remainingin power hadsomethingto do with the fact

VIEW FROM SARATOV /35

that local food supplieswere significantlybetterthan in Moscow. The
country had alreadybrokenapartinto local economicunits, and city
authoritieshad to attendto local needsfirst. Moreover,beneaththe
superficial calm agitateda civil societythat measurablypushedthe
limits of the permissible.New faceshad beenelectedto the Saratov
Soviet-peoplewho had campaignedto end the local Party
apparatus'smonopoly of power and to open the city to the outside
world. While I was in town, the first issuesof severalindependent
newspapersappeared.Volga Germansand the local Tatar community pressedfor reform and recognition. People exchangedviews
freely, and I found no forbidden topics of conversation.More important, local sentimentsand broad social phenomenaparalleled
those in the capitals becausethey made sensein terms of local
conditions.Saratovsocietysufferedthe familiar crisis in confidence
as it searcheddesperatelyfor somethingto believein. As elsewhere,
a nostalgicand uncritical interestin the tsarist past filled the spiritual vacuum,as did a revival of religious or other spiritual activity,
which included a fascination with the occult. The political lineup
among the local intelligentsia did not differ from that of Moscow
(i.e., Sakharovwas a hero, Yeltsin was popular, Gorbachevwas
neither). In other words, I sensedthat the old guard still in charge
felt more accountablethan ever to its local constituency,whose
passivitycould no longer be taken for granted.Although the political mood in Saratov wasfar from uniform, I nonethelessdetected
broad public agreementon the most vital political and socioeconomic issue:systemicreform hadto continue.
During the day'sintensediscussionson August 19, 1991,I realized
the extent to which years of ferment and revelations about the
country'stragic history had discreditedSoviet power in many circles.
Basedin the city's Polytechnic Institute,the DemocraticRussiamovement had formed a caucuswithin the city soviet, which soon splintered. Battles over local rule had broken out in some of the
neighborhoodsovietsas the formerly disenfranchisedsoughtto exercisetheir rights. I heardandreadabouthungerstrikes,anarchists,Hari
Krishnas,the openingof soupkitchensandSundayschools.The spring
1991 electionshad given the "democraticforces" greatervisibility
and one of their spokesmen,V.G. Golovachev-soonto emergeas
"Saratov'sYeltsin"-hadbeenelectedchairmanof the soviet,to the
dismay of the council's executive committee. The official paper,

/36

DONALD J. RALEIGH

Kommunist,maintainedits conservativeline, but Saratov, one of the
severalnew publicationsdebutingthat year-abadly produced,officially reviled, and disrespectfulbiweekly-backedGolovachev
and the demokraty.
It was unclear whether Golovachev, like many of the country's
reformers,hadbeena Communistby convictionor by convenience.In
either case,he had donewell beforeperestroika,and seemedto know
how to adapthimselfnow. Golovachevsidedwith the city's reformers
on all issuesthat challengedthe powerof the entrenchedapparatchiki.
He and his supportersencounteredbitter resistancefrom the chairman
of the city soviet'sexecutive committee,
from the ruling cliquessettled
in someof the neighborhoodsoviets,from the regional soviet and its
ruling organs,and from the local regional Party boss,K.D. Murenin,
whoseautocraticinclinations and egotism,so reminiscentof thoseof
Romania'sformer leader,Ceausescu,
earnedhim the nicknameMurenescu.Murenin hadactuallybeena favorite topic of conversationsince
June,whenthe granddaughter
of Saratov-bornNikolai Chernyshevskii,
who servedas director of the local ChernyshevskiiMuseumthat honored Saratov'srevolutionaryson, had committedsuicide by plunging
to her deathfrom a window in Murenin's apartment.Therewas much
speculationas to what haddriven her to suchdesperation,the more so
since her son died by his own hand three days later after poisoning
himself. Now rumorscirculatedthat the unsavoryMurenin had left on
a Volga cruise--and,in fact, he had.
That evening'snationally televisedpressconferenceorganizedby
the ringleadersof the coup may mark one of the great historic momentsin the history of the Sovietmedia.Reminiscentin manyways of
the impact television had had in Romaniathe year before, when a
dazedpopulationheardresentfulcrowdsdemandthe overthrowof the
despisedCeausescu,the broadcastillustratesthe extent to which the
media had becomean autonomousforce both reflecting and shaping
public opinion in the Soviet Union. No one could misreadthe Soviet
media'sdisdain for the organizersof the coup. A sniffling Gennadii
Yanaev, his face swollen by fatigue and alcohol, had a tough time
fielding the combativequestions.His trembling handsand quivering
voice conveyedan image of impotence,mediocrity, and falsehood;he
appearedas a caricatureof the quintessential,boozed-upParty functionary from the Brezhnevera.Minister of InternalAffairs Boris Pugo,
who normally seemedsteely cold, tough, and loathsome,seemed

VIEW FROM SARATOV 137

merely loathsomewhen stripped of his usual confidence. Vasilii
Starodubtsev,the head of Russia'sunimportant Peasants'Union,
didn't seem to know what all the disagreementwas about. If the
stunning spectacleexposedthese mediocrities to public scrutiny,
then the news program following the pressconferenceclearedup
any remaining uncertainty viewers may have nursed: it showed
tanksrumbling throughthe streetsof Moscow and it reportedon the
forceful oppositionof Boris Yeltsin and other membersof the Russian parliament,who had declaredthe actionsof the StateCommittee treasonous.My phonerang off the hook for the next hour or so;
the significanceof the momentwas lost on no one. Although I could
not reach Moscow or Leningradby phone that evening, I went to
bed with the sensethat Yanaev and his associateshad seized not
power,but merelyits illusion.
The vivid imageof tanksin Moscow convincedme that I would be
departinginto uncertaintyif I left Saratov.Phoningfrom ChapelHill,
North Carolina, at 3:00 A.M. Saratovtime, my wife, Karen, urgedme
to stay put, informed me of the reactionto the coup in Leningradand
someof the republics,and updatedme on the responseat home.Anxious telephoneconversationswith friends in Moscow servedas a sort
of spiritual breakfastthat got me throughthe next morning. They reconfirmed what I had heardfrom my wife, and informed me of the
valiant oppositionof the well-informed Muscovites,some of whom
followed eventsby watchingCNN. I spentthe next hour calling people
in Saratovand receiving calls from those who had additional word
from othercities. Therewas somethingcomplicitousand sweetlydefiant in registeringour indignationoverthe telephone.Despitethe strain
the technologicallyimpoverishedSoviet telephonesystemwas under,
it held up remarkablewell: it enabledpeopleto reachout to friends and
family following the historic pressconference.To a certain extent,
oppositionto the putschspreadby telephone,and, as I later learned,
with the help of teletypeandfax machinesaswell.
On Tuesday,August 20, the coup beganto unfold locally. Saratovites who went to the newspaperkiosks that morning could no longer
remainindifferent to the attemptto setthe political clock back, for the
official newspaper,Kommunist,and the "progressive"organ,Saratov,
had hit the newsstands.Kommunistpublished
all of the previousday's
documentsissuedby the State Committeeas well as a statementby
Lukianov that further discussionof the new Union Treaty, scheduled

138

DONALD J. RALEIGH

to be voted on that week, had to be postponed.Popular suspicions
that conservativeelementssaw the new Union Treaty as equivalent
to the breakupof the Party's centralizedpower, and thus had decided to act before it was voted on, now seemedvalidated. The
papercarriedno statementswhatsoeverfrom the local Party organization or from the city council, and I suspectthat only a handful of
apparatchikihad beenin the know beforehand.My eyesfixed upon
the one photographin the issue, which depictedthe main agronomist and tractor driver from the ChapaevCollective Farm. In contrast, Saratovpublishedportraits of Yeltsin and Gorbachev,as well
as statementsby Yeltsin, Acting Chairmanof the RussianSupreme
Soviet RuslanKhasbulatov,and Chairmanof the Council of Ministers of the RussianRepublicIvan Silaev.PresidentYeltsin's historic
decreecalling the actions of the State Committeefor the State of
Emergencyillegal andunconstitutionaldeclaredunambiguouslythat
those who supportedthis crime againstthe state would be prosecuted. A headlinemade referenceto Khrushchev'sousterin 1964.
The cartoondepictedthe USSR inside a cage.An editorial queried:
"Can it really be that the hunk of sausagethey toss at us from their
reserveswill prompt us, the people,to deceiveourselvesand sink
back into the swamponceagain... ?" "A dark cloud hangsover the
entire country," flashedthe headline.
As on Monday, I spentthe day in heated,relentless,collective speculation anddiscussion,aswell aseating,andconsuminglargeamounts
of alcohol. The comfort of being with kindred souls wasdissipatedby
their reportsthat my visit to Saratovthe yearbefore,after a seventeenyear campaignto get there,had arouseddeepsuspicionson the part of
the KGB, who insistedI was "no merehistorian." For this reason,the
coup attempt seemeddirected as much againstme; I had a personal
stakein how it unfolded.
That eveningthe coup beganto play itself out in Saratov.Meeting
that afternoon,regional authoritiescould do no more than to issuea
bland appealto the local populationto remain calm. As one of them,
Yu.G. Slepov,so ironically put it, "Taking a positiononly complicates
the situation." Peoplewith whom I cameinto contactunderstoodthis
restraintfor what it was: a sign of divisiveness,andan indicationthat a
local power strugglehad begunin earnest.In fact, having learnedthe
reaction of Boris Yeltsin, leadersof the Kirov neighborhoodsoviet
expressedtheir support for the popular RussianPresident,although

VIEW FROM SARATOV /39

they opposedhis call for a generalstrike without the sanctionof the
SupremeSoviet. Such respectfor the rule of law and constitutional
orderreassuredme.
By 7:00 P.M. a crowd, eventually estimatedto be ten to twelve
thousandstrong,beganto assembleon Revolution Square,the largest
squarein Saratov,locatedin the heartof town, acrossthe streetfrom
the splendid(tsarist)building that housesthe SaratovCity Soviet.Borderedon the north by Lenin Prospect,the city's major thoroughfare,
which runs from the Volga River on the eastto the railroadstationand
the hills that nestle up against the city on the west, the square is
Saratov'sequivalent of Moscow's Red Square.A tasteless,clunky
Lenin monumenttowersover the large expanse.Lenin's slightly limp,
outstretchedright hand seemedto be pointing an accusingfinger at
those who fell under his stony gaze. As well it should. For in a few
short days Lenin would no longer be standingin Revolution Square,
but in Theater Square,as it was called before the revolution. The
irreverentwould be collecting signatureson a petition demandinghis
removal, while a few scandalizedwar veteranswould try in vain to
preventvandalsfrom defamingthe icon by sprayingin blood-redpaint
on the monument'spedestal,"Hangmanof Russia."
Deputiesfrom the city and oblastsoviets,with the assistanceof the
emergencycouncil of the local branchof the DemocraticRussiamovement, a broadcaucusformed earlier in the year that broughttogether
the numerousstrandsof the country'sdemocraticopposition,organized the public meeting on the eveningof August 20. The gathering
turned into a public expressionof support for PresidentYeltsin and
popular rejection of the leadershipof the regional soviet, which was
synonymouswith the local leadershipof the CommunistParty. A successionof emotionalspeakersreadYeltsin's decrees;demandedGorbachev'sreturn to Moscow and the arrestof his turncoat comrades;
insistedthat the leadershipof the region clarify its attitudetoward the
eventsand lift the "information blockade"from Saratov;called for an
immediateconvocationof the regional and city soviets and for the
dismissalof the executivecommitteeof the city soviet,headedby V.S.
Agapov, for supportingthe putschists. Others
thirstedfor the blood of
the overseerof the local radio andtelevisionchannels,A.P. Zotov, and
of the editor of Kommunist,N.F. Zorin, for settingup the information
blockade.Golovachevurgedapprovalof a resolutionof supportfor the
RussianPresident.The crowdendorsedthe ideaaswell ascalls to post

140

DONALD J. RALEIGH

RevolutionSquare,Saratov: "HangmanofRussia"

VIEW FROM SARATOV 14I

guardsover the local television and radio stationsand the city soviet.
Thosewho were unawareof the public meetingthat night must have
senseda shift in the local balanceof forces, nonetheless,for that evening Channel5, the Saratovstation,beganbroadcastingofficial communiquesfrom the Russian,that is, Yeltsin, government.
Several observationsneed to be made about the meeting on the
eveningof August20. The KGB andpolice did not interfereat all. The
crowd was heterogeneous,
althoughmembersof the intelligentsiapredominated.City sovietdeputyV. Zhavoronskii,an activist in the Democratic Russiamovement,and "mayor" Golovachevpresidedover the
meeting. The former undoubtedlysaw the public demonstrationas a
vehicle to strengthenthe handof democraticelementsin town, a goal
undoubtedlysharedby Golovachev,who also had a personalstakein
the matter,ashe andAgapovandCo. hadbeensparringall year.
The herbal sleeping aid given to me by friends did not work. I
welcomedmorning becauseit endedmy sustaineddialogue with my
subconsciousand deepestfears, and despitethe uneasinessI felt when
I recalledthat Victor Ivanovich was due to show up ''to fix a broken
kitchen faucet." No doubtsremainedin my mind that he worked for
the KGB; consequently,the fact that he did not drop in or phoneboth
relieved me and gave me somethingelse to mull over. A call from
Moscowinforming me that threeMuscoviteshaddiedthe night before
deepenedmy gloom, althoughit was reassuringto learnthat the radio
station Moscow Echo kept peoplethere well informed. My efforts to
placea call to friends in Leningradonceagainfailed.
Eagerto learn if there had beenany repercussionsto the previous
night's massrally, I set out in searchof fresh newspapers.Kommunist
carrieda spateof statementsand announcements
from the StateCommittee (referredto in Russianby its difficult-to-pronounceacronym,
Novemberassertionsthat foreign
Geh-keh-cheh-peh),including hard~to-believe
powers understoodthe need for the adoption of extraordinarymeasures. Another announcementcommentedbriefly on the opposition
centeredaroundBoris Yeltsin, Ivan Silaev, and RuslanKhasbulatov,
but insistedthatthe GKChPwaspatientlycooperatingwith these"confused patriots." I read as well that the SupremeSoviet was scheduled
to meeton August 26 to discussthe measurestakenby the GKChP. A
samplingof local public opinion included remarksby only five individuals, four of whom supportedthe extraordinarymeasures.The fifth
individual insistedthe country'sproblemshad to be solvedon a legal

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DONALD J. RALEIGH

basis.All of thosecanvassedstressedthe needfor law andorder. Since
the report on Monday evening'spressconferencedid not at all accurately reflect what viewers had witnessed,I could readily dismissthe
survey. Kommunistrepeatedthe ''temporary''ban on all but an approvedlist of newspapers.Among the short articles on health,beauty
tips, and how-to-fix-it columnswas tuckedaway a modestnotice that
Soviet citizens could no longer buy foreign currency.This, in effect,
would preventmost peoplefrom being able to travel abroad.I sawno
mention of the eventsin Moscow or elsewhere.The day's obligatory
photo portrayedF. Alimov, a machineoperatorat the Bannerof the
Red OctoberCollective Farm,who for four summersnow had stacked
fodderin an exemplarymanner.
Despitethe ban on non-Partynewspapers,Saratovput out a special
edition that morningaswell. The tonereflectedBoris Yeltsin's spirited
defiance. Demandingthat an internationalteam of doctors examine
Gorbachev,Yeltsin volunteeredto havethe RussianRepublicpay the
medicalbill from its depletedhard-currencyreserves.Once againemphasizingthe unconstitutionalnatureof the attemptedcoup, Saratov's
Golovachevcalledupon Saratovitesto upholdall ofYeltsin'sdecrees,
and upon city, regional, and neighborhoodsoviet leadersto back
Yeltsin. Golovachevalso propheticallystatedthat the coup would fail.
Other articles assessedpublic opinion in the capitals as well as in
Saratov.A roving reporter who took the First Secretaryof the City
Committeeof the CommunistParty, S. Slepov,by surprise,let Slepov's
cautiousand insipid remarks about the legality of the extraordinary
measuresspeakfor themselves.
A probing article analyzedthe putschitself and why it was failing.
Posingquestionsthat were on many people'sminds about the ineptnessof the coup'sorganizers,the authorobservedthat their last chance
to save themselveswas a two-thirds vote of support within the SupremeSoviet, scheduledto meeton the 26th, or a decisionto resortto
force. A relatedpiecedecriedthe cheappopulismof the coup'sorganizers as expressedin their vaguepromisesto improve food supplies
andhousing,andlower prices.No happyworkersadornedSaratov,but
insteada cartoonof a jowly Party apparatchikwith the caption,''The
measuresthat I want to proposeare unpopular,but, believeme, comrades,they'renecessary."
In readingthe paper,I could not help but think that Soviet society
hadbeenasclosedto thosewho constituteit, including its leaders,as it

VIEW FROM SARATOV 143

hadbeento me. How elsecanwe accountfor the colossalineptitude
of Russia's"Pinochets," as the newspaperSaratov began calling
GennadiiYanaevand his accomplices?Back in 1917Lenin actually
had a much betterappreciationof the public mood out in the provinces than did those who had calculatedon overthrowing M.S.
Gorbachev.Had they takenthe pulse of the Russianheartlandbeforehand, they probably would have reconsideredtheir plans or
abandonedthem altogether.It seemedto me that the putschistshad
beendeludedby the widespreadview that, apartfrom a few exceptions, the provincesrepresenteda bulwark of conservatism,and by
illusions of a yet sound centralizedpower that had the clout to
compelthe provincesto comply with the center'swishes.Failing to
see that the old guard's ability to survive contrived elections in
many provincial centerstold us virtually nothing about prevailing
attitudes in these settings, the putschistsbecamevictims of their
own self-deception.
Emboldenedby the tone of Saratov, I decidedto drop in unannouncedat the SaratovRegional Party Archive, located a short distancefrom my apartment.A month or so beforemy departurefor the
Soviet Union, I had written to the director of the archive, requesting
permissionto use its holdings during my forthcoming visit. Although
laws forbadenon-Communistsfrom working in Partyarchives,several
American and Europeanscholarshad been grantedaccessto central
Party archivesin Moscowduring the previousmonths.As I was about
to beginwriting a book on the Civil War in SaratovRegion(1918-22),
I wishedto takeadvantageof the lifting of restrictionsregardingaccess
to vital materialsthat heretoforewereoff-limits, in the hopeof obtaining accessto Party archives, which, in effect, remainedthe only
sourcesI had notyet examined.
Unable to tell from looking at the gray brick building how to find
the entrance,let alone the director, I deliberatelywhisked past the
armedguard without making eye contact.As I expected,he collared
me, briefly questionedme, and pointed me to the correct passage.
Once inside, I locatedthe director'soffice and assuredhis perplexed
secretarythat I was willing to wait as long as necessaryin orderto see
him. "Where did you say you were from?" she prodded.My answer
sent her scurrying, and momentarilyI was introducing myself to Mr.
Lobanov.
Lobanov'ssweatyoutstretchedhand made a hesitanthandshake.I

144

DONALD J. RALEIGH

smelledfear. Yes, I told him, I knew that it was illegal for me to use
Party archives,but he and I both realized that current practice had
changedall that. And, yes, I had beentold that Lobanovhad assumed
his postjust a shortwhile ago.
"Too bad your letter took so long in getting hereand too bad your
university colleaguessentus written supportof your requestjust yesterday. We in Saratovlook quite favorably upon your appeal,but we
can'tlet you work herewithout the pennissionof the CentralCommittee. Unfortunately,I doubt that we will receive a reply to the letter I
sentto Moscowbeforeyou leaveSaratov."
"Excuseme," I pressed."There'sa telephoneon your desk. Let's
call Moscow.I'll be happyto arguemy case."
"I'll call Moscowmyself," Lobanovrepliedwith somehostility.
"Should I come back tomorrow?" I asked,knowing full well what
his answerwould be.
"Don't bother.You cancall me."
I left frustrated by my meeting with the soft-spoken,timid
Lobanov,who to me epitomizedthe bland, morally neutraltype that
used to make a careerwithin the Party establishmentby being disagreeablyagreeable.On my way to the statearchiveto report on my
visit with Lobanov, I stoppedin at the Volga Publishing House to
leave somematerialswith my editor. There I had a chanceencounter
with an eccentricold man who had publisheda book on local medicinal herbs--aparticularly timely subject, owing not only to the keen
public interestin anything not given its due in the past, but also to
the lack of pharmaceuticals.Genuine, sincere, and unpretentious,
this veterinarian-turned-herbalist
had dreamedfor yearsof meetinga
real Americanwith flashy white teeth,and I walked into his dreamthe
momentI enteredmy editor'sbasementoffice, which servedas work
station, reception area, trade center, and diner. My new self-proclaimedfriend had one uselesseye (he had beenkicked by a horse),
and the other twinkled at me impishly from behind smudgedspectacles. His spontaneousdisplay of emotionand affection lightenedmy
heart, and once again directedmy thoughtsto the many fine qualities of the Soviet people I find so disarmingly endearing.They
deservedbetter than Yanaevand his ilk, I thought to myself. Even
Lobanov.
Thesequalitieswerejust as evidentat the statearchiveon Kutiakov
Street, where archivists put a desk at my disposal in a room they

VIEW FROM SARATOV 145

occupiedon the secondfloor. They invited me to work there, rather
than in the Lilliputian public reading room, so that casualacquaintanceswould not botherme, asthey hadduring my first visit to Saratov
the yearbefore.The archivists,four women,joked that the deskavailable to me was a partingpresentfrom one of their coworkerswho had
recentlyemigratedto Israel.They servedme tea,pastries,andfruit and
vegetablesfrom the plots they worked on weekends.And they shared
their food and drink with me not just that day, but during the coming
weeksas well. For now, we worked together,listenedto radio broadcaststogether,and discussedlocal and national politics together.We
got to know abouteachother'sfamilies andillnesses.In today'sidiom,
we bonded.From things they said, and from the way they saidthem,
I came to understandthe meaning of the coup from this provincial
perspective.
In the early afternoonI met friends for lunch at the Volga Hotel
Restaurant,consideredthe bestrestaurantin town. Serviceis horrible
and the menu limited. While dining, one can observethe waitresses
andwaiterspeddlingor swappingrationed(andexpensive)hard liquor
for who knows what favors. The Volga's attraction is that the high
priceskeepit off-limits to most. As this was our first visit together,my
friends and I soughtto catchup on eachother'slives and families, but
no matter how hard we tried, talk reverted again and again to the
political situation andto speculatingabouthow long this frightful setbackcould last.
Shortly after I returnedto my cozy comerin the archive,an agitated
archivist burst into the room to announcethat someof the organizers
of the coup had beenarrested.We broke into spontaneousapplause.
There were tears and phone calls. We turned up the volume of the
radio, congratulatingourselvesfor suggestingearlier that the coup
could not last. Experiencingboundlessrelief and yearning for more
concretenews, we left for home to listen to the latest information. I
heardthe 6:00 P.M. broadcastat the Volga PublishingHouse,wherethe
umestrainedgoodwill and lightheartedness
reigningthere infectedme.
Later I was to fmd out that a block away from my publisher'sat the
very sametime, eighty-threedeputiesof the city soviet, abouttwenty
shy of a quorum, had convened.Golovachevread a statementabout
the arrestsand aboutYeltsin'sauthorityto deal with the coup'sconsequences.All but four or five of the deputiesdemonstratedtheir pleasure with the outcomeof the coup by standingwhen congratulatory

146 DONALD J. RALEIGH

telegramswere read.The deputiesresolvedto hold an emergencysession that eveningand to issuean official announcementto the people
ofSaratov.
A much welcomedchangeon the evening of Wednesday,August
21, was that conversationnow centeredon family, friends, and other
personalmatters,ratherthan on politics and the country'sprecarious
future. We switched the TV off, not wishing to have the congenial
ambiencedestroyedby any unexpectedannouncements.
It was hard to
believethat all we had lived throughhad beencompressedinto a few
days.

VALERII ZAVOROTNYI

Letter from St. Petersburg

Born andraisedin Leningrad(now St. Petersburg),wherehewas
trainedas a computerscientist,Valerii Zavorotnyihasbeenactively
involvedin the city's democraticmovementsince1988as a
participant, political observer,andcommentator.Overtheyearshe
computer
hastried his handat variousprofessions-filmmaker,
scientist,sculptor, writer-beforeturning to public life. His writings
on public affairs appearedin numerousLeningradpublications
during the Gorbachevyears.
I woke up on the 19th when my phonerang anda voice informed me:
"Everything is going to hell. Gorbachevwas arrested,emergencyrule
hasbeenintroduced."I mumbledsomethinginto the receiverandhung
up. Let me tell you, it is a horrible thing to be awakenedby a phone
call like that.
What to do? I had to get up and turn on the TV. All I learnedwas
that the samesymphonyorchestrawas playing the samepiece onall
threechannels.For a Sovietbeing,this representsa clear signal that a
sharpturn in policy in the belovedcountry is in the offmg. Ten minutes later, an announcerbeganto read with a stony face, first, Lukianov's statement,then the Appeal to the Soviet People,and Decree
No.1 of the EmergencyCommittee.... I hadno more questions.
Now, hard as I try, I cannotrecall what I felt in thosemoments.I
guessit was somekind of temporarynumbnessof feeling. I washed,I
dressed,I drank coffee, I tried to collect thoughtsthat I did not have.
But this statedid not last long. Gradually,my brain regainedits agility.
Under thesecircumstancesI did not expectany more news, and, sure
enough, the TV merely repeatedthe earlier statement,followed by
moremusic.
147

148

VALERII ZA VOROTNYI

That morningI hada datewith two Frenchhistorianswho hadbeen
invited by the Memorial Society.·They had just come from Novosibirsk, and I had promisedto show them the city. What a day for an
excursion! I gave the mattersomethought and decidedto go to their
place, pick them up, and take a walk with them to the Mariinskii
Palace[the LeningradCity Soviet]. If anythingat all wereto happen,it
wasmostlikely to happenthere.
I left home expectingto be greetedif not by tanks,then by heavy
police patrols.Therewas nothing of the sort, nothing at all that would
distinguishthis morning from any other workday morning. Peoplewere
rushingto their jobs, city busescameandwent, and the ownersof co-op
businesses
wereopeningup their stallsoutsidethe subwaystation....
It was then that, for the first time that morning, my mood really
soured."It looks like we are going to swallow this one, too," I saidto
myself.
I took the subwayto Vasilevskii Island, where the French couple
was staying.The first thing they askedme when they openedthe door
was,"Do you think we canstayherelonger?"It would havebeenmore
appropriatefor them toask me whetherthey would be able to get out
of here. We chatteda little over a cup of coffee in the kitchen and I
beganlooking at my watch, angling to get out of their apartmentas
soon as possible. At the same time I felt badly about leaving two
foreignersin that kind of a situation. "What do you think will happen
next?" askedAlain (his wife's name was Sonya). I wished I knew
someonewho could answerthis question."Do you think the West will
be able to help?" he continued.I wantedvery muchto assumea proud
pose and answer,"No, we'll take care of it ourselves."However, I
immediatelythought of the sceneon the street,where everybodywas
going about their businessas if nothing had happened.Perhapsthe
West is our only hope, I said to myself, and mumbledin responseto
Alain's question somethinglike, "We've gotten ourselvesinto this
mess,and we'll have to take care of it ourselves."I rememberthis
conversationvery well andrememberalso thatI wasentirely disingenuous. What I was saying to myself ran differently: "What nonsense!
Theyhaveall the power-thearmy, the KGB-which meansthey will
be entrenchedfor years.Onceagain,the only free speechwill be in the
*Memorial is a voluntary associationdedicatedto the history and rehabilitation of the victims of repression.

LEITER FROM ST. PETERSBURG 149

kitchen; onceagain,we'll haveto handcopy the samizdat,onceagain
we'll haveto fear police searchesandworty while reading clandestine
literature...."
We decidedto take a walk in the city together.I thought I would
take them toSt. Isaac'sCathedralandwhile thereI would take a peak
at the Mariinskii PalaceSquareto seeif anythingwasafoot.
Nevskii Prospectwas busy as usual: therewas traffic, retail kiosks
were doing a brisk business,shopswereopen.... Alain, though,noted
that people were gloomier than usual. I disagreed,saying that
Leningradersare quite gloomy as rule. We walked all the way to
HerzenStreetwithout encounteringanythingunusual.Only after turning the comer did we come acrossa small band of young people,
marchingtogether,holding handsanddisplayinga handmadeplacard:
"Down with Dictatorship!"An old womanhissed:"Damnyou all! You
made a messand now you'll pay for it." About a dozen pedestrians
crossedto the other side of the street.Otherstried to avert their eyes
and walked pastas quickly as possible.Alain got out his cameraand
took a picture of the marchers,trying to be as inconspicuousas possible. Here we go again, I thoughtto myself,'back to ''you ought to be
ashamedin front of the foreigner"; "foreign spies"; "clandestineCIA
operations";"the Iron Curtain."
Finally we reachedSt. Isaac's,I took them inside, showedthe way
to the top, and told them thatI would be waiting for them in front of
the Mariinskii Palace,on the SenateSquare.
I expectedthe Mariinskii to be surroundedby soldiers or OMON
specialmilitia troops---theway they did it in Vilnius backin Januarybut there was nothing of the sort. What I saw was about a hundred
peoplemilling aboutunderthe columnswith Russia'stricolor flag and
a few placards.It was then that I saw for the first time the mentionof
the junta and a call for a general strike.One column was decorated
with a big portrait of Yeltsin, the other sporteda sign: "No to Red
Fascism."A few militiamen were amongthe crowd. The palacedoors
were open and peoplekept going in and out. Finally, I spotteda few
guys in gray OMON uniforms, but they were unarmed.I walkedup to
oneof them."What'sup, officer?"
He did not answerme. We stood for a while, in silence.''Thereis
somethingamiss here," I said to myself. "Things are a messeverywhere. Still, this is a coup d'etat,after all. Could it be that they don't
havethe brainsto pull this off either?"

150

VALERII ZAVOROTNYI

At the Mariinskii Palace, St. Petersburg: "No to Red Fascism!" "Join the
Indefinite Political Strike!" "No to the CPSUDictatorship!"

Soon after Alain and Sonyarejoined me, I spotteda Deputy I knew
from the dayswhen we worked togetherfor the PopularFront.· He was
exactlywhat I neededthen. I quickly saidgood-byeto my Frenchfriends,
promisedto call them later that evening,andran off to catchthe Deputy.
Tenminuteslater,I wasinsidethe palace,climbing the marblestaircaseto
the secondfloor, having no idea whatsoeverthat I would not leavethis
building until threedayslater. Thus beganthe most exciting andperhaps
the bestthreedaysof my life in the last severalyears.
I was not lucky enoughto find a job right away, though everyone
therehadplenty to do. At first, we were busy duplicatingleaflets (we
were afraid that newspaperswould be closed down). TV and radio
were closedtight, and our only hope was the photocopymachinesat
the palace.Newscameovertwo telephonelines andwaswritten down
longhand.We had only two fax machines.Yeltsin's first decreesand
*This was a grassroots,Gorbachev-encouraged
democraticmovementof the
early yearsof perestroika.

LEITER FROM ST. PETERSBURG 151

addressescameover them from Moscow. Later in the day, two newspapers,Smenaand Nevskoevremia, managedto come out by some
miracle (the deputieshadto "musclein" on the censors).Day andnight
during these days we kept getting leaflets, statements,and decrees
from Moscow,kept duplicatingthemanddistributingthemall throughout
the city.
On the eveningof the 19th we found out that twocolumnsof troops
and equipmentwere moving toward the city from the direction of
Pskov. At the same time, we learned that a Special Forces storm
trooperunit of six hundredmenhadenteredthe city andwas quartered
at a military college on Voinov Street. Other military units regularly
stationedaroundLeningradwere put on alert but were staying putfor
the time being. Severalgroups,headedby deputiesfrom the city soviet, went to thosebasesas well as to the military collegesand to the
navy bases.Many of those who came to the squarelater, especially
former soldiers, organizedthemselvesinto groups and also went to
speakto the military.
The staff headquartersorganizedat the palace was recruiting reserveofficers from amongthosewho cameto the square(by that time,
over a thousandpeoplehad alreadygatheredthere). Pretendingto be
oneofthosebravereserveofficers (thoughI nevergot beyondthe rank
of sergeant),I managedto get myself admitted into one of these
groups.I adaptedto the role so well that three hours later I was promoted to group commander.They even issued me a very powerful
mandate.I am sorry I will not haveany grandchildren,for this pieceof
paperis exactly what one would like to frame and put on the wall for
the sakeof one'sdescendants.
What happenedduring the following two nights and two days is a
long story. On the morning of the 19th, deputiesandall thosewho had
helpedthem to get electedbeganto streaminto the palace.All of this
resembled[the election campaignof] 1989, when people were only
beginningto come out of hibernation,feel like actual humanbeings,
andrealizethat they could makea difference.Many were simply those
"men in the street"who had once madeit possiblefor the deputiesto
be elected.As in 1989, the division betweenthose who were voting
and thosewho were being voted into office becameblurred. This was
all the more remarkablebecausejust a few daysago it looked as if all
factional infighting amongthe newly electeddeputieswould lead to a
deadend.The attitudetowardthe "democrats"hadbeenchanging,and,

152

VALERII ZAVOROTNYI

Rally in PalaceSquare,August19

sad to say, not in their favor. And, God knows, this was understandable,just as it was clearthat the deputieshadnot had any prior experience of democraticgovernment,no political culture, and, saddestof
all, were not alwaysawareof their deficiencies.Who can blamethem,
though.Onecould not askhistory to slow down.
I hadneverbeenenthusiasticaboutpolitics. It is interestingto study
and analyzepolitics as a form of the relation betweenthe government
andsociety,but to be an actorin it was not for me. In any case,politics
is not a cleanbusiness,it neveris. However,at certainmoments,many
things becomedifferent; otherwise,we would not have had Sakharov
or many other men and women I have encounteredwhose integrity I
neverdoubted.
Our greatpoliticianswho thoughtup this coupd'etat(oh, thesewise
men!) had made all the correct calculations,including the public's
growing disappointmentin the "democrats."But once again, they
failed to take into accountthe "minutiae." They forgot that peoplehad
alreadyhada tasteof freedomandthat they might not wish to go back.
They might elect a bad government.But, having obtainedthe right to

LETJ'ER FROM ST. PETERSBURG 153

choosetheir own government,evenif they subsequentlydamnit with
four-letter words, they would not wish to part with this right. For the
fIrst time in decades,indeed,centuries,this was their government--a
flawed governmentto be sure (''this fucking government!"),but the
governmentthat theythemselveselected.And thosepeoplecameout to
safeguardthis government,that is to say,to safeguardthemselves
. ...
I can also tell you that despitethe almost completeinformation
blackout,with the radio and TV continuouslyspreadinglies, we managedto set up the production,duplication,and distribution throughout
the city of thousandsof leafletsandnewssummaries.In manyoffices,
where the authoritieshad not yet shut down duplicating equipment,
dozensof different peopledid their bestto producea few hundred,a
few thousandcopies.... Dozensdrove their carsto the palaceto pick
up stacksof leaflets andthen distributedthem in their neighborhoods
or at military bases.
At a certain point, after we had learnedabout the troops moving
toward Leningradalong the Tallinn Highway but did not know anything aboutthe otherapproaches
to the city, a taxi droveright up to the
palace.A strappingfellow got out of it and, cutting throughthe crowd
andthe volunteerchainsurroundingthe palace,addressed
me: "Listen,
commander,here is what's happeningoutsidethe city...." When I
askedhim how he hadfound aboutwhat was going on, he told me that
a few dozentaxi drivers had gottentogetherand went scoutingin the
suburbs,communicatingwith each other on their taxi radios. These
were our taxi drivers--thesameguys who will not budgeunlessyou
wavea few large-denomination billsor a packofMarlborosin front of
their noses!
On the fIrst evening, a group of doctors came to the palace,
equippedwith all the fIrst-aid stuff-medicines,bandages,andso onand they stayedto the end, readyto minister to the wounded.People
broughtfood. Among themtherewere not only older womenwho had
managedto scrapetogethera coupleof sandwichesmadewith rationed
sausageandthe last packetof tea,but alsothe "new biznesmeny,"who
hauled in cartons and cartons of delicacieswe had forgotten even
existed.Outsidethe palace,peoplewho knew eachothergot together
and setup little improvisedcafes,treatingthe demonstratorsto hot tea
andcoffee--gratis.
Throughoutthe crisis, we kept receiving calls from "co-operators"
(this is the term for small businessmenhere), who would offer and

154

VALERIl ZA VOROTNYl

then deliver copying equipment,paper,computers.... In recenttimes,
this categoryof peopleon the whole, thoughwith someexceptions,has
not enjoyedgreatrespectamongthe population.Indeed,a savagemarket economyis not a pretty sight. The crazy inflation destroyingthe
value of money,and the opportunityto grab this samemoneyin large
quantities from an inept state, has been correctly describedby one
Westernobserveras a gang rape of the stateby its citizens. I might
add,though,that this statehasdoneplenty of raping of its citizensand
cannotexpectto be treatedproperlyby them; consideralso thedecades
of inexcusablelying, thievery,andcorruptionby the state,andyou will
understandwhy peopledo not put much stock in businessethics and
commondecency.And of course,it is the commonmanwho mustfoot
the bill. Still, there was nothing we could expect. Alas, a civilized
marketeconomyalwaysevolvesfrom a savageone.
Be that as it may, theseco-op ownershad alreadyseparatedthemselvesfrom the system,though they tendedto duplicate some of its
traits, unlike, for example,the dissidents,the so-called"sixties people," who did not want to haveanythingin commonwith the systemor
to acceptany of the rules by which it playedits game.The dissidents
were guided exclusively by the idea of moral resistanceagainstthe
system,while those co-op owners had already developeda taste for
having their own autonomousbusinesses.They understoodwell that
what was happeningnow might affect their right to continue to run
their own lives. And the stand they took during those days made a
significantcontribution.
I recall oneof thoseguys,who hadbeensupplyingus with paperfor
leaflets,sayingto me: "Hang in there,boys. We know that if you keel
over, we will, too."
Of course,this is not to say that they fonned the majority of those
who came to the square.The majority were commonfolk, ordinary
people of different generations.Many of them had probably never
thought they would ever wind up in such a crowd. And still, they
came.
On the eveningof the 19th, a bunchof very youngpeopleorganized
work teamsand beganbuilding barricades.They, too, had their own
commanders,even their own "boot camp." A young man of twenty,
Maksim Poliakov,presidedover this whole enterprise.He and I had a
lot of dealingstogether,and I rememberhim well. Two strandscuriously intertwined in his life: the August crisis in Petersburgand the

LEITER FROM ST. PETERSBURG 155

Januaryone in Vilnius. Back in February,he and a few other young
men formed a Petersburgdetachmentand went to Vilnius to guardthe
Lithuanianparliamentbuilding. He camebackto Petersburgon August
18 for a brief vacation, and on the 19th he was already organizing
people at the square.For all those three days, he walked aroundthe
square in his Lithuanian "uniform" of the "Regional Protection
Forces."I had the opportunityto observeMaksim as he was teaching
the guys how to build barricadesaccording to the design he had
learnedwhile erectingbarricadeson the roof of the Lithuanianparliament building to guard againsta paratrooperlanding. And they followed his instructions,settingup the "antiparatroop"contraptionsand
thenthe ordinary kind----at fIrst funny and awkward-lookingand in the
end,solid ones,madeof blocksof concreteandloadedtrucks.
The militia and the OMON troops did joint guard duty. Here in
Leningrad, both of them took our side from the beginning. Maksim
was shaking hishead, saying that only a crazy man could have predicted that he would be drinking tea with the OMON trooperson the
samebarricade.The guys from OMON told us what to do if we were
gassed(they were sure that gas would be usedin caseof an attack).
We had nevergiven this a thought.But while we were scratchingour
heads,trying to figure out what to do, a truck belongingto some"small
business"beganunloadinggasmasks.This was living proofof mental
telepathy, and nobody doubted at that moment that the science of
extrasensoryphenomenawasno lesstrue to naturethanMarxism.
On the eveningof the 19th,a whole caravanof watertrucksblocked
the approachesto the square.The drivers came to see us and said:
"Well, folks, you'll be safe for now-we parkedthem in such a way
that a tank will bust before it movesthem. We're going to turn in for
the night: tomorrow is anotherworkday for us." This self-generated
organizedactivity was a commonoccurrenceat the square.Therewere
dozensof suchgrassrootsorganizations,uniting very different people,
and they actedwithout waiting for anyoneto tell them what to do. As
hours went by, it was becomingincreasinglyclear that even if those
others were to win, they would not be able to clamp down on us as
before,to takebackthe pastsix years.
The peopledid not have fear in their eyes.They were anxiousand
tense,yes, but they were not frightened. At a certain point, as I was
standingguard,Deputy Salewalked out onto the square.Right away a
circle formed aroundher. It did not look like shewaspreparedto make

/56

VALERiI ZA VOROTNYI

Rally in PalaceSquare,August20

a speech,and a bit awkwardly, she said: "Well, my fellow citizens of
Petersburg,havewe gottenourselvesinto trouble!" Therewasuproarious laughter.She told me later that that was the momentshe realized
the putschhad failed. Just think: a few years ago many of thosewho
were laughing would not have daredto leavetheir homesat a time of
such crisis. And there they were now, standing in the middle of a
squarethat might soonbe attackedby tanks,laughing.
I am not one to idealize what happened,and I am aware that
changeshave touchedonly a segmentof our society, the most active
segment,but a segmentnonetheless.Yet in momentsof such great
stress,it is the mostactivepart of societythat playsthe decisiverole.
There were many military men on the square.On the first day they
camewearingtheir civilian clothes,but on the secondday they hadput
on their uniforms. Theyjoined the staff headquarters
andpaid visits to
the military bases.The Afghan veteransstoodguardin the squareand
in a few other strategiclocationsin the city. One of them said to me:
"WhenI returnedfrom Afghanistanbackthen and sawwhat was going
on in our society, I said to myself that there would soon come a time

LEITER FROM ST. PETERSBURG 157

when I would be settingtankson fire in the streetsof our city." Those
werehis exactwords.
I was fortunateenoughto meetthere,nearthe palace,manyremarkable peopleand to experiencethings I would neverhave experienced
had it not been for those three days. I am aware that some of my
recollectionsmight seemromantic. But I want to convey the atmosphereof those days with all possibleauthenticity. I want you to be
able to seethe faces of thosepeoplewho, after all is said and done,
wereresponsiblefor the outcome.
When we beganreceiving the news from Moscow that the tanks
were leaving the White House,and realizedthat this might be the last
night of the coup d'etat,a new type of rumor startedcirculating at the
square:"Yazov shot himself, the EmergencyCommitteehas beenarrested,the Baltic Fleet has struck againstthe putsch." (All the Baltic
fleet had actually done at the time was declare its neutrality in the
conflict.) That is when the public addresssystemat the Mariinskii
Palace,its windows wide open, beganto play Glier's "Hymn to the
Great City." I cannotbeginto conveyto you what it was like to be in
the squareduring those moments.. .. Whateverhappensin the next
few years-andanythingcan happen-tbememoryof that last night in
the square-ringedby the barricades,illuminated by the yellow street
lamps,with the black silhouetteof the cathedralin the background,the
dark sky above, and the Glier hymn floating through the air-4he
memoryof that night will stay with peoplefor a long time. Many will
rememberit forever.

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III
In High Places

BetweenAugust 19 and 21, the barricadeserectedon the streetsof
MoscowandLeningradcameto signifY the greatdivide that separated
advocatesof democraticreform from defendersof the old Communist
order. In no group was this great divide more visible and wrenching
than in the political elite--am.ongthose at the apex of the country's
governmentinstitutions, the CommunistParty, and the military. For
them, the coupwas a momentof reckoning.Part III revealshow some
of the leadingfigures in the Sovietpolitical elite facedthis challenge.

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NITKEUULS.GORBACHEV

What Happened in Foros

After returningfromhis summerresidencein the Crimea, wherehe
washeldincommunicado
for threedays, Gorbachevheldhisfirst
pressconferenceon ThursdaYiAugust22. He devotedmostofhis long
openingstatementto an accountofhis andhisfamily's isolation at the
Presidentialcompoundin Foros, his dealingswith the conspirators,
andhis attemptsto resisttheir will. He spokewithoutnotesand
withoutpausing,ignoring the occasionalgentletugsofhispressaide,
Vitalii Ignatenko.It is this account,extractedfrom the opening
statement,that we reproducein its entirety.
[ ...] On August 18, at 4:50 P.M., I was infonned by the head of
[Presidential]securitythat a group of personshad come down to the
compoundand demandedto meetwith me. I saidthat I was expecting
no one, that I had not invited anyone,and that nobodyhad told me to
expectanyone.The headof security,too, told me that he did not know
anythingabout it either. "Then why did you let them in?" "Because,"
was his answer,''they had the headof the SecurityDirectorateof the
KGB, [Yurii] Plekhanov,with them." Otherwisethe security people
would not have let them passinto the President'sresidence.Such are
the rules;they aretoughbut necessary.
I decidedto find out who might havesentthem here.Nothing could
be simpler, since I have at my disposalall meansof communication:
the ordinary [telephone] line, the governmentnetwork, the strategic
network,the satellitelinks, etc.... I pickedup one of the telephonesI was working in my office just then---andit was dead. I picked up
anotherphone,a third, a fourth, a fifth; they wereall dead.I pickedup
the internaltelephone-disconnected.
That wasit. I was isolated.
I realizedthat this missionwas not going to be the kind of mission
161

162 MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV

we deal with ordinarily. I askedmy wife [RaisaMaksimovna],daughter [Irina], and son-in-law [Anatolii] to gather together and said to
them: "Here is what hasjust happened
.... I don't needany additional
information. I can see that somethingvery seriousis going on. Evidently they are going to try and blackmail me into something,or they
will try to arrestme, or kidnap me, or somethingelse.In otherwords,
anythingcanhappen."
I told RaisaMaksimovna,Irina, andAnatolii that if it wasa question
of the most importantmatter~f
policies, of [our political] courstr-I
November
would standmy groundto the end. I would not give in to any blackmail, any threats,or any pressure,and I would not make any other
decisions.
I consideredit necessaryto say this, and you understandwhy: anything at all could happennext ... and especially,consideringthe consequences
for the membersof my family .... We understoodthat, too.
The whole family said that the decision was up to me: they were
readyto sharewith me whatevermight happen,right to the end. That
wasthe endof our [family] council.
I walked out to invite the visitors in, but they, led by [Valerii]
Boldin, the President'schiefof staff, hadalreadygoneup to the office
breachof protocol.
on their own--anunprecedented
The Presidentwas given an ultimatum to hand over his powers to
the Vice President.I said: "Before I startansweringquestions,I would
like to askyou: Who sentyou?"
The answerwas : "The committee."
"What committee?"
"Well, the committeeto deal with the emergencysituation in the
country."
"Who createdthis committee?I didn't createit, the SupremeSoviet
didn't createit, so who createdit?"
I was told that people [in the leadership] had already joined together, and that now a decreefrom the Presidentwas needed.The
matterwas formulatedlike this: "Either you issuea decree[establishing the state of emergency]and remain here, or else you hand over
your powersto the Vice President."
"Why is the issueformulatedin this manner?"
"The situation in the country is such-thecountry is sliding toward a catastrophe----that
it is necessaryto take measures,a stateof
emergencyis needed.Other measurescan no longer savethe situa-

WHAT HAPPENED IN FOROS 163

tion; we canno longerindulgeourselvesin illusions...."
And so it went, on andon.
In reply I said to them that I knew better than all of them the
political, economic,and social situation inthe country, the conditions
of people'slives, all the caresthat burdenthem now. Further, [I said]
that we hadapproachedthe phasewhenall that is necessaryto improve
life mustbe donefasterand with more decisiveness.But I am a determined opponent-andnot only for political and moral reasons-of
thosemethodsof dealingwith problems,methodsthat havealwaysled
to the deathsof hundreds,thousands,millions of people. We must
reject [thosemethods]onceand for all. Otherwise,we would haveto
betray and bury everything that we have startedto implement and
resignourselvesto launchinganotherroundof bloodshed.
That'swhy I said: "Both you and thosewho sentyou are adventurists. You will destroyyourselves-butthe hell with you, that's your
own business-mostimportant, you will destroythe country, everything we haveworked for. We have now reachedthe point when it is
possibleto sign the [Union] Treaty. After the signing--andwe have
worked on [this agenda]for a whole month--majordecisionswill be
takenregardingthe problemswith fuel, food, and financesso that we
can quickly stabilizethe political andeconomicsituation,speedup the
transitionto a marketeconomy,andcreateopportunitiesfor our people
to apply themselvesfreely in all walks of life. And [you havecomeup
with] all this just as we are aboutto reachagreement!·True enough,it
is not a perfect agreement,and we have not yet gotten rid of our
suspicions-oneither side. We see it in the relations betweenthe
Union [government]and the republics,and betweenpolitical and social movements.All that is true. But the only way todealwith this is to
seekaccord.Accord is emerging,andwe havebegunto move forward.
Only thosebenton suicidecanproposeat this point the introductionof
a totalitarianregimein our country."
Therewasa demand:"Resign!"
I said: "You'll neverseeme do eitherone.Tell this to all thosewho
sent you here. There won't be any more conversationsbetweenus.
You may say that the Presidentis readyto put his signatureunderany
telegram,at once.And we havea reason:on the 20th, we are signinga
newUnion Treaty."
*That is, amongthe prospectivecosignersof the Union Treaty.

164

MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV

(By the way, this was the end of Sunday,and I was finishing work
on my speechfor this solemnoccasion;as late as four o'clock, [Georgii]
Shakhnazarovand I were exchangingopinionsaboutit in the presence
of my otheraide,Anatolii Cherniaev,who wasnot at this meeting.)
"So, therewe canmeetwith many leaders;andfor the 21st, we have
scheduleda meetingof the FederationCouncil----that'swherewe will
discussall of thesequestions.[There] we will seekagreements[on the
issues]that haveeludedus on the governmentlevel.·
"Here they are for you, the centralissues,"1 said. "That'swherewe
must hammerout solutions,and not the way you propose.So, tomorrow you want to declarea stateof emergency,do you? And then what?
Why don't you try to predict one day ahead,four movesahead.What
then?The country will reject it, it won't supportthesemeasures.You
are trying to exploit the difficulties, the fact that peopleare tired, that
they might supportany dictator...."
(Incidentally, during the past few days 1 had been working with
ComradeCherniaevon a very long article--it was shapingup to be
thirty-two pages.There was a scenarioof this sort in it, and now its
cast of charactershad shown up in person.My argumentconcerning
this scenariowas that it spelledruin for society, it was a deadend, it
would throw societybackwardandbury everythingthat we now have.)
[I said:] "I am readyto convenethe Congressof People'sDeputies
and the SupremeSoviet, if somein the leadershiphave doubts. Let's
meet, let's discussthings. The Deputiesare all in their districts, they
know what'sgoing on there,let's adoptan emergencyresolution,take
other measures.1 will defend the path of concord, the path toward
deepeningthe reforms and cooperatingwith the West--theseare the
three main areas,and now they needto be synchronizedand coordinated.Especiallysince there is a correspondingdesire on the part of
othernationsto cooperatewith us at this decisivestage."
But it was a conversationwith deaf-mutes.Evidently they had already prepared.The machineryhad been set in motion---that'sclear
now.
1 said: "That's it, there can be nothing more for us to talk about.
Reportthat 1 am categoricallyopposed,and that you will be defeated.
But 1 am concernedfor the peopleand for what we haveaccomplished
overtheseyears...." And that'show it ended.
*That is, in the old Union government.

WHAT HAPPENED IN FOROS 165

But after their ultimatum had been answeredby my categorical
demandthat they report my conclusions,everythingstartedto develop
accordingto the logic of conflict. Total isolationby seaand land. I still
hadthirty-two of my guardswith me. They decidedto standfirm to the
end. They dividedup all the areasof defense,including my family, and
assignedall the different posts. When I found out that it had been
statedat the coup committee'spressconferencethat I was seriouslyill
and unlikely to return to a normal life, it becameclear to me that the
next thing would be to make reality correspondto this statement.The
guardsrealizedthis aswell. A decisionwasmadenot to orderany food
from outside and to live on what we had on hand. I was absolutely
composed,althoughI was deeply shakenand angeredby the political
blindnessand irresponsibility of these criminals. I was sure, I was
convinced,that all of this couldn't last long, that they wouldn't get
awaywith it.
Seventy-twohoursof completeisolation, of struggle.I think that it
was all done in order to break the Presidentpsychologically.It was
hard.What morecanI say?
Every day, morning and evening,I madeand transmitteddemands
that communicationsbe restoredand that an airplane be sent immediatelyto fly me backto Moscow, backto my job. After the press
conference,I addedthe demandthat a retraction of the false report
about the stateof my health be published--thereport madeby those
oh-so-healthypeople whose handswere shaking as they faced you.
[Laughterand applausefrom the reporters.]You raisedgoodquestions
andmockedthem.It wasa farce.
Everything was cut off. But the resourcefullads found some old
radio receiversin the servicequarters,rigged up antennas,and started
to tune in whateverthey could. The BBC andRadioLiberty broadcasts
camein bestof all. Thenthe Voice of Americacamein-at least,that
is what I wastold, what they reportedto me. [ ...]
Peopletook a civic, responsibleposition, and did not collaborate
with the EmergencyCommittee.What happenedwas doneby force. I
know, I havealreadybeentold a lot aboutwhat went on.
I want to say here, before you, that I am really with you. We all
have seenthat it was not in vain that for the last six years,with such
difficulties and so painfully, we have beenlooking for ways to move
forward. Our society rejectedthe putschists.In the end, they were
isolated.They did not succeedin turning the army againstthe people.

166 MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV

The anny came into contact with the people, and after that no one
could doanything.They [the putschists]realizedthat theyhadfailed.
The republicsadoptedthe right position. In this regard,I must give
credit where credit is due--themost principled position was adopted
by Russia'sParliament,Russia'sdeputies,Russia'sgovernment,and
aboveall an outstandingrole wasplayedby Boris NikolaevichYeltsin.
I must sayalso that today we must give credit wherecredit is due-to the principledpositionof Muscovites,Leningraders,and inhabitants
of many other regions.The [putschists']attemptto createthe impression that the country was virtually supportingthem ... Well, they did
find some[support].Thesedaysin our country,you canfind anything.
But on the whole, the country rejectedthis road to bloodshed.I
don't think it is possibleto get a betterargument,a betterplebiscite,
testifying to the true positionof the people.[ ...]
When it becameclear that uncompromisingposition had been
adoptedby Russia,her leadership,otherrepublics,the people,andthat
the army had not moved againstthe people,they panickedand began
to look for a way out.
I was informed that a group of conspiratorshad arrived in the Crimeaon the Presidentialplanein orderto takethe Presidentto Moscow.
When they came,I said [to my securitypeople]: take them to another
building, put themunderguard,and conveyto themmy demandthat I
will not speakto any of themuntil the governmentcommunication line
is restored.Their responsewas that this would take a long time. "Take
your time," I replied,"at this point I am not rushinganywhere."
Communicationswere restored,and I begantalking to the country.
First thing, I talkedto Boris Nikolaevich [Yeltsin]. I called[Nursultan]
Nazarbaev,[Leonid] Kravchuk, [Nikolai] Dementei,and [Islam] Karimov! I said to them: "I'm holding the fort here with my garrison."
[Laughterin the audience.]But that wasexactlywhat was going on: 72
hours of such terrible tension. The security people at a certain point
feared that we might be overtaken from the sea. But, as we have
learned,the sailors were giving the Presidenta sign that they would
rescuehim. The Navy did not participatein the conspiracy.
After that, I went to work. I ordered[Mikhail] Moiseev [Chief of
the GeneralStaff] to take over the leadershipat the Ministry of Defense (he had been earlier called away from the Crimea) and im·Theleadersof, respectively,Kazakhstan,Ukraine,Belarus,andUzbekistan.

WHAT HAPPENED IN FOROS 167

mediatelyto haveall the troopsreturnto their barracks,to their bases,
and to announcethat [Dmitrii] Yazov was being removed from his
postandwould be arrested.
All of this has been carried out. I found the Commandantof the
Kremlin and askedhim under whose commandthe [Kremlin] KGB
regimentwas, and I requestedthat the regiment'scommanderbe summoned.He wassummoned.I gavean orderoverthe phone:"Submitto
no one'sauthority exceptmine andthat of the Kremlin Commandant."
He said: "Yes, sir."
In general,I startedcalling all the mostimportantpoints, to block
off everythingall at once, becausethings were still dangerous.They
could do awaywith me en route,or whereverthey chose.I decidednot
to leave.
Then I was told that a planewas on its way with a delegationfrom
the RussianFederation.I said I would receivethembeforedoing anything else. I called [Civil Aviation] Minister Boris Paniukov and
Moiseev and said that the plane should land not in Simferopol--orit
would takethemthreehoursto get to me-butat the military airfield. I
gave a commandthat they be met and that transportationbe arranged
to bring themto me.
The delegationarrived,andwe talked for a while and found we had
a high degree of understanding.I think that what we have lived
throughhasgiven us not only experience,but also greaterunderstanding. This is what it meanswhen democraticforces are united, and this
is what it meanswhen they are disunited. Just think, sometimeswe
haverammedour headsfighting over someissueandpracticallycalled
eachotherenemies.
We startedthinking abouthow to makeour way out of there.ThenI
had to issue a lot more instructions. Ivashko and Lukianov arrived
separately.They got there, even though no transportationhad been
providedfor them. I receivedthem. I did not receivethe conspirators,
did not see them, and do not want to see them. We divided among
different planesandtook thembackto Moscow; andwhenthey left the
planesthey were all arrestedand incarcerated.I gave an order to the
Kremlin Commandantnot to admit anyonewho had cooperatedwith
them.
I have scheduledfor tomorrow a meetingof the nine republic leaders who have worked out the Treaty and preparedit for signing. Tomorrow we shallbe meetingandwe mustdiscusseverything.

168

MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV

These were painful lessons,and for me personally, very painful
indeed.This is simply a mostpainful traumafor me.
I think that tomorrow we will start discussing,thinking over and
working out positionson the issuesinvolved in moving forward andon
new stepsto take. We needto seein this not only the misfortunethat
befell us, but also the immense opportunity that these events have
revealed.They have revealedthe true position of our people. In my
conversationswith the leadersof foreign states,they all focusedattention specifically on the fact that the position of the people and the
positionof the army showedthat irreversiblechangeshavetakenplace
in the Union. Therefore,they arehopingthat we will takeadvantageof
all theseopportunities.They all said that they would cooperate,and
they believethat this cooperationshouldtake more active, more decisive forms. Today I receivedtwelve ambassadors
from the EEC countries. They declaredtheir solidarityandsupport.
What decisionshavebeenmade?I've issueda decree...
Oh, by the way, you know, at the time, it lookedas if they might do
away with me, with my family, with everybodywho was there with
me, and then issue a lie that the Presidenthad taken such and such
position and, moreover,that they were acting on his behalf. This is
why I saw through all this treacheryduring their press conference,
howeverprimitive andcrude.As onecomradefrom the RussianFederation said, they are just as incapableof doing this right as anything
else:
I decidedto makea video recordingright away. I madefour recordings. The kids, Irina and Anatolii, cut up the tapeinto four pieces,and
we startedlooking for channels,someonewe could trust, to sendthis
tapeout.
Here is one of them. I'm turning it over to [Vitalii] Ignatenko,let
him havea look. The othertapesmay turn up, becausethey did go out
despitethe obstacles.My physician wrote out severalcopies of his
medical opinion, andwe gave them out and distributedthem so that
everyonewould know the true state of the President'shealth. And
finally, I put forward four points in written form andaddedsomething
by hand so it would be clear that I had written it (the four points had
beentypedon a typewriter),andI signedmy own statement.
*Gorbachev is echoing comedian Gennadii Khazanov'smemorablequip,
"Theseguysof ours,they can'tevenstagea putschcorrectly."

WHAT HAPPENED IN FOROS 169

The first point: Yanaev'staking upon himself my responsibilities
underthe pretextof my illness, [my] inability to carry out my duties,
representsa deceptionof the people,and forthat reasoncannotconstitute anythingbut a coupd'etat.
Second.This meansthat all subsequent
actionsare illegal andwithout legitimacy: neitherthe Presidentnor theCongressof People's Deputieshasgiven Yanaevsuchauthority.
Third. I askthat it be conveyedto Lukianov that I demandan urgent
conveningof the USSRSupremeSoviet andthe Congressof People's
Deputies sothat they might considerthe presentsituation, for they
alonehavethe right, after analyzingthe situation,to passa decisionon
necessarymeasuresandthe mechanismfor their implementation.
Fourth. I demandthat the activities of the StateCommitteefor the
Stateof Emergencybe suspendedimmediatelyuntil suchtime as the
aforementioneddecisionsare taken by the SupremeSoviet and the
Congressof People'sDeputies.The continuationof theseactivitiesand
further escalationof the measuresbeingtakenby the EmergencyCommittee may result in tragedy for all peoples,exacerbatethe situation
still further, and perhapswreck totally the coordinatedefforts to bring
the countryout of the crisis that hasbeeninitiated by the centerandthe
republics.
I demandedan answer.I wastold: "Wait, you will get one." At first,
therewas no responseat all. ThenI was told: "The answeris coming."
But I receivednothing.
That wasthe situation.
Now the most importantthing is that decisionshaveto be made.I
have rescindedall the orders given by the Vice President,and the
[Emergency]Committee,andthe Cabinetover the pastfew days.With
my authority as President,I removedthem from office and dismissed
them, and that which requiresthe decisionof the SupremeSoviet has
been submitted for its consideration.The USSR Prosecutorhas informed me that he instituted criminal proceedingsyesterday,and we
haveagreedthat the investigativeteamwill consistof USSRand RussianFederationinvestigators.[ ...]

BORIS YELTSIN

Proclamations, Decrees,and
Appeals in Responseto the
Coup, August 19, 1991

Boris Yeltsin, thefirst freely electedPresidentofthe Russian
Republic,issuedthefollowing "Appealto the CitizensofRussia," on
the morningofthefirst day ofthe coup. Yeltsin's proclamationwas
thefirst public responseofany kind to the announcement
ofthe State
Committeeon the StateofEmergency.It wassoonreproducedon
photocopymachinesandpostedin metrostationsandelsewhere
throughoutthe city. Later that day, Yeltsin issuedseveraldecreesand
appeals,someofwhich are reprintedbelow. Ofspecialimportance
washis appealto officersandsoldiersto forsaketheplottersand
submitto the authority ofthe Russiangovernment.

Document1. Appeal to the Citizensof Russia
(issuedat 9:00 A.M. on August 19, 1991)
Citizensof Russia:
On the night of August 1&-19, 1991,the legally electedPresidentof
the countrywasremovedfrom power.
Regardlessof the reasonsgiven for his removal,we are dealingwith
a rightist, reactionary,anticonstitutionalcoup. Despiteall the difficulties and severetrials being experiencedby the people,the democratic
processin the country is acquiringan increasinglybroadsweepandan
irreversiblecharacter.
The peoplesof Russiaare becomingmastersof their destiny. The
uncontrolledpowersof unconstitutionalorganshavebeenlimited considerably,andthis includesparty organs.
170

APPEAL TO THE CITIZENS OF RUSSIA 171

The leadershipof Russia has adopteda resolute position on the
Union Treaty, striving for the unity of the Soviet Union and the unity
of Russia.Our positionon this issuepermitteda considerableacceleration of the preparationof this treaty, coordinationwith all the republics, and the decisionthat the date for signing would be August 20.
Tomorrow'ssigninghasbeencanceled.
These developmentsgave rise to angry reactionary forces, and
pushedthem to irresponsibleand adventuristattemptsto solve the
most complicatedpolitical and economic problems by methods of
force. Attemptsto realizea couphavebeentried earlier.
We consideredand considerthat such methodsof force are unacceptable.They discredit the Union in the eyes of the whole world,
undermineour prestigein the world community,and return us to the
cold war era along with the isolation of Soviet Union in the world
community. All of this forces us to proclaim that the so-calledcommittee'sascendancy
to poweris unlawful.
Accordingly, weproclaimall decisionsandinstructionsof this committeeto be unlawful.
We are confident that the organs of local power will unswervingly adhereto constitutionallaws and decreesof the Presidentof Russia.
We appeal to citizens of Russia to give a fitting rebuff to the
putschistsand demand a return to normal constitutional development.
Undoubtedly,it is essentialto give the country's President,Gorbachev, an opportunity to addressthe people. Today he has been
blockaded.I havebeendeniedcommunicationswith him. We demand
an immediateconvocationof the Congressof People'sDeputiesof the
Union. We are absolutelyconfidentthat our countrymenwill not permit the sanctioningof the tyranny and lawlessnessof the putschists,
who have lost all shameand conscience.We addressan appeal to
servicemento manifestlofty civic duty and not take part in the reactionary coup.
Until thesedemandsare met, we appealfor an indefinite general
strike....
Yeltsin, Presidentof Russia
Silaev,Chairmanof the RSFSRCouncil of Ministers
Khasbulatov,Acting Chairmanof the RSFSRSupremeSoviet

172

BORIS YELTSIN

Document2: DecreeNo. S9 of the Presidentof the RSFSR
(issuedat 1:44 P.M. on August 19, 1991)
In connectionwith the actions of a group of individuals who proclaimedthemselvesthe StateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergency,I
orderthat:
1. The work of saidCommitteebe deemedillegal andthe actionsof
its organizersbe regardedas constitutinga coup d'etat,which is none
otherthan a crime againstthe state.
2. All decisionsmade in the name of this so-calledCommitteefor
the Stateof Emergencybe regardedas illegal and carrying no force of
law on the territory of the RSFSR. The territory of the RSFSR is
governedby the lawfully elected governmentin the personsof the
President,the SupremeSoviet, the Chairmanof the Council of Ministers, and all stateand local governingand administrativeorgansof the
RSFSR.
3. Actions of governmentofficials who carry out the ordersof said
Committee are subject to the Criminal Code of the RSFSR and are
liable to criminal prosecutionaccordingto law.
The presentdecreebecomeslaw at the time of its signing.
Presidentof the RSFSR,B.Yeltsin

Document3: DecreeNo. 61 of the Presidentof the RSFSR
(issuedat 4:47 P.M. on August 19, 1991)
An attemptto carry out a coup d'etathas beenmade;the Presidentof
the USSR, who is the SupremeCommanderof the USSR Armed
Forces, has been removed from office; the Vice Presidentof the
USSR,the Prime Minister of the USSR,the Chairmanof the Committee for StateSecurity[KGB] of the USSR,and the USSRMinisters of
Defenseand of Internal Affairs havejoined an unconstitutionalorgan
and have therebycommitteda crime againstthe state. As a result of
these actions, the work of the lawfully elected executive branch of
governmentof the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublicshas beenparalyzed. In this extraordinarysituation,I decreethat:
1. Until the conveningof the extraordinaryCongressof the USSR
People'sDeputies, all organs of executive power of the USSR that

APPEAL TO SOLDIERSAND OFFICERS 173

operate on the territory of the RSFSR, including the KGB of the
USSR,the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR,and the Ministry
of Defenseof the USSR,becomesubjectto direct rule by the popularly
electedPresidentof the RSFSR.
2. The RSFSRCommitteeon State Security, the RSFSRMinistry
of Internal Affairs, and the RSFSRStateCommitteefor Defensetemporarily carry out the functions of the correspondingUnion government organs on the territory of the RSFSR. All regional and other
organsof the USSRKGB andthe USSRMinistries oflnternal Affairs
andDefensethat operateon the territory of the RSFSRshall be subject
to direct rule by the decreesand dispositionsof the RSFSRPresident,
the RSFSRCouncil of Ministers, the RSFSRKGB and Ministry of
InternalAffairs, andthe RSFSRStateCommitteefor Defense.
3. All organs,officials, citizensof the RSFSRmusttake immediate
action to preventthe implementationof any andall ordersof the unconstitutionalCommittee for the State of Emergency.Officials who
follow the ordersof this Committeeare removedfrom office in accordance with the Constitution of the RSFSR. Organs of the RSFSR
Prosecutor'sOffice musttake immediatemeasuresto initiate criminal
proceedingsagainstthe aforesaidpersons.
Presidentof the RSFSR,B.Yeltsin

Document4: Appealby Boris Yeltsin,
Presidentof the RSFSR,to the Soldiers
andOfficers of the USSRArmed Forces,
the USSRCommitteefor StateSecurity[KGB],
and the USSRMinistry of InternalAffairs [MVO]
Servicemen!
Countrymen!
An attempthas beenmadeto stagea coup d'etat. The Presidentof
the country, the Commander-in-Chiefof the Armed Forces of the
USSR,has beenremovedfrom power. The Vice President,the Chairman of the KGB, andthe First DeputyChairmanof the DefenseCouncil [of the USSR] have formed an unconstitutionalbody, and have
therebycommittedthe most seriouscrime againstthe state.The country is faced with the threat of terror. The "order" promised by the

174 BORIS YELTSIN

A soldierreadsYeltsin'sappealto the armedforces

APPEAL TO SOLDIERSAND OFFICERS 175

self-appointedsaviorsof the Fatherlandwill result in tragedy: wholesale repressionof dissent,concentrationcamps,nighttime arrests."A
better life" will remain a propagandalie. Soldiersand officers, at this
tragic hour I appealto you. Do not let yourselvesbe snaredin the web
of lies, promises,and demagogicargumentsabout the soldier'sduty.
Do not allow yourselvesto becomea blind weaponof the criminal will
of a group of adventurerswho have violated the Constitutionand the
laws of the USSR.
Soldiers! I appealto you. Think aboutyour loved ones,your friends,
andyour people.At this difficult hour of decision,rememberthat you
have taken an oath of allegianceto your people, the people against
whom you arebeing forcedto turn your weapons.
A throne can be erectedusing bayonets,but it is not possibleto sit
on bayonetsfor long. The daysof the conspiratorsarenumbered.
Soldiers, officers,generals!An hour ago I appointedthe headof the
RSFSRCommitteefor Defense.He is your comrade-in-arms,Colonel
GeneralK.I. Kobets. I have issueda decreeplacing all the territorial
and other organsof the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB, and
the Ministry of Defense[of the USSR] deployedon the territory of the
RSFSRwithout delay underthe commandof the Presidentof the RussianFederation,the Ministry ofInternalAffairs of the RussianFederation, andthe StateCommitteefor Defenseof the RussianFederation.
Dark clouds of terror and dictatorshiphave gatheredover Russia.
But they will not becomean eternalnight. Rule of law shall triumph in
our land, andour long-sufferingpeoplewill gain freedom.This tim~
for now andforever!
Soldiers, I trust that in this tragic hour you will make the right
decision.The honor andthe glory of Russianarms shall not turncrimsonwith the blood of the people.
Boris Yeltsin, Presidentof the RussianFederation
5:10p.M.

BORIS YELTSIN

Speechto the Russian
Parliament, August 21, 1991

Boris Yeltsincamebeforethe Russianparliamentat 12:55P.M. on
Wednesday,August21. By then, theplottershadbeenroutedand were
attemptingto flee. Reprintedbelowis the completetextofYeltsin's
speech.

Distinguishedpeople,deputies.
Russiaand the country, as a whole, are living through a dramatic,
perhapstragic, periodin its history.
In the history of our country there have been severalattemptsto
stagea coup,at a time when it would haveseemedthat democracywas
on the rise and gathering momentum.Right-wing forces have tried
severaltimesto stagea coupd'etat,andthey haveat last succeeded.
You will recall that the first attempttook placeat the beginningof
the year,but at that time they were scaredoff by the statementmadeby
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze,and the correspondingreactionof public opinionin Russia,the country, andthe world.
You all recall the sessionof the USSR SupremeSoviet, when the
samepeople--Pavlov,Kriuchkov, Yazov--trled to extract for themselves some special powers at the expenseof the authority of the
Presidentof the country,which virtually amountedto his removalfrom
office, andso forth.
But this secondattempt,too, failed: the SupremeSoviet gavethem
no support.
And finally, the third, this time successful,attemptcamewhen the
Presidentwasvacationingawayfrom Moscow.Now he is no longeron
vacation; he is forcibly isolatedat his dachain Foros, in the Crimea.
/76

SPEECH TO THE RUSSIANPARLIAMENT 177

What happenedis an unconstitutionalcoupd'etat.It is unconstitutional
becausethere have beenno statementsmade by the Presidentof the
country, either in writing or orally on television or radio. There has
beenno medicalexamination,eitherby Soviet doctorsor international
experts,statingthat he is unableto performhis functions. Information
at our disposalspeaksto the contrary.The President'spersonalphysician sawhim on the 19thbut was subsequentlydisallowedcontactwith
the President.[According to him,] the Presidentwas in good health,
except for a minor arthritic condition, so there·can be no question
abouthis not beingableto dischargehis duties.
In circumstanceswhen democracyin our country is on the rise,
theseactionsareunprecedented
andconstitutean arrogantcoup d'etat.
Let me point out that all of thesepeoplecomefrom the political right.
They were unable to find even a couple of individuals among the
pseudo-democrats
willing to join them, to give a little political variety
to the membershipoftheir Committee.They tried, we know, but failed
to find anybody.The peoplethey approachedrefusedto cooperatewith
them,refusedto takepart in this unconstitutionalplot.
Now what measuresdid we undertakeon our part?
First, early in the morning of the 19th, we issueda statementto the
people of Russiawhich was signedby myself and ComradesSilaev
and Khasbulatov.Although the massmediaof the RussianFederation
havebeenplacedundera virtual blackout,we have set up a powerful
radio station right in this building, we have talked to people on the
phone, and we have succeededin broadcastingthat statement,along
with the subsequent
Decreeof the Presidentof the RussianFederation,
to otherregionsof the country.
During the first twenty-four hours a seriesof other decreeswere
broadcastin this manner,including a decree[no. 59] proclaimingtheir
Committeeunconstitutional;a decreesetting up Russia'sCommittee
for Defense;a decreegiving Russia'sPresidentauthority over all the
executivebranchesof the USSR governmentsituatedon the territory
of the RussianFederation,including the USSRKGB, the USSRMinistry ofInternalAffairs, andthe USSRMinistry of Defense.
In the absenceof the Commander-in-Chief,andtaking into account
the fact that the Minister of Defenseis a criminal, it was our duty to
assumeresponsibility for the USSR armed forces stationedon the
territory of the RussianFederation.Further,we issueda decreesetting
up a specialgroup headedby the First Deputy Prime Minister of the

178 BORIS YELTSIN

RussianFederation.This group was sentto the heartlandof Russiaand
therebeganpreparationsfor assumingpower in caseRussia'sgovernment had beenseizedand eliminatedlast night (and, who knows, this
dangermay still exist).
And now regardingthe actionsofYanaev,Pavlov,and others,there
was a decreeon the armedforces.The Presidentof the RussianFederation hasassumedauthorityover the armedforces.The Tamanandthe
Kantemirov divisions and the airborne ParatrooperUnit have gone
over to the side of the RussianFederation,and they are acting on
ordersof the Presidentof the RussianFederation.
What are the reasonsfor the failure of the attemptsto isolate or, to
usethis junta'scynical phrase,to "intern" the leadershipof the Russian
Federation---thePresident,the Chairmanof the Council of Ministers,
andthe Acting Chairmanofthe SupremeSovietofthe RussianFederation? The reasonsare that the Tula Airborne ParatrooperDivision,
instead of storming and seizing the building of the Russian
Federation'sparliament,took it undertheir protectionand guardedit
from attackfor twenty-four hours.We are grateful to this Division, its
commandingofficers, and its Commander,GeneralLebed. Of course,
he is facing certaindangernow, but accordingto my Presidentialdecree, and since GeneralLebed is now residenton the territory of the
RussianFederation,I have placed him under the protection of the
Presidentof Russia,safeguardinghim from possibleprosecutionon the
partof the USSRorgansoflaw andorder.
I have also signeda decreeon the operationof enterpriseson the
territory of the RussianFederation,a decreeon the economicsovereignty of the RussianFederation.Let me elaborateon this.
Taking into accountthat the Union Treaty was to be signedon the
20th andthat we hadan agreementwith the Presidentof the Union that
on the 21st and 22nd, he would be signing a decreetransferringthe
propertyand the enterpriseson the territory of the RussianFederation
to the jurisdiction of the RussianFederation,we hadprepareda decree
placing thoseenterprisesunderthe jurisdiction of the RussianFederation. But now that the Union Treatywas not signedyesterday,because
of the actionstakenby an unconstitutional·group of rebels, andsince
the Presidentis incommunicado,I have signeda decreeproviding for
the economic sovereigntyof the RussianFederation,stating that all
propertyon the territory of the RussianFederationis placedunderthe
jurisdictionofthe RussianFederation.

SPEECH TO THE RUSSIANPARLIAMENT 179

In light of the curfew imposedin Moscow and Leningrad, I have
removedthe commandersof the Moscow and Leningradmilitary districts and I have appointeddifferent personswho act on orders of
appropriateauthorities,and I have also appointedthe Minister of Defense for the RussianFederation,Colonel GeneralKonstantinIvanovich Kobets.
I have also signed several appeals:to the citizens of Russia, to
PresidentBush, to servicemen,and to his Holiness the Patriarchof
Moscow and All Russia,Aleksii II. The last appealwas deliveredby
hand,by Vice PresidentRutskoi, andthe Patriarchhas supportedus at
this difficult periodof time, andhe saidthat the faithful would support
us at this difficult time.
As RuslanImranovich [Khasbulatov] said earlier, we have formulated an ultimatum and discussedit with Lukianov... , thoughI must
say that we cannot believe Lukianov when he says that he did not
participate and did not even know that this group was planning an
imminentcoup.
Further, I have issueda directive to put the Houseof Soviets["the
White House"] underguard.This decisionwas fully justified, because
therewereplansto launchan attackon the parliamentbuilding, precise
planswith everythingworkedout hour by hour andminute by minute.
It is only thanksto our decisiveactionsandthe actionsofthe peopleof
Moscow who stagedan all-day vigil at the building---we were inside
the building and the people of Moscow were outside in the rain-it
was largely thanks to them, when they stoppedtanks and armored
personnelcarriersandthe specialforcesthat hadbeensentto stormthe
building and arrestthe membersof the Russiangovernment.We must
thank the people of Moscow, who deservepraise for such resolute
actions.
The [RSFSR]Minister of ForeignAffairs, Kozyrev, hasbeensentto
the United Nationsto inform Peresde Cuellar andthe UnitedNations
about the unconstitutionaldevelopmentsin our country and what the
RussianFederationplansto do aboutthem.
I must say that Bush, Mitterrand, and others were firm in their
denunciationof the coup d'etatand the actionsof this Committeefor
the State of Emergency.They do not acknowledgeits decisions,but
they supportthe actionsof the Russiangovernment,and thereforewill
seeto it that the world communityoffers us supportand expressesits
opinion with regardto what hashappened.

180 BORIS YELTSIN

I askedthemthat they, for their part, demandto be put in touchwith
the Presidentof the Union [Gorbachev].But of course,communications with him are brokenor, rather,blocked in Foros, in the Crimea,
by the forces of the Union KGB, the Navy, and his own Presidential
securitydetail, which is alsoKGB. So he hasthreerings aroundhim.
My conversationsover the telephonewith Yanaevand Kriuchkov
haveshownthat they are trying to justifY their actions,sayingthat they
havebeenacting constitutionally,that Gorbachevis unableto perform
his functions,but this is not true.
Today, around three o'clock in the morning, Kriuchkov canceled,
for the durationof this night, the actionsdirectedat isolating and then
taking by stormthe Houseof Soviets[the White House].He agreedto
my proposal-thathe and I togetherfly to Foros and bring back the
President.But I needyour permissionfor this.
[Voices of the deputies:"No, don't go!"]
Khasbulatov:Well, this is what I, too, havebeentelling the President.
In accordancewith our request,Kriuchkov mustcomehereat 13:00
hours.*
As to the idea of flying there,I don't think there is anotherway of
finding out what the objectivesituation is.Needlessto say, Kriuchkov
mustgive his guarantees.
[Voices: "What kind of guarantees?"]
I repeat:this is the situation,but the decisionis yours.
So this is the situation as of now. The leadershipof the Russian
Federation,the Presidentandthe leadershipof the SupremeSoviet and
the Council of Ministers, have been acting energetically;there is no
panic,thereis no despair,andwe do hopethat the daysof the junta are
numbered,and they must be removedfrom power. This Committee
must be dissolved,and all of its eight membersmust be brought to
justice.

*Kriuchkov nevercame.

INTERVIEW WITH NIKOLAI VORONTSOV

BetweenRussia and the Soviet
Union-With Notes on the USSR
Counell of Ministers Meeting of
August 19, 1991

Nikolai Vorontsov,the USSRMinister ofEnvironmentandNatural
ResourcesManagementanda People'sDeputyofthe Russian
Federation,wasoneoftwo cabinetministersto objectto the coup
during the meetingofthe USSRCouncilofMinisters on August19,
1991.Becauseno official minuteswerekept, Vorontsovtookhis own
notes,which are to this day the only survivingrecordofthe ministers'
individualpositionsregardingthe coup. The eventsofthis particular
meetinggainedpublic notorietyat thesessionofRussia'sSupreme
Sovietheldon August23, 1991, which wasattendedby Gorbachev.
After Gorbachevfinishedhis addressto the Russianparliament,Boris
Yeltsincajoledhim into readinga transcript ofthecabinetmeeting
basedon Vorontsov'snotes-alitany ofbetrayalby the ministers
appointedto high officeby Gorbachevhimself.Thetranscript was
publishedin Komsomolskaiapravdaon August24, 1991.
Vorontsovwasinterviewedby GregoryFreidin in Berkeley,California, in April 1993. Both this interview and Vorontsov'stranscript of
the cabinetmeeting,including his parentheticalcomments,are reproducedbelow.

Interview with Nikolai Vorontsov, April 1993
Vorontsov: For two weeks before the coup, I was on sick leave
becauseof high blood pressure,and was living at the government
181

182

NIKOLAI VORONTSOV

sanatoriumin the village of Uspenskoe.Needlessto say, this was a
working sick leave.Papersfrom my Ministry arrived every day, and a
coupleof times I went to Moscow to attendexecutiveboardmeetings.
That Monday, August 19, I was planningto come to Moscow, among
otherthings,to attendthe Congressof Compatriotsto which I hadbeen
invited as a guestof honor. [ ...] At 9:30 that morning, therewasto be
a specialmassat UspenskiiCathedralin the Kremlin in honor of the
congress.An event of this sort is both colorful and rare, and I would
not miss it for anything.
My driver, Volodia, cameto pick me up at 8:00 A.M. "Have you
listenedto the radio?"he askedme as soonashe greetedme.
"What happened?"I shotback, andhe told me the whole story, that
Gorbachevhad taken ill and on and on.... I decidedright away that
my wife, YelenaAlekseevnaLiapunova,andI shouldgo to Moscowat
once, straight to the Kremlin, to the Uspenskii Cathedral.The mass
was to be attendedby Boris Yeltsin, Gavriil Popov [Mayor of Moscow], Anatolii Sobchak[Mayor of Leningrad}-in other words, the
leading democraticpolitical figures. While on the way to Moscow, I
called the Ministry and askedthem whetherthere had beenany communicationsfrom the Council of Ministers or other governmentalorgans. There was nothing. I told them where I was going and how to
reach me. During the next few hours, I called them regularly to let
them know where I was and to receive any important information.
Only at 3:00 P.M., or evenlater, at 3:30, was I informedthat the Union
Council of Ministers had been scheduledto meet that evening at 6
o'clock.
We arrived at the Kremlin on time. The sceneat the cathedralwas
quite confused; people did not know what was happening.Among
them,therewere many"compatriots"--secondor third-generationdescendantsof Russianemigres,who had come to Russiafor the first
time in their life, and there, waiting for them, was this nice little surprise. I saw the Patriarch,I saw Mikhail Nikitich Tolstoi, a People's
Deputyandthe organizerof the Congressof the Compatriots,but none
of the big-time politicianswere in attendance.I askedmy wife to keep
in touch with me and left the cathedralfor the White House.While on
the way there, I telephonedthe Ministry once again, and once again
therewas no communicationfrom the Prime Minister's office or from
the EmergencyCommittee,or, for that matter,anyoneelse.
I arrived at the White House at 9:50. Yeltsin was not there, and

COUNCIL OF MINISTERSMEETING

183

neitherwere Khasbulatovor Silaev. Nobody knew wherethey were. I
droppedby the office of GennadiiBurbulis [Yeltsin's chief of staff].
There I ran into Academician Yurii Alekseevich Ryzhov, a USSR
People'sDeputy andDeputy of the USSRSupremeSoviet. I was very
happy to see him there. As a rule he was the only member of the
[USSR] SupremeSoviet Presidiumto attendrallies organizedby the
democrats,just as I was thereas the only memberof the Union Council of Ministers. I also ran into Aleksei Vladimirovich Yablokov, who
told me the previousweekthat he hadbeenappointedby Yeltsin as his
principal adviseron ecologicalmatters.
The three of us, along with Burbulis, proceededto the office of
[Vice PresidentAleksandr] Rutskoi, who was the only top representative of the governmentin the White House. As we walked into his
office, Rutskoi wasdrafting by handthe appealby the Russiangovernment, alonglines that he hadjust discussedwith Yeltsin andKhasbulatov. They had given him the main points overthe telephone,and now
he wasdrafting the final versionof the text by hand.
At Rutskoi's, we learned that the meeting of the Presidium of
Russia'sSupremeSoviet had been scheduledfor 10 o'clock in the
morning, with the sole purposeof immediately conveningan emergency sessionof the SupremeSoviet of the RussianFederation.The
leadership--Yeltsin,Silaev, Khasbulatov-werestill in Arkhangelskoe [at Yeltsin's dacha],and one must give credit to Rutskoi for his
decisivenessand courage.He was readyto issuethe famousappealto
the citizens of Russiaon his own responsibility, if anything were to
happento the otherson their way to the White House.
At around10 or 10:15,we enteredthe meetingroom ofthe Supreme
SovietPresidium.Therewereaboutfifteen memberssitting aroundthe
table, one short of the quorum(sixteenout ofthe thirty memberswere
needed).Rutskoi satdown in the Chairman'sseat.Yablokov, Ryzhov,
and I, too, sat ourselvesat the table-justas an expressionof solidarity. No soonerhad we sat down than in walked Yeltsin, Silaev, and
Khasbulatov.The doorsremainedopened,andthe room wasbeginning
to be filled by deputiesof the Russianparliamentas well as Union
deputies-practicallyall of themmembersof the InterregionalGroup"
*The InterregionalGroup,madeup of abouttwo hundredliberal-mindeddeputies, fonned after the first free electionsof the new USSR Congressof People's
Deputiesin 1989.The groupwasoriginally headedby SakharovandYeltsin.

184 NIKOLAI VORONTSOV

Now, with Khasbulatovpresent,there was a quorum,and the decision of the Presidiumcould be binding. Khasbulatovchairedthe meeting and did so, one must say, in the bestand most dignified manner.
He proposedthe convening of an [emergency] sessionof Russia's
SupremeSoviet. However, when Khasbulatov'smotion was put to a
vote, deputiesVladimir Isalmv, Vice Chairmanof Russia'sparliament,
and Boris Isaev,Chairmanof the Council of Nationalitiesof the Russianparliament,votedto abstain.·The motion, consequently,could not
be adopted(a majority of all the membersof the Presidiumwas required for passage).Khasbulatovwas undauntedand announcedthat
he was nevertheless calling
an emergencysessionof the SupremeSoviet on his own responsibility.
A press conferenceof the Russianleadershipwas scheduledfor
11:00 A.M. By that time, we could alreadyseeout of the window that
tanks were arriving from the direction of Kutuzovskii Prospect.Fearing that nobodywould be able to attendthe pressconferencebecause
of possiblecordons,we decidedto invite foreign ambassadors
to attend
the pressconferencealong with reporters.We thought that the presenceof ambassadoriallimousines,flags and all, would make it possible for the reportersto breakthroughto the White House.
A few moments later, Yeltsin, Yablokov, Ryzhov, and I were
marchingto the SupremeSoviet hall where the pressconferencehad
already started. The person presiding over it, as we saw when we
walked in, was Silaev. Let me point out that Silaev is a man without
any political ambitions,just an honestand very capableadministrator.
Only extraordinarycircumstancescould have promptedhim to take
charge.He must have arrived somethree minutes before Yeltsin did
and, not knowing what might havehappenedto him, openedthe press
conferenceand beganreadingthe text of the governmentappeal,the
one signedby [Russia's] President,the Chairmanof the Council of
Ministers [Silaev himself], and the Chairmanof the SupremeSoviet
[Khasbulatov]. Silaev'svoice projectedsuch a remarkableforce that,
for a moment,Yeltsin wastakenabackandpausedin the doorway.But
• According to the RussianInformation Agency, both Isakov and Isaev voted
againstKhasbulatov'smotion. The personwho abstainedwas Yurii Voronin, the
headof the ParliamentaryCommitteeon Budget, Taxes,and Prices. SeePutch:
Khronika trevoznykhdnei, with an introduction by A. Vinogradov and G.
Pavlikovskii (Moscow: Progress,1991),p. 59.

COUNCIL OF MINISTERSMEETING

185

this lasted only a split second,and a moment later, we all took our
seatson the podium-Yeltsin, Rutskoi, Khasbulatov,Silaev, Yablokov, Ryzhov, and I. Yeltsin read out the "Appeal to the Citizens of
Russia," sharply worded and unequivocal.There were practically no
questions,or, perhaps,we simply did not take any question,for obviousreasons
....

Freidin: Werethereany ambassadors
there?
Vorontsov:Yes. I rememberthe Italian ambassador
andthe ambassadorfrom the Netherlands.I don't recall, though,whether[U.S. Ambassador]Matlock wasthere.I think thosewho learnedaboutthe press
conferencein time to attend did come, but eventswere unfolding at
sucha madpacethat somemay havemissedit throughno fault of their
own. Therewere, I recall, at leasteight big ambassadoriallimousines,
with their country'sflags, parkedoutsidethe White House.
After the pressconference,the questionwas: what to do next?There
was a meeting at the office of SergeiNikolaevich Krasavchenko.*It
wason the third floor, with a view of the embankment.I think Burbulis
was there, too. The question was: what did we have in the White
House?The answer:nothing. We had no autonomouscommunication
system,no radio station, and there was no public addresssystemthat
we could use to communicatewith the outside.The list was long. It
was an utterly dismal picture. In the meantime,someof the Supreme
Soviet staff membersand governmentofficials beganto leavethe building. I evenrecall runninginto a vice premierof the RussianGovernment.
Freidin: What washis name?
Vorontsov:G.V. Kulik. I must say, though,that all the membersof
Russia'scabinet,including [Kulik], had voted to supporttheir Prime
Minister [Silaev]. And yet, during thosedays,neitherKulik nor Gavrilov was anywhereto be found. Prime Minister Silaev was highly visible, but the two vice premierswereunheardandunseen.
Back to Krasavchenko'
s office. The questionwas how to distribute
the governmentappeal.It was clear that it would not be broadcastby
the media.t The solution, of course,was to use the copying machines
·Chairmanof the RussianSupremeSoviet'sCommitteefor EconomicReform
andmemberof the Presidiumof the SupremeSoviet.
tTbe text of the appealswas publishedthe following day, August 20, in
/zvestiia.

186 NIKOLAI VORONTSOV

of the SupremeSoviet. But who would be doing the copying?We did
not want to compromisethe membersof the supportstaff--say,some
woman clerk who was responsiblefor the copier-if the Emergency
Committeereally took over. To be askingthe clerks to do this job, we
decided,would be simply immoral. So we took a small copying mas office, and the two
chine from the receptionroom of Krasavchenko'
of us begancopyingthe fIrst appeals(fIve pagesaltogether)on a little
Canonmachineat the rate of no more than six copies a minute. We
stapledthem by hand and then, taking a stack (twenty-fIve or thirty
copies),I marchedout of the White Houseand distributedthem there
amongthe people.And peoplehadalreadybegun to arrive. They were
practicallytearingthe sheetsright out of my hands,but I tried to give
them only to thosewho promisedto make more copies anddistribute
them further. So somepromisedto make more copieson their office
copiers, some on their typewriters, and some,simply by hand, "fIve
copiesusingcarbonpaper."I kept going backandforth, makinga total
of four or fIve trips.
During one of thesetrips, I saw from the window that therewas a
commotion outside and a tank was being surroundedby a small
crowd. I rushed downstairs.By the time I got there, I saw Boris
Nikolaevich alreadystandingon the tank. I elbowedmy way to the
tank and then I, too, clamberedup on it. Who else was on it? Apart
from Yeltsin and his bodyguards,there was People'sDeputy
Mikhail Grigorievich Arutiunov; Deputy V.P. Mironov; Viacheslav
Bragin, who until recentlychairedthe Committeeon the Press;·and
USSR Deputy Yaroshenko,who was Minister of Economics in
Silaev'sgovernment.When Yeltsin went to the United Statesfor the
first time, it was Yaroshenko who helped him to organize the
planeloadof disposableneedlesand medicinesthat Yeltsin had purchasedwith his speakingfees.Thosewere all the deputieswho were
on the tank.
After Yeltsin madehis famousspeech,I decidedto makemy own
brief statement.I saidthat peopleassumedthat the USSRgovernment
supportedthe EmergencyCommittee."It is not that way at all," I said.
"I am a memberof the USSR government,and I can assureyou that
it's not that way at all."
·Bragin was subsequentlyappointedhead of the StateCommitteefor Television andRadioBroadcasting(formerly Gosteleradio).

COUNCIL OF MINISTERSMEETING

187

You see,I hadalreadyhada similar experiencebackin March 1991
when there was an attempt to establisha state of emergencyat a
meetingof the Council of Ministers. At that time, three people-the
Minister of Geology,G. Gabrieliants;DeputyPrimeMinister for Fossil
Fuels and Electrical Energy, L. Riabev; and I-managedto stop this
attemptin its tracks. The only differencebetweenthat time and now
wasthat in March 1991 Gorbachevwasstill sitting in the Kremlin.
Freidin: Who demandedthe introduction of a state of emergency
then?
Vorontsov:That whole story happenedon the day of the openingof
Russia'sCongressof People'sDeputies,when massiverallies were
beingheld all over Moscow. The threefigures who were pushingfor a
state of emergencywere Pugo, Kriuchkov, and Yazov. Rather passively andvaguely,Pavlov,too, was in favor of it. I havemy recordof
that meeting, and most of the ministers presentsaid somethinglike
this: Yes, it is necessaryto introducea stateof emergency,but. ..."
I decidedto speakout, but beforemy turn came,Gabrieliantsgot up
and made a very good speech(during the putsch,he was in the Crimea). He said: "What are you doing? Do you want to go back to the
old days?" I spoke after him, and the third to come to our side was
Deputy Prime Minister Riabev. After the three of us had spoken,the
attemptsomehowdid not go any further. This is what I wasthinking of
as I stood on the tank. If only the Council of Ministers had met, I
thought, we would have been able to convince the membersof the
cabinet,as we had done in March, not to go along with the state of
emergency.
On the tank, I beganby introducingmyselfas a People'sDeputy of
Russiaandthe USSRMinister of Environment,a memberof the Union
cabinet.I said: "I want to inform Y01l-{)fficially-that therehasbeen
no meetingof the USSRCouncil of Ministers andas of now, nonehas
beenscheduled.So you must understandthat if anyonespeaksin the
nameof the USSRgovernment[in supportof the EmergencyCommittee], that personis lying. The Soviet governmentis a collegial body,
and I assureyou that it has not madeany collective decision [on the
state of emergency]."That was all. After me spoke Colonel General
Kobets, Russia'sDeputy and Minister of Defense.He made a good
speech,invoking the soldier's honor, saying that our soldiers would
neverraise armsagainstthe people.Thesewere very importantwords

188 NIKOLAI VORONTSOV

and, like his otheractionsin thosedays,they playeda major role in the
defenseof the White House. Look, here was this career officer, a
general,who had madehis choice, and that was very impressiveand
reassuring.
[ ...] Sometimearound3:30 P.M., whenI calledthe Ministry again,I
wastold that the EmergencyCommittee'spressconferencewas scheduled for 5:00 P.M. andthat the Council of Ministers would be meeting
at six. I was still with Ryzhov then, and both of us decidedthat we
shouldtry to find EduardShevardnadze.[After stoppingat the Hotel
Minsk], we found him finally at his newly renovatedtown house.
When we drove up (by then we hadbeenjoined by A.P. Vladislavlev,
Deputy Chairman of the Scientific-Industrial Union), we were surprised that accessto the building was not blocked by anything or
anyone.Peoplecould go in and out as they pleased.Inside, Shevardnadze,completelyalone,was facing a groupof foreign correspondents.
Therewere no interpreters,and someof the reporterswho knew Russian were doubling as translators.We were all very glad to seeeach
other. He embracedevery one of us and then introduced us to the
reporters. They began to ask us questions,and first Vladislavlev,
whoseEnglishwas muchbetterthanmine, andthenI madestatements.
I know newspapersreportedon this impromptupressconference.
Soonit wastime to go to the Council of Ministersmeeting.As I was
approachingthe building on Pushkin Streeta little after six, I had a
strong feeling that I would soonbe arrested.I had had plenty of exposure--thetank speech,the press conferencewith Shevardnadze
....
There was more than enoughfor an arrest. To my surprise,nothing
happened.One by one ministerswere arriving, greetingeachother as
thoughnothinghadhappened.
I walked up to Vitalii KhuseinovichDoguzhiev,then First Deputy
Prime Minister, and shook his hand for a long time and especially
warmly. In March, he was simply Deputy Prime Minister, with a special responsibilityfor large-scaledisasters.In that capacity,he was my
immediatesuperior.Back in March, when there was that push for the
state of emergency,I had had a meetingwith Lukianov, who rudely
rejectedmy entreaties,sayingthat there was nothing specialgoing on
and that I shouldmind my own business.After that I had goneto the
Council of Ministers building and tried to get in touch with [Prime
Minister] Pavlov. He was not there. The cabinethad met the day before, anda massrally [in supportof Yeltsin andRussia]was scheduled

COUNCIL OF MINISTERSMEETING

189

to take place the next day. I felt that since I was both a memberof
Russia'sParliamentand a USSR Minister, I should try to serve as a
channelof communicationbetweenthe two antagonistsandkeepboth
sidestalking. I sawMikhail SergeevichShkabardnia,the chief aide of
the outgoinggovernmentof [USSR] PrimeMinister Ryzhkovwho was
then clearing his office. I said to him: "Listen, there might be bloodshedin the streets,we mustdo something."
"I cannothelp you," he said,"I am clearingout of here."
Still, he offeredthe useof his specialgovernmentphoneline [with
direct accessto the membersof the Cabinet]. With Shkabardnia'sassistance,I got hold of Doguzhiev, which was a feat in itself, and
pleadedwith him to do somethingto help preventbloodshed.He respondedwith proper concern,even thankedme for the information,
and promisedto do all he could to help diffuse the situation. Now I
was hoping that my handshakewould remind him of his position during the March days.[ ...]
The notes I took at the Council meetinghave beenpublished,and
they tell the story of what happenedthere.
Noteson the USSRCouncil of Ministers
Meetingof August19, 1991
The extraordinarysessionof the Cabinetof Ministers beganat 6:05 P.M.
As usual,the Ministers of Defense,ForeignAffairs, and Internal Affairs, andthe chairmanof the KGB were absent[from the meeting].
V. Pavlov, Prime Minister: Are you preparedto work under emergencyconditions?We had alreadycometo an agreementwith you in
principle (he was alluding to specialmeasuresto bolsterthe economy).
But today the situation is as follows: that which we had agreedupon,
our decisions,are not carriedout. As a result, therewill come a point
when production will simply come to a halt. This is not a political
matter-wehaveno interestin political slogans.
Are you in agreementwith the declarationof the Presidiumof the
USSRCabinetof Ministers?
(This meetingof the Presidiumhad takenplace late in the evening
on Saturday,August 17. It was attendedby the Prime Minister, the
Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, and heads of the
Presidium apparat. At that meeting, there was dissatisfactionex-

190 N1KOLA1 VORONTSOV
presse~in
my
November

opinion justified-aboutthe fact that the Cabinetof
Ministershadnot receivedthe text of the Union Treaty; eventhe Prime
Minister learnedits text from the newspapers.In any case,we had not
receivedthe text of what the Presidiumdecided.And it is yet to be
explainedwhat relation this meeting had to the preparationsfor the
putsch.)
K. Katushev,Minister ofExternal EconomicAffairs: An expanded
meetingof our Ministry's executiveboardwas held. We listenedto the
leadership'sdeclarationand put it into operation.We are carrying out
the tasksthat have beenassignedto us by the GKChP. We have also
informedour traderepresentatives
abroad.
V. Orlov, Minister of Finance: We are operatingunder a special
securitysystemto preventthe misappropriationof funds.
Sychev,StateBoard ofStandards:No one hasthe right to refuseto
.... The stateof emergency
follow the All-Union systemof standards
oughtto havebeenintroducedearlier.
Lev Ivanovich (headofone ofthe new ministries): We supportyou.
Our societyneedslaw and order. We havebeenwaiting for this measurefor a long time.
L. Davletova,Committeefor Light Industry: Light industry is on the
vergeof collapsebecauseof the sovereigntydeclarationsby the republics. The directorsof light industryare indignantoverthe fact that light
industrywasnot includedin the text of the Union Treaty.
V. Gusev,Chairman ofthe StateCommitteefor Chemistryand Biotechnology: I contacted100 enterprises.All of them supportthe appealsof the GKChP. But it would be foolish to think that everything's
fine. I'm worried aboutthe "Azot" factory in Kemerovoandthe plants
in Bashkiria,wherestrikesmay breakout.
On the questionof politics: If we retreatan inch, we will lose our
positionsandour lives. We will not haveanotherchance.
B. Paniukov,Minister ofCivil Aviation: We were late in introducing
the stateof emergency.We musthavelaw andorderin the country.
An offiCial from the Ministry ofthe Machine-BuildingIndustry: All
machine-buildingenterprisesof the SovietUnion, theUSSRAcademy
of Sciences,and the EngineeringAcademyare in favor of the stateof
emergency.We sawwhattook placeout on ManezhSquare-nomore
than 700 peopleshowedup. We mustpushaheaddecisively.
V. Pavlov, Prime Minister: But I am againsttanks! Let peopleget
out into the streets,let themtalk....

COUNCIL OF MINISTERSMEETING

191

One of the ministers: Everything was fme in our industry before
lunch. But after the lunch break,leafletsfrom the Russiangovernment
beganto appear.
Sychev,StateBoardofStandards:Thank:God for the StateofEmergency.
V. Pavlov, Prime Minister: Yes, sometroublemakersare strolling
abouton ManezhSquare.But you cannotcomparethe ZIL factory and
the "Uralmash"[factory complex]to ManezhSquare....
DeputyMinister ofPowerSupply:The moodis normal,thereare no
accidents,and the Moscow power stations have been secured-all
without a hitch.
DeputyMinister ofAgriculture and Food Supply: The situation in
food supply will be difficult. We will haveto inventory what we have.
The Westwill give us nothing.
An offiCial from the Ministry of Communications:Everything is
undercontrol in our industry.
A. Tiziakov, a memberof the GKChP: Everyonewants order....
Democracy has brought us down to a state of ... (several people
interject: "Yea, enoughalready!").
N. Vorontsov, Minister of Environmentand Natural Resources
Management:Our executiveboardtook measuresto assurethe continued functioning of the economicmechanism.Unified economic,including ecological,functioning, requiresthat the centerwork with the
republics.
With regardto my positionon what hastranspired.I askmyselfone
question:in what situation do I find myself? I was nominatedby the
SupremeSoviet of the USSR and appointedto my position by President Gorbachev.All the ministersshouldaskthemselvesthis question.
I don'tunderstandwhy we havebeenavoidingit.
The White House has issueda seriesof decreesthat speakof the
illegality of what has transpired. Since among the membersof the
central governmentI alone am a Deputy of the Russianparliament,I
am preparedto provide communications,to serveas a shuttlebetween
the White Houseandthe Cabinetof Ministers, so that we can avoid a
further deteriorationof the situation.
(My servicesin this regardwere nevercalledupon.)
V. Shcherbakov,Deputy Prime Minister: The national economy
must continue to operateno matter what. We will not be receiving
credits in the next few hours or days. We will have to switch to the

192 NIKOLAI VORONTSOV

regime of operationunder emergencyconditions. With the exception
of Moscow, we should notsummondirectorsfrom their plants, or we
risk disruptingthe economy.
No one here cameto work for a specific individual. The policy of
the leadersof the GKChP is still not clear to me. I will continue to
work honestly.As for my personalposition I will determineit later. I
am in favor of discipline,but without a returnto the methodsof 1929.
Yu. Masliukov, DeputyPrime Minister: We musthavesupport from
the personnel in industry and finance. Let's put an end to staff
reductions.
(An argumentbetweenMasliukov and Pavlov ensuesconcerning
variouseconomicproblems.)
L. Riabev,DeputyPrimeMinister: We mustmovetowardobserving
the Constitutionas strictlyaspossible.
(Incidentally, it was the views of Riabev, Vorontsov, and Gabrieliants,the Minister of GeologicalResources,at an earliermeetingthat
had preventedagreementon the useof force againstthe striking miners. Pugo, Yazov, and Kriuchkov had attendedthat session,in violation of the rules.)
V. Doguzhiev,First Deputy Prime Minister: I am in favor of the
Union Treaty,though it requiressomemodification. As to the stateof
emergency,we havediscussedthe needfor emergencymeasuresmany
timesoverthe years.
What hastranspireddoesnot signifY a return to totalitarianism.The
centermust assumethe function of guaranteeinghumanrights, including economicrights. Drastic economicmeasuresare takenin capitalist
countries,too.... We needto reviseour approachto the 1992plan and
strengthencentralization.
N. Gubenko,Minister of Culture: My industry is not engagedin
material production,but it doeshave a lot to do with moral and spiritual values.True, amongthe creativeintelligentsiathere are provocateurs who want to shedblood, but I am not speakingabout them. At
this point, all that hastranspiredis beyondthe boundsof the law.
M Shchadov,Minister of the Coal Industry: The situation in the
country is very complex,and yet, somecomradesare oversimplifYing
matters.The situationis changingby the hour. If a stateof emergency
is not introducedtoday in the Kuzbassand Vorkuta regions,then tomorrow the miners will strike and their blood will flow. The Kemerovo RegionSoviethasdecidedto havethe minersgo on strike.

COUNCIL OF MINISTERSMEETING

193

V. Pavlov, Prime Minister: Comrades!Why arewe discussingpolitical issues?There will be a Congressof People'sDeputies(he has
in mind the sessionof the SupremeSoviet), and it will decideeverything.
We must support theUnion Treaty, but amendmentswill be necessary. As professionals,we have views about the unified economic
space,about theneedto provide the country with breadand fuel. We
have run out of com: 5 percentof the cows and 10 percentof the total
numberof pigs havebeenslaughtered.

***
Note by G.V. Uronov of Komsomolskaia
pravda: This was the only
cabinet-levelmeetingheld during the coup.In the courseof thosedays,
N. Vorontsov and the Minister of the Chemicaland Oil Refining Industry, SalambekKhadzhiev,decidedto transfertheir ministriestemporarily to Y eltsin's authority.
Vorontsov: "I decidedto inform the cabinet of this decision, but
Pavlov was goneand Doguzhievwas too busy. AnotherDeputyPrime
Minister, the AcademicianLaverov, to this day maintainssilence.Almost every minister is---to one degreeor another--areal professional
in his field, but if this is a professionalismtotally devoid of civic and
political convictions,we mustfear suchprofessionals."
Interview with Nikolai Vorontsov,April 1993

Freidin: There was at least one other version of your notes that
circulatedin thosedays.
Vorontsov:During the sessionof Russia'sSupremeSoviet on August 22, I madea statement,sayingthat I had notesfrom the meeting
of the USSR Council of Ministers on August 19 and that I would be
happyto readthem to anyonewho would like to hearthem. During a
break in the session,I held an impromptu pressconferenceand read
my notes outloud to a group of reportersand deputies.This was how
an unfortunateerror crept in, and the Minister for ChemicalIndustry,
Khadzhiev,becameassociatedwith the supportersof the putscheven
though he was not presentat the Council meetingandjoined the Yeltsin forces as soon as he cameback to Moscow on August 20. Some
reporter must have confusedhim with the new Fuel Oil Minister

194 NIKOLAI VORONTSOV

whosenameI could not recall then. It was this unfortunatetranscript
thatmadeits way onto Yeltsin'sdesk.

Freidin: You mean the version that Yeltsin forced Gorbachevto
readout loud beforethe sessionof Russia'sSupremeSoviet?
Vorontsov: Yes. But even that unfortunateversion gave one the
senseof how much Gorbachevhad beenbetrayedby his government.
That was Yeltsin's point, and the transcript,evenin a corrupt version,
drove it home.
Freidin: WasPavlovdrunk during the Council meetingon the 19th?
Vorontsov:It is hard to say. His speechwas slurred,he was clearly
having difficulty speaking,but somedrugs for hypertensionhave this
effect, and my impressionwas that it was those drugs rather than
alcohol.But I could be wrong.

Freidin: I recall that when I saw you that evening,you mentioned
somethingaboutthe reasonPavlovgavefor the suddenintroductionof
the state of emergency,somethingabout Stinger missiles and urban
terrorists?
Vorontsov: It was rather incoherent,but, referring to Kriuchkov
[headof the KGB] as his source,he said that a "left" coup d'etatwas
imminent, that terrorists, armed to the teeth, even equippedwith
Stingermissiles,were lining up all along the GardenRing Road, and
that if it had not been for the state of emergency,the entire Soviet
governmentwould havebeenin danger.As I said,Pavlov was borderline incoherentwhen he was giving this preposterousinformation, and
I did not takehis words seriously.
Freidin: What happenedafterthe Council meeting?
Vorontsov: I went briefly to the Congressof Compatriotsand then
home,whereI was very glad to seemy very worried wife, andyou as
well--this quite aside from any personalsympathies.I thought that
you might be the last personfrom the outsideworld to seeme alive, or
free, the last link. I am gladthosefearsdid not materialize....

Vladimir Shcherbakov Recounts
His Role in the Coup

Vladimir IvanovichShcherbakov,First DeputyPrimeMinister ofthe
SovietUnion, explainedhis actionsduring the coupto an
extraordinarysessionoftheSupremeSovieton August28, 1991. His
speechwasbroadcaston MoscowCentral Television.
I assert,quite unequivocally,that the Soviet government,the Soviet
Council of Ministers,as a collectivebody of government,asthe executive power,did not takepart in any secretconspiraciesbehindthe back
of the President,the SupremeSoviet, and the people.And as a collective body, we did not commit any anticonstitutionalactions.
Prime Minister Pavlov, who turned us into .hostagesof his
decision--the investigationwi11look into how this took place-and
the three Council ministers,Y azov, Pugo,and Kriuchkov, are another
matter....
During the periodof August 19-22,I confirm that we took no single
unconstitutionalor illegal action. Moreover, we did not implement a
single decisionof the StateEmergencyCommittee.As of the 20th and
21st,we beganrefusingto implementthesedecisionsofficially. On the
20th, we reachedagreementfirst with Comrade Vitalii Doguzhiev
[First Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR] and then at the Presidium
on the 21st, at 13:30--whenthe tanks, incidentally, were still on the
streetsand nothing was clear as regardsGorbachev'shealthand what
was the matter with him. We refused to carry out the Emergency
Committee'sinstructionsin the economicsphere:on lowering prices
for children'sgoods,on parity of pricesbetweenthe city and countryside, on housing, and other such foolishness.We said that this was
195

196

VLADIMIR SHCHERBAKOV

adventurism,that it was yet anotherattemptto make the economya
hostageof political passions,andwe refusedto do this.
Second,we regardedthe instructionsof the Council of Ministers
issuedby Vice PresidentY anaev,on the introductionof censorshipand
on organizing the re-registrationof the mass media, as unconstitutional, andrefusedto carry themout.
Third, we adopteda statementin which the following was laid
down: We, the USSRgovernment,statethat underthesecircumstances
we submit only to the Constitutionand the laws of the USSRand we
undertakestrictly to carry themout, and are accountableonly to PresidentGorbachevandthe SupremeSoviet.
I regret that we removedthe secondphrase,but it was there. Further, it was written that underthesecircumstances,we refusedto carry
out the decisionsof the Vice ... of the Acting President,Yanaev,and
of the EmergencyCommittee.It was madeclear to us that we might
not recognizethe Acting President,but that underthe Constitutionwe
were bound to recognizethe Vice President,and that if we adopted
sucha statement,it would be unconstitutional.
[Inaudiblecall from the hall; Shcherbakovpausesandsighsdeeply.]
Further, what actually happenedat the session[of the Council of
Ministers] on August 191
First, none of us knew; that morning, all of us learnedof this from
the radio and the television,eachin his own way. In the morning, the
Presidiummet, and we phonedeachother. No one knew anything,not
a singleministerknew anything....
We went our separateways, all trying to figure out what was going
on. Somesort of additionalinfonnationat leastneededto be collected.
We agreedto meeta little later.
At this time, I phoned Yanaev and put three questionsto him.
"Gennadii Ivanovich, I ask you to answer,quite clearly and comprehensibly, three questions.First, do you really have trustworthy informationthat PresidentGorbachevis ill andis not in a conditionto carry
out his duties?"He gaveme not a word of proof, becauseit was clear
that by that very eveningthe situation would be quite different. The
secondquestion: "Was the text of all these statements[of the State
EmergencyCommittee] not distorted?"I never read them becauseit
was all from the radio. But from what I had heard,it was clear to me

HIS ROLE IN THE COUP

197

that therewas so much nonsenseandso much of everythingtherethat,
again,it did not bode well. And the third: "You haveadopteda statement, you the Soviet leadership.Three of you signed, but probably
more of you got to discuss it." But at this point, I was no longer
speaking.I knew, roughly, who had signed,and of course,if they sit
down with a bottle, thosekinds of peoplemay sign anythingyou want.
I askedhim: ''Therewere probablymoreof you peoplethere--atleast,
tell me who was there. And in general,how is all this to be understood?"
He answeredall threequestionsin the affmnative. I askedhim: "Is
ComradeLukianov with you?" He said: "Yes, he is." "Doeshe support
this?" "Yes, he does."
I askedhim: "Then explain to me, GennadiiIvanovich. Surely you
know that you havesteamrolledthe stateof emergency;nothing is left
standing.How is all this to be understood?Lukianov could not have
sanctionedthis."
He said: "We reachedagreementthat we will explain everythingat
the session[of the USSRSupremeSoviet]. Anyway," he asked,"what
areyou planningto do?"
I said: "You know, in general,this is a dubiousaffair, andso, for the
present,I don't know-I have no information. I will carry out my
duties until the session[of the SupremeSoviet], but at presentI will
deal exclusively with the economy.The situationthere is such that it
will explodeany momentnow."
He saidto me, "That'sright. Okay, Pavlov will tell you the details.
This is not for the telephone...."
[Shcherbakov,Pavlov and other membersof the Council of Ministers met on the evening of August 19. According to Shcherbakov's
account,Pavlov beganby asking Council memberstheir attitude toward the text of the Union Treaty. Then, accordingto Shcherbakov,
Pavlovaskedthe ministersto give their opinionsaboutthe introduction
of the stateof emergency.ShcherbakovdescribesPavlov'sreport.]
Pavlov said that a critical situation had been brewing for a long
time, but that of late, a military coup had been prepared.A large
number of armed fighters had been concentratedwithin the Garden
Ring Road. Their weaponswere just hand-heldgrenadelaunchersfor
three battalions.He said a list of people [from the governmentand

198

VLADIMIR SHCHERBAKOV

Party leadership]to be removedin this situationhad beenseizedfrom
them-----andthat all of us, membersof the sitting government,were on
theselists, on different lists, but certainly on them. "But," Pavlovwent
on, "we have avertedall this by introducing the state of emergency.
Now, each of you, expressyour position. What is your attitude to
this?" That is how the questionwasposed....
I, of course, did not understandwhat was going on. My first
thoughtswere that this was a Khrushchev-modelcoup. So, on the first
day, I was of courseinterestedmost of all in the healthof Gorbachev,
becausethis was a sort of hopefor his return. Give all this, say,a week
or two, andeverythingcan be restored.I phoneda lot of peoplein the
RussianRepublic and tried somehowto understand.There was no
information. And I cameto the conclusion,after a conversationwith
Pavlov at night, when all membersof the Presidium had left, that
somethinghad indeedhappenedto Gorbachev.After the full Council
met, the Presidiumcontinuedthe debate.We neverreachedagreement
and decidedto part for the day. Pavlov and I went down to his office,
and he told me what had in fact happened.How he explainedit I will
discussfurther.
[Pavlov] saidto me that on August 18, he and his son-whohad to
fly off-were sitting anddrinking. [Then, accordingto Pavlov]:
"Kriuchkov called: 'Come urgently and immediately to the
Kremlin-there is an emergency.An armedcoup is being prepared.Membersof the securityforceshaveto makea decisionon
introducinga stateof emergency.'
"I askedhim, 'Whereis Lukianov?'
"He saidLukianov wasoff to Valdai.
" 'But how can such a matterbe decidedwithout Lukianov?
Let's senda helicopterimmediately.'
"We gatheredtogether.In cameBaklanov,Shenin,Plekhanov,
and, most important,Boldin. They saidthey hadjust gottenback
from the Crimea.That they had waited in the President'sreception room for an hour. They were unableto get in becausethere
weredoctorswith him. That RaisaMaksimovnawasalsounwell,
a most serioussituation.They were let in for fifteen minutes.The
Presidentwas in bed, was in effect not respondingto words, in
general was inactive. 'So we askedthe doctors, "Is it a heart
attackor a strokeor everythingtogether?"They said, "We don't

HIS ROLE IN THE COUP

199

know." But in general it becameclear to us that it was not a
minor matter,but that generallyhe would not be aroundfor some
time, and so we camebackimmediately.That, comrades,is what
we reportto you.' "
I still doubtedthat this was a military coup. I was thinking: they are
not idiots, after all. They have set a date for a session[of the Supreme
Soviet] and they understandthat they cannotput the country on its
kneesin a week. Most important, if that is what they want, then why
havethey not arrestedanyone?
All the same,on the 20th I startedto understand.We maintained
communicationwith all the presidentsof the republicsand, roughly at
lunch time, I finally cameto the conclusionthat it was necessaryto do
something.The situation was so unclear and all of us-the USSR
government-had
becomehostagesin this situation.In political terms,
we wereunableto takea stepeitherto the left or the right.
To begin, it was necessaryto removethe Prime Minister [Pavlov]
from the EmergencyCommittee,to untie his handsandto showhim to
everyone,becauseas long as the Prime Minister was included in the
EmergencyCommittee, the whole world might think that we [the
Council of Ministers] supportedthem [the EmergencyCommittee].It
was necessaryfor everyoneto understandthat we did not; nor did the
headof stateof the USSRgovernment.
So I tried various routes. At first, I tried to reach an agreement
simply that Pavlov was not being releasedfrom his home. That never
worked. Then I went to him and we agreedthat we would officially
publish a statementon his illness and that his duties would be transIt was not that I was afraid; it wasjust
ferred to ComradeDo~hiev.
November
that Doguzhievwas more experiencedand strongerand knew how to
govern, unlike myself.· In the government,our responsibilitiesare
fairly clear. I deal with all kinds of analytical, economic,and social
problems,andDoguzhievdealswith the rest. ...
But the final thing: Coming out to this rostrum for the last time--I
havespenta lot of time in this hall-I want to tell you what I think, not
lectureyou. The mostdifficult tasksstill lie ahead,after all. An assessment of the plot has been given, yet we still do not grasp its cata·Shcherbakovis referring hereto the fact that both he and Doguzhievwere
first deputy primeministersandthat eithermight havereplacedPavlov.

200

VLADIMIR SHCHERBAKOV

strophicconsequences.
I do not absolveourselves,the government,or
myselfpersonally,of the blame.In general,I think that our main fault,
and our main tragedy,is that we did not understandwhat Gorbachev
was doing. We did not understandit andhadnot evaluatedit.
We understoodthat there was a build-up of forces under way on
both sides.But we did not understandGorbachev'sefforts to achieve
political stabilizationthroughthe Union Treaty,economicstabilization
through a joint program,and internationaleconomicrelationsthrough
the London accords.We were always grumbling in the government,
"What is being agreedto behindour backs?Things are not right." We
failed to put the collectivesin the right frame of mind. This was our
majormistake.

INTERVIEW WITH YEVGENII SHAPOSHNIKOV

The Coup and the Armed Forces

At the time oftheAugustcoup, YevgeniiShaposhnikov
commanded
the SovietAir Force. Following the coup, he wasappointedDefense
Minister ofthe USSRandAir Marshal. This interviewwasconducted
by SovietjournalistAndreiKaraulovandwaspublishedin
Nezavisimaiagazetaon September
12, 1991.
Nezavisimaiagazeta:Having workedfor a long time alongsideyour
predecessor,
MarshalYazov, were you surprisedto seehim amongthe
membersof the StateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergency?
Shaposhnikov:Look at his date of birth: 1923. That meansthat
Yazov was educatedand grew up under Stalinism. Then cameperestroika,democratization,and glasnost.And the further it went, the less
he liked it. He waspatientfor a long time. But the Union was cracking,
the armed forces were breaking apart and allying themselveswith
separaterepublics,andthe economywas prey to chaos.So Yazov, the
marshal,was seizedby doubt. Yes, he would say to himself, we must
live in a new way, speakin a new way, feel in a new way.... But what
if this meantthe destructionof all thosethings he has spenthis whole
life with? I think he was confused... I meanliterally, confused,becausehe never,but never,went all the way. He would not haveshotat
people.I am convincedaboutthat. Here are a few facts. On the morning of the 19th he convenedthe [Defense] Ministry's Collegium [of
departmentheads]:a stateof emergencywas beingintroduced,aswell
for the armedforces throughoutthe
as a higher level of preparedness
Union; somecities, including Moscow, were to be occupiedby military units. "Watch out," he added,"don't do stupid things. There are
peoplewho would throw themselvesundertanks,or try to setthemon
fIre; we don't want blood." Thosewere his words.That is why, I think,
201

202

YEVGENII SHAPOSHNIKOV

the soldiersdid not receivethat most seriousorder. All they were told
was: Go in, and stay in such-and-sucha place, and that's it. I understoodalreadyon the morning of the 19th that Yazov would not order
the troopsto shootat civilians. In the final analysis, Ithink that is in his
favor.

Nezavisimaiagazeta:But they hadlive shellsin thosetanks!
Shaposhnikov:Shells, yes, but as to shooting . .. Yazov was not
capableof this. That is what I think.

Nezavisimaiagazeta:Were relationsbetweenyou not the best?
Shaposhnikov:We were not close, personally. Our dealingswere
purely professional.Yazov always had his own viewpoint on everything; he thought he knew everything better than anyone else. On
August 19, at the meetingof the Collegium, we were all in a stateof
shock, appalled, if that is the way to put it. There we were, sitting
there, not knowing what to do or say. In fact, he did not give us any
time to reflect; he spoketersely,no more than ten to fifteen minutes.I
noticedthathe wasnot at all enthusiastic-rather,
depressed,
evena bit
disoriented,I'd say. He marchedin, told us that Gorbachevhad taken
ill, that the signing of the Union Treaty, scheduledfor the following
day, could not take placeunderthe circumstances.But he did not saya
kind word to put people at ease-somethinglike, well, the state of
emergencyis being introduced,but we will continueour work, we'll
hope.... Instead,he just said: "Armed Forces----upgrade
statusto battle ready,proceed!"He did not allow any questions,andin any case,to
be honest, nobody showedany wish to ask. "That is all," he said,
"Carry out your orders."
The atmospherewithin the Collegiumis far from friendly. That was
the main problem.I think if the Collegiumhad a bit of a humaneatmospherein it, we would havesharedour thoughtsWith eachother. During
my tenure,a relatively brief one to be sure,I cannotrecall a single time
whenwe would simply get togetherandspeakwith eachotherhonestly
aboutour worries.Not once.And not that time, either.We walkedout.
I was going down the stairs next to the Deputy Commanderof the
Navy. Among the armedforces, the Air Force and the Navy are consideredto be the most democraticallyorientedservices.I askedhim:
"Ivan Matveevich,what do you think? I feel really troubledby this. I
feel it in my gut. It's somekind of foul play-lookslike a coupd'etat."

THE ARMED FORCES 203

"I can'tfigure it out either,"he said,"On the onehandthey are from
the Gorbachevteam,andthen,all of a sudden,they announcea stateof
emergency
...."
We left the building and eachgot into his own car. That was the
end of our conversation.We were all afraid of one another-Stalin's
legacy.
Let me tell you a story aboutYazov. On August20 the radio station
MoscowEcho announcedmy arrest.[LeningradMayor] Sobchaksaid
at a meeting in Leningradthat the whole of the Air Force had sided
with Yeltsin. Foreign radio stationsreportedthe same.At that time I
was in my office. Suddenlythe telephonerang. It was Yazov, summoningme.
Nezavisimaiagazeta:You riskednevercomingback...
Shaposhnikov:My attitude was this: They did not know exactly
which side I was on. I had receivedsomephonecalls from the KGB:
"We haveheardreportsof insinuationsagainstyou. You must issue a
denial."
I played dumb. "I cannot deny somethingthat I have not heard
directly," I said.
"But accordingto Sobchak..."
"No," I said, "I don't know anything about it. Let's just hang up,
both of us. There'sno point in going on with this conversation."In
other words, Yazov could not have had any evidenceabout me. So I
went to the Ministry, waited there for almost an hour. Then I called
him in his car.
"I'll be theresoon;wait for me!" he replied.
So, for the first time in many years,I saw a Yazov with a human
face. He cameout to greet me: "Forgive me for being late, Yevgenii
Ivanovich,but you understandthetimesaretough.Pleasesit down."
He sat down oppositeme. None of this, I thought, bodedwell. He
was simply planningto use a different approachwith me. Instead,he
tilted his headto the side,put his handunderhis cheekandsaid: "What
do you think I shoulddo? Tell me honestly."
So I told him honestly. I told him that it was necessaryto try to
resolvethe situation.How? With dignity, of course.
"Do you know a dignified way out?"
"Yes. Withdraw the troops from the city, cancel the state of
emergency
...." I decidedto go all the way: we werealone,after all.

204

YEVGENII SHAPOSHNIKOV

"SupposeI do," he said,"What will happento the Committee?"
"Dissolve the Committee and to hell with it. Declare it illegal.
Transferpower to the SupremeSoviet. And bring Gorbachevback to
Moscow...."
No soonerhad I spokenthese words than three membersof the
Military Collegium enteredthe office. Yazov changedimmediately,
his face becameentirely different. He askedthe three to sit down and
saidto me: "Do you know why I askedyou here?"I felt my blood run
cold. It hadbeena mistakefor me to speakto him openly. But he said
to me: ''There are too many democratsin the Air Force. You can
expectanything from them at any time. Are you surethat you control
thesepeople?"
"Yes, I'm sure."
"So takethe necessarymeasuresandattendto your business."
Nezavisimaiagazeta:How do you explainthis strangemeeting?
Shaposhnikov:He haddoubts.My impressionis that whenthe three
generalsenteredthe office he wanted to defend me from them, to
protectme. In fact I hadthe clearimpressionthat he was looking for a
way out.
After the meetingI returnedto my office and summonedmy senior
aides.
"Well, men,what do you think ofthis? Let's put our headstogether
and forget for a momentaboutour epaulets."In the Air Force,people
relate to one another in such a way that it is possibleto look one
anotherin the eye."So what'sto be done?What'syour opinion?"
As I expected,the reply was unanimous:we've got to end this
business.
"Very well," I replied,"it's all clear.Comewhat may, you will obey
ordersonly from me and from nobody else,no matterwho it is." The
sameorderwasissuedto the troops.
As night approachedon August20, I heardthat an attackwas being
plannedon the White House.I calledColonel GeneralGrachev."What
areyou going to do?" I askedhim.
"I've got the feeling that I'm holding the short end of the stick:
thesebastardswant me to issueorders[to attackthe White House]."
"And what will you do?"
"Well," saidGrachev,"I'm going to resign."
"They won't acceptyour resignation--it'sa stateof emergency."

THE ARMED FORCES 205

"Well, thento hell with it-I'll just shootmyself!"
"Grachev," I said to him, "hold your fire for the time being. I'd
ratheryou andI makea visit to the White House.I've discussedit with
my wife, though, and she thinks that if I were to go to the White
House,Y azov might simply fire me, and I might lose all control over
my troops.So the effect would be the oppositeof what I intended.
"Grachev,"I went on, ''you've got such an incredible force on the
ground.... Let's take the paratroopersand surroundthe Kremlin, Of-betterstill-let's arrestthejunta ourselves."
He said: "Yes, we've got enoughpower, but neitheryou nor I have
enoughof the otherstuff."
"Like what?"
He said: "How manytimes haveyou beeninsidethe Kremlin?"
"Threetimes,I think."
"And I," said Grachev,"have beenthere only once. So we'll send
the paratroopersthere, and the KGB security guys will take us off
easily from aroundthe comer. Don't you think they have done their
prepwork?"
I agreedwith Grachev. He continued: "Let's just sit by the telephonesand try to avert any stupid trouble. When the night is over,
things will becomeclearer.If we move on the Kremlin, we may just
get too entangledin this whole mess,risk the lives of a lot of people....
Let'sjust wait a little longer."
As soonas we finished, I got an ideaof what to do. If they orderthe
storming of the White House (regardlessof who issuesit-Yazov,
Kriuchkov, Yanaev,it did not matter),I will go to themwith an ultimatum: "Rescindthe order or else; and if I do not get back to headquarterswithin ten minutesor if I do not call headquarters
ten minutesfrom
now, the bombersare going to take off and bomb you to kingdom
come.This is the Air Force--nojoke. Whatdo you sayto me now?"
We maintainedcontinuouscommunicationwith the Russians,the
White House.OnceI said to [GeneralKobets'saide] Colonel Tsalko:
"Aleksandr Valerianovich, please come to my office-! don't feel
comfortablediscussingthis with you overthe telephone."
He said he would comeright away. Fifteen minuteslater, he called
andsaid: "Yevgenii Ivanovich,we havebeensurroundedby suchcare,
such watchful care ... , that I don't think I can leave the White
House."
Then I had a conversationwith Kedrov, one of Yeltsin's aides. I

206

YEVGENlI SHAPOSHNIKOV

said to him: "I guaranteethat neitherthe Air Force nor the Airborne
Paratrooperswill take a single step in your direction. Everything will
be all right-thereis nothingto fear."
He stuck the telephonereceiverout of the window: "Do you hear
what is going on outside?"
And I heardthe crowd chanting:"Russia!Russia!"
On the 21st, early in the morning, I receiveda phonecall: "You are
orderedto attend a Collegium meeting with Minister Y azov at 9:00
A.M." Yazov took a long time to explainthe situation,andthe explanation itself was ratherdisjointed,which was somethingunusualfor him.
He spokedisparaginglyabout Yanaevand Pavlov, saying: "Oh those
guys are bad; they are drunkards; they have draggedme into this
without even knowing wherethey are going; and I have draggedyou
in, and you draggedin the soldiers,who are now sitting there in their
tanks-theArmy has beendisgraced!"And he askedus to offer our
opinionsaboutwhat to do.
I got up and said: "According to the RussianArmy tradition that the
youngestshould go first (I was the youngestamongthe membersof
the Collegium),I requestpermissionto speak."
But Moiseev· intervened."Wait, I have important information," he
saidandbeganto talk aboutsomething.
SuddenlyYazov interruptedhim: "Mikhail Alekseevich,everybody
knowsthat. Pleaselet Yevgenii Ivanovichspeak."
I began: "In the name of rescuing the reputation of the Armed
Forces,we must give the order for the troopsto leaveMoscow." And
thenI repeatedeverythingI hadsaidto Y azovthe previousday. Practically everyonein the Collegiumsupportedmy position.
"Well," said Yazov, "I understandyour position. The Emergency
Committeeis meetingright now, but I decidednot to attend.However,
I will inform them about it. I will probably ... give the order to
withdraw the troops from Moscow. But I would like to tell you that I
will remain a memberof the EmergencyCommittee. I cannot be a
traitor twice. This is my cross,andI will bearit to the end...."
You see,Y azov could have switchedsides,but he would not do it.
We proposedthen: "Dmitrii Timofeevich, we must announceyour
decisionat once.The sessionof Russia'sSupremeSovietis to convene
*GeneralM.A. Moiseev,the Chief of the GeneralStaff, was retired from the
servicetwo daysafterthe endof the putsch.

THE ARMED FORCES

207

at 11:00 A.M. Let the deputiesdo their work in peace,in a nonnal
environment."
It lookedlike he agreed,but thenagainsomethingstrangeseemedto
be going on. I returnedto my office, I was waiting for the order,but no
order was forthcoming. I called Rutskoi's secretary(the sessionhad
alreadybegun) and dictatedto him a note saying that the Army was
withdrawing from Moscow andwould no longertake part in this business. I saw Rutskoi read the note on television. It was, however,
Bakatin who madethe [public] announcement,saying that the Collegium of the Ministry of Defensehadmadethis decision.

Nezavisimaiagazeta:So who stoppedthe putsch?
Shaposhnikov:I believe many things came together at the same
time. In general--pardonme for sayingsomethingso banal--thetimes
stoppedthe putsch.

Nezavisimaiagazeta:But was this really a putsch?This questionis
beingaskedwith increasingfrequency.
Shaposhnikov:Yes, it was. I see it this way: The action [of the
EmergencyCommittee]had not beenseriouslythought out, whatever
angleyou approachit from. But someriddlesremain,you areright. To
be honestwith you, I don't quite understandit either.This is one of the
more enigmatic pagesin this century'shistory. But sooneror later,
peoplewill solvethis riddle.
[ ...]

Nezavisimaiagazeta:Do you think that somegeneralor other--say,
GeneralMakashov·--couldhavehadhis divisionsmarchinto Moscow
without an order?
Shaposhnikov:No. This is a different matter, though. All of us in
the army are burdenedwith this one word: orders. And if someone
violateshis ordersor, worse,decidesto go into combatcontraryto his
orders,he will be stopped,which is not so hard to do. On the 22nd I
sawYeltsin in the Kremlin. He was leavingGorbachev'soffice while I
was standingin the receptionroom having a drink of water. I could
*GeneraI Makashevwas known for his right-wing views and his association
with the putschists.

208

YEVGENII SHAPOSHNIKOV

hearYeltsin say into the receiver: "RuslanImranovich [Khasbulatov],
don't worry, I havethe situationundercontrol. If anythinghappens,I
will go to the White Houseat once."
I askedhim: "Would you like a drink of water,Boris Nikolaevich?"
He shook my hand and said: "You're a good man, you really did
hang in there. But I don't have time to drink water. Three armored
columnsaremoving towardthe White Houseagain."
I said: "Boris Nikolaevich, the Air Force is ready to carry out any
order."
"All right, thendo somethingaboutit."
I called Antoshkin, the Moscow District Commanderof the Air
Force:"Do you recognizemy voice?"
"Yes, I do."
"Well, then listen to my order: The Air Force is to be brought to
combatreadinessat once.Fly your planeslow, show force, show support for the White House.But hold the fire. If necessary,call Rutskoi."
That's how it was. Ten minutes later, I was called in to see Gorbachev.I enteredhis office, and there they were all sitting, all "nine
plus one."· Gorbachevsaid to me in a ratherrestrainedtone of voice:
"Tell us what you were doing betweenthe 19th andthe 21st."
I gavea brief report.
"That's what we thought you were doing," said Gorbachev."We
offer you the postof Minister of Defense."
[ ...]

*The headsof the nine republicsthat had agreedto the Union Treaty,plus the
USSRPresident,Gorbachev.

INTERVIEW WITH DAVLAT KHUDONAZAROV

From Dushanbeto Moscow

At the time ofthe coup,Davlat Khudonazarov,a nativeofTajikistan,
was Chairmanofthe USSRUnion ofCinematographers.He wasa
memberofthe First CongressofPeople'sDeputiesin 1989andthen a
Deputyto the SupremeSovietofthe USSR.In 1990, at the
Twenty-eighthParty Congress,he wasappointeda memberofthe
Central Committeeofthe CommunistParty ofthe SovietUnion as
part ofthe so-called"Yakovlevlist" ofliberal deputies.He was
interviewedby GregoryFreidin in April 1992while visiting
Hollywood, California.
Freidin: Tell me aboutthe putsch.How did you fIrst fInd out about

it?
Khudonazarov:The morning of the 19th, in Dushanbe,I got a call
from one of my friends telling me somethinghad happened."Oh stop
kidding me," was my fIrst response,but when I heardthe newsmyself
half an hour or so later, I fell into a sort of trance,as if my headwas
suddenlyfIlled with cottonwool.I remainedin this statefor a coupleof
hours. I just did not want to believethat this was for real. I wantedto
believe I was simply dreamingit all. But life went on aroundme, the
sun was shining, and finally the reality of it sankin. ThenI hadto wait
for a couple of hours until I could rouse out of bed my contactsin
Moscow.
I telephonedMaria Zverevaand Andrei Razumovskii,my deputies
at the Cinematographers'
Union. "Listen, folks, pleaseget togetherin
the union, invite [Andrei] Smirnov[a former chairmanof the Union of
Cinematographers]
andanyoneSmirnovconsidersimportant."
They met, and soonafterwardwe agreedover the telephonethat we
all understoodwhat kind of charactershad seizedpower and that we
209

210 DAVLAT KHUDONAZAROV

must actively get involved in resistance.I also told them that I would
be flying to Moscowandthat they shouldexpectme the next morning.
So all was settled.
There was one detail, however.My family and I had the tickets to
fly to the Pamirthe next day" But my wife said, "You know, Davlat,
we'll fly to Moscowtomorrowwith you."
This wasvery ironic. For the lastthreeyearsI hadbeenpressingher
to cometo Moscowwith me andbring the children. So I said,"Why is
it that you did not want to come with me then, when all was quiet in
Moscow,but now you wantto come?"
"Well," shesaid,"now thereare tanksin the streets,and if anything
happensto you, we want to be nearby."
To make a long story short, after a little family altercation,I said:
"Okay, tomorrowI'm flying to the Pamirwith you."
As soon as I said that, I dialed my secretaryin Moscow again and
told her, "Masha, I am cancelingmy Moscow trip tomorrow. I'll be
flying to the Pamirinstead."
After a long pause,shesaid slowly, "You know, Davlat, I think you
havemadethe right choice-thereare tanks all aroundhere,it will be
betterin the mountains."I smiled to myselfand hung up. So my wife
calmeddown.
While in Dushanbeon the 19th, I madeseveralphonecalls to Moscow. And during my third phonecall there---Iwastalking to an official
at the Cinematographers'
Uniorr--I heardhim say: "Listen, there are
tanks here, you know, perhapswe should be a little more cautious
now."
When I heardthat I simply blew my stack."How can you saythat?
When we used to organizedemonstrationsand rallies we knew that
even though we were criticizing Gorbachev,we were still under his
protection.And now, when he is locked up somewhere,you are suggestingthat we shouldkeep quiet aboutthose dirty bastards!..." I
was saying this on the intercity phone line. "You are suggestingwe
hide! Under no circumstances.We mustbe completelyopenaboutour
opposition."
When I hung up the phone,my wife said: "Listen, you havealways
beenoutspoken,but this time I think you havegonea little too far."
*Khudonazarovcomesfrom Gornyi Badakhshan,a regionof the Tajik Republic that is high in the PamirMountains,closeto Afghanistan.

FROM DUSHANBE TO MOSCOW 211

And one more detail. One of the Tajik Cinematographers'Union
officials I was with on the 19th was Rubit Karimov, the Executive
Secretaryof the Union. This was in the morning shortly after I found
out aboutthe eventsandI was still feeling dumbfounded.Karimov (he
is a manin his early forties) wasriding with me in the car. He spoketo
me softly, almost confidentially: "Davlat, as I recall, you, too, have
spokenout againstGorbachev."
My mind was sort of wanderingat that time, but all of a suddenI
realizedthat he was throwing me a line, giving me the opportunityto
changesides. I said: "What? Me? You meanhave I ever spokenout
againstGorbachev?I can'tremember...."
"Why yes," he was quick to remind me. "Last Januaryyou were
organizing the protest,the letter of 196, you were accusinghim [of
responsibilityfor the bloodshedin Lithuania]."
"Don't you understand?"I said, "We were attackingfrom another
side-theoppositeside."
We were at the Tajik Film Studio that morning, and there, too, I
noticedsomepeopleavertingtheir eyes,pretendingnot to notice me-anything not to greet me, becausethen they would have had to say
something.Peopledid not want to be pinned down. And the atmospherewas strange.Insteadof regular programming,the radio was
repeatingover and over again the melody that precededimportant
announcements.
And from time to time, they would readthe text of the
EmergencyCommittee'sor Lukianov'sstatement.That sameevening,
the EmergencyCommitteepeoplewent on television, and it became
clearwhat kind peoplethey truly were.
Twice I receivedcalls from the editor of a small Tajik independent
newspaper."Master," he said,using aTajik form of address,ustot,''we
have reachedthe SupremeSoviet of Russia--Yeltsin is there." Later
on, he called me and said that he had spokenwith the Moscow City
Sovietandthat [Mayor] Gavriil Popov,too, was there.This editor was
a wonderful fellow. He was surethat the coup would not work. Later,
in the fall, when we lost the election,* he broke down crying at the
pressconference.
The next morning, on the 20th, I got up early, packedthe bags,and
by 6 o'clock we were at the airport. I passedmy [five-year-old] sonon
who wasboardingthe plane-thiswasa small
to oneof the passengers
*K.hudonazarovwasanunsuccessfulcandidatefor presidentof Tajikistan.

212

DAVLAT KHUDONAZAROV

Yak-4O--andhe was soon seated;my [seventeen-year-old]daughter
followed. It was my wife's turn now-we were the last to board. I
said: "Pleaseforgive me, but I've got to go to Moscow." Before she
could even openher mouth, theflight attendantbeganto rush her to
board the plane. So she had to get on board, and so we said goodbye.
I went to the ticket office to try and get a ticket to Moscow. It was
about 6:15 in the morning by then (3:15 A.M. in Moscow). The flight
for Moscow was to departsoon.The planewas alreadyon the tarmac.
There was a lot of agitation aroundthe boarding gate, which clearly
meantthat the big bosseswere flying to Moscow.
I had madeup my mind, of course,that I shouldtry to be as inconspicuousas possible,so I avoided the special reservationsoffice for
Deputiesand VIPs (they might report my whereabouts).My plan had
beento get off the plane in Moscow unnoticedand get to the city by
the suburbantrain and subway, insteadof hiring a taxi. Alas, there
wereno tickets for ordinaryfolks.
In the meantime,I saw that the airport was filling up with very
of the Tajik CommunistParty Central
important people--Secretaries
Committeeand peoplelike that. They were standingin a small crowd
talking to each other, laughing heartily, making a lot of noise. They
were clearly euphoricaboutsomething.I took asideone of their sidekicks who was weaving in and out of the crowd, and askedhim what
the commotionwas all about. ''They are all going to the [CPSU] Central CommitteePlenumin Moscow," he replied.
On the spur of the moment, I walked up to one of the Second
Secretariesof the Central Committeeand said to him: "What's going
on? You are going to the Plenumin Moscow and you have not even
informedme?"
"Well," he looked at me with somemixture of surpriseand condescension,''we didn't evenknow that you werehere."
Needlessto say,they hadno desireto havepeoplelike me attendthe
Plenum,and sinceI did not representthe republic'sCommunistParty
organization,they werenot obligatedto includeme in their delegation.
"Get me a ticket," I said, "help me." He beganto hem and haw, but
I noticedthat he was looking at me in a rather strangeway. The eyes
were saying somethinglike: "You may be still hustling, Davlat, but
soonyou'll be a deadman." For them,I was alreadya corpse,really.
SuddenlyI noticeda limousinedrive up to the entrance,andout of it

FROM DUSHANBE TO MOSCOW 213

steppedthe headof the Committeefor State Security and, with him,
Kakham Makkhamov, First Secretaryof the Tajik CommunistParty
andthe Presidentofthe Republic.So I turnedto him: "KakhamMakkhamovich,no one hasinformedme aboutthe Plenum,and now I can't
evenget on the plane---thereareno more seatsleft."
He, too, was all excited,eveneuphoric."Don't worry-I can yield
my seatto you."
"Thank you," I said, "but I'd rather you keep your own seat and
help me get mine." Thenhe turnedto someoneelse.
I waited but nobody volunteeredto assistme. The placewas teaming with VIP aides, who under any other circumstanceswould have
fallen all over themselvesto get a ticket for a memberof the Central
Committeeof the CPSUandDeputyof the USSRSupremeSoviet.But
nobodymadea move.They knew who was standingbeforethem.
Fortunately,a good colleagueof mine, Bozaruli Safarov,a member
of the SupremeSoviet and formerly a functionary in Aeroflot, saw
what was happeningand came to my aid. He took my papers,disappeared,and a few momentslater broughtme back a ticket. That's
how I boardedthe plane.
We were airborne.I was sitting in an empty row. All of a sudden,
Makkhamovgot up from his seatand cameand sat down right next to
me. Then,the headof his securitydetail got up andtook a seatnext to
him. Strangely,he proceededto go to sleep. Soon, though, the food
was brought in, and after we finished eating, I askedhim: "Kakham
Makkhamovich,what do thoseguys think they are doing? I think it's
real adventurism.I hopethereis going to be a meetingof the Politburo
before the Plenum. I think it would be a good idea to draw the line
betweenthemandthe Party."
He hemmedand hawed:"Well, yes, I think things havebeengoing
more or less all right, but the Treaty-thechangein the country's
name is very unfortunate:It's very hard to take." And so on. It was
clear he was not too eagerto answermy questions,so he got up and
excusedhimself to go have a smoke in the pilot's cabin. He did not
comeout until the planelandedin Moscow an hour and forty minutes
later. In the meantime,I was having a chat with his securityman, and
he agreedwith me completely,calling the coup leaders"adventurists
*This is a referenceto the proposedchangein the nameof the country to the
"Union of SovereignRepublics."

214 DAVLAT KHUDONAZAROV

and idiots." He was an officer in the KGB! I can'trememberhis name,
but he was a manin his mid-thirties.
After we arrived at the airport in Moscow, I ran into the group of
peoplewho were going to serveas Russia'sprovisionalgovernmentin
caseMoscow was lost. Aleksei Yablokov was there, and a few other
people--Ican't recall their names.With them was a group of military
men of various ranks and ages.I walked up to them and asked:"Are
we hangingin there,fellows?" "Sure," they said, ''we're going to kick
them out of here"-theymeantthe putschists.About thirty or forty of
them were there, counting both the civilians and the military. They
demandeda plane but got no responsefor a few hours. Finally they
were given a planeandflew off to Sverdlovsk.
There was a lot of traffic on the road, and it took us a long time to get
to Moscow fromthe airport. When I finally reachedmy hotel, my secre'"
tary at the Cinematographers'
Union informed me that headsof the creative artsunionsweregatheringat [Minister of Culture] Gubenko'soffice.
I rushedthere at once. What they were trying to do was to coordinate the position of the creativeintelligentsia.Gubenkoaddressedme
fIrst. I responded:''Theseare putschistsand usurpers--that'swhat our
position should be." I rememberusing these very words. Gubenko
askedmy opinion; I respondedunambiguouslyandsharply.
"Well," he said,"I wonderif this sort of opinion is sharedby everybody." Other peoplespoke,including the Chairmanof the Architects'
Union, Platonov. He essentiallyexpressedthe samesentiments,if in
rathermore delicateterms.
Finally, Gubenkospoke."I feel closer to Platonov'sopinion. I am
for a softer approach.It is inappropriateto be unequivocallike Khudonazarov.Everything is much more complicated.As I was madeto
understand,there is nothing simple about this." He went on in this
vein, makingthings soundmore andmore ambiguous.
As soonas I realizedthat he was going to befuddlethe issue,I broke
in saying, "I have a documenthere with me." By that time I already
had an official statementof the Cinematographers'
Union. So I said:
"Here is my union'sposition.Would you like to join us in condemning
the putsch?"I did not get either''yes''or "no" then.
Later on, Platonov and I kept in touch and tried to coordinateour
actions. We even convinced Tikhon Khrennikov [Chairman of the
Composers'Union] to sign an appeal,and he thankedme later for the
opportunity.

FROM DUSHANBE TO MOSCOW 215

The meeting withGubenkowas at aroundnoon. After leaving Gubenko,I went to the Cinematographers'
Union to makephonecalls. I
called Sobchakand asked him how things were in Petersburg.He
reassuredme that everything was quiet. I askedhim to get hold of
Lavrov, the theaterunion chairman,whosesignatureI neededfor the
appeal.He told me that he thought it was importantto have as many
peoplearoundthe White Houseaspossible.
At somepoint, I found out that the CentralCommitteePlenumwas
not going to take placefor a variety of reasons.It hadbeenin preparation, though. The main reasonit never convenedwas that Gorbachev
could have run the risk of being removedfrom his post of General
Secretary.For that reason,Gorbachev'ssupporterswere not very eager
to seeit convene.My position was different. I was an advocateof the
split. Evenif only a small grouphadsplit from the Party,I still felt that
it would have beenimportant for it to make its statementagainstthe
coup.
I called the Central Committee Secretariesover and over again,
beginningwith Ivashko [Gorbachev'sDeputy Party Secretary].Their
aideswould pick up the phoneandtell me that they were in a meeting
or away from their offices. This went on till the evening.I, a member
of the Central Committee,could not make contactwith the organization. In the evening, Platonovjoined me for a fifth round of phone
calls. All in vain. Finally, it occurredto me that we could use a fax. I
calledthe Central Committeeagain andaskedthem for their fax number. They said: "What fax? We don't have any fax around here." I
calledanotherCentralCommitteeSecretary'soffice. They didn't have
a fax either.I calledanother,still another.The answerwasthe same.
Finally, I figured it out: the Secretaryin charge of International
Affairs, Falin, must have a fax machine.So Platonovand I sent our
proteststatementcareof Falin. But the aideon duty there,the onewho
gaveme the fax number,said: "You know, there is nobodythereright
now to receiveyour fax."
"How come?"I said.
"It's after five o'c1ock--theworkdayis over."
"I hope they switch it to automatic," I said to him and hung up,
chuckling to myself: "There is a coup d'etat, but they've done their
nine to five andgonehome.What a wonderful life they have!" The fax
had been switched to automatic,and the next day I did learn from
Ivashko'saidesthat the statementPlatonovandI had senthim was put

216 DAVLAT KHUDONAZAROV

on his deskin the morning [of the 21st]. But I could not reachIvashko
himself. He was in a meeting,probably discussingour statementtogetherwith other similar documents(I was sureLatsis had sentthem
his own).·
That day,the 20th, I also calleda few peopleat the CentralCommittee, including Andrei Grachev,who would later becomeGorbachev's
presssecretary,and Vladimir Yegorov, who was Gorbachev'sadviser
for cultural affairs. In other words, I tried to reachthe decentpeopleI
knew there and offer them some supportin a humansort of way, so
that they would not loseheartin that deadzone.
On the eveningof the 20th, I went to the White Houseand stayed
there until 2:30 in the morning, leaving after it becameclear that
nothing untowardwas going to happen.I was there in a group with
otherdeputies;Vladimir Volkov decidedto staytill the end.
I will not go into the atmosphereat the White Housethat night-it
is all too well known. A lot of people there looked rather operatic.
Someclutchedsubmachinegunsandhadterribly seriousfaces.At one
point, I noticed a row of bottles filled with light-colored liquid. I
thoughtit was whitewine, but it turnedout to be incendiaryliquid.
AleksandrGelmanhaswonderful stories.He was in Burbulis's office at night andthey hadquite a few drinks there.So at one point they
askedKobetst to call his buddiesat the [Union] Ministry of Defense
and ask them whetherthey were going to attack the White Houseor
not. He called. They told him that they wantedto attackbut could not
becausetheir scoutshad told them that there were too many people
aroundthe White House.
You shouldask Gelman,although,I don't know,perhapshe would
be too embarrassed
to write this up for publication.But his story is that
after they hadfinishedonebottle,they startedlooking for more,asking
aroundto seewhetheranyonehadanything stashed
away somewhere.
GeneralKobetsownedup to it andbroughtonefrom his office. Lots of
funny stories.But I was nottheremyself.
After I left the White House, I walked to my hotel [the Hotel
Moskva] in the drizzle, in the middle of the curfew, but, of course,
nobodystoppedme. The streetswereabsolutelyempty.
*Otto Latsis,a liberal reformerandan editorof thejournal Kommunist.
tColonel GeneralKobetswas Russia'sChief Military Liaison with the Union
DefenseMinistry.

FROM DUSHANBE TO MOSCOW 217

The next day, or, rather,a few hours later, I was back in the White
HousewhereVorontsovand I tried to organizethe temporarytransfer
of Union governmentstructuresto Russianjurisdiction. We convinced
the Minister of the ChemicalandOil Refining Industry,Khadzhiev,to
join with Vorontsov's Ministry [of Environment] and my [Cinematographers'] union in this venture. We were trying to convince
Gubenkoto do the same,but he refusedto join us, sayingthat he was
going to do thingshis own way.

***
And now, a few thoughtson what happenedafter the putsch.Right
away there appearedlists of heroes.At one point, in the union, I was
given a pieceof paperwith names."What is this?" I asked.
"Thesearethe namesof the activists."
"What kind of activists?"
"Thesearethe peoplewho took part in the events."
"So what," I said. "What shall we do with them? Does this mean
that otherpeopledid not takepart, or thatthesearetrue revolutionaries
and that others,who are not on the list, were counter-revolutionaries?
Let's agreeonceand for all that I have not seenthis list and that you
did not prepareit."
I know that later somepeoplewere given days off and bonusesat
work for having defendedthe White House.It's ludicrous! As if that
werewhy peopledecidedto resist!

INTERVIEW WITH ANATOLII SOBCHAK.

Breakthrough: The Coup in
St. Petersburg

Anatolii Sobchak,a well-knownlawyer andpublicfigure, was the
Mayor ofLeningrad(now St. Petersburg)andoneofthe most
prominentmembersofthe SupremeSovietofthe USSRwhenthe coup
tookplace. He was interviewedon August26, 1991, by A. Golovkova
andA. Chernovafor Moskovskienovosti.
The night of August 18-191 spentin my Moscow official apartment.·
Early on Monday morning I was awakenedby a telephonecall. It
was my friends from Kazakhstancalling to inform. me aboutthe military coup (thanksto the differencein time zones!).
My first move was to look out the window to see whether the
building was surrounded.It was not. Otherwise,I would have had to
go to my neighbors.The official building in Krylatskoewas filled with
membersof the USSR SupremeSoviet. 1 telephonedfor the car and
my bodyguard.Oleg was on duty that day (I will not divulge his last
name for understandablereasons),but the actual guardingwas being
doneby the boyson Yeltsin'steam.
1 found out that Yeltsin was expectingme at his dachain Usovo,
which is beyondArkhangelskoe.
Tankswere rolling along the OuterRing Road.What a pitiful sight.
Right there on the highway shoulder,a tank was burning. No, nobody
had set it on fire. It was burning by. itself. Far more unpleasant:1 ran
into a group of paratroopersas 1 turned off the Outer Ring Road. But
they did not stop me.
*Many membersof the USSRSupremeSoviet who were not permanentresidentsof Moscowhadspecialapartmentsin the capital for official use.
218

IN ST. PETERSBURG 219

Yeltsin'sdachawasbeingguardedby no morethansix or eight men
with machineguns. I entered-andfroze in surprise.The whole Russian leadershipwas in the room. One platoonof specialforces would
havebeenenoughto dealwith our Russianstatehood.
Yeltsin askedwhat I could suggest.
I said: "We must call a sessionof Russia'sparliament.And the
sessionshouldlast aroundthe clock."
Yeltsin: "We have already decidedto do just that. Any moment
now, they will bring the text of the Appeal to the Citizens of Russia.
After that, we'll decidewhetherto stayhereor leave."
Opinionsweredivided. Either alternativewasdangerous.
Khasbulatov:"I'm leaving as soonas I get the text. You decidefor
yourself."
The text was brought in. The headof the RussianSupremeSoviet
[Khasbulatov]left for the White House.He was using a private car, it
seems.He did not want to be recognized.
I beganto insist: "We should break through after Khasbulatov.Is
thereanotherroad?I am very worried aboutthe specialforces guys at
the OuterRing Roadturnoff."
They saidtherewasno otherway out, exceptby foot.
I: "After all, this is the presidentialentourage
.... Let's fly the flag
andoffwe go. The soonerthe better."
They put a bulletproofveston Boris Nikolaevich.His daughtersaid:
"Papa,don'tworry. Now everythingdependson you alone."
By the way, no one displayedany visible signs of agitation. Not
eventhe President'swife, Nainalosifovna.
I askedYeltsin whetherI was neededin the White Houseor could I
go backto Leningrad.He said,"You may go."
I made myselfclear: "I will follow you all the way to Kutuzovskii
Prospect,and from there on, I'll decidedependingon the situation. If
we slip through, I'll double back to the Outer Ring Road and ride to
the Sheremetevo
Airport."
Thank God, the special forces were alreadygone. Either they had
goneto catchus but missed,or anothergroupchargedwith arrestingus
arrived too late at the dachain Usovo. (As we found out later, it was
the latter: they arrivedtenminutestoo late.)
We were driving fast. In front of us was the Traffic Police car, so
others let us pass.Ditto the tanks and the armoredpersonnelcarriers

220 ANATOL/I SOBCHAK

(APCs). Yeltsin's guardswere coveringboth sides of his limousine.
We whippedthroughthe Ring Road in ten minutes.Rublev Highway
was next. The road is narrow, and it was full of tanks and APCs, but
seeingour flag, they, too, moved to the shoulder.Fortunately,there
weren'tmanyof them.
We had broken through! Now, I had to turn off for Sheremetevo.
Oncethere,I leamedthat the next planeto Petersburgwould leave in
two anda half hours.
Later on I found out that an order to arrest me had in fact been
issued.But they did not botherto senda specialforces unit after me.
The order was issuedto the airport KGB agents.They agreed-in
word only. When I was sitting in the deputies'VIP lounge,threemen
camein. The conciergeaskedthem to show their identification. They
showedtheir papers.
I saidto Oleg, "Get ready."
He saidto me, "I know oneoftheseguys."
The threepassedinto the cafeteria.Oleg followed them. They came
back together,said that they were from the specialunit fighting currency speculation,andthat they intendedto guardme all the way until
I got on the tarmac. Now I had four bodyguards.Three of them had
machineguns.
In order not to wastetime, I got on the line to Petersburgand gave
instructionsto the OMON [specialpolice] to protectthe building of the
LeningradTelevision Station. I tried to assessthe situation. In a live
broadcast,the Commanderof the LeningradMilitary District, General
Samsonov,had already declaredthat he was taking all power in the
city in his own hands.As for the rest, it seemedquiet; there were no
troopsin the city itself.
Later I discoveredthat they also had a plan to arrest me at the
PulkovoAirport [in Leningrad].But, on his own initiative, the chiefof
the LeningradPolice,Arkadii Kramarev,had alreadysenta car for me
with OMON troops. My assistantsfrom the Mayor's Office cameto
meetme at the airport aswell.
I dove into the car and went straight to the headquartersof the
LeningradMilitary District. My guardsstayeddownstairs.Later they
told me how one of Gidaspov'sguards,who was hangingout in the
hallway of the headquarters,beamedwith joy and from behind my
backstuckhis tongueout at them.

IN ST. PETERSBURG 221

The office of the Commander-in-Chiefis on the secondfloor. The
door was not locked, the room was empty. I yelled at the top of my
voice so that the whole building could hear: "What kind of crap is
this? Why isn't there anybody guarding the office of the District
Commander!"
A frightened lieutenant colonel ran out of some place or other.
Under a different set of circumstances,he would not have let me in,
but now he was standing at attention. I went on: "Take me to the
Commander-in-Chiefl"
"Yes, sir. They aremeetingright in there,sir...."
"Take me thereat once!"
We went down to the groundfloor. They were all sitting there,the
little dears: Samsonov,Kurkov (head of the KGB), Savin (Interior
Forces),Viktorov (headof the NorthwesternMilitary District), and, of
course,Gidaspov,the first Communistof the region. And finally, the
loyal democratandour benefactor,Arkadii Kramarev.He wasthe only
oneof us.
I noticedthat they were surprisedby my suddenappearance,and I
did not let them opentheir mouths.Right away, I gave them a whole
speech,remindedthemaboutGeneralShaposhnikov,who hadrefused
to shoot the people in Novocherkasskin 1962.* I explainedto them
that, from a legal standpoint,they wereall conspirators,andthat if they
movedso muchas a finger, they would be tried--just like the Nazis at
Nuremberg.
I reproachedSamsonov:"Well, General,rememberTbilisi. t ... On
April 9, 1989, you were just about the only one there who behaved
rationally. You avoidedcarryingout illegal orders,you remainedin the
shadow.... What's happeningwith you now? Have you decidedto
join that criminal gang?... That EmergencyCommitteeis illegal!"
Samsonov:And why is it illegal? I havean order...
[Sobchak]: You know very well that I am one of the people who
draftedthe Law on the Stateof Emergency.Thereare only four situations in which it may be imposedon a specified territory, namely:
*Sobchakis referring to the bloody suppressionof a strike and massprotests
triggered by longstandinggrievancesin the southern,largely Cossackcity of
Novocherkassk.The story of theseeventswas aired and debatedduring the early
glasnostperiod.
tUnarmeddemonstratorsin the Georgiancapital were massacredby Soviet
troopsin the springof 1989.

222 ANATOLII SOBCHAK

humanepidemics,cattle epidemics,earthquakes,and massdisorders.
Which oneof theseis taking place?
Samsonov:But we are introducingthe stateof emergencyjust in case.
I havean order.Thereis a codedtelegram....
[Sobchak]: Showit to me.
Samsonov:I can't.It's secret.
[Sobchak]: Then answer,doesit containthe following words: "Introducemartial law in the city of Leningrad"?
Samsonov:No, thereareno wordslike that. ...
[Sobchak]: I know therearen't.And you'd betterrememberGeneral
Rodionov· during the First Congressof People'sDeputies.On April
9th he, too, oversteppedhis orders.All he was orderedto do wasprotect military installations,but insteadhe threw in his troopsagainstthe
people.Are you taking the samepath?
Gidaspov:Why areyou raisingyour voice at us?
[Sobchak]: And you would be betteroff not speakingat all. Don't
you understandthat by your very presenceyou are destroyingyour
own party? Instead of sitting here now you ought to be running
throughthe streetsyelling that the CPSUhasnothingto do with this.
Gidaspov:But we havean economiccollapse,industrialproduction
is falling ....
[Sobchak]: That's a lie. In the fIrst six monthsof this year Leningrad'sindustryoverfulfIlled the quota.
I turnedto Samsonov:"Viktor Nikolaevich, I ask you to do everything in your powerto preventthe army from enteringthe city."
He said:"All right, I'll do it."
I went to the Mariinskii Palace,the City Hall. There I learnedthat
our Vice Mayor, RearAdmiral ViacheslavShcherbakov,wasreturning
from his trip. I held a meetingwith the Chairmanof the Leningrad
City Soviet, AleksandrBeliaev. I said, "We shouldcall a sessionof
the Soviet." He said, "We alreadyhave, and the deputieshave been
informed."
I made arrangementswith the television station to make a live
appearance
on the program"Fact." My appearancewas scheduledfor
7:20p.M.
I showedup at the studio fIve minutesbeforethe broadcast,accom*GeneralRodionovwasin chargeof the troopsat Tbilisi.

IN ST. PETERSBURG 223

paniedby ViacheslavShcherbakovand Yurii Yarov, the Chairmanof
the RegionalSoviet; the putschistshad includedboth of them in their
EmergencyCommittee without ever asking them. The presidentof
LeningradTV, Boris Petrov, even secureda satellite connection,so
viewersfar beyondthe Leningradcity limit watchedus.
I had the idea of referring to the Moscow putschistsas "ex" (exVice President,ex-Ministerof Defense,andso forth), andthenalso,of
prefacingtheir nameswith the title "Citizen," as if they had already
takentheir seatsin the dock.·
If until that eveningtherehad beenno sign of popularresistanceto
the putsch (the sessionof the Leningrad Soviet had not yet taken
place), the joint appearanceof the Mayor, the Vice Mayor, and the
Chairmanof the RegionalSoviet dispelledthe suffocatingatmosphere
anddisorientationall the moreeffectively.
After the televisionbroadcastwe calledin additionalOMON forces.
Here too, Kramarevshowedthat he was more than equal to his task.
Shcherbakovwasshuttlingbetweenthe Mariinskii Palaceandthe Military District Headquarters
....
Samsonovall the while was undertremendouspressurefrom Moscow. Hysterical,the putschistswere screamingat him over the phone,
accusinghim of selling out to the democrats.
In the meantime,two columns of armoredvehicles were moving
toward the city from the south. Their movementswere closely monitored by the Traffic Police, who remainedloyal to democracy.Barricadeshad to be erected,but we did not have enoughtime. The tanks
were expectedwithin an hour. We figured out that we could block the
approacheswith the heavy earth-movingequipmentbasedat the airport. But after the tanks had passedthe town of Gatchina,Samsonov
gaveme his officer's word of honorthat he would not let the armored
vehiclesinto the city. He orderedthe column to move from Gatchina
toward Siverskaia.There,in the birthplaceof Pushkin'sancestorsand
his nanny, on the groundsof the military airport, those tanks would
remainstationedfor threefull days.
How, and with what arguments,did Shcherbakovand I succeedin
persuadingSamsonov?I don't know, but I think it was commonsense.
*"Comrade"wasthe usualfonn of official addressin the SovietUnion. Ironically, only peoplewhoserights were suspended----because
they weresuspectedof
breakingor hadbrokenthe law-wereaddressed
officially as"Citizen."

224 ANATOLII SOBCHAK

We said to him: "Don't you see,General,what nonentitiesthesepeople are?Evenif they takepower,they will not be ableto hold on to it."
The tension had easedsomewhat.I got on the line with Y eltsin.
Then I took a nap for an hour on the little couch in my office. And at
six o'clock in the morning, I went to the Putilov factory. I managedto
arrive before the shift started.There, at the factory gate, a car with a
megaphonewas alreadywaiting. We held a rally. After that, I went to
the managementoffice in orderto ensurethat everyonewho wantedto
join the rally in the city could receivea pass.As I was leaving, a large
group of the Putilov workers, three or four thousand,was already
marchingdown StachechnyiProspect[literally, the Avenueof Strikes].
I myself shouldhave beenleadingthosepeopleall the way to Palace
Square,but my securitypeopletold me that, given the information at
their disposal,I oughtnot.
The whole city was on PalaceSquareat 10:00A.M. Whole columns
of people had to be turned away even before they could reach the
square.Howeverbroadthe square,the humanseahad turnedout to be
evenbroader.We decidedthat peopleshouldgo backto their placesof
work by 1:00 P.M. That was exactly what happened.There were no
no-shows.
They told me later that evenprisonersaskedto go to the barricades,
promisingthey would turn themselvesin afterward.
One of the speakerswas Drnitrii SergeevichLikhachev, the most
seniorscholarand a patriot, a memberof the Academy[of Sciences],
andnow a popularhero aswell.
It was clearthat putschistswould not succeedin Petersburg.
Toward theevening,I had a heaven-sentidea. Our problemscould
be solved if Yeltsin appointedShcherbakovto be the Military Commandantof the City of Leningradand the LeningradRegion,and also
making him the personalrepresentativeof both the RussianPresident
andthe DefenseCommitteeof the RussianFederation.·
What kind of a teamdoesYeltsin havethere?A fax arrived with a
decreeappointingShcherbakovheadof the LeningradMilitary District
[General Sarnsonov'sposition]. That was almost a catastrophe:now
Sarnsonovwould really go out of bounds.. . . Besides,such an ap• At that time the RussianFederationhad not yet establisheda Ministry of
Defense,andthe relevantfunctionswerecarriedout by a Committeefor Defense.

IN ST. PETERSBURG 225

pointmentdid not solveany problems,sincein additionto the Military
District we alsohada navalbaseanda BorderMilitary District. ...
I was right. ... Samsonovcalledme: "What areyou plotting behind
my back?"
I reassuredhim: there was a mistake,we'll correctit immediately.
But the radio was alreadytransmittingthe newsof this-for us-fatal
appointment.I explainedover the phoneseveraltimes what kind of
text we needed. Finally, the necessarydocument arrived from
Moscow.
At three in the morning, still more news arrived. A unit of the
Military District's special forces was being deployedalong Kaliaev
Street and was moving in the direction of City Hall. Previously the
unit's missionwasto recaptureairplaneshijackedby terrorists.
Shcherbakovsaid: "The whole of the OMON andyour police force
will be no obstacleto those guys. They'll take care of them in five
minutes."
We decided to go separateways. I went to the Putilov factory,
calledout the director,explainedthe situation.
ThankGodtherewas noneedto rousethe Putilov workers....

INTERVIEW WITH ALEKSANDR N. YAKOVLEV

Our Chlldren Were on the
Barricades

AleksandrN. Yakovlev,along with Mikhail GorbachevandEduard
Shevardnadze,
wasoneofthefoundingfathersofperestroikaand
glasnost.A closeassociateofGorbachev's, he becamea full member
oftheParty Politburo in 1987andsoonearneda reputationas the
mostoutspokenadvocateofradical change.Increasinglyfrustrated
with the conservativeParty apparat, he resignedfrom the Politburo at
the Twenty-eighthParty Congressin the summerof1990, remaininga
prominent,thoughat timesdistantandcritical, memberof
Gorbachev'scircle ofadvisers.Four daysbeforethe coup, he was
expelledfrom the Party. Thefollowing interviewwasconductedbyA.
Shcherbakov,reporterfor the magazineOgonek,whereit appearedin
the issuefor August31-September7, 1991.During a visit to Berkeley
andStanfordin February1993, Yakovlevaddedsomedetails to his
accountofthe coup in an interviewwith GregoryFreidin. Excerpts
from that conversationhavebeeninterpolatedinto the Ogonek
interview.
Yakovlev: I was awakenedat 4:30 in the morning by the fonner
generalof the KGB, Oleg Kalugin, who told me the newsofthe coup
d'etat.I saidto him: "Oleg, are you in your right mind?" "Saneas sane
canbe" was his answer.I got out of bedandlookedout of the window:
on both sides of the street,there were unmarkedcars filled with the
"boys." I called Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin. He orderedViktor Barannikov, Russia'sMinister of Internal Affairs, to take the necessary
steps,andbeforelong, a unit of Russia'ssecurityforces arrived at my
door.
226

OUR CHILDREN WERE ON THE BARRICADES 227

[A few of themrushedinto my apartmentandtold me that the place
was now undertheir control and that I had nothing to worry about."I
can defend myself, too," I said to them, ''just give me one of your
machineguns." "That's againstour rules," their chief replied, "If you
arearmed,we won't be ableto protectyou."]
Soon,the "boys" who had hadme undersurveillanceearlierturned
around and sped away. And then the reporterscame, some of them
offering help take me into hiding. I receivedmany such offers, more
than twenty, as I recall, some coming from people I was not even
acquaintedwith.

Ogonek: Why did you decide not to attemptto escapefrom what
wasa probablestrike againstyou?
Yakovlev:I hadto work.
Ogonek:But you could have continuedwith your work in a more
secureplacethanyour Moscowapartment.
Yakovlev:In circumstancesof this sort, you must work in public
view, so that peoplecan seeyou, so that they can understandyou are
not hiding. This makesit easierfor them to believe in their eventual
victory. Few things are as significant as making a speechat the Moscow Soviet---beforea hugecrowd of people,just a few hoursafter the
putsch,to sayto peoplesomethingthat might inspire them: The other
side had tanks and weaponsat its disposal,and all our side had was
enthusiasmandfaith that we were in the right.
Ogonek:I heardover Moscow Echo that someonehad spottedyou
in the White Housewith a pistol in onehandanda radio in the other.
Yakovlev:Well, that was a small episode,and not a very important
oneeither.
Ogonek: Do you believe that the putsch,or attemptedputsch,was
inevitable--waspredetermined,asit were,by the logic of events?
Yakovlev:This is onepossibleexplanationfor what happened.But I
prefer to look at things from a different perspective.The split in our
society-in terms of the ideology, politics, psychology, structure-beganto be felt in 1985.
*This is exactlywhat Yakovlevdid on the afternoonof the August19.

228 ALEKSANDRN YAKOVLEV

Roughly,two main trendsemerged.One wasobjective: it expressed
the desirefor changeon the part of the peopleandtheir realizationthat
it was not possibleto live the old way any longer. The othertrend was
reactionarythrough and through: to sabotageperestroikaand change.
This reactionarytrendbecameespeciallystrongwhen the issueof free
electionsbeganto be debatedin earnestand when people beganto
demandthe removal of the Party from the structuresof state power.
It was then that the Party becamethe main engine of resistanceto
perestroika.
In this regard,I was very much taken abackby the effort of President Gorbachev(I guessin this case,he was acting as the General
Secretaryof the Party) to whitewashthe Party's leadership----people
who did not utter a single word in public against the coup d'etat,
againstthe seizureof the President,againstthe murder of the three
individuals. As he presentsit, membersof the Party leadershipwere
locked inan inner struggle.
I, for my part, couldn't carelesswhereand how they were arguing
among themselves.I now hear that so-and-sohad inner objections
againstthe putsch. But what does that mean---innerobjections?My
son, who is the father of three children, spentthe fateful night on the
barricades.And so did my daughterand her husband.But the highranking leadershiphadinner objections!In my opinion, this is no way
to takea stand.
Ogonek: Would it be fair to summarizeyour position as follows:
Totalitarianismin our countrywill not be vanquishedaslong asa party
that believes in the idea of violence as the main political force-namelythe CommunistPartyof the SovietUnion-is alive andwell?
Yakovlev:I agree.
Ogonek: One of the key questionsdebatedamong the democrats
even before the putsch was the question of what kind of political
organizationswe are going to promote:whetherit would be preferable
to have a strongly disciplined organization,possibly with a narrow
base,or a looser,more broadlybasedmovement.How doesthe putsch
affectyour thinking on this issue?
Yakovlev:I canonly give you my own opinion. Before the putsch,I
was slightly more inclined (say, 51 to 49) toward a broadly based
movement.And now I have reversedmy position. I am inclined to

OUR CHILDREN WERE ON THE BARRICADES 229

think that we needa well-organizedforce that might serveas a guarantor againstthings like the putsch. Let me tell you, though, that the
overwhelmingmajority of the leadershipof the Movementfor Democratic Reform· provedthemselvesto be capableof taking a strongand
unequivocalstand.Therewereexceptions,but theywereinsignificant.
I was in constantcommunicationwith Gavriil Popov,Yeltsin, Shevardnadze,and Laptev [Deputy Chairmanof the USSR SupremeSoviet]. It was Laptev who continuouslyinformed us aboutthe situation
in the Kremlin. I was in touch with one official (I did not know him
personally)who informedme of what was going on in the Emergency
Committee,whattheir planswere.This wasvital information.
[I had anotherold friend in the Kremlin, a technical worker, who
kept me informedaboutwhat he could seefrom his window-whether
the limousineswere coming in or out, how many, and so forth. One
time he called me and said that the limousines were moving in a
strangeway: a cortegeof themwould startmoving in onedirectionand
then, all of a sudden,would turn back.. .. I rememberhis words:
"AleksandrNikolaevich,they are like eelson a hot griddle." That, too,
was important information, becauseit gave you some senseof the
moodinsidethe Kremlin, andthe moodwasoneof confusion.]
One of myoid friends from the CentralCommitteekept calling me
on the phoneandtelling me what was happeningthereandhow and in
what way the leadershipwas planning to offer supportto the EmergencyCommittee.
Ogonek:Let's talk aboutthe individuals from the othercamp.Were
thereany surprisesfor you whenyou learnedaboutthe compositionof
the EmergencyCommittee?
Yakovlev: No surprises,except for one. I was both shockedand
offendedto find Yazov among them. He is a World War n veteran
who fought in the trenches,a soldier,a unit commander.He andI were
neighborsat the front. He is a real soldier, and this was always apparent in his attitudesandactions.How this mancould havedonewhat he
did is still a psychologicalriddle for me. It is possiblethat he was
influencedby the military, who are usedto measuringthe might of a
*Referenceis to a loose political movementthat AleksandrYakovlev, along
with former USSR Foreign Minister EduardShevardnadzeand Moscow Mayor
Gavriil Popov,beganto organizein the springof 1991.

230 ALEKSANDRN. YAKOVLEV

nation by counting rocketsand bombs.The more shells, guns, rifles,
androcketsyou have,the more influential is the voice of your country.
In their opinion, the Soviet Union underStalin--atotalitariancountry
an
practicingmassrepressionandre-enserfmentof the peasantry-was
"influential" power. But as soonas we embarkedon the roadto disarmament,tried to breakout of our isolationandjoin the civilized world,
we became,in their opinion, a second-ratepower.... Do you comprehendthe meaningof this basepropaganda?

Ogonek: The putschists' game was a gangsters'game-without
rules. Why, then, did they, to put it simply, make a messof things?
Why didn't they clamp down on the leadersof the democraticmovement,who areso popularamongthe people?
Yakovlev:First of all, I believethey were frightenedby the possible
reactionto such a move. Further, I suspectthat thesevery mediocre
individuals-who,moreover,had lost touch with the people---thought
that, given the stressesof our socioeconomiccrisis, all they neededto
do was to make the first move and that after that, everybodywould
simply sigh a sigh of relief and say: at last, we'll have order, we'll
have food. As enemiesof democracyand freedom, they could not
comprehend--theydid not possessthe mentality necessaryto understand-thereality of our own day, the fact that the senseof being free
andliving in a democracyis moreimportantfor our people.
After all, how could they haveexpectedthat so many would ignore
the instructionsissuedby the commandants, ignore
the banon demonstrationsandstrikes?...
[Early on, Gavriil Popovgot in touchwith the directorsof severalof
Moscow's major factories and the city's transportationdepartments,
including the Moscow metro, and elicited from them an agreementto
go on strike at a moment'snotice, pendinga signal from the Mayor's
Office. The EmergencyCommitteewas duly informedof this arrangement. The quid pro quo with the Military Commandantwas that the
city would continueto function normally as long as the securityforces
did not interferewith the demonstrators.]
They could not evenbeginto imaginethat peoplein Moscowwould
begin building barricades.And they certainly did not supposethat
during the fIrst hours of the coup d'etat, some military units would
refuseto shoot at peopleand that someof them would evenjoin the
democraticforces.

OUR CHILDREN WERE ON THE BARRICADES 231

Now, every one of the putschistsmust bear his responsibility for
what took place.But this shouldbe donewith strict adherenceto law!
We must not stoop to revenge,to a settling of accounts,to summary
justice.... Since we are for the rule of law, we must follow it to the
letter.

Ogonek:I think that someof the democrats,carriedaway by their
zealto restorejustice,may crossthe boundsof democracyandlaw.
Yakovlev: The word democratdoes not fit such individuals. You
can'tbe a democratandadvocatesmashing,crushing,bashing....
Ogonek: Some people even today believe that the putsch was
a game, orchestratedfrom behind the scenesby Gorbachevand the
leftists....
Yakovlev:By the left? This is fantastic.... How could the left have
doneit? Do you meanto saythey could have goneto Pugoor Kriuchkov and said, "Hey, fellows, let's organize a junta"? This is pure
nonsense.As to the secondpossibility . . . I do not think that Gorbachevhadanythingto do with this conspiracy.I do not want to think
otherwise!

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IV
Defending the White House

Almost from the inception,the White Housebecamethe strategiccenter of confrontation during the August coup. The democratic resistance, led by Boris Yeltsin, was concentratedat the White House.
From there, they communicatedwith the rest of the country and the
world via telephone,fax, and radio broadcasts.It soonbecameapparent that control of the country couldnot be securedwithout taking over
the building that housedthe Russiangovernment-agovernmentthat
had becomevirtually synonymouswith opposition to the putsch. In
this section,we concentrateon eventsin and aroundthe White House,
with special attention to the early hours of Wednesday,August 21,
whenthousandsof Muscovitespreparedto defendthe building against
what they believedto be an imminentattack.

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THERESASABONIS-CHAFEE

Reflectionsfrom the Barricades

TheresaSabonis-Chafee,
thena graduatestudentin International
Relationsat the WoodrowWilson SchoolofPublic Policy at Princeton
University, wasin Moscowwhenthe couptookplacein August1991.
Shehadarrived therein January1991 to work at the World
Laboratory,an internationalsciencepolicy organization.
It occurredto me on the metro at 12:15 A.M. that I did not really know
what I was doing, that I was likely to be deported, and that my
Russian-languageskills (which had been nonexistentseven months
earlier) could charitablybe describedas "poor," but I resolvednot to
think about it too much. I am a studentof internationalrelations, a
teacherof Soviet history, and a tax-payingresidentof Moscow, I reminded myself. How could I do anything else?As my train spedtoward the center of town, closer to the home of the government,I
reflectedon the day'seventsso far.
I had awakenedearly and travelednearly two hoursto my Russian
teacher'ssummerhome, as I had done severaltimes a week for the
pastfew months.The villagewasstill andnervous,andradioscould be
heardfrom everyfront yard. I noticedit wasnot the usualprogram,but
was unawareof the Soviettradition of playing solemnclassicswhen a
headof state or important official has died. I was later told that the
music usually continuesfor hours or even days before it is supplemented with information. This time, however, the information had
beenreleasedpromptly. My teacher,Natalia, was startledto seeme.
"Oh, Terry," she said, ''you didn't listen to the news this morning."
Then, as she preparedbreakfast,she slowly explainedwhat had happened. We ate a tense meal, listening to the radio announcer.In a
funerealvoice, he was readingthe samebrief statementthat had been
235

236

THERESA SABONIS-CHAFEE

repeatedsince 6:00 A.M.: The Presidentis ill. A provisional government will run the country. The announcementwas repeatedregularly
for the next few hours,interspersedwith movementsfrom SwanLake.
Tchaikovskyis one of the few greatartiststo be acceptedaspolitically
correct by every Russianadministration,and so, althoughthe provisional governmentdid not once mention the word "socialism," their
style wasunmistakable.The pasthadseizedpower.
Natalia decidedto return to Moscow to assessthe situation and to
wait for instructionsfrom her office. While the family packed,neighbors arrived with their office telephonenumbers.They askedNatalia
to phoneand inquire when they would be called out to help with the
harvest.1 sat outside,staring at the snapdragons,wondering whether
the notoriouspatienceof the Russianpeoplewould allow for eventhis.
Radioscould be heardfrom all the neighboringyards,and SwanLake
contributedto the surrealismof the morning. War or stateoppression,
which would it be?Which wasbetter?How could therebe civil war in
a city of nine million? What would that look like? 1 thoughtaboutthe
overthrowof Khrushchevand his reforms. Although it seemedinconceivable,maybeperestroikaandglasnostcould be reversed.
At a demonstrationduring the hungry winter months, I had seena
woman carrying a sign that proclaimed,"I would trade this governmentfor a kilogram of macaroni."How manypeoplewould be content
to tradethis struggling democracyfor a governmentthat was more in
control? Could the new governmentfeed the people--andif it could,
would that be enough?
Nataliaand1 traveledtogetherinto Moscow,wherewe partedat the
river port. 1 went to the embassyto try to get some news. At every
metro station and in many metro train cars, young peoplewere diligently postingan announcement
from Yeltsin denouncingthe coupand
calling for resistance.Crowds of subduedpeople strainedto read the
documentin all the placeswhere it was posted,but 1 saw no signs of
real resistance.At the embassytherewas little news.Americanswere
not yet being advisedto evacuate,but they were requestedto file their
whereaboutsimmediately.Many American citizens were there filling
out registrations,last-minute documentsfor marriageto Soviet citizens, and official invitations for Soviet friends to visit them in the
United States.
1 went to my office building and looked for my friend Zhenia, who
workedin the office next door. Raisedon bannedbooksandAmerican

REFLECTIONSFROM THE BARRICADES 237

movies in the Brezhnevyears, Zhenia is a communicationsengineer
who also translatestechnicalmanualsandis involved in many international cooperationprojects.I had often soughthis advice on what we
but he was
called''the Soviet soul." I felt badly in needof reassurance,
not around.
In my own office, I found my friend Tania in the room we share.
Shewas relievedto find me, afraid that I had goneoff on my own. We
decidedto departtogetherfor Red Squareto learn what was happening. On the tram, an older man heardus speakingin English. "Someone shut up the American monkey," he shouted."We don't needher
kind here anymore."The passengers
staredat me in mute embarrassment. No one said anything to him. After we steppedoff the tram,
Tania said to me, "You see,somepeopleare pleased.Today they feel
that no onecantouchthem."
The squarewas surroundedby tanksandpersonnelcarriers,andthe
large exhibition hall containingan exhibit about theAfghan War was
being used to house troops and equipment.It too was heavily surrounded,but peoplecrowdedaroundthe young soldiers,calling them
"child" and asking them "Do you really intend to kill your own people?" I suddenlyrealizedthat the low rumble I was hearingwas the
sound of tanks in motion. It vibrated the street slightly, and left the
sameecho in my stomachas fireworks displays. In Manezh Square,
peoplecrowdedto hear the announcements
being shoutedfrom bullhorns. Organizersof the resistancewere standingon abandonedcars,
urging everyoneto go to the White House,the official building of the
RussianFederationgovernment,to help protectYeltsin and the deputies who were inside.
We walked slowly, arriving at the White House at sunset, and
watchedthe chaotic processof assemblingbarricades.A nearbyconstruction site had been cannibalized,city buses strategically abandoned,and trolleybusesderailed.Crowdsof peoplelurchedfrantically
after the leaflets that were occasionally droppedfrom the upstairs
floors. When it beganto grow dark, Tania insistedthat we leave, and
we picked our way through the barricadestoward the metro. As we
left, I listenedto an announcement
askingpeopleto return in shifts. A
man stoppedus on our way, inquiring aboutthe situationat the White
House.As Taniadescribedthe barricades,he saidproudly, "Our trucks
have been there all day." He was from the Mosfilm studio, one of
many agenciesthat decidedimmediatelywhere their loyalties lay in

238

THERESA SABONIS-CHAFEE

this crisis andjust as quickly donatedtheir shareof stateresources.
At home I cookeddinner while Tania called her parentsin Leningrad. Tania's father, a retired military officer of high rank, had been
pleasedwhen the coup leadersseizedcontrol. "Father was always in
charge,"shesaidby way of apology."He neverfelt what it wasto be a
cog in a machine--healways commandedthe machine." We watched
the news, which was followed by a press conferencecalled by the
eight leadersof the coup,andTaniatranslatedtheir stockanswerswith
a mixture of humor and rage. "This show is from a time we thought
was behind us," she said. The press conferencewas followed by a
ballet production of Swan Lake. Tania left my apartmentbefore
11:00P.M.
At midnight, I caught the metro train, just in time to make one
transferbefore the systemclosed.I had decidedto go alone, with no
one to worry about me. The train and all the stationswere empty. I
wonderedif the line that connectedwith the White House would be
closedfor the curfew. I was relieved to find the OctoberStation still
open, but was immediately surroundedby a slightly drunk group of
teenageboys, so-calledMoscow hooligans.They realizedI was foreign, and as they crowdedaroundme making rude suggestions,I wondered what I expectedto do for the resistanceif I could not even
effectively chaseoff teenagers.
By the time I arrived at the connectingplatform, they were circled
aroundme, dancingand shouting.Seeingmy plight, an older and very
severelooking man invited me to sit next to him. Therewas something
familiar abouthis spare,intenselook andmanner,but I could not place
it exactly. The hooliganboys seemedto afford him immediaterespect,
and after exchangingquiet words with him they rushedto makeapologiesto me.
He askedwhereI washeaded.
"To the meeting,"I said,andhe waspleased.
"Let's go together.You arean American?But you speakRussian?"
"Yes, some,"I replied,hoping I knew enoughto maintaina conversation. I did not want to lose sight of him now that I had found someoneconfident.
He recognizedmy surnameas Lithuanian,andintroducedhimselfas
Leonid Konstantinovich,a journalist who had coveredthe strugglein
Lithuania. He showedme his latestwork in Literaturnaia gazeta,one
of the many newspapersthat had been shut down that morning. To-

REFLECTIONSFROM THE BARRICADES 239

getherwith the now-subduedhooligans,we exited at the metro station
closestto the White House. Ironically, the name of the station was
Barrikadnaia,or "Place of the Barricades."It was an areawhere important battles had beenfought during the Revolution of 1905. I remembereda memorial on the nearby 1905 Street which bears the
words,"Cobblestonesarethe weaponsof the proletariat."
As we approachedthe White House,I could seethat the proletariat
of 1991 was better armed. A construction crane had been commandeeredand the barricadeswere now much higher than they had
been, a tangle of concretetraffic barriers,metal scrap, and vehicles.
People were milling about, building ftres for warmth. "They won't
help much," Leonid said, referringto the barricadesand gesturingat a
few small tanks trying maneuvers,"but they are vital for the spirit."
Oncewe climbedthe barricades,the boys went off in their own direction, and Leonid askedme what my plans were. I admittedthat I had
none,just that I wanted''to havestoodwith Russia."
August is already fall in Moscow, and the night was chilly. It was
raining lightly. Leonid astonishedme by inviting me into the building.
"I don't know if we cando it, but let's try," he said.
We were still awaiting approvalfor entranceat 3:00 A.M. when we
saw Yeltsin rush into the building. The crowd respondedenthusiastically. The guardslet us in shortly after Yeltsin. I had nopresscredentials, but Leonid kept saying to the guards,"She's not a journalist,
she'sa historian. Don't you think this is history?" He later confessed
that "when I met you at the metro I understoodhow I would get into
the building." His own credentials,from the Lithuanian parliament
building, would not havebeenenoughwithout a foreignerto give him
the properair of authority.
In the pressroom, an article aboutLeonid was passedaround,and I
thenunderstoodwhat hadcommandedthe suddenrespectof the young
hooligans.Russianssay that anyonewho has servedtime in political
prison is easily recognizable,that a certain lookgrows on a man if he
"sits" for a long time. Leonid Konstantinovichwore that look proudly,
and had evenmaintaineda prison-stylehaircut. I am certainnow that
this unspokencredential,not my passport,had gainedus accessto the
seatof the now-besiegedgovernment.
We toured the building with four membersof the foreign press.
Peoplefrom many newspapersthat had beenshut down were camped
out in the building, preparingone-pagephotocopieswith their mast-

240 THERESA SABONIS-CHAFEE

headsand news that they had gleanedfrom the foreign press.Radio
Russia,closedby the putschgovernment,had movedinto the building
and was preparingits broadcastsfor the morning. A young boy who
spoke some English and who looked all of seventeenwas managing
the foreign press.I askedhim why he was there. "I work here." He
admittedhumbly, "I alwayshandlethe press.It's just more interesting
today than usual." He took us to the top floor to survey the crowd
below, and apologizedto the photographersthat he could not permit
themto openthe windows.
Leonid interviewed the head of security for the building. At that
time two agencieswere providing their services--Aleksand Kolokol
Security.Both wereprivate securityagencies,with a stafflargely comprised of Afghan War veterans.They were busy with strategy,and
pausedonly briefly to answerhis questions.Then we made the acquaintanceof People'sDeputy Mostovoi, a member of the Human
Rights Committeeof the SupremeSovietof the RussianRepublic.
DeputyMostovoi, who hadcometo the building assoonas he heard
about the coup, did not want to discussthe putsch governmentor
speculateaboutthe future, but he seemedpleasedto havean audience.
While other deputiesnappedon their desks,he maintaineda steady
several-hour-Iongmonologuefor us, reviewing his life, his family, the
history of perestroika,and how much hope he had for Yeltsin. He
seemedto be trying to recall how he hadcometo this point in history.
I struggledto understandall his conversation,andwonderedwhy he
hadthe time to botherwith us. It slowly dawnedon me that the deputies, including Mostovoi, had plenty of time-all of them were virtual
prisoners,with no way to leavesafely. We had simply found a deputy
with insomnia.
After a few hours Mostovoiwas orderedby a stemsecretaryto get
somerest, so Leonid and I went to the dining hall for a smoke.It was
there I learnedthat Leonid had been imprisoned in 1986 for some
articleshe had written aboutpolitical repression.He had servedthree
yearsandtwo monthsin a political prison.He wasreleasedjust in time
to begincoveringthe early eventsin Lithuania.We discussedour plans
for the morning. He suggestedthat, sincethe metrowould opensoon,I
shouldgo home for a while, then meethim back at Building Entrance
No.8, at eithertwo, three,or four o'clock in the afternoon.
At 6:00 A.M. sharp,Radio Russiabeganblaring the little newsthey
had over the building'S loudspeakers,punctuatedby the songsof the

REFLECTIONSFROM THE BARRICADES 241

lateVladimir Vysotskii, a much-lovedDylan-styleRussianfolk singer.
His whiskey-ruined,desperatevoice wasrousingthe staffbackto their
taskswhenI left.
At home, I was barragedwith phone calls from the States,from
Moscow friends, and from a friend who was on vacationin the Altai
region. Everyonewantedto know what was going on. So did I. I slept
for two hoursandthenwent to British Air to changemy airline tickets.
I was scheduledto depart in four days for Japanand Hawaii, but I
couldnot imagineleavingnow. At the embassyI hadheardan estimate
that the situationwould be resolvedoneway or anotherin two weeks.
It was ratherarbitrary, but it soundedright, so I canceledmy tickets,
planningto reschedulethem in September.I wonderedwhat I would
be leaving behindwhen I returnedto the university. The ticket agent
was glad to have a seatfreed up: Americanshad not beenorderedto
evacuate,but mostwerein a hurry to leave.
ThenI mademy way backto the White House.Onestopaway from
Barrikadnaia,I went to buy some foodandcigarettesfor Leonid. Here,
peoplewerebehavingas if it were a normal day. The ubiquitouscommercial kiosks were all open,selling everythingfrom importedunderwear and tennis shoesto crystal and ice cream.As usual,the line for
underwearwas short,the line for ice creamlong. I wonderedwhether
the city understoodthat it was undersiegeby the past.Then I spotted
clustersof peoplereadingthe one-pagenoticesthat hadbeenprepared
by the Russianpress-in-exilethe night before.It gaveme a little hope,
but I could not understandwhy so few people were joining in the
generalstrike calledfor by Yeltsin.
I got back to the White House at 3:15 P.M. A large crowd was
departing. Yeltsin had just given his first public speech.One look
made it clear that the situation had somehowbecomemore serious.
The crowd was much larger, security tighter, and the people more
frenziedas they lungedfor newsflyers. I doubtedthat I would be able
to get back into the building, but Leonid met me as promisedand
sweptme pastthe guards.I askedhim what he thoughtwould happen
that night. "Do you play chess?"he askedsuddenly.I wastakenaback,
and stammered,"Not well." He went on: "But you understand.If you
area goodplayer,andI play againstyou, Tereza,andI am also good,I
can anticipateyour moves.But if you begin to invent your own rules,
then I'm a fool if I think I can anticipateanything: it isn't my game.
And this isn't our game.We only wait."

242

THERESA SABONIS-CHAFEE

Justbeforea scheduled6:00 P.M. pressconference,Vysotskii's singing was interruptedby a suddenorderto evacuateall the womenfrom
the building and for men to claim their gas masks from the second
floor. I stoodin the entryway,undecidedfor severalminutes.Many of
the secretarieswere weepingas they left. Leonid offered little advice.
"It's dangerous,of course,and you shouldgo, but if you want to stay
we can try to find a small gas mask." I wantedto stay, but when I
imagined trying to understandeverything in an emergencywith no
interpreter,I reluctantlyleft with mostof the otherwomen,andjoined
the crowdoutside.
After I left, Leonid tried to defend the rights of the handful of
women who insistedon staying, but he was soon evicted along with
them. After waiting severalhours he finally succeededin re-entering
the building to help RadioRussiawith their broadcasts.
I wanderedamong the crowd, debating the merits of shouting,
"Comrades,I need an interpreter," but decided I would rather be
treatedas a RussianamongRussians.I sawan elderly man standingin
the rain with his Orthodoxprayerbeads.I wantedto sendup a desperate prayertoo, but it cameout insteadas an odd, silent, appealto the
crowd--"Okay everybody, let's make God proud." Security forces
aroundthe building were trying to bring everythingquickly to order.
They created cordons of people with their arms linked, one immediatelyaroundthe building, then a secondto help with crowd control. The first cordonwas men only, until they realizedthat therewere
not enoughlarge gasmasks.Thenwomenwho could fit into the smallest sizegasmasksalsojoinedthe first cordon.I endedup in the second
cordon,controlling accessto a drive-in entrance.We were to prevent
people from enteringunlessthey had one of four credentials:proper
documents,a badgeidentifying them as a People'sDeputy, a military
uniform from Russia,or a weaponsdelivery. I felt a little hypocritical,
preventingentranceto a building where I had myself spentthe night
with dubious credentials,
but I wantedto contributesomehow,andthis
was the task I had beenassigned.The tensionof this eveningseemed
quite different from the incredulity of the night before.Crowd control
andsecurityhadbecomemuchmoreimportant.
My arms were linked with thoseof a full-beardedman namedAIeksii (who recognizedmy accentand was greatly pleasedto meet an
American)and an olderwomanwho neverintroducedherself. Instead
she held my arm firmly and solemnly dedicatedher attention to in-

REFLECTIONSFROM THE BARRICADES 243

spectingdocuments.She was the classic model of a Russiangrandmother,short and solid, applying all her considerablezeal to preventing peoplefrom entering.I haveencounteredmanyof her casteherein
Moscow, but it was fascinatingto witnessa babushkaapplying those
energiesto the defenseof Yeltsin. Sometimearound 9:00 P.M. she
disappearedinto the crowd.
The number of people presentwas variously estimatedas somewhere between30,000and 50,000. Thesecurityforces beganrecruiting men to join the RussianArmy, and the crowd applaudedas each
new group of volunteersjoggedby. They were of all ages,and some
who had arrived at the White House directly from work were now
joggingby in businesssuits,taking military instructionsfrom the security guardsand Afghan War veterans.As I dutifully inspecteddocuments,I wonderedwhat we would accomplish.

***
It rained intermittently, and as the sun set on the White Housethe
senseof uneasegrew. Bolsheviks,so the Russianssay,preferto shoot
at night. Two of the famous skyscrapersconstructedby Germanprisoners of war stood over our shoulderslike the ghost of Stalin. The
barricadesaroundthe building had beenimproved, and the statueof
triumphant Soviet youth that stood in the squarehad also been improved by the addition of a tricolor flag, symbol of the democratic
opposition. Someonesaid that the U.S. Embassy,which was a block
away,was also flying the tricolor flag. We could not seeit from where
we stood,but I hopedit was true. I had still not heardthe official U.S.
positionon what washappening,andwasterribly afraid thatthey were
waffling. I thoughtaboutTiananmenSquare,and tried to summonall
the reasonswhy this shouldbe different. I wonderedwhat I would do
if a personstandingnear me was shot. For some reason,it seemed
morefrighteningthanthe prospectthat I might be shot.
The crowd would fall silent for eachannouncement,but there was
little information.An agedcolonel general(three-stargeneral),veteran
of the GreatPatriotic War (World War II), assumedcommandof the
newly assembledtroops, and stood by himself in a cordonedarea,
splendidly attired in his full uniform and chestof medals,awaiting
the tanks--expecting,perhaps,to order them to leave. Young soldiers defecting from the Soviet forces were admitted to meet with

244

THERESA SABONIS-CHAFEE

Russianofficers who had come over to Yeltsin's side. Casesof guns
neverlearnedwherethey camefro~treamed
andammunitio~INovember
Novemberin
through our entrance.Peoplenot standingin the cordonswere clustered around small radios. As I waved anothercaseof ammunition
throughthe entrance,I suddenlyrealizedthat this wasnot going to be a
slaughterof innocentprotesters,but a war--perhapsa hopelessone,
but a war.
I was a child during Martin Luther King's marches,and was raised
with a profound respectfor nonviolent protest.It would be easierfor
me to join a nonviolent protest, however doomed. I thought again
aboutthe questionthat hadtroubledme all morning, aboutcivil war. I
had to decide,for myself, whetherI could "standwith Russia"evenif
it meantthis. I decidedto stand.
There was not much nobility in it, just a slow, deepand very Russiananger.All my connectionsto the USSRhadbeenin the contextof
the reforms.It was because
of themthat I had changedmy careerand
organizeda studentexchangeto Soviet Georgia. When my students
were invited, in 1988,to help destroya decommissionedSAM missile
outsideTbilisi for national TV, I had dearly hopedthat it was not an
emptygesture.Back in the States,I hadgoneon to graduateschooland
hadbegunto studySovietpolitics.
And then I had comehere,and somewhereamid the long lines, the
''war of laws," andoften incoherentchange,two things had happened.
I had really learnedhow fragile, yet how dear,were the hope and the
freedombroughtby the reforms;andthis hadbecomemy home.It was
my city: my friends who hadriskedtheir careersandlives in serviceof
thosedreams,my studentswho were studyingto meetthe challenges
of their new world--andthe putschgovernmentdaredto proclaimthe
death of all our hopes, the dreams on which we had all survived
throughthe winter.
Three uniformed KGB officials arrived at our gate and we all fell
nervously silent until they announcedthemselves"For Russia."The
murmur''They'reours" rippled immediatelythroughthe crowd (to the
Soviet mind, it was unimaginablethat they would lie about such a
thing). After a brief interrogation,our gate commanderescortedthem
that
into the building. At around11:00 P.M. we heardan announcement
Y azov, the Minister of Defense,had defectedto Russia. A roar of
cheeringwent up in the crowd. Even thoughthe news later provedto
be erroneous,it lifted everyone'sspirits immensely. We all took a

REFLECTIONSFROM THE BARRICADES 245

break, and babushkasappearedfrom all directions with bliny, bread
with meat slices, tea and coffee. Cartons of cigaretteswere passed
around.
An American film crew was searchingfor someonewho spoke
English. Aleksii shoutedto our organizersthat I was an "Amerikanka."
The young commanderof our group was astonished.He summoned
the film crew, who askedme what the news about Y azov meant. I
speculatedthat a governmentthat is trying to rule by force cannot
survive if it loses its military commanders.My Russian comrades
askedme to repeatwhat I had said, in Russian."If Yazov is ours, it
will be our Russia,"I told them.
Some of us, myself included, thought it was all over then. Our
commander,Igor, was anxious to take good care of the foreign
"guest." He suggestedthat I havea rest in one of the many busesthat
were parkedagainstthe building. Soakedand exhausted,I agreed,and
he promisedto wakeme whentherewasnews.
I sleptuntil 1:00 A.M., andawoketo the RadioRussiabroadcast.But
somethingwas clearlywrong outside.The cordonshad beenreformed
to keeppeopleout of the roadway,andthe loudspeakerswerebooming
instructions.I camerunning out of the bus, and Igor found me. "The
tanks are coming," he said. I was confused."If Yazov is for us, why
are the tanks still coming?" I asked.He looked grim. "Anarchy" was
all he said.I wonderedwhat it would feel like to be a nineteen-year-old
in one of thosetanks, ''just following orders" to crashthe barricades
and come upon thousandsof my own countrymenwith their arms
linked andtheir heartsresolved.I hopedit would be enough.
Defensesof the building were rearranged.Gauzeand cotton makeshift gas maskswere distributed. As groupsof Afghan veteranstook
over securingthe entrances,the whole crowd--no longer just those
who were helping with crowd control-linked arms. Former Foreign
Minister Eduard Shevardnadzehurried through, greeting the troops.
Then we waited, and the rain drummeddown. Five or six times an
hour we would be called again into formation. The announcements
said that one tank was coming, then that four were coming, maybe
more; that they werethirty metersaway.We heardthe tank locations.I
was expectingto hearthe unmistakablesoundI had learnedto recognize the day before,the soundof tanksat closerange.I knew that if we
heardit here,all of our lives would be changedforever.
Ira, a bilingual employeeof an international exhibition hall, was

246

THERESA SABONIS-CHAFEE

standingnearme. I askedher what she haddoneon Monday. "I cried,"
shesaid. "Then I cleanedmy apartment.My friends remindedme that
it was the first time in sevenyears that my home was likely to be
searched,so I camehereinstead."
I noticed many young people, and thought of my former student,
Arkhil. His parentswere at a conferencein Italy, andhe was supposed
to be stayingat his grandmother'shousenearthe centerof town, in an
area now surroundedby tanks. I knew he had led a sheltered,privilegedlife. Was he all right? What did he think of this situation?I later
learnedhe had spentthe night standingnot far from me. Arkhil bears
the samenameas his grandfather,a famousSoviethero of World War
II. He hadtakenhis grandfather'santiquerifle to the White Houseand
stoodon the barricadeswith the volunteerarmy. Arkhil is sixteen.
For a while I talkedwith a youngUzbeknamedLyosha.An agricultural engineer,he had worked in Moscow for six years.His company
holds severalseatson the new Moscow stock exchange.Most of his
colleagueswere at the White House,discussingin quiet momentswhat
effectsthe coup had on the world stock market.Lyoshawas telling us
about his two-month visit to the United States when he suddenly
turnedto me. "I don't understandyou," he said in English. "Why are
you here?It could be dangerous andtheseare not your problems."1
disagreed."I am a teacherof Soviet history and a studentof international relations---ofcoursetheseare my problems.If this can happen,
it is problemfor the whole world. It is a problemof civilization." "Yes,
1 see," he replied. But he seemedunconvinced,and all night, as we
received new announcementsof conflicting information, Lyosha
would call to me from his placein line: "Are you afraid yet, Tereza?"
We all were.We wonderedwhat washappeningin the restof Moscow.
From wherewe stood,we could not hearthe shooting.
We stooduntil 5:30 A.M. As the sunroseover our soggy,exhausted
crowd, everyonerelaxed.In daylight, the threatseemedlessplausible.
Many of us would not know until much later how closethe tanks had
come: one was strandedon the barricadesjust outside the White
House.At 5:30 A.M. Yeltsin announcedthat the dangerhadpassedand
that we could go home, although he encouragedus to observethe
general strikeand not go to work. No one was sure that victory had
been won. Many people remainedon the barricadesfor anotherfull
day. Arkhil remainedon guard with his grandfather'Sgun for three
days-untilYeltsin's teamdepartedfor the Crimea.

REFLECTIONSFROM THE BARRICADES 247

***
Thoseof us who left the White House early in the morning struggled to get informationfrom the still-exiled pressor from foreign news
services.We discoveredthat Yazov had not defectedto Russia,as we
had heard, and that the coup leaderswere still in power. We began
trying to locatefriends who hadbeenlost in the pastfew days.When I
found my teacherNatalia again, her coffee table was piled high with
new books: Solzhenitsyn,Bulgakov, and all the greatliterary-political
writers. Of the booksshehad selected,shesaid,"I neverboughtthem,
becausethey were expensive,and I could readthem in the library. But
now I haveboughtall the writers I love who will be bannedagain."
Katia, who had lived with me a few months before, found me as
soon as I walked into my apartment.Shebeggedme to find someone
to smuggleto America somevideo film and photostaken during the
previousnight. "They have to understandwhat this is," she said. She
believed thatthe resistancewould be crushedby the putsch government. She explainedthat her film crew, which usually producescommercials and rock videos, had beenfilming since the coup began.A
scriptwriterandproductionassistant,Katia had interviewedsoldiersin
their tanks, passersby,protestersat the barricades.Sometime in the
afternoonof the first day, their video equipmentwas seized.The crew
managedto preservesomeof the earlier film, and continued recording
eventsusinga photocamera.
On the secondnight, with only a photocamera,they hadgoneto the
barricadeson the GardenRing Road, not far from the White House.
Katia saysthe soldiersbeganshootingjust after the flash from a crew
member'scameramanagedto capturea photo of one tank aiming at
the crowd. A boy who was standingnext to her and the photographer
andjeering at the tanks was shot. Katia was sick, and the crew rushed
to pull her away. They all fought down their own hysteriaandtogether
the crew continuedphotographingall night. I promisedto try and find
someoneto smuggletheir film.
I spentthe day trying to find a smuggler.Late in the afternoon,I
stopped in at my office and finally found Zhenia, who had been
searchingfor me for two days. From him, I learnedthat the putsch
governmenthad fled. I collapsedinto a chair, laughing, crying, and
confused.With part of our attention still on the radio, listening for
further news,we comparedstoriesof the pastfew days."Why did you,

248 THERESA SABONIS-CHAFEE

of all people,"he asked,smiling as he quotedfrom a favorite AmericanWestern,''try to savethis miserabletown?"

***
In Soviet tradition, even numbersof flowers are for sadoccasions,
odd numbersfor celebration.Peoplebroughtflowers in evennumbers
to the site where the young men died, and in both even and odd
numbersto the barricades.The rest of the week was a celebration.
Although it seemedto me that peopleof all ageshadbeenat the White
House, the city officials said that most of the defendershad been
young. In their honor,therewere fireworks and endlessrock concerts.
At the funeral for the three boyswho died, I met an elderly woman."I
am so proud of our youth," she said. "I am a teacher,and I do not
understandour boys today. But all of them, the good boys, the bad
boys,the hooligans---tbeywerethere."
On the way to Moscow'sinternationalairport with Zhenia a week
later, I spotteda famousmonumentdepicting stylized fragmentsfrom
an antitankbarricade.It hadbeenerectedto commemoratethe nearest
point to the city that the Nazishadoccupiedin the GreatPatrioticWar.
It is chillingly near,but I was stunnedto think of how muchcloserthe
putsch governmenthad come to occupying the capital city. Was it
possiblethat they could havesucceeded?
I shuddered,rememberingthat we had all believedit was possible.
The personneldirector of Zhenia'soffice had been soconfident of a
putsch victory that he had prepareda formal documentdenouncing
manyof our colleagues,including (I was told) Zhenia.Onepoll, taken
before the outcomeof the coup was certain, bad indicated56 percent
support for the putsch government.Fearful of the temporary"attendancerules" institutedin offices, few peoplein Moscowhadjoinedthe
general strike. Even Igor, the commanderof my group at the White
House,was careful to arrive at work on time, going directly from the
White Housedefensegroupsto his construction-sitejob.
I askedZheniaone last time aboutthe stateof the Sovietsoul. "This
gives us hope, of course,"he said in referenceto recentevents."But
we are not finished. We have to continue. As Chekhov said, 'Every
day I squeezethe slave out of myself, drop by drop.' A slave knows
how to be a slave,andhe can imaginehow to be a master.But to learn
to be a free man---thatis the hardestlesson.It takessometime."

INTERVIEW WITH ALEKSANDR PROKHANOV

Concerning the Defendersof the
WhiteHouse

Russianwriter AleksandrProkhanovwasoneofthe authorsof "A
Word to thePeople," ahard-line Communist-Nationalist
manifesto
that waspublishedin SovetskaiaRossiiaon the eveofthe coupcalling
for strongmeasuresto arrestthe disintegrationofthe SovietUnion.
He wasinterviewedby the newspaperKomsomolskaiapravdaon
September3, 1991.Somemonthsearlier, he hadbecomethe
editor-in-chiefofthepremierultranationalist,violentlychauvinist
newspaper,Den.
AleksandrProkhanovtold Komsomolskaia
pravdathat a stateof emergency was still neededin order to curb the political and economic
chaosthat continuedto engulf the Soviet Union. During the Emergency Committee'sbrief reign, Prokhanovhad visited the White
House,if only to observe.The biggestproblemwith the Emergency
Committee--someof whose membershe knew personally as great
leadersandmenof action-wasits inability to act decisivelyandcompetently. A "circus" was how he qualified their activity, declaringit to
be not the work of a few highly placedconspirators,but an impersonal
"provocationstagedby history itself'--an event inevitably attending
the disintegrationofa largeempire.A real coupd'etat,in his informed
opinion (and he had just fmished a book on the coup d'etat in Afghanistan),"ought to have beencarriedout in a single night, with all
the potential opponentsroundedup and jailed and all the channels
of communicationcut." "Only after that," continued Prokhanov,
"should the coup leadershavebroughtout into the streetsthe military
hardware--in order to depressstill further a population already
249

250 ALEKSANDRPROKHANOV

Defendersofthe WhiteHouse, Tuesdaynight

THE DEFENDERSOF THE WHITE HOUSE 251

shockedanddisoriented"by what hadtranspiredduring the night.
He went on:
"What has taken place is incomprehensibleto me. It is beyond
comprehensionin general. Nobody stormed the Palace[the White
House],specialforces were taking a rest, andat the sametime, orders
were given to drag all the military hardwareinto the streets,which
madepeopleall excited,just as the beesget excitedwhena bearsticks
his paw into a hive. And the people,who at fIrst were frightenedby
this sight but soonfound out that the soldiersdid not haveany ammunition, took a seat on the tanks, stuck flowers into the empty gun
barrels,beganto spoonfeedthe soldiers,and within about four hours
the army hadcompletelylost its capacityto act. ...
"I repeat: What has transpiredappearsto me as some sort of a
sataniccircus. Indeed, look what happenedas a result of this quasiconspiracy,underthe tank treadsof which three peopleperished:the
movementfor strengtheningthe stateis completelyrouted.That is why
I do not want to talk aboutthis conspiracy.The courtswill passtheir
judgmenton that. What I want to talk aboutis the real coup d'etatthat
.... I am conwas carriedout underthe cover of the quasi-conspiracy
vinced that if the peopleinvolved had actually set out to do what they
are being accusedof, they would have completedthe job. I still think
that the general schemeaccordingto which eventsunfolded did not
include the use of violence.... The coup may have fIZzled out even
before the Committee'spress conference.I suspectthat something
happenedwhen GeneralVarennikov and othersflew to Foros [on the
eveof the coup]--andthat somethingdoesnot fIt into the scenariothat
is beingfed to us right now."
Turning to the sceneat the White House, Prokhanovdivided the
defendersinto four categories.
"When I got there (though I was not planning to defendthe White
House),the fIrst thing that struckme wasthe 'pop culture' atmosphere
-somekind of a youth or rock revolution. It was the protestculture:
students,hippies. It was Paris in 1968, with Sartre and Marcuse,the
existentialists.And it seemsto me that they were defendingthe romanceof the situation: 'Tanks in the city, tanks in the city... .' The
'rock prophecy,'it seemed,wascomingtrue.

252 ALEKSANDRPROKHANOV

"The secondcategorywas the peopledefendingtheir own way of
life. The 'perestroikasegment,'as they are called, but actually the
bourgeoisie,who hadsomethingto defend.If the EmergencyCommittee had triumphed,a numberof cooperativeswould, of course,have
been destroyed;there might even have been expropriations.These
were peoplethreatenedwith eradicationas a social class: people involved in joint ventures,membersof cooperatives,andso forth. It was
with great pleasurethat I drank a bottle of Bavarianbeerat the barricadesand smokeda Camel cigarette,a treat from a defenderof the
White Housewho wasstandingnext to me.
"Third, of course,there were a large number of women and girls
there.Oh, that remarkableMuscovitefemininity! Strangeas it may be,
even the women close to me, who know my hard-line views, made
runs to the barricadeswith food for the little soldiers. That was the
women'smovement-inshock,struck with horror. But they were not
those women of the barricades,the genie of the revolution, from
Delacroix'spaintings.They were the kind of womenwho were crying
out, 'Thou shaltnot kill! Stop! May the Lord protectyou!'
"And the fourth, very active, segment:professionalpoliticians who
marchedto the microphone,shift after shift, and directed the entire
procedure."

MICHAEL HETZER

Death on the Streets

This accountappearedin the Guardian,a weeklynewspaperfor
Moscow'sforeign community,in an issuedatedAugust23, 1991. The
author, MichaelHetzer,waseditor-in-chiefofthe Guardian.
I was standingatop a bus about 200 yards from the advancingtanks
when the pop-popof gunfire eruptedin the early minutesof Wednesday morning.I thoughtsomeonewasthrowing firecrackers.
My miscalculationwas a symptom of the prevailing mood. The
entirerain-soakednight seemedunreal.Surreal.
I had alreadybeenat the building since 5:30 P.M. Tuesday.In the
streetssurroundingthe Russianparliamentbuilding until the first shots
were fired, women walked dogs, lovers strolled in tight embrace,
groups of men passedvodka bottles while others munchedon food
from well-stockedpicnic baskets.Undera steadyrain, peoplehuddled
beneathumbrellasandclusteredaroundradiostunedto the resistance's
station, Radio Liberty. Young and old cheeredwhen the news came
that Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov was ill. They cheeredwhen they
heardthat GeneralDmitrii Yazov also was ill. They cheeredfor every
scrapof metalthat waspiled on their barricades,everycall for unity in
the speeches,and every rack of black breadthat was carried into the
parliament.
So when,at 12:05A.M., I heardgunfire yet did not immediatelydive
for coveraway from my vulnerableposition,it wasnot out of bravery,
but out of seriousmisreadingof the situation.
Shortly after the first shots,word spreadlike a brushfirethroughthe
crowd of some 15,000that tanks were on the GardenRing Roadand
hadalreadykilled severalpeople.
"They're expectedto circle aroundand approachfrom along the
253

254

MICHAEL HE1ZER

embankment,"saidoneof the organizersfrom his perchatop a rag-tag
barricadenearthe Kutuzovskii Bridge, directly in front of the parliamentbuilding. "If you'rehereout of simplecuriosity, now is the time
to leave.All menshouldtakeup positions."
Thus began a systematicformation of row upon row of human
chains. A disquieting hush fell over the people. They whisperedto
thosearoundthem. You could hearthe scuffle of feet on the pavement
andthe hissof rain dropssplashinginto the puddles.
At 12:10 A.M. more shotscould be heardover the hill on the Ring
Road. This time the sound,fast and regular, was unmistakablyautomatic gunfire.
"They're coming!" one woman cried. "The bastardsare coming."
Later there was another burst of gunfire and then severalterrific
explosions.
Peopleheld their positions,hand in hand, their eyesglued to the
horizon. Would the tanks come acrossthe bridge?Would they come
along the embankment?Would they approachfrom Barrikadnaia
metro stationor along Kutuzov Prospect?Everyoneexpectedthe column of tanksto appearat any moment.
As it happened,the assaultnevercame.The six tanksthat provoked
the violencehardly representeda seriousattemptto take over the Russian parliamentbuilding. Rather,they were an exampleof the kind of
spontaneous
violencethat caneruptany time so muchweaponryis on
the city streets.
Within a half-hourof the final gunshotsI venturedup to the Garden
shot~
andwitnessedthe aftermath:a
Ring Roadin the direction of the
November
bloody spoton the asphaltwherea demonstratorwas crushed,a makeshift crosserectedover the site, and a heatedargumentraging in an
underpassbetweendemonstratorsand soldiersof four capturedtanks
aboutthe termsof surrender.
According to eyewitnessaccounts,the six tankshad approacheda
line of demonstratorswho had taken up positions along the Garden
Ring Roadnearthe U.S. Embassy.Two tanksadvancedon the crowd,
crushingtwo people.Angry demonstratorsthrew Molotov cocktailsat
the remaining tanks, whose drivers halted rather than killing more
people.Firesburnedatopthe leadtank.
Finally, one driver openedhis hatch and peekedout his head. A
demonstratorwho had climbed onto the tank tried to wrest the driver
from the tank but was himselfpulled inside. The soldiersopenedfire.

DEATH ON THE STREETS 255

The man inside the tank was killed, despite attemptsby others to
rescuehim.
The rest of the evening stretchedlike an epilogueto theseevents.
But for a few momentsaround4:45 A.M., fifteen minutes before the
end of the curfew, it seemedthe feared main assaultwas coming.
Suddenly,every streetlightalong the GardenRing Road went out and
the roar of approachingtanks could be heard. Such a timed advance
seemedto signal a seriousassault.Demonstratorstook up positionsto
block the vehicles.
Four armoredpersonnelcarriersapproachedthe demonstratorsand
then halted. They idled a few momentsand then turned and fled. A
victory cry rosefrom the demonstrators.
The carriershad only beenpatrolling. And the extinguishingof the
streetlights was not part of an assaultplan; it markedthe coming of
dawn. SomewherealongMoscow'sGardenRing Roadan unseenelectric eyehaddetectedthe first hint of comingdaylight.
The long night wasover.

A Man in the Crowd

This accountappearedin thepopularweeklyOgonek(October5-12,
1991). Thenameofthe author waswithheldby the magazine.
On the morning of August 22 a young man came to our editorial
offices with a stackof photographsandbeganto tell us aboutwherehe
was during the coup and what he photographed.Unfortunately, the
photographswere of poor quality, but his story seemedinterestingto
us---notas that of a fully objectivewitnessof thesetragic events(it is
too personalfor that, and indeedhow could anyonebe objectiveback
then?)--butas an interestingexampleof the awakeningof the civic
consciousness
in a manwho was,in all respects,well adjusted.
-Alia TseninaandSergeiFilippov
On Monday the 19th I walked over the bridge from the Hotel Ukraina
to the White House.Everything there was unsteadysomehow.There
were not many people.Appealswere postedabout.Peoplewere erecting barricades.It was evident that they were there of their own volition, without orders. Some vehicles were being deployed. On the
bridge therewas a column of troops, and peoplewere speakingto the
soldiers. Then I realized that they had convincedthe soldiers, won
them over. The column turned around and began to depart toward
Kutuzovskii Prospect.And what canI do?I wondered.
There were four tanks over to the right, on the incline of the embankment.The first tank was No. 104. Therewas a major standingon
top of it. His name was SergeiVladimirovich Yevdokimov. He said
that he waspart of the TamanDivision. We struckup a friendship.We
sharedthe samefirst name and patronymic. I spent four hours with
256

A MAN IN THE CROWD 257

him. At times 1 would departfor a short while, but 1 always returned.
And each time our conversationbeganwith my asking him how he
could go againstthe Presidentof Russia,who in all our history had
beenthe only one electedby universalsuffrage."I am not againstthe
President,but 1 have my orders,"he would reply. "I promiseyou that
we will neithershootnor mow down the Russianpeople.1 do not even
havelive ammunition.But 1 cannotleave.Ordersareorders."
"Sergei, you're taking a big risk," 1 responded.''Think about it:
they'll take away your stripes. You see, history is happeningright
before our eyes ... it's being created.You'll be a part of it. You can
either go down with all of them-orgo out a hero." He agreed.1 then
ran over to the White Houseandyelled out that therewere sometanks
that were readyto defectto our side. We had to back themup. Then a
Deputy walked by-I don't rememberhis name. 1 quickly photographedhim.
"How areyou preparingto defendus?"1 asked.
"The people of Moscow are preparingto defend themselves,"he
responded."Look, thereare somemilitia men over herewith machine
guns, and over there some boys from 'Aleks' [a security flrm] are
settingup defenses."
"But this is really not serious,"1 shot back. "They have no hardware."
"What do you propose?"he asked.
"If you give me permission,"1 said, ''then 1 will bring some tanks
over here right now." He liked my proposalbut said that it neededto
be discussed.He brought me over to Lieutenant Colonel Sergei
Yushenkov,who is also a Deputy.1 explainedmy ideato him. He,too,
liked it very much. We then went to Rutskoi. Ultimately, Major
Yevdokimov receiveda personalauthorizationfrom Yeltsin, and the
tanks cameoverto the White House.
Soonthe Presidentbeganto issuemandatesto the deputies,granting
them specialpowers.Thesemandateswere signedby Yeltsin personally andstampedwith an official seal.
1 approacheda deputy."Do you needhelp?"1 asked.
"Yes," he replied,"do you havea group?"
"Yes, therearethousandsof peopleright thereoutside."
"I don't need thousands,but 1 do need about flfty to go over to
MoscowEcho.The radio stationhasgoneoff the air."
1 went outsideand ran into a group of Chechenswho had come to

258 A MAN IN THE CROWD

defendKhasbulatov-well,Yeltsin too. (Before,1 hadnot gottenalong
with them very well, but now 1 found them to be very agreeable.)1
draftedfifty of them. "Wait here,I'll be right back," 1 told them. Then
1joined the Deputy-whosename1 don't rememberbut whosephotograph 1 took-and togetherwe brought the group over to the area
wherethe zoo is, KrasnaiaPresnia.
The deputy was a bit overwhelmed."How are we going to get
there?"he asked.
"Look," 1 told him, "you have a mandatesignedby the President.
Don't worry. Justgive us ordersandwe'll takecareof the rest."
The Deputy laughed."Okay, 1 order you to securesomemeansof
transportation!"
We blockedthe road and stoppeda city bus. The deputypresented
the mandateto the driver. The driver wasn'timpressed."I'm at work,"
he said,"so go and ... yourself."
This goes to show that we have ignorant people in our country.
Perhapshe was not againstus, but for whateverreasonhe failed to
graspthe urgencyof the situation. "I order you to obey!" shoutedthe
Deputy. We then grabbedthe driver by the arms and legs and carried
him out of the bus. The driver grabbedhis bag from the storagecompartmentandran away.
1 sat down at the steeringwheel. We drove off. Over the microphone 1 made an announcement:"Attention, I've driven a bus only
oncebefore."
At the MoscowCity Sovietwe hookedup with somemoredeputies.
1 turnedoff the lights insidethe bus, andno one evenstoppedus, even
though we drove onto Red Squareitself. However, we were not allowed to enter the radio station right away. First, we had to knock
down the door. The militiamen who were guarding Moscow Echo
resistedat first, but they backeddown as soonasthey sawthe mandate
signedby Yeltsin. We took up postsin the hall where the watchman
hashis station.Meanwhile,the deputiesgot in touch with the Minister
of Communicationsand thirty minuteslater receivedauthorizationto
put the radio stationback on the air. After that 1 returnedto the White
House.
By now everythingwas organizedover at the White House.Groups
of volunteershad been set up. Copying machineswere spewingout
leaflets.1 joined othersin distributing thesefrom the balcony when 1
suddenly rememberedthat my car was still parked at the Hotel

A MAN IN THE CROWD 259

Ukraina. "Let me take theseleafletsand distributethem to the closest
military units," I said.
I grabbeda large stack and left. I spoke with commanderseverywhere and explainedthe situation. And still I had an entire stack of
leafletsleft over. Then I beganto post them along the street,but I was
arrestedby the militia. I explainedeverythingto them. They let me go,
but said: "Don't post any more of those leaflets, or else you'll be
arrestedagain--andnext time you might not be released."
That night I was unable to sleep very much-maybetwo or three
hours.
The next day I againwent to the White House,but now I could not
get in, sincea stringentsecuritysystemhadalreadybeensetup. Okay,
I figured, I'll go do somethingout on the street.I stoodtherethinking
for a while and then got a small group together. Valerii Borisovich
Pinaev,Yurii Dmitrievich Zubkov, and some othersjoined me. We
were togetherfor almostthe whole day. At aboutseveno'clock on the
evening of the 20th we made a large flanking motion to inspectthe
approachesto the White House. Giant barricadeswere alreadybeing
setup.
Valerii spokeup when we were nearthe U.S. Embassyin front of
the tunnel on the Garden Ring Road. "Look, Sergei. There are no
barricadeshere,but only someblack Volgasthat areblocking traffic. If
tanks come through here now, thesecars will separateand let them
through."Recognizingthe danger,we spedbackto the White House.I
explainedthe situationto somepeople.Sooneveryonebeganto shout,
and after gatheringtogethera couplehundredpeople,we went over to
the GardenRing Roadto build barricades.It startedto rain heavily and
we got soakedto the bone.The GardenRing Roadis wide, andwe did
not have many people.By now all the black Volgas had disappeared
without a trace. We worked so fast we had not noticed anything. I
rememberthat at onepoint a breadtruck zoomedup andthe driver told
us that tankswere coming towardus from the directionof the Paveletskii Train Station. Several peopleran back to the White Houseto get
reinforcements.Our hands werealreadyshakingfrom work-we were
afraid we would not fmish. So we begansimply to flag down trucks
that werepassingby.
Drivers who refusedto cooperatewere forcibly removedfrom their
vehicles, which were then incorporatedinto the barricade.We deployed a KamAZ truck, two Intourist "Icarus" tour buses,and a ZIL

260 A MAN IN THE CROWD

stretch limousine. A column of street-cleaningtrucks approached.
They pulled overto the side. Somemomentslater, the tanksappeared.
[The incident that follows took place soon after midnight on
Wednesday,August21.]
Two or threethousandpeoplelinked their armstogether.Everybody
was lined up in a row that stretchedacrossthe width of the Garden
Ring Road.The row was not single-file----rather,it was quite deep.The
tanks approachedin a column. They cameright up to the crowd and
halted. Somewomen ran up to them and shouted:"Stop!" Suddenly,
machineguns startedto ftre. My memory is a bit foggy, but at this
point there was somekind of surgein the crowd as about 150 people
threw themselves
in front of the tanks."What the hell areyou doing?!"
someoneshouted.I don't rememberwhat I did exactly, exceptthat I
was swearing a lot, and I grabbedat the machine gun of the tank
driver, who climbedup to the turret. But once he shot from undermy
armpit, I quickly cameto my senses.I immediatelyjumpedback, and
off the tank. The crowd, too, was dispersing."Everyone form lines!"
someoneshouted.The soldierson the tankskept ftring into the air. But
we were alreadydrawing back into formation and linking arms. Then,
onceagain,the tanksdescended
uponus.
It was a miracle that so many of us managedto get out from under
the tracksof the tanks.We stoodour grounduntil the end, hoping that
they would stop. In single file, pushingrelentlesslyforward, the column of tankspoundedaway at our defenseslike a batteringram--and
then moved onforward into the underpassto shatterour barricadeof
trolleybuses.Boy, I thought,if only we could stop them there. At this
point the drivers of the ZIL street-cleaningtrucks-whichwereparked
on the other side----drovetheir vehiclesover to the tunnel and blocked
the exit. The small tanks were alreadyramming the trolleybuses,whose
wheel-baseswere lowered. A tank rammedone trolleybus, startedto
crush it, and almost made it over the top----but in the end could not
move it out of the way. Two vehicles went over to the side; one of
them tried to breakthrough the barrier from the left, but got trapped.
People immediately ran in that direction from left and right. At the
sametime, oneof the armoredvehiclescut throughoneor two trolleybusesand got stuck in the center.The armoredpersonnelcarrier-it
was No. 536-hadhardly run over one of the trolleybuses,however,
when it beganto descendupon some people, leaving victims in its
wake. But we had alreadyftgured out that they were shootinginto the

A MAN IN THE CROWD 261

air and not directly at the people,and so a bunch of hotheadsjumped
down [from the sides of the underpass]onto the tanks. I was really
impressedby a man who was carrying a megaphone;he was about
forty-five yearsold. It was purely on his accountthat two of the small
tankscameto a halt. While everyoneelsewas hiding, he stoodon the
underpasswall, directly underthe barrelsof the machineguns,screaming: "Shootme, I havechildrenjust like you, but shoot,I'm not afraid,
all of us areunarmedout here."
Just then vehicle No. 536 destroyeda trolleybus, fired shots, and
descended
upon somepeople.One of the boysopeneda backdoor and
tried to get to the crew for negotiations--forwhich he receiveda bullet
in the forehead.The tank draggedhim backand forth for five minutes.
Someoneeventuallytried to pull the body out and stick a beamor a
bar in the track of the vehicle. This person also got trapped and
crushed,I think. On the other side,a womanscreamed:from the other
side shemusthavegottencrushed,too. [This last conjectureprovedto
be incorrect.]
I was also really impressedby the driver of the MAZ cranetruck.
He was a very braveman: with a single motion he cut throughto the
trolleybusthat the tank had movedasideandturnedit around,shoving
it back in place and blocking the passage.He did this severaltimes.
The peoplebelow, in the underpass,
weregettingmad: they werebeing
killed, and there was nothing they could do about it. Of course,the
guys beganto react--theythrew stones,branches,and Molotov cocktails. Naturally, they aimed especiallyat No. 536-which burst into
flames and continuedto thrashabout. The men threw a tarpaulinover
it and one guy even sat down on it. The kid who sat down on the
tarpaulinperished,I think.
I recall that therewas an army major who was running aroundand
worrying about what might happento people.When the tank caught
fire, he yelled out that there might be live ammunition that could
explode,in which casea lot of peoplecould die. It turnedout that he
was right. There was a completeset of ammunitionin the vehicle. A
shell had beenloadedinto the breach.The crew membersjumpedout
andthenfought the fire on their tank. We thenextinguishedthe fire. At
this point their officer, a major, a very strongman, snatcheda machine
gun from a soldier, releaseda few roundsinto the air, pushedhis way
through the crowd, and ran off somewherein the direction of the
Kremlin.

262

A MAN IN THE CROWD

The tanksthat had suddenlyhaltedwent in reverseand movedback
into the underpasstunnel to protect themselvesfrom the stonesand
Molotov cocktails. The soldiersstood readywith their machineguns.
They understoodthey haddonesomethingterrible andstoodtherelike
corneredwolf cubs.And if the peoplehadmovedany closer-manyof
them saw the casualtiesand were shouting "Death to them!"-there
would havebeenmany more victims. At this point the major who had
warned us earlier about the explosives started talking and calming
everyonedown. Then somedeputiesshowedup. Negotiationsfor surrenderbegan.Finally, the soldiers came out of the armoredvehicles
wearing their [special forces] berets,medals, and decorations.They
departedin formation. And they were not that young,either; they were
twenty or moreyearsof age.
I don't rememberhow the night ended.At sevenin the morning I
went to bed and aroundnoon I was back at the White House.Again
someonewas making a speechabout something.And I sensedthat
victory wasours.

E-MAIL FROM ALEKSEI KOZHEVNIKOV

On the Barricades

Dr. AlekseiKozhevnikovofthe Institutefor the History ofScienceand
Technologyin Moscowwrote thefollowing account-inEnglish-toa
Jrient! in Berkeley,California, on August22. He sentit by electronic
mail andit waspublishedin the Daily Californian.
The generalsituation is the following. Muscovitesare defendingthe
hugebuilding of the Russianparliamentright nearthe AmericanEmbassy.Thereare manypoliticians inside who organizethe opposition,
andRussian-including Yeltsin, membersof two parliaments-Soviet
and others.The first night therewere about 10,000peoplearoundthe
building. Yesterdaynoon therewas a large rally with maybe300,000
people if not more. And last night probably more than 50,000 were
constantly staying in defense.Half of them were highly organized:
they were divided into detachmentsand stood in lines close to each
otheraroundthe walls andon the nearestbarricades.Anotherhalf were
sitting or moving around.Thereare manyarmoredvehiclesin various
partsof Moscow.They move in complicatedways andno one,at least
outsidethe building, understands
clearlythe military situation.
The radio announcements
andrumorsarecontradictoryandnot very
reliable. Soldiers,when spokento, do not expressreadinessto fight
with people.Most probably,sometroops refusedto fight and left the
city, but new onesare coming. Two small detachmentsof tanks and
armoredvehiclescameto thebuilding to help in defense.Besidesthese
placeswith troops--someblocks in the centerof the city and around
the parliamentbuilding---therest of the city is quiet and ordinary life
goeson. Although a curfewwasproclaimed,it is not respectedat all.
I stayedin the defenseline the first night. The secondnight I went
aroundcarryinga placardwith a call to soldiersfor fraternization.The
263

264 ALEKSEI KOZHEVNIKOV

ideawasto meetpossibletroopsearlierandspeakto them-everybody
wasexpectinga confrontationthis night--evenbeforethey reachedthe
major defenses.It turnedout that this night [Tuesday,August20] there
were relatively few troops in Moscow, sincemany left the city in the
evening.
I guessthat thesmall battlethat took placehappenedunintentionally
at about 1:00 A.M. A small detachmentof armoredvehiclesmostprobably was not trying to storm the building, but was passingby via
TchaikovskyStreet(the one with the American Embassy),about 300
meters from the parliamentbuilding. There were barricadeson this
streetat the two entrancesof the tunnel. Somevehicleswere stopped
peacefully(I saw two, maybe there were a few more). Five of them
decidedto passthroughandthey got into the tunnel rathereasily. I did
not watchthis, but reportedlytherewas someshootinginto the air. The
secondbarricadewas larger. Therewere sometrolleys acrossthe tunnel entrance,and finally the vehiclescould not make a hole in it and
they were blocked inside. They stoppedat a place, about a hundred
meterslong, with the tunnel entranceat one end, the barricadeat the
other,andwalls (oneto five metershigh) on their left andright sides.
About three hundredpeople,including myself, rushedto the place
wherethey heardshooting.When I cameclose,five vehicleswere near
the barricadeand about two dozenpeoplecamedown close to them.
The soldierswere not very aggressive.In three vehiclesthey opened
the hatchesand lookedout from themso that the peoplecould speakto
them. The defenderswho cameto the barricadeswere not an organized
detachmentbut a kind of crowd. Somepeoplebehavedpeacefully. I
too came down to the vehicles with my placard and spoke to the
soldiers.Someothers(mostly teenagers)wereexcitedandpsychologically ready to fight, and their words and gesturesmay have looked
aggressiveandunpleasantto the soldiers.
Things quickly becamemore dangerouswhen one of the vehicles
with closedhatchesbeganto move, actively trying to throw off a man
or two who stood on its armoredtop. A dozen boys were running
aroundit, evadingits wheelsandattackingits armor,althoughthe most
seriousweaponsthey hadwere iron andwoodensticks.
I climbed up on the wall. Probably a minute after this one of the
boys was shot. He was attacking(probably without any weapon)the
vehicle from its rear; he came in contact with it, its door opened
(probably from inside), and someoneshot him to deathat point blank

ON THE BARRICADES 265

range.He fell so that half of the body was inside the vehicle and the
feet draggedon the ground. The vehicle continuedmoving back and
forth, people were still attacking it, and those standingon the walls
startedscreaming"Murderers!"
After a minute the boys picked up the body, which had fallen out.
The vehicle was hitting the barricade,trying to make a hole in it; a
trolley was crashed,but still it could not make a hole large enoughto
escape.Somereportedlater that it crushedtwo more people.I could
not seethis from whereI stood,but therewas a greatdangerand a real
possibility for this.
Other vehicles stayedquiet, but there was generalhysteria.A soldier from one of them ran out and raisedhis hands,appealingto the
peopleand apologizing.From the walls peoplethrew stonesand sticks
at the aggressivevehicles;then they took somegas from a car on the
streetand startedthrowing bottles of it. The vehicle beganto burn on
its top. It was shootingfrom the machinegun into the air. I could do
nothing more with my placard and left the place when the vehicle
beganto burn.
Finally, two vehicles went back into the tunnel, where the people
could not attackthem from the walls above. Soldiersfrom threeother
vehiclessurrenderedwith them and left their vehiclesin the handsof
the boys. Probably therewere no more victims. When I visited that
place an hour later, severalmembersof parliamentand a generalwho
organizedthe defenseof the building werethereandthey were negotiating with the soldiers.The situationhad cooleddown a bit, and even
the excitedteenagerswerehelpingto introducesomeorder.
But we were still expectingthe generalattackon the building, first at
2:00 A.M., thenat 4:00 AM., andI movedbackcloserto the major defense
lines. The night cameto an endquietly, althoughseveraltimestherewere
announcements
aboutapproachingtroops.At 6:00 A.M. I returnedhome.
The presentsituationis unclear.The military madesomemore dangerous announcementson the official radio station. There are also
rumors that the situation has improved greatly and that the plotters
eitherescapedor werearrested.Anyway, therewill be reasonfor me to
go to the [parliament] building this evening.It is 4:00 P.M. now, the
rain hasstopped,andI am finishing this letter andgoing out.
P.S. I was infonnedthat your letter to me of August 20 arrived. I
have not readit yet. We--at leastthosewho take an active interestin

266 ALEKSEI KOZHEVNIKOV

the events-havemuch information. including the leaflets. orders(both
official andoppositional).free radio service(irregular).andfree newspapersin the form of leaflets. The strangestthing is how easily and
naturally people find themselvesfeeling and acting in the historical
situation.As if it is ordinarylife.

CONVERSATIONWITH VIKTOR SHEINIS AND
ALLANAZIMOVA

In and Around the White House

Viktor Sheiniswasa DeputyoftheSupremeSovietofthe Russian
Federationanda keymemberofits ConstitutionalOversight
Committee.He serveson the CouncilofRepresentatives
ofthe
DemocraticRussiaMovement.Beforeenteringpolitics during
perestroika,Sheinishada careerin academicresearchin the area of
economicsandpolitical economy.Alla Nazimovais a well-known
labor sociologist.Like her husband,sheis an activememberof
DemocraticRussia.NazimovaandSheiniswereinterviewedby
GregoryFreidin in Berkeley,California, in January1992.
Freidin: When did you first hearaboutthe coup andwhat was your
initial reaction?
Sheinis: I receiveda call from a young man who worked, among
other places, for Nezavisimaiagazeta and Radio Liberty, Misha
Sokolov.He woke me up. It was about7:00 A.M. He askedme if! was
awareof the latestnews. There had beenplenty of news lately, and I
try to keepup, so I saidcautiously:"Yes, I know the latestnews."
"And what is your reaction?"he asked.
"Could you more specific?"I parried. And that is when he told me
whathadactuallyhappenedthatmorning.
Right away, we turnedon the radio and television,and also tried to
listen to the foreign broadcasts.We heardthe official announcements.
Then we tried to tune in our favorite radio station,Moscow Echo,but
by thattime it hadalreadybeenforced off the air.
Freidin: What was your scheduleon Monday? Whom did you
see,what did you do, what actions did you try to undertake?Let's
267

268

VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLA NAZIMOVA

startwith the schedule.Whendid you beginto act?
Sheinis:Naturally, the eventsmade a completemessof my schedule. If I recall correctly, some SupremeSoviet committeeon which I
had the honor of serving was scheduledto meet at the White House
that morning at 11:00. What other plansI had I can't recall, but naturally, the eventscanceledthem all, and I mademy way to the White
Housewith all possiblehaste.I arrivedtherecloseto 9:00 A.M.
Freidin: What was the mood of the peoplearoundyou? Your own
reaction?
Sheinis:I must say that I was in my worst mood from about 7:00
A.M., when I found out about it, until about 11:00 A.M., when the
Presidiumof the SupremeSoviet went into session.There I saw that
we were preparedto resist. We took a rather uncompromisingstand.
From that point on and throughoutthe crisis, I don't think I experiencedagainany depressionor senseof catastrophe.
Freidin: Couldyou be morepreciseaboutthe senseof forebodingor, as you put it, catastrophe-that
you had beforethat sessionof the
Presidium?What wasyour greatestworry?
Sheinis: The greatestworries had to do with our historical experience, especiallythe invasion of Czechoslovakiain 1968, Poland in
1981. I knew what happenedtherevery well. I was afraid that the next
stepwould be the dissolutionof Russia'sparliament;Russia'sgovernmentwould ceaseto function, andthe peopleassociatedwith the democratic movement,including Yeltsin, would be interned. I suspected
we were dealingwith rather conservativepeoplewho tend to follow
the tried andtrue methodsof the past.In my mind then,the mostlikely
outcomewasthe Polishscenarioof 1981.·
Freidin: Did you think about the outbreakof violence on a large
scale, the possibility of civil war? That was my biggest worry that
morning.
Sheinis:No, I was not thinking about civil war. My questionwas:
will we be capableof organizingpassiveresistanceon a large enough
scale?In Poland, they failed to organize somethingreally effective,
even though in the first days of martial law there, it seemedthat the
*That is, introductionof martial law.

IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 269

governmentmight be willing to make concessions.I was almost sure
that the democraticleadershipwould be neutralized.That wasa matter
of commonsense.Fromthat point on the questionwould be: would the
society,deprivedof its democraticleadership,be capableof acting on
its own?

Freidin: Do you know anythingaboutthe reactionof your neighbors?
Sheinis: No. At that time, I did not yet have an opportunity to
discussthe eventswith neighbors.

Freidin: What aboutyour family?
Nazimova:In the political sense,we representa typical politicized
family. We saweyeto eye as far as the eventswere concernedand did
not havemuch of a discussion.I had to feed my husband,seehim off,
and rush to my office. At that time, I was in the middle of my brief
stint at the Union of Journalists,on the Committeefor the Defenseof
Freedomof Speech.That's where I was going then. But first, I'd like
to tell you aboutthe reactionof our neighbors.
I must say that, living in a huge apartmentbuilding like ours, one
doesnot know one'sneighbors.I don't even know all the neighbors
who live on our floor. Quite unexpectedly,right after the latest news
on the radio, our doorbell beganto ring. Apparently, our neighbors
knew more aboutus than we did aboutthem. Right away we hadthree
neighborsat our door, offering their telephonenumbersand other coordinates,saying:"If you haveany trouble,pleasecometo us. You can
stay with us for as long as you need,and if there is anything we can
help you with, all you needto do is saythe word." They also camein
the evening--justto checkthat we wereall right. I wasreally struckby
this, becausebefore we might have said hello to eachother and that
wasall. That'sthe kind oflife we lead-toobusy.

Freidin: Whatkind of peoplewere they?Professionals?
Academics?
Nazimova: Not really. One was a kind of rank-and-file engineer.
The other was a single mother raising two teenagedaughters,with
greatdifficulties. But the third-true-wasan old friend andcolleague
of ours.The first two werea real surprisefor me.

Freidin: They wereall women?
Nazimova:Yes, thesewere women.But I think the reasonwas that

270

VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLA NAZIMOVA

their men, by that time, may have already gone to work. Besides,
womenaremuchmoresocial,it's easierfor themto makecontact.
Now what happenedat my work. It was 9:00 A.M. or so. I met my
colleagues,and all of us had pretty much the samereaction.We were
very upset.But soonI learnedcrucial information,namelythat Yeltsin,
Khasbulatov,Rutskoi, and Silaev had alreadyprepareda public statement, that this statementwas absolutely uncompromising,that they
were on their way to the White House,and that they had beenable to
escapedetention and were about to arrive at the White House. The
moodchangedas soonaswe receivedthis information.
Freidin: But what were people saying before that? Was there any
cynicism?
Sheinis:No, absolutelynot. But, of course,I was surroundedby the
deputieswho were closeto me in spirit andin political outlook. Broadly speaking,the moodwasto resist.
Freidin: Werethereany specificplansto mountresistance?
Sheinis:Specificplans?No, we hadnone-nothingconcrete.To my
knowledge,someplansappearedonly toward theendof the day on the
19.
Nazimova:WhenI arrivedat the Journalists'Union, I startedcalling
the SupremeSoviet to find out the latestnews. When I first got there,
SashaGutiontov-youknow the columnistfrom /zvestiiaand also the
chairmanof my committee-raninto my office andtold me that Yeltsin's pressconferencehad beenscheduledfor ten o'clock. He rushed
there. Viktor called me right after the Yeltsin press conferenceand
dictatedto me the text ofYeltsin's statement.I typed it up and called
my former employer,the Institute for the Study of the International
Labor Movement.Myoid colleaguecopied it right away and pasted
copies on walls. There was sort of a senseof a sharedresolve, an
unwillingnessto returnto what we had hadbefore[beforeperestroika].
Perhapsthe reasonfor this is that mostemployeesof the Institute were
pretty much of the samegeneration,peoplein their forties and fifties.
We all rememberedvery well the times when we hadto live underthe
iron heel,so to speak.Nobodywantedto returnto thosetimes.
Now a few words aboutthe director of the institute, Timofeev. He
submittedto the instructions issuedby the Academy of Sciencesto
haveall employeesreportto their offices andrigorouslyto checkatten-

IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 271

dancein order to preventpeoplefrom going to the White House.So
the bossesturnedout to be real scoundrels.
Freidin: I havethis question.Both of you arequite well-known public
figures; your addressis known. I am sureyour nameswere on the list
of thoseto be arrested....
Nazimova:Yes. Viktor wasnumberthirty.
Freidin: If I were in your shoes,I would haveleft home immediately
-evenbefore breakfast.Why didn't you? Was it resignationbefore
the inevitable?
Nazimova:I understoodthat this might happento Viktor. That'swhy I
felt I had to feed him a good breakfast.Of coursewe understoodthat
the risk was there. When we left home, we tried to figure out if we
werebeingfollowed.
Sheinis: I don't know how to explain it. But I had no sensationof
fear or imminentpersonaldangerduring thosethreedays.
Freidin: But you saidearlierthatyou felt real despairwhenyou first
heard thenews.
Nazimova:Yes, at first, there was the senseof defeat; we felt defeatedandvulnerable.The sensewas: it's all over.
Freidin: You felt exposed?
Sheinis: I was thinking to myself: Damn it! We're not prepared-just like the leadersof Solidarity, or like Alexander Dubcek and
company!
Nazimova:Let me add something.Before the events,we often said
-especiallyafterwhathappenedin Vilnius-thatwe musthaveall the
addressesand telephonenumbers,especiallythe addresses,because
phonesmight be cut. And I remembermy first thought, too, was:
Damn it. I don't evenhaveany addresses
whereI can get help, except
for two or three friends! We were just neverorganizedenoughto do
this. Unfortunately,DemocraticRussiadoesnot havea regularprocedure for this sortof thing.
As for the tanks, here's a story for you. The Committee for the
Defenseof Free Speech,where I worked, is situatedon the Garden
Ring Road, next to the PressCenter. And that complex of buildings
wassurroundedby tanks.Besides,the GardenRing Roadis the biggest

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VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLA NAZIMOVA

parkwayin the centerof the city, so therewere columnsand columns
of themmoving in front of our building. I was looking out a third-floor
window at a huge armoredturtle parked below. The soldiers were
getting out of the hatchesvery cautiouslyand apprehensively,almost
furtively. All of us, myself and my coworkers,were simply glued to
the windows----thissightwasso unusualfor us.
Freidin: Can you say somethingabout thecoordinationof activity
amongthe demonstratorswho surroundedthe White House?Did the
White House have a hand in it? Let me elaborateon my question.
WhenI droveby the White Houseat 10:30that morning,the perimeter
of the building was empty-I askedthe cab driver to drive aroundit.
Then we drove on to the Minsk Highway, and that is wherewe met a
column of tanks. I rememberI countedover 150 tanks and armored
vehicles,thengaveup. I was en route to Peredelkinoat the time. When
I returnedto the White Houseat aroundtwo o'clock or so, I noticed
that some people from the White House were giving some kind of
instructionsto the demonstrators.
Sheinis:I don't know whetherthere were instructionsor not. But I
can attestto the fact that AleksandrVladimirovich Rutskoi had a personal role in the goings on aroundthe White House.I could seehim
comingout of the White Houseinto the inner courtyardandalso to the
outside. I could see that he was giving instructions to individuals,
speakingto people.I myselfwalked out of the White Houseon a few
occasionsto talk to the Muscoviteswho gatheredthere.
Freidin: When,approximately?
Sheinis:Later in the afternoonof the fIrst day. I rememberit was
drizzling, and people were holding umbrellasover me, asking questions. They were asking me about what was going on in the White
House. Peoplewould say: "How come we don't have copies of the
governmentstatements?"They meant the fIrst statementby Yeltsin
and the appealssigned by Yeltsin, Khasbulatov,and Silaev. I went
back to the White House then and knocked on all the doors, asking
peopleto turn on all the photocopymachinesin the White House to
make more copies. Later on, I myself took stacks of those copies
outside,andpeoplewould snapthemup in a matterof seconds.
Nazimova:And they would circulatethemwidely....

IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 273

Freidin: I'm sorry I did not bring my own copy of the leaflet for
your autograph.But you were going to say somethingaboutwhat was
happeningearlier.
Sheinis: Actually, it was about the sessionof the Presidiumof the
SupremeSoviet, which beganat 11:00 A.M. The committeemeetingI
was supposedto participatein that moming-I recall now that it was
the Committeeon theUnion Treaty-didnot takeplace,understandably.
The sessionof the Presidiumlastedfor aboutan hour and a half. At
a certain point, we beganto discussthe text of the statementto be
issuedby the Presidium.The draft was composedby Volodia Lukin.·
The discussiondraggedon and on, and I was beginningto get irritated
at the growing numberof amendmentsandreformulationsandso on. It
was not the time to be indulging in niceties.I took the floor and said:
"Respectedcitizens,we are sitting hereand discussingfme points,but
the situation may changeany moment and we will have to declare,
following Mirabeau,that we are herebecauseof the will of the people
and we will surrenderonly at the point of the bayonet."I cannotsay
that my appealimpressedmy colleaguesthat much. What I was suggestingspecificallywas that it was incumbenton us to think aboutthe
measureswe would undertakeif the forces of the new ordertook the
White Houseby storm.I understoodthat to discussthesemattersat the
sessionof the Presidium,attendedby a lot of people,might not have
beenaltogetherappropriate.But we were losing time, valuabletime!
And I felt that we did not havethe luxury to be arguingaboutthe style
of the statement.
As soon as the sessionwas over, I called AlIa and dictated the
statementto her, andthenI calledmy own institute,lMEMO [Institute
of ForeignEconomiesand InternationalRelations].I called the director
November
~s
nameis Martynov-with whom I had hada numberof disagreements. Nevertheless,Martynov was a liberal, a man who unambiguously followed Gorbachev'scourse.This is why, incidentally, he was
electedto the CommunistParty Central Committeeat the [Twentyeighth] Congress,which you yourselfattended.And althoughI did not
think he wasa manof greatinfluence,I still tried to useour association
to find common languagebetweenthe Russiangovernmentand the
segmentof the CentralCommitteethat was faithful to Gorbachevand
wasunlikely to supportthe putschists.
*Vladimir Lukin, laternamedRussia'sAmbassadorto the United States.

274

VIKTOR SHEINISAND ALLA NAZIMOVA

I got his secretaryftrst and after some delay she connectedme to
Martynov. The conversationwas ratherbrief. There is a psychological
story here.For the ftrst time in my life, and perhapsfor the last time, I
was speakingwith a man who was so shaken,so disoriented,so helpless, so discombobulatedby what was going on.... Naturally, he did
not supportthe coup. I gavehim the most essentialinformation about
the sessionof the Presidium.My criterion for selectingthe pertinent
information was the HradczanyCongressof 1968.· So I said to him:
"The sessionof the SupremeSoviet [of the RussianFederation] is
calledfor the day after tomorrow."
He responded:"But they will not let you hold it."
At the end of our conversationI promisedthat I would cometo the
Institute as soonas I found the time and consultwith my colleagueson
the courseof further action.t This is one of a very small numberof my
promisesthat I have not been able to keep, and to this day, I regret
breakingit.
Freidin: You left the White Houseon severaloccasions.Could you
tell me what thepeoplein the White Housethought aboutthe people
aroundthe building.
Sheinis: I can't speakfor everybody.I am sure-infact, I knowthat very early on certain securitymeasureswere takenand a security
force was established.Military school cadetswere invited to join the
securityforces,andso were the more reliable elementsof the Ministry
of the Internal Affairs. Soon GeneralKobets took commandand was
able to activatehis wide networkof colleaguesin the military. But this
was on the peripheryof my vision, at least,during the ftrst few hours.I
was then preoccupied---together
with other membersof the Constitutional Committeewho were present-withdrafting the documentpreparedby Valerii Zorkin. Now he is the chairmanof our Constitutional
Court, but at that time he was merely a Soviet professorserving as an
expertfor our committee.In juridical terms,the text was very powerful, demonstratingthat the actionsof the putschistswere unconstitutional. As soonas the text was ready,we all signedit andhad it copied
anddistributedat once.
*Referenceis to an undergroundcongressof the CzechoslovakCommunist
Partyafterthe countrywasinvadedby the WarsawPactarmies.
tSheinishadbeennominatedby his Institutefor a seatin Russia'sparliament.

IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 275

Freidin: Let me reformulatemy question.Did you feel inspiredby
what was going on outsidethe White House,all that public support?
Sheinis: You know this is a crucial, if not the crucial, question.I
think I would be exaggeratingif I were to say that what was going on
outside in any way influenced what was going on inside the White
House. We had very little information. One thing I can say is that it
was decidedat onepoint to send[delegationsof deputies]to the factories. But therewas no follow-up and nothing was appropriatelyorganized. Towardthe evening,anotherdecisionwasmade:to senddeputies
to the army regimentsto discusswhat was going on with the military.
And that evening,the deputiesI know well, those associated
with the
ConstitutionalCommittee,all wentto the regiments.
Freidin: You werealreadyvisiting the garrisonon Mondaynight?
Sheinis:Yes.
Freidin: I thoughtthat washappeningon Tuesday.
Sheinis:I did it on Tuesdayas well. On Tuesday,actually, I spent
mostof the day going from oneregimentto another.
Freidin: Can you tell me a little aboutthe call for a massrally for
Tuesdayas well as the call for a generalstrike, which I rememberwas
issuedat a certainpoint on Monday. Did you haveanythingto do with
thesedecisions?
Sheinis:It becameclearalreadyon Monday night that therewas no
generalstrike.
Freidin: I was outsidethe White Housewhile the issueof the general strike was being debatedinside. From time to time, someone
would comeout of the White Houseto tell the crowd who was taking
whatposition.
Sheinis: If you have in mind the sessionof the Presidium,it took
placein the morning,beginningat 11 :00 A.M.
Freidin: I was there outside the White House by early afternoon,
and I rememberdistinctly peoplecoming out of the White Houseand
announcingthat so-and-sotook such-and-such
a positionregardingthe
generalstrike. I think that even someform of minutes,too, was being
distributed.I think this wasaround2:00 P.M. on Monday.

276

VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLA NAZIMOVA

Sheinis:You are right, but it was not the Presidiumsession.Deputies were meetingregularly throughoutthe day. This was taking place
in the Circular Hall, which is not the largestauditorium,andasI recall,
it was not filled to capacity. There were about one hundredto two
hundredpeoplesitting thereat anyonetime. Peoplewere coming and
going. Not all of them were deputies--somewere assistants,experts,
and so on. There,it is true, issueswere debatednonstop.That was also
the placewhereimportantinformationwasbeingmadepublic as itwas
arriving in the White House. The personwho played perhapsthe
most importantrole in the collection and distribution of information
was SergeiFilatov, now the First Deputy Chairmanof the Supreme
Soviet, who was at that time the Secretaryof the SupremeSoviet
Presidium.
Nazimova:I mustinteIject here.It hasto be admittedthat communication betweenthe White House and Moscow public was very poor.
The radio stationMoscowEchowas not broadcastingproperly.People
did not know what they shouldbe doing. When on Monday eveningI
camehome after all my daily labors,I had no idea what neededto be
done. I calledViktor at the SupremeSoviet. The phonewas answered
by Viktor's colleague,Volkov, who said, "Everyoneshould come to
the White House,becausethere is a chancethat the building will be
stormed."
Freidin: When wasthat?
Nazimova:Between7:00 and 8:00 P.M. I calledeverybodyI could. I
knew a lot of people.At my former Institute,I was the chieforganizer
of the DemocraticRussiaMovement.I had a list of all the telephone
numbers,so I called a lot of people.Many came,and we all spentthe
night outsidethe White House.
Freidin: Were there any delegationssent to the factories after the
call for a generalstrike wasissued?
Sheinis: I don't know whetheranything was done or not, but if it
was,the numberswere not very significant.
Freidin: Did you participate in the discussionof the questionof
generalstrike?Whatwerethe argumentspro andcon?
Sheinis:If therewere any, I did not participatein them. What I can
rememberas far as the issueof the strike is concernedwas the feeling

IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 277

of deepdisappointmentthat the generalstrike was simply not working
out. Of course,we were getting reportsthat at one factory or another
outside Moscow people went on strike or put up demands,and that
miners struck somewhere.I had no opportunityto verifY thesereports
subsequently,but I believethat many of themwould not havechecked
out. But the fact that Moscowwas not striking was completelyclearto
me by the eveningof the 19th. The call for a generalstrike was unanswered,hadno effect.

Freidin: Why was it that it hadno effect?
Sheinis:Thereareprofoundreasonsfor this.
Freidin: But let us limit ourselvesto thosedays.What did you think
then?
Sheinis:First of all, it hadno effect becausewe hadno organization
at the factories.DemocraticRussialearnedto do two things: to mobilize huge massesof people to take part in a demonstration,and to
campaignfor candidatesin elections.
Nazimova:In fact, it was one and the sameorganization-thepeople in chargeof electioncampaignswere the samepeoplewho mobilized for the demonstrations.Our organizations,the voter clubs, were
set up in the electionprecincts,aroundresidentialareas,not at places
of work.
Freidin: Very interesting.There were a few hotheadsin the crowd
outside the White House calling on peopleto arm themselves,and I
had a feeling that the audiencewas not entirely unreceptive.My impressionthen was that at a certain point, after the White House had
made a decision not to use violence (if indeed such a decision was
made),thosehotheadsdisappeared.
Nazimova:Well, I can answerthis question,becauseI was making
my roundsoutsidethe White Houseon Monday evening.Young men
in their mid-twentieswere walking aroundin the crowd askingpeople
to give up their stashesof Molotov cocktailsto have them storedin a
safe place-toavoid a possibleprovocation.I evenrememberthe place
they usedto collect that stuff-atthe right wing of the White House.
Sheinis:I, too, was appealingto peoplewith the samerequest,but I
have a very soft voice and, lacking a bullhorn, I don't think I was
heardby morethana hundredpeople.

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VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLA NAZIMOVA

Freidin: I recall that even the White House did not have a public
addresssystem.
Nazimova:True. They got one setup only late on Tuesdayevening.
Freidin: Did you hear or watch the pressconferenceof the EmergencyCommittee?
Sheinis:First, I heardaboutit. I was on my way to the regimentsat
that time. But I watchedit early on Tuesdaymorning when it was
beingrebroadcast.
Freidin: Could you tell me what was taking placein the regiments?
I am especiallyinterestedin, first, the mood amongthe officer corps,
and second,how they explainedto themselveswhat they were doing.
And who werethe deputieswho went with you?
Sheinis: I don't rememberexactly, but, say, on Tuesday,at one
time, I was with Bella Denisenko,at another,with Aleksei Surkov,
then with SergeiYushenkov,and then with Nelazov,a teacher.There
were also somedeputiesfrom the Moscow Soviet. I just don't remembertheir namesnow.
Freidin: What regimentsdid you visit on Monday?
Sheinis: On Monday, late in the evening, I went to the Supreme
SovietMilitary Academy.
Freidin: What kind of an academyis that?
Sheinis:That'sjust the name.It is situatedsomewherecloseto the
OuterRing Road.Then, following that, in the early hoursof the morning, I went to the OstankinoTV Tower where a regimentsurrounded
the TelevisionCenter.
A small detail. In the evening,when weleft the White Houseby car,
the building was already pretty much surroundedby the barricades,
and carshad real trouble getting out of there. On Tuesday,one could
no longer drive out of the White House.Carswere parkedoutsidethe
Krasnopresnenskaia
metrostation.
Freidin: How did the officers explainto themselveswhat they were
doing? Say,thosearoundthe OstankinoTV Tower?
Sheinis:Let me start with the Military Academy.There I encounteredthe samekind of feeling of disorientationthat I had earlier seen

IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 279

in Director Martynov. Except that the military understoodeven less.
The officers we spoketo had beentaken completely by surprise.In
general (with one exception about which later), their mood can be
summarizedas follows: We don't want to participatein any of this-whetheron one side or the other. At the sametime, it was clear that
their loyalty to the SovietUnion hadthe upperhand.They would say:
"We havetaken an oath of loyalty to Soviet power. We haveto carry
out the orders. The ordersviolate the law. But it is your businessto
sort this all out, and if the ordersare indeedillegal, then it is up to you
to rescindthem. The army shouldnot be decidingwhich ordersit will
carry out andwhich it will not."
The conversationslasteda long time-anhour, two hours. By the
way, as a rule, we were not allowed to enter regimentalterritory. So
the conversationswere taking placein the vicinity of the guardhouse.
We talkedaboutall sortsof things,aboutNuremberg...
Freidin: Yes, the Nurembergtrials-that was the only thing that I
could sayto the tankerswho surroundedthe White Houseon Monday.
Sheinis: They would tell us that they were following Yazov's orders.We would tell them that Gorbachevwas the only one authorized
to issue such orders. They would parry that they had been told that
Gorbachevwas ill. And so it went. We would discussthe political
situation.They were in favor of retainingthe Union,they were critical
of the policy of the Russiangovernment,and on andon. Therewas not
really any orderto theseconversations.But I want to sayonething: we
were neverpreventedfrom distributing the statementsand decreesof
the Russiangovernmentamongthe soldiers.This was true evenwhen
the officers wereclearly ill-disposedtowardus.
We had quite a volume of theseofficial statements,Yeltsin's ftrst
decreesand so on. On Tuesdaywe even had the ultimatum of the
Russiangovernmentaddressedto Lukianov [Chairman of the USSR
SupremeSoviet].
Freidin: Tell me aboutthe hostileofficer.
Sheinis:That was on Tuesdayin the daytime.We receivedinformation that in the vicinity of the LeningradHighway therewas a concentration of the military forcesthat were likely to be usedin attackingthe
White House.And so we got into a car-BellaDenisenko,myself, and
two other male deputies(I can't remembertheir names).We were

280

VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLA NAZIMOVA

alwaystravelingin groupsoffour, not countingthe driver. So therewe
were, driving along the LeningradHighway looking for the troops. It
took us a long time. At a certainpoint we were following somesort of
military vehicle. Later it turned out that it was a regiment meantto
guardprisons.We talked to them, probablywastingour time, because
that regiment was unlikely to participate in any action against the
White House.Finally, we were driving back, and all of a suddenwe
saw a group of tanks flying the flag of Russia, and driving in the
oppositedirection. Those were the tanks that had gone over to the
Russianside late on Monday (there were about twelve of them). We
wonderedwhat they were doing thereand why they had left the White
House.After a while, we caughtup with them. When we askedthem
why they had left the defenseof the White House,a lieutenantcolonel--I think his namewas Kobyzev,as he informedme later--toldus
in a rather energeticfashion that we must leave the territory of the
regiment.We told him that as deputieswe had the right to enterthe
territory of any military regiment.He would not budge.So I produced
a document,signedby Khasbulatov,sayingthat Sheinisis allowed to
conductdiscussionsin military regimentsin orderto explainthe position of the Russiangovernment.The man took this document,looked
at it, and said, "Very interesting." Then he put it in his pocket and
resumedpushingus out. We askedfor permissionto takeleafletsto the
soldiers.He saidhe would do it for us. We refused.
They werevery rudeto Denisenko,who wasnot too passiveherself.
He threatenedher, sayingthat he would orderhis boysto kick us out of
there. She respondedby turning to the "boys" and saying to them,
"Look I have sons your age, how can you behavelike this toward
me?!"
Finally, after it was clear that we were not getting anywherewith
him and we decidedto leave, I asked him to return Khasbulatov's
letter. "Oh, don't worry," he said to me, "Khasbulatovwill write you
anotherone." Which, actually,was not that far from the truth. The fact
is that they had beenphotocopied,and I had lots of them. In conclusion, he took the paperout of his pocket,tore it in half andgaveit back
to me in that form. I recountedthis story at the sessionof the Supreme
Soviet,which openedthe next day.
Freidin: Were thereany conversationsaboutgoing undergroundon
Monday?

IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 281

Sheinis:No. Deputiestalkedamongthemselves,acknowledgingthat
we were unprepared,but thesewere, so to speak,private conversations. And when we got togetherfor meetings,all we did was receive
and exchangeinformation about what was going on where, what cables had beenreceived,and what the plan of action was. Thoseof the
deputycorpswith whom I was in constantcontactwere in full agreementthat our main businesswas to visit as many military garrisonsas
possible.
Nazimova:Here is an interestingstory for you. This was Monday
night~r
rather, the early hours of Tuesdaymorning. I was standing
November
nearthe little bridge outsidethe White House,helping with the building of the barricadethere, when I noticed SergeiYushenkovwalking
in a sort of steadfastmanner-witha column of tanksmoving behind
him. I knew Yushenkovpersonally.So I begancheeringright away:
"Here are our tanks, our tanks are coming!" There was a woman
standingnext to me. She turned to me and said: "How can you be
cheeringtanks!" She did not understandthat thosetanks had crossed
over to our side, and when I explained it to her, she, too, started
cheering,without evenpausing.
Another interesting episode.I was going home at around six or
sevenon Wednesdaymorning [after spendingthe night outside the
White House]. I was in a tram car and sitting acrossthe way from me
was a young man,apparentlyalso going homeafter spending thenight
outside the White House. Somehow,we could recognizeeach other
very quickly-we all had wet clothes,drawn faces,exhaustedlooks,
dirty shoes(it wasraining). I turnedto him andsaid: "It's all over now,
everythingwill be all right." He looked at me, figured out quickly the
differencein our generationand said: "Only middle-agedpeoplelike
you were afraid that we would not succeed.We young people we
didn't haveany doubtsthat we would win."
Freidin: Of course,how old could he have been---twenty?
Nazimova:He wasa sophomoreor a junior in college.
Freidin: In 1985,whenGorbachevtook over, he wasfourteenor so.
Nazimova:He grewup in a world different from ours.
Freidin: What kind of peoplewere aroundyou on Tuesdaynight
andWednesdaymorning?

282

VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLA NAZIMOVA

Nazimova: I was really surprisedto encounterthere some of my
Institute colleagues--Iwon't name names--whomI had always
thought of as being, if not apolitical, then extremelycautious.It was
clear that their sympathieswere on the side of democracy,but they
would not allow themselvesto makeany public statementaboutit. As
a rule, they neverjoined demonstrationsor attendedrallies. I neversaw
them participate in meetingswhen I was organizing our chapterof
DemocraticRussia.But on the secondnight of our vigil outside the
White House,I found myselfstandingright next to oneof those,shall I
say, utterly respectablemen. He, too, was ready [to sacrificehimself].
It was clearthat we would be sweptoff our feet by the crowd if either
a tank or someother military vehicle camecloseto the perimeter.We
were standingbetweena tall fence and the wall of the White House.
Therewas no escapethere.
Anotherdetail, indicativeof the kind of solidaritypeoplewereexperiencing. It wasraining ratherheavily. A very youngman,a boy really,
came upto me and askedwhether I had anything to protect myself
againstgases.We were all afraid of gasat somepoint. I saidI did not.
He thenproduceda pieceof gauze,folded it into a few layers,andthen
dippedit right into a puddle."Takethis," he said. "We'll yell if thereis
a gasattack,andthenyou'll haveto breathethrough thisthing." People
really caredabouteachother.It wasvery, very touching.
Freidin: I can very well imagine that, perhaps,after we are no
longeralive, revisionisthistorianswill be arguing aboutthis eventuntil
they are blue in the face. Nobody will be able to understandwhy
Yeltsin and companywere not arrested,why the governmentdid not
cut off all the communicationsfrom the White House,and so on. Too
manymiracles.
Nazimova:I agree.They could havetakencareof the whole thing in
oneday.
Freidin: For a nonparticipant,noneof this looks like a seriousgame.
Nazimova:Thereis oneexplanationthat mustbe takeninto account.
The leadersof the coup were all peopleof the old school. They were
usedto the idea that if someoneat the top gives an order, that order is
obeyedbelow.
Freidin: They were of the old school also with regard to competenceandefficiency. They did not plan thingswell andthey bungledit.

IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 283

Nazimova: Nor did they have unanimity among themselves,each
suspectingthe other as a potentialbetrayer.Who would be the first to
betray whom? Who would be the first to go to Gorbachevand beg
forgiveness?That wasthe question.
Freidin: Here is my story of Mondaynight. Right beforethe putsch,
I had made a date to meet Nikolai Nikolaevich Vorontsov [USSR
Minister for EnvironmentandNatural ResourceManagement]and his
wife, Yelena AlekseevnaLiapunova,at the Congressof Compatriots
on Monday night. Vorontsov was supposedto makean openingstatementthere.I hadspentall afternoonoutsidethe White Houseandfrom
there went straightto the TchaikovskyConcertHall, where the opening ceremonieswere to be held, arriving therequite wet from the rain
and disheveled.Armored vehicleswere parkedall along the entrance
to the Concert Hall, and right there in the middle of Mayakovsky
Square,a teamof workerswastrying to launcha hot-air balloonwith a
big sign: "Welcome,Compatriots!"The sign was soggy, and the balloon had gotten water-logged.It lifted up a little, hovered,and then
collapsed.How symbolic,I saidto myself.
Once in the concerthall, I could not find Vorontsov,but I did meet
YelenaAlekseevna.Shewas very worried. Sheknew that her husband
had climbed onto the tank with Yeltsin that morning, and shehad not
heardfrom him since.The scenein the foyer wasvery strange:a group
of female dancersin Russianpeasantdresswere steppingout through
the crowd, accompaniedby three accordion-playingmen outfitted in
somefake traditional garb. You didn't know whetherto laugh or cry at
this sight, or both. After the bell rang, Liapunovaand I took our seats
in the orchestra,to the right of the stage. There was a man sitting
acrossthe aisle from us, a conceptualartist from Leningradwho had
emigrated to the United States. I rememberedhis nom de plume:
Smorchevskii-Butterbrod.After the openingspeecheshad beenmade,
he askedto speak,and to my surprise,Mikhail Tolstoi, the masterof
ceremoniesof the Congress,gave him pennission.Smorchevskiidid
not mount the stage,but took a microphoneand positionedhimself
right in front of it. Most peoplecould seehim. Both the way he spoke
andwhat he saidwere very moving. He invited the hall to standup for
a momentin honor of PresidentGorbachev,who, he said, "may have
alreadybeenassassinated."
Another man shoutedsomethingfrom the
balcony, but I could not hear him well. The audience,most of it at

284

VIKTOR SHEINIS AND ALLA NAZIMOVA

least, got up to their feet. Some remainedseated,including a few
RussianOrthodox priests sitting acrossthe hall from us. I wondered
then whetherit was a political statementon their part, or perhapsthey
wereafraid they might violate the dignity of the Orthodoxpriesthood.I
still don'tknow.
Liapunovaand I left soonafter the openingspeeches.We just could
not continuesitting therewatchingall sortsof performanceswhen we
did not know whetherVorontsovhad beenarrested,or worse. We got
up to leave,andas we werewalking out, I stoppedto shakeSmorchevskU's hand and to thank him for his speech.He and I were approximately the sameage, middle forties. Both of us had lived throughthe
invasionof Czechoslovakia,and now onceagainwe were reliving the
daysof our youth. SuddenlyI heardsomebodybehindme sayin a loud
whisper: "We'll break your fucking neck if you keep on doing what
you are doing." Dumbfounded,I turned around: there were two tall
athletic-lookingguys standingbehindme. My blood ran cold, just like
the old days.I said goodbyeto Smorchevskiiand followed Liapunova
out of the hall. We werenot followed.
I offered to accompanyher home. Outside, automobileswere
parkedsideby sidewith armoredpersonnelcarriers.I wantedto take a
cab, but Liapunova insisted that we go by metro. Only later did I
realize why: she wantedto be aroundpeople,just in case.The train
was half empty (it was 8:30 or so). A youngish bespectacledman
walked silently through our car, holding a pathetichandmadeplacard
of the big rally at the White Houseon Tuesday
with the announcement
poker-faced,lookedat him
in condemnationof the putsch.Passengers,
or, for that matin silence.Therewere no gesturesof encouragement,
ter, hostility. At the next stop the man walked out of the car and
enteredthe next one.
Soon after we arrived at the Vorontsovs,we saw the replay of the
famouspressconference,anda few minuteslater Nikolai camehome.
We watchedthe newstogetherand he told us aboutthe Cabinetmeeting earlier in the day and aboutsomearrests.It was time for me to go
home.They walkedme out andsawme get into a cab,andaskedme to
make sure to call them as soon as I got home. I did, and they were
relievedto hearthat I hadgottenhomesafely.
Nazimova:Here is anotherepisodeI would like to sharewith you.
On TuesdayViktor had to attend a receptionat the HungarianEmbassy;he had to presenta paperor someinformation or documents.I

IN AND AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE 285

drove him there in our car. Later he camehomefor a nap--it was not
possibleto take a nap in the White House.That evening,we got a call
from SashaGutiontov, who told us that a curfew had beendeclared.
"How are you going to get to the White House?"he asked,trying
unsuccessfullyto persuadeus to stay home. "You'll be arrestedright
away." Well, I droppedour car off at the garagenearour house,and
from thereViktor and I walked tothe metro and from the metro to the
White House.The streetswere absolutelydeserted,but therewere no
patrols and no one tried to stop us. In the metro, the closerwe got to
the Barrikadnaiastation,the morecrowdedthe train became.
Sheinis:It was absolutelyclearthat peoplewere going to the White
House.
Nazimova:Therewere so manypeopletherethat it was difficult to
breakthroughthe crowd, andViktor hadtrouble gettinginto the White
House.Finally, someonerecognizedhinr-"This is Deputy Sheinis!"
-andthe crowdpartedto 1t:9t him through.

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v
Getting the News In and Out

One of the plotters' fIrst moveswhen they seizedpower was to take
control of the country'smassmedia: the press,television, and radio.
Their actionswere designedto control the flow of information and to
ensurethat it flowed in the properdirection,just as their predecessors
had donefor so many decadesbeforethe introductionof glasnost.The
accountsthat follow, by both Sovietand foreignjournalists,show how
professionaljournalistscopedwith the crisis andmanaged,evenunder
highly adverseconditions,to get the newsin andout.

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lAIN ELLIOT

Three Days in August:
On-the-Spot Impressions

lain Elliott servedformanyyearsas an editorialandfeaturewriter
for The TimesofLondonandan editor ofSovietAnalyst. In 1988he
movedto Munich asAssociateDirector ofRadioLiberty. It was in this
capacitythat he witnessedthe eventsofAugust1991 in Moscow.His
accountappearedin Reporton the USSR,a publicationofthe Radio
Free EuropeandRadioLiberty ResearchInstitute, in September1991.

In the steadyrain of Monday afternoonon August 19, I watchedthe
indignant crowds on Kalinin Bridge and the Smolenskembankment
building barricadesandthrustingleafletsinto the handsof young, confusedtank crewmen.Workersdraggedconcreteblocks into placewith
their trucks. Young lads carriedup stretchesof railings. Middle-aged
academics,briefcasein onehand,scaffoldingpole in the other,delayed
their return hometo addtheir contributionto the defenseof the White
House and their electedrepresentatives.The first barriers of trolleybuseswith slashedtires grew strongerby the minute. Building sites
were ransacked,and a vast supply of long steelrods for ferroconcrete
constructiongave thebarricadesthe appearanceof someancientphalanx of spears.A veteranof the Afghan War saidthat suchrods were
the mosteffective defense
availableagainstthe tanks.At five o'clock a
familiar sound caught my attention: the news from Radio Liberty
emergedloud and clear from the centerof a large clusterof umbrellas
at the endof the bridge.
At 5:15 P.M., troop transportvehicles,which were trying to force
their way throughto the makeshiftbarrieron the bridge,abandonedthe
attempt,and in a dangerousoperation,turnedaroundamid the crowds
289

290 lAIN ELliOT

beforedisappearingin the direction of the Hotel Ukraina. Somefrustratedsoldierinside one of the transportersfired a few roundsinto the
air to frighten the crowds into clearing a path. Later, a column of
severaldozenlight tanks camechargingrecklesslyarounda comerat
the Smolenskmetro station.The tank officers weredesperatelywaving
passersbyout of the way, but were clearly determinednot to relax
speed for fear of finding themselvespinned down like so many
others by leaflet-waving youngsters.Nonetheless,someonehad
managedto scrawl with a piece of chalk on tank No. 073, "Freedom, not tanks!"
Outside the Marx Prospectmetro station people were clustered
aroundBoris Yeltsin's"Appeal to the Citizensof Russia,"postedon a
wall opposite the Bolshoi Theater. In front of the nearby Moscow
Hotel a large crowd was cheeringthe speechesof young deputies.A
generalstrike wasspreading,therewas widespreadsupportfor Y eltsin,
and Russianswere no longer preparedto give way to totalitarianism.
The young deputy Dmitrii Chegodaev,a "DemocraticRussia"leader,
wasparticularlyeffectivewith his megaphone,summoningthe crowds
to an all-night vigil outsidethe White House. I was to speakto him
againunderhappiercircumstancesan epochlater, on Thursdaynight.
Still with his megaphone,he was persuadinglaughingbut determined
Muscovitesto stand clear so that two powerful Krupp cranescould
remove "Iron Feliks"· from his high pedestalbefore the KGB headquarters.For severalhours in the late afternoon,agile young people
scrambledall over the towering statue,placing steelcablesaroundhis
neck,andlinking themto an ancientyellow bus. They wereconvinced
by Sergei Stankevichand other spokesmenfor Yeltsin and [Mayor]
Gavriil Popovthat this day of victory shouldnot be marredby further
casualties,and waited patiently until almostmidnight, when the hated
symbol of KGB repressionwas eventually laid low in a safe, wellorganizedoperation.
That tenseMonday evening,however,I heardfrom oneof the deputies at the White Housethat Radio RussiaandMoscowEcho hadbeen
suppressed.I had visited Sergei Korzun, chief editor of the popular
Moscow Echo radio stationin its crampedquartersjust that morning,
shortly after KGB officers had told him to close down. He said then
*Feliks Dzerzhinskii, the founder of the Soviet secret police (the Cheka),
whosegiganticstatuestoodin LubiankaSquare.

ON-THE-SPOTIMPRESSIONS 291

that he had no intention of obeying them since he did not recognize
their authority, and it therefore seemedprobable that he had been
arrested.This turned out not to be so, and Moscow Echo was soon
backon air, althoughits broadcastswere interruptedmore thanoncein
the grim hours that followed. I spokethat week with severaljournalists, print andradio; their experiencesvariedgreatly,as did their fascinating accountsof how they had somehowsucceededin defying the
incompetentjunta's attempts to suppresstheir activities. But they
sharedwith the young men who stood unarmedbefore the tanks a
courageousdeterminationto do everythingin their powerto ensurethe
collapseof the coup.
Suddenlya dozentanks roaredpastthe Metropol Hotel and Sverdlov statue,headingfor ManezhSquare,scatteringthosewho, like me,
were strolling awayfrom the speakerstowardthe line of toughOMaN
paramilitarypolice blocking off RedSquare.Threetanksspedpastand
on throughManezhSquare,but the fourth groundto a halt so abruptly
I thought for a momentthat it had hit one of the passersby.It was a
relief to realize that nothing more dramatic than engine failure had
occurred.Within secondsthe snortingtankswith flak-jacketedsoldiers
on top clutching their Kalashnikovswere surroundedby peoplefrom
the meetingdeterminedto educatethe soldiersabout how they were
being misled. Leaflets fluttered from the windows of the deputies'
offices in the Hotel Moskva,but possiblyevenmoreeffectivewerethe
plump, motherly Russianwomen who gave the undernourishedsoldiers everythingthey had in their baskets,from bunchesof grapesto a
very largejar of stewedfruit, which an officer demandedbe promptly
returned."And they make our children take part in this!" shoutedone
irate woman.
Confusedand unhappy,the soldiers and tank crews listenedto a
range of hecklers,from lecturerson the nature of democracyto the
only drunk I wasto seeamonghundredsof thousandsof demonstrators
againstthe junta. Ripping openhis shirt and thrustinghis nakedchest
againstthe muzzle of a Kalashnikov in the handsof a nervousteenager, he shouted: "You won't shoot us, will you? After all, we're
Russian,and you're Russian."At last the rain stoppedand the setting
sun madethe red bricks of the Lenin Museumglow. Tank crewmen
helpedsomepretty girls climb up besidethem to decoratetheir tank
with flowers. An angry officer chasedthe girls off, but agreedto
withdraw the remaining tanks the way they had come, if only the

292 lAIN ELLIOT

crowd would step back enoughto allow them to maneuveraround.
And so the tanksleft, ignominiouslytowing backwardsthe onebroken
down, the triumphantcheersof the crowd resoundingacrossManezh
Squarewhile the OMON lookedon impassively.
Monday set the scene for the defeat of the bungling junta. The
politically aware among the populationrealized their strength,and I
saw little evidenceof doubt among those on the barricadeswhether
democracywould prevail. Of course all too many Muscovites kept
their headsdown, waiting to see which way the wind was blowing
before voicing any opinion about events. And there were severalin
busesand the subwaywho even arguedin favor of the junta, hoping
for a return to the Brezhnevstagnationwhen at leastthere was something to buy in the shops.
On Tuesday,August 20, meetingswere taking place all over Moscow as the staffs of newspapers,factories, and other institutions decided where they stood. Some simply went about their businessas
usual. Otherswere divided, and opted to sit on the fence until it becamecleareronto which side it would be in their own bestintereststo
jump. For peoplein the mediathis was not really an option; thosewho
did not immediately go public with a statementopposing the coup
were denouncedby their more courageouscolleaguesas compromisers. But somenewspapersthat immediatelydecidedto defy the junta's
ban found that they lackedthe meansto publish a normal issue---and
not, in most casesthat I heardabout,becausetherewere tanksbarring
the way to the printing presses.More often it was simply that the
responsibleofficial for the formerly Party-controllednewspapersrefusedto provide the keys; and sinceaccessto copy machineswas still
severelyrestricted,it was not alwaysa simplematterto run off several
thousandleaflets or brief "emergency"issuesof a newspaper.Even
obtainingsuppliesof xeroxpaperrequiredconsiderableinitiative.
Under the leadershipof Irma Mameladze,AlIa Latynina, and Yurii
Shekochikhin(who is also an electeddeputy), Literatumaia gazeta
journalistsheld a meetingat their editorial offices in Kostianskii Lane
to protestthe actionsof the junta and arrangefor joint action by the
democratic media. The weekly is printed courtesy of the Pravda
presses,and since they lacked the facilities to producean immediate
"emergency"issuethemselves,they decidedto pile into their bus and
join the demonstrationof solidarity at the Russianparliament.They
were not impressedby the attitudeof their editor FedorBurlatskii, who

ON-THE-SPOTIMPRESSIONS 293

stayedin the Crimean sunshineand provided no leadershipfor their
protest.It was not until Wednesday,August 21, that he phonedin his
protestover the closureof his newspaper,in time for the front pageof
that week'sdelayedissue.
Vitalii Tretiakov, editor of Nezavisimaiagazeta,produceda special
issueof his newspaperby fax despitethe ban, and quickly organized
undergrounddistribution of it and the following issues.When I called
at his offices on the first floor of the "Voskhod" factory off Miasnitskaia Street(temporarilycalledKirov StreetunderCommunistrule), he
paid tribute to all thosewho hadhelpedprovide paperand copy facilities. He expressedparticulargratitudeto the Library of ForeignLiterature; as an article in the Saturday issue pointed out, while some
printing housesmade the impossible demandof an official letter of
permissionfrom Minister Poltoraninbeforetaking the risk of printing
the liberal newspaper,the director of the library, ViacheslavIvanov,
simply said "Come." It was late when they arrived. "But no tasksare
hopelesswhere Deputy Director YekaterinaGenievais concerned.If
not already aware of her energy and determinationone would have
beenastonishedto seehow necessarybut difficult-to-find peopleappeared;how doors,the keys to which it was impossibleto find, were
opened;and so on." The newspaperpublisheda list of library staff
who hadshownparticulardedication.
Among the most active in producingand distributing leaflets were
young membersof the Memorial Society,who took paperfrom every
office they could find and producedthousandsof leaflets on their
overworkedcopy machines."Suppressed"newspapersandpressagenciesprovidedtheminformationby fax, which they sentto the Westvia
Pragueand Bratislava,since they were unableto fax direct. One lad
had an uneasymoment when two policemenapproachedas he was
distributing leafletsto tank crews. But all they askedwas, "Have you
got any more for us?" On TuesdayAleksandrDaniel· had a bad moment when a truck pulled up outside [the Memorial Society'smakeshift headquarters]and a KGB officer rang the bell. They talked, and
thenhe said,"It's all right, we won't shootyou."
Outside the White House on Tuesdaythere was a steadyflow of
speakersto inspire the thousandsof supporterswho had gatheredto

*AleksandrDaniel, historian and humanrights activist, is the son of the late
writer Yulii Daniel.

294 lAIN ELLIOT

preventthe storming of the Russianparliament.Yeltsin, EduardShevardnadze,andYelenaBonnerwere enthusiasticallyreceived;the poet
Yevgenii Yevtushenkolesswarmly, althoughhe did succeedin capturing the atmospherein his poem"19 August," which he proclaimedto
the crowds:

This Augustday will be rememberedin songandsaga.
Todaywe are a people,no longer idiots deceived.
AndtodaySakharov,shylywiping his cracked
spectacles,is comingto the aid ofour parliament.
Besidethe tanksthe conscienceawakens.
Yeltsinclimbson a tank. Andbesidehim
Not theghostsofformer Kremlin leaders,
but theskilledmenofRussia,notyetvanished,
Andtired women,victimsoflong queuing.
No! Russiawill notagainfall on her kneesfor interminableyears.
With us are Pushkin,Tolstoi.
With usstandsthe wholeawakenedpeople.
AndtheRussianparliament,like a woundedmarbleswanof
freedom,defendedby thepeople,swimsinto immortality.
Former KGB GeneralOleg Kalugin introduceda KGB lieutenant
colonel who appealedto his boss"Volodia Kriuchkov" to abandonthe
junta, becauseit was "aboutto collapse"anyway. Hesaidthat most of
his brother officers had declaredfor Y eltsin. (The samemessagewas
receivedby a BBC correspondentwho phonedthe KGB public relations office in the Lubianka."We're all for Yeltsin here!" he wastold.)
At first it was announcedthat Yeltsin could not speakto his supporters outsidethe White House"becausehe had a greatmany mattersto
attendto," but when he did in fact appearon the long balcony,it was
clearthat therewereotherconcernsalso. He was surroundedby police
shields,and at one point an armedpolicemanjumpedup on the wall in
front of his president,pointing at what might havebeena sniperhigh
in a nearby building. There were several false alarms about the impendingstormingof the White House,and instructionswere given on
what to do in a tear gasattack.As usual,Russiansroseto the occasion
with a streamof anecdotes:"Why are thesepeoplecheeringwhen we
know that a column of fifty tanks is corning to crush us? They've

ON-THE-SPOTIMPRESSIONS 295

probablyheardthat it's not fifty but only forty-nine!" Matchedonly by the
enthusiasticreceptiongiven to Yeltsin were the cheersthat greetedthe
appearanceof the popular comedianGennadiiKhazanov,who mimicked Gorbachevand causedshoutsof laughterwith his sharpcommentsaboutwould-bedictatorswith shakinghands.Therewere other,
lessrepeatablejokes about"Yanasha"[Yanaev] on the walls of transportabletoilets providedfor the defendersof the Russianparliament.
The first reportsfrom the TchaikovskyStreetunderpasson the night
of August 20--21 were inaccurate,with as manyasten saidto be killed
and dozenswounded.Katia Genieva,deputy director of the StateLibrary for ForeignLiterature,who, despitethe curfew and the tanks in
the streets,wasworking throughthe night to arrangefor the printing of
thousandsof copiesof an "emergency"issueof Nezavisimaiagazeta,
found time to worry about my wife and me. She thought that we
should catch the first plane home: "It's going to be nasty in Russia
now; they'll arrest all of us; I'll help in any way I can." My wife
Elizabeth,in Moscow for the BBC RussianService,thought it much
too interestingto leave.Two trucks stoppingimmediatelyopposite[the
library building] in the dark small hours to allow armed soldiers to
jump out mademe wonderwhetherit wasnot gettingtoo interestingto
stay. A dozen heavy tanks in camouflagepaint, which made them
seemeven more outrageousin the centerof a city, roared along the
embankmenttowardthe White House.
By the time I reachedTchaikovsky Street,however, it was quiet.
Grim but determined"afgantsy" [Afghan War veterans]talked about
their experiencesas they stood in the persistentdrizzle beside a
burned-outtrolleybus.Girls were placingflowers to coverbloodstains.
There were several makeshift shrines of broken planks. Just a few
yards from the reconstructed barricade
I noticed a wall coveredwith
leaflets. One was headed"Radio Liberty Informs" and a typed page
gave a dozenitems with world reactionsto the coup. Y aroslavLeontiev, the duty editor for Radio Russia that night, had compiled a
fairly comprehensivechronologyof the tragic eventsfrom the flood of
phonecalls received.He told me that only information confmnedby
independentsourceswas included.Although an attemptwas madeby
the junta to remove Radio Russiafrom the air, its frequencieswere
defiantly stuck up on walls around the city and, being on medium
waves,appearedto havemostlistenerson the radiosI heardaroundthe
barricades.

296 lAIN ELLIOT

Radio Liberty also contributedsignificantly to defeatingthe junta's
attemptto impose censorship,
as Gorbachev,Yeltsin, YelenaBonner,
and othershave since confirmed. EveryoneI talked to, on the barricades,at the White House,or in newspaperoffices and institutes,had
warm words for Radio Liberty andfor the work of our freelancecorrespondentsin particular. SergeiMarkov, a young politics professorat
Moscow University, told me how he had recordedfrom a broadcast
Yeltsin's first decreeopposingthe junta. Markov cycled through the
rain to the local soviet at Dubnaand had the satisfactionof watching
the executive committeeput Y eltsin's instructionsimmediately into
effect after they hadlistenedto the recording.Markov, who is leaderof
the RussianSocial DemocraticParty, spentthe long night of August
20--21 in the White House with Radio Liberty providing a steady
streamof information from Russiaand abroad. On Saturday,at the
memorialmeetingon ManezhSquarefor the threevictims of the coup,
I could seeover the shoulderof the man in front readinghis copy of
VecherniaiaMoskva. "According to Radio Liberty," it read. Yeltsin
himself heardevidenceenoughof the value of Radio Liberty broadcastingin the fraught daysof the putsch,when Radio freelancerswere
broadcastingdirect from the tenth floor of the White House. On August 27 he issueda decreeproviding Radio Liberty with a Moscow
bureauandfull accreditationfor its correspondents
in the RSFSR.
Three indispensablehumanfactors for building a solid foundation
for democracyin Russiawere very much in evidencein thoseexhilarating August days. There were electedrepresentativesof the people
who providedthe right leadershipat the right time. Therewas a politically conscioussectionof the population-probablynot the majority,
but sufficiently numerousto prevail--thatwaspreparedto standup for
democratic principles despite very real dangers.And there were
enoughjournalists with the initiative and courageto ensurethat the
democraticpoliticians and their supporterscould communicatewith
eachother quickly and effectively to organizethe defeatof the reactionary forces.
Among the politicians, Yeltsin of courseplayeda decisiverole: he
appearedto be the right person in the right place at the right time.
Whentherewasa very real fear of snipers,he was preparedto take the
risk of speakingto the crowds from the top of a tank-a risk that
provedjustified, since eventhe "Vremia" television news carried the
imagearoundthe countrywith at leastsomeindication of the contents

ON-THE-SPOTIMPRESSIONS 297

of his inspiring "Appeal to the Citizens of Russia." I wonderedif
Yeltsin too was remindedof the statueat the Finland Stationin Leningrad,with a triumphantLenin atop an armoredcar. Yeltsin epitomized
the fledgling Russian democracyin a way that no other politician
could. Shevardnadze,
Khasbulatov,Burbulis, and severalleadingdeputies showedsimilar courageanddedicationto defeatingthe junta. On
August 20, Deputy Valerii Borshchevof the Moscow City Soviet on
TverskaiaStreetdescribedto me how their building, like the White
House,had becomea centerof resistance,defying the tanks gathered
outside.Shevardnadze
hadspokento the crowdstheretoo.
I met severalof the leadersof new Russianparties---somenumerically more significant than others and with a wide range of policies,
but all convincedof the benefits of a multiparty system.At a press
conferenceon Thursdaymorning, August 22, Nikolai Travkin of the
DemocraticPartyof Russia,Viktor Aksiuchitsof the RussianChristian
Democrats,SergeiMarkov of the Social Democrats,and Vladimir Filin
of the RepublicanParty of Russiadebatedissuessuchas privatization,
social services,and policies on national minorities in the RSFSRand
ethnic Russiansin the other republics. Their views varied greatly, of
course,but they agreedon the needto put their policies into practice
only through the electoral processand parliamentarydebate,and all
hadprovedby their actionsin the precedingdaysthat they were united
in their determinationto defenddemocraticgovernment.The Kadets
(Constitutional Democrats)with their green flag embossedwith a
white swanwere presentat most streetdemonstrations,althoughthey
told me they had only a few hundredmembers.They stand for the
samepolicies that won their party strong supportamongmiddle-class
votersfor the ConstituentAssemblyof 1918.
Many a true word is spokenin jest, and it was widely claimedin the
streetsof Moscow that since the democraticforces had failed to prepare themselvesto deal with the hard-line putsch that everyoneexpected,gratitudefor its failure was owed more to the bungling of the
junta than to the competenceof the democratic leadership.Deputy
Telman Gdlian joked that Dmitrii Yazov should be shown leniency
becauseby threateningstudentswith military servicehe had increased
their determinationto opposea military takeover.Otherspointed out
that when Boris Pugo brandedas ''traitors'' the OMON officers who
pledgedtheir loyalty to Yeltsin, he merelystrengthened
their resolveto
fight to the end in defenseof the White House.Certainly their failure

298 lAIN ELLIOT

to win the obedienceof army, KGB, and MVD units at least sufficiently to remove quickly the RSFSRleadership;their failure to cut
telephonecommunications,jam radio broadcasts,andsuppressthe free
press;their completeinability to inspire either trust or terror-1"ather
than contempt-inthe broadmasseswho watchedtheir feeble television performancesall meant that they deservedto lose every bit as
much as the RSFSRleadershipearnedits victory. Without doubt the
strongline takenby PresidentBush,PrimeMinister JohnMajor, Chancellor Kohl, and other Westernleadersheartenedthe democratsand
further demoralizedthejunta.
All of this becameknown to thosewho mannedthe barricadesonly
thanks to the democraticmedia. In addition to the ones mentioned
above,I saw many "emergency"issuesof the democraticnewspapers
pastedon walls and even on tanks; they certainly reachedthe troops
and had the desiredeffect. AleksandrKabakov, politicalcommentator
of Moskovskienovosti and author of "The Defector," a screenplay
predicting the disintegrationof the USSR and armed clashesin the
Moscowstreets,wastired andunshavenbut triumphantafterthe defeat
of the putsch.He told me that the film of "The Defector" had received
an unplannedpremiereimmediatelyafter Sobchak'sdefiant speechon
Leningrad television. He also passedon four issuesof the "emergency" version of Moskovskienovosti (A3-size photocopy)that had
been distributed at the height of the crisis. Issue no. 3 included an
appealby the indomitable and ubiquitous Yelena Bonner for half a
million Muscovitesto demonstratetheir supportfor the Russianparliament ''to showthat we are worthy of the title of citizensof the capital
andof the state,ratherthanjust a crowd, interestedonly in sausage."
Most of the newspapersthat appearedwith the permissionof the
junta were opposedby someof their staff. In addition to the "putschist" Moskovskaiapravda, there was an "illegal" Moskovskaiapravda
appearingas an A4-size leaflet, appealingto readersto ignore the
normal-size"legal" issue. Moskovskiikomsomoletsmanagedto produce five "emergency" issues in the form of A3-size photocopies.
Rossiia, the White House-basednewspaperof the presidium of the
RSFSR SupremeSoviet, produceda seriesof A3-size leaflet issues
with appealsto passthemon andreproducethem as much as possible.
This activity was complementedby the radio stations ineffectively
bannedby the junta: Radio Russia,Moscow Echo, and Radio 3-Anna,
which gave its air waves to Radio RussiacorrespondentsLiubimov

ON-THE-SPOTIMPRESSIONS 299

and Politkovskii, broadcastingfrom inside the White House. Its frequenciescouldbe seenpostedon the walls of Moscowstreets.
The Westernradio stationsbroadcastingin Russianand other languagesof the former USSR spreadthis information further. Even
Mikhail Gorbachev,isolatedin the Crimea,was able to follow events
in Moscow and elsewherethanks, as he acknowledged,to the BBC,
Radio Liberty, and the Voice of America. It was gratifying to see so
many tributes in the liberal Russianpressto the work of the international broadcasters.A randomsurveyof the newspapersI managedto
buy, beg, or scrimmagefor in the courseof that week found information attributedto Radio Liberty in VechemiaiaMoskva (August 22),
Literatumaia gazeta (August 21), and Moskovskienovosti (August
24)-whereAleksandrKabakovwrote of how he had listenedto Andrei Babitskii and Mikhail Sokolov reporting for Radio Liberty from
the White House. Rossiiskaiagazeta(August 23) wrote that on the
morning of August 21 the barricadesdamagedby the APC attacks
were being restoredwhen, "to relieve the pickets who had lived
through those heavy hours, Muscovitesbeganto arrive on the flrst
metro trains, having spent the night at their receivers,listening on
RadioLiberty to informationaboutthe attackthathadbegun."
But for me as an observerof theseevents,the lasting impressionis
of the youth of the majority of thosewho defendeddemocracyon the
barricadesanddistributedleaflets,andof their convictionthat they had
no alternative. As Yeltsin said in his victory speechat the rally on
August 22: "It has againbeenshownhow greatare the powersof the
people.The political courseof Russia,and the honor and virtue of its
highestbodiesof authority, its leadership,were defendedby unarmed,
peaceful citizens. It is symbolic that among those who becamethe
defenseof the Constitution,the law, and humanworth, there were a
great many young people. This meansthat the future courseof this
reform is ensured."
Many Westernspecialistsdismissedthe dissidentsof the Brezhnev
era as too small in numberto have any significant impact on political
reform. But the self-sacrificeof thosefew courageousindividualswho
in the 1960s and 1970s placed their civic duty and the defenseof
human rights above their own well-being was not wasted.Through
samizdatand Western radio broadcasts,their example reachedthe
post-1968generation, and
it was notlost.
On Saturdayevening Elizabeth and I visited Misha and Flara

300 lAIN ELliOT

Litvinov, parentsof Pavel Litvinov, one of the few who demonstrated
for someminuteson Red Squareagainstthe invasionof Czechoslovakia beforebeing arrested.Among thosesqueezedinto their hospitable
kitchen to watch the amazing sceneson Russian television were
Kronid Liubarskii and his wife, LarissaBogoraz,who hadplayedtheir
part in the eventsof that week in a worthy culminationof their distinguishedlifetime work in defenseof humanrights. Onecould not avoid
the conviction that it was they and their small circle that had planted
the seedsthat flowered this August in Moscow. I rememberedLev
Timofeev, Gleb Yakunin, Mstislav Rostropovichat the White House,
but it was the words of Yelena Bonner among the representativesof
that tiny band of dissidentsthat came to mind. When she spoke on
August20 shecalled onMuscovitesno longerto act like bydlo (cattle)
but, avoiding bloodshed,to standfor a free, democraticRussiaagainst
the junta: "They cannot stand over us. We are above them, we are
betterthanthey, morehonest,andwe aremany!"

INTERVIEW WITH SERGEIMEDVEDEV

Getting the News on "Vremia"

SergeiMedvedevwasajournalistforthe centraltelevisionnews
program "Vremia" whenthe coupbegan.His film report, shownon
"Vremia" on Monday,August19, gavenationalcoverageto the
resistancemovementmobilizedby Yeltsinagainstthejunta.From
Medvedev'sreport, millions ofSovietcitizenslearnedfor thefirst time
about Yeltsin's"Appealto the CitizensofRussia," andtheysawfilm
clips ofYeltsinstandingcourageouslyatop a tank. Thereport also
includedpicturesofthe constructionofbarricadesaroundthe White
House.AlthoughMedvedevwasdismissedfrom hisjob after the
airing ofhis report, he wasreinstatedon Wednesday,August21, and
on Thursdayhe becamethe anchormanfor "Vremia. " He was
interviewedby Bill Keller, MoscowBureauChieffor theNew York
25, 1991.
Times,on September
Medvedev:My wife learnedfrom the radio that a coup had taken
place. Then we turnedon the television, and our program"Morning,"
which starts at 6:30 A.M., was not on. Announcerswere sitting there
and reading the statementsof the GKChP. Of coursewe were very
upset.I was particularly upset,becauseon that day I was supposedto
anchorthe program"Vremia."
By nine o'clock I was at work. All the bossesof "Vremia" were
alreadysitting in their places.Our chief editor, Olvar Kakuchaia,said
they got him up at two in the morning. They gaveKravchenko·almost
no chanceto sleep;they had found him at home. He called our chief
editor. Then,in the middle of the night,justasit was gettingon toward
*Leonid Kravchenko was head of USSR Gosteleradio,later renamedState
Companyfor TelevisionandRadioBroadcasting.
301

302

SERGEI MEDVEDEV

dawn, they beganto surroundthe building with military vehiclesand
paratroopers,judging by their clothing. All of this was visible from the
windows of the building. There was almost nothing being broadcast.
Someprogramswere closed,and others,like our newsprogram,were
given a packetof documentsthat hadbeenadoptedby the putschists.
Our main sourceof information onTV was CNN. [ ...]
At around 11:00 A.M.-I'm afraid to say precisely, maybe it was
11:40 A.M.-I saw on CNN that tanks had enteredMoscow. But I did
not seetankswhen I was going aroundthe city. I was especiallyon the
lookout in the morning, but didn't seeanything. There was no one on
the streets,no specialbrigadesof police. Moscowwasquiet.
When the tanks arrived, my colleaguesand I beganto count them.
We countedforty. We understoodthat this was very seriousbusiness.
The tanks went through the center of Moscow. They came down
Kalinin Prospect.Then CNN began to show the first spontaneous
meetings. We tried to go out on the street. But it turned out that,
startingthat morning,taking camerasout for filming wascontrolled.
of the StateEmergencyCommittee,KGB employRepresentatives
ees, sat at Gosteleradio.They forbade anyoneto leave. Then, in the
middle of the day it becamepossibleto leaveto film with a permission
signedby the chief editor-no one lower thanthat, not a deputy, no
one but the chief editor. The chief editor signedsuch a statementfor
me. It was interesting that no one else was making such requests.
Everyonesatin the studio.Everyonesatin place.[ ...]
Kakuchaiasignedthe statementfor me to go film, saying,"Be very
careful.You shouldn'tgo out becauseof the tanks."
I said: "All the same,we'll go."
We left. We went to the otherbuilding becausethe camerasand the
operatorsare there.It's in the otherdirection, acrossthe street.At first
they wouldn't let us in one entrance;we got in through anotherone.
We were lucky to carry out a camera,andwe went out throughthe exit
without the signatureof the KGB chief who was sitting with us in the
building. I think we managedto do this becausetherewas someconfusion there about who had allowed us to pass.They weren'tsure what
kind of signatureswere needed.Theseparatroopersdidn't know whose
signaturewasvalid andwhosewas not.
Thereforewe left quietly, got in the car, and drove off. First, we
went to Manezh Square.On Manezh Square,a meeting had already
ended,but meetingskept occurring spontaneously,one after another.

GEITING THE NEWS ON "VREMIA"

303

Severalrows of trolleybuseswere at the entrances.We did manageto
get to the square.Police were all around.I said, we are news people,
from television, and we are authorizedby somekind of authority-I
didn't say by whom-to film everything.The police were busy with
the trolleybuses,trying to pull them away with tow trucks. And when
they hadcleareda passage,we managedto get throughit.
We passedthrough three or four cordons and enteredManezh
Square.Military vehicleswere alreadythere.Peoplesat on the armor.
We recordedall this, talked with people. We saw that there was no
particulai confrontationbetweenthe peopleand the army. They were
talking with eachother.
Then the squarebeganto empty out, and it was explainedthat for
morethanan hourpeoplehadbeengoing to the White House.
[Medvedevsaysthat he then decidedto go to the White Housewith
his film crew.]
We drove in the car almostto the first barricades.When I saw the
barricades,honestly speaking,I rejoiced, becauseI understoodthat
therewould be resistance,not just in words, as often happensin Moscow-noise,shouting,but thingsdon't go further thanthat.
We beganto film all of this. We beganto film meetingswith people
who were building the barricades,then how the leaflets were being
thrown out of the building; oratorswere speaking.We were there for
quite a long time. It was alreadyalmost8:00 P.M. whenwe returnedto
the studio. We returned,and I was 100 percentconvincedthat in the
studio nobody had any needfor what we had filmed. And unexpectedly, the first deputy, Valentin Lazutkin, deputyto Kravchenko,said,
"Get the materialreadyaboutwhat is going on today in Moscow." We
sat down very quickly and beganto edit. He said: "Later I'll look to
seewhatyou have."
About five minutes before 9:00 P.M., as the information program
was about to begin, we didn't have anything ready. At that time, he
enteredandsaid,"Let's havea look."
I said: "Valentin Valentinovich, we're not ready yet. We've only
donehalf of it. We can showyou what we have,but without sound."I
readto him from the script. Therewasno soundyet.
We showed him the first part of our report. There was the big
statementfrom Yeltsin, with an appealto the people.This appealwas
about four minuteslong. Lazutkin looked at all this and said: "What
comesnext?"

304

SERGEIMEDVEDEV

I said: "Well, we'll showthe barricadesandthe peoplethere."
He said: "You must shorten Yeltsin." He didn't say take it out
completely, but it had to be shortenedto the minimum. Out of four
minutes,maybeforty secondswereleft, maybea minute.
I said: ''Therestof what [Y eltsin] saidI will try to put in my script."
He said: "Okay."
After this I ran to the editing room. We finished the report, with
interviews,with the barricades.In generaleverythingwasthere.
Then, when the report was broadcast,it was as though the ceiling
crashedin on my head. All the telephonesbeganto explode. Yurii
Prokofiev, the Secretaryof the Moscow Party Committee,phoned.
AleksandrDzasokhovphoned-he'sa Central CommitteeSecretary.
Boris Pugo phoned.I don't rememberwho else for sure, becauseI
didn't talk with them. Lazutkin talked with them. Kravchenkophoned
-Lazutkin later told me aboutthis-Kravchenkophonedandsaidthis
report was a direct appealto cometo the barricades;it was instigating
material. But judging by everything,he was repeatingsomeoneelse's
words, becauseLazutkin said it appeared[Kravchenko] had not seen
the material.
I didn't wait around to see how everything would come out, although before I left, one of the deputy editors beganto shout at me:
"How could you deceiveus? You gave an interview to peoplein the
opposition."He blamedme for a phraseat the endof the report: "If we
have the chance,we will give you additional information later about
what is happeningin Moscow." Everyoneblamedme for this phrase.
Later, I learnedthat manywho defendedthe White Housefound out
whereto go and what to do preciselyfrom this report.But at that time,
I didn't know any of this. I just went home.I didn't want to wait. I just
slammedthe door and went home to my wife and child. We put our
daughterto bed,andI saidto my wife: "Let's go to the White House."
She said: "It's terrible to leavethe child." She was sleepingon the
balcony. Usually she sleepsvery soundly, so we put her to bed and
left.
We left the car at the Hotel Ukraina [acrossfrom the White House],
and we were going along, and the first personI saw was my friend
Paul Hofheinz from Fortunemagazine,who shouldhavebeenin Italy
on vacation.We greetedeachother.We went aroundtogether.
Peoplecameup andcongratulatedme, slappedme on the shoulders.
I understoodthatthey would protectme. I felt reassured.

GEITING THE NEWS ON "VREMIA"

305

The next morning,a big meetingtook placeof the leadersof television, wherethey considered,amongotherthings,the questionof what
to do with me. Kravchenkoorderedour chiefeditorto demoteme from
the position of commentatorto senior editor. In monetaryterms, the
salaryis half as much.And I wasdeprivedof the right to appearon the
air. Thenthe chiefeditor saidto me, "Listen, Seryozha,you haveto go
hide somewhere,becauseI don'tknow what will happennext. Go take
a vacationimmediately."
I didn't say anything againstit. I got my papersall in order for a
vacationleave.But the next day I took a cameraandwe went out again
to film. I don't know why they gave it to us. It was simply a coincidence,andwe wentto the White Houseagainandshoteverything.
But of coursewhenwe returned,they saidto me, "You're still here?
Surelyyou can'tmakea report."
The next day, we went againto the White House,this time inside
the building. We talkedwith manypeople,met manyfriends.Meetings
were going on. It was alreadyclearthat eventswere developingin the
otherdirectionnow.
On August 22, accordingto the schedule,I should have beenthe
anchor on "Vremia." Although I was on vacation, there was still a
schedule.I phonedLazutkin at home and asked,"Am I working, or
not?"
He said,"What? You don't know that I tore up Kravchenko'sorder
in front of your bosses?"
I said,"CanI comeandanchor'Vremia'?"
He said,"Yes, you can."
I arrived at the office, took what I had filmed, which had not been
broadcast,edited it and put it on the air on the 22nd. It was very
emotional.It wasthe first "free" programsincethe 19th.

Keller: Why didn't the putschistsgettougher?
Medvedev:Today,there are very many versionsaboutthis. Things
really wereunclearfor us, at least.We waitedall the time for someone
to cometo the office and explain what was to be broadcastand what
was not. But no one came,althoughthey closedsomeof the newspapers.But I don't think they were incompetent,becauseamongthe top
leaderswas Kriuchkov. His office knows what to do. So it could not
havebeenthe incompetence.I think that theremight be two versions.
The first is that they did not feel confidencein themselves.They tried

306 SERGEIMEDVEDEV

[to carry out the COUp] more or less in a democraticway, to createa
facadeof democracy.
This explanationis plausiblebecausethe next day Prokofiev called
again aboutmy report and said "It was nothing terrible." No one understoodthe meaningof his phonecall. We objectively showedwhat
was going on in Moscow. I think this might be the explanationfor the
fact thatthey didn't apply censorship.
Keller: Maybe they were used to the fact that the leaders of
Gosteleradiowerealwaysobedient.
Medvedev: Yes, never before had there been a situation where
someonegave a commandand TV did not fulfill it. I don't remember
sucha caseever.At leastnot consciously.
Keller: Did you feel that among the leadersat Gosteleradiothere
wasa wish to get correctinformationon the air?
Medvedev:Yes, therewas sucha desire,and therewas uncertainty,
this I observed.Somekind of paralysisaffectedpeople.Therewere all
kinds of reactionsfrom different people-fear,uncertainty,readiness
to fight back.
Keller: After the putsch,do you feel the atmospherehere is really
free?
Medvedev:It's a very complicatedsituation,becausea new leadership, Yegor Yakovlev, has arrived. Eduard Sagalaev·is back. Obviously so far there is no worry. "Give people the chanceto work.
Please.Give them what they need." But now there is a struggle of
those who worked here earlier--for twenty, twenty-five years-with
thosewho havejust arrived, becausethey feel that the new leadership
would like to get rid of them. This feeling of concernaboutone'sfate,
one'ssituationat work, hasunited people.This is unusualfor any TV
operation,becausethere'salwayslots of jealousy.
Keller: Would you comparethe psychologyof the older and younger generations?
Medvedev:I think the main difference is that the veterans----those
who have worked here a long time-they feel an internal censor.It
*EduardSagalaevran "Vremia" duringthe heydayof perestroika.

GETTING THE NEWS ON "VREMIA"

307

interferes in what they say and show, that which might have been
done.Somethinginsidejust says"no, that won't fly," evenifhe wants
to do it. All the same,it won't work out. I speakthis way becauseI
also work in this system.I beganunderBrezhnev.I worked for seven
yearsin radio, andI, too, havethis feeling.
I was born in the former city of Konigsberg [now Kaliningrad],
which in 1946went from EastPrussiato Russia,to the SovietUnion. I
was born there in 1958. My parentswent there from Leningradafter
they graduated.My mother is a teacher.My father used to work in
television; he was director of a TV studio, then he becamethe chairman of the television and radio committeeof Kaliningrad. Now he's
retired. I graduatedfrom Moscow StateUniversity, the journalismfaculty. After graduationin 1981,I worked at Gosteleradio.Until 1987 I
worked on radio, and since 1987 on "Vremia." I worked, for a few
monthsonly, on a newspaperin Kaliningrad. I love radio and television a lot.
Keller: Was therea periodduring the coup whenyou thoughtit was
the endof freedom?
Medvedev:There was a momentin the morning, when I heardthe
radio andturnedon the TV. But the further eventsdeveloped,the more
certainI becamethat it would not last long, especiallywhen I learned
that a portion of troops had gone over to the side of Yeltsin and
machinesand tanks that supportedYeltsin had moved in aroundthe
White House.Then I was absolutelyconvincedthat it would be really
hardfor the putschists,andthey would not be victorious.

ANN COOPER

The Foreign Press and the Coup

Ann Cooperreportedfrom Moscowfor NationalPublic Radiofrom
1986through 1991.
"Boy, haveI got badnews,"announcedmy husband,Bill Keller, when
I answeredhis phonecall from Moscow. It was early morning, August
19, 1991,andI wasstill in my room at the Hotel Lietuva in Vilnius.
For Moscow correspondents,August was normally a welcome respite from the crushof political news.Kremlin leaderswent off to their
Black Seabeachresorts,andforeign correspondents
could safely leave
for their own vacations---orfor businesstrips, like the one I was on to
gather material for a retrospectivepiece about Lithuania's independencecampaign.
Bill quickly describedthe announcementof Gorbachev'sphony
illness and the membershipof the ominous State of Emergency
Committee.
"This is not a joke," he concluded,knowing that I might needa little
convincing after living through several years of rumors and false
alarmsaboutconservativeplots to oustMikhail Gorbachev.
We talked briefly aboutthe crudenessof the scheme.The goal was
obvious: Gennadii Yanaev and his fellow thugs, relics of the Soviet
past, wantedto reversethe breathtakingtransformationsof the Gorbachevera and preservetheir own cozy world of power. Their use of
the absurd"Gorbachevis sick" story, andtheir appealsto a false Soviet
patriotism,indicatedhow thoroughlyout of touch they were. The lies of
the pastwereno longercalmly acceptedby an obedientsociety;indeed,it
seemedto us that the putchisty,as the coup plotterscameto be known
in Russian,would needan unthinkableamountof force to imposetheir
will on a public now accustomedto speakingits own mind.
308

THE FOREIGN PRESS 309

Lithuania had already shown us that tanks and bullets were not
alwaysenoughto tramplea buddingdemocracy.Sevenmonthsearlier,
Bill and I had watchedin horror as the Soviet military shot its way
through a peacefulcrowd of unarmedprotestersto seizethe Vilnius
televisiontower. The military easily grabbedcontrol of the tower and
the republic's main broadcastingstudios, but in the wake of the attacks,more protestersthan everpouredinto the streets.Lithuaniawas
not vanquished.The Januaryviolencein Vilnius had struckmany as a
dressrehearsalfor a granderscheme.No more dressrehearsalsnow.
This wasthe real thing.
I ran down the hall to tell my National Public Radio colleague,Ben
Roe, and we set to work, beggingfor new planetickets back to Moscow, cancelingour interviews and phoning friends in Vilnius, where
the newswasjust beginningto spread.Our friend Gintaspickedus up
right away,andwe spedoff towardthe Lithuanianparliamentbuilding,
strongholdof the republic's democraticallyelectedgovernment.The
routeto parliamentwas alreadylittered with metal beamsandconcrete
blocks designedto thwart tanks; after January,the Lithuanians had
becomemasterbuildersof the instantbarricade.
Inside the parliament building I felt as though I was wandering
through a rerun of January.Local militia loyal to Lithuania's proindependence
governmentjammedinto a lobby area,countingout bullets for their rifles. Legislative workers rushedout of the building
carrying electronic equipment-nodoubt for storage in safer hideaways.Parliamentarians
andjournalistsswappedscrapsof information
in the hallways.Rita Dapkus,the indefatigableLithuanian-American
who ran the parliamentpressoffice, settledin for the expectedsiege
with a wry smile. "At least this time we've got company,"she said,
noting that Moscow, and not Vilnius, appearedto be the fIrst targetof
theputschists.
Later, on the way to the Vilnius airport, Gintasaskedshyly whether,
whenthe dustsettleda bit, I could checkthe statusof his applicationto
emigrateto the United States.Gintas actually had a good chanceof
getting out of the Soviet Union, becausehis wife's family lived in
California. The coup gave his applicationa new urgency,and his requestfor help broughtme close totears.How manypeoplelike Gintas
hadwe met-peoplewho flourishedwhengiven new freedomto speak
andwrite, to travel abroad,to createprivatebusinesses,
to form political parties or publish anti-Communistnewspapers.At a minimum, a

310 ANN COOPER

return to dictatorship would reversetheir achievementsand destroy
their dreams.It was these personalanxieties,rather than the larger
threat to internationalorder, that preoccupiedme in the ftrst hours of
the coup.
What, for example,might becomeof our loyal driver Volodia, who
picked me up at the airport when I landed in Moscow early Monday
afternoon?As usual,Volodia wasburstingwith news-thelatestradio
announcements,
how manytanks he had countedon his way out of the
city. I wonderedhow the new regimemight rewardVolodia'senthusiastic assistanceto a foreign journalist. Two of the putschists,Prime
Minister Valentin Pavlov and KGB chief Vladimir Kriuchkov, had
madehystericalanti-Westernstatementsin recentmonths,and a new
round of antiforeignerpropagandaseemedcertainif they succeededin
bringingthe countryundertheir control.
I saw the fIrSt tanks shortly after Volodia turned onto Leningrad
Highway. We were still in Moscow's suburbs,and the convoys we
passedwere parked along the roadside,apparentlyawaiting further
orders.Most of the soldierswho loungedatop the armor appearedto
be from CentralAsia, a worrisomesign becausecentralAsiansseemed
far more likely than Slavic soldiersto obeyany ordersaimedat subduing Russiancivilians. Later, though,I sawthat mosttroopsdeployedin
Moscow-particularly around Manezh Square-wereSlavic. They
looked like raw recruits, uncertain what they were doing there and
extremely uncomfortablewhen civilians caught their eye and asked
point blank: "You wouldn't shootat us,would you?"
The putschistshad called a pressconferencefor 5:00 P.M. Monday.
When I arrived at the Foreign Ministry's presscenterat 4:00 P.M., it
wasbedlam.For somereason,guardsat the door were favoring foreign
correspondents,and I managedto ftght my way into the building in
time to getthroughthe securitycheckandftnd a seat.
As I waited for the beginningof this surrealevent,I wonderedhow
one shouldaddressquestionsto the leadersof a coup.
Shouldthey be simpleand straightforward?Carroll Bogertof Newsweek apparently thought so. She was recognizedftrst and asked:
"Whereis Mikhail SergeevichGorbachev?What is he sick with?"
____Qr should one load the questionwith all the contemptone felt for
the menon the stage?
"Bearing in mind the wording of your communique,did you askfor
advice from GeneralPinochet?"demandedan Italian correspondent.

THE FOREIGN PRESS 311

His impudencewon a round of applausefrom his colleagues,but no
satisfactoryresponsefrom the putschists.
In the end, it was a journalist from the scrappiestof the new Soviet
newspaperswho found what struckme aspreciselythe right balanceof
contempt and courage,delivered in a voice with only the thinnest
veneerof civility: "Could you pleasesay whether or not you understandthat last night you carriedout a coup d'etat?"askedtwenty-fouryear-oldTatianaMalkina of Nezavisimaiagazeta.
Malkina's impertinencedid more than confront the putschistswith
the "coup" label. It was a warning of sorts, from an entire generation
that cameof age in the perestroikayears,a generationthat had never
known the fears and subservienceof its parentsand was not about to
meekly surrenderits future to a bunchof old Communistfossils. It was
an ominoussign for the putschists.
Our apartmentwas completepandemoniumthat night. Irina, our
belovedteacherandtranslator,monitoredradio andTV while I juggled
the constantjangle of phone calls-from editors in Washingtonand
from Russianfriends andacquaintances
in Perm,Sverdlovsk,Izhevsk,
andotherprovincial cities Bill or I hadvisited.
"This is Igor from Izhevsk.Do you rememberme?"
"Yes," I lied.
"We haveno informationhere.Canyou tell me what'shappeningin
Moscow?"
Of courseI could, becauseeven though I only later remembered
precisely who Igor was, I was certain he had helped me generously
when I was in Izhevsk.Provincialhospitalitywas oneof the greatjoys
of travel in the Soviet Union; it more than madeup for the nightmare
of Aeroflot flights andthe discomfortsof provincial hotels.
Irina and I took turns fielding thesecalls, swappingour newsabout
Boris Yeltsin's defiant standat the Russianparliamentfor information
aboutthe scenein the provinces.It seemedthat outsideof Moscowand
Leningrad there were no protestsin Russia, but neither were there
tanks. And so far, the putsch'sinformation blackouthad succeededin
censoringY eltsin's protests.
That was aboutto change,though.At 9:00 P.M., "Vremia," the main
televisionnewsprogram,openedwith yet anotherreadingof the statementsand decreesof the GKChP, the country'sostensiblenew rulers.
And then, suddenly,amazingly,therewas Boris Yeltsin's burly figure
standingon an unfriendlytank outsidehis parliamentbuilding, spitting

312 ANN COOPER

out an eloquent denunciationof the coup. Yeltsin's audaciousact
would later becomethe most stirring symbol of resistanceto the coup.
Now, inexplicably, the putsch-controlledairwaveswere transmitting
this symbol to the entire country, along with a daring narration by
SergeiMedvedev,a youngreporterfor centraltelevision.
Medvedevinfonned his viewers about Yeltsin's call for a nationwide strike. When Yeltsin's image faded, there was Medvedevat the
barricadesaround the RussianWhite House, describing the barrierbuilding and interviewing a seriesof calmly determinedMuscovites
who hadcometo defendthe bUilding.
Medvedev'sreport sentan electrifying messagearoundthe country:
althoughthe putschistshad deployedtankson the perimeterof central
TV headquarters,
they were not in full control of what wentout on the
air. Psychologically,that bit of information was as important to the
resistanceaswasthe powerful imageof its leader,Boris Yeltsin.
After "Vremia," we had fewer callers from the provinces. Now
peopleknew; Y eltsin had drawn his line andurgedthe public to stand
behindhim. What would the peopledo?
On Tuesdaymorning, as we drove around Moscow, it seemedat
fIrst that the peoplewould acquiesceratherthan rebel. The city looked
dismayingly nonnal. Shopswere open, offices functioned, factories
produced.When I stoppedpeople on the streets,most said they opposed the coup, but few were ready to respondto Yeltsin's strike
appeal.
"We'll seehow thingsdevelopfurther," onewomantold me.
I askedwhat developmentsshe was waiting for. She said she and
her coworkerssimply hadn't yet gotten aroundto talking about Yeltsin'sappeal.
Whenmight they talk aboutit, I asked."After lunch," shesaid,looking
like shehopedI would go away. I expressedamazementthat morethan
twenty-fourhoursafter it began,shefelt no senseof urgencyabout the
coup--eventhough she claimedto sympathizewith Yeltsin. Nothing
strangeabout it, said the woman, explaining that the constructionoffIce wheresheworkedwas subordinateto the nationalgovernment.
"What difference does that make?" I asked, mystifIed by what
seemedto me a non sequitur.Irina guessedthat the womanworked in
a secret,defense-related
office andwas simply unableto copewith the
notion of questioninganyonein authority--evenmen who had illegally seizedpower.

THE FOREIGN PRESS 313

By early Tuesdaymorning all routes to the RussianWhite House
were mazesof barricades.Thesemade strong symbolsof resistance,
but they were rather pitiful defensesagainsta possibletank assault.
The buses,cars,bricks, and metal strewn acrossthe roadwayswould
prove no more effective than the barricadesof Vilnius or Tiananmen
Square,shouldthe military decideto attack.
The closerwe got to the White House,though,the morebuoyantthe
mood became.Severalarmoredvehicles had come over to Yeltsin's
side during the night. Unlike the troops on guard a couple of miles
away, down by the Kremlin, the soldiers on theserebel tanks were
smiling and chattingwith demonstrators.They werehappyto talk with
a reporter.
"The peopleelectedBoris Yeltsin, andthe army is with the people,"
saidoneparatrooperwhenI askedwhy his unit hadswitchedloyalties.
Othersoldiersrespondedwith similar slogans.It was nice rhetoric, but
no one was willing to tell me the details of how the group decidedto
defectto Yeltsin.
Even so, the paratrooper'sexplanationoffered a reminder of the
legitimacy Yeltsin had attainedwhen Russianvoters electedhim as
their Presidenttwo months earlier. Russianshad never before been
given the chanceto choosea leaderdemocratically.Yeltsin's decisive
mandatenow put him on the moral high groundas he battleda gangof
menwith no legitimateclaim on power.
The coup was one of life's rare momentsof absoluteclarity, when
many are called upon to choosesides, and there is no gray area for
retreat.As I pickedthroughthe campfiresanddebrisaroundthe White
House early Tuesdaymorning, it seemedto me that very few had
chosenYeltsin's side; in a city of nine million, only a few thousand
remainedafter Monday'sall-night vigil. Even later that day, when the
few thousandgrew to a rally of tens of thousands,the crowd looked
puny comparedwith the unbelievablemassesI had seenat anti-Soviet
rallies in the Baltic republics.
"It's not enoughpeople,"I thought asI watchedthe hourly expansionsandcontractionsof the White Housecrowd. But what constituted
"enough"?A military attacklaunchedwhenthe crowd haddwindledto
only a few thousandcould still easily becomea massacre.Perhapsit
wasthis nightmarishvision thatkept the tanksaway.
NPR'stwo weekdaynewsprogramsare on the air nine hoursa day,
and during a fast-breakingeventlike the coup, a correspondenthasto

314 ANN COOPER

be reachableby phonethroughoutthat broadcasttime. In Moscowthat
meant sitting tight by the telephone,at home. This was enormously
frustratingwhen I worked alone,as I usually did. But with Ben Roe in
town, one of us could be on the streets,calling in information, while
the otherpulled phoneduty.
Our broadcastlink was an ordinary phoneline like thoseavailable
to Soviet citizens. Internationalcalls had to be bookedin advance-perhapsone or two daysahead,to get throughto America. For several
months,though, I had taken advantageof a little-known fluke in the
phone systemthat allowed me to bypassSoviet operatorsaltogether.
Although I could not direct dial to America from my phone,I could
dial a call to Finland. Thus, I could easily reach the AT&T "USA
Direct" number in Finland and immediately be connectedwith any
telephonein the United States.
Now I worried that the putschistsmight shut down our only viable
connectionto NPR. Ironically, I should have worried about AT&T
instead.Ma Bell apparentlywas not awareof its illicit Moscow-to-Finland traffic until the coup causeda hugejump in its use.By September
the Finlandroute wasblocked--apparentlyat AT&T's request,though
no AT&T operatorcould evergive me a plausibleexplanationfor this
decision.
Fortunatelythe phonesneverwent down during the coup itself. In
fact, if the putschistsdid have any kind of blueprint for curtailing the
they nevercarriedit out. Our reports
work of foreign correspondents,
were not blocked,and we had considerableaccessto information---at
leastaboutthe resistance.
The hardpart, of course,was reportingon the putschiststhemselves,
who did not appearagain in public after the Monday night press
conference.Their whereaboutsand intentionsbecamethe subjectof
dozensof rumors over the next two days. But the only authoritative
information about them came from TASS, the governmentnews
agencywhosebosseshad put up little resistanceto the dictatesof the
coupleaders.
TASS's main rival was the independentnews service Interfax,
which managedto keepfunctioning throughoutthe coup, sendingfact
and rumor severaltimes a day to its fax clients. Interfax had a nationwide networkof aggressivereporters;Westernreportersconsideredits
reports uneven, but indispensable.During the coup, two of Gorbachev'smore moderateaidesusedInterfax to issue a statementde-

THE FOREIGN PRESS 315

mandingthe withdrawal of tanks and insistingthat the Presidentwas
not sick at all. The mostpoignantInterfax reportwas a rambling statement from former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze,who
monthsearlierhad stunnedthe world with his resignationand chilling
predictionof an impendingcoup.
"I am awarethat this may be a cry in the dark," beganShevardnadze,in his Interfax appealfor peacefulresistance."I would like you
to interpretmy messagecorrectly. May it not be regardedas a plea of
despair.It is first and foremostan expressionof hopeand confidence
in this country."
Fax machineswere crucial to Yeltsin's strategyfor challengingthe
coup leaders.Using his authority as RussianPresident,he issueda
seriesof decrees,essentiallytaking control of the RussianRepUblic.
Yeltsin aidestransmittedthesedecreesby fax to newspapersall over
the country. A couple of weekslater, in the southernRussiancity of
Krasnodar,I could seethe impactthis hadhadin the provinces.During
the coup, with other information sourcessilenced,Krasnodar'slocal
youth newspaperran all of Yeltsin's decreesverbatim; as a result,
readersmanyhundredsof miles from Moscowhadthe impressionof a
Presidentbusygrabbingcontrol from the coupleaders.
Krasnodar'sCommunistPartypaperdid not run Yeltsin's decrees-only the bulletins approvedby the putschistsandput out by TASS; An
editor at the Communistpapergaveme this absurdexplanation:while
he did receivethe Yeltsin faxes, he did not know whetherthey were
authentic,so he ran TASS instead.Little wonderthat the Yeltsin-appointedreformerswho took over in post-coupKrasnodarwere trying
to confiscatethe Partypaperandall of its property.
The putschistshad betterluck controlling the electronicmedia, although there was an important exceptionin Moscow. Moscow Echo
was a tiny independentstationthat hadkept Muscoviteswell informed
during the Januarysiege in Lithuania, when most other media were
muzzled.Severaltimes during the August coup securitythugs pulled
the plug on Moscow Echo, only to have it reappeara few hours later
from someother clandestinesite. The cat and mousegamegave the
Muscovitesa morale boosteverytime the stationcamebackon the air.
The reporting,though,turnedout to be lessthanreliable.
On Tuesdaynight, with Ben on the streetsfor us at the White
House,Irina andI hadMoscowEchotunedin during the singleviolent
clashof the coup. A breathlessreportercameon the air, describinga

316 ANN COOPER

line of tanks, lots of shooting and a death toll of aroundten. A few
minutes later, Moscow Echo's transmissionswent dead in mid-sentence. And a few minutesafter that I had to be on the air with NPR,
giving a live updateof what was going on. Needlessto say, my report
was full of gloom. Only a bit later, whenBen managedto call me, did I
realizethat therewas no tank assaulton the White House.The clashes
that did occurwere a few blocks away. Fortunately,Ben'seyewitness
descriptionreplacedmy misleadingreport when the "All Things Considered"broadcastwasrepeatedthat night.
By WednesdaymorningVolodia hadbecomean expertnavigatorof
the White House barricades,which extendedfor blocks beyond the
actual Russianparliamentbuilding. After picking up Irina and me, he
maneuveredthroughseeminglyimpassableroutes,depositingus atthe
Hotel Ukraina acrossthe river from the White House.Ben and some
other reportershad managedto grab an hour or two of sleep at the
Hotel Ukraina, and Irina and I brought them cookiesand soft drinks
for breakfast.Thesewere the non-nutritional,high-energymainstayof
my diet during much of my five frantic years covering the Soviet
Union.
After yet anothercookie breakfastI wadedthrough the crowds to
the emergencysessionof the Russianparliamentcalledby Yeltsin. In
the lobby I mingled with parliamentariansand journalists."We have
won," saida smiling Lev Timofeev, a gentlewriter who spentyearsin
prison for the intellectual honestyof his essayson Soviet economics.
Others told me essentially the same thing-that, having made it
througha crucial night with no attack,it now appearedthe military was
in rebellionandwould not comeafterYeltsin.
I remainedunconvincedas I went into the parliamentarychamber.
Before the sessiongot under way someonehad a seizure;the man's
desperategaspsseemedto me a horrible metaphorfor Russia'sstruggle againstthe putschists.
Russia'stop leaderstook the stage-Yeltsin,Prime Minister Ivan
Silaev, vice presidentAleksandrRutskoi, andthe parliamentarychairman RuslanKhasbulatov.Thesefour menpresentedan incredibleprofile in couragethroughoutthe coup; it remainsincomprehensibleto me
that their alliance collapsedsoon afterward--thatRutskoi and Khasbulatovlater becamethe bitterestofY eltsin's enemies.
After the dramaticspeechesin parliamentI rushedhometo file for
"Morning Edition." On the GardenRing RoadI noticedthat the tanks

THE FOREIGN PRESS 317

parked outside the Foreign Ministry press center had disappeared.
What could it mean?The presscenter was hardly a major strategic
target, yet it was one of the few buildings where tanks had beenstationed. I neededto find out what was happeningat Red Square,but
traffic in central Moscow made it impossible to go check and still
make my Morning Edition deadline. Volodia dropped me at home,
thendashedoff with Ben to inspectRed Square.
Unlike most of my colleagues,who lived in foreigners'compounds,
I renteda tiny Soviet apartment.An elderly neighborgot on the elevator with me, sortingthroughher mail.
"Our newspapersare very sadtoday," she told me. "Everything is
very sadtoday."
"Maybe it will all turn out all right," I said, not stoppingto explain
why I felt a suddenburstof optimism.
Half an hour or so later my optimism was confirmed.Ben calledto
say that he and Volodia arrived in time to witnessthe paradeof tanks
leaving Red Square. Soon after that I went on NPR with the first
concretenewsindicatingthe coupwasending.
The rest of the day was a wild paradeof rumors. Someputschists
had committedsuicide.No, they all boardeda planeto seekasylumin
CentralAsia. No, they were drunk in the Kremlin. No, they had been
arrested.No, they were headeddown to see Gorbachev,to beg his
forgiveness....
As the hostsof NPR badgeredus for confirmation of eachstory, I
recall finally going on one broadcast,running through every rumor I
had heardin the pastcoupleof hours,and endingby advisingthe host
to ''takeyour pick."
"Who's in control, who's running thecountry?"the hostspersisted,
was
until about4:00 A.M. on Thursday,when"All Things Considered"
headinginto its final hour. Damnedif I knew. All I could say with
certaintywasthat the putschistswere gone,Muscoviteshaddeliriously
celebratedtheir·departureat the White House,and Mikhail Gorbachev
wasbackin Moscow.An NPR hostwantedto know what Gorbachev's
return meantfor the future of the Union Treaty, a documentdefining
new relationshipsamong Soviet republics. I pointed out that since
dawn was just approaching,and democracyseemedout of dangerfor
the moment,most of Moscow was getting somewell-deservedsleep;
the fate of the Soviet Union could be resolvedlater, after everyone
woke up.

INTERVIEW WITH TATIANA MALKINA

The August 19 PressConference

Themass-circulationmagazineOgonek(October5-12, 1991)
publishedthis interviewwith TatianaMalkina, a twenty-four-year-old
journalistfor the newspaperNezavisimaiagazeta.TatianaMalkina
roseto fameat the August19pressconferenceofthe Emergency
Committeewhenshealonedaredto posethe unequivocalquestion:
"Couldyoupleasesaywhetheror notyou understand that
last night
you carried out a coupd'etat?" ThefolloWing accountweaves
interviewmaterialwith commentaryby thejournalist Asya
Kolodizhner.
Malkina: The 19th of August is my birthday. Mom got up at six in
orderto preparea lot of food for me to take to the office for a birthday
celebration.All departmentsof Nezavisimaiagazeta are in a single
large stable,a sectionof the former "Voskhod" factory. At work we're
all crazy aboutone anotherand so I decidedat onceto treat everyone.
Suddenly my mother woke me up: "Get up, Tania, they're saying
something on the radio. . . ." Half asleep, I respondedgrumpily:
"Comeon, Mom, can'tyou let me sleeponcea year." My motherthen
turnedup the radio all the way. And imagine,there I was, the angelic
birthday girl, lying in bed and swearinghorribly. Mom's usedto that.
Now I hadto wakeup my colleaguesandargueover who wasgoing to
wakeup the chief....

But of courseno one canceledthe refreshments.Tania'sexcited
coworkersgreetedthe victuals with a thunderousovation. At the
office, Taniafirst of all setaboutcalling Yanaev'ssecretary.
Malkina: During the previous two months at Nezavisimaiagazeta
we frequently discusseda similar version of the coup. We imagined
318

THE AUGUST 19 PRESSCONFERENCE 319

andtried to figure out who would do what to whom. I am a big fan of
odiousfigures. And thoseof us in our departmentagreedearly on that
[in caseofa coup] GennadiiIvanovichYanaevwas mine....
For mostof the summerTaniaaggressivelysoughtmeetingswith
the Vice President,whose secretary,Vladimir Nikolaevich, was
politenesspersonified,andwho promisedthat if GennadiiIvanovich wasgoing to grantan interviewto anybody,thenof courseit
would be to Nezavisimaiagazeta. ... Then he confidentially informed her that Yanaevjust couldn'tseeher right now. You see,
the Vice Presidenthad someambassadors
to see... from Mauritania, Tanzania.... The list of GennadiiIvanovich'sstateduties
was endless(maybe hewas getting ready for the coup?). Tania
punctuallyrang Vladimir Nikolaevichtwice a week, andhe soon
got to know her.
Malkina: Every now and then I got angry and said,"Listen, it's not
that the presstakessucha lively interestin GennadiiIvanovich. Could
it be really difficult to find time for a thirty-minuteinterview?"
"Now Tania," respondedthe secretary,"a half hour is not nearly
enough for your newspaper.We need to find time for a serious
discussion."
Eventually, my boss told me: "Just forget about him. Who cares
about this Gennadii anyway?" And then the EmergencyCommittee
camealong.
On the 19th I placedmy call. "Vladimir Nikolaevich, you owe me
one. Everythinghaschangedcompletely,everythinghasbecomes-o-o-o
interesting.GennadiiIvanovichis our Presidentnow,justabout...."
Vladimir Nikolaevich respondedgently, playing along as it were,
that Yanaevwas terribly busy and had pressingbusinessaffairs. He
askedme to call back in an hour. When I did so, he was very severe
with me. He saidthat therewould be no interview today, but that there
was going to be a pressconferenceat five o'clock. But he saidnothing
aboutthe specialone-timepassfor the pressconferenceor about the
fact that it would be hopelesstrying to attendit.

Tania went to the pressconferencewith a colleague.At the entranceto the building therewas a hugecrowd, someguards,and
admissionfor "pool" reportersonly. Journalistsare usedto sur-

320

TAT/ANA MALKlNA

prises,and after a long altercationwith the guards,Tania'scolleaguegot inside and handedsomesort of passto her behindthe
backof oneof the guards.

Malkina: There was a secondcheckpointright in front of the entranceto the auditorium, where you again had to show a pass.Once
more we had to dodge and enter together as a single ''pool.'' The
officer who frisked us almostgot hold of my macecartridge,which I
coveredwith a handkerchief.Luckily, however,he didn't realizewhat
it was. Oh, you know, I said to him, those are my personalitems,
feminine things, and I nervouslybeganto enumerateall kinds of cosmetic items.In short,we slippedthrough.
During the pressconferenceI wantedto standup, pull a stupidface,
and pronouncein a serious tone: "Gennadii Ivanovich! You know
today'smy birthday.Now in 1968at this time you weresendingtroops
into Czechoslovakia,but I was only a year old, and now today you've
offered me this present.A classypresent!Thank you!" Then I would
sheda few tears....
We were almost late, and we enteredsimultaneouslywith the ...
leaders.Suddenly,my mood turnedugly. Oh, what asses!It was not
just that they were scoundrelsand criminals, no, it was simply a
panopticon.. . . "Good heavens,"I thought, they are far outside the
boundsof reason,they are irrational and the irrationality can set in for
good." You know, they mademe experiencesucha feeling of ragethat
I simply wantedto stranglethem.... And yet the journalistswere still
asking such flabby questions.When it comesto poor Ignatenko[Gorbachev'spresssecretary],they hack at him as hard as they can, but
now thesesamehandsomethings can'tevenopentheir mouths... not
a word. . . . All the foreigners were sleeping or something.. . . The
only seriousquestioncame from the journalist from La Stampa.But
questionslike this arenot for theserulersmanques.
After the pressconferencepeoplebeganto recognizeTania on
the streetand in the subway. The reactionswere diverse. A female TV viewer calledthe editorial offices, insistedon speaking
to the editor-in-chief,and ventedher angeraboutTania'sbehavior at the pressconference.For somereason,she above all did
not like Tania'sdress.Then a young man sentin someverses...
which alsocontaineda few words abouther dress.

THE AUGUST 19 PRESSCONFERENCE 321

Tania'smotherwore this dressin her youth. It was considered
to be a holiday outfit, andTaniawould wearit if on a given night
she said to herself, ''Tomorrow I'll be a lady." And on the 19th
she was wearing it; it was her birthday, after all .... Her usual
form of dressis a pair of jeansanda sweater.
Malkina: I do not want to be rememberedby my fellow citizensas a
heroinebecauseof that one question.Any journalist from the Nezavisimaia gazetawould haveaskeda similar question.The pressconferencewas a purely emotionalmoment,andindeedwe realizedeventhat
morning that the whole thing was a soap opera and that the strings
werebeingpulled from backstage
....

There were many young journalists among those who did not
allow the news blackoutto develop.The majority of workers at
the newspaperRossiia are under thirty. They all stayedat the
White House during the coup and releasedover forty leaflets.
Tania Voloshina, who is twenty-sevenand the mother of fouryear-old Sasha,and Lena Moskaleva,who is twenty-two with
two children,led the editorial teamof Rossiiaon the fifth floor of
the White House for three days and three nights. . . . Moscow
Echodid not stopits work for an hour, evenafter it wastakenoff
the air. Democraticpublicationsput out the "Obshchaiagazeta."·
Any of the young peoplewho are accustomedto using Aesopian
languageor to concealingtheir gesturesof defiancecould haveaskeda
questionlike Tania's.They do not find it necessaryto struggleagainst
self-censorship,like their older colleagues.They are also unaware,it
would seem,of Glavlit [the USSRcensor].Thesejournalistswere not
educatedby Prague1968,but by the Baltics....
A truly independentpressis on its way.

*This was the nameof the joint newspaperput out during the coup by eleven
newspapers
bannedby the EmergencyCommittee.

INTERVIEW WITH VALERII KUCHER

A Russian Reporter Remembers
the Coup

Valerii Kucheris ajournalistfromMagnitogorsk.In 1983he became
the editor ofMagnitogorskiirabochii,a local newspaperhe helped
transforminto a radical mouthpieceofglasnostduring the Gorbachev
years.Kucher'soutspokenjournalism
won him a seatin the USSR
CongressofPeople'sDeputiesin March 1989.He was electedto the
newSovietparliamentas a representativeoftheJournalists'Union.
At the time ofthe coup he was the editor ofRossiiskievesti, the weekly
newspaperofthe governmentoftheRussianFederation.He was
interviewedin Moscowin March 1992by Irina Mikhaleva, who works
for the MoscowBureauofNationalPublic Radio.

We were awakenedby a call from Magnitogorsk.It was a little after
6:00 A.M. in Moscow. It was my daughter.The time differenceis two
hours."Do you havea coupd'etatthere?"We did not understandwhat
shewas talking about."Turn on your radio--youhavea coup d'etat."
So we turned on the radio at six in the morning and we heard the
announcement.
I drove to the White Houseat once. On my way there,I passedby
severaltanks. The first person1 saw at the White Housewas General
Kobets.We actuallyran into eachotheraswe were enteringthe White
House.He wasvery agitatedandkeptrepeating:"Damn it, damn it, we
must organizesomething,we must do something,we must organize
something."
"But what happened?What are we to do?" 1 askedhim and followed him to his office. 1tried to find out what washappening.
"I havejust come back from Yeltsin's dacha,"he said. "We have
322

A RUSSIANREPORTERREMEMBERS 323

decidedwe must organizethe defenseof the White House.The situation is dangerou!r-it'sa putsch.Anything couldhappennow."
It was hard to understandwhat was really going on at that point,
becausetherewasnobodyfrom the top leadershiparound.

Milcha/eva: What wasyour emotionalstateat that moment?
Kucher: I felt agitatedand disoriented.I should tell you, though,
that I was not vacillating, was not trying to make up my mind what
side I was on. No, it was completely clear to me. I was not even
consciousof any decision.Justas you aren'tconsciousof your heartbeat,so I was not consciousof the decision.It camenaturally, it went
without saying.... But I did feel anxious,agitated,becausetherewas
no informationaboutanything.I calledthe editorial office of the newspaper[Rossiiskievestl1,told themwhereI was, and askedthemto stay
put and wait for me. That's how I reactedat the beginning.I tried to
stayin closetouchwith the peoplein the leadership.

Milchaleva: What wasthe sceneat the White House?
Kucher: I went to the InformationCenter.Phoneswereringing nonstop. After a little while, newspeoplebeganto gather.The first newsI
heardwhen I got therewasthat arrestshadcommenced.It was closeto
9:00 A.M. I was told that arrestshad begun,that someindividuals had
been already arrested,that the EmergencyCommittee had already
launchedthe policy of repression.Soon afterward,the leadership,including SilaevandYeltsin, had a meetingwith the deputiesin orderto
makethe first announcement.I waspresentat that meeting,and it was
right there and then that Yeltsin spokeaboutthe eventsas a ''putsch.''
He did not equivocate,and this decisivenessand clarity in the use of
words struck me then and etcheditself deeply in my memory. These
were preciseterms. "It is a putsch,"he said, "it is a conspiracy."The
impressionhe conveyedwas that of great possible,probable danger,
andalsothat the situationwas graspedwith all the precisionandclarity
of which our languageis capable.This sharpdecisivenessandabsence
of any equivocationon the part ofYeltsin andhis closeaidessomehow
gavea more manageableshapeto my personalanxiety, straightenedit
out, so to speak.The situationbecameclearin my own mind, too.
I decidedto conveythis senseof clarity, this analysisof the events
to my colleagues,the news staff of Magnitogorskiirabochii. I did not
think that I was courtingpossibledanger,that peoplewould be divided

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into those who supportedor did not support the putsch. What was
important for me was to sharemy senseof the eventswith the people
of Magnitogorsk,to makesurethat they heardmy voice. So I arranged
to be interviewedover the phone.The interview cameout on August
20. In a way, I was infectedby Yeltsin's clarity and decisiveness,and
in the interview I, too, called a spadea spade:"It is a conspiracy,a
putsch, an attempt at a revanche."The guys at the newspaper--you
haveto understandthis is a provincial newspaper--were
very worried.
They took the whole night to put the issuetogetherand print it. The
workers who had a democraticorientationguardedthe paperthroughout the night. I have beentold also that not a single personleft the
editorial office until they finished printing the issue. In the morning,
evenbeforethe trams begangoing, they had hand-deliveredstacksof
the paperat the factory gates.So in part, thanksto my interview, which
was publishedin the issue,peoplewere informed about what kind of
an eventwas taking placein Moscow. While I was dictating the interview, I was looking out of the window of the White House. I was
trying to conveymy stateof mind, my feelings.
of resistancewere formed
I had the sensethen that the headquarters
very quickly, that self-defenseteamswere organizedalmostat once,as
peoplebeganto gatheraroundthe White House.

Milcha/eva: Did you havea senseon that first day that peopleat the
White Housewerebeingorganizedaccordingto someplan?
Kucher: I understandwhat you are asking. The answeris no. The
senseI had then was that I was witnessingsomesort of a spontaneous
organization,that it was self-generated,that peoplewere forming into
groups and undertakingactions as they went along. Things were organizedon the fly. I had the feeling then that I was completely,but
completely alone. You were on your own completely, with no one
standing over you, and you could do practically anything. If you
wanted,you could stay at home,or you could participate.It was up to
you. Those were the days of real choice, political, civic, individual
choice.As the eventswereunfolding, I almosthadthe senseof a cloud
cover lifting, of fog dissipating,of things becomingclear and lucid. It
was only thenthat I understoodwhat a horrifying country we hadbeen
living in, what dangerhad beenstalking us, what kind of organization
the CPSUreally was,what a monsterthat systemofpartocracywas! It
was only then that I fully understoodthoseideasthat I had beenvoic-

A RUSSIANREPORTERREMEMBERS 325

ing before the putsch--whetherin my conversationswith friends,
newspaperreports,or speakingat public rallies. Thosethreedaysgave
me the opportunityto gain a real understandingof the political choices.
I usedto teachRussiangrammarto little kids. In thosedays I was not
quite sureaboutthe rules myself, and I rememberthat I would finally
understandthis or that rule only in the courseof my explaining it to
them. Only then would I be able to find my own words to explain to
them why there should or should not be a comma here. Likewise,
during thosethreedaysI acquireda systemof my own convictionsand
my own argumentsin support.I hadheld the sameconvictionsbefore,
but only during the putsch did they permeatemy whole being and
becometruly my own.

Mikhaleva:What werethe mostmemorableeventsfor you?
Kucher: I rememberwell, first, how we were growing more and
more agitated; two, how fear inside the White House was growing
towardthe eveningof the 21st; three,how we experiencedthe senseof
growing clarity aboutour position: on the one hand,you felt growing
fear, on the other, growing resolve. There you were, with fear and
resolveseesawinginsideyou andoutsideyou. All of a suddenyou felt
terribly frightenedand then, out of nowhere,you would begin to feel
greatresolve.
I saw the centerof danger,which was inside the White House.But
then, I would leave the White House and practically a few hundred
yards away, life was as normal as ever, and peoplewere going about
their businessas though nothing had happened.I saw peopleleaving
the White House.Thosewere governmentofficials, eachcanying his
briefcase,hasteningto leave the area after the announcementof an
impendingattack had beenmade. A little later, when the dangerhad
passed,someof themwould comeback. Among themwere evengovernmentministerswho would come in and askfor firearms. After the
dangerwas over, they liked the ideaof paradingaboutthe placewith a
pistol. What I am saying is that somepeoplewere enjoying the playacting, some were practically posing, reminding me of Grushnitskii,
the poseurcharacterfrom Lermontov'sHero ofOur Time.
That first day, I wastrying to be close toYeltsin. That is why I was
able to see how he would come out to share his decision with the
people.I was not therewhen thosedecisionswerebeing discussedand
formulated, but I saw him come out with his new decision and an-

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VALERII KUCHER

nounceit to us. I wastherewith him on the White Housebalconyashe
spoke to the people, protectedby those large shields that his bodyguardsheld on both sidesof him. He was always very swift when he
was in public, almostdashing.Therewas that senseof certitudeabout
him. He first demonstratedit whenhe climbedthat tank with his megaphone.That happenedafter Yeltsin'smeetingwith the deputies.Silaev
spoke first, then Yeltsin appeared,followed by Burbulis and other
leaders.Yeltsin made his speechthen and left. He was followed by
GeneralKobets, and peoplelistenedto him no less attentivelythan to
Yeltsin. I recordedKobets's speech.He, too, wasvery clear,but unlike
Yeltsin, he did not offer any analysisof the events.He did saythat the
army would nevershootat its people,but he nevercalledthe GKChP
conspiratorsor putschists.He was very measured.There were also
questionsfrom the deputies.I rememberone repeatingthe questionof
some woman in the crowd when Yeltsin said to the soldiers: "You
won't shoot at your President,will you?" And that woman said: "It's
all very well that they won't shootat the President,but what aboutme,
will they shoot at me?" So one of the deputiesaskedthe samequestions.
ThenI arrivedat our editorial office, gatheredeverybodyandsaidto
them: "Folks, we've got to take a position. Our position should be
firm, We are for democracy,we are againstthe putschists.We must do
something."We hada small groupof peoplewith computers.This had
beena very recentdevelopmentwith us, we had just then gotten the
computerequipment.So, we put togetherleafletsandprintedthem. By
the eveningwe had a lot, and all of us, including the womenworking
in the accountingoffice, weredistributingthemby hand.

Mikhaleva:Hadn'tyour newspaperbeenshutdown by then?
Kucher: Yes, of course.We had actually talked to the printers,but
without much success.Our paper,from the very beginning,was conceivedas an alternativeto the Party'scentralpress.We werea Russian
paper.But our printer was the printing houseof Moskovskaiapravda.
They gaveus the runaroundat first, andtowardthe endof the day they
simply saidthat they could not print our paper.I hadhopedthey would
print us. So, we decided to go it alone. By ten that night, we had
alreadyproduceda large stackof leaflets with Y eltsin's first decrees.
And that's what we did every day. In the three-dayperiod, we issued
six leaflets,ifI remembercorrectly.

A RUSSIANREPORTERREMEMBERS 327

Milchaleva: How manycopiesdid you produce?
Kucher: Not that many-all that our equipmentcould produce.I
remembertaking a stack with me to Kalinin Prospect,and people
simply tore themout of my hands.I believethe reasonfew peoplegot
hold of theseleafletsis that they would quite literally tearthem apart,
trying to yank themout of one another'shands.This was an explosion
of glasnost:peoplebelievedevery word they readin them. We would
postthemwherewe could--in the subways,on lampposts,andso on.
Milchaleva: Whendid you get the sensethat the putschwasfailing?
Kucher: I was afraid that the White Housewould be attacked,I had
a strong feeling that would happen.As to the ultimate failure of the
putsch, I had no doubts about that almost from the very beginning,
before everybodyelse understoodit. The reasonis that I receiveda
phone call from the United Statesfrom my friend ProfessorSteve
Kotkin, an AmericanSovietologist.He calledme on the eveningof the
19th and askedme how I was doing, what was happening.I tried to
inform him the bestI could. He said,"Listen, Valerii, my predictionis
that it will all end very soon, two to three days at the most, and then
it'll be all over. So, don't worry." That'sthe kind of conversationI had
with my friend StephenKotkin. I knewthat he understoodthe situation
herepretty well, I was surethat his predictionwould cometrue. Jokes
aside, I did not think the putschistswould succeed,but I was pretty
surethey would try to attackthe White House.
On the 19th, we had printed our leaflets,distributedthem, and then
in the early hours of the morning, I left the White House and went
home. A few hours later, I was back there. I saw it as my function to
collect thedecreesand all other information there and passthem on
as soon as possible to the editorial offices, so that they could
quickly print them. Nobodygaveme this assignment-itall happened
spontaneously.
Speakingof interestingmoments,I rememberthat ftrst evening,I
cameout of the White Houseto seewhat was going on aroundit, and
there on the barricades,I saw the Japaneseambassador.It was the
20th. He drove up to the barricadesin his embassycar. I was very
intrigued by his presencethere. I walked up to him, greetedhim, and
asked for an interview. He agreed.After this interview, we became
friends. It was clearthat he wantedto makea statement.The Japanese
leadershiphad a ratherstrange,reservedreactionto the putsch,but he

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VALERII KUCHER

wantedto showwherehe stood,and it was very importantfor him that
an editor saw him there and even interviewedhim right on the barricades.For me it was importantto clarify for my readersthe Japanese
government'sattitude to the events.He was very judicious in his remarks,asyou canunderstand.
I had frequent meetingswith General Kobets during those days,
talked to him, interviewed him, saw how the security regime in the
White House was growing tighter and tighter. At a certain point, a
security detail took a position on the roof, and at a certainpoint, they
begandistributing bullet-proofvests. By the eveningof the 20th, the
internal White Houseradio stationbeganits broadcasts.I have a tape
of Sergei Stankevich'sreport about Gorbachevin Foros. All these
reportswere eagerlyawaitedand were quickly snatchedup by reporters and passedon to editorial offices. I always tried to passon this
informationto myoid colleaguesin Magnitogorskas well as my Moscow paper.
On the eveningof the 20th, the situationwas very grave. We were
expectingthe attack at any moment, and there were constantrumors
aboutthe "appointedhour" of the attack.Around ten in the evening,I
went home to pick up my wife. I wantedher to seethe White House
andwhat was happening around
there.Despiteall the barriers,etc., we
managedto get right into the thick of it, almost right up to the very
White House.We took a walk aroundthe barricades.I wantedto show
her what was going on, becauseshewasjust holedup in our apartment
on the Rublev Highway, frightened to death that something might
happento me. Peopleweresitting aroundbonfiresunderthe drizzle.... A
few days later, I found out that the head of the Moscow Weather
Bureausentan official letter to Ivan Silaevdenyingthe rumorsthat he
was in cahootswith the junta andthat it was he who usedsomemeans
to bring about the rain over the White House on the 20th. It was an
official letter, really, in which he deniedhis complicity in andability to
produce localized rainfall and asked Silaevto dispel all such suspicions. That kind of absurdity also took place then. Suddenly,many
governmentofficials beganto fear that they might be suspectedof
cooperatingwith thejunta.

Milchaleva: Wastherea PressOffice at the White House?
Kucher: Yes. It was Sergei Stankevich, for the most part, who
playedthe role of the PressSecretary.The importantinformation was

A RUSSIANREPORTERREMEMBERS 329

the decreesand official decisions,and as soon as I receivedthem, I
would passthemon to the editorial office.
On the eveningof the 20th (it could havebeenearly the next momin~I
can't can't recall now), I ran into Poltoranin, the Press Minister
[Chairman of Russia'sState Committee on the Press], in Yeltsin's
waiting room. I saidto him: "Mikhail Nikiforovich, look, we've started
publishinga newspaper,we print it ourselvesand then post it all over
the city. You know, the junta bannedus, but we couldn'tjust sit still,
so we found a way to print the mostimportantthings."
He said that they were discussingthe idea of an oppositionpress
and publishing a joint newspaperto tell peoplewhat happened."Get
on the phoneto Yegor Yakovlev," he said. ''Use the governmentline
and call him-he'swaiting to hearfrom people.Sendhim your representative."
This idea of publishinga joint newspaperwas floating aroundthen.
I rememberdiscussingit quite spontaneouslywith our correspondent,
Nikolai Vishnevskii. It was he who said to me during our planning
meetingat the editorial office that it would be a good ideato publisha
joint newspaperwith all the other bannedpapers.By the time we had
gottenhold of the telephonenumbersof the editors-in-chief,the idea,
as it turnedout, hadalreadysurfacedelsewhere.
After my conversationwith Poltoranin, I called Yegor Yakovlev
and askedhim what my newspaper'scontributionshouldbe, what we
should be writing now. He said: "Call Kommersant,send your own
reporterthere, and then you'll decidewhat you shouldcover. But for
the time being, we'll just publish a joint newspapercontainingall the
official decreesof the Russiangovernment,and if you don't mind,
we'll put your namedown,too, asa cofounderof the issue."
Of course,I agreed.But we did not have the time to bring out a
secondissueof thejoint paper-theputschwas over. The idea,though,
was to haveone liaison personfrom everypaper,somehowto coordinatethe coverage,and to publish it undera single roof, so to speak.I
liked this idea so much that I decided to set up a Club of Eleven
Editors, associatedwith my paper, and later on, sometimeafter the
putsch, we producedthe secondissue of this joint newspaper.This
thenwasthe opinion of everyoneof theseeditorsaboutthe situationin
the country. Actually, we put out two issuesafter the putsch. That's
how the idea of the joint newspaperwas realized.Of course,it had no
real future: eventhe two issuesthat I put togetherafter the putschwere

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VALERII KUCHER

a ratherartificial creation.My impulse was to preservethat feeling of
solidarity we all had then, but undernormal circumstances,therewas
neither a need for it nor an inclination. We simply do not have that
kind of causetoday,a powerful causeto bring everybodytogether.
Mikhaleva: What do think aboutthe radio reportingin thosedays?
Kucher: Of course,those days were ideally suited for the radio.
MoscowEchowas superb,unique.I tunedin as often as I could. They
did an excellentjob.
Mikhaleva: My own impressionis that, for the most part, in the
country as a whole, peoplereactedrather impassively,with indifference.Only a small numbertook an active part in the events.The rest
appearedindifferent. What do you think? What causedthis attitude?
Kucher: I explainit by the fact that peoplehadbeenlied to so much
and for such a long time that they simply could not understandwhat
was going on. Only now, perhaps,are they capableof more or less
soberanalysis.Indeed,only now is it begi~ing
to sink in what would
November
have happenedhad the putschistswon. Finally, the eventsdeveloped
so fast that peoplesimply did not havethe time to makejudgments,to
form an opinion. They could not appreciatethe enormity of what had
happened,that the entiresocialsystemhadchanged.
Mikhaleva: And you yourself, did you understandthat the putsch
meantthe endof communism,that communismwould cometo an end
in thesethree days, that the whole systemwould collapse?Did you
really think that on, say,Wednesdaythe 21st?
Kucher: No, of course not. I'll be frank with Yol.r-I could not
foreseethe rapidity with which the eventsactuallyunfolded.And I was
very surprisedthat things movedso fast. But I knew, I sensedit with
my whole body, that if the junta took the upper hand, democracyin
Russia would be doomed. But I did not understandthat this huge
machine,this enormousedifice, had suchspindly legs, was so easyto
knock down. As we wrote in that first issue of the joint newspaper
after the putsch,democracyhad won becausea free peopleand a free
presstook their standtogether.It turnedout that people'sinner mood,
inner feeling, was so much opposedto the CPSU and its system,so
much opposedto all they stood for, that the collapseof communism
did not take that much effort. But it is true therewasn'tany exuberant

A RUSSIANREPORTERREMEMBERS 331

reactionon the part of the people in those three days. They did not
respondin one big outburst,with fireworks and so forth, but slowly
and in different ways. They havebeenrespondingever since.It takes
time to absorb freedom, to becomecomfortable with it-that's my
opinion.

Mikhaleva: What about now? If a putsch were to happen now,
would it succeed?
Kucher: I know thereis talk like that andsomeregretthat the putsch
failed. But let us look at thosewho cameto defendthe White House.
They were younger people, for the most part. The veteransof the
CPSU, the Komsomol, the war veteransdid not man the barricades.
Young peoplecame,andthereweremanyyoungwomen.It wasa very
good-lookingcrowd, good faces.... Perhaps,for the young people,it
was an opportunityto put themselvesto a testas a social force. And of
course,in defendingthe White House,thesepeopledid not have any
specificpolitical or socialprogramin mind, they did not think that, for
example,we must take strong measures
to stabilizethe ruble, to carry
out a radical land reform and so forth. Thosewere not the slogansthat
movedthem in thosethreedays.What did they feel? My senseis that
peoplesimply could not standthe ideaof having thoseParty martinets
remain in power. Nobody wantedall thoseLukianovs,Ryzhkovs,all
thosemonsters,thoseParty bosses
to continuegoverningthe country.
Mikhaleva: What was Gorbachev'srole in all of this, in your opinion? I know it is a complex question, but I would like your own
personalopinion.
Kucher: In my reporting,I oncecameacrossan interestingdocument
-1 have written about it in my newspaper.It was a transcript of
Lukianov's talk with a delegationof Russia'sdeputies.It was not
intendedfor publication. Among them were Silaev and a few other
membersof the government.In this talk, Lukianovusedthreats,saying
that if Russiacontinuedto refuse to abide by the Union laws, there
would be unpleasantconsequences.
He spokewith authority, as one of
the key membersof the Union government;he spokeas the masterof
the situation. And in that conversation,he said that Gorbachevwas
awareof the measuresthat might be undertakenagainstRussia'sgovernment.Lateron, he changedhis tune.But the transcriptpromptedme
to write a note to Lukianov. Then, somemilitary peoplehavetold me

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VALERII KUCHER

that they interceptedGorbachev'scommunicationswith the Kremlin
on the eve of the coup. I askedthem if I could listen to the tape.They
promisedto give it to me, but I never receivedit. When I reminded
them of the promisesometimelater, they told me that they had lost it.
It is hard to say what actually transpired.However,during the putsch,
many in the White Housewere sayingthat Gorbachevknew aboutthe
plansto stagea coup.
Mikhaleva: Tell me more about what people were thinking about
Gorbachevin the White Housein thosedays?
Kucher: Peopleassociatedwith the apparatof the Council of Ministers
- I emphasize,the apparat--triedhard to raise suspicionsabout Gorbachev; some in the military did too. Again I emphasizethat these
were the officials of the apparat,not electedofficials; they were officials who are no longer there. They tried to presentGorbachevas a
virtual accompliceof the putschists,if not the actual leader. Those
people,I would say,weresimply scoundrels.As to the electedofficials
of the SupremeSoviet, the democraticleadership,they had a clear
position: "What happenedto the President?If he is sick, give us the
opinion of medical experts.Tell us where he is. Give us preciseand
clearinformation. Demandto speakto the President."Thosewere two
distinct attitudes.It was clearthat one segment,the apparat,wantedto
count him with the traitors, to implicate him, to compromisehim.
Indeed,how else can one interpret that incident when I was told that
they had the tape of an interceptedcommunicationand then was told
that the tapehadbeenlost? Why did they approacha reporterwith this
sort of information? It's a question,isn't it? PerhapssomedayI will
name that person.Moreover, that personsaid to me: "We'll use the
tapewhenthe time is right."
So, to sumup what I think aboutGorbachev,I believethat he could
not have been among those who were preparedto use violence and
terror againsttheir own people.That is my personalconviction. As to
the rest, I have no idea. When they talked to Gorbachevpreviously
aboutthe necessityto introducea stateof emergency,he may havesaid
somethingto them that they interpretedas tacit approval. He could
havemeantonething andthey understoodit in their own way. Perhaps
there is some truth to those who say that his equivocationswere so
ambiguousthat one could interpret them any way one wished. And
surely he had doubtsabout his course,about his methods;surely, he

A RUSSIANREPORTERREMEMBERS 333

consideredall sorts of options in trying to find a way out of an impossiblesituation,agonizedoverthem. But I do not believethat he was
capableof thosemethods,of that role, of that massivelie. It is unthinkable for me. Of course,there are also somepeoplenow who want to
presentthe putschas a kind of comic opera.But the dangerwas real.
And it wasn'tjust the tanksthat posedthis danger,not the immediate
threatof violence.The questionwasthe coursethe countrywould take:
towarddemocracyor towardpartocracy.That wasthe fork in the road.
Mikhaleva: But why would peoplewho had alreadybeeninvested
with power, why would thosepeoplestagea coup?In order to prove
that they actually had power? After all, Kriuchkov and Yazov had
plenty of power, they pretty much controlled the situation. So why
would the peoplewho hadreal powerdecideto stagea coup?
Kucher: You know what?They did not havepowerover the people.
It was a strangesituation.For this is a real mystery: what is the relationshipbetweenthe peopleandthe rulers?Eventoday,I do not understandwhat it should be. But I know that in one way or another,the
peoplegive the rulers their consent,which allows the governmentto
carry out its policy. What the putschistsdid not havewas that consent,
they did not have influence amongthe people,they could not gain a
sure footing. For that reason,they decidedto destroythose who had
and continuedto gain influenceamongthe people.Take our problems
today [early 1992]. If it had been Pavlov who decontrolledprices,
peoplewould have tom him to shreds.It is a questionof trust, and
becausepeopletrust this government,they are not in revolt. That is
why they arestill toleratingboth Yeltsin and[Yegor] Gaidar.
That is what the putschistsdid not have,that is what they had lost.
Even though they had the opportunity to issueorders,to use all the
trappingsof this enormousstate, theyunderstoodthat peoplehad an
aversionto them. They were outsidethe people.How did this come
about?I think that peoplehadbecome sosick of this Party, sick of the
corruption aroundthem, sick of this small clique presidingover their
lives, their apparentincompetence.Peoplehad grown to hate them so
much that it was imperativefor the Party bossesto do something.To
throw tanksagainstthe people?That, obviously,could not achievethe
desiredeffect. So what they set out to do was to destroya few democrats.They could havebeeneffective had they carriedout large-scale
repression,had they managedto destroy physically the people who

334

VALERIl KUCHER

were on their list. But they failed. What they did not understandis that
they would have had to destroy hundredsof millions in order to reinstill fear in people.Peoplehadlost fear.

Milchaleva: Why?
Kucher: It was not the kind of anny that could do that. I remember

talking to one of the first tankerswho arrived at the White House. I
askedhim: "Who areyou?"
"We are Soviet,"he said.
"What the hell is Soviet?" I replied, "and what the hell did you
comeherefor?"
Lateron, I realizedthat this was not the right approachfor talking to
those people. They were frightened or something,they looked confused.For a soldier,to attackyou hadto be sureof yourself,andthat is
what they lost, they were not sureof themselvesany more.This confusion createda vacuum,a split: they were not yet citizensof Russia,but
they were no longer thesoldiersof that old system.An anny in sucha
psychologicalstateis not capableof violence againstthe people.It is,
in this sense,partof the people.

Mikhaleva: Returningto thosethree days at the White House,who
were thepeoplewho impressedyou most?What was the most memorableevent?
Kucher: Governmentofficials fleeing the White House looked to
me like cartoonbureaucratswith briefcases.For the first time in my
life, I was able to seewhat the apparatwas really all about. They all
looked alike, all carried similar-looking briefcases.The apparatwas
leaving the White House.In droves.That was the first, most memorable picture.
November for the first time--what it
Second,I saw and felt~xperienced
meantto make a real choice.I saw this in simple people.I saw this in
militiamen, armedand wearing flack jackets.They were the first line
of defense,and they would have beenmowed down in the first few
secondsof the attack. But they would not have turned back. People
were facing possibledeath,just simplepeople,andthey were standing
firm--unlike the bureaucrats. Istill carry this picture vividly in mind:
someare fleeing, andsomearestandingfirm.
And here is anotherimpressionthat cuts deepinto my memory. At
momentsof great stress,some people think only about themselves,

A RUSSIANREPORTERREMEMBERS 335

aboutthe opportunityto glorify themselves,to promotethemselves.I
saw in those days some individuals placedhigh in the government
who, after the main dangerhad alreadypassed,were asking for personal weapons.And they would sling thoseover the shoulder.It was
clearthat this was all make-believe.The samecould be saidaboutall
thoseoratorswho suddenlyappearedout of nowhereand beganmaking fiery speechesafterthe couphadfailed.

Milchaleva: What aboutthe situationinsidethe White House?
Kucher: To my surprise,the White Housefor a long time smelledof
the people.It becamedemocratic,totally democraticto the point that
things were strewn aroundall over the place, cannedfood, heapsof
breadloaves,cigarettebuttson the floor, massesof peoplesleepingon
the floor, including reporters.It was some kind of a revolutionary
flophouse.Everythingwas simple,primitive even-notlike today. Today you needa passto get in, andyou cannotevenget into the cafeteria at StaraiaSquare.* The danger,the mortal dangerpeoplefacedthen,
madeyou feel absolutelydemocratic.You felt like the otherguy, it gave
you a senseof solidarity, a greatsensationof democracy.Nobody cared
aboutrank or otherdistinctions---justpeople.Doors were open: feel free
to comeinto any office. Everythingtherewas in motion. But therewasa
time when the White House was practically empty, with only a few
individuals stayingput. It was whenorderswere issuedfor everybodyto
leavethe White Houseby five in the afternoon.The attackwas expected.
So therewereten, maybetwenty minutes,the mosttragic twentyminutes,
when the entire building was empty while outsidea seaof peoplewas
lapping at the White Housewalls. In thosemoments,the White House
was quiet and empty--like a bomb shelter,with a few securitypeople
armedto the teeth(originally, therewaslittle weaponryaround).
Milchaleva: Was it true that merchantscameto the barricadeswith
loadsof food andcigarettesto distributefree of chargeto the defenders
of the White House?
Kucher: Yes, that was true, therewere mountainsof sausageat the
White House,mountainsof bread,cigarettes,tea, and so on. Indeed,
the White Housereekedof smokedsausageandbakedbreadfor weeks
*Now the executiveheadquarters
of the Russiangovernment.the buildings on
Staraia(Old) Squareformerly belongedto the CentralCommitteeof the CPSU.

336

VALERII KUCHER

afterward.Businessmenwere not the only oneswho were responsible
for this cornucopia;the White Housesupply staffhaddonea lot also.I
recall whenGeneralKobets was only beginningto think aboutorganizing the defenseof the White House, practically the first thing he
thought about was finding portable toilets. And he did find some.
There was also a lot of intelligence gathering, tracking of the
putschists'moves: for example,the headquartersat the White House
wereawareof everyairplanetakeoffand landingon the territory of the
Soviet Union; they knew aboutevery movementof troops.They were
receiving confidential information from the GeneralStaff, of course.
Then, deputieswere sentto meetwith the troops on the GardenRing
Road....
But let me tell you that somepeoplewere making moneyon it, too.
Oneguy approachedme andofferedme somethingfor money.He was
speculating.I meanthat evenamid thesetragic events,somemembers
of the intelligentsiaelite were seekingto promotethemselves,someof
the commonfolk were looking for opportunityto makea profit. That,
too, was part of the picture, as it always happenswhen really big
eventstake place---thegood was side by side with the bad,the tragic,
sideby sidewith the ridiculous.

Chronology of Eventsof
August 19, 20, 21,1991

In compilingthis ChronologyofEvents,the editorsrelied on several
publishedchronologies;documentssuchas the decreesissuedby the
EmergencyCommitteeandby thegovernmentofRussia;their own
memoriesofevents;and-because
thereare manyinconsistencies
amongall the above--agooddealofcommonsense.*Accordingly,
the chronologyshouldbe usedwith caution.Notealso that timesgiven
for someofthe eventsrefer to the momentoftheir beingreportedby a
newsserviceandnot necessarilythe momentwhentheytookplace.
The world found out about the conspiracyon Monday, August 19,
1991,but the coupd'etatassuchhadcommencedon the previousday.
On Sunday,August 18, in the Presidentialvacationhome in Foros,
in the Crimea,Mikhail S. Gorbachevwas at work on his speechfor the
signingof the Union Treaty(the signingwasscheduledfor August20).
At 4:00 P.M., he discussedhis speechon the telephonewith his aide,
Georgii Sbakbnazarov,who was stayingat a nearbyresort.At 4:50 P.M.,
Gorbachevwas informed that a delegation,headedby his chief of
*The following sourceshave been used: Khronika putcha: chas za chasom.
Sobytiia19-22avgusta1991 v svodkakhRossiiskogoInformatsionnogoAgenstva
(Leningrad, 1991); Putsch: The Diary (Oakville-New York-London: Mosaic
Press,1992); Current Digest of the SovietPress,vol. 43, nos. 33 and 34 (1991);
Komsomolskaiapravda, August 22, 1991; . . . Deviatnadtsatoe,dvadtsatoe.
dvadtsatpervoe... (Moscow, 1991); Valentin Stepankovand Yevgenii Lisov's
Kremlevskiizagovor: versiia sledstviia,(Moscow, 1992); and GeneralAleksandr
Lebed'smemoirSpektak/nazyvalsiaputch,publishedin Tiraspol in 1993,the first
installmentof which wasreprintedin LiteraturnaiaRossiia,September24, 1993.
337

338 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST 19,1991

staff, Valerii Boldin, and including the Chief of the SecurityDirectorate of the KGB, Yurii Plekhanov,had arrived--uninvited--andwas
requestinga meetingwith him. Reachingfor the telephoneto find out
the reasonfor this surprisevisit, Gorbachevdiscoveredthat all of his
lines of communicationwith the outsideworld had beencut. After a
brief family council, Gorbachevmet the visitors, who, speakingin the
name of the EmergencyCommittee,offered him an ultimatum: sign
the declarationof the stateof emergencyandtransferpresidentialpowers to Vice PresidentYanaev,or resign. Gorbachevrefusedto do either. The delegation returned to Moscow empty-handed,and the
machineryof the coup d'etat, much of it slappedtogetherat the last
moment,went intomotion.
August19, 1991
1:00 A.M. GennadiiShishkin, First Deputy Director of TASS, is awakenedby a
phonecall from Leonid Kravchenko,the Director of Gosteleradio,and asked
to cometo the CentralCommitteeheadquarters.
4:00 A.M. The SevastopolRegimentof the KGB surroundsGorbachev'sdachaat
Foros in the Crimea. The runway at the airstrip where the presidentialplane
and helicoptersit is blocked on the order of Commanderof the Air Defense
Forces,Colonel GeneralMaltsev.
4:30 A.M. A codedcable, signedby the Minister of Defense,Dmitrii Yazov, is
sentto the Commanderof the FarEastForces;the Commanderof the Airborne
ParatrooperForces;commandersof army groups,military districts and fleets;
and headsof the chief and central directoratesof the Ministry of Defense,
ordering them to upgradethe readinessstatusof the forces undertheir commandto battle-ready.
6:00 A.M. Centraltelevision and radio are takenover by the StateCommitteefor
the Stateof Emergency,consistingof eight governmentofficials: Vice President
Gennadii Yanaev; KGB headVladimir Kriuchkov; DefenseMinister Dmitrii
Yazov; Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo; Prime Minister Valentin
Pavlov; First Deputy Chairmanof the National DefenseCouncil and leaderof
the military industrial complex Oleg Baklanov; chairmanof Peasants'Union
Vasilii Starodubtsev;andthe Presidentof the Associationof StateEnterprises
and Industrial Groupsin Production,Construction,Transportation,and Communications,AleksandrTiziakov. Only one nationwide channelis broadcasting. Eachhour, the following items areread:Decreeof Vice PresidentYanaev;
Declarationof the Soviet Leadership;Appeal to the Soviet People;Appeal to
[Foreign] Statesand Governmentsand the SecretaryGeneral of the United
Nations; ResolutionNo. 1 of the EmergencyCommittee; and a declaration

CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST 19,1991 339

criticizing the Union Treaty by Anatolii Lukianov, Chairman of the USSR
SupremeSoviet. All of these statements,exceptfor Lukianov's declaration,
pronounceGorbachevto be "no longercapableof performinghis dutiesdueto
the stateof his health." Lukianov's declarationis datedAugust 16, 1991; the
others,August 18, 1991.
Minister of DefenseDmitrii Yazov, a memberof the EmergencyCommittee, convenesa meeting of the commandersof the country'smilitary districts. His instructions: maintain order and increasesecurity at military
installations.
7:40 A.M. KGB personnelenter the offices of the Moscow Echo radio station,
shutit down, and sealthe premises.
8:25--9:00A.M. In Lithuania, the Radio and Television Centeris taken over by
Soviet Army troops.Broadcastsare interrupted,but radio transmissioncontinuesin the capital,Vilnius.
Oneof the first stepsby the conspiratorsis to limit the pressto nine central and
Moscownewspapers.
8:30 A.M. Viktor Urazhtsev,People'sDeputy of the RSFSRandthe chairmanof
Shield, a veterans'association,is arrestedoutsidethe RSFSRSupremeSoviet
Building (hereafter,the White House).
9:00 A.M. Telrnan Gdlian, a USSR People'sDeputy famous for his struggle
againstofficial corruption,is arrestedin his apartmentby agentsof the KGB.
He is held under guardwith two other RSFSRdeputies,Mikhail Kamchatov
andNikolai Proselkov,at a military baseoutsideMoscow.
The "Appeal to the Citizens of Russia"is signedby the Presidentof Russia,
Boris Yeltsin; Ivan Silaev, PrimeMinister of Russia;andRuslanKhasbulatov,
Acting Chairmanof the SupremeSoviet of Russia.The appeal declaresthe
StateCommitteefor the Stateof Emergencyalong with its decreesand orders
to be illegal and unconstitutional;orders local authoritiesto observestrictly
constitutionallaws and presidentialdecrees;demandsthat Gorbachevbe allowed to addressthe country; convenesan ExtraordinarySessionof the Congress of People'sDeputies of the USSR; and calls for a general strike in
supportof thesedemands.
The Moscow City Soviet setsup headquartersto deal with the emergencysituation.
9:20 A.M. Yeltsin signs DecreeNo. 59, declaringthat (1) the EmergencyCommittee is unconstitutionaland its actions a coup d'etat; (2) decisionsof the
EmergencyCommitteehave no legal force on RSFSRterritory; and (3) officials following the ordersof the EmergencyCommitteeare in violation of the
RSFSRCriminal Codeandsubjectto prosecution.

340

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9:30 A.M. In Moscow, movementsof military columns begin, including army
trucks, tanks, and armoredpersonnelcarriers (APCs). Broadcastingover the
Russiantelevisionchannelof RussianFederationbroadcastingis interrupted.
10:00 A.M. The PressServiceof the Foreign Ministry of the RussianFederation
announcesthat foreign correspondents
are invited to a pressconferenceto be
held at 11:00A.M. in the Houseof Sovietsof the RussianFederation(hereafter
the White House).Yeltsin is expectedto conductthe pressconference.
The Leningrad Military District Commander,GeneralViktor Samsonov,announceson local radio andtelevisionthe formation of the StateCommitteefor
the Stateof Emergencyand the introductionof emergencymeasuresaffecting
the workplace,public transport,the media, and communications.Strikes and
public meetingsareprohibited.
The Presidiumof the SupremeSoviet of the RSFSRdecidesto convenean
emergencysessionof the SupremeSovieton August21, 1991.
APCs surroundKomsomolskaiapravda'seditorial offices.
10:30A.M. PrimeMinister Pavlov,a coupleader,suffersan attackof hypertension.
11 :00 A.M. A large tank column advancesinto Moscow along the Minsk
Highway.
11:30A.M. Membersof the USSRCommitteeon ConstitutionalOversightsign a
statementdeclaringthe formation of the EmergencyCommitteeto be without
legal foundation. The statement,heavily distortedby the headof the official
newsagencyTASS, Lev Spiridonov,is publishedin the Tuesdaypapers.
11:45 A.M. Demonstratorsbegin arriving at Manezh Squarebearingbannersof
protest.No measuresare taken to dispersethe crowd. Vladimir Zhirinovskii,
leaderof the Liberal-DemocraticParty, is chasedfrom the squareby protesters.
11:54 A.M. An army captaininterviewedoutsidethe building of the news agency
TASS assertsthat his unit would use its weaponsagainstthe civilian population if so ordered
12:19 P.M. A spontaneousgatheringtakes place on Manezh Squareand across
from the Moscow City Soviet. Ten armoredvehiclesarrive from Maiakovskii
Squarebut are blockedby the crowd on TverskaiaStreet.The White Houseis
reportedlysurroundedby tanks.
12:30 P.M. Armoredtransportvehiclesmoving towardthe centerof Moscow are
stoppedby the crowd in front of the Moscow City Soviet. Demonstrators
mount the vehicles and the vehicles tum back. The Russiantricolor flag appearsin the window of the city soviet. Yeltsin is expectedto speak.

CHRONOWGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST 19. 1991

341

The spontaneous
gatheringon ManezhSquarenow numbersseveralthousand
peopleand continuesto grow. Yeltsin's address"To the Citizensof Russia"is
read and word about Yeltsin's call for a generalstrike spreadson Manezh
Square.Demonstratorsblock TverskaiaStreetnear the Hotel National with
two trolley cars.
Tanks have beenpositionedat all bridgesin Moscow. According to Moscow
Echo, the Commanderof the Moscow Military District, Colonel GeneralNikolai Kalinin, newly appointedby Yanaev, announcesthat a state of emergencyhasbeenintroducedin Moscow.
Chairmanof the USSRSupremeSoviet Anatolii Lukianov hasannouncedhis
intention to convenean emergencysessionof the USSR SupremeSoviet on
August 26 and suggeststhat committeesof the SupremeSoviet begin to considerthe decreesof the EmergencyCommittee.
1:00 P.M. Yeltsin hasemergedfrom the White HouseandmountedTank No. 110
of the Taman Division, from which he appealsto Muscovites and all the
citizens of Russiato give a worthy responseto thoseinvolved in the putsch
and to demandthe return of the nation to normal constitutionaldevelopment.
Standingnext to Yeltsin, Nikolai Vorontsov and GeneralKonstantinKobets
also addressthe small crowd.
1:30 P.M. Military vehiclescontinueto massaroundManezhandTheaterSquares.A
motorizedrifle unit is posted at the Bolshoi Theater.Buseswith special assault
troopsare parkednearthe Historical Museum.Demonstratorsagainstoparmored
carriers betweenManezh Squareand Alexander Garden. Army Major Viktor
Gogolev publicly announcesthat there are no ordersto shoot A Moscow City
SovietDeputy announcesto the crowd that two factoriesare out on strike [unconfirmed] andPeople'sDeputyTelmanGdlianhasbeenarrested.
A groupof demonstratorsleavesfor the White House.A largeconcentrationof
military personnelis observedin the vicinity of the White House.
RuslanKhasbulatovhas announcedthat the Presidiumof the SupremeSoviet
has resolvedto convenean emergencysessionof the SupremeSoviet of the
RussianFederationto be held on August21. One issuewill be on the agenda:
"The political situationin the republic owing to the coupd'etat."
1:35 P.M. Major GeneralAleksandr Lebed arrives at the White House on the
ordersof the Commanderof the Airborne ParatrooperForces(APF), Colonel
GeneralPavel Grachev,to take commandof the defenseof the White House
with the SecondBattalion of the RiazanRegimentof the APF. The missionis
accomplishedthatnight.
2:00 P.M. The CentralTelegraphin Moscow, now controlledby a troop of military
personnelfrom the TamanDivision, hasterminatedintercity and international
communications.

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People'sDeputiesof the RussianFederationhavecalled on the Muscovitesto
cometo the White Houseto defendit from possibleattack.
2:37 P.M. In Leningrad,Nina Andreeva,an outspokenconservative,expressesfull
supportfor the coup and the expectationthat a majority of the Soviet population will supportit, with the exceptionof MoscowandLeningrad.
2:43 P.M. In Leningrad,an emergencysessionof the LeningradSoviet is to be
convenedat 4:00 P.M. A crowd of about 1,000 people gathersoutside the
building.
3:10 P.M. The Commanderof the Air DefenseForces,Colonel GeneralMaltsev,
has issuedthe following order over the telephone:"There havebeenattempts
on the part of people close to Gorbachevto break through to Gorbachev.If
such attemptsare repeated,I order you to arrestall involved and hand them
over to the KGB." This information is publicized by Sergei Stankevichon
August20 overthe White Houseintercomsystem.
3:28 P.M. According to the RussianInformation Agency, Gorbachevis under
housearrestat his dachain the Crimea.
The Memorial Societyissuesa statementcondemningthe coup.
3:30 P.M. At the White House,barricadesare erectedout of stonesand bricks to
preventthe stormingof the building which, as rumor hasit, will begin at 4:00
P.M. In the White House,a staff for the defenseof the building is organized
under Colonel GeneralKonstantin Kobets, designatedChairmanof the State
Committeeof the RussianFederationfor Defense.[The decreeconfirming the
appointmentis signedon August20.]
4:00 P.M. The air spaceover and the sea and approachesto Gorbachev'sresidencein Foroshavebeendeclaredoff limits by the EmergencyCommittee.
4:47 P.M. Yeltsin has issuedDecreeNo. 61 transferring all executiveorgans,
including the KGB, the MVD, and the DefenseMinistry at the All-Union
level, to his authoritywithin the RussianFederation.
4:57 P.M. The Council of Ministers of the RussianFederationissuesthe resolution "On the Illegal Introduction of the State of Emergency" supporting
Yeltsin's "Appeal to the Citizens of Russia" and DecreeNo. 61. The LeningradCity Sovietissuesa similar statement.
5:00 P.M. In Moscow, RussianPrime Minister Ivan Silaev holds a meetingnearthe
White Houseand readsthe two presidentialdecreesand the resolutionof the
Council of Ministers of the RussianFederation.He calls upon Muscovitesand
Russiansto opposethe unconstitutionalcoup d'etat. He statesthat the whereaboutsof Gorbachevareunknownto the Russianleadership.

CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST19,1991 343

Armored carriersclearall approachesto ManezhSquare.The trolleycarsoverturned by demonstratorsacrossfrom TverskaiaStreet are removed and armored vehicles placed along all streets leading to the square. An officer
requeststhat the gathering disperse,but the crowd is now growing again.
Copies of the presidentialaddressand decreeshower down onto Tverskaia
Streetfrom windows in the MoscowCity Soviet.
Meanwhile,Yanaev,Pugo,Baklanov,Starodubtsev,and Tiziakov are holding
a press conferenceat the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs PressCenter.
Yanaevstatesthat Gorbachev"is restingand undergoingmedicaltreatmentin
the Crimea." He explainsthat the stateof emergencyhasbeendeclared"in a
very difficult periodfor the countryin orderto avoid excessesof any sort."
5:10 P.M. Yeltsin issueshis Appeal of the Presidentof Russiato Soldiers and
Officers of the USSR Armed Forces,the KGB, and the Ministry of Internal
Affairs [MVD]. Characterizingthe actions of the EmergencyCommittee,he
says:"The 'order' promisedus by the self-appointedsaviorsof the Fatherland
will end in wholesalesuppressionof dissent,concentrationcamps,and nighttime arrests."
In Moscow, tanks and military vehicles attemptingto cross Borodin Bridge
toward the city centerwere stoppedby demonstratorswho have blockedthe
route with busesandtrolleycars.The military forcestum back, with one officerfiring his automaticrifle into the air.
5:15 P.M. The barricadesaround the White House have been reinforced with
concreteblocks and dumpsters,but there has been no attempt to storm the
building. SeveralthousandMuscoviteshaveformed a humanchain aroundthe
building complexin orderto defendit.
5:30 P.M. Yeltsin has issuedPresidentialDecreeNo. 62 creating"a government
in exile," including Vice PremierOleg Lobov; memberof the Presidiumof the
RSFSRSupremeSoviet,SergeiKrasavchenko;andmemberof the StateCouncil, Aleksei Yablokov. They leave Moscow for Sverdlovsk(Yekaterinburg)
andestablishtemporaryheadquarters
in a specialbunker70 kilometersoutside
the city.
The USSR Central Bank has announcedthat it is terminatingthe saleof hard
currencyto citizensgoing abroadon personalbusiness.
5:55 P.M. At the emergencysessionof the LeningradSoviet, the deputiesoppose
the introduction of a state of emergencyin the city. Sobchakhas flown to
Leningradfrom Moscow. All approachesand entriesto the LeningradSoviet
havebeenblockedby trucks.
6:00 P.M. A meetingof the USSRCouncil of Ministers is convenedby Valentin
Pavlov to discussthe operationof the economyunderthe stateof emergency.
Among the ministerspresentat the meeting,only Minister of Culture Nikolai

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Gubenko and Minister of Environmentand Natural ResourcesManagement
Nikolai Vorontsov expresstheir loyalty to PresidentGorbachev.Vorontsov
offers to serveas an intermediarybetweenthe EmergencyCommitteeand the
Russianleadershipin the White House.
A scheduledplenary sessionof the CPSU Central Committee is postponed
until the USSRSupreme Soviethasbeenconvenedto discussthe introduction
ofthe stateof emergency.
6:38 P.M. Yeltsin hasissuedhis Appeal of the Presidentof Russiato the Patriarch
of All Russia.
7:00 P.M. The Congressof Compatriotsopensin Moscow. Yeltsin is now not expectedto officially openthe congressas plannedfor 7:00 P.M. Participantsin the
congressissueno statementregardingthe unfolding eventsin the country.
7:20 P.M. LeningradMayor Anatolii Sobchakappearson Leningradtelevision's
program "Fakt" along with Deputy Mayor ViacheslavShcherbakovand the
head of the Leningrad Regional Soviet, Yurii Yarov. Sobchak calls for a
political strike and a rally to take place the following day on St. Isaac's
Square.Earlier in the day, Sobchakreportedat an emergencysessionof the
LeningradCity Soviet that PresidentGorbachevhad beenaskedto resign but
had refused and demandedto be allowed to make a televised appearance.
Sobchak'sspeechat the sessionof the city soviet was broadcastlive by radio
to St. Isaac'sSquarewhere a protest rally was taking place. The work of
erectingbarricadeshascontinuedoutsidethe city soviet.
8:08 P.M. The presscenterof the LeningradKGB acknowledgesthat the introduction of the stateof emergencycameas a surpriseto many KGB officers. It
appearsthat supportfor the StateEmergencyCommitteewithin the KGB is far
from unanimous.
8:52 P.M. The RussianInformation Agency reports that Yeltsin has addressed
severalthousandpeoplegatheredoutsidethe White House.He announcedthat
the Russiangovernmentwould remainin the White Housearoundthe clock.
9:00 P.M. The USSRtelevisionnewsprogram"Vremia" goeson the air according
to its regularschedule.In additionto the readingof the EmergencyCommittee
decrees,the programcontainssensationalreportsfrom MoscowandLeningrad
showing--ina sympatheticlight-massresistanceto the coup.
9:40 P.M. The "Vremia" studio receivesirate phone calls from, among others,
Boris Pugo,CPSU Politburo memberAleksandrDzasokhov,and the headof the
MoscowParty organization,Yurii Prokofiev, whoare outragedby the reportfrom
Moscow.Finally, Yanaevcalls andsaysthat"it wasa good,balancedreport."
is madeon the newly createdRadioof the Supreme
10:00 P.M. An announcement
Soviet of the RussianFederation--RadioRussia--broadcasting
from the White

CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST20, /99/

345

House to clear away the barricadesto make way for a tank unit from the
TamanDivision which will guardthe White Houseduring the stormingthat is
now expectedto comeduring the night. Shortly thereafterthe tank unit, commandedby Major SergeiYevdokimov,takesup its guardpost.
Eight armoredscout vehicles flying the Russiantricolor arrive at the White
Houseunderthe commandof Major GeneralAleksandrLebed.Lebedreportedly announcesthat he and airbornetroops from the Tula Division have arrived to protect the legal Russian authorities on orders from the APF
commander,ColonelGeneralPavelGrachev.
10:20 P.M. Human rights activist Yelena Bonnercalls upon Muscovitesto "defend freedom."
10:30P.M. Yeltsin signsa decree(No. 63) namingandcondemningthe leadersof
the coup for their criminal acts.He appealsto all organsof stateto upholdthe
Constitutionandoffers legal protectionto officials disobeyingthe ordersof the
EmergencyCommittee.This is the last decreeissuedduring the first day of the
coup.
According to a pressreleaseof the EmergencyCommittee,the Ministry of
Internal Affairs of the RussianFederationhas orderedthat cadetsfrom the
academiesof the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs be transferred,fully
armed,to Moscow no later than August 21. Acting on ordersfrom the EmergencyCommittee,the USSRMinister of InternalAffairs hasvoidedthe orders
of Russia'sMinistry ofIntemalAffairs.
11:30P.M. The independentnewsagenciesInterfax andPostfactumas well asthe
RussianInformation Agency are still operating.Copies of the underground
editionsof NezavisimaiagazetaandKuranty arecirculated.
Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov returns to Moscow and addressesthe crowd
outsidethe White House.

August 20, 1991
12:00 A.M. Five of thirteenmines in Vorkuta go on strike. By noon threemore
mineshavejoinedthe protest.It is expectedthat the remainingfive will go on
strike aswell. Miners in the Kuzbassalsopreparefor strikes.
Personnelof the radio station Moscow Echo have been informed that the
Sklifosovskii EmergencyMedicineInstitute,which hasthe largestfacility for emergencytreatment in Moscow,is preparingto receivelargenumbersof wounded.
12:15 A.M. The RussianInformation Agency reportsthat the leadershipof the
army, the MVD, andthe KGB aswell asmembersof the EmergencyCommittee itself arevacillating in their supportof the coup.

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In Leningrad,Mayor Sobchakholds a pressconferenceandpredictsthe defeat
of the coup. He statesthat all the deputiesfavor conveningan Extraordinary
Sessionof the Congressof People'sDeputiesof the USSR.He also saysthat
GeneralSamsonovhasgiven his word of honorthat military forceswill not be
movedinto the city. Nonetheless,thereare reportsof troopsandtank columns
moving toward Leningrad.Meanwhile, the mayoral offices have beenbarricadedand Molotov cocktails readied.A guard for the building is assembled
out of officers of the OMON andAfghan war veterans.
1:00 A.M. Half the telephonesin Ivan Silaev'soffice havebeen disconnected,complicatinghis communicationswith governmentofficials in otherparts of Russia.
Nearly 10,000peoplehave assembledoutsidethe White House.Self-defense
units arebeingformed.
2:00-3:00A.M. Thereis a reportthat Yeltsin tried to contactYanaev,unsuccessfully. Later, Yeltsin reachesYanaev,who tells him that Gorbachevis not yet
capableof performinghis dutiesowing to the stateof his health.
3:11 A.M. Thereis an unconfirmedreportthat Gorbachevflew out of Simferopol
the eveningof August 19, his destinationwas unknown.Witnessesreportthat
he appearedto be in goodhealth.
4:00 A.M. Demonstratorsbelievethat the stormingof the White Houseis imminent. The peoplewho spentthe night defendingthe building appealto Muscovites to relieve them so that they can go home and rest. According to the
independentnews agencyInterfax, Ivan Silaev appealedto the defendersof
the White Housenot to disperse"until peoplecometo relieveyou."
4:52 A.M. A column of armoredtransport vehicles approachingLeningrad is
sighted52 kilometersoutsidethe city. Accordingto official orders,theseunits
shouldhavearrivedat midnight. By 5:00 A.M., KGB andArmy divisionshave
joinedthe columnnearGatchinaoutsideLeningrad
5:00 A.M. A deputy of the LeningradSoviet reportsthat close to 150 military
vehicles,tanks, and APCs are moving toward Leningrad. Self-defenseunits
arebeingformed outsidethe building of the LeningradSoviet.
6:07 A.M. In Moscow, Silaevgivesa radio addressat the White House.He thanks
the demonstrators.
6:54 A.M. In Moscow,the citywide protestagainstthe introductionof the stateof
emergencyin the USSR,plannedfor noon, is movedfrom ManezhSquareto
the White Housedue to fearsthat tear-gasmay be usedagainstdemonstrators.
ManezhSquareis completelyfilled with armoredvehiclesandtroops.
8:02 A.M. Accordingto the RussianInformation Agency, Colonel GeneralPavel
Grachev,hasbeenput underarrest[this reportprovedto be incorrect]. Highly

CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST20, /99/

347

placedofficials of the Russiangovernmentreport that the Airborne Assault
Division which arrived from Tula to protect the White Housewas acting on
Grachev'sorders.
9:00 A.M. The White House Radio announcesYeltsin's decreecalling for a
political generalstrike.
9:31 A.M. OutsideLeningrad,the column of armoredvehiclesstopsits advance
andretreatsfartherfrom the city.
A meetingis in progresson the squareat the Kirov Factoryin Leningrad.The
numberof protesterson the squareis estimatedat 10,000.
10:00A.M. In Leningrad,the protestmeetingplannedfor PalaceSquarebegins.It
lasts until 1:00 P.M. with an estimated130,000to 300,000participants.The
meetingissuesa unanimousdeclarationin supportof the decreesof the Russianparliament,the LeningradSoviet,andLeningrad'smayor. After the meeting, groupsof protestersproceedto the LeningradSovietto guardthebuilding.
In Moscow, RussianVice PresidentAleksandr Rutskoi, Silaev, and Khasbulatov havereportedlyleft the Kremlin by car to presentAnatolii Lukianov
with an ultimatum.
Thousandsof peoplecontinueto arrive in the vicinity of the White House.The
building of barricadescontinues.
Yanaevhasissueda decree,datedAugust20, overrulingYeltsin's decreesnos.
59,61,62,and63 of August 19 on the groundsthat they are"at variancewith
the laws andthe Constitutionof the USSR."
The EmergencyCommitteeissuesits ResolutionNo.3, establishingtight controls overthe electronicmedia,closingdown Russia'sTelevisionandRadioas
well as Moscow Echo, and orderingthe KGB and MVD "to take additional
measuresin orderto ensurethatthe decreeis carriedout."
10:36 A.M. A memorandum,signedby Yeltsin, Rutskoi,Silaev,andKhasbulatov,
is presentedto the Chairmanof the SupremeSoviet of the USSR(Lukianov),
requesting,amongotherthings,an urgentmeetingwith Gorbachev,the lifting
of the stateof emergencyfor the duration of the sessionof the RSFSRSupremeSoviet,the lifting of censorship,and the disbandingof the Emergency
Committee.
11:00 A.M.-12:00 noon. Major GeneralLebedwithdrawshis battalionsfrom the
vicinity of the White Houseon ordersfrom ColonelGeneralGrachev.
11:00 A.M. The headof the GoverningBoard of the USSRCentral StateBank,
Viktor Gerashchenko,
sendsa cableto the headsof the CentralBank Branches
and the National Banks in the republics demandingthat they carry out their

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duties as outlined in ResolutionNo. 1 of the EmergencyCommitteeor face
dismissal.
The RSFSRPressand Information Ministry registersObshchaiagazeta(Joint
Newspaper),a publication formed by a consortium of eleven independent
papersbannedby the EmergencyCommittee.
According to the pressservice of the CPSU Central Committee,the Deputy
GeneralSecretaryof the CPSU,Vladimir Ivashko,hasbeenhospitalizedfor a
minor operation. According to the same source, no plenary sessionof the
CentralCommitteeis expectedin the next two days.
11:15 A.M. The leadershipof the USSRCinematographers'
Union issuesa statement protestingthe introduction of the stateof emergencyand declaringthe
actionsof the EmergencyCommitteeillegitimate.
11 :30 A.M. Rutskoi, Silaev, and Khasbulatovreturn to the White House from
their visit to Lukianov. They are greetedby an enthusiasticcrowd when they
arrive at the White House.
11:31 A.M. The Presidiumof the RSFSRSupremeSoviet has resolvedthat an
emergencysessionof the SupremeSoviet is to be convenedat 11:00 A.M. the
following morning (August21).
11 :54 A.M. There is an unconfirmedreportthat Gorbachevarrived outsideMoscow by plane the previousevening.Rumor has it that he is being held under
KGB guardat a residenceoutsideMoscow. Thereareunconfirmedreportsthat
Air Force General Yevgenii Shaposhnikovhas been placed under arrest on
Yazov'sorders.[Thesereportsprovedto be incorrect.]
12:00noon. Outsidethe parliament,a rally beginsunderthe slogan"The Defense
of Legality and the Rule of Law." The estimatesof the size of the rally vary
from 70,000to over 150,000.
There are now four different radio stationsbroadcastingfrom inside the Russianparliamentbuilding.
At the rally, RussianVice PresidentRutskoi explainsthat the putschleaders
havebeengiven 24 hoursto meetthe Russianauthorities'demands.He reports
that Lukianov himself admits the illegality of the State Emergency
Committee'sactions.Yeltsin alsoaddresses
the rally andreaffirmsthe position
ofthe Russianleadership.
Meanwhile, outside the Moscow City Soviet, Aleksandr Yakovlev, Gavriil
Popov, EduardShevardnadze,
and Sergei Stankevichaddressa rally of thousands.They call the coup plotters "state criminals." At the conclusionof the
rally, the demonstratorsmarch to the White House carrying a giant tricolor
flag which is to adornthe balconyofthe White House.

CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST20,1991 349

A meeting of the headsof the "creative" unions is held at the office of the
USSRMinister of Culture,Nikolai Gubenko,to discussa commonresponseto
the introductionofthe stateof emergency.
The Central Committeeof the USSRKomsomol hasissueda strongcondemnationof the EmergencyCommittee.
12:17 P.M. It is reportedthat the EmergencyCommitteeis preparinga decreeto
removeYeltsin from his postasPresidentof Russiaandprosecuteboth Yeltsin
andGeneralKobets.
Units of the USSRMinistry of Intemal Affairs in Krasnoiarskhold a gathering
in supportof Yeltsin.
12:30 P.M. Colonel Ivanov of the staff headquartersof the Leningrad Military
District EmergencyCommitteestates,in reply to a reporter'squestion,that the
attitude of troops toward the addressesissuedby Yeltsin and the Leningrad
Sovietis "positive."

An emergencymeetingof the Congressof RussianBusinessCircles issuesa
strongcondemnationof the EmergencyCommitteeandappealsto the business
communityabroadfor support.
12:34 P.M. The Presidiumof the Moscow Soviet appealsto the military to avoid
civil war andnot to openfire on citizens.
1:00 A.M. Mstislav Rostropovichhas arrived in Moscow from Paris and proceededdirectly to the White House.
1:40 P.M. RussianVice PresidentAleksandrRutskoi hasbriefed reportersabout
his meeting with the Chairmanof the SupremeSoviet Lukianov (see 10:36
above).Accordingto Rutskoi,Lukianov saidthat he would convenea meeting
of the Presidiumto considerthe legal status of the State EmergencyCommittee'sdecreesandwould insistthat Gorbachevbe permittedto attend.Lukianov
hopedto contactthe President,who was reportedto be alive andwell. Rutskoi
believedthat Gorbachevwas still underguardby a specialunit of KGB troops
at a dachain the Crimea,andnot in Moscowas somehavereported.
Colonel Qaddafiof Libya hassenta congratulatorytelegramto Yanaev.
MoscowEchoradio stationis backon the air.
2:50 P.M. According to the RussianInformation Agency, the EmergencyCommittee has issued arrest warrants for the USSR People'sDeputies Sergei
BelozerstevandOleg Kalugin.
3:00 P.M. GeneralKobets sendsthe SupremeCommanderof Russia'sCossack
Forces,Mikhail Nesmachnyi,to the Mounted Regimentof the Mosfilm Film

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Studiosto take possessionof horsesand weaponsneededby the Cossacksfor
the protectionof the legitimategovernmentof Russia.
USSR Minister of Environment and Natural ResourcesManagement
Vorontsov and USSR Minister of Chemical and Oil Refining Industry
Khadzhiev sign orderstransferringtheir respectiveministries to the jurisdiction of the Presidentof the RSFSR''temporarily,until power is restoredto the
Presidentof the USSR."
3:09 P.M. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RussianFederationissuesa
diplomatic note disclaiming responsibility for any acts by the Emergency
Committeeand requestsforeign governmentsto freeze gold and currencyreservesand cargo until an extraordinaryCongressof People'sDeputiesof the
USSRconvenes.

3:15 P.M. PresidentBush calls Yeltsin and askshim about the stepstaken by the
Russianleadershipto restoreorder. Bush expressesunqualifiedsupportfor GorbachevandYeltsin on the partof G7 nationsandpraisesYeltsin for his courage.

3:26 P.M. Inside the International Section of the CPSU Central Committee,
instructionsare circulatedon preparingsecretdocumentsand internal memos
for destruction.
4:00 P.M. In Moscow,the rally outsidethe White Houseendsandthe movement
of military units intensifies. The Moscow Soviet receivesa report that the
storming of its building is scheduledfor 8:00 P.M. The mayor and city soviet
call uponMuscovitesto go thereandstandwitnessto any bloodshed.
The formation of self-defenseunits outsidethe White Housecontinues.
4:02 P.M. Editors of bannednewspapersjointly preparea sixteen-pageissue of
Obshchaiagazeta.

4:11 P.M. It is raining in Moscow. The RussianInformation Agency reports that
troops loyal to the EmergencyCommitteewill attempt to storm and seize the
White Housethis evening.A part of thesemilitary forces are reportedlynearthe
centerof Moscow and are armedwith sniper rifles equippedwith night vision
scopes.

4:28 P.M. Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov holds a meetingto warn all Muscovites
aboutthe criminal penaltiesfor thosewho attemptto createalternativeorgans
of poweron the basisof ordersof the EmergencyCommittee.
4:39 P.M. Former USSR Foreign Minister EduardShevardnadze,speakingat a
meetingoutsidethe White House,saysthat ''the dictatorshipwill not succeed."

4:51 P.M. SergeiStankevichannounceson the radio of the RussianparliamentRadioRussia--thatthe stormingof the building may be imminent. He calls for
full readinessandrequestsall womento leavethe building.

CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST20.1991 351

4:55 P.M. Boris Yeltsin meetswith EduardShevardnadze
to discussjoint efforts
to restorelaw andorderin the country.
5:00 P.M. Prime Minister John Major of Great Britain telephonesYeltsin to
inform him that his governmentis not evenconsideringthe questionof recognizing the EmergencyCommittee.In responseto Yeltsin's words about the
planned attackon the White House,Major assuresYeltsin that were this to
happen,the world communitywould actmostdecisivelyagainstthe putschists.
The Japanesegovernmenthas announcedthe suspensionof trade and economic cooperationwith the USSR.
A columnof a hundredtanks entersTallinn, thecapitalof Estonia,andproceedsto
a neighborhoodwheretheRussian-speaking
populationis concentrated.
5:19 P.M. The Presidentof the Republicof Moldova, Mircea Snegur,hasissueda
decreedeclaringthe EmergencyCommitteeillegitimate andits actsillegal.
5:25 P.M. According to the RussianInformation Agency, a snappoll of Muscovites hasbeentakenon August20. Out of 1,500polled, 10 percentsupported
the introductionof a stateof emergencyand79.4 percentwere opposed.Only
3.9 percentexpressedconfidencein YanaevasActing President;2.3 percentin
Prime Minister Pavlov. In addition: 53 percentbelievedthat Gorbachevmust
resumehis dutiesasUSSRPresident;82 percentsupportedYeltsin; 72 percent
wantedorder in the country restored;64 percentbelievedthis shouldbe done
within the constitutionalframework; and59 percentbelievedthe actionsofthe
EmergencyCommitteewould exacerbatechaosanddisorder.
5:28 P.M. According to news reports,the defenseof the White House is to be
reinforcedwith six battalionsfrom the Leningradregion as soonas air transport canbe arranged.
At the meetingof the Presidiumof the SupremeSovietof Russia,the storming
of the White Housewasjudgedto be highly likely.
5:44 P.M. Yeltsin hasaddressedthe crowd outsidethe White House.He saysthe
junta will stopat nothing to hold on to powerbecausethey haveeverythingto
lose. He notesthe stateof emergencyhasonly beenintroducedin thoseplaces
wheresupportersof democracyhold power. He calls for calm andaskspeople
to refrain from any actsof provocationagainstthe military.
5:48 P.M. Yeltsin assumesthe responsibilitiesof Commander-in-Chiefof all the
armedforceson the territory of the RussianRepublicuntil Gorbachevresumes
his dutiesas Presidentof the USSR.
12:00-6:00P.M. A meeting is being held at the office of the USSR Deputy
Minister of DefenseVladislav Achalov for the purposeof preparingoperational
plans for attacking the White House. Among those presentare: Vladislav

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Achalov; Pavel Grachev, Commanderof the Airborne ParatrooperForces;
Boris Gromov, DeputyMinister ofInternal Affairs; Genii Ageev,First Deputy
Chairman of the KGB; General Viktor Karpukhin, the Commanderof the
"Alpha" unit; and General Boris Beskov, the Commanderof the KGB unit
"B." They are joined later by General Aleksandr Lebed and Dmitrii Yazov.
The attackplan, code-named"Thunder,"wasto be carriedout at 3:00 A.M.
6:00 P.M. Speakingover the White House intercom system, Yeltsin adviser
Sergei Stankevich reportsthat, accordingto reliable sources,Gorbachevand
his family arebeingheld at the presidentialdachain Forosin the Crimea.
There are two divisions in Moscow: an armored and a motorized infantry
division. Two specialpolice units are also stationedin the city. The troopsare
groupedat Kuntsevo,the city center,the Kirov metro station, and on Leningrad Prospect.Oleg Poptsov,the headof the RussianRepublicTelevisionand
deputy of the RSFSRSupremeSoviet, calls on the residentsof Moscow and
officials of transportenterprisesto block the advanceof thesetroopsby forming a ring aroundthe White House.
Volunteersoutside the White Houseare being instructedin self-defense,including the use of gas masksand Molotov cocktails.The defendersare asked
to form into units often. Women havebeenaskedto fraternizewith soldiers.
Somewomencarry signssaying"Soldiers,do not fire at mothers."
Leningrad'sdeputy mayor, Rear Admiral ViacheslavShcherbakov,has been
appointedby Yeltsin to be Commanderof the LeningradMilitary District.
6:25 P.M. Lukianov informs Yeltsin's aidesthat he has spokenwith Yazov and
Kriuchkov andboth deniedplansto stormthe Russianparliament.
Accordingto Yeltsin's PressOffice, YanaevtelephonedYeltsin soonthereafter. Yeltsin: "What are you planning-toseizethe White Houseby force? Do
of this action for you both in this country and
you realize the consequences
abroad?"Yanaev:"I know nothing aboutsuchan order. I will makeinquiries,
andif thereis suchan order, I shall rescindit."
7:00 P.M. In Moscow, 40 tanks move from the direction of Kalinin Prospect.In
addition to the KGB troops stationedat the Hotel Rossiia,there are reports
aboutthe movementsof an armoredtank division and airbornecombattroops.
Meanwhile,radio broadcastscontinuefrom the White House.
Inside the White House,an order goes out not to tum lights on: snipershave
beenspottedon the roof of the Hotel Ukrainaacrossthe river from the building.
7:35 P.M. Yeltsin has appointedColonel General Konstantin Kobets Defense
Minister ofthe RussianRepublic.
8:00 P.M. Yeltsin declares:"I don't believethat Anatolii Lukianov did not know
aboutthe impendingcoup."

CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST20, /99/

353

A meetingof the EmergencyCommitteeis convened.chairedby Yanaevand
attendedby a severaltop governmentofficials not membersof the Committee.
Yanaevreadshis statementdenouncingthe rumors that the EmergencyCommittee is planning to attack the White House and suggeststhat it be made
public. His suggestionis met with silence.
Later, after the EmergencyCommitteewent into a closedsession,a decision
wasmadeto arrestYeltsin "for a certainperiodof time."
The Commanderof the Moscow Military District, Colonel GeneralNikolai
Kalinin, announcesa curfew in the city of Moscow from 11:00 P.M. to 5:00
A.M. He also indicatesthat a withdrawal of heavy military equipmentfrom the
capital will begin at around11:00 P.M.
Among the defendersof the White Houseare personnelof the RSFSRMinis-

try of Internal Affairs armedwith Kalashnikovrifles. Employeesof the private
securityfirm "Aleks," wearingblack stockingson their headsto concealtheir
identity, are guardingthe White House.

RussianForeignMinister Andrei Kozyrev announcesat a pressconferencein
Paris that the possibility of settingup a Russiangovernmentin exile has not
beenruled out if the situationfurther deterioratesin the SovietUnion.
There are mass rallies taking place in the cities of Saratov and Samarain
supportof Yeltsin.
8:10 P.M. The SupremeSoviet of Lithuania condemnsthe actionsof the EmergencyCommitteeas illegal.
8:37 P.M. The Presidentof Tatarstan,Mintimir Shaimiev,supportsthe Emergency
Committee.A public rally protestingthe introduction of the stateof emergency,
held in Kazanon August20, was dispersedby SpecialForcestroops.
9:20 P.M. The news program"Vremia" announcesnew decisionsby the EmergencyCommittee,including the curfew in Moscow.
9:33 P.M. LeningradMayor SobchakandDeputyMayor ViacheslavShcherbakov
appearon LeningradTelevision.The latter appealsto servicemenin the Leningrad region to make a choice in favor of the peopleand fulfill the decreesof
the RussianPresident.The emergencysessionsof the Leningrad City and
RegionalSovietscontinue.
9:38 P.M. Yeltsin offers legal protectionto thosein the ranks of stateorganswho
immediatelyfulfill the decreesand ordersof the President,Council of Ministers,and otheragenciesof the RussianRepublic.
9:43 P.M. The Russianleadershiphas issuedan Appeal of the RSFSRGovernmentto the Organsof Law andOrderandthe People'sMilitia.

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9:47 P.M. Rumors[subsequentlyprovedfalse] circulatethat USSRDefenseMinister Yazov has resignedand repudiatedthe army's involvementin the coup.
Chief of the GeneralStaff Mikhail Moiseevis said to havereplacedhim. The
DefenseMinistry's pressservicedeniesthis report.
9:59 P.M. In Leningrad,artillery officers make severaldemandsfor Gorbachev's
releaseandin supportof Yeltsin's call to bring the conspiratorsto justice.
10:00P.M. Tankswith numberspaintedover are seenmoving away from Manezh
Squarein the directionofthe White House.
All police stationsin Moscowhavebeenshutdown. The military has takenover.
10:37 P.M. RussianDefenseMinister KobetsissuesOrderNo. I commandingall
military forces on Russianterritory to disregardall ordersof the Emergency
Committee, to prevent the use of force against the civilian population or
electedgovernment,andto returnto their normal stations.
10:43 P.M. In anticipationof the expectedstormingof the White House,Russian
DefenseMinister Kobets issuesOrder No.2 rescindingthe curfew order. He
calls on all involved in defendingthe White Houseto remainat their postson
alert.
The Moscowmetroannouncesthat trainswili stoprunningat II :00 P.M.
10:50 P.M. Yeltsin has issuedan Appeal to the Troops of the Tamanand Dzerzhinskii Motorized Infantry Divisions and the Kantemir Tank Division. He
urgesthem to come over to the side of the electedgovernmentof Russiain
defenseof democracy:"My dear sons! I hope that you will make the right
choice. I hopethat you will take the side of legitimateauthority, the President
of the RSFSR."
11:00 P.M. RussianDefenseMinister Kobets addressesthe People'sDeputiesof
the RussianRepublic in front of the White House. Membersof the Russian
governmentare issuedweapons.He announcesthat the building will be protectedby nearly 2,000 organizeddefenders,including 300 armedprofessionals. The professionalsinclude militia of the RussianRepublic. Kobets also
expectsreinforcementsfrom Minsk. In addition,therearethousandsof people
surroundingthe building who are preparedto block the path of military vehicles. There are sixteenbarricadesaroundthe White House. Lights inside the
White Houseare extinguished.Gas masks areissuedto everyoneinside the
building. The headof securityfor the Russianparliamentreceivesa reportthat
the assaulton the building hasbeensetfor 2:00 A.M.
Throughoutthe evening,groups of deputiesof the RSFSRParliamentleave
the White Houseto meetwith commandersof military detachmentsin Moscow andits vicinity.

CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21. 1991

355

11 :02 P.M. The Presidentof the GeorgianRepublic,Zviad Gamsakhurdia,appeals
to the governmentsof Westernnationsto recognizethe independenceof the
USSRconstituentrepublicsin light of the coupd'etatin Moscow. At the same
time, he qualifies the eventas "either a backroomdeal or a public spectacle
stagedso that certain politicians could collect political dividends that they
havebeencountingon."
11 :08 P.M. The SupremeSovietsof Estoniaand Latvia havedeclaredthe actions
of the EmergencyCommitteeunconstitutional.
11:11 P.M. Moscow Mayor Popov issueslocal instructions"On the Activity of
Public Organizationsandthe Suspensionof the Activity of the MoscowOrganizationsof Veteransof War andLabor" (which haddeclaredtheir supportfor
the EmergencyCommittee).

August 21, 1991
12:00midnight. The White Housevolunteersform groupsof 100; bulldozersand
tractorsarerepositionedto face in the directionof the anticipatedattack.
Gennadii Burbulisasksthe volunteersnot to sacrificethemselvesbut to allow
the attackingvehiclesto go through:"We mustwin a moral victory."
If they are to arrive at the White Housefor the attack,the paratroopersunder
the commandof GeneralPavel Grachevmust begin to move at midnight, but
Grachevhasrefusedto give the order.
12:06 A.M. Burstsof automaticgunfire are heardfrom the direction of the U.S.
Embassy.
Shotsring out in the vicinity ofthe White House.
12:1 0A.M. More shotsareheardfrom nearthe White House.
12:20 A.M. People'sDeputiesmeetbriefly in the White Houseto discusswhich
routesto taketo meetmilitary formationsmassingin the areaaroundthe building.
The Krymskii Val by the river and Kalinin Prospect,a broad avenuethat leads
straightto theWhite House,areespeciallydangerousplacesto be atthis time.
12:31 A.M. In the areaof the barricadeserectednear SmolenskSquare,single
shotsring out. A detachmentof five armoredvehiclesattemptsto passthrough
a tunnel running along Tchaikovsky Streetbetweenthe u.s. Embassyand
SmolenskSquare.The headvehicle is trying to ram a trolleybusbut it fails to
makean openingin thebarricade.
A 23-year-oldAfghan veteran,Dmitrii Komar, jumpsonto APC No. 536 and
tries to ''blind'' the vehicle with a tarpaulin. He is thrown off, gets up, and

356 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST2/, /99/

jumps into the openhatchof the APC. The APC lurches,andKomar is thrown
out of and draggedalongsidethe APC. Vladimir Usov, who is runningto help
Komar, is shot dead.Another defender,Igor Krichevskii, throws a stoneat the
APC. As he beginsto move in the direction of the vehicle, he is shot in the
head.All threemen aredead
The RussianInformation Agency reportersat the sceneare approachedby an
army major who doesnot give his namebut identifies himselfas officer of the
27th Brigade. He tells the reportersthat the storming of the White House is
scheduledfor this night, that the attackis to be launchedby thirty tanksand up
to forty APCs, andthat closeto one thousandsoldiersare to participatein the
operation.
12:35 A.M. The transmitterof Moscow Echo, whosereportershavebeenbroadcastinglive from the White House,ceasesfunctioning.
12:37 A.M. According to the RussianInformation Agency, a poll conductedin
Voronezh disclosedthat 49 percent of the 724 polled residentsof the city
considerthe EmergencyCommitteeillegitimate; 28 percentconsiderit legitimate;23 percentarenot sure.
12:45 A.M. The chairmanof the Control Commissionof the RSFSRCommunist
Party telephonesChairman of the USSR SupremeSoviet Lukianov, asking
him to do everything possibleto avoid bloodshed.Lukianov replies that he
cannotdo anythingand that it was Yeltsin who had provokedthe situation in
the first place("Wheredid his weaponscomefrom?" Lukianov wondered).
12:57 A.M. The City of Samarasupportsthe Presidentof Russia.
1:03 A.M. RussianVice PresidentRutskoi warns those gatheredin the White
Houseabouta possibleassaultby KGB agentsdressedin civilian clothes.He
orders the security force to open fire without warning in caseof such an
attack.
Defenseorganizersat the White Houseask citizensgatheredoutsideto form a
humanchain.
1:30 A.M. There is an unconfirmed report that a military group with tanks is
stormingthe building of the MoscowCity Soviet.
The Moscow Military District Headquartersreports that the Kantemir and
TamanDivisions are being withdrawn asunreliable.Only KGB and specialforcesunits will remainin Moscow.
1:35 A.M. People'sDeputy Urazhtsevreportsthat he was arrestedby the State
EmergencyCommitteeearlier in the day and urgedto join the coup. Later he
was releasedHe says, "I think they do not believe they can win. They're
demoralized."

CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21. 1991

357

I :40 A.M. KazakhstanPresidentNazarbaevcalls Yeltsin andtells him that he has
spokenwith Yanaevwho "promisednot to useforce."
I :45 A.M. Some30 deputiesgo out onto the streetto try to preventbloodshed.
I :49 A.M. The Patriarchof All Russia,Aleksii II, issuesan appeal for peace,
saying that ''who raises anns against unarmedpeople commits a grave sin
which excommunicates
themfrom the Churchandfrom God."
I :00-2:00 A.M. Colonel GeneralVladislav Achalov, USSR Deputy Minister of
Defensefor EmergencySituations,reportsto Yazov aboutthe first fatalities
and the rapidly growing numbersof defendersaroundthe White House. He
warns Yazov that the plannedattackwill result in massivebloodshed.Yazov
calls off the attack.
A.M. The estimatednumberof peoplesurroundingthe White Housevaries
from 10,000to 50,000.Reportedlythousandsmoreblock distantapproaches
to
the Krasnopresnenskaia
Embankmentwherethe White Houseis situated.

2:~2:30

Eduard Shevardnadzearrives and enters the parliament building. It is announced by megaphonethat soldiers from one military unit assuredthe
People'sDeputiesthey would not fire on the people.
The APC involved in the fatal incidentwas attackedby a Molotov cocktail and
is burningnearthe tunnel underKalinin Prospect.The humanchainsdefending the parliament are shiftingin responseto reportsaboutmovementsof the
attackingtroops.
The OMON troopsthat haveguardedthe Moscow SovietBuilding leavefor an
unknowndestination.
2:30 A.M. Membersof a Moscowmotorcyclistclub (rokery) return from Kutuzov
Prospectand report that no troops are there. Rumors circulate that additional
forces have landed outside Moscow and are moving in. The White House
defenseheadquarters
is unableto confinnthis.
There hasbeenno attemptto stonnthe Moscow Soviet. Columnsof military
vehiclesleavein the directionofPushkinSquare.
2:43 A.M. River transportcrews bring their vesselsto the Krasnapresnenskaia
Embankmentof the MoscowRiver anddeclaretheir supportfor Yeltsin.
3:04 A.M. Colonel General Vladislav Achalov, USSR Deputy Minister of Defense for EmergencySituations,has given assurancesto a USSR People's
Deputy thatthe military commandhasno plansto stonnthe White House.
3:08 A.M. Over the previoustwo hours,the Russianleadershiphasbeenin contact with Yanaev,Moiseev (Chiefof the GeneralStaft), Kalinin (Commander

358 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21, 1991

of the MoscowMilitary District), andUSSRSupremeSovietChairmanLukianov. All of them-exceptKriuchkov, who could not be found-sworethat
they wouldstopthe troops. Although it is quiet nearthe White House,it is not
known whetherthe coup leaderswill keep their word aboutnot attackingthe
White House..
3:15 AM. The troops involved in the assaultoperationare leaving Moscow in a
chaotic manner.The StateTraffic Patrol reportsthat tankshavebeencrossing
the GardenRing Roadfor severalhours--inthe outgoingdirection.
3:16 AM. MoscowEchois back onthe air.
3:24 AM. Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Colonel GeneralBoris Gromov,
representatives
of the KGB, as well asthe MoscowMilitary District Headquarters deny that the military vehicle burning near the White House belongsto
them. It is supposedthat therewerecasualtiesamongthe crews.
3:30 AM. The TamanTank Division hasalreadywithdrawnfrom the city andthe
withdrawal of the KantemirDivision is in progress.The retreatfrom Moscow
is proceedingat full speed,thoughin an apparently disorganized
manner.
3:40 AM. Rutskoi has spokenwith Lukianov: Gorbachev'shealth is fine. Membersof Gorbachev'sSecurityCouncil, Vadim BakatinandYevgenii Primakov,
havealsoconfirmedthis information.
4:15 A.M. An Air Force official says that "zero hour" has already passed,so
everyonecan sleepeasily now. He assertsthat there is not even one airborne
unit in Moscow. He adds that ''the rumors aboutYazov'sresignationare greatly
exaggerated;the Minister of Defenseis in commandandleadingthe army."
4:20 AM. The City of Moscow Military Commandant,Lieutenant General
Smirnov, expresses
regret for the victims and believesthat no military commandersissuedordersto storm the parliament.He statesthat no troops will
attemptto seizethe White Houseeither tomorrow or the following day: the
rumors aboutthe arrival of additional paratrooperforces at the Kubinka base
nearMoscowareunfounded.
4:30 AM. The StateNovember
~mergency
Committeeheadedby Yanaevmeetsat the Hotel
Oktiabrskaia.
An aide to General Kobets reports that units of the Vitebsk KGB Division
havehaltedat the entranceto Moscow.
5:00 AM. The cadetsof the Brianskf'olice AcademyareheadingtowardMoscow
to aid in the defenseof the White House.Pugohasorderedthe Moscow police
to disarmthe cadets.
5:16 AM. Troops have occupiedthe first two floors of the television centerin
Tallinn, Estonia.

CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21, 1991

359

5:25 A.M. Yeltsin'saide StateSecretary GennadiiBurbulis hascontactedKriuchkov
severaltimes during the night aboutpossiblemovementsof KGB troopsandhas
warnedthe KGB chiefaboutthe dire consequences
of any stonningof the White
House.Two KGB brigadesin Moscowhavejust beenturnedbackafter Burbulis
calledKriuchkov. In Burbulis'sopinion,"a turningpoint has beenpassed."
The top leadershipof the KGB is meetingthroughthe night. Headsof departmentseitherrefuseto follow ordersor maintainneutrality.
5:30 A.M. Kobets'sheadquarterslearnsthat the majority of KGB units from the
Vitebsk Division never enteredMoscow. White Houseradio announcesthat
the Briansk,Orel, and Vladimir police academieswent over to the side of the
RussianSupremeSoviet.
5:50 A.M. The leadershipsof severalrepublics of the USSR are preparingan
ultimatum to the EmergencyCommittee.The RussianSupremeSoviet will
considerit at 11:00A.M. Thecentraldemand:the coupmustbe endedtoday.
Early morning. Yanaevcalls Burbulis andexplains:"I only wantedto improve
this would have."
the countryeconomically,not knowing what consequences
6:07 A.M. The RussianInformation Agency reportsthat, thanksto the intervention by People'sDeputiesGleb Yakunin, Vladimir Kriuchkov [not the KGB
Chairman],SergeiYushenkov,andothers,the six APCs trappedin the underpassand blockedby an irate crowd of protesterswere able to leavein peace.
Part of the retreatingKantemir Division, they were mistakenlythoughtto be
on their way to attackthe White House.
8:00 A.M. The defensestaff of the Russianparliamentreportsthat the dangerof
an attackhasnot passedandcalls uponthe defendersto remain.
A meetingof the executivecollegium of the USSRMinistry of Defenseis convened.
9:00 A.M. DefenseMinister Dmitrii Yazov signsthe orderfor the troopsto begin
returningto their permanentbasesimmediately.
9:25 A.M. DefenseMinister Yazov resigns.
10:18 A.M. Moscow Echo goes off the air, again, on the order of a unit of
paratroopers.The unit was sent to the studio on the orders of the Moscow
Commandant.The explanation:an unknown radio station calling itself Moscow Echo was broadcastingfrom 1:19 A.M. to 3:47 A.M., sharplyexaggerating the numberof victims andspreadingothermisinformation.
10:43 A.M. The MoscowCity andRegionalSovietscall on peopleto cometo the
defenseof the White House in the eveningand to report the movementsof
military units in the areaby telephone.

360 CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21, 1991

11 :00 A.M. The emergencysessionof Russia'sSupremeSoviet begins,as planned,
a~enda,
"On the Political Situationin RSFSRObtaining
with a single item on the
November
as a Result of a Coup d'Etat" The sessionis televisedlive on the USSR TV
channel.
Rus1anKhasbulatovopensthe sessionof Russia'sSupremeSovietwith praise
for thosewho opposedthe coup and defendedthe Russianleadership.He says
the responseto the eventsby the leadersof Kazakhstan,Ukraine, Moldova,
andthe republicsin the Caucasuswas somewhatlate in coming. He thanksthe
leadersof countriesin the West and EasternEuropefor their strong support
againstthe coupattempt.
The armoredvehiclesthat have beenpostedoutsidethe Novosti Information
Agencyfor two daysarebeingwithdrawn.
11:09 A.M. PresidentialDecreeNo. 65 "On Insuring the Functioning of Enterprisesand Organizationsin the RussianRepublic" is circulated.The decreeis
datedAugust20.
11 :56 A.M. The Moscow city governmentdeclaresthe curfew introducedthe
previous day to be illegal and demandsthe immediatewithdrawal of troops
beyond the city limits. Soon after, the Commanderof the Moscow Region
Military District, Colonel GeneralNikolai Kalinin, makesthe following statement: "RespectedMuscovites! The pasttwenty-four hours havedemonstrated
the unsuitability of continuing the curfew in the capital city. Taking into accountthe sociopoliticalsituationin Moscow, I havedecidedto discontinuethe
curfewbeginningAugust21."
11:()(}-12:00 Members of the EmergencyCommittee arrive at the Ministry of
Defenseto convinceYazov to rescindhis order to withdraw the troops from
Moscow. Yazov refusesand suggeststhat they all go to seeGorbachevin the
Crimea.
12:00 noon. Yeltsin's PressSecretary,Pavel Voshchanov,reportsthat an agreement has been reachedwith Kriuchkov that the RussianRepublic leadership
will go to Forosto meetwith Gorbachev.
Deputy General Secretaryof the CPSU Ivashko tries to contactYanaev to
learnthe whereaboutsof the CPSUGeneralSecretaryGorbachev.
I

12:30 P.M. RussianDefenseMinister Kobets has confirmed to a reporter that
Kriuchkov'sorderto attackthe White Housedoesindeedexist.
12:55 P.M. Yeltsin announcesat the emergencysessionof the RussianSupreme
Soviet that KGB chief Kriuchkov shouldbe arriving there at one o'clock. He
again calls the coup unconstitutionaland refers to two previousattemptsat a
coup from the right. He requeststhat Western leaders attempt to contact
Gorbachevwho is still beingheld in the Crimea.

CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21, 1991

361

1:20 P.M. In his speechto the emergencysessionof the RSFSRSupremeSoviet,
Khasbulatovoutlines the reasonsfor the coup, the chief among them, the
desireof the "reactionaryforces to torpedothe Union Treaty." He expresses
indignationaboutthe coverageof eventsprovidedby the newspapersPravda
andSovetskaiaRossiiaandSovietTV. He recommendsthe immediatetransfer
ofthesemediaorgansto the authorityof the RSFSRgovernment.
1:31 P.M. The RussianSupremeSovietauthorizesRussianPrimeMinister Silaev
and RussianVice PresidentRutskoi to accompanyKGB chief Kriuchkov and
medical expertsto reachGorbachevand confirm that he is both alive and in
goodhealth.
The sessiontakesa recess duringwhich time it is learnedthatKriuchkov who, it is
suspected,gavethe ordersto stormthe White House,will not be appearing.
1:53 P.M. Yeltsin hasannouncedthat the membersof the EmergencyCommittee
are headedtoward Vnukovo Airport in Moscow. He recommendsthe authorizationof their detentionat the airport.
2:00 P.M. KazakhstanPresidentNursultan Nazarbaevresigns from the CPSU
Central CommitteePolitburo, stating as his reasonthe fact that the Central
Committee Secretariatsupportedthe coup by attempting to force regional
Partyorganizationsto collaboratewith the EmergencyCommittee.
2:12 P.M. RuslanKhasbulatovreportsthat two officials of the KGB cameto the
White Houseandrequestedthat the live TV broadcastofthe RussianSupreme
Sovietsessionbe terminated.The broadcastcontinuesuninterrupted.
2:18 P.M. The plane carrying several membersof the EmergencyCommittee
(Kriuchkov, Baklanov, Tiziakov and Yazov), along with Lukianov, Ivashko
and the commanderof the presidentialguard, Plekhanov,takes off for the
Crimea from the Vnukovo-2 Airport before a unit of Russia'sMVD forces
arrivesthereto arrestthem.
2:20 P.M. Officials of the Moscow city governmentand the military conclude
negotiationson the removalof troopsfrom the city.
2:30 P.M. RadioRussiaresumesbroadcastingfrom its regularstudios.
2:55 P.M. Commanderof the Moscow Military District Colonel GeneralNikolai
Kalinin announcesthat earlierin the morningthe DefenseMinistry Collegium
met, in the absenceof Dmitrii Yazov, and decidedto rescindthe curfew in
Moscow and to withdraw the troopsfrom the capital and return them to their
permanentbases.
3:12 P.M. Sourcesat the Scientific-IndustrialUnion report that Arkadii Volskii
spokewith PresidentGorbachevby phonetodayandthat the Presidentwas in
good health. [Gorbachev'scommunicationslines were not restoreduntil after
4:15 P.M.]

362

CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21. 1991

3:15 P.M. According to the Russian Information Agency, the Chairman of
Ukraine's SupremeSoviet, Leonid Kravchuk, informed Lukianov in a telephone conversationthat if the stateof emergencywere to be introducedin
Ukraine, massprotestsand disturbanceswould be likely and that he, Kravchuk, would not try to dissuadepeoplefrom taking part in them.
4:00 P.M. The eveningedition of /zvestiiagoeson sale with a bannerheadline,
"ReactionHasFailed."
4:08 P.M. The presidentialplanecarryingmembersof the EmergencyCommittee,
Lukianov, Ivashko, and others lands at the Belbek Military Airport in the
Crimea.Two governmentlimousineswhisk the passengers
off to Gorbachev's
dachain Foros.As soonas they arrive, Gorbachev'spersonalguardputsthem
under arrest. Gorbachevrefusesto see them until his communicationsare
restored;after they are restored,he refusesto seethem until the arrival of the
RSFSRgovernmentdelegation.
Gorbachev'sfirst phonecall is to Yeltsin, followed by calls to the leadersof other
republics,Chiefof the GeneralStaffMoiseev,andtheKremlin Commandant.
4:14 P.M. Sevenmembersof the StateEmergencyCommitteeare reportedto be
under arrest. Rumors circulate that the USSR DefenseMinister Yazov has
committedsuicide[this provesincorrect].
4:30 P.M. AleksandrDzasokhov,memberof the CPSUPolitburo and a Secretary
of the Central Committee,holds a pressconferenceand declaresthat "the use
of emergencypowersby whateverpolitical force is inadmissible.
4:52 P.M. A plane carrying Ivan Silaev, Aleksandr Rutskoi, two membersof
Gorbachev'sSecurity Council, Vadim Bakatin, Yevgenii Primakov, ten
People'sDeputiesof the RSFSR,and 36 militia officers, armedwith submachineguns,takesoff from Vnukovo-2 Airport for Foros.
4:56 P.M. Khasbulatovreportsthatthe planecarryingmembersof the StateEmergency Committeehas landedin the Crimea. The plane carrying Silaev, Rutskoi, andothersis en route.
A meetingbetweenYeltsin and the Chief of the GeneralStaff of the USSR
Armed ForcesMoiseevhasbeenscheduledfor the evening.
A resolutionis adoptedby the Presidiumof the USSRSupremeSovietcalling
the coupunconstitutional.
5:05 P.M. The collegium of the USSR Ministry of Defenseindicatesthat all
troopshavebeenwithdrawnfrom Moscow.
5:12 P.M. Accordingto the poll conductedon August20 by the All-Union Center
for the Studyof Public Opinion, out of the 4,567peoplesurveyedfrom differ-

CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21. 1991

363

ent regionsof the USSR,20 percentsupportedthe EmergencyCommitteeand
62 percentconsideredits actionsillegal. In Russiaand Kazakhstan,the figures
were 23 and 57 percent,respectively;in Ukraine, 14 percentwere for the
EmergencyCommitteeand72 percentagainst.
5:30 P.M. An avalancheof pressconferencesbeginswith stateofficials andother
representatives
hasteningto declaretheir respectfor the electedauthoritiesand
to repudiatethe actionsof the coupleaders.At his pressconference,the USSR
Minister of ForeignAffairs AleksandrBessmertnykhexplainsthat he was ill
until today.
5:36 P.M. An emergencysessionof the Moscow City Soviet is scheduledfor
10:00A.M. Thursdaymorningto discussthe political situationin Moscow.
5:53 P.M. PresidentNazarbaevof Kazakhstanreports that he has just had a
telephoneconversationwith Gorbachev.The SovietPresidentis still underthe
protectionof his thirty KGB guards.Membersof the EmergencyCommittee
are at the dachain Forosseekingan audiencewith the President.Nazarbaev
urged Gorbachevnot to negotiatewith the coup leadersand to await the
delegationarriving from Moscow.
6:08 P.M. The Presidiumof the MoscowCity Sovietproclaimsthe funeral day of
thosekilled to bean official day ofmouming.In additionto the threefatalities,
therewerefour otherswoundedby gunfire.
6:22 P.M. A presidentialaide,Georgii Shakhnazarov,
reportsthat it is not known
whenGorbachevwill returnto Moscowto resumehis duties,but that members
of the State EmergencyCommittee will be removed from their posts. He
refusesto saywhetherthey will be prosecuted.
6:30 P.M. The landing strip at the Belbek Military Airport near Gorbachev's
dachain the Crimeais blockedoff, reportedlyon Kriuchkov'sorder.The plane
carryingthe RSFSRdelegationmay haveto land in Simferopol,which is five
hours'drive from Gorbachevdachain Foros.
6:36 P.M. Departmentsof the USSRMinistry of Internal Affairs andthe KGB in
chargeof Moscow andthe Moscow region havebeentransferredto Russia's
jurisdiction.
6:45 P.M. After contactingby telephonethe planecarryingthe RSFSRdelegation,
Gorbachevordersthe Chief of the USSRGeneralStaff Moiseevto clear the
landingstrip at Belbek.The orderis carriedout at once.
7:02 P.M. Troops leave the radio and television centersoccupiedearlier in the
day in Lithuania and the telephonecommunicationscenterseizedin Vilnius
two daysearlier.
7:14 P.M. Arkadii Volskii (memberofCPSU Central Committee)has called on
the CentralCommitteeto condemnthe coupin orderto free the Partyfrom any
suspicionconcerningits involvementin the events.

364

CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21. 1991

7:16 P.M. The planecarrying the RSFSRgovernmentdelegationlands at Belbek,
andthe passengers, including
Silaev,Rutskoi, Primakov,andBakatin,are soon
greetedby the Gorbachevs.Rutskoi recalled:..It was clear from the looks of
Gorbachevand RaisaMaksimovnathat what hadtakenplace wasnot a show,
that they had indeed been isolated and psychologicallywere ready for any
eventuality."
Beforeleaving for Moscow, Gorbachevmeetswith Lukianov and Ivashko. He
calls Lukianov ''traitor!''
8:00 P.M. PresidentGorbachevis expectedto be arriving in Moscow from Simferopollatertonight.
8:11 P.M. Russian Defense Minister Kobets issues an addressto Muscovites
praisingtheir efforts and calls for calm to expeditethe removal of troopsfrom
Moscow.
8:26 P.M. The Russianparliamentis now in recessuntil the following day. A
crowd of people still remainsgatheredoutsidethe White Houseand several
thousanddecide to spendthe night there, keeping vigil. The barricadesare
being cleared away but one remains as a symbolic reminder of Moscow's
determination.
Debris has beenclearedfrom SmolenskSquarewherepeoplewere crushedby
tanks, but the overturnedtrolleycars still block traffic. The withdrawal of
troopscontinues.
9:05 P.M. The evening news program "Vremia" broadcastsa brief statement
issuedby SovietPresidentGorbachev.He stressesthat he is fully in command
of the situation.He will returnto Moscowin a few hours.
9:30 P.M. Yeltsin issues"Demandsof the Presidentof the RSFSRto the Organizers of the Anti-ConstitutionalPutsch"calling for an end to all anticonstitutional
actionsby 10:00P.M. It is addressed
to Yanaev,Baklanov,Kriuchkov, Pavlov,
Pugo,Starodubtsev,Tiziakov, andYazov.
10:00 P.M. Yeltsin hasissuedPresidentialDecreeNo. 69 "On the MassMedia in
the RussianRepublic," affirming press freedomand transferringGosteleradio
installationson Russia'sterritory to Russia'sjurisdiction.
Yeltsin hasissuedPresidentialDecreeNo. 70 removinga numberof chairmen
from their postson the executivecommitteesof Sovietsof People'sDeputies
in the RussianRepublic becauseof their collaborationwith the Emergency
Committee.
10:39 P.M. Gorbachevis expectedto arrive in Moscow from the Crimeaaround
midnight. He may hold a pressconferenceafter his arrival.

CHRONOLOGYOF EVENTS: AUGUST21, 1991

365

10:49 P.M. At a pressconference(held earlier in the day), First Deputy Prime
Minister of the USSRVladimir Shcherbakovattemptsto explain the inactivity
of the Council of Ministers during the coup. He statesthat the Presidiumofthe
Council of Ministers, which met earlier, has discussedthe issue of the
Cabinet'sresignation but decided against it. He also reports that Valentin
Pavlov's condition is poor and that the Soviet Prime Minister knew nothing
aheadof time aboutthe plansfor the coup.
11 :00-12:00In Leningrad,the City Sovietdecidesto work throughthe night and
keepsecurityforcespostedaroundthe building.
12:00 Midnight. The presidentialplanecarryingthe Gorbachevs,the membersof
the RSFSRgovernmentdelegation,and Kriuchkov (the other membersof the
EmergencyCommittee are on a separateplane) takes otT from the Belbek
Military Airport for Moscow.
At around2 A.M., the TU-134 presidentialplanelandsin Moscow.

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Index of PersonalNames
Achalov, Vladislav,351-52,357
Agapov,Vladimir, 141
Ageev,Genii, 352
Akhromeev,Sergei,29n
Aksiuchits,Viktor, 297
Alekseev,Sergei,128
Aleksii II, Patriarchof Russia,179,
357
Allende, Salvador,50
Andreeva,Nina, 342
Antoshkin,Nikolai, 208
Arutiunov, Mikhail, 186

Burbulis,Gennadii,129, 183, 185,
216,297,326,355,359
Burlatskii, Fedor,292
Bush,George,3,48,179,298,350

Babitskii, Andrei, 299
Bakatin,Vadim, 7,108,207,358,362,
364
Baker,James,8, 27n
Baklanov,oteg, 11,31,42--43,57-58,
198,338,343,361,364
Barannikov,Viktor, 226
Baskin,1M., 125
Beliaev,Aleksandr,222
Belozertsev,Sergei,349
Beskov,Boris, 352
Bessmertnykh,Aleksandr,27n, 59, 363
Bogert,Carroll, 44, 310
Bogoraz,Larissa,300
Boldin, Valerii, 10,57-58,65,162,
198,338
Bonnell,Victoria E., 25, 85
Bonner,Yelena,95-96, 108,294,296,
298,300,345
Borshchev,Valerii, 297
Bragin,Viacheslav,186
Brezhnev,Leonid, 136,237,292,299,
307
Bunich,Pavel,125
Bulgakov,Mikhail, 247

Daniel, Aleksandr,293
Daniel, Yulii, 293
Dapkus,Rita, 309
Davletova,Liudmila 190
de Cuellar,Peres,179
Delacroix,Eugene,252
Dementei,Nikolai, 166
Denisenko,Bella, 278--80
Doguzhiev,Vitalii, 188--89,192-93,
195,199
Dubcek,Alexander,271
Dzasokhov,Aleksandr,304, 344,362
Dzerzhinskii,Feliks, 15,84,290

Carnegie,Dale, 125
Ceausescu,
Nicolae, 136
Chegodaev,Dmitrii, 290
Chekhov,Anton, 248
Chemiaev,Anatolii, 164
Chemyshevskii,Nikolai, 136
Cooper,Ann, 26, 308

Elliot, lain, 26, 289
FederovSviatislav,125
Filatov, Sergei,276
Filin, Vladimir, 297
Filippov, Sergei,256
Freidin,Anna,98
Freidin,Gregory,25, 71,181,185,
187,193-94,209,226,267-83
Freidin,MonosGrigorievich,86
Freidina,Gita Samuilovna,86
367

368 INDEX

Gabrielants,Grigorii, 187, 192
Gaidar,Yegor, 333
Gamsakhurdia,Zviad, 355
Gavrilov, Igor 185
Gdlian, Telman, 297,339, 341
Gelman,Aleksandr,216
Generalov,Viacheslav,29n
Genieva,Yekaterina,293, 295
Gerashchenko,
Viktor, 347
Gidaspov,Boris, 220-22
Glier, Reinhold,157
Gogolev,Viktor, 341
Golovachev,V.G., 135-36,139,
141-42,145
Golovatov,Mikhail, 29n
Goncharov,Sergei,29n
Gorbachev,Mikhail, 3-12,14--17,
19, 21,23,25, 26n, 27n, 31,
33-34,42,44,46-47,50-59,
61-63,65-67,85-86,88,96,
104,108-9,115,117,122,124,
127,131-33,135, 138-39,
142-43,147,150,161,171,
180-82,187,191,194-96,198,
200,202-4,207-8,210-11,
215-16,226,228,231,273,279,
283,295-96,299,308,310,314,
317,320,328,331-32,337-39,
342-44,346-52,354,358,
360-65
Gorbacheva,Irina, 162, 168
Gorbacheva,Raisa,162, 198, 364
Gorodnichev,Yurii, 115
Grachev,Andrei, 216
Grachev,Pavel,13, 18,24,28n, 29n,
204--5,341,345-47,352,355
Gremitskikh,Yurii, 50
Gromov,Boris,8, 352, 358
Gubenko,Nikolai, 192,214--15,217,
343-44,348
Gusev,Vladimir, 190
Gutiontov,Aleksandr,270, 285
Hetzer,Michael, 26, 253
Hofheinz,Paul,304
Ignatenko,Vitalii, 161, 168,320
Ilf, Ilia, 125
Isaev,Boris, 184

Isakov,Vladimir, 184
Ivanov, Viacheslav,293
Ivanova,Tamara,72
Ivashko,Vladimir, 167,215-16,348,
360-62,364
Kabakov,Aleksandr,298-99
Kakuchaia,Olvar, 301-2
Kalinin, Nikolai, 60, 341, 353, 357,
359-61
Kalugin, Oleg, 226, 294, 349
Kamchatov,Mikhail, 339
Karaulov,Andrei, 201
Karimov, Islam, 166
Karimov, Rubit, 211
Karpukhin,Viktor, 18, 29n, 352
Katushev,Konstantin,190
Kedrov (yeltsin'saide),205
Keller, Bill, 301, 305-8,311
Khadzhiev,Salambek,193,217,350
Khasbulatov,Ruslan,24-25,44, 46,
72,109,129,138,141,171,177,
179-80,183-85,208,219,258,
270,272,280,297,316,339,
341,347-48,360-62
Khazanov,Gennadii,168,295
Khrennikov,Tikhon, 214
Khrushchev,Nikita, 49,138,198,236
Khudonazarov,Davlat,25, 2~12, 214
King, Martin Luther, 244
Kiselev, Anatolii, 111, 113,
Kobets,Konstantin,175, 179, 187,
205,216,274,322,326,328,
336,341-42,349,352,354,
358-60,364
Kohl, Helmut, 50, 298
Kolodizhner,Asya, 318
Komar, Dmitri, 355-56
Korsak,Aleksandr,29n
Korzun, Sergei,290
Kotkin, Stephen,327
Kozhevnikov,Aleksei, 26, 263
Kozyrev, Andrei, 179,353
Kramarev, Arkadii,220-21,223
Krasavchenko,Sergei,185-86,343
Kravchenko,Leonid, 301, 303-5,338
Kravchuk,Leonid,166,362
Krichevskii, Igor, 356

INDEX 369

Kriuchkov, Vladimir, RSFSRdeputy,
359
Kriuchkov, Vladimir A., Chairmanof
the KGB, 8, 11,24,31,43,
57-59,66-68,176,180,187,
192,194-95,198,205,231,294,
305,310,333,338,352,358-61,

36~5

Kruchina,Nikolai, 29n
Kucher,Valerii, 26, 322, 323-28,
330-35
Kulik, Gennadii,185
Laptev,Ivan D., 229
Latsis,Otto, 216
Latynina,AlIa, 292
Laverov,Nikolai, 193
Lavrov, Kiril Iu., 215
Lazutkin, Valentin V., 303-5
Lebed,Aleksandr,13, 18, 28n, 178,
341,345,347,352
Leighton,LaurenG., 25,100
Lenin, Vladimir Ilich, 107, 128, 139,
143,297
Leontiev,Yaroslav,295
Lermontov,Mikhail, 124,325
Liapunova,Yelena,182,283-84
Likhachev,Dmitrii S., 224
Lisov, Yevgenii, 22, 27n, 29n
Litvinov, Mikhail, 299-300
Litvinov, Pavel,300
Litvinova, Flara,299-300
Liubarskii, Kronid, 300
Liubimov, Aleksandr,298
Lobanov,Viacheslav,143-44
Lobov,01eg,343
Lukianov, Anatolii, 29n, 41, 54, 58,
63, 133, 137, 147, 167,169, 179,
188,197-98,211,279,331,339,
341,347-49,352,356,358,
361-62,364
Lukin, Vladimir, 273
Major, John,298, 351
Makashev,Albert, 207
Makkhamov,Kakham,213
Malkina, Tatiana,26, 49, 311,318-21
Maltsev, Igor,338,342

Mameladze,Irma, 292
Marcuse,Herbert,251
Markov, Sergei,296-97
Martynov,Vladlen,A., 273-74,
279
Masliukov, Yurii, 192
Matlock, Jack,27n, 185
McMichael, Scott,27n
Medvedev,Sergei,12-13,26,28n,
301,303,305-7,312
Mikhaleva,Irina, 322-28,330-35
Mirabeau,Comtede, 273
Mironov, Viacheslav,186
Mitterand,Fran~ois, 179
Moiseev,Mikhail, 166-67,206,354,
357,362-63
Moskaleva,Lena,321
Mostovoi, Anatolii A., 240
Murenin, K.D., 136
Nazarbaev,Nursultan,166,357,361,
363
Nazimova,AlIa, 26, 28n, 267,269-73,
276-78,281-85
Nesmachnyi,Mikhail, 349
NicholasII, Tsar,92
Orlov, Vladimir 190
Paniukov,Boris, 167, 190
Pavlov,Valentin, 8-9,11,17,24,27n,
31,43,58,62-66,96,128,176,
178,187-95,197-99,206,253,
310,333,338,340,343,351,
364-65
Petrik, Vladimir, 25, 111-19
Petroff, Serge,25,120
Petrov,Boris, 223
Petrov,Yevgenii (Kataev),125
Pinaev,Valerii B., 259
Pinochet,Augusto,50, 143,310
Platonov,Y urii, 214-15
Plekhanov,Yurii, 10, 29n, 58, 65, 67,
161,198,338,361
Pobedinskaia,Olga, 116
Poliakov,Maksim, 154-55
Politkovskii, Aleksandr,299
Poltoranin,Mikhail N., 293, 329

370 INDEX

Popov,Gavriil, 23, 29n, 3On, 108,
182,211,229-30,290,345,348,
350,355
Poptsov,0leg, 352
Primakov,Yevgenii, 358, 362,364
Prokhanov,Aleksandr,26, 249, 251
Prokofiev,Yurii, 304, 306, 344
Proselkov,Nikolai, 339
Pugo,Boris K., 8, 11, 17,31, 42-43,
48,53,59,104,129,136,187,
192,195,231,297,304,338,
343-44,358,364
Pushkin,Aleksandr,123, 294

Shcherbakov,Vladimir, 25, 27n, 62,
191,195-97,199,365
Sheinis,Viktor, 26, 28n, 267-81,
284-85
Shekochikhin,Yurii, 292
Shenin,Oleg, 29n, 57-58, 198
Shevardnadze,
Eduard,3, 7-8,14,86,
108,127,131,176,188,226,
229,245,294,297,315,348,
350-51,357
Shishkin,Gennadii,338,
Shkabardnia,Mikhail S., 189
Silaev,Ivan, 14,25,44,46,72,138,
141,171,177,183-85,270,272,
Qaddafi,Muammaral-, 349
316,323,326,328,331,339,
342,346-48,361-62,364
Slepov,S., 142
Raleigh,DonaldJ., 25,131
Slepov,Yu.G., 138
Razumovskii,Andrei, 209
Smirnov,Andrei, 209
Riabev,Lev,187,192
Smorchevskii-Butterbrod,122,283-84
Riabinnikov,Vladimir, 53
Snegur,Mircea, 351
Rodionov,Igor, 222
Sobchak,Anatolii, 13,25,49,182,
Roe,Ben, 309, 314-17
203,215,218,221-22,298,
Rostropovich,Mstislav, 109,300,349
343-44,346,353
Rutskoi, Aleksandr,14,24,109,119,
Sokolov,Mikhail, 267, 299
128-29,179,183,185,207-8,
257,270,272,316,347-49,356, Solzhenitsyn,Aleksandr,247
Spiridonov,Lev, 340
358,361-62,364
Ryzhkov,Nikolai, 189,331
Stalin, Joseph,97,109,203,230,243
Ryzhov,Yurii, 183-85,188
Stankevich,Sergei,290, 328, 342,
348,350,352
Starodubstev,Vasilii, 11,31,42-43,
Sabonis-Chafee,
Theresa,26, 235n,
48-49,137,338,343,364
241,246
Stepankov,Valentin, 22, 27n, 29n
Safarov,Bozaruli, 213
Sagalaev,Eduard,306
Surkov,Aleksei, 278
Suslov,Mikhail, 120
Sakharov,Andrei, 4-5, 95,108,135,
Sychev,Valerii, 190-91
152, 183n,294
Sale,Marina, 155
Tchaikovsky,Peter,236
Samsonov,Viktor, 220-25,340, 346
Timofeev,Lev, 300, 316
Sartre,Jean-Paul,251
Shaimiev,Mintimir, 353
Timofeev,Timur, 270
Tiziakov, Aleksandr,11,21,31,
Shakespeare,
William, 120
42-44,191,338,343,361,364
Shaknazarov,Georgii, 164,337,363
Tolstoi, Alexei, 122
Shaposhnikov,Matvei, 221
Shaposhnikov,Yevgenii,25,201-7,348 Tolstoi, Leo, 126,294
Tolstoi, Mikhail, 122-23,126, 128,
Shatalin,Stanislav,132
182,283
Shchadov,Mikhail, 192
Travkin, Nikolai, 297
Shcherbakov,Viacheslav,222-25,
344,352-53
Tretiakov,Vitalii, 293

INDEX 371

Trotskii, Lev, 128
Tsalko,AleksandrV., 205
Tsenina,AlIa, 256
Tverskoi,Vitalii, 117
Urazhtsev,Viktor, 339,356
Usov, Vladimir, 356
Varennikov,Valentin, 29n, 58,251
Virginskii, Anatolii, 162, 168
Vishnevskii,Nikolai, 329
Vladislavlev,Aleksandr,188
Volkov, Vladimir, 216, 276
Voloshina,Tatiana,321
Volskii, Arkadii, 361, 363
Voronin, Yurii, 184
Vorontsov,Nikolai Nikolaevich,25,
72,181,185,187,191-94,217,
283-84,341,344,350
Voshchanov,Pavel,360
Vysotskii, Vladimir, 241-42
Yablokov, Aleksei, 183-85,214,343
Yakovlev, AleksandrNikolaevich,3,
7-8, 14,25,27n, 108, 132,209,
226-31,348
Yakovlev, Yegor, 306,329
Yakunin, Gleb, 300, 359
Yanaev,GennadiiI.,11-12,17,270,31,
33,42-48,50-54,56,58-61,63,
65-67,86,107,115,118,132,
136-37,143-44,169,178,180,
196-97,205-6,295,308,318-20,
338,341,343-44,346-47,349,
351-53,357-60,364
Yarov, Yurii, 223, 344

Yaroshenko,Viktor, 186
Yazov,Dmitrii,8, 11, 14, 17,24, 29n,
31,43,55-63,91,104,157,167,
176,187,192,195,201-6,229,
244-45,247,253,279,297,333,
338-39,348,352,354,357-62,
364
Y egorov,Vladimir, 216
Yeltsin, Boris, 4-6, 9,12-14,16-19,
21, 23-25,28n, 29n,44,46, 51,
61,67-68,71-72,75-81,87-88,
90-95,98,104,108,113,117,
120-29,133-35,137-39,
141-42,145,149-50,166,
170-76,181-86,188,193-94,
203,205,207-8,211,218-20,
224,226,229,233,236-37,
239-41,243-44,246,257-58,
263,268,270,272,279,282-83,
290,294-97,299,301,303-4,
307,311-13,315-16,322-26,
329,333,339-54,356-57,
359-62,364
Yeltsina,NainaY., 219
Yevdokimov,Sergei,256-57,345
Yevtushenko,Yevgenii, 95, 108,294
Yushenkov,Sergei,257, 278, 281,359
Zavorotnyi,Valerii, 25, 147
Zhavoronskii,V., 141
Zhirinovskii, Vladimir, 340
Zorin, N.F., 139
Zorkin, Valerii, 274
Zotov, A.P., 134, 139
Zubkov, Yurii, 259
Zvereva,Maria, 209

About the Editors

Victoria E. Bonnell, Professorof Sociologyat the University of California at Berkeley, has written about Russian history, society, and
politics. Her books include a study of Russia'sprerevolutionarylabor
and revolutionarymovements,an edited volume on Russianworkers
underthe tsaristregime,anda forthcomingwork on political iconography in Sovietpropagandaart. Shehasvisited Russiamany times over
the pasttwenty-threeyearsand has beena close observerof the Russianscene.
Ann Cooperworked as a journalist in Moscow from December1986
through September1991. She openedNational Public Radio'sbureau
in the Soviet capital in 1987 and servedas NPR bureauchief for the
next four and a half years. She also contributedarticles to the New
York Times on politics and changein the Soviet Union. Ms. Cooper
workedpreviouslyfor National Journal, The Baltimore Sun, Congressional Quarterly, and The Louisville Courier-Journal. Sheis currently
NPR'scorrespondentin SouthAfrica.
GregoryFreidin, Professorof RussianLiteratureand the Humanities
at StanfordUniversity, is a writer and commentatoron Russianculture
andpolitics. The authorof a critical biographyof Osip Mandelstam,he
is completinga book aboutIsaacBabel andhis receptionin Russiaand
the United States.His articles on contemporaryRussianpolitics and
cultural life have appearedin manyjournals. He returnsfrequently to
Moscow, where he lived before emigrating to the United Statesin
1971.